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Prefatory Note

The attached document represents the most complete and accurate version available
based on original files from the FOMC Secretariat at the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
Please note that some material may have been redacted from this document if that
material was received on a confidential basis. Redacted material is indicated by
occasional gaps in the text or by gray boxes around non-text content. All redacted
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Information Act.

Content last modified 03/07/2014.

CLASS I FOMC - RESTRICTED CONTROLLED (FR)
JUNE 19, 2008

MONETARY POLICY ALTERNATIVES

PREPARED FOR THE FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE
BY THE STAFF OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

June 19, 2008

MONETARY POLICY ALTERNATIVES
Recent Developments
Summary
(1)

Market participants marked up the expected path of monetary policy

substantially over the intermeeting period in response to a number of factors,
including speeches by Federal Reserve officials that were read as emphasizing
concerns about the outlook for inflation; a sharp rise in oil prices; economic data that,
on balance, were interpreted as pointing to a stronger outlook for growth; and
improving conditions in financial markets. Investors currently place high odds on the
Committee leaving the target federal funds rate unchanged at the upcoming FOMC
meeting, but also attach some probability to a 25 basis point increase. Nominal
Treasury yields rose notably in reaction to the revisions to policy expectations and
apparently to an increase in term premiums. TIPS-based measures of inflation
compensation rose markedly, especially at shorter maturities, responding to sharply
higher oil and agricultural commodity prices. Functioning of short-term funding
markets showed improvement but conditions nonetheless remained strained. Spreads
of interbank term funding rates over comparable-maturity overnight index swap (OIS)
rates narrowed over the period. Equity prices were somewhat volatile, rising early in
the intermeeting period before falling to end the period down appreciably; stock
prices for investment banks registered significant declines amid renewed worries
about their financial condition and future earnings prospects. Spreads on both
investment-grade and speculative-grade securities narrowed a bit. Bond issuance
surged, but business lending by banks decelerated and commercial paper outstanding
declined.

Issuance of leveraged loans continued to be weak, although secondary-

market conditions improved modestly. The trade-weighted index of the nominal

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

dollar against the currencies of the major trading partners of the United States
increased 1 percent on net.
Monetary Policy Expectations and Treasury Yields
(2)

Although the FOMC’s decision at its April meeting to reduce the target

federal funds rate by 25 basis points was largely anticipated, some market participants
had reportedly assigned some weight to no change in the target rate. As a result, rates
on federal funds futures maturing through early next year fell 5 to 15 basis points on
the announcement.1 By contrast, over the remainder of the intermeeting period, the
expected path of policy was marked up substantially in response to commentary by
FOMC officials that was interpreted as emphasizing concerns about the outlook for
inflation and generally stronger-than-expected economic data; a significant portion of
the increase occurred in volatile trading over a few days in early June. The revision to
policy expectations also occurred against the backdrop of sharp increases in oil prices,
which reportedly contributed to heightened concerns about the future path of
inflation. Judging from options on federal funds futures, investors attach about an 80
percent probability to no change in the target rate at the upcoming FOMC meeting
and 15 percent to a 25 basis point increase (Chart 1). All respondents to the Desk’s
survey of primary dealers expected no change in the target rate at the June meeting,
and a substantial majority expected the FOMC to keep rates on hold over the next 2
to 3 meetings. Futures quotes suggest that investors now expect the federal funds
rate to reach about 2½ percent by end of this year, and about 3½ percent by the end

The effective federal funds rate averaged 1.99 percent over the intermeeting period, but as
has been the case in recent months, volatility was very elevated. Over the period, the
volume of long-term repurchase agreements (RPs) increased $5 billion. The Desk redeemed
$35 billion in Treasury securities and sold $35 billion of Treasury securities on an outright
basis to offset the provision of balances through various programs, including primary credit,
the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, the Term Auction Facility, the single-tranche term RP
program, and draws on foreign currency swap arrangements.
1

2 of 41

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

3 of 41

Chart 1
Interest Rate Developments
Probability density for target funds rate
after the June meeting

Expected federal funds rates*
Percent

Percent
90

June 19, 2008
April 29, 2008

80
Futures market*
Desk’s survey**

4.25

70
3.75
60
50

3.25

40
2.75

30
20

2.25

10

1.75

2.00

0

2.25

1.75
2008

*Derived from options on federal funds futures.
**Survey of primary dealer economists on June 17, 2008.

Implied distribution of federal funds rate six
months ahead*

2009

2010

*Estimates from federal funds and Eurodollar futures, with an allowance
for term premiums and other adjustments.

Implied Volatilities
Percent

Percent

15
Recent: 6/19/2008
Last FOMC: 4/29/2008

Basis Points

16

Apr.
FOMC

Daily
14

250

Ten-Year Treasury (left scale)
Six-Month Eurodollar (right scale)*
200

12

10
10
150
8

5

6
100
4

0

2
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
*Width of a 90 percent confidence interval computed from the term
structures for the expected federal funds rate and implied volatility.

0.25 0.75 1.25 1.75 2.25 2.75 3.25 3.75 4.25 4.75 5.25
*Derived from options on Eurodollar futures contracts, with term premium
and other adjustments to estimate expectations for the federal funds rate.

Nominal Treasury yields*

Inflation compensation and oil prices*
$/barrel

Percent
7

Apr.
FOMC

Daily

Ten-year
Two-year

6
5
4
3
2
1
0

2006

50

2007

2008

*Par yields from a smoothed nominal off-the-run Treasury yield curve.

Note. Last observation is for Jun. 19, 2008.

150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40

Percent
4.0

Apr.
FOMC

Daily

Spot WTI (left scale)
Next five years (right scale)
Five-to-ten year forward (right scale)

3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5

2006

2007

2008

*Estimates based on smoothed nominal and inflation-indexed
Treasury yield curves and adjusted for the indexation-lag (carry) effect.

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

of 2009, about 45 and 65 basis points higher than at the time of the April meeting,
respectively. Desk survey respondents anticipated a much less steep path for policy,
with the federal funds rate reaching 2¾ percent only at the end of 2009. The optionimplied distributions of the federal funds rate six and twelve months ahead have
shifted to the right, and are now skewed towards higher rates. Policy uncertainty, as
measured by the dispersion of these distributions, moved markedly higher over the
intermeeting period, with much of the increase coinciding with the sharp backup in
policy expectations in early June.
(3)

Yields on nominal Treasury securities rose sharply over the intermeeting

period. Two-year yields increased about 65 basis points and ten-year yields about 40
basis points. The increases were partly attributable to the rise in the expected path for
policy, but also appeared to reflect increases in term premiums. Liquidity improved in
the Treasury market, but it remained impaired relative to historical norms. On most
days, bid-asked spreads on on-the-run nominal securities were near the low end of
their range since early August 2007. In the TIPS market, the yield on ten-year issues
rose by about 20 basis points. TIPS-based inflation compensation rose sharply over
the period, with the increase concentrated at shorter horizons. Five-year inflation
compensation adjusted for carry effects increased about 45 basis points. In contrast,
five-year inflation compensation five years forward was about flat. Sharp advances in
both near-term and far-term oil futures prices and rises in agricultural commodities
prices likely contributed substantially to the rise in inflation compensation. (See box
“Oil Prices and Inflation Compensation.”) Probability distributions derived from
inflation caps suggest an increase in both inflation expectations and uncertainty. (See
box “Deriving Probability Densities for Inflation from Inflation Caps.”) Survey

4 of 41

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

Oil Prices and Inflation Compensation
This box presents empirical estimates of the effects
of oil price shocks on TIPS-based measures of inflation
compensation. Such effects could reflect underlying
shifts in market participants’ inflation expectations
or their uncertainty regarding the outlook for inflation.

5 of 41

Response of Inflation Compensation
to a 10 Percent Oil Price Shock
basis oil prices
Inflation compensation andpoints
14
Dollars
Percent
175
155
135

5

Spot Oil Price
12
1f1 Inflation Compensation 4
5f1 Inflation Compensation 10

115

To examine this issue, daily changes in inflation
compensation at a given horizon are regressed on
daily changes in the one-year-ahead oil futures price,
controlling for surprises in economic news releases
and unanticipated monetary policy actions. Inflation
compensation at short horizons is measured by
the spread between nominal and indexed Treasury
securities at a constant maturity of three years, while
inflation compensation at intermediate and longer
horizons is measured using spreads on three-yearaverage forward rates at horizons of 4 to 6 years and
7 to 9 years ahead, respectively.

8

95

6

75

3
2

4 1

55

2 0

35
15
3 year 2002 4-6 year
2000
2004

7-9 2008
2006 year

0 -1

horizon
Note: The dashed lines denote 95 percent
confidence intervals for each coefficient.

18
2004-2005
2006-2007
2008

16
14
12

Using data since January 2004, these regressions indicate
that oil price shocks have statistically significant effects
on inflation compensation at all horizons (upper panel).
Specifically, a 10 percent increase in the price of oil
is associated with a rise of 12 basis points in near-term
inflation compensation and a rise of about 2 to 3 basis
points in forward inflation compensation at the
intermediate and longer-term horizons.

