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Factors Impacting the Effectiveness of
Hardest Hit Fund Florida

SIGTARP 16-001

October 6, 2015

Office of the special inspector general
For the Troubled Asset Relief Program
1801 L Street, NW, 4th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20220

October 6, 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Honorable Jacob J. Lew – Secretary of the Treasury

FROM:

/Signed/
The Honorable Christy Goldsmith Romero – Special Inspector
General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program

SUBJECT:

Factors Impacting the Effectiveness of Hardest Hit Fund Florida
(SIGTARP 16-001)

We are providing this report for your information and use. It discusses the Florida Housing
Finance Corporation’s implementation and Treasury’s oversight of the programs that comprise
Florida’s Hardest-Hit Fund (“HHF”) Program.
The Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program conducted
this evaluation (engagement code 006), under the authority of Public Law 110-343, as
amended, which also incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under
the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.
We considered comments from the Department of the Treasury when preparing the report.
Treasury’s comments are addressed in the report, where applicable, and a copy of Treasury’s
response is included in the Management Comments – Appendix J.
We appreciate the courtesies extended to our staff. For additional information on this report,
please contact Mr. Bruce S. Gimbel, Deputy Special Inspector General for Audit and
Evaluation (Bruce.Gimbel@treasury.gov / 202-927-8978), or Ms. Jenniffer F. Wilson,
Assistant Deputy Special Inspector General for Audit and Evaluation
(Jenniffer.Wilson@treasury.gov / 202-622-4633.)

SIGTARP 16-001

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Factors Impacting the Effectiveness of Hardest Hit Fund Florida

Summary
Five years into the Troubled Asset Relief
Program’s (“TARP”) second largest
foreclosure prevention program known as the
Housing Finance Agency Innovation Fund for
the Hardest Hit Housing Markets (“Hardest
Hit Fund” or “HHF”), HHF in Florida has
helped only 22,400, far less than expected at
the beginning of the program. HHF Florida
has drawn down only about half the $1 billion
in TARP funds available.

What SIGTARP Found
SIGTARP found that Treasury abandoned its
announced intent to bring strict accountability
by measuring Hardest Hit Fund program
effectiveness, and as a result, Treasury has
allowed the Hardest Hit Fund in Florida to
underperform compared to other HHF states,
consistently. The Administration and
Treasury announced that the Hardest Hit
Fund combined flexibility for states with strict
accountability by Treasury, and that program
effectiveness would be measured, with
effective oversight. Treasury told all 19
participating state housing finance agencies
that they were required to have a tracking
system to measure progress against goals.
Former Treasury Home Preservation Office
Chief Phyllis Caldwell told SIGTARP in 2011,
that Treasury could evaluate success in HHF
in ways such as, “are we reaching the right
number of people, are we reaching them in a
sustainable way.”
Treasury has no goals or targets to measure
program effectiveness due to fear of
impacting the “dynamic nature” of this TARP
program, which has led to a lack of
accountability and effectiveness of both
Treasury and Florida’s HFA. Treasury could
have set specific goals/targets tailored to
HHF Florida, but did not do so. SIGTARP
found that as a result, HHF Florida has not
been as effective in reaching homeowners as
other states. HHF Florida has the lowest
homeowner admission rate of any HHF state,
one of the highest withdrawn application
SIGTARP 16-001

rates, and has consistently denied
homeowners at higher rates than the national
average.
Treasury has no goal for the right number of
people to be helped by HHF Florida, and as
a result, Treasury has allowed Florida’s HFA
to reduce its estimate of the number of
people to be helped by HHF by 63% from
106,000 to 39,000, despite the fact that
Florida had the nation’s highest foreclosure
rate at 2.3% in 2014.
Treasury has no targeted homeowner
admission rate for HHF Florida, and as a
result, only 20% (22,400 of 109,774) of
homeowners who applied for help received
assistance. This is the lowest of any HHF
state, and is far below the other 18 states’
average of providing assistance to about half
(48%) of homeowners who apply. HHF has
consistently had a low homeowner admission
rate over five years (ranging from 18-23%).
Treasury has no targeted homeowner denial
rate for HHF Florida, and as a result, HHF
Florida has consistently denied a higher
percentage of homeowners for assistance
(27-45%) than the national average. This
rate improved this year, but is still slightly
above the national average of 26%.
Treasury provides no transparency on why
HHF Florida denied homeowners.
Treasury has no targeted number of
homeowner applications withdrawn by
Florida’s HFA, and as a result, as of March
2015, nearly 40% of all homeowners who
applied to HHF Florida either withdrew their
application or had their application withdrawn
by Florida’s HFA. This rate has escalated
from 35% in 2012, and was far higher than
the other 18 states’ average of 24%, as of
March 2015.
Treasury has no target for how long HHF
Florida should process homeowner
applications, and as a result, it takes a
median of nearly 6 months (167 days) for a
homeowner to get assistance.
SIGTARP found several factors contributed
to HHF Florida’s slowness in getting
assistance to homeowners and lack of
effectiveness during the height of the crisis
October 6, 2015

Factors Impacting the Effectiveness of Hardest Hit Fund Florida

when Florida homeowners needed it most.
Treasury lacked comprehensive planning
and waited for Florida’s HFA to get large
servicers to participate. Unemployed
homeowners would have to wait more than
one year for statewide rollout of HHF
assistance.
SIGTARP found that despite choosing
Florida for HHF because it had the third
highest home price decline in the nation,
there was no HHF Florida program targeted
to underwater homeowners for the first three
years. Treasury left it to Florida’s HFA acting
deferentially.
In the first two years, nearly half of all
homeowners were denied as ineligible, but
Treasury accepted Florida HFA’s justification.
Two weeks after SIGTARP’s 2012 report,
Florida’s HFA voted to eliminate four
eligibility requirements that accounted for half
of all denied homeowners.
In December 2010, Treasury deferred to
Florida HFA’s request to reduce the duration
of unemployment assistance from 18 months
to 6 months, the shortest duration in HHF,
despite Treasury knowing that
unemployment was 27 weeks or longer.
Florida’s HFA would extend assistance to
12 months, two weeks after SIGTARP’s 2012
report.
Treasury can, and has on occasion,
intervened to “change the game,” “pressure”
or “push,” Florida’s HFA, according to senior
Treasury officials, and that intervention has
brought some improvement. Treasury
intervened to get large servicers to
participate. After SIGTARP’s 2012 HHF
report, Treasury took strong action to
increase HHF Florida’s effectiveness,
sending a November 2012 Action
Memorandum to Florida’s HFA, instructing
them to increase homeowners assisted to
750 a month, raise the ratio of approved
homeowners to denied homeowners,
increase inadequate staffing levels, and
create a program to address negative equity.
This brought improvement, but Treasury did
not hold Florida’s HFA to 750 homeowners
SIGTARP 16-001

per month, and HHF Florida continued to lag
behind other HHF states.
Despite improvements made in 2013,
SIGTARP found several factors contributing
to HHF Florida lagging behind other HHF
states. Treasury did not identify and mitigate
the obstacle that Florida’s HFA was unable to
handle the flood of applications for the 2013
principal reduction program. After the first
week, Florida’s HFA stopped accepting
applications for 8 months. Only 14% of
homeowners who applied have received this
assistance, and more than one-third of
homeowners have been denied. Treasury
did not identify and mitigate obstacles for
senior citizens with reverse mortgages facing
problems applying for assistance and
providing necessary documentation. As a
result, 46% of all seniors who have applied
had their application withdrawn. Treasury
has no goal for the length of time Florida’s
HFA takes to process an application, and as
a result, it takes 9 to10 months for a senior
citizen to obtain assistance. Treasury lacked
comprehensive planning in a HHF Florida
program for a non-profit to buy homes and
HHF to modify mortgages by not identifying
and mitigating an obstacle that the non-profit
might not be the successful bidder at HUD
sales. After a two-year pilot, only 92
homeowners have been helped through that
program.
Rather than holding itself and Florida’s HFA
strictly accountable, Treasury conducts
deferential oversight, without a sense of
urgency. Treasury’s current Home
Preservation Office (HPO) Chief Mark
McArdle described to SIGTARP how
Treasury “leaves it to the states” to decide.
Treasury looks for incremental change –
either a program change or steady growth
quarter to quarter- “one or the other,”
according to Treasury HPO Chief McArdle.
Treasury only tracks and measures against
the goal of HHF Florida spending their
allocated $1 billion in TARP funds by the end
of the program in December 2017. After five
years, HHF Florida has spent only half of
these funds, despite Florida’s homeowners
experiencing a critical need.

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Factors Impacting the Effectiveness of Hardest Hit Fund Florida

SIGTARP also found that Treasury shifts to
homeowners the burden of complying with
the Dodd-Frank Act’s prohibition on anyone
convicted of a mortgage-related crime within
the last 10 years from receiving HHF funds,
by only complying with this law by requiring
homeowners to self-report. Treasury
conducts no due diligence to check readily
available public databases on convictions of
homeowners, making HHF vulnerable to
fraud and thwarting the intent of the DoddFrank Act.

Treasury provided comments to the draft
report. SIGTARP addressed those
comments where applicable. Treasury
generally disagreed with SIGTARP’s
findings, and said that “Treasury believes it
would hamper progress and slow the pace of
assistance by substantially increasing the
administrative burden to operate these
programs.” Treasury did not agree to
implement SIGTARP’s recommendations,
but said they would “review all of SIGTARP’s
recommendations and respond to each one
in the ordinary course.”

What SIGTARP Recommends
Given the sense of urgency that Treasury
must adopt to improve the effectiveness of
HHF Florida to help the urgent needs of
Florida homeowners now, not by
December 31, 2017, when the program ends,
and to ensure that Florida homeowners have
the same chance of HHF assistance as
homeowners in other states, SIGTARP made
20 recommendations to Treasury to improve
HHF Florida’s homeowner admission rate,
homeowner withdrawal rates, homeowner
denial rates, time to process homeowner
applications, and time to process senior
citizens’ applications. SIGTARP also made
recommendations for Treasury to reassess
whether all eligibility requirements are
absolutely necessary and eliminate those
that are not, particularly for senior citizens;
increase reporting at a county level to give
insight into areas for improvement; report
why homeowners have been denied; require
more detailed reporting on withdrawn
applications; increase contact with
homeowners to give insight into areas for
improvement; and form a performance
committee to meet each quarter to measure
performance in each state, identify obstacles,
and develop strategies to mitigate those
obstacles. To reduce HHF’s vulnerability to
fraud, waste, and abuse, SIGTARP made
recommendations related to Treasury
conducting due diligence, including
background checks on homeowners and
HFA employees related to convictions.

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Factors Impacting the Effectiveness of Hardest Hit Fund Florida

Table of Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 1
Background ................................................................................................................................................. 3
According to Treasury Data, Only 20 Percent of Homeowners Who Applied for Help from the
Hardest Hit Fund Florida Received Assistance – the Lowest of All HHF States.................................... 5
According to Treasury Data, the Other HHF States Average Providing Assistance to About
Half (48 Percent) of Homeowners Who Applied ........................................................................... 7
HHF Florida Consistently Denied Homeowners at Higher Rates than the National HHF
Average Every Year, Which Improved This Year, But is Still Slightly Above the
National Average .......................................................................................................................... 10
HHF Florida Has a High Number of Withdrawn Applications (Either by the Homeowner or
Florida’s HFA) Compared to the National HHF Average ............................................................ 12
Treasury Has Not Done Everything It Can To Ensure That HHF Florida is Effective in Providing
Assistance to Homeowners and as a Result HHF Florida Has Underperformed .................................. 14
SIGTARP Found That Treasury Abandoned Its Intent To Set Goals for HHF Program
Effectiveness and Measure Progress Against Those Goals .......................................................... 14
Treasury Is Not Operating with a Sense of Urgency To Ensure that HHF Florida Is
Effective ........................................................................................................................................ 17
Several Factors Contributed to Hardest Hit Fund Florida’s Slowness in Getting Assistance to
Homeowners and Lack of Effectiveness During the Height of the Crisis When Florida
Homeowners Needed it Most................................................................................................................. 19
Plagued by a Lack of Comprehensive Planning by Treasury, Which Waited for Florida’s
HFA To Get Large Servicers To Participate, the Hardest Hit Fund Florida was Slow To
Reach Homeowners ...................................................................................................................... 19
For the First Three Years (February 2010 – September 2013), There Was No Hardest Hit
Fund Targeted Assistance to Underwater Homeowners in Florida .............................................. 21
For the First Two Years, Nearly Half of All Who Completed an Application for the Hardest
Hit Fund in Florida Were Denied as Ineligible ............................................................................. 22
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Factors Impacting the Effectiveness of Hardest Hit Fund Florida

Treasury Allowed Florida To Decrease the Duration of HHF Unemployment from 18
Months to 6 Months Despite Treasury Knowing that Unemployment was 27 Weeks or
Longer, and that Treasury Allowed Extended Unemployment Assistance in HAMP ................. 24
Treasury Took Some Strong Oversight Action in Response to SIGTARP’s 2012 Report and
Recommendations To Hold Treasury and the Florida Housing Finance Agency Accountable
and Make HHF Florida More Effective ................................................................................................. 28
Improvements After Treasury Intervened To Take a Stronger Role Following SIGTARP’s
2012 Report Prove that Stronger and More Proactive Treasury Action in HHF Leads to
Stronger HHF Performance .......................................................................................................... 30
Despite Improvements Made in 2013, HHF Florida Continues To Lag Behind Other HHF States
in Effectiveness ...................................................................................................................................... 32
Implementation Issues Delayed HHF Florida Principal Reduction Assistance and Caused a
Backlog ......................................................................................................................................... 32
The HHF Program for Senior Citizens Has Struggled in Part Because Seniors Had
Difficulty Applying and Providing Necessary Documentation .................................................... 35
The HHF Florida Two-year Pilot To Buy and Modify Pools of Mortgages Has Not Been
Effective ........................................................................................................................................ 38
Treasury Must Ensure that the New Homebuyer HHF Program Progresses Effectively and
Make Timely Changes To Ensure Effectiveness .......................................................................... 40
HHF Florida Has Vulnerabilities to Fraud That Treasury Should Strengthen ................................ 40
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................ 45
Recommendations ..................................................................................................................................... 55
Management Comments and SIGTARP’s Response ................................................................................ 60
Appendix A – Objective, Scope, and Methodology ................................................................................. 61
Appendix B – Acronyms and Abbreviations ............................................................................................ 63
Appendix C – Utilization of TARP HHF Funding, By State ................................................................... 64
Appendix D – HHF Florida Assistance by County Over the Last 12 Months and Program to Date
– As of 3/31/2015................................................................................................................................... 65

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Factors Impacting the Effectiveness of Hardest Hit Fund Florida

Appendix E – HHF Application Volume Over Time by Application Status – Florida Compared
to Other HHF States ............................................................................................................................... 67
Appendix F – Application Denial Rate by State ....................................................................................... 68
Appendix G – Application Withdrawal Rate by State .............................................................................. 69
Appendix H – Treasury Action Memorandum to Florida HFA ............................................................... 70
Appendix I – Audit Team Members ......................................................................................................... 72
Appendix J – Management Comments ..................................................................................................... 73

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FACTORS IMPACTING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HARDEST HIT FUND FLORIDA

1

Introduction
In 2009, the United States was in a financial crisis, with approximately 2.8 million
homeowners receiving foreclosure filings, according to RealtyTrac LLC, 18.3%
of them (517,000) in Florida. 1 Almost 6% (nearly 3 in 45) of Florida households
entered into foreclosure, compared to slightly more than 2% (1 in 45) of
households nationwide. In February 2010, the Administration announced the
second largest TARP housing program, the $7.6 billion TARP Housing Finance
Agency Innovation Fund for the Hardest Hit Housing Markets (“Hardest Hit
Fund,” or “HHF”), to target help to families in the states “hit the hardest by the
aftermath of the housing bubble.” 2
Treasury selected the first five HHF states because each saw the average price of
homes fall by more than 20% from the peak – Florida had a 37.4% average price
decline. Treasury expanded HHF three times to cover 18 states and the District of
Columbia (the “states” or “HHF states”). Treasury was so concerned with
Florida’s home price decline and 11.8% unemployment rate, that it would pick
Florida in two additional rounds, allocating $1 billion in TARP funds for HHF in
Florida (“HHF Florida”). HHF Florida is administered by Florida’s housing
finance agency called the Florida Housing Finance Corporation (“Florida’s
HFA”). Treasury, as the steward for TARP funds, is responsible for oversight
over HHF.
Two years into this TARP program, on April 12, 2012, SIGTARP issued a report
finding that HHF had experienced significant delay in providing help to
homeowners due to several factors including a lack of comprehensive planning by
Treasury and a delay and limitation in participation in the program by large
servicers and the government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”) – Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. As of December 31, 2011, which was the latest Treasury data
available at that time, the Hardest Hit Fund had only spent $217.4 million to
provide assistance to 30,640 homeowners – approximately 3% of the TARP funds
allocated to HHF and approximately 7% of the minimum number of homeowners
whom the state HFAs estimated helping over the life of the program, which ends
in 2017. At that point, HHF Florida had provided assistance to 3,302
homeowners (3.1% of the 106,000 expected to be helped by HHF) and spent
$15,156,356 (1.4% of allocated TARP funds). 3 SIGTARP also reported that
nearly all (98%) of the help provided to homeowners under HHF had been related
to unemployment assistance or reinstatement of past-due amounts, the only types
of assistance for which GSEs directed servicers to participate. SIGTARP
concluded that without significant change, HHF was likely to be limited in

1

RealtyTrac is a data analytics company that provides real estate data analytics and services.
TARP’s signature housing program that began in early 2009 is the Home Affordable Modification program (“HAMP”).
3
Florida’s estimate of the number of homeowners expected to be helped by HHF may double-count individual
homeowners who receive assistance from more than one program.
2

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FACTORS IMPACTING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HARDEST HIT FUND FLORIDA

2

addressing negative equity for homeowners who are underwater. Treasury
rejected SIGTARP’s recommendations.
In a letter to SIGTARP in 2013, Senator Bill Nelson requested that SIGTARP
initiate a review of HHF Florida after a Tampa Bay Times article was published
entitled “Tax dollars are paying Florida mortgages for felons, debtors.”
SIGTARP began an evaluation of the Hardest Hit Fund in Florida to assess
Florida’s HFA’s implementation and Treasury’s oversight of HHF Florida. Our
evaluation covers the entirety of HHF Florida. SIGTARP conducted this
evaluation in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspection and
Evaluation” established by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency. For a discussion of the evaluation’s scope and methodology, see
Appendix A.

