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SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

June 24–25, 2008

Table 1: Economic Projections of Federal Reserve Governors and Reserve
Bank Presidents 1
2008

2009

2010

Central Tendencies
Real GDP Growth
April projections

1.0 to 1.6
0.3 to 1.2

2.0 to 2.8
2.0 to 2.8

2.5 to 3.0
2.6 to 3.1

Unemployment Rate
April projections

5.5 to 5.7
5.5 to 5.7

5.3 to 5.8
5.2 to 5.7

5.0 to 5.6
4.9 to 5.5

PCE Inflation
April projections

3.8 to 4.2
3.1 to 3.4

2.0 to 2.3
1.9 to 2.3

1.8 to 2.0
1.8 to 2.0

Core PCE Inflation
April projections

2.2 to 2.4
2.2 to 2.4

2.0 to 2.2
1.9 to 2.1

1.8 to 2.0
1.7 to 1.9

Real GDP Growth
April projections

0.9 to 1.8
0.0 to 1.5

1.9 to 3.0
1.8 to 3.0

2.0 to 3.5
2.0 to 3.4

Unemployment Rate
April projections

5.5 to 5.8
5.3 to 6.0

5.2 to 6.1
5.2 to 6.3

5.0 to 5.8
4.8 to 5.9

PCE Inflation
April projections

3.4 to 4.6
2.8 to 3.8

1.7 to 3.0
1.7 to 3.0

1.6 to 2.1
1.5 to 2.0

Core PCE Inflation
April projections

2.0 to 2.5
1.9 to 2.5

1.8 to 2.3
1.7 to 2.2

1.5 to 2.0
1.3 to 2.0

Ranges

1. Projections of real GDP growth, PCE inflation and core PCE inflation are fourth-quarter-to-fourthquarter growth rates, i.e. percentage changes from the fourth quarter of the prior year to the fourth quarter
of the indicated year. PCE inflation and core PCE inflation are the percentage rates of change in the price
index for personal consumption expenditures and the price index for personal consumption expenditures
excluding food and energy, respectively. Each participant's projections are based on his or her assessment of
appropriate monetary policy. The range for each variable in a given year includes all participants'
projections, from lowest to highest, for that variable in the given year; the central tendencies exclude the
three highest and three lowest projections for each variable in each year.

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SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

June 24–25, 2008

Table 1a
Economic Projections for the First Half of 2008*
Central Tendencies and Ranges
Central Tendency
Real GDP Growth
Total PCE Inflation
Core PCE Inflation

Range

1.2 to 1.4
3.7 to 4.0
2.1 to 2.2

1.0 to 1.5
3.6 to 4.6
2.0 to 2.4

Participants' Projections
Projection
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Real GDP Growth Total PCE Inflation Core PCE Inflation
1.50
4.60
2.40
1.20
3.70
2.10
1.40
4.00
2.20
1.10
3.60
2.00
1.30
3.70
2.10
1.40
3.80
2.10
1.40
3.80
2.20
1.30
3.80
2.20
1.20
4.10
2.40
1.40
3.80
2.10
1.00
4.30
2.20
1.40
3.80
2.00
1.40
3.70
2.10
1.50
3.80
2.40
1.40
3.80
2.10
1.40
3.80
2.10
1.40
3.80
2.10

* Growth and inflation are reported at annualized rates.

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SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

June 24–25, 2008

Table 1b
Economic Projections for the Second Half of 2008*
Central Tendencies and Ranges
Central Tendency
Real GDP Growth
Total PCE Inflation
Core PCE Inflation

Range

0.6 to 2.1
3.6 to 4.6
2.3 to 2.5

0.4 to 2.2
3.2 to 4.8
2.0 to 2.6

Participants' Projections
Projection
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Real GDP Growth Total PCE Inflation Core PCE Inflation
1.30
4.60
2.40
1.40
3.90
2.30
0.60
3.60
2.40
2.10
3.20
2.00
2.10
3.30
2.50
0.40
4.80
2.50
1.00
4.60
2.60
1.10
4.20
2.20
2.20
4.10
2.60
1.60
4.20
2.30
1.00
4.10
2.40
1.00
4.20
2.40
0.40
4.50
2.30
2.10
3.20
2.60
1.60
4.60
2.50
1.60
4.40
2.50
0.60
4.60
2.50

* Projections for the second half of 2008 implied by participants' June projections for the first half of 2008
and for 2008 as a whole. Growth and inflation are reported at annualized rates.

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SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

June 24–25, 2008

Table 2: June Economic Projections
Respondent Year

GDP Growth Unemployment Rate Total PCE Inflation Core PCE Inflation

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008

1.4
1.3
1.0
1.6
1.7
0.9
1.2
1.2
1.7
1.5
1.0
1.2
0.9
1.8
1.5
1.5
1.0

5.7
5.6
5.5
5.6
5.5
5.8
5.7
5.6
5.6
5.5
5.7
5.5
5.6
5.5
5.5
5.7
5.8

4.6
3.8
3.8
3.4
3.5
4.3
4.2
4.0
4.1
4.0
4.2
4.0
4.1
3.5
4.2
4.1
4.2

2.4
2.2
2.3
2.0
2.3
2.3
2.4
2.2
2.5
2.2
2.3
2.2
2.2
2.5
2.3
2.3
2.3

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009

2.0
2.3
2.0
3.0
2.5
2.2
2.4
2.2
2.7
2.8
2.7
2.6
2.0
3.0
2.8
2.0
1.9

5.6
5.6
5.8
5.4
5.6
5.7
5.3
5.8
5.3
5.4
5.6
5.4
5.8
5.2
5.3
5.4
6.1

2.5
2.1
2.8
1.7
2.2
2.1
2.2
2.0
2.2
1.9
2.3
2.0
2.0
3.0
2.1
2.3
2.0

2.3
2.1
2.1
1.8
2.2
2.1
2.2
2.0
2.0
1.9
2.0
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.1
2.3
1.9

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SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

June 24–25, 2008

Table 2 (continued): June Economic Projections
Respondent Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010

GDP Growth Unemployment Rate Total PCE Inflation Core PCE Inflation
2.0
2.5
2.8
2.6
2.5
3.2
2.9
3.0
2.7
3.5
2.6
2.9
2.8
2.7
3.1
2.5
3.0

5.4
5.6
5.5
5.2
5.6
5.4
5.1
5.6
5.1
5.0
5.4
5.1
5.7
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.8