10
8
6
4
2
3 year

4-6 year

7-9 year

horizon

Subsample analysis indicates that the sensitivity of near-term inflation compensation
to oil price shocks has increased markedly over the past few years, roughly in line
with the increasing weight of energy prices in the CPI basket.1 Indeed, the regression
coefficient for the most recent sample (January to mid-June 2008) is about twice as
large as for the 2004-2005 sample. In contrast, the responsiveness of long-term forward
inflation compensation has remained quite stable over this period, suggesting that there
has been relatively little change in how oil price shocks influence investors’ expectations
and uncertainty about the longer-term inflation outlook.
1

For example, the weight of gasoline in the CPI basket increased from 3.2 percent in December 2003
to 4.1 percent in December 2005 and to 5.2 percent in December 20007.

0

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

Deriving probability densities for inflation from inflation caps
fall

Inflation derivatives markets have grown in recent years. One such derivative
is an inflation cap, which pays the holder an amount equal to the difference between
headline CPI inflation and a level specified in the contract (the “strike price”) times
the notional value of the contract in each year over the term of the contract. Thus, an
inflation cap effectively provides the holder with insurance against high inflation
outcomes. Although the inflation caps market is still nascent, with fairly limited
trading activity, anecdotal information suggests that investor interest in inflation caps
has picked up this year.
Prices of inflation caps at various strike prices and maturities can be used to
construct implied probability density functions (pdfs) for inflation at selected
horizons. These pdfs are constructed assuming that investors are risk neutral and that
inflation is the sum of two components: a stochastic long-run trend plus transitory
shocks around that trend.1
The figure below shows such pdfs for the one-year inflation rate five years
ahead on selected recent dates. These pdfs have widened during 2008 and, since the
April FOMC meeting, have also shifted to the right. The widening of the pdfs
suggests that uncertainty about long-run inflation outcomes has increased in recent
months, and the rightward shift in the distributions is consistent with some increase
in inflation expectations. However, two important caveats apply to this exercise.
First, if investors are in fact risk averse, the widening of the pdfs and the rightward
shift in the distributions could represent larger risk premiums that investors are
willing to pay to hedge against the possibility of greater-than-expected inflation in the
future. Second, the market is comparatively small and illiquid, and the perceptions of
inflation risk among investors in this market might not be representative of those of
investors in the broader economy.

1

The assumption about the inflation process is intended as a plausible characterization of how investors might view
inflation dynamics. However, the results are robust to alternative assumptions about the inflation process.

6 of 41

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

measures of inflation expectations were flat to higher over the period, continuing the
upward trend seen so far this year.2
Money Markets
(4)

Functioning in the interbank funding markets appeared to improve

modestly, but conditions in those markets remained strained. Spreads of one- and
three-month interbank term funding rates over comparable-maturity OIS rates
declined over the intermeeting period (Chart 2).3 Market participants attributed part
of the narrowing to the expansion in the credit extended through the Term Auction
Facility (TAF) from $100 billion to $150 billion outstanding. European banks’
demand for dollar funding appeared to remain elevated relative to that of domestic
banks. Conditions in euro and sterling interbank markets also remained strained, but
were little changed from the time of the April FOMC meeting despite announcements
of further write-downs in the first quarter by many European banks. In contrast,
implied rates from foreign exchange and currency basis swaps indicate that European
financial institutions may have appreciably increased their demand for dollar funding;
demand was strong at dollar auctions offered by the European Central Bank and
Swiss National Bank even as they increased the size of those auctions in line with the
increases in the sizes of their dollar swap lines with the Federal Reserve to $50 billion
An implied forward measure of inflation expectations beginning in five years and ending in
ten years calculated using data for five- and ten-year inflation expectations from the Survey
of Professional Forecasters fell 30 basis points from the first to the second quarter. The
Desk survey measure of five-year-forward inflation expectations was little changed over the
intermeeting period.
3 In reaction to a widespread belief that banks on the Libor panel were understating their
borrowing costs, on June 11 the British Bankers’ Association (BBA) announced a series of
changes to Libor. The changes included tighter scrutiny of the rates contributed by banks
on the Libor panel, wider membership on the committee that oversees Libor, and potential
increases in the number of contributors to some rate-setting panels. The BBA also indicated
that it would investigate whether the rate-setting mechanism stigmatizes contributors and
examine the possibility of introducing a second rate-fixing process for U.S. dollar Libor rates
after the U.S. market opening.
2

7 of 41

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

8 of 41

Chart 2
Asset Market Developments
Spreads of Libor over OIS

Spreads on thirty-day commercial paper
Basis points

Basis points
140

Apr.
FOMC

Daily

Daily

ABCP
A2/P2

120

1-month
3-month

200

Apr.
FOMC

150

100
80

100
60
40

50

20
0
Jan.

0

Apr.

July
Oct.
Jan.
Apr.
2007
2008
Note. Libor quotes are taken at 6:00 am, and OIS quotes are observed
at the close of business of the previous trading day.

Jan.

Apr.

July
Oct.
Jan.
Apr.
2007
2008
Note. The ABCP spread is the AA ABCP rate minus the AA nonfinancial
rate. The A2/P2 spread is the A2/P2 nonfinancial rate minus the AA
nonfinancial rate.

Overnight repo rates

CDS spreads at selected financial institutions
Percent

Target federal funds rate
Treasury
MBS

Basis points
8

Apr.
FOMC

Daily

7

Banks*
Broker/dealers**

6

300

Apr.
FOMC

Daily

250
200

5

150

4
3

100

2
50

1
0
Jan.

Apr.

July
2007

Oct.

Jan.

0

Apr.
2008

Jan.

July
Oct.
Jan.
2007
*Median spread of 24 banking organizations.
**Median spread of 10 broker-dealers.

Source. Bloomberg

Equity prices

Apr.

Apr.
2008

Corporate bond spreads*
Index(12/31/00=100)

Apr.
FOMC

Daily

Wilshire
Dow Jones Financial

Basis points

Basis points

170
450
150
130

Apr.
FOMC

Daily

Ten-Year BBB (left scale)
Ten-Year High-Yield (right scale)

400

1000

750

350
300

110
90

500

250
200

250

150
70
100
50
2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

50

0
2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

*Measured relative to an estimated off-the-run Treasury yield curve.

Note. Last observation is for Jun. 19, 2008.

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

and $12 billion, respectively. Liquidity in the market for interbank loans of more than
three-month maturity reportedly remained thin and quoted spreads on those
instruments were about unchanged. Late in the period, some quarter-end pressures
were evident in the pattern of money market rates, but anecdotal reports indicated
that concerns about the quarter-end were not especially pronounced.
(5)

Depository institutions’ use of both overnight and term primary credit

borrowing increased over the intermeeting period. Borrowing has increased
substantially since the spread between the primary credit rate and the target federal
funds rate was reduced to 25 basis points in March. The volume of bids at TAF
auctions have remained substantial, but stop-out rates have declined substantially
relative to prior auctions to levels well below one-month Libor. The fall in stop-out
rates likely was a response to the increase in auction sizes. Primary Dealer Credit
Facility (PDCF) credit outstanding has declined by more than 50 percent over the
intermeeting period. (See box “Developments in Federal Reserve Liquidity
Facilities.”)
(6)

Conditions in repo markets seemed to improve a bit since April, although

functioning of the repo markets for less-liquid collateral remained poor. Supported
by sales and redemptions from the System Open Market Account (SOMA), the
overnight Treasury general collateral (GC) repo rate traded close to the federal funds
rate during much of the intermeeting period. Overnight agency and agency-backed
MBS repos generally traded at tight spreads to GC repo rates. Dealer haircuts on
non-Treasury repos were little changed at elevated levels. Term Securities Lending
Facility (TSLF) auctions were generally undersubscribed over the intermeeting period,
but the auction on June 12 was fully covered, evidently reflecting increased demand
ahead of quarter-end.

9 of 41

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

Developments in Federal Reserve Liquidity Facilities
The amount of primary credit outstanding (both overnight and term)
and the number of institutions borrowing increased on net over the
intermeeting period. After reaching a peak of nearly $20 billion in late
May, the amount of primary credit outstanding has hovered around
$13.5 billion for the past two weeks. Currently, 67 depository
institutions (DIs) have outstanding primary credit loans, up from 44 at
the time of the April FOMC meeting. Although nearly 80 percent of
current credit outstanding consists of loans to a small number of
branches and agencies of foreign banks, most borrowers are domestic
banks and thrifts. Primary credit borrowing picked up sharply in late
March, after the spread of the primary credit rate to the target federal
funds rate was lowered to 25 basis points and the maximum maturity of
loans was increased to 90 days. Federal Reserve Banks report that the
domestic institutions borrowing include DIs with well diversified asset
portfolios along with some that have relatively high concentrations of
residential or commercial real estate assets in areas where the housing
market is most stressed.
The total amount of bids at the four TAF auctions conducted over the
intermeeting period remained elevated, but stop-out rates declined
substantially relative to prior auctions, likely in response to the increased
auction sizes. The percentage of TAF credit outstanding that was
awarded to branches and agencies of foreign banks has progressively
declined from about 85 percent at the April 21 auction to 64 percent at
the June 16 auction, perhaps partly in response to the expansion of the
swap lines with the European Central Bank and the Swiss National
Bank.
Primary dealers have substantially reduced their reliance on the PDCF,
and the amount outstanding at that facility has declined by more than 50
percent over the intermeeting period, to about $8.5 billion. In recent
weeks, only three dealers have accessed the facility, and one of them
accounts for the bulk of PDCF credit outstanding.
The volume of securities lent through the TSLF declined, on net, over the
intermeeting period, and all of the auctions but one had bid to cover
ratios below one. The auction on June 12 was the exception, with the
increased demand reportedly related to somewhat higher financing
concerns over quarter-end. The reduced use of the facility and the trend
of undersubscription of these auctions likely reflected the improved
conditions in funding markets over the intermeeting period. Moreover,
because spreads of non-Treasury repo rates over those on Treasury repo
have narrowed and have frequently been smaller than the minimum fee
for borrowing through the TSLF, the incentive for dealers to participate
in the TSLF—to exchange non-Treasury collateral for Treasuries—has
diminished.