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FACTORS IMPACTING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HARDEST HIT FUND FLORIDA

3

Background
The Administration announced that HHF would “Help address urgent problems
facing homeowners at the center of the housing crisis” [emphasis added]. The
White House announced, “This new innovation fund will help housing finance
agencies in the hardest-hit areas and localities further respond to the most
pressing problems in their communities” [emphasis added].
As SIGTARP reported in 2012, former Treasury Chief of Homeownership
Preservation Office (“HPO”) Phyllis Caldwell told SIGTARP, “We focused on
price declines….We thought about principal reduction and negative equity to
address that in places where homeowners had put down 20% or more and were
still underwater.” 4 Caldwell explained that Treasury thought it “could capture the
responsible borrower caught in the bubble and then price declines.”
Treasury’s website describes the Hardest Hit Fund as providing targeted aid to
families in states hit hard by the economic and housing market downturn, to
provide funding for state HFAs to develop locally-tailored foreclosure prevention
strategies. Treasury’s former HPO Chief Phyllis Caldwell told SIGTARP in 2011
that there were differences at the state level that showed the need for state-level
solutions, a local program versus a national program, saying “for instance, it’s
difficult to develop the same set of criteria for Arizona and Ohio in order to
develop home foreclosure prevention solutions.”
Hardest Hit Fund Florida started with: (1) unemployment assistance – HHF pays
an unemployed or underemployed homeowner’s mortgage for a set number of
months up to a set amount and (2) reinstatement – a one-time payment up to a set
amount to a mortgage lender to help satisfy past-due amounts. According to a
2012 report by the State of Florida Auditor General, Florida’s HFA has
employees who work on HHF Florida, but largely relies on approximately 100
advisor agencies they contract with throughout Florida to process HHF
homeowner applications and determine eligibility.
Three quarters of homeowners in Florida who are receiving HHF assistance are
unemployed or underemployed. Almost all (96%) of homeowners in Florida
receiving HHF assistance made less than $70,000, with 82% making less than
$50,000. Additionally, about 80% have underwater homes. 5 Half of these
homeowners were 60 or more days’ past-due on their mortgage (including 42%
who were 90 days past-due).
Although unemployment and home price decline have improved in Florida,
Florida homeowners are still struggling. In 2014, Florida had the nation’s highest
foreclosure rate at 2.3%, according to RealtyTrac. As of March 31, 2015, the
4
5

See SIGTARP, “Factors Affecting Implementation of the Hardest Hit Fund Program,” April 12, 2012.
Underwater homes have a loan to value ratio over 100%.

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FACTORS IMPACTING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HARDEST HIT FUND FLORIDA

4

latest Treasury data available as of the drafting of this report, after five years,
HHF Florida had provided assistance to 22,400 homeowners, had spent about half
of the allocated TARP dollars ($495.6 million) and spent $53.5 million on
administrative expenses, outreach, and counseling. 6 Only three states lag behind
Florida in their use of available TARP funds, as a percentage of HHF funds
received. 7

6

As of March 31, 2015, Florida HFA had drawn down $596.3 million (56%) of the approximate $1.06 billion in HHF
funds available, leaving $495.6 million. Figures may not add due to rounding.
7
See Appendix C for utilization of HHF funding by state.
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FACTORS IMPACTING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HARDEST HIT FUND FLORIDA

5

According to Treasury Data, Only 20 Percent of
Homeowners Who Applied for Help from the
Hardest Hit Fund Florida Received Assistance –
the Lowest of All HHF States
Only 20% of homeowners who applied for the Hardest Hit Fund Florida received
assistance. According to Florida HFA’s most recent report sent to Treasury, as of
March 31, 2015, only 22,400 of the 109,774 homeowners who applied for the
Hardest Hit Fund in Florida received assistance – a 20% homeowner admission
rate. Treasury has not set a goal for what is the right number of people for HHF
Florida to reach, and rejected SIGTARP’s 2012 recommendation to set such
goals. Treasury has allowed HHF Florida to decrease the estimate of
homeowners to be helped by 63%, from 106,000 homeowners to 39,000. 8
SIGTARP found with HHF Florida that this estimate has limited usefulness
because Treasury has permitted Florida HFA to change its estimate several times,
creating a shifting baseline that makes it difficult for Treasury to measure HHF
Florida’s progress and to hold itself or Florida’s HFA accountable for getting
assistance to homeowners when they needed it most.
Treasury also has not set a goal for a target homeowner admission rate for HHF
Florida. SIGTARP found that HHF Florida has the lowest rate of admitting
homeowners into HHF than any of the other 18 HHF states.

8

On May 30, 2012, Treasury allowed Florida’s HFA to decrease its aggregate estimate of 53,000 homeowners to be
helped in each of Florida’s two HHF programs (unemployment assistance and reinstatement) to 45,000 homeowners
each. On September 20, 2013, when HHF Florida began its first HHF principal reduction program, Treasury allowed
Florida’s HFA to adjust their estimates of homeowners to be helped in the unemployment assistance and reinstatement
programs to a combined total of 25,000 homeowners. With the addition of the Principal Reduction Program (“PR”) and
two other programs – Modification Enabling Pilot Program (“MEP”) and Elderly Mortgage Assistance Program
(“ELMORE”) – Florida HFA’s estimate is 39,000.

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FACTORS IMPACTING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HARDEST HIT FUND FLORIDA

6

TABLE 1

HARDEST HIT FUND HOMEOWNER ADMISSION RATE BY STATE

State
District of Columbia
Tennessee
Indiana
Ohio
Illinois
Kentucky
North Carolina
Rhode Island
Mississippi
Michigan
New Jersey
South Carolina
Oregon
California
Nevada
Georgia
Alabama
Arizona
Florida

Homeowners
Receiving
Assistance
697
7,355
5,198
24,485
13,798
6,668
19,060
3,075
3,187
25,573
6,000
9,209
11,740
48,864
5,282
6,245
3,947
3,728
22,400

Total
Applicants
861
9,352
6,818
34,778
20,294
9,881
28,787
4,833
5,096
54,230
13,093
22,113
28,269
119,453
13,694
22,695
14,766
15,619
109,774

Application
Approval Rate
81%
79%
76%
70%
68%
67%
66%
64%
63%
47%
46%
42%
42%
41%
39%
28%
27%
24%
20%

Source: SIGTARP analysis of Treasury, Housing Finance Agency Aggregate Report as of March 31, 2015, obtained from
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/Housing-Finance-Agency-Aggregate-Report.aspx, accessed August 10, 2015.

The low homeowner admission rate for Florida has been relatively constant
throughout the history of HHF (ranging from 18-23% since March 2011). 9 This
is not new information to Treasury. Each quarter, Florida’s HFA reports to
Treasury on the total number of homeowners who applied, received assistance,
were denied assistance, had their applications withdrawn, or have applications in
process, by each program.
Transparency in reporting to Treasury at a county level in HHF can be
significantly improved to give insight into the effectiveness of HHF Florida. The
number of homeowners who received assistance is the only county-level data that
Treasury requires to be reported. 10 This data shows that in the last year
(April 1, 2014 to March 31, 2015), 28 of 67 Florida counties (more than 40%)
provided HHF assistance to fewer than 10 Florida homeowners. Because
Treasury does not require Florida HFA (or any other state HFA) to report the
number of homeowners who applied for HHF in each county, Treasury and the
public had no insight into each county’s homeowner admission rate.
9

Florida’s March 31, 2012 report to Treasury showed that HHF in Florida had only provided assistance to 18% of
homeowners who applied. Florida’s March 31, 2013 report to Treasury showed that HHF in Florida had only provided
assistance to 21% of homeowners who applied. Florida’s March 31, 2014 report to Treasury showed that HHF in
Florida had only provided assistance to 23% of homeowners who applied.
10
See Appendix D for information related to Florida HHF assistance by county.
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FACTORS IMPACTING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HARDEST HIT FUND FLORIDA

7

Treasury also does not require state HFAs to report by county, the number of
homeowners denied for HHF, whose applications were withdrawn, or whose
applications are in process, which would provide greater transparency and insight
into each county’s performance. Treasury also does not require Florida HFA to
report on a county-level the performance of each category of HHF Florida
assistance (such as principal reduction or unemployment). County-level HHF
performance data is particularly important for HHF Florida’s advisor agents in
counties who review applications and make decisions on homeowners.
Treasury has no goal for how long it takes Florida’s HFA (or their county-level
advisor agents) to process homeowner applications. According to Treasury’s data
as of March 31, 2015, HHF Florida takes a median of 167 days from the time a
homeowner seeks help to the time they get unemployment assistance. Last
quarter’s median was 174 days. HHF Florida takes a median of 226 days to get
reinstatement assistance, which has improved, but last quarter was 167 days.
Given the various steps and players involved in the homeowner application
process, measuring county-level performance could bring transparency and
insight to see where there might be delays or other obstacles.

According to Treasury Data, the Other HHF States Average
Providing Assistance to About Half (48 Percent) of Homeowners
Who Applied
Nationwide HHF (including Florida) Provides Assistance to 42 Percent of
Homeowners
The other 18 states in HHF average providing assistance to about half (48%) of
homeowners who apply. HHF Florida’s low homeowner admission rate pulls the
national average for HHF down to 42%, which is still more than double HHF
Florida’s homeowner admission rate. According to the latest Treasury data
available as of the time of drafting this report, as of March 31, 2015, across all 19
HHF states, 226,511 of the 534,406 homeowners who applied for the Hardest Hit
Fund received assistance – a 42% homeowner admission rate nationwide. One in
every five homeowners who applied (20%) received help from the Hardest Hit
Fund Florida, compared to a national average of two in every five homeowners
(42%).

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Figure 1: Hardest Hit Fund Homeowner Admission Rates Over Time – Florida vs. Other
HHF States

Source: SIGTARP analysis of Treasury, Housing Finance Agency Aggregate Report as of March 31, 2015.

An overall low homeowner admission rate raises questions as to the effectiveness
of HHF Florida and the fact that the rate has not improved raises questions about
whether HHF Florida has been effective in responding to “urgent” and “pressing”
problems as HHF promised. Homeowners who did not get help from HHF
Florida either: (1) were denied (29,544 homeowners – 27%); (2) had their
application withdrawn by Florida’s HFA or withdrew their application after
approval (43,030 homeowners – 39%); or (3) had an application in process
(14,800 homeowners – 13%). 11

11

According to the latest Treasury data available, as of the time of the drafting of this report, March 31, 2015.

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Figure 2: Status of Florida Hardest Hit Fund Applications Over Time

Source: SIGTARP analysis of Treasury, Housing Finance Agency Aggregate Reports as of March 31, 2015,
March 31, 2014, and March 31, 2013, obtained from http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financialstability/reports/Pages/Housing-Finance-Agency-Aggregate-Report.aspx, accessed 8/10/2015. HFA performance data
from March 31, 2012 was obtained from each states Q1 2012 HHF quarterly performance report, the websites containing
these reports can be accessed through Treasury’s “Hardest Hit Fund: State-By-State Information” website at:
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/housing/Pages/Program-Documents.aspx.
Note: Figures may not total 100% due to rounding.

Compared to other HHF states, Treasury’s latest data as of the drafting of this
report (as of March 31, 2015) shows that HHF Florida has a lower homeowner
admission rate, higher rate of withdrawn homeowner applications, and higher
percentage of applications in process than the national average. Because HHF
Florida’s numbers skew the national average, SIGTARP is also presenting the
average of the other 18 HHF states. 12

12

Appendix E shows a comparison of Florida application data to that of the other HHF states.

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Figure 3: Status of Hardest Hit Fund Applications – Florida vs. Other HHF States

Florida

Other HHF States

All HHF States
5%

2%
13%

20%

24%
48%

39%

27%

26%

27%

42%

26%

Homeowners Receiving Assistance

Homeowners Receiving Assistance

Homeowners Receiving Assistance

Homeowners Denied Assistance

Homeowners Denied Assistance

Homeowners Denied Assistance

Homeowners Withdrawn

Homeowners Withdrawn

Homeowners Withdrawn

Homeowners in Process

Homeowners in Process

Homeowners in Process

Source: SIGTARP analysis of Treasury, Housing Finance Agency Aggregate Report as of March 31, 2015, obtained from
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/Housing-Finance-Agency-Aggregate-Report.aspx, accessed
8/10/2015.
Note: Figures may not total 100% due to rounding.

HHF Florida Consistently Denied Homeowners at Higher Rates than
the National HHF Average Every Year, Which Improved This Year,
But is Still Slightly Above the National Average
HHF Florida has a high number of applications “in process”
Treasury has not set a goal for a target homeowner denial rate for HHF Florida.
As a result, through the history of HHF, HHF Florida has denied a higher
percentage of homeowners for assistance than the national average in HHF, which
showed improvement this year, but is still slightly above the national average.
After the first year in HHF, as of March 31, 2011, according to Treasury’s data,
Florida’s HFA reported denying 45% (288) of the 639 homeowners who applied,
compared to a national HHF average of 21%. As of March 31, 2012, Florida’s
HFA had denied 11,352 homeowners, 43% of all who applied, compared to the
national HHF average of 31%. 13 After SIGTARP’s April 2012 report, there was
some improvement, but Florida still denied a higher percentage of homeowners
for assistance than the national average – denying 38% of homeowners for the

13

According to Treasury data, as of March 31, 2012, Florida’s HFA has denied 11,352 homeowners, 43% of the 26,280
homeowners who had applied for HHF.

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years ended March 2013 and March 2014, compared to the national average of
28%. 14

Figure 4: Hardest Hit Fund Homeowner Denial Rates Over Time – Florida vs. Other
HHF States
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

45% 21% 20%

43% 31% 28%

38% 28% 27%

38% 28% 26%

27% 26% 26%

March
2011

March
2012

March
2013

March
2014

March
2015

Florida

Nationwide Average

Other HHF States

Source: SIGTARP analysis of Treasury, Housing Finance Agency Aggregate Report as of March 31, 2015,
Note: See Appendix F for application denial rates by state.

Treasury does not have insight into why these homeowners were denied. Even
though Florida’s HFA includes in a letter to the homeowner the reason for denial,
Treasury does not require reporting on those reasons. Treasury’s HPO Chief told
SIGTARP that in 2011, Treasury looked very closely at the reasons why
homeowners were denied in Florida. However, Treasury provides no
transparency to the public on the reasons why HHF Florida denied homeowners.
For the first time this year ended March 31, 2015, there was improvement. HHF
Florida reported denying 29,544 (27%) of the 109,774 homeowners who applied,
which is slightly over the national average of 26%. Treasury has not set a goal
that HHF Florida’s rate of denying homeowners meet some target such as the
14

According to Treasury data, as of March 31, 2013, Florida’s HFA had denied 15,729 homeowners, 38% of the 41,890
homeowners who had applied for HHF. According to Treasury data, as of March 31, 2014, Florida’s HFA had denied
26,334 homeowners, 38% of the 68,598 homeowners who had applied for HHF.

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national average, or if it did, it was neither made public nor memorialized. This
improvement should be maintained. Also, during this same reporting period,
HHF Florida had very high rates of homeowners whose HHF applications were
withdrawn – 39% (compared to the national HHF average of 27%), and 14,800
homeowners whose HHF applications were in process – 13% (compared to the
5% national HHF average), which requires further Treasury review.

HHF Florida Has a High Number of Withdrawn Applications (Either
by the Homeowner or Florida’s HFA) Compared to the National HHF
Average
According to Treasury’s data, nearly 40% (43,030) of all 109,774 homeowners
who applied for HHF Florida had their application withdrawn, either initiated by
themselves or by Florida’s HFA. This has been an escalating issue with HHF in
Florida, growing from 2012 reporting of 35% of homeowners who applied. The
national HHF average is 27% withdrawn applications. HHF Florida has such a
high withdrawn applications rate that it drags the national average up. The
average of the other HHF states is 24% withdrawn applications.
Figure 5: Hardest Hit Fund Withdrawn Application Rates Over Time – Florida vs. Other HHF
States

Source: SIGTARP analysis of Treasury, Housing Finance Agency Aggregate Report as of March 31, 2015, obtained from
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/Housing-Finance-Agency-Aggregate-Report.aspx, accessed
8/10/2015.