2.0
1.8
2.0
1.8
2.0
1.9
1.9
1.8
1.7
1.9
2.1
1.8
2.0
2.0
1.9
1.9
1.6

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2.0
1.8
2.0
1.8
2.0
1.8
2.0
1.8
1.7
1.9
1.9
1.8
2.0
1.5
1.9
1.9
1.5

SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

June 24–25, 2008

Chart 1: Central Tendencies and Ranges of Economic Projections*
Real GDP Growth

Percent
7
6

Central Tendency of Projections
Range of Projections

5
4

•

•

•

•

3

•

2
1
0

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Unemployment Rate

2010

Percent
8
7
6

•

•

•

•

5

•

4
3

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

PCE Inflation

2010

Percent
5
4

•

•

•

•

3

•

2
1
0

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Core PCE Inflation

2010

Percent
5
4
3

•

•

•

•

•

2
1
0

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

* See notes to Table 1 for variable definitions.

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2008

2009

2010

SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

June 24–25, 2008

Uncertainty and Risks - GDP Growth
2(a): Please indicate your judgment of the uncertainty attached to your projections relative to
levels of uncertainty over the past 20 years.
Number of participants
15

10

5

0

Lower
(C)

Broadly
similar
(B)

Higher
(A)

2(b): Please indicate your judgment of the risk weighting around your projections.
Number of participants
15

10

5

0

Weighted to
downside
(C)

Broadly
balanced
(B)

Weighted to
upside
(A)

Individual Responses

Respondent

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

2(a)
2(b)

A
B

B
C

A
C

A
C

B
C

A
C

A
C

A
C

B
B

A
C

A
C

A
C

A
C

B
B

A
C

A
C

A
C

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SEP : Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

June 24-25, 2008

Uncertainty and Risks -Unemployment Rate
2(a): Please indicate your judgment of the uncertainty attached to your projections relative to
levels of uncertainty over the past 20 years.
Number of participants

15

10

5

0

Lower
(C)

Higher
(A)

Broadly
similar
(B)

2(b): Please indicate your judgment of the risk weighting around your projections.
Number of participants
15

10

5

0

Weighted to
downside
(C)

Weighted to
upside
(A)

Broadly
balanced
(B)

Individual Responses

Respondent
2(a)
2(b)

1
B
B

2

3

4

B
A

A
A

A
A

5
B
A

6

7

8

A
A

A
A

B
A

9
B
B

10

A
A

11

A
A

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12

A
A

13

A
A

14

B
B

15

A
A

16

A
A

17
A
A

SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

June 24–25, 2008

Uncertainty and Risks - Total PCE Inflation
2(a): Please indicate your judgment of the uncertainty attached to your projections relative to
levels of uncertainty over the past 20 years.
Number of participants
15

10

5

0

Lower
(C)

Broadly
similar
(B)

Higher
(A)

2(b): Please indicate your judgment of the risk weighting around your projections.
Number of participants
15

10

5

0

Weighted to
downside
(C)

Broadly
balanced
(B)

Weighted to
upside
(A)

Individual Responses

Respondent

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

2(a)
2(b)

A
A

A
A

A
A

A
A

A
A

A
A

A
A

A
B

B
A

A
A

A
A

A
A

A
B

B
B

A
A

A
A

B
B

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SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

June 24–25, 2008

Uncertainty and Risks - Core PCE Inflation
2(a): Please indicate your judgment of the uncertainty attached to your projections relative to
levels of uncertainty over the past 20 years.
Number of participants
15

10

5

0

Lower
(C)

Broadly
similar
(B)

Higher
(A)

2(b): Please indicate your judgment of the risk weighting around your projections.
Number of participants
15

10

5

0

Weighted to
downside
(C)

Broadly
balanced
(B)

Weighted to
upside
(A)

Individual Responses

Respondent

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

2(a)
2(b)

A
A

A
A

A
A

A
B

B
A

B
B

A
A

B
B

B
A

B
B

A
A

A
A

B
B

B
B

B
B

A
A

B
B

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SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

June 24–25, 2008

Uncertainty and Risks

2(a). (Optional) If you have any explanatory comments regarding your

judgment of the uncertainty attached to your pro jections relative to levels of

uncertainty over the past 20 years, you may enter them below.

Respondent 1:
N/A
Respondent 2:
N/A
Respondent 3:
N/A
Respondent 4:
Quantitative judgment based on standard deviation of FRBNY forecast distribution for GDP growth and
core PCE inflation relative to those reported in Reifschneider and Tulip.
Respondent 5:
N/A
Respondent 6:
Uncertainty regarding growth and unemployment stems from the difficult-to-predict nature of both the fi­
nancial crisis and the housing correction. Large swings in energy and other commodity prices make PCE
inflation unusually difficult to predict.
Respondent 7:
N/A
Respondent 8:
The persistent run-up in energy and food prices, and highly uncertain prospects for prices of these com­
modities, implies greater uncertainty associated with my pro jections of PCE inflation. There is also greater
uncertainty surrounding my pro jections of GDP growth in comparison with the experience of the past 20
years because of persistent strains in financial markets and on large financial institutions and because it is
unclear if consumer spending, in particular, will be sustained over the next several quarters.
Respondent 9:
N/A
Respondent 10:
N/A
Respondent 11:
No Comment.
Respondent 12:
The size and persistence of the financial and oil shocks and the housing cycle raise the level of uncertainty
around our pro jections for real economic activity. The elevation in some measures of inflation expectations,
as well as the increased volatility in commodities prices, also raise the level of uncertainty about our inflation
projections.
Respondent 13:
N/A

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June 24–25, 2008

Respondent 14:
N/A
Respondent 15:
Uncertainties about the path for financial market improvement hence for financial conditions and about oil
prices result in heightened uncertainty about GDP and overall inflation.
Respondent 16:
N/A
Respondent 17:
The uncertainty attached to my projections for GDP and unemployment over the next four quarters is
above average, after which uncertainty returns to average. The uncertainty surrounding inflation pro jections
is about average, reflecting higher uncertainty about commodity prices offset by lower uncertainty associated
with appropriate monetary policy.

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SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

June 24–25, 2008

Uncertainty and Risks

2(b). (Optional) If you have any explanatory comments regarding your

judgment of the risk weighting around your pro jections, you may enter them

below.