10 of 41

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

Capital Markets
(7)

Broad equity price indexes fell 2 to 4 percent, on balance, over the

intermeeting period. Financial sector stocks significantly underperformed the broad
indexes, partly reflecting renewed concerns about the financial condition of some
primary dealers, while energy stocks showed significant increases. Revisions to
expected earnings were negative in the financial sector; positive in the energy sector,
largely a reflection of rising oil prices; and about flat in other non-financial sectors.
Option-implied volatility on the S&P 500 reversed some of its decline over the
preceding intermeeting period, and is now near the middle of the elevated range seen
since August 2007. The spread between the twelve-month forward trend earningsprice ratio for S&P 500 firms and the real long-term Treasury yield — a rough gauge
of the equity risk premium — was little changed and remains near the upper end of its
range over the past two decades. Yields on both investment-grade and speculativegrade corporate bonds rose significantly over the period, but by slightly less than
yields on comparable-maturity Treasury yields, implying a further narrowing of
spreads. However, spreads remain elevated by historical standards. In the market for
leveraged loans, spreads to Libor in the primary market stayed at high levels.
Conditions in the secondary market, while still difficult, improved somewhat, with
prices moving up a little and bid-asked spreads narrowing. The improvement may be
partly attributable to better market sentiment as banks continued to reduce their
backlogs of underwritten deals. Implied spreads on the LCDX indexes were little
changed over the intermeeting period.
(8)

Several financial guarantors were downgraded by rating agencies over the

intermeeting period. The impact of the downgrades on the municipal bond market
has been limited, and ratios of municipal bond yields to comparable-maturity Treasury
yields reversed their February and March jumps in recent weeks. Issuance of longterm municipal bonds continued to be strong in May, with some of this issuance

11 of 41

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

reflecting the refinancing of auction-rate securities (ARS) whose auctions failed. The
impact of recent downgrades on financial institutions has been limited to date, but
analysts anticipate further write-downs associated with these downgrades; additional
downgrades or defaults by financial guarantors would likely generate significant losses
for a handful of financial institutions.
(9)

Interest rates on 30-year fixed-rate conforming mortgages increased over

the intermeeting period, leaving spreads over 10-year Treasury securities little changed
(Chart 3). Posted offer rates on 30-year jumbo mortgages also rose, and such credit
continued to be difficult to obtain. Issuance of agency residential mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) remained strong. Option-adjusted spreads on agency MBS widened
on net over the intermeeting period. Credit default swap (CDS) indexes on the
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, edged up.
The temporary increase in the conforming loan limit included in the economic
stimulus bill has, as yet, had little effect, with the GSEs purchasing small volumes and
issuing no securities backed by such loans. Issuance of GNMA securities, which are
backed by FHA and VA loans, has increased markedly since the end of 2007. The
increase may reflect substitution into such loans by borrowers unable readily to obtain
mortgage credit. By contrast, issuance of private-label RMBS backed by
nonconforming loans was virtually nonexistent in April, as was issuance of
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS). Spreads on CDS indexes for CMBS
remained at historically high levels.
(10)

Conditions in other consumer lending markets were generally good.

Issuance of consumer asset-backed securities (ABS) over the intermeeting period was
strong, led by an increase in issuance of paper backed by auto loans. Spreads on
consumer ABS began to narrow. Anecdotal reports suggested that policy actions by
Congress and the Department of Education helped assuage concerns about student

12 of 41

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

13 of 41

Chart 3
Asset Market Developments
Average bid price on most liquid leveraged loans

Municipal bond yield ratios

Percent of par
Daily

Ratio
102

Apr.
FOMC

Weekly

Apr.
FOMC

Twenty-year
One-year

100

2.0
1.8

98
1.6
96
1.4

94
92

1.2

90

1.0

88

0.8

86
0.6
Jan.

Mar.

May

July
Oct. Dec. Feb. Apr.
2007
2008
Note. Last observation is for Jun. 18, 2008.
Source. LSTA/LPC Mark-to-Market Pricing on SMi 100 index.

June

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Note. Yields over Treasury. Last observation is for Jun. 12, 2008.
Source. Bloomberg.

Mortgage rate spreads

Growth of house prices
Basis points

Apr.
FOMC

Weekly

FRM
One-Year ARM

Percent

450

15

Quarterly, s.a.a.r.
400
350

10

300
250

5

200

OFHEO Purchase-Only Index

150

0

100
50
Q1p

-5

0
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Note. FRM spread relative to ten-year Treasury. ARM spread relative
to one-year Treasury. Last weekly observation is for Jun. 18, 2008.
Source. Freddie Mac.

p Projected.

1996

1998

Agency option-adjusted spreads

Ten-year investment grade CMBS spreads
Basis points

Apr.
FOMC

Daily

Fannie Mae
Ginnie Mae

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

Basis points
240
220

Weekly

AAA
BBB

200

Apr.
FOMC

2000

1500

180
160
140

1000

120
100
80

500

60
40
20

0

0
2006

2007

Note. Spreads over Treasury.
Source. Bloomberg. Last observation is for Jun. 18, 2008.

2008

Jan.

Mar.

May

July
Oct. Dec. Feb. Apr. June
2007
2008
Note. Spreads over swaps. Last weekly observation is for Jun. 11, 2008.
Source. Morgan Stanley.

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

loan availability for the 2008-09 school year.4 However, these actions were not
designed to support the secondary market and it remains to be seen whether these
steps will spur a broader recovery in the student loan market.
Foreign Developments
(11)

Foreign credit markets were relatively stable, but foreign bond yields rose

noticeably over the period. Although the central banks of the major foreign industrial
economies kept policy rates on hold, foreign central bank officials, like their U.S.
counterparts, expressed concern about inflationary pressures, leading market
participants to significantly revise upward their expected paths for future monetary
policy. Yields on sovereign benchmark bonds rose 20 to 60 basis points in those
countries (Chart 4). The trade-weighted index of the nominal dollar against the
currencies of the major trading partners of the United States increased 1 percent on
net and tended to move with market perceptions the relative economic strength of the
U.S. versus foreign economies and the relative stances of monetary policies.5 Overall
European equity indexes declined between 6 and 8 percent, led by financial stocks,
which fell as banks announced further write-downs for the first quarter, but Japan’s
headline equity indexes rose about 2 percent.
(12)

A number of central banks in emerging market economies tightened policy

over the intermeeting period in order to combat rising food and energy prices, and
yields on local-currency bonds have risen. Rising energy costs pushed some countries
to scale back fuel subsidies, adding to short-term inflationary pressures. Stock
markets in the emerging economies generally declined between 1 and 10 percent,
On May 7, the President signed into law the Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans
Act of 2008. The act gave the Department of Education new authority to purchase Stafford
and PLUS loans for the 2008-09 academic year. The Department of Education held a
briefing on May 20 to present its proposals for implementing its new authority.
5 There were no foreign official purchases or sales of dollars by reporting central banks in
industrial countries during the intermeeting period.
4

14 of 41

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

15 of 41

Chart 4
International Financial Indicators

Ten-year government bond yields (nominal)
6.0

Nominal trade-weighted dollar indexes

Percent

3.0

Daily

Apr. FOMC

Index(12/31/04=100)
Daily

Apr. FOMC
Broad
Major Currencies
Other Important Trading Partners

UK (left scale)
Germany (left scale)
Japan (right scale)

5.5

116
112

2.5
108

5.0

2.0
104

4.5

1.5

4.0

100

1.0

96
92
3.5

0.5
88

3.0

0.0
2005

2006

Stock price indexes
Industrial countries

2007

Index(12/30/04=100)

Daily

84

2008

2005

Stock price indexes
Emerging market economies
180

Apr. FOMC
UK (FTSE-350)
Euro Area (DJ Euro)
Japan (Topix)

2006

170

2007

2008

Index(12/30/04=100)

Daily

280

Apr. FOMC
Brazil (Bovespa)
Korea (KOSPI)
Mexico (Bolsa)

250

160
220
150
140

190

130

160

120
130
110
100

100
90
2005

2006

2007

Note. Last daily observation is for June 19, 2008.