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Treasury lumps two very different situations into one category: a withdrawal of
the HHF application initiated by the homeowner after being deemed eligible for
HHF assistance, and a withdrawal initiated by Florida’s HFA for homeowners
who do not respond to requests for information. Treasury does not know how
many homeowners withdrew their application themselves versus how many
homeowners saw their application withdrawn by Florida’s HFA because Treasury
does not require that reporting. 15
Neither Treasury nor Florida’s HFA know the reasons why a homeowner
withdraws. They do not follow up with the homeowner to ask. A senior Florida
HFA official told SIGTARP about the principal reduction assistance that HHF
Florida began providing in September 2013, saying, “unfortunately, you know,
there’s certainly been well over 12,000 of those folks who on their own accord
have decided not to pursue their applications and have, you know, withdrawn and
voluntarily left the process for reasons unfortunately they don’t often
communicate to us.” SIGTARP found that HHF Florida has always had high
withdrawn application rates, even prior to the launch of the principal reduction
assistance.
Treasury has not set a goal for HHF Florida for the number of applications
withdrawn by Florida’s HFA. High numbers of applications that Florida’s HFA,
or their advisor agencies in counties around Florida, withdraws for homeowners
who are not responding to requests for information, raises questions about
whether HHF Florida is operating in the most effective way in each county.
Treasury does not require any county-level reporting on withdrawn applications,
let alone breaking down applications that Florida’s HFA withdrew by county.
County-level data would bring accountability and give Treasury faster and better
insight into program effectiveness and targeted areas for improvement, including,
among other things, whether there is homeowner confusion that could be
remedied or whether there could be a more effective way to reach out to
homeowners.

15

Appendix G shows application withdrawal rates by HHF state.

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Treasury Has Not Done Everything It Can To
Ensure That HHF Florida is Effective in Providing
Assistance to Homeowners and as a Result HHF
Florida Has Underperformed
SIGTARP found that Treasury set the objective of the Hardest Hit Fund to allow
HFAs “to develop creative, effective approaches that consider local
conditions”[emphasis added], but Treasury has not done everything it can do to
ensure that HHF Florida is “effective” in providing assistance to homeowners. In
Treasury’s March 29, 2010 press release, and in guidelines given to the HHF
states, Treasury stated that the objective of HHF is to develop creative, effective
approaches that consider local conditions. After Treasury approved state specific
HHF programs, on June 23, 2010, Treasury’s Assistant Secretary for Financial
Stability Herbert Allison stated that the Administration “will continue to do
everything it can to help those who are struggling the most during this difficult
time.”

SIGTARP Found That Treasury Abandoned Its Intent To Set Goals
for HHF Program Effectiveness and Measure Progress Against
Those Goals
In February 2010, the White House announced, “The program will be under strict
transparency and accountability rules.” The White House announced that
“program effectiveness” would be measured, and that there would be “effective
oversight” under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (the law that
created TARP) [emphasis added]. Oversight under EESA means Treasury, not
just the state HFAs.
On March 29, 2010, Treasury repeated that program activity will be subject to
effective oversight under EESA, and stating:
HFAs will be required to develop and maintain operational and
performance metrics, have a detailed financial reporting system
and track homeowners helped through its programs. HFAs will
report data to Treasury on a periodic basis, including metrics used
to measure program effectiveness against stated objectives.
Treasury may request that the HFA modify the proposed
performance measures or seek additional metrics as necessary
[emphasis added].
Treasury repeated this statement in its guidelines to state HFAs. Treasury’s
guidelines provide that HHF is designed to allow the maximum possible
flexibility to eligible HFAs in designing programs that are tailored to the needs of
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the specific state, while Treasury ensures the effectiveness of the program. The
two concepts of state flexibility and Treasury measuring effectiveness were not
mutually exclusive. Treasury required:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Detailed information about the specific problems that the program will
address as well as the specific goals for the program and how progress toward
those goals will be measured.
Identification of any anticipated program implementation obstacles and a
related mitigation plan.
Information of its organizational capacity to implement the program.
Detailed staffing plan and key partners including their roles, expertise and
relationship.
Plan to minimize program and fraud risk, and risk management and fraud
prevention strategies.
Description of proposed methodology for measuring program progress,
including key performance measurements, frequency of reporting and tracking
system to measure progress against goals.

Treasury’s former Chief HPO Phyllis Caldwell told SIGTARP in 2011, that
Treasury could evaluate success in HHF in ways such as, “are we reaching the
right number of people, are we reaching them in a sustainable way…” [emphasis
added]. HHF states performance numbers are the only information Treasury
publishes on accountability in HHF.
SIGTARP found in its April 2012 report, that Treasury had not set any
measurable goals and metrics that would allow Treasury, the public, and Congress
to measure the progress of HHF. The recommendations SIGTARP made in April
2012 reflect what Treasury said they would do at the start of HHF to conduct
effective oversight. In April 2012, SIGTARP did not tell Treasury what goals
they should set to measure program effectiveness, instead recommending:
1) Treasury set meaningful and measurable performance goals for HHF,
including, at a minimum, the number of homeowners Treasury estimates will
be helped by the program, and measure progress against those goals.
2) Treasury should instruct state HFAs in HHF to set meaningful and measurable
overarching and interim performance goals with appropriate metrics to
measure progress for their individual state programs.
3) Treasury should set milestones at which the state HFAs in HHF must review
the progress of individual state programs and make program adjustments from
this review.
Treasury rejected SIGTARP’s recommendations stating, “Treasury believes
establishing static numeric targets (as the recommendations seem to suggest) is
not well suited to the dynamic nature of HHF. Treasury has a rigorous
performance management program in place, which requires each HFA to set goals

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and targets for all of its initiatives.” Treasury has not set any numeric or nonnumeric goals and targets, except one time for HHF Florida in November 2012.
HHF Florida’s goals are “preserving homeownership” and “protecting home
values,” goals that are more high-level expectations that could have been
considered met in the first year. The number of people helped is not the only goal
that Treasury could have set. There are a number of goals that Treasury could
have set, but did not. Treasury’s current HPO Chief Mark McArdle told
SIGTARP, “There is no such thing as one set goal that works or doesn’t work.”
Treasury’s responsibility to define targeted outcomes and measure progress
against them is important for accountability over the state HFAs’ uses of TARP
funds. The Government Performance and Results Act (“GPRA”) requires Federal
agencies to measure performance against established goals. Congress enacted this
law to hold Federal agencies accountable for achieving program results and to
improve management of Federal programs. Treasury cannot escape GPRA’s
requirements because a state should have flexibility and be innovative under
HHF. Flexibility and innovation does not come in a Federal program without
accountability that can be measured.
Treasury has not done everything it can do for HHF Florida. Targeted outcomes
that can be measured benefit Treasury, Congress, and taxpayers in seeing areas
for improvement. HHF Florida is, and has been, underperforming. HHF Florida
loses opportunities to be “dynamic” by having, for example, such a low
homeowner admission rate. For five years, Treasury has tried it their way, with
HHF Florida having no numeric goals and targets to measure effectiveness, and as
a result, the numbers have not added up for Florida homeowners.
The dynamic nature of the program will not be harmed by numeric goals. The
one time Treasury set numeric goals and measureable targets in HHF in 2012
there was significant improvement (discussed in more detail later in this report).
At the beginning of HHF, Treasury warned HHF states that Treasury may request
that the HFA modify the proposed performance measures or seek additional
metrics, as necessary. Treasury has only done this one time – in 2012. In 2012,
Treasury took strong action by issuing Action Memorandums to Arizona (in
February 2012), Georgia (in April 2012), New Jersey (in May 2012), and Florida
(in November 2012) with numeric goals to increase the number of homeowners
receiving assistance along with other changes. 16 Treasury’s action brought
improvements to the effectiveness of HHF Florida, but Treasury would not repeat
it.

16

Appendix H is Treasury’s Action Memorandum to Florida.

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Treasury Is Not Operating with a Sense of Urgency To Ensure that
HHF Florida Is Effective
SIGTARP found that Treasury is not operating with a sense of urgency to ensure
that HHF Florida is effective now, but is instead tracking to see if HHF Florida
will spend the allotted $1 billion in TARP by the end of the program in December
2017. The Administration and Treasury announced that they would act with a
sense of urgency to help homeowners with HHF. In February 2010, the White
House announced HHF as a TARP program to “Help address urgent problems
facing homeowners at the center of the housing crisis” [emphasis added]. The
White House announcement also states that HHF will respond to “the most
pressing problems” in those communities [emphasis added]. On June 23, 2010,
Treasury announced that it had approved state plans to use HHF funding,
including HHF Florida, stating that the first round of HHF states now could roll
out their specific Hardest Hit Fund programs to provide relief to struggling
homeowners “as soon as possible” [emphasis added]. On August 4, 2010,
Treasury announced that it had approved the second round of HHF states to begin
using HHF funds, with Treasury’s Assistant Secretary for Financial Stability
Herbert Allison stating, “[W]e are committed to doing everything we can to
immediately help those who are hurting the most during these tough times”
[emphasis added].
Each quarter Treasury has seen in HHF Florida’s reports that it is
underperforming in comparison to other states, but does not do all that it can do to
conduct effective oversight as was promised. Treasury describes its role more as
a collaborator with the state HFAs. Treasury’s HHF Program Director told
SIGTARP, “There is so much going on that we just can’t see based on a quarterly
performance report.” Treasury’s HHF Program Director told SIGTARP that she
talks to the states every day. She described in a Treasury blog how “participating
states and Treasury have worked together to develop and implement” HHF,
explaining:
Treasury and other stakeholders have communicated constantly,
sharing best practices, implementing new ideas, and refining programs
and outreach campaigns. This collaboration and flexibility have
helped states respond to changes in housing markets, local economies,
and industry dynamics, and as a result, improve the quality of
assistance provided to homeowners. Treasury has also worked with
participating states to identify barriers to program success and make
appropriate changes quickly so programs continue to grow.
This collaboration is not memorialized. Treasury’s HHF Program Director told
SIGTARP that if it’s not working, the state HFAs tweak it, and Treasury’s role is
to support them in those efforts.

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Rather than requiring state HFAs to have metrics used to measure program
effectiveness against stated objectives as Treasury said it would conduct its
oversight, senior Treasury officials instead look for improvement more generally.
Treasury HPO Chief McArdle told SIGTARP in 2013, “What we push states to
do is to continuously improve. So you either make a change to your program, you
show steady growth quarter to quarter. You do one or the other. And you know,
basically Florida followed that thing.” Success from continuous improvement
that is not defined results in:
•
•
•
•

No target of success for HHF Florida to aim for.
No baseline to measure HHF Florida’s performance against.
No standard for accountability of Treasury or Florida’s HFA.
Lack of useful information and insight into areas where the program’s
effectiveness can be improved mid-course, rather than at the end of HHF
when it is too late.

The one time Treasury set a goal for HHF Florida, the program’s effectiveness
improved, only for it to slip again, under Treasury’s watch. In November 2012,
Treasury required HHF Florida to nearly triple the number of homeowners HHF
assisted each month from an average of 278 to 750 homeowners. This goal
spurred Florida’s HFA to reach for a target without diminishing their ability to
innovate and tailor HHF programs to that state’s needs. On the contrary, it
enabled both Florida’s HFA and Treasury to ensure that innovation was
implemented in such a way that the program could be more effective. However,
Treasury allowed HHF Florida to slip from this goal. Between October 2012 and
March 2015, HHF Florida assisted an average of 534 homeowners each month –
216 fewer than Treasury’s goal. Only once, in the third quarter of 2013, did HHF
Florida achieve the goal of an average of 750 homeowners helped a month, and
did not meet this target in any other quarter. Treasury missed an opportunity to
hold itself and HHF Florida continuously accountable for maintaining
improvement.
The one goal that Treasury does track is whether HHF Florida will use their
allocated $1 billion in TARP funds by the program end; after five years, HHF
Florida only used half of the allocated TARP dollars in a 7-year program.
Treasury HPO Chief McArdle told SIGTARP, “I believe they’re going to utilize
their funds with [the HHF principal reduction program].” Using up allotted
TARP funds by a 7-year deadline does not necessarily mean that HHF Florida is
effective in addressing the “urgent” and “pressing” needs of Florida homeowners
“as soon as possible” as the Administration and Treasury announced.
Unfortunately, for some homeowners HHF help may come too late. As the next
section of this report describes, many Florida homeowners needed HHF
assistance the most at the height of the crisis when Floridians were hit hardest.

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Several Factors Contributed to Hardest Hit Fund
Florida’s Slowness in Getting Assistance to
Homeowners and Lack of Effectiveness During
the Height of the Crisis When Florida
Homeowners Needed it Most
Hardest Hit Fund Florida was slow in getting assistance to homeowners and
lacked effectiveness during the first years of the program, which was the height of
the crisis, when Florida homeowners needed it most.

Plagued by a Lack of Comprehensive Planning by Treasury, Which
Waited for Florida’s HFA To Get Large Servicers To Participate, the
Hardest Hit Fund Florida was Slow To Reach Homeowners
Florida started 2010 with an 11.8% unemployment rate, but unemployed
homeowners would have to wait more than one year before the statewide rollout
of HHF Florida unemployment assistance. 17 By then, Florida’s unemployment
rate although still high at 10.1% had already started to improve.
Figure 6: Florida’s Unemployment Rate (Seasonally Adjusted)
12.0%

10.0%

8.0%

6.0%

4.0%

2.0%

0.0%

Unemployment Rate (Seasonally Adjusted)
Announcement of Florida's participation in the Hardest Hit Fund
Start date of the HHF Florida Unemployment Mortgage Assistance Program (Statewide)
Source: SIGTARP analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics data.

17

See SIGTARP, “Factors Affecting Implementation of the Hardest Hit Fund Program,” April 12, 2012 Appendix I for
Treasury’s calculation of unemployment for Florida, related to Treasury’s selection of Florida for the first round of
HHF.

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SIGTARP found that the same factors that contributed to the Hardest Hit Fund’s
significant delay in assisting homeowners nationwide, applied to Florida,
including a lack of comprehensive planning by Treasury that led to delay and
limitation in participation in the program by large servicers and the Governmentsponsored enterprises (GSEs) (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). 18 Florida’s HFA
Director of Homeownership Programs told SIGTARP in 2011 that the primary
challenge with implementing HHF Florida was the lack of big servicer
participation. 19 He told SIGTARP in 2011, “The one billion dollars has been a
nice carrot to use for servicers in Florida, but there is no stick with the carrot to
force servicers to participate,” and that if Treasury had a stick to use on servicers,
they had not used it. 20
SIGTARP found in its 2012 audit that Treasury’s delay in securing support from
large servicers and the GSEs was a planning and execution error. 21 Treasury’s
HPO Chief Mark McArdle told SIGTARP that Treasury expected states to talk
with servicers and find out what worked, and “we wanted to let that process work
out.” Treasury knew that the process was not working and that as a result, HHF
programs were not rolling out. Treasury’s HPO Chief told SIGTARP, “what
servicers wanted to do, maybe states didn’t want to do, and what states want to
do, servicers didn’t want to do.” Treasury HPO Chief McArdle told SIGTARP
that servicers were coming to Treasury and saying that they could have maybe
worked with one or two states, but now there were 19, “and so we knew we had to
change the game.” He told SIGTARP:
By the summer of 2010, as the program got larger, we intervened.
And we held this summit, we said, “All right. You guys can still do
your innovation, but let’s at least all agree on the template, though, for
one basic program.” So that was a little different than how we
operated before. We basically said, “All right. Can we all agree to do
this?” And everyone did agree to do that. And that program started to
gain significant traction.
HHF states did not gain traction on their own, and there was no traction until
Treasury intervened to “change the game.” Treasury did not gain GSE support
for HHF programs for eight months, until October 2010, and even then GSE
guidance to servicers only supported unemployment or reinstatement programs. 22
18

See SIGTARP, “Factors Affecting Implementation of the Hardest Hit Fund Program,” April 12, 2012.
Florida’s HFA delayed its pilot launch to October 2010 because large servicers were not participating, and they only
launched with one servicer. Florida’s HFA explained, “Without big servicers, it would take much, much longer to get
the funds out, with just community banks and credit unions. It would be a trickle of eligible applicants. Without the
big servicers, we would only be able to help about 50%” of the applicants the HFA had originally estimated. See
SIGTARP, “Factors Affecting Implementation of the Hardest Hit Fund Program,” April 12, 2012, page 21.
20
See SIGTARP, “Factors Affecting Implementation of the Hardest Hit Fund Program,” April 12, 2012, page 19.
21
See SIGTARP, “Factors Affecting Implementation of the Hardest Hit Fund Program,” April 12, 2012, page 19.
22
These programs require no financial sacrifice from the servicers or investors. The GSEs did not support principal
reduction.
19

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A senior Florida HFA official told SIGTARP that there was no hint of big
servicer participation until Fannie/Freddie put out guidance. Treasury’s
intervention to “change the game” did not take away each state’s ability to tailor
solutions to local problems, but instead made HHF more effective. In 2011, a
Florida HFA senior officer told SIGTARP that Treasury’s servicer summit was
the first big step and that FHFA, the GSEs, the big servicers, and the first 10
states looked to Treasury “to instigate this improvement.” Florida’s HFA told
SIGTARP that only after the summit did Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issue the
guidance directing servicers to accept HHF funds for their loans.

For the First Three Years (February 2010 – September 2013), There
Was No Hardest Hit Fund Targeted Assistance to Underwater
Homeowners in Florida
SIGTARP found that despite choosing Florida as one of the first HHF states
because it had the third highest home price decline in the nation at 37.4%, the
Hardest Hit Fund in Florida suffered from a lack of comprehensive planning by
Treasury to provide assistance to underwater homeowners hit hard by home price
declines (those with negative equity) during the first three years when home price
declines were at their highest. 23
Figure 7: Florida’s Average Home Prices During the Financial Crisis
$350,000
$300,000
$250,000
$200,000
$150,000
$100,000
$50,000
$-

Average Home Price (Seasonally Adjusted)
Announcement of Florida's participation in the Hardest Hit Fund
Start Date of the HHF Florida Principal Reduction Program (Statewide)
Source: SIGTARP analysis of FHFA, House Price Index Datasets, accessed August 7, 2015.

