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economic
report
of the

presid e n t
Transmitted to Congress
January 2025
together with the
annual report of the
council of economic advisers

economic
re p ort
of the

president

transmitted to congress | January 2025
together with the annual report
of the council of economic advisers

Contents
Economic Report of the President. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers. . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Letter of Transmittal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Introduction.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Chapter 1: Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Chapter 2: How Remote Work Is Reshaping the Economy. . . . . . . . . . . 89
Chapter 3: Aligning the International Tax System with the
Globalized Economy.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Chapter 4: Expanding and Strengthening U.S. Health Insurance
Coverage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Chapter 5: Achieving a Net Zero Carbon Dioxide Emissions
Economy in the United States.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
Chapter 6: America's Role in International Capital Flows. . . . . . . . . . . 207
Chapter 7: The K-12 Education System: Economic Impacts and
Opportunities for Innovation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
References.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
Appendix A: Report to the President on the Activities of the
Council of Economic Advisers during 2024.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
Appendix B: Statistical Tables Relating to Income, Employment,
and Production. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379

____________
*For a detailed table of contents of the Council’s Report, see page 11.

iii

Economic Report
of the
President

Economic Report of the President
January 9, 2025
To the Congress of the United States:
In the last four years, America has overcome some of the most challenging
economic conditions in our history. When I took office, our economy was in
the grips of worst pandemic in a century, and decades of trickle-down policies had left us especially vulnerable to its shocks. Hundreds of thousands of
businesses had closed, and millions of Americans risked losing their homes.
Unemployment was high and the risk of long-term damage was real.
My Administration responded with a new economic playbook to
rebuild our economy from the middle out and bottom up, not the top down.
Since then, we’ve made historic investments in our nation and in the industries of the future. We’ve stood by unions and helped to create a record 16
million jobs. We’ve fought to lower costs for consumers, and to give small
businesses a fair chance to compete. Today, our economy has not only
recovered, it has emerged stronger, laying the foundation for a promising
new chapter in the American comeback story.
My Council of Economic Advisers has prepared this report examining
actions taken to both ease the pandemic’s immediate impact and strengthen
our economy over the long-term, to help ensure we learn the right lessons as
a nation and to build on the historic progress we’ve made.
Our work began right away with the American Rescue Plan, one of the
most consequential recovery packages in history. To reopen our economy,
we knew we had to defeat COVID-19, so we launched unprecedented vaccination efforts. We got immediate economic relief out to tens of millions
of families who needed it most. We expanded the Child Tax Credit, cutting child poverty in half to its lowest rate in history. And we sent funding
directly to every state, city, and town in the nation, keeping police on the
beat and teachers in the classroom, families in their homes and small businesses on their feet, preventing a wave of scarring bankruptcies, defaults,
and evictions.
At the same time, the pandemic had snarled supply chains and set off
widespread labor shortages, driving up costs worldwide. In response, my
Administration immediately convened businesses and labor to unclog our
ports and get goods flowing. Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified invasion
of Ukraine further increased food and gas prices. In response, I directed the
Economic Report of the President | 3

largest release of fuel from our strategic reserve in history to ensure that our
energy markets were well supplied, and we challenged oil and gas companies to reinvest record profits in domestic production, which has reached
an all-time high under my Administration. And we took steps to promote
competition across industries, boosting transparency and lowering costs
for consumers.
Our approach worked. Inflation is down significantly from its peak and
is now close to pre-pandemic levels. Together, we’ve achieved the elusive
“soft landing” of lower inflation, steady employment, strong economic
growth, and rising real wages – which most observers said was impossible.
But ending the economic crisis alone was never enough. I ran for
President to set the American economy on a stronger long-term course,
by breaking from the trickle-down orthodoxy that has failed our nation
for decades. That theory holds that by cutting taxes for the very wealthy,
benefits will trickle down to everyone else. But in truth, not a lot has ever
trickled down onto most folks’ kitchen tables. Instead, inequality grew and
America slid deeper into debt.
I have a different approach. I believe the best way to build America
is to invest in America, in American products and American people. And
the best way to grow our economy is to grow the backbone of our nation:
the middle class. That’s what my Investing in America agenda has done,
through landmark laws that shore up our infrastructure, our manufacturing base, and our people. Together, these are some of the most significant
investments in America since the New Deal.
For decades, American infrastructure has been neglected. But our
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law is finally modernizing the nation’s roads,
bridges, ports, airports, transit systems, and more; removing every lead pipe
in America, so every child can drink clean water; and providing affordable
high-speed internet for every American, no matter where they live. And it’s
making sure these projects are done with American products and American
workers, creating hundreds of thousands of good-paying new jobs, many of
them union jobs.
For too long, American factories have moved overseas, taking vital
industries with them. Now, our CHIPS and Science Act is bringing manufacturing home, already attracting nearly $450 billion in manufacturing
investments to build massive new semiconductor factories, equipping
America to lead the industries of future. At the same time, our Inflation
Reduction Act is making the most significant investment in fighting climate
change in history, not only putting America on track to halve carbon emissions by 2030 and promoting our energy abundance and security, but also
creating hundreds of thousands of good-paying clean-energy jobs.

4 |

Economic Report of the President

I know all too well, Americans still too often struggle to afford lifesaving prescription drugs, and sometimes are even forced to choose between
medicine and rent. It’s wrong. The Inflation Reduction Act also takes historic steps to change that, capping total out-of-pocket costs for seniors on
Medicare at $2,000 a year; slashing insulin for seniors to $35 a month, down
from as much as $400; and finally giving Medicare the power to negotiate
lower drug prices across the board. And it has expanded health insurance
through the Affordable Care Act, bringing the share of uninsured Americans
to record lows.
The impact of these efforts is just starting – and the full effects will be
felt over the next decade - but there is no question that our nation today is the
best-positioned on earth to win the competition for the 21st century. We’ve
laid a foundation of possibilities that will make life a little easier for millions
of Americans and can propel America forward for decades.
Today, we hand the incoming Administration the world’s strongest
economy. The next four years will determine if America builds on that
strength, or slides back into the old trickle-down approach that only benefits
those at the very top. I believe that the transformative investments we’ve
made are already deeply rooted in our nation, and therefore too costly, politically and economically, to reverse. At this inflection point, I hope that our
playbook serves as a model for how to fight for the middle class and give
working families a fair shot, forging a stronger, more secure and prosperous
America for generations to come.

J
Economic Report of the President | 5

The Annual Report
of the
Council of Economic Advisers

Letter of Transmittal
Council of Economic Advisers
Thursday, January 9, 2025

Mr. President:
The Council of Economic Advisers herewith submits its 2025 Annual
Report in accordance with the Employment Act of 1946, as amended by the
Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978.
Sincerely yours,

Jared Bernstein
Chair

Heather Boushey
Member

C. Kirabo Jackson
Member

9

Contents
Economic Report of the President. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers. . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Letter of Transmittal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Introduction.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Chapter 1: Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead.. . . . . . . . . . 18
Chapter 2: How Remote Work Is Reshaping the Economy. . . . . . . 20
Chapter 3: Aligning the International Tax System with the
Globalized Economy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Chapter 4: Expanding and Strengthening U.S. Health
Insurance Coverage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Chapter 5: Achieving a Net Zero Carbon Dioxide Emissions
Economy in the United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Chapter 6: America’s Role in International Capital Flows. . . . . . . . 27
Chapter 7: Economic Impacts and Opportunities for Innovation
in the K-12 Education System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Chapter 1: Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
A Unique Recovery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Macroeconomic Developments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
GDP.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Recovery in Context. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Consumption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shifts in Consumer Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Services Shortfall and Goods Consumption. . . . . . . . . . . .
Excess Saving. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Investment .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36
37
40
41
42
44
46

11

Policy Environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Fiscal Policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Monetary Policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Financial Conditions.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mortgage Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

48
48
51
52

Developments in Inflation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Supply Chain Disruptions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Strong Demand Meets Constrained Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Inflation Expectations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
The Labor Market: A Quick Return to Full Employment. . . . . . . . . 60
Economic Wellbeing of Workers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Dollars and Cents Measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Household Financial Situation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Additional Measures of Economic Wellbeing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Lessons for Future Crises.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Benefits of a Robust Fiscal Response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Unemployment Insurance .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
The Forecast for the Years Ahead .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
The Long-term Outlook for Real GDP Growth.. . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Outlook Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Chapter 2: How Remote Work Is Reshaping the Economy. . . . . . . . . . . 89
The Rise of Remote Work. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Who Works Remotely?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
The Remote Work Framework.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Search and matching. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Geographic sorting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Remote Work, Welfare, and Wages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
How remote work affects productivity.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
How wages differ for remote workers.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Remote Work and Job Access. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Implications for Matching and Sorting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

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Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers

Re-sorting in the short run. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Diminished mismatch in the long run. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The quality of matches. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Geographic reallocation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

109
110
113
114

The Big Picture and Public Policy.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Chapter 3: Aligning the International Tax System with
the Globalized Economy.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Globalization and a Patchwork of Corporate Tax Systems. . . . . . .
Globalization Without Cooperation: The Prisoner’s
Dilemma. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cross-Border Tax Planning by Multinationals. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Economic Implications of Cross-Border Tax Planning. . . . . .
Unilateral Country Actions to Curb Cross-Border
Tax Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Addressing the Dilemma: Global Coordination. . . . . . . . . . . .

123
123
126
129
131
132

Digitalization and Rethinking Taxing Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Why the United States Would Benefit from Adopting the
Global Tax Deal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Potential Revenue Generation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
More Equitable and Efficient Economic
Resource Allocation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
Chapter 4: Expanding and Strengthening U.S. Health
Insurance Coverage.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
The Role of Health Insurance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Insurance Coverage and Financial Protection.. . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Insurance Coverage and Health. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Insurance Coverage, Labor Supply, and Beyond. . . . . . . . . . . 151
Expanding Access to Marketplace Coverage.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Expansion in Premium Tax Credits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Beyond Tax Credits: Federal Actions Expanding
Marketplace Enrollment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Protecting and Extending Medicaid Coverage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Contents

| 13

Expanding Medicaid Coverage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
Protecting Medicaid Coverage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
Strengthening Prescription Drug Coverage and Reducing
Costs Under Medicare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Increasing Financial Protection Against Prescription
Drug Costs.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
Negotiating Drug Prices to Bring Down Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . 168
The Next Steps in Strengthening Health Insurance and
Lowering Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
Chapter 5: Achieving a Net Zero Carbon Dioxide Emissions
Economy in the United States.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
Understanding the Past, Looking to the Future. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
Historical Energy-related CO2 Emissions Trends.. . . . . . . . . . 175
Future Impacts of Recent Mitigation Policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
Paths to a Net Zero Economy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Electricity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Decarbonizing Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
Electrification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
Beyond Electricity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
Decarbonization Beyond Electrification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
Negative Emissions Technologies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
The Path Ahead. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
Chapter 6: America's Role in International Capital Flows. . . . . . . . . . . 207
The Current Account and Financial Account.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
The International Capital Flows Landscape. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
Recent U.S. Capital Inflows and Outflows. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
The Geography of Capital Flows. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
The International Investment Position. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
America as the World’s Broker: Cross-Border Returns.. . . . . . . . . 219
Foreign Direct Investment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
The Benefits of FDI and the Administration’s Role in
Stimulating Direct Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

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Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers

Investment into the United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
Investment into Other Countries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Cross-Border Lending and Global Banks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
Financial Intermediation within the United States . . . . . . . . . 229
Changes in Cross-Border Lending. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
Flight to Safety: U.S. Treasuries and the Dollar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
U.S. Debt as a Global Safe Asset .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
The Dollar as Global Reserve Currency.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
A Full Accounting of International Accounts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
Chapter 7: The K-12 Education System: Economic Impacts and
Opportunities for Innovation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
Why Education Matters: Returns to Income and
Economic Growth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
Evidence on the Human Capital Channel.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
Evidence on the Innovation Channel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
Educational Attainment, Knowledge Capital, and
GDP Growth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
The State of the K-12 Education System.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
COVID-19 and Student Achievement, Engagement,
and Wellbeing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Federal Investments in K-12 Education
Promoting Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Addressing Structural Challenges and Disparities in
Education Outcomes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

247
249
251
253

Opportunities for Improvement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
Equalizing Funding Across Districts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stabilizing Funding Levels Over Time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Labor Inputs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Staffing All Classrooms with Qualified Educators. . . . . . . . . .
Causes of Staffing Challenges.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Policies to Attract and Retain Qualified Educators. . . . . . . . .
Policies to Maximize Educators’ Potential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Capital Inputs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Addressing Capital Funding Inequities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Technology Inputs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Contents

255
258
259
261
265
268
273
273
275
276
| 15

The Federal Government’s Role in Agenda Setting. . . . . . . . . . . . 278
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
References.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
Appendix A: Report to the President on the Activities of the
Council of Economic Advisers during 2024.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
Appendix B: Statistical Tables Relating to Income, Employment,
and Production. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379

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Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers

Introduction
The Biden-Harris Administration entered office as the country was in the
grip of a once-in-a-century global pandemic. The economy was in the throes
of one of the deepest macroeconomic shocks since the Great Depression,
and while unemployment was down from its peak, it was still highly
elevated. The Administration took immediate and decisive action to offset
the impact of the two-sided pandemic shock—to both the economy’s supply and demand sides—and lay the groundwork for a lasting, durable, and
inclusive recovery.
The 2025 Economic Report of the President, the fourth and last of the
Administration, provides careful analyses of how the Administration has
implemented public policy to achieve the President’s economic goals.
It begins by reviewing macroeconomic trends over the past four years,
illustrating the path from economic uncertainty to robust growth and a
historically strong labor market. It then delves into specific topics within
labor markets, tax policy, healthcare, climate policy, international trade,
and education to examine how policy implementation can make a tangible,
positive difference in the lives of families and communities.
Many of these policy details rarely make headlines either on traditional or
social media. But, as this volume shows, well-designed policies can help
struggling families and address consequential market failures, just as failing
to make such interventions can stall or reverse progress.
For example, chapter 4 of this Report highlights more than a dozen specific
healthcare policies that together helped boost health insurance enrollment to
a record high. Chapter 5 highlights numerous policies summing to the largest-ever U.S. investment in clean energy, which are helping to bend the arc
of U.S. carbon emissions. Chapter 6 highlights how investment incentives
17

created through the Inflation Reduction Act have attracted record foreign
direct investment. Addressing the sobering reality of pandemic-era learning
losses, chapter 7 highlights numerous actions taken by federal policymakers
to aid academic recovery following the pandemic.
Elsewhere, this Report highlights additional policy action that may be
needed to respond to broad economic trends. Chapter 2 explores structural
changes to the U.S. labor market brought about by remote work and potential new policy challenges and opportunities. Chapter 3 explains why U.S.
participation in the Global Tax Deal is necessary for shoring up tax revenue
from multinational corporations operating across numerous tax regimes in
various countries. Taken together, the Report’s chapters illustrate the difference that competent policy creation and implementation can make in building an economy based on fairness, opportunity, and broadly shared growth.

Chapter 1: Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead
The U.S. post-pandemic recovery is an unusual and, in many ways, remarkable period in macroeconomic history. Among the most notable trends is
the speed at which the U.S. economy returned to full employment and how
durable full employment has been. When President Biden took office in
January 2021, the unemployment rate was still elevated at 6.4 percent and
payroll employment was well below its pre-pandemic level. In far less time
than in past recoveries, the economy surpassed the pre-pandemic level of
real GDP, entering a robust expansion that consistently exceeded forecasters’ expectations. Figure i-1 shows how the actual unemployment rate came
in lower than even the most optimistic Blue Chip forecasts through the
second quarter of 2024. This uniquely strong job market helped support real
wage and income gains, which in turn bolstered consumer spending. The
Biden-Harris investment agenda was also consequential to the recovery and
long-term health of the economy by crowding in private capital in support
of key sectors, including clean energy and semiconductors.
During the pandemic, nearly all advanced economies experienced a
spike in inflation, which climbed to levels not seen in decades. At the time
of this writing, the spike had largely dissipated in the United States. What
factors were behind inflation’s rise and fall? The CEA has long shown that
the inflation surge was driven by the collision of strong demand and snarled
supply. This view has been further supported by the extent of disinflation

18 | 

Figure i-1. Unemployment Rate
Percent
6.5
6.0
5.5
5.0
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2021:Q1 2021:Q3 2022:Q1 2022:Q3 2023:Q1 2023:Q3 2024:Q1 2024:Q3
Actual
Blue Chip January 2023
CBO February 2023

Council of Economic Advisers

SEP December 2022

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Congressional Budget Office; Blue Chip Economic
Indicators; Federal Reserve Board of Governors; CEA calculations.
Note: Data are seasonally adjusted. All forecasts (besides Blue Chip) were finalized before
2022:Q4 data were released. Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) data reflect median
Federal Open Market Committee projections, Q4 level. Shaded area indicates the
difference between Blue Chip Top 10 average and Blue Chip Bottom 10 average estimates.
2025 Economic Report of the President

that occurred as supply chains unsnarled. Chapter 1 carefully reviews the
details of inflation’s roundtrip.
The chapter concludes with two policy lessons from the past four
years. Hitting back hard and fast against exogenous shocks is one key lesson, both to quickly return to full employment and to avoid scarring effects
that can persistently damage economic performance. The second lesson is
the urgent need to reform one of the nation’s first lines of counter-cyclical
defense: the unemployment insurance (UI) program. The enormous expansion of UI during the COVID-19 era served as a critical stabilizer, but it also
stretched the capacity of an antiquated system. In the spirit of “fixing the
roof when the sun is shining,” policymakers would be smart to engage in
needed reforms, many of which are cited in chapter 1. The chapter concludes
with the Administration’s 10-year forecast.

Introduction | 19

Chapter 2: How Remote Work Is Reshaping the Economy
The rise of remote work is one of the more economically important labor
market legacies of the pandemic. Chapter 2 is largely motivated by the
figure below, which shows an elevated level of remote work relative to just
a few years ago (figure i-2). Many employers and workers have continued
to operate in either fully remote or hybrid work models since the pandemic,
with improved technology and new workplace practices supporting the
trend.
It will take time for researchers to fully understand the economic
implications of this fundamental shift in the structure of work. Available evidence suggests that remote work comes with benefits and costs to employers
and employees. It is a valued job amenity that can reduce barriers to accessing the labor market—for example, for those with disabilities or caregiving responsibilities. Remote work is also likely to leave an imprint on the
geographic pattern of economic activity as it loosens locational constraints
to matching workers with suitable jobs. At the same time, remote work
poses real challenges to businesses because some of the traditional benefits

Figure i-2. Share of Paid Workdays That Are Remote
Percent
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

2003

2005

2008

2010

Council of Economic Advisers

2013

2015

2018

2020

2023

Sources: Barrero, Bloom, and Davis (2021a); CEA calculations.
Note: Remote work share is defined as the share of full paid days worked from home. Pre2020 estimates are derived from the American Time Use Survey. Estimates beginning in May
2020 are from the Survey of Working Arrangements and Attitudes. Gray bars indicate
recessions.
2025 Economic Report of the President

20 | 

of in-person work—teamwork, collaboration, and mentoring—may be more
difficult to achieve remotely.
With these economic considerations come a collection of public policy
issues. Remote work is most common among workers with high education
and income levels and, as such, reinforces some pre-existing patterns of
labor market inequality. Policymakers must also grapple with changes in
economic activity patterns, such as central business districts experiencing
reduced demand for commercial real estate. As this key structural shift plays
out, maximizing its benefits and minimizing its costs will require careful
investigation of its economic implications.

Chapter 3: Aligning the International Tax
System with the Globalized Economy
The Administration has long argued that the United States needs to put its
fiscal accounts on a more sustainable path. The Administration’s budgets
have focused on deficit reduction by proposing increased taxes on corporations and high-wealth individuals. Chapter 3 explores a critical aspect of
protecting the corporate tax base: reforming the way countries, including the
United States, tax multinational corporations.
The chapter focuses on how the Global Tax Deal—a coordinated international framework agreed upon by the United States and more than 130
other countries—seeks to align the international tax system and globalized
economy (figure i-3). Despite unilateral country efforts to curb cross-border
tax planning by multinational corporations, including the U.S. Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act, an estimated $2 trillion of global multinational profits were taxed
at effective rates below 15 percent from 2017 to 2020. The ability of multinationals to exploit differences in tax regimes across countries motivates the
proposals discussed in the chapter.
In a global economy, countries have an incentive to decrease their
corporate tax rates to attract economic activity. Without coordination, such
incentives encourage a “race to the bottom” in corporate tax rates across
countries. Given this structure of corporate tax competition, multinationals
spend significant resources shifting profits around the globe to reduce their
tax burden. At the same time, the rapid growth of digital services has raised
questions about which countries have taxing rights over digital activity and
led to a rise in unilateral Digital Services Taxes.
The Global Tax Deal addresses these challenges through two pillars. Under one pillar of the agreement, large multinationals would face a
global minimum tax rate of 15 percent. The deal also includes mechanisms
that provide strong incentives for countries to join, thus curbing the race
to reduce corporate tax rates. The other pillar of the agreement outlines a

Introduction | 21

Figure i-3. Countries That Agreed to the October 2021
Global Tax Deal Framework
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0

Council of Economic Advisers

1

Signed

Not signed

Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; CEA calculations.
Note: Figure shows which countries signed the October 2021 Statement on a Two-Pillar
Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy as of
June 9, 2023.
2025 Economic Report of the President

coordinated approach to levying taxes based in part on where large multinationals’ customers are located. Specifically, this pillar reallocates a portion
of a large multinational’s taxable income to the countries where its customers are located even if it has no physical presence in those countries.
The chapter argues that replacing international tax competition with
cooperation would improve economic efficiency, protect revenues, and
improve tax fairness by aligning the international tax system with the globalized economy.

Chapter 4: Expanding and Strengthening
U.S. Health Insurance Coverage
Figure i-4, from chapter 4, is a powerful illustration of the impact of
both useful and damaging healthcare policy. The figure shows the millions of individuals enrolled in the Affordable Care Act Health Insurance
Marketplace. Enrollment initially grew quickly, with the Marketplace
providing coverage for about 12 million individuals by 2015. But as the
chapter discusses, the Trump Administration took active steps to discourage signups for Marketplace coverage. In contrast, the Biden-Harris
Administration removed barriers to enrollment by increasing outreach and
simplifying ways to sign up for coverage. At the same time, those eligible

22 | 

were provided support to pay for coverage through increased premium tax
credits. The results were record coverage in the Marketplace and the lowestever uninsured rate.
Numerous policies contributed to the results; table i-1 lists more than
a dozen that the Administration introduced or expanded to raise health coverage among American families. Chapter 4 documents the many positive
effects of acquiring health coverage, including not only improved medical
outcomes, but also long-term benefits such as increased labor supply, earnings, and overall wellbeing.

Figure i-4. Marketplace Enrollment at the End of Open
Enrollment
Number of individuals who selected a marketplace plan (millions)
22

Enrollment for plan year
beginning Jan. 2024

20
18
16
14
12
10

Biden-Harris
Administration

8
6
4
2
0
2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services; Department of Health and Human Services.
Note: Data for each year denote plan selections during the open enrollment period for that plan
year.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Introduction | 23

Table i-1. Notable Biden-Harris Administration Health
Insurance Policies

Expanding Access to Marketplace Coverage

• Increased generosity of Premium Tax Credits to help purchase Marketplace
coverage
• Created a special open enrollment period in 2021 in response to the pandemic
• Extended the annual open enrollment period to 10 weeks
• Substantially increased funding for advertising and enrollment assistance

• Established a year-round special enrollment period for those with incomes less
than 150 percent of the federal poverty level
• Fixed the family glitch to extend financial assistance to eligible family members
• Protected consumers from junk health plans with short-term duration limits and
coverage disclaimers

Protecting and Extending Medicaid Coverage

• Raised federal matching funds to encourage states to adopt ACA Medicaid
expansions
• Provided states with the option to extend postpartum Medicaid coverage from
60 days to 12 months
• Required states to provide 12 months of continuous eligibility for children in
Medicaid and CHIP
• Minimized declines in coverage following the end of pandemic-era continuous
Medicaid coverage

Strengthening Prescription Drug Coverage and Reducing Costs Under
Medicare

• Limited out-of-pocket insulin spending under Medicare Parts B and D to $35 per
month/prescription
• Expanded the Low-Income Subsidy Program under Medicare Part D
• Capped out-of-pocket prescription drug spending under Part D beginning in 2024
• Gave Medicare the authority to negotiate prices of certain high-price drugs

Chapter 5: Achieving a Net Zero Carbon Dioxide
Emissions Economy in the United States
The Administration set ambitious goals for reducing CO2 emissions and
passed historic legislation to safeguard a future where continued economic
progress can coincide with a safe and stable climate. Table i-2 highlights
some of the Administration’s major climate commitments and policies.
Figure i-5 shows trends to date in CO2 emissions by economic sector.
Chapter 5 presents a framework for the next steps in a net zero CO2
emissions strategy, highlighting four distinct components guided by a concept in environmental economics known as the equimarginal principle. The
principle, which might be summarized as “picking the lowest-hanging fruit
first,” highlights the fact that each sector of the economy faces unique costs
and challenges to decarbonization.
24 | 

The first strategic component of reaching the Administration’s goals
is achieving net zero CO2 emissions in the electricity sector, broadly
considered to be technologically possible and less expensive than other
abatement options. The linchpin of the step is increasing energy storage and
transmission capacity so variable renewables like wind and solar power can
be efficiently deployed even when and where the wind is not blowing and
the sun is not shining. Second, the United States can reduce CO2 emissions
significantly by powering more economic activity with clean electricity, a
process known as electrification.
Given current and near-term technology expectations, significant parts
of economic activity and commerce are more costly to electrify than others.
Thus, the final two components of the chapter’s framework focus on (i) how
to decarbonize economic activities that cannot be electrified and (ii) using
negative emissions technologies to capture and store CO2 emissions that
would be more costly to eliminate.
The chapter highlights an ambitious suite of policies necessary to
implement the framework. The ideas build on Administration measures that
provide investors, firms, and households with incentives to research and
implement methods of producing and storing clean electricity, expanding its
use, and applying other decarbonization strategies in areas where electrification is more difficult.

Figure i-5. Energy-related CO2 Emissions by Sector,
1990-2023
Million metric tons CO2
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0

1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 2023
Transportation
Residential

Electric power
Commercial

Industrial

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Energy Information Administration; CEA calculations.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Introduction | 25

Table i-2. Selected Biden-Harris Administration Climate Commitments and
Major Policies
Climate Commitments

• On day one of taking office, the Administration rejoined the international Paris Climate Accords, which intends to
limit global temperature increases to below 1.5–2°C above pre-industrial levels. The Administration set a target of
reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 50–52 percent by 2030 from 2005 levels and achieving a net zero
GHG emissions U.S. economy by 2050.

Expanded Role of Federal Climate Leadership

• The Administration established the first White House Office of Domestic Climate Policy and elevated the role of
Special Presidential Envoy for Climate to prioritize domestic and international decarbonization efforts and
engagements.

• Historic federal actions and nationwide climate strategies across sectors include the U.S. National Blueprint for
Transportation Decarbonization, the Administration’s efforts to achieve 100 percent clean electricity by 2035, the
U.S. Industrial Decarbonization Roadmap, the U.S. Buildings Decarbonization Blueprint, the Administration’s
climate-smart agriculture efforts and Nature-Based Solutions Roadmap, the U.S. Methane Emissions Reduction
Action Plan, the National Climate Resilience Framework, and more.

Clean Energy Tax Credits

• Under the IRA, production tax credits can be claimed for renewable and clean electricity, zero-emissions nuclear
power, advanced manufacturing, clean fuel, and hydrogen.
• Additionally, consumers can claim tax credits for energy efficiency home improvements such as heat pump
purchases as well as qualifying electric vehicle (EV) purchases and electric and alternative fueling infrastructure
under the IRA.
• Investment tax credits can also be claimed for investment in a variety of clean energy projects. As of October
2024, announced private investment in clean energy manufacturing and infrastructure, clean power, and EVs
and batteries under the Administration has totaled over $400 billion.

Clean Energy Demonstrations and Deployment

• Through IRA, BIL, and CHIPS, over $100 billion has been invested directly in accelerating the deployment of clean
energy, clean buildings, and clean manufacturing as well as making communities more resilient to climate change
and providing clean water across the United States.
• The Department of Energy has taken steps to speed up the commercialization of emerging energy technologies
through a $25 billion fund for clean energy demonstrations and increased project financing by the Loan
Programs Office.

Buy Clean Initiative

• The Administration prioritized the procurement of American-made, lower-carbon construction materials in
federally funded projects.

Grid Enhancement and Expansion

• The Administration has taken a number of steps to improve the reliability of the grid through measures that
speed up the buildout of new transmission and increase the efficiency of existing infrastructure. This includes
administering over $10 billion to modernize the grid through the Grid Resilience and Innovation Partnerships
Program and improving the process for environmental reviews under the National Environmental Policy Act.

Greenhouse Gas Standards and Reduction Efforts

• Under the Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has finalized rules and standards to
reduce GHG emissions from fossil fuel-fired power plants and vehicles. Additionally, the EPA implemented a
first-of-its-kind fee for methane emissions.

26 | 

Chapter 6: America’s Role in International Capital Flows
International capital flows have evolved in important ways over the course
of the Administration, reflecting changes in geopolitics and specific policy
actions. Chapter 6 describes recent trends in U.S. external balances by focusing on the evolution of the financial account of the balance of payments. The
resilience and strength of the U.S. post-pandemic recovery helped to make
the United States a premier destination for foreign investment, providing
an important source of capital for productive American enterprises. The
country has increased its dominance of global flows, receiving a much
higher share of international capital flows in recent years compared to prepandemic levels.
Cross-border investments comprise familiar financial assets, like
stocks and bonds, and foreign direct investment, which often goes toward
building factories and equipment. The Administration’s investment agenda
in infrastructure, clean energy, and semiconductor technology has served
as a rich and productive target for foreign capital (see figure i-6). Notably,
incentives created by the IRA and CHIPS Act have helped crowd in foreign
investments to the United States, often reaching areas of the country that
have traditionally faced economic distress.

Figure i-6. Announced Investment in Clean Energy
Projects by Foreign Companies
Billions of dollars

80
60
40
20

0

2017–2020
Manufacturing

Council of Economic Advisers

2021–2023
Energy and industry

Sources: Clean Investment Monitor; CEA calculations.
Note: Energy and industry refers to new or expanded facilities to produce clean energy,
capture carbon dioxide emissions, or decarbonize industrial activity. Manufacturing
refers to the construction or expansion of factories that manufacture clean energy,
clean vehicle, building electrification, or carbon management technology.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Introduction | 27

The Administration has also taken consequential actions to protect
American workers, producers, and taxpayers from violations of rules-based
trade, particularly against China’s long-applied strategy of capturing global
market share, gained via subsidies and non-market policies and practices.
The Administration has worked to address urgent national security challenges—for example, by blocking exports of advanced technologies to
those who might use them against the United States and curtailing outbound
investments that undermine U.S. strategic interests.
Although trade deficits are often cited as a scorecard of U.S. competitiveness, chapter 6 rejects this view. If foreign capital inflows—which mirror
trade deficits in the international accounts—support productive investments,
they are unequivocally positive, helping to boost domestic production and
support high-quality U.S. jobs. Indeed, the United States’ post-pandemic
recovery has been uniquely characterized by rising productivity and high
levels of business investment. International financing has played a critical
role in advancing these lasting and transformative achievements.

Chapter 7: Economic Impacts and Opportunities
for Innovation in the K-12 Education System
Chapter 7 focuses on a set of challenges facing the country’s kindergarten
through 12th-grade (K-12) education system. The COVID-19 pandemic
significantly disrupted K-12 schooling, with profound consequences for
student achievement, attendance, and engagement. Ongoing recovery efforts
must address both pandemic disruptions and longstanding structural shortcomings and inequities in the K-12 system. Although the federal share of
K-12 funding is relatively small (around 9 percent), the Federal Government
has a critical role to play in stabilizing education expenditures during recessions, facilitating greater resource equity across districts, shaping education
policy through laws and incentives, funding innovation and research, and
expanding data collection to inform improvement efforts.
Staffing all classrooms with well-prepared and qualified educators
remains a central obstacle to improving K-12 education. As figure i-7
shows, the nation’s supply of new teacher licensures relative to its number of
school-age children fell by 26 percent from 2001 to 2022. The steady decline
of entry into the teaching profession, coupled with increasing turnover and
the localized nature of teacher labor markets, has resulted in one out of every
eight K-12 public school teaching positions being either vacant or staffed by
underqualified teachers.
One explanation for the overall decline in teacher supply is the continued erosion of pay relative to other occupations requiring college degrees.
Evidence in chapter 7 shows that teachers face a negative wage premium,

28 | 

Figure i-7. New Teacher Licensures

Licensures per 1,000 school-age children
6.5
6.0
5.5
5.0
4.5
4.0
3.5

3.0
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Title II of the Higher Education Act; American Community Survey accessed via
IPUMS; National Center for Education Statistics; CEA calculations.
Note: Gray bars indicate recessions. School-age is defined as age 5 to 17. Data are not
reported for school year 2008–2009, so that data point is imputed linearly. In 2020 and
2021, two and one states, respectively, did not report licensures, so data are also
imputed linearly for those states. Academic year licensure data are adjusted using
population estimates from the spring of the academic calendar. X-axis labels represent
the spring year of the academic calendar.
2025 Economic Report of the President

with median wages 20 percent lower than those of comparable workers in
other occupations. Attracting and retaining diverse and effective educators
will require making the profession more attractive to potential future teachers through increased pay and opportunities for career advancement, safer
schools with reduced gun violence, and improved financial aid for those who
commit to K-12 teaching.
Actions by the Administration to bolster academic recovery efforts,
accelerate the return to pre-pandemic staffing levels, expand high-quality
pathways into the teaching profession, enhance scholarship and debt relief
programs for teachers, and modernize school infrastructure exemplify how
the Federal Government is fundamental to improving K-12 education. Table
i-3 lists some of these specific actions.

Introduction | 29

Table i-3. Actions by the Biden-Harris Administration to
Strengthen K-12 Education
Stabilizing State and District Education Expenditures
• Secured $130 billion in supplemental funding via the ARP

• Increased funding for Title I, Part A by $2 billion and the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act by $1.5 billion

Accelerating Academic Recovery and Student Engagement

• Launched the National Partnership for Student Success, organizing 320,000
Americans to serve as K-12 tutors, mentors, and student-success coaches
• Targeted more than $1 billion in funding for school-based health centers and
mental health professionals through the Bipartisan S afer Communities Act and
Department of Education grant programs
• Increased federal funding for K-12 career and technical education

• Advanced evidence-based practices to address chronic absenteeism with more
than $250 million in grant funding, technical assistance, and data toolkits

Strengthening the Teacher Workforce

• Fixed the application and certification process for the Public Service Loan
Forgiveness and Teacher Education Assistance for College and Higher Education
(TEACH) Grant programs to make teacher education more affordable
• Supported states, districts, and institutions of higher education to establish
high-quality teacher preparation models, such as Grow-Your-Own Programs
and teacher residencies, through grant funding and guidance
• Created registered apprenticeships programs for teachers in 46 states
• Provided grants to Historically Black Colleges and Universities, Tribally Controlled
Colleges and Universities, and Minority S erving Institutions to expand teacher
preparation programs
• Developed a pipeline of future special education teachers through Office of
S pecial Education Programs Personnel Preparation grants

Improving School Infrastructure

• Secured historic new funding as part of the ARP and BIL to improve school HVAC
systems, modernize buildings, and build fleets of electric buses
• Advanced efforts to identify and replace lead pipes in schools through the BIL

Reducing Gun Violence in Schools

• Signed the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act which provide $1 billion to
create safer schools and address students' mental health needs
• Established the Office of Gun Violence Prevention and an Emerging Firearms
Threats Task Force

30 | 

Chapter 1

Four Years in Review and
the Years Ahead
When President Biden was inaugurated on January 20, 2021, the U.S.
economy was still severely damaged by the COVID-19 pandemic. The
unemployment rate stood at 6.4 percent, with more than 2.5 times as many
workers filing continuing unemployment claims than they had in 2019 and
more than 9 million fewer jobs being held relative to one year prior. Over
the course of the Biden-Harris Administration, the U.S. economy has not
only rebounded from the pandemic, but also has seen one of the fastest, most
robust economic recoveries on record.
The pandemic shocked both demand and supply, causing extended shutdowns in entire sectors of the U.S. economy and reshaping demand for
goods, services, and housing. A recession nearly twice as deep as the Great
Recession followed. As the American Rescue Plan (ARP) quickly ramped
up widespread vaccination against COVID-19, the negative pandemicinduced supply shock largely reversed and the U.S. economy resurged,
though supply and demand imbalances persisted in some sectors given pentup demand and the tight labor market. Given the severity of the pandemic
recession, the pace and durability of the recovery and subsequent expansion
have surpassed expectations based on past recessions, with U.S. growth far
outpacing other advanced economies.
During the Administration, the U.S. economy has achieved the lowest average unemployment rate of any administration in more than 50 years and
reached its all-time lowest unemployment rates for Black and Latino workers. A record 20 million new business applications have been filed since the

31

start of the Administration, and nearly 17 million jobs have been created.
Combined with historic investments from the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA),
CHIPS and Science Act (CHIPS), and Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL),
the Administration’s policies have helped to fast-track economic recovery
and invest in America’s future economic growth.
At the same time, the intersection of strong demand and constrained supply
led to increased inflation in the United States and many other advanced
economies. U.S. inflation peaked in June 2022 at 9.1 percent year-over-year,
as measured by the Consumer Price Index. Since then, inflation has returned
to near pre-pandemic levels as demand and supply have come into better
balance.
This chapter explores the components of the U.S. pandemic recession, economic recovery, and ongoing expansion. The chapter begins by comparing
the recovery with forecasts, then examines trends in output, consumption,
investment, and inflation. The chapter concludes by analyzing the labor
market, worker welfare measures, and policy lessons and offering the
Administration’s official forecast for the decade ahead.

A Unique Recovery
The U.S. pandemic recovery has been robust and swift compared to
recoveries from prior recessions, and further, the recovery and subsequent
expansion have consistently outpaced forecasts. As of the third quarter of
2024 (hereafter, 2024:Q3), actual real GDP exceeded every projection made
by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) from January 2020 through
June 2024, as shown in figure 1-1.1 The cumulative increase in real GDP
from 2019:Q4 to 2024:Q3 was 11.4 percent, 2.9 percentage points greater
than predicted by the CBO’s final pre-pandemic forecast in January 2020,
which did not account for a recession. Moreover, GDP growth was almost

Figure 1-1 shows the first forecast released each calendar year from 2020 through 2024. As of
2024:Q3, actual real GDP exceeded all forecasts made between January 2020 and June 2024, the
most recent forecast at the time of publication.

1

32 |

Chapter 1

Figure 1-1. Real Gross Domestic Product and
CBO Forecasts
Index (2019:Q4 = 100)
115
110
105
100
95
90
2019:Q4

2020:Q4

2021:Q4

2022:Q4

2023:Q4

Actual

CBO January 2020

CBO February 2021

CBO May 2022

CBO February 2023

CBO February 2024

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Congressional Budget Office; CEA calculations.
Note: Gray bar indicates recession. Data are seasonally adjusted. CBO projections may not
line up with actual data due to revisions.
2025 Economic Report of the President

4 percentage points stronger than expected in the CBO’s February 2023
forecast, the first projection made after inflation peaked in June 2022.2
Professional forecasts made around the end of 2022, with disinflation
underway, suggested that a period of substantially elevated unemployment
and slow growth would be necessary to bring inflation down. Instead, the
actual sacrifice ratio—a measure of the increase in unemployment required
to achieve a 1 percentage point decrease in inflation—has been far lower
than pre-pandemic empirical estimates (Tetlow 2022; Cecchetti and Rich
1999; Ball 1994). The U.S. economy has achieved rapid and broad-based
disinflation during a period of historically low unemployment and strong
growth.
As shown in figure 1-2, inflation over the past two years has been
in line with projections made after inflation’s peak. While most analysts
CBO forecasts are labeled based on their release dates, but forecasts can be locked several months
prior to their release. For example, the February 2023 forecast is based on data released as of
December 6, 2022, while the May 2022 forecast is based on data released as of March 2, 2022.
Inflation as measured by the Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index peaked in June 2022.

2

Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

| 33

Figure 1-2. PCE Price Index
Percent change (year-over-year)
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
2019:Q1 2019:Q4 2020:Q3 2021:Q2 2022:Q1 2022:Q4 2023:Q3 2024:Q2
Actual

Blue Chip January 2023

Council of Economic Advisers

SEP December 2022
CBO February 2023

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Congressional Budget Office; Blue Chip Economic
Indicators; Federal Reserve Board of Governors; CEA calculations.
Note: Gray bar indicates recession. Data are seasonally adjusted. All forecasts were finalized
before 2022:Q4 data were released. Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) data reflect
median FOMC projections, Q4/Q4 percent change. Shaded area indicates the difference
between Blue Chip Top 10 average and Blue Chip Bottom 10 average estimates.
2025 Economic Report of the President

projected that steady disinflation would require a sustained increase in
unemployment, the unemployment rate remained below even the average
of the 10 most optimistic Blue Chip Economic Indicators projections from
2023:Q1 through 2024:Q2, as shown in figure 1-3. As of 2024:Q3, the
unemployment rate was below the CBO and Blue Chip consensus forecast
projections.
The unique macroeconomic conditions and policy choices following
the onset of the pandemic ushered in a rapid recovery that repeatedly defied
forecasters’ expectations of rising unemployment. If the CBO and Blue
Chip forecasters’ expectations had come to fruition, approximately 2 million additional Americans would have been out of work at the end of 2023.
Beating the forecasts had real impacts for Americans: Working families’
livelihoods remained intact, and as inflation slowed and real wages and
incomes grew, these additional workers remained in the labor force to reap
these gains.

34 |

Chapter 1

Figure 1-3. Unemployment Rate
Percent
6.5
6.0
5.5
5.0
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2021:Q1 2021:Q3 2022:Q1 2022:Q3 2023:Q1 2023:Q3 2024:Q1 2024:Q3
Actual
Blue Chip January 2023
CBO February 2023

Council of Economic Advisers

SEP December 2022

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Congressional Budget Office; Blue Chip Economic
Indicators; Federal Reserve Board of Governors; CEA calculations.
Note: Data are seasonally adjusted. All forecasts (besides Blue Chip) were finalized before
2022:Q4 data were released. Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) data reflect median
FOMC projections, Q4 level. Shaded area indicates the difference between Blue Chip Top
10 average and Blue Chip Bottom 10 average estimates.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Keeping millions more workers employed in a strong labor market
with real wage gains has allowed the economic benefits of full employment
to take hold. As the CEA has documented, full employment expansions particularly benefit demographic groups with comparatively lower labor force
participation rates and higher unemployment rates (CEA 2024a). The U.S.
labor market has broken multiple records under the Administration, gains
made possible by data-driven policymaking and an unwavering focus on
supporting American families.

Macroeconomic Developments
Over the past four years, the U.S. economy has outpaced recoveries following past domestic crises as well as pandemic recoveries in other advanced
economies on two critical dimensions: recovery speed and subsequent
expansions in GDP and consumption.

Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

| 35

GDP
Quantified in terms of real GDP growth, the period between January 2021
and September 2024 was one of sustained expansion, as shown in figure 1-4.
The four-quarter percent changes in real GDP and real private domestic final
demand (PDFP), a measure of consumption and private fixed investment
that better predicts future economic growth than GDP itself (CEA 2015),
have been positive since 2021:Q1. Between 2020:Q4 and 2024:Q3, real
GDP has grown by 12.6 percent and real PDFP has grown by 14.6 percent.

Figure 1-4. Real GDP and PDFP
Percent change (year-over-year)
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
2019:Q2 2020:Q1 2020:Q4 2021:Q3 2022:Q2 2023:Q1 2024:Q4 2024:Q3
Real GDP

Council of Economic Advisers

Real PDFP

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Note: Data are seasonally adjusted and based on 2017-chained dollars. Gray bar indicates
recession.
2025 Economic Report of the President

36 |

Chapter 1

Table 1-1. Historical Comparisons
Real GDP Per Capita

Peak to
Trough

(Percent
Change)

Five Years
from Peak

Duration

Real PCE Per Capita

Peak to
Trough

(Percent
Change)

(Quarters)

(Percent
Change)

Five Years
from Peak

Duration

(Percent
Change)

(Quarters)

Great
Depression

-32.7%

-27.5%

44

-20.8%

-

-

Great
Recession

-5.1%

-0.8%

21

-3.5%

-0.6%

23

Pandemic
Recession

-9.3%

9.5%

5

-10.4%

12.0%

5

Average
(All Others)

-3.1%

9.2%

8

-1.6%

9.4%

7

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Barro and Ursua (2008); Maddison (1995); CEA calculations.

Note: Peak is defined as the last period before either GDP per capita or real PCE per capita
decreases during an economic recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic
Research. Trough is defined as the lowest point within a recession. Duration is the number of
quarters from the peak until that peak is exceeded. Data prior to 1947 are annual from Maddison
(1995) and Barro and Ursua (2008). For the Pandemic Recession, the percent change from the peak
to 2024:Q3 is used, since five years have not passed. "Average" includes all other NBER-defined
recessions from 1947 to present. For PCE per capita during the Great Depression, the data needed
to calculate five years from peak and duration are unavailable.
2025 Economic Report of the President

The Recovery in Context
Real GDP per capita exceeded its pre-recession peak after just five quarters,
a remarkably short duration from peak to recovery by historical standards,
as reported in table 1-1. For example, following the Great Recession, real
GDP per capita did not surpass its 2007:Q4 peak until 2013:Q1, a duration
of 21 quarters. The two recessions featured different drivers and dynamics;
the Great Recession was associated with a severe financial crisis, and history shows that such events tend to be followed by protracted recoveries
(Reinhart and Rogoff 2009; Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor 2013). In contrast,
the pandemic recession featured a massive negative supply shock that
largely reversed as the ARP facilitated widespread vaccination of Americans
against COVID-19. The speed, resilience, and durability of the pandemic
recession recovery are notable given that economic activity overcame a
peak-to-trough depth nearly double that of the Great Recession. Policies that
Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

| 37

supported strong demand over this period likely contributed to the historically rapid recovery from the pandemic recession (de Soyres, Santacreu, and
Young 2022).
To capture the post-recovery expansion, table 1-1 reports cumulative real per capita GDP growth in the five years after selected recessions
began.3 From 2019:Q4 through 2024:Q3, real per capita GDP increased by
9.5 percent. Five years after the Great Recession began, per capita GDP still
had not recovered; despite the severity of the pandemic recession, the GDP
recovery and subsequent expansion mirror more minor recessions.
The differences are particularly stark in terms of consumer spending.
While the peak-to-trough decline in real per capita personal consumption
expenditures during the pandemic recession was almost triple that of the
Great Recession, consumer spending recovered in around one fourth of
the time and increased by 12.0 percent between 2019:Q4 and 2024:Q3. In
contrast, five years after the Great Recession began, consumer spending was
below the pre-recession level.
The U.S. post-pandemic recovery was also rapid by international
standards. As shown in figure 1-5, U.S. real GDP exceeded its prior peak in
five quarters, two quarters faster than the average among the remaining G7
countries. The figure also reveals a shallower real GDP trough in the United
States relative to most other G7 economies.
Real GDP has expanded in most G7 countries since the eve of the pandemic, following a strong collective international response. However, U.S.
real GDP growth since the pre-pandemic peak, at 11.4 percent, is more than
double the next-largest expansion. One likely driver is the strong discretionary fiscal support in the United States relative to other advanced economies,
which supported U.S. consumer spending (de Soyres, Santacreu, and Young
2022). Consumption comprises a larger share of U.S. GDP than that of other
advanced economies.
While food and energy price shocks following Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine hit European economies especially hard, high inflation rates in the
wake of the pandemic and Russia’s invasion were a near-global phenomenon. Figure 1-6 shows that despite U.S. growth far outpacing growth in
other G7 economies, the cumulative increases in core inflation have been
more comparable. The common experience of high pandemic-induced
inflation across advanced economies highlights the importance of supplyside factors in driving the surge in inflation and subsequent disinflation (de
Soyres et al. 2024).

As of 2024:Q3, it has been 19 quarters since the pre-pandemic peak in GDP (2019:Q4), one quarter
short of the five-year horizon reported for the remaining recessions in table 1-1.

3

38 |

Chapter 1

Figure 1-5. Real GDP Recovery in the G7
Index (2019:Q4 = 100)
115
110
105
100
95
90
85
80
75

2019

2020

2021

2022

Italy

Japan

U.K.

France

U.S.

Canada

2023

2024
Germany

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Statistics Canada; The National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies; Federal
Statistical Office of Germany; Italian National Institute of Statistics; Cabinet Office,
Government of Japan; U.K. Office for National Statistics; U.S Bureau of Economic Analysis; CEA
calculations.
Note: Gray bar indicates U.S. recession. Data are seasonally adjusted.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

| 39

Figure 1-6. Cumulative Core Inflation and Real GDP
Growth in the G7, 2019:Q4 to 2024:Q3
Cumulative core inflation, percent
25
U.K.
20

U.S.

Germany
France

15

Italy
Canada

10
Japan
5

0

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Cumulative real GDP growth, percent
Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Statistics Canada; The National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies;
Federal Statistical Office of Germany; Deutsche Bundesbank; Italian National Institute of
Statistics; Cabinet Office, Government of Japan; Statistics Bureau of Japan, Ministry of
Internal Affairs and Communications; U.K. Office for National Statistics; U.S Bureau of
Economic Analysis; U.S Bureau of Labor Statistics; CEA calculations.
Note: All inflation data are harmonized except for the U.S., which uses core CPI
excluding owner-equivalent rents. Japan and Canada's inflation metrics are core CPI
measures harmonized for cross-country comparison, not the Harmonzied Index of
Consumer Prices series.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Consumption
Consumer spending accounts for more than two thirds of U.S. GDP and
has been a strong driver of growth during the current economic expansion.
Real spending surpassed its pre-pandemic level in January 2021 and has
40 |

Chapter 1

risen consistently over the past four years, with cumulative growth outpacing GDP growth. Robust consumer spending is due in part to policies like
the ARP—which shored up household balance sheets—as well as to real
wage gains and rising household net worth. The sharp reduction in services
spending after the pandemic began, while an initial drag on total consumption, subsequently supported increased goods consumption. As of October
2024, real consumer spending had increased over its pre-pandemic level for
durables, nondurables, and services.

Shifts in Consumer Demand
The composition of demand shifted substantially in response to pandemicinduced demand and supply shocks, and spending patterns on both goods
and services were highly unusual relative to past recessions. As public health
imperatives kept Americans at home during the pandemic’s acute phase,
households dramatically reduced spending on in-person services. Figure
1-7 shows that the scope of the collapse was unprecedented, as services
consumption tends to remain relatively steady even in recessions.

Figure 1-7. Real Core Services ex. Housing Spending
Across Recessions
Index (pre-recession peak = 100)
130
120
110
100
90
80
70

-24 -18 -12

-6

0

6

12

18

24

30

36

Months since pre-recession peak

Pandemic Recession

Great Recession

42

48

54

60

Average

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; CEA calculations.
Note: Data are seasonally adjusted. Nominal series are deflated using their
respective price indexes, then indexed to 100 at the peak before the recession as
defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research. "Average" includes all other
post-1959 recessions.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

| 41

The reduction in services consumption effectively increased disposable personal income, while consumer demand simultaneously rose in
categories like household furnishings and at-home entertainment. Notably,
durable goods spending increased dramatically, surpassing its pre-recession
peak three months after the pandemic-induced recession began. This result
is surprising given the pro-cyclicality of durables consumption (Berger and
Vavra 2015); for comparison, durables spending remained depressed for
47 months after the Great Recession. Because consumers rarely repurchase
durables like appliances and furniture quickly, economists assumed that
consumers were front-loading purchases and anticipated a subsequent
decline in durables spending (Tauber and Van Zandweghe 2021). Instead,
real consumer spending on durables remained above pre-pandemic levels
and even increased from mid-2021 through 2024, with overall goods consumption remaining correspondingly strong.

The Services Shortfall and Goods Consumption
Figure 1-8 shows the extent to which pandemic-era goods consumption
diverged from goods spending in past recessions and recoveries. Strong

Figure 1-8. Real Core Goods Spending Across
Recessions
Index (pre-recession peak = 100)

130
120
110
100
90
80
70

-24 -18 -12

-6

0

6

12

18

24

30

36

Months since pre-recession peak

Pandemic Recession

Council of Economic Advisers

Great Recession

42

48

54

Average

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; CEA calculations.
Note: Data are seasonally adjusted. Nominal series are deflated using their respective
price indexes, then indexed to 100 at the peak before the recession as defined by the
National Bureau of Economic Research. "Average" includes all other post-1959
recessions.
2025 Economic Report of the President

42 |

Chapter 1

60

goods consumption has been an essential driver of the current economic
expansion, but it is not the full story. Because services account for around
two thirds of total consumption, the unprecedented services spending shortfall dwarfs the increase in goods consumption over the period of the services
shortfall: Only around half of the disposable income saved by abstaining
from core services consumption was redirected contemporaneously to core
goods consumption.4
A conservative estimate of the services shortfall is the gap between
monthly actual spending on non-housing core services and pre-pandemic
spending.5 Figure 1-9 displays changes in real spending by category,

Figure 1-9. Change in PCE and Major Components
from February 2020
Billions of 2017 dollars

2000
1500
1000

500
0
-500
-1000
-1500
-2000
-2500
Jan-2020

Jan-2021

Jan-2022

Core services ex. housing
Food, energy, housing

Jan-2023

Jan-2024

Core goods
Total PCE

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; CEA calculations.
Note: Gray bar indicates recession. Data are seasonally adjusted.
2025 Economic Report of the President

The same holds for total goods and services. Over the period between March 2020 and June 2021,
during which total services spending remained below its pre-pandemic level, the cumulative increase
in total goods consumption relative to the February 2020 level accounts for 57 percent of the
cumulative decrease in total services consumption. Over the period between March 2020 and July
2021, during which core services spending remained below its pre-pandemic level, the cumulative
increase in core goods consumption relative to the February 2020 level accounts for 47 percent of
the cumulative decrease in core services consumption.
5
Throughout this section, the pre-pandemic level refers to February 2020. Monthly data are
employed to account for the large month-to-month swings in consumer spending.
4

Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

| 43

benchmarked to February 2020 levels. Between March 2020 and July 2021—
the period during which core services spending remained depressed—the
cumulative core services shortfall was more than double the cumulative
surplus in core goods spending.
This finding has two implications for the macroeconomic dynamics
of the past four years. First, fiscal support did not increase aggregate goods
consumption beyond what was accounted for by aggregate forgone services
consumption from March 2020 through July 2021. In fact, real consumer
spending on goods could have doubled and still been fully offset by the
decrease in non-housing services spending. Second, these dynamics meant
that household balance sheets were strong: Households had the resources to
support the economic recovery long after the pandemic-era fiscal support
ended.

Excess Saving
Figure 1-10 displays changes in real personal saving relative to pre-pandemic
saving as a function of changes in real disposable personal income (DPI)

Figure 1-10. Change in Real Saving and Selected
Components from February 2020
Billions of 2017 dollars
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
-1000
-2000
-3000
Jan-2020

Jan-2021

Jan-2022

Core services ex. housing
Food, energy, housing
Real personal saving

Council of Economic Advisers

Jan-2023

Jan-2024

Core goods
Real DPI

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; CEA calculations.
Note: Gray bar indicates recession. Data are seasonally adjusted. Personal saving is
deflated using the PCE price index. Real personal saving does not equal real DPI less real
PCE due to personal interest payments and current transfer payments.
2025 Economic Report of the President

44 |

Chapter 1

less changes in consumer spending. From March 2020 through August 2021,
the level of monthly real personal saving exceeded pre-pandemic saving.
Increases in real DPI above its pre-pandemic level contributed positively
to changes in saving from January 2021 through October 2024, though the
positive contributions from increases in real DPI were offset by negative
contributions from other categories from August 2021 through October
2024. Through mid-2021, the services shortfall also contributed to a record
increase in personal saving, offsetting the drag from increased goods consumption. Accordingly, households reallocated forgone services spending
toward future consumption and improved their overall financial situations,
including by paying down debt (Aladangady et al. 2023).
The increase in personal saving was unprecedented relative to saving
trends in both past recessions and periods of economic expansion. Following
the accumulation of pandemic-era excess saving, the saving rate fell to 2
percent in June 2022. As of October 2024, it was 4.4 percent, slightly below
the 2000–2019 average of 5.2 percent, as shown in figure 1-11.
Times of economic uncertainty increase households’ desire to save
in order to protect against future income shocks (Leland 1968; Carroll
and Samwick 1998). With higher disposable incomes, households could
satisfy this precautionary saving motive without dampening consumption.

Figure 1-11. Personal Saving Rate
Percent
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2000

2004

2008

2012

Personal saving rate

2016

2020

2024

2000–2019 average

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; CEA calculations.
Note: Gray bars indicate recessions. Data are seasonally adjusted.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

| 45

Additionally, pandemic-era excess saving acted as a buffer for households
enduring health crises or job loss, though these households were still worse
off than those not directly facing pandemic-related shocks (Aladangady et
al. 2023). For households without immediate financial constraints, excess
saving facilitated a form of consumption smoothing over the past four years.

Investment
Over the last four years, business fixed investment (i.e., real private nonresidential fixed investment) has exceeded multiple forecast expectations,
as shown in figure 1-12. Growing at an annualized rate of 3.8 percent in
2024:Q3, real non-residential investment has cumulatively grown 23.2
percent during the Administration. As the CEA noted in the 2024 Economic
Report of the President, the growth is partially due to firms enhancing
domestic capacity to increase supply chain resilience and due to incentivized manufacturing investment from the IRA and CHIPS (CEA 2024b).

Figure 1-12. Real Private Nonresidential
Fixed Investment
Billions of 2017 dollars
3700
3500
3300
3100
2900
2700
2500

2018

2019
2020
Actual
Blue Chip Jan. 2022
Blue Chip Jan. 2024

Council of Economic Advisers

2021

2022
2023
2024
Blue Chip Jan. 2021
Blue Chip Jan. 2023

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Blue Chip Economic Indicators; CEA
calculations.
Note: Gray bar indicates recession. Data are seasonally adjusted. Blue Chip growth
rates are applied to actual data for the first quarter of the forecast.
2025 Economic Report of the President

46 |

Chapter 1

Incentivized public investment often spurs, or crowds in, private investment
(Dreger and Reimers 2016; Pereira 2001); total private investment commitments hit $1 trillion as of November 2024.
Public investment crowding in private investment likely explains
several economic records set during the Administration. As seen in figure
1-13, real business investment in manufacturing structures as a contribution
to real GDP growth reached a near-record high in 2024. Real construction
spending on manufacturing more than doubled between January 2021 and
September 2024, suggesting that construction activity of manufacturing
facilities has risen.
On residential investment, the story is less rosy. Although real private
residential investment grew 12 percent from 2019:Q4 through 2022:Q2,
it subsequently quickly fell to pre-pandemic levels as interest rates began
climbing. With construction costs also high, both new single-family and
multi-family housing starts slowed. Housing supply has not kept pace with
demand, exacerbating a decade-in-the-making housing shortage estimated

Figure 1-13. Contribution of Real Private Fixed
Investment in Manufacturing Structures to Real GDP
Growth
Contribution to year-over-year real GDP growth, percentage point
0.4
0.3

Passage of IRA and CHIPS

0.2
0.1
0.0
-0.1
-0.2
-0.3
-0.4
1959 1965 1971 1977 1983 1989 1995 2001 2007 2013 2019

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; CEA calculations.
Note: Data are seasonally adjusted.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

| 47

to total 1.5 million to 4.5 million units (Calanog, Metcalfe, and Fagan 2023;
Zillow 2024).

Policy Environment
Many of the economic trends in this chapter were affected by the fiscal and
monetary policy environments. This section tracks their evolution during
the four years of the Administration and details implications for financial
conditions and mortgage rates.

Fiscal Policy
Throughout the Administration, there has been significant legislation not
only to recover from the pandemic, but also to make historic investments
in future U.S. economic growth. Though they have not been adopted, the
Administration’s budgets have also proposed tax changes and spending cuts
to achieve a more sustainable fiscal path.
The signature COVID-19 response legislation of the Administration
was the ARP, signed into law on March 11, 2021. At $1.9 trillion, the ARP
covered a host of areas, from mounting a national vaccine program, stimulus
checks, and childcare subsidies to expanded unemployment benefits and
support for small businesses and state and local governments. A substantial,
multi-pronged response to the widespread devastation of COVID-19, the
ARP helped facilitate the strong economic recovery and impacted many of
the macroeconomic indicators described in this chapter.
Beyond pandemic-specific legislation, there are three sizeable pieces
of investment legislation. Signed into law on November 15, 2021, the BIL
authorized $1.2 trillion to improve transportation infrastructure, invest in
clean energy and climate resilience, and roll out broadband infrastructure
across the country (White House 2024a; DOT 2024). CHIPS, signed on
August 9, 2022, is designed to build up a domestic semiconductor manufacturing industry and protect the United States’ advantage in high-tech manufacturing in part by crowding in private semiconductor investment (DOC
2024). The IRA, signed into law on August 16, 2022, lowered prescription
drug prices, ramped up domestic clean energy production and increased tax
revenue through raising the minimum tax on large corporations and enhancing IRS enforcement (White House 2024b; IRS 2024).

Monetary Policy
Households and businesses faced three distinct interest rate environments
over the past four years that shaped their consumption, saving, and investment decisions (see figure 1-14). The first was a period of very low interest
rates. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) lowered the target

48 |

Chapter 1

Figure 1-14. Selected Nominal U.S. Interest Rates
Percent
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
2003

2006

2009

2012

30-year fixed rate mortgage

2015

2018

2021

2024

Federal funds rate

10-year Treasury yield

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation; Federal Reserve Bank of New York;
Federal Reserve Board of Governors.
Note: Mortgage rates reflect the conventional 30-year fixed mortgage rate derived from
median daily values of coupon rates and the weekly Freddie Mac U.S. Primary Mortgage
Market Survey. Federal funds rate corresponds to the midpoint of the target range. Gray bars
indicate recessions.
2025 Economic Report of the President

range for the nominal federal funds rate to nearly zero on March 15, 2020, a
decrease of 1.5 percentage points from two weeks prior. The move brought
the effective federal funds rate back to the zero lower bound for the second
time in modern history, less than five years after the first such instance
concluded, and the FOMC maintained the near-zero target for two years.
This rapid interest rate reduction was accompanied by a slate of emergency
lending facilities targeting small and medium-sized firms, large corporations, state and local governments, financial institutions, and securities
Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

| 49

markets, among other sectors (Federal Reserve Board of Governors 2023).
Many of these programs were aimed at ensuring that credit markets were
functioning, ultimately supporting the flow of credit to households and
businesses. Crucially, actions by the Federal Reserve, including large-scale
asset purchases, went beyond ensuring market functioning and provided the
economy substantial monetary support (Milstein and Wessel 2024).
The second interest rate environment began in March 2022, when
the FOMC began increasing the federal funds rate target range due to the
upswing in inflation as strong demand outpaced constrained supply. From
March 2022 through July 2023, the FOMC increased the federal funds rate
target range by 525 basis points, the largest increase over a tightening cycle
since the 1980s. From July 2023 to September 2024, the federal funds rate
remained at this higher level.
The final interest rate environment began in September 2024, when the
FOMC once again lowered the federal funds rate, judging that policy normalization was appropriate as inflation was on track to return to the Federal
Reserve’s target level (FOMC 2024).
To capture household and business borrowing costs, figure 1-15 displays ex-ante real interest rate measures, which subtract expected inflation.
Market- and model-based measures of long-run real interest rates reached
historic lows at near zero or negative rates throughout 2021 and early 2022.
As the FOMC began to tighten policy, long-run real interest rates reached
2 percent in 2023; as of November 2024, they remained around 2 percent.
While the shift from extraordinarily low real interest rates to moderately
positive rates implies tighter borrowing conditions, long-run real interest
rates are within range of the years prior to the Great Recession and remain
well below the real interest rates of the 1980s, reflecting a decades-long
downward trend (Obstfeld 2023).

50 |

Chapter 1

Figure 1-15. Real Interest Rates
Percent
10

8

6

4

2

0

-2
1982

1988

1994

Ten-year TIPS yield

2000

2006

2012

2018

2024

Cleveland Fed 10-year real rate

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland; Federal Reserve Board of Governors.
Note: Model-based estimates from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland are based on fixed
income markets and survey-based measures. TIPS refers to Treasury inflation-protected
securities whose principal and interest payments are adjusted for inflation. Gray bars indicate
recessions.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Financial Conditions
Firms and households have faced a range of financial conditions over the
past four years, owing in part to the three distinct monetary policy environments. Figure 1-16 shows the contributions to GDP growth of key financial
indicators, including the federal funds rate, the 10-year Treasury yield, mortgage rates, and equity and home prices. Much of the economic impact from
relatively tighter financial conditions throughout 2022 can be attributed to
falling equity prices, monetary policy tightening, and rising interest rates
on mortgages and corporate bonds. From May 2022 through October 2024,
the restrictive monetary policy stance from the federal funds rate acted as a
headwind to future growth, but headwinds from the federal funds rate were
more than offset by increases in equity prices from November 2023 through
October 2024 (Ajello et al. 2023).
Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

| 51

Figure 1-16. Contributions to GDP Growth, per the
Federal Reserveʼs Financial Conditions Impulse on
Growth (FCI-G)
Percentage points
2.0
1.5

Tailwinds to GDP
growth

1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0

Headwinds to
GDP growth

-1.5
-2.0
Jan-2021

Sep-2021

May-2022

Federal funds rate
BBB rate
Dollar value

Jan-2023

10-year Treasury
Equity prices
FCI-G

Sep-2023

May-2024

Mortgage rate
Housing

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Federal Reserve Board of Governors; CEA calculations.
Note: Data are from FCI-G (baseline), and inverted such that the figure is read as a fiscal
impact measure, which shows cumulative effects on GDP growth one year ahead.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Mortgage Rates
As monetary policy drove mortgage rates to historic lows in 2021 (see figure
1-14), mortgage-holding households were incentivized to refinance; low
rates and pandemic-induced increases in housing demand also incentivized
new buyers (Gamber, Graham, and Yadav 2023). Total mortgage originations spiked as interest rates fell, driven by refinancing as well as new
mortgage originations, as shown in figure 1-17. The refinance share of total
originations reached 70 percent in 2021:Q1. This dynamic, paired with the
unusually rapid transition from expansionary to contractionary monetary
policy, contributed to a “lock-in” effect—as mortgage rates rose sharply, a
large share of households had already refinanced to ultra-low mortgage rates
and were reluctant to sell—significantly reducing housing market turnover
(Quigley 1987; Batzer et al. 2024). As shown in figure 1-16, rising mortgage
rates were a significant drag on growth beginning in 2022.

52 |

Chapter 1

Figure 1-17. Mortgage Originations
Billions of dollars
1,600
1,400
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200
0
2005:Q1

2008:Q1

2011:Q1
Total

2014:Q1

2017:Q1

2020:Q1

2023:Q1

Refinance

Council of Economic Advisers

Source: Mortgage Bankers Association.
Note: Data are seasonally adjusted and in nominal dollars. Data represent one-to-four family
properties. Gray bars indicate recessions.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Developments in Inflation
Inflation, as measured by the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE)
Price Index, was 2.3 percent over the 12 months ending in October 2024,
slightly above the Federal Reserve’s long-run target of 2 percent. As shown
in figure 1-18, inflation has taken a near “round trip” over the past four years
(Bernstein 2024).
Inflation surged as strong demand collided with weak supply and
peaked above 7 percent in June 2022.6 A period of rapid and broad-based
disinflation followed, with nearly 5 percentage points of disinflation ensuing as supply and demand normalized amid substantial monetary policy
This section measures inflation using the PCE Price Index, which is consistent with the Federal
Reserve’s inflation target. The CEA also tracks inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index,
which peaked at 9.1 percent year-over-year in June 2022 and was 2.6 percent in October 2024 (CEA
2023a).

6

Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

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Figure 1-18. Headline and Core PCE Inflation
PCE inflation, year-over-year percent
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
2019

2020

2021

Headline

Council of Economic Advisers

2022

Core

2023

2024

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; CEA calculations.
Note: Data are seasonally adjusted. Core refers to headline less food and energy
components. Gray bar indicates recession.
2025 Economic Report of the President

tightening. Core PCE inflation, which excludes food and energy, peaked at
5.6 percent in February 2022 and was 2.8 percent as of October 2024.

Supply Chain Disruptions
In March 2021, inventory-to-sales ratios in both the retail sector and overall
economy hit record lows, with inventory shortages hampering business
activity in sectors like homebuilding, and semiconductor shortages devastating the market for new and used vehicles (Helper and Soltas 2021).
Global supply chain disruptions caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
further contributed to rising prices in advanced economies, led by food and
energy price shocks (Aizenman et al. 2024; Tong 2024). Figure 1-19 shows
that supplier delivery lag times, one measure of supply chain pressures,
lengthened during the pandemic. Movements in supplier delivery lag times
coincided with the rise and fall of core goods prices.
Unsnarling supply chains was critical to restoring the balance between
supply and demand. The Administration worked with the private sector to
54 |

Chapter 1

Figure 1-19. Supply Chain Pressure and
Core Goods Inflation
12-month percent change

Percent, 12-month
moving average

10

60

8

50

6

40

4

30

2

20

0

10

-2
-4
1990

1994

1998
2002
2006
2010
2014
2018
2022
PCE core goods inflation (left axis)
Percent reporting slower delivery times (right axis)

0

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Institute for Supply Management (ISM); Bureau of Economic Analysis; CEA
calculations.
Note: Gray bars indicate recessions. Data are seasonally adjusted. ISM index represents
manufacturing firms.
2025 Economic Report of the President

resolve supply chain disruptions by establishing the Supply Chain Task
Force and with legislators to pass shipping-rate reforms (White House 2021;
Congress 2022). The inflationary effects of supply disruptions and disinflationary effects of their resolution highlight the fragility of global supply
chains and the role of federal action to resolve disruptions.

Strong Demand Meets Constrained Supply
The pandemic’s unusual dynamics—with fiscal support for household balance sheets and the shortfall in services consumption effectively increasing
disposable income—led to strong demand for consumer goods. While
further research is needed to determine the precise contributions to inflation
of supply relative to demand, robust demand coinciding with massive negative supply shocks put upward pressure on prices (Bernanke and Blanchard
2023; di Giovanni et al. 2024).7.
See Hazell and Hobler (2024) for a literature review on the drivers of post-pandemic inflation as of
November 2024.

7

Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

| 55

To better understand the drivers of inflation and disinflation over the
past four years, figure 1-20 displays contributions to headline inflation from
five components: food, energy, housing, core goods (excluding food and
energy), and core non-housing services (excluding housing and energy).
Core goods (21.8 percent weight in PCE market basket).8 Core goods
prices were a strong contributor to both sides of inflation’s round trip, as
strong demand met constrained supply. As goods spending intensified while
services spending remained below pre-pandemic levels, core goods inflation
increased quickly relative to other categories, from a pre-pandemic baseline
of nearly zero. At its peak in February 2022—four months before headline
PCE inflation peaked—core goods inflation contributed nearly 2 percentage
points to overall inflation. Disinflation took hold as supply chains normalized (see figure 1-19), and by November 2023, yearly core goods inflation
was nearly zero. From December 2023 to October 2024, core goods prices
contributed negatively to yearly inflation.
Core services excluding housing (51.4 percent). Prices of core services
excluding housing accelerated quickly in 2021. Following widespread vaccination against COVID-19, pent-up demand for in-person services met
heavily constrained supply. Rising labor costs amid a tight labor market
added upward price pressures, and inflation in this category remained above
4 percent from May 2021 through September 2023. Core services excluding
housing account for about half of the PCE market basket, and as figure 1-21
shows, their outsized contribution to headline inflation stands out in historical context. By October 2024, the category had seen nearly 2 percentage
points of disinflation from its peak of 5.3 percent.
Food (7.5 percent). Grocery prices began to rise early in the pandemic,
as demand for food at home grew while the pandemic affected food processing facilities and grocery supply chains (Aday and Aday 2020). Food commodity price shocks caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine worsened the
problem, and food inflation was elevated throughout 2022, peaking above
12 percent in August 2022 (Aizenman et al. 2024). Because groceries make
up about 9 percent of the typical American household’s spending, price
increases deeply affected families.9 Grocery inflation cooled substantially in
2023 and 2024, and because wage growth outpaced grocery price growth,
groceries were less expensive in real terms in October 2024 than in 2019
(CEA 2024c).
Energy (3.6 percent). Energy inflation spiked in 2021 and remained
elevated throughout 2022 after pandemic-related disruptions left supply
unable to keep up with demand. Crude oil prices rose in early 2022 following
PCE weights reflect nominal expenditure share for each category in the October 2024 Personal
Income Report.
9
According to the 2023 Consumer Expenditure Survey, households in the third quintile of pre-tax
income spent 8.8 percent of their total annual expenditures on groceries.
8

56 |

Chapter 1

Figure 1-20. Year-over-year PCE Inflation by
Components
Percent
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
2019

2020
Housing

2021

2022

Core services ex. housing

2023
Core goods

2024
Food

Energy

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; CEA calculations.
Note: Figure shows monthly contributions to year-over-year PCE inflation. Core
goods refers to goods less food and energy components. Gray bar indicates
recession.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine but were stemmed by the Administration’s
swift activation of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (Harris and Wolfram
2022). Strong domestic energy production, with U.S. crude oil production
reaching its highest level in August 2024, was an important driver of disinflation. Since January 2023, the contributions of energy price changes to
overall inflation have been small or negative. While gasoline prices rose to
more than $5 a gallon at their peak in June 2022, they had fallen by almost
40 percent to around $3 a gallon by the end of November.
Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

| 57

Figure 1-21. Contribution to Headline PCE
Inflation

Percentage point contribution to year-over-year inflation
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
2000

2003

2006

2009

Housing

Council of Economic Advisers

2012

2015

2018

2021

2024

Core services ex. housing

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; CEA calculations.
Note: Gray bars indicate recessions. Data are seasonally adjusted. Core goods, energy goods
and services, and food are not included.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Housing (15.7 percent). Yearly housing inflation, which exceeded 3
percent prior to the onset of the pandemic, began increasing in mid-2021
and reached 8.3 percent in April 2023, likely owing to pandemic-induced
demand exacerbating the housing market’s structural supply shortfall
(Bernstein et al. 2021).10 Despite 4.9 percentage points of headline disinflation and 3.2 percentage points of housing disinflation, housing inflation
remained elevated at 5.0 percent in October 2024 amid a tight housing
market. At its peak, housing inflation contributed more than 1 percentage
point to yearly PCE inflation, more than double the category’s average
contribution over the past two decades (see figure 1-21).

Inflation Expectations
Despite the rise and fall in actual inflation over the past four years, figure
1-22 shows that market-based long-term inflation expectations remained
The contribution of housing inflation to CPI inflation is larger than its contribution to PCE
inflation due to the relatively larger weight the former index places on housing.
10

58 |

Chapter 1

Figure 1-22. Five-year Inflation Expectations
Percent
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
2019

2020

2021

Michigan survey

2022

2023

TIPS breakeven rate

2024
Cleveland Fed

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: University of Michigan Consumer Survey; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland; CEA calculations.
Note: The breakeven inflation rate represents a measure of expected inflation derived
from five-year Treasury constant maturity securities and five-year Treasury inflationindexed constant maturity securities. Survey data from the University of Michigan reflects
median household expectations. Model-based estimates from the Federal Reserve Bank
of Cleveland are based on fixed income markets and survey-based measures. Gray bar
indicates recession.
2025 Economic Report of the President

relatively close to the Federal Reserve’s 2 percent inflation target, likely
owing to the central bank’s credibility and independence (CEA 2024d).
Because expectations about future inflation directly influence current
inflation, anchored expectations were an essential component of disinflation (Lee, Powell, and Wessel 2020). Longer-term household inflation
Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

| 59

expectations, at 3 percent in October 2024, remain modestly above their
pre-pandemic levels. Near-term inflation expectations, particularly those
of households, followed inflation’s rise and fall but moved less than onefor-one with actual inflation. As of November 2024, household and market
expectations of near-term inflation were close to their pre-pandemic levels.

The Labor Market: A Quick Return to Full Employment
Rebounding from a battered economy to one of the tightest labor markets
in U.S. history allowed droves of unemployed workers to find jobs quickly.
In January 2021, unemployment was 6.4 percent, as shown in figure 1-23,
and both initial and continuing unemployment claims were substantially
elevated compared with their 2019 averages. But as the economy reopened
thanks to widespread COVID-19 vaccinations, the unemployment rate and
unemployment insurance claims began trending down. By January 2022,
the unemployment rate dropped to 4.0 percent, and by that March, initial
unemployment insurance claims were below their pre-pandemic average. In
January 2023, the unemployment rate reached 3.4 percent, the lowest since
May 1969. Since then, the rate rose to 4.2 percent in November 2024, still

Figure 1-23. Unemployment Rate

Percent
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

0
Jan-2021

Sep-2021

May-2022

Council of Economic Advisers

Jan-2023

Sep-2023

May-2024

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Note: The data reflect the seasonally adjusted civilian unemployment rate for ages 16 and
older.
2025 Economic Report of the President

60 |

Chapter 1

historically low but likely more consistent with stable growth and continuing
disinflation.
Payroll employment growth similarly illustrates the transition from
pandemic recovery to a booming labor market, followed by normalization.
Over the course of 2021, payroll gains averaged a historically high 604,000
per month. By June 2022, payroll levels had regained their February 2020
pre-pandemic peak, and monthly payroll gains averaged 324,000 in the
second half of the year. Since then, payroll growth has remained substantial
but cooled slowly. In the three months ending in November 2024, the average pace of payroll growth was 173,000 per month.11 Figure 1-24 illustrates
the changes and shows that, despite slower monthly gains, payroll growth

Figure 1-24. Monthly Change in Nonfarm Payroll
Employment
Thousands
1,000
800
600
400
200
Range of breakeven estimates
0
Jan-2021 Sep-2021 May-2022 Jan-2023 Sep-2023 May-2024
Monthly change

Three-month moving average

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Edelberg and Watson (2024); Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta; CEA calculations.
Note: Data are seasonally adjusted. Top dashed line is the midpoint of the breakeven
estimate from Edelberg and Watson (2024). Bottom dashed line is from the Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta "Jobs Calculator." Trailing moving averages are used.
2025 Economic Report of the President

This chapter’s discussion of payroll data from the Current Establishment Survey does not
incorporate the preliminary benchmark revision to the level of payrolls in March 2024 that was
released in September. However, if the final benchmark revision does reduce payrolls by roughly the
magnitude implied by the preliminary revision, it would not change the trends referred to in this text.
11

Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

| 61

remains consistent with breakeven estimates to maintain a steady unemployment rate (Petrosky-Nadeau and Stewart 2024, Edelberg and Watson
2024).12
Job gains have been widespread across industries during the pandemic
recovery. Even the severely damaged leisure and hospitality industry had
recovered all its job losses by May 2024. The industry, which includes
restaurants and hotels, was hit harder than any other sector during the pandemic and accounted for 37 percent of U.S. job losses between February and
April 2020. This was a deviation from past crises, as recessions typically hit
goods-producing industries harder.
In turn, another unique condition of the pandemic emerged: Job losses
skewed toward women. During the Great Recession of 2007–2009, job
losses skewed male but the pandemic, in contrast, was informally dubbed a
“she-cession” (Hobijn, Sahin, and Song 2010; Covington and Kent 2020).
The demographic mix of leisure and hospitality workers meant pandemic
job losses were more likely to be among lower wage workers who were
women, non-white or Hispanic (Cortes and Forsythe 2023). During the
first year of the pandemic, women with small children exhibited excess
labor force exits relative to women without children (Lim and Zabek 2023).
With the child care industry itself disrupted (Boesch, Lim, and Nunn 2021),
families’ time spent providing child care increased and women’s ability to
balance work and child care differed by characteristics such as education
level and occupation (Goldin 2022). For example, women with more education had a greater likelihood of being able to work from home.
Just a few years later, prime age (25 to 54) women’s labor force participation hit a series high in August 2024, as shown in figure 1-25. Prime
age men’s labor force participation also rose, hitting 90.0 percent in July
2024, its highest level since August 2009 and a partial reversal of a longrun decline. At the same time, record lows were also clocked for various
unemployment rates. Black workers saw their lowest unemployment rate on
record at 4.8 percent in April 2023; Hispanic workers’ unemployment fell
to 3.9 percent in September 2022, tying the series low. These labor market
records, along with others, are at least partially attributable to labor market
tightness.
In early 2021, the ARP launched a national program to ramp up vaccine access and distribute test kits to families and health centers across
the country (HRSA 2022). With vaccines substantially reducing economic
duress, businesses reopened and labor demand quickly increased (Agarwal
and Gopinath 2021). Job openings surged, as shown in figure 1-26, rising to
their highest level on record at nearly 12.2 million in March 2022, almost
While breakeven estimates (i.e., how much monthly payroll growth is needed to keep pace with
population growth to prevent an unemployment rate increase) vary, the academic literature broadly
suggests an approximate pace of 100,000 to 200,000 jobs per month.
12

62 |

Chapter 1

Figure 1-25. Prime-age LFPR for Men and Women
Percent

91

2019 average

89
87
85
83
81
79
77

2019 average

75
73

2019

2020

2021

Men

Council of Economic Advisers

2022

2023

Women

2024

Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics; CEA calculations.
Note: Prime age refers to individuals ages 25 through 54. Gray bar indicates recession.
Data are seasonally adjusted.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Figure 1-26. Job Openings
Thousands
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000

2019 average

6,000
4,000
2,000
0
2019

2020

2021

Council of Economic Advisers

2022

2023

Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics; CEA calculations.
Note: Gray bar indicates recession. Data are seasonally adjusted.
2025 Economic Report of the President

2024

Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

| 63

double the 2017–2019 average of 6.8 million. Labor supply did not rise
commensurately; both overall and prime age labor force participation were
still below their February 2020 levels in March 2022. In turn, the job openings per unemployed person ratio became substantially elevated, reaching 2
available jobs per 1 unemployed person (see figure 1-27).
A variety of factors contributed to increased labor market tightness,
where labor demand exceeds supply at prevailing wages. Real consumer
spending on services rebounded by July 2021, and businesses, especially
those relying on in-person contact, needed labor to meet pent-up demand.
On the labor supply side, a combination of health concerns (Faberman,
Mueller, and Şahin 2022), child care shortages (Heggeness and Suri 2021),
excess savings, and other factors likely contributed to a slow recovery.
The unusually tight labor market gave incumbent workers options.
Employers increased recruiting efforts, such as raising wages and offering
signing bonuses (Macaluso and Waddell 2022). Wage gains in early 2022
were particularly notable and are discussed in depth later in this chapter.

Figure 1-27. Job Openings per Unemployed Person
Ratio
2.5

2.0

1.5

2019 average

1.0

0.5

0.0
2019

2020

2021

Council of Economic Advisers

2022

2023

2024

Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics; CEA calculations.
Note: Unemployed persons are ages 16 and older. Gray bar indicates recession. Data
are seasonally adjusted.
2025 Economic Report of the President

64 |

Chapter 1

As shown in figure 1-28, the quits rate reached 3.0 percent in late 2021
and early 2022, implying that workers were more willing to leave jobs to
upgrade than they were in 2019.
Job mismatch (i.e., the misallocation of job seekers and vacancies
across sectors) spiked amid the labor market’s sudden dip and rebound, but
the effect was smaller and briefer than it was during the Great Recession
(Pizzinelli and Shibata 2022). This, along with a greater U.S. policy emphasis on unemployment insurance rather than job retention subsidies—which
were more consistently used in Europe (Giupponi, Landais, and Lapeyre
2022)—may have facilitated match quality improvements during what has
become known as the “Great Reshuffle.” (Chapter 2 of this Report discusses
improved matching from the perspective of remote work.) Average hourly
earnings saw substantial growth, remote work became more commonplace,
and employers relaxed skills requirements (Forsythe et al. 2022). Those who
wanted work were able to find jobs quickly and, in some cases, occupationally upskill, resulting in real wage gains (CEA 2024e).

Figure 1-28. Quits Rate
Percent
3.3

2.8

2019 average
2.3

1.8

1.3
2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics; CEA calculations.
Note: Gray bar indicates recession. Data are seasonally adjusted.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

| 65

Figure 1-29. Black-white Unemployment Rate Gap
Percent
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1972

1982

1992

2002

2012

2022

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics; CEA calculations.
Note: The data reflect the seasonally adjusted civilian unemployment rate for ages 16 and
older. Gray bars indicate recessions.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Though full employment is not a cure-all for every labor market barrier,
it has helped remedy some prominent inequalities. For example, as shown in
figure 1-29, the Black-white unemployment rate gap has contracted and the
share of people with a disability holding a job has substantially risen compared to pre-pandemic levels. Yet disparities still exist in the labor market by
gender, race, age, and criminal record (CEA 2022, 2023b, 2024a; Couloute
and Kopf 2018; Choi-Allum 2024; Neumark, Burn, and Button 2019).
Effective macroeconomic stabilization is required to reap the benefits of
full employment, and remaining inequities underscore the need for targeted
interventions to address structural, as opposed to cyclical, barriers.
Going forward, two open questions for the U.S. labor market remain.
The first is how immigration intersects with present and future labor market
trends. The CBO estimates total net immigration has risen (CBO 2024) and
in turn, this increase may have helped align labor demand and supply. The
increase likewise affects growth estimates of the population, labor force, and
employment and may have allowed employment to grow more quickly than
expected (Edelberg and Watson 2024). While the CBO projects immigration
66 |

Chapter 1

Figure 1-30. Monthly Business Applications
Thousands
600

500

400

300

200

100

0
2010

2012

2014

2016

All applications

2018

2020

2022

2024

High-propensity applications

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Census Bureau; CEA calculations.
Note: Gray bar indicates recession. Data are seasonally adjusted. High-propensity applications
are defined by Census as applications with a high likelihood of becoming businesses with payroll.
2025 Economic Report of the President

to return closer to historical levels by 2027, how labor supply dynamics may
evolve in the immediate term remains unclear.
The second open question is the future impact of the 20 million new
business applications filed in the United States since January 2021, one
third of which are high-propensity business applications. As shown in figure
1-30, the monthly pace of applications remains elevated compared to prepandemic levels. It has been hypothesized that the application surge was
driven by two waves. The first may have been pandemic-specific entrepreneurial opportunities, such as producing masks; the second may have been
related to vaccines resolving uncertainty for entrepreneurs and increasing
business starts (Decker and Haltiwanger 2023). Given that new businesses
are an important vehicle for job creation, the surge may hold promise for
tomorrow’s labor market (Haltiwanger 2015).

Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

| 67

Economic Wellbeing of Workers
From personal income to child poverty, a holistic perspective is necessary to
understand Americans’ economic wellbeing over the last four years.

Dollars and Cents Measures
Production and nonsupervisory workers have seen some of the fastest nominal wage growth in decades under the Administration.13 Excluding 2020 due
to its adverse compositional effects, production and nonsupervisory workers
experienced 7.0 percent average hourly earnings year-over-year growth
in March 2022, the fastest rate since 1982.14 However, as shown in figure
1-31, these wage gains coincided with high inflation. Between November
2021 and February 2023, headline CPI outpaced average hourly wages for

Figure 1-31. Wage Growth and CPI Inflation
Percent, year-over-year
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Jan-2021

Sep-2021

May-2022
Headline CPI

Council of Economic Advisers

Jan-2023

Sep-2023

May-2024

Hourly earnings (PNS)

Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics; CEA calculations.
Note: PNS means production and nonsupervisory workers.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Production employees in goods-producing industries and nonsupervisory employees in serviceproviding industries are included. These groups account for four fifths of the total employment on
private nonfarm payrolls.
14
Wage growth measures spiked in 2020 due to the volume of low wage workers losing their jobs
and falling out of the calculation.
13

68 |

Chapter 1

production and nonsupervisory workers. This has since reversed, with these
wages outpacing inflation for 20 months through October 2024.
Other wage measures have exhibited a similar pattern.15 The
Employment Cost Index (ECI) for private-sector worker wages saw yearover-year growth of 5.7 percent in June 2022, the highest since 1982. Annual
growth in average hourly earnings (AHE) for private-sector workers peaked
at 5.9 percent in March 2022, and the smoothed Atlanta Federal Reserve
Wage Growth Tracker peaked at 6.7 percent in June, July, and August 2022.
These peaks occurred during the period of high inflation in 2022. Growth
in each measure has since slowed as the labor market has normalized and,
importantly, inflation has cooled. Still, through 2024:Q3, each measure grew
faster than it did before the pandemic, as shown in figure 1-32.
Demographically, non-white workers and those with less education
saw some of the biggest wage gains in 2022 (Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta 2024). By wage level, workers in the bottom half of the distribution
experienced the fastest wage growth, with workers in the 25th and 50th percentile seeing growth reach 7.5 percent in late 2022 and early 2023, respectively. These wage gains were due to the particularly tight labor market at
the lower end of the wage distribution as in-person service providers rehired
workers after substantial job losses in 2020 (CEA 2024a; Autor, Dube, and
McGrew 2024). While wage growth has cooled, the historic pace at the
lower end of the distribution allowed for some wage compression across
demographic groups (Gould and DeCourcy 2024).
Real DPI has also risen, particularly in 2023 after inflation started to
descend. For this metric, it is important to exclude government transfers, as
they spiked due to multiple rounds of fiscal support during the pandemic.
Between January 2021 and October 2024, real DPI per capita, excluding
transfers, rose around $3,800 (8.0 percent), as shown in figure 1-33.

Average hourly earnings, the Employment Cost Index, and the Atlanta Federal Reserve Wage
Growth Tracker all measure wages differently. Average hourly earnings is derived from the BLS
establishment survey and divides the total worker payroll by the sum of total worker hours. The
Employment Cost Index measures wages but is compositionally adjusted so changes in industry
employment composition do not affect the data. The Atlanta Federal Reserve Wage Growth Tracker
uses wage data from the Current Population Survey and represents the median percent change in
the hourly wage of individuals observed 12 months apart. The smoothed measure is a three-month
moving average.
15

Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

| 69

Figure 1-32. Selected Nominal Wage Measures
Percent, year-over-year
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

2010

2012
AHE (all)

2014

2016

AHE (PNS)

Council of Economic Advisers

2018

2020

2022

Atlanta Federal Reserve

2024
ECI

Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta; CEA calculations.
Note: Gray bar indicates recession. ECI means employment cost index, which is at a quarterly
frequency. Atlanta Federal Reserve wage data are non-seasonally adjusted three-month moving
averages; all other data are seasonally adjusted. AHE means average hourly earnings. PNS means
production and nonsupervisory.
2025 Economic Report of the President

70 |

Chapter 1

Figure 1-33. Real DPI ex. Transfers per Capita
Thousands of October 2024 dollars
52

50

48

46
Change:
Jan-2021 to Oct-2024: $3.8K

44

42

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; CEA calculations.
Note: Data are deflated using PCE deflator to October 2024 dollars. DPI ex. transfers is
disposable personal income excluding personal current transfer receipts. Gray bar
indicates recession. Data are seasonally adjusted.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Household Financial Situation
The Survey of Consumer Finances provides a snapshot of household balance
sheets as of March 2022, the start of the FOMC’s monetary tightening cycle,
relative to their pre-pandemic status in 2019. The picture, as shown in table
1-2, is one of rising household net worth (i.e., assets minus liabilities) across
the income distribution due to improvements on both sides of the ledger.
While absolute gains were largest for the highest earners, household net
worth in the poorest income quintile grew by 57 percent, and middle-income
households posted sizeable gains.
On the asset side of the ledger, households at all income levels saw
the value of their financial asset holdings increase, with retirement account
holdings increasing for all income groups and transaction accounts increasing for all but the lowest income quintile.16 Gains extended beyond rising
values: The share of households in the lowest income quintile owning
16

Reported holdings are median values of assets and liabilities held by each income quintile.

Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

| 71

Table 1-2. Change in Selected Assets and Liabilities from
2019 to 2022

Net change in median value by income percentile (thousands of 2022 dollars)
< 20 20-39.9 40-59.9 60-79.9 80-89.9 90-100
Net Worth
6.1
7.8
58.6
62.9
343.5
806.7
Selected Assets
Retirement Accounts
2.4
0.3
6.5
4.7
44.7
25.4
Transaction Accounts
0
0.2
2.4
4.2
10.6
30.5
Selected Liabilities
Credit Card Balances
0.1
-0.6
-0.3
-0.7
-0.8
-1.0
Mortgages
-2.2
2.1
8.8
5
-11.8
39.3
Council of Economic Advisers
Sources: Survey of Consumer Finances; CEA calculations.
Note: Assets and liabilities do not equate to net worth as only a few balance sheet items
are presented.
2025 Economic Report of the President

nonfinancial assets, including vehicles and primary residences, reached its
peak since the modern survey began in 1989. Though gains in stock holdings remain concentrated at the top of the income distribution, the share of
households directly owning stock posted its largest gain since the survey’s
inception, jumping to 21 percent of all households from 15 percent. For
families owning their primary residence, the median net housing value rose
44 percent due to strong pandemic-induced housing demand and insufficient
supply (Aladangady et at. 2023; Gamber et al. 2022).17
On the liabilities side, median credit card balances fell for all but the
lowest-income households. For middle-income households, median values
rose for mortgages, vehicle loans, and home equity lines of credit; while
these loans contributed to an increase in debt held by middle-income households, they may represent welcome developments for families.
The data show a reduction in financial fragility over a period when
household financial situations were initially expected to deteriorate. Instead,
many households’ financial situations were generally in a better position
at the start of the monetary policy tightening cycle than on the eve of the
pandemic. This broad improvement provides suggestive evidence that
expansionary monetary and fiscal policy, along with excess savings accrued
during the pandemic, positioned many families to weather the period of high
interest rates and price increases that spurred them.
The metric is defined by the Survey of Consumer Finances as the home’s value minus debts
secured by the home, such as mortgages or home equity lines of credit.
17

72 |

Chapter 1

While racial disparities in median wealth narrowed between 2019
and 2022, gaps remain. The median wealth ratio between white and Black
families improved, yet Black families have $16 in wealth relative to every
$100 of a typical white family. The gap between Hispanic and white families
also narrowed, with Hispanic families holding $22 in wealth relative to their
white counterparts (Aladangady, Chang, and Krimmel 2023). Net worth
increased across all education levels during the period, but in median terms,
a sizeable gap remained between those with a college degree and those
without (Aladangady et al. 2023).

Additional Measures of Economic Wellbeing
The Official Poverty Measure (OPM) has declined during the Administration
and stood at 11.1 percent in 2023, as shown in figure 1-34. The Supplemental
Poverty Measure (SPM), after hitting a record low of 7.8 percent in 2021,
rose to 12.9 percent in 2023. The SPM for children also rose over the same

Figure 1-34. The Official Poverty Measure and the
Supplemental Poverty Measure
Poverty rate (percent)
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
2009

2011

2013

2015
OPM

2017

2019

2021

2023

SPM

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Census Bureau; Annual Social Economic Component of Current Population Survey;
CEA calculations.
Note: Population as of March of the following year. Breaks in the series reflect methodological
changes. Gray bar indicates recession.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

| 73

timeframe, from a series low of 5.2 percent to 13.7 percent, a consequence18
of the expiration of the enhanced Child Tax Credit (CTC), which the
Administration has consistently worked to reinstate.
The ARP enhanced the CTC by increasing the benefit amount, especially for young children, and making it fully refundable. Refundability
is an important feature as it allows low-income households to receive the
full benefit regardless of earnings or tax liability levels. Eligible taxpayers received half of their estimated CTC amount as an advanced monthly
payment between July and December 2021 (Treasury 2022). The enhanced
version of the CTC was a liquidity buffer for families (Wheat, Deadman,
and Sullivan 2022), with the poorest 20 percent of households with children
receiving an average 35 percent income boost (Davis 2021). CTC spending
analysis finds that the advanced payments were primarily spent on essential
expenses like food, housing, and child-related goods and services (Schild et
al. 2023; Hamilton et al. 2022; Perez-Lopez and Mayol-Garcia 2021). The
CTC enhancement’s impact was substantial, lifting nearly 3 million children
out of SPM poverty and decreasing food hardship for low-income Black,
Hispanic, and white families (CEA 2023d; Parolin et al. 2021).19

Lessons for Future Crises
The pandemic recovery led economists and policymakers into uncharted
territory and generated a host of lessons, two of which are discussed below.

Benefits of a Robust Fiscal Response
Some risks recognized early in the pandemic did not come to fruition. With
full information about the future, policymakers may have allocated fiscal
support differently. With the benefit of hindsight, there are three lessons
from the fiscal response that can inform policy in future crises, and one
conclusion that policymakers should be careful to avoid.
First, timing matters. When facing a crisis such as this one that
abruptly shutters economic activity, the cost of delaying action can far
outweigh the resources saved by fine-tuning fiscal policies to reach only the
most affected households and businesses. Proactive development of policy
infrastructure—such as automatic stabilizers via the tax system, unemployment insurance (UI), SNAP, or other benefits—minimizes the delays associated with targeting support in future recessions, shifting the policy calculus.
Second, the optimal policy choice depends on whether the primary
goal is demand management or social insurance. Direct household relief,
A CEA analysis finds the expanded CTC’s expiration after 2021 is responsible for more than half
of the observed child poverty increase (CEA 2023c).
19
Another benefit over the period was increased health insurance coverage. See chapter 4 in this
volume for more on the topic.
18

74 |

Chapter 1

such as the Economic Impact Payments, can be an effective form of social
insurance (Dynan 2022). It was impossible to predict which households
would be hardest hit in a once-in-a-century global health event; widespread
support prevented hardship for many affected households. An important
secondary effect was strengthened balance sheets for remaining households,
with impacts on consumer spending, growth, and inflation, as discussed in
this chapter. In a pure demand shortfall, effective targeting is an important
tenet of fiscal stimulus (Elmendorf and Furman 2008), but widespread
household support is superior when the social insurance objective takes
precedence.
Third, in a crisis with large and asymmetric downside risk, policymakers should err toward a stronger fiscal response than when risks are
balanced. In January 2021, the Administration recognized inaction posed
the greatest risk to the macroeconomy, with a potential consequence of
prolonged economic distress. Past crises delivered hard-won lessons about
the long-term harm caused by sustained elevated unemployment, including
erosion in workers’ skills and weakened productivity (CEA 2024a; Yellen
2016). There are risks to robust fiscal action—including rising prices—but
a strong fiscal response can deliver durable growth, and the risk of underreacting to a large global shock is material.
Finally, the emergence of inflation does not negate the wisdom of
a strong fiscal response. This chapter presents strong evidence that postpandemic inflation was the result of weakened supply in addition to strong
demand, suggesting that some inflation was an inevitable consequence of
the pandemic’s reshaping of supply and demand forces. The fact that most
advanced economies experienced substantial cumulative inflation despite
employing different fiscal responses underscores this point. Additionally,
the Federal Reserve is well positioned to respond to demand-driven inflation
when it arises. Inflation harms businesses and families across the income
distribution (Jaravel 2024), but the prospect of future inflation must be balanced against labor market pain amid a large, negative shock. Furthermore,
the imperatives to act swiftly and deliver social insurance are amplified
during periods of heightened uncertainty.

Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

| 75

Unemployment Insurance

“Unfortunately, people often only pay attention to
these [unemployment insurance reform] issues at
the wrong time: in the middle of a recession, or a
week before people are going to lose their extended
benefits—or, even worse, a week after they have lost
their extended benefits, as happened more than once
in recent years.”
– CEA Chairman Jason Furman, July 2016
The pandemic spotlighted the need for UI system reform. Millions
losing their jobs in a matter of weeks pushed state UI systems to their brink
technologically and administratively (National Academy of Social Insurance
2024). By January 2021, a web of temporary insurance programs had been
created to extend benefits to those not eligible for regular UI like gig workers and the self-employed (PUA20), extend benefit duration (PEUC21), and
provide a level of wage replacement (FPUC22) (Whittaker and Isaacs 2022).
The temporary programs made a substantial difference in the lives of
workers during the crisis and proved essential as macroeconomic stabilizers.
As shown in figure 1-35, total UI payments made up a substantial portion
of national personal income (among all Americans, not just UI recipients).
In this way, the pandemic-era UI programs facilitated not only smoothed
consumption for unemployed workers but also stimulated economic activity
given their magnitude (Gruber 1997; Ganong et al. 2024). As figure 1-36
shows, expanding eligibility (PUA) and duration (PEUC) supported millions, but these temporary programs would require reauthorization during a
future crisis.
What were some of the labor market effects of more generous UI?
Given job opportunities quickly rebounded, the insurance programs may
For individuals not covered by regular UI but meeting criteria like being a gig worker or
independent contractor, Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) was available for up to 75
weeks. The PUA benefit amount was based on state UI calculations. Individuals who had exhausted
regular UI benefits, Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation (PEUC), and Extended
Benefits were eligible for PUA if unemployment was due to certain PUA-covered circumstances.
21
For individuals eligible for regular UI benefits but who had exhausted the benefits, PEUC
provided an extension of regular UI benefits for up to 49 weeks. If PEUC was exhausted, individuals
could apply for Extended Benefits if the state’s unemployment rate threshold was triggered.
22
For regular UI, PEUC, or PUA claimants, the Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation
(FPUC) provided a weekly supplement benefit. ARP reauthorization of FPUC allowed the
supplement to be available until the week ending September 6, 2021. The initial FPUC supplement
was authorized by the CARES Act at $600 per week; subsequent authorizations were $300 per week.
20

76 |

Chapter 1

Figure 1-35. Total Unemployment Insurance
Contributions to Personal Income

Percent
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

0
Jan-2020

May-2020

Sep-2020

Jan-2021

May-2021

Sep-2021

Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation
Pandemic Unemployment Assistance
Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation
Regular unemployment insurance

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; CEA calculations.
Note: Regular unemployment insurance includes state and federal programs.
2025 Economic Report of the President

have facilitated better job matches due to increasing reservation wages,
particularly at the bottom of the wage distribution (Kim, Cotti, and Orazem
2024). Additionally, there is little evidence that the more generous benefits
substantially disincentivized workers during the pandemic (Ganong et al.
2022; Dube 2021; Altonji et al. 2020). In states that ended pandemic-era UI
programs prior to their slated expiration, job gains were small in magnitude
compared with states that maintained programs until expiration (Coombs et
al. 2022).
The pandemic’s economic damage arrived against the backdrop of
long running calls for UI reform, and while satisfaction with pandemic UI
programs was high, problems were apparent (Boushey and Eizenga 2011;
Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

| 77

Figure 1-36. Unemployment Insurance Continuing
Claims by Program
Claims, millions
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Jan-2020

Jul-2020

Jan-2021

Jul-2021

Jan-2022

Jul-2022

Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation
Pandemic Unemployment Assistance
Extended Benefits
Regular unemployment insurance

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Department of Labor; CEA calculations.
Note: Data are not seasonally adjusted.
2025 Economic Report of the President

West et al. 2016; von Wachter 2016; DOL 2024). Due to antiquated technology, under-resourcing, and the need to rapidly distribute benefits to millions
of workers, pandemic UI programs became a target for fraudsters, including organized criminal operations. The Government Accountability Office
estimates that 11–15 percent of total unemployment benefits paid between
April 2020 and May 2023 were fraudulent, amounting to $100 billion–$135
billion in fraud (GAO 2023). The Department of Labor continues to work
to reduce future fraud risks by various means, including modernizing states’
IT infrastructure. Navarrete (2024) finds that in states with technologically

78 |

Chapter 1

antiqued UI systems, consumption recovered more slowly than in states with
modern systems.23
To better prepare for the next economic crisis, the UI system in the
United States must be broad, agile, and durable to stress, allowing it to be an
effective automatic stabilizer (National Academy of Social Insurance 2024;
Spadafora 2023; Ganong et al. 2022).

The Forecast for the Years Ahead
The Administration finalized the latest version of its official economic
forecast on November 7, 2024. The forecast provides the Administration’s
projections of key economic variables for 2024 and over the next 11 years,
from 2025 to 2035 (table 1-3). Because more data have become available
since this forecast was finalized, the official forecast discussed in this chapter may differ from later estimates.
All economic forecasts are subject to considerable uncertainty affecting the range of potential outcomes. As this forecast was finalized, prominent sources of uncertainty included the economic effects of the transition
to a new administration and geopolitical tensions and their spillover effects
on global trade and finance.
Based on the partial data available when this forecast was finalized,
it appeared that real GDP was on track to grow 2.4 percent during the four
quarters of 2024 and the fourth-quarter unemployment rate appeared likely
to be 4.1 percent. (Official estimates of these rates will be released soon
after the publication of this Report.) During the four quarters of the first
full forecast year, 2025, real GDP growth is expected to edge down to 2.1
percent, the unemployment rate falls to 3.8 percent by yearend, inflation
continues to recede, and nominal interest rates gradually decrease from their
elevated levels in recent years. During the next ten years (2026-2035), the
Administration expects that real output will grow in the 2.0 to 2.2 percent
range, the unemployment rate remains flat at 3.8 percent, the various measures of inflation remain at levels consistent with the Federal Reserve’s
target, and nominal interest rates on U.S. Treasury notes flatten out at 2.9
percent on the short end and 3.8 percent on the long end.
The Administration expects real GDP growth in 2025 to be slightly
slower than that of 2023 and 2024, a forecast roughly aligned with the
consensus of private professional forecasters. Positive but declining growth
rates are expected in both consumer spending and fixed investment, the
major components of demand.
The Administration’s expectations for real GDP growth during the
11-year projection interval reflect the sum of several layers: the continuation
23

Use of the COBOL programming language is deployed as a proxy for lack of UI modernization.

Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

| 79

80 |

Chapter 1

Real
GDP
7.1
3.2
2.6
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.3

6.5
2.6

2.4
2.2
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1

4.0
3.9
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.8

3.6
3.6

Annual

4.1
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.8

3.6
3.8

Q4

Unem ploym ent Rate

5.1
3.7
3.0
2.9
2.9
2.9
2.9
2.9
2.9
2.9
2.9
2.9

2.0
5.1

4.2
4.1
4.0
3.9
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.8

3.0
4.0

Interest Rates
3-Month
10-Year
T-bills
T-notes

Level (percent)

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Bureau of Labor Statistics; Department of the Treasury; Of f ice of Management and Budget; CEA calculations.
Note: The f orecast is based on data available as of November 7, 2024. The interest rate on 3-month (91-day) Treasury Bills is measured on a secondary-market
discount basis.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Actual
1.3
2022
3.2
2023
Forecast
2024
2.4
2025
2.1
2026
2.1
2027
2.0
2028
2.0
2029
2.0
2030
2.2
2031
2.2
2032
2.2
2033
2.2
2034
2.2
2035
2.2
Council of Economic Advisers

Year

Inflation Measures
GDP Price
CPI
Index

Percent Change (Q4-to-Q4)

Table 1-3. Economic Projections, 2024–35

of a basic estimate of potential GDP growth, the aging of the baby boom
cohort into retirement, a boost from the Administration’s growth-promoting
agenda, and some lingering adverse consequences of pandemic-era disruptions to education.
As with past administration forecasts, the growth-promoting parts
of Administration’s policies—on infrastructure, care, human capital, and
immigration reform—are again included in this forecast. Partially offsetting
the expected contributions to growth from the Administration’s policies,
labor force participation will likely decline substantially further during the
next few years as the baby boom cohort continues to retire. In contrast,
during the budget window’s final five years beginning in 2031, this downward pull on the participation rate decreases. Because of the boost from
the Administration’s policies, together with the diminishing downward
demographic pull, potential GDP growth is expected to be stronger during
the last six years of the forecast interval (2030–2035) than during the first
five years (2025–2029).
The CEA’s methodology relies on Okun’s Law to estimate potential
real GDP growth during the past roughly two decades, as shown in figure
1-37, which illustrates the relationship between the change in the unemployment rate and the growth rate of real output.24 The rate of real potential
output growth is estimated as the rate of real output (the average of real GDP
and GDI) growth consistent with a stable unemployment rate—represented
as the location where the regression line crosses the x-axis, at 1.85 percent.
The 1.85 percent estimate represents the average rate of potential output
growth during the estimation interval, but it does not imply that the potential
output growth rate was constant. Rather, potential output growth varied
over the historical interval and likely will vary over the forecast interval in
response to demographic and other factors.
The CEA’s methodology results in a higher estimate of potential GDP
growth than was produced by the same exercise one year ago because of the
notable upward revision to real output growth from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis’s annual revision in September 2024. In that revision, output
growth (measured as the average of real GDP and real GDI) was revised up
by roughly 0.7 percentage point per year during the three years from 2021
through 2023. As shown in figure 1-37, the three datapoints for 2021, 2022,
and 2023 moved rightward, causing the x-intercept (i.e., the estimate of
potential real GDP growth) to move rightward, as well.
Former CEA Chairman Arthur Okun proposed what came to be known as Okun’s Law in 1962
(Okun 1962). When GDP grows faster than its potential rate, the unemployment rate falls, and when
real output grows more slowly than its potential rate, the unemployment rate rises. In its simple firstdifference specification, Okun’s Law takes the form ΔUR = β(y* – y), where ΔUR is the change in
the unemployment rate, and y* and y are the rates of potential real GDP growth and actual real GDP
growth, respectively. β and y* are estimated coefficients, where β should be between zero and one,
and y* is the estimated rate of potential real GDP growth.
24

Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

| 81

Chapter 1

-2

-1

0

2

3

4

5-quarter percent change in real GDO (percent)

1

Potential GDO Growth = 1.85%

2022

2023

5

ΔUR = 0.73* (1.85- %GDO)
(0.08) (0.22)

R² = 0.83

ΔUR = 1.35 -0.73* (%GDO)

6

2021

Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Bureau of Economic Analysis; CEA calculations.
Note: Arrows show the principle effect of the September 2024 NIPA revisions. GDO is the average of GDP and GDI. The x-axis plots five-quarter average
growth of GDO through Q4 of each year, with Q4 of year t and Q4 of year t-1 each receiving 1/8 weights while Q1, Q2, and Q3 receive 1/4 weights.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Council of Economic Advisers

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

Figure 1-37. Estimation of Potential Output Growth by Okun's Law, 2006–2023, Impact of
NIPA Revisions

4-quarter change in the unemployment rate
(percentage points)

82 |

7

The forecast jumps off from a 4.1 percent unemployment rate in
October 2024, which is slightly higher than the Administration’s estimate
of the 3.8 percent rate consistent with stable inflation. As a result, with
real output forecasted to grow 2.1 percent during the four quarters of 2025,
slightly faster than the potential GDP growth rate, the unemployment rate
edges down to 3.8 percent by the end of the year without an increase in
inflation. In comparison, the Blue Chip consensus panel expects a slightly
lower real GDP growth rate of 1.9 percent. Many other forces will be at
work during 2025. In this particular forecast, a glide path of fiscal consolidation is assumed and the legacy of tight monetary policy still restrains the
growth rate of investment and consumer spending. After the unemployment
rate falls by the end of 2025 to 3.8 percent, the rate consistent with stable
inflation, it is expected to remain there for the rest of the forecast interval,
consistent with GDP growing at its potential growth rate.
After falling dramatically from 7.1 percent in 2022 to 3.2 percent in
2023 (Q4 to Q4 changes), CPI inflation appears on track to fall further to
2.6 percent during the four quarters of 2024. The Administration expects
CPI inflation to fall slightly further during 2025 to 2.3 percent, a rate that is
consistent with the Federal Reserve’s 2.0 percent target for the PCE Price
Index. CPI inflation tends to run higher than PCE inflation; over the 45
years through 2023, CPI inflation exceeded PCE inflation by 0.3 percentage
point.25 The price index for GDP—a measure of inflation for everything
produced in the United States—is expected to fall from a forecasted 2.4
percent during 2024 to 2.2 percent during 2025.
In response to an increase in inflation, the FOMC raised the federal
funds rate in 2022 and 2023, then let it plateau at roughly 5.3 percent for
more than a year. Following evidence of a decline in inflation, the FOMC
took the first step down from that plateau in September 2024 and another
step in November. The three-month Treasury bill (T-bill) rate also fell
around the same time. Looking ahead, as inflation settles near the FOMC’s
target, further declines in T-bill rates are expected by private professional
forecasters, the FOMC, and the Administration, with the caveat that the
FOMC’s future rate cuts will be data dependent. After adjusting for 2 percent expected PCE inflation, the real rate on three-month T-bills is expected
to be about 0.9 percent.
With respect to the long end of interest rate forecasts, the Administration
expects the yield on 10-year Treasury notes to edge down slightly from an
expected 4.2 percent average during 2024 to 3.8 percent by 2028 and then
remain there for the rest of the 11-year forecast interval. In principle, the current 10-year yield should be the expected average yield on the three-month
T-bill during the next 10 years, plus a term premium. From this perspective,
25

This calculation uses the retroactive series from the BLS: R-CPI-U-RS.

Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

| 83

the 10-year yield during the last eight years of the forecast implies a real
yield of 0.9 percent, a 2.0 percent rate of PCE inflation, and a 0.9 percentage
point term premium. The Blue Chip consensus forecasts a similar 10-year
yield of 3.7 percent.

The Long-term Outlook for Real GDP Growth
After some upward adjustments in the near term, the Administration’s longterm forecast for real GDP growth is unchanged from the forecast presented
one year earlier and the one presented with the mid-session review of the FY
2024 Budget. The current forecast exceeds the Blue Chip consensus forecast
by an average of 0.2 percentage point a year during the 11 years between
2024 and 2035. As in previous Administration forecasts, the outlook
assumes that the Administration’s proposed economic policies—including
a range of programs to enhance human capital formation, provide childcare,
and reform immigration policy—will be enacted, modestly boosting the
average annual rate of potential real GDP growth during the 11-year forecast
interval.
Not all the adjustments to potential GDP growth are positive. In
particular, students who endured pandemic-era restrictions may not have
acquired human capital at the same pace as the pre-pandemic generations.
Kane et al. (2022) estimate that the loss of human capital acquisition during
the pandemic lowers the present value of lifetime earnings by 1.6 percent.
That loss would not only affect those workers’ earnings but also aggregate
output. Incorporating human capital loss into the Administration’s forecast
in this iteration partially offsets upwardly revised estimates to potential real
GDP growth due to the data revisions discussed earlier. The adverse consequences of the pandemic on education are discussed further in Chapter 7 of
this Report.
Demographics—specifically, the shape of the age-population profile
of the U.S. population shown in figure 1-38—continue to influence output
growth. The baby boom cohort, those born between 1946 and 1964, were
between 60 and 78 years of age in 2024, indicated by the shading in the
figure and reflected in a bulge in the age-population profile. Over the span of
the forecast interval, the cohort members will almost all retire, and the bulge
in the population profile will lie completely among the retirement ages.
As the baby boom cohort retires, it will exert a downward force on
the labor force participation rate and on the growth rate of potential output
throughout the 11-year forecast. The effect, however, is more negative in
the first five years of the forecast than during the last five years. Since
2016, retirements have subtracted about 0.4 percentage point per year from
the growth rate of the participation rate and potential GDP, and a similar
subtraction is likely to continue through about 2029, although to a reduced

84 |

Chapter 1

Figure 1-38: The Evolution of the U.S. Population's Age
Composition
Baby boom cohort (2024)

Millions
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

0

5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
2013

Council of Economic Advisers

2024

2035

Sources: Social Security Administration; CEA calculations.
Note: Baby boom cohort is defined as individuals born from 1946 through 1964.
2025 Economic Report of the President

degree in later years, when the youngest baby boom cohort members (those
born in 1964) reach 65 years of age. After that, the pace of retirements will
decrease because the bulk of the baby boom cohort will have been already
retired. For the last five years of the forecast, projected retirements will
subtract 0.2 percentage point from potential GDP growth.
Table 1-4 reports a standard supply-side decomposition of potential
output growth into the sum of labor inputs—population, labor force participation rate, employment rate, and workweek—plus productivity in the
nonfarm business sector and the difference in output per worker between
the nonfarm business sector and the economy as a whole. The civilian,
noninstitutional population age 16 years and above is expected to grow by
an average annual rate of 0.6 percent from 2024 to 2035, the same pace as
from 2019:Q4 to 2024:Q3 but below the average 1.0 percent annual growth

Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

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86 |

Chapter 1
3.0

Sum: Actual real GDO**

7

3.5

–0.3

2.4

0.0

0.1

0.1

1.2

2.4

–0.5

2.4

–0.3

0.1

1.1

–0.3

(3)

2007:Q4

2001:Q1 to

1.8

–0.4

1.6

–0.1

0.1

1.0

–0.3

(4)

2019:Q4

2007:Q4 to

2.3

0.5

1.8

–0.3

–0.1

0.6

–0.2

(5)

2024:Q3

2019:Q4 to

2.1

–0.1

1.7

–0.1

0.0

0.6

–0.1

(6)

2034:Q4

2024:Q3 to

2025 Economic Report of the President

Population, labor force, and household employment have been adjusted for discontinuities in the population series.

due to rounding. 1953:Q2, 1990:Q3, 2001:Q1, 2007:Q4, and 2019:Q4 are all quarterly business-cycle peaks. GDO is the average of GDP and GDI.

Note: All contributions are in percentage points at an annual rate. The forecast jumps off from data available on November 7, 2024. Total may not add up

**Real GDO and real nonfarm business output are measured as the average of income- and product-side measures.

employment), and output-per-worker growth in the nonfarm business sector.

*The output-per-worker differential (row 6) is the difference between output-per-worker growth in the economy as a whole (GDO divided by household

Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Bureau of Economic Analysis; Department of the Treasury; Office of Management and Budget; CEA calculations.

Council of Economic Advisers

–0.3

Output per worker differential: GDO vs. nonfarm*

6

2.1

Output per hour (productivity, nonfarm business)

–0.2

0.0

0.1

1.4

5

Average weekly hours (nonfarm business)

Employed share of the labor force

4

3

Labor force participation rate

Civilian noninstitutional population age 16+

2

1

(2)

(1)

2001:Q1

1990:Q3 to

2019:Q4

1953:Q2 to

Growth rate (percentage points)

Table 1-4. Supply-side Components of Actual and Potential Real Output Growth, 1953–2035

rate from 2007 to 2019.26 Following analysis by the CBO, and more recent
data from the Office of Homeland Security Statistics, the CEA suspects that
these official data from the Census Bureau have missed some immigration
recently, an artifact that affects the output per worker differential (table 1-4,
row 6). Looking ahead, much of this expected 0.6 percent per year growth in
the working-age population is likely to result from immigration.27
The demographic factors weighing on the labor force participation
rate’s continued decline are expected to be largely offset over the projection
period by the Administration’s human capital and childcare policy proposals, and thus the participation rate is projected to decline only 0.1 percent
annually during the forecast (row 2).
The employed share of the labor force—equal to one minus the unemployment rate—is projected to remain close to its current level and therefore
makes no net contribution over the forecast horizon (row 3). The workweek
is projected to shorten at about the same rate it did during the period of
2007:Q4 to 2019:Q4 (row 4). In sum, labor input growth contributes about
0.4 percentage point to potential output growth over the projection, 0.3
percentage point slower than from 2007:Q4 to 2019:Q4.
Productivity growth (measured as output per hour in the nonfarm
business sector) is projected to grow at an average of 1.7 percent a year
over the 11-year forecast interval, about the same rate as its average growth
since the business-cycle peak in 2007 (row 5). From 2019:Q4 to 2024:Q3,
output-per-worker growth in the overall economy is estimated to have been
boosted by 0.5 percentage point per year above output-per-worker growth
in the nonfarm business sector, in contrast to the typically negative contribution of this output-per-worker differential (row 6).28 The odd behavior is
entirely accounted for by the faster growth of nonfarm employment relative
to household employment, two series that usually grow at the same rate (0.7
percentage point per year during 2019–2024 compared with no differential
over the long run), likely due to an underestimation of immigration by the
The civilian, noninstitutional population excludes individuals who are incarcerated or living
in mental health facilities or homes for seniors, or who are on active duty in the Armed Forces.
Projected growth rates are sourced from demographers at the Social Security Administration.
Because many components of these growth rates are erratic in the short run, table 1-4 documents
historical growth rates for long intervals from business-cycle peak to business-cycle peak. The
exception is column 5, the interval between the last business-cycle peak in 2019:Q4 through
2024:Q3 (the last available quarter when this forecast was finalized).
27
The Administration’s population forecast in based on the forecast from the Office of the Social
Security Actuary at the Social Security Administration (2024).
28
Due to the lack of a high-quality measure of the workweek in government, households, and
agriculture, productivity for the economy as a whole is measured as output per worker rather than
output per hour. The output-per-worker differential, or the difference between output per worker
in the nonfarm business sector and that in the aggregate economy, is typically negative largely as a
consequence of the national income accounting convention that productivity does not grow in the
government or household sectors. It can also be influenced by differences in measurement.
26

Four Years in Review and the Years Ahead

| 87

Census Bureau.29 The Administration assumes that this undercount of the
immigration flow diminishes during the projection interval, and the productivity differential returns to a small negative contribution to real output
growth.

Outlook Summary
The Administration’s real GDP forecast represents the sum of three primary
layers: (i) a baseline projection, developed through an Okun’s Law analysis;
(ii) an adjustment to incorporate the expected demographic outlook, particularly for the retirement of the baby boom cohort; and (iii) an increase
in potential GDP growth to reflect the effects of the Administration’s progrowth policies net of the damage to human capital accumulation during
the pandemic. Adding all three components together results in a projection
of 2.2 percent real GDP growth per year during the budget window’s final
five years.

29

This misestimation was first observed by the CBO (2024) in their annual demographic report.

88 |

Chapter 1

Chapter 2

How Remote Work is
Reshaping the Economy
Remote work has transformed the day-to-day experience of tens of millions
of Americans. Instead of commuting to an office five days a week, many
American workers now do their job from home at least some of the time.
In some cases, fully remote jobs remove the need to live near one’s employer
and dramatically change how workers interact with each other. In other
cases, partially remote jobs provide a mixture of traditional and remote
workplace experiences. This matters for wellbeing and wages, access to
jobs, and where workers decide to reside. Labor and housing markets operate differently in a world where either type of remote work is common, with
downstream effects for governments, downtowns, and the U.S. economy.
In spring 2020, the surge in remote work was inextricably linked to the
COVID-19 pandemic. It was unclear at the time whether remote work would
persist at levels much higher than those in the pre-pandemic period, and it
was difficult to disentangle its labor market footprint from that of the pandemic itself. But as the pandemic subsided and remote work, also known as
telework, remained, it became possible to learn more about the phenomenon
and its effects.
As of late 2024, remote work appeared to be a key labor market experience
of at least 20 percent of the American workforce, roughly half of whom
were fully remote and half of whom were partially remote (i.e., hybrid). For
context, this share is roughly double that of workers represented by unions
and about the same share of the workforce with an occupational license, two
groups deservedly receiving considerable research focus.

89

For many Americans, remote work has improved the working experience
and added valuable labor market options. Employers who offer remote
work can draw on expanded talent pools—including workers needing
flexible work arrangements as well as workers across the country—when
filling open positions. However, in many instances remote work remains
technically infeasible or inordinately costly for businesses to implement.
Emerging research also points to costs of remote work in the form of
reduced collaboration: less-experienced workers are especially likely to miss
out on valuable feedback and mentoring. Because these benefits and costs
vary widely across workers and firms, experimentation by employers will
generate valuable information and help achieve better outcomes.
A striking fact about remote workers is just how likely they are to possess
other labor market advantages. On average, they have more education and
higher incomes than non-remote workers. Remote work—like other nonwage benefits—therefore tends to be part of a larger pattern of labor market
inequality. For example, Black and Hispanic workers are less likely to work
remotely than Asian and white workers.
Like other large, abrupt economic changes, the shift to remote work can also
be disruptive. Long-established patterns of economic activity, particularly
in housing markets, stand to be altered by remote work. Exploiting the
opportunities and minimizing the costs of remote work is a joint challenge
for workers, businesses, and policymakers.
This chapter examines who currently works remotely. It then provides an
economic framework for thinking about remote work’s labor market implications. Building on recent research, the chapter provides analysis of remote
work’s implications for wages and job access. The analysis is especially
focused on job search and matching, but also on geographic sorting—all key
aspects of labor market function likely to be reshaped by remote work. The
chapter concludes with a discussion of the big picture and relevant remote
work issues for policymakers.

90 |

Chapter 2

Figure 2-1. Share of Paid Workdays That Are Remote
Percent
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

2003

2005

2008

2010

Council of Economic Advisers

2013

2015

2018

2020

2023

Sources: Barrero, Bloom, and Davis (2021a); CEA calculations.
Note: Remote work share is defined as the share of full paid days worked from home. Pre2020 estimates are derived from the American Time Use Survey. Estimates beginning in May
2020 are from the Survey of Working Arrangements and Attitudes. Gray bars indicate
recessions.
2025 Economic Report of the President

The Rise of Remote Work
Remote work is not new, but it has quickly made the leap from marginal
labor market phenomenon to common practice. Figure 2-1 shows the
share of paid workdays that are remote, based on the Survey of Working
Arrangement and Attitudes (SWAA) for recent years and American Time
Use Survey (ATUS) for earlier years (Barrero, Bloom, and Davis 2021a).
The share rose dramatically from 7.2 percent in 2019 (in the ATUS) to
27.7 percent (SWAA) in September 2024. The two data sources are related
but distinct, which complicates the pre- and post-pandemic comparison.
Nevertheless, remote work is clearly much more common than previously.
Since October 2022, the Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Population
Survey (CPS) has estimated the share of workers (by contrast to workdays)
who are remote at least part of the time. Figure 2-2 shows the estimates,
broken out for hybrid (remote for some but not all work hours) and fully
remote workers.1 Like the SWAA, the CPS also indicates a substantial
degree of remote work in the contemporary labor market: 12.6 percent of
Workers are considered fully remote only if 100 percent of total hours worked were reported as
such.

1

How Remote Work is Reshaping the Economy | 91

Figure 2-2. Share of Workers Who Work Remotely
Percent
25
20
15
10
5
0

Jan-2023

May-2023

Sep-2023

Hybrid

Council of Economic Advisers

Jan-2024

May-2024

Sep-2024

Fully remote

Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics; CEA calculations.
Note: Respondents are considered fully remote if they report 100 percent of their total
hours worked were remote. Estimates are from published BLS tables.
2025 Economic Report of the President

workers, or 19.8 million, were on hybrid schedules in September 2024, and
11.1 percent (17.5 million) were fully remote.2 However, CPS estimates of
the share of hours worked (16.4 percent in September 2024) are lower than
in the SWAA. Like the SWAA, the ATUS shows a higher rate of remote
work than the CPS. It is not clear what accounts for these differences, but
they are important to keep in mind when interpreting CPS-derived estimates
in Figure 2-2 and elsewhere.
Among remote workers, hours worked remotely varies considerably.
Figure 2-3 shows the distribution of remote hours, inclusive of both hybrid
and fully remote workers. More than one third of the group (36.8 percent)
reported working 40 remote hours a week or more, and 15.1 percent reported
working eight remote hours a week or fewer.
Regardless of the data source and how remote work is measured, it
is clear that the phenomenon has become more common than it was five
years ago. But will this shift prove durable? Immediately following pandemic closures, it was unclear whether and to what extent the rise in remote
A change in the preamble of the relevant CPS survey question was made in December 2023
(Barrero et al. 2024). Before the change, the preamble read: “I now have some questions related
to how the COVID-19 pandemic affected where people work.” It now reads: “I now have a few
questions related to where people work.” The change may have affected who answers in the
affirmative to the remote work question.

2

92 |

Chapter 2

Figure 2-3. Distribution of Hours Worked Remotely
Percent
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

0–8
hours

9–16
hours

17–24
hours

25–32
hours

33–39
hours

40+
hours

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics; CEA calculations.
Note: Sample consists of workers who report at least some remote hours. Estimates are for
October 2023 through September 2024. Estimates are from published BLS tables.
2025 Economic Report of the President

work would be temporary. Much of the increase during 2020 and 2021 was
impelled by public health concerns associated with the pandemic. And some
of the increase did prove temporary, as many workers were called back to
the office when the pandemic abated.
However, the share of workers reporting some amount of remote work
has stabilized in recent years and even increased. From September 2023 to
September 2024, the share reported in the SWAA rose from 19.8 percent to
23.7 percent. Similarly, the share of paid workdays conducted remotely held
roughly steady, at just under 30 percent, during 2024. In the same survey,
respondents are asked how many days their employers intend for them to
work remotely each week after the pandemic. When first asked in mid-2020,
just above 1 day per week was expected. That expectation rose to a peak of
1.6 in mid-2022, subsequently falling slightly to 1.5 days in September 2024
(Barrero, Bloom, and Davis 2021a).
Job openings data can also shed light on whether remote work is here
to stay. While the information can be murky—given that not every hybrid
or remote job advertises itself as such, and the tendency to mention remote
work in job postings may change over time—examining recent trends is
useful. Prior to the pandemic, only about 3 percent of U.S. job postings
stated that new employees could work remotely one or more days a week.

How Remote Work is Reshaping the Economy | 93

By 2024, the share had risen to between 8 and 10 percent, depending on the
data source (Hansen et al. 2023; Indeed n.d.).3
As time has passed since the widespread distribution of COVID-19
vaccines and relaxation of pandemic measures, it appears less likely that
the increase in remote work is a purely temporary phenomenon. Earlier in
the pandemic, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) asked workers if they
teleworked specifically because of COVID-19. By the time that question
was discontinued after September 2022, the share of all workers who teleworked because of COVID-19 had already plummeted from 35.4 percent of
employees in May 2020 to 5.2 percent.
The large-scale social and economic experiment prompted by the
pandemic has generated durable improvements in teleworking technology
and practices, as well as new information about remote work’s efficacy and
desirability. As pointed out by Davis (2024), the pandemic allowed employers to learn what would happen when large shares of workers collaborated
virtually across entire industries, information that could not have been
discovered by a single employer experimenting in isolation.4 Employers
responded to the new technology and information by making choices—
often quite varied even for firms in the same industry employing similar
workers—about how to structure their workplace (Hansen et al. 2023).
Employers continue to experiment with remote work, and use of the practice
could rise or fall based on their unique experiences, but it appears to be here
to stay for many workers.5

Who Works Remotely?
A bit more than one fifth of the workforce now works remotely at some
point during their workweek. Because remote work data are integrated into
the CPS—a rich worker survey used to calculate the monthly unemployment
rate, among many other statistics—they present an opportunity to learn who
is working remotely in the post-pandemic labor market. In the figures that
follow, the CEA examines the more than one fifth of employed workers who
As of late 2024, updated estimates from Hansen et al. (2023) are available at https://wfhmap.
com/ and from Indeed (n.d.) at https://data.indeed.com/#/remote. One might conclude that the lower
share of vacancies with remote options compared to the employed population indicates that remote
jobs’ share of employment will decline. However, this is not necessarily the case, even if all remote
vacancies are being accurately described as such in the data. For example, if the rate at which
workers leave their jobs (thereby necessitating that vacancies be posted) is lower for remote than for
non-remote jobs, this would tend to lower the remote share of vacancies.
4
From the worker perspective and consistent with the same pattern of information-gathering, Chen
et al. (2023) find that elevated exposure to remote work during the initial pandemic shock was
positively correlated with intensity of worker preference for remote work later.
5
Reviewing some of the same trends and studies discussed, other researchers have come to similar
conclusions about the persistence of remote work (Metcalfe, Spinelli, and LaSalvia 2024; Abel et al.
2023; Adrjan et al. 2021).
3

94 |

Chapter 2

Figure 2-4. Share of Workers Who Work Remotely, by
Group
Female
Male
Asian
White
Other
Black
AI/AN
Non-Hispanic
Hispanic
0

Council of Economic Advisers

10

20

30

Percent

Sources: Current Population Survey accessed via IPUMS; CEA calculations.
Note: Estimates are for October 2023 through September 2024 and include both hybrid and
fully remote work. AI/AN refers to American Indian and Alaska Native workers.
2025 Economic Report of the President

reported teleworking in the prior week, pooled over the period from October
2023 to September 2024.6
Remote work is more common among women, Asian, and white workers than it is among men, Black, Hispanic, and American Indian and Alaska
Native workers. Compared to 20.1 percent of men, 24.5 percent of women
report working remotely. Among racial demographics, Asian workers have
the highest share of remote work (32.8 percent), followed by white (22.2
percent), Black (16.9 percent), and American Indian and Alaska Native
(11.1 percent) workers. And as demonstrated in figure 2-4, Hispanic workers (11.6 percent) have a lower share of remote work than non-Hispanic
workers (24.6 percent).7 Restricting the sample to 25- to 54-year-olds, mothers (31.1 percent) and fathers (23.0 percent) of children five and under have
slightly higher rates of remote work than do women and men without young
children (28.4 percent and 21.4 percent, respectively).
Of the remote workers, the average hours of teleworking a week reported was 27. Roughly 45
percent reported teleworking more than 30 hours.
7
Consistent with BLS practice, self-employed workers are included in our calculations here and in
other CPS-derived figures.
6

How Remote Work is Reshaping the Economy | 95

Figure 2-5. Share of Workers Who Work Remotely,
by Education
Percent
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

Less than HS

HS only

Council of Economic Advisers

Some college

Bachelor's
only

Advanced

Sources: Current Population Survey accessed via IPUMS; CEA calculations.
Note: Estimates are for October 2023 through September 2024 and include both hybrid and
fully remote work.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Remote work also varies considerably by educational attainment.
Figure 2-5 shows that those with at least a four-year degree are more likely
to work at least partially remotely than are workers with a high school
degree or less. Remote work is reported by 36.5 percent of workers with
a four-year degree—and even higher, at 42.7 percent, by those with an
advanced degree—as compared to only 7.7 percent by those with a high
school degree only.
Part of the reason for the educational disparity is likely the relative difficulty of implementing remote collaboration in different industries. Remote
work is distributed unequally by sector, with workers in industries like
financial activities (53.1 percent), information (52.0 percent), and professional and business services (44.8 percent) more likely to work remotely at
least sometimes than those in leisure and hospitality (8.0 percent), construction (8.8 percent), and transportation and utilities (10.6 percent), as shown
in figure 2-6. Similarly, workers in occupations like management, business,
and finance (43.5 percent), professional (32.1 percent), and office and
administrative support (24.6 percent) are more likely to work remotely than
their counterparts in transportation (1.9 percent), construction and extraction
96 |

Chapter 2

Figure 2-6. Share of Workers Who Work Remotely,
by Industry
Financial activities
Information

Professional & business services

Public administration
Manufacturing

Education & health services
Other services

Mining

Wholesale & retail trade

Agriculture/forestry/fishing/hunting

Transportation & utilities

Construction

Leisure & hospitality

0

10

20

30

40

50

Percent

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Current Population Survey accessed via IPUMS; CEA calculations.
Note: Estimates are for October 2023 through September 2024 and include both hybrid and
fully remote work.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Figure 2-7. Share of Workers Who Work Remotely,
by Occupation
Management, business, & financial
Professional
Office & administrative support
Sales
Services
Production
Installation, maintenance, & repair
Farming, fishing, & forestry
Construction & extraction
Transportation & material moving
0

Council of Economic Advisers

10

20

30

40

Percent

Sources: Current Population Survey accessed via IPUMS; CEA calculations.
Note: Estimates are for October 2023 through September 2024 and include both hybrid and
fully remote work.
2025 Economic Report of the President

How Remote Work is Reshaping the Economy | 97

Figure 2-8. Median Hourly Wage by Occupation's
Remote Work Share
Median wage (dollars per hour)
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

0

10

20

30

40

Remote work share
Council of Economic Advisers

50

60

70

Sources: Current Population Survey accessed via IPUMS; CEA calculations.
Note: Estimates are for October 2023 through September 2024 and include both hybrid and
fully remote work. Hourly wages are computed using the Economic Policy Institute
definition and are not adjusted for inflation.
2025 Economic Report of the President

(2.4 percent), and farming, fishing, and forestry (3.4 percent), as shown in
figure 2-7.
Differences in remote work share by occupation are closely related to
median wages paid in that occupation. Each data point in figure 2-8 represents an occupation, with the percentage working remotely on the horizontal
axis and the median hourly wage of all the occupation’s workers on the
vertical axis. A strong positive relationship is immediately apparent.
The remote work variation in wages across occupations is accompanied by large differences at the individual worker level. Figure 2-9 shows
that the likelihood of remote work rises sharply with wages. Remote work is
uncommon for low earners—at only 6.5 percent for the bottom hourly wage
decile—but common among the highest earning workers, at just under half
of those in the top decile.
Remote workers are not distributed uniformly across the country.
Areas with the highest share of remote workers tend to be those with more
highly educated workers and occupations suited to remote work. Much of
the Northeast and West feature high rates of remote work, as shown in figure
2-10.

98 |

Chapter 2

Figure 2-9. Share of Workers Who Work Remotely,
by Wage
Percent
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

Bottom 10%

10–25%

25–50%

50–75%

75–90%

Top 10%

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Current Population Survey accessed via IPUMS; CEA calculations.
Note: Estimates are for October 2023 through September 2024 and include both hybrid and
fully remote work. Wage groups are based on hourly wages computed using the Economic
Policy Institute definition.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Considered simultaneously, standard demographic and work characteristics tend to be significant and economically meaningful predictors of
remote work status.8 Educational attainment, occupation, and industry stand
out as the key determinants, jointly accounting for most of the explainable
individual-level variation in remote work propensity.9
In the figures above, the CEA combines those who work remotely for
part of the workweek (hybrid workers) and those who work remotely for
all of the workweek. However, the groups are meaningfully different for
some purposes. Critically, fully remote workers are relatively untethered
to a particular employer’s location, while hybrid workers must commute at
least some of the time.

The following variables are included: age, sex, race, ethnicity, educational attainment, marital
status, presence of a child, state, industry, and occupation.
9
Collectively, the same characteristics predicting remote work also predict higher wages, and the
CEA finds that remote workers have an hourly wage that is 74 percent higher (without controlling
for worker characteristics) than that for non-remote workers. The wage advantage is not necessarily
caused by remote work but reflects the tendency of those with labor market advantages to have
greater remote work access.
8

How Remote Work is Reshaping the Economy | 99

Figure 2-10. Share of Workers Who Work Remotely,
by State
Percent

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Current Population Survey accessed via IPUMS; CEA calculations.
Note: Estimates are for October 2023 through September 2024 and include both hybrid and
fully remote work.
2025 Economic Report of the President

The Remote Work Framework
How should analysts think about the rise in remote work and its impact on
the labor market? To begin answering that question, the CEA considers how
employers structure the jobs that they create. When an employer looks to
fill an open job, it sets a wage, certain non-wage benefits (e.g., health insurance), and terms of employment (e.g., required work hours and the option to
work remotely). The particular combination of non-wage benefits and terms
that workers encounter (and in some cases, negotiate) are determined by the
interplay of (i) available technology, (ii) job design and managerial practices, (iii) a worker’s preferences, and (iv) the balance of bargaining power.
First, jobs differ in the type of work performed and the available
technology, including the computer equipment and software provided to
employees. The technology and the physical constraints related to specific
tasks affect the cost of imposing different job conditions. For example,
remote work may be low cost for an office worker but infeasible for a
construction worker.10 Even in cases where remote work is feasible, it could
degrade productivity if collaboration is more difficult than it would be in
person.
Technology is not the only kind of limitation; institutional and legal constraints also exist. For
instance, state licensure rules could make it costly for a medical professional to advise out-of-state
patients remotely (Maheu 2024).
10

100 |

Chapter 2

Second, jobs are defined by how employees are directed to work. A
technology might exist for some time before businesses figure out how to use
it effectively. In the case of remote work, new management practices might
be called for, as when supervising and motivating the work of employees
whose effort cannot be directly monitored at a workplace. Workers themselves may learn over time how best to interact with remote colleagues.
Third, workers have their own preferences about non-wage benefits,
the ways in which they conduct their work, and other conditions of employment. When employees value remote work to a greater degree, employers
tend to make it more available, though possibly at a cost to wages or other
non-wage benefits. Employers do not necessarily do so out of regard for
their workers, but because supplying a remote work option may be less
expensive than paying the wage premium required to attract workers to a
non-remote job. This wage difference is what economists call a compensating differential, with workers accepting less money in exchange for some
other non-wage benefit they desire.
Finally, the balance of bargaining power affects remote work options.
When labor markets are strong and competition is fierce, both wages and
desirable non-wage amenities (i.e., the benefits and conditions of work) are
abundant (CEA 2024a). The strong post-pandemic labor market, therefore,
may have been a contributor to the sustained rise in remote work (Autor,
Dube, and McGrew 2024).

Search and matching
Workers and firms tend to sort themselves based on the differing value they
apply to remote work. As emphasized in Davis (2024), individuals with the
highest valuation of working remotely look for jobs in which they can do
so, and firms with the lowest cost of doing so supply the remote work jobs.
After the sudden pandemic-era rise in remote work, re-sorting likely
affected a variety of labor market outcomes (Bagga et al. 2024). For
instance, a person with a non-remote job at a medical practice might have
left their job to become a medical records specialist in a remote capacity,
leading to increased job churn.
Remote work, however, is not only an amenity. Fully remote work—
and to a lesser extent, hybrid remote work—also substantially relaxes the
geographic constraints on the jobs workers can take. When work occurs
in person, only a relatively small group of workers and firms, limited by
proximity, can effectively search for each other and form matches. By contrast, when a job is advertised as fully remote, a broader pool of potential
applicants can consider the job.
Remote work therefore offers the potential to lower the degree of
mismatch across local labor markets. Focusing on geography, mismatch

How Remote Work is Reshaping the Economy | 101

arises when job vacancies and workers seeking jobs are unbalanced across
local labor markets (Shimer 2007). The process is inefficient: Overall hiring
would be faster if workers in areas with weak demand could access vacancies from places with strong demand. By reducing geographic barriers,
remote work has the potential to ameliorate the mismatch.
In addition to raising hiring rates, diminished geographic barriers
can lead to improved hiring. Because workers and firms have their unique
characteristics, it becomes easier to form the best possible matches when
job search is less costly. Remote work could have an impact in this regard:
Now that workers and employers can search outside their own local labor
markets, they can achieve better matches that fit the skills and preferences
of workers, as well as the needs of employers. Each of these potential effects
warrants further testing with real-world data.

Geographic sorting
To the extent that remote work relaxes geographic restrictions on workers
and businesses, it also affects where the individuals and firms choose to
locate. A standard economic model of location choice entails that workers
“pay” for high wages through increased housing costs and/or a reduction in
desirable locational amenities (Rosen 1979; Roback 1982). All else being
equal, productive locations featuring high wages also feature high housing
prices.11
Remote work scrambles this equilibrium. In the extreme case, suppose all jobs suddenly included a fully remote option. It would no longer be
necessary to reside in New York City, for example, to receive the high wage
jobs the city offers; residents of other places could access the same wages
without paying for expensive housing. The situation would put upward pressure on housing prices in less expensive places and downward pressure on
New York real estate prices, until the difference in housing costs was small
enough to discourage further migration.12
More realistically, only a minority of jobs are likely to supply a fully
remote option, leaving most workers tied to their place of employment.
Economic theory offers less dramatic predictions in this scenario. To some
This statement assumes that amenities are similar across more- and less-productive places. But
consider a world in which locations differ in two respects: productivity and appeal (i.e., amenity
value). Some places (e.g., New York City) are especially productive for businesses, and others (e.g.,
Honolulu) are especially appealing for residence. Workers make their choice about where to live
while considering wages, housing costs, and this appeal. To avoid an unrealistic situation where
every worker chooses to live in the same place, wages (net of housing costs) must adjust to make
workers indifferent about where they live—if net wages were everywhere identical, all workers
would prefer to live in Honolulu.
12
Brueckner, Kahn, and Lin (2023) present a formal model, building on the Rosen-Roback
framework, for spatial equilibrium with remote work. In their model, as in this example, remote
work is implemented for all workers.
11

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extent, reverse migration of non-remote workers to more-expensive places
(due to house prices being bid up in less-expensive places by remote workers) would partially offset remote worker migration. Hybrid work would
have smaller-scale effects than fully remote work because the workers
would still need to commute occasionally. Many hybrid and fully remote
workers would also demand larger homes, in part because remote work
requires home office space.
Economic theory therefore implies that a rise in remote work should
lead workers to move farther from expensive cities whose chief economic
advantage is the availability of high-wage jobs. The migration could be a
few miles down the road or, in the case of fully remote workers, to some
other place entirely. Conversely, workers living outside expensive places
desiring jobs offered in those places could stay where they are and work
remotely. The extent to which these dynamics are evident in available data
is an important subject for ongoing research.

Remote Work, Welfare, and Wages
Considered as a valued amenity, how much of an improvement in worker
welfare does remote work imply? And to what extent is this amenity value
added to or offset by corresponding changes in productivity and wages?
The most straightforward way to answer the first question is to ask
workers. Recent surveys exploring workers’ willingness to pay for remote
work find that they generally value it considerably. When asked how large
a pay cut they would accept to work remotely for about half the week,
respondents said 5 percent to 8 percent of their pay on average (Aksoy et
al. 2022; Davis 2024; Mas and Pallais 2017). And 31 percent of those currently working at least partially remotely said they would actively seek other
employment—or leave their job—if required to return to the office full time
(Board of Governors 2024). The averages belie substantial variation across
workers; early in the pandemic, nearly one fifth of workers said they would
accept at least a 15 percent pay cut to work remotely two or three days a
week (Barrero, Bloom, and Davis 2021a).
To understand why workers value remote work, it is helpful to explore
how time allocation changes when they work remotely. Time-use data
allow for comparisons between remote and non-remote workers, but the
comparisons are not apples-to-apples. Remote workers tend to have elevated
education levels and work the types of jobs in which virtual interaction is
productive.
While it may not be possible to adjust for all such differences using
available data, the CEA adjusts for several important factors in figure 2-11

How Remote Work is Reshaping the Economy | 103

Figure 2-11. Differences in Time Use of Fully Remote and
Non-remote Workers
Minutes
30
20
10
0
-10
-20
-30
-40
-50

Commute

Sleep

Unadjusted

Personal
Leisure
Chores
activities
Adjusted for worker characteristics

Care for
others

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: American Time Use Survey accessed via IPUMS; CEA calculations.
Note: Sample is limited to people who work at least 5 hours. Data are from 2021 through
2023. Remote workers are defined as spending all time working at their home. Time spent
working is not shown. Worker characteristics are gender, education, age, race, presence of
children, and year.
2025 Economic Report of the President

and finds that they do not substantially change the picture.13 Using ATUS
data for 2021 through 2023, the figure compares the non-work time allocation for fully remote workers to the same allocation for non-remote workers
on a given day.14 Importantly, the figure does not capture the simultaneous

Displayed categories are aggregates of related activities. Commute includes all work-related
travel. Personal activities include personal care (except for sleeping), education, job search and
interviewing, professional and personal care services, and eating and drinking. Leisure includes
socializing, relaxing, and leisure; sports, exercise, and recreation; religious and spiritual activities;
and volunteer activities. Chores include household activities, consumer purchases, household
services, government services and civic obligations, and telephone calls. Care for others includes
care for and helping household and non-household members. Except for work and sleep, all
categories include travel related to that activity.
14
The sample is limited to workers reporting that they worked at least five hours on an identified
day. Fully remote workers are defined as spending all of their work time at home, and non-remote
workers are defined as those who spend at least some of their working time away from home.
13

104 |

Chapter 2

use of time for different activities—e.g., caregiving and chores—but shows
the distribution of time spent on primary activities.15
The total amount of time remote and non-remote workers spend working is similar, with a statistically insignificant difference of six minutes (not
shown). Remote workers spend less time on commuting and personal care.
From the hour remote workers save across the two categories, they allocate
about half to leisure and half to sleep and caregiving of children or other
adults.16 In general, the differences in time allocation between remote and
non-remote workers do not change considerably when adjusting for observable differences between workers.
In addition to shifting the amounts of time spent on different activities,
remote work affects when individuals work and the flexibility they have.
During the pandemic, some remote workers spent increased amounts of time
working on weekends and outside typical weekday hours (McDermott and
Hansen 2021). Mothers working from home reported working more in the
evenings (Pabilonia and Vernon 2023).

How remote work affects productivity
In addition to shifting how people spend their time, remote work can change
how productive they are while they are working. Current evidence does not
suggest a simple positive or negative relationship between remote work and
productivity that holds across the board. In some settings, evidence points
toward remote work increasing productivity. Bloom et al. (2015) find that
in a call center where workers were randomly assigned to work remotely,
remote personnel had higher output than their in-office counterparts because
they worked longer hours and answered more calls per minute. At the industry level, researchers find that total factor productivity was higher in sectors
that experienced larger increases in remote work (Pabilonia and Redmond
2024), though labor productivity was not similarly associated (Fernald et
al. 2024). Other research, such as that by Bloom, Han, and Liang (2024)
examining hybrid remote work, finds no effect on performance.
Still others have found a negative effect of remote work on productivity, particularly through its effect on teamwork, collaboration, and learning.
Gibbs, Mengel, and Siemroth (2024) find a decline in innovation related
to remote work, which they explain through a decline in “watercooler”
conversations that matter for collaboration. Remote work may also lead to
a decrease in mentoring and other interactions, so even in the cases where
Some research finds patterns in how time is shared across multiple activities: mothers report
simultaneous childcare and paid work to a greater extent than do fathers (Pabilonia and Vernon
2023).
16
By contrast, Bloom, Davis, and Barrero (2020) directly ask workers how they use time saved from
reduced commuting and find that more than one third of the saved time is allocated to paid work.
15

How Remote Work is Reshaping the Economy | 105

remote work presents short-run gains for younger workers, long-run losses
may emerge (Emanuel, Harrington, and Pallais 2023; Yang et al. 2022).
Not every association between remote work and productivity will
have a causal interpretation. Researchers have suggested that some of the
measured productivity difference between remote and non-remote workers
could be due to selection: which workers choose to work remotely and how
remote work affects an individual worker’s productivity depend on how
productive that worker was initially (Emanuel and Harrington 2024; Atkin,
Schoar, and Shinde 2023).
The available research literature indicates that the industry, the extent
of remote work (i.e., hybrid or fully remote), the seniority of the worker, and
the job’s context are all important determinants of effects on productivity.
It is intuitive that the productivity effect should differ by how well-suited
an occupation is to being performed remotely. Given that remote work may
negatively impact teamwork and learning, one should expect productivity
impacts to depend on how frequently workers interact with each other.
Additionally, while experienced workers could be more productive working remotely, newer workers can lose out on valuable feedback (Emanuel,
Harrington, and Pallais 2023).

How wages differ for remote workers
The relationship between remote work and wages depends on various factors including the relative productivity of remote work, any change in match
quality, and the amenity value to workers. To identify the combined impact,
researchers could in principle calculate the average wage gap between
remote and non-remote workers after adjusting for all relevant differences in
which workers and jobs tend to be remote. However, in practice it can be difficult or impossible to make all necessary adjustments using available data,
and CEA analysis finds that remote workers continue to earn higher wages
after controlling for observed characteristics. These findings are consistent
with other research finding higher wages for remote workers (Pabilonia and
Vernon 2024).
An alternative is to examine wage changes over time for specific
workers who experience changes in their remote work status, a methodology which helps to adjust for persistent differences between remote and
non-remote workers. The CEA first examined job switchers who also
changed their remote work status. Movements from non-remote to hybrid
jobs, or from hybrid to fully remote jobs, tended to come with larger wage
increases than movements in the opposite direction. However, this pattern
would also be expected if remote work were disproportionately provided in
higher-quality jobs—the pattern evident in figures 2-8 and 2-9. Turning to
job-stayers—for whom job quality seems less likely to change along with a

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shift in remote work status—the pattern is more mixed. Some remote-status
transitions are consistent with the existence of a compensating differential,
but some are not. The CEA regards this evidence as inconclusive and illustrative of the difficulty in identifying compensating differentials amidst the
various ways that workers and jobs can differ (Lavetti 2023).
Other kinds of evidence point more clearly to lower wage growth
for remote workers and therefore notable compensating differentials. In a
survey of business executives, Barrero et al. (2022) ask about the connection between remote work and compensation strategies. They find that, as
of spring 2022, 38 percent of businesses report having increased remote
work to moderate wage growth. A similar share reported an intention to
implement this strategy in the coming months. Averaging across businesses
that did and did not use remote work in this way, executives believed that—
through deployment of remote work—they had limited wage growth by
about 1 percentage point over the prior year.17
Additional research is needed to better understand how remote work
affects wages. Because remote work is so unequally distributed, and because
the relationship between remote work and wages can differ over time and
across groups of workers, this question is especially difficult to answer.

Remote Work and Job Access
In addition to affecting the welfare of workers already in the labor market,
remote work has the potential to affect who participates in the labor force.
During the Biden-Harris Administration, prime-age labor force participation
reached a record high for women in 2024. Prime-age men’s participation
also recovered from the pandemic, but against a backdrop of decline for
more than 70 years (CEA 2024b). Moreover, U.S. population aging has and
will continue to put downward pressure on labor force participation.
If remote work removes impediments to joining the workforce, it
will give some individuals new options and strengthen the U.S. economy.
One group that could gain job access includes people with disabilities. For
disabled workers, remote work can remove physical barriers to accessing
the workplace. For example, workers with mobility restrictions might benefit from wheelchair accessibility features already incorporated into their
residence.18
Two relevant factors imply that measured wage growth could understate welfare improvements
for remote workers. First, any reduction in nominal wage growth could be offset by reductions in
cost of living, if remote work allows households to locate farther from expensive places. Second,
the reduction in commute time implies that earnings per hour (inclusive of hours spent commuting)
would rise more than earnings per hour worked.
18
Individuals with work-limiting characteristics other than disabilities could also benefit. For
example, working from home could allow neurodivergent workers to limit overstimulation or
sensory overload (Doyle 2022).
17

How Remote Work is Reshaping the Economy | 107

Being able to work remotely also has potential benefits for those caring
for children or elderly parents, which can make in-office work requirements
impossible to satisfy. Additionally, individuals moving to take care of a
parent or other family member could use remote work to keep their existing
job or access other distant jobs. Given that caregiving responsibilities are not
equally distributed across men and women, remote work could mitigate gender disparities in labor force participation.19 Consistent with this hypothesis,
increases in sector-specific remote work are associated with a diminished
gap in employment between mothers and other women (Harrington and
Kahn 2023).
Finally, remote work could affect labor force accessibility not only
through encouraging entry, but also by delaying exit (Liu and Quinby 2024).
For example, workers considering retirement or unretirement might find it
appealing to work if remote jobs facilitated traveling while working or other
flexible arrangements.
To better understand remote work’s impact on labor force participation, the CEA examines non-participating workers from October 2021
through September 2023 who had obtained jobs by 12 months after first
appearing in the CPS. Figure 2-12 shows the percentage of those individuals taking remote work positions, separated by their reason for initial nonparticipation.20 Of workers who initially said they were out of the labor force
because of a disability, 6 percent of those working one year later were doing
so remotely. A comparatively large share of initially retired workers and
those with caregiving responsibilities took remote jobs (17 and 14 percent,
respectively).
Regardless of reason, many newly employed workers from outside the
labor force are finding remote jobs, and in at least some cases, the individuals would have not been able to work without a remote option. Additionally,
research supports the hypothesis that remote work raises employment for
people with disabilities, despite the relatively low share of disabled workers
transitioning from non-participation to remote work in the CEA analysis.
Bloom, Dahl, and Rooth (2024) find that most of the recent increase in
employment for those with disabilities ages 18 through 64, from 31.5 percent in 2019 to 38.3 percent in 2024, can be explained by the rise of remote
work.

As of January 2020, 14 percent of all 25- to 54-year-old women reported that caregiving
responsibilities were their reason for not participating in the labor force. By contrast, only 1 percent
of 25- to 54-year-old men reported the same.
20
Of the population not in the labor force in January 2020, 15 percent did not participate because
they were ill or had a disability, 13 percent did not participate due to house or family care, 48
percent did not participate because they were retired, 20 percent did not participate because they
were in school, and 4 percent had other reasons for non-participation.
19

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Chapter 2

Figure 2-12. Remote Work Share of Entrants from Nonparticipation, by Reason
Percent
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Retired

Care

Other

Ill

Disability

Student

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Current Population Survey accessed via IPUMS; CEA calculations.
Note: Estimates are for October 2021 through September 2024 and include both hybrid and
fully remote work. Graph shows the share of remote work among individuals who report not
being in the labor force in month t and employed in month t+12.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Implications for Matching and Sorting
Remote work affects how workers and firms find each other. By relaxing a
geographic constraint—that workers need to live close to their employer—
remote work has potentially sweeping implications for matching and
locational choices. The CEA therefore examines remote work’s effects on
the sorting of workers into jobs, mismatch and match efficiency, and match
quality between workers and firms.

Re-sorting in the short run
In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, many but not all jobs suddenly
became remote. For example, Indeed data show that communications and
marketing jobs became more likely to feature remote options during the
pandemic. At the same time, many job vacancies (e.g., in food preparation
and nursing) featured little change in remote work status (Judes et al. 2021).
Within and across fields, workers differed in their strength of preference for
remote work and were often ill-matched with their current job after the shift.
The temporary misallocation of workers across remote and non-remote jobs
How Remote Work is Reshaping the Economy | 109

led to a surge in quitting and gave remote vacancies a strong recruitment
advantage (Bagga et al. 2024). Bagga and coauthors find that this pattern
was unlikely to be caused by other factors at play during the pandemic. To
illustrate the dynamic, figure 2-13 recreates a similar figure.21
Panel A in the figure compares the average change in job-filling rate
(hires per vacancy) from January 2020 to 2021 among multiple industries,
with each sector’s remote work share shown on the horizontal axis. Job filling was substantially easier during the pandemic for industries with many
remote jobs, as indicated by the positive slope in panel A.22
The pattern appears to have been temporary. By the time the shift
to remote work had settled and the labor market began normalizing, the
job-filling rate advantage for industries with high remote shares had mostly
disappeared, as shown in panel B.
Though it is difficult to determine the current stage of the job-sorting
process, one interpretation of the two panels in figure 2-13 is that because a
valuable amenity became widely available in some jobs but not others, the
labor market endured a sustained period of above-normal churn on the way
to a new equilibrium. The reshuffling was largely accomplished between
2022 and 2024.

Diminished mismatch in the long run
As this effect subsides, it may be replaced by longer-run modifications that
remote work makes to the matching process. As previously discussed, one
important feature of any labor market is mismatch: the extent to which job
seekers and job vacancies are poorly aligned across places or sectors. Over
the long run, remote work should diminish mismatch by breaking down
geographic barriers that make it difficult for job seekers to compete for
vacancies on a level playing field.
One way to test this hypothesis empirically is to examine how statelevel job-finding rates in the post-pandemic era have evolved relative to the
pre-pandemic era. If geographic mismatch has lessened, then job-finding
rates should have converged across places, given that workers in areas with
low job-finding rates now have access to job openings in places where plentiful opportunities exist.23
Figure 2-14 shows the expected pattern. On the vertical axis is the
change in state job-finding rates from 2017–2019 to a recent 12-month
The CEA uses actual remote work shares, averaged from October 2022 through August 2024,
rather than a classification of industries from Dingel and Neiman (2020) by potential for remote
work. However, the results are qualitatively similar when using the researchers’ classification.
22
This analysis places equal weight on all industries. The analysis is qualitatively similar when
weighting industries by their January 2020 job openings share.
23
Convergence in job-filling rates would not necessarily be expected because they depend on where
remote vacancies are posted, which may be spatially concentrated.
21

110 |

Chapter 2

Figure 2-13. Change in Job-Filling Rate, by Industry

A. Change from January 2020 to January–December 2021

Log change in job-filling rate
0.0
-0.1
-0.2
-0.3
-0.4
-0.5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Remote work share

45

50

55

60

65

55

60

65

B. Change from January 2020 to January 2022–August 2024
Log change in job-filling rate
0.0

-0.1
-0.2
-0.3
-0.4
-0.5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Remote work share

45

50

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Current Population Survey accessed via IPUMPS; CEA
calculations.
Note: Job-filling data are from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey. Job-filling rate is
defined as the seasonally adjusted ratio of hires to job openings. The figure plots the log
deviation of the industry-level job-filling rate from its January 2020 level, averaged over 2021
in panel A and over January 2022 through August 2024 in panel B. Industries are JOLTSdefined sectors. Remote work share is the average share of an industry's workforce that
reported working remotely between October 2022 and August 2024.
2025 Economic Report of the President

How Remote Work is Reshaping the Economy | 111

Figure 2-14. Change in Job-Finding Rate from 2017–2019
to 2023–2024, by State
Percentage point change
15
10
5
0
-5
-10

20

23

26

29

State-level job-finding rate, 2017–2019

32

35

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Current Population Survey accessed via IPUMS; CEA calculations.
Note: The job-finding rate is calculated as the share of unemployed workers who are
employed in the next month. Sample is civilian workers aged 16 and over. Changes are
measured from the 2017–2019 average to the October 2023–September 2024 average. Each
dot represents a state or D.C.
2025 Economic Report of the President

period (October 2023 through September 2024). On the horizontal axis is the
state job-finding rate in 2017–2019.24 The negative slope indicates that jobfinding rates have converged in the two time periods, suggesting that remote
work has lessened geographic mismatch. In other words, places where it was
hard to find jobs before the pandemic partially caught up with places where
it was comparatively easy to find jobs.
However, the negative relationship between the 2017–2019 jobfinding rate and its change over time could reflect mean reversion rather
than an effect of remote work. To explore the possibility, the CEA conducts
the same exercise for the years 2015–2017 and 2019 and finds that no
significant relationship existed between the baseline job-finding rate and
its subsequent change. While it is tempting to conclude that remote work
is the cause of the recent convergence, the CEA views these findings as an
opportunity for further research.
In unreported analysis, the CEA includes controls for the 2017–2019 employment share in 13
major industries, as well as the distribution of the state working-age population using 10-year age
bins. The results are similar.
24

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The quality of matches
Labor market search is fundamentally about getting the right employer
matched with the right worker. So, how does remote work affect who is
matched with which firm? The answer helps indicate how remote work
affects match quality. It is a difficult question to answer, however, because
two commonly used match quality metrics—wages and tenure (Belot, Liu,
and Triantafyllou 2024)—are poorly suited to understanding remote work.
As discussed, wages paid to remote workers may reflect a compensating
differential, as well as any effects on match quality and productivity; in this
context, wages are likely a poor proxy for the value of a job match. Because
the rise in remote work is recent, it is difficult to determine whether specific
remote job matches will prove lasting—and, by inference, have relatively
high match quality—compared to non-remote jobs.
Another variable useful for understanding match quality is the quits
rate. Figure 2-15 shows a negative relationship between the change in an
industry’s quits rate (between the pre- and post-pandemic periods) and

Figure 2-15. Change in Quits Rate, by Industry

Log change in quits rate from January 2020 to January 2022–August 2024
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0

-0.1

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Remote work share

40

45

50

55

60

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Current Population Survey accessed via IPUMS; CEA
calculations.
Note: Job-filling data are from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey. Quits rate is
defined as the seasonally adjusted ratio of quits to employment. The figure plots the log
deviation of the industry-level quits rate from its January 2020 level, averaged over January
2022–August 2024. Industries are the JOLTS-defined sectors. Remote work share is the
average share of an industry's workforce that reported working remotely between October
2022 and August 2024.
2025 Economic Report of the President

How Remote Work is Reshaping the Economy | 113

remote work share. Importantly, the relationship exists in the most recent
available data, by contrast to the job-filling pattern (shown above) which
appears to have been temporary. This result is consistent with higher match
quality in industries that have made wider use of remote work.
As discussed, a large share of those working remotely—31 percent of
respondents in the Survey of Household Economics and Decisionmaking
(Board of Governors 2024)—report that they would actively search for a
new job if their current employer required full-time, in-person work. While
the finding speaks directly to the value many workers place on remote work,
it also suggests that remote work underpins match quality for some workers.

Geographic reallocation
In the past, jobs were almost always tied to particular locations. Matching
with an employer meant moving into reasonably close proximity and commuting regularly to a place of business. With remote work, this is no longer
the case. To the extent that remote work makes matching more efficient, it
is due to relaxed geographic constraints allowing hybrid workers to move
moderately farther from their employers and fully remote workers to move
anywhere.
Consider a hybrid worker newly permitted to work from home two
days a week. For those with a standard workweek, the worker’s weekly
commute time is immediately cut by 40 percent, and the cost of locating
slightly farther from work decreases accordingly. The long commute that
was not acceptable five days a week is now potentially tolerable at three
days a week. For a fully remote worker, the situation is more dramatically
altered: The cost of locating farther from work is reduced to almost zero.
Has the change in incentives affected household movement in recent
years, and how does it affect the distance or commute time between workplaces and residences?25 Research based on U.S. credit files reveals that
individuals, especially high-income workers, migrated during the pandemic
from high- to low-density areas (Li and Su 2023).26 City centers in large
metropolitan areas lost residents, while suburbs and small metro areas
gained residents. Largely because of variation in occupational mix across
metropolitan areas, it was therefore partially possible to predict in advance
which places would see the most dramatic changes (Dingel and Neiman
2020).27
Another question for further research is how remote work might differentially affect dual-earner
households. In principle, remote work should make it easier for one worker to access better job
opportunities without requiring a partner to accept a less-desirable job.
26
In Swedish data, researchers found that increases in commuting distance during the pandemic
disproportionately occurred among workers for whom remote work was more available (Nilsson et
al. 2024).
27
See Hansen et al. (2023) for a discussion of the limitations of an occupation-based assessment.
25

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Chapter 2

Figure 2-16. Commute Time Distribution, 2019 and
2023
Percent
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

2019
No commute time
36-45 minutes

1-15 minutes
>45 minutes

2023
16-35 minutes

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: American Community Survey accessed via IPUMS; CEA calculations.
Note: Sample is limited to employed workers.
2025 Economic Report of the President

In figure 2-16, the CEA examines U.S. worker-level data on commute
time. Between 2019 and 2023, the fraction of people with no commute time
increased by over 8 percentage points, indicating a significant shift toward
working from home.28 The share of people with varying non-zero commute
lengths all fell by roughly 1.5 to 2.5 percentage points. The finding suggests
that the shift to remote work drew on workers whose previous commute
times were spread across the distribution (i.e., both short- and long-duration
commutes became less common after the increase in remote work).29
In addition to affecting residential location patterns, remote work
changes demand for housing quantity. Many workers were forced to work
in cramped spaces at home early in the pandemic. As remote work persisted,
some families sought out larger homes that were better equipped for it or

Examining a prior period (2016–2019) for context, almost no change occurs in the share of
workers with zero commute time.
29
The result does not preclude the possibility that, among some hybrid workers, commute times may
have increased as they moved farther from their employers. But it does suggest that any such effect
was offset by the rise in share of those who usually worked from home.
28

How Remote Work is Reshaping the Economy | 115

Figure 2-17. Share of Workers Who Moved, by
Remote Work Status
Percent
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0

Moved PUMAs, remained in state
Non-remote work

Moved states
Remote work

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: American Community Survey accessed via IPUMS; CEA calculations.
Note: Estimates are for moves from 2022 to 2023. Workers are considered remote if their
usual method of transportation was "worked from home." A PUMA is a public-use
microdata area of at least 100,000 residents. Sample is limited to employed workers.
2025 Economic Report of the President

broke off to form new households (Mondragon and Wieland 2022; Ozimek
and Carlson 2023).30
All of these shifts have meant changing house price patterns. Price
growth has tended to be stronger in areas farther from central business
districts and weaker in closer, dense areas (Li and Su 2023). Other research
also finds that the discount for housing positioned away from central business districts has diminished in metropolitan areas with high remote work
potential (Gupta et al. 2022; Brueckner, Kahn, and Lin 2023).
To the extent that newly remote workers tend to seek places with inexpensive housing aligned with their preferences (rather than employer availability), this could affect recent worker mobility. Figure 2-17 indicates that
remote workers are somewhat more likely (3.9 percent) than non-remote
workers (3.0 percent) to have moved within-state (i.e., out of their so-called
public-use microdata area, a location of roughly 100,000 individuals). They
are also more likely (4.2 percent) than non-remote workers (2.2 percent)
However, the long-run impacts on housing prices will likely be more muted as supply has time to
adjust in response to remote work-induced changes in demand (Howard, Liebersohn, and Ozimek
2023).
30

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to have moved across state lines. The pattern by itself does not necessarily
mean that remote work has caused the additional migration. Remote workers
are disproportionately highly educated, which is itself associated with higher
rates of interstate migration (Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak 2011).
Complementary evidence is provided by Li and Su (2023), who find
that net in-migration has fallen dramatically in census tracts with the most
remote jobs; remote jobs have largely stayed in the tracts, but many of the
workers who hold them have left the area. Similarly, Brueckner, Kahn, and
Lin (2023) use U.S. Postal Service data to demonstrate heightened population outflows from high-productivity places with high potential for remote
work.
The migration responses predicted by theory and observed to some
extent by researchers have implications for the distribution of economic
activity, tax revenues generated by the activity, and the commercial real
estate market in particular. Central business districts are likely the most
affected by remote work, given that employers have historically been willing
to pay high prices and taxes to locate in close proximity to other employers
and key labor markets. Workers are limited in how far from central business
districts they can live by the costliness of any required commuting. To the
extent that remote work relaxes the limitation, it reduces demand for locating in or near central business districts. Similarly, commercial real estate has
shown signs of stress in the wake of the pandemic and rise of remote work,
which could have implications for both the financial markets where commercial real estate debt is traded and local public finance. Office vacancies
rose to 20.1 percent in the third quarter of 2024, and forecasters project that
vacancy rates could peak at 24 percent in 2026 (Moody’s 2024; Metcalfe,
Spinelli, and LaSalvia 2024). Gupta, Mittal, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2024)
estimate that remote work could reduce commercial real estate values by
more than $500 billion, though the potential to convert offices to residential
buildings may mitigate some of the long-run impact.31

The Big Picture and Public Policy
Remote work is arguably the most consequential recent shift for U.S.
working arrangements and the overall labor market. Researchers are only
beginning to process the magnitude, durability, and impact of the changes.
As this chapter has shown, the benefits are potentially substantial. Most
workers value a remote-work option: For some, it is a source of workday
flexibility and an avoided commute; for those with disabilities or caregiving
responsibilities, it can make labor force participation more feasible.
Van Nieuwerburgh (2022) provides a detailed analysis and assesses relevant research on this and
other spatial dynamics related to remote work.
31

How Remote Work is Reshaping the Economy | 117

Ancillary benefits like reduced commute times—in turn leading to
decreased traffic congestion and pollution—have also emerged. Stay-athome orders during the early pandemic caused substantial declines in air
pollution, with slightly larger effects in places that featured more remote
work (Brodeur, Cook, and Wright 2021).32
In the case of fully remote work, workers and firms can find each
other when geographic distance would ordinarily make a match impossible.
Without having to relocate, workers and firms can adapt to changing market
conditions by quickly forming new matches. To the extent that match quality
improves, both worker welfare and national productivity are enhanced.
As with any fundamental labor market shift, remote work also creates
potential pitfalls. For some businesses, remote work may turn out to be
an unacceptable productivity drag. This could be evident immediately, or
in other cases, it could become apparent only with time, as collaboration
diminishes and young workers receive insufficient mentoring (Emanuel,
Harrington, and Pallais 2023; Yang et al. 2022). The balance of benefits and
costs will be different for every employer and worker.
Another challenge appears at scale as the accumulated decisions of
individual employers and workers disrupt housing markets. Residential
housing has become increasingly expensive in some areas as demand from
hybrid and fully remote workers surpasses supply. Conversely, demand for
commercial real estate has declined, which poses both risks and opportunities. As economic activity diminishes in central business districts, the
ecosystems that support firms also diminish (Althoff et al. 2022), along
with the property tax revenue upon which some cities rely heavily (Auxier
and Brosy 2024). On the other hand, there are opportunities: For example,
the Administration has worked to facilitate the conversion of office space
to multifamily housing (CEA 2023). This strategy addresses the chronic
undersupply of residential housing and can ameliorate adverse impacts
on non-remote workers (Gupta, Martinez, and Van Nieuwerburgh 2023;
Richard 2024).
Other potential challenges from remote work are admittedly more
speculative. For example, physical workspaces develop social capital
(Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul 2008); it is unclear to what extent virtual
work interactions are a replacement. Relatedly, in largely remote workplaces, organizing workers into unions could require different strategies,
given the increased distance between employers and employees.
The allocation of remote work across the labor market depends on
public policy details. Remote work is not technically feasible in most
instances without reliable high-speed internet access (Barrero, Bloom, and
In China, increased remote work during the early pandemic led to large decreases in air pollution
by reducing travel (Chen and Li 2024). However, studies that focus on travel-related pollution may
miss other effects like changes in home energy use.
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Davis 2021b). Parts of the United States still lack such access, a condition
the Administration worked to address through $90 billion in federal funding to expand access to high-speed, affordable internet across the country.
While Congress failed to continue funding for the Affordable Connectivity
Program, which provided qualifying households up to $30 per month off
their internet bill, the Administration has helped more than 23 million households save money on connectivity (White House 2024).
Long-standing legal impediments can also shape how remote work
plays out in the labor market. For example, occupational licensing rules are
usually set at the state level, and in a healthcare context, providers typically
must be licensed wherever their patients live. In a world of remote medical
work (i.e., telehealth), this system can be a poor fit (Scheffler 2019), limiting
its benefits (Zeltzer et al. 2024).33
Similar issues are posed by state-based employer tax and employee
benefit systems (Aksoy et al. 2022). Remote workers located in a different
state than their employer potentially face double taxation, and only 16 states
and the District of Columbia have reciprocity agreements with others to
navigate taxation of workers commuting across state lines, such as hybrid
workers with an infrequent but long commute (Peterson 2024). Employers
must report and pay unemployment insurance taxes in the state where a
worker lives; setting up operations in each state and understanding applicable law variation is a significant burden (Miller 2020).
In the post-pandemic world, employers and workers will need to
make conscious decisions about whether and how to work remotely. Some
employers will continue to adjust their practices, making increasing or
decreasing use of remote work depending on their circumstances and experiences. But the intensity of worker preference for remote work and its recruiting advantages are strong tailwinds. As researchers add to the understanding
of remote work, policymakers can make evidence-based decisions about
how to broaden its promise while minimizing its downsides.

Survey data suggest that many remote workers are affected by licensing rules. In 2023–2024,
remote workers were 1.7 percentage points more likely than non-remote workers to have an
occupational license (CPS and CEA calculations).
33

How Remote Work is Reshaping the Economy | 119

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Chapter 3

Aligning the International Tax System
with the Globalized Economy
Corporations that operate in more than one country generate a substantial
share of global economic activity. As shown in figure 3-1, multinationals
account for roughly one third of global gross domestic product and more
than half of all international trade. Given the economic significance of
multinationals, taxation of their profits has the potential to be a major source
of government revenue.
However, prior to 2021, a lack of coordination among countries in taxing
multinationals led to a “race to the bottom” in corporate income tax rates
from a 40.2 percent average worldwide statutory tax rate to 23.5 percent
over the past four decades (Enache 2023). Many multinationals pay far less
than that by shifting their profits to low-tax countries despite not engaging
in meaningful economic activity in those countries. From 2017 to 2020, an
estimated $2 trillion of multinational profits were taxed at effective tax rates
below 15 percent (Hugger, González Cabral, and O’Reilly 2023). Clausing
(2020) estimates that cross-border tax planning activity by multinationals
costs the U.S. government more than $100 billion a year. This is particularly
important in the current U.S. fiscal environment, where the federal government has run a budget deficit in 51 of the past 55 years, causing the debt-toGDP ratio to reach 97 percent in Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 (OMB 2024; CBO
2024a).
At the same time, the growth of digital services business activity, such as
entertainment streaming and digital advertising, has raised important questions about which countries have taxing rights over the activity (Cebreiro

121

Gómez et al. 2022). For example, when a Canadian business buys advertising space on a website run by a multinational headquartered in the United
States and the ads are viewed by consumers in Mexico, which country or
countries should have the right to tax the business activity at issue?
In response to the difficulties in addressing tax competition and digital
services taxing rights on a unilateral basis, more than 130 countries, representing over 90 percent of the world economy, agreed in 2021 to modernize
the principles governing the taxation of multinationals’ profits (OECD
2021a). Known as the Global Tax Deal, the principles seek to preserve
global corporate tax revenues and modernize the international tax system

Figure 3-1. Multinationals' Share of Global Economic
Activity in 2016
Percent
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

GDP

Imports

Multinational foreign affiliates

Council of Economic Advisers

Exports
Multinational home country

Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Analytical Activities of
Multinational Enterprises database; CEA calculations.
Note: The navy bars, labeled as multinational home country, represent activity conducted by a
multinational in its home country, while the blue bars, labeled as multinational foreign
affiliates, represent activity conducted by a multinational through its foreign affiliates. 2016 is
the most recent year of data available.
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by setting guidelines for where multinationals pay taxes and how much they
pay (OECD 2023a). The global minimum tax component of the Global Tax
Deal is already being adopted by countries around the world (Brosy 2024).
This chapter explains the challenges that gave rise to the historic agreement
and how the Global Tax Deal addresses those challenges. The chapter first
describes how the deal addresses tax competition and then explains how it
handles digital services taxation. The chapter concludes with a discussion of
why the United States would benefit from participation in the Global Tax
Deal.

Globalization and a Patchwork of Corporate Tax Systems
In today’s globalized economy with cross-border investment and multinationals, each country must consider its own corporate tax policies in
the context of other countries’ corporate tax policies when designing its
corporate tax system. While many factors, including infrastructure, workforce makeup, and rule of law, determine multinationals’ location choices,
countries with relatively low corporate tax rates are generally more attractive than others, all else being equal (Siedschlag, Zhang, and Smith 2013;
Castellani et al. 2022; Basu, Mitra, and Purohit 2023). As a result, countries
compete with one another to keep tax rates low enough to retain or attract
multinational economic activity. Such international tax competition can put
pressure on countries to lower their corporate tax rates and thus undermine
their ability to raise revenue (OECD 1998).

Globalization Without Cooperation: The Prisoner’s Dilemma
A simple example illustrates the fundamental dynamics of corporate tax
competition across countries. Imagine Country A and Country B are simultaneously choosing between a 15 percent corporate tax rate and a 10 percent
corporate tax rate. Multinationals in this scenario can freely choose where to
locate economic activity that collectively generates $100 in taxable income.1
When each country sets its tax rate independently rather than cooperating,
the incentives resemble the classic “prisoner’s dilemma” (Devereux 2023).2
Cross-border tax planning can create a disconnect between where multinationals locate economic
activity and where they report income, which is discussed later in the chapter.
2
To fix ideas, this example assumes total economic activity is held constant and multinationals
can only change the allocation of economic activity across countries. Changing tax rates could
potentially change the total economic activity and thus total income.
1

Aligning the International Tax System with the Globalized Economy | 123

Figure 3-2. Prisoner's Dilemma-Based Corporate
Tax Revenue Prior to Global Tax Deal Pillar Two
Dollars

12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Scenario 1
(15%, 15%)

Scenario 2
(10%, 15%)
Country A

Scenario 3
(15%, 10%)

Scenario 4
(10%, 10%)

Country B

Council of Economic Advisers

Source: CEA calculations.
Note: Figure shows the prisoner's dilemma-based corporate tax revenues collected by
Countries A and B prior to the Global Tax Deal Pillar Two. The first term in parentheses
is the corporate tax rate set by Country A, and the second term in parentheses is the
corporate tax rate set by Country B. This example assumes that total economic activity
is held constant, meaning multinationals can only change the allocation of economic
activity across countries, multinationals report income where their economic activity is
located, and total taxable income equals $100.
2025 Economic Report of the President

If both Country A and Country B enact a 15 percent tax rate (see
scenario 1 in figure 3-2), multinationals will be indifferent about where to
locate their economic activity and split the activity between the countries
equally. As a result, both Countries A and B will collect $7.50 in tax revenue
($50 in taxable income per country multiplied by 15 percent). However, the
15 percent tax rate is likely not sustainable because each country knows that
lowering its rate will attract increased economic activity and raise revenue
collection. If Country A lowers its tax rate to 10 percent while Country B
retains its 15 percent rate (see scenario 2 in figure 3-2), multinationals will
locate all their economic activity in Country A. Country A will then collect

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$10 in tax revenue while Country B collects $0.3 Thus, Country B is incentivized to lower its tax rate to 10 percent, which moves the countries to scenario 4 in figure 3-2. Multinationals will be indifferent between Countries A
and B if they both have a 10 percent tax rate, so both countries will collect $5
in revenue ($50 in taxable income per country multiplied by 10 percent). At

Figure 3-3. Statutory Corporate Tax Rates Across
Countries

Percent
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
2000

2005
United States

2010
Other G7 countries

2015

2020
Select low-tax countries

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: International Monetary Fund; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development; Singapore Department of Statistics; U.N. Conference on Trade and Development;
World Bank; CEA calculations.
Note: Select low-tax countries are Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Montserrat, Switzerland, Singapore, and Turks and Caicos Islands. The G7
countries line does not include the United States. The corporate tax rates across G7 and low-tax
countries are calculated by taking a GDP-weighted average of country-level corporate tax rates.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Scenario 3 in figure 3-2 represents the reverse outcome when Country A keeps its corporate
tax rate at 15 percent and Country B lowers its corporate tax rate to 10 percent. In this scenario,
multinationals will locate all of their economic activity in Country B. Country B will then collect
$10 in tax revenue while Country A collects $0.

3

Aligning the International Tax System with the Globalized Economy | 125

this point, Country A will not want to raise its tax rate unilaterally because
doing so will drive all multinational activity to Country B, and vice versa.
Thus, in equilibrium, both countries choose the lower relative tax rate and
collect $5.
In this stylized example, when the countries compete to be an attractive location for multinational economic activity, they both lower their
tax rates and collect less revenue. If tax competition continues, rates and
revenues risk even further reduction. Both countries, however, would raise
more tax revenue if they committed to cooperating (represented by scenario
1 in figure 3-2).
Prior to the Global Tax Deal, many countries engaged in tax competition (Duan et al. 2024). Specifically, several nations made their corporate tax
systems favorable to business by reducing tax rates and providing targeted
incentives to attract businesses and investment (Devereux, Lockwood, and
Redoano 2008). Tax-haven countries, or low-tax countries, in particular
offer low corporate tax rates to attract capital from high-tax countries (Hines
2007). Figure 3-3 shows how the U.S. statutory corporate tax rate (teal
line) compares to that of other G7 countries (blue line) and select low-tax
countries (navy line). The average corporate tax rate in these select low-tax
countries has fallen from roughly 15 percent in 2000 to around 12 percent,
where it has hovered for the last 15 years; by comparison, the other G7
countries’ average corporate tax rate has steadily fallen from roughly 30
percent in the early 2000s to roughly 20 percent in 2023. In other words,
tax competition has led to the race to the bottom predicted by the prisoner’s
dilemma, undermining government tax revenue collection.

Cross-Border Tax Planning by Multinationals
Variation in corporate tax rates across countries allows multinationals
to locate economic activity in countries with relatively lower tax rates.
Multinationals also reduce their worldwide tax liability through “income
shifting,” where they report income in low-tax countries and deductible
expenses in high-tax countries in ways that are out of alignment with
the economic activity that gives rise to their profits. This phenomenon is
well-documented in the academic literature (Lall 1983; Grubert and Mutti
1991; Swenson 2001; Wier and Zucman 2022). Multinationals can engage
in income shifting by: (i) manipulating transfer prices (e.g., prices on the
sales and purchases of goods, services, and the use of intangibles between
multinational affiliates) to shift income to tax-favorable countries,4 and (ii)
Transfer pricing rules require the use of an “arms-length” price, a price that would be reasonable
to both parties in a transaction between unrelated parties, in transactions between affiliates within
the same multinational group. However, taxpayers often fail to comply with these rules (Wier and
Zucman 2022), and transfer pricing issues are the second most common uncertain tax position
reported to the Internal Revenue Service (Towery 2017).

4

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Chapter 3

Figure 3-4. U.S. Corporate Income as a Share of U.S.
GDP
Percent
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; CEA calculations.
Note: Gray bars indicate recessions. Income measure is before tax with inventory valuation
and capital consumption adjustments.
2025 Economic Report of the President

“earnings stripping” to lower taxes by strategically locating interest on debt
in high-tax countries where tax deductions are more valuable (Treasury
2007). Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) suggest that roughly three quarters
of income shifting is achieved through transfer pricing manipulation and one
quarter of income shifting is achieved through earnings stripping.
A more extreme way for multinationals to reduce their worldwide
income tax liability is through corporate inversion. Inversions occur when
multinationals change their country of domicile—or home country, usually where the parent entity is located—to take advantage of a favorable
corporate tax regime (CBO 2017). Corporate inversions are not usually
accompanied by major operational changes, highlighting the tax motivation
for the transactions. A well-known inversion was the merger of U.S.-based
Burger King and Canada-based Tim Horton’s in 2014 (Capurso 2016). At
the time, the U.S. corporate tax rate was 35 percent, while the corporate tax
rate in Ontario, Canada was 26.5 percent (Deloitte n.d.).5 The combined
company moved its domicile to Canada, likely to secure the lower rate. The
Congressional Budget Office estimates that companies inverting between
Canada’s federal corporate income tax rate was 15 percent, and the Ontario provincial corporate
income tax rate was 11.5 percent in 2014.

5

Aligning the International Tax System with the Globalized Economy | 127

Figure 3-5. U.S. Corporate Income Tax as a Share
of U.S. GDP
Percent
5
4
3
2
1
0

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Congressional Budget Office; CEA calculations.
Note: Gray bars indicate recessions.
2025 Economic Report of the President

1994 and 2014 saw a $45 million reduction in their corporate tax expense
after inversion on average (CBO 2017).
Strategies to exploit tax regime differences are collectively referred
to as cross-border tax planning activities (Edwards, Hutchens, and Persson
2024). The effects of these activities on global corporate tax revenues are
significant. As shown in figures 3-4 and 3-5, U.S. corporate income as a
share of GDP has increased dramatically over the last forty years, yet corporate income taxes as a share of GDP have remained flat. Considering where
foreign income is reported sheds light on the diverging trends. Among U.S.
multinationals, the share of foreign income reported in the low-tax countries
of Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Montserrat, Singapore, Switzerland, and Turks and Caicos Islands more
than doubled from 16 percent in 2001 to 34 percent in 2021 (figure 3-6).6

This increase in the share of foreign income in low-tax countries occurred despite the 2017 Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act reduction in the U.S. statutory corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent
and reforms to the international tax system discussed later in the chapter.

6

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Chapter 3

Figure 3-6. Low-Tax Country Share of U.S.
Multinationals' Foreign Affiliate Income
Percent
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021
Ireland

Switzerland

Bermuda

Singapore

Luxembourg

Select U.K. Caribbean Islands

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; CEA calculations.
Note: Select U.K. Caribbean Islands are British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands,
Montserrat, and Turks and Caicos Islands. Foreign affiliate income includes majorityowned foreign affiliates only and equals pre-tax income net of income from equity
investments (Blouin and Robinson 2023). When available, only equity from investments
in foreign affiliates is used. Missing observations are assigned previous year's value.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Economic Implications of Cross-Border Tax Planning
Cross-border tax planning, which includes the relocation of economic
activity and income shifting, can yield production inefficiencies and social
costs. In general, societal benefits can arise when multinationals allocate

Aligning the International Tax System with the Globalized Economy | 129

their resources to locations where they are most productive. For example,
many non-U.S. multinationals locate activity in the United States to access
a highly skilled workforce, legal protections, and innovation (Asadurian,
Derrick, and McMahon 2024). When a multinational relocates economic
activity to a country with comparatively low corporate tax rates but a highly
productive environment, net societal benefits may remain if the productivity
gains are sufficient to overcome lost corporate tax revenue.

Figure 3-7. Share of U.S. Multinationals' Foreign
Affiliate Income vs. Share of World GDP
Percent
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Share of foreign
affiliate income

Share of world
GDP

2001

Rest of the world

Council of Economic Advisers

Share of foreign
affiliate income

Share of world
GDP

2021

Select low-tax countries

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; International Monetary Fund; Singapore Department
of Statistics; U.N. Conference on Trade and Development; World Bank; CEA calculations.
Note: Low-tax jurisdictions include Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Montserrat, Singapore, Switzerland, and Turks and Caicos Islands. Foreign
affiliate income includes majority-owned foreign affiliates only and equals pre-tax income net
of income from equity investments (Blouin and Robinson 2023). When available, only equity
from investments in foreign affiliates is used. Missing observations for equity income are
assigned previous year's value.
2025 Economic Report of the President

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Chapter 3

On the other hand, if a multinational relocates economic activity to a
less productive location because tax planning attracts it to low corporate tax
rates, then the lost corporate tax revenue is compounded by the social cost
of lower productivity.7 Yet in other cases, multinationals shift income to
less productive, low-tax locations without relocating economic activity, as
discussed above, which deprives the more productive locations where such
activities are actually performed of the related corporate tax revenue (Wier
and Zucman 2022).
The macroeconomic implications of the scenarios above vary. Crossborder tax planning can undermine the efficient allocation of resources to
the extent it causes multinationals to locate economic activity in less productive locations. For example, the analysis below examines mismatches
between the allocation of reported corporate income versus actual economic
activity as measured by GDP, which is often a consequence of cross-border
tax planning.
The imbalance between the share of income earned in low-tax countries and the share of world economic activity occurring in low-tax countries
suggests that multinationals record their income in low-tax countries for
the tax benefit, not because the locations are conducive to growing their
businesses. Figure 3-7 compares the share of U.S. multinational foreign
affiliate income earned in select low-tax countries and the rest of the world
to the relative GDP shares for the locations in 2001 and 2021.8 In 2001,
16 percent of foreign affiliate income was reported in the select low-tax
countries, which earned only 2 percent of total world GDP. In other words,
the share of U.S. multinational income located in the low-tax countries was
disproportionately larger than local GDP. By 2021, the gap had widened.
The share of foreign affiliate income earned in the low-tax countries more
than doubled to 34 percent, while the countries’ GDP share remained at 2
percent. The trend suggests that cross-border tax planning likely reduces the
U.S. corporate tax base without generating gains in economic output.

Unilateral Country Actions to Curb Cross-Border Tax Planning
To thwart cross-border tax planning activities and preserve corporate
tax revenue, some countries have implemented policies unilaterally. For
example, corporate anti-inversion rules have been used to discourage multinationals from relocating their headquarters to lower-tax countries (Yang
and Aquilino 2016). Interest barrier rules limit interest deductibility amounts
The scenarios described here are simplified for illustrative purposes. There would potentially be
other tradeoffs and social cost/benefit issues associated with, for example, balancing corporate
taxation and revenue needs with optimizing corporate investment, productivity, employment, and
other factors, both from the perspective of a given country and globally.
8
A foreign affiliate of a multinational is an entity that is partially or wholly owned by the
multinational and is located in a country other than the multinational’s home country (BEA 2018).
7

Aligning the International Tax System with the Globalized Economy | 131

to prevent multinationals from holding excess debt in high-tax countries
(Knauer and Sommer 2012). Controlled foreign corporation regimes levy
income taxes on the foreign income of domestic companies to discourage
shifting income to low-tax countries (Arnold 2012).
In the United States, the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) created
three provisions that attempted to discourage cross-border tax planning, in
addition to reducing the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent
(Congress 2017). First, the Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income (GILTI)
provision levies a minimum tax on low-taxed foreign income associated with
intangible assets (with an offsetting partial Foreign Tax Credit). Second, the
Foreign-Derived Intangible Income deduction rewards companies that keep
intangible assets within the United States with a reduced effective tax rate.
Third, the Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax applies a minimum tax to multinationals making large payments to foreign affiliates, a common strategy
for shifting income outside of the country.
Importantly, because unilateral actions do not invoke global cooperation, they fail to overcome the prisoner’s dilemma, which allows international tax competition to persist and enables multinationals to continue
exploiting differences in tax regimes to lower their income tax liability.
Indeed, the TCJA failed to stop cross-border tax planning: Clausing (2024)
finds that the provisions have had indeterminate effects on cross-border
tax planning, and figure 3-6 shows U.S. multinationals continue to report
substantial income in low-tax countries.

Addressing the Dilemma: Global Coordination
The Global Tax Deal outlines two pillars of reform (OECD 2021b). Pillar
One, discussed in the next section of this chapter and not yet finalized,
addresses where multinationals pay income taxes. Pillar Two, the Model
Rules of which were published in December 2021 and are being implemented by countries around the world, addresses how much multinationals
pay in income taxes (OECD 2021c).
Pillar Two aims to reduce tax competition by ensuring large multinationals pay a minimum level of tax regardless of where they operate.
Multinationals with at least €750 million ($817 million in October 2024) in
global revenues are subject to a global 15 percent minimum tax, effectively
increasing taxes on multinationals with income in low-tax countries (OECD
2022). The minimum tax addresses the prisoner’s dilemma arising from
international tax competition by structuring payoffs such that any country’s
best option is to cooperate when setting corporate tax policies.
Pillar Two relies on three self-reinforcing mechanisms to ensure
multinationals pay the 15 percent global minimum tax (OECD 2022). The
mechanisms also incentivize countries to participate in Pillar Two. The first

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Chapter 3

Figure 3-8. Illustrative Example of Pillar Two Provisions
for U.S. Multinationals
Percent
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

Subsidiary in high-tax
country

Subsidiary in mid-tax
country

Effective tax rate

Council of Economic Advisers

Subsidiary in low-tax
country

Top-up tax

Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; CEA calculations.
2025 Economic Report of the President

mechanism is the Income Inclusion Rule, which is applied by the home
country to a multinational’s parent entity. Under the rule, the parent entity
must calculate the effective tax rate the multinational faces in each country
where it has a subsidiary.9 For any country in which the multinational pays
an effective tax rate of less than 15 percent, the home country imposes an
additional tax, commonly known as a “top-up” tax, to account for the difference. The Income Inclusion Rule reduces incentives for multinationals
headquartered in countries with such a rule to offshore income to low-tax
countries.
For example, suppose the United States implements an Income
Inclusion Rule and a U.S. multinational has three subsidiaries: the high-tax
subsidiary has an effective tax rate of 25 percent, the mid-tax subsidiary has
an effective tax rate of 12 percent, and the low-tax subsidiary has an effective tax rate of 0 percent. In figure 3-8, the teal area represents the difference
between the effective tax rate the U.S. multinational pays in each country

The effective tax rate equals the ratio of taxes paid in the country to domestic Global Anti-Base
Erosion (GloBE) income in the country. GloBE income is financial reporting income adjusted to
more closely align with the concept of corporate taxable income. See Hanlon and Nessa (2023) for a
detailed discussion of the adjustments.

9

Aligning the International Tax System with the Globalized Economy | 133

and the 15 percent global minimum tax. Under the Income Inclusion Rule,
the United States collects the extra tax revenue represented by the teal area.10
The second mechanism is the Undertaxed Payments Rule (OECD
2020). The rule is applied to subsidiaries of multinationals headquartered in
high-tax countries that do not implement an Income Inclusion Rule.11 The
Undertaxed Payments Rule incentivizes countries to participate in Pillar
Two because if they fail to do so, they sacrifice revenue to other countries.
Countries with the Undertaxed Payments Rule can disallow deductions
for subsidiaries located within their borders if any other entities of the
same multinational group pay an effective tax rate of less than 15 percent.
The rule effectively allows countries who have signed on to Pillar Two
to ensure that any multinationals with subsidiaries operating within their
borders pay a global minimum tax of 15 percent, regardless of where the
parent company is located. Notably, the Income Inclusion Rule has priority
over the Undertaxed Payments Rule; that is, the latter cannot be applied to
multinationals headquartered in countries that have implemented an Income
Inclusion Rule (OECD 2020).
Continuing the previous example, suppose the United States does not
implement an Income Inclusion Rule but the high-tax subsidiary country
implements an Undertaxed Payments Rule. The Undertaxed Payments Rule
allows the high-tax subsidiary country to collect the extra tax revenue represented by the teal area in figure 3-8.
The third mechanism is the Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax,
which addresses situations where a country’s tax rate falls below the global
minimum tax rate (OECD 2023c). In this case, the country can apply its own
top-up tax to ensure that large multinationals operating within its borders
pay at least the global minimum tax rate. Adoption of a Qualified Domestic
Minimum Top-up Tax is voluntary but self-reinforcing: If a country with a
tax rate below 15 percent does not impose a Qualified Domestic Minimum
Top-up Tax and a multinational subsidiary in the country pays an effective
tax rate below 15 percent, other countries will be able to collect the top-up
tax via the Income Inclusion Rule or Undertaxed Payments Rule. In other
words, the low-tax country sacrifices tax revenue to another country and
The U.S. GILTI regime in its current form does not qualify as an Income Inclusion Rule because
the effective GILTI tax rate is less than 15 percent and the tax is calculated on a global basis rather
than a country-by-country basis. Levying a minimum tax on a global basis enables multinationals
to pay less than 15 percent tax in low-tax countries because tax rates are averaged across high- and
low-tax non-U.S. countries in which they operate. Further, some design features of the GILTI regime
create incentives for U.S. multinationals to shift income outside of the United States (Treasury
2024).
11
The OECD established a transitional safe harbor where no tax will be payable under the
Undertaxed Payments Rule for any undertaxed income of a multinational in its ultimate parent entity
country if that country applies a corporate income tax rate of at least 20 percent (OECD 2023b). The
safe harbor will defer the application of the Undertaxed Payments Rule to such income until 2026.
10

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Figure 3-9. Prisoner's Dilemma-Based Corporate Tax
Revenue Under Global Tax Deal Pillar Two
Dollars

12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Scenario 1
(15%, 15%)

Scenario 2
(10%, 15%)
Country A

Scenario 3
(15%, 10%)

Scenario 4
(10%, 10%)

Country B

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; CEA calculations.
Note: Figure shows the prisoner's dilemma-based corporate tax revenues collected by
Countries A and B under the Global Tax Deal Pillar Two. The first term in parentheses is the
corporate tax rate set by Country A, and the second term in parentheses is the corporate tax
rate set by Country B. This example assumes that total economic activity is held constant,
meaning multinationals can only change the allocation of economic activity across countries,
multinationals report income where their economic activity is located, and total taxable
income equals $100.
2025 Economic Report of the President

would be better off enacting a Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax
to collect the tax revenue. Consistent with this incentive, multiple low-tax
countries have announced their intention to impose a Qualified Domestic
Minimum Top-up Tax, and Bermuda has increased its statutory corporate
tax rate from 0 percent to 15 percent (Sullivan 2023; PwC 2024a).
Building on the ongoing example, if the mid-tax subsidiary country
and the low-tax subsidiary country do not want to forgo revenue, they can
collect the tax revenue represented by their respective teal areas by enacting
a Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax.
Thus, the proposition that Pillar Two lays out to countries is quite
simple: As long as at least one country involved implements one of the Pillar
Two provisions, the tax revenue up to a 15 percent effective tax rate (represented by the teal area in figure 3-8) is available for collection. Countries can

Aligning the International Tax System with the Globalized Economy | 135

either adopt one or more of the Pillar Two provisions and collect their share
or allow other countries to collect the additional tax revenue.
Revisiting the two-country prisoner’s dilemma example, Pillar Two
restructures the payoffs such that each country’s best option is to cooperate.
Figure 3-9 shows the adjusted payoffs. As before, if both countries have a
corporate tax rate of 15 percent, as described in scenario 1, multinationals
choosing whether to locate economic activity in Country A or Country B
will be indifferent between them, so both countries will collect $7.50 in tax
revenue ($50 in taxable income per country multiplied by 15 percent).
The innovation of Pillar Two is that the three mechanisms collectively
make multinationals indifferent between Countries A and B, even if one
of them chooses to lower their tax rate, because multinationals will pay 15
percent tax regardless. Pillar Two therefore removes countries’ incentives to
lower their corporate tax rates. Consider scenario 2 of figure 3-9. If Country
A reduces its tax rate to 10 percent and therefore does not participate in
Pillar Two, it will collect only $5 in tax revenues on the $50 of income
within its borders. This is because the Pillar Two provisions enable Country
B to collect extra taxes so that multinationals still pay an effective rate of
15 percent on Country A income. Country A collects 10 percent on the $50
earned within its borders, while Country B collects 15 percent on the $50
earned within its borders plus 5 percent on the $50 earned in Country A.
Country A only collects $5, while Country B collects $10. Neither country
has an incentive to defect from the agreement represented by scenario 1 of
figure 3-9 and should therefore cooperate. This is in contrast with the prePillar Two payoff structure, where both countries could earn higher payoffs
by lowering their corporate tax rate relative to the other country.
Overall, Pillar Two overcomes the prisoner’s dilemma by eliminating
a country’s incentive to reduce its corporate tax rate below 15 percent.12
In doing so, it protects future global corporate tax revenues by curbing
tax competition. This is particularly important given the fiscal challenges
facing countries around the world (Dabla-Norris, Di Gregorio, and Cao
2024). However, its ultimate success depends on countries enacting legislation to incorporate Pillar Two into their national laws. The Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development published the Model Rules
in December 2021 (OECD 2021c). As of September 2024, 31 countries,
including most EU members, Canada, Japan, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, New
Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom,
and Vietnam, have enacted legislation to incorporate Pillar Two (PwC
2024b). Another 34 countries have proposed legislation or announced plans
for implementation. The United States has not yet passed legislation to enact
The Pillar Two 15 percent tax rate represents a floor, so countries may choose to have a higher
global tax rate. For example, in the United States, the President’s FY 2025 Budget proposes a 21
percent GILTI tax rate (Treasury 2024).
12

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Figure 3-10. Digital Services as a Share of U.S. Trade
Percent
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021
Share of exports

Share of imports

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Census Bureau; CEA calculations.
Note: Gray bars indicate recessions. Digital services are defined as services potentially
enabled by information and communication technology.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Pillar Two, though the FY 2025 President’s Budget proposes one path to
implementation (White House 2024).

Digitalization and Rethinking Taxing Rights
In addition to cross-border tax planning activities, the rise of the digital
services business model creates unique taxation issues. Many traditional tax
systems focus on production location to determine taxing rights, meaning
multinationals have historically paid income tax where they produce goods
or services, rather than where their customers are located (Nersesyan 2021).
However, digital services can be produced across multiple countries or on
the internet.
Consider the following hypothetical scenario of a U.S. multinational
operating a search engine available to users worldwide. When a business in
Canada buys advertising space on the U.S. multinational’s search engine and
the advertisements are viewed by Canadian consumers, which country has
Aligning the International Tax System with the Globalized Economy | 137

Table 3-1. Digital Services Tax Implementation Timeline
2019
France

2020
Argentina
Austria
Italy
Poland
Tunisia
Turkey
United Kingdom

2021
Kenya
Spain

2022
Nepal
Tanzania

2023
Uganda

2024
Canada
Colombia
Sierra Leone

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: KPMG; CEA calculations.
Note: Table lists countries that have enacted a digital services tax. Countries are listed under
the year that their digital services tax went into effect. Canada's digital services tax, which
went into effect on June 28, 2024, retroactively applied to revenues earned as of January 1,
2022.
2025 Economic Report of the President

the right to tax the advertising profits? Under a traditional tax system, the
United States has taxing rights because the multinational physically operates
in the United States and does not have a physical presence in Canada.
To provide perspective on the magnitude of cross-border digital services activity, figure 3-10 shows that the share of U.S. trade involving digital
services has increased from 14 percent to 21 percent of exports and from
6 percent to roughly 9 percent of imports over the past two decades. The
growth in digital services has exacerbated the tension between traditional
tax systems and the global nature of multinationals.
In response to the rise of digital services activity, some countries have
unilaterally attempted to levy taxes on revenue multinationals generate from
customers within their borders (KPMG 2024). Often referred to as digital
services taxes, they are grounded in part on the claim that users create value
for digital services companies, and these companies therefore do not pay
enough tax in the countries where those users are located (Stotzky and Fano
2023). Generally, countries impose the taxes on large multinationals based
on total revenue associated with specific digital services (e.g., advertising,
online marketplaces, cloud services, social networks, and online dating).
To illustrate the prevalence of digital services taxes, table 3-1 provides a timeline of implementation around the world. In addition to the 16
countries listed in the figure, other countries have announced intentions to
implement a digital services tax.
A country-by-country approach to taxing digital services is problematic for at least three reasons. First, unilateral digital services taxes may pose
potential barriers to international trade to the extent they disproportionately
burden or restrict the economic activities of the implementing country’s
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trading partners. One approach that could be considered discriminatory
is when a country sets a revenue threshold on its digital services tax such
that foreign multinationals are disproportionately impacted by the tax and
domestic multinationals are disproportionately excluded from it. Foreign
multinationals subject to discriminatory digital services taxes may then be
forced to compete on unfair terms. The discrimination concern is especially
pronounced for U.S. multinationals because they represent a plurality of the
largest global digital companies (Forbes 2024).
Second, as discussed in Hines (2023), countries acting unilaterally
have incentives to impose excessively high tax rates on digital multinationals because the costs of higher taxes (i.e., reduced economic activity) are
borne by all countries in which the digital multinationals have users. For
example, imagine a European country levies a tax on the digital services
revenue of a U.S. multinational providing a search engine. Because the tax
reduces the multinational’s after-tax profits, the multinational could respond
by reducing economic output, such as reducing the quality of its search
engine. The reduced search quality would be borne by all of the multinational’s worldwide consumers, not just those in the European country. Thus,
because the European country collects all the tax revenue generated by its
consumer activity but bears only a portion of reduced worldwide economic
activity, the European country is incentivized to impose inefficiently high
tax rates on digital services activity. Indeed, all countries where the U.S.
multinational has users have the same incentive to impose significant taxes.
This ultimately can result in a reduction of economic activity, which erodes
the global tax base.13 These incentives underscore the need for a cooperative
approach to taxing digital services activity.
Third, when digital services are taxed unilaterally, countries do not
coordinate to ensure that the same revenues are not subject to multiple layers
of taxation. In other words, without a coordinated method of apportioning the
revenues, the multinational can end up paying multiple layers of tax on the
same advertising revenues. Further, because digital services taxes are levied
on revenues rather than profit (revenues minus expenses), the multinational
could face digital services taxes, and potentially multiple layers of digital
services taxes, even if it is not profitable. For example, a multinational that
earns revenues of $1 million and incurs expenses of $1.5 million reports net
losses of $500,000. If a digital services tax is levied on the multinational’s
revenues rather than its profit, the multinational might not have the wherewithal to pay the tax because its expenses exceed its revenues.
Given the concerns with a unilateral approach to cross-border digital
services taxation, Pillar One of the Global Tax Deal would replace the
It is also important to consider the economic incidence of digital services taxes. To the extent that
customer demand is inelastic, passing digital services taxes on to customers through increased prices
could reduce the impact of digital services taxes on multinationals’ economic activity.
13

Aligning the International Tax System with the Globalized Economy | 139

Figure 3-11. Illustrative Example of Pillar One Amount A
for Multinational Earning a 20% Profit
Normal profit
10%
Other profit
7.5%
Amount A (allocated
to market countries)
2.5%

Expenses
80%

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; CEA calculations.
Note: Figure illustrates the computation of Amount A for a multinational with global revenues
above 20 billion euros that earns profit equal to 20 percent of revenues.
2025 Economic Report of the President

existing patchwork of digital services taxes with a unified framework for
levying taxes based in part on the location of a multinational’s customers
(OECD 2023d). Specifically, Pillar One reallocates a portion of a multinational’s taxable profit, referred to as Amount A, to its “market countries,”
defined as countries where its customers are located regardless of where its
physical operations are located or where value is actually created (OECD
2023d). For example, Canada would be a market country for a U.S. multinational operating a search engine and earning revenue from Canadian
businesses advertising to Canadian consumers via the search engine, even if
the multinational has no physical presence in Canada.
Amount A is a portion of a multinational’s residual profit, calculated
as 25 percent of profit exceeding 10 percent of revenues (OECD 2023e).
For example, say a large U.S. multinational operating a search engine
earns profit equal to 20 percent of its revenues (see figure 3-11). Pillar One
deems the first 10 percent as routine and the associated taxing rights would
therefore not be reallocated from the multinational’s home country to market
countries. Twenty five percent of the remaining 10 percent (i.e., 2.5 percent) represents the multinational’s Amount A income. The right to tax the
Amount A income would be reallocated to market countries in proportion to
the multinational’s sales distribution across the market countries.

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Levying taxes on profit rather than revenues ensures that multinationals with low or negative profits do not face taxes that they do not have the
wherewithal to pay. In cases where multiple countries have claims to a multinational’s residual profit, the profit is allocated across countries according
to a formula based on final sales in each country. Tax credit and deduction
rules help ensure that digital services profits are not taxed multiple times
(OECD 2023f).
Pillar One alters the authority of market countries to tax the profits of
certain multinationals based on the multinational’s sales to customers within
their borders, regardless of the physical location of the multinational’s assets
(OECD 2023e). The Amount A rules apply only to multinationals with
global revenues above €20 billion ($21.8 billion in October 2024) and profitability above 10 percent of revenues (OECD n.d.). Devereux and Simmler
(2021) report that 78 of the world’s largest 500 companies would likely be
affected by Pillar One, with roughly 64 percent of Amount A income associated with multinationals headquartered in the United States.
Although Pillar One Amount A applies to large multinationals across
different industries, its coordinated approach to taxing digital services
addresses the global rise in digitalization.14 Negotiations are ongoing to
finalize the Pillar One guidelines. As noted, a growing number of countries
have implemented or plan to implement digital services taxes. Pillar One
would replace the existing patchwork of digital services taxes, effectively
prohibit new digital services taxes, and resolve substantial uncertainty
regarding their fate around the globe.

Why the United States Would Benefit
from Adopting the Global Tax Deal
In October 2021, U.S. negotiators agreed with over 130 other countries
to develop a version of Pillars One and Two of the Global Tax Deal that
includes certain pre-agreed key elements, maintaining that U.S. participation
would level the playing field for U.S. businesses and protect U.S. workers
Another element of Pillar One (commonly known as “Amount B” or the “simplified and
streamlined approach”) aims to simplify transfer pricing rules for certain routine wholesale
distribution activities of multinationals (OECD 2024). As noted previously, multinationals
sometimes manipulate transfer prices on transactions between affiliates to shift income between
countries. This leads to a corresponding shift of the tax base between countries. Wholesale
distribution transactions are extremely common within multinational groups and are relatively easy
to price. However, despite their frequent nature and the ease of pricing them, these transactions are
notorious for generating costly disputes, not only between taxpayers and tax administrations, but
also between tax administrations (Sutton 2024). The Amount B provision of Pillar One is intended to
improve tax certainty, reduce tax compliance and tax administration costs, and improve efficiencies
in the tax system by providing simplified and streamlined transfer pricing rules for routine wholesale
distribution activities.
14

Aligning the International Tax System with the Globalized Economy | 141

(Yellen 2022). Although the Pillar One guidance is not yet finalized, the
President’s FY 2025 Budget proposes multiple measures designed to bring
the United States into compliance with Pillar Two (Treasury 2024). The
measures include modifying the GILTI rules to be applied on a countryby-country basis, raising the minimum tax rate on GILTI to 21 percent, and
adopting an Undertaxed Payments Rule.
Ultimately, legislative action would be required to bring the United
States into compliance with the Global Tax Deal. The United States has
strong reasons to enact such legislation, including potential revenue generation and more efficient allocation of economic resources.

Potential Revenue Generation
The global race to the bottom and the rise of cross-border tax planning have
contributed to growing budget deficits. The Congressional Budget Office
projects that the U.S. national deficit will rise to a peak of 7.1 percent of
GDP in 2033 as the aging population increases Social Security and Medicare
spending and revenues do not keep pace (CBO 2024b). High deficits could
present challenges, including limiting the government’s ability to finance
coordinated federal responses to negative macroeconomic shocks, crowding
out private investment, and raising government borrowing costs (Boskin
2020). Although analysts do not agree on a tipping point at which debt levels
become economically harmful (Caner, Grennes, and Koehler-Geib 2010;
Yang and Su 2018; Gokhale and Smetters 2023), recent and projected trends
underscore the need for revenue-raising tax reform, including from multinationals, that can ensure the United States is on a sustainable fiscal path.
Given that many U.S. multinationals are already operating in countries
that have enacted Pillar Two legislation, the United States will lose out on
revenue if it does not adopt the deal. As long as any single country where a
multinational operates has enacted an Undertaxed Payments Rule, the multinational must pay the 15 percent minimum tax in all countries in which it
operates. Other countries may therefore capture tax revenue that would otherwise flow to the United States. If the United States adopts the Global Tax
Deal, it will collect the top-up tax on U.S. multinationals’ foreign income.
If the United States does not adopt the deal, other countries will collect the
top-up tax on U.S. multinationals’ foreign income via their Undertaxed
Payments Rule. Indeed, the Income Inclusion Rule, Undertaxed Payments
Rule, and Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax are designed to incentivize countries to adopt the Global Tax Deal because they will miss out on
potential tax revenue, and even surrender the revenue to other countries, by
failing to adopt.
Scoring the prospective revenue from U.S. adoption of Pillar Two is
challenging, given the many variants of how countries can adopt and how

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Chapter 3

multinationals can change their income shifting behavior. However, the
CEA’s view is that U.S. adoption of Pillar Two is highly likely to generate
new revenues by stabilizing the international tax system and ending the race
to the bottom, thus allowing the United States to more sustainably and fairly
tax multinationals’ income.

More Equitable and Efficient Economic Resource Allocation
As discussed earlier, international tax competition resulted in a significant
reduction in average corporate tax rates over the past two decades. To the
extent U.S. multinationals relocate economic activity to less productive
locations because they are attracted to low corporate tax rates, lost corporate
tax revenue is compounded by the social cost of lower productivity. Further,
U.S. multinationals shifting income to less productive, low-tax locations
without moving economic activity out of the United States deprives the
United States of the related corporate tax revenue. The Global Tax Deal
alleviates this distortionary behavior.
Domestic businesses cannot engage in cross-border tax planning
activity, making it harder for them to compete with multinationals as they
must earn greater pre-tax profits to make the same after-tax profits as multinationals. The Global Tax Deal levels the playing field for domestic U.S.
businesses by disincentivizing cross-border tax planning. In doing so, the
deal also encourages businesses to allocate capital based on workforce talent
and market factors instead of tax minimization strategies.
The revenue thresholds for digital services taxes generally result in
the taxes being applied to large multinationals, which are disproportionately
based in the United States. A 2019 report by the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative indicates that eight of the nine firms potentially subject to
France’s proposed Digital Services Tax on advertising revenue at the time
were based in the United States and more than 75 percent of digital advertising in France was accounted for by U.S.-based Alphabet (formerly Google)
and Meta (formerly Facebook) (USTR 2019). Pillar One’s worldwide
efficacy therefore depends on U.S. approval. Without Pillar One, digital
services taxes will continue to proliferate, leading to excessively high digital
services tax rates and double taxation that will disproportionately harm U.S.
multinationals.
Adopting the Global Tax Deal will also enable multinationals to reallocate resources used for tax planning and tax compliance to more productive
uses. Multinationals often hire employees or outside advisers specifically
dedicated to optimizing their income shifting strategies. U.S. adoption of
the Global Tax Deal would bring congruence and stability to the international tax system, which will reduce tax uncertainty for U.S. multinationals

Aligning the International Tax System with the Globalized Economy | 143

and make the monetary investments in tax-motivated income shifting less
profitable.

Conclusion
Despite significant macroeconomic shocks and geopolitical tensions over
the past decade, the global economy remains deeply interconnected. Given
the integrated world economy, the rise of digital services, and the distortionary incentives that result from tax competition, a multilateral tax system
aligned with the nature of today’s multinationals would benefit the United
States and the world. International tax coordination will evolve as countries
learn whether the provisions are functioning as intended. But given that
multinationals based in the United States represent a substantial portion of
global GDP, the country’s participation in any international tax agreement
is crucial for the system’s effectiveness and efficiency.
Many provisions of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act are set to expire
at the end of 2025, giving U.S. lawmakers an opportune moment to consider the Global Tax Deal (CRS 2024). The impending sunsets, combined
with the need for more revenue to address growing budget deficits, have
generated much discussion about the future of the U.S. tax system, including multinational taxation. From the perspective of efficiency, fairness,
productivity, and fiscal sustainability, the United States would benefit from
adopting the Global Tax Deal provisions and working cooperatively with
other countries to bring the international tax system into alignment with the
globalized economy.