2008

70
2005

2006

2007

2008

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

although the Shanghai composite fell 25 percent. The trade-weighted index of the
dollar against the currencies of the other important trading partners of the United
States fell slightly. The dollar has depreciated by 1½ percent against the renminbi
since mid-May after remaining essentially unchanged against that currency for most of
April, but has appreciated against most other emerging Asian currencies.
Debt and Money
(13)

The debt of domestic nonfinancial sectors is projected to be expanding at a

3¾ percent annual rate in the second quarter, down from the 6 percent pace recorded
in the first quarter (Chart 5). The slowdown appears to be broad based, with
household, business, and federal government debt all declining. Home mortgage debt
is estimated to have continued its recent slowdown, in part reflecting falling house
prices. Debt in the nonfinancial business sector is on track to decelerate to a 5½
percent annual rate, as a decline in commercial paper issuance and a reduction in C&I
loan growth more than offset surges in both investment-grade and speculative-grade
bond issuance. The slowdown in C&I lending in part reflects a continued low pace of
leveraged buyouts and mergers and acquisitions as well as tighter credit standards and
terms at banks. While bond issuance was strong among energy-producing firms,
issuance more broadly may have been boosted by the stability of bond yields and
spreads and some substitution for commercial paper. Issuance of leveraged loans
reportedly continued to be very weak over the intermeeting period, as banks
continued to work down their backlogs of previously underwritten loans. Issuance of
collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) continued to be extremely weak.
(14)

M2 grew at a sluggish 1¾ percent average rate over April and May, down

substantially from the strong expansion in the first quarter, which was likely a
consequence of investors seeking safety and liquidity. The deceleration was broad
based, and was led by a sharp decline in the growth of retail money market mutual

16 of 41

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

17 of 41

Chart 5
Debt and Money

Changes in selected components of debt of
nonfinancial business*

Growth of debt of nonfinancial sectors
Percent, s.a.a.r.

Total
_____

Monthly rate

Business
Household
__________ __________

2006

8.8

9.8

8.2

11.7

6.8

8.0
7.2
9.1
7.5

9.4
11.1
13.7
10.8

7.0
7.2
6.4
6.1

6.1
3.8

8.1
5.5

3.4
2.7

Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2008 Q1
Q2 e

80
70

C&I loans
Commercial paper
Bonds

10.2

2007

$Billions

60
50

Sum

40
30

e

20
10
0
2005

e Estimated.

2006

Q1

Q2
Q3
2007

Q4

-10

Q1
Q2
2008

e Estimated.
*Commercial paper and C&I loans are seasonally adjusted, bonds are not.

Growth of debt of household sector
Percent

Funded CLO issuance
21

$ billions
12

Monthly Rate

Quarterly, s.a.a.r.
18

Consumer
credit

10
15

8

12
9

6

6
Home
mortgage

Q2e

4

3

Q2e

0

e

2

-3

0
1991

1994

1997

2000

2003

2001

2006

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

e Estimated.
Source. JPMorgan.

e Estimated.

H1 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
2008

M2 velocity and opportunity cost

Growth of M2
Percent
s.a.a.r.

12

8.00

Percentage points

Velocity

2.3

Quarterly
10

Opportunity cost*
(left axis)

4.00

2.2

8
e

2.1

2.00

6
2.0

4
2

1.00
Velocity
(right axis)

Q2e

1.9

0.50

Q2e

0

1.8

0.25

-2
2005
e Estimated.

2006

Q1

Q2
Q3
2007

Q4

Q1
Q2
2008

1993

1997

2001

2005

*Two-quarter moving average.
e Estimated.

1993

1997

2001

2005

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

funds (MMMFs). The flattening out of MMMFs may be attributable to increased
flows into bond mutual funds and a resumption of flows into equity funds following
the outflows seen earlier in the period of financial turmoil. Small time deposits
contracted, as the spreads of rates paid on these deposits relative to those on other
deposits declined. Liquid deposit growth slowed, although monthly figures revealed
an increase from April to May, perhaps in part reflecting receipt of economic stimulus
payments in the latter month. Currency expanded slightly on balance over the two
months.

18 of 41

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

Economic Outlook
(15)

Over the intermeeting period, incoming economic data have been much

stronger on balance than expected by the staff, and the Greenbook forecast for
real activity over the first half of the year has accordingly been marked up
appreciably. However, the staff still expects that ongoing strains in financial
markets, combined with the recent surge in oil prices, will restrain real activity in
the medium term. At the same time, higher energy costs also point to more
inflationary pressures this year and next. Against this backdrop, the Greenbook
forecast is now conditioned on an assumption that the target federal funds rate will
be held at 2 percent this year and that policy will then be tightened by a total of 75
basis points over 2009. Long-term Treasury yields are projected to edge down this
year and next because the staff assumes less tightening of monetary policy than
investors apparently anticipate and because term premiums are expected to
decline. Stock prices are expected to increase at an annual rate of about 7 percent
over the remainder of this year and 12 percent next year, as the equity premium
falls towards its long-run mean in response to dissipating macroeconomic risks.
The real foreign exchange value of the dollar is assumed to depreciate at a rate of 3
percent per annum over the projection period. Oil futures prices rose sharply over
the intermeeting period, and the futures curve shifted from sloping down to being
essentially flat. In line with these quotes, the price of West Texas intermediate
crude oil is expected to remain around its current level of $135 per barrel.
(16)

In this Greenbook forecast, real GDP is projected to expand at an

annual rate of about 1¾ percent in the current quarter, 3 percentage points higher
than in the April projection. The staff sees a part of the recent unexpected
strength as reflecting a shift in the timing of demand, and the growth forecast for
the remainder of this year and for 2009 has been marked down a little. The
economy is now expected to expand at about a ¾ percent annual pace over the

19 of 41

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

second half of the year, reflecting the continuing drag from rising energy prices,
tight credit conditions, and the decline in residential investment. As these effects
wane in 2009, economic growth picks up to about a 2½ percent pace, roughly in
line with the staff’s upwardly revised estimate of the growth rate of potential
output. The revision to the second-quarter growth forecast leaves the level of
output only half a percent below potential at mid-year, a notably smaller gap than
in the April Greenbook; however, the projected gap widens noticeably over time
and by late next year is essentially unchanged from the time of the last meeting.
The unemployment rate is projected to hover just below 5¾ percent through the
end of next year―nearly a percentage point above the staff’s estimate of the
NAIRU. The forecast for headline inflation has been marked up since the April
Greenbook, largely owing to the further increases in energy and other commodity
prices. Total PCE inflation is projected to average about 4½ percent over the
second half of 2008 before falling to a bit above 2 percent in 2009. The staff
forecast for core PCE inflation is around 2¼ percent both this year and next.
Lower-than-expected readings on core inflation in the incoming data were offset
by the upward pressure from rising energy prices on core inflation in the second
half, leaving the forecast for 2008 as a whole unrevised. However, the staff’s
projection for core inflation in 2009 is ¼ percentage point higher than in April.
(17)

The staff’s forecast has been extended beyond 2009 using the FRB/US

model with adjustments to ensure consistency with the staff’s assessment of
longer-run trends. The extended forecast embeds several key assumptions:
Monetary policy aims to stabilize PCE inflation in the long run at a level of 1¾
percent; trend multifactor productivity grows a bit above 1 percent per year; the
real value of the dollar depreciates steadily at about 1¼ percent per year; fiscal
policy is essentially neutral; and energy prices remain roughly constant, but at a
higher level than in the April projection. With energy prices higher and resource

20 of 41

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

slack dissipating more slowly, the forecast trajectories for both PCE inflation and
unemployment through 2012 are both above those in the April forecast. The
extended period of economic slack drives PCE inflation down to 1¾ percent by
the end of 2012, and the federal funds rate moves up to 4¼ percent. Real GDP
increases at an average annual rate of 3 percent from 2010 to 2012—nearly ½
percentage point above its projected potential growth rate over that period. This
allows the unemployment rate to decline to just above 4¾ percent ―the staff’s
estimate of the NAIRU—by the end of the extended forecast.

Monetary Policy Strategies
(18)

As indicated in Chart 6, the Greenbook-consistent measure of short-run

r* now stands at -0.1 percent, nearly half a percentage point higher than in the
April Bluebook, reflecting the upward revision to the staff’s assessment of
aggregate demand in response to incoming economic data. The FRB/US modelbased measure of short-run r* is essentially unchanged at 0.4 percent, as a higher
value of the equity premium offsets the somewhat stronger initial conditions for
aggregate demand.6 The other two model-based estimates of short-run r* are also
roughly unchanged from April and continue to span a wide interval, currently -0.6
percent to 2.2 percent. The actual value of the real federal funds rate is now -0.2
percent if measured on a basis that is methodologically consistent with the
assumptions used in the model-based estimates of r*, that is, using realized core
PCE inflation over the past four quarters as a proxy for expected inflation.
However, alternative estimates of the actual real rate—introduced in this
Bluebook—highlight the extent to which an estimate of the real rate is sensitive to
The FRB/US model-based estimate of r* shown in the April Bluebook treated the
Greenbook projection through 2008:Q2 as actual data, while the current estimate is based on
a simulation that treats the staff forecast through the third quarter as data. This difference
accounts for the upward revision to the equity premium.