23

Treasury’s concerns over high home price declines and unemployment in Florida were so great, that it would select
Florida in three of four HHF rounds.

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Treasury did not take action to ensure that HHF Florida was effective in targeting
underwater homeowners until November 2012, when Treasury intervened to
change the game. 24 There was no HHF Florida program targeted to underwater
homes for the first three years (February 2010 – September 2013). In fact,
Treasury allowed HHF Florida’s only programs to deem ineligible any
unemployed/underemployed homeowner who was significantly underwater (loan
to value ratio exceeding 200%). Rather than propose and pressure Florida’s HFA
to start a program targeting underwater homeowners, Treasury left it to Florida’s
HFA, acting deferential, and only taking action in reaction to a state HFA’s
request. 25 SIGTARP issued its April 2012 report that called into question whether
HHF would be able to reach underwater homeowners given the fact that 98% of
the assistance provided to homeowners was for unemployment or reinstatement of
past-due amounts. After SIGTARP’s report, Treasury proposed and pressured
Florida’s HFA to start a program for underwater homeowners. Treasury’s
approach of leaving the effectiveness of HHF Florida to Florida’s HFA was a lost
opportunity for HHF to help homeowners facing declining home values at the
worst time. By September 2013, when HHF Florida started principal reduction,
home values had already increased by more than 22% from second quarter 2011
lows.

For the First Two Years, Nearly Half of All Who Completed an
Application for the Hardest Hit Fund in Florida Were Denied as
Ineligible
SIGTARP found that the first two years of HHF Florida were plagued by the fact
that nearly half (45%) of homeowners who applied were denied because they fell
outside eligibility requirements. According to HHF Florida’s data, of the 27,541
Florida homeowners who were able to complete their HHF applications by
April 1, 2012, Florida’s HFA denied nearly half (45%) as ineligible. Although
Treasury does not require HHF states to report on the reasons homeowners were
denied, Florida’s HFA compiled information on the denial reasons as of April 1,
2012, in advance of an April 27, 2012 Florida HFA board meeting. According to
this Florida HFA data as of April 1, 2012, the most common reasons why
Florida’s HFA turned 12,516 homeowners down as ineligible were as follows:
24

A senior Florida HFA official told SIGTARP in 2011 that Treasury told the states to tailor HHF to their state
circumstances to best address foreclosures. Treasury’s directive was for these states to develop innovative housing
programs tailored to their local conditions to help prevent foreclosures and stabilize housing markets. Treasury
approved HHF for five categories of assistance: (1) principal reduction; (2) second-lien reduction of payoff; (3)
reinstatement through payment of past-due amounts; or (4) unemployment/underemployment assistance; or (5)
transition assistance such as a short-sale (when the home is sold for less that the mortgage loan balance), deed-in-lieu
of foreclosure (where the homeowner transfers ownership to the lender or investor), or relocation assistance. Each
state HFA could offer multiple programs under HHF, with Treasury approval.
25
Treasury knew that principal reduction was difficult at that time because the GSEs did not support it. Former Treasury
HPO Chief told SIGTARP that principal reduction is difficult and Treasury encouraged individual HFAs to work on
principal reduction within servicers’ non-GSE book. Given the problems that individual states had already had with
the large servicers, it should have been apparent to Treasury that states would have a hard time gaining traction on
their own and would need Treasury’s intervention.
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TABLE 2

REASONS FOR INELIGIBILITY OF FLORIDA HHF APPLICANTS

Ineligibility Reason
Does not have a qualifying hardship (unemployment or
underemployment) that is no fault of their own

Number of
Homeowners
Denied
3,944

First mortgage is more than 180 days past-due
Homeowner cancelled application

2,929
2,704

Monthly housing expenses including first mortgage
plus taxes, insurance, and HOA dues less than 31%
gross monthly income

2,157

Did not obtain mortgage loan on or before 1/1/09
Combined loan to value exceeds 200%

1,641
1,072

Home is a condo and is not on the Fannie Mae/FHA
approved list

821

Source: Florida HFA Board of Directors data as of April 1, 2012.

Treasury did not do all that it could to stop HHF Florida’s high rates of denying
homeowners. Treasury did not set a target denial rate for HHF Florida, or require
that HHF states report publicly on denial reasons and the number of homeowners
denied for each reason. Treasury’s HPO Chief McArdle told SIGTARP that
Treasury asked Florida about their high rejection rate, and in 2011, focused on the
“pull through rate” – the number of applications funded compared with
withdrawn or denied. He told SIGTARP that Treasury looked very closely at the
reasons why homeowners were denied in Florida. He explained that part of the
rejection reason was that HHF Florida had a rule that a homeowner could not be
more than some number of months in arrear which rejected a large number of
borrowers. HPO Chief McArdle explained that because Florida has a long
foreclosure timeline, there were an abnormal number of people in that bucket.
Treasury’s HPO Chief McArdle told SIGTARP, “as long as they have – state a
justification, you know, we’re trying to basically help people who can still be
helped.”
Treasury could have taken action to propose or pressure Florida’s HFA to remove
the second largest eligibility requirement leading to denials that a homeowner
could not be more than 180 days delinquent. As of April 1, 2012, a total of 2,929
Florida homeowners had been denied based on that reason. After SIGTARP
released its April 12, 2012 report, Florida’s HFA board voted two weeks later, on
April 27, 2012, to eliminated that requirement, and allow those denied to be
reconsidered. This would cause a backlog of application reviews, and some
homeowners may not have had the luxury of time.
After SIGTARP’s report, Florida’s HFA removed other eligibility requirements,
including that the mortgage had to be originated prior to January 1, 2009, a loanto-value ratio could not exceed 200%, and that a condo had to be on a Fannie
Mae- or FHA-approved list. These eligibility requirements accounted for half
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(6,463 homeowners) of all 12,516 homeowners who had been previously denied.
HHF Florida’s effectiveness to reach additional homeowners improved. 26
Still, however, HHF Florida’s homeowner denial rates reported for the years
ended March 31, 2013 and 2014 were 38%, much higher than the national
average.

Treasury Allowed Florida To Decrease the Duration of HHF
Unemployment from 18 Months to 6 Months Despite Treasury
Knowing that Unemployment was 27 Weeks or Longer, and that
Treasury Allowed Extended Unemployment Assistance in HAMP
The effectiveness of HHF assistance to unemployed and underemployed Florida
homeowners suffered early on due to a lack of comprehensive planning by
Treasury to ensure that the assistance lasted long enough for a homeowner to
become reemployed at a level where they could afford to pay their mortgage, as
stated in Treasury’s term sheet for HHF Florida. Initially homeowners could
receive 18 months of unemployment assistance based on the average number of
months that individuals received unemployment benefits. Around December
2010, Treasury allowed Florida’s HFA to drop the length of assistance to
six months, effective March 2011.
Treasury should have identified the risk that six months would be too short a time
for Florida homeowners to regain employment at an income where they could
afford to pay their mortgage. SIGTARP identified this risk for HAMP on
April 20, 2010, recommending that Treasury extend the duration of its
unemployment program in HAMP stating:
One prominent feature of this recession is an unusually high degree of
long-term unemployment. According to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics….nearly 43% of unemployed workers have been out of work
for 27 weeks, a length of time longer than the six-month contemplated
maximum for unemployment assistance….large numbers of
unemployed homeowners may still be unemployed at the end of the
forbearance period….For the fortunate who quickly find jobs, the
program [HAMP’s UP] may be an important lifeline. But for the rest,
the forbearance time period will end before a job is found, their unpaid
amount will still be owed, and they will still face an unaffordable
mortgage with a principal balance that has been made higher by the
26

SIGTARP found that the first two years of HHF in Florida were plagued by high numbers of homeowners with
incomplete applications. As of April 1, 2012, two years after the program’s announcement, 41,406 Florida
homeowners had applied for HHF, but one-third of them (13,865) had incomplete applications – defined as
applications that homeowners have begun to fill out, but are not yet completed. A completed application was one
where the homeowner had finished filling out an online application even if required documentation supporting the
application had not necessarily been provided.

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unpaid interest amounts during the forbearance period, potentially
eliminating equity for some and plunging others even deeper
underwater. In light of this reality, Treasury should consider
implementing a program with a longer minimum term and that will
have a broader impact. Although no program will assist all
unemployed borrowers, Treasury should strive for a program that will
at least assist the typical unemployed borrower.
In May 2010, Treasury sent a letter to SIGTARP citing to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics data showing unemployment of 27 weeks or longer, and saying that
Treasury gives servicers the discretion to extend the forbearance beyond 3 months
with no set limit.27 Months later, Treasury allowed HHF Florida to decrease the
length of assistance from 18 months to 6 months.28
Treasury knew that six months was the shortest duration of unemployment
assistance provided in HHF at that time.

27

In July 2011, Treasury formally adopted a SIGTARP recommendation and extended the minimum forbearance to
12 months.
28
See Letter from Treasury to SIGTARP, May 20, 2010, republished in SIGTARP, Quarterly Report to Congress,
Appendix G, July 21, 2010.
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Figure 8: Maximum Duration of HHF Unemployment Assistance by State as of 3/31/2011

Source: SIGTARP analysis of various Hardest Hit Fund program amendments from individual states, which can be
obtained from the Treasury Department’s Hardest Hit Fund - Archived Program Information website at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/housing/hhf/Pages/Archivalinformation.aspx?Program=Hardest+Hit+Fund, accessed 8/11/2015).
Note 1: The maximum duration of HHF unemployment assistance provided by Rhode Island was not capped at a
number of months, but rather however long it took the homeowner to go through the $6,000 of assistance the program
provided.
Note 2: Several states only provided the maximum benefit period to homeowners in highly distressed counties, or to
homeowners who participated in qualifying job training or education programs.

Rather than ensure that HHF Florida’s unemployment assistance would be long
enough to be effective – “for homeowners to become re-employed at a salary that
is sufficient for them to either resume making full mortgage payments or qualify
for a mortgage modification” – as Treasury’s term sheet stated, Treasury adopted
a deferential position to the state HFA despite Treasury’s knowledge. Treasury
HPO Chief Mark McArdle told SIGTARP that Florida HFA did not ask Treasury
for guidance on this change. He said that Treasury did as it always did, ask for
the rationale and reason, and Florida HFA’s reason was that lowering the
assistance would help the money go farther to help more people. Treasury’s HPO
Chief McArdle told SIGTARP, “Now, this is totally something the state can
decide.” He said that Treasury leaves it to the states that are closer to the situation
to decide, and the state did have a stated rationale.
Treasury would again miss an opportunity 10 months later, in October 2011,
when it approved California and Nevada to extend (9 months for California,
12 months for Nevada). This left HHF Florida with the shortest duration;
however, Treasury took no action.
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The deference Treasury gave to Florida’s HFA in leaving it to the state had
serious consequences. After SIGTARP’s 2012 report, Florida’s HFA found, “the
six-month duration of this program is not sufficient time for homeowners to
achieve a successful outcome.” 29 In April 2012, Florida HFA reported that only
11% (208) of 1,904 Florida homeowners who received and exited HHF
unemployment assistance regained employment at a level that made their
mortgage affordable. This brings into question whether the remaining 89% of
Florida homeowners who exited the program continue to struggle to find
employment at an income where they could afford their mortgage.

29

HHF in Florida also provided $6,000 in HHF to reinstate past-due mortgages for homeowners who found employment.
However, typically those same homeowners had also been in the unemployment program and were considered
delinquent by their mortgage servicer while in that program, leading to arrearages over $6,000. It was not until April
2012 when Florida’s HFA internally stated that the $6,000 cap was often quite insufficient to bring the loan current
and suggested increasing the HHF funds from $6,000 to $25,000.

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Treasury Took Some Strong Oversight Action in
Response to SIGTARP’s 2012 Report and
Recommendations To Hold Treasury and the
Florida Housing Finance Agency Accountable
and Make HHF Florida More Effective
Two weeks after SIGTARP’s report, on April 27, 2012, the board governing
Florida’s HFA voted to make changes: 30
•
•
•
•

•
•

Eliminate certain eligibility requirements.
Loosen income requirements. 31
Reconsider homeowners previously denied.
Increase unemployment assistance to 12 months (capped at $24,000). HHF
Florida made the change retroactive to convert those already getting that
assistance. As explained by Treasury’s HPO Chief McArdle, “that totally
froze up their operations.”
Increase up to $18,000 HHF payment to reinstate a delinquent mortgage (total
assistance capped at $42,000).
Increase up to $25,000 in HHF funds as a one-time payment to bring current a
past-due mortgage for homeowners who returned to work or recovered from
underemployment. 32

Following SIGTARP’s report, Treasury increased oversight of HHF by both:
(1) Treasury’s program and policy group and (2) Treasury’s compliance group.
On June 14, 2012, Treasury released the results of its on-site compliance review
at Florida’s HFA looking at 75 loan files.
•

•
•

Treasury found that Florida’s HFA lacked documented processes or adequate
controls to monitor the advisor agencies to ensure program requirements were
being met. Treasury stated, “Without a regular review of approved and denied
loans, the HHF cannot assess the accuracy and effectiveness of these
processes.”
Treasury found that Florida’s HFA did not have a clear definition of what
qualified as substantial underemployment (the required level for HHF
assistance).
Treasury found insufficient documentation to support the calculation of
income, calculation of loan-to-value ratio, or reason for denial.

30

The changes were announced on June 27, 2012, after Treasury’s approval.
Florida HFA’s board also changed threshold income from limiting it to homeowners with housing expenses less than
31% gross monthly income to require that there be at least a 10% reduction in income for a hardship.
32
On May 30, 2012, Florida’s HFA decreased its estimates from helping 53,000 homeowners in each of its HHF
unemployment and reinstatement programs to helping 45,000 homeowners in each program.
31

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In November 2012, the State of Florida Auditor General issued a report to
Florida’s HFA, which found that improved monitoring of the advisor agencies’
eligibility determination processes was needed. Florida’s Auditor General stated
that absent effective monitoring, advisor procedure weaknesses and instances of
noncompliance with contractual requirements may escape timely detection.
Following SIGTARP’s report, in November 2012, Treasury’s program and policy
group took strong oversight action to hold itself and Florida’s HFA accountable
for HHF Florida performance. Treasury’s HPO Chief told SIGTARP that
Treasury realized that HHF Florida was not looking that good at the end of 2011,
and told Florida’s HFA, “Maybe it’s time you think about lengthening assistance,
widening the net a bit.” On November 20, 2012, Treasury issued an Action
Memorandum to Florida’s HFA targeting:
(1) Florida’s low number of homeowners assisted, which averaged 375
homeowners per month.
(2) Florida’s low ratio of approved homeowners to denied homeowners. 33
(3) Florida’s inadequate staffing levels. 34
(4) Florida’s focus on unemployment and reinstatement, with no program to
address negative equity or long-term affordability issues.
By taking strong action, Treasury was able to bring effective change to HHF in
Florida to start providing HHF assistance to underwater homeowners. Treasury
would change their deferential approach to one of putting pressure on Florida’s
HFA including telling Florida HFA that they had no HHF assistance to address
negative equity or long-term affordability issues. Treasury’s HPO Chief McArdle
explained to SIGTARP that Treasury “gave them pressure over time saying, you
know, perhaps you should consider changes to your program because you’re
not—you weren’t—one of the things we asked about was the sustainability of
assistance.” He said that Florida’s HFA did come up with changes eventually.
In its Action Memorandum, Treasury asked Florida for a written plan and set a
minimum benchmark for Florida’s HFA to meet a goal of an average 750 funded
homeowners a month with action steps to achieve that goal. Treasury warned, “If
Florida Housing fails to achieve these goals, Treasury will consider additional
steps, including possible remedial actions, to improve performance.” Treasury
ended by stating that “Florida still faces elevated unemployment, high

33

Treasury found that during the third quarter of 2012, Florida’s HFA had assisted 833 borrowers and had a pull through
rate of 26.3%. The pull through rate is essentially the ratio of approved homeowners to denied homeowners.
Treasury told Florida’s HFA that they “must achieve a combination of high volumes and a higher ratio of approved
homeowners to denied homeowners.”
34
Treasury expressed concern over Florida’s HFA’s staffing level noting that on average other HHF states had one
position for every $9 million allocated, but in Florida it was one position for every $31 million, almost double the next
highest allocation amount per position.
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delinquency rates, and oppressive negative equity…” and “It is urgent that
[Florida’s HFA] take steps now to increase volume while the need is still critical.”