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Chapter 4

Expanding and Strengthening U.S.
Health Insurance Coverage
Health insurance provides valuable financial protection against costly medical expenses and allows people to access essential healthcare. It can improve
quality and length of life, and for some groups like children, the benefits can
be particularly long lasting, leading them to grow into healthier and more
economically secure adults with healthier children of their own.
This chapter explores the many recent policies undertaken by the U.S. government to help individuals and families access affordable and high-quality
health insurance coverage. What is the rationale for many of these interventions and expenditures, and why has the Biden-Harris Administration taken
extensive action to ensure more Americans than ever before can access
health insurance?
Economists have long understood that private health insurance markets can
malfunction on their own and, as a result, leave many people without affordable coverage options (Mankiw 2017). Health insurance works by pooling
risk among a group of people and collecting an upfront fee (i.e., premium) to
cover the expected costs of their healthcare. For insurance to work properly,
not everyone in the pool can become ill and require expensive care at the
same time. Because health costs can be predicted to some extent by both
the individuals and entities bearing the risk, insurance pools must include
people with differing levels of risk (CRS 2023a). For this reason, every highincome country in the world other than the United States either provides
or mandates universal health insurance coverage to encourage broad risk
pooling (Schneider et al. 2021).

145

The United States has taken an approach centered around employer-based
insurance coverage, with approximately 54 percent of people receiving
individual- or family-level coverage through an employer at any point
during the year (Keisler-Starkey and Bunch 2024). By providing coverage
to employees and their family members, employer-based coverage pools
risk (Claxton, Rae, and Winger 2024). For certain people without access to
employer-based insurance, such as entrepreneurs and other workers without
an offer of coverage, retirees, and those unable to work or with low income,
federal programs provide coverage. The United States provides public
insurance coverage to retirees, individuals with disabilities, and low-income
families through Medicare or Medicaid. Everyone else is able to purchase
private health insurance coverage through a marketplace regulated by the
government to provide quality insurance options.
Without government intervention, the private market would likely underprovide essential health insurance coverage to many Americans—an outcome
the Biden-Harris Administration has worked to avoid. Prior to federal
reform under the 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA), it was difficult for
many people without access to employer-based coverage to acquire health
insurance (Collins et al. 2017). The ACA addressed the problem by creating
a regulated Marketplace for private health insurance coverage, providing
government subsidies for Americans to purchase coverage, and expanding
Medicaid eligibility to low-income adults in the 40 states and D.C. that have
adopted Medicaid expansions (KFF 2024a). As a measure of the ACA’s
success, the uninsurance rate declined from 14.5 percent in 2013, the year
prior to these changes, to 8.6 percent in 2016 (Census 2013; Census 2016).
However, the uninsurance rate slowly ticked up over the next four years, and
the COVID-19 pandemic made it clear that uninsurance and underinsurance
(i.e., when people have gaps in coverage or coverage that does not provide
adequate financial protection) remained barriers to people accessing the
healthcare they need (Bornstein et al. 2020).

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Chapter 4

Table 4-1. Notable Biden-Harris Administration Health
Insurance Policies

Expanding Access to Marketplace Coverage

• Increased generosity of Premium Tax Credits to help purchase Marketplace
coverage
• Created a special open enrollment period in 2021 in response to the pandemic
• Extended the annual open enrollment period to 10 weeks
• Substantially increased funding for advertising and enrollment assistance

• Established a year-round special enrollment period for those with incomes less
than 150 percent of the federal poverty level
• Fixed the family glitch to extend financial assistance to eligible family members
•.Protected consumers from junk health plans with short-term duration limits and
coverage disclaimers

Protecting and Extending Medicaid Coverage

• Raised federal matching funds to encourage states to adopt ACA Medicaid
expansions
• Provided states with the option to extend postpartum Medicaid coverage from
60 days to 12 months
• Required states to provide 12 months of continuous eligibility for children in
Medicaid and CHIP
• Minimized declines in coverage following the end of pandemic-era continuous
Medicaid coverage

Strengthening Prescription Drug Coverage and Reducing Costs Under
Medicare

• Limited out-of-pocket insulin spending under Medicare Parts B and D to $35 per
month/prescription
• Expanded the Low-Income Subsidy Program under Medicare Part D
• Capped out-of-pocket prescription drug spending under Part D beginning in 2024
• Gave Medicare the authority to negotiate prices of certain high-price drugs

The Biden-Harris Administration made it a priority to build on and strengthen
the success of the ACA to achieve its aim of extending quality health coverage to all Americans. Table 4-1 provides a list of the Administration’s notable
policies. As a result of the efforts, uninsurance rates reached all-time lows
during the last four years. Specifically, the Administration took major steps
to build on the three main sources of health insurance for people without
access to affordable employer-based coverage: the Marketplace, Medicaid,
and Medicare. The Administration expanded access to financial assistance
for individuals and families to purchase Marketplace coverage, leading to
Expanding and Strengthening U.S. Health Insurance Coverage | 147

unprecedented levels of enrollment. The Administration also put policies
in place, including some intended to reduce insurance loss during the end
of pandemic-era program expansions, to both expand and protect Medicaid
coverage for low-income individuals. Finally, the Administration enhanced
the Medicare program by taking steps to improve prescription drug affordability and provide relief to elderly Americans and those with disabilities.
This chapter begins with a brief overview of recent changes in insurance
coverage in the United States and evidence on the benefits of health insurance. The remaining sections review the major developments in health
insurance policy over the last four years as they relate to the Marketplace,
Medicaid, and Medicare programs.

The Role of Health Insurance
The United States reached record high rates of insurance coverage over the
last four years. The share of people with insurance coverage increased from
91.4 percent in 2021 to 92.1 percent in 2023, which is the most recent year
of data available (see figure 4-1). The growth in coverage under the BidenHarris Administration reverses a decline observed between 2017 and 2019
and builds onto the coverage increase between 2013 and 2016 associated
with the ACA.

Insurance Coverage and Financial Protection
The primary purpose of health insurance is to protect against unexpected
healthcare expenses. Not only is healthcare costly, but there is uncertainty
around when an individual might become sick or injured and require care.
Health insurance reduces risk exposure by allowing people to pay a premium
to cover the healthcare expenses associated with any negative health event.
Health insurance coverage has been shown to reduce out-of-pocket
medical expenditures. For example, the introduction of Medicare in 1965 led
to a 40 percent decline in out-of-pocket spending for those in the top quartile
of healthcare expenditures (Finkelstein and McKnight 2008). In a 2008
randomized lottery for expanded Medicaid coverage in Oregon, low-income
adults gaining coverage saw substantial decreases in out-of-pocket spending, including the near elimination of catastrophic expenditures (Baicker et
al. 2013).
Protection against medical expenditure risk affects people’s overall
financial security. An analysis of the Oregon lottery found that Medicaid
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Figure 4-1. U.S. Insurance Coverage Rate, 2013–2023
Percent

94
92
90

Biden-Harris
Administration

88
86
84

82
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

Council of Economic Advisers

Source: American Community Survey Tables for Health Insurance Coverage.
Note: Respondents are considered to have insurance coverage if they have a current
source of coverage other than the Indian Health Service. The ACS did not release 2020
health insurance coverage estimates due to the pandemic's impact on data collection.
2025 Economic Report of the President

coverage reduced the likelihood of borrowing money or skipping bills to pay
for medical care by 58 percent (Baicker et al. 2013), with a 25 percent reduction in unpaid medical bills being sent to a collection agency (Finkelstein
et al. 2012).
Quasi-experimental studies of Medicaid and insurance expansions in
other states have similar findings, indicating that expanded coverage reduces
medical debt and leads to better financial outcomes, including higher credit
scores and better terms of credit, fewer payday loans, and a reduction in
personal bankruptcies (e.g., Gross and Notowidigdo 2011; Mazumder and
Miller 2016; Allen et al. 2017; Hu et al. 2018; Caswell and Waidmann 2019;
Brevoort, Grodzicki, and Hackmann 2020; Miller et al. 2021). Research
indicates the transition to Medicare coverage at age 65 leads to similar
financial protection (Barcellos and Jacobson 2015; Caswell and Goddeeris
2020; Goldsmith-Pinkham, Pinkovskiy, and Wallace 2023).
Growing evidence suggests that expanded access to health insurance
can prevent low-income families from having to go without other necessities
to pay for essential medical care. Studies of the ACA Medicaid expansions
beginning in 2014, which have been shown to reduce out-of-pocket medical
spending among low-income adults (Abramowitz 2020), find lowered rates
of food insecurity (Moellman 2020) and housing eviction (Allen et al. 2019),
indicating the expansions made households better able to meet their basic
Expanding and Strengthening U.S. Health Insurance Coverage | 149

needs. Additionally, families gaining eligibility for financial assistance to
purchase Marketplace coverage under the ACA saw a 25 percent decline in
their rate of home payment delinquency (Gallagher, Gopalan, and GrinsteinWeiss 2019).

Insurance Coverage and Health
In addition to offering financial protection, health insurance has the potential
to improve health if it increases access to effective medical care. The effect
is often observed among low-income populations who may be unable to
otherwise afford healthcare and who also have worse health outcomes than
higher income groups.
Following the ACA Medicaid expansions, low-income adults reported
improved ability to access medical care across a range of measures (Guth,
Garfield, and Rudowitz 2020). Not only did utilization increase for many
types of healthcare (Guth, Garfield, and Rudowitz 2020), but research
indicates that the use of services known to be particularly beneficial for
health, including screenings and treatment for cancers (Eguia et al. 2018;
Sabik et al. 2018) and prescription drugs for chronic conditions like diabetes
and heart disease (Ghosh, Simon, and Sommers 2019), also increased. The
results are generally consistent with research on the Oregon Medicaid lottery
that found the program increased the use of many types of care, including
preventive services, in addition to diagnosis of and medication use for diabetes (Finkelstein et al. 2012; Baicker et al. 2013; Finkelstein et al. 2016).
While changes in health can be difficult to measure with available data, evidence indicates that access to health insurance does impact
health for certain groups. One of the Oregon lottery analyses found significant improvements in self-reported health measures among those gaining Medicaid coverage (Finkelstein et al. 2012), a similar finding to that of
many ACA insurance expansion studies (Soni, Wherry, and Simon 2020).
While studies of the Oregon lottery did not detect overall changes in physical health measures (Baicker et al. 2013), a recent re-analysis found that
people with little prior healthcare use who gained Medicaid experienced an
improvement in blood pressure (Inoue et al. 2024). Studies examining the
impact of historic Medicaid expansions have documented large reductions
in infant and child mortality (Currie and Gruber 1996a; Currie and Gruber
1996b; Goodman-Bacon 2018), findings echoed in recent research showing substantial declines in adult mortality as a result of the ACA Medicaid
expansions or other state insurance expansions (Sommers, Baicker, and
Epstein 2012; Sommers, Long, and Baicker 2014; Borgschulte and Vogler
2020; Miller, Johnson, and Wherry 2021; Wyse and Meyer 2023). A novel
experimental study of a federal outreach program increasing insurance coverage primarily through the ACA Marketplace found that the intervention

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reduced mortality among middle-aged adults (Goldin, Lurie, and McCubbin
2021). Finally, there is evidence that Medicare coverage reduces mortality
among elderly patients hospitalized with serious illnesses (Card, Dobkin,
and Maestas 2009).
Growing evidence also suggests that, in addition to having short-term
effects on health outcomes, access to health insurance has the potential to
improve long-term health trajectories. Using quasi-experimental research
designs exploiting variation in childhood exposure to Medicaid across
cohorts or geographic areas to identify long-term effects, researchers have
found evidence of improved self-reported health at later ages (Currie,
Decker, and Lin 2008), reduced chronic diseases and related hospitalizations
(Boudreaux, Golberstein, and McAlpine 2016; Thompson 2017; Wherry
et al. 2018; Miller and Wherry 2019), reductions in disability (GoodmanBacon 2021), and reduced mortality later in life (Wherry and Meyer 2016;
Sohn 2017; Brown, Kowalski, and Lurie 2020; Goodman-Bacon 2021).
Health insurance coverage can also impact the health of future generations of Americans. Evidence indicates that not only do children who gain
Medicaid coverage grow into healthier adults, but they also have healthier
children of their own (East et al. 2023).

Insurance Coverage, Labor Supply, and Beyond
Despite concerns that expanding subsidized options for non-employer-based
health insurance could negatively affect labor supply, evidence of the effect
is minimal. One review concludes that ACA insurance expansions did not
have major impacts on employment, hours worked, or wages (Gruber and
Sommers 2019). The findings are consistent with evidence from the Oregon
lottery, where researchers found Medicaid had no effect on employment
status or earnings (Baicker et al. 2014). Other evidence indicates that
increased access to non-employer-based insurance under the ACA has led to
an increase in self-employment among certain groups (Bailey 2017; Bailey
and Dave 2018; Blume-Kohout 2023).
Over the long term, access to health insurance can have significant
positive effects on labor market outcomes and economic wellbeing.
Specifically, a growing body of evidence shows that childhood exposure
to Medicaid can affect individuals’ long-term trajectories and increase
educational attainment and adult earnings, decrease use of public assistance
programs, and reduce the likelihood of incarceration (Cohodes et al. 2016;
Miller and Wherry 2019; Brown, Kowalski, and Lurie 2020; GoodmanBacon 2021; Arenberg, Neller, and Stripling 2024). Further, providing
Medicaid to children has been shown to repay its initial cost in the form of
additional tax revenue and reduced government transfers once the children
become adults (Hendren and Sprung-Keyser 2020; Goodman-Bacon 2021).

Expanding and Strengthening U.S. Health Insurance Coverage | 151

Expanding Access to Marketplace Coverage
The ACA Marketplace has seen record-breaking enrollment during the
Biden-Harris Administration (CEA 2024). As seen in figure 4-2, 21.4 million people signed up for Marketplace coverage during open enrollment
for the 2024 plan year, nearly double the number of enrollments for 2020.
Created in 2014, the ACA Marketplace has allowed nearly 50 million people
to gain health insurance coverage over the last decade, meaning nearly
one out of every seven people living in the United States has benefited
from Marketplace coverage (Treasury 2024a). In addition, the Marketplace
is a source of coverage for self-employed workers and small business
owners; in 2022, these groups represented 28 percent of Marketplace
enrollees (Treasury 2024b). The surge in Marketplace enrollment under
this Administration reflects policy efforts to increase the affordability of
Marketplace coverage and remove barriers to enrollment by intensifying
outreach and simplifying ways to sign up for coverage. During the four years
prior, enrollment had stagnated.

Figure 4-2. Marketplace Enrollment at the End of Open
Enrollment
Number of individuals who selected a marketplace plan (millions)
22

Enrollment for plan year
beginning Jan. 2024

20
18
16
14
12
10

Biden-Harris
Administration

8
6
4
2
0
2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Council of Economic Advisers

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

Sources: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services; Department of Health and Human Services.
Note: Data for each year denote plan selections during the open enrollment period for that plan
year.
2025 Economic Report of the President

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The ACA Marketplace has been successful in providing health insurance options for people without access to other affordable coverage. In the
program’s first year, 8.0 million people enrolled in private coverage through
the Marketplace during the annual open enrollment period. The number
jumped to 11.7 million in 2015 and grew further to 12.7 million in 2016
(see figure 4-2). The majority of people who enrolled in the Marketplace
received financial assistance in these years: In 2016, 83 percent of enrollees
qualified for premium tax credits to help with the purchase of Marketplace
coverage (ASPE 2016). Research shows that previously uninsured adults
who gained access to subsidized Marketplace coverage experienced a
decrease in barriers to medical care and increased their use of outpatient
services and prescription drugs (Goldman et al. 2018). The premium subsidies, along with additional cost-sharing reductions provided by the ACA,
were associated with a 17 percent reduction in out-of-pocket spending and
30 percent reduced likelihood of catastrophic health expenditures for lowincome individuals (Liu et al. 2021).
Following the initial Marketplace enrollment growth, fewer people
enrolled between 2017 and 2020, possibly related to efforts under the Trump
Administration to undermine the ACA. In 2018, one in three non-elderly
people who were uninsured were eligible for free or subsidized coverage in
the ACA Marketplace (Cox and McDermott 2020), suggesting that many
people may be unaware of the option or unable to access it. Enrollment
through the ACA Marketplace is typically limited to an annual open enrollment period, with the exception of certain qualifying life events. Designed to
prevent people from signing up only when they need expensive healthcare,
open enrollment periods can limit coverage opportunities for other individuals, particularly if they are not well advertised or understood. Changes during the Trump Administration to shorten the annual open enrollment period
from 12 to 6 weeks and cut funding for marketing and enrollment assistance
likely exacerbated barriers (Lueck 2021; Pollitz and Amin 2021). In addition, the individual mandate component of the ACA was removed in 2019,
likely having an effect on Marketplace enrollment (Fiedler 2020).
Finally, Marketplace insurance affordability remained an issue for
families despite government subsidies to help purchase coverage. Prior to
the Biden-Harris Administration, families with incomes below 400 percent
of the federal poverty level (FPL) still faced expected premium contributions
of between 2 percent and 10 percent of their income on a sliding scale, while
families above 400 percent FPL had no cap on the percent of their income
they may need to spend on premiums, a significant burden for people in
their 50s and 60s (Banthin et al. 2024; Banthin, Skopec, and Simpson 2024).

Expanding and Strengthening U.S. Health Insurance Coverage | 153

Expansion in Premium Tax Credits
The Biden-Harris Administration implemented several important policies
to expand access to ACA Marketplace coverage and address affordability issues, leading to unprecedented growth in Marketplace enrollment.
One major initiative expanded federal financial assistance to purchase
Marketplace insurance. Initially, individuals with incomes between 100 percent and 400 percent FPL and no other source of affordable coverage were
eligible for premium tax credits toward the purchase of Marketplace coverage. The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA) increased the credit
amount for those who already qualified for assistance. It also expanded
eligibility to people with incomes above 400 percent FPL for the first time,
implementing a cap on expected maximum premium contributions of 8.5
percent of income for these households (Congress 2021). The changes
lowered premiums net of the premium tax credit (i.e., net premiums) for
most individuals and families, helping more people to enroll in coverage
(Ortaliza et al. 2024). While originally slated for two years of availability,
the expanded premium tax credits were extended through 2025 under the
Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA) (Congress 2022a).
The expanded premium tax credits reduced net premiums for millions
of Americans, saving them an average of over $800 annually (CMS 2023a).
Individuals and families with incomes just above the Medicaid eligibility
threshold (i.e., between 138 percent and 150 percent FPL), or residing in
states not implementing the ACA Medicaid expansions and having incomes
between 100 percent and 138 percent FPL, saw their maximum required
premium contribution decrease to 0 percent of income under the expanded
premium tax credits, down from roughly 2 percent to 4 percent of income
(Banthin et al. 2024). As shown in figure 4-3, Marketplace enrollment
nearly doubled for households with incomes between 100 percent and 150
percent FPL between 2020 and 2023. A noticeable, though less pronounced,
increase is evident for the “other” group, which includes enrollees with
household incomes above 400 percent FPL.
Figure 4-3 also shows a large bump in enrollment in 2024 for the 100–
150 percent FPL group, as well as smaller increases for the 150–200 percent
and 200–250 percent FPL groups. The increase likely reflects, in part, the
end of pandemic-era Medicaid coverage in 2023 and actions to assist those
no longer eligible for Medicaid to transition to Marketplace coverage.
As shown in figure 4-4, expanded access to the Marketplace has
particularly benefited people residing in the 10 states that have opted
not to implement ACA Medicaid expansions. Marketplace enrollment in
non-expansion states increased by 152 percent between 2020 and 2024,
reaching a total enrollment of 11.3 million in the 10 states without ACA
Medicaid expansions as of 2024. In contrast, Marketplace enrollment grew

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Figure 4-3. Marketplace Enrollment by Household
Income as a Percent of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL)

Millions of enrollees
10
8
6
4
2
0
2020

2021
100-150% FPL
250-300% FPL

Council of Economic Advisers

2022
150-200% FPL
300-400% FPL

2023

2024
200-250% FPL
Other

Sources: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services; CEA calculations.
Note: Data for each year denote plan selections during the open enrollment period for that
year. Idaho, Nevada, and Vermont are excluded due to inconsistent availability of enrollee
income information. "Other" category includes enrollees with household income less than
100 percent FPL and greater than 400 percent FPL, and those with no reported income
because they did not request financial assistance.
2025 Economic Report of the President

by 40 percent in expansion states over the same period, and total enrollment
reached 8.3 million in 2024 across the 35 states, along with D.C., with ACA
Medicaid expansions in place during the period.1 The growth in Marketplace
enrollment in non-expansion states likely reflects the relatively few alternative coverage sources available to low-income families in the states and,
therefore, heightened need for coverage. However, subsidized Marketplace
coverage is unavailable to individuals with incomes less than 100 percent
FPL in the non-expansion states, creating a coverage gap.
In addition to increasing Marketplace enrollment, the expanded
premium tax credits also made plans with relatively low cost-sharing (i.e.,
deductibles, copays, and coinsurance) more affordable. The Marketplace
offers plans in different categories (Bronze, Silver, Gold, and Platinum)
The five states adopting ACA Medicaid expansions after January 1, 2020 are excluded from this
analysis.

1

Expanding and Strengthening U.S. Health Insurance Coverage | 155

Figure 4-4. Marketplace Enrollment by State ACA
Medicaid Expansion Status
Millions of enrollees
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

ACA expansion states
2020

Council of Economic Advisers

Non-ACA expansion states
2024

Sources: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services; CEA calculations.
Note: Data for each year denote plan selections during the open enrollment period for that
year. States that adopted ACA Medicaid expansions after January 1, 2020 are excluded
(Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and South Dakota).
2025 Economic Report of the President

based on the plan versus enrollee share of the costs for covered services.
As with most health insurance, Marketplace premiums tend to increase with
the level of coverage of the plans (i.e., lower cost-sharing). While premium
subsidies are calculated based on the cost of Silver plans, some consumers
choose to use the increased subsidies to purchase plans with better levels
of coverage. In addition, for people with incomes less than 250 percent
FPL qualifying for additional cost-sharing reductions on Silver plans, the
expanded premium tax credits decreased the cost of the plans, yielding
either zero or low premiums (Congress 2021). Due in part to the change,
the number of Marketplace enrollees receiving cost-sharing reductions
increased from 5.3 million in early 2020 to 10.4 million by February 2024
(CMS 2020; CMS 2024a).
The Biden-Harris Administration has called on Congress to make the
expanded premium tax credits, authorized by current law through 2025, a
permanent policy change (White House 2024a). The Congressional Budget
Office and Joint Committee on Taxation estimate that, on average each year,
3.4 million additional people will have health insurance from 2025 to 2034 if
the premium tax credit expansion is made permanent (CBO 2024).

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Beyond Tax Credits: Federal Actions Expanding Marketplace
Enrollment
Additional federal actions have contributed to the historic Marketplace
enrollment growth in recent years. To address the ongoing COVID-19
pandemic and allow people to access the expanded financial assistance
made available in early 2021, a special open enrollment period was created from February 15 to August 15 in 2021, during which more than 2.8
million people signed up for ACA Marketplace coverage (Branham et al.
2022). In addition, the Biden-Harris Administration in 2021 reversed policy
changes implemented under the Trump Administration, including extending the annual open enrollment period to 10 weeks and increasing funding
for advertising and enrollment assistance (Treasury and HHS 2021; HHS
2022a).
Other changes expanded enrollment opportunities for low-income
individuals and simplified the transition to Marketplace coverage during
the end of pandemic-related Medicaid coverage. Starting in 2022, the
administration created a special enrollment period for people with incomes
under 150 percent FPL, allowing them to enroll in Marketplace coverage
year round (HHS 2022b).2 Originally specified to coincide only with the
expanded premium tax credits, the special enrollment period was made
permanent in 2024, meaning it will remain available even if the expanded
subsidies expire in 2025 (Treasury and HHS 2024). To reduce the potential
negative effects of the end of Medicaid’s pandemic-related continuous
coverage provision in 2023, the Biden-Harris Administration created a
temporary special enrollment period for individuals and their families who
lost Medicaid or Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) coverage
(CMS 2024b). While the loss of Medicaid or CHIP coverage is a qualifying
life event already allowing for Marketplace enrollment, the standard rules
require that enrollment occur within 60 days of the loss. The special enrollment period relaxes the time constraint. The Administration also engaged
in outreach efforts to help people make transitions from Medicaid to ACA
Marketplace coverage (CMS 2023b).
Further, the Biden-Harris Administration revised a prior interpretation
of family eligibility rules for premium tax credits, which often prevented
the families of low-wage employees from receiving assistance. Previously,
the so-called family glitch did not allow families to qualify for premium tax
credits if the employed members had access to affordable individual coverage through their employer, even if the available family coverage option was
unaffordable (Keith 2022). Beginning in 2023, the Administration revised
the eligibility rules to fix the glitch (HHS 2022c).
The change went into effect in 2022 for low-income individuals in states with Marketplaces on
HealthCare.gov and was made optional for states operating Marketplaces on their own platforms.

2

Expanding and Strengthening U.S. Health Insurance Coverage | 157

Effective in November 2024, the Biden-Harris Administration extended
eligibility for Marketplace plans to Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival
(DACA) recipients, as well as eligibility for financial assistance if they meet
the other qualifying criteria. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMS) estimate that this change could lead to 100,000 previously uninsured
DACA recipients newly enrolling in health coverage (CMS 2024c).3
Finally, the Biden-Harris Administration took deliberate steps to
further strengthen the Marketplace by protecting consumers from so-called
junk health plans, which emerged following a rollback of federal regulations
under the Trump Administration. Short-term, limited-duration insurance
plans (STLDI), commonly known as junk plans, were designed to fill temporary gaps in coverage, but a 2018 regulation extended their duration from
90 days to almost a year, renewable for up to three years. Junk plans could
use consumers’ medical histories to raise their premiums or deny them coverage (Pollitz et al. 2018). The plans did not need to adhere to ACA plans’
minimum coverage requirements and threatened to attract individuals with
low health risks away from the Marketplace, thereby potentially impacting
the Marketplace risk pool and leading to elevated premiums (Young 2020).
In addition, a number of high-profile instances highlighted how consumers
were misled into thinking they were purchasing comprehensive coverage,
then were surprised by thousands of dollars in medical bills (Gantz 2019;
Levey 2019; Avila 2019). In response, the Biden-Harris Administration
limited STLDI plans to four months, capping the length of plans advertised
as “short-term,” and required plans to disclose their coverage limitations
(White House 2024b). These changes went into effect for plans sold on or
after September 1, 2024.
The changes during the Biden-Harris Administration have both
expanded and strengthened the ACA Marketplace. The Administration’s
policies have not only increased enrollment, but they have also likely
improved the risk pool by attracting young people, who tend to have lower
health risks, on average, than older adults, to enroll in Marketplace coverage.4 In addition, the growth in Marketplace enrollment is expected to bring
stability to the private insurance market for individuals and families and
encourage competition among insurers (Banthin et al. 2024). If made permanent, the changes could help keep premiums low, attract increasing numbers
of enrollees, and contribute to the long-term success of the Marketplace.

This estimate includes new enrollment in a Basic Health Program, which DACA recipients were
also allowed to enroll in starting in November 2024. Two states currently operate Basic Health
Programs, which cover individuals with incomes between 133–200 percent FPL (CMS 2024d).
4
The share of people under age 45 signing up for coverage under Marketplace open enrollment
increased from 50.6 percent to 55.3 percent from 2020 to 2024, according to CEA calculations based
on CMS Marketplace Open Enrollment Period public use files.
3

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Protecting and Extending Medicaid Coverage
Despite the ACA’s aim of improving access to affordable health insurance,
coverage gaps still exist in states that did not expand Medicaid as intended
under the law. While Medicaid is the nation’s public health insurance
program for low-income individuals, eligibility rules prior to the ACA were
restrictive and generally excluded childless adults and many low-income parents (MACPAC 2021a). Since 2010, 40 states and D.C. expanded Medicaid
to non-elderly adults with incomes up to 138 percent FPL; four states have
expanded Medicaid since President Biden took office (KFF 2024a). In
non-expansion states, most childless adults and low-income parents with
incomes below 138 percent FPL remain ineligible for Medicaid.5 Because
of the way ACA changes were implemented, individuals in non-expansion
states with incomes below 100 percent FPL do not qualify for subsidized
Marketplace coverage (CRS 2021). This creates a gap in affordable coverage options. People in this coverage gap are primarily located in southern
states and disproportionately Black and Hispanic (Drake et al. 2024).
Even for eligible individuals, Medicaid enrollment can be unstable.
Research indicates that approximately 20 percent of people with Medicaid
or Marketplace coverage are at risk of losing insurance coverage at some
point over a two-year period, as compared to just 8.5 percent of those with
employer-based coverage (Einav and Finkelstein 2023). In addition, about
8 percent of Medicaid and CHIP beneficiaries disenroll and re-enroll in
the program within a year (MACPAC 2021b). While some of this churn
results from changes in eligibility (e.g., short-term income fluctuations), it
also likely reflects administrative or informational barriers related to state
eligibility redeterminations. Not only does churn create administrative costs
(Sugar et al. 2021), but disruptions in coverage may prevent people from
receiving necessary healthcare and lead to prolonged uninsurance (Einav
and Finkelstein 2023). While states were barred from disenrolling most
people from Medicaid in exchange for enhanced federal funding during the
COVID-19 public health emergency (PHE), the provision expired in March
2023, requiring states to redetermine eligibility for Medicaid recipients
(CMS 2023c).
The Biden-Harris Administration therefore implemented a number
of policies to strengthen Medicaid by facilitating expansions in eligibility,
promoting continuity of coverage at the end of the COVID-19 PHE, offering
12-month continuous eligibility to certain vulnerable population groups like
children and postpartum individuals, and reducing administrative barriers to
enrollment.
The median Medicaid income eligibility threshold for non-disabled parents in the non-expansion
states for a family of three is 34 percent FPL (or $8,779) as of May 2024, while non-disabled adults
without children only qualify for Medicaid in one of 10 states (KFF 2024b; Wisconsin DHS 2024).

5

Expanding and Strengthening U.S. Health Insurance Coverage | 159

Expanding Medicaid Coverage
To close the Medicaid coverage gap, the ARPA offered additional federal
matching funds to states that had yet to expand Medicaid eligibility.
Specifically, it provided a two-year, 5 percentage point increase in federal
contribution to non-expansion Medicaid costs for any states newly expanding
their Medicaid program (CRS 2021). Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
and South Dakota received the ARPA increase for Medicaid expansion. As
a result, an estimated 1.1 million adults became newly eligible for Medicaid
coverage.6 Numerous studies show that previous ACA Medicaid expansions
were linked to significant coverage gains, narrowed racial gaps in healthcare
access, increased use of healthcare among low-income individuals, and
improved health outcomes (Guth, Garfield, and Rudowitz 2020).
The ARPA also provided the option for states to extend postpartum
Medicaid coverage, an important step toward reducing the United States’
high rate of preventable maternal mortality, which disproportionately affects
Black, American Indian, and Alaska Native women (Hill et al. 2024). One
in three pregnancy-related deaths occurs between one week and one year
postpartum (Petersen et al. 2019). Before 2021, most individuals eligible for
Medicaid because of pregnancy received only 60 days of postpartum coverage. Eligibility after 60 days often depended on state eligibility rules for
parents, which were less generous than eligibility rules for pregnant people,
particularly in non-ACA expansion states (Ranji et al. 2022).7 Prior to the
policy change, more than 20 percent of individuals with pregnancy coverage through Medicaid, which covers 41 percent of all births (KFF 2024d),
became uninsured between two and six months postpartum (Johnston et al.
2021). Two thirds of the people who lost Medicaid coverage during the early
postpartum period remained uninsured nine to 10 months after giving birth
(Eliason et al. 2023).
The new Medicaid postpartum extensions aim to promote insurance
coverage during the year following childbirth and ensure consistent access
to the care needed to improve maternal health. The ARPA temporarily allowed states to extend coverage to 12 months postpartum, and the
option was made permanent by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023
(Congress 2022b). To date, 46 states, D.C., and the U.S. Virgin Islands have
adopted Medicaid postpartum coverage extensions, with two more states
planning to implement extensions (KFF 2024e). It is estimated that, if all
states implement the extensions, approximately 720,000 people annually
The number of newly eligible adults was calculated by summing individual estimates for each state
(Legal Services of Eastern Missouri 2021; Raphael and Rudowitz 2023; KFF n.d.; Kids Count South
Dakota 2024).
7
The median state eligibility threshold for pregnancy Medicaid coverage is 201 percent FPL. The
median state eligibility threshold for parents is 138 percent FPL, while the median for non-expansion
states is 34 percent FPL (KFF 2024c).
6

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will gain access to Medicaid for a full year after giving birth (Gordon et al.
2021). The postpartum extensions were especially important for preventing
disenrollment of eligible individuals as the COVID-19 continuous coverage
provision ended in March 2023.
Evidence from the ACA Medicaid expansions in 2014, which led to
increased postpartum insurance coverage in expansion states (Bellerose,
Collin, and Daw 2022), indicates that insurance coverage during the postpartum period impacts postpartum healthcare use. Research finds increased
use of postpartum outpatient care following state Medicaid expansion
(Steenland et al. 2021), as well as increased postpartum use of effective birth
control methods (Myerson, Crawford, and Wherry 2020; Eliason, SpishakThomas, and Steenland 2022) and fewer hospitalizations during the first
60 days after delivery (Steenland and Wherry 2023). Impacts on maternal
health are difficult to measure, perhaps accounting for the literature’s mixed
findings, with no change observed in maternal morbidity (Chatterji et al.
2023) but evidence of a decline in maternal mortality (Eliason 2020).
An additional Biden-Harris Administration Medicaid policy targeted children. To strengthen Medicaid coverage for young people, the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 mandated that states provide 12
months of continuous eligibility for children under the age of 19 enrolled in
Medicaid and CHIP starting on January 1, 2024 (CMS 2024e).8 States typically renew coverage for children once a year, but the policy prevents states
from disenrolling children if they experience an otherwise-disqualifying
change in circumstances before the renewal period (e.g., a fluctuation in
household income, which is more common among low-income households;
see Gennetian et al. 2019). Prior to the policy change, about half of states
exercised the available option of providing 12-month continuous eligibility
for children (Brooks and Whitener 2023). Rates of disenrollment before
annual renewals and churn were lower for children in the states exercising
the option than in others (MACPAC 2021b; Williams et al. 2022). While
continuous coverage policies are understudied, research indicates they are
associated with increased insurance coverage, decreased coverage gaps
attributed to application problems, and a lower probability of being in fair
or poor health (Brantley and Ku 2021). The Biden-Harris Administration
has also approved several state requests to provide continuous eligibility for
children in Medicaid and CHIP until age six (Georgetown CCF 2024).

Protecting Medicaid Coverage
The Biden-Harris Administration implemented multiple short-term policies
to protect Americans’ Medicaid coverage at the end of the COVID-19 PHE.
CHIP provides health coverage through both Medicaid and separate state CHIP programs to
children in families with incomes too high to otherwise qualify for Medicaid.

8

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In 2023, enrollment in Medicaid and CHIP hit an all-time high of more than
94 million (KFF 2023), due largely to the continuous coverage Medicaid
requirement (Dague and Ukert 2024). To receive an increase in Medicaid
funding through the federal pandemic response under the Families First
Coronavirus Response Act, states were required to maintain enrollment
of nearly all Medicaid enrollees starting in March 2020 until after the end
of the PHE (Congress 2020). States typically redetermine eligibility for
Medicaid on an annual basis and disenroll anyone who is no longer eligible
for coverage or who fails to submit paperwork. The continuous enrollment
provision meant that anyone enrolled in Medicaid at the start of or during
the COVID-19 PHE would maintain coverage without going through the
renewal process or reporting a change in circumstances that would otherwise
disqualify them for Medicaid coverage. The continuous coverage requirement was delinked from the PHE and ended on March 31, 2023, under
the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, which started the eligibility
redetermination process, or so-called unwinding.
Given the tremendous growth in Medicaid enrollment between 2020
and 2023, states faced a complex process of resuming eligibility redeterminations. Not only did states face challenges related to the large volume of
redeterminations, but they also encountered issues related to sufficient staffing and the capability of existing eligibility systems (GAO 2024). Further,
disenrollment was expected to include people potentially still eligible for
Medicaid but losing coverage for procedural reasons, such as if a state was
unable to reach the enrollee for the necessary information to determine
eligibility or if the individual did not complete the needed paperwork. The
occurrences were expected to be more prevalent during the unwinding
period, given the time elapsed since the last eligibility renewal for many
enrollees.9 Not only would erroneous disenrollment, which required restoring enrollment for eligible individuals, result in additional administrative
costs, but the periods without coverage would likely hinder and delay access
to necessary medical care (Sugar et al. 2021).
The Biden-Harris Administration aimed to facilitate the redetermination process for states while preventing coverage loss among eligible beneficiaries. First, states were given 12 to 14 months to restore normal eligibility
and enrollment, but were granted flexibility regarding when to begin the
process and how to prioritize enrollee population groups (CMS 2023d;
CMS 2023e). Second, CMS granted temporary waivers allowing flexibility
for how state redeterminations could be processed (CMS 2023f). Some of
the most common waiver types allowed states to use prior income or asset
information to determine current enrollee eligibility. In addition, common
waivers allowed states to use data from other reliable sources, such as the
Some states continued to conduct eligibility redeterminations during the PHE but did not disenroll
individuals, while other states discontinued redeterminations (GAO 2024).

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U.S. Postal Service and managed care plans, to obtain updated enrollee contact information without requiring verification by the enrollee (GAO 2024).
Other waivers allowed states to use financial information from means-tested
benefits programs like the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program and
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families to renew eligibility, provide
for assistance in renewal form completion and submission, or facilitate reenrollment for eligible individuals disenrolled for procedural reasons (CMS
2023g). Finally, CMS gave states additional time to complete unwindingrelated eligibility determinations to ensure that eligible individuals did not
lose coverage in states unable to complete the process during the initial
timeframe (CMS 2024f).
As of June 2024, monthly total Medicaid and CHIP enrollment had
declined to 80 million (CMS 2024g), with nearly all states having completed
the redetermination process (KFF 2024f). At the conclusion of the Medicaid
unwinding, enrollment is expected to surpass pre-pandemic levels due to
additional state Medicaid expansions since 2020, as well as enrollment
gains during the pandemic among eligible people who signed up for and will
retain coverage (Hale et al. 2024).
Nearly all states have experienced a decline in Medicaid enrollment
since unwinding began. The only exception is North Carolina, which
adopted a permanent Medicaid expansion during the time period (NCDHHS
2024). However, the magnitude of disenrollment shows noticeable variation depending on state policy choices; CMS notes that state uptake of the
available flexibilities and adoption of Medicaid expansions had a significant
impact on successful eligibility renewals (CMS 2023h). For example, figure
4-5 shows the percent change in Medicaid enrollment from March 2023 (the
month prior to the start of unwinding) to June 2024 by state ACA Medicaid
expansion status, excluding any states that expanded during this period.
States without ACA Medicaid expansions saw the largest average decrease
in total enrollment over the period, at 23.1 percent, compared to 13.4 percent
in ACA expansion states. The difference is likely explained, at least in part,
by variation in state eligibility rules. As described, some individuals who
lost Medicaid coverage were able to transition to Marketplace coverage.
The attention to the redetermination process prompted some states to
improve their approach to determining eligibility. During the unwinding,
CMS and states worked in partnership to identify and resolve areas where
states were not meeting federal eligibility redetermination requirements
(GAO 2024). Many states took advantage of the temporary flexibilities
approved by CMS, and a final rule issued in April 2024 made some of the
flexibilities permanent, including allowing states to use available, reliable
resources to update enrollee contact information (CMS 2024h). The agency
is further reviewing other temporary flexibilities to determine which could
be implemented on a long-standing basis (Brooks 2024), part of an ongoing
Expanding and Strengthening U.S. Health Insurance Coverage | 163

Non-ACA expansion states

ACA expansion states

Sources: Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services; CEA calculations.
Note: Enrollment is a count of the number of individuals enrolled in Medicaid/CHIP as of the last day of each month within the selected time frame. States with
Medicaid expansions during this period are excluded (North Carolina, Oregon, and South Dakota). Green and light blue dots represent averages in ACA Medicaid
expansion and non-Medicaid expansion states.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Council of Economic Advisers

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

Percent change

Figure 4-5. Change in Medicaid and CHIP Enrollment, March 2023 to June 2024

TX
FL
MS
WY
GA
TN
AL
SC
KS
WI

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CO
UT
MT
ID
NH
OK
AR
ND
MI
WV
IA
LA
DE
VT
MA
PA
WA
MN
NJ
OH
MO
RI
NM
AZ
KY
NE
IN
NV
NE
DC
NY
HI
VA
CT
MD
AK
CA
ME

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effort to simplify eligibility requirements and streamline application processes for Medicaid and CHIP under the Biden-Harris Administration (CMS
2024i).

Strengthening Prescription Drug Coverage
and Reducing Costs Under Medicare
Until the introduction of Medicare Part D in 2006, the Medicare program
did not provide prescription drug coverage (Oliver, Lee, and Lipton 2004).
The original Medicare program is made up of two parts: Part A and Part B,
which cover hospital and outpatient care, respectively. Medicare Part C (i.e.,
Medicare Advantage) was enacted in 1997 as an alternative choice offering
both Part A and B types of care through private insurance companies (CMS
2024j). Part D provides prescription drug benefits either through enrollment in a separate plan or as part of Medicare Advantage. Participation in
Medicare Part D has grown over time; as of May 2024, more than 80 percent
of the 67.5 million program enrollees held Part D coverage (CMS 2024k).
While Part D led to a substantial reduction in out-of-pocket spending
for prescription drugs (Engelhardt and Gruber 2011), the benefit’s design
left many people vulnerable to high expenses. In particular, Medicare Part D
had a coverage gap, or “donut hole,” where Medicare paid 0 percent of costs
for some people with a certain amount of drug expenditures (CMS n.d.). In
addition, Part D enrollees had no out-of-pocket spending cap (Cubanski,
Neuman, and Freed 2023). The coverage gap and lack of a spending cap
are notable given the high price of prescription drugs in the United States
compared to other countries; across all drugs, U.S. prices are nearly three
times higher than those of other countries, and for brand name drugs, prices
are more than four times higher (Mulcahy, Schwam, and Lovejoy 2024).
These two features left beneficiaries taking expensive prescription drugs,
or with many prescriptions, responsible for high out-of-pocket drug costs.
Despite reforms under the ACA and Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 to phase
out the coverage gap, the number of Part D beneficiaries responsible for high
out-of-pocket spending would likely grow over time due to rapidly rising
drug costs (Trish, Xu, and Joyce 2018). For enrollees whose 2022 prescription drug spending reached the catastrophic coverage phase (the highest
spending phase in Part D) and who did not qualify for subsidized coverage,
average annual out-of-pocket spending was $3,093, more than 10 percent of
the typical income for an enrollee. Average out-of-pocket spending was far
higher for some serious health conditions (Sayed et al. 2024).

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Increasing Financial Protection Against Prescription Drug Costs
The IRA, passed in August 2022, made several major changes to Medicare
to reduce prescription drug expenses for beneficiaries and the Federal
Government. First, the IRA limits out-of-pocket spending on insulin under
Medicare Part B (effective July 2023) and Part D (effective January 2023)
by removing any deductible for covered insulin products and capping copayments at $35 per month per insulin prescription (Congress 2022a). In
2019, prior to the changes made by the IRA, estimates indicate the average
Medicare beneficiary paid $63 per insulin prescription fill, with nearly 40
percent of beneficiaries paying more than $35 and roughly one quarter
paying over $70 per fill (Sayed et al. 2023). Estimates suggest that the new
insulin cap could, on average, save affected Medicare beneficiaries about
$500 per year.
The IRA also expanded eligibility for subsidized prescription drug coverage under Medicare Part D. Prior to 2024, the Low-Income Subsidy (LIS)
program provided two tiers of prescription drug coverage to individuals and
families with little income and few assets. For individuals with incomes up
to 135 percent FPL,10 the program provided a full subsidy, covering Part D
deductibles and premiums for certain plans and requiring minimal co-pays
up to an out-of-pocket limit, followed by no cost sharing. For individuals
with incomes between 135 percent and 150 percent FPL,11 the LIS program
provided a partial subsidy with less financial assistance than the full subsidy
(CRS 2023b). In 2024, the IRA expanded the LIS program’s full subsidy
coverage of Medicare Part D prescription drugs to all individuals meeting
the eligibility criteria for the partial subsidy.
Expanding the LIS program is expected to benefit approximately
460,000 people who now receive the full rather than partial subsidy, and
could encourage about 3 million more people who are eligible for Part D
to enroll (Feyman et al. 2024). Of note, LIS enrollees are not charged the
typical Part D penalty for late program enrollment, a mechanism designed
to limit adverse selection, removing any cost-related barriers to new Part D
enrollment (CMS 2024l).
The LIS program expansion could help increase accessibility to drugs
that were previously unaffordable for some elderly Americans, as well as
remove cost-related barriers to medication adherence. As seen in figure 4-6,
elderly people with incomes qualifying for the LIS program have higher
rates of skipping medication due to cost than elderly adults with incomes at
200 percent FPL and greater. Research shows that medication adherence is
In 2023, the program was available to individuals with incomes of less than 135 percent FPL and
fewer than $9,090 in assets; for married couples, the asset threshold was $16,630. In addition, certain
groups of Medicare beneficiaries automatically qualified for full LIS coverage.
11
In 2023, the group included individuals with incomes between 135 percent and 150 percent FPL
and fewer than $15,160 in assets; for married couples, the asset threshold was $30,240.
10

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Figure 4-6. Share of People Age 65 and Older
Skipping Medication Due to Cost, by Household
Income
Percent
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Household income as a percent of the federal poverty level
Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Health and Retirement Survey; CEA calculations.
Note: Data include waves 2008 through 2018.
2025 Economic Report of the President

related to out-of-pocket costs for prescription drugs, and mortality increases
when people take fewer drugs as a result (Chandra, Flack, and Obermeyer
2024).
Finally, the IRA took important steps to introduce limits on out-ofpocket prescription drug spending for all Medicare Part D enrollees. Even
after reforms to close the coverage gap, the standard benefit design exposed
beneficiaries without LIS (approximately 72 percent of Medicare Part D
beneficiaries) to unlimited prescription drug expenses (Sayed et al. 2024).
The cost-sharing structure made beneficiaries responsible for 5 percent of
all drug expenses surpassing a specified catastrophic coverage threshold
(Cubanski and Neuman 2023). Nearly 1.5 million beneficiaries without LIS
spent above the threshold in 2022 and paid an average of $3,093 in out-ofpocket drug costs (Sayed et al. 2024). According to one analysis, Part D
enrollees requiring the most expensive drugs faced annual out-of-pocket
spending ranging from about $11,000 to nearly $15,000 per year (Cubanski
and Neuman 2023).

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Under the IRA, the 5 percent coinsurance requirement for drug expenditures greater than the catastrophic coverage limit was removed in 2024.
Starting in 2025, Part D enrollees’ out-of-pocket drug costs will be capped
at $2,000, with the amount updated each year using the rate of growth in
per-capita Part D drug costs (CMS 2024m; CMS 2024n). The IRA also
shifts more of the expenses for prescription drugs from Medicare onto drug
manufacturers and Part D prescription drug plans. Finally, a premium stabilization mechanism in the IRA, which began in 2024 and continues through
2029, limits average premium increases for individuals enrolled in Part D
(CMS 2024o). The Department of Health and Human Services estimates
that the 2025 change, along with the other changes discussed, will lead to
a roughly $7.4 billion reduction in annual out-of-pocket spending among
enrollees with out-of-pocket savings, about 36 percent of Medicare Part D
beneficiaries, amounting to almost 19 million individuals. This translates
into an expected reduction in annual out-of-pocket spending of about $400
for these individuals (Sayed et al. 2024).

Negotiating Drug Prices to Bring Down Costs
The IRA also allows the Medicare program to negotiate certain pharmaceutical prices. Prior to the Act’s passage, Medicare and the Federal
Government were forbidden from negotiating directly with drug companies
to lower costs (CRS 2022). The Federal Government was, therefore, unable
to use its market power to buy and provide drugs at lower prices. According
to CMS, Medicare is projected to account for an estimated 35 percent of all
prescription drug expenditures in 2024, indicating the program represents a
large share of the market (CMS 2024p).
Beginning in 2024, the IRA requires the Department of Health and
Human Services to negotiate with drug companies for certain high-cost
drugs. Under the IRA, drugs with high Medicare spending shares that meet
certain criteria are eligible for price negotiation.12 Initially, 10 drugs from
Medicare Part D were subject to negotiation, but the number will increase
each year and begin to include drugs from Medicare Part B, with a total of
60 drugs being price negotiable by 2029 (CBO 2023).
In August 2024, the Biden-Harris Administration announced the first
set of prices, which will become effective in 2026, for all 10 drugs selected
for the first round of negotiation (CMS 2024q). CMS estimates that if the
negotiated prices had been in place in 2023, Medicare net prescription drug
spending on the products would have been lowered by 22 percent (CMS
2024r). Moreover, the reduced prices are likely to help Medicare beneficiaries who previously paid cost-sharing on the drugs’ list prices; in 2022,
For more information on the criteria for drugs to be eligible for price negotiation, see CMS
(2024s).
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nearly 15 percent of all Medicare Part D beneficiaries used at least one of the
drugs negotiated (ASPE 2023). In total, in 2026, CMS estimates beneficiaries will save $1.5 billion in reduced cost-sharing because of the negotiated
prices (CMS 2024r).
The ability of the Federal Government to negotiate Medicare Part
D drug prices is expected to improve the federal fiscal outlook. When the
negotiated prices go into effect in 2026, it is estimated to save Medicare Part
D about $6 billion (CMS 2024r). Between 2022 and 2031, the Congressional
Budget Office estimates that the negotiated drug price provisions of the
IRA will reduce the federal deficit by about $95 billion. Combined with
a requirement that drug companies pay Medicare if the prices for certain
drugs rise faster than inflation, the Medicare-related provisions of the IRA
are expected to reduce the deficit by about $160 billion between 2022 and
2031 (CBO 2022).

The Next Steps in Strengthening Health
Insurance and Lowering Costs
The Biden-Harris Administration has made major strides towards accomplishing its goal of expanding access to affordable health insurance and
healthcare for all Americans. The nation’s rate of health insurance coverage
is at a record high, many Americans have seen significant savings on premiums, and Medicare beneficiaries will see reduced prescription drug costs for
years to come due to policies implemented over the last four years. In addition to the policies discussed here, the Biden-Harris Administration has taken
other important steps to strengthen private health insurance for Americans,
including introducing new protections from surprise out-of-network medical
bills and working to expand access to free, over-the-counter birth control.
The Administration has also made it a priority to protect American families
from the burden of medical debt with new policies that include its removal
from consumer credit reports.
Future efforts to further expand and strengthen health insurance in
the United States should build on the Administration’s progress in closing
the Medicaid coverage gap and expanding access to ACA Marketplace
coverage by making the expanded premium tax credits permanent, simplifying enrollment in the programs, and easing transitions between different
sources of insurance coverage. To further address rising healthcare costs
in the United States, future government actions can build on the important
first step of Medicare drug price negotiation started under the Biden-Harris
Administration, as well as other efforts by the Administration to promote
competition across healthcare markets. Expanding the Medicare drug
price negotiation program, as proposed in the President’s Fiscal Year 2025

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Budget, and efforts to reduce prices more broadly will be critical to controlling the nation’s healthcare spending.

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Chapter 5

Achieving a Net Zero Carbon Dioxide
Emissions Economy in the United States
Climate change poses a significant threat to human well-being in the United
States and around the world (CEA 2023; Jay et al. 2023). To ensure that
continued economic progress can coincide with a safe and stable climate,
the Biden-Harris Administration has set a target of achieving net zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the United States by 2050 (White House
2021a) and signed into law the most significant pieces of climate legislation
in American history.
This chapter reviews the economics of achieving net zero emissions of
carbon dioxide (CO2), one of the main GHGs driving climate change.1 In
the United States, CO2 represents 80 percent of total GHG emissions (EPA
2024a). Emissions of GHGs, including CO2, are a classic negative externality. When a firm or individual emits CO2 into the atmosphere, the costs are
borne by everyone, leaving few economic incentives for abatement actions
to reduce emissions.2
A fundamental role of government is to address externalities through policies that alter incentives, and current Biden-Harris Administration efforts are
helping to fundamentally change the country’s carbon emissions trajectory.
This chapter will highlight the progress already made and discuss how to
build on it to push all the way to net zero.
Due to space constraints, this chapter does not discuss GHGs other than CO2. The economics of
reducing non-CO2 emissions can differ significantly from those reviewed here. The Long-Term
Strategy of the United States (White House 2021b) discusses paths to achieve net zero, including
strategies related to other GHGs.
2
Activities that generate CO2, such as the burning of fossil fuels, often result in additional negative
externalities via the release of hazardous air pollutants like sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and
volatile organic compounds that affect humans and natural ecosystems.
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Cost-effective policies incentivize the lowest-cost abatement actions, a
concept known in environmental economics as the equimarginal principle.3
Policies that prioritize the lowest-hanging fruit will lead to different levels
of decarbonization in different economic sectors, because each sector faces
unique decarbonization costs and challenges. In addition, the most costeffective way to reduce CO2 emissions need not lead to zero CO2 emissions
from every sector, because it can be more cost effective to achieve net zero
by allowing emissions from some sectors and engaging in separate activities
that remove CO2 from the atmosphere to offset those emissions.
This chapter considers four distinct components of moving to net zero CO2
emissions. It begins by discussing how to achieve zero CO2 emissions in
U.S. electricity production, broadly considered both technologically possible and inexpensive relative to abatement options in other sectors (Davis
et al. 2023). The chapter then discusses the potential for reducing emissions
by powering more economic activity with clean electricity instead of fossil
fuels, a process known as electrification. Next, it discusses how to decarbonize economic activities that may be harder to electrify, including using
cleaner fuels and improving energy efficiency. The chapter concludes by
discussing the use of negative emissions technologies (NETs) to capture and
store emitted carbon that would be comparatively more costly to eliminate.
Achieving net zero will involve a collection of policies for two reasons.
First, there are many ways to address the central negative externality from
CO2 emissions. Economists most commonly advocate for economy-wide
carbon taxes or cap-and-trade systems, which are designed to address the
negative externality in all sectors simultaneously and incentivize each sector
to respond in the lowest-cost way (EPA 2024b). An alternate approach is to

Formally, the equimarginal principle says that, to achieve a given amount of abatement, the
marginal cost of abatement should be equal across all sectors and firms. Otherwise, it is more cost
effective to reallocate effort toward abatement activities with lower costs. Properly measured, the
cost of abatement should reflect all costs and benefits, even those unrelated to CO2 abatement, and
include both short- and long-term costs.

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address emissions with a series of sector-specific policies, as in the historic
legislation passed during the Biden-Harris Administration.
Second, the negative externality from emissions is not the only market
failure relevant to achieving net zero. Another critical market failure is that,
due to positive externalities from knowledge spillovers, firms do not have
private incentives to conduct sufficient research and development (R&D)
into the new technologies needed to make progress in achieving carbon
pollution-free electricity, expanding electrification, decarbonizing unelectrified activities, and deploying NETs. These knowledge spillovers also occur
when firms initiate and scale up production, implying the need for government to support demonstration and deployment of new technologies. In
other cases, such as developing a network of electric vehicle (EV) charging
stations or building long-distance electricity transmission infrastructure, the
government can help solve coordination problems that prevent the private
market from making sufficient investments in deploying new technologies.

Understanding the Past, Looking to the Future
The Biden-Harris Administration has set targets of achieving a carbon
pollution-free power sector by 2035 and a net zero GHG emissions economy
by 2050 (White House 2023). The United States has also set a target of
reducing its net GHG emissions by 50–52 percent below 2005 levels in 2030
as its Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Agreement, an international treaty intended to limit the increase in global average temperature
to less than 1.5–2 degrees Celsius from the pre-industrial level (UNFCCC
2021a). This Nationally Determined Contribution reflects a focus on limiting cumulative emissions along the path to net zero.
Three historic pieces of legislation advance these goals: the CHIPS
and Science Act, the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL), and the Inflation
Reduction Act (IRA). These laws have funded hundreds of programs to
decarbonize the American economy, including the selected major initiatives
listed in table 5-1. Among many others, the programs include investment
and production tax credits for clean energy and NETs, new tax incentives
that make switching to clean energy technologies like EVs and heat pumps
more affordable, and research, development, and deployment funding for
new and emerging technologies (DOE 2023a; IRS 2024; Ambrose, Jacobs,

Achieving a Net Zero Carbon Dioxide Emissions Economy in the United States | 173

Table 5-1. Selected Biden-Harris Administration Climate Commitments and
Major Policies
Climate Commitments

• On day one of taking office, the Administration rejoined the international Paris Climate Accords, which intends to
limit global temperature increases to below 1.5–2°C above pre-industrial levels. The Administration set a target of
reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 50–52 percent by 2030 from 2005 levels and achieving a net zero
GHG emissions U.S. economy by 2050.

Expanded Role of Federal Climate Leadership

• The Administration established the first White House Office of Domestic Climate Policy and elevated the role of
Special Presidential Envoy for Climate to prioritize domestic and international decarbonization efforts and
engagements.

• Historic federal actions and nationwide climate strategies across sectors include the U.S. National Blueprint for
Transportation Decarbonization, the Administration’s efforts to achieve 100 percent clean electricity by 2035, the
U.S. Industrial Decarbonization Roadmap, the U.S. Buildings Decarbonization Blueprint, the Administration’s
climate-smart agriculture efforts and Nature-Based Solutions Roadmap, the U.S. Methane Emissions Reduction
Action Plan, the National Climate Resilience Framework, and more.

Clean Energy Tax Credits

• Under the IRA, production tax credits can be claimed for renewable and clean electricity, zero-emissions nuclear
power, advanced manufacturing, clean fuel, and hydrogen.
• Additionally, consumers can claim tax credits for energy efficiency home improvements such as heat pump
purchases as well as qualifying electric vehicle (EV) purchases and electric and alternative fueling infrastructure
under the IRA.
• Investment tax credits can also be claimed for investment in a variety of clean energy projects. As of October
2024, announced private investment in clean energy manufacturing and infrastructure, clean power, and EVs
and batteries under the Administration has totaled over $400 billion.

Clean Energy Demonstrations and Deployment

• Through IRA, BIL, and CHIPS, over $100 billion has been invested directly in accelerating the deployment of clean
energy, clean buildings, and clean manufacturing as well as making communities more resilient to climate change
and providing clean water across the United States.
• The Department of Energy has taken steps to speed up the commercialization of emerging energy technologies
through a $25 billion fund for clean energy demonstrations and increased project financing by the Loan
Programs Office.

Buy Clean Initiative

• The Administration prioritized the procurement of American-made, lower-carbon construction materials in
federally funded projects.

Grid Enhancement and Expansion

• The Administration has taken a number of steps to improve the reliability of the grid through measures that
speed up the buildout of new transmission and increase the efficiency of existing infrastructure. This includes
administering over $10 billion to modernize the grid through the Grid Resilience and Innovation Partnerships
Program and improving the process for environmental reviews under the National Environmental Policy Act.

Greenhouse Gas Standards and Reduction Efforts

• Under the Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has finalized rules and standards to
reduce GHG emissions from fossil fuel-fired power plants and vehicles. Additionally, the EPA implemented a
first-of-its-kind fee for methane emissions.

and Tham 2022). The Administration has also taken significant regulatory
action to reduce emissions from fossil fuel-fired power plants (EPA 2024c).
Although emissions reduction is the primary focus of this chapter,
the Biden-Harris Administration’s clean energy industrial policies also
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aim to deliver additional economic and community benefits. Since 2021,
nearly 900 new or expanded clean energy manufacturing facilities have
been announced, many since the passage of the BIL and IRA (DOE 2024a).
Further, as a result of the IRA, more private clean energy funding is now
going to economically disadvantaged communities (Van Nostrand and
Ashenfarb 2023).

Historical Energy-related CO2 Emissions Trends
U.S. CO2 emissions from energy use peaked in 2007, then began to fall
slowly (EIA 2024a). However, the trend in aggregate emissions masks
important differences by sector—electric power, transportation, industrial
(including agriculture), residential and commercial buildings—each of
which face distinct economic challenges to decarbonization.
Figure 5-1a presents energy-related CO2 emissions by sector. In 2023,
transportation accounted for 39 percent of energy-related emissions, followed by the electric power sector at 30 percent and the industrial sector at
20 percent. Finally, the residential and commercial sectors together made
up 12 percent of total energy-related emissions. When emissions from the
electric power sector are distributed to the other sectors according to their
electricity use, transportation contributed 39 percent, industrial contributed
28 percent, and residential and commercial buildings together contributed
33 percent of CO2 emissions (EIA 2024b).
Figure 5-1b shows a notable decrease in emissions from the electric
power sector, in part because the United States has produced more electricity
from carbon-free sources, including wind and solar, since 2010 and in part
because of a switch from coal to natural gas fossil fuel use (EIA 2024a).
Emissions per kilowatt-hour of electricity generated have fallen by roughly
one third since 1990 (see figure 5-2).
Figure 5-3 shows the extent of electrification by sector from 1949–
2023. Electrification increased rapidly in both residential and commercial
buildings from the 1950s to the 2000s, then slowed. In contrast, electrification has increased only slightly in the industrial sector. The flat transportation trend shown in figure 5-3 underestimates electrification because the
data do not include at-home EV charging, which is measured as residential
energy use. Still, it is difficult to electrify certain forms of transportation,
such as heavy trucking, aviation, and international maritime shipping
(Jaramillo et al. 2023). On average, electrification has increased gradually
throughout the economy, from less than 5 percent of end-use energy in 1949
to nearly 20 percent in 2023.

Achieving a Net Zero Carbon Dioxide Emissions Economy in the United States | 175

Figure 5-1. Energy-related CO2 Emissions
A. Share of 2023 Emissions

Commercial,
5.2% Residential,
6.5%

Transportation,
38.6%

Industrial,
20.0%

Electric power,
29.7%

B. Emissions by Sector, 1990–2023
Million metric tons CO2
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0

1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 2023
Transportation
Residential

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Electric power
Commercial

Sources: Energy Information Administration; CEA calculations.
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Industrial

Figure 5-2. CO2 Emissions per Kilowatt-hour,
1990–2022

Ten-thousandths of a metric ton of CO2 emissions per kilowatt-hour
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1990

1994

1998

2002

2006

Council of Economic Advisers

2010

2014

2018

2022

Sources: Energy Information Administration; CEA calculations.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Figure 5-3. Electrification by Sector, 1949–2023
Percent of end-use energy coming from electricity
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1949

1959

1969

1979

Commercial
Transportation

1989

Residential
Average

1999

2009

2019

Industrial

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Energy Information Administration; CEA calculations.
Note: Values are calculated as electricity sales to ultimate customers in the end-use sector
(Btu) divided by end-use energy consumed by the end-use sector (Btu). Home electric
vehicle charging is not included in the transportation values.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Achieving a Net Zero Carbon Dioxide Emissions Economy in the United States | 177

Future Impacts of Recent Mitigation Policy
Recent policy advances will drive ongoing progress toward net zero. Figure
5-4 compares projections of future emissions with IRA policies (shown as
dashed lines) and without (shown as solid lines) for 2021–2035. The projections come from a recent study conducted by the EPA (2023) and represent
averages across several different models that include a partial list of policies
enacted during the Administration.4

Figure 5-4. CO2 Emissions by Sector, with and without
the IRA

Million metric tons CO2
2,000
1,800
1,600
1,400
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200
0
2021

2023
2025
2027
Transportation (no IRA)

2029

2031
2033
Transportation (IRA)

Electricity (no IRA)

Electricity (IRA)

Industry (no IRA)

Industry (IRA)

Buildings (no IRA)

Buildings (IRA)

Council of Economic Advisers

2035

Sources: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); CEA calculations.
Note: Projections are based on averages of all models included in the EPA's IRA report. IRA
refers to the Inflation Reduction Act. Projections begin after 2021.
2025 Economic Report of the President
The 14 models covered in the EPA analysis vary significantly by which IRA provisions they
incorporate. No model covers all provisions, but all models include some. Some models, like
GCAM-CGS and REGEN-EPRI, offer optimistic, moderate, and pessimistic scenarios of emissions
reductions. For these models, the EPA analysis includes the moderate scenarios. The models do not
account for the EPA’s 2024 GHG standards for fossil fuel-fired power plants (EPA 2024d), which
may further decrease emissions. The values represent the mean of the models.

4

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The projections show a near two-thirds reduction in emissions from the
electric power sector by 2035, reflecting IRA subsidies for solar and wind
production, as well as tax credits for carbon capture and storage in the power
sector. In other sectors, the impact on CO2 emissions from activities other
than electricity use is smaller.

Paths to a Net Zero Economy
Figure 5-5 shows projected paths of future emissions in several scenarios,
including the following: (i) a scenario without Biden-Harris Administration

Figure 5-5. CO2 Emissions Under Different Scenarios
Million metric tons CO2
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
2005

2010

2015

2020

Historical
Pre-IRA policies (including BIL)
Net zero by 2050

2025

2030

2035

Business as usual pre-BHA
IRA

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); United States’ 7th National Communication
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; CEA calculations.
Note: EPA projections for policy scenarios are based on an average of the 11 out of 14
models in EPA (2023) that include BIL in their 2022 policy scenario. EPA (2023) uses models
collected by Bistline et al. (2023). Net zero line is based on a logarithmic extrapolation of 2021
data to 2050. IRA refers to the Inflation Reduction Act. BIL refers to the Bipartisan
Infrastructure Law. BHA refers to the Biden-Harris Administration.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Achieving a Net Zero Carbon Dioxide Emissions Economy in the United States | 179

policies, (ii) a scenario with the Administration policies enacted through
2022, (iii) a scenario also including the IRA-driven changes, and (iv) a
path to net zero.5 Uncertainty exists in any projection, but the broad patterns shown are robust and consistent across modelling efforts (EPA 2023;
Bistline et al. 2023). As in figure 5-4, the simulations show that BidenHarris Administration policies will drive significant emissions reductions
relative to a no-policy scenario. At the same time, further policy intervention
will likely be necessary to reach net zero.
Figure 5-6 decomposes one possible path to net zero by sector based
on a model from Huppman et al. (2023).6 In the model, electricity is fully
decarbonized, but heavy industry and some forms of transportation still
require fossil fuel use. To offset these continuing fossil fuel emissions, as
well as past emissions, NETs are used to remove CO2 from the atmosphere.
These NETs can be biological, like afforestation and farming practices
which increase CO2 uptake in the soil and biomass, or technological, like
direct air capture and storage which uses chemical reactions to pull CO2
from the air. The U.S. economy does not currently make sufficient use of
NETs. As decarbonization advances into harder-to-decarbonize sectors,
NETs are likely to become more cost effective.

5
There are many different projections for CO2 emissions in each of these scenarios. The CEA’s
goal is to highlight the general patterns behind such projections, not to endorse a specific result.
The first scenario comes from the United States’ 7th National Communication to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2021b), the two Biden-Harris Administration
policy scenarios come from EPA (2023), and the net zero scenario is an illustrative logarithmic
extrapolation from 2021 levels to zero CO2 emissions in 2050. The Long-Term Strategy of the
United States (White House 2021b) models several alternative pathways to net zero that include all
GHGs.
6
This study is part of the Energy Modeling Forum, an ongoing collaboration between several
groups, and provides thorough coverage of sector-level and independent NETs. The model used in
figure 5-6 is the US-REGEN model from the Electric Power Research Institute (2021).

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Figure 5-6. CO2 Emissions by Sector, Net Zero
Scenario
Million metric tons CO2 per year
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
-1,000
-2,000
2020

2025
Power

Transportation

2030

Council of Economic Advisers

2035
Commercial
Industry

2040

2045
Residential

2050

Carbon removal

Sources: Huppman et al. (2023); CEA calculations.
Note: Projections are based on the REGEN model developed by the Electric Power
Research Institute. Sector emissions are net of sector-level carbon capture and storage
(CCS). Carbon removal includes bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS),
direct air capture and storage (DACS), and biological processes such as plant growth.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Electricity
Achieving complete decarbonization in electricity production is considered
both technologically possible and inexpensive relative to abatement options
in other sectors (Davis et al. 2023). This section discusses how to achieve
net zero CO2 emissions in electricity production and how electrifying other
sectors can help achieve net zero economy-wide. Figure 5-7 shows one

Achieving a Net Zero Carbon Dioxide Emissions Economy in the United States | 181

Figure 5-7. Electrification by Sector for Net Zero CO2 by
2050
Percent
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2020

2025
Commercial
Industry

2030

2035
Residential
Average

2040

2045
Transportation

2050

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Williams et al. (2021); CEA calculations.
Note: Electrification is measured as electricity sales to ultimate customers in the end-use
sector (EJ) divided by end-use energy consumed by the end-use sector (EJ).
2025 Economic Report of the President

projection of how the share of electricity in final energy demand within each
sector could evolve to achieve a net zero economy in 2050.

Decarbonizing Electricity
The carbon intensity of electricity production has dropped over the last two
decades, driven in part by the falling price of renewables and in part by the
switch from coal to natural gas fossil fuel use. Figure 5-8 shows the average
cost per megawatt-hour of generating electricity over the lifetime of the production infrastructure (i.e., the levelized cost of electricity) for several different energy sources.7 The cost of wind and solar has decreased dramatically.
Indeed, solar went from being the most expensive energy source in 2009 to
The levelized cost of electricity is a measure of the net present cost of electricity generation for
a given generator over its lifetime. Often used to plan investments or compare costs of generation
methods, it is calculated as the sum of total costs over the lifetime of a plant divided by total
electricity produced. However, levelized costs may not account for all relevant characteristics of an
energy project (Joskow 2011).

7

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Figure 5-8. Levelized Cost of Electricity
Dollars per megawatt-hour
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
2009

2011
2013
2015
Nuclear
Coal
Gas (combined cycle)
Onshore wind

2017

2019
2021
Gas (peaking)
Geothermal
Utility-scale solar

2023

Council of Economic Advisers

Source: Lazard (2024).
Note: Data for 2022 are missing; the values in this year are linearly interpolated. Data
are calculated by taking the midpoint of the high and low marginal costs of facilities
across the United States. Subsidies are not included in the numbers used in the figure.
2025 Economic Report of the President

one of the cheapest in 2023, second only to wind. These price decreases have
helped drive out some fossil fuel-powered electricity by displacing some
production and accelerating plant retirements.8 However, continuing drops
in solar and wind prices alone will not lead to full decarbonization of the
electricity grid because of the need for complementary resources, permitting
new clean energy projects, and expanding transmission.9
It can be less expensive to continue running some existing fossil fuel-fired plants until the end of
their lifetimes than to replace them early with new solar and wind generation (Davis, Holladay, and
Sims 2022).
9
Additional challenges, including workforce development and supply chain constraints for critical
minerals needed for battery production, also play a major role but are beyond the scope of this
chapter.
8

Achieving a Net Zero Carbon Dioxide Emissions Economy in the United States | 183

Wind and Solar Energy

Modeling studies widely agree that achieving net zero emissions requires
the rapid acceleration of wind and solar deployment and that the grid can
accommodate significantly more wind and solar energy than is currently
deployed (Kroposki 2018). However, wind and solar are not always available. As an illustration, figure 5-9 shows variation in average electricity generation by source over the course of the day in the continental United States.
While patterns vary across regions, total electricity use currently peaks in
the early evening, just as solar energy becomes unavailable. Although wind
power has the potential to meet demand at any time of the day, it is not
always available.

Figure 5-9. Hourly Power Generation by Energy
Source
Megawatt-hours
600,000
500,000
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
0
Nuclear
Solar
Petroleum products

Hydropower
Coal
Other energy sources

Council of Economic Advisers

Wind
Natural gas

Sources: Energy Information Administration; CEA calculations.
Note: Hourly data are averages from November 2023 through October 2024 that are
converted to Eastern Daylight Time for the continental United States. Hour labels
correspond to the end of hourly reporting periods.
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To provide reliable electricity, variable wind and solar energy are
paired with complementary technologies that can provide electricity when
they become unavailable. These complementary sources of electricity—
“dispatchable” resources—include nuclear power, energy storage, some
types of hydropower, and fossil fuels.10 For example, because they have low
fixed costs and high variable costs, natural gas “peaker” plants can be profitable even if they only run when less expensive, variable renewable sources
are not available. Achieving a carbon pollution-free electric power sector
also requires eliminating emissions from these complementary technologies.
Batteries and Storage Technology

Grid-scale batteries are an important technology for storing wind and solar
energy in the United States so that it can be used whenever it is most needed.11 Use of short duration grid-scale batteries, especially lithium-ion batteries, is rapidly increasing (EIA 2024c). The use of longer-duration batteries
is more nascent, and many technologies are still in a demonstration phase
(DOE 2023b). Pumped storage hydro is another key storage technology.12
Although it has physical requirements that mean it cannot be installed everywhere, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) estimates that significantly
more pumped storage capacity could be added by 2050 (DOE 2024c).13
While falling renewable energy and natural gas prices have driven
decarbonization over the last two decades, achieving net zero will likely
require the combination of variable renewables and effective storage to be
cheaper than the alternative combination of variable renewables and natural
gas (MIT 2022; Butters, Dorsey, and Gowrisankaran 2024). Figure 5-10
shows that the current price per megawatt-hour of renewables backed up
by natural gas is lower than the price per megawatt-hour of renewables
backed up by batteries. Figure 5-11 shows the projected decline in the cost
of utility-scale battery storage per kilowatt through 2050. The fall in the cost
for long-duration batteries, which last at least 10 hours, will allow daytime
Natural gas availability can also be disrupted due to supply chain issues (Gilbert, Bazilian, and
Gross 2021) as well as disruptions caused by extreme weather (DOE 2024b). Disruptions in natural
gas availability have posed issues during several recent storms (DOE 2024b).
11
Non-battery storage options also exist, including pumped hydro, compressed air, liquid air, and
gravity-based energy storage technologies. Each option has different requirements for land and
infrastructure that may make them more or less efficient in different situations (Shine 2023). As of
2022, pumped storage hydropower accounted for 96 percent of all U.S. utility-scale energy storage
(DOE 2023c).
12
When electricity demand is high, water is released from a high-elevation reservoir and generates
electricity as it flows into a lower-elevation reservoir through a system of turbines. When electricity
demand is low, excess electricity from wind and solar generation can be used to pump the water
back up into the higher reservoir.
13
Other forms of long-duration energy storage can store energy over days, weeks, or seasons (DOE
2023b), though further policy intervention is needed to make them commercially viable in many
instances.
10

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Figure 5-10. Levelized Costs of Variable Energy Sources,
Spring 2023
Dollars per megawatt-hour
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0

Solar

Onshore wind

Natural gas backup

Council of Economic Advisers

Battery backup

Offshore wind

Sources: Greenstone (2024); Energy Information Administration; CEA calculations.
Note: Backup energy sources ramp up during peak hours. Data are in 2023 U.S. dollars and do
not account for subsidies.
2025 Economic Report of the President

solar energy generation to satisfy nighttime demand and make wind energy
available regardless of when the wind is blowing. In addition to supporting
renewables and reducing emissions, adding storage to the grid improves
resilience and reliability (DOE 2024b).
Governments can reduce energy storage costs by addressing externalities commonly associated with technological improvement. R&D
externalities occur because new technological knowledge often benefits
all firms working in a sector, not just those that undertake the research
(Jones 2005). Learning-by-doing externalities occur because the process of
producing a good teaches a firm how to reduce costs, and other firms can
follow suit via spillovers (Gillingham and Stock 2018). This externality is
especially important for nascent and emerging technologies, like some longduration storage options, where demonstrating economic feasibility provides
valuable information to other firms (Armitage, Bakhtian, and Jaffe 2024).
Because the value of engaging in these activities for an individual firm is
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Figure 5-11. Utility-scale Battery Storage Projected Costs
Dollars per kilowatt
4,500
4,000
3,500
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
2022

2026

2030

2034
4-hour

2038

2042

2046

10-hour

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Cole and Karmakar (2023); National Renewable Energy Laboratory; CEA calculations.
Note: Data are centered three-year moving averages of median projected values from 16
different studies, given in 2022 dollars. Data include energy and power costs but do not
account for subsidies.
2025 Economic Report of the President

less than the value to society, there will be an under-provision of technological improvement absent government intervention.
Policy can address these positive externalities by subsidizing R&D,
production, and the demonstration of new technologies. To date, the
Biden-Harris Administration has invested more than $300 million in longduration energy storage technologies via the BIL and created the Advanced
Manufacturing Production Credit for domestic production of clean technologies, including batteries. The DOE has set the goal of reducing the cost of
long-duration energy storage, including batteries, by 90 percent by 2030
(DOE 2023d) and analyzed how near-term government support can lead
these technologies to commercial viability (DOE 2023b).
Other Zero CO2-emissions Options for Electricity Generation

Hydroelectric, nuclear, and geothermal power can also provide zero-CO2
emissions electricity, and unlike wind and solar, some types of these
resources are dispatchable. Hydropower plants, which convert kinetic
Achieving a Net Zero Carbon Dioxide Emissions Economy in the United States | 187

energy from dammed water into electricity, provided 6 percent of electricity
generation in 2023 (EIA 2024d). Hydropower is renewable, and it can be
operated to provide stable generation or flexibly to complement wind and
solar (DOE 2024c). While its potential to scale up is limited by natural
resources (Fendt and Parsons 2021), the DOE estimates that significant new
hydropower generation could be added by 2050 through upgrades to existing
plants, adding capacity at existing dams and canals, and limited development of new stream-reaches, in addition to the potential for new pumped
storage capacity already discussed (DOE 2024c).
Nuclear energy provides roughly 20 percent of current electricity generation in the United States. Nuclear plants have high fixed costs and low
variable costs, making them well-suited for stable production. Most U.S.
nuclear plants are large light-water reactors, which can offer low marginal
costs per megawatt-hour due to economies of scale (DOE 2024d). In addition, investments in small modular reactors (SMRs), which have a smaller
geographic footprint than traditional reactors and can be partially prefabricated offsite, can potentially allow for faster, cheaper construction in areas
unsuitable for standard nuclear facilities. While SMRs may cost more per
megawatt-hour than large reactors, they may be more suitable for replacing
smaller retiring coal plants or industrial processes requiring high heat, and
they may be more attainable for investors with limited land, labor, and capital (DOE 2024d). Recent technological advancements have improved their
suitability for flexible production as well (Renteria, Schwartz, and Jenkins
2024), implying that nuclear could be used as a replacement for natural gas
plants in complementing variable renewables.
Concerns about rare disasters and the challenges of storing nuclear
waste have given rise to safety regulations that drive up the cost of nuclear
energy (Lovering, Yip, and Nordhaus 2016), likely contributing to the
decline in the construction of new plants since the 1980s (Makarin, Qian,
and Wang 2024). However, nuclear plants can be safely built and operated
at economically viable costs (Ritchie 2020). For example, France opened its
first nuclear plant in the 1960s and produces the majority of its electricity
using nuclear power today (EIA 2023). Scaling up U.S. nuclear power would
require catalyzing private sector investments by streamlining regulation and
investing in innovation, demonstration, and deployment (DOE 2024d; White
House 2024a). The IRA provides tax credits for nuclear energy production
and investment, and the Biden-Harris Administration funds a number of
demonstration and research programs, offers low-cost loans for deployment
of commercial technologies, and signed the ADVANCE Act to increase
licensing efficiency (DOE 2024d).

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Paths to net zero that prioritize geothermal energy will likely require
further R&D investment (DOE 2024e). Geothermal contributed less than
1 percent of electricity generation in 2023 in part due to the geographic
distribution of natural thermal resources (EIA 2024e). However, new
technologies, such as enhanced geothermal, can help extract geothermal
energy from a much wider range of natural environments (DOE 2024e).
Some analyses project that geothermal will contribute more than 10 percent
of electricity generation by 2050 (Augustine et al. 2023). The Biden-Harris
Administration supports demonstration projects with BIL funding (DOE
2024f) and is working to streamline geothermal resource exploration on
federal lands (DOI 2024).
Long-distance Transmission

The National Transmission Planning Study finds that the United States will
need to more than double its 2020 electricity transmission capacity by 2050
to meet demand growth (DOE 2024g). This will require both new transmission lines and increased capacity on existing transmission lines (DOE
2024h; DOE 2024g). Increased transmission also increases the reliability of
the grid, especially after natural disasters that hamper electricity generation
in some locations (NERC 2023), and promotes the use of carbon-free energy
sources.
The United States has three main power grids, or “interconnections:”
the Eastern, Western, and Texas grids (DOE n.d.a). Regional transmission
refers to sending electricity across long distances within each grid on powerful, high-voltage transmission lines. Electricity could also be transmitted
inter-regionally across interconnections, but the grids are currently not
closely connected.
Transmission across regions and interconnections can help deal with
the variability of wind and solar by reallocating renewable energy across
space, complementing the ability of batteries to reallocate renewable energy
across time. For example, many of the best locations for wind-based electricity production are in the center of the country, while most electricity
demand occurs on the coasts (Joskow 2021). In addition, wind speeds are
not constant even in windy locations. Figure 5-12 shows the uneven distribution of wind speed and solar irradiation across the country.
The grid system is not currently set up to optimally redistribute clean
energy resources over long distances (Simeone and Rose 2024). In the
extreme, places with high renewable energy potential may have negative
electricity prices, because more electricity can be cheaply generated than
is demanded within the regional grid. At the same time, prices may remain
high in other regions, with demand exceeding renewable energy potential
(Davis, Hausman, and Rose 2023). This price discrepancy implies that
electricity produced inexpensively cannot be effectively routed to where it is
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Chapter 5

B. Wind Speed

Sources: National Renewable Energy Laboratory; Census Bureau; CEA calculations.
Note: Solar irradiation is measured as average Global Horizontal Irradiation (kWh/m2/day). Wind speed is measured as the average wind speed at 100m above
surface level (m/s).
2025 Economic Report of the President

Council of Economic Advisers

A. Solar Irradiation

Figure 5-12. Distribution of Continental U.S. Solar and Wind Potential

needed. If renewables could be transmitted to locations with higher demand,
they could push out higher-cost fossil fuel production, leading to cheaper
electricity and fewer emissions in the receiving area. The financial benefits
of transmission across interconnections have been estimated to be as high
as almost three times greater than their cost on average (Bloom et al. 2020).
Planning for long-distance transmission is particularly difficult because
the lines must pass through many states, Tribal lands, and privately owned
properties. Moreover, the United States does not have a planning authority
to coordinate inter-grid transmission projects (Joskow 2021). This inability
to coordinate stakeholders when a project’s benefits are widely distributed
is a classic market failure (Coase 1960). There is also considerable scope to
upgrade transmission capacity without building new lines (O’Boyle, Baker,
and Solomon 2024), including reconductoring lines with high performance
conductors and deploying grid-enhancing technologies. Such investments
are not subject to the same coordination problems and can provide faster and
more cost-effective routes to upgrading the grid.
Increased transmission would cause wholesale prices to rise in some
regions and fall in others (Davis, Hausman, and Rose 2023). Locations sending electricity over long distances would tend to see prices increase, while
receiving locations would see prices decrease. Thus, some power producers
in receiving regions have incentives to block new transmission projects
(Hausman 2024; Davis, Hausman, and Rose 2023).
The Biden-Harris Administration has taken steps to address the
costs and coordination challenges that impede new transmission projects.
The Administration funds large-scale interregional transmission projects
through the $2.5 billion Transmission Facilitation Program and grid resilience through the $10.5 billion Grid Resilience and Innovation Partnerships
Program (GRIP), both introduced under the BIL (DOE 2023e; DOE
2024i; DOE n.d.b). The Administration has also created the Coordinated
Interagency Transmission Authorizations and Permits Program, which aims
to speed up the federal permitting process for transmission projects, and
the National Interest Electric Transmission Corridor Designation Process to
expedite key projects (DOE n.d.c; DOE 2023f). The Federal Government
also supports state-level actions through programs like the Federal-State Grid
Modernization Initiative, technical assistance from the National Labs, and
low-cost financing through the DOE Loan Programs Office (White House
2024b; Lawrence Berkeley National Lab n.d.; DOE 2024j). Additionally,
the independent Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has introduced new rules to expedite regional transmission projects (FERC 2024a).
Permitting for Energy Generation

Infrastructure projects, including clean energy and transmission projects,
may be subject to a variety of state and local requirements, such as land
Achieving a Net Zero Carbon Dioxide Emissions Economy in the United States | 191

use and zoning laws, as well as federal statutes including the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). NEPA requires agencies to consider
the reasonably foreseeable environmental effects of major federal actions,
which can be done through an environmental impact statement (EIS),
environmental assessment (EA), or categorical exclusion. NEPA reviews
often serve as a vehicle for projects to address compliance with substantive
federal environmental laws, including the Endangered Species Act, the
National Historic Preservation Act, the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act,
and more (Luther 2011). EISs require the most thorough agency reviews and
have historically taken several years, on average, for agencies to complete,
which can delay the buildout of clean energy infrastructure (Morales and
Rigby 2023).
Permitting requirements change the economic incentives to undertake
clean energy projects by creating deterrents to investment. The financial
return on a project is determined by the present discounted value of future
profits, which depends on the size of future profits, how long firms must
wait to receive them, the interest rate, and the certainty with which profits
will be received. Permitting affects the present discounted value through two
channels. First, delays in permitting processes can delay projects and push
profits further into the future. Second, permitting can increase uncertainty
about whether projects will come to fruition. Both effects decrease the riskadjusted return to financial capital tied up in a project, creating additional
barriers to new clean energy generation unrelated to the cost of generation.
The Biden-Harris Administration has taken steps to improve the
efficiency of the federal permitting process. First, the IRA allocated $1
billion to hire experts and invest in new technologies to expedite review
(White House 2024c). Additionally, amendments made to NEPA in the
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 and implemented by the Council on
Environmental Quality’s Bipartisan Permitting Reform Implementation
Rule now require that an EIS must not exceed 150 pages (or 300 pages for
a proposal of extraordinary complexity) and must be completed within two
years, while an EA must not exceed 75 pages and must be completed within
one year (White House 2024c; CEQ 2024). These reforms will further the
progress the Biden-Harris Administration has already made in cutting six
months off the median time it takes for agencies to complete EISs, while
protecting the environment and communities (White House 2024d).
Interconnection Queues

Before new energy generation projects can be connected to the grid, transmission operators must ensure that the grid can handle the increase in load.
Historically, projects have been evaluated in the order they are submitted.
Each additional project in the queue then imposes a cost on future projects
by increasing wait times, which can delay the return on investment and
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dissuade investors from undertaking otherwise-profitable clean energy generation projects (Johnston, Liu, and Yang 2023). Because these costs do not
enter into firms’ decisions to join the queue, this creates a negative externality that can lead to inefficient project selection, and government intervention
to decrease wait times can increase completions. If the grid is at capacity,
new applicants must also pay to upgrade transmission infrastructure, providing positive spillovers to other projects that can free-ride on their investment
(Johnston, Liu, and Yang 2023). Using BIL funds, the DOE has analyzed
solutions for reducing interconnection queues (DOE 2024k) and invested
in interconnection infrastructure, including through the $10.5 billion GRIP
and Title 17 Clean Energy Financing Program (DOE 2024j). FERC Order
2023 also aims to reduce interconnection queues by guiding transmission
providers to conduct batch studies of multiple projects at once, as well as
incentivizing faster completion (FERC 2024b; DOE 2024j).
Demand Response

Variability in renewable energy availability can also be addressed by adjusting demand, much like congestion pricing for traffic. Most retail consumers,
including households and small businesses, do not pay retail rates that fully
reflect changes in the cost of producing electricity (Borenstein, Bushnell,
and Mansur 2023). This means that many customers have no incentive to
adjust their consumption patterns to match the availability of cheap, renewable energy. Allowing electricity prices to reflect fluctuations in demand
or supply (e.g., after sudden increases in heat or drops in the availability of
wind power) could help consumers time their electricity consumption for
when renewables are available (Joskow and Wolfram 2012).
New technologies, such as digital meters and advanced sensors, make
it easier for consumers to adjust electricity demand in response to changes in
electricity prices (DOE n.d.d). They can help consumers respond to changes
in electricity prices without having to take additional action or even be
aware of the rate changes (Bollinger and Hartmann 2019). Recent evidence
suggests that time-varying prices with caps to limit consumer spending can
improve the timing of energy demand (Hinchberger et al. 2024). Demand
response can also be used by environmentally conscious consumers to reallocate demand in the absence of time-varying electricity prices. The BidenHarris Administration has promoted demand response programs as part of a
wider effort to promote the use of automation technologies to better balance
electricity supply and demand (DOE 2023g).
Carbon Capture and Storage

Many efforts to decarbonize electricity focus on ensuring that new clean
generation displaces fossil fuels. Another approach is to alter the process of
fossil fuel combustion to reduce CO2 emissions. Carbon capture and storage,
Achieving a Net Zero Carbon Dioxide Emissions Economy in the United States | 193

or CCS, is a term for a suite of technologies that aim to capture CO2 from
process exhaust and prevent it from reaching the atmosphere.14 The equimarginal principle implies that CCS should be used at power plants to reduce
emissions when it is less expensive than using a combination of renewables
and storage, other generation technologies, or adjusting demand. As a result,
CCS can be used to ensure that the economy achieves net zero CO2 emissions as quickly as possible and can be phased out when zero-carbon energy
sources become lower cost alternatives to supply all electricity. Knowledge
gained from R&D and deployment of CCS in the power sector will spill over
to other sectors that make use of CCS.
The EPA has found that CCS is a cost-effective way to reduce emissions, and its recent regulations adopted under section 111 of the Clean
Air Act will require all long-term coal-fired plants and some new gas-fired
plants to control 90 percent of their CO2 emissions (EPA 2024d). This regulatory design requires firms to limit emissions without mandating use of a
specific technology, incentivizing them to do so in the least expensive way
possible. CCS is a cost-effective way to comply in part due to tax credits
that were increased and extended by the IRA, highlighting the interaction of
recent legislation and regulatory efforts in propelling the economy toward
net zero.

Electrification
Given the potential for rapidly decarbonizing the electricity sector, further
electrification of the economy is crucial for reaching net zero. This section
discusses the economics of electrification in each sector of the economy.
The Transportation Sector

In 2023, transportation contributed nearly 40 percent of energy-related CO2
emissions (see figure 5-1). Electrification offers significant opportunities
for reducing emissions not only from fuel consumption, but also from fuel
production, vehicle manufacturing and maintenance, and infrastructure.
Personal vehicles. Replacing internal combustion engine (ICE) with
EVs is central to achieving net zero in the transportation sector. More than
90 percent of American households have at least one car (Census 2022), and
tailpipe CO2 emissions from passenger vehicles and light trucks made up
18 percent of total U.S. CO2 emissions in 2022 (EPA 2024e). Figure 5-13
compares lifecycle emissions from ICE vehicles and EVs. Replacing all
ICE vehicles with EVs would reduce emissions per passenger mile traveled
(PMT) by 46 percent with the mix of electricity generation sources projected

CCS in the power sector prevents emissions from fossil fuel use but does not pull CO2 from the
atmosphere. For this reason, it is not considered to be a NET.

14

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Vehicle manufacturing and maintenance

Figure 5-13. Emissions per Passenger Mile from Personal Vehicles

Fuel production

Grams CO2-e per passenger mile traveled
Sedan
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0

Fuel consumption

Council of Economic Advisers

SUV

Infrastructure construction and operation

Sources: International Council on Clean Transportation; CEA calculations.
Note: ICE vehicle refers to vehicles with internal combustion engines and BEV refers to battery electric vehicles. Calculations are made for vehicles registered in the
United States in 2021 using the GREET model from Argonne National Laboratory. Grid mix refers to electricity generated from both fossil fuel and renewable
sources projected for 2021–2038. Clean grid refers to electricity produced with zero emissions. CO2-e is a measure of total greenhouse gas emissions that converts
non-CO2 gases into their equivalent quantity of CO2 in terms of warming potential.
2025 Economic Report of the President

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to be used from 2021–2038 and by 66 percent with a zero-carbon emissions
grid.
The Biden-Harris Administration has set the target that 50 percent
of new passenger cars and light trucks should be zero- or low-emissions
vehicles, including battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, and fuel cell
electric vehicles, by 2030 (White House 2021c). As of the second quarter
of 2024, low-emissions vehicles made up 9 percent of new vehicle sales, up
from less than 1 percent in 2014, and battery EVs alone made up 7 percent
(EIA 2024f). As older ICE vehicles are retired, the share of EVs on the road
will increase.
There are two main challenges to increasing EV adoption, both of
which the Biden-Harris Administration has taken action to address. First,
EVs have historically been more expensive than ICE vehicles in the United
States, although the market prices are converging (see figure 5-14a) in part
thanks to government support for R&D (White House 2024e) and critical
mineral supply chains (White House 2022). In addition, the IRA funds EV
tax credits that lower the price for many consumers below the trend shown
in figure 5-14a, and EVs often have lower operating costs (Treasury 2024;
Orvis 2022). Second, consumers have concerns about EVs’ range and ease
of travel. ICE vehicles have historically been able to travel farther than EVs
before refueling (although EV and ICE vehicle ranges are converging, as
shown in figure 5-14b), charging typically takes longer than filling a gas
tank, and charging stations are not as common as gas stations.
To make EVs better substitutes for ICE vehicles, complementary
investments are needed to extend battery range and build charging stations
(Rapson and Bushnell 2024). Without government intervention, investment
in charging stations would be insufficient because of a coordination problem:
Investments in charging stations are not profitable unless many people drive
EVs, and fewer consumers will buy an EV if charging stations are not available along long-distance routes (Gillingham and Stock 2018). In response,
investments from the BIL and IRA are working to reduce EV prices,
increase range, and expand charging networks, which have contributed to
the quadrupling of EV purchases and the doubling of the number of publicly
available chargers since the Biden-Harris Administration took office (White
House 2024e; DOT 2024). More than $25 billion of investment in the U.S.
EV charging network has been announced to date, including over $10 billion
from the private sector (White House 2024e). The investments may need to
be adjusted over time to keep adoption on track. These investments will also
encourage adoption of electric medium-duty vehicles such as delivery vans.
Shared transit. Shared transit addresses congestion and emissions
externalities, which means that government intervention to increase its availability can increase wellbeing. Increasing ridership can also reduce emissions. Figure 5-15 shows emissions per PMT for an average bus occupancy
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Hello
Figure 5-14. Range and Transaction Price for New

Light-duty Vehicles

A. Transaction Price

Average transaction price (thousands of dollars)

70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
Jan-2019

Jan-2020

Jan-2021

Jan-2022
EV

B. Range

Jan-2023

Jan-2024

ICE+

Median range (miles)
500
400
300
200
100
0
2011

2014

EV

Council of Economic Advisers

2017

2020
ICE

2023

Sources: Department of Energy; Cox Automotive; CEA calculations.
Note: Average transaction price is calculated as a three-month moving average and is
based on all transacted models, thus reflecting differences in the composition of
model categories. Median range is based on all available model configurations
certified by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in a given year and does not
represent sales- or production-weighted data. Range for electric vehicles is based on
EPA estimates; range for ICE vehicles is based on tank size and combined
city/highway fuel economy. The ICE model category includes gasoline vehicles, while
the ICE+ model category includes all internal combustion engine vehicles as well as
hybrid vehicles.
2025 Economic Report of the President

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Fuel consumption

Fuel production

Vehicle manufacturing and maintenance

Infrastructure construction and operation

Intercity

Sources: Transportation Life-Cycle Assessment Passenger Database; Fuels Institute; Federal Highway Administration; CEA calculations.
Note: Metro, commuter rail, and light rail with an energy mix (20 percent renewable energy) are calculated for the San Francisco systems; electric light rail is
calculated for Los Angeles. Grid mix refers to electricity generated from both fossil fuel and renewable sources; assumptions about the shares are described in each
source. Clean grid refers to electricity generated with zero emissions. Bus PMT are calculated for 11 passengers, the average occupancy in 2018. CO2-e is a measure
of total greenhouse gas emissions that converts non-CO2 gases into their equivalent quantity of CO2 in terms of warming potential.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Council of Economic Advisers

400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0

Grams CO2-e per passenger mile traveled (PMT)
Intracity

Figure 5-15. Emissions per Passenger Mile from Mass Transit

of 11 people (Federal Highway Administration 2018), though most buses
can transport 50–70 passengers at a time (Transportation Research Board
2013). While both private and public EVs have low marginal operating
emissions, displacing private vehicles with shared transit helps decrease lifecycle emissions via reduced vehicle production, maintenance, infrastructure
investments, and vehicle end-of-life.
Increasing public transit ridership will require government action
to build new networks, connect long-distance transit with last-mile travel
modes, reduce trip times, and set optimal prices considering environmental
externalities. A recent study finds that optimal fares for public transit can
be as low as $0.16 and optimal service is more frequent when emissions
and congestion are taken into account (Almagro et al. 2023). The benefits
of expanding the use of a fully electric, zero-emissions public transit fleet
would be greater.
Federal, state, and local governments can act to make a rapid transition
to an electrified public transit system. For example, the EPA’s Clean School
Bus Program buys electric school buses with funding from the BIL (EPA
2024f). Federal funding and incentives for the electrification of rail can help
fund the replacement of older, high-emissions locomotives with new electric
locomotives (Federal Railroad Administration 2024). As shown in figure
5-15, meeting demand for new regional transportation by building new highspeed rail can also help reduce emissions.
Freight. Freight is transported by container ship, rail, air, and heavyduty vehicles. While inexpensive batteries could enable the electrification of
heavy-duty vehicles (Ledna et al. 2024) and shorter-distance, interregional
container shipping (Kersey, Popovich, and Phadke 2022), decarbonizing
global shipping and aviation will likely make use of other technologies that
will be discussed later.
The Residential and Commercial Building Sectors

Direct emissions from buildings comprise 12 percent of annual U.S. CO2
emissions (EIA 2024a). Electrifying heating and cooling, water heating, and
cooking will deliver increasing emissions reductions over time as the grid
decarbonizes (Leung 2018). Because buildings are durable, retrofits will
play a major role in building electrification: 75 percent of homes and 51 percent of commercial space projected to exist in 2050 have already been built
(DOE 2024l). However, retrofits tend to be costly, and without subsidies,
many households and businesses will continue to use existing technologies
until they must be replaced. The Biden-Harris Administration supports electrification through IRA tax credits and home energy rebates (White House
2024f). While building codes are set at the state and local level, the Federal
Government can participate in model code development and offer incentives

Achieving a Net Zero Carbon Dioxide Emissions Economy in the United States | 199

Figure 5-16. Electrification by Industry Subsector
Percent of end-use energy coming from electricity
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2002

2006

2010

Primary metals
Nonmetallic mineral products
Paper
Industry average

2014

2018

Food
Chemicals
Petroleum and coal products

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Energy Information Administration; CEA calculations.
Note: The subsectors included are the six most energy-intensive subsectors in 2018. Primary
metals includes steel and aluminum. Nonmetallic mineral products includes cement and
glass. Chemicals includes fertilizer. Values are calculated as electricity sales to ultimate
customers in the end-use subsector (Btu) divided by end-use energy consumed by the enduse subsector (Btu). The average value represents the average across all industry subsectors,
not just those shown.
2025 Economic Report of the President

and support for local jurisdictions to require new construction to be electric
ready (DOE 2024l).
Because buildings already consume 75 percent of electricity production, decreasing demand for electricity in buildings through improved
energy efficiency will tend to lower electricity prices (O’Shaughnessy et al.
2022). This decrease in prices will then promote electrification throughout
the rest of the economy.
The Industrial Sector

The decarbonization of industry will rely on a combination of electrification,
energy efficiency, low-carbon fuels, and CCS, among other solutions (DOE
2022a). Because of the wide range of industrial processes, optimal measures

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will depend on the industrial subsector. For example, in sectors that use
low and medium temperature heat, electrification can be cost effective with
existing technologies, which generally means using industrial heat pumps
to replace natural gas boilers (Rissman 2022). This process of electrification will be spurred by policies that lower the cost of electricity relative to
natural gas, including subsidies for clean energy generation and batteries.
For applications where higher temperatures are required, such as producing
steel, cement, and glass, heat electrification is unlikely to be economical
soon. For many energy-intensive subsectors, electrification is still nascent
(figure 5-16). The Biden-Harris Administration has funded a wide range of
R&D and demonstration projects to promote electrification and other forms
of industrial decarbonization, which will be discussed in the following sections (DOE 2024m; DOE 2020; DOE 2024n).

Beyond Electricity
This section discusses the economics of decarbonization for un-electrified
parts of the economy and the use of NETs to remove emissions that are
difficult to eliminate.

Decarbonization Beyond Electrification
While grid decarbonization plays a critical role in economy-wide decarbonization, it is still possible to decarbonize portions of the economy that do not
rely on electricity.
Sustainable Fuels

When full electrification is not cost effective, using fuels that have fewer
emissions on a lifecycle basis can be an effective way to reduce emissions.
These fuels are likely to play a large role in decarbonizing both high-heat
industrial processes and freight transportation (Lu et al. 2023). Powering
aviation and cargo ships with electricity is not efficient with current technology, because batteries with the capacity to handle long-distance ranges are
very heavy and take up considerable cargo space (Kennedy and Feldman
2023). The United States is investing in alternative energy-dense sustainable
aviation fuels derived from biomass, wastes, or captured CO2 and hydrogen
as part of its target to reduce aviation emissions by 20 percent by 2030
(White House 2021d; DOE 2024o).
Hydrogen can also be used as an alternative to fossil fuels in ICE
vehicles, fuel cells, and heavy industry. However, there is a tradeoff
between emissions intensity and cost across the available production
technologies. Without subsidies and given current grid conditions, it
is currently cheapest to produce liquid hydrogen using fossil fuels in a

Achieving a Net Zero Carbon Dioxide Emissions Economy in the United States | 201

manner that produces CO2 and other GHG emissions, rather than using
electricity (Schelling 2023). In 2020, 95 percent of hydrogen production
used natural gas as an input (DOE 2020). Due to uncertainty about the
future economic viability of low carbon fuels like clean hydrogen (Davis
et al. 2023), subsidies for R&D and production—such as the IRA’s Clean
Hydrogen Production Tax Credit—are likely to be important. The BIL funds
the establishment of Regional Clean Hydrogen Hubs (DOE 2024p) in addition to other projects promoting research, development, demonstration, and
deployment of clean fuels (DOE 2023h).
Increasing Energy Efficiency

Energy efficiency has been the driving force behind past decarbonization
of the U.S. economy. CO2 emissions per dollar of gross domestic product
fell 55 percent from 1990–2022, largely due to increases in economy-wide
energy efficiency (i.e., decreases in primary energy use per dollar of real
GDP). While improvements in energy efficiency will never be sufficient
to achieve complete decarbonization on their own while fossil fuel energy
sources are in use, the equimarginal principle suggests they are likely to be
an important component of reaching net zero carbon emissions, especially
in economic activities that are not completely electrified.
Energy efficiency is a central component of industrial decarbonization,
with specific applications differing by subsector. Figure 5-17 shows that
energy efficiency improved from 2002–2018 even within subsectors that
did not experience significant electrification. The Industrial Decarbonization
Liftoff report outlines how the Biden-Harris Administration has promoted
energy efficiency with tools including R&D and demonstration projects
(DOE 2023i).
Energy efficiency can also play a key role in decarbonizing freight
transportation and global shipping (Lu et al. 2023). Improvements in the
design of trucks, ships, planes, and engines as well as new innovations in
the use of sails to capture wind for maritime freight can all reduce CO2
emissions per ton-mile (Kennedy and Feldmann 2023). The Biden-Harris
Administration issued the U.S. National Blueprint for Transportation
Decarbonization, which discusses how to increase energy efficiency within
transportation modes and incentivize switching activity to more energy efficient modes, such as shared transit, when possible (DOE 2023j).
Increasing energy efficiency is also crucial to decarbonizing the building sector. Buildings can be made more energy efficient through investments
in insulation, air sealing, envelope requirements, and energy efficient appliances and lighting (DOE 2024l). The Biden-Harris Administration supports
these efforts with IRA tax credits and home energy rebates (White House
2024f), energy efficiency standards for appliances and commercial and
industrial equipment as directed by Congress (DOE 2024q), energy code
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Figure 5-17. Energy Use per Real Dollar of Value
Added by Industry Subsector
1,000 Btu per chained 2017 dollar
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2002

2006
Paper
Primary metals
Chemicals
Manufacturing Total

2010

2014

2018

Petroleum and coal products
Nonmetallic mineral products
Food

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Energy Information Administration; CEA
calculations.
Note: The subsectors included are the six most energy-intensive subsectors in 2018.
Primary metals includes steel and aluminum. Primary metals includes steel and
aluminum. Nonmetallic mineral products includes cement and glass. Chemicals
includes fertilizer. Values are calculated by dividing total energy use (Btu) by gross real
value added for each industry subsector. The average value represents the average
across all industry subsectors, not just those shown.
2025 Economic Report of the President

requirements for federal programs, and $1.2 billion in IRA and BIL funding
to support local jurisdictions in adopting new energy codes (DOE 2023k).
Where buildings are located also affects energy use through the impact
of weather on energy demand for heating and cooling, emissions from
commuting (Lyubich 2024; Almagro et al. 2024; DOE 2023j), and land
use (Hong et al. 2021). Indeed, place effects account for 14–23 percent of

Achieving a Net Zero Carbon Dioxide Emissions Economy in the United States | 203

heterogeneity in household energy use (Lyubich 2024). In 2021, 14 percent
of building emissions were estimated to come from embodied carbon in
material manufacturing, transport, construction, and disposal (DOE 2024l),
suggesting that switching to less carbon-intensive building materials and
practices and reducing the frequency of repairs and rebuilding can lower
CO2 emissions per year of use. As a result, rezoning to encourage dense
construction in low disaster-risk, transit-rich areas, combined with updating building codes for energy efficiency and climate resilience, can ensure
that housing construction and emissions reduction goals advance together
(Schuetz 2022). The Biden-Harris Administration emphasizes the role of
land-use planning and transit-oriented development in reducing emissions in
its Blueprint for Transportation Decarbonization (DOE 2023j).
CCS in Industry and Transportation

As in the electric power sector, CCS could play an important role in decarbonizing heavy industries like steel and cement production, as well as the
production of low-carbon fuels used for transportation. CCS is more likely
to be both a short- and long-term solution in these sectors, unlike in the
power sector where it is likely to be a short-term tool for speeding up the
transition (Browning et al. 2023).