6

21 of 41

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

22 of 41

Chart 6
Equilibrium Real Federal Funds Rate

Short-Run Estimates with Confidence Intervals

Percent

8

8

The actual real funds rate based on lagged core inflation
Range of model-based estimates
70 Percent confidence interval
90 Percent confidence interval
Greenbook-consistent measure

7
6

7
6

5

5

4

4

3

3

2

2

1

1

0

0

-1

-1

-2

-2

-3

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Short-Run and Medium-Run Measures
Current Estimate

Previous Bluebook

(2.2
-0.6
(0.4

(2.1
-0.8
(0.3

-1.2 - 2.6
-2.2 - 3.8
-0.1

-0.5

(2.2
(1.8

(2.2
(1.7

(1.1 - 2.9
(0.5 - 3.7
(2.0

2.0

-0.2
-1.3
-1.3

(0.1
-1.1*
-0.7*

Short-Run Measures
Single-equation model
Small structural model
Large model (FRB/US)
Confidence intervals for three model-based estimates
70 percent confidence interval
90 percent confidence interval
Greenbook-consistent measure

Medium-Run Measures
Single-equation model
Small structural model
Confidence intervals for two model-based estimates
70 percent confidence interval
90 percent confidence interval
TIPS-based factor model

Measures of Actual Real Federal Funds Rate
Based on lagged core inflation
Based on lagged headline inflation
Based on Greenbook projection of headline inflation

* This measure was not reported in the April Bluebook.
Note: Appendix A provides background information regarding the construction of these measures and confidence intervals.

-3

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

the use of alternative proxies for expected inflation. For example, the real funds
rate is about 1 percentage point lower when based on overall PCE inflation.7
(19)

As shown in Chart 7, the recent upward shift in the projected path of oil

prices has had a marked influence on the optimal control simulations of the
FRB/US model; compared with those in April, these simulations portray a
noticeable worsening of the tradeoff between unemployment and inflation and
suggest a substantially tighter path of monetary policy over much of the next three
years. 8 (The initial value of the federal funds rate is much lower this round, since
the simulations now take the lower level of the actual funds rate in the current
quarter as given.) For an inflation goal of 1½ percent (the left-hand set of charts),
the optimal funds rate climbs from the current target rate of 2 percent to about 3
percent by the end of 2010—about 75 basis points higher than in the April
Bluebook—and then gradually rises to nearly 4 percent by 2012. With an inflation
goal of 2 percent (the right-hand set of charts), the funds rate remains close to its
current value through mid-2010 and then rises to above 4 percent by the end of
the simulation. Under either inflation goal, the unemployment rate declines more
slowly back towards the long-run NAIRU than in the previous Bluebook,
reflecting a tighter average stance of monetary policy over the simulation period.
Care should be used in comparing the new measures of the actual real federal funds rate to
the r* values shown here. In order to make such a comparison, the calculation of r* needs to
be adjusted to put it on the same basis as the measure of the actual real federal funds rate to
be used. In addition, the new measures of the actual real federal funds rate based on
headline inflation are more volatile than the measure based on core inflation because they
are influenced to a greater extent by potentially large swings in energy prices. As a result, it
may be preferable to average the values of the actual real federal funds rate over several
quarters before making the comparison to r*.
8 In these simulations, policymakers place equal weight on keeping core PCE inflation close
to a specified goal, on keeping unemployment close to the long-run NAIRU, and on
avoiding changes in the nominal federal funds rate. Moreover, policymakers and
participants in financial markets are assumed to understand fully the forces shaping the
economic outlook, whereas households and firms form their expectations using more limited
information.
7

23 of 41

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

24 of 41

Chart 7
Optimal Policy Under Alternative Inflation Goals
1½ Percent Inflation Goal

2 Percent Inflation Goal

Federal funds rate

Percent
4.5

4.5

Percent
4.5

3.5

3.5

3.5

3.5

2.5

2.5

2.5

2.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

0.5

0.5

6.0

Percent
6.0

6.0

Percent
6.0

5.5

5.5

5.5

5.5

5.0

5.0

5.0

5.0

4.5

4.5

4.5

4.5

4.0

4.0

4.5

Current Bluebook
April Bluebook

0.5

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Civilian unemployment rate

4.0

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2008

2008

2009

2009

2010

2010

2011

2011

2012

2012

0.5

4.0

Core PCE inflation
Percent
2.50

2.50

Percent
2.50

2.25

2.25

2.25

2.25

2.00

2.00

2.00

2.00

1.75

1.75

1.75

1.75

1.50

1.50

2.50

1.50

Four-quarter average

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

1.50

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

Even with a softer labor market, however, the trajectory for core PCE inflation
from 2009 through the end of 2011 is nearly ¼ percentage point higher than in
April, reflecting the effects of higher energy prices and somewhat higher long-run
inflation expectations. (See box “Oil Shocks and Monetary Policy.”)
(20)

As depicted in Chart 8, the outcome-based monetary policy rule

prescribes a funds rate that stays around 2 percent until early 2009 and then rises
to a plateau of about 3½ percent from 2010 onwards. Financial markets
incorporate a higher path: Investors anticipate that the funds rate will reach 3½
percent by late 2009 and then rise to about 4½ percent during 2011. Options
prices suggest that investors’ confidence intervals surrounding their monetary
policy forecasts have widened significantly. The near-term prescriptions from the
simple policy rules proposed by Taylor (1993, 1999) are ¼ to ½ percentage point
higher than in the April Bluebook, reflecting a modestly narrower output gap as
well as somewhat higher core inflation. The Taylor (1999) rule places relatively
greater weight on the output gap than does the 1993 version and hence prescribes
a somewhat lower funds rate. 9 Both versions prescribe funds rates that are
noticeably higher than the expectations of financial market participants. The
prescriptions from the first-difference rule are significantly lower than shown in
the April Bluebook, reflecting the policy inertia of this rule.

Starting in this Bluebook, prescriptions from the Taylor (1999) rule with higher r* will no
longer be presented in Chart 8. The rationale for the use of such a specification was
associated with higher productivity growth rates than the staff anticipates for coming years.

9

25 of 41

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

26 of 41

Oil Shocks and Monetary Policy
For an oil-importing economy, an increase in energy prices tends to reduce economic growth
and boost inflation. Given these opposing tendencies, the implications for the optimal path of
policy can be determined only through use of a specific model and an assumed objective
function. In this box, a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
Federal Funds Rate
Percent
model developed by the staff is used to consider the optimal
1.0
Optimal policy
policy response to a permanent 50 percent rise in the real price
Imperfect credibility
0.8
of oil. In the model, inflation is determined by a Phillips curve
0.6
tradeoff between current inflation and current output, with
0.4
forward-looking inflation expectations. All else equal, core
0.2
prices rise in response to an oil price shock because higher
energy costs push up marginal costs at any given level of
0.0
output. The central bank is assumed to have the objective
-0.2
0
2
4
6
8
10
of minimizing squared deviations of inflation from a target
Years Ahead
level and output from potential.1
In the first simulation, the central bank’s commitment to the
optimal policy – and to a fixed long-run inflation target – is
assumed to be fully credible (solid lines). Two features of
this simulation are critical for understanding the responses
of inflation and output. First, taking expected inflation as
given, the central bank raises the funds rate (top panel),
thereby pushing output below potential (middle panel) and
restraining the rise in core inflation (lower panel). Second,
the central bank, by committing to return inflation to target
relatively quickly – and even to moving it somewhat below
target for a time – limits the effect of the shock on inflation
expectations. As a result, wage and price setters choose
smaller increases in wages and prices in the near term,
reducing the effect of the oil shock on inflation. To implement
this policy, however, the central bank must keep output a bit
below potential for a protracted period.
In the second simulation, policymakers are assumed to be
unable to commit credibly to future policy actions or to the
long-run inflation target, and hence the oil price shock induces
a long-lasting rise in the private sector’s perception of the central
bank’s inflation target. As denoted by the dashed lines, policy
1

Output Gap
Percent
0.1
0.0
-0.1
-0.2
-0.3
-0.4
0

2

4
6
Years Ahead

8

10

Core PCE Inflation
(four-quarter average)
Percent
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
-0.1
-0.2
0

2

4
6
Years Ahead

8

10

A detailed analysis of the implications of an increase in energy prices for the economy and monetary policy is
presented in the memo to the Committee, “Macroeconomic and Monetary Policy Implications of Rising Oil
Prices,” that will be distributed on June 20, 2008.

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

27 of 41

Oil Shocks and Monetary Policy (Cont.)
considerably further than under commitment, output shows a sharper initial contraction, and
in this simulation is tightened considerably further than under commitment, output shows a
inflation rises by more and remains elevated for a protracted period.
sharper initial contraction, and inflation rises by more and remains elevated for a protracted
period.

Thus, the appropriate policy following an oil price shock depends on the credibility of the
central bank. With credibility, the central bank needs to raise the federal funds rate only about
25 basis points in response to the specified shock, and it gradually returns the rate to baseline
over about two years. The resulting cumulative loss in output is fairly small, though the output
gap closes only gradually. Inflation rises about a third of a percentage point before falling a bit
below target by year three. By contrast, in the simulation without full credibility, the central
bank must raise the federal funds rate more than 75 basis points following the increase in oil
prices. As a result of this larger policy move, output falls significantly further than in the case
with credibility before rebounding. Despite the larger downturn, inflation rises about half a
percentage point and returns to near its baseline level only after about five years.