Improvements After Treasury Intervened To Take a Stronger Role
Following SIGTARP’s 2012 Report Prove that Stronger and More
Proactive Treasury Action in HHF Leads to Stronger HHF
Performance
Treasury’s prior lack of action to demand accountability and ensure the
effectiveness of HHF did not work for HHF Florida. Treasury’s HHF Program
Director told SIGTARP that states get to design HHF programs and have the
flexibility to roll it out and implement it, and if it’s not working the states tweak
it, and Treasury’s role is to support the states, and ask questions and offer advice.
However, improvements did not come until after SIGTARP’s report when
Treasury issued Florida the Action Memorandum. Treasury’s HHF Program
Director told SIGTARP that Treasury issued the Action Memorandum to Florida
to say, “We’re concerned about your performance. Here are some steps we’d like
you to take, or we’d like you to respond to this memo with a proposed action plan
or steps that you’re going to take.” 35
Treasury officials describe the action they took with HHF Florida as “pressure” or
“pushing.” Treasury’s HPO Chief McArdle told SIGTARP that Florida “made
dramatic changes, under pressure.” Treasury’s strong action in 2012 brought
improvements that show the benefit of Treasury conducting oversight to ensure
HHF Florida is effective including:
•
•
•

•
•
35

HHF Florida increased the number of homeowners receiving assistance,
although it did not meet Treasury’s targeted goal of helping 750 homeowners
per month, and Treasury did not ensure that HHF Florida met this metric.
There are now two HHF programs in Florida to address underwater homes
and long-term affordability.
Treasury started a principal reduction program for current homeowners with
underwater homes. Treasury HPO Chief McArdle explained, “Within a week
they filled 25,000 slots. So what we pushed them to do was just that, and
they’ve done it.” HPO Chief McArdle told SIGTARP that “Florida
had…current borrowers who were underwater who did the right thing and
paid their mortgage. They designed a program to address that population that
had tremendous demand.”
Treasury required Florida HFA to recast the mortgage after the principal
reduction that would result in a reduction in the mortgage payment.
Treasury was “instrumental” in bringing Ginnie Mae to the table to discuss
recasting the mortgages, according to Florida HFA.

The only time Treasury issued a formal directive was to three other states (Arizona, Georgia, and New Jersey) around
the time of SIGTARP’s audit in 2012. Treasury’s HHF Program Director told SIGTARP that Treasury has not issued
a formal directive since the end of 2012.

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Treasury publicly heralded the improvements in its March 2013 “TARP: Four
Year Retrospective Report,” stating, “As a result of recent program and
operational changes made by state housing finance agencies working closely with
Treasury, OFS expects the pace of assistance to accelerate throughout 2013.”

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Despite Improvements Made in 2013, HHF
Florida Continues To Lag Behind Other HHF
States in Effectiveness
Although there were improvements after Treasury intervened, HHF Florida
continued to lag behind other HHF states in effectiveness. SIGTARP found
several factors that contributed to this lag.

Implementation Issues Delayed HHF Florida Principal Reduction
Assistance and Caused a Backlog
HHF Florida struggled with implementation issues that delayed homeowners from
getting principal reduction assistance. The only way to apply for this assistance is
through the web-based online application. Within the first week there was a flood
of applications. Florida’s HFA stopped accepting applications that week, after the
first 25,000. It would take eight months for Florida HFA to clear the backlog of
applications. Florida HFA did not reopen their system to accept applications
again until May 2014.
According to Treasury’s guidelines, Treasury intended to be involved in
identifying and mitigating obstacles to program effectiveness, but Treasury did
not do that here. Given that Florida was one of the states hit hardest by
underwater homes during the crisis, and that this was the first HHF Florida
program to target underwater homes, Treasury and Florida’s HFA should have
engaged in critical thinking to anticipate a flood of applications, and determine
any obstacles in Florida’s HFA being able to address them. Those obstacles could
have been mitigated with additional staff. That type of comprehensive planning
did not happen, despite Treasury’s intention to identify and mitigate obstacles
when it designed HHF.
When the program reopened, it had helped only 1,756 homeowners. A senior
Florida HFA official told SIGTARP that there were issues with application
withdrawals and incomplete applications. Treasury’s HHF Program Director told
SIGTARP that there were lots of applications from lots of people who were not
eligible for the program, and so the approval rate is commensurately low. 36 As of
December 31, 2013, Florida HFA estimated that the program would help 10,000
Florida homeowners. The Executive Director of Florida’s HFA was quoted in the
press that, “at the end of March, it became clear to us that given the folks who had
been denied and those who reserved a spot but had no other activity, we would
not be able to spend the $350 million.”
36

To be eligible, a homeowner must be underwater (defined as owing 125 percent or more in mortgage debt compared to
the current value of the home), the homeowner must owe less than $350,000 in outstanding home debt, and must earn
a household income that is below 140% of the area median.

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Florida HFA’s decision to stop accepting applications after the first 25,000 could
have had serious consequences to homeowners who may have been eligible but
were kept from applying, and therefore, could not tell their mortgage servicer that
they had applied for HHF assistance. A senior Florida HFA official told
SIGTARP for homeowners who are in the HHF underwriting process, that
Florida’s HFA communicates with servicers and judges to explain that certain
homeowners are potentially eligible for HHF assistance to stop foreclosures. That
official explained to SIGTARP that whether the foreclosure process stops depends
on the judge and the servicer, but that some servicers may delay foreclosure. That
official told SIGTARP that Treasury does not require HFAs to report on issues
related to foreclosures. Treasury’s HHF Program Director addressed dual
tracking with SIGTARP, saying “Oftentimes, servicers receiving funds through
the Hardest Hit Fund’s side of their organization, those folks may not be fully
communicating with the legal foreclosure side of the organization. This has been
well documented across the board since loss mitigation programs have been in
place.” Dual tracking is something that Treasury must monitor in HHF.
However, a homeowner who does not have a chance to even apply to a program
potentially can be single tracked to foreclosure.
With such a great demand, HHF Florida principal reduction can address a great
need for Florida homeowners with underwater homes, but only if it operates
effectively. Nearly 5,000 Florida homeowners have already received assistance.
TABLE 3

PERFORMANCE OF HHF FLORIDA’S PRINCIPAL REDUCTION PROGRAM

Quarter Ended
December 31, 2013
March 31, 2014
June 30, 2014
September 30, 2014
December 31, 2014
March 31, 2015

Homeowners
Assisted During
the Quarter
394
1,362
995
1,048
709
461

Cumulative
Homeowners
Assisted Through
the Quarter
394
1,756
2,751
3,799
4,508
4,969

Source: SIGTARP analysis of Treasury’s Quarterly Performance Report data for HHF Florida’s Principal Reduction Program.

However, according to Treasury data as of March 31, 2015, only 14% of
homeowners who apply for HHF Florida principal reduction have received
assistance, and more than one-third of homeowners have been denied.

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Figure 9: HHF Florida Principal Reduction Program – Cumulative Approval and
Denial Rates as a Percent of Applications

Source: SIGTARP analysis of Treasury’s Quarterly Performance Report data for Florida’s HHF Principal
Reduction Program.

The need for assistance for underwater homeowners is so great an issue in Florida
that Treasury should be actively engaged each quarter, and not wait to take action
to ensure that HHF Florida operates in the most effective manner. Already, fewer
homeowners have received assistance in the last two quarters compared to prior
quarters. Further, it is taking longer for Florida homeowners to get help from this
program than it did in the past. According to Treasury’s March 31, 2015 data,
this past quarter showed that it took a median of 210 days for a homeowner to get
this assistance, longer than the median of 154 days in the year and a half since the
program started.

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Figure 10: Florida Homeowners Receiving HHF Principal Reduction Assistance by
Quarter and Cumulative

Source: SIGTARP analysis of Treasury Quarterly Performance Report data for Florida’s HHF Principal
Reduction Program.

Treasury has set no goals for this program other than to spend $350 million in
TARP funds. Given that it took so long for HHF Florida to have a program that
targeted underwater homeowners, there is no time for Treasury to wait to ensure
that this assistance is effective.

The HHF Program for Senior Citizens Has Struggled in Part
Because Seniors Had Difficulty Applying and Providing Necessary
Documentation
SIGTARP also found that Florida lags behind other states because both Treasury
and Florida’s HFA lacked comprehensive planning to identify and mitigate
obstacles that Florida seniors with reverse mortgages facing problems applying to
the program and providing necessary documentation. Beginning in November
2013, this $25-million HHF program helps Florida seniors with reverse mortgages
and limited means who have suffered a hardship, avoid foreclosure due to their
inability to pay taxes, insurance, or homeowners association fees. 37 Estimated to
37

To be eligible, the senior must have liquid assets under $48,000 and a household income no more than 140% of the
area median income.

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help 2,500 seniors, the program was slow to get help to seniors, a population that
does not have the benefit of time.
Figure 11: Quarterly Performance of HHF Florida’s ELMORE Program

Source: SIGTARP analysis of Treasury’s Quarterly Performance Report data for Florida HHF ELMORE
program.

There have been two obstacles to seniors getting help from this HHF program,
first that seniors had difficulty applying, and second that elderly applicants were
not providing the required documentation. Treasury’s HHF Program Director
told SIGTARP that Treasury asked Florida’s HFA about the number of
applications and the number of homeowners approved and whether there were
operational challenges. Florida’s HFA told Treasury that they were having issues
trying to reach seniors who are not sophisticated in applying and submitting
documents online.
The obstacles that senior citizens were having trouble applying and submitting
required documents may be one explanation to Treasury’s data showing that 46%
had their application withdrawn. However, Treasury should not assume, but
instead dig into this number to understand it better and gain insight for
improvement.

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Figure 12: Status of Florida Seniors’ HHF Applications

Source: SIGTARP analysis of Treasury’s Quarterly Performance Report data as of March 31, 2015.
Note: Percentages do not total 100% due to rounding.

The obstacles senior citizens faced could have been identified earlier through
comprehensive planning by Treasury and Florida’s HFA before rolling out the
program. According to Treasury’s guidelines issued to the HHF states at the start
of the program, Treasury intended to be involved in identifying and mitigating
obstacles to program effectiveness, but Treasury did not do that here until later.
Treasury’s later intervention helped mitigate this obstacle, but for some
homeowners it may have come too late. Treasury asked Florida’s HFA to
streamline their underwriting guidelines to what was necessary, which Florida’s
HFA did. Florida’s HFA also began working with a state agency on aging to help
seniors submit applications and required documents. Now the Department of
Elder Affairs can go into the home of a senior citizen and help them gather the
documents. This type of action by Treasury to bring about change shows how
powerful the Hardest Hit Fund can be if Treasury requests improvement.
Treasury’s action has brought some improvement, and the program has helped
550 seniors (still only 22% of those estimated to be helped). Seniors apply by
calling a toll-free phone number where a live person can advise and assist them,
and staff from the Area Agencies on Aging may assist seniors with gathering and
submitting documents. 38 A senior Florida HFA official told SIGTARP that even
with the applications being taken by telephone instead of requiring an online
application, the biggest delay is being able to obtain the proper documentation.
38

According to Florida’s HFA website, the only way to apply for the Florida ELMORE program is to use the toll-free
ELMORE Application and Information Line at 1-(800) 601-3534 to speak to a certified ELMORE advisor.

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TABLE 4

PERFORMANCE OF HHF FLORIDA’S ELDERLY MORTGAGE ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM
Seniors
Provided
Assistance
- During
the Quarter
1
34
126
127
113
149

Seniors
Provided
Assistance Cumulative
1
35
161
288
401
550

Days to
Obtain
Approval
(Median)
36
88
134
199
296
280

Progress
Toward
Quarter Ended
Program Goal
December 31, 2013
0%
1%
March 31, 2014
June 30, 2014
6%
September 30, 2014
12%
16%
December 31, 2014
March 31, 2015
22%
Source: SIGTARP analysis of Treasury’s Quarterly Performance Report data for HHF Florida’s Elderly Mortgage Assistance Program.
Note: The Days to Obtain Approval column represents median days for the quarter.

Treasury has no goal for the length of time Florida’s HFA takes to process an
application. Florida’s HFA should view a targeted length of time to process an
application not as an excuse to deny a homeowner, but instead as a target for their
own improvement in helping homeowners make it through the approval process.
With a median 280 days to obtain approval for this HHF assistance, Treasury will
need to be actively involved to ensure that the program is moving as fast as it can
to get help to Florida seniors who need the money now, not in 9 to 10 months.

The HHF Florida Two-year Pilot To Buy and Modify Pools of
Mortgages Has Not Been Effective
SIGTARP found that Florida lags behind other HHF states in part because both
Treasury and Florida’s HFA lacked comprehensive planning in a program for a
non-profit to buy mortgages on underwater homes and HHF to pay funds to
modify those mortgages to identify the obstacle that the non-profit might not be
the successful bidder at HUD sales. Started in April 2013, two years later,
Treasury still refers to this program as a pilot program. Treasury approved
Florida to use $50 million in TARP funds to modify mortgages of 1,500 Florida
homeowners whose loans are part of a pool of loans purchased by a non-profit
based in New Jersey named National Community Capital (“NCC”) at a HUDsponsored distressed sale. NCC would write down the principal balance to 115%
of the current value of the home, and HHF would provide the homeowner with up
to $50,000 to reduce the principal balance to 100% of the current value of the
home. Treasury’s term sheet with Florida’s HFA estimated that the HHF money
would be spent over two years. However, after two years, the program still
remains in its pilot phase and has helped only 92 homeowners in two years – 6%
of the 1,500 homeowners estimated to be helped. Florida’s HFA told SIGTARP
that this is because NCC is not the successful bidder at the HUD-sponsored sales.

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TABLE 5

PERFORMANCE OF HHF FLORIDA'S MODIFICATION ENABLING PILOT PROGRAM

Quarter Ended
December 31, 2013
March 31, 2014
June 30, 2014
September 30, 2014
December 31, 2014
March 31, 2015

Homeowners
Assisted
During the
Quarter
1
7
4
19
40
21

Homeowners
Assisted Cumulative
1
8
12
31
71
92

Progress
Toward
Program Goal
0%
1%
1%
2%
5%
6%

Source: SIGTARP analysis of Treasury’s Quarterly Performance Report data for HHF Florida’s Modification Enabling Pilot Program.

Treasury’s HHF Program Director said Treasury asked Florida’s HFA for insight.
Treasury’s HHF Program Director told SIGTARP that there may be a viable
reason why Florida wants to continue to have a $50-million allocation ready for
that program. HHF Program Director told SIGTARP that it takes time to engage
borrowers, that this program has a very long tail. She told SIGTARP that
Treasury is not at a point where they are going to say “shut it down” because they
understand the lag. She told SIGTARP that the state has a tremendous amount of
latitude to design and fund their own programs and elect how they wish to operate
those programs, and if Florida feels that they’ve got a viable pipeline, “we have to
give them a certain amount of latitude to manage that program, and we’ll continue
to ask them questions so that we can evaluate the efficacy of that particular
program.”
However, Treasury has not set any goals or measurable metrics to measure
whether this program is progressing effectively. Treasury’s lack of goals, and
lack of any action to bring accountability for this program to be effective, does
not come without consequence. The money for this program came directly from
existing HHF unemployment assistance programs.

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Treasury Must Ensure that the New Homebuyer HHF Program
Progresses Effectively and Make Timely Changes To Ensure
Effectiveness
In April 2015, for the first time in the history of HHF, Treasury approved a HHF
program not for homeowners, but for new homebuyers. Treasury had previously
rejected a HHF Florida homebuyer assistance program in 2010. Treasury’s HPO
Chief McArdle told SIGTARP in 2013, that Treasury rejected that program
because it did not avoid a foreclosure to keep someone in their home, but instead
was assisting other people to buy foreclosed homes, and that under EESA (the law
governing TARP), it had to be before the foreclosure occurred or preventing a
foreclosure somehow generally. Treasury is now allowing TARP funds to go to a
first time homebuyer program, which is similar to a program that Florida’s HFA
was already participating in outside of TARP. The new HHF program would
provide up to $15,000 to qualified homebuyers to pay down payments and closing
costs. Initially, this program is only open to buy homes located in five counties:
Brevard, Duval, Hillsborough, Orange, and Volusia. 39 Treasury must set goals
for this program now, and set measurable targets that could be measured over
time to ensure that this program is effective.

HHF Florida Has Vulnerabilities to Fraud That Treasury Should
Strengthen
Although the Dodd-Frank Act precludes anyone convicted of a mortgage-related
or real estate-related crime within the last 10 years from receiving HHF funds,
Treasury is not doing enough to ensure that HHF complies with the Dodd-Frank
Act. 40 Rather than conduct due diligence to ensure compliance with the DoddFrank Act, Treasury has shifted the burden to the homeowner to self-report in an
affidavit affirming no mortgage fraud conviction within the past 10 years.
The Dodd-Frank Act precludes HHF assistance for persons convicted of
mortgage-related crimes, not persons who say they were convicted of those
crimes. It is not the homeowner’s duty to comply with the Dodd-Frank Act, it is
Treasury’s duty. However, SIGTARP found that neither Treasury nor Florida
does any due diligence to determine whether a homeowner applying for the

39

Despite being labeled a first time home buyer program, a homeowner might be eligible even if they are not a first time
homebuyer if they are a qualified veteran or are purchasing a home in a federally designated target area.
40
Subtitle G, Section 1481(d)(1) of the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act reads, “No person
shall be eligible to begin receiving assistance from the Making Home Affordable Program authorized under the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (12 U.S.C. 5201 et seq.), or any other mortgage assistance program
authorized or funded by that Act, on or after 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, if such person, in
connection with a mortgage or real estate transaction, has been convicted, within the last 10 years, of any one of the
following: (A) Felony larceny, theft, fraud, or forgery. (B) Money laundering. (C) Tax evasion.”
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Hardest Hit Fund has been convicted of a mortgage-related crime in the last
10 years, instead, relying entirely on homeowner self-reporting. 41
The language in the self-certification makes clear that a Treasury background
check is routine. The HHF self-certification statement says, “Treasury, or their
agents may investigate the accuracy of my statements by performing routine
background checks, including automated searches of federal, state and county
databases, to confirm that I/we have not been convicted of such crimes.”
However, Treasury does not check, or require Florida’s HFA to check, any
database to see if a homeowner has been convicted of a mortgage-related crime.
Self-certifications serve an important function to deter fraud, and provide a law
enforcement remedy where fraud is found, but they are not on their own sufficient
to protect a TARP program from being vulnerable to fraud. Given SIGTARP’s
law enforcement authority, SIGTARP will criminally investigate anyone we find
who lies on a certification for a TARP program. Unfortunately however, if
discovered at all, the misrepresentation may not be found until after the applicant
has received and spent the funds. The TARP funds paid to homeowners under
HHF Florida are thousands of dollars. Recovery of TARP funds lost to fraud is
not easy, and may not be successful if the person no longer has assets.
More should be done up front by Treasury and state HFAs to prevent the funds
from being released to an ineligible applicant. Treasury has an obligation to
ensure that those who are not entitled to participate do not receive funds that
otherwise could go to eligible distressed homeowners. Treasury’s oversight
should be more than a check-the-box determination that the self-certification is a
part of the file. 42 Treasury does more than rely on a homeowner’s selfcertification about their income, their assets, their mortgage, and the value of the
home. Treasury requires due diligence to collect documentation to verify that a
homeowner meets the other eligibility requirements – this eligibility requirement
should be no different.
SIGTARP found that Treasury’s oversight of Florida’s HHF programs related to
homeowner fraud certifications is lacking and leads to vulnerability to fraud.
Treasury’s HHF Program Director told SIGTARP that “[Treasury] does not
perform criminal background checks to verify the accuracy of Dodd-Frank
certifications for HHF programs.” Florida HFA’s Homeownership Director told
SIGTARP that they did not have access to criminal databases to validate the
certifications. The absence of a systematic process for detecting
41

Information is limited even for those deemed ineligible due to a homeowner self-certifying as to a mortgage fraud
conviction. Because Treasury does not require reporting on why a homeowner was denied, Treasury does not know
how many applicants were denied for truthfully self-reporting their mortgage fraud offenses.
42
A Treasury compliance official told SIGTARP that their compliance review consists of looking to see if the
certification is included in the documentation for assistance but does not test for the truthfulness of the attestation.