Respondent 1:
N/A
Respondent 2:
N/A
Respondent 3:
N/A
Respondent 4:
Quantitative judgment based on the difference between pro jection and expected value from FRBNY forecast
distribution. Upside risk to total inflation from risks to conditioning assumption on future oil prices and
refining margins.
Respondent 5:
While we still believe the risks to growth are weighted to the downside, we believe those risks have diminished
over the past two months. This reflects the lack of evidence that a negative feedback loop is in train–the
scenario that had presented the largest down side risk to the outlook in April.
We continue to see the risk of a larger-than-expected passthrough of energy and other commodity price
increases to core inflation and inflationary expectations.
Respondent 6:
N/A
Respondent 7:
N/A
Respondent 8:
Although less likely than formerly, there remains a nontrivial probability that the economy will contract in
the second half of the year because the number of ”identifiable negatives” is high.
Respondent 9:
My growth forecast is essentially the same as in the April pro jection and risks to growth remain balanced.
I’ve revised up my near-term inflation forecast. Given the monetary policy accommodation in the pipeline,
the year-to-date data on inflation and inflation expectations, and the recent behavior of oil and commodity
prices, inflation risks remain to the upside.
Respondent 10:
N/A
Respondent 11:
No Comment.
Respondent 12:
Despite recent upside surprises for real growth, we continue to view the risks to the forecast distribution
for economic activity as skewed toward weakness, as the credit crunch boosts a recessionary tail risk. An

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SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

June 24–25, 2008

upside risk to overall inflation is consistent with a possible continuation of the recent surprising run-up in
energy and food prices. Despite recent downside surprises for core inflation, we view the risks to the forecast
for core inflation as somewhat skewed to the upside, as commodity price passthrough may finally come to
fruition.
Respondent 13:
As in my last pro jection, although I see somewhat more downside risk on GDP growth (and upside risk on
unemployment), I do not see the skewness to be very large because the tail risk is much lower than it was in
the first quarter of the year.
Respondent 14:
N/A
Respondent 15:
Growth risks are skewed to the downside by the possibilities that financial conditions do not improve along
the assumed path, that global monetary policies are tightened appreciably to counter the potential effects of
recent increases in oil prices on inflation expectations, and that the depressed level of consumer and business
confidence begins to show through more to spending. The upside risk to overall inflation results from the
greater possibility that oil prices continue to rise, dragging along inflation expectations. With respect to
core inflation the upside oil and downside growth risks tend to offset.
Respondent 16:
N/A
Respondent 17:
The risk to real growth is weighted to the downside in the second half of this year, due to the possibility of
a weaker fundamental trend in consumer spending emerging after the effects of the stimulus checks wear off,
and the possibility of a greater than expected weakness in business fixed investment.

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SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

June 24–25, 2008

Appropriate Monetary Policy

3. Does your view of the appropriate path of interest rates differ materially
from the interest rate assumed by the staff in the Greenbook?

YES
15

NO
2

Respondent 1: Yes

Expect rate increases substantially more aligned with current market forecast

Respondent 2: Yes

I assume the federal funds rate is raised 25 basis points at this meeting, and then reaches 3 percent by the

end of this year and 4.25 percent by the end of 2009.

Respondent 3: Yes

Achieving an acceptable path for inflation likely requires a more restrictive policy than is assumed in the

Greenbook.

Respondent 4: Yes

Target federal funds rate held at 2.0% through the end of 2008Q3. By the end of 2009, it renormalizes back

to 3.75%, then 4.25% by mid-2010. In the near-term the risks around this path are balanced but in the

medium term they are to the upside.

Respondent 5: Yes

Our funds rate assumption is close to that embedded in futures markets. Specifically, we assume the funds

rate will be 2-1/2 percent in 2008:Q4 and 3-3/4 percent in 2009:Q4

Respondent 6: No

Slightly more aggressive in raising rates late in 2008 and during 2009, higher terminal point in 2009.

Respondent 7: Yes

I assume a somewhat greater increase in the federal funds rate during 2009 and the possibility of increasing

rates before the end of 2008.

Respondent 8: Yes

I expect the Federal funds rate target to increase earlier than indicated in the Greenbook and to rise modestly

more rapidly as well.

Respondent 9: Yes

My policy path is considerably steeper than the Greenbook baseline policy path assumption. My forecast

calls for the funds rate to begin rising in 2008Q3. It reaches 2.75 percent by the end of 2008 and 4.5 percent

by the end of 2009. The funds rate remains at 4.5 percent in 2010. In my view, in order to keep inflation

from rising and keep inflation expectations anchored, the FOMC needs to be aggressive in taking back the

insurance it has put in place.

Respondent 10: Yes

Appropriate monetary policy requires an easier stance in 2009 than what is assumed in the Greenbook.

Respondent 11: Yes

My path for the fed funds rate is based on a Taylor-rule specification. It calls for a trajectory that begins to

rise in the fourth quarter of 2008 and remains somewhat higher than the Greenbook path through 2009.


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SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

June 24–25, 2008

Respondent 12: Yes
I assume that the federal funds rate edges up to 2-1/4 percent at the end of 2008, and then gradually rises
to 3 percent in 2009:Q4 and to 4-1/4 percent in 2010:Q4.
Respondent 13: Yes
Because I think the delayed credit recovery scenario is most likely and do not think that inflation expectations
are likely to blow out, I have the fed funds rate increasing by less than the greenbook baseline and more in
line with the delayed credit recovery scenario.
Respondent 14: Yes
My judgement is that the FOMC will need to raise interest rates more aggressively than the path pro jected
in the June 2008 Greenbook in order to achieve a goal of 1.5 percent on core PCE inflation in 2010.
Respondent 15: No
N/A
Respondent 16: Yes
My baseline assumption is that the funds rate will remain at 2 percent over the balance of 2008, and then
increase to the 4 to 4-1/2 percent range by sometime in 2010.
Respondent 17: Yes
Under appropriate policy the funds rate is likely to increase sooner than in the Greenbook. Recent statements
by Federal Reserve officials have bolstered expectations that the FOMC will react promptly to inflation
pressures, and market have built in two rate increases this year as a result. I believe the Committee will
find it too damaging to its credibility to disappoint those expectations, despite rising unemployment and
lingering financial market ”strains.”