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

28 of 41

Chart 8
The Policy Outlook in an Uncertain Environment
FRB/US Model Simulations of
Estimated Outcome-Based Rule

Information from Financial Markets
Percent
8

8

Current Bluebook
Previous Bluebook
Greenbook assumption

7

Percent
8

8

Current Bluebook
Previous Bluebook
7

7

7

6

6

6

6

5

5

5

5

4

4

4

4

3

3

3

3

2

2

2

2

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Note: In both panels, the dark and light shading represent the 70 and 90 percent confidence intervals respectively. In the
right hand panel, the thin dotted lines represent the confidence intervals shown in the previous Bluebook.

Near-Term Prescriptions of Simple Policy Rules

1½ Percent
Inflation Objective

2 Percent
Inflation Objective

2008Q3

2008Q4

2008Q3

2008Q4

Taylor (1993) rule
Previous Bluebook

4.2
4.0

4.0
3.8

4.0
3.7

3.8
3.5

Taylor (1999) rule
Previous Bluebook

3.8
3.2

3.3
2.8

3.6
3.0

3.1
2.6

First-difference rule
Previous Bluebook

2.0
2.8

2.1
3.1

1.7
2.3

1.6
2.3

Memo
2008Q3
Estimated outcome-based rule
Estimated forecast-based rule
Greenbook assumption
Fed funds futures
Median expectation of primary dealers

2008Q4

1.9
1.8
2.0
2.1
2.0

2.0
1.8
2.0
2.4
2.0

Note: Appendix B provides background information regarding the specification of each rule and the methodology used in
constructing confidence intervals and near-term prescriptions.

0

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

Short-Run Policy Alternatives
(21)

This Bluebook presents three policy alternatives for the Committee’s

consideration, summarized in Table 1. Under Alternative A, the Committee would
reduce the federal funds rate target by 25 basis points to 1¾ percent, and its
statement would suggest that the further easing of policy was motivated by a
relatively downbeat assessment of the growth outlook. Under Alternative B, the
target would be maintained at 2 percent, but the statement would point both to
somewhat diminished downside risks to growth and increased upside risks to
inflation. Alternative C envisions a 25 basis points tightening to 2¼ percent; its
statement expresses continued concern about inflation, but does not strongly
suggest that further policy firming is in train.
(22)

Given the recent sharp increase in prices of energy and agricultural

commodities, inflation is likely to pick up in the very near term. Accordingly,
whereas all three alternatives retain the language from the April statement that “the
Committee expects inflation to moderate,” the time reference for this prediction is
changed from “in coming quarters” to “later this year and next year,” hinting that
the moderation in inflation may be somewhat longer in coming. None of the
alternatives provides any explicit weighting of the risks to the Committee’s
objectives. As usual, the Committee could formulate its statement using language
from more than one alternative. Table 1 may need to be modified once
participants have submitted their economic projections in order to ensure
consistency between the draft statements and participants’ projections and
accompanying narratives.
(23)

If the Committee reads the incoming information as pointing to growth

risks that are a bit less skewed to the downside than in April and inflation risks that
are a bit more tilted toward the upside, then it may wish to couple an unchanged
stance of policy at this meeting with the statement proposed for Alternative B. In

29 of 41

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

30 of 41

Table 1: Alternative Language for the June 2008 FOMC Announcement
April FOMC

Alternative A

Alternative B

Alternative C

Rationale

Assessment
of Risk

1. The Federal Open Market Committee
decided today to lower its target for the
federal funds rate 25 basis points to 2
percent.

The Federal Open Market Committee
decided today to lower its target for the
federal funds rate 25 basis points to 1-3/4
percent.

The Federal Open Market Committee
decided today to keep its target for the
federal funds rate at 2 percent.

The Federal Open Market Committee
decided today to raise its target for the
federal funds rate 25 basis points to 2-1/4
percent.

2. Recent information indicates that
economic activity remains weak.
Household and business spending has
been subdued and labor markets have
softened further. Financial markets
remain under considerable stress, and
tight credit conditions and the deepening
housing contraction are likely to weigh on
economic growth over the next few
quarters.

Policy
Decision

Recent information indicates that
economic activity has remained weak in
recent months. Although consumer
spending appears to have firmed
somewhat, residential investment has
continued to contract sharply and labor
markets have softened further. Financial
markets remain under considerable stress,
and tight credit conditions and the
deepening housing contraction are likely
to weigh on economic growth over the
next few quarters.

Recent information indicates that overall
economic activity continues to expand, partly
reflecting some firming in household
spending. However, labor markets have
softened further and financial markets
remain under considerable stress. Tight
credit conditions, the ongoing housing
contraction, and the rise in energy prices are
likely to weigh on economic growth over the
next few quarters.

Recent information indicates that overall
economic activity continues to expand,
partly reflecting some firming in household
spending. However, labor markets have
softened further and financial markets
remain under considerable stress. Tight
credit conditions, the ongoing housing
contraction, and the rise in energy prices are
likely to weigh on economic growth over
the next few quarters.

3. Although readings on core inflation
have improved somewhat, energy and
other commodity prices have increased,
and some indicators of inflation
expectations have risen in recent months.
The Committee expects inflation to
moderate in coming quarters, reflecting a
projected leveling-out of energy and other
commodity prices and an easing of
pressures on resource utilization. Still,
uncertainty about the inflation outlook
remains high. It will be necessary to
continue to monitor inflation
developments carefully.

Although energy prices have increased
further and some indicators of inflation
expectations have risen in recent months,
core inflation has been stable of late. The
Committee expects inflation to moderate
later this year and next year, reflecting a
projected leveling-out of energy prices and
an easing of pressures on resource
utilization. Still, uncertainty about the
inflation outlook remains high. It will be
necessary to continue to monitor inflation
developments carefully.

The Committee expects inflation to
moderate later this year and next year.
However, in light of the continued increases
in the prices of energy and some other
commodities and the elevated state of some
indicators of inflation expectations,
uncertainty about the inflation outlook
remains high.

Overall inflation has been elevated, energy
prices have continued to increase, and some
indicators of inflation expectations have
risen further. The Committee expects
inflation to moderate later this year and next
year, partly reflecting today’s policy action.
Still, uncertainty about the inflation outlook
remains high. It will be necessary to
continue to monitor inflation developments
carefully.

4. The substantial easing of monetary
policy to date, combined with ongoing
measures to foster market liquidity,
should help to promote moderate growth
over time and to mitigate risks to
economic activity. The Committee will
continue to monitor economic and
financial developments and will act as
needed to promote sustainable economic
growth and price stability.

The substantial easing of monetary policy
to date, combined with ongoing measures
to foster market liquidity, should help to
promote moderate growth over time and
to mitigate risks to economic activity. The
Committee will continue to monitor
economic and financial developments and
will act as needed to promote sustainable
economic growth and price stability.

The substantial easing of monetary policy to
date, combined with ongoing measures to
foster market liquidity, should help to
promote moderate growth over time.
Although downside risks to growth remain,
they appear to have diminished somewhat,
and the upside risks to near-term inflation
and inflation expectations have increased.
The Committee will continue to monitor
economic and financial developments and
will act as needed to promote sustainable
economic growth and price stability.

Future policy adjustments will depend on
the evolution of the outlook for both
inflation and economic growth, as implied
by incoming information on the economy
and financial conditions.

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

view of the recent household and business spending data, as well as some
incremental improvement in financial conditions over the intermeeting period, the
Committee may now believe that the real federal funds rate is near its equilibrium
level. Indeed, the real federal funds rate based on lagged four-quarter core PCE
inflation is now very close to its Greenbook-consistent equilibrium value (Chart 6).
Thus, although the current level of inflation may be seen as somewhat elevated
relative to the Committee’s longer-run objectives, members may judge that the
current stance of policy is consistent with a modal outlook for a gradual closing of
the output gap and modest downward pressure on core inflation over the next few
years. If members anticipate that the factors that are currently restraining
economic growth will gradually dissipate going forward, then they may believe that
policy ought to remain on hold for a while, before gradually beginning to firm.
Indeed, the optimal-control simulation with an inflation goal of 2 percent, shown
in Chart 7, prescribes a trajectory for the target funds rate that hovers around the
current target for the next year or so and subsequently rises. These considerations
might argue for an unchanged stance of policy for the time being, coupled with a
statement that suggests that policy is more likely to firm going forward than to
ease. Members may also see the current constellation of risks as suggesting that
policy should stand pat for now. Although recent developments imply some
diminution in the risk of an adverse feedback loop between financial markets and
the real economy, downside risks to growth persist: Housing markets remain very
weak, labor markets have deteriorated further, and record energy prices are likely
to weigh on consumer sentiment and overall growth. On the other hand, inflation
risks appear to have increased: Rising energy prices and somewhat less resource
slack than had been expected may be seen as adding to inflationary pressures, and
many indicators of inflation expectations have drifted up this year―a trend that has
continued to some extent since the last FOMC meeting. With these crosscurrents,