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misrepresentations made in the self-certifications means that most falsifications
by an applicant would not be discovered.
Treasury should inquire into gaining access to criminal databases; however, even
if they do not receive access, or before they gain access, convictions are public
records, housed as Treasury’s certificate says, in “federal, state, and county
databases,” typically readily available to search on the internet, or at least to
request records that could come in a matter of days while Florida HFA advisor
agents are processing the application. The Florida Supreme Court issued an
administrative order allowing all county clerks to post records online. For
example, the Clerk of the Court Miami Dade County has a “Miami-Dade County
Criminal Justice Online System” where anyone can search by defendant name and
click an option for “I wish to request a background check,” The Lee County Clerk
of the Court provides for an online criminal records request by defendant’s name
on their website.
Treasury’s lack of any due diligence to ensure that HHF funds do not go to
ineligible homeowners (those convicted of mortgage-related fraud) makes HHF
vulnerable to potential fraud, and thwarts the intent of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Taxpayers who funded HHF deserve more than reliance on a self-certification to
protect TARP from fraud. The options available to comply with the Dodd-Frank
Act are not complicated and would require that Treasury, or its agents at Florida’s
HFA, do what it says it does in the warning contained in the certification –
conduct routine criminal record checks against federal, state, and county
databases.
Treasury should also ensure that companies that state HFAs contract with, such as
Florida HFA advisor agencies, who are paid with HHF funds, also are not run or
staffed by felons convicted of mortgage-related crimes. For example, a Florida
homeowner who had applied for HHF and not heard back became concerned. Her
internet search revealed that the director of the advisor agency had been arrested
and charged with organized fraud. An investigation by Florida HFA’s Office of
Inspector General confirmed the pending organized fraud charges and also
confirmed that a record search of the Department of Business and Professional
Regulation and the Office of Financial Regulation showed that in a 2009 final
order, this director of the advisor agency had his real estate license and mortgage
broker licenses revoked for committing fraud related to a residential mortgage
transaction, and that the director had admitted to the fraud. Florida’s HFA had no
knowledge of this. Subsequently, Florida’s HFA terminated their contract with
this advisor agency.
To strengthen HHF even stronger against fraud, Treasury should also search not
just for convictions, but also for arrests. Many county sheriffs maintain online

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records of arrest searches by name. 43 Treasury could put a notation with the
homeowner’s application if they have been criminal charged for mortgage-related
crimes and are awaiting trial. HHF Florida has such long application processing
times that the trial could happen prior to a decision to provide HHF assistance. A
notation in the system reminds an advisor agent of Florida’s HFA to go back and
check to see whether the person has been convicted prior to HHF advancing the
funds.
For example, an employee at an advisor agency read an article in a local
newspaper about criminal charges brought against an applicant who was being
processed for HHF funds. Florida HFA’s Office of Inspector General conducted
an investigation that revealed that the applicant had failed to disclose his
subsequent arrest for fraud charges related to a more than $4-million investment
fraud scheme involving more than 50 victims including many active or retired
Florida school teachers and administrators. The scheme included conduct that
could preclude his eligibility as it alleged that proceeds from the fraud had been
used for personal gain to purchase commercial and residential properties. The
applicant received his first HHF assistance just months after the indictment, and
subsequently pled guilty to four felony counts for operating a sham investment
fraud.
Finally, the exclusion in the Dodd-Frank Act is a minimum, and there could be
other crimes for which a person is convicted that could make HHF vulnerable to
fraud. A senior Florida HFA official told SIGTARP, “The only crime that
prohibits someone from receiving HHF assistance is a conviction under DoddFrank for mortgage fraud.” Florida might have better protected against potential
abuse of taxpayer funds had it chosen to impose additional exclusion criteria.
Treasury’s HHF Program Director described the Dodd-Frank exclusion to
SIGTARP as “pretty narrow.” Besides the Dodd-Frank Act exclusion for
mortgage fraud, HHF Georgia precludes aid to individuals where the applicant
has any federal or Georgia tax liens and the home must be unencumbered by
federal or state tax liens.
It is possible that individuals with other types of serious convictions could make
HHF vulnerable to fraud. This could include persons convicted of a felony within
the last 10 years for crimes of dishonesty unrelated to mortgages, such as
embezzlement, forgery, bank fraud, welfare fraud, unemployment compensation
fraud, and false statements. These types of crimes have the same concerns
regarding integrity and truthfulness as the mortgage fraud exclusion, which
should at a minimum require a more focused review to ensure the truth about
statements of assets and income. For example, according to a 2014 Florida HFA
Office of Inspector General investigative report, a homeowner who had applied
for HHF in September 2012, claimed to be unemployed. A Google search of the
43

For example, the Lee County Sheriff’s website allows anyone to search arrest records by name
http://www.sheriffleefl.org/main/index.php?r=crimeActivity/inmateIndex.

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applicant’s name reveals a July 23, 2012 press release by Florida Chief Financial
Officer Jeff Atwater, Department of Education Commissioner Gerard Robinson,
and State Attorney Stephen Russell of the 20th Judicial Circuit announcing the
arrest of the applicant for misappropriating state funds, Federal grant funds, and
donations of almost $1 million to fund his extravagant lifestyle, funds that were
supposed to fund his prior employer, a Florida non-profit for disabled persons that
later shut down where he served as the Executive Director. He was cleared for
HHF underwriting in November 2012, but did not receive HHF funds only
because he listed the wrong servicer, which delayed funding. He would later be
sentenced to 39 years in prison. The arrest and charges were publicly available on
Lee County records, but were not searched. That type of crime of
misappropriating federal and state dollars should at a minimum require HHF
Florida to conduct greater due diligence to ensure the truth about assets and
income. 44

44

The Florida Housing Finance Corporation Office of Inspector General Annual Report for Fiscal year 2013 reported on
one investigation where they found a HHF recipient received funds who had been reported about in the Tampa Bay
Times and had been “subject to several previous fraud investigations, charges and convictions and is currently in jail.”

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Conclusion
When the Administration and Treasury announced that the Hardest Hit Fund
would give states flexibility to tailor local solutions, it announced that flexibility
would come with strict accountability by Treasury – that program effectiveness
would be measured, and that there would be effective oversight by Treasury. At
the beginning of HHF, Treasury told all state housing finance agencies that they
were required to have a tracking system to measure progress against goals, and
report to Treasury. Former Treasury Home Preservation Office Chief Phyllis
Caldwell told SIGTARP in 2011, that Treasury could evaluate success in HHF in
ways such as, “are we reaching the right number of people, are we reaching them
in a sustainable way.” After five years, HHF Florida has only used half of the
allocated $1 billion in TARP dollars in a 7-year program, has decreased the
number of homeowners estimated assisting by 63% from 106,000 to 39,000, and
is underperforming compared to the national average of other HHF states.
SIGTARP found that Treasury abandoned its intent to set goals for HHF program
effectiveness and to measure progress against those goals. Treasury rejected
SIGTARP’s 2012 recommendations to set goals for effectiveness and measure
progress, stating that any numeric targets are “not well suited to the dynamic
nature of HHF.” HHF Florida’s goals are “preserving homeownership” and
“protecting home values,” more high-level expectations that could have been
considered met in the first year. Treasury has not set any numeric or non-numeric
goals that could measure program effectiveness, except one-time for HHF Florida
in 2012, after SIGTARP’s report. Instead, Treasury’s current HPO Chief Mark
McArdle told SIGTARP, “there is no such thing as one set goal that works or
doesn’t work.”
Treasury setting no measurable goals or targets over fear of impacting the
“dynamic nature” of this TARP program has led to a lack of the strict
accountability promised at the launch of HHF, and what is required of all Federal
agencies by the Government Performance and Results Act. Flexibility and
innovation does not come in a Federal program without accountability that can be
measured against targets.
Treasury has tried it their new way, different than announced, with no numeric
goals and targets to measure the effectiveness of HHF Florida for five years, and
as a result, the numbers have not added up for distressed Florida homeowners.
According to Treasury’s data, only 20% of homeowners who applied for help
from HHF Florida received assistance. Treasury has not set a goal for what is the
right number of people for HHF Florida to reach, as former HPO Chief Caldwell
said, instead allowing HHF Florida to decrease the estimate of homeowners to be
helped by 63%. SIGTARP found that this estimate has limited usefulness
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46

because Treasury has permitted Florida HFA to decrease its estimate several
times, creating a shifting baseline that makes it difficult for Treasury to measure
HHF Florida’s progress and to hold itself or Florida’s HFA accountable in getting
assistance to homeowners in a crisis.
Treasury has not set a goal for a target homeowner admission rate for HHF
Florida, and as a result:
•
•
•

According to Treasury’s data, only 20% (22,400 of 109,774) of homeowners
who applied for help from HHF Florida received assistance.
HHF Florida has the lowest rate of admitting homeowners into HHF than any
other HHF state.
HHF Florida’s 20% homeowner admission rate is far below the other 18 HHF
states that average providing assistance to about half (48%) 204,111 of the
424,632 homeowners who applied.

HHF Florida has not been as effective in reaching homeowners as other states and
has not progressed effectively. By not measuring progress against a target
homeowner admission rate, the low homeowner admission rate for Florida has
been relatively constant throughout the five-year history of HHF (ranging from
18 to 23%). If Treasury continues to reject setting a goal of the right number of
people to reach in Florida, Treasury should at least, publicly, set a goal specific
for HHF Florida’s homeowner admission rate. This goal would target the
particular needs of Florida homeowners, based on the five years of knowledge
that Treasury has about HHF Florida, while ensuring that Florida homeowners
have as much a chance in HHF as homeowners in other HHF states.
HHF Florida consistently denied homeowners at higher rates (38-45%) than the
national average, which improved this year, but is still slightly above the national
average. Treasury has not set a goal for a target homeowner denial rate for HHF
Florida, and as a result, through the history of the five years of HHF, HHF Florida
has denied a higher percentage of homeowners for assistance than the national
average in HHF, which showed some improvement this year. After the first year
in HHF, according to Treasury’s data, as of March 31, 2011, HHF Florida denied
45% of homeowners who applied, compared to the national HHF average of 21%.
By the second year, HHF Florida denied 43% of homeowners, compared to the
national HHF average of 31%.
Treasury does not have insight into why these homeowners were denied because
it does not publicly report on denial reasons. Treasury’s HPO Chief told
SIGTARP that in 2011, Treasury looked very closely at the reasons why
homeowners were denied in Florida. However, Treasury provides no
transparency on why HHF Florida denied homeowners. After SIGTARP’s
April 12, 2012 report, Florida’s HFA compiled the reasons homeowners were
denied, which gave insight that led to the board of Florida’s HFA voting on
April 27, 2012, to eliminate four homeowner eligibility requirements that had led
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to HHF Florida denying half of all homeowners. This led to some improvement
(HHF Florida denied 38% of homeowners for the two following years), but was
still high compared to the national HHF average of 28%. For the first time this
year ended March 31, 2015, there was improvement. HHF Florida reported
denying 29,554 (27%) of the 109,774 homeowners who applied, which is slightly
over the national average of 26%. However, during this same reporting period,
HHF Florida had very high rates of homeowners whose HHF applications were
withdrawn (39% compared to the national HHF average of 27%), and 14,800
homeowners whose HHF applications were in process (13% compared to the 5%
national HHF average), which requires further Treasury review.
According to Treasury’s data, nearly 40% of all homeowners who applied to
HHF Florida either withdrew their application or had their application
withdrawn by Florida’s HFA, which is far higher than the national average.
According to Treasury’s data, 43,030 of the 109,774 homeowners who applied for
HHF Florida either withdrew their application after being approved, or Florida’s
HFA withdrew their application because the homeowner did not respond to
requests for information. Treasury lumps both of these very different situations
into one reporting category, not broken down. The rate has escalated from 35% in
2012. The national HHF average is 27% withdrawn applications, but HHF
Florida drags the national average up. The average of the other HHF states is
24% withdrawn applications. Neither Treasury nor Florida’s HFA follow up with
the homeowner to ask why they withdrew their application.
Treasury has not set a goal for HHF Florida for the number of applications
withdrawn by Florida’s HFA. High numbers of applications that Florida’s HFA,
or their advisor agencies in counties around Florida, withdraws for homeowners
who are not responding to requests for information, raises questions about
whether HHF Florida is operating in the most effective way. Treasury also has no
goal for how long it takes Florida’s HFA to process homeowner applications.
According to Treasury’s data as of March 31, 2015, HHF Florida takes a median
of 167 days (nearly 6 months) to get a homeowner assistance.
SIGTARP found several factors contributed to the Hardest Hit Fund Florida’s
slowness in getting assistance to homeowners and lack of effectiveness during the
height of the crisis when Florida homeowners needed it most:
•

SIGTARP 16-001

HHF Florida lacked comprehensive planning by Treasury, who waited for
Florida’s HFA to get large servicers to participate. According to a senior
Florida HFA official, the lack of big servicer participation was the primary
challenge of implementing HHF. That official told SIGTARP in 2011, “The
one billion dollars has been a nice carrot to use for servicers in Florida, but
there is no stick with the carrot to force servicers to participate,” and that if
Treasury had a stick to use on servicers, they had not used it. Unemployed
homeowners would have to wait more than one year before the statewide
rollout of HHF assistance in Florida. A senior Florida HFA official told
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SIGTARP that there was no hint of big servicer participation until the Fannie
and Freddie (the GSEs) put out guidance, and that the Federal Housing
Finance Agency (FHFA), the GSEs, the big servicers, and the first 10 states
looked to Treasury to instigate improvement. Treasury expected states to talk
to servicers, and “wanted to let that process work out,” according to
Treasury’s HPO Chief. Treasury would later intervene to “change the game”
according to Treasury’s HPO Chief, holding a servicer summit in September
2010, after which the program started to gain traction. Treasury’s servicer
summit was “the first big step” according to a senior Florida HFA official, and
only after that did Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issue guidance directing
servicers to accept HHF funds (in November 2010). Florida started 2010 with
an 11.8% unemployment rate, and by the time the HHF program rolled out,
Florida’s unemployment rate, although still high at 10.1%, had already started
to improve.

SIGTARP 16-001

•

SIGTARP found that despite choosing Florida for HHF because it had the
third highest home price decline in the nation, the Hardest Hit Fund in Florida
suffered from a lack of comprehensive planning by Treasury to provide
assistance to underwater homeowners when home price declines were at their
highest. There was no HHF Florida program targeted to underwater
homeowners for the first three years (2010 – September 2013). Treasury left
it to Florida HFA, acting deferentially, only taking action in response to a
state’s request. Treasury could have intervened to change the game, by
proposing and pressuring Florida’s HFA to start a program targeting
underwater homeowners, but Treasury did not do so until November 2012,
after SIGTARP’s report. By September 2013, when HHF Florida started
principal reduction, home values had already increased by more than 22%
from second quarter 2011 lows.

•

The first two years of HHF Florida were plagued by the fact that nearly half of
all homeowners were denied as ineligible. By April 1, 2012, Florida’s HFA
denied 12,516 of 27,541 homeowners (45%) as ineligible. Treasury’s HPO
Chief told SIGTARP that Treasury looked closely at the reasons why
homeowners were denied, and that Florida’s HFA had rejected a large number
of borrowers because they could not be more than some number of months in
arrears, and that because Florida has a long foreclosure timeline, there was an
abnormal number of people in that bucket. Treasury’s HPO Chief told
SIGTARP, “as long as they have…state a justification, you know, we’re
trying to basically help people who can still be helped.” Two weeks after
SIGTARP’s April 12, 2012 report, the board of Florida’s HFA voted to
eliminate the eligibility requirement that a homeowner not be more than 180 days delinquent (the reason why 2,929 homeowners were denied) and three
other eligibility requirements that had led to HHF Florida denying half of all
homeowners who had applied.