Negative Emissions Technologies
Reaching net zero will require offsetting emissions from sectors where costeffective mitigation is not feasible (DOE 2022b). In other words, there is a
need for NETs, which can allow the economy to reach net zero even when
carbon emissions still occur in some sectors.
Biological NETs are any biological process pulling CO2 from the
atmosphere, usually through plant growth, to maintain or enhance natural
carbon sinks. In particular, forest growth consumes significant CO2, and
some farming practices can increase the carbon uptake of soil.
Technological NETs are engineered systems that remove CO2 from
the atmosphere. The simplest technological NET is direct air capture and
storage (DACS). DACS pulls CO2 from the atmosphere using chemical
reactions (IEA 2024a). DACS requires an external source of energy that may
itself be produced with either fossil fuels or carbon-free energy sources. As
a result, the net cost of using DACS to remove emissions depends on both
the technology for capturing and storing emissions and the technology for
generating the energy inputs.
Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) is a hybrid NET
that involves growing, harvesting, and converting plants into electricity or

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biofuel (IEA 2024b).15 In the conversion process, CCS is applied to capture
and store emissions. Unlike CCS used to decarbonize fossil fuel electricity generation, BECCS can result in net negative emissions because plant
growth pulls CO2 from the atmosphere.
The ability of DACS and BECCS to yield net negative emissions,
rather than simply preventing new emissions, makes them potentially
important tools for meeting international targets to limit global temperature
change, like the 1.5–2 degrees Celsius goal in the Paris Agreement. While
the Biden-Harris Administration’s targets are expressed in terms of flow
emissions, long-run climate targets depend on the stock of carbon in the
atmosphere. As highlighted by the United Nation’s Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC), negative emissions can play an important role
by offsetting positive emissions that occur during the transition to net zero
and legacy emissions from before the transition in order to keep total warming from exceeding the target (IPCC 2018).
Recent analyses show great potential for NETs to contribute significantly to achieving net zero by 2050 (Pett-Ridge et al. 2023; IPCC 2018).
However, due in part to the early stage of development and significant
technology uncertainties, a wide range of costs for technological NETs have
been reported.16 DACS is currently considered too expensive to be widely
deployed. Producing electricity with BECCS is less expensive than using
DACS, but still costs more than other abatement options. Certain biological
NETs, such as afforestation/reforestation, are much less expensive but may
be less permanent, since, for example, the carbon stored in a forest would
be released if it were burned or cleared (NASEM 2019; Cook-Patton et al.
2020; Fuss et al. 2018).
The equimarginal principle suggests there is no need to undertake
an action that reduces emissions at a higher cost than it takes to remove a
ton of emissions through NETs. For this reason, technological NETs are
often referred to as the “backstop technology” (Heal 2009). As technology
improves and the price of this backstop technology comes down, the upper
limit of the cost of reaching net zero will also decrease.
R&D is expected to reduce the costs of DACS and BECCS meaningfully (DOE n.d.e). For example, a survey of technical experts found an
expected decrease from the 2020 cost of DACS of over 50 percent by 2050
(Abegg et al. 2024). Achieving such cost reductions will require government
policy to address externalities related to R&D spillovers and learning-bydoing (Jones et al. 2024). Higher tax credits for CCS—which also apply to
DACS and BECCS—in the IRA will potentially help spur learning-by-doing.
BECCS is part of a broader category of NETs known as Biomass Carbon Removal and Storage
(BiCRS) that includes any process that stores CO2 captured by plants and algae (DOE 2022b).
16
See, for example, Fuss et al. (2018), NASEM (2019), Cook-Patton et al. (2020), Abegg et al.
(2024), Homsy et al. (2024), and DOE (n.d.e).
15

Achieving a Net Zero Carbon Dioxide Emissions Economy in the United States | 205

In addition, the Biden-Harris Administration is funding four Regional Direct
Air Capture Hubs and the Carbon Capture Demonstration Project to harness learning-by-doing externalities and accelerate the demonstration and
deployment of DACS (DOE 2024r; DOE 2024s). Regional hubs also help
address coordination externalities by ensuring that carbon capture facilities
and carbon transportation infrastructure are co-located (Armitage, Bakhtian,
and Jaffe 2024). Government support to create market incentives for NETs
is particularly important, because NETs do not always yield a marketable
product (Jones et al. 2024).

The Path Ahead
The Biden-Harris Administration has made the transition to net zero GHG
emissions a policy priority, setting out targets for a carbon pollution-free
electricity sector by 2035 and net zero GHG emissions by 2050. The
Administration signed into law the most significant climate legislation in
U.S. history, including the IRA, BIL, and CHIPS and Science Act. These
historic achievements have made significant and unprecedented progress in
pushing the economy toward the Administration’s targets.
Achieving these goals will require transformation across all sectors of
the economy, implying that the equimarginal principle will play an important role in climate policy. Net zero can be accomplished most cost effectively with a combination of (i) a fully decarbonized electric power sector,
(ii) significant electrification across other sectors, (iii) the use of clean fuels,
energy efficiency, and CCS to decarbonize un-electrified activities, and (iv)
NETs to offset remaining emissions.
The central goal of climate policy is to address the negative externality of GHG emissions, including CO2. The Biden-Harris Administration’s
efforts are projected to fundamentally alter the country’s emissions trajectory. Future administrations can build on this progress in several ways,
including using carbon pricing to address this externality simultaneously
throughout the economy or continuing the current strategy of addressing the
externality separately with different policies aimed at different economic
activities.
Achieving net zero will also require policy to address a set of additional market failures beyond the CO2 emissions externality, such as promoting R&D and demonstrating the economic feasibility of nascent technologies. Through historic investments in the advancement and deployment of
clean energy technology, the Biden-Harris Administration has taken the first
necessary steps to address the market failures and achieve the transition to
a net zero economy.

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Chapter 6

America's Role in International
Capital Flows
Just as international supply chains are vital for goods trade to function,
international capital flows are essential to a resilient global monetary
system, allowing savings to flow across borders to facilitate investment.1
The United States participates actively in both sending and receiving funds
internationally, whether by domestic citizens buying foreign equities or
foreign investors helping to finance new semiconductor plants on U.S. soil.
International capital flows are cross-border investments in financial assets
recorded in the financial account of the balance of payments. These flows
include investment in stocks and bonds known as portfolio investment, real
assets such as factories and equipment known as foreign direct investment
(FDI), and cross-border lending by global banks. Capital inflows thus
provide an important source of funds that finance investment in the United
States. Analogously, U.S. firms and investors provide significant amounts
of capital to finance investments in stocks, bonds, and factories around the
world.
The strength and resilience of the U.S. post-pandemic recovery helped to
make the United States a magnet for foreign investment. Equally important,
the Biden-Harris investment agenda in infrastructure, clean energy, and
semiconductor technology has served as a productive target for inflows.2
International capital flows provide the United States numerous benefits, including access to
financing, increased capital allocation efficiency, and enhanced diversification and risk sharing
across borders. More broadly, global financial flows allow capital to be allocated to the most
productive global investment opportunities.
2
A significant share of this new foreign direct investment into the United States originates from
trading partner countries, such as Canada, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom (CEA
2023a).
1

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The United States has increased its dominance of global financial flows,
receiving the highest share of international capital flows in 2022-2023.
Approximately 41 percent of global gross inflows were destined for the
United States, almost doubling the country’s pre-pandemic share of 23
percent (Allen and Bems 2024). The United States’ currency also plays a
unique role on the international stage, functioning as a reserve currency,
denominating an outsized share of global trade, and denominating a large
share of cross-border financial transactions (Boz et al. 2020).
A balance of pull and push factors helps determine the pattern of international
capital flows (Fratzscher 2012; Forbes and Warnock 2012; Obstfeld 2024).
Pull factors are domestic macroeconomic fundamentals, such as strong
economic growth relative to trading partners, that can draw in foreign capital
flows, allowing countries to invest in amounts exceeding the domestic savings pool. The strength of property rights institutions, investor protections,
and corporate governance standards can also serve as pull factors on foreign
capital (Chari 2020). Emphasizing pull factors and demand-based explanations suggest that some countries invest more than they save domestically
due to expenditures at home financed by foreign capital inflows. Here,
domestic macroeconomic fundamentals and domestic absorption patterns
in receiving countries are the underlying drivers of current account deficits.
Push factors are common global factors that can move global savings
towards certain destinations. Events like flights to safety during times of
heightened global economic uncertainty can push funds, as can precautionary motives for channeling savings into reserve or safe haven currencies
(Chari, Dilts Stedman, and Lundblad 2022; Goldberg and Krogstrup 2023).
Another push factor dynamic was described by former Federal Reserve
chairman Ben Bernanke in 2005 in the context of the “global savings glut,”
where excess savings in the rest of the world drove down global real interest
rates (Bernanke 2005). In certain cases, such global imbalances can have
damaging effects on capital-receiving countries, lowering savings rates and

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contributing to bubble investments (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2009), or sapping
aggregate demand when there is short supply in the context of global liquidity traps (Eggertsson and Egiev 2019).
Both a strong economic recovery (pull factors) and investments into safe
debt assets (push factors) have fueled the growing dominance of the United
States in international capital flows. After a brief discussion of the U.S. current account, this chapter explores the financial account of the United States
by tracking its different types of claims and liabilities. Given that flows of
international capital into and out of the United States are the counterparts
to the international trade transactions of imports and exports, we begin by
providing a broad overview of the U.S. current account. Next, we explore
the U.S. financial account and the international capital flows landscape.
The chapter delves into the different classes of investment, beginning with
portfolio investments in debt and equity and the returns that accrue to them,
followed by changes in FDI and changes in other investments that primarily
include cross-border bank lending. Attention is also paid to the international
role of the dollar and the holdings of U.S. dollar reserves as safe assets by
foreign investors.

The Current Account and Financial Account
Balance of payments accounts divide international transactions into three
broad categories: the current account, the capital account, and the financial
account. While the financial account captures the capital flows described
above, the current account captures international trade transactions and net
factor income from abroad.3 For the balance of payments to balance, U.S.
financial account surpluses that reflect tremendous global investor appetite
for U.S. assets, financial and real, are mirrored by current account deficits.
The current account includes statistics on the international trade of goods and services as well as
receipts and payments of primary and secondary income. The capital account is usually a small
part of the balance of payments records and includes capital transfer transactions like foreign aid
and transactions of non-financial, non-produced assets like intangible capital. According to the
Bureau of Economic Analysis, the financial account refers to “investment transactions—including
direct investment, portfolio investment, other investment, reserve assets, and financial derivatives—
between U.S. residents and nonresidents” (Bruner 2021).

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America's Role in International Capital Flows | 209

Figure 6-1. U.S. Trade and Current Account Balances
Billions of dollars
400
200
0
-200
-400
-600
-800
-1,000
-1,200
-1,400
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022
All goods
Current account balance

Council of Economic Advisers

All services
Trade balance

Sources: Census Bureau; Bureau of Economic Analysis; CEA calculations.
Note: Trade data are on a balance of payments basis. Gray bars indicate recessions.
2025 Economic Report of the President

The current account has long been a subject of economic analysis,
in part because the United States has nearly continuously run a current
account deficit since the early 1980s. Because prior Economic Reports of the
President have extensively covered the current account deficit, this chapter
briefly touches on the subject before moving on to an in-depth analysis of
the U.S. financial account (CEA 2022; CEA 2023b; CEA 2024a).
Figure 6-1 shows the U.S. current account from 2000 to 2023. The
current account has averaged a deficit of $552 billion over the period, representing 3.3 percent of GDP. In 2023, the current account deficit was $905
billion, of which the balance on trade in goods and services was almost $785
billion. In 2023, income receipts were $1.57 trillion, and income payments
were $1.69 trillion (BEA 2024a). Canada, China, and Mexico were the top
U.S. trade partners in 2023, accounting for more than 30 percent of the
country’s exports and imports.
Breaking down the trade deficit into goods and services provides
useful insight. The U.S. goods deficit ($1.1 trillion in 2023) overshadows
the surplus in U.S. services trade ($278 billion in 2023), but notably the
United States maintains a global comparative advantage in services exports.

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Most of the services surplus has been driven by digitally-enabled services,
which include all activities performed with information and communication
technologies. Digital services are the fastest-growing trade category as the
United States moves toward an increasingly services-based and digitallyenabled economy (CEA 2024b).
Economists have alternative views about the fundamental causes of
America’s persistently negative trade balance. Aligning with a focus on
global push and pull factors, some economists note the role played by high
savings rates in other countries, which can contribute to large capital inflows
into the United States (Bernanke 2005; Pettis 2017). Such flows can boost
productive investment. They can also depress savings rates and raise aggregate demand if they lower interest rates or contribute to the formation of
bubbles.4 The latter dynamic can contribute to more debt-fueled consumption than is healthy (Obstfeld 2017). Additionally, such flows tend to appreciate the country’s exchange rate, and can contribute to an increase in the
trade deficit if a country’s exports become more expensive and uncompetitive on world markets while imports become cheaper. Recent trends in the
exchange rate show that the U.S. dollar (hereafter referred to as the dollar)
has risen by 7.4 percent in nominal terms relative to a representative basket
of trading-partner currencies since 2020, according to the Federal Reserve’s
Broad Dollar Monthly Index as of October 2024, and the real trade-weighted
value of the dollar is 15 percent above its 20-year historical average.
Foreign countries can have high savings rates for various reasons,
ranging from demographic factors like an aging population to government policies suppressing consumption and thereby encouraging savings.
Relevant government policies include limited public retirement systems or
insufficient social safety nets leading households to save more than they
otherwise would for precautionary purposes (Zhang et al. 2018). The implication of this dynamic is that trading-partner countries can play a role in
shaping trade balances of other countries (Gourinchas et al. 2024).
It is important to recognize that a negative trade balance does not
constitute a negative “score” for an economy. Indeed, the United States’
post-pandemic recovery has been uniquely characterized by high levels of
business investment, one third of which has gone toward factory construction (Van Nostrand 2024a). As a result, much of America’s investment
appears to be going to productive ends. Productivity is rising, business
formation is increasing, and it is likely that these potentially lasting and
transformative advances would not be possible without the supportive role
played by international financing.
A widely cited example of unproductive investment is the housing bubble of the early 2000s
accompanied by a consumption boom that culminated in a global financial crisis with lasting
negative effects on the U.S. economy.

4

America's Role in International Capital Flows | 211

Moreover, the global increase in international trade with U.S. trading
partners has been essential in increasing the supply of goods, services, and
capital. It has given rise to many new domestic business opportunities and
jobs in export sectors. It has fostered competition and boosted productivity.
This latter dynamic has been an especially favorable development over the
past few years, motivated in large part by legislation that is crowding in
private capital from abroad into critical new sectors of U.S. domestic production (CEA 2023a; CEA 2024c).
However, it is also important to recognize that certain aspects of trade
flows can have downsides. Non-market practices and policies deviating
from rules-based trading conventions have hurt communities over the past
few decades (USTR 2024). In this vein, the Administration has taken consequential actions to protect American workers, producers, and taxpayers from
violations of rules-based trade, particularly against China’s long-applied
strategy of capturing global market share, gained via subsidies and nonmarket policies and practices. The Administration has also addressed urgent
national security challenges, for example, by blocking exports of advanced
technologies to those who might use them against the United States, and
regulating investments that can be exploited to pose risks to U.S. national
security in certain technologies and products in countries of concern (White
House 2024).
Turning back to the other side of the balance of payments ledger,
figure 6-2 shows that the United States has run a steady financial account
surplus throughout the 21st century. Between 2000 and 2023, the financial
account balance averaged $530 billion.5 The composition of gross capital
inflows into the United States has varied over time. In 2023, the United
States received approximately $1.9 trillion in foreign capital inflows, and
U.S. investors and multinationals supplied nearly $979 billion in capital
to foreign countries (BEA 2024b). These flows substantially exceeded
their pre-pandemic levels. On a global scale, international capital flows
retrenched from their pre-pandemic values, but the U.S. share of gross
capital flows nearly doubled from 23 percent in 2019 to 41 percent in 2023
(Allen and Bems 2024).
Capital flows play critical economic roles. By internationalizing their
portfolios, investors can increase returns while mitigating risk via diversification. The United States plays an important role in this process. U.S.
Treasuries are considered safe assets worldwide due to low default risk,
high liquidity, and a strong governance environment. Firms, investors, and
The financial account includes asset transactions between the United States and foreign countries.
If an investor living in the United Kingdom, for example, buys shares in an American company,
the transaction appears as a liability in the U.S. financial account, since the investor has a claim on
domestic profits. If an American investor buys shares in a British company, the transaction appears
as a claim in the financial account.

5

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Figure 6-2. U.S. Financial and Current Accounts
Billions of dollars
1,500
1,000
500
0
-500
-1,000
-1,500

2001

2005

2009

2013

Net direct investment
Net other investment
Financial account

2017

2021

Net portfolio investment
Reserves
Current account

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; CEA calculations.
Note: Derivatives are excluded.
2025 Economic Report of the President

governments hold U.S. Treasuries in their portfolios for precautionary and
risk diversification purposes, especially in times of heightened uncertainty,
such as the global financial crisis or COVID-19 pandemic, when investors
seek to reduce the risk exposure of their portfolios (Chari, Dilts Stedman,
and Lundblad 2020). Foreign investors also invest in U.S. equities and direct
investment assets to realize higher returns than are available elsewhere.
Evidence suggests that incoming foreign financial flows lower the cost
of capital in recipient economies, which can spur real investment and growth
(Chari and Henry 2005; Chari and Henry 2008). Capital inflows have the
potential to expand a country’s productive capacity by increasing domestic
investment, while closed economies have access only to the domestic savings pool. Therefore, when net capital inflows are positive (i.e., inflows
exceed outflows), domestic investment can exceed domestic savings.
Investment flows other than portfolio equity and debt, such as crossborder lending and FDI, can play similar roles. In many instances, FDI can
provide access to improved technologies leading to productivity improvements as well as knowledge transfers to the host country (Alfaro and
Hammel 2007; Alfaro et al. 2010; Fons-Rosen et al. 2018; Branstetter 2006).
America's Role in International Capital Flows | 213

Additionally, access to international credit allows countries to smooth
consumption over time, lending in good times and borrowing when faced
with adverse shocks (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996). International borrowing
and lending can therefore insulate countries from the fate of lurching from
feast to famine. Similarly, when there is a foreign appetite for purchasing a
country’s government bonds, international capital flows allow governments
to finance their budget deficits at lower interest rates than would otherwise
prevail.

The International Capital Flows Landscape
Shifts in the composition of international financial flows as a result of
changes in foreign investor preferences or international shocks can impact
U.S. financial asset prices, such as bond yields, stock prices, and the dollar
exchange rate. Taking stock of changes in cross-border investment patterns
is thus an important issue for policymakers and market participants.
Cross-border financial flows and portfolio holdings provide detailed
information about the types of investors (foreign private or foreign official)6
seeking U.S. assets, the geographies from which the investors come, and
the types of instruments (stocks, bonds, or direct investment) that draw their
attention across sectors and over time.
International capital flows have long played an important role in U.S.
economic development. Capital inflows into the United States in the form
of bonds and bank loans during much of the 19th century helped finance
several key industries, most notably the railway sector (Wilkins 1991).
Following World War I, the United States became a lender for the first
time in U.S. history, but U.S. foreign investment leveled off during and
after the Great Depression (Cardoso and Dornbusch 1989). After World
War II, the post-war Bretton Woods system secured dollar dominance on
the international stage (Siripurapu and Berman 2023). By the mid-1970s,
however, U.S. net capital flows started to reverse as the economic situation
in the United States resulted in trade deficits where once there had been trade
surpluses (Reinbold and Wen 2020). Except in 1991, the United States has
run a trade deficit since 1982.

Recent U.S. Capital Inflows and Outflows
Moving forward to the 21st century, capital inflows into the United States
rapidly increased, peaking at more than $2 trillion on the eve of the global
financial crisis in 2007. Figure 6-3 depicts the increase in foreign investment into the United States since 2020, reflecting the strength of the U.S.
Official flows, as classified by the U.S. Federal Government, represent purchases and sales of U.S.
assets by foreign governments and central banks (Treasury 2024).

6

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post-pandemic recovery. The growth was spurred in large part by a 30
percent increase in portfolio investment in lucrative U.S. equity and debt
markets. Portfolio inflows increased to $1.23 trillion in 2023 during the
Biden-Harris Administration, the highest annual amount on record.7
The pattern of inflows stands in contrast to figure 6-4, which shows
more modest growth in U.S. outflows over the past few decades. Outflows

Figure 6-3. U.S. Capital Inflows

Trillions of dollars
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0

2000

2004

Direct investment

2008

2012

Portfolio investment

2016

2020

Other investment

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; CEA calculations.
2025 Economic Report of the President

declined substantially in the wake of the global financial crisis but have
recovered over the past decade and a half.
Figure 6-5 provides a snapshot of the composition of U.S. capital flows
in 2023. The composition of the $979 billion in capital outflows was nearly
evenly split between FDI outflows and other investment outflows, with a
small fraction in portfolio outflows (figure 6-5a). On the other hand, nearly
two thirds of the $1.9 trillion in inflows were in the form of portfolio debt
and equity, with FDI and other investments that include cross-border lending by foreign global banks making up the rest of the balance (figure 6-5b).

Negative inflows in the category of “other” investments refer to liquidations of cross-border
lending in certain years, such as in 2008 during the global financial crisis.

7

America's Role in International Capital Flows | 215

Figure 6-4. U.S. Capital Outflows
Trillions of dollars
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0

2000

2004

Direct investment

2008

2012

Portfolio investment

2016

2020

Other investment

Reserves

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; CEA calculations.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Figure 6-5. Capital Inflows and Outflows

2023 shares

B. Capital Inflows

A. Capital Outflows

16%

45%

46%

8%
Direct investment

65%
Portfolio investment

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; CEA calculations.
2025 Economic Report of the President

216 |

18%

Chapter 6

Other investment

Table 6-1. Top Contributors and Recipients of U.S. Flows
in 2023, by Country
Countries

Net US Inflows
(billions of dollars)

United Kingdom

368.9

Canada
France
Luxembourg
Singapore
Japan

157.0
100.4
99.5
77.8
76.3
73.0

Germany
Taiwan
South Korea
Netherlands
Total

67.7
46.0
42.3
1108.7

Council of Economic Advisors

Countries
United
Kingdom
Canada
France
Singapore
Hong Kong

Australia
Netherlands
Luxembourg
India
Mexico
Total

Net US Outflows
(billions of dollars)
263.0
133.3
62.3
45.2
37.8
32.1
31.5
24.3
12.4
12.1

654.0

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
2025 Economic Report of the President

The Geography of Capital Flows
Unsurprisingly, most of the top contributors to U.S. capital flows are also
top trading partners and geopolitical allies of the United States. In 2023,
the United Kingdom was the top contributor to U.S. inflows, followed
by Canada and France (see table 6-1). Offshore financial centers like
Luxembourg and Singapore also feature in the set of top contributors and
recipients of financial flows.
Mirroring U.S. inflows, the United Kingdom was also the top recipient of U.S. outflows for three out of the four years from 2020 to 2023. The
United States is a diverse investor, often allocating large amounts to different sets of countries each year.8

Outward direct investment is a popular destination for U.S. outflows in 6 of the top 10 countries.
For example, 84 percent of U.S. outflows to Singapore went to outward direct investment, the
largest share of the top 10 countries. Reserve assets, conversely, received the smallest share of U.S.
outflows for all countries in the top 10 in 2023. Most U.S. outflows to the United Kingdom and
Hong Kong (77 percent and 81 percent, respectively) were in the form of loans and currency and
deposits, whereas slightly more than half of U.S. outflows to France and Luxembourg were in the
form of portfolio investments.

8

America's Role in International Capital Flows | 217

The International Investment Position
A final piece of the international capital flows picture is the international
investment position (IIP), which records the stock of a country’s international assets and liabilities accumulated over time (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
2007). Current account surpluses or deficits (flows) accumulate into the
stocks of foreign assets and liabilities. The difference between foreign assets
and foreign liabilities is the U.S. net international investment position (BEA
2024b).
The U.S. net IIP stood at negative $21.3 trillion at the end of the first
quarter of 2024, representing the difference between the stock of foreign
assets ($36.0 trillion) and foreign liabilities ($57.1 trillion), as shown in
figures 6-6a and 6-6b. By 2024, the U.S. stock of foreign assets more than

Figure 6-6. U.S. International Investment Position
A. Foreign Assets
B. Foreign Liabilities

Trillions of dollars

Trillions of dollars

60

60

50

50

40

40

30

30

20

20

10

10

0
2006

2010

2014

2018

2022

0
2006 2010 2014 2018 2022

Direct investment

Portfolio investment

Financial derivatives

Other

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; CEA calculations.
2025 Economic Report of the President

218 |

Chapter 6

doubled from its value of $16.4 trillion in 2006, and the stock of foreign
liabilities nearly tripled from $18.2 trillion over the same period.9
Valuation effects through changes in the prices of assets and liabilities
and exchange rate fluctuations impact the outstanding stocks. For example,
the rise in U.S. stock prices in 2023 exceeded the rise in foreign stock prices,
increasing the market value of U.S. foreign liabilities relative to U.S. foreign
assets (BEA 2024c). Valuation effects have played an important role in the
change in the U.S. net international investment position over the past decade
(Milesi-Ferretti 2021).

America as the World’s Broker: Cross-Border Returns
Examining the purchases and flows of assets across borders provides insight
into how investors view the international economic and financial landscape.
The purchase of foreign equities or debt appears in a country’s financial
account under the category of portfolio investment. While foreign investors
have long viewed American debt as safe investments, they increasingly
see U.S. equity markets as attractive investment destinations due to their
persistent dynamism and growth on a scale often surpassing that of other
countries. Relative to those of the nation’s trading partners, American companies continue to offer highly productive and, as a result, highly lucrative
investment opportunities. Thus, the United States is increasingly the world’s
brokerage (Tabova and Warnock 2024).
The high and rising demand for taking part in the U.S. financial ecosystem is reflected in the rapid rise in U.S. foreign liabilities (i.e., domestic
financial assets owned by foreign investors). Total U.S. international
portfolio liabilities more than tripled between 2006 and 2024. The increase
represents both changes in asset valuation and purchase volume.
Although the increase in portfolio liabilities occurred in both debt
and equity investments, the composition of U.S. liabilities has shifted from
debt to equities (Tabova and Warnock 2024; Atkeson, Heathcote, and Perri
2023). Two decades ago, most foreign investors bought more U.S. debt than
equities. In the last several years, U.S. equities have become more popular,
with current total equity liabilities exceeding total debt liabilities (see figure
6-7), reflecting a steady increase in purchases from abroad as well as valuation effects.
This holdings composition explains why foreign investors now earn
slightly more on their investments in the United States than domestic
9
Foreign assets in the first quarter of 2024 included a stock of portfolio investments valued at $16.8
trillion, foreign direct investment of $11.3 trillion, and other investments, which include cross-border
bank loans valued at $3.2 trillion and derivatives of $2.2 trillion. On the liabilities front, foreign
investments in U.S. portfolio assets stood at $30.2 trillion, FDI was $16.1 trillion, other investments
were $8.6 trillion, and derivatives were $1.6 trillion.

America's Role in International Capital Flows | 219

Figure 6-7. Foreign Investment in U.S. Equities and
Debt
Trillions of dollars
18
15
12
9
6
3
0
1976

1981

1986

1991

1996

2001

Equity and investment fund shares

2006

2011

2016

2021

Debt securities

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Tabova and Warnock (2024); CEA calculations.
Note: Gray bars indicate recessions. Data through 2023.
2025 Economic Report of the President

investors earned abroad from 2003 to 2023 (Curcuru, Thomas, and Warnock
2013; Tabova and Warnock 2024; Atkeson, Heathcote, and Perri 2023).
Previously, foreign investors earned mostly low yields from American debt
while U.S. investors received high returns from foreign equity and debt
investments.10
The consistent demand for U.S. assets can be attributed to the relatively strong returns earned by foreign investors in U.S. markets. Figure 6-8
provides the average annual returns earned on investments by foreigners
from 2003 to 2023 (denoted by liabilities on domestic assets) as well as
the returns earned by Americans investing abroad (denoted by claims on

Earlier evidence suggested that the U.S. returns differential abroad averaged 1.5 to 2 percent.
Specifically, a 6.1 percentage point differential in FDI yields earned in foreign countries was
responsible for the bulk of the 1.9 percentage point overall returns differential for the 1990–2011
period. Additionally, the returns effect (i.e., the yields component) accounted for almost the entire
capital gains differential, with the U.S. earning higher yields abroad. The differential was, on
average, almost entirely due to fluctuations in prices, rather than exchange rates (Curcuru, Thomas,
and Warnock 2013).
10

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Chapter 6

Figure 6-8. Average Annual Investor Returns on U.S.
and Foreign Portfolio Investments, 2003–2023
Percent
10

8

6

4

2

0

Equities

Bonds

Total

U.S. claims on foreign assets
Liabilities on U.S. assets owned by foreign investors

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Tabova and Warnock (2024); CEA calculations.
2025 Economic Report of the President

foreign assets).11 During the period, foreign investors averaged 8.7 percent
yearly returns on U.S. equities and 2.8 percent yearly returns on U.S. debt.
Although portfolio values may fluctuate from year to year, the averages
show investors have been rewarded for placing their money in U.S. financial
assets. Across both asset classes, total returns for foreign investors were 5.4
percent over the decade. Foreign investor returns in dollar terms reflect the
rise in the stock prices and the rising dollar since 2012.
The equity returns earned by foreign investors in U.S. equity markets
were slightly higher, about 0.6 percentage points more on an annual basis,
than the returns earned by U.S. investors in equity markets abroad, over the
past two decades. The differential can be attributed to the faster growth U.S.
equity markets have experienced over the last decade, which can be seen by
Only arithmetic means are presented in figure 6-8. Geometric means tend to be lower for more
volatile return streams. Tabova and Warnock (2024) show that the differential between American
and foreign investment returns is lower using geometric averages.
11

America's Role in International Capital Flows | 221

Figure 6-9. U.S. Market Cap as a Share of World
Market Cap
Percent
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
2003

2006

2009

2012

2015

2018

2021

2024

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bloomberg; CEA calculations.
Note: Gray bars indicate recessions.
2025 Economic Report of the President

comparing U.S. market capitalization to total world market capitalization
(figure 6-9). The U.S. equity share achieved its highest value in two decades
under the Biden-Harris Administration. As discussed more in the following
section, FDI tells a similar story: Corporations with foreign ownership earn
lucrative returns in the United States’ large and dynamic domestic market.
The high returns earned by foreign investors on U.S. financial assets
have been accompanied by American investors seeing large returns on their
investments abroad. U.S. investors averaged 8.1 percent yearly returns on
foreign equities and 4.6 percent yearly returns on foreign debt from 2003
to 2023. Indeed, when considering both debt and equities, American investors’ returns abroad were higher on average than their foreign counterparts’
returns on U.S. investments. The difference was historically due largely to
higher yields on foreign debt compared to U.S. debt (Curcuru, Dvorak, and
Warnock 2008). The low yields on domestic debt can be attributed to continued high demand for U.S. debt offerings, due to their safety and liquidity
in the eyes of investors in the United States and around the world as well

222 |

Chapter 6

as steady Federal Reserve policy (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen
2012).12

Foreign Direct Investment
In addition to buying American stocks and bonds, foreign investors often
acquire partial or full ownership in domestic companies. These purchases
come under the “direct investment asset” category within a country’s
financial account of the balance of payments. Such FDI differs from portfolio investment, as investors gain a measure of influence over the target
companies. FDI can occur through the following channels: multinational
firms launching subsidiaries (known as “greenfield operations”) in foreign
countries, the expansion of existing foreign operations, the acquisition of
new foreign assets through mergers and acquisitions, or investments in joint
ventures (BEA 2024d).
The United States has historically been the largest recipient of FDI
inflows (Commerce 2024a). The increase is consistent with both the strength
of investment opportunities in the U.S. economic recovery and Biden-Harris
Administration policies effectively crowding in foreign investment (CEA
2023a; Van Nostrand 2024b). The United States also invests in foreign
companies around the world. The investments return earnings to American
stakeholders while improving economic cooperation and knowledge transfers across partner countries. Indeed, primary income receipts—which
include interest, dividends, and profits earned for American investors
abroad—increased by nearly $200 billion in 2023 (BEA 2024a).

The Benefits of FDI and the Administration’s Role in Stimulating
Direct Investment
Firms engage in FDI for a variety of reasons, ranging from seeking resources
to efficiency considerations, such as reducing costs or forming strategic alliances internationally. By providing capital, FDI fosters development in host
countries. The resulting efficiency gains help stimulate economic growth
and spur job creation. Another key FDI benefit is knowledge spillover
gained by sharing expertise and know-how across borders, including the
introduction of advanced technologies. Finally, FDI flows are crucial drivers
of international economic integration and help establish supply chains with
A final metric tells the same story of the high returns American markets offer. Internal rates of
return (IRR) are defined as the interest rates required to set the net present value of an investment
equal to zero. A high IRR indicates an elevated return, as the payoff from the investment must be
discounted at a higher rate to reduce it to zero in net present value terms. Similar to the annual
returns above, from 2003 to 2022 foreign investors had an IRR on their investments in the United
States of 8.7 percent, slightly higher than the 7.9 percent that American investors had abroad
(Tabova and Warnock 2024).
12

America's Role in International Capital Flows | 223

Figure 6-10. Foreign Direct Investment into and
out of the United States

2023 foreign direct investment stock
Europe
Asia and Pacific
Canada
Latin America
Middle East
Africa
0

1

2

3

4

Trillions of dollars
U.S. FDI abroad

FDI into the U.S.

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; CEA calculations.
Note: Data are on a historical-cost basis.
2025 Economic Report of the President

strategic partners across borders, also known as global value chains (Qiang
et al. 2021; Lipsey 2004). See figure 6-10.
The Biden-Harris Administration has helped achieve record FDI levels
by actively courting foreign investment in American industries, especially
into manufacturing and clean energy. The strategy has been a critical part of
the Administration’s agenda to produce quality jobs. Indeed, a large share
of the historic increase in manufacturing investment under the Biden-Harris
Administration comes from foreign investors. The Administration has facilitated and encouraged the investments with targeted tax credits established
by the Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS and Science Act to promote
renewable energy and semiconductor production. The incentives crowd in
foreign investment to critical sectors and historically left-behind areas (CEA
2024c). In 2023, South Korea emerged as the biggest source of FDI into the
United States, with announced commitments of $21.5 billion in new investments comprising 90 new projects across a range of industries (Chu 2024).
FDI into clean energy and manufacturing of clean energy is more than seven
times as large as it was under the prior administration (figure 6-11).
The Biden-Harris Administration policies, including the Made in
America initiative, help ensure that the United States remains the world’s
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Figure 6-11. Announced Investment in Clean Energy
Projects by Foreign Companies

Billions of dollars
80
60
40
20
0

2017–2020
Manufacturing

Council of Economic Advisers

2021–2023
Energy and industry

Sources: Clean Investment Monitor; CEA calculations.
Note: Energy and industry refers to new or expanded facilities to produce clean energy,
capture carbon dioxide emissions, or decarbonize industrial activity. Manufacturing
refers to the construction or expansion of factories that manufacture clean energy,
clean vehicle, building electrification, or carbon management technology.
2025 Economic Report of the President

top destination for foreign investment. For example, Samsung Electronics
received $6.4 billion in funding in 2024 to develop a computer chip
manufacturing and research cluster (Commerce 2024b). This funding is in
addition to the company’s $61 billion in planned manufacturing projects
expected to create more than 8,000 jobs (Tarasov 2023). Additionally,
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) financed a nearly
$40 billion project to construct and operate a high-tech semiconductor
fabrication plant in Arizona, whose yields have recently been announced
to surpass factories in Taiwan (Reuters 2024; Hawkins 2024). Similarly,
Panasonic Energy announced a $4 billion investment in a lithium-ion battery
factory in Kansas, expected to create 4,000 jobs (Panasonic 2024).

Investment into the United States
Due to its highly productive companies and the Biden-Harris Administration’s
policies, the United States continues to be the top international investment
destination for FDI flows. FDI is commonly decomposed into new investments and the accumulated stock of prior investments, the former representing the acquisition, establishment, or expansion of U.S. businesses (BEA
2024e).

America's Role in International Capital Flows | 225

Figure 6-12. New Foreign Direct Investment in the
United States
5% 3%

2023 shares

Acquisitions

92%

Establishments

Expansions

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; CEA calculations.
2025 Economic Report of the President

The breadth of foreign firms investing in the United States also reflects
the attractiveness of the country’s large consumer market, advanced infrastructure, and business-friendly environment. The total stock of FDI into the
country has more than doubled in the last 16 years and reached $5.4 trillion
in 2023, up from $2.1 trillion in 2009 (BEA 2024f). In 2023, new net FDI
totaled $148.8 billion domestically (BEA 2024e). Acquisitions tend to dwarf
establishments and expansions (see figure 6-12).
One critical aspect of these 2023 FDI flows is that they overwhelmingly originate from U.S. allies and strategic partners. Measured according
to the location of the foreign parent company, the top three investors in
terms of the total FDI stock in 2023 were the Netherlands ($717.5 billion), Japan ($688.1 billion), and Canada ($671.6 billion).13 Cumulatively,
Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands made up more
than half of FDI flows into the United States in 2023, reflecting the BidenHarris Administration’s goal of forming strong financial linkages with
partner countries (BEA 2024f).
Companies in a range of sectors, including retail trade ($199 billion),
real estate ($213 billion), and professional and scientific services ($239 billion), benefitted from FDI funds in 2023 (BEA 2024f). The industry with
the highest FDI position through 2023 was manufacturing, at $2.2 trillion
(see figure 6-13). The FDI stock in manufacturing has risen 16 percent since

All FDI statistics are on a historical-cost basis, meaning the price of the investment at the time of
investment.
13

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Figure 6-13. Foreign Direct Investment in the United
States, by Industry
2023 stocks

Manufacturing

Other industries

Finance and insurance

Wholesale trade
Information

Depository institutions (banking)
Professional services

Real estate and rental and leasing
Retail trade

0.0

Council of Economic Advisers

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

Trillions of 2023 dollars

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; CEA calculations.
Note: Finance category excludes depository institutions. Professional services includes
scientific and technical services.
2025 Economic Report of the President

2020, reflecting the Biden-Harris Administration’s goal of revitalizing the
American manufacturing industrial base (White House 2022).
As with stocks and bonds, foreign investors receive substantial returns
on their direct investments in the United States,14 averaging 7.4 percent
annually from 2003 to 2023 on an arithmetic mean basis.15

Investment into Other Countries
Because U.S. companies develop and use cutting-edge technology, foreign
countries and businesses often welcome American FDI. Along with funding,
the investments bring technical know-how and knowledge spillover (Lipsey
2004). In 2023, the stock of FDI by U.S. firms worldwide totaled $6.7 trillion. During 2023, new FDI abroad totaled $364 billion (BEA 2024f).
The United States benefits from outward FDI into other countries
by acquiring market share abroad, strengthening supply chains, accessing
Although FDI statistics are imprecise due to ambiguity regarding where corporations locate profits,
the returns broadly suggest the magnitude and direction of profits.
15
The literature attributes the difference between yields on U.S. direct investment abroad and FDI
into the United States to differences in (i) taxes, (ii) risk-adjusted returns, (iii) affiliate/subsidiary
age, and (iv) other factors, such as transfer pricing, industry mix, and intangibles. See Curcuru,
Thomas, and Warnock (2013) for a literature summary.
14

America's Role in International Capital Flows | 227

know-how abroad, and bringing earnings back home (Cohen 2007; Chari,
Ouimet and Tesar 2010; U.S. Chamber of Commerce 2021). U.S.-based
multinational companies earned $577 billion in income from investments
abroad in 2023, much of which makes its way back to American stakeholders (BEA 2024f). Other countries benefit from the investments, and
American technical expertise and capital spreads abroad (Loungani and
Razin 2001; Mohseni-Cheraghlou 2021).
The majority of countries engaged in global trade receive U.S. FDI
in some form. Indeed, more than 50 countries received at least $1 billion
in new investment from the United States in FDI in 2023. The United
Kingdom ($1.1 trillion), the Netherlands ($980 billion), and Luxembourg
($532 billion) were the top three recipients, measured by total stock of U.S.
FDI (BEA 2024f). In terms of outward direct investment, America engages
overwhelmingly with strategic partners.
At the same time, inbound investments from China and outbound
investments have ticked downward. The Chinese footprint in the United
States measured via the stock of accumulated direct investments declined by
23 percent from 2017 to 2023 (BEA 2024f).
While the Biden-Harris Administration has deepened America’s financial integration with its allies and partners, it also protects against potential
risks from direct investment. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (CFIUS) considers transactions on a case-by-case basis, evaluating any potential risk arising from FDI irrespective of its country of origin
(CFIUS 2023). CFIUS upholds the United States’ longstanding commitment
to an open investment economy, while recognizing that a critical component
of FDI is identifying and mitigating national security risks. CFIUS ensures
that any risks to national security arising from FDI are sufficiently addressed
through the narrow tools at the Committee’s disposal.
The Biden-Harris Administration has also been particularly focused
on securing the intangible benefits that often accompany U.S. outbound
investments in certain national security technologies and products—notably
in the semiconductors and microelectronics, quantum information technologies, and artificial intelligence sectors—which could be used to undermine
U.S. national security (White House 2023). Similarly, the Biosecure Act has
increased oversight of the pharmaceuticals sector.

Cross-Border Lending and Global Banks
The cross-border lending market is another important aspect of global financial integration. Grouped in the category of “other flows” in the financial

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account of the balance of payments, capital flows intermediated through
foreign and global banks are an important part of cross-border credit flows.16
Making up an increasingly large share of total lending, cross-border
lending plays a critical and growing role for the United States. Specifically,
lending by foreign banks to firms in the United States serves a critical diversification function for banks around the world, and this lending also helps
to stabilize the domestic banking system by accessing foreign bank balance
sheets via internal capital markets (Gupta 2021). American bank branches
abroad and U.S. government liquidity facilities perform a similar function
for foreign banking systems.

Financial Intermediation within the United States
American cross-border financial ties are extensive and growing. The stock
of U.S. cross-border lending assets increased from $3.2 trillion in the fourth
quarter of 2019 to $3.8 trillion in the second quarter of 2024. The stock
of U.S. cross-border lending liabilities increased from $3.5 trillion to $4.8
trillion over the same time period, according to the Bank for International
Settlements’ locational banking statistics (BIS 2024a).
Foreign lending represents a large share of credit provision in the
United States (Cetorelli, Goldberg, and Ravazzolo 2020). As of September
2024, foreign banks accounted for $1.1 trillion in U.S. loan provision and
held $3.1 trillion in aggregate assets, approximately 13 percent of the U.S.
banking system’s total assets. The total assets of branches and agencies as
well as foreign subsidiaries currently total more than $4 trillion (Federal
Reserve Board 2024). Like other forms of investment moving to U.S.
shores, the loans signal a continued faith in the profitability and creditworthiness of American businesses.
The presence of global banks in domestic financial intermediation can
act as a stabilizing force during times of financial market strain. Foreign
banks can access liquidity from their parent firms though internal capital
markets, thereby overcoming the liquidity shocks and frictions faced by
domestic local banks (Cetorelli and Goldberg 2011). When adverse shocks
hit the U.S. economy, the continuation of credit provision through foreignhosted branch lending can provide an important buffer for domestic financial
intermediation, thus providing diversification by playing a stabilizing role in
the U.S. banking system (Cetorelli and Goldberg 2012). At the same time,
foreign banks can also channel funds to their U.S. operations, ensuring the
robust continuation of credit provision during a crisis or funding liquidity
strain (Choi et al. 2022; Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor 2009).
Cross-border credit refers to any financing that spans international jurisdictions and includes loans
and trade credit made by U.S. banks to borrowers abroad or foreign banks to U.S. borrowers. Crossborder credit also includes international debt issuance.
16

America's Role in International Capital Flows | 229

Figure 6-14. Lending Claims on the United States,
by Country
Lending stock as of 2024:Q1
Japan
Canada
United Kingdom
France
Switzerland
Germany
Netherlands
Spain
Australia
Taiwan
0.0

0.5

Council of Economic Advisers

` 1.0

1.5

Trillions of dollars

2.0

2.5

Source: Bank for International Settlements.
2025 Economic Report of the President

As with FDI, cross-border lending funds primarily originate from
U.S.-allied countries, strengthening financial ties with strategic partners (see
figure 6-14). According to the Bank for International Settlements’ consolidated banking statistics, the top three countries for cross-country lending are
Japan ($2.4 trillion), Canada ($2.0 trillion), and the United Kingdom ($1.4
trillion) (BIS 2024b).17

Changes in Cross-Border Lending
Cross-border lending has evolved dynamically over the decades. In the
1980s, banks primarily engaged in sovereign lending, which shifted into
interbank lending activity across borders. More recently, global banks have
engaged in direct lending to non-bank financial intermediaries and nonfinancial corporations (Buch and Goldberg 2024).
Figure 6-15 depicts the recent shifts, decomposing cross-country
claims into the banking sector, non-bank private sector, and the official sector. While total cross-border claims almost tripled between 2005 and 2024,
The tally of total claims, based on BIS data, is likely an underestimate due to missing data and
country underreporting.
17

230 |

Chapter 6

Figure 6-15. Lending to the United States, by
Sector
Trillions of dollars
10

8
6
4
2
0
2005

2007

2009

2011

2013

Banks

2015

2017

2019

2021

2023

Non-bank private sector

Official sector

All sectors

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bank for International Settlements; CEA calculations.
2025 Economic Report of the President

their composition also changed. Cross-border lending by banks fell significantly from a pre-crisis peak of approximately 20 percent of total claims
in 2008 to 4.8 percent in 2024. In contrast, cross-border non-bank private
sector (e.g., mutual funds and hedge funds) and official sector claims have
increased significantly since the mid-2010s. The liquidity and financial stability risks associated with non-bank financial intermediation and the rise of
the shadow banking sector outside the purview of the regulatory perimeter
are the subject of considerable current policy discussion (Claessens 2024;
Chari 2023).
Global banks also establish branches and subsidiaries in foreign
countries that engage in domestic lending (McCauley et al. 2017; Buch and
Goldberg 2024; Goldberg 2024)—for example, German banks establishing
branches in the United States and lending directly to U.S. firms or U.S.
banks establishing branches in Mexico to lend directly to Mexican firms.18
Both local and cross-border lending have increased since the pandemic,
representing a further financial integration of the world economy and greater
diversification of risk (see figure 6-16).
Statistics on cross-border credit provision understate the role of foreign ownership as a subset
of foreign banks that are chartered in the United States and subject to the country’s regulatory and
supervisory framework as U.S. banks.
18

America's Role in International Capital Flows | 231

Figure 6-16. Local and Cross-border Lending Claims
Lending to the United States (trillions of dollars)

10

8
6
4
2
0
2005

2007 2009 2011
Cross-border claims

2013

2015 2017
Local claims

2019

2021 2023
Total claims

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bureau for International Settlements; CEA calculations.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Finally, differences in funding costs and exchange rate movements
can impact the provision of credit in a particular currency (Hattori and Shin
2009). Monetary policy tightening and broad-based dollar appreciation
reduced the provision of cross-border dollar credit (loans plus debt securities
holdings) in 2022, while yen depreciation and below-zero interest rates in
Japan led to a rapid increase in yen credit. In 2023, banks in Japan reported
increased claims on the U.S. non-financial sector as credit to non-banks
in the United States grew (BIS 2024c). The pattern is consistent with vast
amounts of carry trade activity, with the yen being the funding currency
invested in dollar lending.19

Flight to Safety: U.S. Treasuries and the Dollar
In addition to serving as a destination for profitable investment and bank
lending, the United States plays a critical role in offering safe assets to the

A carry trade is a speculative financial strategy where investors borrow in currencies with low
interest rates (funding currencies) and invest in high interest rate currencies (target currencies).
The aim is to make speculative profits from the interest rate differential between two countries in
expectation that the differential will not be offset by unfavorable exchange rate movements. Carry
trade profits therefore depend on the high-yielding currency either remaining stable or appreciating.
Carry trades in foreign exchange markets are often executed by institutional investors and
speculators looking to exploit differences in global interest rates.
19

232 |

Chapter 6

world in the form of government debt.20 A safe asset is a debt instrument
that is expected to preserve its value across various states of the world,
including adverse systemic events (Eisenbach and Infante 2017). Flights to
the safety of U.S. Treasuries often happen during periods of stress or heightened uncertainty in international financial markets (Gourinchas, Rey, and
Govillot 2017; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2012). The United
States’ currency also functions as a reserve currency on the international
stage, underpinning trade and financial transactions (Boz et al. 2020). As
noted above, U.S. debt offerings fall under the portfolio investment category
in a country’s financial account.
Today, U.S. currency and debt offerings still command a dominant
position in the international financial system. However, debt brinkmanship
of the type that occurs during debates over raising the U.S. debt ceiling—a
Congressionally mandated ceiling on the amount the Federal Government
can borrow—has the potential to damage this valuable status (CEA 2023c).
Losing U.S. Treasuries’ status as safe assets would be economically harmful, reducing U.S. fiscal capacity. In addition, the dollar’s role as a reserve
currency has economic and security benefits. The dollar’s broader role in
financial flows and payments ensures that capital flows through a system
with strong governance, rule of law, and high-quality anti-money laundering rules that help to counter the financing of terrorism (Shambaugh 2024).

U.S. Debt as a Global Safe Asset
A wide range of investors hold U.S. Treasuries, displaying an international
consensus in the safety of U.S. debt. The share of foreign holdings in publicly held outstanding Treasuries was approximately 14 percent in 1990 and
peaked at 34 percent in 2014. In 2023, foreign official and foreign private
investors accounted for nearly a quarter of U.S. Treasury holdings (figure
6-17).
The demand for U.S. Treasuries spans the globe (see figure 6-18).
Of foreign-held Treasuries, European investors accounted for more than a
two-fifths share (44 percent) and investors from Asia and the Americas held
approximately 25 percent each in 2023. The top three investor countries, as
of August 2024, were Japan ($1.1 trillion), China ($774.6 billion), and the
United Kingdom ($743.8 billion). Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,
Kuwait, and several other oil producers also held significant Treasuries.21
In a world where there is a scarcity of safe assets, U.S. Treasuries meet the global demand for
safe, liquid, and collateralizable assets (Gorton and Ordonez 2022; Holmstrom and Tirole 1998;
Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein 2015).
21
The other oil producing countries with reported U.S. Treasury holdings include Algeria, Gabon,
Iraq, Nigeria, and Oman. Iran and Qatar, two additional oil-exporters, did not report U.S. Treasury
holdings in 2022.
20

America's Role in International Capital Flows | 233

Figure 6-17. U.S. Treasury Holders, by Type
Share of total Treasury holdings, 2023
23%

23%

19%
35%
Foreign

Federal Reserve

Domestic private

Council of Economic Advisers

Other

Sources: U.S. Department of the Treasury; CEA calculations.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Figure 6-18. Holdings of U.S. Treasuries, by
Geographic Region
Europe
Americas
Asia (ex. Japan, China)
Japan
China
Middle East
Other
Africa
0.0

Council of Economic Advisers

1.0

2.0

Trillions of dollars

Sources: U.S. Department of the Treasury; CEA calculations.
Note: Data are for 2023. End-of-period values are used. Americas includes Canada,
Latin America, and the Caribbean.
2025 Economic Report of the President

234 |

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3.0

While foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasuries held steady at about
$3.5 trillion over the 2013–2023 period, foreign private holdings more than
doubled from approximately $1.3 trillion in 2013 to $3.0 trillion at the end
of 2023. Foreign holdings suggest that reserve managers at most foreign
central banks continue to view U.S. Treasuries as safe investments, which
also constitute a stable source of demand.22 Foreign countries also hold
dollar reserves in the event that they need to stabilize their exchange rates
through interventions in currency markets. The evidence refutes arguments
that the dollar is losing its dominance in the international financial system
or that U.S. Treasuries are no longer desirable as safe haven investments.
The rising worldwide demand for U.S. Treasuries plays a key role in
reducing the cost of financing American debt (Weiss 2022). Researchers
have estimated the magnitude of foreign official purchases of U.S. government securities on Treasury yields (Bertaut and Judson 2014; Warnock and
Warnock 2009; Beltran et al. 2013).
Both America and the world benefit from U.S. safe assets, a principle
exemplified by the flight to safety that occurred during the global financial
crisis. Although the United States was at the epicenter of the crisis, foreign
and domestic investors sought the safety of U.S. government debt instruments. The share of Treasuries held by private and official investors abroad,
which had been unchanged over the early 2000s, saw dramatic increases
following the crisis, suggesting that the assets were viewed as particularly
safe during a time of economic stress (Neoth and Sengupta 2010). Indeed,
evidence suggests that the United States has a greater risk-bearing capacity
than the rest of the world (Gourinchas, Rey, and Govillot 2017; Maggiori
2017; Sauzet 2023; Kekre and Lenel 2024).
The increase in demand for U.S. Treasuries was large enough during
the crisis that Treasury prices rose despite a massive simultaneous supply
increase (Neoth and Sengupta 2010). Bond purchases by the Federal Reserve
during the period of quantitative and monetary policy easing also served to
lower yields (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2011). In other words,
the surge in demand for Treasuries exceeded the supply increase, resulting in
elevated bond prices and lowered yields (He, Krishnamurthy, and Milbradt
2016).23 In addition to providing a safe asset source, heightened Treasury
purchases during the global financial crisis lowered financing costs for the

Foreign official demand for U.S. Treasuries is particularly notable in an environment of
quantitative tightening, when the U.S. Federal Reserve is reducing the size of its balance sheet.
23
The price increase was unexpected given that the Treasuries supply rose substantially to fund the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, a $700 billion program designed to take bad assets
off the books of the U.S. financial sector. The increase was unexpected because any increase in
supply would have resulted in decreased prices or increased yields had the demand for Treasuries
remained unchanged (Neoth and Sengupta 2010).
22

America's Role in International Capital Flows | 235

United States. The rising prices indicated that the yield to maturity (i.e., the
government’s cost of raising additional funds) fell.24
Foreign investors also turned to U.S. debt during the period of
uncertainty surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic. At the onset of the
pandemic, private and official foreign investors sold U.S. Treasuries to
cover precautionary liquidity needs (referred to as the “dash for cash”), but
the demand for Treasuries quickly rebounded (Barone et al. 2022; He and
Krishnamurthy 2020).25 In fact, foreign absorption of Treasury net issuances
increased in 2021 (Weiss 2022).
U.S. Treasury demand remained high into the post-pandemic period.
Foreign private investor net purchases of Treasuries in 2023 were more
than ten times their pre-pandemic (2017–2019) average (see figure 6-19).

Figure 6-19. Absorption of Treasury Net Issuance, by
Sector

Trillions of dollars

Percent
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
-20
-40

2012

2014

2016

Foreign official (right scale)
Other domestic (right scale)

2018

2020

2022

3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0

Foreign private (right scale)
Foreign share (left scale)

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Bertaut and Judson (2022); U.S. Department of the Treasury; Federal Reserve Bank of
New York; CEA calculations.
Note: Shares can sum to less than 0% and to more than 100% due to valuation changes in
Treasury holdings not tracked by official data as well as due to purchases of Treasuries issued
in a prior year.
2025 Economic Report of the President

The yield to maturity is defined as the interest rate that makes the present value of a bond’s
payments equal to its price.
25
Outside the global financial crisis, net sales by foreign official investors, especially from emerging
market countries, are a common occurrence during stress episodes (Weiss 2022). Therefore,
the pandemic-induced sales in March 2020 were not unusual given the extreme uncertainty that
accompanied the pandemic shock.
24

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On average, foreign investors absorbed roughly 19 percent of Treasury net
issuance in the five years preceding the pandemic (Weiss 2022). Over the
2021–2023 period, foreign investors absorbed an average of 45 percent
annually.

The Dollar as Global Reserve Currency
Foreign exchange reserves allow countries to finance the purchase of
imports denominated in reserve currencies and make payments on their
foreign currency-denominated debts.26 When faced with adverse shocks
or turmoil, accumulated foreign exchange reserves provide countries with
buffers that can be drawn upon to pay for imports and service foreign debt.
The role of the dollar as the world’s dominant reserve currency was
cemented after World War II (Nelson and Weiss 2022; Siripurapu and
Berman 2023). The share of the dollar in global foreign exchange reserves
grew from about 13 percent in 1947 to 85 percent by 1972, when the dollar
became the currency of denomination for trade in commodities like oil and
world trade invoicing. Today, the foreign borrowings of many countries
are predominantly in dollars, and the dollar occupies a central position in
the international monetary system, playing an outsized role in facilitating
international trade (Eichengreen 2012; Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff 2019).
In 2023, the dollar accounted for about 60 percent of global foreign
exchange reserves (Atlantic Council 2024; IMF 2024).27 About 54 percent
of international trade is invoiced in dollars as of 2022, and about 64 percent
of all international loans and international debt securities are denominated
in dollars as of 2024 (Boocker and Wessel 2024). The dollar dominates the
foreign exchange market, which has a $7.5 trillion daily turnover, and nearly
90 percent of all trades in 2022 involved the dollar on at least one side (BIS
2022; Nelson and Weiss 2022).
Reserve currency status confers several benefits on the United States.
While the dollar plays a pivotal role as an international medium of exchange,
it also functions as an important store of value. Countries use their dollar
reserves to purchase dollar-backed safe assets, namely U.S. Treasuries. The
dominant reserve currency status and global demand for safe assets allow
the United States to issue debt at relatively low yields compared to other
sovereign nations (Chen et al. 2022; Maggiori, Neiman, and Schreger 2019).
The ability to borrow and pay for imports in dollars shields the United States
from adverse exchange rate movements and the potential for balance of
payments crises.
Reserve currencies are foreign currencies held on central bank balance sheets to fulfill debt
obligations and finance imports.
27
Other major reserve currencies include the Australian dollar, the British pound, the Canadian
dollar, the Chinese renminbi, the euro, the Japanese yen, and the Swiss franc (IMF 2024).
26

America's Role in International Capital Flows | 237

Figure 6-20. Composition
Foreign Exchange
Chartof
Title
Reserve Holdings

Percent of total reserves

100
80
60
40
20
0

1947

1972

Dollar share

1990

Non-dollar share

2023

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: IMF Currency Composition of Official Exchange Reserves; Gluschenko (2024);
CEA calculations.
2025 Economic Report of the President

The dollar’s global reserve currency status was boosted by the fact
that the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system was based on the dollar
as well as denomination of oil in dollars, or petrodollars, in the 1970s (Tran
2024). At the time, oil-exporting countries reinvested their dollar revenues
in U.S. government debt. While there may be a gradual decline in the dollar share in foreign exchange reserves (figure 6-20), this is not matched by
the rise in other major currencies like the euro, the British pound or the
Japanese yen (Crow 2024). Rather, there has been a recent emergence of
non-traditional reserve currencies and digital currencies as well as increased
allocations into gold (Arslanalp, Eichengreen, and Simpson-Bell 2022; Tran
and Matthews 2023; Gopinath 2024).
Recent evidence suggests, however, that the decline in the dollar share
of reserves is primarily driven by a small group of countries, both due to
monetary policy reasons and due to a small group of large foreign exchange
reserve balance countries (Goldberg and Hannaoui 2024). The extent of
international payment system fragmentation also remains modest (Gopinath
et al. 2024). SWIFT data show that 80 percent of trade finance transactions
continue to be settled in dollars. Commodity trade also continues to be
invoiced and settled predominantly in dollars and the dollar’s strength bears
testimony to foreign investors moving into dollar assets (Gopinath 2024).

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Reserve currency status allows the United States to use the dollar as a
tool for international diplomacy and advancing its foreign policy objectives.
While the recent use of financial sanctions has led to de-dollarization fears,
the depth and liquidity of U.S. Treasury markets and robust global demand
for Treasuries as a safe asset suggest that the dollar’s utility remains intact
(Siripurapu and Berman 2023; Lu 2023).

A Full Accounting of International Accounts
This chapter explores the recent evolution of major international investment
policies under the Biden-Harris Administration, with a focus on the financial
account of the U.S. balance of payments.
A detailed analysis of capital flows into and out of the United States
is critical for understanding America’s role in the international financial
system. A variety of motivations, ranging from seeking the high returns that
accompany economic growth to investing in U.S. assets for precautionary
or safety reasons, drive international capital flows into the country. The
United States is considered a safe haven by investors around the world, as
evidenced by the demand for U.S. Treasury assets, which is significant and
has remained stable or even risen over several decades. The role of the dollar as the world’s dominant reserve currency also remains steady, and the
demand for portfolio investments has increased substantially over the last
two decades, as evidenced by the country’s thriving equity and debt markets.
The Biden-Harris Administration’s industrial policy agenda to encourage investments to facilitate the green transition and shore up supply chain
resilience in critical sectors has facilitated a welcome surge of FDI from the
nation’s allies and partners. The importance of the United States in global
capital markets continues to go from strength to strength reflecting our
robust economy.

America's Role in International Capital Flows | 239

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Chapter 7

The K-12 Education System: Economic
Impacts and Opportunities for Innovation
Kindergarten through 12th-grade (K-12) education is the cornerstone investment our society makes in the human capital of its people. U.S. elementary
and secondary schools serve as engines for both individual opportunity and
macroeconomic growth. However, challenges posed by economic recessions, the COVID-19 pandemic, advances in technology and artificial intelligence (CEA 2024a), and an increasingly interconnected global economy
(CEA 2024b) have placed new pressure on schools to rethink how best to
prepare students for the future. To meet these challenges, federal, state, and
local policymakers must ensure that K-12 schools are prepared to equip all
children with the skills to compete and thrive in the 21st century.
The long history of public education in the United States predates the
nation’s founding (Mendez, Yoo, and Rury 2017). Local movements have
driven the expansion of K-12 education over the last three centuries, and
decentralization and local control remain hallmarks of the system today
(Kober and Rentner 2020). In the last 50 years, states have assumed an
expanded role in funding education and setting education policy (Pelsue
2017). Government spending on K-12 education across the local, state, and
federal levels exceeded $880 billion annually in fiscal year (FY) 2021–2022,
3.5 percent of GDP (Pelsue 2017; Cornman et al. 2024).
While federal contributions to K-12 education funding—typically about 9
percent of the system’s total revenue—are small relative to those of state
and local governments, the Federal Government has played a critical role in
stabilizing education expenditures during recessions through the American

241

Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) and the American Rescue Plan
(ARP) (Jackson, Wigger, and Xiong 2021); facilitating equity in spending
through supplemental funding for schools serving a higher percentage
of students from low-income backgrounds via Title I, Part A (Title I);
promoting student health and nutrition via free and reduced-price school
meals through the National School Lunch Program; and funding career
and technical education (CTE) through the Carl D. Perkins Vocational and
Technical Education Act (Perkins Act). Federal laws also directly influence
state policy and school practices; for example, they have helped ensure the
rights of students with disabilities under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) and elevate more holistic measures of school performance under the Every Student Succeeds Act. Finally, federal grants and
reporting requirements promote evidence-based policies, support workforce
development, incentivize innovation, fund research, and expand data collection to enhance K-12 education.
Significant public investments in the K-12 school system allowed the United
States to be a world leader in academic outcomes (both basic literacy and
high school graduation rates) through much of the 20th century (Goldin
2006; Snyder 1993). However, school districts have faced growing challenges in hiring and retaining qualified teachers as salaries in K-12 education have not kept pace with those in the broader market. Some measures
suggest that student achievement began to decline in the decade following
the Great Recession. Moreover, aggregate statistics mask substantial inequities in educational resources, opportunities, and outcomes across individual
districts and by student race and socioeconomic status. The COVID-19
pandemic exacerbated these longstanding challenges, causing a sharp
decline in academic achievement across multiple measures (particularly for
less-advantaged student populations), increasing rates of chronic absenteeism, and creating an even more pressing need to support students’ basic
needs as well as their social-emotional and mental wellbeing. The result
is an increasingly urgent need to attract and retain qualified teachers and
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support staff with competitive wages and supportive working conditions,
as well as find innovative ways to scale evidence-based practices to raise
student achievement.
The Biden-Harris Administration has made unprecedented federal investments in K-12 schools through the ARP, the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act
(BSCA), and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. The Administration
also has secured major increases to Title I funding for schools enrolling a
high percentage of students from low-income backgrounds and IDEA, Part
B funding for special education and related services for students with disabilities. These investments have helped accelerate post-pandemic academic
recovery, modernize school infrastructure, and provide resources to address
students’ mental health challenges (Department of Education 2024a).
However, challenges to ensuring that all students benefit from well-staffed,
well-maintained, and safe schools remain.
This chapter outlines the well-established links between education and
overall economic growth and summarizes the contemporary microeconomic evidence underlying the links. It then builds on existing research to
show how increases in student knowledge—as measured by standardized
tests—are associated with increases in GDP, discusses contemporary challenges facing K-12 education, and draws on the research literature and new
analyses to identify promising policy solutions for strengthening U.S. K-12
schools for all students. Finally, the chapter explores how three key inputs to
education production—labor, physical capital, and technology—all present
opportunities for increasing the effectiveness of the K-12 education system.
Each section of the chapter highlights the federal role in strengthening
public education.

The K-12 Education System: Economic Impacts and Opportunities for Innovation | 243

Why Education Matters: Returns to
Income and Economic Growth
A long tradition of macroeconomic research links national levels of educational attainment to GDP growth (e.g., Lucas 1988; Romer 1990). In the
textbook model of economic growth, overall economic output is produced
using the workers in the labor force, capital inputs (e.g., infrastructure and
materials), and technology. In models of endogenous growth (e.g., Mankiw,
Romer, and Weil 1992; Romer 1994), education affects output through two
distinct channels: (i) a human capital effect which makes workers more
productive, and (ii) an innovation effect which facilitates technological
advancements that increase the productivity of workers and capital (Biasi,
Deming, and Moser 2022).

Evidence on the Human Capital Channel
Building on the seminal work by Mincer (1958), microeconomic research
using natural experiments and studies of twin siblings from the same household with different levels of education has documented that completing an
additional year of schooling (largely holding quality constant) increases
an individual's yearly earnings by 6 percent to 15 percent (Gunderson and
Oreopolous 2020). Recently, consensus has emerged around the importance
of school quality. Leveraging variation within states over time, Doty et al.
(2022) find that a 1 standard deviation increase in average eighth grade math
achievement (roughly a 37 percentile point increase) is associated with an
8 percent increase in adult earnings. More direct measures of school quality
based on randomized admissions lotteries document large differences in
effects on student academic and life outcomes across individual schools
(Angrist, Hull, and Walters 2022). Similarly, value-added models document
how highly-effective teachers increase students’ educational attainment and
earnings (Chetty, Freidman, and Rockoff 2014). Importantly, policies to
enhance school quality, such as those increasing resources, also grow adult
earnings (Jackson, Johnson, and Persico 2016; Rothstein and Schanzenbach
2022).

Evidence on the Innovation Channel
Theories of endogenous economic growth argue that increases in education
output also affect economic growth by enabling innovation, which can both
provide direct benefits to society as a whole and enhance the productivity
of individuals. Much of the evidence on education’s role in generating ideas
comes from research on higher education. Historically, studies link the
establishment of land grant colleges to increased innovation and elevated
regional incomes (Andrews 2021; Maloney and Caicedo 2022). Modern
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evidence shows that the number of patents per capita is positively associated
with federal and state investments in higher education (Aghion et al. 2009).
Studies also document how the establishment of universities increases
local innovation internationally (Valero and Van Reenen 2019) and that
expanding access to science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM)
post-secondary programs can lead to increases in patenting (Bianchi and
Giorcelli 2020; Toivanen and Väänänen 2016).
K-12 education systems play a fundamental role in preparing students
to pursue higher education and become the next generation of innovators (Biasi, Deming, and Moser 2022). Bell et al. (2019) demonstrate that
one’s environment, which is impacted by school quality rather than ability,
largely dictates whether an individual will become an inventor. As a result,
disadvantaged youth who are more likely to attend under-resourced and lowperforming schools are underrepresented among inventors.
In this spirit, the Administration has committed to fighting systemic
barriers to educational opportunity in multiple ways, including new investments in STEM education for underrepresented K-12 and college students
and by promoting a more inclusive STEM workforce (White House 2024a).
Increasing investment in higher education helps expand the knowledge
frontier, and increasing investment in foundational skills taught in elementary and secondary schools helps ensure that future innovators can reach the
frontier and realize their full potential.

Educational Attainment, Knowledge Capital, and GDP Growth
Identifying the causal effect of schooling levels on overall economic growth,
as measured by GDP, is challenging. However, estimates across a variety
of empirical approaches find that a one-year increase in average years of
education for the entire working-age population—a change that can take
several years to unfold—is associated with gains in real GDP between 5
percent and 12 percent (Barro and Lee 2013).
Studies examining both quantity of schooling and knowledge capital
suggest that test scores may be a stronger predictor of economic growth than
years of education. Here, test scores serve as an imperfect proxy for school
quality because scores reflect both the effects of formal schooling and
important factors outside of school that affect student (Altonji and Mansfield
2011). Aggregate measures are also shaped by the changing demography of
students served by school systems over time. Hanushek and Woessmann
(2008) find that country-level performance on international assessments
between 1960 and 2000 is predictive of average annual GDP growth during
the same period. Angrist et al. (2021) find similar results for a broad sample
of 107 countries during the decade between 2000 and 2010.

The K-12 Education System: Economic Impacts and Opportunities for Innovation | 245

The CEA builds on previous analyses to examine how educational
skills predict future macroeconomic growth in the most recent decades.
This analysis examines how average educational achievement in math and
science, as captured by the 1999 Trends in International Mathematics and
Science Study (TIMSS) eighth grade assessment and the 2000 Programme
for International Student Assessment (PISA), taken by 15-year-olds, predicts average annual GDP growth between 2000 and 2023. The regression
includes controls for real GDP per capita (logged) and average years of
education among 25- to 65-year-olds, both measured at baseline in 2000.
Figure 7-1 shows that the patterns found in prior studies persist in more
recent data and in an approach that removes potential reverse causality by

Figure 7-1. Knowledge Capital and Economic Growth

Conditional average annual GDP growth, 2000–2023
4
3
2
1

U.S.

0
-1
-2
-3

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

Average performance on international math and science exams

Council of Economic Advisers

2

Sources: 1999 Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS); 2000
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA); International Monetary Fund;
Penn World Tables; Barro-Lee Dataset; CEA calculations.
Note: 1999 TIMSS and 2000 PISA science and math test scores are standardized within
test type, grade, subject, and year at the country level and averaged across the four
tests. Average annual GDP growth is conditional on average years of education and log
GDP per capita in 2000, and the conditional GDP is centered around the panel average.
2025 Economic Report of the President

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relating inputs to outcomes only measured in the future. Specifically, a 1
standard deviation increase in average performance at the country level is
associated with a 0.33 percentage point increase in average annual GDP
growth (p=0.08) relative to a mean of 3.59 percent.1 These analyses confirm
the importance of education outputs documented in the microeconomic and
macroeconomic literature.

The State of the K-12 Education System
The United States led the world in expanding access to free public education
in the early half of the 20th century during what is known as the “high school
movement” (Goldin and Katz 2008). The grassroots organizing driving the
rapid expansion of secondary education led to an unprecedented increase in
worker skills, facilitating increased economic mobility and contributing to
the creation of the middle class (Goldin and Margo 1991; Haskins 2008).
The gains persist today: 93 percent of U.S. 15-year-olds attend free K-12
public schools, compared to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) average of 82 percent (OECD 2020). The United
States continues to lead all but three countries—Ireland, South Korea, and
Iceland—in years of formal schooling, with an average of 13.3 years (Our
World in Data 2023). The United States also continues to see high rates of
high school attainment, with 91.8 percent of Americans age 25–64 holding a
high school degree in 2022, compared to the OECD average of 80.2 percent
(figure 7-2).
As the analyses above illustrate, educational attainment and years
of schooling matter, but the quality of the education is paramount. The
National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), commonly known as
“the nation’s report card,” provides one window into the quality of the U.S.
K-12 education system. Between 1971 and 2012, average long-term trend
NAEP scores increased steadily, suggesting rising levels of education quality (see figure 7-3). However, NAEP scores have been in decline since 2012,
due in part to the cumulative ill effects of job losses, income reductions, and
increased psychological distress (Ananat et al. 2013), as well as sustained
budget cuts to public education, in the years following the Great Recession
(Jackson, Wigger, and Xiong 2021).
Although student achievement on international assessments such as
TIMSS and PISA paints a more mixed picture of achievement trends in
the United States over the last two decades, one pattern is increasingly
clear. Despite the historical success of the U.S. K-12 education system,
many countries are now outperforming the United States on international
assessments, particularly in math. As shown in figure 7-4, the United States
1

The model applies heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

The K-12 Education System: Economic Impacts and Opportunities for Innovation | 247

Figure 7-2. Share of 25- to 64-year-olds Who
Completed High School
Percent
95

91.8

90
85

80.2

80
75
70
65

60
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022
United States

OECD average

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); CEA
calculations.
Note: OECD average excludes the United States. Data include degrees classified as
high school graduation equivalent (International Standard Classification of Education
level 3) with minor exceptions. For more detail, see 2023 Digest of Education Statistics,
Table 603.10.
2025 Economic Report of the President

ranked 27th and 22nd on the 2023 TIMSS math assessment among fourth
and eighth graders and 31st on the 2022 PISA math assessment among
15-year-olds. In reading, the United States ranked 6th on the 2021 Progress
in International Reading Literacy Study assessment for fifth graders and 9th
on the 2022 PISA assessment for 15-year-olds. In science, U.S. fourth and
eighth graders ranked 14th and 15th on the 2023 TIMSS, respectively. Most
recently, U.S. students ranked 17th in computational thinking and 22nd
in computer literacy on the 2023 International Computer and Information
Literacy Study. These international comparisons provide a helpful benchmark for the competitiveness of the U.S. education system, but they also
can be subject to cross-cultural differences in the effort students invest in
completing the tests (Gneezy et al. 2019).

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Figure 7-3. NAEP Scores Over Time

Change in NAEP LTT score since 1971 in 1990/1992 standard
deviations
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0

-0.1
1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016 2021
Age 9 reading

Age 13 reading

Age 9 math

Age 13 math

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: National Assessment of Educational Progress long-term trend assessments
(NAEP LTT); CEA calculations.
Note: Gray bars indicate recessions. NAEP changed the assessment format in 2004.
Lines prior to 2004 represent the original assessment format; lines after 2004 indicate
the revised assessment format. Results from both the original and revised assessment
format are reported for 2004.
2025 Economic Report of the President

COVID-19 and Student Achievement, Engagement, and Wellbeing
In March of 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic shuttered schools across the
United States and around the world. Between 2019 and 2022, estimates
across multiple standardized assessments suggest that student achievement
fell, on average, between 0.15-0.26 standard deviations in math and 0.070.12 standard deviations in English language arts (ELA) (Kuhfeld and Lewis
2024), roughly the equivalent of one half of a grade level in math and one
third of a grade level in reading (Fahle et al. 2023). Students’ computer and
information literacy skills declined even further by 0.37 standard deviations
between 2018 and 2023. Furthermore, the pandemic widened achievement
gaps across measures of student performance (NAEP n.d.; Callen et al.
2024), with students in high-poverty districts experiencing the most acute
negative educational (Goldhaber et al. 2023), economic (Piacentini et al.
2022), and public health effects (Alsan, Chandra, and Simon 2021).
The K-12 Education System: Economic Impacts and Opportunities for Innovation | 249

Figure 7-4. U.S. Performance on International
Math Assessments
Average scores

PISA

TIMSS

650
600
550
27th

500

22nd
31st

450
400
350
300

Fourth grade

Eighth grade

15-year-olds

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: 2022 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA); 2023 Trends in
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS); CEA calculations.
Note: U.S. rankings are denoted in navy. Rankings reflect raw rankings and do not take
into account statistical significance. 58 countries and territories took the fourth grade
TIMSS, 44 took the eighth grade TIMSS, and 81 took the PISA.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Multiple indicators suggest students are struggling to re-engage with
schooling in the post-pandemic era. Chronic absenteeism—missing 10 percent of school or more—has nearly doubled relative to pre-pandemic levels,
with rates as high as 36 percent in high-poverty districts (Return2Learn
Tracker 2024), as shown in figure 7-5. After decreasing from 2016 to 2019,
the rate of children age 3 to 17 with behavior or conduct problems increased
by 20.6 percent (1.4 percentage points) from 2019 to the latter half of 2020
(Lebrun-Harris et al. 2022). A record number of special education referrals
were made during the 2022–2023 school year, a reflection of the pandemic’s
lasting effect on students, particularly young children (CRPE 2024; Miller and
Mervosh 2024). Data from a nationally representative survey in 2023 found
that teachers perceived substantially higher rates of students struggling with

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Chapter 7

Figure 7-5. Rates of Chronic Absenteeism by
Concentration of Students from Low-Income
Backgrounds

Percent chronically absent
40

36

35

29

30
25
20

2022
average: 28

19

2018
average: 15

15

15

21

10

10
5
0

High poverty

Middle poverty
2018

Low poverty

2022

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Return2Learn Tracker; CEA calculations.
Note: Data are collected at the district level. Categories represent district types.
2025 Economic Report of the President

depression, anxiety, and behavioral expectations than they did prior to the
pandemic (Jacob 2024).

Federal Investments in K-12 Education Promoting Recovery
The negative effects of the pandemic on students’ success in school would
likely have been worse without the investments made by the U.S. Federal
Government to stabilize revenues and support recovery efforts. U.S. K-12
schools benefitted from an unprecedented $189.5 billion in federal aid
through the Elementary and Secondary School Emergency Relief (ESSER)
funds, $122 billion of which were funded by the Administration’s historic
$130 billion investments in K-12 schools as part of the ARP (Department
of Education 2024b). The Administration has also played a key role in
expanding access to school-based mental health professionals and clinics to
support student engagement and wellbeing. For example, the CEA estimates
that the number of school-based social workers increased by 64 percent and

The K-12 Education System: Economic Impacts and Opportunities for Innovation | 251

Figure 7-6. Change in PISA Scores, 2018–2022

Change in PISA score values
0

Math

Reading

Science

-2
-4
-6
-8
-10
-12
-14
-16

OECD average

United States

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); 2022
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA); CEA calculations.
2025 Economic Report of the President

the number of school nurses increased by 16 percent between the 2018–2019
and 2023–2024 school years.2 This growth in student-facing support staff
was made possible in large part by federal funding provided by the ARP
and the BSCA, as well as the Health Resources and Services Administration
and Medicaid.
Student performance on the PISA suggests the United States weathered the pandemic better than many peer nations (see figure 7-6). Declines in
U.S. performance on the 2022 PISA were less than 10 percent of the average
decline among OECD member countries in reading and approximately 86
percent of the average decline in math (CEA 2023).
Recent studies document the important impacts federal relief dollars have had on student academic recovery. Both Dewey et al. (2024)
and Goldhaber and Falken (2024) find that, on average, each $1,000 in
ARP-funded per-pupil spending for a single year increased math scores by
approximately 0.009 of a standard deviation with estimates of similar magnitude for ELA scores. Given that the combined average amount of funds
allocated by ESSER II (part of the Coronavirus Response and Relief Act)
Analyses are based on the Current Population Survey and reflect 12-month averages from August
to July.

2

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Chapter 7

and the ARP per district was over $3,100, a rough estimate suggests that
these federal funds could raise student achievement by 1 percentile point
on average.3 Because the distribution of the vast majority of federal relief
funding was based on Title I formulas that provide aid proportional to the
number of students from low-income backgrounds, high-poverty districts
benefitted from higher levels of funding and were able to narrow the academic achievement gap—exacerbated by the pandemic—between low- and
high-poverty districts (Dewey et al. 2024).

Addressing Structural Challenges and Disparities in Education
Outcomes
The devastating effects of the COVID-19 pandemic elevated the critical role
of K-12 education in supporting students and families and serving as a core
feature of the social safety net. The pandemic also compounded structural
challenges that have long persisted in U.S. education. Efforts to recover
from the pandemic’s ill effects in the short run and strengthen the education
system in the long run will require the country to address the underlying
inequities in the system.
The decentralized structure of the U.S. education system and its history
of de facto and de jure racial segregation have resulted in wide variation
and persistent disparities in access to safe, well-staffed, and well-resourced
schools (Margo 1990; Antman and Cortes 2023; Anstreicher, Fletcher, and
Thompson 2022; Johnson 2019). For example, districts in the top decile
of student attainment have four-year high school graduation rates of 97.5
percent or higher, while districts in the bottom decile have graduation rates
of 75 percent or lower.4 Put differently, a student moving from a bottom- to
a top-performing district would be exposed to peers that are 30 percent more
likely to graduate on time. As shown in figure 7-7, four-year graduation
rates also differ dramatically among students based on their socioeconomic
status, disability status, language spoken at home, and race/ethnicity. Similar
achievement gaps are apparent on the NAEP, affirming the importance of
efforts to address disparities in education funding and opportunities (figure
7-8).

Scaling the estimated effects from Dewey et al. (2024) to the average allocated amount of ESSER
II and ARP dollars per student ($3,100) suggests an average total estimated effect of 0.028 standard
deviations. The CEA then follows Von Hippel (2024) to convert this to a percentile point change.
4
To avoid pandemic-induced distortions, data are from the 2018–2019 academic year for this
calculation only. Graduation rates at the local education agency (LEA) level are not available past
the 2020–2021 academic year.
3

The K-12 Education System: Economic Impacts and Opportunities for Innovation | 253

Figure 7-7. Four-year High School Graduation Rates
National average: 86.6%
Economically disadvantaged

-5.3

Students with disabilities

-15.2

English learner

-14.5

American Indian/Alaska Native/
Native American

-12.7

Black

-5.6

Hispanic/Latino

-3.8

White

3.2

Asian/Pacific Islander

7.1
-20

-10

0

10

Gap between group and national
adjusted four-year cohort graduation rate

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Ed Data Express; CEA calculations.
Note: Data are from the 2021–2022 academic year adjusted four-year graduation
cohort. Students are classified as economically disadvantaged based on individual state
criteria such as eligibility for the National Student Lunch Program. New Mexico and
Oklahoma did not report data and are not included in national estimates.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Opportunities for Improvement
Labor, capital, and technology can be thought of as central inputs into both
canonical models of economic growth as well as education production. In
the context of K-12 education, the framework highlights the central role that
educators (labor), school infrastructure and instructional resources (physical
capital), and other technologies (from school governance and organizational
practices to new education tools) play in shaping the success of the education system.
Any discussion of the U.S. Federal Government’s role in enhancing
the education production function must acknowledge a central constraint:
It contributes a limited share of K-12 funding. During non-recessionary
periods, this share hovers around 9 percent. The remaining 91 percent is
distributed approximately equally between state and local funding (see
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Chapter 7

Figure 7-8. Proficiency by Student Group
Percent difference from national average
English learner
American Indian/Alaska Native/
Native American
Black
Hispanic/Latino
White
Asian/Pacific Islander
-40
Eighth grade math

Eighth grade reading

-20

0

20

Percentage points

40

Fourth grade math

Fourth grade reading

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: National Assessment for Educational Progress; CEA calculations.
Note: Percent proficient includes students at or above percent proficient (including
percent advanced). Data are from the January through March 2022 testing period.
2025 Economic Report of the President

figure 7-9). Despite this limitation, the Federal Government plays a critical
role in making funding more equal across districts and stabilizing funding
across time.

Equalizing Funding Across Districts
The continued reliance on local and state revenue sources has led to an
unequal distribution of funding across U.S. school districts. High-expenditure
districts (the 90th percentile) spend 2.4 times as much per pupil, a $17,770
difference, compared to low-expenditure districts (the 10th percentile). This
wide variation reflects real disparities, rather than local differences in cost
of living, as shown in figure 7-10. A CEA analysis finds that cost-of-living
adjustments (COLA) based on county-level regional price parities explain
only 3.5 percent of the gap between the top and bottom deciles ($620) in
unadjusted expenditures.

The K-12 Education System: Economic Impacts and Opportunities for Innovation | 255

Figure 7-9. Public K-12 Education Revenue Sources
Percent of total revenue

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10

0
1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Federal
State
Local

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: National Center for Education Statistics; Common Core of Data; Bureau of
Labor Statistics; CEA calculations.
Note: Prior to 1995, estimates for the revenue in non-decennial years are imputed
assuming linear growth. Data are plotted through the 2021–2022 academic year. X-axis
labels represent the spring year of the academic calendar.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Two primary factors drive funding inequities. First, large differences
exist in local property tax bases, which constitutes the primary source of
local funding and roughly 36 percent of all public education revenue (NCES
2024a). High-local revenue districts (the 90th percentile) raise 5.7 times as
much money per pupil than low-local revenue districts (the 10th percentile),
a COLA-adjusted gap of $14,900 per pupil. High-local revenue districts
drive the variability: The difference between the 10th and 50th percentile
of local funding per pupil is relatively small ($4,200 COLA-adjusted)
compared to the difference between the 50th and 90th percentile ($10,700
COLA-adjusted).
Second, states spend vastly different amounts on education. For
example, the top five states spend over double the amount of state revenue
on education that the bottom five states spend on education—$11,800 versus
$5,400 COLA-adjusted. While spending differences across states exacerbate
inequities in education funding nationally, many states allocate funds to
districts in progressive ways to reduce inequities (Chingos and Blagg 2017).
The Federal Government has played an important role in mitigating
spending inequities across local communities and states since the passage
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) in 1965. ESEA
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Chapter 7

Figure 7-10. District per Pupil Expenditures
Adjusted for Cost of Living
Number of school districts
350

10th

25th

50th

75th

300
250
200

90th

10th percentile:
$13,800
90th percentile:
$31,000

150
100
50
0
13,000 15,500 18,000 20,500 23,000 25,500 28,000 30,500

2022 dollars
Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: National Center for Education Statistics; Common Core of Data; McMahon
(2024); CEA calculations.
Note: Per pupil expenditures are calculated at the local education agency level for the
2021–2022 academic year. Values are censored at the 5th and 95th percentile and
binned into multiples of 250. Analysis is limited to regular public school districts with
graded schools and at least 50 students. Expenditures are adjusted using county-level
regional price parities compiled by McMahon (2024).
2025 Economic Report of the President

established Title I, which allocates roughly $17 billion per year in funds
across four formulas based on two primary components: need and nonfederal education spending (NCES n.d.; Gordon and Reber 2023a). The first
component, the number of students in need (largely determined by student
poverty levels), is designed to support supplemental education activities for
children from low-income backgrounds. Without Title I and other federal
funds, the expenditure ratio between high- and low-expenditure districts
would be 15 percent higher (2.8 vs. 2.4). For some districts, the funding is
critical. For example, it makes up 8 percent of total funding in Detroit. The
second component, state and local revenue per pupil, increases positively
based on funding levels. While the approach potentially exacerbates statelevel funding differences, it is designed to incentivize states—especially
those with high proportions of low-income students—to invest more in education. Evidence suggests it plays a limited role (Gordon and Reber 2023b).

The K-12 Education System: Economic Impacts and Opportunities for Innovation | 257

The inequitable distribution of public education funding has lasting
impacts on student educational opportunities and outcomes. The school
finance reform literature, which leverages a series of court-ordered funding
reforms, shows that school funding increases both short-term achievement
and long-term outcomes, such as educational attainment and earnings
(Lafortune, Rothstein, and Schanzenbach 2018; Hyman 2017; Jackson,
Johnson, and Persico 2016), particularly for the most disadvantaged students
(Biasi 2023; Jackson et al. 2024; Jackson and Mackevicius 2024).

Stabilizing Funding Levels Over Time
Funding from the Federal Government has served as a backstop against fiscal shortfalls during economic downturns. As shown in figure 7-11, state and
local funding is pro-cyclical, meaning it increases in periods of economic
growth and contracts during recessions. Because most state governments
cannot run deficits to fund current expenditures, they are not able to quickly
raise money to respond to crises (Rueben and Randall 2017). Only the
Federal Government is able to provide immediate financial resources above
and beyond “business as usual” spending to allow districts to respond to

Figure 7-11. K-12 Revenue Sources as a Share of
Total 2007–2008 Revenue
Percent change

10

8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
2008

2010

2012

2014

Federal

Council of Economic Advisers

2016

State

2018

Local

2020

2022

Sources: National Center for Education Statistics; Common Core of Data; Bureau of
Labor Statistics; CEA calculations.
Note: Gray bars indicate recessions. Y axis represents the change in real dollars from
2008 to the indicated year, divided by the total amount of revenue in 2008. X-axis
labels represent the spring year of the academic calendar.
2025 Economic Report of the President

258 |

Chapter 7

acute challenges, such as public health emergencies and extreme weather
events.
The Federal Government smooths fluctuations in spending associated with the business cycle by increasing funding during recessions. State
revenues fell by $46 billion from peak to trough of the Great Recession and
$14 billion during the COVID-19 pandemic through 2021–2022, the most
recent available data. Both the Obama-Biden Administration’s ARRA and
the Biden-Harris Administration’s ARP helped districts minimize budgetary cuts when state and local revenues declined during recessions (Anglum,
Shores, and Steinberg 2021; Department of Education 2021a). ARP funds
not only stabilized expenditures, but also covered significant additional
costs related to reopening and operating schools safely during a pandemic as
well as supporting academic recovery due to school closures.
The counter-cyclical funding helps mitigate the negative human capital losses that accrue as a result of K-12 spending cuts. However, programs
like the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund, created by the ARRA to address
state budget shortfalls, are one-time appropriations passed in reaction to
recessions. Instead of requiring new legislation during each economic downturn and potentially delaying essential aid, the Federal Government could
establish a dynamic funding formula that serves as an automatic stabilizer
to insure against harmful budget cuts (Boushey et al. 2019).
Ultimately, the equalization and stabilization roles of the Federal
Government are intertwined. High-poverty districts are often the most
vulnerable to shocks. As the ESSER’s impact on the COVID-19 pandemic
recovery shows, federal aid targeted to high-needs populations plays a crucial role in ensuring that crises do not exacerbate inequality.
School funding affects student outcomes by improving school quality,
whether through labor inputs (hiring more and higher-quality teachers and
support staff), capital inputs (investing in environments conducive to learning and high-quality curricula), or technological inputs (having access to the
most up-to-date tools as a mechanism to enhance learning and better prepare
students for the increasingly digital economy).

Labor Inputs
Education is a labor-intensive sector, with educators at the core of the
production process. As shown in figure 7-12, salary and benefits for instructional staff alone constitute more than half of the K-12 budget. Thus, efforts
to improve education productivity and maximize public investments in
K-12 schools are directly related to the size and effectiveness of the teacher
workforce (Jackson, Rockoff, and Staiger 2014).
An extensive body of evidence documents the large and lasting effects
teachers have on their students’ academic attainment and labor market

The K-12 Education System: Economic Impacts and Opportunities for Innovation | 259

Figure 7-12. Salary and Benefits as a Share of K-12
Expenditures

Billions of dollars

$203

0

20

$86

40

Percent

$103

60

Salary, instructional

Benefits, instructional

Other benefits

All other expenditures

$43

$134

80

100

Other salary

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: National Center for Education Statistics; Common Core of Data; CEA
calculations.
Note: This figure excludes non-elementary and secondary expenditures. Data are from
the 2021–2022 academic year.
2025 Economic Report of the President

outcomes (Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff 2014; Petek and Pope 2023).
Educators also support students’ non-cognitive skills and socio-emotional
development (Jackson 2018; Kraft 2019) and serve as informal mentors
who share essential social capital for navigating academic challenges and
the college application process (Kraft, Bolves, and Hurd 2023). Having a
highly-qualified teacher in every classroom is critical for students’ academic
success, socio-emotional development, and preparation for the workforce.
Although classroom teachers and other education support staff constitute almost 70 percent of all K-12 employees, non-instructional staff also
play a key role in education production (see figure 7-13). Schooling is a joint
production process in which staff, from the superintendent to education support staff such as bus drivers and food service workers, must all work collectively to create positive and supportive learning conditions for students.
For example, school counselors affect students’ educational attainment at a
level similar in scale to classroom teachers (Mulhern 2023). Principals shape
the culture and climate for teaching and learning in their schools through
their leadership and staffing decisions (Grissom, Egalite, and Lindsay 2021;
Liebowitz and Porter 2019).

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Chapter 7

Figure 7-13. K-12 Education Workforce
Composition, by Role

53

0

20

15

40

15

60

7

80

6

5

100

Percent of K-12 education workforce
Teachers

Management

Educational support
Administrators

Operations

Health and wellness

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Current Population Survey accessed via IPUMS; CEA calculations.
Note: Data include the 2022 and 2023 calendar years. Sample includes only currently
employed individuals and covers staff in both public and private K-12 education.
Values sum to over 100 due to rounding.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Staffing All Classrooms with Qualified Educators
Recruiting and retaining qualified educators has become an increasing
challenge in the United States. Kraft and Lyon (2024) find the percentage
of high school seniors and college freshmen interested in becoming K-12
teachers has declined by as much as 40 percent since 2010. The fall in
interest has translated into substantial declines in new teacher supply and
created significant challenges for staffing every classroom with a qualified
teacher (Nguyen, Lam, and Bruno 2024). For example, the number of new
state-issued licensures to teach in public schools declined from 280,000 in
2001 to 210,000 in 2022, a 24 percent drop.
Personnel shortages are a product of both labor market supply and
demand. Although direct measures of public school teacher demand are not
available in the aggregate, overall demand can be proxied broadly based on
the total number of school-age children in the United States. Figure 7-14
shows that new flows into the teaching profession as measured by new licensures did not keep pace with aggregate demand during the last two decades.
Between 2001 and 2022, the number of new licensures per school-age child

The K-12 Education System: Economic Impacts and Opportunities for Innovation | 261

Figure 7-14. New Teacher Licensures

Licensures per 1,000 school-age children
6.5
6.0
5.5
5.0
4.5
4.0
3.5

3.0
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Title II of the Higher Education Act; American Community Survey accessed via
IPUMS; National Center for Education Statistics; CEA calculations.
Note: Gray bars indicate recessions. School-age is defined as age 5 to 17. Data are not
reported for school year 2008–2009, so that data point is imputed linearly. In 2020 and
2021, two and one states, respectively, did not report licensures, so data are also
imputed linearly for those states. Academic year licensure data are adjusted using
population estimates from the spring of the academic calendar. X-axis labels represent
the spring year of the academic calendar.
2025 Economic Report of the President

declined by 26 percent.5 Encouragingly, other data suggest that new teacher
supply may be beginning to recover with a 4.7 percent increase in the annual
number of bachelor’s and master’s education degree completers between
2019 and 2022 (NCES 2024b). At the same time, a delayed post-pandemic
increase in teacher turnover adds further upward pressure on teacher demand
(Barnum 2023).
State-by-state estimates suggest that one in eight K-12 public school
teaching positions are either vacant or staffed by underqualified teachers (e.g., those with emergency credentials or out-of-field teachers) (Tan,
Arellano, and Patrick 2024). Two months into the 2023–2024 school year,
37 percent of schools had a least one unfilled teaching vacancy. Data from
the nationally representative School Pulse Panel revealed that 79 percent
The trend shown in figure 7-14 is nearly identical when scaling licensures by the number of public
school students.

5

262 |

Chapter 7

Figure 7-15. Percent of Schools with Teacher
Vacancies After the Start of the School Year
Secondary

Elementary

18

Urban
Town

20

Suburban

28

17

28

14

17

High poverty

Low poverty

18

South

14
32

18

23

Northeast

19

West

12

18

Mostly students of color

Mostly white students

15
0
>1 vacancy

20

15

23

Midwest

19

17

19

Rural

17

17

15

31

17

14
20

Percent

40

60

1 vacancy

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: National Center for Education Statistics School Pulse Panel; CEA calculations.
Note: Vacancies include all teaching positions. Data come from the October 2023
survey. Schools are classified as having mostly students of color if the non-white share
of the student population is over 75 percent. Schools with a non-white share of 25
percent or less are classified as having mostly white students.
2025 Economic Report of the President

of public school leaders reported they experienced difficulty filling at least
one teaching position in August 2023. This figure dropped to 74 percent
in August 2024, suggesting some degree of easing in the tight teacher
labor market (NCES 2024c). Although some staff turnover is expected and
healthy, failing to fill vacancies by the start of the school year has direct
negative effects on student academic achievement (Papay and Kraft 2016).
While the broad national trends in teacher supply are concerning,
understanding the localized nature of the teacher labor market is central
The K-12 Education System: Economic Impacts and Opportunities for Innovation | 263

to addressing negative pressures on overall supply. In practice, the market
functions as a collection of hundreds of localized markets for K-12 teachers
in specific subjects, districts, and schools (Edwards et al. 2024; Goldhaber,
Falken, and Theobald 2023). Teachers also have preferences about where
they live and the working conditions of the schools in which they teach,
causing many schools in disadvantaged neighborhoods to struggle to attract
qualified teachers. As figure 7-15 illustrates, recent staffing difficulties are
concentrated in urban schools, high-poverty schools, and school districts
predominantly serving students of color.6 Considerable variation also exists
in the difficulty of staffing certain positions, with school leaders reporting
more acute challenges filling vacancies in special education, English as a
second language, foreign languages, and STEM subjects (see figure 7-16).

Figure 7-16. Percent of Schools With Difficulty
Filling Teacher Vacancies, by Subject
Special education
Foreign languages
ESL
Math
Science
Music or art
English
General elementary
Social studies
0

20
Very difficult

Council of Economic Advisers

40

Percent

60

80

Somewhat difficult

Sources: National Center for Education Statistics School Pulse Panel; CEA calculations.
Note: Data come from the August 2024 survey. Sample is restricted to schools with
vacancies. ESL stands for English as a second language.
2025 Economic Report of the President

This measure does not account for differences in school size which, all else equal, is positively
correlated with the probability a school has one or more vacancies and could be confounded with
other school characteristics (Edwards et al. 2024).

6

264 |

Chapter 7

While it is possible that post-pandemic enrollment declines in some public
schools may help ease the pressure in these teacher labor markets (Goulas
2024), it will not address the underlying challenge of recruiting talented
future educators or allocating teachers efficiently across subjects and geographic areas.

Causes of Staffing Challenges
While teachers enter the profession for myriad reasons, compensation must
remain competitive with other occupations for similarly-skilled workers
to attract and retain effective teachers. The CEA estimates that mean real
weekly wages paid to college-educated workers who were not K-12 teachers rose by 15.4 percent between 2000 and 2023 as worker productivity
also rose, in part due to technological innovation in other sectors of the
economy (Pardue 2024). This large increase in average weekly earnings for
other college-educated workers appears to be driven by rising wages in the
upper part of the earnings distribution, as median weekly real wages rose
only 1.5 percent during this period. Wages for elementary and secondary
school teachers did not keep pace, with mean weekly real wages rising by
only 4.3 percent and median weekly real wages falling by 4.8 percent.7 An
implication of this dynamic is that to avoid teacher shortages, wages (and
therefore total education costs) must increase over time for reasons unrelated
to productivity gains in the education sector (Baumol 1967).8
The CEA examines how teachers’ relative wages have changed over
time compared to workers of similar ages and degrees by estimating Mincer
earnings models, which compare wages across occupations in each year
between 2000 and 2023, after accounting for age and educational attainment. The analysis builds on studies of the average teacher wage penalty
(Allegretto 2024) by using unconditional quantile regressions to estimate
differences in relative wages at the bottom and top of the earnings distribution.9 Results shown in figure 7-17 reveal that the average wage gap is
driven by a negative wage premium (i.e., wage penalty) concentrated in the
middle (50th percentile) and upper (75th percentile) portions of the salary
distribution. The size of the wage penalty at the median of the distribution
increased from 8.9 percent in 2000 to 20.6 percent in 2023. The teacher
wage penalty in the upper range of the wage distribution is even larger
and has increased from 35.4 percent to 52.2 percent over this same period.
Sample includes both public and private school teachers.
Baumol (1967) points out that in certain sectors of the economy like teaching, productivity gains
are less forthcoming than in others, such as manufacturing. The differences are inherent to the sector
or “product.” Doubling class sizes, for example, may appear to boost measured productivity, but not
if learning suffers.
9
The CEA’s focus on weekly relative wages serves to alleviate concerns about salary comparisons
based on hourly wages, given differences in hours worked across occupations.
7
8

The K-12 Education System: Economic Impacts and Opportunities for Innovation | 265

Figure 7-17. Teacher Wage Disparity by Wage
Percentiles
Percent
10

0
-10
-20
-30
-40
-50
-60
2000

2003

2006

25th percentile

2009

Council of Economic Advisers

2012

2015

50th percentile

2018

2021

75th percentile

Sources: Current Population Survey accessed via IPUMS; CEA calculations.
Note: Gray bars indicate recessions. Sample is restricted to full-time workers, age 18-64.
Wage disparity is estimated by fitting unconditional quantile regressions of a Mincerian
wage model, which controls for age (quadratic) and education levels (indicators).
Wages are computed using the Economic Policy Institute definition of weekly pay and
do not include benefits. Pre-K and kindergarten teachers are excluded, but both private
and public elementary and secondary teachers are included.
2025 Economic Report of the President

These overall patterns illustrate the differential effects of the compressed
wage ranges for teachers, which are worsened by the fact that wage growth
outside of teaching has been concentrated at the upper end of the earnings
distribution during the last two decades (Gould and Kandra 2022). Although
the analyses here focus exclusively on wages, similar analyses find that
incorporating benefits only partially offsets these wage penalties, with large
gaps in total compensation remaining (Allegretto 2024).
Both overall teacher supply and the characteristics of who decides to
enter and remain in the profession are shaped by the lower average wages
and constrained earnings distribution for teachers (Hoxby and Leigh 2004;
Chingos and West 2012). Although some individuals forgo higher potential
earnings to serve as teachers because they see it as a calling, relying on
altruism and individual passion for pedagogy is an insufficient labor force
strategy. Research documents how the teaching profession becomes less
attractive to potential entrants during periods of stronger economic growth

266 |

Chapter 7

when there exist more outside options for higher paying jobs (Nagler,
Piopiunik, and West 2020). For example, Brummet et al. (2024) find that
wages among former teachers who exit the profession are far more variable
than those who stay in the profession, with more than a quarter of those
exiting earning more outside of teaching. Among CTE teachers, research
shows that those with career experience in growth industries such as health
services, information technology, and STEM fields are more likely to exit
the profession and have higher average earnings outside of teaching (Kistler,
Dougherty, and Woods 2024).
A second obstacle is the rising cost of undergraduate degrees relative
to the stagnant real wages for K-12 teachers, which has dramatically lowered
the value proposition of paying for college to become a teacher (NCES
2023). Currently, 36.6 percent of public school teachers have outstanding
student loan debt (Learning Policy Institute 2024). The CEA finds that the
average cost of a four-year degree relative to average real weekly salaries
increased by 35.5 percent for K-12 teachers between 2000 and 2023, while
increasing only 17.5 percent and 6.1 percent for college-educated workers
in nursing and accounting.
Large-scale layoffs in the K-12 education sector during economic
downturns can have prolonged negative consequences on the teacher labor
market. Given the large share of district budgets dedicated to salaries and
benefits and the sensitivity of state funding to fluctuations in income and
sales tax revenue, districts have few options to reduce their budgets without
conducting layoffs. The size of the K-12 education sector contracted by
more than 300,000 positions in the wake of the Great Recession, with an
estimated 120,000 teachers losing their jobs (Evans, Schwab, and Wagner
2019; Griffith 2020). These job losses are particularly harmful for recruiting new entrants into the profession given that many districts conduct
layoffs based on inverse seniority, meaning the newest hires are first to lose
their positions, regardless of performance (Kraft and Bleiberg 2022). The
COVID-19 recession caused large-scale layoffs among primarily schoolbased operational staff who were not needed during the time period when
schools transitioned to remote learning (Gould 2020).
Finally, non-monetary benefits enjoyed by teachers, such as professional autonomy, family-friendly work schedules, and job security, are not
as compelling as they once were. Although teachers enjoy holiday vacations
and summers off, they report working nine hours more per week on average
(53 vs. 44) and are twice as likely to say they experience frequent job-related
stress and burnout than other college-educated full-time workers (Doan,
Steiner, and Pandey 2024). National surveys suggest teacher autonomy
and authority over instructional decisions declined in the last decade as test
scores dropped and reformers looked to more directly manage instructional
content and practices (Kraft and Lyon 2024). Teachers’ work also does not
The K-12 Education System: Economic Impacts and Opportunities for Innovation | 267

allow them the flexibility to work remotely or on a hybrid schedule. The
in-school work requirement amounts to a tax on teachers’ wages, given that
workers report valuing flexible work arrangements—now enjoyed by over
36 percent of college-educated workers (see chapter 2 of this volume)—at
5 percent to 8 percent of their pay (Aksoy et al. 2022; Davis 2024; Mas
and Pallais 2017). New laws in some states allowing schools to sanction or
dismiss teachers who teach concepts deemed divisive, such as topics related
to racism and sexual orientation, also likely undercut teachers’ sense of
professional autonomy and job security (Woo et al. 2023).

Policies to Attract and Retain Qualified Educators
The need for policies aimed at ensuring the United States has well-prepared
and supported educators in all classrooms is growing. Efforts to improve
labor quality and productivity in the K-12 education sector must attend to
both designing the profession to attract the next generation of teachers and
maximizing the potential of the current workforce. Data collected during
national administrations of the ACT test in 2017–2018 provide a window
into how policymakers might make the teaching profession more attractive
to young people as they develop career interests (Croft, Guffy, and Vitale
2018). Among the reasons cited by high school test takers who said they
were “potentially” interested in teaching, 72 percent indicated better pay
would increase their interest (see figure 7-18). This suggests that market
wages are often not high enough to attract potentially interested students to
the profession.
The teaching profession is at a double disadvantage because of both
low wages and perceptions among college students that teachers’ salaries
are lower than they actually are (Christian, Ronfeldt, and Zafar 2024). At
least 13 states have taken steps to increase teacher pay substantially in recent
years by raising minimum starting salaries and/or elevating wages across
the profession (Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Missouri,
Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota,
and Utah), and evidence suggests these efforts can help attract people to
the profession (Hendricks 2015; Hough and Loeb 2013). In figure 7-19, a
CEA analysis shows that across an 18-year period between 2001 and 2019
(the last year before pandemic-associated disruptions), states where public
school teachers’ relative wages increased also saw meaningful increases
in the number of new state licensures to teach in K-12 public schools, on
average.10 Model-based estimates with state and year fixed effects, although
imprecise, suggest a $100 increase in weekly wages (roughly equivalent to

The CEA estimates relative wages by comparing the weekly median earnings of public elementary
and secondary school teachers to other non-teacher college-educated workers.
10

268 |

Chapter 7

Figure 7-18. Factors Potentially Increasing High
Schoolers' Interest in K-12 Teaching
Better pay

72

More flexibility in doing the job

41

More career advancement

32

More prestige or respect

30

More college scholarships

27

Safer schools and classrooms

27

Less work outside of school hours

23

More student loan forgiveness

20

Learning more about the job

19

Other

3
0

Council of Economic Advisers

10

20

30

40

50

Percent

60

70

80

Source: ACT Research and Policy.
Note: Sample is restricted to students who indicated potential interest in teaching.
Figure displays top three reasons that would increase respondents' interest in
becoming a K-12 teacher. Data are from 2018.
2025 Economic Report of the President

a $5,200 annual salary raise) increases the number of new licensures by 2.0
percent (p=0.16).11
The Federal Government has an important role to play in catalyzing
efforts to raise teacher pay to be more competitive with market wages on
average, as well as to create opportunities for more pronounced wage growth
in the profession. Edwards et al. (2024) find that the rate at which wages
increase in the first 10 years of the career strongly predicts teacher retention.
There also remain important opportunities to better leverage compensation as a tool to address localized shortages and retain high performers
with opportunities for career advancement. The Federal Government could
encourage innovative compensation approaches, including differentiated
pay programs for educators who teach in hard-to-staff subjects and schools.
Federal funds could also be used to promote efforts to develop career ladders, where teachers would have opportunities to earn promotions based
11

The model applies cluster robust standard errors at the state level.