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Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

the Committee may view the current degree of monetary policy accommodation as
appropriate and wish to allow time for more information to accumulate before
adjusting the stance of policy in either direction.
(24)

The discussion of the growth outlook in the statement proposed for

Alternative B replaces the assessment in the April FOMC statement that economic
growth remains weak by noting instead that overall economic activity continues to
expand, and the firming in consumer spending data is cited as providing some
support to aggregate demand. However, the discussion of the outlook for
economic activity retains some of the more downbeat language from the previous
statement, and adds the rise in energy prices to the list of factors that are seen as
likely to restrain growth going forward. The housing contraction is described as
“ongoing” rather than “deepening” to avoid the suggestion that housing markets
are deteriorating more sharply than before. Meanwhile, the inflation paragraph has
a more hawkish tone than in the April statement. The observation that “readings
on core inflation have improved somewhat” is deleted in light of the fact that core
inflation readings moderated during the spring but have flattened out more
recently. The statement suggests that inflation will moderate, but, unlike the
previous statement, omits discussion of the economic forces that might cause this
to occur. Instead, the continued rise in energy and commodity prices and some
indications of heightened inflation expectations are cited as factors that have
increased the uncertainty about inflation prospects. Although agricultural
commodity prices have increased further since the last FOMC meeting, other
commodity prices, including those of many metals, have declined markedly.
Accordingly, the draft language points to further increases in the prices of “energy
and some other commodities.” The balance of risks assessment is unchanged from
April, except for the addition of a sentence that judges that there are downside
risks to growth―which appear to have diminished somewhat―and upside risks to

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Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

near-term inflation and inflation expectations. The two opposing risks are not
explicitly compared, but since the sentence ends on the discussion of upside risks
to inflation, markets may read it as suggesting that increased upside inflation risks
are now the greater policy concern of the Committee.
(25)

Futures and options quotes suggest that investors think it highly

probable that policy will be left unchanged at this meeting, but expect policy
tightening to begin later this year, perhaps as soon as the August meeting. The
combination of an unchanged funds rate and the slight implicit tilt towards upside
risks envisioned under Alternative B seems broadly consistent with these
expectations, though it may cause investors to push back their expectations for the
onset of policy tightening a bit. Short-term interest rates might edge down, but
longer-term rates would probably be little changed.
(26)

If, in view of recent developments, the Committee judges that the

growth outlook has improved appreciably or that inflationary pressures have risen
significantly, then it may prefer to tighten policy by 25 basis points at this meeting,
as in Alternative C. Also, members may see prompter firming than assumed in
the Greenbook as appropriate if they are more optimistic than the staff about
growth prospects in the second half of the year―as they were in their economic
projections in April. Indeed, the current stance of monetary policy might now be
viewed as giving excessive support to aggregate demand―some measures of real
short-term interest rates have declined further over the intermeeting period, and
members may believe that this will have a larger effect on spending than
envisioned by the staff. Risk considerations also might argue for beginning to
firm policy relatively soon. In particular, since last August, the Committee has
eased policy aggressively, in part to mitigate downside risks to growth stemming
from financial market turmoil. However, financial market conditions have
improved somewhat in recent months: Risk spreads have generally declined, bond

33 of 41

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

issuance has picked up, and many financial institutions have been successful in
raising new capital. In these circumstances, the Committee might see it as
important to be prompt in reversing the earlier aggressive easing of policy.
Members may also be worried that the recent rise in many measures of inflation
expectations could presage a more serious unmooring of inflation expectations
that would prove costly to reverse later, along the lines of the “Higher Inflation
Expectations” scenario. In particular, members might be concerned that, in
current circumstances, the Committee could be perceived as willing to tolerate the
inflationary consequences of higher energy prices and less resource slack. Also,
they may think that heightened inflation pressures could persist to a greater degree
than incorporated in the staff forecast: Oil prices have soared over the last year,
even as futures quotes consistently implied that they were about to level out.
Members may prefer a tighter stance of policy if they are worried that this pattern
could continue (along the lines of the “Ongoing Commodity Price Pressures”
scenario), or if they believe that the pass-through of rising food and energy prices
into core inflation may turn out to be greater than envisioned by the staff. Finally,
the Committee might share the staff’s assessment of the underlying forces shaping
the economy, but may prefer a tighter stance of policy in order to foster a more
rapid moderation in inflation than is foreseen in the staff forecast.
(27)

The discussion of economic activity in the proposed statement for

Alternative C is identical to that in Alternative B. The relatively downbeat
assessment of the growth outlook might suggest to markets that adoption of this
alternative did not necessarily represent the start of a rapid firming in policy.
However, the inflation paragraph in Alternative C points to the elevated level of
headline inflation and acknowledges that some indicators of inflation expectations
have increased further―referring to the increase in short-term inflation
compensation and in some short-term survey measures of inflation expectations

34 of 41

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

over the intermeeting period. Under this alternative, the firming in policy would
be cited as a factor that the Committee expects to cause inflation to moderate.
However, the risks that attend this expectation would be highlighted by indicating
that “uncertainty about the inflation outlook remains high” and that inflation
developments will continue to be monitored carefully, as in the April FOMC
statement. The final paragraph of Alternative C has no balance of risks
assessment, but simply notes that “future policy adjustments will depend on the
evolution of the outlook for both inflation and economic growth.”
(28)

Investors place only small odds on a rate hike at this meeting, and thus

they would be surprised by the adoption of Alternative C. The expected path of
policy over coming quarters would likely be marked up somewhat,
notwithstanding the relatively pessimistic growth paragraph and the absence of any
explicit mention of inflation risks. Accordingly, short-term interest rates would
rise and equity prices would fall. There is a risk that these moves could be quite
pronounced if investors interpreted the adoption of this alternative as signaling a
substantially more rapid pace of policy tightening than had been anticipated.
However, longer-term nominal interest rates and inflation compensation might
decline if the Committee’s decision caused investors to mark down their
expectations for inflation at longer horizons. The foreign exchange value of the
dollar would probably appreciate. Conditions in short-term funding markets could
worsen once again.
(29)

If the Committee remains particularly worried about downside risks to

the outlook for economic activity, then it may prefer to ease policy by another
quarter point at this meeting, as in Alternative A. The unemployment rate has
increased sharply in recent months; in the past, such sharp increases have always
been accompanied by recessions. Mortgage rates and corporate bond yields have
risen over the intermeeting period, tightening financial conditions and adding to

35 of 41

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

the restraint on aggregate demand. Members may also view financial market
functioning as still quite fragile: Short-term funding markets remain strained,
financial firms’ share prices have fallen sharply over the intermeeting period, and
some financial institutions have reported large losses and their credit ratings have
been downgraded. A little more policy accommodation may be seen as
appropriate insurance against the macroeconomic consequences of the risk that
financial market functioning might deteriorate once again. The Committee might
also be concerned that the reasonably firm consumer spending data in the second
quarter might simply reflect a greater degree of anticipatory spending by
households of their fiscal stimulus rebates than assumed in the staff forecast,
implying that growth in the second half of the year could be lower as this effect
wanes. Indeed, the apparent resilience in economic activity could be interpreted as
just a delay in the possible onset of a cyclical downturn, along the lines of the
“Recession” alternative scenario in the Greenbook. Although the recent sharp
increases in energy prices may well add to inflationary pressures in the short run,
they are also likely to weigh on household and business spending. In such
circumstances, the Committee might think that there will be sufficient resource
slack to contain inflation pressures, even with a slight further easing of policy.
(30)

The discussion of recent developments and the outlook for economic

activity and inflation in the draft statement accompanying Alternative A is not
much changed from the April FOMC statement. The apparent strength in
consumer spending in the second quarter is acknowledged, but the language
describing the outlook remains quite downbeat. In the first sentence of the
inflation paragraph, the reference to core inflation having “improved” is updated
to describe recent readings as “stable,” consistent with the incoming core inflation
data. The phrases in that sentence are reordered to emphasize the point that core
inflation has been stable. Alternative A gives no explicit assessment of the risks to

36 of 41

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

either growth or inflation, but simply repeats the risk assessment paragraph from
the previous statement, pointing to liquidity measures and the cumulative easing of
policy as providing support to growth.
(31)

With investors expecting the funds rate to be increased this year, the

adoption of Alternative A would surprise financial markets. Short- and
intermediate-term interest rates would fall, but long-term nominal Treasury yields
and measures of inflation compensation would probably increase, as investors
came to perceive the Committee as willing to tolerate a higher trajectory of
inflation than had been thought. Equity prices might rise, while it is likely that the
foreign exchange value of the dollar would depreciate.
Money and Debt Forecasts
(32)

M2 is projected to expand at about a 7¾ percent annual pace in the first

half of 2008―faster than nominal GDP―as a result of the lagged effects of falling
opportunity costs and heightened demand for safe and liquid assets. Under the
Greenbook forecast, M2 growth is expected to slow to a 3½ percent annual rate in
the second half, as opportunity costs start to rise and the continued gradual
improvement in financial market conditions leads the shift to safe and liquid assets
to unwind. For the year as a whole, M2 is projected to expand about 5¾ percent.
In 2009, M2 is expected to advance about 4 percent, slower than nominal GDP,
largely reflecting the further increase in the opportunity cost of holding M2 assets
as short-term interest rates rise.
(33)