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•

49

The effectiveness of HHF assistance to unemployed/underemployed Florida
homeowners suffered early on due to a lack of comprehensive planning to
ensure that the assistance lasted long enough for a homeowner to become
reemployed at a level where they could afford to pay their mortgage – the
measure of effectiveness stated in Treasury’s term sheet for HHF Florida.
Although in July 2010, Treasury extended unemployment assistance in
HAMP from 6 months to 12 based on SIGTARP’s warning that nearly 43% of
unemployed workers have been out of work for 27 weeks or longer, months
later (in December 2010), Treasury allowed Florida’s HFA to drop the
duration of HHF unemployment assistance from 18 months to 6 months.
Treasury knew that six months was the shortest duration of unemployment
assistance provided in HHF. Treasury’s HPO Chief told SIGTARP that
Treasury “leaves it to the states that are closer to the situation to decide,” and
that the state had a rationale. In October 2011, California and Nevada, who
also had six months of assistance, would extend their assistance, leaving HHF
Florida as the only state at six months. But still, Treasury took no action.
Two weeks after SIGTARP’s 2012 report, Florida’s HFA found that 6 months
was not sufficient time for 88% of HHF-assisted homeowners to achieve a
successful outcome, and they would extend to 12 months. They would make
the change retroactive, which according to Treasury HPO Chief, “totally froze
up their operations.”

Treasury also took strong action to increase the effectiveness of HHF Florida after
SIGTARP’s 2012 report and recommendations, by issuing an Action
Memorandum to Florida’s HFA in November 2012, instructing them to increase
the low number of homeowners assisted, raise the ratio of approved homeowners
to denied homeowners, increase inadequate staffing levels, and create a program
to address negative equity. Treasury asked for a written plan and set a minimum
target of an average of 750 funded homeowners a month, warning, “If Florida
Housing fails to achieve these goals, Treasury will consider additional steps,
including possible remedial actions, to improve performance.” Treasury told
Florida’s HFA to lengthen assistance, to “widen the net,” according to Treasury’s
HPO Chief.
The improvements made after Treasury intervened to change the game by taking a
stronger role after SIGTARP’s 2012 report prove that the action SIGTARP
recommended can make a difference over whether a state flourishes or flounders.
Treasury described its action as “pressure” or “pushing.” Treasury’s HPO Chief
told SIGTARP that Florida “made dramatic changes under pressure.” Treasury
would not issue any Action Memorandums after 2012, and would return to
deference to the states, no goals for effectiveness, and no measurement of
progress against goals aimed at effectiveness.
Despite the improvements made in 2013, from Treasury’s intervention, HHF
Florida continues to lag behind other HHF states. Treasury missed an opportunity
to apply what it had learned about the delays and other obstacles HHF Florida
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faced in its first two programs when Treasury left it to the state to design and
implement the programs. Treasury lost opportunities with new programs to get
involved in the planning stage to identify obstacles that could drag the
effectiveness of the new programs down. SIGTARP found several factors
contribute to this lag.

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•

HHF Florida struggled with implementation issues that delayed homeowners
from getting principal reduction assistance when Florida’s HFA stopped
receiving applications for eight months after receiving a flood of in the first
week (September 2013). According to Treasury’s guidelines issued to the
HHF states at the start of the program, Treasury intended to be involved in
identifying and mitigating obstacles to program effectiveness, but Treasury
did not anticipate the flood despite knowing the need and that this was the first
HHF program for underwater homeowners. Treasury did not mitigate the
obstacle that Florida’s HFA was unable to handle the volume of applications.
At that time the program reopened, only 1,756 homeowners had received
assistance. Treasury has set no goals for this program. Underwater Florida
homeowners do not have time for Treasury to defer to Florida for the
effectiveness of this program. With such a great demand, HHF Florida
principal reduction can address a great need for Florida homeowners with
underwater homes, but only if it operates effectively. Only 14% of
homeowners who applied have received assistance, and more than one-third
of homeowners were denied. Already, fewer homeowners have received
assistance in the last two quarters compared to earlier quarters, and it is taking
longer (210 days) for a homeowner to get assistance than it took in the past
(154 days). Treasury should reconsider which eligibility requirements it
really needs to see if it can widen the net to target the typical underwater
Florida homeowner.

•

In the HHF program for senior citizens with reverse mortgages that began in
November 2013, Treasury and Florida lacked comprehensive planning to
identify and mitigate obstacles that senior citizens faced applying to the
program and providing supporting documents. As a result, Treasury’s data
shows that 46% of all seniors who applied had their application withdrawn,
and it takes a median 280 days (9 to 10 months) for a senior citizen to obtain
approval for this HHF assistance. Flexibility and innovation does not excuse
Treasury planning for obstacles. Comprehensive planning to identify
obstacles unique to seniors should not take so long that it delays assistance,
but does require critical thinking. Florida’s HFA told Treasury that they were
having issues trying to reach seniors who are not sophisticated in applying and
submitting documents online. HHF Florida now works with a state agency on
aging to help go into seniors’ homes to help gather documents, and Treasury
has streamlined the underwriting process. Treasury will need to be actively
involved to ensure this program moves as fast as it can to get help to Florida
seniors who need the money now, not in 9 to 10 months. Treasury has no goal
for the length of time Florida’s HFA takes to process an application. Senior
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citizens do not have the time for marginal improvements in application
processing times each quarter. Seniors deserve extraordinary effort and care
to ensure that the program is effective, and that effort and care should come
from Florida’s HFA and Treasury.
•

SIGTARP found that Treasury and Florida’s HFA lacked comprehensive
planning in a program for a non-profit to buy mortgages on underwater homes
and use HHF funds to modify those mortgages by not identifying the obstacle
that the non-profit might not be the successful bidder at Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) sales. After a 2-year pilot program,
only 92 homeowners have been helped. Rather than take action to hold HHF
Florida accountable or setting performance targets, Treasury’s HHF Program
Director told SIGTARP that Treasury is not at a point to shut the program
down, and that the state “has a tremendous amount of latitude to design and
fund their own programs.” The states are not funding these programs, TARP
is. In the meantime, the $50 million in TARP funds is not being used for
other programs effectively reaching homeowners.

SIGTARP also found that although the Dodd-Frank Act precludes anyone
convicted of a mortgage-related crime within the last 10 years from receiving
HHF funds, Treasury shifts the burden of complying with the Dodd-Frank Act to
homeowners to self-report, not conducting any due diligence to check readily
available public databases for convictions. The Dodd-Frank Act precludes HHF
for those convicted of a mortgage-related crime, not those who say they were
convicted. This makes HHF vulnerable to fraud and thwarts the intent of the
Dodd-Frank Act. Treasury can strengthen HHF even further against fraud by
searching for arrests, as well as convictions for non-mortgage related crimes of
dishonesty that could make HHF vulnerable to fraud such as misrepresented
income and assets. Treasury should also require regular background checks of
those who work on HHF programs.
Despite HHF announced as a TARP program to “help address urgent problems
facing homeowners at the center of the housing crisis,” SIGTARP found that
Treasury has not conducted oversight with a sense of urgency to ensure that HHF
Florida is effective. Instead, Treasury looks for either a change to HHF Florida or
steady growth quarter-to-quarter – “one or the other” – according to Treasury’s
HPO Chief. Treasury only tracks and measures against the goal of HHF Florida
spending their allocated $1 billion in TARP funds by the end of the program in
December 31, 2017. Treasury HPO Chief McArdle told SIGTARP in 2013, “I
believe they’re going to utilize their funds with [the HHF principal reduction
program].” Some HHF states have already reached that capacity. After five
years, HHF Florida still has half of their HHF funds, despite Florida’s
homeowners experiencing a critical need.
Rather than bring strict accountability by measuring program effectiveness as
promised, Treasury has allowed HHF Florida to underperform compared to other
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HHF states, consistently. Although there has been some improvement, it is not
enough to address the urgent needs of Florida homeowners. Underperforming
numbers show areas for Treasury to set goals specific to HHF Florida, rather than
hope for marginal improvement each quarter. The lowest homeowner admission
rate, the highest withdrawn application rate, failure to meet Treasury’s only
minimum benchmark to help 750 homeowners a month, an eight-month stop in
accepting applications for principal reduction assistance, a two-year pilot program
with only 92 homeowners helped, 280 days to get assistance to senior citizens, are
all areas where Treasury has allowed HHF Florida to proceed without
accountability. Treasury’s HHF Program Director told SIGTARP that if it’s not
working, the state HFAs “tweak it.” She said Treasury’s role is to support them
in those efforts. However, Treasury’s role is to conduct oversight and ensure the
effectiveness of HHF in each state by intervening to change the game when a
program underperforms. That is what Treasury promised to do at the start of the
program, and what has driven any improvement in HHF Florida.
Treasury allowing HHF Florida to underperform is not because of a lack of
communication or close contact with Florida’s HFA. Treasury’s HHF Program
Director told SIGTARP that she talks to the HHF states every day. Treasury
officials told SIGTARP that they seek insight behind the quarterly performance
numbers by asking Florida’s HFA questions. Treasury’s HHF Program Director
has described how Treasury communicates constantly with “stakeholders” in
HHF to share best practices, refine programs, and identify obstacles, among other
things. She described how Treasury holds a monthly conference call with all
HHF states, and an annual in- person summit with all states, large servicers, and
the GSEs, to understand their issues and concerns. Despite Treasury’s constant
contact, collaboration, and sharing, Treasury has allowed HHF Florida to lag
behind other HHF states in program effectiveness, consistently, according to
Treasury’s own performance numbers. Treasury’s HHF Program Director told
SIGTARP, “there is so much going on that we just can’t see based on a quarterly
performance report.” If Treasury cannot see what is going on, then neither can
the public. There should be greater transparency as to the specific improvement
(goal) that Treasury wants HHF Florida to meet and how Treasury will measure
the state HFA getting there. To the extent those discussions happen between
Treasury and state HFAs, they are not memorialized, which allows the HHF states
to escape accountability from Treasury, Congress, and the American taxpayers
that fund TARP.
There is one significant stakeholder that Treasury did not mention – Florida
homeowners. As times have improved for most, it can be tough for those with a
job, an income sufficient to pay their mortgage, and who do not owe more than
their home is worth, to understand the struggles and frustration of a homeowner
still going through tough times looking to the TARP bailout for help. Without
regular contact and communication with those homeowners, it can be hard for
Treasury officials to put a face to a HHF performance statistic, hard to understand
how an unsophisticated homeowner can get confused about all the documents
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required, hard to understand the desperation of a homeowner who could not wait
months while their application was “in process” and had to go elsewhere for help
or entered into foreclosure, and hard to understand what it is like for a senior
citizen to face a world that has gone online, and face their own forgetfulness
about where documents are to be found.
To make HHF Florida as effective as possible, Treasury should increase its
contact and communication with the stakeholders that matter the most – Florida
homeowners who take part in the HHF application process, who can give
Treasury the best insight into areas that need improvement. Treasury should not
just communicate with those who received assistance, but homeowners who were
denied or had their application withdrawn. Only regular communication and
contact with Florida homeowners who have been part of the HHF Florida
application process will give Treasury a true picture of what lies behind the
performance numbers, what Florida’s HFA might not be able to tell them, and
what obstacles stand in the way of HHF Florida being as effective as possible.
It can be natural with such close contact with a state HFA for Treasury to not
want to come down hard on them. Oversight is not easy or comfortable. There is
a natural tension with holding someone accountable. It is more comfortable to
give deference – “leave it to the states” as Treasury officials told SIGTARP, to be
satisfied with some steady improvement and a state HFA justification for worse
performance than other states. It can be easier for Treasury’s program staff to
leave oversight to Treasury compliance staff, but Treasury’s compliance staff
responsibility relates to following program rules, not the effectiveness of program
performance. Treasury’s approach to oversight has led to HHF Florida not being
as effective as it could be, or as effective as other HHF states. Otherwise, HHF
Florida’s performance numbers would not be lagging behind HHF national
averages. If not Treasury, then who will bring that accountability that was
promised, accountability that could help more Florida homeowners?
The people who have gotten help from HHF Florida have received real assistance
in a critical time of need, and while no program will assist all struggling
homeowners, Treasury should strive for a program that will help the typical
struggling Florida homeowner. As HHF Florida lags behind other HHF states,
with only two years left for HHF, the time for Treasury giving tremendous
latitude and deference to Florida’s HFA without the “strict accountability”
Treasury promised must be over. HHF is not designed to be so dynamic and give
such latitude and deference to the states that state HFAs are allowed to administer
a program that lags well behind other HHF states in providing effective assistance
to Florida homeowners.
Florida homeowners in distress need help now, not by the end of 2017.
According to RealtyTrac, Florida had the nation’s highest foreclosure rate at 2.3%
in 2014. Five years into the program, these are not homeowners who have time
for Treasury and Florida’s HFA to watch for steady improvement that while
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needed, is not enough to stop HHF Florida from lagging behind other HHF states.
Even with improvements made in HHF, Florida homeowners still need Treasury
to push and pressure and demand that HHF Florida is the most effective it can be
right now, by setting targets and measuring progress against those targets, rather
than measuring against the prior quarter. That is the role Treasury signed up for.
Treasury should go back to its roots – how it described HHF – state flexibility
with strict Treasury accountability through goals for effectiveness and measuring
progress against those goals. To change a future outcome for the
underperforming HHF Florida, it is time for Treasury to change the game.
Otherwise, HHF Florida may spend the $1 billion by December 2017, but it risks
not being as effective as it can be to help the urgent needs of Florida homeowners
now. All TARP programs are emergency program designed to help during times
of crisis. That includes HHF Florida.