The K-12 Education System: Economic Impacts and Opportunities for Innovation | 269

Figure 7-19. Changes in Licensures and Public
School Teacher Pay, by State
Change in new teacher licensures per 10,000 people
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
-15
-20
-25
-30

-400

-300

-200

-100

0

100

200

Change in relative weekly pay for public school teachers (dollars)

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: Current Population Survey accessed via IPUMS; Title II of the Higher Education
Act; American Community Survey accessed via IPUMS; CEA calculations.
Note: Relative pay is calculated as the difference between public school teacher weekly
pay and weekly pay for all non-teacher, college-educated workers using the Economic
Policy Institute definition of weekly wages. Total new teacher licensures are adjusted by
the working age population for the end year of the academic year period. The change
in both licensures and relative wages are calculated as the difference between the 2018
and 2019 average and the 2001 and 2002 average.
2025 Economic Report of the President

on their performance. Such a system would better leverage the expertise of
excellent teachers by having them spend part of their day serving as instructional coaches, curriculum developers, or new teacher mentors. Teacher
career ladders offer a way to address the third most cited factor by ACT test
takers that would increase their interest in teaching: “More opportunities
for career advancement” (Croft, Guffy, and Vitale 2018). Such an approach
stands in contrast to more common supplemental stipends and merit-pay
programs based on annual performance measures, which fail to provide a
clear signal to potential educators about their earning potential (Chiang et
al. 2017).
270 |

Chapter 7

Meaningful differences in staffing challenges across schools and
regions also point to the importance of removing barriers to professional
mobility and investing in place-based teacher training. One such barrier
is the lack of transferability of state teaching licensures in many contexts
(Evans, Francies, and McDole 2020). The Federal Government could both
help subsidize membership costs for states to join the Interstate Teacher
Mobility Compact and use its convening power to encourage state leaders to
streamline the licensure reciprocity process and reduce barriers to licensure
portability and employment (Teacher Compact n.d.). Reducing barriers for
transferring teaching licensures across states via expanded reciprocity could
help increase the mobility of teacher labor supply (Goldhaber et al. 2015).
Research suggests that Grow Your Own teacher preparation programs
supporting paraprofessionals and other community members to earn a bachelor’s degree and teacher’s license can increase the local supply of educators
(Hashim and Laski 2024; Blazar et al. 2024). Saunders et al. (2024) find that
teacher residency programs that provide an extended period of supervised
professional practice increase teacher retention. The Administration has
invested in these promising pathways and other programs to support growth
in new teacher labor supply through expanded funding for the Teacher
Quality Partnership Grant, IDEA Part D, and the Hawkins Program (White
House 2024b). Under the Administration, the registered apprenticeship
programs for K-12 teachers, which share many traits with Grow Your Own
and residency programs, have been extended to 47 states and territories.
Allowing candidates to earn pay and benefits while working toward their
degree and/or teacher’s license can significantly increase pathways into the
education sector, reduce or eliminate the cost of becoming a teacher, and
provide future educators with valuable classroom experience. Expanding
student-teaching placements in hard-to-staff schools can also increase new
teachers’ openness to working in these settings and provide them with valuable training to succeed (Goldhaber et al. 2022).
Reducing the private cost of teacher preparation through expanded federal grants and loan forgiveness programs provide a direct lever for policymakers to shape new teacher supply and quality. As shown in figure 7-18, 27
percent of high school students potentially interested in teaching indicated
that college scholarships were a top factor that could increase their willingness to become teachers; 20 percent cited loan forgiveness. The Public
Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program allows for outstanding federal
student loan balances to be forgiven for public service workers who have
completed 10 years of full-time service and made qualifying monthly payments on their loans for 120 months (Federal Student Aid 2024). As a result
of significant procedural fixes the Administration made to the program, the
number of public servants with debt approved for discharge increased from
less than 7,000 prior to the Administration to more than 1 million in October
The K-12 Education System: Economic Impacts and Opportunities for Innovation | 271

Figure 7-20. Instances of Gunfire on K-12 School
Campuses During School Hours
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

1999

2003

2007

2011

2015

2019

2023

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: The Washington Post; CEA calculations.
Note: Data do not include instances of gunfire that occur after school hours,
unintentional firing that does not cause injury, or shootings on college campuses.
2025 Economic Report of the President

2024 (CEA 2024c). Research also shows that students are more likely to
enter public service when financial aid is packaged as a conditional grant
rather than a forgivable loan (Field 2009). Continuing efforts to increase
funding for programs like the Teacher Education Assistance for College
and Higher Education (TEACH) Grant Program and the Noyce Teacher
Scholarship Program, which provide tuition scholarships in exchange for
teaching in high-need fields and schools, would be a strategic investment in
the next generation of educators (Turner 2021; NSF n.d.).
The ACT survey results also point to the critical importance of reducing gun violence in schools and their surrounding communities. Frequent
school shootings are a uniquely American phenomenon (World Population
Review 2024). As shown in figure 7-20, conservative estimates suggest
there have been at least 415 school shootings, 30 of which were mass shootings, since the event at Columbine High School in 1999 (Cox et al. 2024). In
addition to having immediate and long-term negative effects on exposed students (Beland and Kim 2016; Rossin-Slater et al. 2020; Deb and Gangaram
2023; Cabral et al. 2024; Levine and McKnight 2024), the traumatic events
lead to increased turnover among teachers and school staff (Cabral et al.
2024). Shootings have increased markedly since the 2017–2018 school year,

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when 27 percent of students potentially interested in teaching indicated that
safer schools and classrooms would increase their interest in the profession
(figure 7-18). The Administration has taken a range of actions to reduce gun
violence overall and in schools, such as creating the Stronger Connections
grant program which provides $1 billion in funding to support safer schools
and more inclusive learning environments, establishing the Office of Gun
Violence Prevention and the Emerging Firearms Threats Task Force, issuing
executive orders to increase safe gun storage, and enhancing background
checks for firearm buyers under the age of 21 (Department of Education
2024c; White House 2024c).

Policies to Maximize Educators’ Potential
Efforts to attract skilled workers to the teaching profession are most effective when they are paired with policies and programs designed to maximize
teachers’ potential. Research shows that teacher-school match quality is an
important component of educators’ overall effectiveness and that teacher
effectiveness differs across settings and student populations (Jackson 2013;
Delgado 2023). Districts can support principals to successfully navigate
the teacher hiring process with early and information-rich practices and by
providing them with autonomy over who they hire (Liu and Johnson 2006;
James, Kraft, and Papay 2023). This is made possible when districts and
school leaders have the flexibility to publicly post vacant positions at the
beginning of the hiring cycle and hire the candidate best suited for the position regardless of seniority.
Schools can support teachers’ professional growth on the job through
professional development, such as high-quality induction and mentoring
programs (Ronfeldt and McQueen 2017), teacher coaching (Kraft, Blazar,
and Hogan 2018), and peer observation and feedback (Papay et al. 2020;
Burgess, Rawal, and Taylor 2021). Finally, school leaders can work to
develop cultures and climates that promote teachers’ professional growth
and retention (Bryk et al. 2010; Kraft and Papay 2014), as well as students’
academic success (Kraft, Marinell, and Yee 2016; Porter et al. 2023). The
U.S. Federal Government can support these efforts through expanded funding of Title II, Part A and competitive grant programs.

Capital Inputs
A growing body of research documents how the condition of school
infrastructure affects teacher and student outcomes (Biasi, Lafortune, and
Schönholzer 2024; Jackson and Mackevicius 2024). Approximately one half
of school districts participating in a recent U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) survey reported that they needed to replace or repair their capital infrastructure, such as heating, ventilation, air conditioning, or plumbing

The K-12 Education System: Economic Impacts and Opportunities for Innovation | 273

(GAO 2020). Investments to modernize school buildings have considerable
benefits (Neilson and Zimmerman 2014) and will become increasingly
important as the adverse effects of climate change place increasing pressure
on K-12 infrastructure (Will and Lieberman 2023).
Lead abatement and air conditioning improvements are two concrete
and urgent interventions with proven benefits for federal policymakers to
target. In the 12 states with available testing data, 44 percent of schools had
one or more water samples with a significant concentration of lead (Cradock
et al. 2019). Children can also be exposed to lead during recess via the
surface of playground equipment (Almansour et al. 2019). Any level of lead
is dangerous for children and can lead to long-term cognitive impairment
and increased levels of aggression and agitation (American Academy of
Pediatrics 2024). Lead-hazard control grants issued by the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development have been shown to reduce lead poisoning, and each 1 percentage-point drop in lead poisoning yields test score
gains of 0.04 standard deviations in math and 0.08 standard deviations in
reading, roughly equivalent to a 1.5 percentile increase in math and a 3 percentile increase in reading (Sorensen et al. 2019). The Administration took
action to reduce these risks by allocating $3 billion in funding to identify
and replace lead pipes in May 2024 (EPA 2024a) and issuing a final rule in
October 2024 requiring lead pipes that carry drinking water to be replaced
within 10 years (EPA 2024b).
Approximately one third of schools reported needing to replace or
repair their heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system in the
GAO survey (GAO 2020). As the number of school days with temperatures
above 80 degrees increases due to climate change, areas that were cool
year-round prior to 1970 (when nearly 40 percent of school buildings were
built) now need air conditioning to create a tolerable learning environment
(Phillips and Penney 2024). Research shows that a 1-degree hotter school
year causes a 1 percent decrease in learning that year without air conditioning (Park et al. 2020), with increasingly common extreme heat having even
larger effects (EPA 2024c). Air conditioning systems can also improve
ventilation, lowering the risk of transmission of respiratory illnesses, such
as COVID-19, and filtering pollutants, such as dust, smoke, and mold (CDC
2024; Bottrell 2019; Howard et al. 2021). Poorly maintained air conditioning systems can become home to mold, increasing incidences of asthma
(Jenkins Environmental n.d.). Biasi, Lafortune, and Schönholzer (2024) find
that investments in air conditioning yield test score increases of 0.2 standard
deviations, or 7.4 percentiles. Encouragingly, nearly one half of school
districts surveyed by the Center for Green Schools said they planned to use
ESSER III funds (i.e., ESSER funds allocated by the ARP) to upgrade their
HVAC systems (Sauter and Heming 2022).

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Figure 7-21. School Facilities Improvement
Spending, by Category

Billions of dollars

$51

0

20
M&O

Construction

$49

40

Percent

Other

60

Land

$8 $6 $3

80

100

Instructional equipment

Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: National Center for Education Statistics; Common Core of Data (CCD); CEA
calculations.
Note: School facilities improvement spending includes all categories of capital
spending as designated by the CCD, as well as maintenance and operations (M&O),
which is categorized as support spending. Data are from the 2021–2022 academic
year.
2025 Economic Report of the President

Addressing Capital Funding Inequities
On average, districts allocated 86 percent of their facilities improvement
budget on construction costs and maintenance and operations in 2022 (see
figure 7-21). Over half of all school districts fund capital infrastructure
projects primarily through local taxes, especially property taxes. For highpoverty school districts, which have limited property tax revenue from
which to draw, state support is crucial for financing capital projects (GAO
2020). However, 14 states do not provide capital funding to school districts,
and in those that do, state funding rarely makes up the difference: Highpoverty districts (defined as those with greater than 65 percent economically
disadvantaged students) spend 37 percent less per school on capital investments than low-poverty districts (Filardo 2021). As a result, students from
low-income backgrounds are less likely to attend schools in buildings that
are in good shape and less likely to attend schools in districts with a high
amount of capital outlay than students from relatively more affluent backgrounds (Blagg, Terrones, and Nelson 2023). Accordingly, hot school days
disproportionately affect students of color, who are more likely to attend

The K-12 Education System: Economic Impacts and Opportunities for Innovation | 275

high-poverty schools that lack the proper air conditioning and ventilation
systems (Park et al. 2020).
Hallmark investments by the Administration, such as ARP funds and
the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, are examples of how the U.S. Federal
Government can strengthen schooling infrastructure to the benefit of students. Local education agency administrators reported that they planned
to use $26 billion of ESSER III funds to improve school facilities and
operations in 2024 (DiMarco and Jordan 2022). The Renew America’s
Schools Program, launched by the U.S. Department of Energy in 2022, with
a subsequent round of funding announced in 2024, has made $500 million
available to school districts to improve energy infrastructure (DOE 2024),
enabling schools to sustainably invest in air conditioning. Additionally, the
Administration announced in May 2024 that it will fund 3,400 new clean
school buses, a $900 million investment, via the Clean School Bus Rebate
Program (EPA 2024d).

Technology Inputs
Recent technological advancements, such as computer-adaptive learning programs (CAL) and generative artificial intelligence, present both
opportunities and challenges for the U.S. K-12 education system. Given the
historical resilience of the traditional classroom model during past periods
of major technological innovations (Reich 2020), the CEA is skeptical of
prognostications that the new technologies will imminently replace teachers
or brick-and-mortar schools. Teaching involves multiple complex tasks,
such as lesson planning, providing direct instruction, identifying individual
student challenges, differentiating instruction to students’ individual needs,
and managing classroom behavior (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991). Human
relationships and social interactions play a central role in the learning process. However, CAL and AI-powered tools hold considerable potential for
augmenting teacher productivity and student learning.
Jackson and Makarin (2018) illustrate how the potential benefits of
education technology depend on (i) the effectiveness of the new tool, (ii)
the time savings it provides teachers, and (iii) the ease of adoption and use.
The framework makes clear that education technologies are most likely to
be effective when they perform sufficiently well to be a productive replacement for teachers’ task-specific work,12 allow teachers to focus on other
productive tasks for which they have a comparative advantage, and are easy
Research outside the education sector affirms that AI boosts productivity by roughly 20 percent
to 25 percent for particular tasks in a range of white-collar jobs, including software development
(Cui et al. 2024), professional writing for office jobs (Noy and Zhang 2023), customer service
(Brynjolfsson, Li, and Raymond 2023), and tasks in management consulting (Dell’Acqua et al.
2023). In all cases, the gains are heterogeneous and most pronounced for workers who otherwise
would have been less productive than their peers.
12

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to use. It also implies that new technologies will not be a panacea, as their
value depends on the skillset of each individual (likely being most helpful
for the otherwise least effective teachers) and the degree to which students
and teachers are able to use it with fidelity.
Teachers report using AI most frequently for individual tasks, such as
customizing instruction through AI-enhanced CAL programs and generating
instructional materials (Diliberti et al. 2024). Taylor (2018) finds that the
integration of computer-aided instructional software designed to provide
individualized instruction improves student achievement in less-effective
teachers’ classrooms but may reduce student performance in higher-performing teachers’ classrooms. Similarly, Jackson and Makarin (2018) find
that providing teachers with high-quality online off-the-shelf lesson plans
improves outcomes overall, with the largest gains among the weakest teachers. Research on CAL programs finds substantial impacts in some settings
(Escueta et al. 2020), but also that many teachers and students do not use
the tools for the recommended amount of time (Holt 2024; Oreopoulos et al.
2024). Without implementation support and equal access to the internet and
digital devices, new technology may remain on the periphery of teaching
and learning and even exacerbate existing inequities in K-12 schools.
AI-powered tutoring programs and tutor assistance programs may
also become productivity-enhancing complements to teachers and tutors.
One study shows that CAL programs can be effectively integrated into
high-dosage tutoring models, allowing programs to double student-tutor
ratios while largely sustaining their effectiveness (Bhatt et al. 2024). Large
language models can be trained on transcripts from expert human tutors
to enhance their ability to diagnose student errors and identify productive
remediation techniques, such as guided questioning (Wang et al. 2024a). A
randomized control trial of Tutor CoPilot, which provides real-time guidance to tutors, found that the technology improved student performance
on mini-assessments given at the end of each session and had the largest
benefits for lower-rated and less-experienced tutors (Wang et al. 2024b).
Still, open questions remain about the benefits of AI-powered tutoring for
students’ long-run skill development. One study found that an AI tutor using
Open-AI’s ChatGPT-4 improved student performance in high school math,
but that students in the treatment group performed worse relative to control
students when they no longer had access to the AI tutor (Bastani et al. 2024).
Arguably, the potential benefits of AI in education will be in providing tools available to teachers and students, each for specific tasks, to
complement people-centric teaching and learning, rather than as an all-inone technology. Training for teachers on how to deploy technology from a
wide-ranging AI toolkit will be essential for success (aiEDU 2024). Federal
policy can help facilitate the creation of such a toolkit, and the Institute of
Education Sciences can fund research on which tools are most effective in
The K-12 Education System: Economic Impacts and Opportunities for Innovation | 277

specific contexts and for specific purposes (Institute of Education Sciences
n.d.).

The Federal Government’s Role in Agenda Setting
While the U.S. Federal Government accounts for a small share of all public
school funding, it has considerable influence on public education through
laws, regulations, and agenda setting. For example, the No Child Left
Behind Act (NCLB)—the 2001 reauthorization of ESEA—required annual
testing in all states to identify schools that failed to make “adequate yearly
progress” overall and among specific student subgroups (National Center
for Education Evaluation 2008). The law linked test-based performance
measures to sanctions and rewards, led to rapid advancements in data collection infrastructure, heightened attention on student achievement gaps, and
set new standards for being considered a highly-qualified teacher. Research
finds that NCLB improved academic achievement for students in general
and for students from low-income backgrounds in particular (Dee and Jacob
2011; Reback, Rockoff, and Schwartz 2014). The Every Student Succeeds
Act—the 2015 ESEA reauthorization—maintained test-based accountability
but granted increased autonomy to states regarding school improvement and
accountability systems (Department of Education 2024d). It also included
requirements to provide more information to parents and expanded the
set of metrics that are used in accountability to include graduation rates as
well as the option to use suspensions, absenteeism, teacher qualifications,
resource equity, and other metrics. School districts around the country now
measure student wellbeing and school climate, disseminate this information
to parents, and use it to inform policy decisions.
The Federal Government also plays a key leadership role in shaping
policies through targeted grants and investments. The Administration’s
investments in K-12 education, particularly through ARP funding, sparked
a rapid recovery of K-12 public education jobs to pre-pandemic levels, supported critical academic acceleration efforts, increased Title I aid, and made
pursuing a teaching career more affordable through reforms to the TEACH
grant and PSLF (Department of Education 2021b). Enhanced federal funding
for the Perkins Act has helped to accelerate the much-needed expansion of
CTE in public high schools. CTE prepares students with the skills necessary
for high-demand sectors of the economy. Additionally, rigorous evaluations
show that CTE academies and programs have positive effects on students’
academic achievement and attainment and substantially increase graduates’
earnings in the labor market (Page 2012; Dougherty 2018; Hemelt, Lenard,
and Paeplow 2019; Bonilla 2020; Brunner, Dougherty, and Ross 2023).
The Administration successfully launched the National Partnership
for Student Success, a nationwide effort led by the U.S. Department of
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Education, AmeriCorps, and Johns Hopkins University that successfully
recruited, trained, supported, and engaged an additional 320,000 people
to serve as tutors, mentors, and student-success coaches in just two years
(Balfanz and Byrnes 2024). The BSCA championed by the Administration
made historic investments in school-based mental health services and school
safety. The Administration has also targeted competitive federal grant
programs to activities intended to increase student attendance and engagement and improve student achievement, held convenings of policymakers,
and provided guidance on best practices (such as home visits, tracking
real-time attendance data, and promoting full-service community schools)
(Department of Education 2024e; White House 2024d). Thus, federal leadership can influence policy and make meaningful and impactful change.

Conclusion
The K-12 education system has long been and continues to be the primary
public investment the United States makes in the human capital of its people.
Elementary and secondary education prepares students with the foundational
knowledge and skills they need to thrive in higher education and the labor
market, as well as to realize their intellectual and academic potential. The
work of educators and schools is fundamental to the U.S. economy and
provides large returns on the investments made by both individuals and the
government at every level.
Ensuring that the United States benefits from a world-class K-12
education system and keeps pace with the rapidly evolving landscape of
the future of work remains imperative. Meeting the challenge will require
schools to be fully staffed with quality educators; provide healthy, safe,
inclusive, and modern learning environments; and leverage technological advancements in productive ways. Perhaps the greatest opportunity to
improve the productivity of K-12 education is to attract and retain the best
and brightest to serve as educators through subsidies for higher education,
competitive market wages, differentiated career pathways, and supportive
working conditions. Modernizing the capital infrastructure of schools,
especially those in disrepair or with outdated systems, will enhance both
teaching and learning. New approaches to integrating CAL and generative
AI into the education system to complement teachers’ work holds promise
but will require thoughtful development and experimentation to ensure these
technologies serve as productivity-enhancing tools that build core knowledge and skills while keeping human interactions at the center of education.
The Federal Government will have a central role in supporting the continued strength of—and innovation in—K-12 education, as well as ensuring
that all students enjoy equitable access to the full benefits of high-quality
schooling. This will include ongoing direct financial investments in K-12
The K-12 Education System: Economic Impacts and Opportunities for Innovation | 279

schools to ensure more equitable funding and insure against fiscal shortfalls
during economic downturns. It will also involve catalyzing research and
development and experimentation in the sector through grants to practitioners and researchers. Efforts to improve the analytic capacity of districts and
state education departments, as well as to collect detailed and real-time data
on teacher labor markets and student outcomes, will help inform ongoing
efforts for targeted improvements. These investments will pay dividends
for current and future generations, with broad-based benefits to economic
growth for the United States as a whole.

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362 | 

Appendix A

Report to the President
on the Activities of the
Council of Economic Advisers
during 2024

363

Letter of Transmittal
Council of Economic Advisers

Thursday, January 9, 2025
Mr. President:

The Council of Economic Advisers herewith submits its 2025 Annual
Report in accordance with the Employment Act of 1946, as amended by the
Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978.
Sincerely yours,

Jared Bernstein
Member

Heather Boushey
Member

C. Kirabo Jackson
Member

Activities of the Council of Economic Advisers during 2025 | 365

Council Members and Their Dates of Service
Name

Position

Oath of office date

Separation date

Edwin G. Nourse
Leon H. Keyserling

Chairman
Vice Chairman
Acting Chairman
Chairman
Member
Vice Chairman
Member
Member
Chairman
Member
Member
Member
Chairman
Member
Member
Member
Member
Chairman
Member
Member
Member
Chairman
Member
Member
Member
Chairman
Member
Member
Member
Chairman
Member
Member
Chairman
Member
Member
Member
Member
Chairman
Member
Member
Chairman
Member
Member
Member
Member
Chairman
Member
Member

August 9, 1946
August 9, 1946
November 2, 1949
May 10, 1950
August 9, 1946
May 10, 1950
June 29, 1950
September 8, 1952
March 19, 1953
September 15, 1953
December 2, 1953
April 4, 1955
December 3, 1956
May 2, 1955
December 3, 1956
November 1, 1958
May 7, 1959
January 29, 1961
January 29, 1961
January 29, 1961
August 3, 1962
November 16, 1964
May 17, 1963
September 2, 1964
November 16, 1964
February 15, 1968
February 2, 1966
February 15, 1968
July 1, 1968
February 4, 1969
February 4, 1969
February 4, 1969
January 1, 1972
September 9, 1971
March 13, 1972
July 23, 1973
October 31, 1973
September 4, 1974
June 13, 1975
July 22, 1975
January 22, 1977
March 18, 1977
March 18, 1977
June 6, 1979
August 20, 1980
February 27, 1981
June 12, 1981
July 14, 1981

November 1, 1949

John D. Clark
Roy Blough
Robert C. Turner
Arthur F. Burns
Neil H. Jacoby
Walter W. Stewart
Raymond J. Saulnier
Joseph S. Davis
Paul W. McCracken
Karl Brandt
Henry C. Wallich
Walter W. Heller
James Tobin
Kermit Gordon
Gardner Ackley
John P. Lewis
Otto Eckstein
Arthur M. Okun
James S. Duesenberry
Merton J. Peck
Warren L. Smith
Paul W. McCracken
Hendrik S. Houthakker
Herbert Stein
Ezra Solomon
Marina v.N. Whitman
Gary L. Seevers
William J. Fellner
Alan Greenspan
Paul W. MacAvoy
Burton G. Malkiel
Charles L. Schultze
William D. Nordhaus
Lyle E. Gramley
George C. Eads
Stephen M. Goldfeld
Murray L. Weidenbaum
William A. Niskanen
Jerry L. Jordan

366 |

Appendix A

January 20, 1953
February 11, 1953
August 20, 1952
January 20, 1953
December 1, 1956
February 9, 1955
April 29, 1955
January 20, 1961
October 31, 1958
January 31, 1959
January 20, 1961
January 20, 1961
November 15, 1964
July 31, 1962
December 27, 1962
February 15, 1968
August 31, 1964
February 1, 1966
January 20, 1969
June 30, 1968
January 20, 1969
January 20, 1969
December 31, 1971
July 15, 1971
August 31, 1974
March 26, 1973
August 15, 1973
April 15, 1975
February 25, 1975
January 20, 1977
November 15, 1976
January 20, 1977
January 20, 1981
February 4, 1979
May 27, 1980
January 20, 1981
January 20, 1981
August 25, 1982
March 30, 1985
July 31, 1982

Council Members and Their Dates of Service
Name

Position

Oath of office date

Separation date

Martin Feldstein
William Poole
Beryl W. Sprinkel
Thomas Gale Moore
Michael L. Mussa
Michael J. Boskin
John B. Taylor
Richard L. Schmalensee
David F. Bradford
Paul Wonnacott
Laura D’Andrea Tyson
Alan S. Blinder
Joseph E. Stiglitz

Chairman
Member
Chairman
Member
Member
Chairman
Member
Member
Member
Member
Chair
Member
Member
Chairman
Member
Member
Chair
Member
Member
Chairman
Member
Member
Chairman
Member
Member
Chairman
Member
Member
Chairman
Chairman
Member
Member
Chairman
Member
Chair
Member
Chairman
Member
Member
Member
Chairman
Member
Chairman
Member
Member
Member
Member

October 14, 1982
December 10, 1982
April 18, 1985
July 1, 1985
August 18, 1986
February 2, 1989
June 9, 1989
October 3, 1989
November 13, 1991
November 13, 1991
February 5, 1993
July 27, 1993
July 27, 1993
June 28, 1995
June 30, 1995
January 29, 1996
February 18, 1997
April 23, 1997
October 22, 1998
August 12, 1999
August 12, 1999
May 31, 2000
May 11, 2001
July 25, 2001
November 30, 2001
May 29, 2003
November 21, 2003
November 21, 2003
February 23, 2005
June 21, 2005
November 18, 2005
November 18, 2005
February 27, 2006
July 17, 2008
January 29, 2009
March 11, 2009
September 10, 2010
March 11, 2009
April 19, 2011
April 19, 2011
November 7, 2011
February 7, 2013
August 4, 2013
August 6, 2013
July 21, 2014
August 10, 2015
August 31, 2015

July 10, 1984
January 20, 1985
January 20, 1989
May 1, 1989
September 19, 1988
January 12, 1993
August 2, 1991
June 21, 1991
January 20, 1993
January 20, 1993
April 22, 1995
June 26, 1994

Martin N. Baily
Alicia H. Munnell
Janet L. Yellen
Jeffrey A. Frankel
Rebecca M. Blank
Martin N. Baily
Robert Z. Lawrence
Kathryn L. Shaw
R. Glenn Hubbard
Mark B. McClellan
Randall S. Kroszner
N. Gregory Mankiw
Kristin J. Forbes
Harvey S. Rosen
Ben S. Bernanke
Katherine Baicker
Matthew J. Slaughter
Edward P. Lazear
Donald B. Marron
Christina D. Romer
Austan D. Goolsbee
Cecilia Elena Rouse
Katharine G. Abraham
Carl Shapiro
Alan B. Krueger
James H. Stock
Jason Furman
Betsey Stevenson
Maurice Obstfeld
Sandra E. Black
Jay C. Shambaugh

February 10, 1997
August 30, 1996
August 1, 1997
August 3, 1999
March 2, 1999
July 9, 1999
January 19, 2001
January 12, 2001
January 19, 2001
February 28, 2003
November 13, 2002
July 1, 2003
February 18, 2005
June 3, 2005
June 10, 2005
January 31, 2006
July 11, 2007
March 1, 2007
January 20, 2009
January 20, 2009
September 3, 2010
August 5, 2011
February 28, 2011
April 19, 2013
May 4, 2012
August 2, 2013
May 19, 2014
January 20, 2017
August 7, 2015
August 28, 2015
January 20, 2017
January 20, 2017

Activities of the Council of Economic Advisers during 2025 | 367

Council Members and Their Dates of Service
Name

Position

Oath of office date

Separation date

Kevin A. Hassett
Richard V. Burkhauser
Tomas J. Philipson

Chairman
Member
Member
Acting Chairman
Vice Chairman
Member
Acting Chairman
Vice Chairman
Chair
Member
Chair
Member
Member

September 13, 2017
September 28, 2017
August 31, 2017
July 1, 2019
July 24, 2019
May 22, 2019
June 23, 2020
June 23, 2020
March 2, 2021
January 20, 2021
June 13, 2023
January 20, 2021
August 28, 2023

June 30, 2019
May 18, 2019

Tyler B. Goodspeed
Cecilia Elena Rouse
Jared Bernstein
Heather Boushey
C. Kirabo Jackson

368 |

Appendix A

June 22, 2020
January 6, 2021
April 1, 2023
January 20, 2025
January 20, 2025
October 11, 2024

Report to the President on the
Activities of the Council of
Economic Advisers during 2024
Established by the Employment Act of 1946, the Council of Economic Advisers is
charged with advising the President on economic policy based on data, research,
and evidence. The Council is composed of three members: a Chair, who is
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate; and two
Members, who are appointed by the President. Along with a team of economists,
they analyze and interpret economic developments and formulate and recommend
economic policies that advance the interests of the American people.

The Chair of the Council
Jared Bernstein was confirmed by the Senate on June 13, 2023, as the 31st Chair
of the Council of Economic Advisers. In this role, he serves as President Biden’s
Chief Economist and as a Member of the Cabinet. Before his appointment as
Chair, Dr. Bernstein served as a CEA Member from the beginning of the BidenHarris Administration.
Chair Bernstein has held a variety of posts in economic policy and research. In
policy, he was Chief Economist and Economic Adviser to then–Vice President
Biden from 2009 to 2011 and served as Deputy Chief Economist at the
Department of Labor during the Clinton Administration. In research, Dr. Bernstein
was a Senior Fellow at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities from 2011 to
2020 and spent 16 years in senior roles at the Economic Policy Institute. An expert
on labor markets and macroeconomics, Dr. Bernstein has focused his research on
income inequality, mobility, employment and earnings, international trade, and the
living standards of the middle class. He received a BA from the Manhattan School
of Music, an MA from the Hunter School of Social Work, and an MA and PhD
from Columbia University.

Activities of the Council of Economic Advisers during 2025 | 369

The Members of the Council
Heather Boushey was appointed to the Council by the President on January 20,
2021. Before assuming this position, Boushey cofounded the Washington Center
for Equitable Growth in 2013, which she led until stepping down in 2020 to join
the Biden-Harris Administration. She previously served as Chief Economist for
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s 2016 transition team and as an economist at
the Center for American Progress, the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S.
Congress, the Center for Economic and Policy Research, and the Economic Policy
Institute. She received a BA from Hampshire College and a PhD in economics
from the New School for Social Research.
C. Kirabo Jackson was appointed to the Council by the President on August
28, 2023 and served as member through October 11, 2024. Dr. Jackson is the
Abraham Harris Professor of Human Development and Social Policy, a Professor
of Economics, and a Faculty Fellow at the Institute for Policy Research at
Northwestern University. Jackson is also on leave as editor-in-chief for the
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. Dr. Jackson’s research focuses
on the economics of education, labor economics, and social policy issues. He
received a BA from Yale University, an MA from Harvard University, and a PhD
in economics from Harvard University.

Areas of Activity
A central function of the Council is to advise the President on all economic issues
and developments, including preparing frequent memos for the President, the
Vice President, and White House senior staff on key economic data releases and
policy issues. The Council works closely with officials at various government
entities—including the National Economic Council, the Domestic Policy Council,
the Office of Management and Budget, and Administrative Agencies—to engage
in discussions on numerous policy matters. The Council, the Department of the
Treasury, and the Office of Management and Budget are responsible for producing the economic forecasts that underlie the Administration’s Budget proposals.
Finally, the Council is a leading participant in the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), historically chairing the Economic
Policy Committee and participating in OECD working meetings. The Council
produces economic analysis that is presented across blog posts, issue briefs, white
papers, and public speeches. Under Chair Bernstein’s leadership, the CEA has
increased the frequency of its external publications, with a particular focus on the
analysis and interpretation of economic data releases.

370 |

Appendix A

Blog Posts
•

“A Strong Year for the Labor Market,” a blog recapping jobs, labor supply,
and wage growth trends in 2023 (January 2024).

•

“[Previous Month] CPI Report,” a series of blog posts analyzing monthly
inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index (January, March, June,
July, August, September, October 2024).

•

“New Business Surge: Unveiling the Business Application Boom through an
Analysis of Administrative Data,” a blog analyzing the surge in new business applications in recent years and its potential impacts on job creation and
the economy (January 2024).

•

“The Labor Market Recovery Has Been Strong Across the Country,” a blog
about the labor market recovery since the 2020 recession, which documents
the equitable recovery across States (January 2024).

•

“Record Marketplace Coverage in 2024: A Banner Year for Coverage,” a
blog outlining how actions taken by the Biden-Harris Administration have
contributed to increased Medicaid and ACA Marketplace enrollment and
helped to increase rates of insurance coverage (January 2024).

•

“[Previous Quarter] Real GDP Report,” a series of blogs analyzing the quarterly release of real GDP data and what it represents for the macroeconomy
(January, April, July 2024).

• “[Previous Month] Employment Report,” a series of blogs analyzing monthly
payroll data and summarizing its implications for the economy (February,
April, May, June, July, August, September, October 2024).
• “Empowering the IRS: Understanding the Full Potential of the Inflation
Reduction Act’s Historic Investment in the Internal Revenue Service,” a
blog summarizing and providing context for the Treasury Department report
analyzing the effect of the IRA on tax revenue (February 2024).
• “U.S. Semiconductor Jobs are Making a Comeback,” a blog about how the
CHIPS and Science Act has spurred growth in the semiconductor field and
will continue to do so in the future (March 2024).
• “An Update on Non-Housing Services Inflation,” a blog examining recent
trends in the prices of non-housing services and how they might affect inflation as a whole (March 2024).
• “Real-World Examples of the Benefits of SAVE,” a blog recapping some of
the benefits that Saving on a Valuable Education (SAVE) program offers to
borrowers (March 2024).

Activities of the Council of Economic Advisers during 2025 | 371

•

“[Previous Month] PCE Report,” a series of blogs analyzing the monthly
inflation as measured by overall and core Personal Consumption Expenditure
price indices (March, May, August 2024).

•

“The Next Phase of Electricity Decarbonization? Planned Power Capacity
is Nearly All Zero-Carbon,” a blog describing how policies by the BidenHarris Administration have helped to increase battery and renewable capacity (April 2024).

•

“Seven Facts About the Economics of Child Care,” a blog about structural
market issues within the childcare industry and the impacts of affordable,
high-quality care for various family outcomes (April 2024).

•

“The Importance of Central Bank Independence,” a blog about why central
bank independence is critical to maintaining price stability (May 2024).

•

“Investing in Places Historically Left Behind: Foreign Direct Investment
in U.S. Clean Energy Manufacturing,” a blog on how the Administration’s
strategic investments in infrastructure, clean energy, and semiconductors
attracted further investment by domestic and foreign private investors
(June 2024).

•

“What Drives the U.S. Services Trade Surplus? Growth in Digitally-Enabled
Services Exports,” a blog reviewing how digitally-enabled services drive the
U.S. services trade surplus (June 2024).

•

“Update: Grocery Price Inflation Has Cooled Substantially,” a blog looking
into the recent cooling of grocery inflation (June 2024).

•

“Federal Relief Funds Contributed to Academic Recovery Across
the Country,” a blog summarizing recent research on COVID-19 learning
loss and potential impacts of the American Rescue Plan’s ESSER funding
on student outcomes (July 2024).

•

“Tariffs as a Major Revenue Source: Implications for Distribution
and Growth,” a blog about why policy proposals that would replace income
taxes with tariffs would reduce government revenues and pose serious equity
concerns (July 2024).

•

“Reforming Permitting Requirements to Lower the Cost of Building New
Housing and Increase Housing Affordability,” a blog on the various policies
implemented by the Biden-Harris Administration to shorten the permitting
process and reduce other barriers to housing affordability (August 2024).

•

“The 2023 Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Reports: Strong household
income gains, lower official poverty, uninsured rate near record low,” a blog
summarizing the key findings of the U.S. Census Bureau’s annual reports on
poverty, income, and health insurance (September 2024).

372 |

Appendix A

•

“Revisions Show US Economy Grew Faster, 2021–23, Boosting
Real Incomes,” a blog explaining the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ revisions to the National Income and Product Accounts, and in particular, measures of GDP growth (September 2024).

•

“Beating the Forecasts: How the US Economy Defied Expectations,” a blog
describing how the US economy has far exceeded even the most optimistic
Blue Chip forecasts from 2022 (September 2024).

•

“Lower Rates are Good for Business,” a blog describing how lower interest
rates and recent rule changes from the Small Business Administration may
benefit small businesses (September 2024).

•

“Making Public Service Loan Forgiveness Work for Borrowers and the
American People,” a blog about how policy changes to the Public Service
Loan Forgiveness Program implemented by the Biden-Harris Administration
have helped 1 million public service workers discharge outstanding federal
student loans (October 2024).

•

“When the Signal Gets Jammed, Look To the Trend,” a blog analyzing
the October jobs report in the context of broader labor market trends
(November 2024).

•

“Expanded Financial Assistance Allows Families to Save Money and
Upgrade Health Insurance,” a blog on how the enhanced premium tax
credits for ACA coverage—set to expire in 2025—have lowered the cost of
health insurance for consumers and increased the quality of their coverage
(November 2024).

•

“All Aboard the ApprenticeSHIP: Assessing the Changing Face of Registered
Apprenticeships,” a blog about the expansion and diversification of
Registered Apprenticeship programs under this Administration and the
impact of these programs on labor market opportunities (November 2024).

•

“Some Lessons From 47 (!!) Jobs Reports,” a blog reviewing key insights
into the U.S. job market over the past 4 years, including the importance of
strong labor supply and historically-low unemployment (December 2024).

•

“December CPI Blog: Updating our Housing Model,” a blog examining
trends in housing inflation and describing CEA’s updated housing model
(December 2024).

•

“Setting the Record Straight: Benchmarking the Biden Years,” a blog reviewing accomplishments across key economic indicators (December 2024).

Activities of the Council of Economic Advisers during 2025 | 373

Issue Briefs, Speeches, and White Papers
•

“The Benefits of SAVE,” an issue brief about how the SAVE Program could
benefit eligible students through long-term debt relief (February 2024).

•

“Valuing the Future: Revision to the Social Discount Rate Means
Appropriately Assessing Benefits and Costs,” an issue brief highlighting the
economic importance of the social discount rate in regulatory benefit-cost
analysis (February 2024).

•

“The Price Isn’t Right: How Junk Fees Cost Consumers and Undermine
Competition,” an issue brief explaining how junk fees can erode consumer
welfare and undermine competition (March 2024).

•

“Remarks by CEA Chair Jared Bernstein at the Council on Foreign Relations,”
a speech about the Biden-Harris Administration’s trade policy agenda
(April 2024).

•

“The Economics of Administration Action on Student Debt,” an issue brief
summarizing key details of the Administration’s policy changes to promote
student debt relief and income-driven repayment for eligible students
(April 2024).

•

“Assessing Methods to Integrate the Physical Risks and Transition Risks
and Opportunities of Climate Change into the President’s Macroeconomic
Forecast,” a white paper presenting a step-by-step methodology for quantifying climate-related costs into a macroeconomic forecasting model
(April 2024).

•

“Remarks by CEA Chair Jared Bernstein at the Economic Club of
New York,” a speech describing the Biden-Harris Administration’s approach
to correcting market failures through economic policy (April 2024).

•

“The Signal and Noise in UI Claims,” an issue brief explaining why
unemployment insurance is an important gauge for labor market strength
(May 2024).

•

“Recent Labor Market Conditions for Black Workers,” an issue brief about
how the strong labor market has led to historically strong outcomes for Black
Americans (May 2024).

•

“The Economics of HBCUs,” an issue brief on the importance of HBCUs in
fostering economic mobility (May 2024).

•

“Remarks by CEA Chair Jared Bernstein at the Anti-Monopoly Summit,”
a speech focusing on how the Biden-Harris Administration has promoted
competition in various markets (May 2024).

•

“A First-Principles Look at Historically Low U.S. Fertility and its
Macroeconomic Implications,” an issue brief highlighting potential fiscal

374 |

Appendix A

and socioeconomic implications of declining fertility and an aging population in the U.S. (May 2024).
•

“Remarks by CEA Chair Jared Bernstein at the 2024 China – US Symposium,”
a speech about the evolution of U.S. trade policy in response to a changing
geopolitical landscape (June 2024).

•

“Remarks by CEA Chair Jared Bernstein at the Communications Workers
of America Legislative-Political Conference,” a speech about the steps
the Biden-Harris Administration has taken to support worker’s rights
(June 2024).

•

“Impacts of the Expiration of Federal Child Care Stabilization Funding
and the Mitigating Effects of State-Level Stopgap Funding,” an issue brief
extending previous CEA analysis on the effects of ARP funds on child care
prices, maternal labor supply, and access to care (June 2024).

•

“Racial Discrimination in Contemporary America,” an issue brief summarizing recent evidence about the prevalence of racial discrimination that
is observed in data on neighborhood quality, wealth accumulation, employment, and wages (July 2024).

•

“Potential Labor Market Impacts of Artificial Intelligence: An
Empirical Analysis,” a white paper extending the CEA’s chapter in the 2024
Economic Report of the President about labor market impacts of AI
(July 2024).

•

“Remarks by CEA Chair Jared Bernstein at the HUD Insurance Summit,” a
speech about current housing supply challenges in the U.S. and the BidenHarris Administration’s policy proposals to address them (July 2024).

•

“Inflation’s (Almost) Roundtrip: What Happened, How People Experienced
It, and What Have we Learned?,” a speech about the rise and fall of inflation
in the post-Pandemic era and its impact on workers (July 2024).

•

“Economic Security of Older Women,” an issue brief on the unique economic challenges that older women face (September 2024).

•

“Child Care is Infrastructure: Evidence from Universal Pre-K,” an issue brief
on the potential impacts of universal pre-K on maternal employment rates
and economic activity (September 2024).

•

“Statement by CEA Chair Jared Bernstein,” a speech congratulating the
Nobel Prize in Economics winners Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and
James Robinson (October 2024).

•

“GDP Issue Brief,” an issue brief analyzing GDP growth over the past 4
years, reflecting the Administration’s strong and above-expectations record
on economic growth, investment, and consumer spending (October 2024).

Activities of the Council of Economic Advisers during 2025 | 375

Public Information
The Economic Report of the President, together with the Annual Report of
the Council of Economic Advisers, is an important vehicle for presenting the
Administration’s domestic and international economic policies. It is available for
purchase through the Government Publishing Office and is viewable at no cost
at www.gpo.gov/erp. All the Council’s written materials noted above, including
this Report, can be found at www.whitehouse.gov/cea. All links provided in this
Report are active as of the date of publication.

376 |

Appendix A

The Staff of the Council of Economic Advisers
Front Office
Amy Ganz 	����������������������������������������Chief of Staff
David Ratner	��������������������������������������Chief Economist
AnnElizabeth McMahon	��������������������Policy Economist
Reid Fauble	����������������������������������������Adviser to a Member
Molly Opinsky 	����������������������������������Adviser to the Chair
Kaleb Snider 	������������������������������������Operations Manager
Senior Economists
Steven Braun 	������������������������������������Director of Macroeconomic Forecasting
Gregory Casey 	����������������������������������Climate, Industrial Policy
Anusha Chari 	������������������������������������International Finance, Macroeconomics
Theodore Figinski	������������������������������Social Insurance, Public Finance, Tax
Kathryn Holston	��������������������������������Macroeconomics, Finance, Competition
Matthew Kraft	������������������������������������Education, Care
Ryan Nunn 	����������������������������������������Labor, Public Finance
Kate Pennington	��������������������������������Housing, Climate, Technology
Julia Reinitz 	��������������������������������������National Security
Erin Towery 	��������������������������������������Tax, Small Business, Competition
Laura Wherry 	������������������������������������Healthcare
Staff Economists
Anna Croley	��������������������������������������Industrial Organization, Public Finance
Tomer Fidelman 	��������������������������������Macroeconomics, Finance
Camille Gardner	��������������������������������Education, Climate, International
Rachel Pomerantz	������������������������������Labor, Macroeconomics
Benjamin Weintraut 	��������������������������Climate, Energy, Industrial Policy
Danielle Graves Williamson	��������������Education, Social Insurance, Healthcare
Research Assistants
Aden Barton	��������������������������������������Macroeconomics, International
Steven Berit 	��������������������������������������Climate, Industrial Policy, Energy
Amelia Michael	����������������������������������Industrial Policy, Technology, Climate
Lily Nevo 	������������������������������������������Labor, Care, Education
Asha Reddy Patt	��������������������������������Labor, International, Healthcare
Zaria Roller	����������������������������������������Education, Care, Healthcare
Griffin Roy Young 	����������������������������Macroeconomics, Public Finance
Activities of the Council of Economic Advisers during 2025 | 377

Special Adviser
Christian Flores	����������������������������������Public Investment, Industrial Policy
Statistical Office
Brian Amorosi 	����������������������������������Director of the Statistical Office
Madeleine Phillips 	����������������������������Statistical Office Associate
Administrative Office
Megan Packer	������������������������������������Administrative Officer
Interns
Mary Akinrogbe, Madeline Becker, Saketh Damera, Noel Feller, Thomasina Hare,
Nassir T. Holden, Anna Hyslop, Kayla Krupa, Maggie McInerney, Tianyue Joyce
Shi, Rikhil Vagadia, Rushil Vashee, Stephen Vasiljevic, Kazuma Wells, Shuheng
Zhang.

ERP Production
Shea Gibbs 	����������������������������������������Editor
Michael Sarinsky 	������������������������������Editor
Molly Opinsky 	����������������������������������Project Manager
Asha Reddy Patt	��������������������������������Project Manager

378 |

Appendix A

Appendix B

Statistical Tables Relating to Income,
Employment, and Production

379

Contents
National Income or Expenditure
B–1.

Percent changes in real gross domestic product, 1973–2024��������������

386

B–2.

Contributions to percent change in real gross domestic product,
1973–2024�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������

388

B–3.

Gross domestic product, 2008–2024���������������������������������������������������

390

B–4.

Percentage shares of gross domestic product, 1973–2024������������������

392

B–5.

Chain-type price indexes for gross domestic product, 1973–2024�����

394

B–6.

Gross value added by sector, 1973–2024��������������������������������������������

396

B–7.

Real gross value added by sector, 1973–2024�������������������������������������

397

B–8.

Gross domestic product (GDP) by industry, value added, in current
dollars and as a percentage of GDP, 2013–2024���������������������������������

398

B–9.

Real gross domestic product by industry, value added, and percent
changes, 2013–2024���������������������������������������������������������������������������

400

B–10. Personal consumption expenditures, 1973–2024��������������������������������

402

B–11. Real personal consumption expenditures, 2007–2024������������������������

403

B–12. Private fixed investment by type, 1973–2024�������������������������������������

404

B–13. Real private fixed investment by type, 2007–2024�����������������������������

405

B–14. Foreign transactions in the national income and product accounts,
1973–2024�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������

406

B–15. Real exports and imports of goods and services, 2007–2024�������������

407

B–16. Sources of personal income, 1973–2024���������������������������������������������

408

B–17. Disposition of personal income, 1973–2024���������������������������������������

410

B–18. Total and per capita disposable personal income and personal
consumption expenditures, and per capita gross domestic
product, in current and real dollars, 1973–2024����������������������������������

411

B–19. Gross saving and investment, 1973–2024�������������������������������������������

412

B–20. Median money income (in 2023 dollars) and poverty status of
families and people, by race, 2015–2023��������������������������������������������

414

B–21. Real farm income, 1957–2024������������������������������������������������������������

415

Contents

| 381

Labor Market Indicators
B–22. Civilian labor force, 1929–2024����������������������������������������������������������

416

B–23. Civilian employment by sex, age, and demographic characteristic,
1978–2024�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������

418

B–24. Unemployment by sex, age, and demographic characteristic,
1978–2024�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������

419

B–25. Civilian labor force participation rate, 1978–2024�����������������������������

420

B–26. Civilian employment/population ratio, 1978–2024����������������������������

421

B–27. Civilian unemployment rate, 1978–2024��������������������������������������������

422

B–28. Unemployment by duration and reason, 1978–2024��������������������������

423

B–29. Employees on nonagricultural payrolls, by major industry,
1978–2024�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������

424

B–30. Hours and earnings in private nonagricultural industries,
1978–2024�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������

426

B–31. Employment cost index, private industry, 2006–2024������������������������

427

B–32. Productivity and related data, business and nonfarm business
sectors, 1973–2024������������������������������������������������������������������������������

428

B–33. Changes in productivity and related data, business and nonfarm
business sectors, 1973–2024���������������������������������������������������������������

429

Production and Business Activity
B–34. Industrial production indexes, major industry divisions,
1978–2024�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������

430

B–35. Capacity utilization rates, 1978–2024�������������������������������������������������

431

B–36. New private housing units started, authorized, and completed
and houses sold, 1978–2024����������������������������������������������������������������

432

B–37. Manufacturing and trade sales and inventories, 1981–2024���������������

433

Prices
B–38. Changes in consumer price indexes, 1981–2024��������������������������������

434

B–39. Price indexes for personal consumption expenditures, and
percent changes, 1973–2024��������������������������������������������������������������

435

382 |

Appendix B

Money Stock, Credit, and Finance
B–40. Money stock and debt measures, 1986–2024��������������������������������������

436

B–41. Consumer credit outstanding, 1973–2024�������������������������������������������

437

B–42. Bond yields and interest rates, 1953–2024������������������������������������������

438

B–43. Mortgage debt outstanding by type of property and of financing,
1964–2024�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������

440

B–44. Mortgage debt outstanding by holder, 1964–2024������������������������������

441

Government Finance
B–45. Federal receipts, outlays, surplus or deficit, and debt, fiscal years
1960–2025�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������

442

B–46. Federal receipts, outlays, surplus or deficit, and debt, as percent
of gross domestic product, fiscal years 1954–2025�����������������������������

443

B–47. Federal receipts and outlays, by major category, and surplus or
deficit, fiscal years 1960–2025������������������������������������������������������������

444

B–48. Federal receipts, outlays, surplus or deficit, and debt, fiscal years
2019–2024�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������

445

B–49. Federal and State and local government current receipts and
expenditures, national income and product accounts (NIPA) basis,
1973–2024�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������

446

B–50. State and local government revenues and expenditures,
fiscal years 1959–2022������������������������������������������������������������������������

447

B–51. U.S. Treasury securities outstanding by kind of obligation,
1984–2024�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������

448

B–52. Estimated ownership of U.S. Treasury securities, 2010–2024������������

449

Corporate Profits and Finance
B–53. Corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital
consumption adjustments, 1973–2024������������������������������������������������

450

B–54. Corporate profits by industry, 1973–2024�������������������������������������������

451

B–55. Historical stock prices and yields, 1949–2003������������������������������������

452

B–56. Common stock prices and yields, 2000–2024�������������������������������������

453

Contents

| 383

International Statistics
B–57. U.S. international transactions, 1973–2024����������������������������������������

454

B–58. U.S. international trade in goods on balance of payments (BOP)
and Census basis, and trade in services on BOP basis, 1994–2024����

456

B–59. U.S. international trade in goods and services by area and country,
2000–2023�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������

457

B–60. Foreign exchange rates, 2003–2024����������������������������������������������������

458

B–61. Growth rates in real gross domestic product by area and country,
2006–2025�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������

459

384 |

Appendix B

General Notes
Detail in these tables may not add to totals due to rounding.
Because of the formula used for calculating real gross domestic product (GDP),
the chained (2017) dollar estimates for the detailed components do not add to the
chained-dollar value of GDP or to any intermediate aggregate. The Department
of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) no longer publishes chained-dollar
estimates prior to 2007, except for selected series.
Because of the method used for seasonal adjustment, the sum or average of seasonally adjusted monthly values generally will not equal annual totals based on
unadjusted values.
Unless otherwise noted, all dollar figures are in current dollars.
Symbols used:
p Preliminary.
... Not available (also, not applicable).
NSA Not seasonally adjusted.
Data in these tables reflect revisions made by source agencies through
December 11, 2024.
Excel versions of these tables are available at www.gpo.gov/erp.

General Notes

| 385

National Income or Expenditure
Table B–1. Percent changes in real gross domestic product, 1973–2024
[Percent change, fourth quarter over fourth quarter; quarterly changes at seasonally adjusted annual rates]
Personal consumption
expenditures

Year or quarter

1973 ����������������������
1974 ����������������������
1975 ����������������������
1976 ����������������������
1977 ����������������������
1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III p ��������������

Gross
domestic
product

4.0
–1.9
2.6
4.3
5.0
6.7
1.3
.0
1.3
–1.4
7.9
5.6
4.2
2.9
4.5
3.8
2.7
.6
1.2
4.4
2.6
4.1
2.2
4.4
4.5
4.9
4.8
2.9
.2
2.0
4.3
3.4
3.0
2.6
2.1
–2.5
.1
2.8
1.5
1.6
3.0
2.7
2.1
2.2
3.0
2.1
3.4
–1.0
5.7
1.3
3.2
5.6
6.4
3.5
7.4
–1.0
.3
2.7
3.4
2.8
2.4
4.4
3.2
1.6
3.0
2.8

Fixed investment
Nonresidential
Total

1.8
–1.6
5.1
5.4
4.2
4.0
1.7
.0
.1
3.5
6.6
4.3
4.8
4.4
2.8
4.6
2.4
.8
.9
4.9
3.3
3.8
2.8
3.4
4.5
5.6
5.2
4.3
2.5
2.0
3.8
3.8
2.8
3.2
2.0
–1.5
–.2
2.8
1.0
1.5
2.2
3.5
2.6
2.5
3.1
2.0
2.8
–.8
7.7
1.6
3.0
9.5
14.1
3.1
4.4
1.0
2.6
1.5
1.2
4.9
1.0
2.5
3.5
1.9
2.8
3.5

See next page for continuation of table.

386 |

Appendix B

Gross private domestic investment

Goods

0.4
–5.6
6.1
6.4
4.9
3.5
.3
–2.5
–.2
3.6
8.3
5.3
4.6
6.5
.4
4.5
1.8
–1.6
–.8
5.3
4.4
5.5
2.3
4.8
5.3
8.1
6.6
4.0
4.9
1.7
6.6
4.3
3.0
4.6
1.8
–6.8
.6
4.3
.9
2.4
3.9
5.3
4.0
3.7
5.4
2.1
3.8
8.6
6.3
–1.5
3.4
17.9
14.4
–9.6
4.6
–1.7
–1.5
–2.3
–.7
7.4
–.3
3.5
3.4
–1.2
3.0
5.6

Services

3.2
2.4
4.1
4.5
3.7
4.4
2.9
2.2
.3
3.4
5.3
3.6
5.0
3.0
4.5
4.7
2.7
2.3
2.0
4.7
2.7
2.8
3.0
2.7
4.0
4.3
4.5
4.5
1.3
2.1
2.3
3.6
2.7
2.5
2.0
1.2
–.6
2.1
1.0
1.1
1.4
2.6
1.9
1.9
2.0
2.0
2.4
–5.1
8.4
3.2
2.8
5.4
13.9
10.4
4.3
2.4
4.7
3.5
2.2
3.8
1.6
2.1
3.5
3.4
2.7
2.6

Total

10.2
–10.4
–9.8
15.2
14.9
14.3
–3.4
–7.2
6.7
–17.3
31.3
14.2
1.9
–4.1
9.8
–.5
.7
–6.5
2.1
7.7
7.6
11.5
.8
11.2
11.4
9.7
8.5
4.4
–11.1
4.4
8.7
8.0
6.1
–1.4
–2.0
–15.3
–9.0
12.0
10.5
3.9
10.6
5.8
3.5
2.3
4.9
4.7
1.2
2.5
8.1
–.5
2.2
–2.4
–6.4
16.3
28.3
7.4
–8.5
–5.7
5.8
–8.9
8.0
10.1
.7
3.6
8.3
1.1

Total

3.5
–9.9
–2.6
12.1
12.1
13.1
1.1
–4.8
1.5
–8.0
18.3
11.3
3.7
.6
1.5
3.7
1.5
–4.2
–1.9
8.7
8.4
6.6
5.5
9.9
8.3
11.5
7.2
5.9
–4.7
–1.5
8.6
6.5
5.8
.0
–1.1
–11.1
–10.5
6.2
9.2
7.3
6.6
7.8
2.6
3.5
5.5
3.3
2.9
1.1
3.8
1.6
4.4
9.4
5.5
–2.1
2.9
8.5
2.0
–1.8
–1.9
3.1
8.6
2.6
3.5
6.5
2.3
1.7

Total
10.6
–3.9
–5.9
7.8
11.9
16.0
5.5
–.9
9.0
–9.5
10.4
13.9
3.2
–3.2
2.2
5.1
4.5
–.9
–3.4
7.1
7.6
8.5
7.4
11.3
9.7
11.6
8.4
8.5
–6.8
–5.1
6.8
6.5
6.1
8.1
7.3
–7.0
–10.3
9.0
10.1
5.7
6.4
7.7
.9
3.3
5.6
5.6
3.1
–3.3
4.9
8.5
5.0
9.6
8.9
–1.8
3.4
13.6
7.3
7.7
5.7
5.3
9.9
1.1
3.8
4.5
3.9
3.8

Structures
7.9
–6.4
–8.1
3.8
5.7
21.7
8.8
2.7
14.1
–13.5
–3.9
15.7
3.3
–14.3
4.9
–3.3
3.3
–3.2
–12.8
1.0
.2
1.6
4.7
10.9
4.4
4.3
–.1
10.8
–10.6
–15.7
1.9
.3
1.5
9.0
17.7
–.9
–27.1
–3.4
9.0
4.1
6.4
9.6
–5.6
3.7
–.4
3.5
5.9
–13.8
–1.2
9.7
9.7
8.8
.6
–3.8
–9.5
10.9
8.8
9.2
9.8
14.9
16.4
1.7
6.5
6.3
.2
–4.7

Equipment
13.5
–3.7
–6.7
9.0
17.2
14.5
2.7
–4.4
4.6
–10.0
19.9
13.4
1.7
.8
.1
8.2
2.5
–2.7
–3.2
11.3
13.1
12.5
8.1
11.1
10.7
14.8
9.5
8.5
–7.7
–3.7
9.6
9.8
8.7
7.1
3.9
–15.9
–8.4
22.6
12.7
7.8
6.7
6.4
2.0
–.9
7.5
3.3
–2.2
–3.5
1.0
6.1
3.1
5.3
8.7
–10.6
1.5
16.4
1.1
6.6
1.1
.9
12.5
–1.1
.7
.3
9.8
10.6

Intellectual
property
products
5.1
1.6
2.8
11.8
4.8
10.3
9.4
4.7
12.1
3.4
13.0
12.6
7.7
5.4
4.2
9.8
11.3
6.2
7.2
4.8
2.9
5.8
8.3
12.1
12.4
11.5
13.3
6.6
–2.1
.9
5.8
5.7
5.1
9.3
4.0
.9
3.8
1.6
7.2
3.7
6.1
8.2
4.3
9.0
7.2
9.9
7.8
3.3
12.3
10.3
4.1
14.3
13.8
8.6
12.4
12.6
12.7
8.0
7.9
4.5
3.9
2.8
5.2
7.5
.7
2.5

Residential

–10.5
–24.6
7.8
23.8
12.6
6.8
–9.1
–15.3
–22.0
–1.7
49.7
3.7
5.2
11.8
–.5
.1
–6.5
–13.6
2.9
13.6
10.6
1.6
.1
5.6
4.0
11.3
3.5
–1.5
2.0
8.1
12.7
6.6
5.2
–15.2
–21.2
–24.7
–11.5
–5.7
5.3
15.4
7.5
8.1
9.7
4.5
5.1
–4.1
2.3
16.6
.6
–16.4
2.5
8.7
–3.7
–3.4
1.2
–4.5
–11.6
–25.2
–22.8
–4.3
4.5
7.7
2.5
13.7
–2.8
–5.0

Change
in
private
inventories
����������������
����������������
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����������������
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����������������
����������������
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����������������
����������������

Table B–1. Percent changes in real gross domestic product, 1973–2024—Continued
[Percent change, fourth quarter over fourth quarter; quarterly changes at seasonally adjusted annual rates]
Net exports of
goods and services
Year or quarter

1973 ����������������������
1974 ����������������������
1975 ����������������������
1976 ����������������������
1977 ����������������������
1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
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2024: I ������������������
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Government consumption expenditures
and gross investment
Federal

Net
exports

Exports

Imports

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18.4
3.1
1.5
4.3
–1.4
18.8
10.5
3.9
.7
–12.2
5.5
9.1
1.5
10.6
12.8
14.0
10.2
7.4
9.2
4.5
4.4
10.8
9.4
10.1
8.3
2.6
6.2
6.0
–12.2
4.0
7.2
7.2
7.4
9.9
9.2
–2.0
1.3
10.4
4.8
2.9
5.2
2.4
–1.5
1.4
6.1
.3
1.1
–9.9
7.0
5.0
2.0
.3
3.2
.9
25.5
–4.6
12.7
14.5
–1.1
2.0
–4.8
4.9
6.2
1.9
1.0
7.5

–0.5
–1.0
–5.6
19.2
5.7
9.9
.9
–9.3
6.2
–3.9
24.6
18.9
5.6
7.9
6.3
3.8
2.6
–.2
5.7
6.5
9.9
12.2
4.8
11.1
14.2
11.0
12.4
11.1
–7.6
9.6
5.9
10.9
6.1
4.0
1.6
–5.4
–5.2
11.3
3.3
.5
2.9
6.5
3.3
2.2
5.8
3.0
–1.8
.0
11.4
2.0
1.2
8.3
8.3
8.6
20.8
13.4
5.9
–5.4
–4.5
–.8
–3.1
4.7
4.2
6.1
7.6
10.2

Total
–0.3
3.0
3.0
–1.3
1.9
4.4
.9
.3
2.5
2.6
1.9
6.3
6.1
4.7
3.0
1.4
2.5
2.6
.0
1.3
–.7
.0
–.6
2.6
1.7
2.8
3.9
.5
4.9
3.8
1.8
.8
.8
1.9
2.3
2.6
3.1
–1.5
–3.4
–2.1
–2.3
.3
2.6
1.5
1.0
1.9
4.8
1.3
–.3
.5
4.3
5.2
–4.2
–1.5
–.3
–3.4
–1.5
1.6
5.4
5.1
2.9
5.7
3.6
1.8
3.1
5.0

Total
–3.6
3.7
.8
–1.0
2.3
3.5
1.2
4.0
6.0
4.5
2.7
7.1
6.7
5.3
3.6
–1.4
.5
1.5
–2.3
1.6
–4.5
–4.2
–4.8
1.1
.2
–.3
3.3
–1.9
5.5
8.1
6.6
2.6
1.8
2.4
3.6
6.4
6.2
1.8
–3.6
–2.6
–6.0
–1.0
1.4
.2
1.4
3.5
4.0
5.1
.7
–1.0
2.1
17.2
–8.0
–7.5
3.1
–8.5
–3.3
–.4
9.0
4.6
–1.1
5.3
–.3
–.4
4.3
8.9

National Nondefense defense
–5.0
1.2
.5
–2.1
.1
2.9
2.4
3.7
7.9
7.3
6.5
5.6
8.2
4.7
5.3
–.8
–1.3
.0
–4.9
–.4
–5.4
–6.7
–5.0
.3
–.8
–2.4
3.8
–3.3
4.7
8.1
9.0
2.8
1.8
3.1
3.9
7.4
4.9
1.3
–3.6
–4.7
–6.4
–3.4
–.2
–.5
2.1
4.5
4.3
4.2
–4.8
–1.4
2.7
–7.9
–2.8
–4.6
–3.7
–11.2
2.0
–2.9
7.6
4.9
.8
6.7
–1.3
–2.5
6.4
13.9

–0.3
9.5
1.4
1.3
6.8
4.8
–1.1
4.6
2.0
–1.6
–6.6
11.5
2.8
6.8
–1.0
–3.0
5.8
5.4
4.3
6.2
–2.5
1.1
–4.3
2.6
1.9
3.3
2.4
.4
6.8
8.2
2.6
2.3
1.9
1.3
3.1
4.5
8.9
2.7
–3.5
1.2
–5.4
2.8
3.8
1.2
.4
2.1
3.5
6.4
8.8
–.5
1.2
63.0
–14.3
–11.3
13.0
–5.0
–9.7
2.9
10.8
4.3
–3.5
3.4
.9
2.6
1.5
2.5

State
and
local
2.9
2.4
4.9
–1.6
1.7
5.2
.7
–2.9
–.7
.8
1.1
5.4
5.5
4.1
2.4
4.1
4.3
3.6
1.9
1.1
2.2
3.1
2.2
3.6
2.7
4.6
4.2
1.8
4.6
1.5
–.8
–.2
.2
1.6
1.5
.3
1.0
–3.7
–3.2
–1.7
.2
1.1
3.3
2.2
.8
.9
5.3
–1.0
–.9
1.4
5.7
–1.6
–1.8
2.3
–2.3
–.1
–.4
2.7
3.4
5.3
5.4
5.9
6.1
3.1
2.3
2.7

Final
Final
Gross sales to Gross
sales of domestic private domestic Average
of GDP
domestic pur- domestic income and
GDI
product chases 1
pur(GDI) 3
chasers 2
2.8
–1.7
3.9
3.8
4.5
6.4
2.2
.5
.3
.4
6.0
5.0
4.6
3.9
3.0
4.6
2.9
1.0
.5
4.5
2.7
3.3
3.0
4.2
3.9
5.2
4.6
3.2
1.5
.9
4.3
3.1
2.9
2.9
2.3
–1.8
–.2
2.0
1.3
2.0
2.4
3.0
2.0
2.4
3.1
1.9
3.7
–1.3
5.0
1.7
3.6
7.8
8.7
.4
3.2
–.9
2.3
3.5
1.9
5.1
2.6
3.0
3.7
2.1
1.9
3.0

2.9
–2.3
2.0
5.4
5.6
6.0
.5
–1.4
1.8
–.7
9.5
6.5
4.5
2.9
4.1
3.0
2.1
–.1
.9
4.6
3.2
4.3
1.8
4.6
5.2
5.9
5.6
3.7
.4
2.7
4.2
4.0
3.0
2.1
1.3
–3.1
–.8
3.1
1.4
1.2
2.7
3.3
2.7
2.3
3.0
2.5
2.9
.1
6.4
1.0
3.1
6.5
7.0
4.4
7.4
1.4
–.2
.2
2.7
2.4
2.5
4.4
3.0
2.2
3.8
3.3

2.2
–3.5
3.4
6.7
5.9
6.1
1.5
–1.2
.4
.8
9.1
5.9
4.6
3.5
2.5
4.4
2.2
–.3
.3
5.6
4.3
4.4
3.3
4.8
5.3
6.9
5.7
4.7
.9
1.3
4.8
4.4
3.4
2.5
1.3
–3.5
–2.1
3.4
2.4
2.6
3.1
4.3
2.6
2.7
3.6
2.3
2.9
–.4
6.9
1.6
3.3
9.5
12.3
2.0
4.1
2.5
2.4
.8
.6
4.6
2.5
2.6
3.5
2.9
2.7
3.2

3.8
–2.9
2.7
3.8
6.0
5.4
.8
1.3
1.2
–1.2
6.6
6.7
3.4
2.7
5.5
4.7
1.0
1.0
.7
3.9
3.0
4.3
2.9
4.8
5.5
4.9
4.4
3.6
–.4
3.2
2.7
3.8
4.1
2.6
–.3
–2.6
.6
3.3
2.0
2.8
1.3
4.1
1.4
1.3
3.0
2.8
2.6
.1
5.1
1.0
2.9
4.2
5.3
4.4
6.4
1.7
–.3
3.9
–1.4
1.7
2.1
2.7
5.1
3.0
2.0
2.2

3.9
–2.4
2.6
4.1
5.5
6.0
1.0
.6
1.2
–1.3
7.3
6.1
3.8
2.8
5.0
4.2
1.9
.8
.9
4.1
2.8
4.2
2.6
4.6
5.0
4.9
4.6
3.3
–.1
2.6
3.5
3.6
3.6
2.6
.9
–2.6
.4
3.0
1.8
2.2
2.1
3.4
1.8
1.7
3.0
2.4
3.0
–.5
5.4
1.1
3.1
4.9
5.9
3.9
6.9
.3
.0
3.3
1.0
2.3
2.3
3.5
4.1
2.3
2.5
2.5

1 Gross domestic product (GDP) less exports of goods and services plus imports of goods and services.
2 Personal consumption expenditures plus gross private fixed investment.
3 Gross domestic income is deflated by the implicit price deflator for GDP.

Note: Percent changes based on unrounded GDP quantity indexes.
Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).

National Income or Expenditure | 387

Table B–2. Contributions to percent change in real gross domestic product, 1973–2024
[Percentage points, except as noted; annual average to annual average, quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]
Personal consumption
expenditures

Year or quarter

1973 ����������������������
1974 ����������������������
1975 ����������������������
1976 ����������������������
1977 ����������������������
1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III p ��������������

Gross
domestic
product
(percent
change)

5.6
–.5
–.2
5.4
4.6
5.5
3.2
–.3
2.5
–1.8
4.6
7.2
4.2
3.5
3.5
4.2
3.7
1.9
–.1
3.5
2.7
4.0
2.7
3.8
4.4
4.5
4.8
4.1
1.0
1.7
2.8
3.8
3.5
2.8
2.0
.1
–2.6
2.7
1.6
2.3
2.1
2.5
2.9
1.8
2.5
3.0
2.6
–2.2
6.1
2.5
2.9
5.6
6.4
3.5
7.4
–1.0
.3
2.7
3.4
2.8
2.4
4.4
3.2
1.6
3.0
2.8

Fixed investment
Nonresidential
Total

2.97
–.50
1.36
3.41
2.59
2.68
1.44
–.19
.85
.88
3.51
3.30
3.20
2.58
2.14
2.65
1.86
1.28
.12
2.36
2.24
2.51
1.91
2.26
2.45
3.42
3.49
3.29
1.63
1.70
2.13
2.54
2.38
1.95
1.63
.10
–.88
1.31
1.16
.94
1.18
1.91
2.27
1.65
1.79
1.86
1.45
–1.70
5.83
2.06
1.72
6.10
9.04
2.11
3.00
.64
1.71
1.02
.81
3.27
.65
1.72
2.33
1.30
1.90
2.37

See next page for continuation of table.

388 |

Appendix B

Gross private domestic investment

Goods

1.52
–1.08
.20
2.03
1.26
1.19
.45
–.72
.33
.19
1.69
1.91
1.38
1.45
.47
.96
.64
.16
–.49
.76
.99
1.26
.71
1.06
1.12
1.54
1.83
1.23
.72
.92
1.15
1.21
.98
.87
.65
–.71
–.70
.62
.49
.48
.76
.96
1.08
.78
.88
.84
.65
.97
2.50
–.14
.42
3.80
3.19
–2.38
1.05
–.41
–.37
–.54
–.15
1.59
–.08
.76
.73
–.25
.63
1.17

Services

1.45
.58
1.16
1.38
1.33
1.49
.99
.53
.52
.69
1.82
1.39
1.83
1.13
1.67
1.69
1.21
1.12
.61
1.60
1.26
1.26
1.20
1.20
1.33
1.88
1.66
2.06
.92
.78
.98
1.34
1.40
1.08
.98
.81
–.18
.68
.68
.46
.42
.95
1.19
.87
.90
1.01
.80
–2.66
3.33
2.20
1.30
2.30
5.85
4.48
1.95
1.05
2.09
1.55
.96
1.67
.73
.96
1.60
1.55
1.27
1.20

Total

1.95
–1.24
–2.91
2.91
2.47
2.22
.72
–2.07
1.64
–2.46
1.60
4.73
–.01
.03
.53
.45
.72
–.45
–1.09
1.11
1.24
1.90
.55
1.49
2.01
1.76
1.62
1.31
–1.11
–.16
.76
1.64
1.26
.60
–.49
–1.52
–3.49
1.84
.95
1.65
1.19
1.09
1.08
–.02
.77
1.02
.57
–.82
1.54
1.07
.02
–.28
–1.01
2.73
4.68
1.34
–1.67
–1.05
1.08
–1.63
1.42
1.80
.16
.64
1.47
.21

Total

1.47
–.98
–1.68
1.54
2.23
2.10
1.11
–1.18
.50
–1.16
1.32
2.83
1.02
.34
.11
.59
.55
–.25
–.84
.83
1.17
1.29
.99
1.48
1.49
1.82
1.65
1.34
–.27
–.64
.77
1.23
1.33
.50
–.24
–1.05
–2.69
.44
1.00
1.48
.96
1.20
.78
.50
.77
.90
.49
–.34
1.28
.48
.43
1.65
.99
–.38
.53
1.44
.35
–.33
–.36
.53
1.48
.45
.62
1.14
.42
.31

Total
1.51
.10
–1.13
.66
1.26
1.72
1.34
.00
.87
–.43
–.06
2.18
.91
–.24
.01
.63
.71
.14
–.48
.33
.84
.91
1.15
1.13
1.38
1.44
1.36
1.31
–.31
–.94
.30
.67
.92
1.00
.89
.08
–1.95
.52
1.00
1.16
.61
1.07
.44
.25
.61
.93
.52
–.64
.80
.90
.81
1.25
1.17
–.21
.47
1.66
.94
1.01
.76
.71
1.30
.16
.52
.61
.53
.52

Structures
0.30
–.08
–.42
.09
.15
.52
.51
.26
.39
–.09
–.56
.58
.31
–.49
–.11
.02
.07
.05
–.38
–.18
–.01
.05
.16
.15
.21
.16
.01
.24
–.04
–.56
–.09
.00
.06
.22
.42
.23
–.71
–.50
.08
.35
.03
.33
.01
–.10
.08
.17
.07
–.29
–.08
.10
.32
.21
.01
–.11
–.26
.28
.24
.26
.28
.43
.49
.06
.20
.20
.01
–.15

Equipment
1.12
.14
–.73
.39
1.01
1.08
.62
–.35
.28
–.47
.32
1.29
.39
.08
.03
.43
.35
–.14
–.28
.34
.73
.75
.78
.65
.76
.91
.89
.71
–.31
–.35
.26
.49
.60
.57
.25
–.29
–1.21
.91
.69
.62
.33
.48
.24
–.05
.22
.35
.06
–.58
.34
.22
.18
.31
.46
–.54
.10
.75
.05
.33
.05
.04
.61
–.05
.04
.02
.49
.53

Intellectual
property
products
0.08
.05
.01
.18
.11
.12
.20
.09
.21
.12
.17
.30
.21
.17
.10
.18
.29
.22
.18
.17
.12
.11
.20
.33
.41
.37
.45
.36
.04
–.03
.14
.18
.26
.21
.23
.14
–.02
.11
.24
.20
.25
.26
.20
.40
.31
.41
.39
.22
.53
.58
.31
.72
.70
.44
.63
.63
.65
.42
.42
.24
.21
.15
.28
.40
.04
.14

Residential

–0.04
–1.08
–.54
.88
.97
.38
–.22
–1.19
–.37
–.72
1.38
.65
.11
.58
.10
–.05
–.16
–.38
–.35
.49
.32
.38
–.15
.35
.11
.38
.29
.03
.04
.29
.47
.57
.41
–.50
–1.13
–1.14
–.74
–.08
.00
.31
.34
.13
.34
.25
.16
–.03
–.04
.30
.48
–.42
–.37
.40
–.18
–.17
.06
–.22
–.59
–1.34
–1.12
–.18
.17
.30
.10
.53
–.11
–.21

Change
in
private
inventories
0.48
–.26
–1.24
1.37
.24
.12
–.40
–.89
1.13
–1.31
.28
1.90
–1.03
–.31
.41
–.13
.17
–.21
–.26
.28
.07
.61
–.44
.02
.52
–.07
–.03
–.03
–.84
.49
–.02
.40
–.07
.10
–.25
–.47
–.80
1.40
–.05
.17
.24
–.11
.30
–.52
.00
.12
.08
–.48
.26
.59
–.41
–1.93
–2.00
3.10
4.14
–.10
–2.01
–.72
1.44
–2.16
–.06
1.34
–.47
–.49
1.05
–.11

Table B–2. Contributions to percent change in real gross domestic product,
1973–2024—Continued
[Percentage points, except as noted; annual average to annual average, quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]
Government consumption expenditures
and gross investment

Net exports of goods and services
Year or quarter

1973 ����������������������
1974 ����������������������
1975 ����������������������
1976 ����������������������
1977 ����������������������
1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III p ��������������

Net
exports
0.80
.73
.86
–1.05
–.70
.05
.64
1.64
–.15
–.59
–1.32
–1.54
–.39
–.29
.17
.81
.51
.40
.62
–.04
–.56
–.41
.12
–.15
–.31
–1.14
–.90
–.85
–.24
–.67
–.49
–.63
–.30
–.06
.52
1.04
1.07
–.43
.12
.12
.20
–.31
–.77
–.16
–.20
–.26
–.11
–.24
–1.26
–.42
.49
–1.14
–.82
–1.10
–.22
–2.40
.50
2.50
.56
.33
–.11
–.10
.09
–.61
–.90
–.57

Exports
Total
1.08
.56
–.05
.36
.19
.80
.80
.95
.12
–.71
–.22
.61
.24
.53
.77
1.23
.97
.78
.61
.66
.31
.84
1.02
.86
1.26
.26
.52
.86
–.59
–.19
.19
.88
.67
.95
.94
.67
–1.00
1.40
.90
.54
.41
.52
.04
.06
.49
.35
.07
–1.52
.67
.82
.31
.00
.33
.09
2.54
–.51
1.40
1.63
–.12
.23
–.54
.53
.66
.21
.12
.79

Goods
1.05
.49
–.14
.34
.12
.64
.69
.88
–.05
–.63
–.21
.41
.20
.27
.62
.99
.72
.56
.45
.52
.22
.65
.83
.68
1.10
.17
.32
.72
–.49
–.24
.19
.58
.52
.71
.53
.48
–1.00
1.13
.65
.37
.27
.41
–.03
.05
.32
.34
.01
–.75
.54
.45
.17
–.10
.09
–.19
1.87
–.74
.84
1.53
–.43
.39
–.86
.53
.37
–.02
.07
.70

Imports
Services
0.02
.08
.09
.02
.07
.17
.11
.07
.17
–.08
.00
.20
.05
.25
.15
.24
.26
.22
.16
.14
.09
.19
.19
.18
.16
.08
.20
.13
–.10
.05
.01
.30
.15
.24
.41
.19
.00
.28
.26
.17
.13
.12
.07
.01
.17
.01
.05
–.77
.14
.38
.14
.10
.24
.29
.67
.23
.56
.09
.31
–.17
.31
.00
.29
.23
.05
.09

Total
–0.28
.17
.91
–1.41
–.89
–.76
–.16
.69
–.26
.12
–1.10
–2.16
–.63
–.82
–.60
–.41
–.46
–.37
.01
–.70
–.87
–1.25
–.90
–1.01
–1.57
–1.39
–1.42
–1.71
.35
–.48
–.68
–1.51
–.98
–1.01
–.42
.37
2.07
–1.83
–.79
–.42
–.20
–.84
–.81
–.22
–.69
–.60
–.18
1.28
–1.93
–1.24
.17
–1.14
–1.15
–1.19
–2.77
–1.90
–.90
.87
.68
.10
.44
–.63
–.57
–.82
–1.01
–1.37

Goods
–0.33
.17
.85
–1.31
–.82
–.66
–.13
.66
–.18
.20
–.98
–1.78
–.50
–.80
–.39
–.35
–.37
–.25
–.04
–.76
–.82
–1.15
–.84
–.91
–1.40
–1.18
–1.31
–1.45
.39
–.41
–.67
–1.28
–.88
–.81
–.27
.47
2.10
–1.73
–.74
–.38
–.28
–.75
–.74
–.14
–.53
–.62
–.06
.67
–1.58
–.81
.22
–.94
–.64
–.12
–2.38
–1.60
–.40
1.08
.48
–.04
.57
–.56
–.19
–.69
–.90
–1.14

Federal
Services
0.05
.00
.06
–.10
–.07
–.10
–.02
.03
–.09
–.08
–.12
–.38
–.13
–.02
–.21
–.07
–.09
–.13
.05
.05
–.05
–.10
–.06
–.10
–.17
–.21
–.11
–.26
–.04
–.07
–.01
–.22
–.09
–.20
–.15
–.10
–.03
–.10
–.05
–.04
.07
–.09
–.07
–.08
–.16
.02
–.11
.60
–.35
–.43
–.05
–.20
–.51
–1.07
–.39
–.29
–.50
–.21
.21
.14
–.13
–.07
–.38
–.13
–.12
–.23

Total
–0.07
.47
.49
.12
.26
.60
.36
.36
.20
.37
.79
.74
1.37
1.14
.62
.26
.58
.65
.25
.10
–.17
.02
.10
.18
.30
.44
.59
.33
.67
.83
.40
.30
.14
.30
.34
.49
.72
–.02
–.67
–.42
–.46
–.16
.37
.35
.10
.35
.68
.60
–.05
–.20
.66
.95
–.78
–.28
–.04
–.60
–.27
.26
.90
.84
.48
.94
.61
.30
.52
.83

Total
–0.39
.06
.05
.01
.21
.23
.20
.38
.43
.35
.65
.33
.78
.61
.38
–.15
.15
.20
.01
–.15
–.32
–.31
–.21
–.09
–.06
–.06
.12
.02
.24
.47
.45
.31
.15
.17
.14
.46
.48
.34
–.23
–.16
–.43
–.18
.00
.04
.03
.22
.25
.41
.13
–.22
.19
1.14
–.58
–.53
.21
–.58
–.22
–.04
.54
.28
–.08
.33
–.02
–.02
.27
.55

National Nondefense defense
–0.40
–.07
–.07
–.04
.06
.04
.15
.22
.40
.47
.51
.38
.62
.52
.38
–.04
–.02
.02
–.06
–.31
–.32
–.28
–.21
–.08
–.13
–.09
.06
–.04
.13
.30
.35
.26
.11
.07
.13
.33
.29
.16
–.12
–.18
–.33
–.18
–.09
–.02
.04
.13
.21
.12
–.04
–.15
.12
–.33
–.11
–.18
–.14
–.43
.07
–.11
.26
.17
.03
.24
–.05
–.09
.23
.48

0.01
.14
.13
.06
.15
.19
.05
.16
.03
–.11
.14
–.04
.16
.09
.01
–.12
.18
.18
.07
.16
.00
–.02
.00
–.01
.07
.03
.06
.06
.12
.18
.10
.05
.04
.10
.01
.14
.20
.18
–.12
.02
–.10
.00
.09
.06
–.01
.09
.04
.30
.17
–.07
.07
1.47
–.47
–.35
.35
–.15
–.29
.07
.28
.11
–.11
.09
.02
.07
.04
.07

State
and
local
0.32
.41
.43
.10
.05
.37
.16
–.02
–.23
.01
.14
.41
.59
.53
.24
.42
.43
.45
.24
.25
.15
.32
.31
.27
.36
.50
.47
.31
.43
.35
–.06
–.02
.00
.13
.20
.03
.24
–.36
–.44
–.26
–.03
.02
.36
.31
.07
.12
.43
.18
–.18
.02
.47
–.19
–.20
.26
–.25
–.01
–.05
.29
.36
.56
.56
.62
.63
.32
.25
.28

Final
sales of
domestic
product
5.16
–.28
1.03
4.01
4.38
5.42
3.56
.63
1.41
–.50
4.31
5.34
5.20
3.77
3.04
4.31
3.50
2.09
.15
3.24
2.68
3.41
3.13
3.76
3.92
4.55
4.82
4.11
1.80
1.21
2.81
3.45
3.55
2.68
2.26
.58
–1.78
1.30
1.61
2.12
1.88
2.64
2.65
2.34
2.46
2.85
2.50
–1.69
5.80
1.92
3.30
7.56
8.43
.35
3.27
–.92
2.29
3.44
1.91
4.96
2.51
3.01
3.66
2.12
1.93
2.94

Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).

National Income or Expenditure | 389

Table B–3. Gross domestic product, 2008–2024
[Quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]
Personal consumption
expenditures

Year or quarter

Gross private domestic investment
Fixed investment

Gross
domestic
product

Nonresidential
Total

Goods

Services

Total

Total

Total

Structures

Equipment

Intellectual
property
products

Residential

Change
in
private
inventories

Billions of dollars
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III p ��������������

14,769.9
14,478.1
15,049.0
15,599.7
16,254.0
16,880.7
17,608.1
18,295.0
18,804.9
19,612.1
20,656.5
21,540.0
21,354.1
23,681.2
26,006.9
27,720.7
22,656.8
23,368.9
23,922.0
24,777.0
25,215.5
25,805.8
26,272.0
26,734.3
27,164.4
27,453.8
27,967.7
28,297.0
28,624.1
29,016.7
29,354.3

10,050.1
9,891.2
10,260.3
10,698.9
11,047.4
11,388.2
11,874.5
12,297.4
12,726.8
13,290.6
13,934.4
14,437.5
14,225.7
16,113.9
17,690.8
18,822.8
15,259.4
16,016.3
16,363.9
16,816.1
17,175.1
17,603.8
17,876.2
18,108.3
18,506.2
18,685.7
18,929.0
19,170.2
19,424.8
19,682.7
19,928.2

3,363.2
3,180.0
3,317.8
3,518.1
3,637.7
3,742.2
3,886.6
3,955.1
4,033.0
4,212.2
4,414.2
4,532.8
4,706.7
5,500.4
5,939.1
6,123.9
5,248.9
5,543.6
5,501.8
5,707.1
5,846.1
5,971.1
5,973.0
5,966.2
6,084.8
6,088.1
6,147.9
6,174.8
6,148.9
6,204.6
6,264.3

6,686.9
6,711.2
6,942.4
7,180.7
7,409.6
7,646.1
7,987.9
8,342.3
8,693.8
9,078.4
9,520.2
9,904.7
9,519.0
10,613.6
11,751.8
12,698.9
10,010.5
10,472.7
10,862.0
11,109.1
11,329.0
11,632.7
11,903.3
12,142.1
12,421.4
12,597.6
12,781.1
12,995.4
13,275.9
13,478.1
13,663.9

2,477.6
1,929.7
2,165.5
2,332.6
2,621.8
2,838.3
3,074.0
3,288.5
3,278.3
3,467.7
3,724.8
3,893.7
3,755.0
4,223.8
4,821.2
4,984.8
4,045.5
4,017.6
4,232.8
4,599.2
4,784.8
4,786.5
4,801.6
4,911.9
4,847.2
4,925.7
5,063.4
5,102.8
5,159.9
5,297.8
5,347.7

2,506.9
2,080.4
2,111.6
2,286.3
2,550.5
2,732.9
2,989.2
3,148.4
3,239.2
3,435.0
3,668.4
3,820.8
3,791.1
4,211.6
4,671.6
4,943.1
4,086.7
4,182.2
4,231.0
4,346.4
4,539.9
4,669.6
4,727.8
4,749.0
4,826.3
4,925.7
4,974.2
5,046.1
5,138.5
5,201.1
5,263.7

1,990.9
1,690.4
1,735.0
1,907.5
2,118.5
2,221.3
2,425.2
2,507.5
2,529.0
2,661.1
2,856.5
2,993.7
2,870.5
3,079.1
3,492.8
3,831.6
3,000.2
3,067.3
3,085.9
3,162.9
3,319.5
3,443.8
3,564.0
3,643.9
3,742.3
3,833.7
3,848.8
3,901.5
3,957.8
4,018.5
4,084.0

571.1
455.8
379.8
404.5
479.4
491.5
574.6
584.5
566.2
594.9
636.6
677.9
624.7
628.3
756.1
884.1
612.6
622.7
630.1
647.9
691.2
735.4
781.7
816.1
857.6
888.7
884.1
905.8
914.9
916.0
906.3

845.4
670.3
777.0
881.3
983.4
1,035.3
1,109.1
1,144.1
1,119.8
1,160.0
1,227.6
1,240.9
1,109.5
1,188.6
1,317.7
1,425.8
1,180.8
1,196.7
1,178.6
1,198.4
1,267.9
1,298.8
1,340.4
1,363.6
1,390.1
1,432.1
1,437.2
1,443.9
1,458.8
1,499.7
1,547.2

574.4
564.4
578.2
621.7
655.7
694.6
741.5
778.9
843.0
906.2
992.2
1,074.9
1,136.3
1,262.1
1,419.0
1,521.7
1,206.9
1,247.9
1,277.2
1,316.7
1,360.3
1,409.6
1,441.8
1,464.2
1,494.6
1,512.9
1,527.4
1,551.7
1,584.1
1,602.7
1,630.6

516.0
390.0
376.6
378.8
432.0
511.5
564.0
640.9
710.2
773.9
811.9
827.1
920.6
1,132.5
1,178.8
1,111.5
1,086.5
1,114.9
1,145.1
1,183.5
1,220.4
1,225.8
1,163.9
1,105.1
1,084.0
1,091.9
1,125.3
1,144.7
1,180.7
1,182.6
1,179.6

–29.2
–150.8
53.9
46.3
71.2
105.5
84.8
140.1
39.1
32.7
56.4
73.0
–36.1
12.2
149.6
41.7
–41.2
–164.6
1.8
252.8
244.9
117.0
73.8
162.9
20.9
.0
89.2
56.7
21.4
96.8
84.0

666.0
541.4
454.8
469.0
531.5
537.3
597.2
598.2
579.7
594.9
629.2
644.0
585.0
569.6
590.3
654.3
575.3
576.1
570.5
556.5
571.1
583.3
596.3
610.4
631.9
656.3
659.2
669.7
679.9
680.2
672.0

799.7
630.2
757.8
859.6
953.9
1,006.5
1,086.0
1,127.2
1,117.5
1,160.0
1,228.6
1,241.1
1,115.6
1,190.3
1,242.2
1,285.2
1,187.2
1,212.1
1,178.7
1,183.2
1,228.9
1,232.2
1,252.1
1,255.5
1,258.2
1,295.7
1,292.3
1,294.6
1,295.7
1,326.5
1,360.4

573.7
570.8
586.4
622.9
653.8
695.0
739.1
774.0
847.6
906.2
986.5
1,067.0
1,115.1
1,228.9
1,367.1
1,445.9
1,178.0
1,216.7
1,242.0
1,279.0
1,317.3
1,357.2
1,383.6
1,410.2
1,425.8
1,439.6
1,449.7
1,468.3
1,495.0
1,497.7
1,507.1

623.0
487.9
472.8
472.2
533.3
601.1
626.8
693.2
742.2
773.9
768.5
761.6
820.1
909.4
831.6
762.7
919.1
910.5
902.6
905.3
894.9
867.8
807.1
756.5
748.2
756.4
770.6
775.5
800.8
795.2
785.1

–32.3
–170.3
54.4
44.4
69.2
103.5
85.1
133.6
33.4
32.7
54.3
72.4
–29.6
11.6
119.1
33.1
–22.0
–141.0
9.5
200.1
195.8
86.7
58.8
135.1
20.6
–.2
67.2
44.6
17.7
71.7
64.1

Billions of chained (2017) dollars
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III p ��������������

16,781.5
16,349.1
16,789.8
17,052.4
17,442.8
17,812.2
18,261.7
18,799.6
19,141.7
19,612.1
20,193.9
20,715.7
20,267.6
21,494.8
22,034.8
22,671.1
21,058.4
21,389.0
21,571.4
21,960.4
21,903.9
21,919.2
22,066.8
22,249.5
22,403.4
22,539.4
22,780.9
22,960.6
23,053.5
23,223.9
23,386.7

11,270.7
11,123.6
11,335.6
11,528.5
11,686.1
11,889.9
12,226.4
12,638.8
12,949.0
13,290.6
13,654.9
13,948.1
13,594.7
14,787.2
15,236.2
15,621.7
14,328.6
14,809.1
14,924.3
15,086.9
15,123.4
15,219.9
15,277.6
15,324.0
15,510.2
15,548.5
15,646.7
15,781.4
15,856.9
15,967.3
16,106.4

See next page for continuation of table.

390 |

Appendix B

3,312.7
3,209.4
3,300.2
3,372.3
3,444.2
3,562.3
3,717.7
3,902.5
4,044.7
4,212.2
4,378.7
4,513.6
4,723.0
5,258.6
5,226.3
5,323.7
5,177.5
5,354.9
5,221.4
5,280.7
5,258.4
5,238.3
5,208.5
5,200.0
5,293.5
5,288.9
5,334.1
5,378.5
5,362.8
5,402.1
5,476.0

7,981.2
7,948.6
8,065.3
8,183.9
8,265.3
8,341.9
8,516.3
8,738.9
8,904.9
9,078.4
9,276.6
9,436.2
8,891.6
9,557.9
10,031.7
10,318.7
9,184.6
9,488.8
9,727.3
9,831.0
9,888.6
10,004.0
10,090.2
10,144.1
10,238.1
10,279.7
10,333.3
10,423.6
10,511.3
10,582.7
10,650.9

2,564.3
2,025.3
2,309.0
2,463.1
2,735.3
2,938.7
3,129.0
3,323.4
3,320.2
3,467.7
3,668.1
3,784.0
3,612.1
3,929.2
4,164.3
4,169.2
3,840.2
3,777.7
3,923.2
4,175.7
4,250.7
4,156.8
4,096.0
4,153.8
4,058.1
4,136.6
4,237.3
4,244.8
4,282.5
4,369.2
4,380.8

2,620.6
2,201.6
2,269.9
2,432.5
2,678.0
2,842.0
3,052.6
3,193.6
3,286.9
3,435.0
3,611.7
3,710.9
3,639.0
3,902.9
4,007.5
4,103.9
3,867.1
3,919.5
3,898.5
3,926.4
4,006.8
4,026.4
4,008.2
3,988.7
4,018.8
4,103.0
4,128.9
4,164.9
4,231.4
4,255.7
4,274.0

2,008.3
1,716.4
1,794.3
1,951.3
2,137.1
2,238.6
2,421.1
2,498.9
2,544.8
2,661.1
2,844.3
2,952.2
2,815.5
2,985.2
3,192.9
3,384.5
2,937.9
3,001.4
2,988.2
3,013.3
3,110.7
3,165.9
3,225.1
3,270.0
3,312.8
3,391.6
3,400.9
3,432.9
3,471.0
3,504.1
3,536.8

Table B–3. Gross domestic product, 2008–2024—Continued
[Quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]
Net exports of
goods and services
Year or quarter

Government consumption expenditures
and gross investment
Federal

Net
exports

Exports

Imports

Total

2008 ������������������ –740.9
2009 ������������������ –419.2
2010 ������������������ –532.3
2011 ������������������ –579.6
2012 ������������������ –551.6
2013 ������������������ –478.5
2014 ������������������ –508.9
2015 ������������������ –524.3
2016 ������������������ –503.3
2017 ������������������ –543.3
2018 ������������������ –593.1
2019 ������������������ –577.3
2020 ������������������ –626.2
2021 ������������������ –860.0
2022 ������������������ –958.9
2023 ������������������ –797.3
2021: I �������������� –795.8
      II ������������� –835.1
      III ������������ –888.7
      IV ������������ –920.6
2022: I �������������� –1,077.0
      II ������������� –1,022.1
      III ������������ –885.9
      IV ������������ –850.7
2023: I �������������� –813.6
      II ������������� –803.5
      III ������������ –781.1
      IV ������������ –791.2
2024: I �������������� –841.6
      II ������������� –906.9
      III p ���������� –954.1

1,835.3
1,582.8
1,857.2
2,115.9
2,217.7
2,287.9
2,378.5
2,270.6
2,235.6
2,388.3
2,538.1
2,539.4
2,151.1
2,555.4
3,017.4
3,052.5
2,381.2
2,505.0
2,570.1
2,765.4
2,848.7
3,071.6
3,102.6
3,046.7
3,060.6
2,995.5
3,062.0
3,091.7
3,125.4
3,154.3
3,204.1

2,576.2
2,001.9
2,389.6
2,695.5
2,769.3
2,766.4
2,887.4
2,794.9
2,738.8
2,931.6
3,131.2
3,116.7
2,777.3
3,415.5
3,976.3
3,849.8
3,177.0
3,340.1
3,458.8
3,686.0
3,925.7
4,093.7
3,988.4
3,897.4
3,874.2
3,799.0
3,843.1
3,882.9
3,967.0
4,061.2
4,158.3

2,983.0
3,076.3
3,155.6
3,147.9
3,136.5
3,132.6
3,168.6
3,233.4
3,303.0
3,397.1
3,590.4
3,786.0
3,999.6
4,203.5
4,453.8
4,710.5
4,147.6
4,170.0
4,214.0
4,282.3
4,332.6
4,437.6
4,480.1
4,564.8
4,624.6
4,645.9
4,756.4
4,815.2
4,881.0
4,943.0
5,032.6

1,152.0
1,220.8
1,300.2
1,299.8
1,287.0
1,227.4
1,217.1
1,222.8
1,237.4
1,266.1
1,346.3
1,419.5
1,523.0
1,603.2
1,641.0
1,762.6
1,613.4
1,597.4
1,585.0
1,616.9
1,606.5
1,622.1
1,641.4
1,694.2
1,731.6
1,741.8
1,780.9
1,796.2
1,810.3
1,842.2
1,893.4

2008 ������������������
2009 ������������������
2010 ������������������
2011 ������������������
2012 ������������������
2013 ������������������
2014 ������������������
2015 ������������������
2016 ������������������
2017 ������������������
2018 ������������������
2019 ������������������
2020 ������������������
2021 ������������������
2022 ������������������
2023 ������������������
2021: I ��������������
      II �������������
      III ������������
      IV ������������
2022: I ��������������
      II �������������
      III ������������
      IV ������������
2023: I ��������������
      II �������������
      III ������������
      IV ������������
2024: I ��������������
      II �������������
      III p ����������

1,846.6
1,693.1
1,907.3
2,044.2
2,126.3
2,190.3
2,275.8
2,283.1
2,293.9
2,388.3
2,456.4
2,469.5
2,145.3
2,284.3
2,455.9
2,523.8
2,235.4
2,253.2
2,258.3
2,390.3
2,362.2
2,433.7
2,517.5
2,510.3
2,522.5
2,491.6
2,521.5
2,559.6
2,571.8
2,578.4
2,625.4

2,325.4
2,031.8
2,295.3
2,405.8
2,464.7
2,494.6
2,623.4
2,759.5
2,799.7
2,931.6
3,050.0
3,085.9
2,808.8
3,220.8
3,497.6
3,456.6
3,102.2
3,164.7
3,230.2
3,386.3
3,494.3
3,545.0
3,495.7
3,455.5
3,448.5
3,421.3
3,460.4
3,496.3
3,548.7
3,614.0
3,702.9

3,420.1
3,542.7
3,539.7
3,426.9
3,356.0
3,275.6
3,247.3
3,313.6
3,378.5
3,397.1
3,465.0
3,600.4
3,721.8
3,711.4
3,669.9
3,811.8
3,749.4
3,709.2
3,694.9
3,692.2
3,660.9
3,647.2
3,661.3
3,710.1
3,756.4
3,783.7
3,836.3
3,870.7
3,887.7
3,917.0
3,964.7

1,287.2
1,367.4
1,422.6
1,384.2
1,357.9
1,283.9
1,251.9
1,252.7
1,260.0
1,266.1
1,309.9
1,360.3
1,445.5
1,472.0
1,424.3
1,466.1
1,506.7
1,475.7
1,447.2
1,458.4
1,426.3
1,414.4
1,412.9
1,443.6
1,460.0
1,456.0
1,474.8
1,473.5
1,472.2
1,487.8
1,519.9

Total

National Nondefense defense

State
and
local

Final
Final
Gross
sales to
Gross
sales of domestic private domestic Average
of GDP
domestic
purdomestic income and
GDI
product chases 1
pur(GDI) 3
chasers 2

Billions of dollars
750.3
787.6
828.0
834.0
814.2
764.3
744.1
730.4
729.4
748.3
795.1
849.5
885.0
908.7
930.0
1,002.1
905.0
909.1
908.8
911.7
903.7
928.8
930.8
956.9
976.9
989.4
1,016.6
1,025.4
1,028.4
1,051.5
1,091.3

401.6
433.2
472.2
465.8
472.8
463.1
473.0
492.4
507.9
517.8
551.2
570.0
638.1
694.5
711.0
760.5
708.4
688.3
676.2
705.2
702.8
693.3
710.6
737.3
754.7
752.4
764.3
770.8
781.9
790.7
802.1

1,831.1
1,855.6
1,855.4
1,848.2
1,849.5
1,905.2
1,951.5
2,010.6
2,065.7
2,131.1
2,244.1
2,366.5
2,476.6
2,600.3
2,812.7
2,947.9
2,534.2
2,572.6
2,629.0
2,665.4
2,726.1
2,815.5
2,838.7
2,870.6
2,893.0
2,904.1
2,975.5
3,019.0
3,070.7
3,100.9
3,139.2

14,799.1
14,628.8
14,995.1
15,553.5
16,182.8
16,775.2
17,523.3
18,154.9
18,765.8
19,579.4
20,600.1
21,467.0
21,390.2
23,669.0
25,857.2
27,679.0
22,698.0
23,533.5
23,920.2
24,524.2
24,970.6
25,688.8
26,198.2
26,571.4
27,143.5
27,453.8
27,878.5
28,240.3
28,602.7
28,919.9
29,270.3

15,510.7
14,897.2
15,581.3
16,179.3
16,805.6
17,359.1
18,117.0
18,819.3
19,308.2
20,155.4
21,249.6
22,117.3
21,980.3
24,541.2
26,965.8
28,518.1
23,452.6
24,203.9
24,810.7
25,697.6
26,292.5
26,827.9
27,157.9
27,585.0
27,978.0
28,257.3
28,748.8
29,088.1
29,465.6
29,923.6
30,308.4

12,556.9
11,971.7
12,371.8
12,985.2
13,597.9
14,121.1
14,863.6
15,445.8
15,966.1
16,725.6
17,602.8
18,258.3
18,016.7
20,325.5
22,362.4
23,765.8
19,346.1
20,198.5
20,594.9
21,162.5
21,715.0
22,273.3
22,604.0
22,857.3
23,332.5
23,611.4
23,903.2
24,216.3
24,563.3
24,883.8
25,191.8

14,578.7
14,286.3
14,979.5
15,624.0
16,407.6
16,910.5
17,749.1
18,388.0
18,752.0
19,544.2
20,593.1
21,482.9
21,246.5
23,679.6
26,082.5
27,476.1
22,686.6
23,338.9
23,947.7
24,745.2
25,355.2
25,912.7
26,454.7
26,607.4
26,964.5
27,229.3
27,627.9
28,082.7
28,499.2
28,821.9
29,114.0

14,674.3
14,382.2
15,014.2
15,611.9
16,330.8
16,895.6
17,678.6
18,341.5
18,778.5
19,578.2
20,624.8
21,511.5
21,300.3
23,680.4
26,044.7
27,598.4
22,671.7
23,353.9
23,934.8
24,761.1
25,285.4
25,859.2
26,363.3
26,670.8
27,064.4
27,341.6
27,797.8
28,189.8
28,561.6
28,919.3
29,234.2

17,268.4
16,664.4
17,169.9
17,409.2
17,773.1
18,102.6
18,602.0
19,276.0
19,647.5
20,155.4
20,787.5
21,332.6
20,933.4
22,423.4
23,058.6
23,593.1
21,918.8
22,294.1
22,536.7
22,944.1
23,022.1
23,011.3
23,023.4
23,177.6
23,315.3
23,459.3
23,710.4
23,887.4
24,017.2
24,242.6
24,441.7

13,906.8
13,319.2
13,600.3
13,957.7
14,362.5
14,730.8
15,278.6
15,832.3
16,235.9
16,725.6
17,266.5
17,658.8
17,233.4
18,690.1
19,243.7
19,725.6
18,195.1
18,728.5
18,823.1
19,013.7
19,130.3
19,246.4
19,285.8
19,312.5
19,528.8
19,651.5
19,775.6
19,946.4
20,088.1
20,222.9
20,380.4

16,564.3
16,132.6
16,712.3
17,079.0
17,607.6
17,843.6
18,407.9
18,895.2
19,087.8
19,544.2
20,131.9
20,660.8
20,165.4
21,493.4
22,098.9
22,471.0
21,086.0
21,361.5
21,594.6
21,932.2
22,025.2
22,010.0
22,220.2
22,143.8
22,238.6
22,355.1
22,504.2
22,786.7
22,953.0
23,068.0
23,195.3

16,672.9
16,240.9
16,751.0
17,065.7
17,525.2
17,827.9
18,334.8
18,847.4
19,114.7
19,578.2
20,162.9
20,688.2
20,216.5
21,494.1
22,066.8
22,571.1
21,072.2
21,375.3
21,583.0
21,946.3
21,964.5
21,964.6
22,143.5
22,196.7
22,321.0
22,447.3
22,642.5
22,873.7
23,003.3
23,145.9
23,291.0

Billions of chained (2017) dollars
–478.8
–338.7
–388.0
–361.6
–338.4
–304.3
–347.6
–476.5
–505.8
–543.3
–593.5
–616.3
–663.4
–936.6
–1,041.7
–932.8
–866.8
–911.5
–972.0
–996.0
–1,132.1
–1,111.2
–978.2
–945.3
–926.0
–929.6
–938.9
–936.7
–977.0
–1,035.7
–1,077.6

824.6
871.7
897.3
878.1
848.2
792.4
760.4
744.9
741.1
748.3
774.6
816.3
840.5
831.9
799.3
825.2
843.3
837.3
827.5
819.6
795.7
799.5
793.6
808.3
818.0
819.6
833.0
830.3
825.0
838.0
865.7

461.2
494.3
524.1
504.9
508.8
491.0
491.3
507.8
518.8
517.8
535.3
544.1
605.0
640.1
625.1
640.9
663.5
638.4
619.6
638.8
630.8
614.9
619.3
635.5
642.2
636.4
641.8
643.2
647.3
649.8
653.9

2,136.8
2,177.9
2,117.0
2,042.3
1,997.7
1,991.8
1,995.3
2,060.8
2,118.5
2,131.1
2,155.2
2,240.2
2,277.2
2,241.8
2,245.8
2,345.1
2,246.1
2,236.1
2,249.0
2,236.0
2,235.3
2,232.9
2,248.0
2,266.9
2,296.6
2,327.1
2,360.8
2,395.9
2,414.0
2,427.9
2,443.9

16,841.4
16,542.9
16,755.0
17,025.8
17,387.5
17,715.9
18,185.6
18,669.0
19,108.4
19,579.4
20,137.6
20,642.8
20,293.6
21,468.5
21,881.0
22,606.6
21,083.9
21,526.7
21,546.8
21,716.6
21,665.5
21,791.6
21,980.3
22,086.4
22,364.1
22,505.9
22,674.5
22,881.9
23,003.2
23,113.1
23,282.2

1 Gross domestic product (GDP) less exports of goods and services plus imports of goods and services.
2 Personal consumption expenditures plus gross private fixed investment.
3 For chained dollar measures, gross domestic income is deflated by the implicit price deflator for GDP.

Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).

National Income or Expenditure | 391

Table B–4. Percentage shares of gross domestic product, 1973–2024
[Percent of nominal GDP]
Personal consumption
expenditures

Year or quarter

1973 ����������������������
1974 ����������������������
1975 ����������������������
1976 ����������������������
1977 ����������������������
1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III p ��������������

Gross
domestic
product
(percent)

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

Fixed investment
Nonresidential
Total

59.6
60.2
61.2
61.3
61.2
60.5
60.3
61.3
60.3
61.9
62.8
61.7
62.5
63.0
63.4
63.6
63.4
63.9
64.0
64.4
64.9
64.8
65.0
65.0
64.5
64.9
65.2
66.0
66.8
67.2
67.6
67.4
67.3
67.2
67.3
68.0
68.3
68.2
68.6
68.0
67.5
67.4
67.2
67.7
67.8
67.5
67.0
66.6
68.0
68.0
67.9
67.4
68.5
68.4
67.9
68.1
68.2
68.0
67.7
68.1
68.1
67.7
67.7
67.9
67.8
67.9

See next page for continuation of table.