Growth of domestic nonfinancial sector debt is expected to slow to an

annual rate of around 4¾ percent in 2008 and 4½ percent in 2009, down notably
from the 8¼ percent advance posted last year. The fall-off in debt growth owes
mainly to an anticipated slowing of household borrowing, amid falling house
prices and tighter standards and terms on consumer loans, and also to diminishing

37 of 41

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

38 of 41

Table 2
Alternative Growth Rates for M2
(percent, annual rate)

25 bp Easing

No change

25 bp Tightening

Greenbook
Forecast*

Monthly Growth Rates
Dec-07
Jan-08
Feb-08
Mar-08
Apr-08
May-08
Jun-08
Jul-08
Aug-08
Sep-08
Oct-08
Nov-08
Dec-08

4.9
8.0
16.8
12.6
2.4
1.2
2.5
4.4
5.5
5.6
3.5
3.1
3.2

4.9
8.0
16.8
12.6
2.4
1.2
2.5
4.0
4.7
4.8
2.8
2.6
2.8

4.9
8.0
16.8
12.6
2.4
1.2
2.5
3.6
3.9
4.0
2.1
2.1
2.4

4.9
8.0
16.8
12.6
2.4
1.2
2.5
4.0
4.7
4.8
2.8
2.6
2.8

Quarterly Growth Rates
2007 Q4
2008 Q1
2008 Q2
2008 Q3
2008 Q4

4.8
9.5
6.0
4.0
4.1

4.8
9.5
6.0
3.6
3.4

4.8
9.5
6.0
3.2
2.8

4.8
9.5
6.0
3.6
3.4

Annual Growth Rates
2007
2008
2009

5.8
6.0
5.3

5.8
5.7
5.2

5.8
5.5
5.1

5.8
5.7
4.1

4.3
5.1
4.0

3.7
4.9
3.4

3.0
4.6
2.9

3.7
4.9
3.4

Growth From
Jun-08
2008 Q1
2008 Q2

To
Dec-08
Sep-08
Dec-08

* This forecast is consistent with nominal GDP and interest rates in the Greenbook forecast.

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

39 of 41

leveraged buyout, merger and acquisition, and share repurchase activity that is
expected to slow the growth of business borrowing.

Directive
(34)

Draft language for the directive is provided below.

Directive Wording
The Federal Open Market Committee seeks monetary and financial
conditions that will foster price stability and promote sustainable growth
in output. To further its long-run objectives, the Committee in the
immediate future seeks conditions in reserve markets consistent with
MAINTAINING/INCREASING/reducing the federal funds rate
AT/to an average of around ________ 2 percent.

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

40 of 41

Appendix A: Measures of the Equilibrium Real Rate
The equilibrium real rate—that is, the nominal rate adjusted for expected inflation—is the real federal
funds rate that, if maintained, would be projected to return output to its potential level over time.
The short-run equilibrium rate is defined as the rate that would close the output gap in twelve quarters
given the corresponding model’s projection of the economy. The medium-run concept is the value of
the real federal funds rate projected to keep output at potential in seven years, under the assumption that
monetary policy acts to bring actual and potential output into line in the short run and then keeps them
equal thereafter. Both concepts of the equilibrium real rate approximate expected inflation using trailing
four-quarter core PCE inflation. The TIPS-based factor model measure provides an estimate of market
expectations for the real federal funds rate seven years ahead.
In calculating the actual real funds rate, the nominal rate is measured as the quarterly average of
the observed federal funds rate. Expected inflation is approximated in three ways: using lagged core
inflation, as was done to define the equilibrium real rate; using lagged four-quarter headline PCE
inflation; and using projected four-quarter headline PCE inflation beginning with the next quarter.
For the current quarter, the nominal rate is specified as the target federal funds rate on the Bluebook
publication date. Moreover, if the upcoming FOMC meeting falls early in the quarter, the lagged
inflation measure ends in the last quarter and the projected inflation measure starts in the current quarter.
Confidence intervals reflect uncertainties about model specification, coefficients, and the level of
potential output. The final column of the table indicates the values published in the previous Bluebook.
Measure

Description

Single-equation
Model

The measure of the equilibrium real rate in the single-equation model is based on an
estimated aggregate-demand relationship between the current value of the output gap and
its lagged values as well as the lagged values of the real federal funds rate.

Small Structural The small-scale model of the economy consists of equations for six variables: the output
gap, the equity premium, the federal budget surplus, the trend growth rate of output, the
Model
real bond yield, and the real federal funds rate.
Large Model
(FRB/US)

Estimates of the equilibrium real rate using FRB/US—the staff’s large-scale econometric
model of the U.S. economy—depend on a very broad array of economic factors, some of
which take the form of projected values of the model’s exogenous variables.

Greenbookconsistent

The FRB/US model is used in conjunction with an extended version of the Greenbook
forecast to derive a Greenbook-consistent measure. FRB/US is first add-factored so that
its simulation matches the extended Greenbook forecast, and then a second simulation is
run off this baseline to determine the value of the real federal funds rate that closes the
output gap.

TIPS-based
Factor Model

Yields on TIPS (Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities) reflect investors’ expectations of
the future path of real interest rates, but also include term and liquidity premiums. The
TIPS-based measure of the equilibrium real rate is constructed using the seven-year-ahead
instantaneous real forward rate derived from TIPS yields as of the Bluebook publication
date. This forward rate is adjusted to remove estimates of the term and liquidity
premiums based on a three-factor arbitrage-free term-structure model applied to TIPS
yields, nominal yields, and inflation. Because TIPS indexation is based on the total CPI,
this measure is also adjusted for the medium-term difference—projected at 40 basis
points—between total CPI inflation and core PCE inflation.

Class I FOMC - Restricted Controlled (FR)

41 of 41

Appendix B: Analysis of Policy Paths and Confidence Intervals
Rule Specifications: For the following rules, it denotes the federal funds rate for quarter t, while
the explanatory variables include the staff’s projection of trailing four-quarter core PCE inflation (πt),
inflation two and three quarters ahead (πt+2|t and πt+3|t), the output gap in the current period and one
quarter ahead ( yt − yt* and yt +1|t − yt*+1|t ), and the three-quarter-ahead forecast of annual average GDP
growth relative to potential ( Δ 4 yt +3|t − Δ 4 yt*+3|t ); π * denotes an assumed value of policymakers’ long-run
inflation objective. The outcome-based and forecast-based rules were estimated using real-time data
over the sample 1988:1-2006:4; each specification was chosen using the Bayesian information criterion.
Each rule incorporates a 75 basis point shift in the intercept, specified as a sequence of
25 basis point increments during the first three quarters of 1998. The first two simple rules were
proposed by Taylor (1993, 1999). The prescriptions of the first-difference rule do not depend on
assumptions regarding r* or the level of the output gap; see Orphanides (2003).
Outcome-based rule

it = 1.20it-1–0.39it-2+0.19[1.17 + 1.73 πt + 3.66( yt − yt* ) – 2.72( yt −1 − yt*−1 )]

Forecast-based rule

it = 1.18it-1–0.38it-2+0.20[0.98 +1.72 πt+2|t+2.29( yt +1|t − yt*+1|t )–1.37( yt −1 − yt*−1 )]

Taylor (1993) rule

it = 2 + πt + 0.5(πt – π * ) + 0.5( yt − yt* )

Taylor (1999) rule

it = 2 + πt + 0.5(πt – π * ) + ( yt − yt* )

First-difference rule

it = it-1 + 0.5(πt+3|t – π * ) + 0.5( Δ 4 yt +3|t − Δ 4 yt*+3|t )

FRB/US Model Simulations: Prescriptions from the two empirical rules are computed using dynamic
simulations of the FRB/US model, implemented as though the rule were followed starting at this FOMC
meeting. The dotted line labeled “Previous Bluebook” is based on the current specification of the policy
rule, applied to the previous Greenbook projection. Confidence intervals are based on stochastic
simulations of the FRB/US model with shocks drawn from the estimated residuals over 1986-2005.
Information from Financial Markets: The expected funds rate path is based on forward rate
agreements, and the confidence intervals for this path are constructed using prices of interest rate caps.
Near-Term Prescriptions of Simple Policy Rules: These prescriptions are calculated using Greenbook
projections for inflation and the output gap. Because the first-difference rule involves the lagged funds
rate, the value labeled “Previous Bluebook” for the current quarter is computed using the actual value
of the lagged funds rate, and the one-quarter-ahead prescriptions are based on this rule’s prescription for
the current quarter.
References:
Taylor, John B. (1993). “Discretion versus policy rules in practice,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference
Series on Public Policy, vol. 39 (December), pp. 195-214.
————— (1999). “A Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules,” in John B. Taylor, ed.,
Monetary Policy Rules. The University of Chicago Press, pp. 319-341.
Orphanides, Athanasios (2003). “Historical Monetary Policy Analysis and the Taylor Rule,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, vol. 50 (July), pp. 983-1022.