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SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

June 24–25, 2008

Forecast Narratives

4(a). Please describe the key factors shaping your central economic outlook

and the uncertainty around that outlook

Respondent 1:
Significant uncertainty for 2H 2008 with respect to impact on financial institution weakness on broader
economy
Respondent 2:
(1) I expect growth to be below trend through the end of 2008, reflecting continuing declines in residential
investment and high energy prices. Tight financial conditions linger and restrain growth somewhat through
early 2009. Strong export growth–driven by a decline in the dollar and strong foreign growth–provides nearterm support. Finally, continued high energy prices pose a downside risk to growth.
(2) Over time, I expect economic growth to be driven by an accommodative monetary policy, tax rebates, a
less rapid pace of decline in housing, and stable or falling energy prices.
(3) I expect inflation to moderate gradually over the forecast horizon due to a leveling off of food and
energy prices, and due to faster removal of policy accommodation and the insurance taken out against fi­
nancial turmoil. Since I assume the effect of slack on inflation is modest at best, I do not expect near-term
economic weakness to contribute to a rapid decline in inflation.
(4) Despite below trend growth, an accommodative monetary policy, higher energy and commodity prices,
greater dollar depreciation, and a possible loosening of the anchoring of long-term inflation expectations pose
considerable upside risks to the expected moderation in core and overall inflation.
Respondent 3:
Commodity-price increases soon begin bleeding over into core inflation and inflation expectations. Policy
responds with a series of rate increases during the second half of 2008. The housing and financial sectors
undergo a long, drawn out convalescence. Banks gradually repair their fragile balance sheets.
Respondent 4:
Our central pro jection has the US economy experiencing a weak recovery from the subdued growth in the
first part of 2008. Growth remains near its potential rate through 2009-10 implying we see only a narrowing
rather than a complete closing of the output gap in this period. Although we judge the economy will just
skirt a recession, the chance of a recession remains high.
Within the central scenario the bulk of the correction in housing will be completed by mid-2009 and resi­
dential investments large drag on GDP will be over by the end of 2008. The decline in housing prices will
continue through the end of 2009 with about an 12% peak to trough drop using the OFHEO repeat sales
index (purchase only). Net exports provide a boost to GDP growth in 2008 and 2009.
We pro ject a continued very gradual moderation in core inflation with total inflation running well above
core in the summer of 2008 but then moving in line with the core pro jection. This path is based on inflation
expectations remaining well-contained, our assessment of the FOMC inflation objective, and the opening of
an output gap in 2008 along with little evidence higher energy and food costs are passing-through to labor
compensation.
The risks to our central projection are substantial. The main short-term one is that the ongoing tur­
moil in financial markets further restricts the supply of credit, exacerbating contractionary forces which in
turn leads to a further tightening of credit conditions and so on. Over the medium term a ma jor risk is that

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trend productivity growth will differ from our conditioning assumption. A related risk on the downside is a
steeper-than-assumed rise of the personal saving rate resulting from wealth effects.
For core inflation, we see the risks as roughly balanced and for total inflation to the upside. There are
risks on the downside if a recession occurs. However, potential pass-through of higher costs stemming from
higher energy and commodity prices, and the decline in the exchange value of the dollar pose upside risks.
Further, the behavior of some measures of inflation expectations over the last few months continues to sug­
gest that private agents might have less confidence in the FOMCs commitment to price stability than in
previous periods during the 2000s expansion when total inflation was running above core.
The combination of this risk profile, the heightened uncertainty present around potential turning points
and the ongoing volatility in financial and commodity markets produces elevated uncertainty around our
central pro jection compared to typical levels.

Respondent 5:
We assume that financial headwinds and reduced purchasing power due to higher energy prices will hold
growth below potential over the course of 2008.
The financial headwinds are assumed to dissipate as we move forward, as institutions build on the progress
they have already made in coping with problem assets and in raising new capital. The speed at which these
headwinds ease presents a two-sided risk to the forecast.
Increases in consumer energy prices are assumed to peak relatively soon; this assumption relies on cur­
rent quotes from futures markets, which have proved to be poor predictors. The associated uncertainty over
the prospects for energy prices presents a risk to both the growth and inflation outlooks.
Under our forecast for growth, the economy maintains a modest degree of resource slack throughout the
projection period. This slack is viewed as necessary to offset the cost pressures from energy and other com­
modity prices and to help keep inflationary expectations in check. The ability of the slack to offset the other
pressures on inflation is another source of uncertainty and risk to the inflation forecast.
Respondent 6:
Consumption spending was surprisingly strong in Q2 Seems likely to be much weaker in H2, reflecting falling
real income and wealth, the waning effects of the rebates, high energy prices, tight credit, and poor senti­
ment. Residential investment will continue weak and nonresidential investment will slow considerably from
recent pace. Exports will continue to support growth and the negative impact of residential construction on
GDP may begin to wane by Q4, but overall the second half now looks weaker than the first half. Financial
conditions will remain stressed with periods of improvement and retreat. A technical recession probably
began in the first half of 2008, based on monthly data. The jump in the unemployment rate in May was
probably overstated but unemployment will rise as growth remains very slow. Growth will be slow until the
second half of 2009 (above trend in 2010) and job creation will lag, as in previous downturns.
Inflation depends critically on commodity prices, which are very difficult to predict. The best guess is
for stabilization or more moderate increases in energy prices, which will lead headline inflation to slow to­
ward the end of this year. There will be more passthrough to core than in the past, as the increases in
raw materials will be perceived as persistent rather than transitory. Slack in the labor market, slowing
wage growth, decent productivity growth, slightly tighter markups, modest increases in rents will keep core
inflation from rising much.
Respondent 7:

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The persistence in the increases in a number of commodity prices, particularly energy, have led me to increase
my assessment of the uncertainty surrounding forecasts of both headline and core inflation. The risks due
to the housing market and the impact of the financial turmoil – and a continuing concern about a lingering
negative feedback between the two – also lead to my assessment of high uncertainty surrounding forecasts
of real GDP and unemployment.
Respondent 8:
My outlook for ’08 and ’09 continues to be influenced by the ”headwinds” episode of the early 1990s and the
extensive time required to work off excess inventories in the housing sector. However, I expect that these
problems will have diminished appreciably by 2010 and that the economy will expand at a pace modestly
above trend in that year. With appropriate monetary policy, I expect core inflation to decline to an accept­
able rate by 2010.
Respondent 9:
The recent data on the economy have been only slightly better than assumed in my April forecast. I continue
to assume trend growth of 2.7 percent but there remains considerable uncertainty around that number. I
expect the economy to pick up at the end of 2008 and get back to trend growth in 2009 as the housing cor­
rection unwinds and financial markets stabilize. I continue to assume a relatively small impact of tax rebates
on consumer spending in 2008. Given the recent behavior of oil prices and other commodity and import
prices, and the monetary policy easing already in place, there may be more upward pressure on headline and
core inflation over the forecast horizon than in my baseline forecast. This would necessitate more aggressive
monetary policy than in my baseline to restrain expectations and bring inflationary pressures back to a rate
consistent with my long-run goal.
Respondent 10:
We maintain a weak outlook for GDP growth over the course of this year. While consumer expenditures in
April and May were stronger than expected, we view the current strength in consumption as temporary, with
more consumption now coming at the expense of less consumption for the remainder of the year. The con­
sumption fundamentals remain weak. The labor market is contracting, households net worth is decreasing,
and soaring energy prices are limiting discretionary spending. Moreover, longer-term yields have increased
noticeably and credit markets remain tight. In this context, the fiscal stimulus provides only a partial offset.
We expect the pace of economic activity over the second half of this year to be only slightly faster than in
the first half the result of a diminishing drag to growth from residential investment. In the first half of 2009,
growth is still slightly below potential, as households expenditures remain constrained by declining net worth
associated with falling house prices. The economy is then expected to grow significantly above potential in
2009:H2 and in 2010, when households net worth starts to stabilize and the underlying monetary stimulus
to all interest-sensitive components of demand becomes more apparent.
The unemployment rate peaks at 5.6 percent at the beginning of 2009, and is then on a downward tra­
jectory for the rest of the forecast horizon. Inflation is responsive to the slack emerging in labor markets.
As a result, inflation is pro jected to decline slightly below 2 percent by the end of 2010. This occurs even
when factoring into the forecast some pass-through from high energy prices into core inflation.
Risks to economic activity continue to be skewed to the downside. While there have been improvements in
financial markets, conditions have yet to return to normal. Tighter credit markets have the potential to exert
more restraint on spending than is currently embedded in our baseline forecast. In addition, the continued
fragility in financial markets leaves credit markets vulnerable to event risks.
The risks to the outlook for core inflation are broadly balanced. We rely on an economically meaning­
ful short-run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. While there is uncertainty surrounding the
extent of this tradeoff, an unemployment rate well above the natural rate for some considerable period of
time has historically been associated with declines in inflation.

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Respondent 11:
The large inventory of unsold homes and higher foreclosure rates continues to weigh heavily on the residen­
tial housing market, dampening the growth rate of the economy as a whole. My below-trend pro jection for
output contributes to my forecast for declining inflation rates, especially the core rate, but I also see evidence
supporting that view in the less worker bargaining power scenario from Greenbook.
Although downside risks to output growth remain, the primary risks to this forecast are for higher in­
put prices and inflation expectations.
Respondent 12:
Financial conditions remain tight, with elevated risk spreads and tightening of credit availability. The asso­
ciated credit crunch will likely restrict the pace of economic activity over the next year. In addition, housing
activity has shown few signs of stabilizing, labor market conditions continue to deteriorate, and consumer
and business spending are likely to remain subdued. Hence, the risk that the economy might fall into reces­
sion remains elevated despite the resilience shown so far by consumers and the recent upside surprises to the
GDP growth.
Recent readings on core inflation have been better than expected, although energy price increases have
pushed headline inflation to uncomfortable levels. Despite increases in some measures of inflation expecta­
tions, I still, on balance, view inflation expectations as fairly well anchored. Going forward, weaker growth in
the U.S. economy should generate more slack in product and labor markets, thereby putting some downward
pressure on inflation. In addition, I expect commodity prices to level out around their current levels, but
risks are to the upside.
I assume that monetary policy remains quite accommodative over the next year, helping support growth
even after the fiscal stimulus ends. In particular, the funds rate remains at 2 percent until the fourth quarter
of 2008, and then rises gradually to its equilibrium rate of 4 1 percent by the end of 2010. Monetary policy,
4
along with robust exports, helps push growth modestly above trend in 2009 and 2010. The unemployment
rate remains fairly steady at about 5-1/2 percent until the middle of 2009 and then begins to drop toward
the NAIRU of 4-3/4 percent. Core PCE inflation is elevated in the second half of 2008 and early in 2009,
reflecting some pass-through from the surge in energy and food prices. Core inflation then declines gradually
to 1-3/4 percent by the end of 2010, which I view as consistent with price stability.
Respondent 13:
Although I see a much lower probability that the credit markets will deteriorate substantially in the future
because I think we are likely to have turned the corner in this episode of financial disruption, I think that
the clean up in the credit markets will take a long time because they won’t get back to normal until there
has been a recapitalization of financial institutions, which will be a slow process. I thus find the delayed
credit recovery scenario (which I think of as having similarity to the ”headwinds” period of the early 1990s)
to be the most likely scenario. This is why I have slower GDP growth and higher unemployment than the
greenbook baseline. I am a little more sanguine on the inflation outlook than the greenbook because I think
there has been only a slight deterioration in long-run inflation expectations, which I view as a key driving
factor of the inflation process. I am concerned that inflation expectations could rise a little bit, but also see
the downside risk on GDP growth. Thus I see the inflation risk as balanced.
Respondent 14:
The threat of severe damage to the intermediation sector due to ongoing turmoil in financial markets has
receded. There is still some residual probability associated with this event, but it is substantially lower
than it was earlier this year. This retreating probability is shaping private sector expectations for 2008 and
2009. The FOMC’s pre-emptive moves made earlier this year were designed in part to mitigate against a
particularly poor real economic performance during the spring and summer of 2008. That performance has
been stronger than anticipated, leading to a more robust economy and a more worrisome inflation outlook