392 |

Appendix B

Gross private domestic investment

Goods

29.2
29.2
29.2
29.2
28.8
28.2
28.1
28.0
27.1
26.9
26.8
26.3
26.2
26.1
25.9
25.5
25.2
25.0
24.3
24.0
23.9
24.0
23.8
23.8
23.4
23.3
23.7
23.9
23.9
23.8
23.8
23.8
23.6
23.4
23.3
22.8
22.0
22.0
22.6
22.4
22.2
22.1
21.6
21.4
21.5
21.4
21.0
22.0
23.2
22.8
22.1
23.2
23.7
23.0
23.0
23.2
23.1
22.7
22.3
22.4
22.2
22.0
21.8
21.5
21.4
21.3

Services

30.4
31.0
32.0
32.1
32.4
32.3
32.3
33.3
33.2
35.0
36.0
35.4
36.3
36.9
37.5
38.1
38.2
38.9
39.7
40.4
41.0
40.8
41.2
41.2
41.2
41.6
41.5
42.1
43.0
43.5
43.8
43.6
43.6
43.7
44.1
45.3
46.4
46.1
46.0
45.6
45.3
45.4
45.6
46.2
46.3
46.1
46.0
44.6
44.8
45.2
45.8
44.2
44.8
45.4
44.8
44.9
45.1
45.3
45.4
45.7
45.9
45.7
45.9
46.4
46.4
46.5

Total

18.7
17.8
15.3
17.3
19.1
20.3
20.5
18.6
19.7
17.4
17.5
20.3
19.1
18.5
18.4
17.9
17.7
16.7
15.3
15.5
16.1
17.2
17.2
17.7
18.6
19.2
19.6
19.9
18.3
17.7
17.7
18.7
19.4
19.6
18.5
16.8
13.3
14.4
15.0
16.1
16.8
17.5
18.0
17.4
17.7
18.0
18.1
17.6
17.8
18.5
18.0
17.9
17.2
17.7
18.6
19.0
18.5
18.3
18.4
17.8
17.9
18.1
18.0
18.0
18.3
18.2

Total

17.6
16.9
15.6
16.3
18.0
19.2
19.9
18.8
18.8
17.8
17.7
18.7
18.6
18.4
17.8
17.5
17.2
16.4
15.3
15.3
15.8
16.4
16.8
17.4
17.8
18.5
19.0
19.4
18.6
17.5
17.6
18.1
19.0
19.1
18.2
17.0
14.4
14.0
14.7
15.7
16.2
17.0
17.2
17.2
17.5
17.8
17.7
17.8
17.8
18.0
17.8
18.0
17.9
17.7
17.5
18.0
18.1
18.0
17.8
17.8
17.9
17.8
17.8
18.0
17.9
17.9

Total
12.1
12.4
11.7
11.7
12.4
13.4
14.2
14.2
14.7
14.5
13.3
14.0
14.0
13.3
12.7
12.6
12.7
12.4
11.8
11.4
11.7
11.9
12.6
12.9
13.4
13.8
14.2
14.6
13.8
12.4
12.0
12.0
12.4
13.0
13.5
13.5
11.7
11.5
12.2
13.0
13.2
13.8
13.7
13.4
13.6
13.8
13.9
13.4
13.0
13.4
13.8
13.2
13.1
12.9
12.8
13.2
13.3
13.6
13.6
13.8
14.0
13.8
13.8
13.8
13.8
13.9

Structures
3.9
4.0
3.6
3.5
3.6
4.0
4.5
4.8
5.2
5.3
4.2
4.4
4.5
3.9
3.6
3.5
3.4
3.4
3.0
2.6
2.6
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9
3.0
3.0
3.1
3.2
2.6
2.5
2.5
2.7
3.1
3.5
3.9
3.1
2.5
2.6
2.9
2.9
3.3
3.2
3.0
3.0
3.1
3.1
2.9
2.7
2.9
3.2
2.7
2.7
2.6
2.6
2.7
2.8
3.0
3.1
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.1

Equipment
6.7
6.8
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.7
7.9
7.6
7.5
7.0
6.8
7.2
7.1
6.9
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.2
5.9
5.9
6.2
6.5
6.9
7.0
7.1
7.3
7.4
7.5
6.7
6.0
5.9
5.9
6.1
6.2
6.2
5.7
4.6
5.2
5.6
6.1
6.1
6.3
6.3
6.0
5.9
5.9
5.8
5.2
5.0
5.1
5.1
5.2
5.1
4.9
4.8
5.0
5.0
5.1
5.1
5.1
5.2
5.1
5.1
5.1
5.2
5.3

Intellectual
property
products
1.6
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.8
1.9
2.0
2.2
2.2
2.4
2.4
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.7
2.8
2.9
2.9
2.9
2.8
3.0
3.1
3.4
3.5
3.8
4.0
3.9
3.7
3.7
3.6
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.9
3.9
3.8
4.0
4.0
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.5
4.6
4.8
5.0
5.3
5.3
5.5
5.5
5.3
5.3
5.3
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.5
5.5
5.5
5.5
5.5
5.5
5.5
5.5
5.6

Residential

5.5
4.5
4.0
4.6
5.5
5.9
5.6
4.5
4.0
3.3
4.4
4.7
4.6
5.1
5.1
4.9
4.5
4.0
3.6
3.9
4.2
4.4
4.2
4.4
4.4
4.6
4.8
4.7
4.8
5.1
5.6
6.1
6.6
6.1
4.8
3.5
2.7
2.5
2.4
2.7
3.0
3.2
3.5
3.8
3.9
3.9
3.8
4.3
4.8
4.5
4.0
4.8
4.8
4.8
4.8
4.8
4.8
4.4
4.1
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.1
4.1
4.0

Change
in
private
inventories
1.1
.9
–.4
.9
1.1
1.1
.7
–.2
.9
–.4
–.2
1.6
.5
.1
.6
.4
.5
.2
.0
.3
.3
.9
.4
.4
.8
.7
.6
.5
–.4
.2
.1
.5
.4
.5
.2
–.2
–1.0
.4
.3
.4
.6
.5
.8
.2
.2
.3
.3
–.2
.1
.6
.2
–.2
–.7
.0
1.0
1.0
.5
.3
.6
.1
.0
.3
.2
.1
.3
.3

Table B–4. Percentage shares of gross domestic product, 1973–2024—Continued
[Percent of nominal GDP]
Government consumption expenditures
and gross investment

Net exports of goods and services
Year or quarter

1973 �����������������������
1974 �����������������������
1975 �����������������������
1976 �����������������������
1977 �����������������������
1978 �����������������������
1979 �����������������������
1980 �����������������������
1981 �����������������������
1982 �����������������������
1983 �����������������������
1984 �����������������������
1985 �����������������������
1986 �����������������������
1987 �����������������������
1988 �����������������������
1989 �����������������������
1990 �����������������������
1991 �����������������������
1992 �����������������������
1993 �����������������������
1994 �����������������������
1995 �����������������������
1996 �����������������������
1997 �����������������������
1998 �����������������������
1999 �����������������������
2000 �����������������������
2001 �����������������������
2002 �����������������������
2003 �����������������������
2004 �����������������������
2005 �����������������������
2006 �����������������������
2007 �����������������������
2008 �����������������������
2009 �����������������������
2010 �����������������������
2011 �����������������������
2012 �����������������������
2013 �����������������������
2014 �����������������������
2015 �����������������������
2016 �����������������������
2017 �����������������������
2018 �����������������������
2019 �����������������������
2020 �����������������������
2021 �����������������������
2022 �����������������������
2023 �����������������������
2021: I �������������������
      II ������������������
      III �����������������
      IV �����������������
2022: I �������������������
      II ������������������
      III �����������������
      IV �����������������
2023: I �������������������
      II ������������������
      III �����������������
      IV �����������������
2024: I �������������������
      II ������������������
      III p ���������������

Net
exports
0.3
–.1
.9
–.1
–1.1
–1.1
–.9
–.5
–.4
–.6
–1.4
–2.5
–2.6
–2.9
–3.0
–2.1
–1.5
–1.3
–.5
–.5
–1.0
–1.3
–1.2
–1.2
–1.2
–1.8
–2.7
–3.7
–3.6
–4.0
–4.6
–5.2
–5.7
–5.7
–5.1
–5.0
–2.9
–3.5
–3.7
–3.4
–2.8
–2.9
–2.9
–2.7
–2.8
–2.9
–2.7
–2.9
–3.6
–3.7
–2.9
–3.5
–3.6
–3.7
–3.7
–4.3
–4.0
–3.4
–3.2
–3.0
–2.9
–2.8
–2.8
–2.9
–3.1
–3.3

Exports
Total
6.7
8.2
8.2
8.0
7.7
7.9
8.8
9.8
9.5
8.5
7.6
7.5
7.0
7.0
7.5
8.5
8.9
9.3
9.7
9.7
9.5
9.9
10.6
10.7
11.1
10.5
10.3
10.7
9.7
9.1
9.0
9.6
10.0
10.6
11.5
12.4
10.9
12.3
13.6
13.6
13.6
13.5
12.4
11.9
12.2
12.3
11.8
10.1
10.8
11.6
11.0
10.5
10.7
10.7
11.2
11.3
11.9
11.8
11.4
11.3
10.9
10.9
10.9
10.9
10.9
10.9

Goods
5.3
6.7
6.7
6.5
6.2
6.4
7.1
8.1
7.6
6.7
5.9
5.7
5.2
5.1
5.5
6.3
6.6
6.8
7.0
7.0
6.8
7.1
7.8
7.8
8.2
7.6
7.4
7.8
7.0
6.5
6.4
6.8
7.1
7.6
8.0
8.7
7.3
8.5
9.4
9.4
9.3
9.2
8.2
7.7
7.9
8.1
7.6
6.7
7.4
7.9
7.3
7.2
7.4
7.3
7.7
7.7
8.2
8.1
7.7
7.6
7.2
7.2
7.2
7.1
7.1
7.1

Imports
Services
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.5
1.5
1.6
1.6
1.8
1.9
1.8
1.7
1.8
1.7
2.0
2.0
2.1
2.3
2.5
2.7
2.7
2.7
2.8
2.9
3.0
3.0
2.9
2.9
2.9
2.7
2.7
2.6
2.9
2.9
3.1
3.5
3.7
3.6
3.9
4.2
4.2
4.3
4.3
4.2
4.2
4.3
4.2
4.2
3.4
3.4
3.7
3.7
3.4
3.4
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.8
3.8
3.8

Total
6.4
8.2
7.3
8.1
8.8
9.0
9.6
10.3
9.9
9.1
9.0
10.0
9.6
9.9
10.5
10.6
10.5
10.6
10.1
10.2
10.5
11.2
11.8
11.9
12.3
12.3
13.0
14.4
13.3
13.2
13.6
14.8
15.7
16.3
16.5
17.4
13.8
15.9
17.3
17.0
16.4
16.4
15.3
14.6
14.9
15.2
14.5
13.0
14.4
15.3
13.9
14.0
14.3
14.5
14.9
15.6
15.9
15.2
14.6
14.3
13.8
13.7
13.7
13.9
14.0
14.2

Goods
5.0
6.8
5.9
6.7
7.3
7.5
8.1
8.7
8.4
7.5
7.5
8.3
7.9
8.1
8.5
8.6
8.6
8.5
8.1
8.4
8.6
9.3
9.9
10.0
10.3
10.3
10.9
12.2
11.1
11.0
11.3
12.4
13.2
13.8
13.8
14.5
11.0
12.9
14.3
14.1
13.6
13.6
12.5
11.8
12.1
12.4
11.7
10.8
12.0
12.5
11.2
11.8
12.0
11.9
12.3
12.9
13.1
12.4
11.8
11.5
11.1
11.1
11.0
11.1
11.2
11.3

Federal
Services
1.4
1.5
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.5
1.5
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.5
1.7
1.7
1.8
1.9
1.9
1.9
2.0
2.0
1.9
1.9
1.9
1.9
1.9
2.0
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.4
2.6
2.7
2.9
2.9
2.9
3.0
2.9
2.8
2.8
2.8
2.8
2.9
2.8
2.8
2.2
2.4
2.8
2.7
2.2
2.3
2.6
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.8
2.8
2.7
2.7
2.7
2.7
2.8
2.8
2.8

Total
21.4
22.1
22.6
21.6
20.9
20.3
20.0
20.6
20.4
21.3
21.1
20.5
21.0
21.3
21.2
20.6
20.4
20.8
21.1
20.6
19.9
19.2
19.0
18.5
18.0
17.8
17.9
17.8
18.4
19.1
19.3
19.1
19.0
19.0
19.3
20.2
21.2
21.0
20.2
19.3
18.6
18.0
17.7
17.6
17.3
17.4
17.6
18.7
17.8
17.1
17.0
18.3
17.8
17.6
17.3
17.2
17.2
17.1
17.1
17.0
16.9
17.0
17.0
17.1
17.0
17.1

Total
10.3
10.3
10.3
9.9
9.6
9.3
9.2
9.6
9.8
10.4
10.5
10.2
10.4
10.5
10.4
9.8
9.5
9.4
9.5
9.0
8.5
7.9
7.5
7.2
6.8
6.5
6.3
6.2
6.3
6.8
7.2
7.3
7.3
7.2
7.3
7.8
8.4
8.6
8.3
7.9
7.3
6.9
6.7
6.6
6.5
6.5
6.6
7.1
6.8
6.3
6.4
7.1
6.8
6.6
6.5
6.4
6.3
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.3
6.4
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.4

National
defense

Nondefense

7.2
7.1
7.0
6.7
6.5
6.2
6.1
6.4
6.7
7.3
7.5
7.4
7.6
7.7
7.7
7.3
6.9
6.8
6.7
6.2
5.7
5.2
4.9
4.7
4.3
4.1
4.0
3.8
3.9
4.2
4.5
4.7
4.7
4.6
4.7
5.1
5.4
5.5
5.3
5.0
4.5
4.2
4.0
3.9
3.8
3.8
3.9
4.1
3.8
3.6
3.6
4.0
3.9
3.8
3.7
3.6
3.6
3.5
3.6
3.6
3.6
3.6
3.6
3.6
3.6
3.7

3.1
3.2
3.3
3.2
3.2
3.1
3.0
3.2
3.1
3.1
3.0
2.8
2.8
2.8
2.7
2.5
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.7
2.6
2.6
2.5
2.5
2.4
2.4
2.3
2.4
2.6
2.7
2.6
2.6
2.6
2.6
2.7
3.0
3.1
3.0
2.9
2.7
2.7
2.7
2.7
2.6
2.7
2.6
3.0
2.9
2.7
2.7
3.1
2.9
2.8
2.8
2.8
2.7
2.7
2.8
2.8
2.7
2.7
2.7
2.7
2.7
2.7

State
and
local
11.1
11.8
12.3
11.7
11.2
10.9
10.8
11.0
10.6
10.9
10.6
10.3
10.5
10.8
10.9
10.8
11.0
11.3
11.6
11.6
11.4
11.4
11.4
11.3
11.2
11.3
11.5
11.6
12.1
12.3
12.1
11.8
11.7
11.7
12.0
12.4
12.8
12.3
11.8
11.4
11.3
11.1
11.0
11.0
10.9
10.9
11.0
11.6
11.0
10.8
10.6
11.2
11.0
11.0
10.8
10.8
10.9
10.8
10.7
10.6
10.6
10.6
10.7
10.7
10.7
10.7

Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).

National Income or Expenditure | 393

Table B–5. Chain-type price indexes for gross domestic product, 1973–2024
[Index numbers, 2017=100, except as noted; quarterly data seasonally adjusted]
Personal consumption expenditures

Gross private domestic investment
Fixed investment

Year or quarter

1973 ����������������������
1974 ����������������������
1975 ����������������������
1976 ����������������������
1977 ����������������������
1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III p ��������������

Gross
domestic
product

23.340
25.434
27.796
29.327
31.148
33.339
36.104
39.375
43.092
45.756
47.545
49.262
50.820
51.850
53.126
55.002
57.159
59.307
61.303
62.701
64.189
65.557
66.933
68.156
69.337
70.102
71.084
72.709
74.385
75.500
77.012
79.069
81.537
84.074
86.352
87.977
88.557
89.618
91.466
93.176
94.786
96.436
97.277
98.208
100.000
102.290
103.981
105.380
110.172
118.041
122.272
107.645
109.278
110.931
112.836
115.160
117.760
119.073
120.173
121.247
121.809
122.785
123.247
124.168
124.942
125.528

Nonresidential
Total

22.455
24.793
26.860
28.333
30.176
32.276
35.143
38.928
42.415
44.771
46.676
48.439
50.128
51.219
52.802
54.865
57.261
59.775
61.774
63.420
65.000
66.356
67.754
69.203
70.407
70.967
72.001
73.822
75.302
76.291
77.894
79.827
82.127
84.440
86.607
89.170
88.921
90.514
92.804
94.534
95.781
97.121
97.299
98.284
100.000
102.047
103.509
104.641
108.972
116.111
120.491
106.529
108.188
109.681
111.491
113.585
115.672
117.014
118.172
119.320
120.182
120.983
121.480
122.507
123.275
123.734

See next page for continuation of table.

394 |

Appendix B

Goods

37.970
42.709
46.159
47.966
50.526
53.626
58.698
65.271
70.120
72.031
73.331
74.718
75.917
75.562
77.992
80.048
83.128
86.532
88.647
89.717
90.496
91.417
92.271
93.285
93.177
91.777
92.258
94.089
94.018
93.122
93.003
94.311
96.203
97.494
98.576
101.524
99.084
100.533
104.325
105.620
105.049
104.542
101.350
99.710
100.000
100.811
100.426
99.656
104.597
113.638
115.030
101.395
103.536
105.380
108.077
111.173
113.982
114.669
114.727
114.946
115.111
115.257
114.807
114.659
114.857
114.397

Services

16.389
17.778
19.302
20.641
22.203
23.910
25.915
28.610
31.541
34.017
36.106
37.985
39.843
41.480
42.726
44.769
46.880
49.029
50.946
52.758
54.582
56.066
57.632
59.214
60.883
62.172
63.409
65.210
67.292
69.033
71.336
73.528
75.998
78.750
81.388
83.783
84.432
86.077
87.742
89.648
91.659
93.795
95.462
97.629
100.000
102.626
104.965
107.055
111.045
117.146
123.067
109.022
110.409
111.708
113.040
114.595
116.300
117.982
119.707
121.335
122.556
123.696
124.680
126.309
127.367
128.296

Total

32.770
36.038
40.356
42.587
45.725
49.431
53.867
58.908
64.404
67.817
68.025
68.758
69.609
71.174
72.656
74.483
76.382
77.978
79.300
79.300
80.240
81.437
82.748
82.700
82.748
82.140
82.218
83.296
84.006
84.281
84.973
87.455
90.993
94.194
95.615
96.400
95.297
93.688
94.598
95.797
96.678
98.331
98.728
98.549
100.000
101.539
102.912
104.063
107.503
115.854
119.552
105.565
106.373
107.978
110.098
112.687
115.217
117.237
118.274
119.373
119.065
119.556
120.214
120.484
121.224
122.101

Total

31.635
34.764
38.984
41.233
44.397
48.111
52.434
57.325
62.589
66.105
66.357
67.004
67.980
69.644
71.061
73.044
74.928
76.565
77.906
77.949
78.886
80.099
81.430
81.498
81.640
81.196
81.333
82.486
83.206
83.453
84.183
86.642
90.223
93.428
94.857
95.658
94.494
93.026
93.991
95.241
96.160
97.922
98.582
98.550
100.000
101.568
102.961
104.179
107.909
116.569
120.448
105.689
106.711
108.537
110.701
113.302
115.969
117.947
119.060
120.094
120.055
120.478
121.164
121.444
122.220
123.162

Total
40.595
44.542
50.410
53.187
56.710
60.502
65.368
71.138
77.902
82.329
82.193
82.453
83.305
84.766
85.734
87.893
89.937
91.867
93.606
93.300
93.500
94.238
95.176
94.599
94.070
92.594
91.666
92.068
91.698
91.219
90.517
91.409
93.780
96.066
97.621
99.131
98.488
96.695
97.756
99.130
99.229
100.170
100.345
99.380
100.000
100.427
101.406
101.953
103.145
109.391
113.208
102.121
102.198
103.279
104.982
106.741
108.815
110.544
111.464
112.979
113.041
113.169
113.643
114.020
114.672
115.466

Structures Equipment
13.393
15.244
17.065
17.901
19.454
21.332
23.811
26.024
29.603
31.939
31.125
31.397
32.144
32.760
33.286
34.698
36.057
37.222
37.896
37.905
39.016
40.394
42.143
43.214
44.864
46.915
48.357
50.252
52.884
55.089
57.057
61.282
68.841
77.037
81.581
85.751
84.186
83.502
86.244
90.209
91.474
96.213
97.719
97.668
100.000
101.174
105.261
106.789
110.306
128.093
135.121
106.435
108.020
110.377
116.394
121.105
126.195
131.250
133.821
135.772
135.408
134.094
135.210
134.513
134.625
134.804

67.811
72.897
84.000
89.157
94.635
99.891
106.353
115.715
124.182
129.288
129.659
128.600
128.600
131.183
132.038
133.864
136.423
139.212
141.570
141.355
139.703
139.454
137.927
134.799
131.083
125.201
120.368
117.751
114.281
111.883
108.990
108.078
107.827
106.758
106.377
105.708
106.354
102.543
102.518
103.088
102.857
102.124
101.498
100.206
100.000
99.921
99.982
99.453
99.862
106.079
110.942
99.444
98.720
99.993
101.290
103.189
105.425
107.073
108.629
110.488
110.531
111.218
111.531
112.583
113.057
113.727

Intellectual
property
products
42.618
46.596
50.336
52.561
54.868
57.725
61.562
66.316
71.265
75.312
78.125
80.315
81.651
82.286
83.761
86.381
87.494
88.404
90.535
89.634
90.261
90.732
93.406
93.818
94.326
93.868
95.383
98.100
97.969
96.657
95.926
95.613
96.232
97.372
98.571
100.125
98.877
98.593
99.807
100.292
99.948
100.326
100.626
99.453
100.000
100.582
100.736
101.895
102.705
103.797
105.244
102.460
102.573
102.833
102.953
103.271
103.868
104.215
103.834
104.833
105.091
105.368
105.686
105.962
107.016
108.197

Residential

15.854
17.492
19.109
20.347
22.425
25.179
28.023
31.045
33.557
35.356
36.193
37.265
38.289
39.978
41.707
43.159
44.570
45.597
46.190
46.759
48.663
50.424
52.227
53.348
54.634
56.075
58.176
60.758
63.642
65.218
68.308
73.102
78.338
82.914
84.010
82.828
79.930
79.643
80.236
81.006
85.095
89.986
92.454
95.699
100.000
105.640
108.600
112.260
124.537
141.754
145.736
118.282
122.449
126.817
130.601
136.158
140.999
143.964
145.894
144.810
144.359
146.086
147.689
147.527
148.802
150.348

Table B–5. Chain-type price indexes for gross domestic product, 1973–2024—Continued
[Index numbers, 2017=100, except as noted; quarterly data seasonally adjusted]
Exports and imports
of goods and
services

Government consumption
expenditures and
gross investment
Federal

Year or quarter

1973 �����������������
1974 �����������������
1975 �����������������
1976 �����������������
1977 �����������������
1978 �����������������
1979 �����������������
1980 �����������������
1981 �����������������
1982 �����������������
1983 �����������������
1984 �����������������
1985 �����������������
1986 �����������������
1987 �����������������
1988 �����������������
1989 �����������������
1990 �����������������
1991 �����������������
1992 �����������������
1993 �����������������
1994 �����������������
1995 �����������������
1996 �����������������
1997 �����������������
1998 �����������������
1999 �����������������
2000 �����������������
2001 �����������������
2002 �����������������
2003 �����������������
2004 �����������������
2005 �����������������
2006 �����������������
2007 �����������������
2008 �����������������
2009 �����������������
2010 �����������������
2011 �����������������
2012 �����������������
2013 �����������������
2014 �����������������
2015 �����������������
2016 �����������������
2017 �����������������
2018 �����������������
2019 �����������������
2020 �����������������
2021 �����������������
2022 �����������������
2023 �����������������
2021: I �������������
      II ������������
      III �����������
      IV �����������
2022: I �������������
      II ������������
      III �����������
      IV �����������
2023: I �������������
      II ������������
      III �����������
      IV �����������
2024: I �������������
      II ������������
      III p ���������

Exports

Imports

Total

37.931
46.714
51.491
53.181
55.348
58.715
65.787
72.462
77.828
78.199
78.518
79.252
76.893
75.610
77.280
81.237
82.583
83.048
83.974
83.566
83.704
84.676
86.569
85.419
83.914
81.927
81.311
82.873
82.223
81.507
82.800
85.818
88.784
91.604
95.059
99.387
93.484
97.378
103.508
104.298
104.457
104.515
99.455
97.457
100.000
103.325
102.829
100.270
111.870
122.863
120.948
106.645
111.258
113.857
115.720
120.614
126.218
123.245
121.372
121.334
120.225
121.441
120.792
121.530
122.339
122.047

29.738
42.545
46.087
47.475
51.658
55.299
64.761
80.674
85.035
82.173
79.093
78.409
75.834
75.832
80.416
84.264
86.106
88.575
87.837
87.907
87.234
88.053
90.466
88.889
85.800
81.180
81.664
85.236
83.031
82.042
84.523
88.553
93.764
97.393
100.794
110.783
98.534
104.107
112.040
112.359
110.894
110.067
101.283
97.825
100.000
102.662
100.999
98.881
106.046
113.687
111.375
102.510
105.630
107.144
108.899
112.376
115.490
114.096
112.784
112.343
111.040
111.061
111.058
111.786
112.373
112.297

18.623
20.412
22.297
23.522
24.977
26.629
28.820
31.802
34.959
37.336
38.781
40.464
41.718
42.418
43.564
45.004
46.723
48.682
50.450
51.978
53.203
54.613
56.163
57.314
58.439
59.433
61.422
64.059
65.909
67.610
70.091
73.016
76.726
80.063
83.653
87.213
86.836
89.149
91.861
93.460
95.634
97.578
97.581
97.766
100.000
103.619
105.155
107.466
113.258
121.360
123.578
110.608
112.411
114.038
115.974
118.349
121.678
122.369
123.046
123.120
122.796
123.992
124.406
125.555
126.199
126.941

Total

22.800
24.620
26.785
28.451
30.201
32.239
34.664
38.013
41.563
44.501
45.977
48.003
49.022
49.255
49.597
51.215
52.646
54.272
56.224
57.660
58.918
60.539
62.413
63.455
64.436
65.260
66.872
69.115
70.395
72.669
75.849
78.458
81.723
84.327
86.829
89.472
89.279
91.394
93.900
94.783
95.597
97.215
97.609
98.205
100.000
102.775
104.352
105.359
108.912
115.218
120.226
107.069
108.223
109.501
110.856
112.633
114.685
116.184
117.371
118.610
119.635
120.759
121.899
122.967
123.825
124.578

National Nondefense defense
22.543
24.387
26.442
28.170
30.015
32.216
34.765
38.319
41.995
45.155
46.824
48.969
49.794
49.815
50.173
51.745
53.147
54.872
56.601
58.247
59.147
60.696
62.422
63.465
64.350
65.152
66.801
69.056
70.365
72.712
76.317
78.965
82.562
85.452
88.071
90.999
90.352
92.273
94.979
95.990
96.459
97.850
98.053
98.419
100.000
102.642
104.067
105.287
109.227
116.361
121.432
107.310
108.561
109.811
111.223
113.574
116.175
117.295
118.400
119.444
120.725
122.051
123.507
124.662
125.486
126.068

23.259
25.013
27.411
28.935
30.477
32.179
34.353
37.286
40.574
43.034
44.065
45.814
47.327
48.109
48.415
50.179
51.695
53.079
55.584
56.548
58.565
60.335
62.496
63.538
64.698
65.560
67.112
69.339
70.576
72.735
75.221
77.770
80.461
82.573
84.879
87.023
87.637
90.094
92.262
92.927
94.308
96.287
96.968
97.897
100.000
102.968
104.767
105.468
108.503
113.744
118.669
106.757
107.784
109.097
110.374
111.418
112.763
114.753
116.043
117.532
118.228
119.094
119.824
120.782
121.682
122.660

State
and
local

15.949
17.717
19.421
20.369
21.636
23.042
25.077
27.821
30.731
32.742
34.189
35.650
37.102
38.171
39.953
41.289
43.244
45.465
47.130
48.736
49.950
51.237
52.602
53.809
55.006
56.078
58.231
61.030
63.128
64.538
66.646
69.726
73.667
77.406
81.603
85.692
85.201
87.642
90.494
92.579
95.654
97.804
97.567
97.505
100.000
104.126
105.638
108.756
115.990
125.246
125.705
112.819
115.044
116.893
119.203
121.961
126.102
126.283
126.640
125.974
124.800
126.041
126.006
127.205
127.720
128.455

Personal
consumption
Final
expenGross
sales of ditures domestic
Gross
domestic excludpurproduct
ing
chases 1 domestic
product
food
and
energy
23.184
25.259
27.609
29.140
30.962
33.151
35.899
39.148
42.834
45.508
47.289
48.997
50.578
51.621
52.888
54.784
56.938
59.091
61.086
62.486
63.972
65.343
66.722
67.963
69.162
69.958
70.955
72.595
74.272
75.380
76.898
78.952
81.426
83.963
86.244
87.871
88.429
89.496
91.352
93.071
94.690
96.358
97.246
98.207
100.000
102.297
103.993
105.404
110.249
118.172
122.438
107.673
109.342
111.035
112.948
115.272
117.899
119.202
120.317
121.379
121.992
122.957
123.423
124.348
125.129
125.725

23.003
24.825
26.899
28.534
30.369
32.382
34.743
37.936
41.260
43.942
46.191
48.106
50.060
51.788
53.460
55.732
58.045
60.397
62.554
64.456
66.206
67.688
69.163
70.474
71.718
72.630
73.583
74.898
76.317
77.593
78.845
80.396
82.158
84.126
86.001
87.688
88.503
89.785
91.209
92.897
94.285
95.697
96.874
98.426
100.000
101.897
103.573
104.951
108.705
114.521
119.268
106.539
108.083
109.385
110.811
112.466
113.795
115.247
116.577
117.931
119.050
119.744
120.346
121.458
122.296
122.947

23.137
25.486
27.815
29.343
31.278
33.501
36.440
40.234
43.945
46.478
48.095
49.722
51.200
52.268
53.747
55.648
57.838
60.127
62.015
63.457
64.890
66.251
67.680
68.857
69.873
70.339
71.410
73.265
74.690
75.713
77.355
79.572
82.346
84.997
87.308
89.787
89.397
90.734
92.921
94.548
95.908
97.408
97.593
98.241
100.000
102.222
103.680
105.020
109.446
116.959
120.873
107.054
108.592
110.126
112.011
114.241
116.606
117.965
119.024
119.991
120.456
121.266
121.778
122.691
123.434
124.015

5.5
9.0
9.3
5.5
6.2
7.0
8.3
9.1
9.4
6.2
3.9
3.6
3.2
2.0
2.5
3.5
3.9
3.8
3.4
2.3
2.4
2.1
2.1
1.8
1.7
1.1
1.4
2.3
2.3
1.5
2.0
2.7
3.1
3.1
2.7
1.9
.7
1.2
2.1
1.9
1.7
1.7
.9
1.0
1.8
2.3
1.7
1.3
4.5
7.1
3.6
5.2
6.2
6.2
7.0
8.5
9.3
4.5
3.7
3.6
1.9
3.2
1.5
3.0
2.5
1.9

Percent change 2
Personal
consumption
expenditures

Total

5.4
10.4
8.3
5.5
6.5
7.0
8.9
10.8
9.0
5.6
4.3
3.8
3.5
2.2
3.1
3.9
4.4
4.4
3.3
2.7
2.5
2.1
2.1
2.1
1.7
.8
1.5
2.5
2.0
1.3
2.1
2.5
2.9
2.8
2.6
3.0
–.3
1.8
2.5
1.9
1.3
1.4
.2
1.0
1.7
2.0
1.4
1.1
4.1
6.6
3.8
4.6
6.4
5.6
6.8
7.7
7.6
4.7
4.0
3.9
2.9
2.7
1.7
3.4
2.5
1.5

Gross
domestic
Excludpuring chases 1
food
and
energy
3.8
7.9
8.4
6.1
6.4
6.6
7.3
9.2
8.8
6.5
5.1
4.1
4.1
3.5
3.2
4.2
4.2
4.1
3.6
3.0
2.7
2.2
2.2
1.9
1.8
1.3
1.3
1.8
1.9
1.7
1.6
2.0
2.2
2.4
2.2
2.0
.9
1.4
1.6
1.9
1.5
1.5
1.2
1.6
1.6
1.9
1.6
1.3
3.6
5.4
4.1
3.4
5.9
4.9
5.3
6.1
4.8
5.2
4.7
4.7
3.8
2.4
2.0
3.7
2.8
2.1

5.7
10.2
9.1
5.5
6.6
7.1
8.8
10.4
9.2
5.8
3.5
3.4
3.0
2.1
2.8
3.5
3.9
4.0
3.1
2.3
2.3
2.1
2.2
1.7
1.5
.7
1.5
2.6
1.9
1.4
2.2
2.9
3.5
3.2
2.7
2.8
–.4
1.5
2.4
1.8
1.4
1.6
.2
.7
1.8
2.2
1.4
1.3
4.2
6.9
3.3
4.6
5.9
5.8
7.0
8.2
8.5
4.7
3.6
3.3
1.6
2.7
1.7
3.0
2.4
1.9

1 Gross domestic product (GDP) less exports of goods and services plus imports of goods and services.
2 Quarterly percent changes are at annual rates.

Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).

National Income or Expenditure | 395

Table B–6. Gross value added by sector, 1973–2024
[Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]
Business 1
Year or quarter

1973 ����������������������
1974 ����������������������
1975 ����������������������
1976 ����������������������
1977 ����������������������
1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III p ��������������

Gross
domestic
product

1,425.4
1,545.2
1,684.9
1,873.4
2,081.8
2,351.6
2,627.3
2,857.3
3,207.0
3,343.8
3,634.0
4,037.6
4,339.0
4,579.6
4,855.2
5,236.4
5,641.6
5,963.1
6,158.1
6,520.3
6,858.6
7,287.2
7,639.7
8,073.1
8,577.6
9,062.8
9,631.2
10,251.0
10,581.9
10,929.1
11,456.5
12,217.2
13,039.2
13,815.6
14,474.2
14,769.9
14,478.1
15,049.0
15,599.7
16,254.0
16,880.7
17,608.1
18,295.0
18,804.9
19,612.1
20,656.5
21,540.0
21,354.1
23,681.2
26,006.9
27,720.7
22,656.8
23,368.9
23,922.0
24,777.0
25,215.5
25,805.8
26,272.0
26,734.3
27,164.4
27,453.8
27,967.7
28,297.0
28,624.1
29,016.7
29,354.3

Total

1,094.0
1,182.8
1,284.8
1,443.3
1,616.2
1,838.2
2,062.8
2,225.8
2,502.0
2,568.6
2,801.9
3,136.7
3,369.6
3,539.3
3,735.2
4,019.3
4,326.7
4,542.0
4,645.0
4,920.2
5,177.4
5,523.7
5,795.1
6,159.5
6,578.8
6,959.2
7,401.8
7,875.9
8,057.7
8,256.0
8,642.9
9,249.3
9,911.0
10,524.7
10,997.8
11,061.8
10,659.6
11,137.8
11,614.9
12,206.4
12,723.8
13,340.5
13,900.9
14,282.7
14,941.9
15,776.7
16,469.3
16,075.7
18,174.9
20,106.2
21,398.5
17,286.6
17,916.9
18,362.2
19,133.9
19,478.0
19,967.1
20,306.3
20,673.3
20,988.5
21,190.8
21,594.7
21,819.8
22,016.0
22,315.1
22,564.3

Nonfarm 1

1,047.2
1,138.5
1,239.2
1,400.2
1,572.7
1,787.5
2,002.7
2,174.4
2,437.0
2,508.2
2,757.0
3,072.6
3,305.9
3,479.4
3,673.2
3,957.9
4,252.8
4,464.2
4,574.7
4,840.4
5,106.2
5,440.1
5,726.7
6,066.9
6,490.6
6,879.2
7,330.2
7,799.3
7,978.6
8,181.0
8,550.4
9,128.4
9,804.7
10,426.4
10,880.0
10,943.0
10,557.1
11,020.8
11,463.7
12,057.7
12,539.3
13,173.5
13,754.7
14,152.4
14,803.1
15,639.9
16,346.7
15,956.7
17,991.3
19,864.3
21,176.2
17,134.9
17,725.5
18,162.7
18,941.9
19,262.0
19,724.3
20,056.7
20,414.2
20,740.8
20,963.1
21,377.4
21,623.4
21,831.4
22,121.7
22,369.2

Households and institutions

Farm

46.8
44.2
45.6
43.0
43.5
50.7
60.1
51.4
65.0
60.4
44.9
64.2
63.7
59.9
62.0
61.4
73.9
77.8
70.4
79.9
71.3
83.6
68.4
92.6
88.1
80.0
71.7
76.7
79.0
75.1
92.4
120.9
106.3
98.3
117.9
118.8
102.5
117.0
151.1
148.8
184.5
167.1
146.3
130.3
138.7
136.8
122.6
119.0
183.6
241.9
222.3
151.7
191.4
199.5
192.0
216.0
242.9
249.6
259.1
247.8
227.7
217.4
196.4
184.6
193.4
195.1

Total

124.6
137.2
151.6
164.9
179.9
202.1
226.3
258.2
291.6
323.8
352.5
383.8
411.8
447.0
489.5
539.8
586.0
636.3
677.3
720.3
772.8
824.7
877.8
923.2
975.9
1,040.6
1,111.2
1,190.7
1,271.7
1,344.7
1,408.8
1,489.2
1,572.8
1,658.9
1,749.5
1,886.9
1,934.9
1,965.0
2,012.0
2,058.4
2,117.2
2,177.9
2,251.0
2,334.3
2,423.2
2,539.1
2,657.2
2,779.8
2,911.4
3,188.0
3,447.3
2,828.1
2,876.4
2,938.2
3,003.1
3,071.3
3,147.5
3,237.3
3,296.1
3,362.7
3,415.1
3,473.8
3,537.5
3,615.5
3,668.3
3,716.8

Households

78.5
85.5
93.7
101.7
110.7
124.8
139.5
158.8
179.2
198.2
213.6
230.9
248.2
268.4
289.8
316.4
341.4
367.6
386.6
407.1
437.6
472.7
506.9
534.6
565.7
601.6
644.0
692.3
748.9
781.6
814.1
862.6
922.3
976.2
1,035.9
1,125.2
1,136.8
1,150.7
1,164.0
1,168.8
1,203.0
1,230.6
1,260.3
1,304.1
1,359.3
1,423.3
1,485.6
1,562.2
1,644.3
1,824.6
1,997.7
1,591.5
1,628.8
1,658.4
1,698.6
1,747.5
1,800.4
1,852.6
1,897.9
1,947.8
1,979.3
2,013.6
2,050.3
2,094.8
2,129.4
2,157.4

Nonprofit
institutions
serving
households 2
46.1
51.7
58.0
63.2
69.2
77.3
86.9
99.3
112.4
125.6
138.9
152.8
163.6
178.6
199.7
223.4
244.6
268.8
290.7
313.2
335.1
352.0
370.9
388.7
410.2
439.0
467.2
498.4
522.8
563.0
594.6
626.6
650.5
682.8
713.6
761.7
798.2
814.3
848.0
889.6
914.2
947.3
990.6
1,030.3
1,063.9
1,115.7
1,171.6
1,217.6
1,267.1
1,363.4
1,449.5
1,236.6
1,247.6
1,279.8
1,304.5
1,323.8
1,347.1
1,384.6
1,398.1
1,414.9
1,435.8
1,460.2
1,487.2
1,520.6
1,538.9
1,559.4

General government 3

Total

206.8
225.3
248.4
265.3
285.7
311.3
338.2
373.4
413.5
451.4
479.7
517.1
557.5
593.3
630.4
677.4
728.8
784.9
835.8
879.8
908.3
938.8
966.9
990.3
1,022.9
1,063.0
1,118.1
1,184.3
1,252.6
1,328.4
1,404.8
1,478.7
1,555.4
1,631.9
1,726.9
1,821.2
1,883.5
1,946.1
1,972.9
1,989.1
2,039.7
2,089.7
2,143.1
2,187.9
2,247.0
2,340.8
2,413.4
2,498.6
2,594.8
2,712.7
2,875.0
2,542.1
2,575.5
2,621.6
2,640.1
2,666.2
2,691.2
2,728.5
2,764.9
2,813.2
2,847.9
2,899.2
2,939.6
2,992.6
3,033.3
3,073.3

Federal

96.4
102.5
110.5
117.3
125.2
135.8
145.4
159.8
178.3
195.7
207.1
225.3
240.0
250.6
261.0
278.5
292.8
306.7
323.5
329.6
331.5
332.6
333.0
331.8
333.5
336.8
345.0
360.3
370.3
397.8
434.7
459.4
488.4
509.9
535.7
569.1
603.0
640.0
659.8
663.7
658.6
667.9
674.6
686.8
702.1
729.7
751.7
787.4
825.9
871.4
929.7
810.7
821.9
830.6
840.7
853.9
864.2
877.4
890.0
907.7
921.7
938.5
950.9
967.0
979.2
991.9

State
and
local
110.4
122.8
138.0
148.0
160.6
175.5
192.8
213.5
235.2
255.6
272.6
291.9
317.6
342.7
369.4
398.8
436.1
478.2
512.2
550.2
576.9
606.2
633.9
658.6
689.3
726.2
773.1
824.0
882.3
930.6
970.1
1,019.3
1,067.0
1,122.1
1,191.2
1,252.1
1,280.5
1,306.1
1,313.1
1,325.5
1,381.1
1,421.8
1,468.5
1,501.1
1,544.9
1,611.0
1,661.7
1,711.3
1,768.9
1,841.3
1,945.3
1,731.4
1,753.7
1,791.0
1,799.5
1,812.3
1,826.9
1,851.1
1,874.9
1,905.5
1,926.2
1,960.7
1,988.8
2,025.5
2,054.1
2,081.4

Addendum:
Gross
housing
value
added
101.4
110.4
121.3
130.9
144.2
160.2
177.7
204.0
231.6
258.6
280.6
303.1
333.8
364.5
392.1
424.2
452.7
487.0
515.3
545.2
578.4
619.6
662.6
695.0
731.9
774.8
825.1
880.6
947.7
983.5
1,014.8
1,074.1
1,149.7
1,209.4
1,279.3
1,388.7
1,415.5
1,443.9
1,471.0
1,493.6
1,534.5
1,574.4
1,618.6
1,675.4
1,734.0
1,814.9
1,908.4
1,990.2
2,097.4
2,323.9
2,546.8
2,030.9
2,077.0
2,115.6
2,166.1
2,226.4
2,291.9
2,358.9
2,418.4
2,481.7
2,523.9
2,567.7
2,613.8
2,666.9
2,709.5
2,745.5

1 Gross domestic business value added equals gross domestic product excluding gross value added of households and institutions and of general
government. Nonfarm value added equals gross domestic business value added excluding gross farm value added.
2 Equals compensation of employees of nonprofit institutions, the rental value of nonresidential fixed assets owned and used by nonprofit institutions serving
households, and rental income of persons for tenant-occupied housing owned by nonprofit institutions.
3 Equals compensation of general government employees plus general government consumption of fixed capital.
Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).

396 |

Appendix B

Table B–7. Real gross value added by sector, 1973–2024
[Billions of chained (2017) dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]
Business 1
Year or quarter

1973 ����������������������
1974 ����������������������
1975 ����������������������
1976 ����������������������
1977 ����������������������
1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III p ��������������

Gross
domestic
product

6,106.4
6,073.4
6,060.9
6,387.4
6,682.8
7,052.7
7,276.0
7,257.3
7,441.5
7,307.3
7,642.3
8,195.3
8,537.0
8,832.6
9,137.7
9,519.4
9,869.0
10,055.1
10,044.2
10,398.0
10,684.2
11,114.6
11,413.0
11,843.6
12,370.3
12,924.9
13,543.8
14,096.0
14,230.7
14,472.7
14,877.3
15,449.8
15,988.0
16,433.1
16,762.4
16,781.5
16,349.1
16,789.8
17,052.4
17,442.8
17,812.2
18,261.7
18,799.6
19,141.7
19,612.1
20,193.9
20,715.7
20,267.6
21,494.8
22,034.8
22,671.1
21,058.4
21,389.0
21,571.4
21,960.4
21,903.9
21,919.2
22,066.8
22,249.5
22,403.4
22,539.4
22,780.9
22,960.6
23,053.5
23,223.9
23,386.7

Total

4,093.6
4,031.2
3,992.9
4,262.7
4,506.8
4,794.2
4,964.5
4,919.7
5,063.2
4,917.8
5,178.5
5,637.8
5,900.7
6,115.1
6,334.2
6,605.5
6,858.3
6,968.2
6,925.7
7,218.9
7,424.8
7,782.8
8,022.0
8,394.4
8,835.1
9,321.2
9,859.2
10,301.6
10,363.5
10,540.7
10,873.0
11,350.4
11,796.2
12,182.9
12,441.8
12,332.0
11,882.3
12,264.0
12,507.6
12,911.8
13,267.3
13,709.7
14,222.0
14,515.7
14,941.9
15,456.6
15,917.4
15,485.2
16,661.3
17,073.0
17,568.7
16,277.2
16,573.3
16,711.8
17,082.9
16,992.9
16,976.3
17,084.0
17,238.6
17,344.8
17,454.4
17,663.8
17,811.8
17,872.6
18,017.0
18,160.0

Nonfarm 1

4,072.1
4,011.2
3,945.4
4,227.8
4,470.2
4,770.3
4,932.3
4,890.7
5,002.0
4,848.9
5,150.1
5,585.3
5,831.8
6,051.8
6,271.3
6,556.6
6,796.9
6,899.1
6,856.1
7,134.5
7,354.4
7,693.2
7,957.5
8,315.0
8,744.4
9,234.3
9,771.4
10,198.8
10,266.6
10,439.8
10,763.5
11,228.2
11,667.5
12,056.6
12,330.8
12,221.0
11,754.4
12,139.2
12,389.8
12,803.2
13,139.5
13,586.7
14,087.6
14,372.3
14,803.1
15,312.5
15,784.7
15,352.9
16,517.6
16,930.7
17,420.3
16,133.2
16,431.6
16,570.1
16,935.4
16,848.8
16,834.5
16,943.3
17,096.4
17,201.2
17,303.1
17,515.1
17,661.6
17,719.4
17,852.9
18,005.0

Households and institutions

Farm

36.6
35.8
42.6
40.7
42.9
40.8
44.5
43.1
57.1
59.8
41.0
55.1
65.0
62.5
63.1
56.3
64.4
69.1
69.3
80.2
71.2
85.9
68.4
79.5
88.6
86.7
88.2
103.0
97.2
101.1
109.7
121.5
127.9
125.1
110.3
110.1
126.8
123.3
118.0
112.4
126.5
124.5
134.8
143.9
138.7
144.1
131.4
131.4
142.9
142.4
148.1
143.3
141.1
141.1
146.3
143.4
141.7
141.5
143.1
144.3
150.0
148.4
149.8
152.8
164.1
154.8

Total

839.7
873.9
904.3
916.0
923.2
957.8
984.4
1,014.0
1,033.5
1,064.8
1,108.7
1,134.2
1,153.9
1,190.0
1,234.6
1,298.0
1,350.7
1,394.0
1,422.6
1,458.6
1,533.7
1,585.5
1,632.7
1,665.2
1,716.4
1,738.7
1,779.1
1,847.6
1,893.5
1,920.8
1,961.9
2,034.1
2,101.3
2,135.6
2,174.4
2,269.8
2,256.0
2,301.5
2,328.3
2,327.9
2,351.5
2,356.9
2,371.9
2,397.3
2,423.2
2,472.1
2,505.9
2,507.4
2,558.4
2,654.2
2,713.9
2,524.5
2,549.8
2,568.4
2,590.8
2,618.4
2,646.9
2,670.7
2,680.8
2,697.8
2,705.9
2,717.7
2,734.2
2,749.4
2,765.5
2,774.9

Households

494.6
516.7
531.5
538.4
538.3
564.2
575.7
592.1
598.6
606.7
630.4
642.3
656.9
670.0
687.0
715.5
737.7
752.0
763.6
780.9
818.8
860.3
890.1
908.3
934.1
958.3
989.0
1,032.8
1,070.7
1,076.3
1,107.7
1,148.5
1,202.8
1,234.6
1,264.1
1,333.7
1,307.7
1,335.3
1,335.3
1,315.4
1,330.7
1,333.2
1,330.9
1,341.3
1,359.3
1,379.5
1,393.9
1,422.8
1,468.3
1,550.7
1,579.5
1,436.9
1,461.5
1,477.7
1,497.1
1,523.3
1,547.5
1,563.2
1,568.8
1,575.1
1,575.7
1,579.4
1,587.7
1,593.4
1,605.9
1,611.3

Nonprofit
institutions
serving
households 2
341.5
353.2
369.0
373.8
381.6
389.4
404.9
418.2
431.7
456.5
476.9
491.0
495.5
519.6
548.5
584.6
616.2
646.9
664.6
683.8
721.6
730.1
747.0
761.4
787.4
783.9
792.6
816.8
823.7
846.3
855.5
887.0
898.9
900.8
909.8
935.0
947.8
965.6
992.8
1,012.5
1,020.8
1,023.8
1,041.0
1,056.0
1,063.9
1,092.6
1,112.0
1,084.9
1,090.8
1,105.4
1,136.2
1,087.9
1,088.9
1,091.6
1,094.9
1,096.7
1,101.4
1,109.5
1,114.0
1,124.5
1,132.0
1,140.0
1,148.2
1,157.7
1,161.3
1,165.4

General government 3

Total

1,373.1
1,400.0
1,421.0
1,433.1
1,448.1
1,475.7
1,492.2
1,514.4
1,525.1
1,543.2
1,556.5
1,579.4
1,627.1
1,670.9
1,712.2
1,760.2
1,803.3
1,848.3
1,867.1
1,875.1
1,879.6
1,881.4
1,884.2
1,887.8
1,902.2
1,923.0
1,939.8
1,971.2
2,005.7
2,043.9
2,069.7
2,084.2
2,103.0
2,120.3
2,150.3
2,194.9
2,234.8
2,245.5
2,235.3
2,215.2
2,201.6
2,198.7
2,206.4
2,228.8
2,247.0
2,265.6
2,293.6
2,272.5
2,284.3
2,316.6
2,398.4
2,264.6
2,275.2
2,299.9
2,297.5
2,301.9
2,304.8
2,320.8
2,339.0
2,370.1
2,388.6
2,409.7
2,425.1
2,441.9
2,452.1
2,463.4

Federal

511.0
511.1
509.4
510.6
512.7
519.5
520.6
529.0
537.9
547.8
561.6
576.2
594.6
608.9
628.1
640.2
650.0
661.3
665.0
654.2
643.3
625.5
605.5
591.1
581.4
575.1
570.4
573.4
575.0
585.2
601.0
609.7
617.5
622.2
630.8
654.2
686.9
710.0
716.7
716.1
704.6
699.9
695.9
700.1
702.1
706.9
716.3
738.7
749.4
750.4
760.0
747.2
749.9
750.2
750.5
751.5
748.6
749.9
751.7
757.0
758.6
762.1
762.5
767.1
770.8
773.9

State
and
local
848.3
879.2
905.9
917.9
932.2
954.1
971.5
985.1
984.9
991.6
987.7
993.9
1,022.5
1,052.3
1,073.2
1,110.0
1,144.2
1,178.4
1,193.9
1,214.3
1,231.0
1,252.5
1,277.3
1,297.1
1,322.7
1,350.9
1,373.2
1,402.2
1,435.6
1,463.8
1,473.2
1,478.6
1,489.3
1,502.0
1,523.5
1,543.9
1,549.8
1,536.1
1,518.6
1,498.8
1,497.0
1,498.8
1,510.4
1,528.7
1,544.9
1,558.7
1,577.3
1,534.5
1,535.9
1,567.0
1,639.3
1,518.6
1,526.4
1,550.5
1,547.9
1,551.3
1,557.0
1,571.6
1,588.0
1,613.9
1,630.9
1,648.5
1,663.8
1,676.0
1,682.5
1,690.8

Addendum:
Gross
housing
value
added
643.1
674.6
696.2
703.1
713.2
738.8
753.1
779.7
795.0
813.5
845.0
861.2
896.8
921.2
942.6
973.7
994.1
1,014.0
1,034.7
1,059.9
1,097.9
1,144.8
1,185.6
1,206.1
1,235.1
1,264.0
1,299.7
1,344.3
1,386.9
1,385.5
1,409.2
1,459.1
1,528.8
1,558.9
1,589.1
1,672.1
1,655.4
1,700.6
1,710.8
1,702.4
1,715.7
1,719.5
1,718.4
1,727.4
1,734.0
1,756.9
1,783.9
1,807.1
1,867.6
1,963.6
1,999.6
1,828.7
1,859.1
1,879.7
1,902.9
1,932.6
1,959.4
1,977.6
1,984.6
1,992.2
1,995.3
2,000.4
2,010.3
2,017.8
2,031.5
2,038.2

1 Gross domestic business value added equals gross domestic product excluding gross value added of households and institutions and of general
government. Nonfarm value added equals gross domestic business value added excluding gross farm value added.
2 Equals compensation of employees of nonprofit institutions, the rental value of nonresidential fixed assets owned and used by nonprofit institutions serving
households, and rental income of persons for tenant-occupied housing owned by nonprofit institutions.
3 Equals compensation of general government employees plus general government consumption of fixed capital.
Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).

National Income or Expenditure | 397

Table B–8. Gross domestic product (GDP) by industry, value added, in current dollars and
as a percentage of GDP, 2013–2024
[Billions of dollars; except as noted]
Private industries
Gross
domestic
product

Year

Total
private
industries

Agriculture,
forestry,
fishing,
and
hunting

Manufacturing
Construction

Mining

Total
manufacturing

Durable
goods

Nondurable
goods

Utilities

Wholesale
trade

Retail
trade

Value added
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������

16,880.7
17,608.1
18,295.0
18,804.9
19,612.1
20,656.5
21,540.0
21,354.1
23,681.2
26,006.9
27,720.7
22,656.8
23,368.9
23,922.0
24,777.0
25,215.5
25,805.8
26,272.0
26,734.3
27,164.4
27,453.8
27,967.7
28,297.0
28,624.1
29,016.7

14,665.5
15,332.5
15,951.0
16,413.1
17,156.3
18,097.8
18,909.8
18,641.7
20,871.2
23,068.3
24,615.6
19,900.7
20,579.8
21,084.4
21,920.0
22,326.0
22,889.4
23,316.5
23,741.5
24,121.9
24,376.5
24,838.1
25,125.9
25,397.2
25,746.2

215.8
200.6
182.1
167.5
176.8
177.1
164.2
162.9
228.6
290.0
274.2
196.4
234.7
244.4
238.9
263.3
289.3
298.1
309.3
299.4
280.1
269.4
247.8
235.4
243.0

388.2
418.1
262.3
211.8
267.3
313.5
294.0
201.9
331.9
460.6
411.8
279.9
309.5
340.1
398.1
415.4
503.6
488.2
435.0
406.6
388.1
424.1
428.3
399.2
404.4

86.9
87.1
87.2
87.3
87.5
87.6
87.8
87.3
88.1
88.7
88.8
87.8
88.1
88.1
88.5
88.5
88.7
88.8
88.8
88.8
88.8
88.8
88.8
88.7
88.7

1.3
1.1
1.0
.9
.9
.9
.8
.8
1.0
1.1
1.0
.9
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.1
1.1
1.2
1.1
1.0
1.0
.9
.8
.8

2.3
2.4
1.4
1.1
1.4
1.5
1.4
.9
1.4
1.8
1.5
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.6
1.6
2.0
1.9
1.6
1.5
1.4
1.5
1.5
1.4
1.4

Percent
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

594.7
649.9
715.3
776.8
840.2
889.1
953.0
957.8
1,011.7
1,114.3
1,220.6
995.0
999.5
1,007.5
1,044.8
1,079.1
1,091.2
1,117.6
1,169.3
1,185.6
1,202.4
1,231.6
1,262.7
1,291.1
1,306.4

1,970.5
2,009.7
2,071.1
2,035.2
2,109.7
2,261.8
2,268.8
2,149.5
2,408.8
2,684.5
2,840.4
2,296.3
2,364.9
2,412.8
2,561.0
2,603.3
2,681.2
2,686.1
2,767.3
2,765.6
2,789.3
2,891.1
2,915.7
2,880.6
2,909.5

1,083.7
1,106.1
1,144.5
1,139.9
1,178.3
1,232.5
1,262.5
1,200.2
1,283.5
1,399.7
1,511.9
1,260.9
1,276.5
1,266.6
1,330.0
1,357.9
1,382.3
1,410.1
1,448.5
1,457.9
1,501.0
1,532.4
1,556.5
1,527.4
1,547.8

886.8
903.6
926.7
895.4
931.4
1,029.3
1,006.2
949.3
1,125.3
1,284.8
1,328.5
1,035.4
1,088.4
1,146.2
1,231.0
1,245.4
1,299.0
1,276.0
1,318.8
1,307.7
1,288.3
1,358.7
1,359.3
1,353.1
1,361.7

287.6
299.3
300.5
303.4
313.7
320.4
331.6
345.7
390.8
443.6
446.5
386.6
375.3
390.9
410.3
395.5
456.9
467.8
454.3
454.0
452.0
449.8
430.2
435.8
441.5

1,042.7
1,092.1
1,148.6
1,142.9
1,176.1
1,222.1
1,296.8
1,301.8
1,415.1
1,595.5
1,653.0
1,364.0
1,395.8
1,421.3
1,479.3
1,550.4
1,584.9
1,610.2
1,636.7
1,640.7
1,640.2
1,660.4
1,670.8
1,684.8
1,690.5

979.7
1,018.2
1,081.2
1,133.2
1,178.9
1,223.6
1,277.6
1,333.1
1,535.2
1,628.9
1,772.4
1,479.9
1,553.8
1,526.0
1,581.0
1,581.5
1,606.5
1,635.8
1,691.6
1,728.7
1,746.8
1,796.3
1,817.8
1,818.8
1,823.4

1.7
1.7
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.7
1.6
1.7
1.6
1.6
1.7
1.6
1.8
1.8
1.7
1.7
1.6
1.6
1.5
1.5
1.5

6.2
6.2
6.3
6.1
6.0
5.9
6.0
6.1
6.0
6.1
6.0
6.0
6.0
5.9
6.0
6.1
6.1
6.1
6.1
6.0
6.0
5.9
5.9
5.9
5.8

5.8
5.8
5.9
6.0
6.0
5.9
5.9
6.2
6.5
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6
6.4
6.4
6.3
6.2
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.4
6.4
6.4
6.4
6.3

Industry value added as a percentage of GDP (percent)
3.5
3.7
3.9
4.1
4.3
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.3
4.3
4.4
4.4
4.3
4.2
4.2
4.3
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.4
4.4
4.4
4.5
4.5
4.5

11.7
11.4
11.3
10.8
10.8
10.9
10.5
10.1
10.2
10.3
10.2
10.1
10.1
10.1
10.3
10.3
10.4
10.2
10.4
10.2
10.2
10.3
10.3
10.1
10.0

6.4
6.3
6.3
6.1
6.0
6.0
5.9
5.6
5.4
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.5
5.3
5.4
5.4
5.4
5.4
5.4
5.4
5.5
5.5
5.5
5.3
5.3

5.3
5.1
5.1
4.8
4.7
5.0
4.7
4.4
4.8
4.9
4.8
4.6
4.7
4.8
5.0
4.9
5.0
4.9
4.9
4.8
4.7
4.9
4.8
4.7
4.7

1 Consists of agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting; mining; construction; and manufacturing.
2 Consists of utilities; wholesale trade; retail trade; transportation and warehousing; information; finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing;

professional and business services; educational services, health care, and social assistance; arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services;
and other services, except government.
Note: Data shown in shown in Tables B–8 and B–9 are consistent with the annual revision of the industry accounts released in September 2024. For details
see Survey of Current Business, October 2024.
See next page for continuation of table.

398 |

Appendix B

Table B–8. Gross domestic product (GDP) by industry, value added, in current dollars and
as a percentage of GDP, 2013–2024—Continued
[Billions of dollars; except as noted]
Private industries—Continued

Year

Transportation
and
warehousing

Finance,
insurance,
real
estate,
Information
rental,
and
leasing

Professional
and
business
services

Arts,
Educational entertainservices,
ment,
health
recreation,
care,
accommoand
dation,
social
food
assistance and
services

Other
services,
except
government

Government

Private
Private
goodsservicesproducing producing
industries 1 industries 2

Value added
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������

497.4
533.6
583.9
603.0
635.5
677.3
710.0
638.7
775.4
916.3
943.7
697.3
747.8
801.4
855.3
882.4
910.4
934.5
937.9
944.7
948.2
936.8
945.2
951.1
965.0

835.5
848.8
913.1
974.9
1,010.0
1,041.5
1,142.6
1,181.3
1,310.4
1,367.5
1,477.9
1,263.5
1,300.9
1,317.7
1,359.3
1,340.0
1,354.3
1,374.4
1,401.2
1,426.8
1,463.5
1,504.4
1,516.9
1,536.0
1,556.7

3,368.7
3,569.9
3,728.6
3,894.7
4,033.0
4,258.2
4,458.1
4,628.8
5,003.6
5,417.5
5,811.6
4,825.0
4,940.7
5,040.7
5,208.2
5,288.7
5,364.6
5,470.2
5,546.6
5,689.6
5,755.6
5,859.8
5,941.5
6,042.4
6,151.7

2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������

2.9
3.0
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.3
3.3
3.0
3.3
3.5
3.4
3.1
3.2
3.4
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.6
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.3
3.3
3.3
3.3

4.9
4.8
5.0
5.2
5.1
5.0
5.3
5.5
5.5
5.3
5.3
5.6
5.6
5.5
5.5
5.3
5.2
5.2
5.2
5.3
5.3
5.4
5.4
5.4
5.4

20.0
20.3
20.4
20.7
20.6
20.6
20.7
21.7
21.1
20.8
21.0
21.3
21.1
21.1
21.0
21.0
20.8
20.8
20.7
20.9
21.0
21.0
21.0
21.1
21.2

2,021.2
2,120.1
2,237.0
2,305.0
2,433.6
2,589.1
2,728.9
2,726.1
3,064.2
3,381.0
3,611.7
2,929.4
3,005.7
3,103.5
3,217.9
3,294.8
3,340.1
3,414.6
3,474.6
3,535.9
3,593.3
3,630.5
3,687.0
3,761.0
3,820.4

1,450.0
1,495.0
1,574.9
1,657.0
1,716.9
1,792.0
1,884.2
1,870.0
2,004.2
2,151.4
2,350.9
1,963.2
1,980.8
2,013.8
2,058.8
2,100.3
2,117.7
2,171.4
2,216.4
2,283.6
2,326.8
2,370.9
2,422.3
2,480.0
2,517.3

653.1
692.5
748.8
791.8
831.2
874.6
922.2
693.4
906.7
1,067.9
1,211.5
766.3
891.0
968.6
1,000.9
1,005.0
1,050.8
1,091.5
1,124.2
1,179.8
1,205.5
1,224.1
1,236.5
1,267.5
1,292.5

360.5
384.7
403.5
415.9
433.2
457.7
477.9
450.6
484.8
549.3
589.4
458.0
479.3
495.8
506.0
526.2
537.9
556.2
577.1
580.6
584.7
589.0
603.3
613.6
623.9

2,215.2
2,275.6
2,344.0
2,391.9
2,455.8
2,558.8
2,630.2
2,712.4
2,810.0
2,938.6
3,105.1
2,756.1
2,789.1
2,837.5
2,857.1
2,889.5
2,916.4
2,955.5
2,992.8
3,042.4
3,077.3
3,129.6
3,171.0
3,226.9
3,270.5

3,169.3
3,278.3
3,230.9
3,191.3
3,394.1
3,641.5
3,680.0
3,472.1
3,981.0
4,549.4
4,746.9
3,767.5
3,908.6
4,004.8
4,242.9
4,361.2
4,565.3
4,590.1
4,680.8
4,657.3
4,659.9
4,816.2
4,854.5
4,806.3
4,863.4

11,496.3
12,054.2
12,720.1
13,221.7
13,762.2
14,456.3
15,229.8
15,169.6
16,890.3
18,519.0
19,868.7
16,133.1
16,671.1
17,079.6
17,677.1
17,964.8
18,324.0
18,726.4
19,060.6
19,464.7
19,716.6
20,021.9
20,271.5
20,590.9
20,882.8

13.1
12.9
12.8
12.7
12.5
12.4
12.2
12.7
11.9
11.3
11.2
12.2
11.9
11.9
11.5
11.5
11.3
11.2
11.2
11.2
11.2
11.2
11.2
11.3
11.3

18.8
18.6
17.7
17.0
17.3
17.6
17.1
16.3
16.8
17.5
17.1
16.6
16.7
16.7
17.1
17.3
17.7
17.5
17.5
17.1
17.0
17.2
17.2
16.8
16.8

68.1
68.5
69.5
70.3
70.2
70.0
70.7
71.0
71.3
71.2
71.7
71.2
71.3
71.4
71.3
71.2
71.0
71.3
71.3
71.7
71.8
71.6
71.6
71.9
72.0

Industry value added as a percentage of GDP (percent)
12.0
12.0
12.2
12.3
12.4
12.5
12.7
12.8
12.9
13.0
13.0
12.9
12.9
13.0
13.0
13.1
12.9
13.0
13.0
13.0
13.1
13.0
13.0
13.1
13.2

8.6
8.5
8.6
8.8
8.8
8.7
8.7
8.8
8.5
8.3
8.5
8.7
8.5
8.4
8.3
8.3
8.2
8.3
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.5
8.6
8.7
8.7

3.9
3.9
4.1
4.2
4.2
4.2
4.3
3.2
3.8
4.1
4.4
3.4
3.8
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.1
4.2
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.4
4.4
4.4
4.5

2.1
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.1
2.0
2.1
2.1
2.0
2.1
2.1
2.0
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.2
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.2

Note (cont’d): Value added is the contribution of each private industry and of government to GDP. Value added is equal to an industry’s gross output minus
its intermediate inputs. Current-dollar value added is calculated as the sum of distributions by an industry to its labor and capital, which are derived from the
components of gross domestic income.
Value added industry data shown in Tables B–8 and B–9 are based on the 2017 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).
Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).

National Income or Expenditure | 399

Table B–9. Real gross domestic product by industry, value added, and percent changes,
2013–2024
Private industries
Gross
domestic
product

Year

Total
private
industries

Agriculture,
forestry,
fishing,
and
hunting

Manufacturing
Mining

Construction

Total
manufacturing

Durable
goods

Nondurable
goods

Utilities

Wholesale
trade

Retail
trade

Chain-type quantity indexes for value added (2017=100)
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������

90.822
93.115
95.857
97.601
100.000
102.967
105.627
103.342
109.600
112.353
115.597
107.374
109.060
109.990
111.974
111.685
111.764
112.516
113.448
114.233
114.926
116.158
117.074
117.548
118.416

89.864
92.449
95.558
97.403
100.000
103.238
106.179
103.693
110.775
113.698
117.117
108.365
110.226
111.112
113.399
113.001
113.036
113.877
114.875
115.663
116.397
117.728
118.680
119.146
120.111

2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������

2.1
2.5
2.9
1.8
2.5
3.0
2.6
–2.2
6.1
2.5
2.9
5.6
6.4
3.5
7.4
–1.0
.3
2.7
3.4
2.8
2.4
4.4
3.2
1.6
3.0

2.5
2.9
3.4
1.9
2.7
3.2
2.8
–2.3
6.8
2.6
3.0
6.4
7.0
3.3
8.5
–1.4
.1
3.0
3.6
2.8
2.6
4.7
3.3
1.6
3.3

90.722
89.904
97.033
102.656
100.000
104.108
97.534
98.904
105.009
104.981
108.950
105.263
103.398
103.874
107.503
105.712
104.139
104.364
105.708
106.602
110.476
109.089
109.632
111.142
117.229

90.442
100.047
106.970
97.872
100.000
103.633
116.893
113.913
103.877
94.180
125.813
110.036
104.075
102.578
98.820
91.011
87.117
93.543
105.052
113.551
127.219
131.389
131.094
127.506
125.922

83.022
85.837
90.977
95.732
100.000
102.801
105.007
102.673
105.640
99.970
97.720
106.262
107.637
105.480
103.180
105.241
101.369
96.825
96.445
96.065
96.520
98.732
99.562
101.562
102.847

96.229
97.133
97.870
97.138
100.000
104.897
105.456
100.880
108.519
109.538
109.869
106.544
107.840
107.881
111.810
110.338
109.071
109.133
109.608
106.909
108.752
111.154
112.660
110.786
112.992

95.081
95.920
96.741
96.362
100.000
104.189
105.402
99.552
107.235
109.777
108.834
106.137
107.168
106.035
109.599
109.840
110.451
109.349
109.469
107.636
108.789
109.086
109.823
106.849
108.376

97.697
98.686
99.316
98.128
100.000
105.774
105.523
102.594
110.221
109.539
111.281
107.190
108.846
110.262
114.585
111.146
107.852
109.147
110.009
106.324
108.908
113.742
116.149
115.612
118.651

96.905
93.312
94.652
99.951
100.000
98.584
99.620
105.625
102.412
104.221
109.329
99.514
100.861
103.612
105.662
105.998
105.210
101.688
103.988
104.234
116.767
106.112
110.204
107.606
109.091

92.194
95.876
100.243
99.410
100.000
100.829
101.872
102.497
101.524
99.929
99.383
103.665
102.580
99.142
100.708
100.196
98.410
99.845
101.266
100.975
99.224
98.879
98.453
99.415
99.974

82.969
85.421
89.904
95.177
100.000
103.490
106.343
104.397
105.027
100.758
111.768
110.774
105.810
101.163
102.360
97.895
98.760
101.046
105.329
107.763
108.109
113.923
117.275
119.183
119.016

2.6
4.0
4.6
–.8
.6
.8
1.0
.6
–.9
–1.6
–.5
–4.5
–4.1
–12.7
6.5
–2.0
–6.9
6.0
5.8
–1.1
–6.8
–1.4
–1.7
4.0
2.3

4.6
3.0
5.2
5.9
5.1
3.5
2.8
–1.8
.6
–4.1
10.9
16.6
–16.8
–16.4
4.8
–16.3
3.6
9.6
18.1
9.6
1.3
23.3
12.3
6.7
–.6

Percent change from year earlier; quarterly changes at seasonally adjusted annual rates
10.1
–.9
7.9
5.8
–2.6
4.1
–6.3
1.4
6.2
.0
3.8
4.6
–6.9
1.9
14.7
–6.5
–5.8
.9
5.3
3.4
15.3
–4.9
2.0
5.6
23.8

4.1
10.6
6.9
–8.5
2.2
3.6
12.8
–2.5
–8.8
–9.3
33.6
–.4
–20.0
–5.6
–13.9
–28.1
–16.0
32.9
59.1
36.5
57.6
13.8
–.9
–10.5
–4.9

4.1
3.4
6.0
5.2
4.5
2.8
2.1
–2.2
2.9
–5.4
–2.3
4.2
5.3
–7.8
–8.4
8.2
–13.9
–16.8
–1.6
–1.6
1.9
9.5
3.4
8.3
5.2

3.3
.9
.8
–.7
2.9
4.9
.5
–4.3
7.6
.9
.3
5.8
5.0
.2
15.4
–5.2
–4.5
.2
1.8
–9.5
7.1
9.1
5.5
–6.5
8.2

2.4
.9
.9
–.4
3.8
4.2
1.2
–5.6
7.7
2.4
–.9
8.2
3.9
–4.2
14.1
.9
2.2
–3.9
.4
–6.5
4.4
1.1
2.7
–10.4
5.8

4.4
1.0
.6
–1.2
1.9
5.8
–.2
–2.8
7.4
–.6
1.6
3.1
6.3
5.3
16.6
–11.5
–11.3
4.9
3.2
–12.7
10.1
19.0
8.7
–1.8
10.9

–0.7
–3.7
1.4
5.6
.0
–1.4
1.1
6.0
–3.0
1.8
4.9
–16.6
5.5
11.4
8.2
1.3
–2.9
–12.7
9.4
.9
57.5
–31.8
16.3
–9.1
5.6

1 Consists of agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting; mining; construction; and manufacturing.
2 Consists of utilities; wholesale trade; retail trade; transportation and warehousing; information; finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing;
professional and business services; educational services, health care, and social assistance; arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services;
and other services, except government.
See next page for continuation of table.

400 |

Appendix B

Table B–9. Real gross domestic product by industry, value added, and percent changes,
2013–2024—Continued
Private industries—Continued

Year

Transportation
and
warehousing

Finance,
insurance,
estate,
Information realrental,
and
leasing

Professional
and
business
services

Arts,
Educational entertainservices,
ment,
health
recreation,
care,
accommoand
dation,
social
food
assistance and
services

Other
services,
except
government

Government

Private
Private
goodsservicesproducing producing
industries 1 industries 2

Chain-type quantity indexes for value added (2017=100)
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������

86.192
89.654
93.015
95.017
100.000
103.487
103.692
95.046
107.988
109.639
111.250
104.408
106.247
109.444
111.854
109.774
109.315
109.780
109.687
110.115
110.957
111.915
112.013
112.251
112.361

75.518
77.904
86.201
93.855
100.000
105.547
116.604
121.210
137.679
146.411
158.992
130.666
136.254
139.165
144.631
143.132
144.811
147.560
150.141
153.660
156.703
162.331
163.275
164.090
164.723

2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������

3.2
4.0
3.7
2.2
5.2
3.5
.2
–8.3
13.6
1.5
1.5
32.3
7.2
12.6
9.1
–7.2
–1.7
1.7
–.3
1.6
3.1
3.5
.4
.9
.4

10.6
3.2
10.7
8.9
6.5
5.5
10.5
4.0
13.6
6.3
8.6
16.6
18.2
8.8
16.7
–4.1
4.8
7.8
7.2
9.7
8.2
15.2
2.3
2.0
1.6

95.723
97.903
99.046
99.735
100.000
101.493
103.760
105.130
111.021
114.564
115.947
108.339
110.078
111.473
114.196
114.422
114.631
114.931
114.270
115.550
115.234
116.276
116.726
116.692
117.788

86.363
90.213
93.361
95.354
100.000
106.203
111.450
110.886
125.125
135.869
139.370
118.933
122.926
127.234
131.405
133.165
134.766
136.909
138.639
138.711
138.950
139.288
140.533
142.002
142.667

89.698
91.582
95.191
97.998
100.000
102.806
106.028
102.604
107.235
112.396
117.720
105.454
106.544
107.684
109.257
110.959
111.607
113.162
113.857
116.357
116.899
118.105
119.517
120.940
122.094

89.384
92.798
95.785
97.476
100.000
101.915
104.062
76.482
95.745
103.920
107.062
83.593
96.451
101.296
101.642
100.358
104.554
105.802
104.966
107.609
107.095
107.281
106.261
107.998
108.824

91.976
96.172
97.869
97.946
100.000
103.209
103.662
93.375
96.367
100.668
95.628
92.388
96.384
98.325
98.369
100.168
100.950
100.957
100.597
98.247
95.692
93.708
94.863
94.696
94.264

98.400
98.349
98.176
98.986
100.000
101.110
101.770
100.467
101.273
102.942
105.147
100.238
100.773
102.063
102.019
102.519
102.802
102.960
103.487
104.321
104.807
105.384
106.076
106.566
106.766

91.789
94.046
96.782
97.124
100.000
104.232
105.875
102.274
107.413
105.619
108.390
106.855
107.467
106.867
108.461
107.135
104.842
104.523
105.976
105.114
107.586
109.861
110.998
110.281
112.149

89.378
92.052
95.256
97.471
100.000
102.991
106.251
104.031
111.578
115.701
119.289
108.722
110.881
112.126
114.581
114.420
115.070
116.223
117.091
118.320
118.590
119.671
120.573
121.344
122.079

4.0
2.5
2.9
.4
3.0
4.2
1.6
–3.4
5.0
–1.7
2.6
4.9
2.3
–2.2
6.1
–4.8
–8.3
–1.2
5.7
–3.2
9.7
8.7
4.2
–2.6
6.9

2.1
3.0
3.5
2.3
2.6
3.0
3.2
–2.1
7.3
3.7
3.1
6.8
8.2
4.6
9.0
–.6
2.3
4.1
3.0
4.3
.9
3.7
3.0
2.6
2.4

Percent change from year earlier; quarterly changes at seasonally adjusted annual rates
–0.4
2.3
1.2
.7
.3
1.5
2.2
1.3
5.6
3.2
1.2
3.2
6.6
5.2
10.1
.8
.7
1.1
–2.3
4.6
–1.1
3.7
1.6
–.1
3.8

1.8
4.5
3.5
2.1
4.9
6.2
4.9
–.5
12.8
8.6
2.6
14.8
14.1
14.8
13.8
5.5
4.9
6.5
5.2
.2
.7
1.0
3.6
4.2
1.9

1.8
2.1
3.9
2.9
2.0
2.8
3.1
–3.2
4.5
4.8
4.7
–5.2
4.2
4.3
6.0
6.4
2.4
5.7
2.5
9.1
1.9
4.2
4.9
4.8
3.9

2.6
3.8
3.2
1.8
2.6
1.9
2.1
–26.5
25.2
8.5
3.0
25.2
77.2
21.7
1.4
–5.0
17.8
4.9
–3.1
10.5
–1.9
.7
–3.7
6.7
3.1

1.0
4.6
1.8
.1
2.1
3.2
.4
–9.9
3.2
4.5
–5.0
–10.6
18.5
8.3
.2
7.5
3.2
.0
–1.4
–9.0
–10.0
–8.0
5.0
–.7
–1.8

–0.5
–.1
–.2
.8
1.0
1.1
.7
–1.3
.8
1.6
2.1
.3
2.2
5.2
–.2
2.0
1.1
.6
2.1
3.3
1.9
2.2
2.7
1.9
.8

Note: Data are based on the 2017 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).
See Note, Table B–8.
Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).

National Income or Expenditure | 401

Table B–10. Personal consumption expenditures, 1973–2024
[Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]
Goods

Year or quarter

1973 ����������������������
1974 ����������������������
1975 ����������������������
1976 ����������������������
1977 ����������������������
1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III p ��������������

Personal
consumption
expenditures

849.6
930.2
1,030.5
1,147.7
1,274.0
1,422.3
1,585.4
1,750.7
1,934.0
2,071.3
2,281.6
2,492.3
2,712.8
2,886.3
3,076.3
3,330.0
3,576.8
3,809.0
3,943.4
4,197.6
4,452.0
4,721.0
4,962.6
5,244.6
5,536.8
5,877.2
6,283.8
6,767.2
7,073.8
7,348.9
7,740.7
8,232.0
8,769.1
9,277.2
9,746.6
10,050.1
9,891.2
10,260.3
10,698.9
11,047.4
11,388.2
11,874.5
12,297.4
12,726.8
13,290.6
13,934.4
14,437.5
14,225.7
16,113.9
17,690.8
18,822.8
15,259.4
16,016.3
16,363.9
16,816.1
17,175.1
17,603.8
17,876.2
18,108.3
18,506.2
18,685.7
18,929.0
19,170.2
19,424.8
19,682.7
19,928.2

Durable

Total

416.6
451.5
491.3
546.3
600.4
663.6
737.9
799.8
869.4
899.3
973.8
1,063.7
1,137.6
1,195.6
1,256.3
1,337.3
1,423.8
1,491.3
1,497.4
1,563.3
1,642.3
1,746.6
1,815.5
1,917.7
2,006.5
2,108.4
2,287.1
2,453.2
2,525.6
2,598.8
2,722.6
2,902.0
3,082.9
3,239.7
3,367.0
3,363.2
3,180.0
3,317.8
3,518.1
3,637.7
3,742.2
3,886.6
3,955.1
4,033.0
4,212.2
4,414.2
4,532.8
4,706.7
5,500.4
5,939.1
6,123.9
5,248.9
5,543.6
5,501.8
5,707.1
5,846.1
5,971.1
5,973.0
5,966.2
6,084.8
6,088.1
6,147.9
6,174.8
6,148.9
6,204.6
6,264.3

Services
Nondurable

Total 1

Motor
vehicles
and
parts

130.5
130.2
142.2
168.6
192.0
213.3
226.3
226.4
243.9
253.0
295.0
342.2
380.4
421.4
442.0
475.1
494.3
497.1
477.2
508.1
551.5
607.2
635.7
676.3
715.5
779.3
855.6
912.6
941.5
985.4
1,017.8
1,080.6
1,128.6
1,158.3
1,188.0
1,098.8
1,012.1
1,049.0
1,093.5
1,144.2
1,191.8
1,247.3
1,315.8
1,356.5
1,415.9
1,488.8
1,523.6
1,616.9
1,990.3
2,078.0
2,142.6
1,917.4
2,050.3
1,953.3
2,040.1
2,084.5
2,078.8
2,083.4
2,065.4
2,146.4
2,143.1
2,141.7
2,139.3
2,127.3
2,141.8
2,168.2

54.4
48.2
52.6
68.2
79.8
89.2
90.2
84.4
93.0
100.0
122.9
147.2
170.1
187.5
188.2
202.2
207.8
205.1
185.7
204.8
224.7
249.8
255.7
273.5
293.1
320.2
350.7
363.2
383.3
401.3
401.5
409.3
410.0
394.9
400.6
343.3
318.6
344.5
365.2
396.6
422.1
451.6
490.7
504.6
529.4
550.0
545.0
546.7
697.3
726.4
750.0
672.6
744.6
665.2
707.0
735.4
727.4
723.2
719.5
764.0
761.7
743.4
730.7
711.9
715.6
724.3

Total 1

286.1
321.4
349.2
377.7
408.4
450.2
511.6
573.4
625.4
646.3
678.8
721.5
757.2
774.2
814.3
862.3
929.5
994.2
1,020.3
1,055.2
1,090.8
1,139.4
1,179.8
1,241.4
1,291.0
1,329.1
1,431.5
1,540.6
1,584.1
1,613.4
1,704.8
1,821.4
1,954.3
2,081.3
2,179.0
2,264.5
2,167.9
2,268.9
2,424.6
2,493.5
2,550.4
2,639.3
2,639.3
2,676.5
2,796.3
2,925.4
3,009.2
3,089.8
3,510.1
3,861.0
3,981.3
3,331.6
3,493.3
3,548.6
3,667.0
3,761.6
3,892.3
3,889.6
3,900.8
3,938.5
3,945.1
4,006.2
4,035.4
4,021.5
4,062.8
4,096.1

Food and
beverages Gasoline
purchased and
for offother
premises energy
congoods
sumption
126.7
143.0
156.6
167.3
179.8
196.1
218.4
239.2
255.3
267.1
277.0
291.1
303.0
316.4
324.3
342.8
365.4
391.2
403.0
404.5
413.5
432.1
443.7
461.9
474.8
487.4
515.5
540.6
564.0
575.1
599.6
632.6
668.2
700.3
737.3
769.1
772.9
786.9
819.5
846.2
870.5
910.4
942.0
969.6
1,010.4
1,044.4
1,083.2
1,198.9
1,291.9
1,395.8
1,444.0
1,252.7
1,282.1
1,301.2
1,331.5
1,357.2
1,385.7
1,411.2
1,429.1
1,436.1
1,434.8
1,447.6
1,457.6
1,464.9
1,471.4
1,487.6

Addendum:
Personal
consumption
expendiFinancial
tures
excluding
Health services
and
food
care
insurand
ance
energy 2

Household consumption
expenditures

34.3
43.8
48.0
53.0
57.8
61.5
80.4
101.9
113.4
108.4
106.5
108.2
110.5
91.2
96.4
99.9
110.4
124.2
121.1
125.0
126.9
129.2
133.4
144.7
147.7
132.4
146.5
184.5
178.0
167.9
196.4
232.7
283.8
319.7
345.5
391.1
287.0
336.7
413.8
421.9
421.6
410.9
318.8
287.0
324.0
366.7
352.5
258.4
385.8
514.6
467.2
318.6
369.3
403.6
451.6
496.6
564.0
511.5
486.5
469.4
459.1
476.2
464.0
443.3
456.2
436.7

Total

432.9
478.6
539.2
601.4
673.6
758.7
847.5
950.9
1,064.6
1,172.0
1,307.8
1,428.6
1,575.2
1,690.7
1,820.0
1,992.7
2,153.0
2,317.7
2,446.0
2,634.3
2,809.6
2,974.4
3,147.1
3,326.9
3,530.3
3,768.8
3,996.7
4,314.0
4,548.2
4,750.1
5,018.2
5,329.9
5,686.1
6,037.6
6,379.6
6,686.9
6,711.2
6,942.4
7,180.7
7,409.6
7,646.1
7,987.9
8,342.3
8,693.8
9,078.4
9,520.2
9,904.7
9,519.0
10,613.6
11,751.8
12,698.9
10,010.5
10,472.7
10,862.0
11,109.1
11,329.0
11,632.7
11,903.3
12,142.1
12,421.4
12,597.6
12,781.1
12,995.4
13,275.9
13,478.1
13,663.9

Total 1

Housing
and
utilities

419.2
463.1
522.2
582.4
653.0
735.7
821.4
920.8
1,030.4
1,134.0
1,267.1
1,383.3
1,527.3
1,638.0
1,764.3
1,929.4
2,084.9
2,241.8
2,365.9
2,546.4
2,719.6
2,876.6
3,044.7
3,216.9
3,424.7
3,645.0
3,858.5
4,156.0
4,369.1
4,551.8
4,812.6
5,123.6
5,475.9
5,798.4
6,130.8
6,399.6
6,422.0
6,648.0
6,868.9
7,068.1
7,298.7
7,634.6
7,978.5
8,305.5
8,682.0
9,099.3
9,487.0
9,037.0
10,172.8
11,214.9
12,144.8
9,576.2
10,053.9
10,424.4
10,636.6
10,825.6
11,096.2
11,350.4
11,587.3
11,874.9
12,049.2
12,221.7
12,433.4
12,688.9
12,856.8
13,041.1

143.5
158.6
176.5
194.7
217.8
244.3
273.4
312.5
352.1
387.5
421.2
457.5
500.6
537.0
571.6
614.4
655.2
696.5
735.2
771.1
814.9
863.3
913.7
962.4
1,009.8
1,065.5
1,123.1
1,198.6
1,287.5
1,329.5
1,391.1
1,466.6
1,580.1
1,665.7
1,759.6
1,872.7
1,900.0
1,947.9
1,983.3
2,014.7
2,085.7
2,146.0
2,196.1
2,269.0
2,350.2
2,459.3
2,562.0
2,684.0
2,837.1
3,114.1
3,347.7
2,771.7
2,808.6
2,857.9
2,910.3
2,997.5
3,080.5
3,149.8
3,228.4
3,275.2
3,317.0
3,377.4
3,421.2
3,479.7
3,534.0
3,576.9

67.2
76.1
89.0
101.8
115.7
131.2
148.8
171.7
201.9
225.2
253.1
276.5
302.2
330.2
366.0
410.1
451.2
506.2
555.8
612.8
648.8
680.5
719.9
752.1
790.9
832.0
863.6
918.4
996.6
1,082.9
1,154.0
1,238.9
1,320.5
1,391.9
1,478.2
1,555.3
1,632.7
1,699.6
1,757.1
1,821.3
1,863.8
1,945.5
2,059.8
2,164.6
2,245.3
2,344.7
2,472.4
2,354.2
2,639.3
2,815.7
3,057.6
2,534.0
2,623.0
2,677.6
2,722.7
2,753.8
2,772.7
2,835.3
2,901.0
2,983.3
3,029.9
3,068.6
3,148.8
3,233.6
3,274.3
3,341.6

39.9
44.1
51.8
56.8
65.1
76.7
83.6
91.7
98.5
113.7
141.0
150.8
178.2
187.7
189.5
202.9
222.3
230.8
250.1
277.0
314.0
327.9
347.0
372.1
408.9
446.1
484.6
541.9
529.3
539.0
574.2
619.3
676.8
719.5
762.7
777.5
720.5
768.0
811.1
830.9
870.8
925.6
976.8
996.1
1,073.2
1,130.9
1,135.0
1,152.9
1,266.2
1,329.0
1,436.3
1,226.4
1,254.7
1,279.4
1,304.1
1,309.5
1,312.6
1,334.8
1,359.3
1,389.4
1,437.2
1,459.3
1,459.2
1,516.4
1,535.8
1,567.4

668.5
719.7
797.3
894.7
998.6
1,122.4
1,239.7
1,353.1
1,501.5
1,622.9
1,817.2
2,008.1
2,210.3
2,391.3
2,566.6
2,793.1
3,002.1
3,194.9
3,314.4
3,561.7
3,796.6
4,042.5
4,267.2
4,513.0
4,787.8
5,132.4
5,495.9
5,904.5
6,182.2
6,460.4
6,784.4
7,198.5
7,627.2
8,056.6
8,453.5
8,666.3
8,616.1
8,915.3
9,246.6
9,571.6
9,876.2
10,321.0
10,811.0
11,249.4
11,730.3
12,278.0
12,760.4
12,526.3
14,176.2
15,466.5
16,603.8
13,430.3
14,108.1
14,396.4
14,769.8
15,026.3
15,337.3
15,637.7
15,864.6
16,289.9
16,491.7
16,692.8
16,940.9
17,202.8
17,435.3
17,689.4

1 Includes other items not shown separately.
2 Food consists of food and beverages purchased for off-premises consumption; food services, which include purchased meals and beverages, are not
classified as food.
Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).

402 |

Appendix B

Table B–11. Real personal consumption expenditures, 2007–2024
[Billions of chained (2017) dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]
Goods

Year or quarter

2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III p ��������������

Personal
consumption
expenditures

11,253.9
11,270.7
11,123.6
11,335.6
11,528.5
11,686.1
11,889.9
12,226.4
12,638.8
12,949.0
13,290.6
13,654.9
13,948.1
13,594.7
14,787.2
15,236.2
15,621.7
14,328.6
14,809.1
14,924.3
15,086.9
15,123.4
15,219.9
15,277.6
15,324.0
15,510.2
15,548.5
15,646.7
15,781.4
15,856.9
15,967.3
16,106.4

Durable

Total
Total 1

3,415.7
3,312.7
3,209.4
3,300.2
3,372.3
3,444.2
3,562.3
3,717.7
3,902.5
4,044.7
4,212.2
4,378.7
4,513.6
4,723.0
5,258.6
5,226.3
5,323.7
5,177.5
5,354.9
5,221.4
5,280.7
5,258.4
5,238.3
5,208.5
5,200.0
5,293.5
5,288.9
5,334.1
5,378.5
5,362.8
5,402.1
5,476.0

985.4
928.8
871.9
920.6
967.5
1,025.3
1,087.9
1,168.2
1,257.7
1,325.5
1,415.9
1,509.5
1,559.7
1,670.0
1,947.4
1,909.8
1,984.3
1,956.0
2,024.4
1,885.0
1,924.2
1,924.6
1,914.2
1,905.1
1,895.4
1,971.8
1,970.2
1,990.5
2,004.5
1,995.7
2,022.3
2,059.5

Services
Nondurable

Motor
vehicles
and
parts
424.3
370.4
344.2
357.5
367.5
393.8
415.2
443.6
481.3
498.1
529.4
549.9
540.4
533.4
610.6
569.4
587.0
639.1
663.9
565.8
573.8
578.5
572.6
564.4
562.0
601.4
590.8
582.1
573.7
562.5
571.5
584.9

Total 1

2,434.5
2,396.1
2,356.4
2,393.5
2,414.6
2,424.9
2,478.6
2,552.3
2,646.3
2,719.9
2,796.3
2,869.8
2,954.6
3,055.3
3,317.1
3,321.1
3,347.2
3,228.7
3,337.8
3,340.8
3,361.3
3,338.7
3,328.8
3,308.1
3,308.8
3,329.2
3,326.2
3,351.6
3,381.7
3,374.5
3,388.6
3,426.5

Food and
beverages Gasoline
purchased
and
for offother
premises energy
congoods
sumption
869.7
855.1
849.3
862.0
863.3
870.7
887.0
910.3
931.4
968.3
1,010.4
1,039.0
1,066.9
1,143.0
1,194.4
1,169.8
1,152.1
1,182.3
1,199.8
1,197.1
1,198.5
1,189.4
1,173.9
1,159.6
1,156.1
1,150.4
1,148.1
1,152.9
1,157.2
1,156.8
1,163.0
1,171.3

Addendum:
Personal
consumption
expendiFinancial
tures
excluding
Health services
and
food
care
insurand
ance
energy 2

Household consumption
expenditures

314.1
301.7
303.5
302.0
295.0
291.0
298.8
302.0
318.8
323.8
324.0
323.0
321.8
277.8
311.3
313.9
317.3
289.8
311.9
320.4
322.8
318.4
313.8
311.4
311.9
317.4
318.6
315.5
317.7
310.6
316.3
319.1

Total

7,838.5
7,981.2
7,948.6
8,065.3
8,183.9
8,265.3
8,341.9
8,516.3
8,738.9
8,904.9
9,078.4
9,276.6
9,436.2
8,891.6
9,557.9
10,031.7
10,318.7
9,184.6
9,488.8
9,727.3
9,831.0
9,888.6
10,004.0
10,090.2
10,144.1
10,238.1
10,279.7
10,333.3
10,423.6
10,511.3
10,582.7
10,650.9

Total 1

Housing
and
utilities

7,571.1
7,669.9
7,624.8
7,730.8
7,833.3
7,882.6
7,956.1
8,131.1
8,355.1
8,507.0
8,682.0
8,861.3
9,034.6
8,433.2
9,168.9
9,605.2
9,917.5
8,781.6
9,112.2
9,346.4
9,435.6
9,473.1
9,572.5
9,654.7
9,720.3
9,833.0
9,879.1
9,932.7
10,025.3
10,097.7
10,151.0
10,224.9

2,193.9
2,255.7
2,263.0
2,314.8
2,323.8
2,318.8
2,343.2
2,341.5
2,336.7
2,347.0
2,350.2
2,385.0
2,411.2
2,460.6
2,526.6
2,598.2
2,610.6
2,508.0
2,517.6
2,535.5
2,545.3
2,581.7
2,599.9
2,597.5
2,613.6
2,601.9
2,605.2
2,618.5
2,617.1
2,621.9
2,634.2
2,640.5

1,754.0
1,797.0
1,836.4
1,864.5
1,893.1
1,927.6
1,945.6
2,008.2
2,114.2
2,196.3
2,245.3
2,301.8
2,384.5
2,214.4
2,412.6
2,513.5
2,667.0
2,329.7
2,402.0
2,443.7
2,475.1
2,478.0
2,486.2
2,521.6
2,568.0
2,629.6
2,648.3
2,669.2
2,720.9
2,767.3
2,789.0
2,832.4

1,013.6
1,038.2
1,028.0
1,026.5
1,053.2
1,040.2
1,037.2
1,047.9
1,073.6
1,046.5
1,073.2
1,073.4
1,051.1
1,055.0
1,091.3
1,088.3
1,131.7
1,087.3
1,087.3
1,091.6
1,099.0
1,086.8
1,080.7
1,090.0
1,095.5
1,111.2
1,136.4
1,139.8
1,139.4
1,156.2
1,153.9
1,164.4

9,829.5
9,883.2
9,735.4
9,929.6
10,137.8
10,303.5
10,474.9
10,785.1
11,159.9
11,429.3
11,730.3
12,049.5
12,320.2
11,935.4
13,041.0
13,505.3
13,921.5
12,609.4
13,057.2
13,165.2
13,332.2
13,363.0
13,479.4
13,569.7
13,609.3
13,813.7
13,853.5
13,941.1
14,077.6
14,164.3
14,257.3
14,388.6

1 Includes other items not shown separately.
2 Food consists of food and beverages purchased for off-premises consumption; food services, which include purchased meals and beverages, are not classified
as food.
Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).

National Income or Expenditure | 403

Table B–12. Private fixed investment by type, 1973–2024
[Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]
Nonresidential

Residential
Intellectual property
products

Equipment
Private
fixed
Year or quarter investment

1973 �����������������
1974 �����������������
1975 �����������������
1976 �����������������
1977 �����������������
1978 �����������������
1979 �����������������
1980 �����������������
1981 �����������������
1982 �����������������
1983 �����������������
1984 �����������������
1985 �����������������
1986 �����������������
1987 �����������������
1988 �����������������
1989 �����������������
1990 �����������������
1991 �����������������
1992 �����������������
1993 �����������������
1994 �����������������
1995 �����������������
1996 �����������������
1997 �����������������
1998 �����������������
1999 �����������������
2000 �����������������
2001 �����������������
2002 �����������������
2003 �����������������
2004 �����������������
2005 �����������������
2006 �����������������
2007 �����������������
2008 �����������������
2009 �����������������
2010 �����������������
2011 �����������������
2012 �����������������
2013 �����������������
2014 �����������������
2015 �����������������
2016 �����������������
2017 �����������������
2018 �����������������
2019 �����������������
2020 �����������������
2021 �����������������
2022 �����������������
2023 �����������������
2021: I �������������
      II ������������
      III �����������
      IV �����������
2022: I �������������
      II ������������
      III �����������
      IV �����������
2023: I �������������
      II ������������
      III �����������
      IV �����������
2024: I �������������
      II ������������
      III p ���������

251.0
260.5
263.5
306.1
374.3
452.6
521.7
536.4
601.4
595.9
643.3
754.7
807.8
842.6
865.0
918.5
972.0
978.9
944.7
996.7
1,086.0
1,192.7
1,286.3
1,401.3
1,524.7
1,673.0
1,826.2
1,983.9
1,973.1
1,910.4
2,013.0
2,217.2
2,477.2
2,632.0
2,639.1
2,506.9
2,080.4
2,111.6
2,286.3
2,550.5
2,732.9
2,989.2
3,148.4
3,239.2
3,435.0
3,668.4
3,820.8
3,791.1
4,211.6
4,671.6
4,943.1
4,086.7
4,182.2
4,231.0
4,346.4
4,539.9
4,669.6
4,727.8
4,749.0
4,826.3
4,925.7
4,974.2
5,046.1
5,138.5
5,201.1
5,263.7

Total
nonresidential

Structures

172.7
191.1
196.8
219.3
259.1
314.6
373.8
406.9
472.9
485.1
482.2
564.3
607.8
607.8
615.2
662.3
716.0
739.2
723.6
741.9
799.2
868.9
962.2
1,043.2
1,149.1
1,254.1
1,364.5
1,498.4
1,460.1
1,352.8
1,375.9
1,467.4
1,621.0
1,793.8
1,948.6
1,990.9
1,690.4
1,735.0
1,907.5
2,118.5
2,221.3
2,425.2
2,507.5
2,529.0
2,661.1
2,856.5
2,993.7
2,870.5
3,079.1
3,492.8
3,831.6
3,000.2
3,067.3
3,085.9
3,162.9
3,319.5
3,443.8
3,564.0
3,643.9
3,742.3
3,833.7
3,848.8
3,901.5
3,957.8
4,018.5
4,084.0

55.0
61.2
61.4
65.9
74.6
93.6
117.7
136.2
167.3
177.6
154.3
177.4
194.5
176.5
174.2
182.8
193.7
202.9
183.6
172.6
177.2
186.8
207.3
224.6
250.3
276.0
285.7
321.0
333.5
287.0
286.6
307.7
353.0
425.2
510.3
571.1
455.8
379.8
404.5
479.4
491.5
574.6
584.5
566.2
594.9
636.6
677.9
624.7
628.3
756.1
884.1
612.6
622.7
630.1
647.9
691.2
735.4
781.7
816.1
857.6
888.7
884.1
905.8
914.9
916.0
906.3

Information processing
equipment
Total 1

Computers
and
Total peripheral
Other
equipment

95.1
104.3
107.6
121.2
148.7
180.6
208.1
216.4
240.9
234.9
246.5
291.9
307.9
317.7
320.9
346.8
372.2
371.9
360.8
381.7
425.1
476.4
528.1
565.3
610.9
660.0
713.6
766.1
711.5
659.6
670.6
721.9
794.9
862.3
893.4
845.4
670.3
777.0
881.3
983.4
1,035.3
1,109.1
1,144.1
1,119.8
1,160.0
1,227.6
1,240.9
1,109.5
1,188.6
1,317.7
1,425.8
1,180.8
1,196.7
1,178.6
1,198.4
1,267.9
1,298.8
1,340.4
1,363.6
1,390.1
1,432.1
1,437.2
1,443.9
1,458.8
1,499.7
1,547.2

19.9
23.1
23.8
27.5
33.7
42.3
50.3
58.9
69.6
74.2
83.7
101.2
106.6
111.1
112.2
120.8
130.7
129.6
129.2
142.1
153.3
167.0
188.4
204.7
222.8
240.1
259.8
293.8
265.9
236.7
242.7
255.8
267.0
288.5
310.9
306.3
275.6
307.5
313.3
331.2
344.8
352.2
362.2
365.2
386.0
406.6
405.4
400.4
442.1
482.4
468.7
437.4
436.6
432.6
461.7
489.1
480.7
490.0
469.8
469.9
465.8
463.6
475.3
483.7
495.1
518.0

1 Includes other items not shown separately.

3.5
3.9
3.6
4.4
5.7
7.6
10.2
12.5
17.1
18.9
23.9
31.6
33.7
33.4
35.8
38.0
43.1
38.6
37.7
44.0
47.9
52.4
66.1
72.8
81.4
87.9
97.2
103.2
87.6
79.7
79.9
84.2
84.2
92.6
95.4
93.9
88.9
99.6
95.6
103.5
102.1
101.9
101.3
99.5
105.8
120.4
118.9
126.6
147.3
162.1
151.2
147.6
142.0
144.3
155.4
167.0
158.0
167.2
156.3
149.3
150.3
148.5
157.0
168.1
176.1
190.9

16.3
19.2
20.2
23.1
28.0
34.8
40.2
46.4
52.5
55.3
59.8
69.6
72.9
77.7
76.4
82.8
87.6
90.9
91.5
98.1
105.4
114.6
122.3
131.9
141.4
152.2
162.5
190.6
178.4
157.0
162.8
171.6
182.8
195.9
215.5
212.4
186.7
207.9
217.7
227.7
242.6
250.2
260.9
265.8
280.2
286.2
286.5
273.8
294.7
320.3
317.4
289.8
294.6
288.3
306.3
322.1
322.7
322.9
313.5
320.7
315.6
315.1
318.4
315.6
319.0
327.1

2 Research and development investment includes expenditures for software.

Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).

404 |

Appendix B

Indus- Transtrial portation
1
equip- equip- Total
ment
ment
26.0
30.7
31.3
34.1
39.4
47.7
56.2
60.7
65.5
62.7
58.9
68.1
72.5
75.4
76.7
84.2
93.3
92.1
89.3
93.0
102.2
113.6
129.0
136.5
140.4
147.4
149.1
162.9
151.9
141.7
143.4
144.2
162.4
181.6
194.1
194.3
153.7
155.2
191.5
211.2
211.4
223.4
224.7
222.9
237.3
253.6
262.1
241.0
268.1
298.8
313.1
249.8
265.1
274.6
282.8
295.1
297.8
297.5
304.8
310.8
313.6
313.3
314.5
324.0
323.2
329.0

26.6
26.3
25.2
30.0
39.3
47.3
53.6
48.4
50.6
46.8
53.5
64.4
69.0
70.5
68.1
72.9
67.9
70.0
71.5
74.7
89.4
107.7
116.1
123.2
135.5
147.1
174.4
170.8
154.2
141.6
134.1
159.2
179.6
194.3
188.8
148.7
74.9
135.8
177.8
215.3
243.4
274.9
309.8
297.8
299.9
319.3
308.4
221.3
214.7
229.9
321.7
233.7
234.5
207.3
183.3
191.8
215.2
240.3
272.2
292.5
329.9
336.7
327.6
320.6
349.8
371.9

22.7
25.5
27.8
32.2
35.8
40.4
48.1
54.4
64.8
72.7
81.3
95.0
105.3
113.5
120.1
132.7
150.1
164.4
179.1
187.7
196.9
205.7
226.8
253.3
288.0
318.1
365.1
411.3
415.0
406.2
418.7
437.8
473.1
506.3
544.8
574.4
564.4
578.2
621.7
655.7
694.6
741.5
778.9
843.0
906.2
992.2
1,074.9
1,136.3
1,262.1
1,419.0
1,521.7
1,206.9
1,247.9
1,277.2
1,316.7
1,360.3
1,409.6
1,441.8
1,464.2
1,494.6
1,512.9
1,527.4
1,551.7
1,584.1
1,602.7
1,630.6

Structures

Total
resiResearch denSoftand
tial 1
ware development 2
3.2
3.9
4.8
5.2
5.5
6.3
8.1
9.8
11.8
14.0
16.4
20.4
23.8
25.6
29.0
33.3
40.6
45.4
48.7
51.1
57.2
60.4
65.5
74.5
93.8
109.2
136.6
156.8
157.7
152.5
155.0
166.3
178.6
189.5
206.4
223.8
226.0
226.4
249.8
272.1
285.6
303.7
316.3
347.9
382.9
422.8
447.4
478.4
533.8
601.9
645.8
510.2
529.7
540.6
554.6
576.4
596.8
613.0
621.5
635.8
639.3
647.3
660.6
675.2
690.7
707.0

14.6
16.4
17.5
19.6
21.8
24.9
29.1
34.2
39.7
44.8
49.6
56.9
63.0
66.5
69.2
76.4
84.1
91.5
101.0
105.4
106.3
109.2
121.2
134.5
148.1
160.6
177.5
199.0
202.7
196.1
201.0
207.4
224.7
245.6
268.0
284.2
274.6
282.4
303.4
313.4
338.7
364.4
385.3
413.2
437.5
479.5
535.6
568.5
637.8
714.4
765.4
610.3
629.8
644.6
666.4
687.8
710.8
722.7
736.3
750.4
762.5
769.2
779.7
795.0
798.6
810.2

78.3
69.5
66.7
86.8
115.2
138.0
147.8
129.5
128.5
110.8
161.1
190.4
200.1
234.8
249.8
256.2
256.0
239.7
221.2
254.7
286.8
323.8
324.1
358.1
375.6
418.8
461.8
485.4
513.1
557.6
637.1
749.8
856.2
838.2
690.5
516.0
390.0
376.6
378.8
432.0
511.5
564.0
640.9
710.2
773.9
811.9
827.1
920.6
1,132.5
1,178.8
1,111.5
1,086.5
1,114.9
1,145.1
1,183.5
1,220.4
1,225.8
1,163.9
1,105.1
1,084.0
1,091.9
1,125.3
1,144.7
1,180.7
1,182.6
1,179.6

Total 1

76.6
67.6
64.8
84.6
112.8
135.3
144.7
126.1
124.9
107.2
156.9
185.6
195.0
229.3
244.0
250.1
249.9
233.7
215.4
248.8
280.7
317.6
317.7
351.7
369.3
412.1
454.5
477.7
505.2
549.6
628.8
740.8
846.6
828.1
680.6
506.4
381.2
367.4
369.1
421.5
500.0
551.7
627.6
696.0
758.9
796.2
811.3
903.5
1,112.2
1,157.3
1,090.2
1,066.6
1,094.2
1,125.0
1,162.9
1,199.0
1,204.0
1,142.2
1,083.9
1,062.4
1,070.8
1,104.2
1,123.5
1,159.8
1,161.3
1,158.1

Single
family

35.2
29.7
29.6
43.9
62.2
72.8
72.3
52.9
52.0
41.5
72.5
86.4
87.4
104.1
117.2
120.1
120.9
112.9
99.4
122.0
140.1
162.3
153.5
170.8
175.2
199.4
223.8
236.8
249.1
265.9
310.6
377.6
433.5
416.0
305.2
185.8
105.3
112.6
108.2
132.0
170.8
193.6
221.1
242.5
270.2
289.6
280.0
309.4
423.9
453.2
400.4
392.5
417.3
437.9
447.8
478.2
491.5
442.2
401.0
378.5
384.5
411.8
426.9
440.3
435.9
421.8

Table B–13. Real private fixed investment by type, 2007–2024
[Billions of chained (2017) dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]
Nonresidential

Residential
Intellectual property
products

Equipment
Year or quarter

Private
fixed
investment

Total
nonresi- Strucdential tures

Information processing
equipment
Total 2
Total

2007 �����������������
2008 �����������������
2009 �����������������
2010 �����������������
2011 �����������������
2012 �����������������
2013 �����������������
2014 �����������������
2015 �����������������
2016 �����������������
2017 �����������������
2018 �����������������
2019 �����������������
2020 �����������������
2021 �����������������
2022 �����������������
2023 �����������������
2021: I �������������
      II ������������
      III �����������
      IV �����������
2022: I �������������
      II ������������
      III �����������
      IV �����������
2023: I �������������
      II ������������
      III �����������
      IV �����������
2024: I �������������
      II ������������
      III p ���������

2,782.2
2,620.6
2,201.6
2,269.9
2,432.5
2,678.0
2,842.0
3,052.6
3,193.6
3,286.9
3,435.0
3,611.7
3,710.9
3,639.0
3,902.9
4,007.5
4,103.9
3,867.1
3,919.5
3,898.5
3,926.4
4,006.8
4,026.4
4,008.2
3,988.7
4,018.8
4,103.0
4,128.9
4,164.9
4,231.4
4,255.7
4,274.0

1,996.1
2,008.3
1,716.4
1,794.3
1,951.3
2,137.1
2,238.6
2,421.1
2,498.9
2,544.8
2,661.1
2,844.3
2,952.2
2,815.5
2,985.2
3,192.9
3,384.5
2,937.9
3,001.4
2,988.2
3,013.3
3,110.7
3,165.9
3,225.1
3,270.0
3,312.8
3,391.6
3,400.9
3,432.9
3,471.0
3,504.1
3,536.8

625.5
666.0
541.4
454.8
469.0
531.5
537.3
597.2
598.2
579.7
594.9
629.2
644.0
585.0
569.6
590.3
654.3
575.3
576.1
570.5
556.5
571.1
583.3
596.3
610.4
631.9
656.3
659.2
669.7
679.9
680.2
672.0

839.9
799.7
630.2
757.8
859.6
953.9
1,006.5
1,086.0
1,127.2
1,117.5
1,160.0
1,228.6
1,241.1
1,115.6
1,190.3
1,242.2
1,285.2
1,187.2
1,212.1
1,178.7
1,183.2
1,228.9
1,232.2
1,252.1
1,255.5
1,258.2
1,295.7
1,292.3
1,294.6
1,295.7
1,326.5
1,360.4

204.5
215.6
204.8
239.2
250.8
274.0
293.9
312.9
336.7
356.1
386.0
416.8
428.9
432.5
478.7
513.6
491.5
474.0
473.3
468.0
499.4
522.4
512.0
521.6
498.3
493.7
488.6
485.9
497.7
502.0
511.7
533.1

Computers
and
peripheral Other
equipment 1
72.2
77.9
79.2
91.9
91.8
101.1
100.6
100.4
100.4
99.7
105.8
119.6
121.1
131.5
150.7
159.8
148.5
152.5
146.1
146.9
157.3
165.7
155.7
164.8
153.1
145.3
147.8
146.5
154.5
164.7
172.3
187.0

134.2
140.1
128.9
151.1
162.1
176.4
195.5
213.7
236.7
256.5
280.2
297.1
307.8
300.5
327.0
352.8
342.6
320.4
326.5
320.2
341.0
355.4
355.8
355.6
344.6
348.5
340.4
339.1
342.5
335.7
337.4
343.5

Indus- Transtrial portation
2
equip- equip- Total
ment
ment
219.6
210.5
164.4
164.2
197.0
213.5
212.8
223.5
225.7
224.9
237.3
248.7
253.2
230.7
246.1
253.8
256.0
235.6
245.9
249.9
253.0
256.9
253.4
250.2
254.8
256.1
256.7
255.2
255.8
260.9
258.2
261.6

212.9
166.9
78.1
152.4
195.8
231.8
257.7
287.4
318.7
302.6
299.9
318.3
304.9
220.4
226.6
227.5
290.2
236.0
254.7
221.7
194.0
202.9
217.3
234.9
254.8
263.9
301.6
303.0
292.4
282.7
308.3
323.7

552.7
573.7
570.8
586.4
622.9
653.8
695.0
739.1
774.0
847.6
906.2
986.5
1,067.0
1,115.1
1,228.9
1,367.1
1,445.9
1,178.0
1,216.7
1,242.0
1,279.0
1,317.3
1,357.2
1,383.6
1,410.2
1,425.8
1,439.6
1,449.7
1,468.3
1,495.0
1,497.7
1,507.1

Structures

Total
Re- residensearch
Softde- tial 2 Total 2 Single
ware and
family
velopment 3
173.3
187.4
193.1
200.4
222.3
246.7
264.3
286.1
304.6
340.5
382.9
433.9
466.5
510.9
586.8
673.7
722.2
559.0
580.8
595.0
612.5
644.0
666.5
682.1
702.3
706.5
714.7
725.6
741.8
760.9
765.3
769.6

316.0
325.3
317.3
318.5
331.8
334.5
357.7
377.0
390.3
424.5
437.5
464.3
510.8
520.7
563.5
613.9
645.1
542.0
558.7
568.2
585.1
595.8
611.0
620.0
628.9
639.4
644.7
645.2
650.9
660.1
659.7
665.3

821.9
623.0
487.9
472.8
472.2
533.3
601.1
626.8
693.2
742.2
773.9
768.5
761.6
820.1
909.4
831.6
762.7
919.1
910.5
902.6
905.3
894.9
867.8
807.1
756.5
748.2
756.4
770.6
775.5
800.8
795.2
785.1

818.3
617.7
482.1
465.8
464.1
525.3
592.1
616.2
681.1
728.6
758.9
753.4
746.5
804.2
892.0
814.5
745.0
901.5
892.7
885.7
888.3
877.8
850.6
789.8
739.7
730.8
738.9
752.8
757.4
782.8
776.7
766.5

356.6
224.0
132.4
143.8
137.2
166.0
203.6
216.1
240.8
253.2
270.2
277.7
260.1
275.8
338.1
311.7
266.3
332.2
340.1
342.6
337.7
345.5
339.4
297.7
264.0
251.7
258.5
274.8
280.3
290.0
284.0
273.5

1 Because computers exhibit rapid changes in prices relative to other prices in the economy, the chained-dollar estimates should not be used to measure
the component’s relative importance or its contribution to the growth rate of more aggregate series. The quantity index for computers can be used to accurately
measure the real growth rate of this series. For information on this component, see Survey of Current Business Table 5.3.1 (for growth rates), Table 5.3.2 (for
contributions), and Table 5.3.3 (for quantity indexes).
2 Includes other items not shown separately.
3 Research and development investment includes expenditures for software.
Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).