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Recommendations
Making recommendations to improve the effectiveness of Government, and
prevent fraud, waste, and abuse, is the traditional role of an office of inspector
general. Given that SIGTARP is a Special OIG, our role is not to improve the
effectiveness of Treasury, but to improve the effectiveness of TARP programs,
and protect TARP programs from fraud, waste, and abuse.
1. To improve the effectiveness of the Hardest Hit Fund Florida on an urgent
basis, and to ensure that Florida homeowners have the same chance of Hardest
Hit Fund assistance as homeowners in other HHF states, Treasury should
improve the homeowner admission rate in HHF Florida to a targeted level that
would bring it closer to the average homeowner admission rate of the other
HHF states. Treasury should set numeric targets that HHF Florida must meet
each quarter to reach the targeted homeowner admission rate and include
those targets in an action memorandum to Florida’s housing finance agency.
2. To improve the effectiveness of the Hardest Hit Fund in all states on an urgent
basis, Treasury should form a HHF performance committee to meet each
quarter to assess performance by each state housing finance agency in
comparison to other state HHF programs, identify obstacles and risks, and
develop strategies to mitigate those obstacles and risks. Treasury should
memorialize the work of that committee through meeting minutes, and report
on those obstacles and risks, as well as mitigation strategies to the Treasury
Deputy Secretary twice a year.
3. To improve the effectiveness of the Hardest Hit Fund Florida in reaching
homeowners in Florida on an urgent basis, Treasury should, within 60 days,
reassess eligibility requirements of each HHF Florida program to ensure that
programs target the typical Florida homeowner, keep only those requirements
that are absolutely necessary, and eliminate those that are not. Treasury
should memorialize the findings of this reassessment.
4. To give Treasury insight into areas to improve the effectiveness of the Hardest
Hit Fund on an urgent basis, Treasury should require all participating state
housing finance agencies to report on an overall state HHF level as well as
individual HHF program level: the reasons why homeowners were denied
assistance along with the corresponding number of homeowners denied for
that reason. Treasury should require this reporting on a quarterly and
cumulative basis and post that information on its website for transparency and
accountability.
5. To give Treasury insight into areas to improve the effectiveness of the Hardest
Hit Fund on an urgent basis, Treasury should require each state housing
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finance agency to report county-level data for all HHF programs and
individual state HHF program on: the number of homeowners who have
applied for HHF, the number of homeowners denied, the number of
homeowners who withdrew their application after being approved for
assistance, the number of homeowners who the state housing finance agency
withdrew their application, the number of homeowners whose applications are
in process, and the median number of days to process homeowner
applications. Treasury should require this reporting on a quarterly and
cumulative basis and post this information on its website for transparency and
accountability.
6. To improve the effectiveness of the Hardest Hit Fund Florida on an urgent
basis, and ensure that homeowners throughout Florida have the same chance
of HHF assistance as homeowners in other counties within the state, Treasury
should assess whether HHF Florida is operating in the most effective manner
in each county. This should include, at a minimum, Treasury analyzing,
within 60 days, which Florida counties have the lowest homeowner admission
rates, the highest homeowner denial rates, the highest rate of homeowner
applications withdrawn by an advisor agent for Florida’s housing finance
agency, and the longest application processing times, Treasury setting targets
and milestones for improvement in an action memorandum to Florida’s
housing finance agency. Treasury program staff should, within six months,
visit with advisor agents of Florida’s housing finance agency in counties hit
the hardest but where HHF Florida is least effective, not for a compliance
review, but to get an understanding of eligibility requirements that may be too
strict to target the typical Florida homeowner seeking HHF assistance, and the
challenges and obstacles the advisor agents face in making a decision to deny
or withdraw a homeowner.
7. To give Treasury insight into areas to improve the effectiveness of the Hardest
Hit Fund on an urgent basis, Treasury should require that state housing
finance agencies report separately the number of homeowners who withdrew
their HHF application from the number of homeowners whose HHF
application was withdrawn by the state housing finance agency. Treasury
should require that reporting on a quarterly and cumulative basis and post that
reporting on its website for transparency and accountability.
8. To improve the effectiveness of the Hardest Hit Fund on an urgent basis,
Treasury should reduce to a targeted level the length of time to process a
senior citizen’s application and give assistance in the Hardest Hit Fund
Florida’s senior citizen program known as ELMORE. Florida’s housing
finance agency should view a targeted length of time to process an application
under ELMORE not as an excuse to deny a homeowner, but instead as a target
for their own improvement in helping homeowners make it through the
approval process. Treasury should set numeric targets that HHF Florida must
meet each quarter to reach the targeted processing time, and include those
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targets in an action memorandum to Florida’s housing finance agency, and
measure progress quarterly.
9. To improve the effectiveness of the Hardest Hit Fund Florida on an urgent
basis, including the median 280 days to process a homeowner’s application
and the fact that 46% of applications have been withdrawn, Treasury should
identify with more detail the obstacle to senior citizens getting assistance from
the Hardest Hit Fund Florida’s program known as ELMORE by determining
which documents senior citizens are having trouble providing. To assist in
identifying these documents, Treasury should, within 60 days, separately meet
with Florida’s Department of Elderly Affairs, and advisor agencies for
Florida’s housing finance agency in targeted counties with low ELMORE
participation in comparison to the number of senior citizens in those counties
with reverse mortgages. After identifying the documents that are causing
obstacles to homeowner participation, Treasury should determine whether
those documents are essential for HHF Florida to provide assistance, and
mitigate that obstacle by further reducing required documents (beyond what
Treasury and Florida’s housing finance agency have already reduced) to only
those documents that are essential.
10. To improve the effectiveness of the Hardest Hit Fund Florida on an urgent
basis, Treasury should preclude Florida’s housing finance agency from
withdrawing a senior citizen’s application to the HHF program known as
ELMORE based on homeowner non-responsiveness unless Florida’s
Department of Elderly Affairs has stated in writing that it has done all it can to
help the homeowner complete the application and find the required
documents.
11. To identify obstacles to the effectiveness of the Hardest Hit Fund Florida on
an urgent basis, Treasury should increase its contact and communication with
Florida homeowners, particularly those who have gone through HHF Florida’s
application process by: (1) within 90 days, Treasury begin communications
with Florida homeowners who withdrew their application or had their
application withdrawn to understand the reasons why; (2) inviting homeowner
advocacy groups representing homeowners who have applied for HHF to an
annual summit with Treasury officials similar to Treasury’s servicer summit;
(3) holding targeted Treasury-sponsored outreach events, for example, at
Florida senior citizen centers, and in areas of high underwater Florida
homeowners with limited participation in the principal reduction program; and
(4) having the new HHF performance committee review and discuss
homeowner complaints about HHF Florida at each meeting.
12. To ensure that HHF Florida is effective and ensure that homeowners
throughout Florida have the same chance of HHF assistance as homeowners
in other counties within the state, Treasury should hold HHF Florida
accountable to maintaining its improvement in homeowner denial rates, by
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setting a targeted homeowner denial rate that keeps HHF Florida in line with
the national average for HHF. Treasury should provide that targeted rate in an
action memorandum to Florida’s housing finance agency and each quarter
ensure that it meets that target.
13. To improve the efficiency of the Hardest Hit Fund Florida on an urgent basis,
Treasury should reduce the length of time HHF Florida takes to process an
application from the median of 167 days to a targeted length of time.
Treasury should provide that target in an action memorandum to Florida’s
housing finance agency and each quarter measure progress against that target.
14. To improve the effectiveness of the Hardest Hit Fund Florida on an urgent
basis, Treasury should reduce the rate of homeowner applications withdrawn
by the state housing finance agency to a targeted level. Treasury should
provide that target in an action memorandum to Florida’s housing finance
agency and each quarter measure progress against that target.
15. To improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Hardest Hit Fund Florida
on an urgent basis, Treasury should, within 90 days, determine to either
convert the Hardest Hit Fund pilot program known as the Modification
Enabling Project to a full program or close it and put the funds to better use in
existing HHF Florida programs.
16. To prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in the Hardest Hit Fund and noncompliance with the Dodd-Frank Act, Treasury should ensure HHF funds do
not go to felons convicted of mortgage-related crimes by searching or
requiring state housing finance agencies to search federal, state, and county
databases for an applicant homeowner’s criminal history, prior to the release
of any funds to the applicant, given the fact that convictions are public
records. Treasury should make efforts to gain access to other criminal
databases.
17. To prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in the Hardest Hit Fund and noncompliance with the Dodd-Frank Act, Treasury should monitor applicants
(and existing recipients) for subsequent mortgage-related convictions that
would disqualify the homeowner from receiving HHF funds (or additional
HHF funds). If an applicant has been arrested but not yet convicted of a crime
that falls within the Dodd-Frank Act exclusion, Treasury should ensure that
the state housing finance agency checks to see if the applicant (or existing
recipient) has been convicted as a final underwriting step prior to releasing
any funds (or further funds) to the homeowner.
18. To prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in the Hardest Hit Fund, Treasury should
ensure that state housing finance agencies conduct regular criminal history
background checks on staff or contractors who are paid, either directly or
indirectly, with HHF funds by searching federal, state, and county databases.
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19. To prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in the Hardest Hit Fund, Treasury should
conduct due diligence by searching public records for an applicant’s
conviction for non-mortgage related crimes of dishonesty (such as
embezzlement, forgery, bank fraud, welfare fraud, unemployment
compensation fraud, tax fraud, money laundering, and fast statements), and, if
found, conduct further due diligence, including looking into potential
misrepresentations of assets and income based on the nature of the crimes.
20. To increase nationwide stakeholder communication and address obstacles on
an urgent need basis, Treasury should hold its servicer summit with the 19
Hardest Hit Fund states on a bi-annual instead of an annual basis to keep
proactively apprised of the obstacles and limitations the HHF states are
experiencing, and to make timely interventions to better the performance and
increase effectiveness in every HHF state in getting assistance to
homeowners.

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Management Comments and SIGTARP’s
Response
Treasury provided comments to the draft report. SIGTARP addressed those
comments where applicable. Treasury generally disagreed with SIGTARP’s
findings, and said that “Treasury believes it would hamper progress and slow the
pace of assistance by substantially increasing the administrative burden to operate
these programs.” Treasury did not agree to implement SIGTARP’s
recommendations, but said they would “review all of SIGTARP’s
recommendations and respond to each one in the ordinary course.”

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Appendix A – Objective, Scope, and Methodology
SIGTARP performed this evaluation under authority of Public Law 110-343, as amended, which
also incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General
Act of 1978, as amended. SIGTARP initiated this evaluation in response to a request from Senator
Bill Nelson. The evaluation’s objective was to assess Florida Housing Finance Corporation’s
(Florida HFA) implementation and Treasury’s oversight of the programs that comprise Florida’s
HHF program.
The scope of this evaluation covered Florida HFA’s Unemployment Mortgage Assistance Program,
Mortgage Loan Reinstatement Payment Program, Principal Reduction Program, Elderly Mortgage
Assistance Program, Modification Enabling Pilot Program, and Down Payment Assistance Program
from each program’s inception through March 31, 2015. SIGTARP conducted this evaluation from
June 2013 through September 2015 in Washington, D.C. and Tallahassee, Florida.
SIGTARP interviewed Treasury and Florida HFA officials, analyzed quarterly performance and
financial data, performed a limited review of Florida HFA’s underwriting, and reviewed other
program documents such as FL HFA’s program proposals, readiness assessment, and Florida HFA
and Treasury emails and memoranda. In addition, SIGTARP reviewed Treasury and Florida HFA
press releases and obtained information from Treasury’s and Florida HFA’s websites.
SIGTARP conducted this evaluation in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspection and
Evaluation,” January 2012 edition, established by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity
and Efficiency. Those standards require that SIGTARP plan and perform the evaluation to obtain
evidence sufficient to provide a reasonable basis for findings and conclusions based on the
evaluation objectives. SIGTARP believes that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
the findings and conclusions based on the evaluation objectives.

Limitations on Data
SIGTARP relied on Treasury and Florida HFA to provide email communication and certain
documentation related to Florida’s HHF Programs. It is possible that the documentation provided
did not reflect a comprehensive response to SIGTARP’s documentation requests, potentially limiting
SIGTARP’s review.

Use of Computer-Processed Data
SIGTARP relied on computer-processed data for this evaluation. Specifically, SIGTARP relied on
Florida HFA’s and Treasury’s quarterly performance reports to determine the numbers and
percentages of HHF applications approved, denied, withdrawn, and in process; and the quarterly
financial reports to determine the status of HHF funding across each state HHF program. SIGTARP
did not validate the accuracy of the data.

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Internal Controls
To address the reporting objective in this evaluation, SIGTARP performed a limited review
interviewing Treasury and Florida HFA officials, and reviewing selected Federal and state laws and
regulations, and Treasury and state policies and procedures to determine the extent to which policies
and procedures existed.

Prior Coverage
SIGTARP has covered the HHF program in two previous audit reports. On April 12, 2012,
SIGTARP released an audit report titled, “Factors Affecting Implementation of the Hardest Hit Fund
Program.” On April 21, 2015, SIGTARP released an audit report titled, “Treasury Should Do Much
More to Increase the Effectiveness of the TARP Hardest Hit Fund Blight Elimination Program.”

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Appendix B – Acronyms and Abbreviations
19 jurisdictions or states
ELMORE
Fannie Mae
Florida’s HFA
Freddie Mac
Ginnie Mae
GSE
HAMP
HFA
HHF
MEP
OFS
PR
SIGTARP
TARP
Treasury

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18 states and the District of Columbia
Elderly Mortgage Assistance Program
Federal National Mortgage Association
Florida Housing Finance Corporation
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
Government National Mortgage Association
Government-sponsored enterprise
Home Affordable Modification Program
housing finance agency
Housing Finance Agency Innovation Fund for the Hardest Hit
Housing Markets (also “Hardest Hit Fund”)
Modification Enabling Pilot Program
Office of Financial Stability
Principal Reduction Program
Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset
Relief Program
Troubled Asset Relief Program
U.S. Department of the Treasury

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Appendix C – Utilization of TARP HHF Funding, By State

Source: SIGTARP analysis of Treasury Quarterly Financial Reports.

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Appendix D – HHF Florida Assistance by County Over the
Last 12 Months and Program to Date – As of 3/31/2015
HHF FLORIDA ASSISTANCE BY COUNTY

County
Dixie
Jefferson
Calhoun
Hamilton
Taylor
Madison
Bradford
Glades
Lafayette
Union
Washington
Holmes
Gulf
Liberty
Sumter
Franklin
Hardee
Levy
Columbia
Jackson
Walton
Gilchrist
Baker
DeSoto
Hendry
Suwannee
Monroe
Okeechobee
Putnam
Wakulla
Nassau
Okaloosa
Highlands
Gadsden
Martin
Santa Rosa
Flagler
Indian River
Citrus
Bay
Alachua
Collier
Escambia
St. Johns

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Homeowners that
Started Receiving
Assistance Over the
Last 12 months
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
5
5
5
6
6
7
7
7
8
9
12
12
14
23
23
25
26
27
29
34
42
43
52
57
61
61

Homeowners that
Received Assistance
Program to Date
6
6
3
1
1
9
8
7
3
1
15
10
5
5
17
8
25
25
23
23
20
22
19
29
29
21
20
61
49
47
71
132
65
77
126
91
146
151
140
133
143
313
259
259

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Clay
Charlotte
Leon
Manatee
Marion
Sarasota
Lake
Hernando
St. Lucie
Osceola
Seminole
Volusia
Lee
Polk
Brevard
Pasco
Pinellas
Duval
Orange
Palm Beach
Hillsborough
Miami-Dade
Broward

62
67
80
83
87
87
87
108
124
133
145
170
192
199
268
284
341
401
440
480
482
683
738

66

255
223
296
254
335
309
299
242
506
388
539
604
862
497
931
709
988
1,586
1,555
1,825
1,367
2,255
2,951

Source: SIGTARP analysis of Florida Housing Finance Corporation, Q1 2014 and Q1 2015 Quarterly Performance Reports.

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Appendix E – HHF Application Volume Over Time by
Application Status – Florida Compared to Other HHF States
HHF APPLICATION VOLUME BY APPLICATION STATUS
March
2011

March
2012

March
2013

March
2014

March
2015

Florida

Homeowners Receiving Assistance
Homeowners Denied Assistance
Homeowners Withdrawn from Program
Homeowners in Process
Total Applications
Application Approval Rate

150
288
6
195
639
23%

4,745
11,352
9,243
940
26,280
18%

8,592
15,729
15,300
2,269
41,890
21%

16,025
26,334
25,191
1,048
68,598
23%

22,400
29,544
43,030
14,800
109,774
20%

Other States

Homeowners Receiving Assistance
Homeowners Denied Assistance
Homeowners Withdrawn from Program
Homeowners in Process
Total Applications
Application Approval Rate

2,043
2,607
723
7,627
13,000
16%

38,832
33,804
25,513
22,296
120,445
32%

101,282
62,991
49,486
21,517
235,276
43%

162,772
93,266
79,689
18,236
352,768
46%

204,111
109,991
100,588
9,942
424,632
48%

All States

Homeowners Receiving Assistance
Homeowners Denied Assistance
Homeowners Withdrawn from Program
Homeowners in Process
Total Applications
Application Approval Rate

2,193
2,895
729
7,822
13,639
16%

43,577
45,156
34,756
23,236
146,725
30%

109,874
78,720
64,786
23,786
277,166
40%

178,797
119,600
104,880
19,284
421,366
42%

226,511
139,535
143,618
24,742
534,406
42%

Source: SIGTARP analysis of Treasury, Housing Finance Agency Aggregate Report as of March 31, 2015, March 31, 2014, and
March 31, 2013. HFA performance data from March 31, 2012 was obtained from each states Q1 2012 HHF quarterly performance
report, the websites containing these reports can be accessed through Treasury’s “Hardest Hit Fund: State-By-State Information”
website at: http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/housing/Pages/Program-Documents.aspx.

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Appendix F – Application Denial Rate by State
HARDEST HIT FUND HOMEOWNER DENIAL RATE BY STATE

State
Arizona
New Jersey
Georgia
South Carolina
Michigan
Rhode Island
California
Florida
Mississippi
Illinois
Nevada
North Carolina
Kentucky
District of Columbia
Ohio
Tennessee
Alabama
Oregon
Indiana

Homeowners
Denied
Assistance
10,711
6,951
8,815
7,887
16,363
1,425
32,262
29,544
1,296
4,072
2,694
5,363
1,816
124
4,841
1,300
1,476
2,136
459

Total
Applicants
15,619
13,093
22,695
22,113
54,230
4,833
119,453
109,774
5,096
20,294
13,694
28,787
9,881
861
34,778
9,352
14,766
28,269
6,818

Application
Denial Rate
69%
53%
39%
36%
30%
29%
27%
27%
25%
20%
20%
19%
18%
14%
14%
14%
10%
8%
7%

Source: SIGTARP analysis of Treasury's Aggregate QPR Report for March 31, 2015, obtained from Website,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/Housing-Finance-Agency-Aggregate-Report.aspx.

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Appendix G – Application Withdrawal Rate by State
HARDEST HIT FUND HOMEOWNER WITHDRAWAL RATE BY STATE

State
Alabama
Oregon
Nevada
Florida
Georgia
California
Michigan
South Carolina
Ohio
North Carolina
Indiana
Kentucky
Illinois
Mississippi
Tennessee
Rhode Island
Arizona
District of Columbia
New Jersey

Homeowners
Withdrawn from
Program
9,200
14,298
5,665
43,030
6,555
33,377
11,327
4,433
5,113
3,773
828
1,131
2,192
469
697
333
1,033
28
136

Total
Applicants
14,766
28,269
13,694
109,774
22,695
119,453
54,230
22,113
34,778
28,787
6,818
9,881
20,294
5,096
9,352
4,833
15,619
861
13,093

Application
Withdrawal
Rate
62%
51%
41%
39%
29%
28%
21%
20%
15%
13%
12%
11%
11%
9%
7%
7%
7%
3%
1%

Source: SIGTARP analysis of Treasury’s Aggregate QPR Report for March 31, 2015, obtained from Website,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/Housing-Finance-Agency-Aggregate-Report.aspx.

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Appendix H – Treasury Action Memorandum to Florida HFA

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Appendix I – Evaluation Team Members
This evaluation was conducted and the report was prepared under the direction of Bruce S. Gimbel, Deputy
Special Inspector General for Audit and Evaluation, and Jenniffer F. Wilson, Assistant Deputy Special
Inspector General for Audit and Evaluation, Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset
Relief Program.
Staff members who conducted the evaluation and contributed to the report include Craig Meklir, Michael
Davitt, Gerardo Lopez, Dennis Lee, and Yusuf House.

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Appendix J – Management Comments

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SIGTARP Hotline
If you are aware of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, or misrepresentations associated with the Troubled
Asset Relief Program, please contact SIGTARP.
By Online Form: www.SIGTARP.gov

By Phone: Call toll free: (877) SIG-2009

By Fax: (202) 622-4559
By Mail:

Office of the Special Inspector General
for the Troubled Asset Relief Program
1801 L Street., NW, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20220

Press Inquiries
If you have any inquiries, please contact our Press Office:

Kyra Daley
Deputy Director of Communications
Kyra.daley@treasury.gov
202-927-1852

Legislative Affairs
For Congressional inquiries, please contact our Legislative Affairs Office:
Joseph Cwiklinski
Director of Legislative Affairs
Joseph.Cwiklinski@treasury.gov
202-927-9159

Obtaining Copies of Testimony and Reports
To obtain copies of testimony and reports, please log on to our website at www.SIGTARP.gov.

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