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than envisioned earlier in the year.
Respondent 15:
The forces restraining growth this year–tight credit availability as lenders conserve capital and liquidity, de­
creases in housing prices and activity, and oil price increases–slowly recede over the next 1-1/2 years, so that
economic growth next year begins to exceed the growth rate of potential, given an accommodative stance
of policy. The assumed leveling off of oil prices and persistent output gap reverse the increase in inflation
and any incipient rise in inflation expectations from the near-term elevation of headline inflation. Policy is
tightened gradually to forestall overshooting and cap inflation at just under 2 percent.
Respondent 16:
Based on positive incoming data my 2008 GDP forecast is notably higher than in April. However, I still
expect the housing and financial markets to exert a significant drag on real activity for the balance of the
year and into 2009. As a result, my GDP growth forecast for 2009 is similar to my last submission. The
possibility that financial market turmoil could flare up again, the possibility that nonresidential construc­
tion could deteriorate more than I expect, and the uncertain effect of rising energy prices on consumer and
business spending convince me that in the near term the risks to real GDP growth remain weighted to the
down-side.
Although I assume that oil prices will stabilize at current levels, rapid increases in oil and food prices
over the first half of 2008 will lead to average headline inflation being close to 4 percent in 2008. I also
assume that inflationary pressures will unwind relatively slowly in 2009, a judgment that is reinforced by
anecdotal reports on pricing from businesses in my district, along with the recent uptick in some measures
of inflation expectations. These developments suggest to me that inflationary risks remain weighted to the
upside.
Respondent 17:
The economy has slowed significantly but I now believe it has not entered and likely will not enter a reces­
sion. Temporary fiscal stimulus is providing a temporary boost to activity, but that’s likely to wear off and
commercial construction is likely to soften significantly before the end of the year. Recovery is likely to be
slow in 2009.
Headline inflation is too high, and likely to rise in the near term as commodity price increases work their way
through. Inflation expectations appear to remain stable for now, although they lie above levels consistent
with inflation objectives below 2 percent. Appropriate policy works to restore price stability in a reasonably
timely manner. Commodity price volatility will pose continuing challenges for that endeavor.

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Forecast Narratives (continued)

4(b). Please describe the key judgements and assumptions affecting your

economic projections in the final pro jection year.

Respondent 1:
On path of returning to trend levels, but not at steady-state at end of projection period. Tax policy, trade
policy and regulatory policy uncertainty expected to impact 2009 and 2010 economic performance negatively
Respondent 2:
(1) Economic growth returns to potential in 2010. Demographic changes contribute to a fall in potential
growth in 2009 and 2010. Potential growth is estimated to fall from 2.7 percent currently, to 2.6 percent in
2009 and 2.5 percent in 2010.
(2) Core PCE inflation approaches desired levels by 2010.
(3) Monetary policy begins to tighten this year and reaches neutral by the end of 2009.
Respondent 3:
Because of the slow recovery of the housing and financial sectors, the unemployment rate remains elevated
through the end of 2010.
Respondent 4:
We assume that long-term inflation expectations are between 2-2.5% on a CPI basis and the FOMC’s infla­
tion objective to be 1.5-2.0% for the PCE deflator and 2-2.5% for the CPI. Potential growth is 2.6% (in 2010
the retirement of baby boomers begins to have a perceptible impact on labor input), and that the output
gap opens in 2008 and narrows in 2009-10. Our extended forecast also includes some implicit judgments
about the likely ranges for the NAIRU and the neutral policy rate. Those judgments put the neutral policy
rate in the region of 3.75% to 4.75% absent the current disruptions in financial markets and the NAIRU
between 4.5% to 5%.
Respondent 5:
We assume a modest degree of slack will be necessary to insure that inflation will fall below 2 percent as we
move beyond the forecast horizon. Accordingly, under appropriate policy, we do not see growth exceeding
our estimate of potential (which is 2.6 percent) in 2010. This leaves our pro jection for the unemployment
rate in 2010:Q4 at 5.6 percent, somewhat above our assumption for the NAIRU (which is 5.0 percent).
Respondent 6:
The growth estimate for 2010 is above my estimate of potential growth, which is about 2.8, as it reflects a
cyclical recovery. The unemployment rate in 2010 is above my estimate of the NAIRU (around 4.8) because
job growth will lag the recovery. The core inflation projection in 2010 reflects my views on the operational
definition of price stability; I have the overall inflation rate in 2010 slightly higher reflecting continued mo­
mentum in food and energy prices.
Respondent 7:
My judgments and assumptions are largely consistent with those in the Greenbook, except that I assume
the federal funds rate is higher in 2009 and 2010.
Respondent 8:
The financial headwinds will have diminished significantly by 2010 and the adjustment in housing will
be largely complete, permitting the underlying resilience and flexibility of the economy to show through.
Monetary policy will have acted, and will be positioned, to resist any material deterioration in inflation

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expectations or appreciable acceleration in core inflation.
Respondent 9:
Real output is growing at about a trend pace of 2.7 percent in 2010, the unemployment rate is about at
its natural rate of 5 to 5.25 percent, and inflation is running above my long-term goal of 1.5 percent. As
mentioned in 4(a), accommodative monetary policy may lead to upward pressure on core inflation and raises
the risk that inflation expectations begin to move upward. If this happens, monetary policy would have to
tighten more in 2009 than in my baseline forecast and possibly remain above a neutral rate in 2010 to keep
inflation and inflation expectations from rising.
Respondent 10:
Potential GDP growth is 2

1
2

percent. The NAIRU is 4

3
4

percent. The target inflation rate is 2.0 percent.

Respondent 11:
I have defined appropriate policy over this horizon as one that is consistent with achieving PCE inflation
slightly less than 2 percent and I have adopted assumptions for labor productivity and employment growth
that are consistent with potential GDP growth of 2.6 percent.
Respondent 12:
In 2010, my forecast shows inflation that is consistent with price stability. By the end of 2010, real GDP
growth, the unemployment rate, and the real funds rate are at or near their long-run sustainable levels.
Respondent 13:
Long-run inflation objective at 2%, NAIRU at 4.75% and potential GDP same as in greenbook.
Respondent 14:
The 2010 numbers place output growth at the steady state rate and core inflation at target. Overall PCE
inflation remains elevated because of longer-term relative price changes in the energy sector.
Respondent 15:
potential output increases at 2.5 percent; the NAIRU is 4.75 percent; inflation a little below 2 percent is
consistent with price stability.
Respondent 16:
My 2010 projection for real GDP growth roughly corresponds to my estimate of potential growth.
My 2010 projection for headline inflation is in the range of my preferred long-run inflation rate.
Respondent 17:
Trend real GDP growth is around 2.7 percent, and the average realized PCE inflation rate in 2010 under an
appropriate monetary policy is 1.5 percent.