National Income or Expenditure | 405

Table B–14. Foreign transactions in the national income and product accounts, 1973–2024
[Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]
Current receipts from rest of the world

Current payments to rest of the world

Exports of goods
and services
Year or quarter

Total
ServTotal Goods 1 ices
1

1973 ����������������������
1974 ����������������������
1975 ����������������������
1976 ����������������������
1977 ����������������������
1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III p ��������������

118.8
156.5
166.7
181.9
196.5
233.1
298.5
359.9
397.3
384.2
378.9
424.2
415.9
432.3
487.2
596.7
682.0
740.7
763.3
785.1
810.4
905.5
1,042.6
1,114.0
1,233.9
1,239.8
1,355.2
1,527.8
1,411.6
1,390.6
1,478.5
1,705.6
1,940.9
2,247.7
2,584.4
2,779.9
2,362.1
2,714.1
3,049.8
3,161.8
3,266.0
3,405.9
3,269.3
3,275.1
3,585.1
3,830.7
3,876.1
3,312.7
3,819.9
4,431.1
4,666.5
3,615.3
3,737.0
3,852.4
4,074.8
4,158.6
4,451.6
4,547.5
4,566.7
4,602.3
4,587.8
4,714.6
4,761.3
4,823.3
4,859.5
4,855.3

95.3
126.7
138.7
149.5
159.3
186.9
230.1
280.8
305.2
283.2
277.0
302.4
303.2
321.0
363.9
444.6
504.3
551.9
594.9
633.1
654.8
720.9
812.8
867.6
953.8
953.0
992.9
1,096.1
1,026.8
998.0
1,035.2
1,176.4
1,301.6
1,470.2
1,659.3
1,835.3
1,582.8
1,857.2
2,115.9
2,217.7
2,287.9
2,378.5
2,270.6
2,235.6
2,388.3
2,538.1
2,539.4
2,151.1
2,555.4
3,017.4
3,052.5
2,381.2
2,505.0
2,570.1
2,765.4
2,848.7
3,071.6
3,102.6
3,046.7
3,060.6
2,995.5
3,062.0
3,091.7
3,125.4
3,154.3
3,204.1

75.8
103.5
112.5
121.5
128.4
149.9
187.3
230.4
245.2
222.6
214.0
231.3
227.5
231.4
265.6
332.1
374.8
403.3
430.1
455.3
467.7
518.4
592.4
628.8
699.9
692.6
711.7
795.1
739.6
706.6
733.9
828.0
919.3
1,043.1
1,159.7
1,291.0
1,057.4
1,272.9
1,468.5
1,529.6
1,563.9
1,617.0
1,496.7
1,447.6
1,546.7
1,669.3
1,644.8
1,421.6
1,747.2
2,065.1
2,022.0
1,621.8
1,717.7
1,752.8
1,896.6
1,949.3
2,121.5
2,140.5
2,049.1
2,059.6
1,968.1
2,025.7
2,034.3
2,037.0
2,053.4
2,088.4

19.5
23.2
26.2
28.0
30.9
37.0
42.9
50.3
60.0
60.7
62.9
71.1
75.7
89.6
98.4
112.5
129.5
148.6
164.8
177.7
187.1
202.6
220.4
238.8
253.9
260.4
281.2
301.1
287.2
291.4
301.3
348.4
382.2
427.1
499.6
544.3
525.4
584.3
647.4
688.1
724.1
761.6
773.9
788.0
841.6
868.8
894.6
729.5
808.2
952.3
1,030.5
759.4
787.3
817.4
868.7
899.4
950.1
962.0
997.6
1,001.0
1,027.4
1,036.3
1,057.4
1,088.4
1,100.9
1,115.7

Imports of goods
and services
Income
receipts

Total

23.5
29.8
28.0
32.4
37.2
46.3
68.3
79.1
92.0
101.0
101.9
121.9
112.7
111.3
123.3
152.1
177.7
188.8
168.4
152.1
155.6
184.5
229.8
246.4
280.1
286.8
324.6
390.6
339.6
335.8
377.4
464.7
569.3
702.6
850.2
855.2
689.3
760.0
827.9
827.4
847.2
881.5
860.6
892.9
1,031.1
1,138.7
1,174.7
989.1
1,083.5
1,219.2
1,411.4
1,051.0
1,055.7
1,101.5
1,125.7
1,127.0
1,194.2
1,257.5
1,298.1
1,347.1
1,388.5
1,455.7
1,454.2
1,493.0
1,504.0
1,449.1

109.9
150.5
146.9
174.8
207.5
245.8
299.6
351.4
393.9
387.5
413.9
514.3
530.2
575.0
641.3
712.4
774.3
815.6
755.4
830.7
889.8
1,021.1
1,148.5
1,229.0
1,364.0
1,445.1
1,631.9
1,924.7
1,803.0
1,846.0
2,006.2
2,343.4
2,692.0
3,067.0
3,325.2
3,484.1
2,745.3
3,153.8
3,510.1
3,585.8
3,617.2
3,781.0
3,692.4
3,676.5
3,963.1
4,271.8
4,323.4
3,885.6
4,699.3
5,452.0
5,582.4
4,394.4
4,599.1
4,797.5
5,006.0
5,298.2
5,516.9
5,507.3
5,485.7
5,531.6
5,505.4
5,630.9
5,661.6
5,796.0
5,920.9
6,074.9

ServTotal Goods 1 ices
1
91.2
127.5
122.7
151.1
182.4
212.3
252.7
293.8
317.8
303.2
328.6
405.1
417.2
452.9
508.7
554.0
591.0
629.7
623.5
667.8
720.0
813.4
902.6
964.0
1,055.8
1,115.7
1,252.5
1,477.2
1,403.6
1,437.7
1,557.1
1,810.5
2,041.5
2,256.6
2,395.2
2,576.2
2,001.9
2,389.6
2,695.5
2,769.3
2,766.4
2,887.4
2,794.9
2,738.8
2,931.6
3,131.2
3,116.7
2,777.3
3,415.5
3,976.3
3,849.8
3,177.0
3,340.1
3,458.8
3,686.0
3,925.7
4,093.7
3,988.4
3,897.4
3,874.2
3,799.0
3,843.1
3,882.9
3,967.0
4,061.2
4,158.3

71.8
104.5
99.0
124.6
152.6
177.4
212.8
248.6
267.8
250.5
272.7
336.3
343.3
370.0
414.8
452.1
484.8
508.1
500.7
544.9
592.8
676.8
757.4
807.4
885.7
930.8
1,051.2
1,251.2
1,176.2
1,198.9
1,299.0
1,513.6
1,722.8
1,900.6
2,002.7
2,148.7
1,588.1
1,947.0
2,231.1
2,293.3
2,293.9
2,389.3
2,289.6
2,218.7
2,369.9
2,559.1
2,516.7
2,305.1
2,839.6
3,257.0
3,096.1
2,675.8
2,798.5
2,844.2
3,039.9
3,253.6
3,374.3
3,245.4
3,154.9
3,135.8
3,051.5
3,090.8
3,106.5
3,170.1
3,252.8
3,331.6

19.3
22.9
23.7
26.5
29.8
34.8
39.9
45.3
49.9
52.6
56.0
68.8
73.9
82.9
93.9
101.9
106.2
121.7
122.8
122.9
127.2
136.6
145.1
156.5
170.1
184.9
201.3
226.0
227.4
238.9
258.1
296.9
318.7
356.0
392.5
427.5
413.8
442.5
464.3
476.1
472.5
498.1
505.4
520.1
561.7
572.1
600.0
472.2
575.9
719.3
753.7
501.2
541.6
614.6
646.1
672.2
719.4
743.1
742.5
738.5
747.5
752.4
776.4
796.9
808.4
826.7

Income
payments

10.9
14.3
15.0
15.5
16.9
24.7
36.4
44.9
59.1
64.5
64.8
85.6
87.3
94.4
105.8
129.5
152.9
154.2
136.8
121.0
124.4
161.6
201.9
215.5
256.8
269.4
293.7
352.2
289.3
290.0
318.9
388.0
494.5
656.2
754.5
710.0
539.0
554.3
589.9
594.7
616.9
646.4
640.5
661.5
738.2
848.4
892.8
777.5
930.8
1,069.9
1,311.3
867.6
925.7
966.0
964.0
1,009.3
1,033.2
1,080.9
1,156.2
1,247.0
1,283.8
1,355.2
1,359.3
1,410.8
1,444.1
1,433.7

Current taxes and
transfer payments
to rest of the world (net)

Total

From
persons
(net)

From
government
(net)

7.9
8.7
9.1
8.1
8.1
8.8
10.6
12.6
17.0
19.8
20.5
23.6
25.7
27.8
26.8
29.0
30.4
31.7
–4.9
41.9
45.4
46.1
44.1
49.5
51.4
60.0
85.7
95.4
110.2
118.3
130.1
144.9
156.1
154.2
175.5
198.0
204.3
209.9
224.7
221.8
233.9
247.2
257.0
276.1
293.4
292.3
313.9
330.8
353.0
405.8
421.2
349.9
333.3
372.7
356.1
363.2
390.1
437.9
432.1
410.4
422.6
432.6
419.4
418.2
415.6
483.0

1.6
1.4
1.3
1.4
1.4
1.6
1.7
2.0
5.6
6.7
7.0
7.9
8.3
9.1
10.0
10.8
11.6
12.2
14.1
14.5
17.1
18.9
20.3
22.6
25.7
29.7
36.3
38.6
42.5
44.4
46.1
49.5
54.4
57.1
65.3
71.1
69.8
72.1
74.7
75.7
77.8
83.7
89.5
90.6
95.7
98.7
102.3
102.3
111.4
128.6
135.6
106.2
108.4
113.3
117.9
123.5
128.3
129.8
132.8
133.2
134.2
136.2
138.7
140.9
141.4
141.9

5.6
6.4
7.1
5.7
5.3
5.9
6.8
8.3
8.3
9.7
10.1
12.2
14.4
15.4
13.4
13.7
14.2
14.7
–24.0
22.0
22.9
21.1
15.6
20.0
16.7
17.4
25.0
26.8
26.7
29.3
32.0
34.0
39.9
41.7
49.1
54.3
62.9
63.3
66.8
67.3
66.6
65.3
65.2
69.2
67.8
74.3
74.4
87.7
95.6
122.3
122.3
101.8
84.7
110.0
85.7
96.4
110.2
147.6
135.1
128.5
129.7
124.8
106.2
99.8
95.5
156.3

From
business
(net)
0.7
1.0
.7
1.1
1.4
1.4
2.0
2.4
3.2
3.4
3.4
3.5
2.9
3.2
3.4
4.5
4.6
4.8
5.0
5.4
5.4
6.0
8.2
6.9
9.1
13.0
24.4
29.9
41.1
44.6
52.0
61.4
61.8
55.3
61.0
72.5
71.6
74.6
83.2
78.7
89.6
98.1
102.4
116.3
129.8
119.3
137.2
140.8
146.0
154.9
163.4
141.9
140.2
149.4
152.5
143.3
151.6
160.4
164.2
148.7
158.7
171.6
174.5
177.5
178.8
184.7

Balance
on
current
account,
NIPA 2

8.9
6.0
19.8
7.1
–10.9
–12.6
–1.2
8.5
3.4
–3.3
–35.1
–90.1
–114.3
–142.7
–154.1
–115.7
–92.4
–74.9
7.9
–45.6
–79.4
–115.6
–105.9
–115.0
–130.1
–205.3
–276.6
–396.9
–391.4
–455.4
–527.6
–637.8
–751.2
–819.3
–740.9
–704.2
–383.1
–439.8
–460.3
–424.0
–351.2
–375.1
–423.1
–401.4
–378.0
–441.2
–447.3
–572.9
–879.4
–1,020.9
–915.9
–779.1
–862.1
–945.1
–931.2
–1,139.6
–1,065.4
–959.8
–919.0
–929.3
–917.6
–916.3
–900.3
–972.7
–1,061.3
–1,219.6

1 Certain goods, primarily military equipment purchased and sold by the Federal Government, are included in services. Beginning with 1986, repairs and
alterations of equipment were reclassified from goods to services.
2 National income and product accounts (NIPA).
Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).

406 |

Appendix B

Table B–15. Real exports and imports of goods and services, 2007–2024
[Billions of chained (2017) dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]
Exports of goods and services
Year or quarter

2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III p ��������������

Imports of goods and services

Goods 1
Total

1,745.5
1,846.6
1,693.1
1,907.3
2,044.2
2,126.3
2,190.3
2,275.8
2,283.1
2,293.9
2,388.3
2,456.4
2,469.5
2,145.3
2,284.3
2,455.9
2,523.8
2,235.4
2,253.2
2,258.3
2,390.3
2,362.2
2,433.7
2,517.5
2,510.3
2,522.5
2,491.6
2,521.5
2,559.6
2,571.8
2,578.4
2,625.4

Total
1,146.7
1,214.0
1,070.0
1,232.4
1,324.5
1,376.9
1,417.3
1,480.6
1,475.7
1,485.2
1,546.7
1,612.1
1,614.9
1,452.6
1,564.4
1,656.8
1,694.3
1,542.0
1,546.6
1,536.2
1,632.7
1,592.7
1,634.5
1,711.9
1,688.4
1,710.3
1,661.5
1,691.8
1,713.6
1,712.5
1,716.5
1,759.2

Goods 1

Durable
goods

Nondurable
goods

Nonagricultural
goods

Services 1

764.1
801.1
666.5
786.3
861.8
905.0
924.9
963.5
942.5
932.7
962.5
996.5
974.2
819.6
917.7
967.4
992.9
898.0
921.6
910.1
941.0
940.6
957.2
982.1
989.8
992.5
981.7
1,006.4
990.8
986.9
998.9
1,027.5

382.9
413.0
402.6
445.1
463.3
474.0
493.5
517.9
532.6
552.3
584.1
615.4
639.6
633.6
648.7
690.7
703.4
644.9
628.6
629.7
691.6
656.3
679.5
726.8
700.4
718.2
682.8
689.5
723.3
725.8
718.7
733.2

1,040.1
1,101.0
960.6
1,111.0
1,204.9
1,256.4
1,295.3
1,348.8
1,341.3
1,343.6
1,402.8
1,467.7
1,471.7
1,302.0
1,423.0
1,521.3
1,569.9
1,390.0
1,412.3
1,406.4
1,483.2
1,456.4
1,492.2
1,575.8
1,560.8
1,581.9
1,545.1
1,571.2
1,581.4
1,574.9
1,588.6
1,623.5

595.2
628.5
628.3
675.6
719.7
749.6
773.5
794.3
807.5
808.7
841.6
844.2
854.5
694.9
722.8
802.8
833.5
696.9
709.5
724.7
760.3
773.1
803.7
808.8
825.8
816.4
833.7
833.8
850.0
862.8
865.5
870.6

Total

2,376.4
2,325.4
2,031.8
2,295.3
2,405.8
2,464.7
2,494.6
2,623.4
2,759.5
2,799.7
2,931.6
3,050.0
3,085.9
2,808.8
3,220.8
3,497.6
3,456.6
3,102.2
3,164.7
3,230.2
3,386.3
3,494.3
3,545.0
3,495.7
3,455.5
3,448.5
3,421.3
3,460.4
3,496.3
3,548.7
3,614.0
3,702.9

Total
1,927.5
1,864.5
1,576.0
1,818.3
1,918.6
1,969.5
2,009.0
2,120.8
2,243.5
2,268.4
2,369.9
2,491.6
2,504.8
2,357.7
2,698.7
2,880.4
2,828.2
2,636.7
2,670.8
2,676.5
2,811.0
2,901.9
2,924.1
2,862.2
2,833.4
2,834.4
2,798.4
2,833.7
2,846.1
2,891.1
2,949.9
3,025.4

Durable
goods
1,050.8
1,017.4
811.2
1,002.3
1,096.9
1,186.2
1,242.0
1,352.1
1,442.2
1,459.7
1,562.3
1,650.9
1,656.3
1,534.8
1,807.0
1,950.3
1,931.8
1,771.0
1,794.4
1,780.3
1,882.3
1,967.2
1,983.1
1,948.5
1,902.5
1,919.5
1,921.5
1,934.9
1,951.5
1,988.6
2,028.2
2,085.4

NonNon- Services 1
durable petroleum
goods
goods
866.7
837.3
760.6
802.9
808.8
776.0
763.1
769.3
802.7
810.0
807.6
841.0
848.6
822.4
893.5
935.3
904.2
866.8
878.6
897.3
931.4
940.6
946.8
920.8
933.1
920.1
886.0
906.8
903.8
912.9
932.2
951.5

1,602.4
1,550.6
1,284.3
1,526.0
1,638.7
1,729.5
1,795.5
1,929.5
2,052.5
2,069.6
2,172.5
2,305.0
2,331.7
2,209.3
2,539.3
2,729.6
2,670.0
2,484.5
2,511.6
2,511.3
2,649.8
2,753.1
2,781.5
2,707.0
2,676.8
2,671.6
2,647.4
2,675.1
2,685.9
2,742.5
2,795.6
2,876.4

446.7
463.5
468.2
485.1
493.1
500.4
487.7
503.4
515.8
531.4
561.7
558.4
580.8
454.2
525.4
619.2
629.3
470.4
497.9
555.9
577.6
594.7
623.0
635.2
623.9
616.2
623.7
627.7
649.8
657.4
664.4
678.1

1 Certain goods, primarily military equipment purchased and sold by the Federal Government, are included in services. Repairs and alterations of equipment
are also included in services.
Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).

National Income or Expenditure | 407

Table B–16. Sources of personal income, 1973–2024
[Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]
Proprietors’ income with
inventory valuation and capital
consumption adjustments

Compensation of employees
Wages and salaries
Year or quarter

Personal
income
Total
Total

1973 ����������������������
1974 ����������������������
1975 ����������������������
1976 ����������������������
1977 ����������������������
1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III p ��������������

1,140.8
1,251.8
1,369.4
1,502.6
1,659.2
1,863.7
2,082.7
2,324.5
2,603.2
2,789.5
2,981.7
3,288.7
3,522.9
3,731.2
3,946.8
4,280.0
4,621.0
4,913.3
5,089.9
5,417.5
5,652.9
5,940.9
6,283.4
6,666.2
7,074.0
7,588.4
7,978.6
8,621.3
8,993.1
9,150.0
9,481.8
10,015.9
10,546.1
11,302.0
11,932.1
12,425.7
12,065.7
12,556.6
13,309.6
13,917.8
14,068.8
14,784.1
15,473.7
15,887.7
16,662.8
17,528.2
18,363.2
19,620.1
21,419.5
22,088.9
23,402.5
22,155.5
21,034.8
21,148.8
21,338.9
21,557.4
21,853.0
22,299.8
22,645.5
22,981.2
23,288.8
23,532.4
23,807.8
24,344.2
24,574.0
24,749.9

812.7
887.7
947.2
1,048.3
1,165.8
1,316.8
1,477.2
1,622.2
1,792.5
1,893.0
2,012.5
2,215.9
2,387.3
2,542.1
2,722.4
2,948.0
3,139.6
3,340.4
3,450.5
3,668.2
3,817.3
4,006.2
4,198.1
4,416.9
4,708.8
5,071.1
5,402.7
5,847.1
6,038.3
6,135.1
6,353.6
6,719.5
7,066.1
7,479.7
7,878.5
8,056.8
7,759.0
7,925.4
8,226.2
8,567.4
8,835.0
9,250.2
9,699.4
9,966.1
10,424.4
10,957.4
11,446.6
11,596.4
12,557.0
13,436.7
14,190.2
12,089.1
12,404.0
12,702.3
13,032.7
13,174.2
13,287.8
13,604.6
13,680.3
13,883.4
14,084.6
14,311.4
14,481.2
14,823.7
14,945.6
15,093.3

See next page for continuation of table.

408 |

Supplements to
wages and salaries

Appendix B

708.8
772.3
814.8
899.7
994.2
1,120.6
1,253.3
1,373.4
1,511.4
1,587.5
1,677.5
1,844.9
1,982.6
2,102.3
2,256.3
2,439.8
2,583.1
2,741.2
2,814.5
2,965.5
3,079.3
3,236.6
3,418.0
3,616.5
3,876.8
4,181.6
4,457.9
4,824.9
4,953.6
4,995.8
5,138.3
5,421.0
5,691.4
6,056.7
6,396.4
6,534.1
6,249.1
6,372.5
6,626.2
6,928.1
7,114.0
7,476.3
7,859.5
8,091.2
8,474.4
8,899.8
9,325.1
9,465.7
10,315.6
11,123.1
11,725.2
9,879.5
10,171.9
10,451.0
10,759.9
10,892.8
10,995.9
11,278.9
11,325.0
11,480.7
11,641.0
11,824.0
11,955.3
12,251.0
12,343.0
12,457.6

Private Governindustries ment

560.0
611.8
638.6
710.8
791.6
900.6
1,016.2
1,112.0
1,225.5
1,280.0
1,352.7
1,496.8
1,608.7
1,705.1
1,833.2
1,987.7
2,101.9
2,222.2
2,265.7
2,393.5
2,490.3
2,627.1
2,789.0
2,968.4
3,205.0
3,480.3
3,724.2
4,045.2
4,131.6
4,123.0
4,224.3
4,468.7
4,700.1
5,022.2
5,307.8
5,390.2
5,073.9
5,181.3
5,431.3
5,729.8
5,906.0
6,239.4
6,583.7
6,783.2
7,126.2
7,498.0
7,874.8
7,971.1
8,770.5
9,499.0
9,992.5
8,370.4
8,642.8
8,885.6
9,183.2
9,298.0
9,387.3
9,644.7
9,665.9
9,792.9
9,929.3
10,073.0
10,174.7
10,434.7
10,499.7
10,591.1

148.8
160.5
176.2
188.9
202.6
220.0
237.1
261.5
285.8
307.5
324.8
348.1
373.9
397.2
423.1
452.0
481.1
519.0
548.8
572.0
589.0
609.5
629.0
648.1
671.9
701.3
733.8
779.8
822.0
872.9
914.0
952.3
991.3
1,034.5
1,088.5
1,143.9
1,175.2
1,191.2
1,194.9
1,198.3
1,208.0
1,236.9
1,275.8
1,308.0
1,348.2
1,401.9
1,450.3
1,494.6
1,545.1
1,624.2
1,732.8
1,509.2
1,529.1
1,565.3
1,576.8
1,594.8
1,608.6
1,634.2
1,659.1
1,687.8
1,711.7
1,751.0
1,780.7
1,816.2
1,843.3
1,866.5

Total

103.9
115.4
132.4
148.6
171.7
196.2
223.9
248.8
281.2
305.5
335.0
371.0
404.8
439.7
466.1
508.2
556.6
599.2
636.0
702.7
737.9
769.6
780.1
800.5
832.0
889.5
944.8
1,022.2
1,084.7
1,139.3
1,215.3
1,298.5
1,374.7
1,422.9
1,482.1
1,522.7
1,509.9
1,552.9
1,600.0
1,639.2
1,721.0
1,773.9
1,839.9
1,874.9
1,950.0
2,057.6
2,121.5
2,130.8
2,241.4
2,313.6
2,464.9
2,209.6
2,232.1
2,251.3
2,272.8
2,281.5
2,291.9
2,325.7
2,355.3
2,402.7
2,443.7
2,487.5
2,525.9
2,572.8
2,602.6
2,635.8

Employer Employer
contribu- contributions for
for
employee tions
pension government
and
social
insurinsurance
ance
funds
64.1
70.7
85.7
94.2
110.6
124.7
141.3
159.9
177.5
195.7
215.1
231.9
257.0
281.9
299.9
323.6
362.9
392.7
420.9
474.3
498.3
515.5
515.9
525.7
542.4
582.3
621.4
677.0
726.7
773.2
832.8
889.7
946.7
975.6
1,020.4
1,051.3
1,051.8
1,083.9
1,107.3
1,125.9
1,194.7
1,227.5
1,270.6
1,293.9
1,345.3
1,432.8
1,470.8
1,472.1
1,534.7
1,548.3
1,643.9
1,529.4
1,534.8
1,536.9
1,537.6
1,537.0
1,537.7
1,548.4
1,570.0
1,602.1
1,628.3
1,657.9
1,687.4
1,722.7
1,750.3
1,776.6

39.8
44.7
46.7
54.4
61.1
71.5
82.6
88.9
103.6
109.8
119.9
139.0
147.7
157.9
166.3
184.6
193.7
206.5
215.1
228.4
239.7
254.1
264.1
274.8
289.6
307.2
323.3
345.2
358.0
366.0
382.5
408.8
428.1
447.3
461.7
471.4
458.1
469.0
492.7
513.3
526.3
546.4
569.4
580.9
604.7
624.8
650.6
658.7
706.7
765.3
821.0
680.1
697.3
714.4
735.2
744.5
754.2
777.3
785.3
800.7
815.4
829.6
838.5
850.1
852.3
859.1

Total

112.5
112.2
118.2
131.0
144.5
166.0
179.4
171.6
179.7
171.2
186.3
228.2
241.1
256.5
286.5
325.5
341.1
353.2
354.2
400.2
428.0
456.6
481.2
543.8
584.0
640.3
696.4
753.6
831.1
870.1
897.5
962.9
979.1
1,050.9
995.4
960.3
938.1
1,108.5
1,228.3
1,299.9
1,351.7
1,370.0
1,347.7
1,349.2
1,428.6
1,495.3
1,555.8
1,594.0
1,815.3
1,873.6
1,949.0
1,697.5
1,845.5
1,867.1
1,850.8
1,833.3
1,850.1
1,895.3
1,915.5
1,934.7
1,936.6
1,954.6
1,970.1
1,972.1
2,002.3
2,009.5

Farm

29.1
23.5
22.0
17.2
16.0
19.9
22.2
11.7
19.0
13.3
6.2
20.9
21.0
22.8
28.9
26.8
33.0
32.2
26.8
34.8
31.4
34.7
22.0
37.3
32.4
28.6
28.0
31.2
32.1
20.3
37.1
52.4
47.9
34.3
41.5
39.5
27.6
38.7
63.9
61.0
87.5
68.5
55.5
36.0
41.0
32.1
33.8
46.3
75.5
95.9
71.3
49.3
94.9
89.2
68.8
81.2
98.1
100.5
104.0
92.7
76.0
66.2
50.2
38.5
41.1
40.9

Rental
income
of
persons
with
capital
conNonfarm
sumption
adjustment

83.4
88.7
96.2
113.8
128.5
146.1
157.3
159.9
160.7
157.9
180.1
207.3
220.1
233.7
257.6
298.7
308.1
321.0
327.4
365.4
396.6
422.0
459.2
506.4
551.6
611.7
668.3
722.4
798.9
849.8
860.4
910.5
931.2
1,016.6
953.9
920.8
910.5
1,069.8
1,164.4
1,238.9
1,264.2
1,301.5
1,292.3
1,313.2
1,387.6
1,463.2
1,522.0
1,547.7
1,739.7
1,777.6
1,877.7
1,648.3
1,750.6
1,778.0
1,782.0
1,752.1
1,752.0
1,794.9
1,811.5
1,842.0
1,860.6
1,888.3
1,920.0
1,933.6
1,961.2
1,968.6

23.1
23.2
22.3
20.3
15.9
16.5
16.1
19.0
23.8
23.8
24.4
24.7
26.2
18.3
16.6
22.5
21.5
28.2
38.6
60.6
90.1
113.7
124.9
142.5
147.1
165.2
178.5
183.5
202.4
208.4
227.1
242.8
221.1
181.1
186.3
290.3
347.6
433.7
506.5
534.5
578.7
598.5
601.4
618.7
642.0
671.5
688.4
738.1
772.3
870.3
989.1
745.6
761.6
781.2
800.7
814.3
858.2
889.5
919.1
963.6
984.1
995.0
1,013.6
1,046.1
1,053.4
1,055.7

Table B–16. Sources of personal income, 1973–2024—Continued
[Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]
Personal income receipts
on assets

Personal current transfer receipts
Government social benefits to persons

Year or quarter
Total

1973 ����������������������
1974 ����������������������
1975 ����������������������
1976 ����������������������
1977 ����������������������
1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III p ��������������

155.4
180.6
201.0
220.0
251.6
285.8
327.1
397.7
483.9
554.9
600.2
676.7
724.3
766.3
776.3
848.0
959.7
1,004.8
1,008.7
995.4
1,001.9
1,043.6
1,128.5
1,188.8
1,266.5
1,352.5
1,336.2
1,455.6
1,461.9
1,402.6
1,435.6
1,498.7
1,636.4
1,899.0
2,105.3
2,151.5
1,838.5
1,747.7
1,906.5
2,103.6
1,983.2
2,177.4
2,344.6
2,415.4
2,611.0
2,789.4
2,950.0
2,912.4
3,180.7
3,474.0
3,822.9
3,048.0
3,158.1
3,225.4
3,291.3
3,333.6
3,424.9
3,509.5
3,628.2
3,729.9
3,806.4
3,836.2
3,919.1
3,938.9
3,950.2
3,938.8

Personal Personal
interest dividend
income income

125.5
147.4
168.0
181.0
206.9
235.1
269.5
333.5
414.2
481.8
518.2
590.9
630.5
663.1
674.3
720.1
802.3
835.1
827.7
806.2
796.8
806.3
869.4
886.4
928.8
994.0
987.7
1,069.3
1,087.5
1,001.2
1,004.4
939.3
1,081.3
1,215.4
1,325.2
1,345.8
1,272.8
1,211.1
1,216.1
1,271.8
1,201.6
1,260.4
1,347.7
1,388.0
1,466.7
1,554.5
1,603.5
1,509.0
1,480.3
1,634.9
1,892.0
1,477.7
1,480.3
1,475.0
1,488.0
1,526.6
1,595.9
1,663.7
1,753.3
1,823.3
1,870.6
1,908.7
1,965.3
1,951.0
1,966.2
1,964.1

29.9
33.2
32.9
39.0
44.7
50.7
57.7
64.2
69.7
73.1
82.0
85.8
93.8
103.1
102.0
128.0
157.5
169.7
181.0
189.3
205.1
237.3
259.2
302.4
337.8
358.4
348.5
386.4
374.4
401.5
431.2
559.4
555.0
683.6
780.1
805.7
565.6
536.6
690.4
831.7
781.6
917.0
996.9
1,027.4
1,144.3
1,234.9
1,346.5
1,403.5
1,700.5
1,839.2
1,930.9
1,570.3
1,677.8
1,750.4
1,803.4
1,807.0
1,828.9
1,845.8
1,874.9
1,906.6
1,935.8
1,927.5
1,953.8
1,988.0
1,984.0
1,974.7

Total

112.6
133.3
170.0
184.3
194.6
209.9
235.6
280.1
319.0
355.5
384.3
400.6
425.4
451.6
468.1
497.5
544.2
596.9
668.1
748.0
793.0
829.0
883.5
929.2
954.9
983.9
1,026.2
1,087.3
1,192.6
1,285.2
1,347.3
1,421.2
1,516.7
1,613.8
1,728.1
1,955.1
2,146.7
2,325.2
2,358.7
2,363.0
2,424.3
2,541.6
2,685.4
2,777.0
2,855.7
2,976.3
3,147.1
4,228.8
4,653.7
4,139.2
4,268.0
6,078.0
4,404.3
4,148.6
3,984.0
4,062.3
4,115.2
4,130.9
4,248.3
4,245.6
4,281.6
4,268.3
4,276.5
4,446.1
4,512.3
4,557.6

Total 1

108.6
128.6
163.1
177.6
189.5
203.4
227.3
271.5
307.8
343.1
370.5
380.9
403.1
428.6
447.9
476.9
521.1
574.7
650.5
731.8
778.9
815.7
864.7
906.3
935.4
957.9
992.2
1,044.9
1,145.8
1,251.0
1,321.0
1,404.5
1,490.9
1,593.0
1,697.3
1,919.3
2,107.7
2,281.4
2,310.1
2,322.6
2,385.9
2,498.6
2,635.1
2,717.3
2,807.4
2,926.0
3,090.8
4,181.1
4,561.0
4,013.8
4,146.5
6,007.8
4,311.6
4,048.7
3,876.0
3,944.5
3,986.8
4,002.9
4,120.9
4,121.6
4,160.2
4,147.5
4,156.5
4,314.6
4,380.1
4,424.9

UnemploySocial
3
ment
security 2 Medicare Medicaid insurance
50.7
57.6
65.9
74.5
83.2
91.4
102.6
118.6
138.6
153.7
164.4
173.0
183.3
193.6
201.0
213.9
227.4
244.1
264.2
281.8
297.9
312.2
327.7
342.0
356.6
369.2
379.9
401.4
425.1
446.9
463.5
485.5
512.7
544.1
575.7
605.5
664.5
690.2
713.3
762.1
799.0
834.6
871.8
896.5
926.1
972.4
1,030.7
1,077.9
1,114.6
1,211.5
1,357.0
1,105.6
1,109.6
1,116.9
1,126.2
1,198.5
1,207.2
1,214.8
1,225.6
1,339.9
1,353.3
1,360.7
1,374.0
1,426.5
1,439.7
1,453.2

10.2
12.7
15.6
18.8
22.1
25.5
29.9
36.2
43.5
50.9
57.8
64.7
69.7
75.3
81.6
86.3
98.2
107.6
117.5
132.6
146.8
164.4
181.2
194.9
206.9
205.6
208.7
219.1
242.6
259.7
276.7
304.4
332.1
399.1
428.2
461.6
493.0
513.4
535.6
554.7
572.8
600.0
634.9
662.1
691.8
733.6
790.5
820.4
878.9
935.0
1,009.5
854.9
871.2
887.1
902.4
917.6
926.6
937.4
958.5
981.1
1,001.8
1,019.9
1,035.3
1,049.2
1,067.1
1,090.2

9.6
11.2
13.9
15.5
16.7
18.6
21.1
23.9
27.7
30.2
33.9
36.6
39.7
43.6
47.8
53.0
60.8
73.1
96.9
116.2
130.1
139.4
149.6
158.2
163.1
170.2
184.6
199.5
227.3
250.0
264.5
289.8
304.4
299.1
324.2
338.3
369.6
396.9
406.0
417.5
440.0
490.9
535.9
562.8
573.7
589.8
614.0
657.6
736.5
814.4
878.1
704.9
745.6
749.2
746.3
791.9
819.2
819.0
827.5
877.6
911.6
867.2
856.2
904.8
924.7
919.4

4.6
7.0
18.1
16.4
13.1
9.4
9.7
16.1
15.9
25.2
26.4
16.0
15.9
16.5
14.6
13.3
14.4
18.2
26.8
39.6
34.8
23.9
21.7
22.3
20.1
19.7
20.5
20.7
31.9
53.5
53.2
36.4
31.8
30.4
32.7
51.1
131.2
138.9
107.2
83.6
62.5
35.5
32.5
32.0
30.2
27.6
27.5
528.6
317.3
23.8
33.2
583.8
440.8
212.8
31.8
24.5
21.7
23.1
25.9
30.1
32.7
34.7
35.3
34.9
34.9
35.7

Other

23.3
28.4
35.7
38.7
40.9
44.9
49.9
62.1
66.3
66.8
71.5
74.3
78.0
83.0
86.4
93.6
103.1
113.9
127.0
142.9
150.0
156.1
164.0
167.6
166.4
170.0
174.4
179.1
192.4
211.3
231.2
254.3
273.5
281.5
294.9
417.7
398.0
484.2
484.8
434.4
432.5
453.5
467.4
467.1
474.2
482.9
498.2
951.7
1,360.7
860.3
671.7
2,608.5
992.9
928.7
912.7
851.6
847.0
837.6
905.1
706.5
666.8
664.2
649.1
687.4
696.8
704.8

Other
current
transfer
receipts,
from
business
(net)

Less:
Contributions
for
government
social
insurance,
domestic

3.9
4.7
6.8
6.7
5.1
6.5
8.2
8.6
11.2
12.4
13.8
19.7
22.3
22.9
20.2
20.6
23.2
22.2
17.6
16.3
14.1
13.3
18.7
22.9
19.4
26.0
34.0
42.4
46.8
34.2
26.3
16.8
25.8
20.8
30.8
35.8
39.0
43.7
48.5
40.4
38.4
42.9
50.3
59.7
48.3
50.3
56.3
47.7
92.7
125.4
121.6
70.3
92.7
99.9
108.0
117.8
128.4
127.9
127.4
124.0
121.4
120.9
120.0
131.5
132.3
132.6

75.5
85.2
89.3
101.3
113.1
131.3
152.7
166.2
195.7
208.9
226.0
257.5
281.4
303.4
323.1
361.5
385.2
410.1
430.2
455.0
477.4
508.2
532.8
555.1
587.2
624.7
661.3
705.8
733.2
751.5
779.3
829.2
873.3
922.5
961.4
988.4
964.3
983.7
916.7
950.5
1,104.3
1,153.6
1,204.7
1,238.8
1,298.9
1,361.7
1,424.8
1,449.7
1,559.5
1,704.8
1,816.6
1,502.8
1,538.8
1,575.8
1,620.7
1,660.3
1,683.2
1,729.9
1,745.9
1,776.0
1,804.5
1,833.2
1,852.8
1,882.9
1,889.9
1,905.0

1 Includes Veterans’ benefits, not shown seperately.
2 Includes old-age, survivors, and disability insurance benefits that are distributed from the federal old-age and survivors insurance trust fund and the

disability insurance trust fund.
3 Includes hospital and supplementary medical insurance benefits that are distributed from the federal hospital insurance trust fund and the supplementary
medical insurance trust fund.
Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).

National Income or Expenditure | 409

Table B–17. Disposition of personal income, 1973–2024
[Billions of dollars, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]
Percent of disposable
personal income 2

Less: Personal outlays

Year or quarter

1973 ����������������������
1974 ����������������������
1975 ����������������������
1976 ����������������������
1977 ����������������������
1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III p ��������������

Personal
income

1,140.8
1,251.8
1,369.4
1,502.6
1,659.2
1,863.7
2,082.7
2,324.5
2,603.2
2,789.5
2,981.7
3,288.7
3,522.9
3,731.2
3,946.8
4,280.0
4,621.0
4,913.3
5,089.9
5,417.5
5,652.9
5,940.9
6,283.4
6,666.2
7,074.0
7,588.4
7,978.6
8,621.3
8,993.1
9,150.0
9,481.8
10,015.9
10,546.1
11,302.0
11,932.1
12,425.7
12,065.7
12,556.6
13,309.6
13,917.8
14,068.8
14,784.1
15,473.7
15,887.7
16,662.8
17,528.2
18,363.2
19,620.1
21,419.5
22,088.9
23,402.5
22,155.5
21,034.8
21,148.8
21,338.9
21,557.4
21,853.0
22,299.8
22,645.5
22,981.2
23,288.8
23,532.4
23,807.8
24,344.2
24,574.0
24,749.9

Less:
Personal
current
taxes

132.4
151.0
147.6
172.7
197.9
229.6
268.9
299.5
345.8
354.7
352.9
377.9
417.8
437.8
489.6
505.9
567.7
594.7
588.9
612.8
648.8
693.1
748.4
837.1
931.8
1,032.4
1,111.9
1,236.3
1,239.0
1,052.2
1,003.5
1,048.7
1,212.5
1,357.0
1,492.5
1,507.5
1,152.4
1,237.6
1,453.7
1,509.5
1,677.5
1,785.7
1,940.9
1,958.8
2,048.8
2,074.2
2,198.7
2,245.3
2,705.1
3,244.9
2,855.7
2,547.7
2,675.6
2,750.0
2,847.0
3,254.1
3,297.4
3,224.9
3,203.3
2,834.2
2,828.4
2,866.0
2,894.3
2,965.6
3,005.4
3,058.4

Equals:
Disposable
personal
income

1,008.4
1,100.8
1,221.8
1,330.0
1,461.4
1,634.1
1,813.8
2,024.9
2,257.4
2,434.7
2,628.8
2,910.8
3,105.1
3,293.4
3,457.2
3,774.1
4,053.3
4,318.6
4,501.0
4,804.7
5,004.1
5,247.8
5,535.0
5,829.1
6,142.2
6,555.9
6,866.7
7,385.0
7,754.1
8,097.9
8,478.2
8,967.1
9,333.6
9,945.0
10,439.6
10,918.2
10,913.3
11,319.0
11,855.9
12,408.3
12,391.2
12,998.4
13,532.9
13,928.9
14,613.9
15,454.0
16,164.5
17,374.8
18,714.4
18,844.0
20,546.8
19,607.7
18,359.2
18,398.8
18,491.9
18,303.3
18,555.6
19,074.9
19,442.3
20,147.0
20,460.4
20,666.4
20,913.5
21,378.6
21,568.6
21,691.5

Total

872.6
954.5
1,057.8
1,175.6
1,305.4
1,459.0
1,627.0
1,800.1
1,993.9
2,143.5
2,364.2
2,584.5
2,822.1
3,004.7
3,196.6
3,457.0
3,717.9
3,958.0
4,100.0
4,354.2
4,611.5
4,890.6
5,155.9
5,459.2
5,770.4
6,131.3
6,550.9
7,068.1
7,390.9
7,646.3
8,038.3
8,550.1
9,124.5
9,669.1
10,176.2
10,466.7
10,288.4
10,647.6
11,079.6
11,431.8
11,775.5
12,286.4
12,742.3
13,182.7
13,772.3
14,457.4
14,986.3
14,715.8
16,618.7
18,277.9
19,579.6
15,739.8
16,522.4
16,878.4
17,334.2
17,699.3
18,154.6
18,482.1
18,775.6
19,196.3
19,427.3
19,723.5
19,971.3
20,230.5
20,507.5
20,757.1

1 Consists of nonmortgage interest paid by households.
2 Percents based on data in millions of dollars.

Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).

410 |

Appendix B

Personal
consumption
expenditures
849.6
930.2
1,030.5
1,147.7
1,274.0
1,422.3
1,585.4
1,750.7
1,934.0
2,071.3
2,281.6
2,492.3
2,712.8
2,886.3
3,076.3
3,330.0
3,576.8
3,809.0
3,943.4
4,197.6
4,452.0
4,721.0
4,962.6
5,244.6
5,536.8
5,877.2
6,283.8
6,767.2
7,073.8
7,348.9
7,740.7
8,232.0
8,769.1
9,277.2
9,746.6
10,050.1
9,891.2
10,260.3
10,698.9
11,047.4
11,388.2
11,874.5
12,297.4
12,726.8
13,290.6
13,934.4
14,437.5
14,225.7
16,113.9
17,690.8
18,822.8
15,259.4
16,016.3
16,363.9
16,816.1
17,175.1
17,603.8
17,876.2
18,108.3
18,506.2
18,685.7
18,929.0
19,170.2
19,424.8
19,682.7
19,928.2

Personal
interest
payments 1
19.6
20.9
23.4
23.5
26.6
31.3
35.5
42.5
48.4
58.5
67.4
75.0
90.6
97.3
97.1
101.3
113.1
118.4
119.9
116.1
113.9
119.9
140.4
157.0
169.7
184.6
190.8
217.7
225.6
200.6
196.5
207.3
237.3
266.9
291.2
272.0
252.8
242.3
229.9
229.6
229.5
243.7
263.5
272.8
290.4
321.3
341.2
287.5
277.8
334.4
493.1
263.2
283.4
284.5
280.1
280.1
299.0
351.2
407.5
430.4
480.4
529.5
532.2
534.4
551.7
554.0

Personal
current
transfer
payments
3.4
3.4
3.8
4.4
4.8
5.4
6.0
6.9
11.5
13.8
15.1
17.1
18.8
21.1
23.2
25.6
28.0
30.6
36.7
40.5
45.6
49.8
52.9
57.6
63.9
69.5
76.3
83.2
91.5
96.7
101.1
110.9
118.1
124.9
138.4
144.6
144.3
145.0
150.8
154.8
157.8
168.2
181.4
183.1
191.3
201.6
207.6
202.7
227.0
252.6
263.7
217.2
222.6
230.0
237.9
244.1
251.9
254.7
259.9
259.7
261.2
265.0
268.9
271.4
273.1
274.9

Equals:
Personal
saving

Personal outlays

Total

135.8
146.3
164.0
154.4
155.9
175.1
186.8
224.9
263.6
291.2
264.7
326.3
282.9
288.7
260.6
317.1
335.4
360.6
401.0
450.5
392.6
357.2
379.0
369.9
371.8
424.6
315.8
316.8
363.2
451.6
439.9
417.0
209.2
276.0
263.4
451.5
624.9
671.4
776.3
976.5
615.7
712.0
790.6
746.2
841.6
996.7
1,178.2
2,659.0
2,095.7
566.1
967.2
3,867.9
1,836.8
1,520.4
1,157.7
604.1
401.0
592.7
666.6
950.7
1,033.1
942.9
942.2
1,148.1
1,061.1
934.4

86.5
86.7
86.6
88.4
89.3
89.3
89.7
88.9
88.3
88.0
89.9
88.8
90.9
91.2
92.5
91.6
91.7
91.7
91.1
90.6
92.2
93.2
93.2
93.7
93.9
93.5
95.4
95.7
95.3
94.4
94.8
95.3
97.8
97.2
97.5
95.9
94.3
94.1
93.5
92.1
95.0
94.5
94.2
94.6
94.2
93.6
92.7
84.7
88.8
97.0
95.3
80.3
90.0
91.7
93.7
96.7
97.8
96.9
96.6
95.3
95.0
95.4
95.5
94.6
95.1
95.7

Personal
consumption
expenditures
84.3
84.5
84.3
86.3
87.2
87.0
87.4
86.5
85.7
85.1
86.8
85.6
87.4
87.6
89.0
88.2
88.2
88.2
87.6
87.4
89.0
90.0
89.7
90.0
90.1
89.6
91.5
91.6
91.2
90.8
91.3
91.8
94.0
93.3
93.4
92.0
90.6
90.6
90.2
89.0
91.9
91.4
90.9
91.4
90.9
90.2
89.3
81.9
86.1
93.9
91.6
77.8
87.2
88.9
90.9
93.8
94.9
93.7
93.1
91.9
91.3
91.6
91.7
90.9
91.3
91.9

Personal
saving

13.5
13.3
13.4
11.6
10.7
10.7
10.3
11.1
11.7
12.0
10.1
11.2
9.1
8.8
7.5
8.4
8.3
8.4
8.9
9.4
7.8
6.8
6.8
6.3
6.1
6.5
4.6
4.3
4.7
5.6
5.2
4.7
2.2
2.8
2.5
4.1
5.7
5.9
6.5
7.9
5.0
5.5
5.8
5.4
5.8
6.4
7.3
15.3
11.2
3.0
4.7
19.7
10.0
8.3
6.3
3.3
2.2
3.1
3.4
4.7
5.0
4.6
4.5
5.4
4.9
4.3

Table B–18. Total and per capita disposable personal income and personal consumption
expenditures, and per capita gross domestic product, in current and real dollars, 1973–2024
[Quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates, except as noted]
Disposable personal income
Year or quarter

1973 ����������������������
1974 ����������������������
1975 ����������������������
1976 ����������������������
1977 ����������������������
1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III p ��������������

Total
(billions of dollars)
Current
dollars

Chained
(2017)
dollars

1,008.4
1,100.8
1,221.8
1,330.0
1,461.4
1,634.1
1,813.8
2,024.9
2,257.4
2,434.7
2,628.8
2,910.8
3,105.1
3,293.4
3,457.2
3,774.1
4,053.3
4,318.6
4,501.0
4,804.7
5,004.1
5,247.8
5,535.0
5,829.1
6,142.2
6,555.9
6,866.7
7,385.0
7,754.1
8,097.9
8,478.2
8,967.1
9,333.6
9,945.0
10,439.6
10,918.2
10,913.3
11,319.0
11,855.9
12,408.3
12,391.2
12,998.4
13,532.9
13,928.9
14,613.9
15,454.0
16,164.5
17,374.8
18,714.4
18,844.0
20,546.8
19,607.7
18,359.2
18,398.8
18,491.9
18,303.3
18,555.6
19,074.9
19,442.3
20,147.0
20,460.4
20,666.4
20,913.5
21,378.6
21,568.6
21,691.5

4,490.5
4,439.8
4,548.7
4,694.0
4,842.7
5,062.8
5,161.1
5,201.8
5,322.2
5,438.1
5,632.1
6,009.2
6,194.3
6,430.0
6,547.5
6,878.8
7,078.6
7,224.8
7,286.3
7,575.9
7,698.6
7,908.6
8,169.2
8,423.3
8,723.8
9,238.0
9,536.9
10,003.7
10,297.3
10,614.4
10,884.3
11,233.2
11,364.9
11,777.6
12,054.1
12,244.3
12,273.0
12,505.3
12,775.2
13,125.7
12,937.1
13,383.7
13,908.5
14,172.0
14,613.9
15,144.0
15,616.5
16,604.2
17,173.6
16,229.4
17,052.5
18,411.7
16,975.3
16,780.2
16,590.4
16,116.8
16,042.8
16,302.0
16,452.9
16,885.3
17,025.2
17,082.8
17,216.5
17,451.8
17,497.2
17,531.6

Personal consumption expenditures

Per capita
(dollars)
Current
dollars
4,758
5,146
5,657
6,098
6,634
7,340
8,058
8,892
9,815
10,485
11,218
12,313
13,019
13,684
14,236
15,401
16,384
17,262
17,753
18,701
19,226
19,919
20,762
21,612
22,502
23,740
24,583
26,151
27,186
28,122
29,172
30,577
31,533
33,281
34,603
35,851
35,520
36,532
37,964
39,426
39,077
40,671
42,013
42,910
44,710
47,002
48,907
52,365
56,306
56,492
61,296
59,059
55,271
55,335
55,564
54,966
55,669
57,151
58,175
60,222
61,088
61,612
62,257
63,569
64,060
64,331

Chained
(2017)
dollars
21,188
20,757
21,061
21,524
21,984
22,741
22,928
22,842
23,139
23,418
24,035
25,420
25,971
26,716
26,962
28,070
28,613
28,878
28,739
29,487
29,578
30,019
30,644
31,230
31,960
33,452
34,142
35,424
36,102
36,861
37,451
38,304
38,396
39,414
39,954
40,205
39,946
40,361
40,908
41,705
40,798
41,876
43,179
43,659
44,710
46,059
47,249
50,043
51,670
48,654
50,871
55,456
51,105
50,467
49,851
48,400
48,130
48,843
49,230
50,472
50,832
50,928
51,251
51,892
51,968
51,994

Total
(billions of dollars)
Current
dollars

Chained
(2017)
dollars

849.6
930.2
1,030.5
1,147.7
1,274.0
1,422.3
1,585.4
1,750.7
1,934.0
2,071.3
2,281.6
2,492.3
2,712.8
2,886.3
3,076.3
3,330.0
3,576.8
3,809.0
3,943.4
4,197.6
4,452.0
4,721.0
4,962.6
5,244.6
5,536.8
5,877.2
6,283.8
6,767.2
7,073.8
7,348.9
7,740.7
8,232.0
8,769.1
9,277.2
9,746.6
10,050.1
9,891.2
10,260.3
10,698.9
11,047.4
11,388.2
11,874.5
12,297.4
12,726.8
13,290.6
13,934.4
14,437.5
14,225.7
16,113.9
17,690.8
18,822.8
15,259.4
16,016.3
16,363.9
16,816.1
17,175.1
17,603.8
17,876.2
18,108.3
18,506.2
18,685.7
18,929.0
19,170.2
19,424.8
19,682.7
19,928.2

3,783.4
3,751.7
3,836.7
4,050.6
4,221.8
4,406.5
4,511.3
4,497.2
4,559.6
4,626.3
4,888.2
5,145.4
5,411.8
5,635.2
5,826.1
6,069.4
6,246.4
6,372.2
6,383.7
6,618.6
6,849.2
7,114.5
7,324.5
7,578.6
7,864.0
8,281.7
8,727.3
9,166.9
9,393.9
9,632.8
9,937.6
10,312.2
10,677.4
10,986.8
11,253.9
11,270.7
11,123.6
11,335.6
11,528.5
11,686.1
11,889.9
12,226.4
12,638.8
12,949.0
13,290.6
13,654.9
13,948.1
13,594.7
14,787.2
15,236.2
15,621.7
14,328.6
14,809.1
14,924.3
15,086.9
15,123.4
15,219.9
15,277.6
15,324.0
15,510.2
15,548.5
15,646.7
15,781.4
15,856.9
15,967.3
16,106.4

Per capita
(dollars)
Current
dollars
4,009
4,349
4,771
5,262
5,783
6,388
7,043
7,688
8,408
8,919
9,737
10,543
11,374
11,992
12,668
13,589
14,458
15,225
15,554
16,338
17,104
17,919
18,615
19,445
20,284
21,283
22,496
23,963
24,801
25,521
26,635
28,070
29,626
31,046
32,306
33,001
32,194
33,115
34,259
35,102
35,914
37,154
38,177
39,207
40,662
42,380
43,682
42,874
48,482
53,035
56,152
45,961
48,218
49,215
50,529
51,578
52,813
53,560
54,184
55,317
55,789
56,432
57,067
57,759
58,459
59,102

Chained
(2017)
dollars
17,851
17,540
17,764
18,573
19,165
19,793
20,041
19,748
19,823
19,922
20,860
21,766
22,690
23,413
23,991
24,767
25,249
25,470
25,179
25,761
26,314
27,005
27,475
28,099
28,810
29,989
31,244
32,461
32,935
33,452
34,194
35,164
36,073
36,767
37,302
37,009
36,205
36,586
36,915
37,131
37,496
38,255
39,237
39,891
40,662
41,530
42,202
40,973
44,491
45,676
46,603
43,158
44,583
44,886
45,333
45,417
45,661
45,774
45,853
46,362
46,423
46,647
46,979
47,150
47,424
47,767

Gross domestic
product
per capita
(dollars)
Current
dollars
6,725
7,224
7,801
8,590
9,450
10,563
11,672
12,547
13,943
14,399
15,508
17,080
18,192
19,028
19,993
21,368
22,805
23,835
24,290
25,379
26,350
27,660
28,658
29,932
31,424
32,818
34,480
36,300
37,100
37,954
39,420
41,660
44,052
46,234
47,976
48,498
47,123
48,570
49,952
51,645
53,235
55,094
56,797
57,931
60,002
62,825
65,171
64,358
71,250
77,966
82,697
68,242
70,353
71,947
74,450
75,724
77,421
78,715
79,995
81,197
81,968
83,379
84,237
85,113
86,182
87,057

Chained
(2017)
dollars
28,812
28,394
28,062
29,289
30,337
31,679
32,323
31,869
32,353
31,467
32,613
34,668
35,794
36,698
37,628
38,845
39,893
40,191
39,618
40,472
41,048
42,188
42,811
43,912
45,319
46,803
48,487
49,915
49,893
50,260
51,191
52,682
54,015
54,994
55,561
55,104
53,213
54,189
54,604
55,422
56,172
57,139
58,364
58,968
60,002
61,418
62,677
61,084
64,672
66,058
67,633
63,428
64,392
64,877
65,986
65,779
65,760
66,115
66,575
66,967
67,295
67,916
68,351
68,549
68,977
69,359

Population
(thousands) 1

211,939
213,898
215,981
218,086
220,289
222,629
225,106
227,726
230,008
232,218
234,333
236,394
238,506
240,683
242,843
245,061
247,387
250,181
253,530
256,922
260,282
263,455
266,588
269,714
272,958
276,154
279,328
282,398
285,225
287,955
290,626
293,262
295,993
298,818
301,696
304,543
307,240
309,839
312,295
314,725
317,099
319,601
322,113
324,609
326,860
328,794
330,513
331,800
332,367
333,568
335,208
332,005
332,166
332,497
332,802
332,991
333,320
333,762
334,201
334,547
334,934
335,430
335,923
336,308
336,692
337,184

1 Population of the United States including Armed Forces overseas. Annual data are averages of quarterly data. Quarterly data are averages for the period.

Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of the Census).

National Income or Expenditure | 411

Table B–19. Gross saving and investment, 1973–2024
[Billions of dollars, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]
Gross saving
Net saving
Year or quarter

1973 ����������������������
1974 ����������������������
1975 ����������������������
1976 ����������������������
1977 ����������������������
1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III p ��������������

Total
gross
saving

335.3
349.2
348.1
399.3
459.4
548.0
613.6
630.3
744.2
726.0
716.8
881.8
881.2
864.7
949.1
1,076.8
1,110.0
1,113.6
1,153.6
1,148.0
1,163.9
1,295.8
1,427.2
1,580.0
1,781.9
1,931.7
2,008.2
2,126.2
2,072.0
2,000.3
1,987.8
2,157.8
2,353.8
2,642.3
2,511.9
2,211.8
1,997.7
2,300.7
2,533.1
2,972.4
3,118.8
3,446.2
3,587.8
3,473.7
3,703.2
3,950.8
4,163.4
3,893.3
4,171.0
4,763.1
4,810.8
4,118.6
3,947.3
4,140.5
4,477.7
4,643.7
4,705.6
4,914.3
4,788.9
4,661.8
4,755.1
4,804.8
5,021.6
5,103.2
5,102.6
4,973.1

Net private saving
Total
net
saving
156.6
142.3
109.6
139.1
169.6
220.8
239.7
201.9
257.0
189.1
154.2
283.4
241.0
179.4
218.7
292.3
271.7
225.0
221.2
187.8
160.4
240.2
304.8
404.7
542.5
622.0
609.3
614.9
472.5
342.3
268.7
336.0
382.8
518.2
259.1
–147.2
–373.5
–89.6
58.8
396.9
437.2
626.5
664.9
465.6
554.2
638.2
685.9
269.8
299.6
449.7
223.1
387.8
134.1
226.0
450.6
488.7
426.9
535.0
348.3
151.2
196.2
191.7
353.2
389.1
321.6
121.6

Total
189.3
186.0
218.3
224.4
242.5
278.0
288.3
296.5
355.3
379.2
379.8
480.1
442.7
399.3
398.8
463.6
450.4
464.6
529.8
593.4
546.6
560.1
617.7
638.3
676.9
651.3
579.8
496.7
577.3
793.8
848.2
879.2
780.2
826.1
649.2
699.8
1,211.9
1,537.7
1,570.0
1,754.4
1,337.1
1,458.0
1,438.9
1,375.1
1,515.9
1,744.5
1,935.4
3,261.8
2,893.0
1,381.7
1,951.1
4,688.3
2,728.1
2,300.8
1,854.9
1,221.7
1,181.8
1,542.8
1,580.5
1,833.7
1,925.5
1,961.7
2,083.3
2,189.0
2,206.7
2,090.7

Personal
saving
135.8
146.3
164.0
154.4
155.9
175.1
186.8
224.9
263.6
291.2
264.7
326.3
282.9
288.7
260.6
317.1
335.4
360.6
401.0
450.5
392.6
357.2
379.0
369.9
371.8
424.6
315.8
316.8
363.2
451.6
439.9
417.0
209.2
276.0
263.4
451.5
624.9
671.4
776.3
976.5
615.7
712.0
790.6
746.2
841.6
996.7
1,178.2
2,659.0
2,095.7
566.1
967.2
3,867.9
1,836.8
1,520.4
1,157.7
604.1
401.0
592.7
666.6
950.7
1,033.1
942.9
942.2
1,148.1
1,061.1
934.4

1 With inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments.

See next page for continuation of table.

412 |

Appendix B

Consumption of fixed capital
Net government saving

Undistributed
corporate
profits 1
53.5
39.7
54.3
70.0
86.6
102.9
101.5
71.6
91.7
88.0
115.1
153.8
159.7
110.6
138.2
146.5
115.0
104.0
128.8
142.9
154.0
202.9
238.7
268.3
305.2
226.7
264.0
179.9
214.1
342.2
408.3
462.2
571.0
550.1
385.7
248.3
587.0
866.2
793.7
777.8
721.4
746.0
648.3
628.9
674.2
747.8
757.3
602.8
797.3
815.6
983.8
820.4
891.4
780.4
697.2
617.6
780.8
950.0
913.9
883.1
892.4
1,018.8
1,141.0
1,040.9
1,145.5
1,156.2

Total
–32.7
–43.7
–108.6
–85.3
–72.9
–57.2
–48.6
–94.7
–98.2
–190.1
–225.6
–196.7
–201.7
–219.9
–180.1
–171.3
–178.7
–239.5
–308.5
–405.6
–386.2
–319.9
–312.9
–233.6
–134.4
–29.3
29.5
118.2
–104.7
–451.4
–579.4
–543.3
–397.4
–307.9
–390.0
–847.0
–1,585.5
–1,627.3
–1,511.2
–1,357.5
–899.9
–831.6
–774.0
–909.5
–961.6
–1,106.2
–1,249.6
–2,992.0
–2,593.4
–932.0
–1,728.0
–4,300.5
–2,594.1
–2,074.8
–1,404.3
–733.0
–754.9
–1,007.8
–1,232.2
–1,682.5
–1,729.3
–1,770.0
–1,730.1
–1,799.9
–1,885.1
–1,969.1

Federal
–38.3
–41.3
–97.9
–80.9
–73.4
–62.0
–47.4
–88.8
–88.1
–167.4
–207.2
–196.5
–199.2
–215.9
–165.7
–160.0
–159.4
–203.3
–248.4
–334.5
–313.5
–255.6
–242.1
–179.4
–92.0
1.4
69.1
159.7
15.0
–267.8
–397.4
–393.5
–293.8
–221.9
–259.7
–624.9
–1,243.2
–1,318.4
–1,234.1
–1,072.7
–633.9
–594.0
–557.4
–667.3
–736.8
–906.4
–1,043.8
–2,940.8
–2,838.8
–1,020.3
–1,666.4
–4,170.4
–3,359.5
–2,270.4
–1,554.7
–897.4
–907.9
–1,052.5
–1,223.3
–1,637.5
–1,659.5
–1,677.2
–1,691.4
–1,746.1
–1,791.6
–1,933.7

State
and
local
5.6
–2.3
–10.7
–4.4
.5
4.9
–1.2
–5.9
–10.2
–22.8
–18.4
–.2
–2.4
–4.0
–14.4
–11.3
–19.3
–36.3
–60.1
–71.1
–72.6
–64.2
–70.8
–54.2
–42.4
–30.7
–39.7
–41.5
–119.8
–183.6
–182.0
–149.8
–103.7
–86.0
–130.4
–222.1
–342.3
–309.0
–277.0
–284.8
–266.0
–237.6
–216.6
–242.2
–224.8
–199.9
–205.8
–51.2
245.4
88.3
–61.6
–130.1
765.5
195.6
150.4
164.4
153.0
44.8
–8.9
–45.0
–69.8
–92.8
–38.7
–53.8
–93.5
–35.4

Total

178.7
206.9
238.5
260.2
289.8
327.2
373.9
428.4
487.2
537.0
562.6
598.4
640.1
685.3
730.4
784.5
838.3
888.5
932.4
960.2
1,003.5
1,055.6
1,122.4
1,175.3
1,239.3
1,309.7
1,398.9
1,511.2
1,599.5
1,658.0
1,719.1
1,821.8
1,971.1
2,124.2
2,252.8
2,359.0
2,371.3
2,390.4
2,474.4
2,575.5
2,681.6
2,819.7
2,922.9
3,008.1
3,149.0
3,312.6
3,477.5
3,623.5
3,871.4
4,313.4
4,587.7
3,730.7
3,813.2
3,914.4
4,027.1
4,155.0
4,278.7
4,379.3
4,440.6
4,510.6
4,558.9
4,613.0
4,668.5
4,714.1
4,781.0
4,851.6

Private

131.5
153.2
178.8
196.5
221.1
252.1
290.7
335.0
381.9
420.4
438.8
463.5
496.4
531.6
566.3
607.9
649.6
688.4
721.5
742.9
778.2
822.5
880.7
929.1
987.8
1,052.2
1,132.2
1,231.5
1,311.7
1,361.8
1,412.0
1,497.1
1,622.6
1,751.8
1,852.4
1,931.9
1,928.5
1,933.2
1,997.2
2,081.9
2,176.6
2,301.4
2,397.9
2,475.6
2,599.1
2,737.3
2,879.7
3,004.3
3,209.4
3,579.8
3,810.9
3,091.2
3,159.8
3,246.1
3,340.5
3,448.3
3,550.5
3,634.9
3,685.3
3,744.0
3,786.3
3,832.7
3,880.6
3,918.0
3,976.9
4,036.4

Government

47.2
53.7
59.7
63.7
68.7
75.1
83.1
93.5
105.3
116.6
123.8
134.9
143.7
153.7
164.1
176.6
188.6
200.1
210.9
217.4
225.3
233.1
241.7
246.2
251.6
257.6
266.7
279.7
287.8
296.2
307.1
324.7
348.4
372.3
400.3
427.0
442.8
457.2
477.2
493.6
505.0
518.3
525.1
532.5
549.9
575.3
597.8
619.2
662.0
733.6
776.8
639.5
653.4
668.3
686.6
706.6
728.2
744.4
755.2
766.5
772.6
780.4
787.9
796.1
804.1
815.1

Table B–19. Gross saving and investment, 1973–2024—Continued
[Billions of dollars, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]
Gross domestic investment, capital account
transactions, and net lending, NIPA 2

Addenda:

Gross domestic investment
Year or quarter
Total

1973 ���������������������
1974 ���������������������
1975 ���������������������
1976 ���������������������
1977 ���������������������
1978 ���������������������
1979 ���������������������
1980 ���������������������
1981 ���������������������
1982 ���������������������
1983 ���������������������
1984 ���������������������
1985 ���������������������
1986 ���������������������
1987 ���������������������
1988 ���������������������
1989 ���������������������
1990 ���������������������
1991 ���������������������
1992 ���������������������
1993 ���������������������
1994 ���������������������
1995 ���������������������
1996 ���������������������
1997 ���������������������
1998 ���������������������
1999 ���������������������
2000 ���������������������
2001 ���������������������
2002 ���������������������
2003 ���������������������
2004 ���������������������
2005 ���������������������
2006 ���������������������
2007 ���������������������
2008 ���������������������
2009 ���������������������
2010 ���������������������
2011 ���������������������
2012 ���������������������
2013 ���������������������
2014 ���������������������
2015 ���������������������
2016 ���������������������
2017 ���������������������
2018 ���������������������
2019 ���������������������
2020 ���������������������
2021 ���������������������
2022 ���������������������
2023 ���������������������
2021: I �����������������
      II ����������������
      III ���������������
      IV ���������������
2022: I �����������������
      II ����������������
      III ���������������
      IV ���������������
2023: I �����������������
      II ����������������
      III ���������������
      IV ���������������
2024: I �����������������
      II ����������������
      III p �������������

341.4
356.6
361.5
420.0
478.9
571.3
658.6
674.6
781.9
734.7
773.6
923.2
935.2
944.6
992.7
1,079.6
1,177.8
1,208.9
1,246.3
1,263.6
1,319.3
1,435.1
1,519.3
1,637.0
1,792.1
1,875.3
1,978.9
2,030.4
1,955.3
1,918.7
1,963.6
2,129.7
2,296.8
2,432.5
2,524.2
2,403.0
2,189.5
2,370.2
2,508.8
2,818.8
3,089.0
3,305.2
3,494.8
3,526.6
3,771.1
4,014.3
4,220.4
4,000.9
4,172.6
4,687.5
5,055.4
4,088.8
3,977.3
4,114.8
4,509.5
4,503.9
4,598.7
4,731.6
4,915.8
4,861.7
4,979.6
5,144.6
5,235.9
5,228.0
5,297.4
5,213.5

Total

332.6
350.7
341.7
412.9
489.8
583.9
659.8
666.0
778.6
738.0
808.7
1,013.3
1,049.5
1,087.2
1,146.8
1,195.4
1,270.1
1,283.8
1,238.4
1,309.1
1,398.7
1,550.7
1,625.2
1,752.0
1,922.2
2,080.7
2,255.5
2,427.3
2,346.7
2,374.1
2,491.3
2,767.5
3,048.0
3,251.8
3,265.0
3,107.2
2,572.6
2,810.0
2,969.2
3,242.8
3,440.2
3,680.3
3,917.9
3,928.0
4,149.1
4,455.4
4,667.7
4,573.8
5,052.0
5,708.5
5,971.3
4,867.9
4,839.3
5,059.9
5,440.8
5,643.5
5,664.1
5,691.4
5,834.8
5,791.0
5,897.3
6,060.9
6,136.2
6,200.8
6,358.7
6,433.1

Gross government saving

StatisNet
Capital lending tical
Gross Gross account or net discrep- Gross
private
trans- borrow- ancy private
domes- governing
saving
ment actions
tic
(net) 3
(–),
investinvest- ment
NIPA 2, 4
ment
266.9
274.5
257.3
323.2
396.6
478.4
539.7
530.1
631.2
581.0
637.5
820.1
829.7
849.1
892.2
937.0
999.7
993.4
944.3
1,013.0
1,106.8
1,256.5
1,317.5
1,432.1
1,595.6
1,736.7
1,887.1
2,038.4
1,934.8
1,930.4
2,027.1
2,281.3
2,534.7
2,701.0
2,673.0
2,477.6
1,929.7
2,165.5
2,332.6
2,621.8
2,838.3
3,074.0
3,288.5
3,278.3
3,467.7
3,724.8
3,893.7
3,755.0
4,223.8
4,821.2
4,984.8
4,045.5
4,017.6
4,232.8
4,599.2
4,784.8
4,786.5
4,801.6
4,911.9
4,847.2
4,925.7
5,063.4
5,102.8
5,159.9
5,297.8
5,347.7

65.6
0.0
76.2
.0
84.4
.1
89.6
.1
93.2
.1
105.6
.1
120.1
.1
135.9
.1
147.3
.1
156.9
.1
171.2
.1
193.2
.1
219.9
.1
238.1
.1
254.6
.1
258.4
.1
270.4
.3
290.4
7.4
294.1
5.3
296.1
–1.3
291.9
.9
294.2
1.3
307.7
.4
320.0
.2
326.6
.5
344.0
.2
368.5
6.7
388.9
4.6
411.9 –11.9
443.7
4.2
464.2
8.8
486.2
4.6
513.3
–.7
550.9
7.7
592.0
6.4
629.6
.8
642.9
6.3
644.5
7.4
636.6
9.5
621.0
–.5
601.8
7.0
606.3
6.9
629.4
8.3
649.7
7.0
681.4
16.0
730.6
4.7
773.9
6.9
818.8
6.1
828.2
7.3
887.2
.9
986.6
6.8
822.4
31.3
821.7
3.1
827.1 –12.5
841.6
7.1
858.7
5.9
877.6
10.8
889.8 –24.6
922.9
11.4
943.7
10.6
971.6
4.8
997.5
4.5
1,033.4
7.5
1,040.9
8.0
1,060.9
6.6
1,085.4 ������������

8.8
5.9
19.8
7.0
–11.0
–12.7
–1.3
8.4
3.3
–3.4
–35.2
–90.2
–114.4
–142.8
–154.2
–115.9
–92.7
–82.3
2.6
–44.3
–80.2
–116.9
–106.3
–115.2
–130.6
–205.6
–283.3
–401.4
–379.5
–459.6
–536.4
–642.4
–750.5
–827.0
–747.2
–705.0
–389.4
–447.2
–469.8
–423.5
–358.2
–382.0
–431.4
–408.4
–394.0
–445.8
–454.1
–579.0
–886.6
–1,021.8
–922.7
–810.4
–865.1
–932.6
–938.4
–1,145.5
–1,076.2
–935.2
–930.4
–939.8
–922.4
–920.8
–907.8
–980.7
–1,068.0
��������������

6.1
7.5
13.3
20.7
19.4
23.3
45.0
44.3
37.7
8.6
56.9
41.4
54.1
79.8
43.6
2.8
67.8
95.4
92.7
115.5
155.4
139.2
92.2
57.0
10.3
–56.4
–29.3
–95.8
–116.7
–81.7
–24.2
–28.1
–57.0
–209.8
12.3
191.2
191.7
69.4
–24.3
–153.6
–29.8
–140.9
–93.0
52.9
67.9
63.4
57.0
107.6
1.6
–75.6
244.6
–29.8
30.0
–25.7
31.8
–139.7
–106.9
–182.7
126.9
199.9
224.5
339.8
214.3
124.9
194.8
240.3

320.8
339.1
397.1
420.9
463.6
530.1
579.0
631.5
737.2
799.6
818.6
943.6
939.1
930.9
965.1
1,071.5
1,100.0
1,153.0
1,251.2
1,336.3
1,324.8
1,382.6
1,498.5
1,567.4
1,664.7
1,703.5
1,712.0
1,728.2
1,889.0
2,155.6
2,260.1
2,376.4
2,402.8
2,577.9
2,501.6
2,631.8
3,140.4
3,470.9
3,567.2
3,836.3
3,513.7
3,759.4
3,836.7
3,850.6
4,114.9
4,481.8
4,815.2
6,266.1
6,102.4
4,961.5
5,762.0
7,779.6
5,887.9
5,546.9
5,195.3
4,670.1
4,732.2
5,177.7
5,265.9
5,577.8
5,711.8
5,794.4
5,963.9
6,107.0
6,183.6
6,127.1

Total

14.5
10.1
–48.9
–21.6
–4.2
17.9
34.6
–1.2
7.1
–73.5
–101.8
–61.8
–57.9
–66.2
–16.0
5.3
9.9
–39.4
–97.6
–188.2
–160.9
–86.8
–71.3
12.6
117.2
228.2
296.2
397.9
183.1
–155.3
–272.3
–218.6
–49.0
64.4
10.3
–420.0
–1,142.7
–1,170.2
–1,034.0
–863.9
–394.9
–313.2
–248.9
–376.9
–411.8
–530.9
–651.8
–2,372.8
–1,931.4
–198.4
–951.1
–3,661.0
–1,940.6
–1,406.5
–717.7
–26.4
–26.6
–263.4
–477.0
–916.0
–956.7
–989.6
–942.3
–1,003.8
–1,081.0
–1,154.0

Federal

State
and
local

–6.0
20.4
–6.0
16.0
–59.2
10.3
–39.2
17.6
–28.2
24.0
–12.4
30.3
7.2
27.3
–28.4
27.1
–20.6
27.6
–92.0
18.4
–126.1
24.3
–105.9
44.1
–102.3
44.4
–112.4
46.2
–55.6
39.6
–41.0
46.4
–32.5
42.4
–69.8
30.4
–108.3
10.7
–191.2
3.0
–166.5
5.6
–105.3
18.5
–88.6
17.3
–25.7
38.3
62.3
54.8
156.8
71.4
227.3
68.9
322.8
75.1
179.5
3.6
–101.0 –54.3
–225.1 –47.1
–213.0
–5.6
–103.2
54.2
–20.7
85.1
–46.9
57.2
–399.1 –20.9
–1,009.5 –133.2
–1,074.6 –95.5
–979.2 –54.8
–811.0 –52.8
–367.9 –27.1
–322.7
9.5
–285.0
36.1
–393.6
16.7
–456.6
44.9
–616.2
85.3
–744.9
93.2
–2,630.3 257.5
–2,510.0 578.6
–662.4 464.1
–1,288.2 337.1
–3,850.5 189.5
–3,034.6 1,094.0
–1,939.2 532.7
–1,215.9 498.3
–550.3 523.9
–552.3 525.6
–690.3 426.9
–856.7 379.8
–1,266.0 350.1
–1,283.9 327.2
–1,296.5 306.9
–1,306.4 364.1
–1,356.8 353.0
–1,396.7 315.7
–1,533.0 379.1

Net
domestic
investment

Gross
saving
as a
percent
of gross
national
income

Net
saving
as a
percent
of gross
national
income

153.9
143.8
103.1
152.6
199.9
256.7
285.9
237.6
291.3
201.0
246.1
414.9
409.4
401.9
416.4
410.9
431.9
395.3
306.0
348.9
395.2
495.0
502.8
576.7
682.9
770.9
856.6
916.0
747.2
716.1
772.2
945.6
1,077.0
1,127.7
1,012.3
748.2
201.3
419.6
494.8
667.2
758.6
860.6
995.0
919.9
1,000.1
1,142.8
1,190.2
950.3
1,180.6
1,395.1
1,383.6
1,137.2
1,026.1
1,145.4
1,413.7
1,488.6
1,385.4
1,312.1
1,394.2
1,280.4
1,338.3
1,447.8
1,467.8
1,486.7
1,577.7
1,581.5

23.4
22.5
20.7
21.4
22.1
23.3
23.5
22.1
23.2
21.5
19.8
21.9
20.4
19.1
19.7
20.5
19.8
18.9
18.9
17.8
17.3
18.1
18.8
19.6
20.7
21.1
20.7
20.5
19.3
18.1
17.2
17.5
17.9
18.8
17.3
15.0
13.8
15.2
16.0
17.9
18.2
19.2
19.3
18.3
18.7
18.9
19.1
18.1
17.5
18.2
17.4
18.0
16.8
17.2
18.0
18.2
18.0
18.5
17.9
17.2
17.4
17.3
17.8
17.9
17.7
17.1

10.9
9.2
6.5
7.4
8.1
9.4
9.2
7.1
8.0
5.6
4.3
7.0
5.6
4.0
4.5
5.6
4.9
3.8
3.6
2.9
2.4
3.3
4.0
5.0
6.3
6.8
6.3
5.9
4.4
3.1
2.3
2.7
2.9
3.7
1.8
–1.0
–2.6
–.6
.4
2.4
2.6
3.5
3.6
2.5
2.8
3.1
3.2
1.3
1.3
1.7
.8
1.7
.6
.9
1.8
1.9
1.6
2.0
1.3
.6
.7
.7
1.3
1.4
1.1
.4

2 National income and product accounts (NIPA).
3 Consists of capital transfers and the acquisition and disposal of nonproduced nonfinancial assets.
4 Prior to 1982, equals the balance on current account, NIPA.

Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).

National Income or Expenditure | 413

Table B–20. Median money income (in 2023 dollars) and poverty status of families and
people, by race, 2015–2023
Families 1

People below
poverty level 2

Below poverty level 2
Race,
Hispanic origin,
and year

Number
(millions)

TOTAL (all races) 4
2015 ���������������������������������������
2016 ���������������������������������������
2017 ���������������������������������������
2017 5 �������������������������������������
2018 ���������������������������������������
2019 ���������������������������������������
2020 6 �������������������������������������
2021 ���������������������������������������
2022 ���������������������������������������
2023 ���������������������������������������
WHITE, non-Hispanic 7
2015 ���������������������������������������
2016 ���������������������������������������
2017 ���������������������������������������
2017 5 �������������������������������������
2018 ���������������������������������������
2019 ���������������������������������������
2020 6 �������������������������������������
2021 ���������������������������������������
2022 ���������������������������������������
2023 ���������������������������������������
BLACK 7
2015 ���������������������������������������
2016 ���������������������������������������
2017 ���������������������������������������
2017 5 �������������������������������������
2018 ���������������������������������������
2019 ���������������������������������������
2020 6 �������������������������������������
2021 ���������������������������������������
2022 ���������������������������������������
2023 ���������������������������������������
ASIAN 7
2015 ���������������������������������������
2016 ���������������������������������������
2017 ���������������������������������������
2017 5 �������������������������������������
2018 ���������������������������������������
2019 ���������������������������������������
2020 6 �������������������������������������
2021 ���������������������������������������
2022 ���������������������������������������
2023 ���������������������������������������
HISPANIC (any race) 7
2015 ���������������������������������������
2016 ���������������������������������������
2017 ���������������������������������������
2017 5 �������������������������������������
2018 ���������������������������������������
2019 ���������������������������������������
2020 6 �������������������������������������
2021 ���������������������������������������
2022 ���������������������������������������
2023 ���������������������������������������

Median
Female
money
householder,
Total
income
no husband
(in
present
Number
2023
(milPercent
dollions)
Number
lars) 3 Number
(milPercent
(milPercent
lions)
lions)

Median money income (in 2023 dollars)
of people 15 years old and over
with income 3
Males

All
people

Yearround
full-time
workers

Females

All
people

13.5 $46,660 $65,640 $29,860
12.7 48,400 66,590 31,000
12.3 49,430 68,330 31,190
12.3 49,430 67,920 31,690
11.8 49,920 68,640 32,480
10.5 52,380 71,960 34,760
11.5 49,950 75,970 34,410
11.6 51,420 71,380 34,640
11.5 50,380 68,810 34,090
11.1 51,350 70,790 35,410

Yearround
full-time
workers

82.2 $88,820
82.9 90,540
83.1 92,930
83.5 93,170
83.5 94,340
83.7 101,700
83.7 98,680
84.3 99,200
84.4 96,430
84.7 100,800

8.6
8.1
7.8
7.8
7.5
6.6
7.3
7.4
7.4
7.0

10.4
9.8
9.3
9.3
9.0
7.8
8.7
8.8
8.8
8.3

4.4
4.1
4.0
4.0
3.7
3.3
3.6
3.6
3.5
3.3

28.2
26.6
25.7
26.2
24.9
22.2
23.5
23.0
23.0
21.8

43.1
40.6
39.7
39.6
38.2
34.0
37.6
37.9
37.9
36.8

53.8
54.1
53.9
54.2
54.2
54.3
53.5
53.5
53.0
52.8

101,200
102,200
105,100
106,400
107,300
114,800
113,000
113,100
107,500
113,200

3.5
3.4
3.2
3.2
3.2
2.7
3.1
3.0
3.2
2.8

6.4
6.3
6.0
5.9
5.8
5.0
5.8
5.6
6.1
5.3

1.6
1.6
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.1
1.3
1.2
1.3
1.1

21.7
21.1
19.8
20.2
19.7
17.1
18.8
17.3
18.9
16.7

17.8
17.3
17.0
16.6
15.7
14.2
16.0
15.8
16.7
14.9

9.1
8.8
8.7
8.5
8.1
7.3
8.2
8.1
8.6
7.7

53,020
54,040
56,090
56,530
57,360
59,770
58,710
57,610
54,820
58,010

76,320
76,210
76,390
76,260
78,310
83,100
84,570
81,360
78,640
80,960

32,200
32,990
33,180
34,030
35,350
37,040
36,840
36,560
36,570
37,440

57,400
58,910
59,910
61,870
60,810
63,520
67,000
64,730
62,960
63,120

9.8
10.0
10.0
10.0
9.8
10.0
10.2
10.3
10.4
10.4

57,510
61,470
61,920
61,980
63,700
69,170
67,350
66,670
69,420
71,390

2.1
1.9
1.8
1.9
1.7
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.5
1.6

21.1
19.0
18.2
18.9
17.7
16.3
16.8
17.4
14.3
15.4

1.5
1.3
1.3
1.4
1.2
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.0
1.1

33.9
31.6
30.8
31.9
29.4
27.3
28.2
29.3
24.5
25.9

10.0
9.2
9.0
9.2
8.9
8.1
8.6
8.6
7.6
8.0

24.1
22.0
21.2
21.7
20.8
18.8
19.6
19.5
17.1
17.9

34,430
36,910
36,850
35,950
37,330
36,950
36,590
37,960
38,780
40,220

52,400
52,280
53,480
51,910
54,690
55,250
60,200
57,270
54,490
56,530

27,150
28,440
28,930
29,280
30,540
31,940
31,270
31,890
33,660
32,450

46,620
46,490
45,950
47,190
48,240
49,640
53,870
53,950
52,530
51,310

4.7
4.7
4.9
4.9
5.1
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.5
5.6

114,100
116,400
113,500
115,900
121,400
132,700
128,300
132,600
131,300
131,800

.4
.3
.4
.4
.4
.3
.3
.4
.3
.4

8.0
7.2
7.8
7.4
7.6
5.7
6.4
7.1
6.3
6.4

.1
.1
.1
.1
.1
.1
.1
.1
.1
.1

16.2
19.4
15.5
16.3
19.6
14.4
15.4
14.7
15.0
13.7

2.1
1.9
2.0
1.9
2.0
1.5
1.6
1.9
1.9
2.0

11.4
10.1
10.0
9.7
10.1
7.3
8.1
9.3
8.6
9.1

54,910 81,330
58,020 83,720
59,770 86,660
60,190 86,410
62,120 86,080
63,450 92,620
60,620 104,000
63,470 96,530
63,550 94,410
64,360 96,720

33,330
33,340
34,580
33,780
37,410
37,940
37,730
38,380
42,250
40,850

62,960
63,980
63,910
65,650
69,640
71,250
84,130
77,080
74,270
74,290

12.8
13.0
13.2
13.3
13.3
13.2
13.7
14.1
14.2
14.7

59,460
63,640
65,610
65,590
66,090
72,020
70,260
69,770
70,580
71,150

2.5
2.3
2.2
2.2
2.1
1.8
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.1

19.6
17.3
16.3
16.4
15.5
13.9
14.8
15.0
15.2
14.4

1.2
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.0
.9
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0

35.5
32.7
32.7
33.4
30.8
26.8
28.6
28.2
29.6
27.4

12.1
11.1
10.8
10.8
10.5
9.5
10.5
10.7
10.8
10.9

21.4
19.4
18.3
18.3
17.6
15.7
17.0
17.1
16.9
16.6

35,310
37,990
37,560
37,310
37,690
38,160
37,530
40,690
38,740
39,280

23,750
24,790
24,860
25,100
26,020
27,680
26,800
28,360
27,860
28,360

39,770
39,890
39,700
40,200
42,190
43,620
47,160
45,440
43,470
45,570

45,190
47,550
48,830
47,170
48,410
49,640
53,630
51,930
50,350
50,540

$52,450
53,790
54,310
56,090
55,810
59,260
61,550
59,330
57,770
57,770

1 The term “family” refers to a group of two or more persons related by birth, marriage, or adoption and residing together. Every family must include a
reference person.
2 Poverty thresholds are updated each year to reflect changes in the consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U).
3 Adjusted by the chained consumer price index for all urban consumers (C-CPI-U).
4 Data for American Indians and Alaska natives, native Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders, and those reporting two or more races are included in the total
but not shown separately.
5 Reflects implementation of an updated data processing system.
6 Reflects implementation of Census 2020-based population controls comparable to succeeding years.
7 The CPS allows respondents to choose more than one race. Data shown are for “white alone, non-Hispanic,” “black alone,” and “Asian alone” race
categories. (“Black” is also “black or African American.”) Family race and Hispanic origin are based on the reference person.
Note: For details see Income and Poverty in the United States in publication Series P–60 on the CPS ASEC.
Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census).

414 |

Appendix B

Table B–21. Real farm income, 1957–2024
[Billions of chained (2024) dollars]
Income of farm operators from farming 1
Gross farm income
Year

Value of agricultural sector production
Total

1957 ����������������������
1958 ����������������������
1959 ����������������������
1960 ����������������������
1961 ����������������������
1962 ����������������������
1963 ����������������������
1964 ����������������������
1965 ����������������������
1966 ����������������������
1967 ����������������������
1968 ����������������������
1969 ����������������������
1970 ����������������������
1971 ����������������������
1972 ����������������������
1973 ����������������������
1974 ����������������������
1975 ����������������������
1976 ����������������������
1977 ����������������������
1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ���������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2024 p ��������������������

295.5
323.4
310.5
311.9
324.3
334.6
338.8
325.5
351.8
371.0
360.9
355.3
368.4
364.9
366.8
402.7
530.7
483.8
453.1
439.5
437.3
482.5
522.8
474.8
483.4
449.3
405.3
427.1
396.9
377.1
397.0
405.1
419.8
417.7
392.4
400.6
400.0
412.9
394.5
433.3
430.0
415.6
413.9
416.3
420.8
382.5
420.7
467.1
458.5
432.3
492.5
518.9
476.0
498.2
575.7
604.5
639.6
627.7
567.5
525.7
532.8
521.0
517.7
542.1
589.1
655.4
623.4
594.6

Total
286.9
314.4
304.9
306.2
312.4
320.8
325.6
308.8
333.2
346.9
338.9
331.6
343.7
341.9
348.2
380.2
516.8
481.2
449.5
436.4
430.0
471.2
518.1
470.7
477.8
439.8
380.8
405.6
378.0
348.6
357.5
372.2
396.0
398.1
375.6
382.3
373.9
397.8
380.9
419.8
416.4
393.4
376.0
376.3
383.0
361.9
393.9
446.5
421.0
408.7
475.2
501.4
458.8
480.9
561.4
590.2
625.1
615.0
553.6
509.2
518.3
504.2
490.7
487.9
559.6
638.9
610.8
584.0

Crops 2, 3
116.0
124.6
121.0
126.7
126.5
131.7
140.1
129.8
143.8
134.6
137.3
129.7
128.6
127.3
138.3
146.9
231.0
242.0
227.1
206.5
205.7
212.7
231.2
204.7
229.4
196.6
149.8
197.6
181.5
152.9
152.0
157.7
178.6
175.7
165.9
177.9
161.3
192.0
179.5
212.6
203.2
182.4
163.5
163.6
160.0
162.4
176.6
198.2
175.6
176.8
219.1
247.4
232.8
234.9
272.9
286.1
308.9
267.9
237.3
241.4
235.4
228.9
216.3
229.5
278.8
288.4
279.7
240.5

Animals
and animal
products 3
154.3
172.5
165.4
160.6
166.3
169.3
164.8
157.5
167.7
190.1
178.6
178.9
191.5
190.9
185.8
208.9
259.5
210.8
193.7
199.1
190.3
221.1
247.0
223.7
204.6
193.0
184.5
183.1
170.0
170.9
178.6
179.0
182.9
190.1
178.2
174.1
179.5
171.4
164.2
169.2
174.0
168.2
167.7
170.7
179.1
155.0
170.8
196.8
194.3
177.8
200.8
198.4
169.2
196.0
224.2
227.3
239.3
278.4
250.0
211.0
221.6
216.8
211.0
196.3
221.3
272.5
253.9
269.6

Farm-related
income 4
16.6
17.3
18.5
18.9
19.6
19.9
20.7
21.4
21.7
22.2
23.1
23.0
23.5
23.6
24.1
24.5
26.3
28.3
28.6
30.7
34.1
37.4
39.9
42.4
43.8
50.2
46.5
24.9
26.4
24.8
27.0
35.4
34.5
32.2
31.5
30.3
33.1
34.4
37.2
38.1
39.2
42.8
44.8
42.1
43.9
44.4
46.5
51.5
51.1
54.2
55.3
55.7
56.8
50.0
64.3
76.8
76.9
68.7
66.3
56.8
61.4
58.5
63.4
62.1
59.6
78.0
77.2
73.9

Direct
Federal
Government
payments
8.6
9.0
5.6
5.7
11.9
13.8
13.3
16.8
18.6
24.1
22.0
23.7
24.8
23.1
18.6
22.4
14.0
2.6
3.6
3.1
7.3
11.4
4.8
4.1
5.6
9.6
24.5
21.4
19.0
28.5
39.5
33.0
23.9
19.6
16.8
18.3
26.1
15.1
13.6
13.5
13.5
22.1
37.9
40.0
37.8
20.6
26.9
20.5
37.5
23.5
17.3
17.4
17.2
17.3
14.3
14.3
14.5
12.7
13.9
16.6
14.4
16.7
27.0
54.2
29.5
16.5
12.6
10.6

Production
expenses

201.4
214.1
222.7
221.3
228.7
239.3
246.9
244.8
254.3
268.4
272.8
270.8
275.1
275.8
278.1
292.6
346.4
349.5
338.1
353.4
357.4
387.9
427.7
423.5
405.3
384.1
367.7
361.0
326.7
302.0
307.4
314.9
318.0
320.0
310.2
300.4
308.9
312.4
320.1
325.0
337.3
331.4
329.9
329.0
328.3
317.6
321.6
328.6
337.5
346.7
390.9
407.8
388.1
390.5
420.2
475.0
476.2
507.9
462.4
446.3
437.9
420.1
418.9
424.6
422.8
462.3
473.1
453.9

Net
farm
income

94.2
109.3
87.8
90.6
95.6
95.3
92.0
80.7
97.5
102.6
88.2
84.4
93.4
89.1
88.6
110.1
184.4
134.3
114.9
86.2
79.9
94.7
95.1
51.3
78.1
65.3
37.6
66.0
70.3
75.2
89.6
90.2
101.9
97.7
82.2
100.2
91.2
100.4
74.4
108.3
92.7
84.2
84.0
87.3
92.4
64.9
99.2
138.5
121.0
85.6
101.5
111.0
87.9
107.7
155.5
129.5
163.4
119.8
105.1
79.5
94.8
100.9
98.8
117.5
166.4
193.1
150.3
140.7

1 The GDP chain-type price index is used to convert the current-dollar statistics to 2024=100 equivalents.
2 Crop receipts include proceeds received from commodities placed under Commodity Credit Corporation loans.
3 The value of production equates to the sum of cash receipts, home consumption, and the value of the change in inventories.
4 Includes income from forest products sold, the gross imputed rental value of farm dwellings, machine hire and custom work, and other sources of farm

income such as commodity insurance indemnities.
Note: Data for 2024 are forecasts.
Source: Department of Agriculture (Economic Research Service).

National Income or Expenditure | 415

Labor Market Indicators
Table B–22. Civilian labor force, 1929–2024
[Monthly data seasonally adjusted, except as noted]

Year or month

Civilian
noninstitutional
population 1

Civilian labor force
Employment
Total

Total

NonAgricultural agricultural

Not in
labor
force

Civilian
labor force
participation rate 2

Civilian
employment/
population
ratio 3

1,550
4,340
8,020
12,060
12,830
11,340
10,610
9,030
7,700
10,390
9,480
8,120
5,560
2,660
1,070
670
1,040
2,270
2,356

������������������
������������������
������������������
������������������
������������������
������������������
������������������
������������������
������������������
������������������
������������������
44,200
43,990
42,230
39,100
38,590
40,230
45,550
45,850

�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
55.7
56.0
57.2
58.7
58.6
57.2
55.8
56.8

�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
47.6
50.4
54.5
57.6
57.9
56.1
53.6
54.5

3.2
8.7
15.9
23.6
24.9
21.7
20.1
16.9
14.3
19.0
17.2
14.6
9.9
4.7
1.9
1.2
1.9
3.9
3.9

2,311
2,276
3,637
3,288
2,055
1,883
1,834
3,532
2,852
2,750
2,859
4,602
3,740
3,852
4,714
3,911
4,070
3,786
3,366
2,875
2,975
2,817
2,832
4,093
5,016
4,882
4,365
5,156
7,929
7,406
6,991
6,202
6,137
7,637
8,273
10,678
10,717
8,539
8,312
8,237
7,425
6,701
6,528

42,477
42,447
42,708
42,787
42,604
43,093
44,041
44,678
44,660
44,402
45,336
46,088
46,960
47,617
48,312
49,539
50,583
51,394
52,058
52,288
52,527
53,291
53,602
54,315
55,834
57,091
57,667
58,171
59,377
59,991
60,025
59,659
59,900
60,806
61,460
62,067
62,665
62,839
62,744
62,752
62,888
62,944
62,523

58.3
58.8
58.9
59.2
59.2
59.0
58.9
58.8
59.3
60.0
59.6
59.5
59.3
59.4
59.3
58.8
58.7
58.7
58.9
59.2
59.6
59.6
60.1
60.4
60.2
60.4
60.8
61.3
61.2
61.6
62.3
63.2
63.7
63.8
63.9
64.0
64.0
64.4
64.8
65.3
65.6
65.9
66.5

56.0
56.6
55.4
56.1
57.3
57.3
57.1
55.5
56.7
57.5
57.1
55.4
56.0
56.1
55.4
55.5
55.4
55.7
56.2
56.9
57.3
57.5
58.0
57.4
56.6
57.0
57.8
57.8
56.1
56.8
57.9
59.3
59.9
59.2
59.0
57.8
57.9
59.5
60.1
60.7
61.5
62.3
63.0

3.9
3.8
5.9
5.3
3.3
3.0
2.9
5.5
4.4
4.1
4.3
6.8
5.5
5.5
6.7
5.5
5.7
5.2
4.5
3.8
3.8
3.6
3.5
4.9
5.9
5.6
4.9
5.6
8.5
7.7
7.1
6.1
5.8
7.1
7.6
9.7
9.6
7.5
7.2
7.0
6.2
5.5
5.3

Unemployment

Thousands of persons 14 years of age and over
1929 ����������������������
1930 ����������������������
1931 ����������������������
1932 ����������������������
1933 ����������������������
1934 ����������������������
1935 ����������������������
1936 ����������������������
1937 ����������������������
1938 ����������������������
1939 ����������������������
1940 ����������������������
1941 ����������������������
1942 ����������������������
1943 ����������������������
1944 ����������������������
1945 ����������������������
1946 ����������������������
1947 ����������������������

�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
99,840
99,900
98,640
94,640
93,220
94,090
103,070
106,018

49,180
49,820
50,420
51,000
51,590
52,230
52,870
53,440
54,000
54,610
55,230
55,640
55,910
56,410
55,540
54,630
53,860
57,520
60,168

1947 ����������������������
1948 ����������������������
1949 ����������������������
1950 ����������������������
1951 ����������������������
1952 ����������������������
1953 ����������������������
1954 ����������������������
1955 ����������������������
1956 ����������������������
1957 ����������������������
1958 ����������������������
1959 ����������������������
1960 ����������������������
1961 ����������������������
1962 ����������������������
1963 ����������������������
1964 ����������������������
1965 ����������������������
1966 ����������������������
1967 ����������������������
1968 ����������������������
1969 ����������������������
1970 ����������������������
1971 ����������������������
1972 ����������������������
1973 ����������������������
1974 ����������������������
1975 ����������������������
1976 ����������������������
1977 ����������������������
1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������

101,827
103,068
103,994
104,995
104,621
105,231
107,056
108,321
109,683
110,954
112,265
113,727
115,329
117,245
118,771
120,153
122,416
124,485
126,513
128,058
129,874
132,028
134,335
137,085
140,216
144,126
147,096
150,120
153,153
156,150
159,033
161,910
164,863
167,745
170,130
172,271
174,215
176,383
178,206
180,587
182,753
184,613
186,393

59,350
60,621
61,286
62,208
62,017
62,138
63,015
63,643
65,023
66,552
66,929
67,639
68,369
69,628
70,459
70,614
71,833
73,091
74,455
75,770
77,347
78,737
80,734
82,771
84,382
87,034
89,429
91,949
93,775
96,158
99,009
102,251
104,962
106,940
108,670
110,204
111,550
113,544
115,461
117,834
119,865
121,669
123,869

47,630
45,480
42,400
38,940
38,760
40,890
42,260
44,410
46,300
44,220
45,750
47,520
50,350
53,750
54,470
53,960
52,820
55,250
57,812

10,450
10,340
10,290
10,170
10,090
9,900
10,110
10,000
9,820
9,690
9,610
9,540
9,100
9,250
9,080
8,950
8,580
8,320
8,256

37,180
35,140
32,110
28,770
28,670
30,990
32,150
34,410
36,480
34,530
36,140
37,980
41,250
44,500
45,390
45,010
44,240
46,930
49,557

Unemployment
rate,
civilian
workers 4

Percent

Thousands of persons 16 years of age and over
57,038
58,343
57,651
58,918
59,961
60,250
61,179
60,109
62,170
63,799
64,071
63,036
64,630
65,778
65,746
66,702
67,762
69,305
71,088
72,895
74,372
75,920
77,902
78,678
79,367
82,153
85,064
86,794
85,846
88,752
92,017
96,048
98,824
99,303
100,397
99,526
100,834
105,005
107,150
109,597
112,440
114,968
117,342

7,890
7,629
7,658
7,160
6,726
6,500
6,260
6,205
6,450
6,283
5,947
5,586
5,565
5,458
5,200
4,944
4,687
4,523
4,361
3,979
3,844
3,817
3,606
3,463
3,394
3,484
3,470
3,515
3,408
3,331
3,283
3,387
3,347
3,364
3,368
3,401
3,383
3,321
3,179
3,163
3,208
3,169
3,199

1 Not seasonally adjusted.
2 Civilian labor force as percent of civilian noninstitutional population.
3 Civilian employment as percent of civilian noninstitutional population.
4 Unemployed as percent of civilian labor force.

See next page for continuation of table.