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Forecast Narratives (continued)

4(c). Please describe any important differences between your current economic

forecast and the Greenbook
Respondent 1:
Expect weaker growth and higher inflation in 2009 than GB forecasts
Respondent 2:
(1) My outlook for growth in 2008 is less pessimistic than Greenbook. In particular, I expect real GDP
growth will remain stable in the second half while Greenbook expects a significant decrease in growth. For
core inflation, I am more concerned about the upside risks than appears to be the case in Greenbook.
(2) I expect a faster removal of policy accommodation
than Greenbook, with the federal funds rate reaching
2009. As a result, I expect real GDP growth will be
potential as forecast in Greenbook. I also expect core

and the insurance taken out against financial turmoil
neutral (approximately 4 1/4 percent) by the end of
at potential in 2010, rather than significantly above
PCE inflation will be lower in 2010 than Greenbook.

Respondent 3:
Core inflation follows a path similar to that in the Greenbook baseline forecast, but only because policy is
tightened more quickly. Continuing increases in food and energy prices mean that headline inflation retreats
more gradually than in the Greenbook. Persistent headwinds from high energy prices and the recapitaliza­
tion of the banking system imply an extended period of sluggish growth.
Respondent 4:
We pro ject slightly higher trend growth of hours worked mainly because we assume that the secular decline
in the labor force participation rate will occur later and more slowly than in the GB. We assume lower
inflation persistence than does the GB. In terms of the short-term forecast we pro ject lower core and total
inflation in 2008H2. The difference for total inflation appears to be driven by lower assumptions on energy
prices (we assume average oil prices slightly below current future prices) and markups by refiners.
Respondent 5:
We do not think that negative influences from credit conditions and higher energy prices are severe enough
to reduce growth in 2008:H2 to the degree assumed in the Greenbook. We also think that a more aggressive
path of policy tightening will be necessary to keep inflation and inflationary expectations in check.
Respondent 6:
My estimate of potential growth was above the Greenbook until this round; staff have moved their estimate
up close to mine in this iteration. I am a bit more pessimistic about near-term growth because I see recession
dynamics taking hold and expect significant restraint from credit conditions.
Respondent 7:
No important differences.
Respondent 8:
The differences are minor.
Respondent 9:
I assume the labor force grows at about 0.8 percent per year. Nonfarm payroll employment declines in
2008Q2, is flat in 2008Q3, and rises by an average of about 54 thousand jobs per month in 2008Q4. The
Greenbook has payrolls declining by about 33 thousand jobs per month in 2008Q3 and 2008Q4. In my
forecast, employment rebounds to a better than 120 thousand jobs per month pace in 2009 and 2010. The

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Greenbook has weaker employment growth than this.
Respondent 10:
We concur with the Greenbook that activity is likely to remain weak at least for the rest of this year, and
possibly also for the first half of 2009.
Differences in the inflation outlook are slightly more significant, and they are essentially the result of our
lower implied sacrifice ratio.
Respondent 11:
Over the balance of the forecast horizon, my pro jections for output and inflation are broadly similar to the
Greenbook.
Respondent 12:
The broad contours of the forecast are similar to the Greenbooks. The most important differences are that I
am slightly more optimistic on inflation, reflecting my view that inflation expectations have drifted upwards
by less than the Greenbook has assumed; and because I expect the economy to converge to its long-run
values more quickly than Greenbook assumes.
Respondent 13:
I see a somewhat slower recovery because I think the clean up of the financial system will take a long time
and will be a drag (headwind) on growth along the lines of the delayed credit recovery scenario.
Respondent 14:
Relative to the June Greenbook, this forecast envisions a stronger real economy and a more challenging
inflation scenario. The path for the federal funds rate would have to rise more aggressively in this forecast
if the 2010 outcomes are to be achieved.
Respondent 15:
less recessionary tendencies in the second half of this year; a reversal of the recent upcreep in inflation ex­
pectations once energy prices level off.
Respondent 16:
NA
Respondent 17:
The key difference is a more hawkish policy assumption which results in a more subdued recovery and lower
final year inflation.

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Forecast Narratives (continued)

4(d). Please describe the key factors causing your forecast to change since the

previous quarter’s pro jections.
Respondent 1:
No material changes
Respondent 2:
My outlook for first half growth has been revised upwards despite higher energy prices. The upward revision
reflects first quarter growth that is stronger than I expected and an upward revision to my estimate of second
quarter growth. However, my outlook for growth in 2009 and 2010 is relatively unchanged. My outlook for
PCE inflation in the first half is somewhat higher and my outlook for core PCE inflation is somewhat lower
than last time, again reflecting recent economic developments.
Respondent 3:
More-resilient-than-expected consumer spending is responsible for an upward revision to near-term GDP
growth.
Respondent 4:
In April we pro jected the US economy would experience a mild recession in the first half of the year. Relative
to our April forecast, the labor market has been stronger (we view the out-sized jump in the unemployment
rate in May as a seasonal quirk), household spending outside of autos has been firmer, business spending has
been little better and housing data has not been materially worse than our forecast. These data combined
with the confirmed strength of net exports makes it most likely a recession has been avoided. In addition, if
a recession still does occur it is more likely to be mild.
Incoming data since April were consistent with our core inflation forecast in the near term but higher energy
prices have slightly increased the forecast for core in 2008H2. Energy prices have continued to surprise on
the upside and we have increased the forecast for total inflation and now assess the risks to the upside in
the near term.
The policy path underlying our central pro jection is unchanged in the near-term but we have slightly steep­
ened the assumed path for renormalization of real interest rates in light of the tentative signs of stabilization
and pro jected higher readings on total inflation.
Respondent 5:
The incoming data on the real economy and the improvements in financial market conditions have caused us
to mark up our outlook for growth in 2008. We feel these changes more then offset the dampening influence
on demand from higher energy prices. That said, the higher prices for energy and other commodities and
the increasing risk that inflation expectations have moved up a bit have caused us to raise our forecasts for
both total and core PCE.
Respondent 6:
Modest improvement in financial markets and stronger-than-expected incoming data led me to raise my
growth forecast for 2008, especially the first half. Otherwise the general contour of my forecast is not much
changed.
Respondent 7:
My main changes are in a higher real GDP forecast for 2008 and higher headline inflation in 2008. Both
of these have been driven by the data received since the last FOMC. My longer term projections remain
little changed. I also have changed the increased the uncertainty around the inflation outlook given the
movements in commodity prices, particularly energy.

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Respondent 8:
There are three changes worth noting. My forecast of real growth for 2008 is back up (approximately) to
the January pro jection, reflecting the better-than-anticipated performance of the economy in the first half
of this year. And, in light of somewhat better prospects for 2008, I raised my outlook for growth in 2009
marginally as well. Finally, PCE inflation in 2008 is expected to run higher than earlier anticipated because
of developments in energy and other commodity prices.
Respondent 9:
The incoming data on the real economy have largely been consistent with my April pro jection. However,
recent readings on inflation, inflation expectations, oil prices, and other commodity prices have led me to
revise upward my estimate of near-term inflation. Consequently, my path for the funds rate is steeper than
in the last forecast. I now assume the FOMC begins raising the funds rate in 2008Q3. Accommodative mon­
etary policy risks unanchoring inflation expectations so the funds rate needs to increase over the forecast
horizon to 4.5 percent by the end of 2009.
Respondent 10:
The differences are small. More growth in the first half of this year comes at the expense of less growth
in 2008:H2. Consequently, the outlook for economic activity this year is unchanged. Over the remaining
of the forecast horizon, we pro ject some more labor market slack than previously thought. This additional
slack offsets pressures to core inflation stemming from higher energy prices. As a result, the outlook for core
inflation has not changed materially.
Respondent 11:
Incoming data led me to revise up my pro jections for BFI and PCE in the first half of 2008. Higher prices for
energy and some other commodity have caused me to increase my headline inflation pro jections throughout
the balance of the forecast period.
Respondent 12:
Recent data on second-quarter activity have been stronger than I expected, and readings on core inflation
have been a bit lower than I expected. However, the surge in commodity prices (particularly the roughly
$25/barrel jump in the path of oil prices) has boosted my 2008 forecast for headline inflation substantially,
and my 2008 forecast for core inflation modestly. Higher energy prices will also dampen growth a bit in the
second half of 2008 and early 2009. Taken together, I have raised my forecast for real GDP growth in 2008
by about 1 percentage point and reduced it in 2009 by about 0.1 percentage point. At the same time, I
2
have raised my PCE inflation forecast for 2008 by a bit less than 1 percentage point, with a more modest
increase in 2009. However, the pass-through of higher food and energy prices remains fairly modest, and my
core inflation forecast in 2009 has edged up only slightly.
Respondent 13:
My forecast has only changed because of the stronger growth we have been seeing in this quarter. However,
as with the greenbook, I see some payback and so have lower growth in 2009 and 2010. I have raised my
inflation forecast (only slightly for core) because of higher energy prices and a slight uptick (10 basis points)
in long-run expected inflation.
Respondent 14:
Some of the news on headline inflation has been worse than anticipated in the previous forecast, but much
of the forecast remains the same.
Respondent 15:
Stronger than expected growth in the first half of this year and a greater rise in oil prices account for the
higher growth rate and higher headline inflation for 2008. Rates of increase in output and prices and unem­
ployment rates for 2009 and 2010 are not materially different from my previous projections.

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Respondent 16:
As a result of generally positive incoming data I have revised up my 2008 H1 real GDP forecast by 150 basis
points. However, I assume that the effects of higher energy prices offset these positive surprises in the second
half of the year, leaving my 2008 H2 forecast essentially unchanged.
As a result of continued increases in energy prices I have revised my 2008 headline inflation forecast higher
by 90 basis points. In addition, hints of increases in inflation expectations and accumulating reports I have
received about anticipated cost-based pricing decisions by businesses leads to me to raise my 2009 forecast
for both core and headline inflation by 20 basis points. These developments also cause me to assume a
steeper tra jectory for the funds rate during 2009 in order to return inflation to my preferred range in 2010.
Respondent 17:
Unexpectedly favorable data on household spending, personal income, private nonresidential construction
and new orders have led me to raise my forecasts for consumption and business fixed investment. Unfavor­
able readings on inflation and inflation expectations have led me to mark up my inflation and policy rate
forecasts as well.

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Chart 2(a): Distribution of Participants’ Projections (percent)
Real GDP
2008
April
Greenbook

Unemployment Rate
2008

Number of participants
June
Greenbook

June Projections
April Projections

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.5

2009

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.5

April Projections

5.0 5.1

5.2 5.3

5.4 5.5

5.6 5.7

5.8 5.9

April
Greenbook

4.8 4.9

5.0 5.1

5.2 5.3

5.4 5.5

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

5.6 5.7

5.8 5.9

6.0 6.1

6.2 6.3

Number of participants

April
Greenbook

4.8 4.9

6.2 6.3

June
Greenbook

2010
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

6.0 6.1

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Number of participants

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Number of participants
April and June
Greenbook

June Projections

2009

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.5

2010

April and June
Greenbook

4.8 4.9

Number of participants
June
April
Greenbook Greenbook

Number of participants

5.0 5.1

Authorized for Public Release – 29 of 30

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

June
Greenbook

5.2 5.3

5.4 5.5

5.6 5.7

5.8 5.9

6.0 6.1

6.2 6.3

SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

June 24–25, 2008

Chart 2(b): Distribution of Participants’ Projections (percent)
PCE Inflation
2008

Core PCE Inflation
2008

Number of participants
April
Greenbook

June
Greenbook

June Projections
April Projections

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.3 4.5
1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.6

2009
April
Greenbook

June Projections
April Projections

1.5 1.6

1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.3 4.5
1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.6

2.1 2.2

1.5 1.6

1.7 1.8

2.5 2.6

1.9 2.0

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

June
Greenbook

2.1 2.2

2.3 2.4

2.5 2.6

Number of participants
April
Greenbook

1.3 1.4

2.3 2.4

Number of participants

2010
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.3 4.5
1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.6

1.9 2.0

April
Greenbook

1.3 1.4

Number of participants

April
June
Greenbook Greenbook

1.7 1.8

2009
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

June
Greenbook

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

April and June
Greenbook

1.3 1.4

Number of participants

2010

Number of participants

1.5 1.6

Authorized for Public Release – 30 of 30

1.7 1.8

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

June
Greenbook

1.9 2.0

2.1 2.2

2.3 2.4

2.5 2.6


Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, One Federal Reserve Bank Plaza, St. Louis, MO 63102