416 |

Appendix B

49,148
50,714
49,993
51,758
53,235
53,749
54,919
53,904
55,722
57,514
58,123
57,450
59,065
60,318
60,546
61,759
63,076
64,782
66,726
68,915
70,527
72,103
74,296
75,215
75,972
78,669
81,594
83,279
82,438
85,421
88,734
92,661
95,477
95,938
97,030
96,125
97,450
101,685
103,971
106,434
109,232
111,800
114,142

Table B–22. Civilian labor force, 1929–2024—Continued
[Monthly data seasonally adjusted, except as noted]

Year or month

Civilian
noninstitutional
population 1

Civilian labor force
Employment
Total

Total

NonAgricultural agricultural

Unemployment

Not in
labor
force

Civilian
labor force
participation rate 2

Thousands of persons 16 years of age and over
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 5 ��������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2023: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct �������������
      Nov ������������
      Dec �������������
2024: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct �������������
      Nov ������������

189,164
190,925
192,805
194,838
196,814
198,584
200,591
203,133
205,220
207,753
212,577
215,092
217,570
221,168
223,357
226,082
228,815
231,867
233,788
235,801
237,830
239,618
243,284
245,679
247,947
250,801
253,538
255,079
257,791
259,175
260,329
261,445
263,973
266,942
265,962
266,112
266,272
266,443
266,618
266,801
267,002
267,213
267,428
267,642
267,822
267,991
267,540
267,711
267,884
268,066
268,248
268,438
268,644
268,856
269,080
269,289
269,463

125,840
126,346
128,105
129,200
131,056
132,304
133,943
136,297
137,673
139,368
142,583
143,734
144,863
146,510
147,401
149,320
151,428
153,124
154,287
154,142
153,889
153,617
154,975
155,389
155,922
157,130
159,187
160,320
162,075
163,539
160,742
161,204
164,287
167,116
165,871
166,263
166,690
166,678
166,823
167,000
167,113
167,840
167,897
167,723
168,127
167,451
167,276
167,426
167,895
167,982
167,732
168,009
168,429
168,549
168,699
168,479
168,286

118,793
117,718
118,492
120,259
123,060
124,900
126,708
129,558
131,463
133,488
136,891
136,933
136,485
137,736
139,252
141,730
144,427
146,047
145,362
139,877
139,064
139,869
142,469
143,929
146,305
148,834
151,436
153,337
155,761
157,538
147,795
152,581
158,291
161,037
160,152
160,301
160,824
160,962
160,707
161,004
161,209
161,500
161,550
161,280
161,866
161,183
161,152
160,968
161,466
161,491
161,083
161,199
161,266
161,434
161,864
161,496
161,141

3,223
3,269
3,247
3,115
3,409
3,440
3,443
3,399
3,378
3,281
2,464
2,299
2,311
2,275
2,232
2,197
2,206
2,095
2,168
2,103
2,206
2,254
2,186
2,130
2,237
2,422
2,460
2,454
2,425
2,425
2,349
2,291
2,290
2,264
2,249
2,343
2,223
2,295
2,293
2,299
2,251
2,279
2,286
2,201
2,262
2,205
2,184
2,201
2,217
2,246
2,221
2,379
2,273
2,327
2,267
2,248
2,201

115,570
114,449
115,245
117,144
119,651
121,460
123,264
126,159
128,085
130,207
134,427
134,635
134,174
135,461
137,020
139,532
142,221
143,952
143,194
137,775
136,858
137,615
140,283
141,799
144,068
146,411
148,976
150,883
153,336
155,113
145,446
150,290
156,001
158,772
157,663
157,797
158,332
158,615
158,491
158,886
159,089
159,275
159,306
159,166
159,578
158,993
158,735
158,601
158,970
159,161
158,919
158,984
159,100
159,108
159,635
159,353
158,955

Civilian
employment/
population
ratio 3

Unemployment
rate,
civilian
workers 4

Percent
7,047
8,628
9,613
8,940
7,996
7,404
7,236
6,739
6,210
5,880
5,692
6,801
8,378
8,774
8,149
7,591
7,001
7,078
8,924
14,265
14,825
13,747
12,506
11,460
9,617
8,296
7,751
6,982
6,314
6,001
12,947
8,623
5,996
6,080
5,719
5,962
5,866
5,715
6,117
5,997
5,904
6,340
6,347
6,443
6,262
6,268
6,124
6,458
6,429
6,492
6,649
6,811
7,163
7,115
6,834
6,984
7,145

63,324
64,578
64,700
65,638
65,758
66,280
66,647
66,837
67,547
68,385
69,994
71,359
72,707
74,658
75,956
76,762
77,387
78,743
79,501
81,659
83,941
86,001
88,310
90,290
92,025
93,671
94,351
94,759
95,716
95,636
99,587
100,241
99,686
99,826
100,090
99,849
99,582
99,766
99,795
99,801
99,889
99,374
99,531
99,919
99,695
100,540
100,265
100,285
99,989
100,083
100,516
100,429
100,215
100,306
100,381
100,809
101,177

66.5
66.2
66.4
66.3
66.6
66.6
66.8
67.1
67.1
67.1
67.1
66.8
66.6
66.2
66.0
66.0
66.2
66.0
66.0
65.4
64.7
64.1
63.7
63.2
62.9
62.7
62.8
62.9
62.9
63.1
61.7
61.7
62.2
62.6
62.4
62.5
62.6
62.6
62.6
62.6
62.6
62.8
62.8
62.7
62.8
62.5
62.5
62.5
62.7
62.7
62.5
62.6
62.7
62.7
62.7
62.6
62.5

62.8
61.7
61.5
61.7
62.5
62.9
63.2
63.8
64.1
64.3
64.4
63.7
62.7
62.3
62.3
62.7
63.1
63.0
62.2
59.3
58.5
58.4
58.6
58.6
59.0
59.3
59.7
60.1
60.4
60.8
56.8
58.4
60.0
60.3
60.2
60.2
60.4
60.4
60.3
60.3
60.4
60.4
60.4
60.3
60.4
60.1
60.2
60.1
60.3
60.2
60.1
60.1
60.0
60.0
60.2
60.0
59.8

5.6
6.8
7.5
6.9
6.1
5.6
5.4
4.9
4.5
4.2
4.0
4.7
5.8
6.0
5.5
5.1
4.6
4.6
5.8
9.3
9.6
8.9
8.1
7.4
6.2
5.3
4.9
4.4
3.9
3.7
8.1
5.3
3.6
3.6
3.4
3.6
3.5
3.4
3.7
3.6
3.5
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.9
3.8
3.9
4.0
4.1
4.3
4.2
4.1
4.1
4.2

5 Beginning in 2000, data for agricultural employment are for agricultural and related industries; data for this series and for nonagricultural employment are
not strictly comparable with data for earlier years. Because of independent seasonal adjustment for these two series, monthly data will not add to total civilian
employment.
Note: Labor force data in Tables B–22 through B–28 are based on household interviews and usually relate to the calendar week that includes the 12th of
the month. Historical comparability is affected by revisions to population controls, changes in occupational and industry classification, and other changes to the
survey. In recent years, updated population controls have been introduced annually with the release of January data, so data are not strictly comparable with
earlier periods. Particularly notable changes were introduced for data in the years 1953, 1960, 1962, 1972, 1973, 1978, 1980, 1990, 1994, 1997, 1998, 2000,
2003, 2008 and 2012. For definitions of terms, area samples used, historical comparability of the data, comparability with other series, etc., see Employment
and Earnings or concepts and methodology of the CPS at http://www.bls.gov/cps/documentation.htm#concepts.
Source: Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics).

Labor Market Indicators | 417

Table B–23. Civilian employment by sex, age, and demographic characteristic, 1978–2024
[Thousands of persons 16 years of age and over, except as noted; monthly data seasonally adjusted]
By race or ethnicity 1

By sex and age

Year or month

1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2023: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct �������������
      Nov ������������
      Dec �������������
2024: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct �������������
      Nov ������������

All
civilian
workers

Men
20
years
and
over

96,048
98,824
99,303
100,397
99,526
100,834
105,005
107,150
109,597
112,440
114,968
117,342
118,793
117,718
118,492
120,259
123,060
124,900
126,708
129,558
131,463
133,488
136,891
136,933
136,485
137,736
139,252
141,730
144,427
146,047
145,362
139,877
139,064
139,869
142,469
143,929
146,305
148,834
151,436
153,337
155,761
157,538
147,795
152,581
158,291
161,037
160,152
160,301
160,824
160,962
160,707
161,004
161,209
161,500
161,550
161,280
161,866
161,183
161,152
160,968
161,466
161,491
161,083
161,199
161,266
161,434
161,864
161,496
161,141

52,143
53,308
53,101
53,582
52,891
53,487
55,769
56,562
57,569
58,726
59,781
60,837
61,678
61,178
61,496
62,355
63,294
64,085
64,897
66,284
67,135
67,761
69,634
69,776
69,734
70,415
71,572
73,050
74,431
75,337
74,750
71,341
71,230
72,182
73,403
74,176
75,471
76,776
78,084
78,919
80,211
80,917
76,227
78,216
81,409
82,698
82,281
82,340
82,688
82,596
82,520
82,836
82,896
82,800
82,853
82,526
83,084
82,958
82,304
82,178
82,543
82,318
81,986
82,618
82,576
82,452
82,815
82,896
82,617

Women
20
Both
years sexes
and
16–19
over
35,836
37,434
38,492
39,590
40,086
41,004
42,793
44,154
45,556
47,074
48,383
49,745
50,535
50,634
51,328
52,099
53,606
54,396
55,311
56,613
57,278
58,555
60,067
60,417
60,420
61,402
61,773
62,702
63,834
64,799
65,039
63,699
63,456
63,360
64,640
65,295
66,287
67,323
68,387
69,344
70,424
71,470
66,873
69,099
71,283
72,692
72,176
72,257
72,368
72,597
72,527
72,605
72,837
73,107
73,119
73,066
73,049
72,587
73,144
73,182
73,061
73,334
73,226
72,798
73,078
73,589
73,426
73,159
72,981

8,070
8,083
7,710
7,225
6,549
6,342
6,444
6,434
6,472
6,640
6,805
6,759
6,581
5,906
5,669
5,805
6,161
6,419
6,500
6,661
7,051
7,172
7,189
6,740
6,332
5,919
5,907
5,978
6,162
5,911
5,573
4,837
4,378
4,327
4,426
4,458
4,548
4,734
4,965
5,074
5,126
5,150
4,695
5,266
5,600
5,647
5,695
5,704
5,767
5,770
5,660
5,563
5,476
5,593
5,578
5,688
5,733
5,638
5,704
5,608
5,862
5,839
5,871
5,782
5,612
5,393
5,624
5,441
5,543

White

Black or African American

Asian

Hispanic or Latino ethnicity

Men
20
years
and
over

Women
20
years
and
over

Total

Total

Men
20
years
and
over

4,047
4,174
4,267
4,329
4,347
4,428
4,773
4,977
5,128
5,365
5,548
5,727
5,884
5,874
5,978
6,095
6,320
6,556
6,762
7,013
7,290
7,663
7,703
7,741
7,610
7,636
7,707
7,876
8,068
8,240
8,260
7,956
7,944
7,906
8,313
8,408
8,663
9,032
9,219
9,514
9,751
9,910
9,176
9,525
10,034
10,420
10,303
10,307
10,506
10,557
10,449
10,295
10,358
10,367
10,403
10,475
10,533
10,486
10,445
10,568
10,387
10,442
10,421
10,289
10,428
10,474
10,358
10,447
10,298

������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
6,043
6,180
6,215
5,756
5,994
6,244
6,522
6,839
6,917
6,635
6,705
6,867
7,705
8,136
8,325
8,706
9,213
9,448
9,832
10,179
9,437
10,016
10,615
11,096
10,936
10,970
11,056
11,053
11,043
11,084
11,260
11,125
11,255
11,134
11,144
11,084
11,223
11,081
11,113
11,214
11,393
11,400
11,383
11,269
11,202
11,393
11,339

4,527
4,785
5,527
5,813
5,805
6,072
6,651
6,888
7,219
7,790
8,250
8,573
9,845
9,828
10,027
10,361
10,788
11,127
11,642
12,726
13,291
13,720
15,735
16,190
16,590
17,372
17,930
18,632
19,613
20,382
20,346
19,647
19,906
20,269
21,878
22,514
23,492
24,400
25,249
25,938
27,012
27,805
25,952
27,429
29,299
30,343
29,755
29,813
30,065
30,183
30,374
30,588
30,609
30,451
30,637
30,525
30,636
30,480
30,700
30,883
30,994
31,187
31,185
31,388
31,191
31,443
31,484
31,303
31,276

2,568
2,701
3,142
3,325
3,354
3,523
3,825
3,994
4,174
4,444
4,680
4,853
5,609
5,623
5,757
5,992
6,189
6,367
6,655
7,307
7,570
7,576
8,859
9,100
9,341
10,063
10,385
10,872
11,391
11,827
11,769
11,256
11,438
11,685
12,212
12,638
13,202
13,624
14,055
14,355
14,873
15,204
14,333
15,138
15,997
16,386
16,082
16,047
16,298
16,267
16,436
16,571
16,591
16,436
16,520
16,409
16,537
16,438
16,519
16,720
16,800
16,765
16,767
17,023
16,923
16,980
16,978
17,052
16,932

Total

Men
20
years
and
over

Women
20
years
and
over

Total

84,936
87,259
87,715
88,709
87,903
88,893
92,120
93,736
95,660
97,789
99,812
101,584
102,261
101,182
101,669
103,045
105,190
106,490
107,808
109,856
110,931
112,235
114,424
114,430
114,013
114,235
115,239
116,949
118,833
119,792
119,126
114,996
114,168
114,690
114,769
115,379
116,788
117,944
119,313
120,176
121,461
122,441
115,341
118,291
121,908
123,165
122,796
122,764
122,846
123,263
123,103
123,422
123,366
123,543
123,403
123,198
123,550
122,802
122,663
122,685
123,286
123,229
122,922
123,095
123,032
123,049
123,490
122,905
122,830

46,594
47,546
47,419
47,846
47,209
47,618
49,461
50,061
50,818
51,649
52,466
53,292
53,685
53,103
53,357
54,021
54,676
55,254
55,977
56,986
57,500
57,934
59,119
59,245
59,124
59,348
60,159
61,255
62,259
62,806
62,304
59,626
59,438
60,118
60,193
60,511
61,289
61,959
62,575
63,009
63,719
64,070
60,570
61,737
63,743
64,316
64,208
64,138
64,287
64,399
64,330
64,498
64,394
64,307
64,313
64,148
64,559
64,208
63,674
63,658
64,029
63,801
63,588
64,011
64,005
63,910
64,114
64,085
63,950

30,975
32,357
33,275
34,275
34,710
35,476
36,823
37,907
39,050
40,242
41,316
42,346
42,796
42,862
43,327
43,910
45,116
45,643
46,164
47,063
47,342
48,098
49,145
49,369
49,448
49,823
50,040
50,589
51,359
51,996
52,124
51,231
50,997
50,881
50,911
51,198
51,798
52,161
52,771
53,179
53,682
54,304
51,048
52,389
53,767
54,441
54,137
54,182
54,046
54,331
54,349
54,606
54,670
54,803
54,767
54,621
54,609
54,175
54,615
54,646
54,677
54,843
54,752
54,505
54,583
54,866
54,947
54,583
54,544

9,102
9,359
9,313
9,355
9,189
9,375
10,119
10,501
10,814
11,309
11,658
11,953
12,175
12,074
12,151
12,382
12,835
13,279
13,542
13,969
14,556
15,056
15,156
15,006
14,872
14,739
14,909
15,313
15,765
16,051
15,953
15,025
15,010
15,051
15,856
16,151
16,732
17,472
17,982
18,587
19,091
19,381
17,873
18,726
19,937
20,674
20,512
20,613
20,974
20,713
20,613
20,411
20,523
20,626
20,650
20,636
20,886
20,952
20,887
20,950
20,746
20,812
20,643
20,570
20,739
20,639
20,801
20,832
20,556

4,483
4,606
4,498
4,520
4,414
4,531
4,871
4,992
5,150
5,357
5,509
5,602
5,692
5,706
5,681
5,793
5,964
6,137
6,167
6,325
6,530
6,702
6,741
6,627
6,652
6,586
6,681
6,901
7,079
7,245
7,151
6,628
6,680
6,765
7,104
7,304
7,613
7,938
8,228
8,500
8,745
8,883
8,150
8,597
9,294
9,617
9,562
9,670
9,811
9,519
9,511
9,478
9,593
9,640
9,631
9,520
9,648
9,821
9,717
9,709
9,677
9,661
9,497
9,643
9,681
9,551
9,817
9,754
9,658

Women
20
years
and
over
1,537
1,638
1,886
2,029
2,040
2,127
2,357
2,456
2,615
2,872
3,047
3,172
3,567
3,603
3,693
3,800
3,989
4,116
4,341
4,705
4,928
5,290
5,903
6,121
6,367
6,541
6,752
6,913
7,321
7,662
7,707
7,649
7,788
7,918
8,858
9,056
9,431
9,853
10,217
10,543
11,045
11,516
10,593
11,165
12,049
12,649
12,453
12,474
12,473
12,568
12,661
12,660
12,724
12,776
12,785
12,727
12,737
12,746
12,759
12,860
12,870
13,016
13,032
12,951
12,949
13,223
13,262
13,032
13,144

1 Beginning in 2003, persons who selected this race group only. Persons whose ethnicity is identified as Hispanic or Latino may be of any race. Prior to 2003,
persons who selected more than one race were included in the group they identified as the main race. Data for “black or African American” were for “black”
prior to 2003. See Employment and Earnings or concepts and methodology of the Current Population Survey (CPS) at http://www.bls.gov/cps/documentation.
htm#concepts for details.
Note: Detail will not sum to total because data for all race groups are not shown here.
See footnote 5 and Note, Table B–22.
Source: Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics).

418 |

Appendix B

Table B–24. Unemployment by sex, age, and demographic characteristic, 1978–2024
[Thousands of persons 16 years of age and over, except as noted; monthly data seasonally adjusted]
By race or ethnicity 1

By sex and age

Year or month

1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2023: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct �������������
      Nov ������������
      Dec �������������
2024: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct �������������
      Nov ������������

All
civilian
workers

6,202
6,137
7,637
8,273
10,678
10,717
8,539
8,312
8,237
7,425
6,701
6,528
7,047
8,628
9,613
8,940
7,996
7,404
7,236
6,739
6,210
5,880
5,692
6,801
8,378
8,774
8,149
7,591
7,001
7,078
8,924
14,265
14,825
13,747
12,506
11,460
9,617
8,296
7,751
6,982
6,314
6,001
12,947
8,623
5,996
6,080
5,719
5,962
5,866
5,715
6,117
5,997
5,904
6,340
6,347
6,443
6,262
6,268
6,124
6,458
6,429
6,492
6,649
6,811
7,163
7,115
6,834
6,984
7,145

Men
20
years
and
over

Women
20
Both
years sexes
and
16–19
over

2,328
2,308
3,353
3,615
5,089
5,257
3,932
3,715
3,751
3,369
2,987
2,867
3,239
4,195
4,717
4,287
3,627
3,239
3,146
2,882
2,580
2,433
2,376
3,040
3,896
4,209
3,791
3,392
3,131
3,259
4,297
7,555
7,763
6,898
5,984
5,568
4,585
3,959
3,675
3,287
2,976
2,819
6,118
4,302
2,867
2,985
2,759
2,805
2,877
2,797
2,962
2,941
2,874
3,151
3,271
3,161
3,172
3,050
3,060
3,002
2,855
3,064
3,243
3,227
3,477
3,405
3,192
3,361
3,369

2,292
2,276
2,615
2,895
3,613
3,632
3,107
3,129
3,032
2,709
2,487
2,467
2,596
3,074
3,469
3,288
3,049
2,819
2,783
2,585
2,424
2,285
2,235
2,599
3,228
3,314
3,150
3,013
2,751
2,718
3,342
5,157
5,534
5,450
5,125
4,565
3,926
3,371
3,151
2,868
2,578
2,435
5,804
3,625
2,453
2,382
2,295
2,446
2,355
2,324
2,503
2,358
2,330
2,407
2,333
2,421
2,350
2,460
2,385
2,653
2,731
2,655
2,586
2,788
2,890
2,822
2,708
2,752
2,933

1,583
1,555
1,669
1,763
1,977
1,829
1,499
1,468
1,454
1,347
1,226
1,194
1,212
1,359
1,427
1,365
1,320
1,346
1,306
1,271
1,205
1,162
1,081
1,162
1,253
1,251
1,208
1,186
1,119
1,101
1,285
1,552
1,528
1,400
1,397
1,327
1,106
966
925
827
759
746
1,025
696
675
713
665
711
635
595
652
698
699
781
743
861
739
758
679
803
842
772
821
795
795
888
935
870
843

White

Total

4,698
4,664
5,884
6,343
8,241
8,128
6,372
6,191
6,140
5,501
4,944
4,770
5,186
6,560
7,169
6,655
5,892
5,459
5,300
4,836
4,484
4,273
4,121
4,969
6,137
6,311
5,847
5,350
5,002
5,143
6,509
10,648
10,916
9,889
8,915
8,033
6,540
5,662
5,345
4,765
4,354
4,159
9,090
5,854
4,049
4,162
3,933
4,036
4,110
3,978
4,179
3,936
3,986
4,387
4,352
4,414
4,223
4,424
4,299
4,356
4,310
4,479
4,462
4,457
4,854
4,890
4,677
4,845
4,855

Men
20
years
and
over
1,797
1,773
2,629
2,825
3,991
4,098
2,992
2,834
2,857
2,584
2,268
2,149
2,431
3,284
3,620
3,263
2,735
2,465
2,363
2,140
1,920
1,813
1,731
2,275
2,943
3,125
2,785
2,450
2,281
2,408
3,179
5,746
5,828
5,046
4,347
3,994
3,141
2,751
2,594
2,288
2,094
1,967
4,334
2,957
1,995
2,091
1,916
1,968
2,022
1,962
2,100
2,008
2,033
2,228
2,302
2,215
2,136
2,197
2,195
2,027
1,933
2,181
2,208
2,143
2,308
2,372
2,271
2,354
2,325

Women
20
years
and
over
1,713
1,699
1,964
2,143
2,715
2,643
2,264
2,283
2,213
1,922
1,766
1,758
1,852
2,248
2,512
2,400
2,197
2,042
1,998
1,784
1,688
1,616
1,595
1,849
2,269
2,276
2,172
2,054
1,927
1,930
2,384
3,745
3,960
3,818
3,564
3,102
2,623
2,249
2,100
1,923
1,743
1,664
4,013
2,411
1,585
1,580
1,547
1,603
1,660
1,573
1,629
1,462
1,503
1,619
1,583
1,588
1,521
1,669
1,604
1,808
1,811
1,779
1,689
1,763
1,946
1,911
1,747
1,843
1,916

Black or African American

Asian

Hispanic or Latino ethnicity

Men
20
years
and
over

Total

Total

Total

1,330
1,319
1,553
1,731
2,142
2,272
1,914
1,864
1,840
1,684
1,547
1,544
1,565
1,723
2,011
1,844
1,666
1,538
1,592
1,560
1,426
1,309
1,241
1,416
1,693
1,787
1,729
1,700
1,549
1,445
1,788
2,606
2,852
2,831
2,544
2,429
2,141
1,846
1,655
1,501
1,322
1,251
2,304
1,756
1,300
1,212
1,173
1,252
1,138
1,050
1,243
1,294
1,248
1,155
1,251
1,266
1,285
1,143
1,164
1,240
1,424
1,239
1,343
1,372
1,385
1,344
1,262
1,259
1,397

462
473
636
703
954
1,002
815
757
765
666
617
619
664
745
886
801
682
593
639
585
524
480
499
573
695
760
733
699
640
622
811
1,286
1,396
1,360
1,152
1,082
973
835
737
663
582
571
1,069
845
572
542
537
524
547
458
570
596
537
516
570
528
651
473
548
636
640
533
654
626
689
602
532
585
612

Women
20
years
and
over
510
513
574
671
793
878
747
750
728
706
642
625
633
698
800
729
685
620
643
673
622
561
512
582
738
772
755
734
656
588
732
1,032
1,165
1,204
1,119
1,069
943
811
724
657
573
527
1,062
791
596
538
508
563
477
495
587
585
564
513
487
590
534
528
521
482
612
548
572
617
601
610
585
543
652

������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
227
288
389
366
277
259
205
229
285
522
543
518
483
448
436
347
349
333
304
280
894
529
306
344
325
387
318
321
338
360
269
362
332
356
404
353
336
390
290
322
361
488
431
486
481
468
442

452
434
620
678
929
961
800
811
857
751
732
750
876
1,092
1,311
1,248
1,187
1,140
1,132
1,069
1,026
945
954
1,138
1,353
1,441
1,342
1,191
1,081
1,220
1,678
2,706
2,843
2,629
2,514
2,257
1,878
1,726
1,548
1,401
1,323
1,248
3,018
1,995
1,302
1,475
1,455
1,703
1,459
1,403
1,283
1,354
1,410
1,558
1,478
1,531
1,465
1,602
1,618
1,616
1,448
1,589
1,630
1,614
1,755
1,822
1,687
1,684
1,742

Men
20
years
and
over
175
168
284
321
461
491
393
401
438
374
351
342
425
575
675
629
558
530
495
471
436
374
388
495
636
693
635
536
497
576
860
1,474
1,519
1,345
1,195
1,090
864
820
720
632
591
553
1,451
986
626
730
760
894
688
695
682
627
673
736
736
719
729
824
852
695
654
766
826
746
786
854
720
704
775

Women
20
years
and
over
168
160
190
212
293
302
258
269
278
241
234
276
289
339
418
418
431
404
438
401
376
376
371
436
496
555
504
464
414
446
567
911
1,001
984
995
855
764
686
627
585
547
497
1,291
812
513
557
578
624
588
534
456
545
536
587
570
537
523
601
577
675
612
623
550
604
741
698
663
712
723

1 See footnote 1 and Note, Table B–23.

Note: See footnote 5 and Note, Table B–22.
Source: Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics).

Labor Market Indicators | 419

Table B–25. Civilian labor force participation rate, 1978–2024
[Percent 1; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

Men
Year or month

1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2023: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct �������������
      Nov ������������
      Dec �������������
2024: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct �������������
      Nov ������������

All
civilian
workers

20
years
and
over

63.2
63.7
63.8
63.9
64.0
64.0
64.4
64.8
65.3
65.6
65.9
66.5
66.5
66.2
66.4
66.3
66.6
66.6
66.8
67.1
67.1
67.1
67.1
66.8
66.6
66.2
66.0
66.0
66.2
66.0
66.0
65.4
64.7
64.1
63.7
63.2
62.9
62.7
62.8
62.9
62.9
63.1
61.7
61.7
62.2
62.6
62.4
62.5
62.6
62.6
62.6
62.6
62.6
62.8
62.8
62.7
62.8
62.5
62.5
62.5
62.7
62.7
62.5
62.6
62.7
62.7
62.7
62.6
62.5

79.8
79.8
79.4
79.0
78.7
78.5
78.3
78.1
78.1
78.0
77.9
78.1
78.2
77.7
77.7
77.3
76.8
76.7
76.8
77.0
76.8
76.7
76.7
76.5
76.3
75.9
75.8
75.8
75.9
75.9
75.7
74.8
74.1
73.4
73.0
72.5
71.9
71.7
71.7
71.6
71.6
71.6
70.1
69.8
70.3
70.4
70.1
70.2
70.5
70.3
70.3
70.5
70.5
70.5
70.6
70.2
70.6
70.4
70.2
70.0
70.2
70.1
69.9
70.4
70.5
70.3
70.4
70.5
70.3

Women

20–24
years

25–54
years

85.9
86.4
85.9
85.5
84.9
84.8
85.0
85.0
85.8
85.2
85.0
85.3
84.4
83.5
83.3
83.2
83.1
83.1
82.5
82.5
82.0
81.9
82.6
81.6
80.7
80.0
79.6
79.1
79.6
78.7
78.7
76.2
74.5
74.7
74.5
73.9
73.9
73.0
73.0
74.1
73.2
74.0
71.0
73.0
73.2
72.5
72.0
73.3
74.4
71.9
72.9
73.0
72.3
72.6
72.0
71.1
72.4
71.7
73.8
72.3
72.8
73.9
72.5
73.3
72.6
72.0
72.6
73.6
73.3

94.3
94.4
94.2
94.1
94.0
93.8
93.9
93.9
93.8
93.7
93.6
93.7
93.4
93.1
93.0
92.6
91.7
91.6
91.8
91.8
91.8
91.7
91.6
91.3
91.0
90.6
90.5
90.5
90.6
90.9
90.5
89.7
89.3
88.7
88.7
88.4
88.2
88.3
88.5
88.6
89.0
89.1
87.9
88.0
88.6
89.1
88.5
89.0
89.1
89.1
89.1
89.2
89.4
89.3
89.6
89.0
89.3
89.2
89.2
89.3
89.2
89.1
89.2
89.6
90.0
89.5
89.5
89.3
89.3

55
years
and
over

20
years
and
over

47.2
46.6
45.6
44.5
43.8
43.0
41.8
41.0
40.4
40.4
39.9
39.6
39.4
38.5
38.4
37.7
37.8
37.9
38.3
38.9
39.1
39.6
40.1
40.9
42.0
42.6
43.2
44.2
44.9
45.2
46.0
46.3
46.4
46.3
46.8
46.5
45.9
45.9
46.2
46.1
46.2
46.3
45.1
44.2
44.7
44.2
44.8
44.2
44.3
44.1
44.0
44.2
44.0
44.0
44.2
44.0
44.6
44.3
44.1
43.9
44.3
43.7
43.4
43.6
43.7
43.8
44.0
44.4
44.0

49.6
50.6
51.3
52.1
52.7
53.1
53.7
54.7
55.5
56.2
56.8
57.7
58.0
57.9
58.5
58.5
59.3
59.4
59.9
60.5
60.4
60.7
60.6
60.6
60.5
60.6
60.3
60.4
60.5
60.6
60.9
60.8
60.3
59.8
59.3
58.8
58.5
58.2
58.3
58.5
58.5
58.9
57.6
57.3
58.1
58.6
58.4
58.5
58.5
58.6
58.7
58.6
58.7
58.9
58.8
58.8
58.7
58.4
58.8
59.0
58.9
59.0
58.8
58.6
58.9
59.2
58.9
58.7
58.7

20–24
years

25–54
years

68.3
69.0
68.9
69.6
69.8
69.9
70.4
71.8
72.4
73.0
72.7
72.4
71.3
70.1
70.9
70.9
71.0
70.3
71.3
72.7
73.0
73.2
73.1
72.7
72.1
70.8
70.5
70.1
69.5
70.1
70.0
69.6
68.3
67.8
67.4
67.5
67.7
68.3
68.0
68.5
69.0
70.4
67.5
68.6
68.7
70.1
71.0
70.6
69.5
69.8
69.9
68.9
68.9
69.7
70.7
70.5
70.9
70.9
71.5
71.1
71.4
70.7
69.1
68.8
70.0
69.1
68.6
70.0
69.7

60.6
62.3
64.0
65.3
66.3
67.1
68.2
69.6
70.8
71.9
72.7
73.6
74.0
74.1
74.6
74.6
75.3
75.6
76.1
76.7
76.5
76.8
76.7
76.4
75.9
75.6
75.3
75.3
75.5
75.4
75.8
75.6
75.2
74.7
74.5
73.9
73.9
73.7
74.3
75.0
75.3
76.0
75.1
75.3
76.4
77.4
76.9
77.2
77.2
77.5
77.6
77.8
77.5
77.7
77.4
77.6
77.3
77.1
77.4
77.7
77.7
78.0
78.1
77.9
78.1
78.4
78.1
77.8
77.7

1 Civilian labor force as percent of civilian noninstitutional population in group specified.
2 See footnote 1, Table B–23.

Note: Data relate to persons 16 years of age and over, except as noted.
See footnote 5 and Note, Table B–22.
Source: Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics).

420 |

Appendix B

55
years
and
over
23.1
23.2
22.8
22.7
22.7
22.4
22.2
22.0
22.1
22.0
22.3
23.0
22.9
22.6
22.8
22.8
24.0
23.9
23.9
24.6
25.0
25.6
26.1
27.0
28.5
30.0
30.5
31.4
32.3
33.2
33.9
34.7
35.1
35.1
35.1
35.1
34.9
34.7
34.7
34.7
34.7
35.0
34.0
33.3
33.6
33.6
33.3
33.3
33.5
33.5
33.5
33.4
33.9
34.1
33.9
33.8
33.7
33.2
33.5
33.8
33.6
33.7
33.6
33.5
33.5
33.9
33.8
33.5
33.5

By race or ethnicity 2

Both
sexes
16–19
years

White

Black or
African
American

57.8
57.9
56.7
55.4
54.1
53.5
53.9
54.5
54.7
54.7
55.3
55.9
53.7
51.6
51.3
51.5
52.7
53.5
52.3
51.6
52.8
52.0
52.0
49.6
47.4
44.5
43.9
43.7
43.7
41.3
40.2
37.5
34.9
34.1
34.3
34.5
34.0
34.3
35.2
35.2
35.1
35.3
34.5
36.2
36.8
36.9
37.1
37.4
37.3
37.0
36.7
36.4
35.8
37.0
36.6
37.9
37.5
37.0
36.5
36.6
38.2
37.6
38.1
37.4
36.4
35.7
37.2
35.8
36.2

63.3
63.9
64.1
64.3
64.3
64.3
64.6
65.0
65.5
65.8
66.2
66.7
66.9
66.6
66.8
66.8
67.1
67.1
67.2
67.5
67.3
67.3
67.3
67.0
66.8
66.5
66.3
66.3
66.5
66.4
66.3
65.8
65.1
64.5
64.0
63.5
63.1
62.8
62.9
62.8
62.8
63.0
61.8
61.5
62.0
62.3
62.1
62.1
62.2
62.3
62.3
62.3
62.3
62.5
62.4
62.3
62.3
62.1
62.1
62.1
62.3
62.3
62.2
62.2
62.3
62.3
62.4
62.2
62.1

61.5
61.4
61.0
60.8
61.0
61.5
62.2
62.9
63.3
63.8
63.8
64.2
64.0
63.3
63.9
63.2
63.4
63.7
64.1
64.7
65.6
65.8
65.8
65.3
64.8
64.3
63.8
64.2
64.1
63.7
63.7
62.4
62.2
61.4
61.5
61.2
61.2
61.5
61.6
62.3
62.3
62.5
60.5
60.9
62.2
63.1
62.9
63.3
64.0
62.9
63.1
62.7
62.8
62.7
63.0
63.0
63.7
63.4
63.3
63.7
63.6
63.2
62.9
62.7
63.2
62.7
62.9
62.9
62.4

Asian
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
67.2
67.2
67.2
66.4
65.9
66.1
66.2
66.5
67.0
66.0
64.7
64.6
63.9
64.6
63.6
62.8
63.2
63.6
63.5
64.0
62.7
63.8
64.5
65.0
64.2
65.1
64.8
64.8
65.0
65.4
65.5
65.6
65.7
65.3
65.0
63.9
64.5
64.5
64.1
64.7
65.3
65.9
65.7
65.4
65.3
65.5
64.7

Hispanic
or Latino
ethnicity
62.9
63.6
64.0
64.1
63.6
63.8
64.9
64.6
65.4
66.4
67.4
67.6
67.4
66.5
66.8
66.2
66.1
65.8
66.5
67.9
67.9
67.7
69.7
69.5
69.1
68.3
68.6
68.0
68.7
68.8
68.5
68.0
67.5
66.5
66.4
66.0
66.1
65.9
65.8
66.1
66.3
66.8
65.6
65.5
66.3
66.9
66.4
66.9
66.8
66.8
66.8
67.3
67.3
67.1
67.2
67.0
66.9
66.7
66.8
67.1
66.8
67.3
67.3
67.5
67.3
67.8
67.4
66.9
66.9

Table B–26. Civilian employment/population ratio, 1978–2024
[Percent 1; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

Men
Year or month

1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2023: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct �������������
      Nov ������������
      Dec �������������
2024: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct �������������
      Nov ������������

All
civilian
workers
59.3
59.9
59.2
59.0
57.8
57.9
59.5
60.1
60.7
61.5
62.3
63.0
62.8
61.7
61.5
61.7
62.5
62.9
63.2
63.8
64.1
64.3
64.4
63.7
62.7
62.3
62.3
62.7
63.1
63.0
62.2
59.3
58.5
58.4
58.6
58.6
59.0
59.3
59.7
60.1
60.4
60.8
56.8
58.4
60.0
60.3
60.2
60.2
60.4
60.4
60.3
60.3
60.4
60.4
60.4
60.3
60.4
60.1
60.2
60.1
60.3
60.2
60.1
60.1
60.0
60.0
60.2
60.0
59.8

20
years
and
over
76.4
76.5
74.6
74.0
71.8
71.4
73.2
73.3
73.3
73.8
74.2
74.5
74.3
72.7
72.1
72.3
72.6
73.0
73.2
73.7
73.9
74.0
74.2
73.3
72.3
71.7
71.9
72.4
72.9
72.8
71.6
67.6
66.8
67.0
67.5
67.4
67.8
68.1
68.5
68.8
69.0
69.2
64.8
66.2
67.9
67.9
67.8
67.9
68.1
68.0
67.9
68.1
68.1
68.0
68.0
67.6
68.0
67.9
67.7
67.6
67.8
67.6
67.3
67.8
67.7
67.5
67.8
67.8
67.5

Women

20–24
years

25–54
years

78.0
78.9
75.1
74.2
71.0
71.3
74.9
75.3
76.3
76.8
77.5
77.8
76.7
73.8
73.1
73.8
74.6
75.4
74.7
75.2
75.4
75.6
76.6
74.2
72.5
71.5
71.6
71.5
72.7
71.7
69.7
63.3
61.3
63.0
63.8
63.5
64.9
65.1
66.2
67.9
67.6
68.3
61.3
65.9
67.5
67.2
66.4
67.5
69.2
67.5
67.7
68.0
67.1
66.5
66.0
65.5
67.2
67.1
68.7
66.6
67.6
69.0
66.5
67.4
66.9
66.0
67.3
66.9
66.7

91.0
91.1
89.4
89.0
86.5
86.1
88.4
88.7
88.5
89.0
89.5
89.9
89.1
87.5
86.8
87.0
87.2
87.6
87.9
88.4
88.8
89.0
89.0
87.9
86.6
85.9
86.3
86.9
87.3
87.5
86.0
81.5
81.0
81.4
82.5
82.8
83.6
84.4
85.0
85.4
86.2
86.4
81.8
83.6
85.9
86.3
85.8
86.2
86.4
86.3
86.3
86.5
86.6
86.4
86.4
85.9
86.2
86.1
86.2
86.3
86.4
86.1
86.0
86.5
86.6
86.3
86.4
86.3
86.1

55
years
and
over

20
years
and
over

45.7
45.2
44.1
42.9
41.6
40.6
39.8
39.3
38.8
39.0
38.6
38.3
38.0
36.8
36.4
35.9
36.2
36.5
37.0
37.7
38.0
38.5
39.1
39.6
40.3
40.7
41.5
42.7
43.5
43.7
44.2
43.0
42.8
43.1
43.8
43.8
43.9
44.1
44.4
44.6
44.7
45.1
42.2
42.3
43.5
43.0
43.7
43.1
43.1
43.0
42.8
42.8
43.0
42.8
43.1
42.8
43.1
43.0
42.7
42.7
43.1
42.4
42.3
42.4
42.3
42.4
42.7
42.9
42.6

46.6
47.7
48.1
48.6
48.4
48.8
50.1
51.0
52.0
53.1
54.0
54.9
55.2
54.6
54.8
55.0
56.2
56.5
57.0
57.8
58.0
58.5
58.4
58.1
57.5
57.5
57.4
57.6
58.0
58.2
57.9
56.2
55.5
55.0
55.0
54.9
55.2
55.4
55.7
56.1
56.4
56.9
53.0
54.5
56.2
56.8
56.6
56.6
56.7
56.8
56.7
56.8
56.9
57.1
57.0
56.9
56.9
56.5
56.9
56.9
56.8
57.0
56.8
56.5
56.6
57.0
56.8
56.6
56.4

20–24
years

25–54
years

61.4
62.4
61.8
61.8
60.6
60.9
62.7
64.1
64.9
66.1
66.6
66.4
65.2
63.2
63.6
64.0
64.5
64.0
64.9
66.8
67.3
68.0
67.9
67.3
65.6
64.2
64.3
64.5
64.2
65.0
63.8
61.1
59.4
58.7
59.2
59.8
60.9
62.5
63.0
64.2
64.7
66.4
58.2
63.0
64.4
66.0
66.5
66.4
65.3
66.5
66.1
65.2
64.6
65.6
66.8
66.1
66.5
66.4
68.0
66.5
66.3
66.0
64.0
64.0
64.8
64.0
64.1
65.6
65.1

57.3
59.0
60.1
61.2
61.2
62.0
63.9
65.3
66.6
68.2
69.3
70.4
70.6
70.1
70.1
70.4
71.5
72.2
72.8
73.5
73.6
74.1
74.2
73.4
72.3
72.0
71.8
72.0
72.5
72.5
72.3
70.2
69.3
69.0
69.2
69.3
70.0
70.3
71.1
72.1
72.8
73.7
69.6
71.7
74.0
75.1
74.7
74.9
75.0
75.1
75.1
75.2
75.3
75.3
75.3
75.3
75.1
74.8
75.0
75.2
75.0
75.5
75.7
75.1
75.3
75.6
75.5
74.9
74.8

55
years
and
over
22.3
22.5
22.1
21.9
21.6
21.4
21.3
21.1
21.3
21.3
21.7
22.4
22.2
21.9
21.8
22.0
23.1
23.0
23.1
23.8
24.4
24.9
25.5
26.3
27.5
28.9
29.4
30.4
31.4
32.2
32.7
32.6
32.9
32.9
33.1
33.3
33.4
33.5
33.5
33.6
33.7
34.0
31.5
31.9
32.7
32.8
32.5
32.4
32.7
32.7
32.6
32.7
33.1
33.2
33.0
32.9
32.8
32.3
32.7
32.8
32.8
32.8
32.7
32.5
32.5
33.0
32.9
32.6
32.5

By race or ethnicity 2

Both
sexes
16–19
years

White

Black or
African
American

48.3
48.5
46.6
44.6
41.5
41.5
43.7
44.4
44.6
45.5
46.8
47.5
45.3
42.0
41.0
41.7
43.4
44.2
43.5
43.4
45.1
44.7
45.2
42.3
39.6
36.8
36.4
36.5
36.9
34.8
32.6
28.4
25.9
25.8
26.1
26.6
27.3
28.5
29.7
30.3
30.6
30.9
28.3
32.0
32.8
32.8
33.2
33.3
33.6
33.6
32.9
32.3
31.8
32.4
32.3
32.9
33.2
32.6
32.6
32.0
33.4
33.2
33.4
32.9
31.9
30.6
31.9
30.9
31.4

60.0
60.6
60.0
60.0
58.8
58.9
60.5
61.0
61.5
62.3
63.1
63.8
63.7
62.6
62.4
62.7
63.5
63.8
64.1
64.6
64.7
64.8
64.9
64.2
63.4
63.0
63.1
63.4
63.8
63.6
62.8
60.2
59.4
59.4
59.4
59.4
59.7
59.9
60.2
60.4
60.7
61.0
57.3
58.6
60.0
60.2
60.2
60.1
60.2
60.3
60.2
60.4
60.3
60.4
60.3
60.1
60.3
59.9
60.0
59.9
60.2
60.2
60.0
60.0
60.0
60.0
60.1
59.8
59.8

53.6
53.8
52.3
51.3
49.4
49.5
52.3
53.4
54.1
55.6
56.3
56.9
56.7
55.4
54.9
55.0
56.1
57.1
57.4
58.2
59.7
60.6
60.9
59.7
58.1
57.4
57.2
57.7
58.4
58.4
57.3
53.2
52.3
51.7
53.0
53.2
54.3
55.7
56.4
57.6
58.3
58.7
53.6
55.7
58.4
59.6
59.5
59.7
60.7
59.9
59.6
58.9
59.2
59.4
59.4
59.3
60.0
60.1
60.0
60.1
59.5
59.6
59.1
58.8
59.2
58.9
59.3
59.3
58.5

Asian
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
64.8
64.2
63.2
62.4
63.0
63.4
64.2
64.3
64.3
61.2
59.9
60.0
60.1
61.2
60.4
60.4
60.9
61.5
61.6
62.3
57.3
60.6
62.7
63.1
62.3
62.9
63.0
63.0
63.1
63.4
64.0
63.5
63.8
63.3
62.7
61.9
62.6
62.3
62.5
62.9
63.3
63.2
63.3
62.7
62.6
62.9
62.3

Hispanic
or Latino
ethnicity
57.2
58.3
57.6
57.4
54.9
55.1
57.9
57.8
58.5
60.5
61.9
62.2
61.9
59.8
59.1
59.1
59.5
59.7
60.6
62.6
63.1
63.4
65.7
64.9
63.9
63.1
63.8
64.0
65.2
64.9
63.3
59.7
59.0
58.9
59.5
60.0
61.2
61.6
62.0
62.7
63.2
63.9
58.7
61.1
63.5
63.8
63.3
63.3
63.7
63.8
64.1
64.4
64.3
63.9
64.1
63.8
63.9
63.4
63.5
63.7
63.8
64.1
64.0
64.2
63.7
64.1
64.0
63.5
63.3

1 Civilian employment as percent of civilian noninstitutional population in group specified.
2 See footnote 1, Table B–23.

Note: Data relate to persons 16 years of age and over, except as noted.
See footnote 5 and Note, Table B–22.
Source: Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics).

Labor Market Indicators | 421

Table B–27. Civilian unemployment rate, 1978–2024
[Percent 1; monthly data seasonally adjusted]
By race or ethnicity 2

By sex and age
Year or month

1978 ��������������������������
1979 ��������������������������
1980 ��������������������������
1981 ��������������������������
1982 ��������������������������
1983 ��������������������������
1984 ��������������������������
1985 ��������������������������
1986 ��������������������������
1987 ��������������������������
1988 ��������������������������
1989 ��������������������������
1990 ��������������������������
1991 ��������������������������
1992 ��������������������������
1993 ��������������������������
1994 ��������������������������
1995 ��������������������������
1996 ��������������������������
1997 ��������������������������
1998 ��������������������������
1999 ��������������������������
2000 ��������������������������
2001 ��������������������������
2002 ��������������������������
2003 ��������������������������
2004 ��������������������������
2005 ��������������������������
2006 ��������������������������
2007 ��������������������������
2008 ��������������������������
2009 ��������������������������
2010 ��������������������������
2011 ��������������������������
2012 ��������������������������
2013 ��������������������������
2014 ��������������������������
2015 ��������������������������
2016 ��������������������������
2017 ��������������������������
2018 ��������������������������
2019 ��������������������������
2020 ��������������������������
2021 ��������������������������
2022 ��������������������������
2023 ��������������������������
2023: Jan �����������������
      Feb �����������������
      Mar ����������������
      Apr �����������������
      May ����������������
      June ���������������
      July ����������������
      Aug ����������������
      Sept ���������������
      Oct �����������������
      Nov ����������������
      Dec �����������������
2024: Jan �����������������
      Feb �����������������
      Mar ����������������
      Apr �����������������
      May ����������������
      June ���������������
      July ����������������
      Aug ����������������
      Sept ���������������
      Oct �����������������
      Nov ����������������

All
civilian
workers

6.1
5.8
7.1
7.6
9.7
9.6
7.5
7.2
7.0
6.2
5.5
5.3
5.6
6.8
7.5
6.9
6.1
5.6
5.4
4.9
4.5
4.2
4.0
4.7
5.8
6.0
5.5
5.1
4.6
4.6
5.8
9.3
9.6
8.9
8.1
7.4
6.2
5.3
4.9
4.4
3.9
3.7
8.1
5.3
3.6
3.6
3.4
3.6
3.5
3.4
3.7
3.6
3.5
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.9
3.8
3.9
4.0
4.1
4.3
4.2
4.1
4.1
4.2

Men
20
years
and
over
4.3
4.2
5.9
6.3
8.8
8.9
6.6
6.2
6.1
5.4
4.8
4.5
5.0
6.4
7.1
6.4
5.4
4.8
4.6
4.2
3.7
3.5
3.3
4.2
5.3
5.6
5.0
4.4
4.0
4.1
5.4
9.6
9.8
8.7
7.5
7.0
5.7
4.9
4.5
4.0
3.6
3.4
7.4
5.2
3.4
3.5
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.3
3.5
3.4
3.4
3.7
3.8
3.7
3.7
3.5
3.6
3.5
3.3
3.6
3.8
3.8
4.0
4.0
3.7
3.9
3.9

Women
20
years
and
over
6.0
5.7
6.4
6.8
8.3
8.1
6.8
6.6
6.2
5.4
4.9
4.7
4.9
5.7
6.3
5.9
5.4
4.9
4.8
4.4
4.1
3.8
3.6
4.1
5.1
5.1
4.9
4.6
4.1
4.0
4.9
7.5
8.0
7.9
7.3
6.5
5.6
4.8
4.4
4.0
3.5
3.3
8.0
5.0
3.3
3.2
3.1
3.3
3.2
3.1
3.3
3.1
3.1
3.2
3.1
3.2
3.1
3.3
3.2
3.5
3.6
3.5
3.4
3.7
3.8
3.7
3.6
3.6
3.9

Both
sexes
16–19
16.4
16.1
17.8
19.6
23.2
22.4
18.9
18.6
18.3
16.9
15.3
15.0
15.5
18.7
20.1
19.0
17.6
17.3
16.7
16.0
14.6
13.9
13.1
14.7
16.5
17.5
17.0
16.6
15.4
15.7
18.7
24.3
25.9
24.4
24.0
22.9
19.6
16.9
15.7
14.0
12.9
12.7
17.9
11.7
10.8
11.2
10.5
11.1
9.9
9.3
10.3
11.2
11.3
12.3
11.8
13.1
11.4
11.9
10.6
12.5
12.6
11.7
12.3
12.1
12.4
14.1
14.3
13.8
13.2

White

5.2
5.1
6.3
6.7
8.6
8.4
6.5
6.2
6.0
5.3
4.7
4.5
4.8
6.1
6.6
6.1
5.3
4.9
4.7
4.2
3.9
3.7
3.5
4.2
5.1
5.2
4.8
4.4
4.0
4.1
5.2
8.5
8.7
7.9
7.2
6.5
5.3
4.6
4.3
3.8
3.5
3.3
7.3
4.7
3.2
3.3
3.1
3.2
3.2
3.1
3.3
3.1
3.1
3.4
3.4
3.5
3.3
3.5
3.4
3.4
3.4
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.8
3.8
3.6
3.8
3.8

Black or
African
American
12.8
12.3
14.3
15.6
18.9
19.5
15.9
15.1
14.5
13.0
11.7
11.4
11.4
12.5
14.2
13.0
11.5
10.4
10.5
10.0
8.9
8.0
7.6
8.6
10.2
10.8
10.4
10.0
8.9
8.3
10.1
14.8
16.0
15.8
13.8
13.1
11.3
9.6
8.4
7.5
6.5
6.1
11.4
8.6
6.1
5.5
5.4
5.7
5.1
4.8
5.7
6.0
5.7
5.3
5.7
5.8
5.8
5.2
5.3
5.6
6.4
5.6
6.1
6.3
6.3
6.1
5.7
5.7
6.4

Asian

�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
3.6
4.5
5.9
6.0
4.4
4.0
3.0
3.2
4.0
7.3
7.5
7.0
5.9
5.2
5.0
3.8
3.6
3.4
3.0
2.7
8.7
5.0
2.8
3.0
2.9
3.4
2.8
2.8
3.0
3.1
2.3
3.2
2.9
3.1
3.5
3.1
2.9
3.4
2.5
2.8
3.1
4.1
3.7
4.1
4.1
3.9
3.8

By educational attainment
(25 years & over)
U-6
measure
of labor Less
HisHigh
Some
Bachpanic or underthan
school college
elor’s
Latino utilizaa
high
graduor
asdegree
ethnic- tion 3
school ates, no sociate
and
ity
diploma college degree higher 4
9.1
8.3
10.1
10.4
13.8
13.7
10.7
10.5
10.6
8.8
8.2
8.0
8.2
10.0
11.6
10.8
9.9
9.3
8.9
7.7
7.2
6.4
5.7
6.6
7.5
7.7
7.0
6.0
5.2
5.6
7.6
12.1
12.5
11.5
10.3
9.1
7.4
6.6
5.8
5.1
4.7
4.3
10.4
6.8
4.3
4.6
4.7
5.4
4.6
4.4
4.1
4.2
4.4
4.9
4.6
4.8
4.6
5.0
5.0
5.0
4.5
4.8
5.0
4.9
5.3
5.5
5.1
5.1
5.3

������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
10.9
10.1
9.7
8.9
8.0
7.4
7.0
8.1
9.6
10.1
9.6
8.9
8.2
8.3
10.5
16.2
16.7
15.9
14.7
13.8
12.0
10.4
9.6
8.5
7.7
7.2
13.6
9.4
6.9
6.9
6.7
6.8
6.7
6.6
6.8
6.9
6.7
7.1
7.0
7.2
7.0
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.3
7.4
7.4
7.4
7.8
7.9
7.7
7.7
7.8

�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
11.5
10.8
9.8
9.0
8.7
8.1
7.1
6.7
6.3
7.2
8.4
8.8
8.5
7.6
6.8
7.1
9.0
14.6
14.9
14.1
12.4
11.0
9.0
8.0
7.4
6.5
5.6
5.4
11.7
8.3
5.5
5.6
4.5
5.8
4.8
5.4
5.7
6.0
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.8
6.3
6.0
6.0
6.1
4.9
6.0
5.9
5.9
6.7
7.1
6.8
6.6
6.0

�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
6.8
6.3
5.4
4.8
4.7
4.3
4.0
3.5
3.4
4.2
5.3
5.5
5.0
4.7
4.3
4.4
5.7
9.7
10.3
9.4
8.3
7.5
6.0
5.4
5.2
4.6
4.1
3.7
9.0
6.2
4.0
3.9
3.8
3.6
4.0
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.3
3.9
4.1
4.0
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.2
4.1
4.0
4.3
4.2
4.6
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.6

�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
5.6
5.2
4.5
4.0
3.7
3.3
3.0
2.8
2.7
3.3
4.5
4.8
4.2
3.9
3.6
3.6
4.6
8.0
8.4
8.0
7.1
6.4
5.4
4.5
4.1
3.8
3.3
3.0
7.8
5.1
3.1
3.0
2.9
3.3
3.0
2.9
3.2
3.0
3.1
3.1
3.0
3.1
2.8
3.1
3.3
3.1
3.4
3.3
3.1
3.4
3.5
3.4
3.4
3.4
3.6

���������������
���������������
���������������
���������������
���������������
���������������
���������������
���������������
���������������
���������������
���������������
���������������
���������������
���������������
3.2
2.9
2.6
2.4
2.2
2.0
1.8
1.8
1.7
2.3
2.9
3.1
2.7
2.3
2.0
2.0
2.6
4.6
4.7
4.3
4.0
3.7
3.2
2.6
2.5
2.3
2.1
2.1
4.8
3.1
2.0
2.1
2.0
2.1
2.0
1.9
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.2
2.2
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.2
2.1
2.2
2.1
2.4
2.3
2.5
2.3
2.5
2.4

1 Unemployed as percent of civilian labor force in group specified.
2 See footnote 1, Table B–23.
3 Total unemployed, plus all persons marginally attached to the labor force, plus total employed part time for economic reasons, as a percent of the civilian

labor force plus all persons marginally attached to the labor force.
4 Includes persons with bachelor’s, master’s, professional, and doctoral degrees.
Note: Data relate to persons 16 years of age and over, except as noted.
See Note, Table B–22.
Source: Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics).

422 |

Appendix B

Table B–28. Unemployment by duration and reason, 1978–2024
[Thousands of persons, except as noted; monthly data seasonally adjusted 1]
Duration of unemployment
Year or month

1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2023: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct �������������
      Nov ������������
      Dec �������������
2024: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct �������������
      Nov ������������

Unemployment
6,202
6,137
7,637
8,273
10,678
10,717
8,539
8,312
8,237
7,425
6,701
6,528
7,047
8,628
9,613
8,940
7,996
7,404
7,236
6,739
6,210
5,880
5,692
6,801
8,378
8,774
8,149
7,591
7,001
7,078
8,924
14,265
14,825
13,747
12,506
11,460
9,617
8,296
7,751
6,982
6,314
6,001
12,947
8,623
5,996
6,080
5,719
5,962
5,866
5,715
6,117
5,997
5,904
6,340
6,347
6,443
6,262
6,268
6,124
6,458
6,429
6,492
6,649
6,811
7,163
7,115
6,834
6,984
7,145

Less
than 5
weeks
2,865
2,950
3,295
3,449
3,883
3,570
3,350
3,498
3,448
3,246
3,084
3,174
3,265
3,480
3,376
3,262
2,728
2,700
2,633
2,538
2,622
2,568
2,558
2,853
2,893
2,785
2,696
2,667
2,614
2,542
2,932
3,165
2,771
2,677
2,644
2,584
2,471
2,399
2,362
2,270
2,170
2,086
3,708
2,140
2,216
2,112
1,942
2,294
2,279
1,867
2,080
2,065
2,007
2,224
2,053
2,269
2,069
2,191
2,140
2,326
2,189
2,262
2,309
2,128
2,351
2,468
2,146
2,112
2,209

5–14
weeks
1,923
1,946
2,470
2,539
3,311
2,937
2,451
2,509
2,557
2,196
2,007
1,978
2,257
2,791
2,830
2,584
2,408
2,342
2,287
2,138
1,950
1,832
1,815
2,196
2,580
2,612
2,382
2,304
2,121
2,232
2,804
3,828
3,267
2,993
2,866
2,759
2,432
2,302
2,226
2,008
1,876
1,789
4,728
1,981
1,711
1,866
1,795
1,838
1,765
1,920
1,863
1,850
1,741
1,913
2,043
1,836
2,060
1,791
1,848
1,933
1,979
1,987
1,918
2,102
2,141
2,019
1,982
2,080
2,067

15–26
weeks
766
706
1,052
1,122
1,708
1,652
1,104
1,025
1,045
943
801
730
822
1,246
1,453
1,297
1,237
1,085
1,053
995
763
755
669
951
1,369
1,442
1,293
1,130
1,031
1,061
1,427
2,775
2,371
2,061
1,859
1,807
1,497
1,267
1,158
1,017
917
860
2,516
1,164
756
925
929
812
797
748
911
905
956
970
985
1,079
931
1,104
867
974
982
869
955
1,087
1,087
1,167
1,119
1,234
1,232

27
weeks
and
over
648
535
820
1,162
1,776
2,559
1,634
1,280
1,187
1,040
809
646
703
1,111
1,954
1,798
1,623
1,278
1,262
1,067
875
725
649
801
1,535
1,936
1,779
1,490
1,235
1,243
1,761
4,496
6,415
6,016
5,136
4,310
3,218
2,328
2,005
1,687
1,350
1,266
1,995
3,337
1,314
1,177
1,073
1,051
1,050
1,089
1,132
1,117
1,205
1,326
1,303
1,291
1,220
1,245
1,277
1,203
1,246
1,250
1,350
1,516
1,535
1,533
1,630
1,608
1,661

Reason for unemployment

Average Median
(mean)
duration duration
(weeks) 2 (weeks)
11.9
10.8
11.9
13.7
15.6
20.0
18.2
15.6
15.0
14.5
13.5
11.9
12.0
13.7
17.7
18.0
18.8
16.6
16.7
15.8
14.5
13.4
12.6
13.1
16.6
19.2
19.6
18.4
16.8
16.8
17.9
24.4
33.0
39.3
39.4
36.5
33.7
29.2
27.5
25.0
22.7
21.6
16.5
28.7
22.6
20.6
20.4
19.3
19.5
20.8
21.2
20.7
20.6
20.4
21.4
21.6
19.5
22.3
20.8
20.9
21.6
19.9
21.2
20.7
20.6
21.0
22.6
22.9
23.7

5.9
5.4
6.5
6.9
8.7
10.1
7.9
6.8
6.9
6.5
5.9
4.8
5.3
6.8
8.7
8.3
9.2
8.3
8.3
8.0
6.7
6.4
5.9
6.8
9.1
10.1
9.8
8.9
8.3
8.5
9.4
15.1
21.4
21.4
19.3
17.0
14.0
11.6
10.6
10.0
9.3
9.1
9.7
16.5
8.7
8.9
9.8
8.9
8.4
8.7
8.9
8.8
8.9
8.8
9.1
8.6
9.0
9.7
9.6
9.3
9.5
8.7
8.9
9.8
9.4
9.4
9.9
10.0
10.5

Job losers 3
Total
2,585
2,635
3,947
4,267
6,268
6,258
4,421
4,139
4,033
3,566
3,092
2,983
3,387
4,694
5,389
4,848
3,815
3,476
3,370
3,037
2,822
2,622
2,517
3,476
4,607
4,838
4,197
3,667
3,321
3,515
4,789
9,160
9,250
8,106
6,877
6,073
4,878
4,063
3,740
3,434
2,990
2,786
9,770
5,099
2,767
2,870
2,568
2,766
2,884
2,676
2,999
2,790
2,703
2,946
2,869
3,120
3,058
3,058
3,028
3,216
3,042
3,241
3,220
3,176
3,490
3,328
3,233
3,400
3,407

On
layoff
712
851
1,488
1,430
2,127
1,780
1,171
1,157
1,090
943
851
850
1,028
1,292
1,260
1,115
977
1,030
1,021
931
866
848
852
1,067
1,124
1,121
998
933
921
976
1,176
1,630
1,431
1,230
1,183
1,136
1,007
974
966
956
852
823
6,371
1,582
830
811
763
807
781
760
782
781
723
813
813
904
889
917
876
827
779
871
836
813
1,062
872
894
846
780

Other
1,873
1,784
2,459
2,837
4,141
4,478
3,250
2,982
2,943
2,623
2,241
2,133
2,359
3,402
4,129
3,733
2,838
2,446
2,349
2,106
1,957
1,774
1,664
2,409
3,483
3,717
3,199
2,734
2,400
2,539
3,614
7,530
7,819
6,876
5,694
4,937
3,871
3,089
2,774
2,479
2,138
1,963
3,399
3,516
1,936
2,059
1,804
1,959
2,104
1,916
2,218
2,009
1,980
2,132
2,056
2,217
2,169
2,140
2,151
2,389
2,263
2,370
2,384
2,362
2,427
2,456
2,340
2,554
2,627

Job
ReNew
leavers entrants entrants
874
880
891
923
840
830
823
877
1,015
965
983
1,024
1,041
1,004
1,002
976
791
824
774
795
734
783
780
835
866
818
858
872
827
793
896
882
889
956
967
932
824
819
858
778
794
814
683
803
857
822
883
888
841
786
764
796
854
804
797
801
821
833
794
711
823
785
717
752
855
845
818
801
853

1,857
1,806
1,927
2,102
2,384
2,412
2,184
2,256
2,160
1,974
1,809
1,843
1,930
2,139
2,285
2,198
2,786
2,525
2,512
2,338
2,132
2,005
1,961
2,031
2,368
2,477
2,408
2,386
2,237
2,142
2,472
3,187
3,466
3,401
3,345
3,207
2,829
2,535
2,330
2,079
1,928
1,810
1,969
2,204
1,891
1,831
1,799
1,844
1,683
1,778
1,851
1,776
1,868
1,931
2,024
1,869
1,771
1,741
1,834
1,946
1,920
1,929
2,046
2,094
2,160
2,132
2,046
2,154
2,193

885
817
872
981
1,185
1,216
1,110
1,039
1,029
920
816
677
688
792
937
919
604
579
580
569
520
469
434
459
536
641
686
666
616
627
766
1,035
1,220
1,284
1,316
1,247
1,086
879
823
690
602
591
526
518
482
556
526
521
506
519
527
559
534
592
586
603
582
609
550
611
678
574
630
708
650
718
662
602
693

1 Because of independent seasonal adjustment of the various series, detail will not sum to totals.
2 Beginning with 2011, includes unemployment durations of up to 5 years; prior data are for up to 2 years.
3 Beginning with 1994, job losers and persons who completed temporary jobs.

Note: Data relate to persons 16 years of age and over.
See Note, Table B–22.
Source: Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics).

Labor Market Indicators | 423

Table B–29. Employees on nonagricultural payrolls, by major industry, 1978–2024
[Thousands of jobs; monthly data seasonally adjusted]
Private industries

Year or month

1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2023: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct �������������
      Nov ������������
      Dec �������������
2024: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct �������������
      Nov p ����������

Total
nonagricultural
employment

86,826
89,933
90,533
91,297
89,689
90,295
94,548
97,532
99,500
102,116
105,378
108,051
109,527
108,425
108,799
110,931
114,393
117,401
119,828
122,941
126,146
129,228
132,011
132,073
130,634
130,330
131,769
134,033
136,435
137,981
137,224
131,296
130,345
131,914
134,157
136,363
138,939
141,824
144,335
146,607
148,908
150,904
142,186
146,285
152,520
156,051
154,773
155,060
155,206
155,484
155,787
156,027
156,211
156,421
156,667
156,832
157,014
157,304
157,560
157,796
158,106
158,214
158,430
158,548
158,692
158,770
159,025
159,061
159,288

Goods-producing industries
Total
private

71,014
73,865
74,158
75,117
73,706
74,284
78,389
81,000
82,661
84,960
87,838
90,124
91,112
89,879
90,012
91,942
95,118
97,968
100,289
103,278
106,237
108,921
111,222
110,955
109,121
108,747
110,148
112,229
114,462
115,763
114,714
108,741
107,854
109,828
112,237
114,511
117,058
119,795
122,111
124,257
126,454
128,291
120,200
124,311
130,329
133,269
132,283
132,509
132,600
132,831
133,085
133,270
133,418
133,568
133,764
133,862
134,014
134,228
134,424
134,605
134,837
134,945
135,151
135,248
135,347
135,384
135,606
135,604
135,798

Total

24,156
24,997
24,263
24,118
22,550
22,110
23,435
23,585
23,318
23,470
23,909
24,045
23,723
22,588
22,095
22,219
22,774
23,156
23,409
23,886
24,354
24,465
24,649
23,873
22,557
21,816
21,882
22,190
22,530
22,233
21,334
18,557
17,751
18,048
18,420
18,738
19,226
19,610
19,749
20,084
20,704
21,037
20,023
20,350
21,179
21,598
21,494
21,520
21,508
21,541
21,555
21,597
21,604
21,637
21,664
21,654
21,690
21,723
21,753
21,768
21,801
21,798
21,810
21,812
21,833
21,835
21,850
21,806
21,840

Mining
and
logging
902
1,008
1,077
1,180
1,163
997
1,014
974
829
771
770
750
765
739
689
666
659
641
637
654
645
598
599
606
583
572
591
628
684
724
766
694
705
788
848
863
891
813
668
676
727
727
600
560
605
640
631
633
635
639
642
642
644
644
645
644
640
643
641
641
643
638
634
634
635
635
636
638
640

Private service-providing industries
Trade, transportation,
and utilities 1

Manufacturing
Construction

4,322
4,562
4,454
4,304
4,024
4,065
4,501
4,793
4,937
5,090
5,233
5,309
5,263
4,780
4,608
4,779
5,095
5,274
5,536
5,813
6,149
6,545
6,787
6,826
6,716
6,735
6,976
7,336
7,691
7,630
7,162
6,016
5,518
5,533
5,646
5,856
6,151
6,461
6,728
6,969
7,288
7,493
7,257
7,436
7,763
8,018
7,921
7,947
7,941
7,961
7,977
8,010
8,021
8,052
8,065
8,087
8,102
8,120
8,146
8,170
8,207
8,202
8,215
8,233
8,247
8,275
8,301
8,303
8,313

Total
18,932
19,426
18,733
18,634
17,363
17,048
17,920
17,819
17,552
17,609
17,906
17,985
17,695
17,068
16,799
16,774
17,020
17,241
17,237
17,419
17,560
17,322
17,263
16,441
15,259
14,509
14,315
14,227
14,155
13,879
13,406
11,847
11,528
11,726
11,927
12,020
12,185
12,336
12,354
12,439
12,688
12,817
12,167
12,354
12,812
12,940
12,942
12,940
12,932
12,941
12,936
12,945
12,939
12,941
12,954
12,923
12,948
12,960
12,966
12,957
12,951
12,958
12,961
12,945
12,951
12,925
12,913
12,865
12,887

1 Includes wholesale trade, transportation and warehousing, and utilities, not shown separately.

Durable
goods
11,770
12,220
11,679
11,611
10,610
10,326
11,050
11,034
10,795
10,767
10,969
11,004
10,737
10,220
9,946
9,901
10,132
10,373
10,486
10,705
10,911
10,831
10,877
10,336
9,485
8,964
8,925
8,956
8,981
8,808
8,463
7,284
7,064
7,273
7,470
7,548
7,674
7,765
7,714
7,741
7,946
8,039
7,573
7,681
7,968
8,102
8,075
8,075
8,074
8,084
8,085
8,104
8,113
8,116
8,125
8,092
8,129
8,148
8,144
8,141
8,140
8,143
8,142
8,125
8,130
8,100
8,096
8,052
8,078

Nondurable
goods
7,162
7,206
7,054
7,023
6,753
6,722
6,870
6,784
6,757
6,842
6,938
6,981
6,958
6,848
6,853
6,872
6,889
6,868
6,751
6,714
6,649
6,491
6,386
6,105
5,774
5,546
5,390
5,271
5,174
5,071
4,943
4,564
4,464
4,453
4,457
4,472
4,512
4,571
4,640
4,699
4,742
4,778
4,594
4,673
4,844
4,838
4,867
4,865
4,858
4,857
4,851
4,841
4,826
4,825
4,829
4,831
4,819
4,812
4,822
4,816
4,811
4,815
4,819
4,820
4,821
4,825
4,817
4,813
4,809

Total
Total
46,858
48,869
49,895
50,999
51,156
52,174
54,954
57,415
59,343
61,490
63,929
66,079
67,389
67,292
67,917
69,723
72,344
74,813
76,880
79,392
81,883
84,456
86,573
87,082
86,564
86,931
88,266
90,039
91,931
93,530
93,380
90,184
90,104
91,780
93,817
95,773
97,831
100,185
102,362
104,173
105,750
107,254
100,177
103,961
109,150
111,671
110,789
110,989
111,092
111,290
111,530
111,673
111,814
111,931
112,100
112,208
112,324
112,505
112,671
112,837
113,036
113,147
113,341
113,436
113,514
113,549
113,756
113,798
113,958

17,633
18,276
18,387
18,577
18,430
18,642
19,624
20,350
20,765
21,271
21,942
22,477
22,632
22,243
22,085
22,335
23,081
23,782
24,183
24,640
25,122
25,703
26,153
25,908
25,417
25,200
25,440
25,861
26,172
26,520
26,181
24,794
24,523
24,947
25,353
25,735
26,253
26,754
27,124
27,336
27,549
27,662
26,624
27,653
28,632
28,847
28,771
28,851
28,819
28,834
28,875
28,860
28,869
28,840
28,882
28,888
28,843
28,867
28,874
28,928
28,962
29,003
29,037
29,036
29,036
29,039
29,059
29,055
29,032

Retail
trade
9,882
10,185
10,249
10,369
10,377
10,640
11,227
11,738
12,082
12,422
12,812
13,112
13,185
12,896
12,826
13,016
13,485
13,889
14,133
14,377
14,596
14,955
15,262
15,219
15,003
14,894
15,033
15,253
15,325
15,490
15,251
14,488
14,404
14,630
14,801
15,037
15,313
15,559
15,777
15,789
15,728
15,560
14,809
15,253
15,489
15,590
15,518
15,607
15,580
15,586
15,599
15,594
15,599
15,594
15,612
15,613
15,570
15,603
15,619
15,643
15,662
15,676
15,684
15,665
15,661
15,647
15,654
15,650
15,622

Note: Data in Tables B–29 and B–30 are based on reports from employing establishments and relate to full- and part-time wage and salary workers in
nonagricultural establishments who received pay for any part of the pay period that includes the 12th of the month. Not comparable with labor force data
(Tables B–22 through B–28), which include proprietors, self-employed persons, unpaid family workers, and private household workers; which count persons as
See next page for continuation of table.

424 |

Appendix B

Table B–29. Employees on nonagricultural payrolls, by major industry,
1978–2024—Continued
[Thousands of jobs; monthly data seasonally adjusted]
Private industries—Continued

Government

Private service-providing industries—Continued
Year or month
Information
1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2023: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct �������������
      Nov ������������
      Dec �������������
2024: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct �������������
      Nov p ����������

2,287
2,375
2,361
2,382
2,317
2,253
2,398
2,437
2,445
2,507
2,585
2,622
2,688
2,678
2,641
2,668
2,738
2,844
2,940
3,084
3,218
3,419
3,630
3,629
3,395
3,188
3,118
3,061
3,038
3,032
2,984
2,804
2,707
2,674
2,676
2,706
2,726
2,750
2,794
2,814
2,839
2,864
2,721
2,856
3,063
3,027
3,067
3,049
3,054
3,053
3,050
3,043
3,015
2,997
3,008
2,982
2,999
3,012
3,020
3,017
3,019
3,016
3,015
3,015
2,999
2,991
2,992
2,986
2,986

Financial
activities
4,599
4,843
5,025
5,163
5,209
5,334
5,553
5,815
6,128
6,385
6,500
6,562
6,614
6,561
6,559
6,742
6,910
6,866
7,018
7,255
7,566
7,753
7,783
7,900
7,956
8,078
8,105
8,197
8,367
8,348
8,206
7,838
7,695
7,697
7,783
7,886
7,977
8,123
8,287
8,451
8,590
8,754
8,704
8,806
9,062
9,197
9,145
9,146
9,150
9,179
9,192
9,201
9,219
9,223
9,223
9,223
9,227
9,233
9,229
9,222
9,226
9,223
9,235
9,248
9,244
9,251
9,257
9,263
9,280

Professional and
business
services
6,997
7,339
7,571
7,809
7,875
8,065
8,493
8,900
9,241
9,639
10,121
10,588
10,882
10,750
11,007
11,534
12,216
12,889
13,510
14,386
15,200
16,013
16,725
16,537
16,041
16,057
16,470
17,034
17,652
18,034
17,830
16,674
16,824
17,433
18,037
18,623
19,174
19,747
20,168
20,563
21,008
21,334
20,376
21,386
22,537
22,840
22,771
22,779
22,797
22,827
22,876
22,883
22,866
22,865
22,864
22,859
22,869
22,882
22,930
22,936
22,953
22,936
22,991
22,980
22,976
22,929
22,951
22,928
22,954

Education
and
health
services
6,427
6,768
7,077
7,364
7,526
7,781
8,211
8,679
9,086
9,543
10,096
10,652
11,024
11,556
11,948
12,362
12,872
13,360
13,761
14,185
14,570
14,939
15,252
15,814
16,398
16,835
17,230
17,676
18,154
18,676
19,228
19,630
19,975
20,318
20,769
21,086
21,439
22,029
22,639
23,188
23,638
24,163
23,275
23,652
24,336
25,342
24,906
24,968
25,030
25,109
25,200
25,277
25,386
25,479
25,560
25,637
25,747
25,831
25,931
26,011
26,087
26,185
26,254
26,336
26,403
26,470
26,561
26,628
26,707

Leisure
and
hospitality
6,411
6,631
6,721
6,840
6,874
7,078
7,489
7,869
8,156
8,446
8,778
9,062
9,288
9,256
9,437
9,732
10,100
10,501
10,777
11,018
11,232
11,543
11,862
12,036
11,986
12,173
12,493
12,816
13,110
13,427
13,436
13,077
13,049
13,353
13,768
14,254
14,696
15,160
15,660
16,051
16,295
16,586
13,148
14,151
15,827
16,593
16,345
16,412
16,447
16,489
16,528
16,588
16,629
16,681
16,708
16,765
16,775
16,816
16,813
16,839
16,893
16,884
16,902
16,906
16,944
16,953
17,014
17,016
17,069

Other
services
2,505
2,637
2,755
2,865
2,924
3,021
3,186
3,366
3,523
3,699
3,907
4,116
4,261
4,249
4,240
4,350
4,428
4,572
4,690
4,825
4,976
5,087
5,168
5,258
5,372
5,401
5,409
5,395
5,438
5,494
5,515
5,367
5,330
5,360
5,430
5,483
5,567
5,622
5,691
5,770
5,831
5,891
5,329
5,457
5,694
5,826
5,784
5,784
5,795
5,799
5,809
5,821
5,830
5,846
5,855
5,854
5,864
5,864
5,874
5,884
5,896
5,900
5,907
5,915
5,912
5,916
5,922
5,922
5,930

Total

15,812
16,068
16,375
16,180
15,982
16,011
16,159
16,533
16,838
17,156
17,540
17,927
18,415
18,545
18,787
18,989
19,275
19,432
19,539
19,664
19,909
20,307
20,790
21,118
21,513
21,583
21,621
21,804
21,974
22,218
22,509
22,555
22,490
22,086
21,920
21,853
21,882
22,029
22,224
22,350
22,455
22,613
21,986
21,973
22,191
22,782
22,490
22,551
22,606
22,653
22,702
22,757
22,793
22,853
22,903
22,970
23,000
23,076
23,136
23,191
23,269
23,269
23,279
23,300
23,345
23,386
23,419
23,457
23,490

Federal

2,893
2,894
3,000
2,922
2,884
2,915
2,943
3,014
3,044
3,089
3,124
3,136
3,196
3,110
3,111
3,063
3,018
2,949
2,877
2,806
2,772
2,769
2,865
2,764
2,766
2,761
2,730
2,732
2,732
2,734
2,762
2,832
2,977
2,859
2,820
2,769
2,733
2,757
2,795
2,805
2,800
2,831
2,930
2,886
2,867
2,925
2,882
2,892
2,900
2,908
2,914
2,920
2,928
2,939
2,945
2,953
2,952
2,961
2,974
2,981
2,993
2,993
2,994
2,996
2,996
2,997
3,001
3,003
3,001

State

3,474
3,541
3,610
3,640
3,640
3,662
3,734
3,832
3,893
3,967
4,076
4,182
4,305
4,355
4,408
4,488
4,576
4,635
4,606
4,582
4,612
4,709
4,786
4,905
5,029
5,002
4,982
5,032
5,075
5,122
5,177
5,169
5,137
5,078
5,055
5,046
5,050
5,077
5,110
5,165
5,173
5,206
5,135
5,156
5,111
5,304
5,206
5,229
5,249
5,263
5,280
5,301
5,301
5,329
5,346
5,375
5,383
5,404
5,420
5,434
5,444
5,448
5,429
5,436
5,459
5,473
5,495
5,514
5,534

Local

9,446
9,633
9,765
9,619
9,458
9,434
9,482
9,687
9,901
10,100
10,339
10,609
10,914
11,081
11,267
11,438
11,682
11,849
12,056
12,276
12,525
12,829
13,139
13,449
13,718
13,820
13,909
14,041
14,167
14,362
14,571
14,554
14,376
14,150
14,045
14,037
14,098
14,195
14,319
14,379
14,481
14,576
13,921
13,931
14,213
14,552
14,402
14,430
14,457
14,482
14,508
14,536
14,564
14,585
14,612
14,642
14,665
14,711
14,742
14,776
14,832
14,828
14,856
14,868
14,890
14,916
14,923
14,940
14,955

Note (cont’d): employed when they are not at work because of industrial disputes, bad weather, etc., even if they are not paid for the time off; which are
based on a sample of the working-age population; and which count persons only once—as employed, unemployed, or not in the labor force. In the data shown
here, persons who work at more than one job are counted each time they appear on a payroll.
Establishment data for employment, hours, and earnings are classified based on the 2022 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).
For further description and details see Employment and Earnings.
Source: Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics).

Labor Market Indicators | 425

Table B–30. Hours and earnings in private nonagricultural industries, 1978–2024
[Monthly data seasonally adjusted]
Production and nonsupervisory employees 1

All employees

Year or month Average
weekly
hours

1978 �����������������
1979 �����������������
1980 �����������������
1981 �����������������
1982 �����������������
1983 �����������������
1984 �����������������
1985 �����������������
1986 �����������������
1987 �����������������
1988 �����������������
1989 �����������������
1990 �����������������
1991 �����������������
1992 �����������������
1993 �����������������
1994 �����������������
1995 �����������������
1996 �����������������
1997 �����������������
1998 �����������������
1999 �����������������
2000 �����������������
2001 �����������������
2002 �����������������
2003 �����������������
2004 �����������������
2005 �����������������
2006 �����������������
2007 �����������������
2008 �����������������
2009 �����������������
2010 �����������������
2011 �����������������
2012 �����������������
2013 �����������������
2014 �����������������
2015 �����������������
2016 �����������������
2017 �����������������
2018 �����������������
2019 �����������������
2020 �����������������
2021 �����������������
2022 �����������������
2023 �����������������
2023: Jan ��������
      Feb ��������
      Mar �������
      Apr ��������
      May �������
      June ������
      July �������
      Aug �������
      Sept ������
      Oct ��������
      Nov �������
      Dec ��������
2024: Jan ��������
      Feb ��������
      Mar �������
      Apr ��������
      May �������
      June ������
      July �������
      Aug �������
      Sept ������
      Oct ��������
      Nov p �����

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34.4
34.3
33.8
34.1
34.3
34.5
34.4
34.5
34.5
34.4
34.4
34.5
34.4
34.6
34.7
34.5
34.4
34.6
34.5
34.4
34.3
34.4
34.4
34.3
34.4
34.4
34.3
34.4
34.4
34.2
34.3
34.4
34.3
34.3
34.3
34.2
34.3
34.3
34.2
34.3

Average weekly earnings
Average hourly
earnings
Percent
change
Average
Percent change
Level
Level
from year earlier weekly
from year earlier
hours
Current 1982–84 Current 1982–84 Current 1982–84
Current 1982–84 Current 1982–84 Current 1982–84
dollars dollars 2 dollars dollars 2 dollars dollars 2
dollars dollars 3 dollars dollars 3 dollars dollars 3
Average hourly
earnings

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$20.92
21.56
22.17
22.56
23.03
23.49
23.95
24.46
25.02
25.64
26.32
27.11
27.99
29.35
30.60
32.26
33.73
33.07
33.15
33.31
33.44
33.54
33.70
33.84
33.91
34.01
34.10
34.23
34.34
34.51
34.56
34.69
34.75
34.88
34.99
35.07
35.22
35.33
35.48
35.61

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$10.09
10.01
10.33
10.35
10.24
10.23
10.28
10.33
10.56
10.68
10.74
10.80
10.95
11.34
11.29
11.02
11.07
11.01
10.99
11.04
11.04
11.06
11.09
11.11
11.07
11.07
11.09
11.11
11.12
11.14
11.11
11.11
11.09
11.14
11.18
11.19
11.21
11.23
11.25
11.25

Average weekly earnings

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$719.74
738.96
749.92
769.57
790.79
809.43
825.08
844.77
864.10
881.09
906.19
936.37
963.06
1,014.38
1,063.08
1,114.30
1,160.96
1,144.22
1,143.68
1,145.86
1,146.99
1,153.78
1,159.28
1,160.71
1,166.50
1,169.94
1,169.63
1,177.51
1,181.30
1,180.24
1,185.41
1,193.34
1,191.93
1,196.38
1,200.16
1,199.39
1,208.05
1,211.82
1,213.42
1,221.42

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$347.13
343.22
349.55
352.92
351.56
352.55
354.18
356.84
364.57
367.11
369.69
372.90
376.70
391.94
392.32
380.76
381.01
380.95
379.32
379.75
378.50
380.33
381.34
381.03
380.98
380.73
380.33
382.28
382.62
381.11
381.09
382.20
380.56
381.96
383.38
382.54
384.58
385.09
384.66
385.99

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2.7
1.5
2.6
2.8
2.4
1.9
2.4
2.3
2.0
2.8
3.3
2.9
5.3
4.8
4.8
4.2
4.9
4.1
3.7
3.5
3.9
4.1
3.8
4.2
3.9
3.4
4.0
4.3
3.1
3.6
4.1
3.9
3.7
3.5
3.3
3.6
3.6
3.7
3.7

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–1.1
1.8
1.0
–.4
.3
.5
.8
2.2
.7
.7
.9
1.0
4.0
.1
–2.9
.1
–1.4
–1.7
–1.2
–1.4
–.2
1.0
.5
.5
.2
.1
.8
.9
.0
.5
.6
.5
.4
.5
.4
.9
1.1
1.1
1.0

35.8
35.6
35.2
35.2
34.7
34.9
35.1
34.9
34.7
34.7
34.6
34.5
34.3
34.1
34.2
34.3
34.5
34.3
34.3
34.5
34.5
34.3
34.3
33.9
33.9
33.7
33.7
33.8
33.9
33.8
33.6
33.1
33.4
33.6
33.7
33.7
33.7
33.7
33.6
33.7
33.8
33.6
33.9
34.2
34.0
33.9
34.0
33.9
33.9
33.8
33.8
33.8
33.8
33.8
33.8
33.8
33.7
33.8
33.6
33.7
33.8
33.7
33.7
33.7
33.7
33.7
33.7
33.7
33.7

$5.88
6.34
6.84
7.43
7.86
8.20
8.49
8.73
8.92
9.14
9.44
9.81
10.20
10.51
10.77
11.04
11.33
11.65
12.04
12.51
13.01
13.48
14.01
14.54
14.96
15.36
15.68
16.11
16.75
17.41
18.06
18.60
19.04
19.43
19.73
20.13
20.60
21.03
21.53
22.05
22.71
23.51
24.68
25.90
27.56
28.94
28.31
28.42
28.58
28.68
28.79
28.90
29.03
29.09
29.18
29.29
29.42
29.51
29.64
29.70
29.79
29.83
29.95
30.07
30.16
30.26
30.36
30.48
30.57

$8.96
8.67
8.25
8.13
8.11
8.22
8.22
8.17
8.21
8.12
8.07
8.00
7.91
7.83
7.79
7.77
7.78
7.78
7.81
7.94
8.15
8.26
8.29
8.38
8.50
8.54
8.50
8.43
8.50
8.59
8.56
8.87
8.90
8.77
8.72
8.78
8.85
9.07
9.20
9.22
9.26
9.43
9.78
9.75
9.57
9.68
9.60
9.61
9.65
9.65
9.68
9.69
9.72
9.68
9.67
9.70
9.74
9.74
9.76
9.73
9.72
9.70
9.75
9.80
9.81
9.83
9.85
9.86
9.87

$210.17 $320.38
225.46 308.43
240.83 290.51
261.29 285.88
272.98 281.71
286.34 286.91
298.08 288.56
304.37 284.72
309.69 285.17
317.33 282.07
326.50 279.06
338.42 276.04
349.63 271.03
358.46 266.91
368.17 266.40
378.80 266.57
391.11 268.62
399.93 266.98
413.17 268.12
431.67 273.90
448.47 280.82
463.07 283.74
480.90 284.72
493.53 284.46
506.48 287.94
517.65 287.90
528.65 286.53
543.91 284.77
567.00 287.67
589.09 290.53
607.10 287.65
615.82 293.77
635.86 297.18
652.75 294.60
665.56 294.20
677.62 295.49
694.74 298.47
708.73 305.74
723.20 308.96
742.42 310.57
767.01 312.88
790.64 317.24
837.39 331.97
886.54 333.90
937.44 325.52
979.95 327.75
962.54 326.40
963.44 325.62
968.86 327.28
969.38 326.01
973.10 327.05
976.82 327.56
981.21 328.46
983.24 327.11
986.28 326.95
990.00 327.99
991.45 328.07
997.44 329.26
995.90 328.09
1,000.89 328.00
1,006.90 328.49
1,005.27 326.92
1,009.32 328.42
1,013.36 330.14
1,016.39 330.62
1,019.76 331.25
1,023.13 331.89
1,027.18 332.41
1,030.21 332.45

7.6
7.3
6.8
8.5
4.5
4.9
4.1
2.1
1.7
2.5
2.9
3.7
3.3
2.5
2.7
2.9
3.2
2.3
3.3
4.5
3.9
3.3
3.9
2.6
2.6
2.2
2.1
2.9
4.2
3.9
3.1
1.4
3.3
2.7
2.0
1.8
2.5
2.0
2.0
2.7
3.3
3.1
5.9
5.9
5.7
4.5
5.6
4.5
4.5
4.2
4.2
4.1
4.3
4.2
4.1
4.0
4.0
4.5
3.5
3.9
3.9
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.6
3.7
3.7
3.8
3.9

–0.1
–3.7
–5.8
–1.6
–1.5
1.8
.6
–1.3
.2
–1.1
–1.1
–1.1
–1.8
–1.5
–.2
.1
.8
–.6
.4
2.2
2.5
1.0
.3
–.1
1.2
.0
–.5
–.6
1.0
1.0
–1.0
2.1
1.2
–.9
–.1
.4
1.0
2.4
1.1
.5
.7
1.4
4.6
.6
–2.5
.7
–.6
–1.1
.0
–.4
.5
1.5
1.5
.7
.5
.9
1.0
1.2
.5
.7
.4
.3
.4
.8
.7
1.3
1.5
1.3
1.3

1 Production employees in goods-producing industries and nonsupervisory employees in service-providing industries. These groups account for four-fifths of
the total employment on private nonfarm payrolls.
2 Current dollars divided by the consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U) on a 1982–84=100 base.
3 Current dollars divided by the consumer price index for urban wage earners and clerical workers (CPI-W) on a 1982–84=100 base.
Note: See Note, Table B–29.
Source: Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics).

426 |

Appendix B

Table B–31. Employment cost index, private industry, 2006–2024
Total private
Year and month

Total
compensation

Wages
and
salaries

Service-providing 1

Goods-producing
Total
Benefits 2 compensation

Wages
and
salaries

Total
Benefits 2 compensation

Wages
and
salaries

Manufacturing

Total
Benefits 2 compensation

Wages
and
salaries

Benefits 2

Indexes on NAICS basis, December 2005=100; not seasonally adjusted
December:
2006 ����������
2007 ����������
2008 ����������
2009 ����������
2010 ����������
2011 ����������
2012 ����������
2013 ����������
2014 ����������
2015 ����������
2016 ����������
2017 ����������
2018 ����������
2019 ����������
2020 ����������
2021 ����������
2022 ����������
2023 ����������
2024: Mar �������
      June ������
      Sept ������

103.2
106.3
108.9
110.2
112.5
115.0
117.1
119.4
122.2
124.5
127.2
130.5
134.4
138.0
141.6
147.8
155.3
161.6
163.8
165.4
166.4

103.2
106.6
109.4
110.8
112.8
114.6
116.6
119.0
121.6
124.2
127.1
130.6
134.7
138.7
142.6
149.7
157.4
164.1
166.3
167.9
169.1

103.1
105.6
107.7
108.7
111.9
115.9
118.2
120.5
123.5
125.1
127.3
130.2
133.6
136.2
139.1
143.2
150.1
155.5
157.9
159.4
160.1

2023: Mar �������
      June ������
      Sept ������
      Dec ��������
2024: Mar �������
      June ������
      Sept ������

157.3
158.9
160.4
161.9
163.7
165.1
166.3

159.4
161.1
162.7
164.4
166.2
167.6
168.9

152.3
153.7
155.0
156.1
157.7
159.0
160.1

102.5
105.0
107.5
108.6
111.1
113.8
115.6
117.7
120.3
123.2
125.8
128.9
131.9
135.8
138.9
144.0
150.6
156.3
158.3
159.5
160.5

102.9
106.0
109.0
110.0
111.6
113.5
115.4
117.6
120.1
123.2
126.2
129.3
133.0
137.5
141.0
146.6
153.9
160.2
162.4
163.3
164.5

101.7
103.2
104.7
105.8
110.1
114.4
116.0
118.0
120.7
123.1
124.9
128.0
129.6
132.5
134.9
138.7
143.9
148.6
150.3
151.9
152.4

103.4
106.7
109.4
110.8
113.0
115.3
117.6
120.0
122.8
124.9
127.7
131.0
135.2
138.7
142.4
148.9
156.6
163.1
165.4
167.0
168.1

103.3
106.8
109.6
111.1
113.1
114.9
117.0
119.4
122.1
124.5
127.4
131.0
135.2
139.1
143.1
150.5
158.3
165.2
167.4
169.0
170.2

103.7
106.6
108.9
109.9
112.6
116.4
119.1
121.5
124.6
125.9
128.3
131.2
135.1
137.6
140.6
144.8
152.3
157.9
160.4
161.9
162.7

101.8
103.8
105.9
107.0
110.0
113.1
114.9
117.0
119.8
122.8
125.5
128.9
131.6
135.3
138.5
143.5
150.3
155.8
158.1
159.6
160.4

102.3
104.9
107.7
108.9
110.7
112.7
114.8
117.2
119.8
123.0
126.2
129.3
132.9
137.1
140.7
146.4
153.9
159.7
162.3
163.7
164.8

100.8
101.7
102.5
103.6
108.8
113.9
115.0
116.6
119.8
122.5
124.3
128.0
129.1
131.9
134.3
138.2
143.5
148.3
150.1
151.9
152.3

152.1
153.5
154.7
156.1
158.0
159.4
160.6

155.9
157.3
158.5
160.1
162.2
163.4
164.9

144.9
146.2
147.5
148.6
149.9
151.6
152.5

3.7
2.8
2.2
.9
2.5
3.4
2.3
2.0
2.6
1.0
1.9
2.3
3.0
1.9
2.2
3.0
5.2
3.7
3.6
3.5
3.4

1.8
2.0
2.0
1.0
2.8
2.8
1.6
1.8
2.4
2.5
2.2
2.7
2.1
2.8
2.4
3.6
4.7
3.7
3.8
3.8
3.8

2.3
2.5
2.7
1.1
1.7
1.8
1.9
2.1
2.2
2.7
2.6
2.5
2.8
3.2
2.6
4.1
5.1
3.8
4.0
3.9
4.0

0.8
.9
.8
1.1
5.0
4.7
1.0
1.4
2.7
2.3
1.5
3.0
.9
2.2
1.8
2.9
3.8
3.3
3.4
3.6
3.3

1.2
1.0
.8
.8
1.1
.8
.7

1.0
.9
.8
.9
1.2
.9
.8

1.1
.9
.8
1.0
1.3
.7
.9

0.8
.9
.9
.7
.9
1.1
.6

Indexes on NAICS basis, December 2005=100; seasonally adjusted
152.5
153.7
155.1
156.6
158.3
159.1
160.6

156.0
157.3
158.7
160.4
162.4
162.8
164.6

145.3
146.6
147.9
148.9
150.2
151.6
152.4

158.6
160.3
161.9
163.4
165.2
166.7
167.8

160.3
162.1
163.8
165.4
167.2
168.8
170.0

154.6
156.1
157.3
158.5
160.2
161.5
162.6

Percent change from 12 months earlier, not seasonally adjusted
December:
2006 ����������
2007 ����������
2008 ����������
2009 ����������
2010 ����������
2011 ����������
2012 ����������
2013 ����������
2014 ����������
2015 ����������
2016 ����������
2017 ����������
2018 ����������
2019 ����������
2020 ����������
2021 ����������
2022 ����������
2023 ����������
2024: Mar �������
      June ������
      Sept ������

3.2
3.0
2.4
1.2
2.1
2.2
1.8
2.0
2.3
1.9
2.2
2.6
3.0
2.7
2.6
4.4
5.1
4.1
4.1
3.9
3.6

3.2
3.3
2.6
1.3
1.8
1.6
1.7
2.1
2.2
2.1
2.3
2.8
3.1
3.0
2.8
5.0
5.1
4.3
4.3
4.1
3.8

3.1
2.4
2.0
.9
2.9
3.6
2.0
1.9
2.5
1.3
1.8
2.3
2.6
1.9
2.1
2.9
4.8
3.6
3.6
3.5
3.3

2.5
2.4
2.4
1.0
2.3
2.4
1.6
1.8
2.2
2.4
2.1
2.5
2.3
3.0
2.3
3.7
4.6
3.8
3.8
3.5
3.5

2.9
3.0
2.8
.9
1.5
1.7
1.7
1.9
2.1
2.6
2.4
2.5
2.9
3.4
2.5
4.0
5.0
4.1
4.1
3.6
3.7

1.7
1.5
1.5
1.1
4.1
3.9
1.4
1.7
2.3
2.0
1.5
2.5
1.3
2.2
1.8
2.8
3.7
3.3
3.4
3.4
3.0

3.4
3.2
2.5
1.3
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.3
1.7
2.2
2.6
3.2
2.6
2.7
4.6
5.2
4.2
4.2
4.0
3.7

3.3
3.4
2.6
1.4
1.8
1.6
1.8
2.1
2.3
2.0
2.3
2.8
3.2
2.9
2.9
5.2
5.2
4.4
4.4
4.1
3.8

Percent change from 3 months earlier, seasonally adjusted
2023: Mar �������
      June ������
      Sept ������
      Dec ��������
2024: Mar �������
      June ������
      Sept ������

1.2
1.0
.9
.9
1.1
.9
.7

1.1
1.1
1.0
1.0
1.1
.8
.8

1.1
.9
.8
.7
1.0
.8
.7

1.1
.8
.9
1.0
1.1
.5
.9

1.2
.8
.9
1.1
1.2
.2
1.1

0.8
.9
.9
.7
.9
.9
.5

1.1
1.1
1.0
.9
1.1
.9
.7

1.1
1.1
1.0
1.0
1.1
1.0
.7

1 On Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) basis, data are for service-producing industries.
2 Employer costs for employee benefits.

Note: Changes effective with the release of March 2006 data (in April 2006) include changing industry classification to NAICS from SIC and rebasing data to
December 2005=100. Historical SIC data are available through December 2005.
Data exclude farm and household workers.
Source: Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics).

Labor Market Indicators | 427

Table B–32. Productivity and related data, business and nonfarm business sectors,
1973–2024
[Index numbers, 2017=100; quarterly data seasonally adjusted]
Labor productivity
(output per hour)
Year or quarter

1973 �����������������
1974 �����������������
1975 �����������������
1976 �����������������
1977 �����������������
1978 �����������������
1979 �����������������
1980 �����������������
1981 �����������������
1982 �����������������
1983 �����������������
1984 �����������������
1985 �����������������
1986 �����������������
1987 �����������������
1988 �����������������
1989 �����������������
1990 �����������������
1991 �����������������
1992 �����������������
1993 �����������������
1994 �����������������
1995 �����������������
1996 �����������������
1997 �����������������
1998 �����������������
1999 �����������������
2000 �����������������
2001 �����������������
2002 �����������������
2003 �����������������
2004 �����������������
2005 �����������������
2006 �����������������
2007 �����������������
2008 �����������������
2009 �����������������
2010 �����������������
2011 �����������������
2012 �����������������
2013 �����������������
2014 �����������������
2015 �����������������
2016 �����������������
2017 �����������������
2018 �����������������
2019 �����������������
2020 �����������������
2021 �����������������
2022 �����������������
2023 �����������������
2021: I �������������
      II ������������
      III �����������
      IV �����������
2022: I �������������
      II ������������
      III �����������
      IV �����������
2023: I �������������
      II ������������
      III �����������
      IV �����������
2024: I �������������
      II ������������
      III p ���������

Output 1

Hours of
all persons 2

Compensation
per hour 3

Real
compensation
per hour 4

Unit labor
costs

Value-added output
price deflator 5

Nonfarm
Nonfarm
Nonfarm
Nonfarm
Nonfarm
Business Nonfarm
Business Nonfarm
business Business business Business business Business business Business business Business business
sector business
sector sector sector sector sector sector sector sector sector sector sector sector sector
44.524
43.753
45.273
46.780
47.633
48.202
48.260
48.240
49.266
48.987
50.655
52.101
53.290
54.790
55.086
55.915
56.554
57.676
58.593
61.314
61.372
61.723
62.154
63.669
65.043
67.266
70.004
72.206
74.108
77.244
80.188
82.706
84.553
85.388
86.788
87.977
91.572
94.524
94.352
95.009
96.028
96.760
97.927
98.689
100.000
101.477
103.652
109.073
111.440
109.874
111.741
111.356
111.503
110.912
111.752
110.209
109.446
109.405
110.279
110.346
111.333
112.351
113.258
113.501
114.122
114.608

45.895
45.132
46.344
47.957
48.787
49.483
49.377
49.355
50.075
49.663
51.701
52.855
53.772
55.370
55.672
56.588
57.088
58.055
59.004
61.641
61.710
62.136
62.806
64.121
65.362
67.551
70.196
72.292
74.153
77.331
80.184
82.567
84.372
85.203
86.680
87.928
91.459
94.443
94.315
95.083
95.797
96.690
97.934
98.687
100.000
101.371
103.627
109.178
111.396
109.734
111.544
111.460
111.503
110.813
111.580
110.148
109.321
109.269
110.041
110.130
111.135
112.180
113.053
113.250
113.845
114.478

27.397
26.979
26.723
28.529
30.162
32.086
33.226
32.925
33.886
32.913
34.658
37.732
39.491
40.926
42.392
44.208
45.900
46.635
46.351
48.313
49.691
52.087
53.688
56.181
59.130
62.383
65.984
68.945
69.359
70.545
72.768
75.964
78.948
81.535
83.268
82.533
79.524
82.078
83.709
86.413
88.793
91.754
95.182
97.148
100.000
103.445
106.529
103.636
111.508
114.263
117.580
108.937
110.919
111.845
114.329
113.727
113.615
114.337
115.371
116.082
116.815
118.217
119.207
119.614
120.581
121.537

27.508
27.097
26.653
28.560
30.198
32.225
33.319
33.038
33.790
32.756
34.791
37.731
39.395
40.882
42.365
44.292
45.915
46.606
46.316
48.196
49.682
51.970
53.756
56.171
59.071
62.381
66.009
68.896
69.354
70.524
72.711
75.850
78.818
81.446
83.298
82.557
79.405
82.004
83.697
86.490
88.762
91.783
95.166
97.089
100.000
103.441
106.630
103.714
111.581
114.373
117.680
108.985
111.001
111.936
114.404
113.819
113.723
114.457
115.491
116.200
116.888
118.320
119.310
119.700
120.602
121.629

61.534
61.662
59.026
60.985
63.322
66.566
68.848
68.253
68.781
67.187
68.419
72.421
74.106
74.696
76.955
79.062
81.162
80.857
79.106
78.797
80.967
84.389
86.379
88.239
90.909
92.740
94.257
95.484
93.592
91.327
90.747
91.848
93.370
95.487
95.944
93.812
86.844
86.833
88.720
90.952
92.466
94.827
97.197
98.438
100.000
101.939
102.776
95.015
100.061
103.995
105.225
97.827
99.476
100.841
102.306
103.193
103.809
104.508
104.617
105.198
104.924
105.221
105.253
105.386
105.659
106.046

59.936
60.040
57.511
59.553
61.898
65.124
67.479
66.940
67.479
65.956
67.292
71.386
73.263
73.834
76.098
78.272
80.429
80.279
78.496
78.188
80.509
83.639
85.590
87.602
90.375
92.346
94.035
95.303
93.528
91.198
90.681
91.865
93.417
95.591
96.099
93.892
86.820
86.829
88.742
90.962
92.656
94.925
97.174
98.381
100.000
102.042
102.898
94.995
100.166
104.228
105.501
97.779
99.550
101.013
102.531
103.333
104.026
104.748
104.953
105.512
105.177
105.473
105.535
105.696
105.936
106.247

13.148
14.372
15.897
17.167
18.541
20.101
22.042
24.400
26.692
28.668
29.927
31.251
32.843
34.697
35.997
37.906
39.045
41.480
43.399
46.066
46.739
47.079
48.218
49.936
51.938
55.001
57.657
61.670
64.481
65.916
68.392
71.588
74.177
77.010
80.450
82.943
83.935
85.409
87.058
89.177
90.468
92.688
95.372
96.643
100.000
103.388
107.332
116.052
122.030
126.535
131.510
119.110
121.116
122.837
124.661
125.080
125.406
127.594
127.834
129.029
130.920
132.551
133.942
136.954
137.267
138.185

13.260
14.508
16.024
17.271
18.688
20.289
22.217
24.600
26.959
28.924
30.214
31.515
33.049
34.952
36.269
38.130
39.235
41.583
43.557
46.264
46.830
47.287
48.458
50.127
52.079
55.091
57.645
61.688
64.367
65.846
68.299
71.411
74.018
76.853
80.188
82.750
83.786
85.319
87.006
89.051
90.167
92.538
95.397
96.684
100.000
103.361
107.312
116.150
122.028
126.313
131.250
119.277
121.167
122.766
124.500
124.975
125.181
127.378
127.490
128.699
130.707
132.335
133.668
136.668
137.013
138.048

66.271
65.239
66.130
67.520
68.473
69.370
69.481
69.167
69.138
70.027
70.109
70.285
71.457
74.235
74.495
75.664
74.710
75.634
76.350
79.073
78.253
77.207
77.214
77.887
79.294
82.847
85.068
87.998
89.459
90.029
91.333
93.116
93.317
93.834
95.317
94.630
96.097
96.225
95.052
95.371
95.309
96.047
98.657
98.698
100.000
100.923
102.905
109.805
110.139
105.656
105.459
110.578
110.244
110.058
109.381
107.343
105.054
105.513
104.671
104.674
105.425
105.831
106.236
107.618
107.117
107.506

66.834
65.860
66.655
67.929
69.015
70.020
70.034
69.737
69.830
70.652
70.781
70.880
71.906
74.782
75.058
76.113
75.074
75.821
76.629
79.413
78.405
77.550
77.597
78.186
79.509
82.982
85.051
88.025
89.300
89.934
91.209
92.886
93.116
93.643
95.007
94.411
95.927
96.124
94.994
95.236
94.992
95.892
98.684
98.740
100.000
100.897
102.885
109.897
110.137
105.470
105.251
110.733
110.290
109.995
109.239
107.253
104.865
105.334
104.389
104.406
105.253
105.659
106.018
107.394
106.919
107.399

29.530
32.847
35.114
36.697
38.926
41.701
45.674
50.580
54.179
58.521
59.080
59.982
61.630
63.327
65.346
67.791
69.040
71.920
74.068
75.131
76.157
76.274
77.579
78.430
79.852
81.766
82.361
85.409
87.010
85.335
85.290
86.556
87.728
90.188
92.697
94.278
91.660
90.357
92.270
93.861
94.210
95.792
97.391
97.927
100.000
101.883
103.551
106.399
109.503
115.164
117.691
106.963
108.621
110.751
111.551
113.494
114.582
116.625
115.919
116.931
117.593
117.979
118.263
120.663
120.281
120.572

28.891
32.147
34.576
36.013
38.306
41.002
44.996
49.844
53.838
58.240
58.439
59.626
61.462
63.125
65.147
67.383
68.727
71.626
73.821
75.053
75.887
76.103
77.154
78.176
79.678
81.555
82.120
85.333
86.803
85.149
85.178
86.488
87.727
90.200
92.511
94.112
91.611
90.339
92.250
93.656
94.123
95.706
97.410
97.971
100.000
101.963
103.555
106.386
109.544
115.108
117.667
107.013
108.667
110.786
111.579
113.461
114.507
116.573
115.857
116.861
117.611
117.966
118.235
120.679
120.351
120.589

26.724
29.341
32.178
33.857
35.862
38.342
41.550
45.243
49.415
52.231
54.106
55.636
57.106
57.878
58.970
60.847
63.087
65.182
67.070
68.158
69.732
70.974
72.240
73.376
74.462
74.660
75.075
76.453
77.750
78.325
79.490
81.489
84.018
86.390
88.394
89.700
89.709
90.818
92.862
94.538
95.903
97.307
97.743
98.394
100.000
102.071
103.467
103.814
109.084
117.766
121.799
106.201
108.107
109.876
112.006
114.624
117.618
118.861
119.925
121.007
121.407
122.254
122.502
123.183
123.856
124.253

25.717
28.384
31.408
33.120
35.181
37.471
40.603
44.461
48.721
51.728
53.531
55.011
56.689
57.494
58.571
60.365
62.569
64.706
66.723
67.845
69.429
70.714
71.965
72.963
74.227
74.496
75.017
76.473
77.715
78.364
79.439
81.299
84.034
86.479
88.235
89.543
89.814
90.787
92.526
94.177
95.432
96.958
97.637
98.471
100.000
102.138
103.561
103.933
108.923
117.327
121.560
106.209
107.874
109.612
111.848
114.323
117.165
118.376
119.407
120.577
121.152
122.051
122.432
123.206
123.911
124.239

1 Output refers to real gross domestic product in the sector.
2 Hours at work of all persons engaged in sector, including hours of employees, proprietors, and unpaid family workers. Estimates based primarily on
establishment data.
3 Wages and salaries of employees plus employers’ contributions for social insurance and private benefit plans. Also includes an estimate of wages,
salaries, and supplemental payments for the self-employed.
4 Hourly compensation divided by consumer price series. The trend for 1978-2023 is based on the consumer price index retroactive series (CPI-U-RS). The
change for prior years and recent quarters is based on the consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U).
5 Current dollar output divided by the output index.
Source: Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics).

428 |

Appendix B

Table B–33. Changes in productivity and related data, business and nonfarm business
sectors, 1973–2024
[Percent change from preceding period; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]
Labor productivity
(output per hour)
Year or quarter

1973 �����������������
1974 �����������������
1975 �����������������
1976 �����������������
1977 �����������������
1978 �����������������
1979 �����������������
1980 �����������������
1981 �����������������
1982 �����������������
1983 �����������������
1984 �����������������
1985 �����������������
1986 �����������������
1987 �����������������
1988 �����������������
1989 �����������������
1990 �����������������
1991 �����������������
1992 �����������������
1993 �����������������
1994 �����������������
1995 �����������������
1996 �����������������
1997 �����������������
1998 �����������������
1999 �����������������
2000 �����������������
2001 �����������������
2002 �����������������
2003 �����������������
2004 �����������������
2005 �����������������
2006 �����������������
2007 �����������������
2008 �����������������
2009 �����������������
2010 �����������������
2011 �����������������
2012 �����������������
2013 �����������������
2014 �����������������
2015 �����������������
2016 �����������������
2017 �����������������
2018 �����������������
2019 �����������������
2020 �����������������
2021 �����������������
2022 �����������������
2023 �����������������
2021: I �������������
      II ������������
      III �����������
      IV �����������
2022: I �������������
      II ������������
      III �����������
      IV �����������
2023: I �������������
      II ������������
      III �����������
      IV �����������
2024: I �������������
      II ������������
      III p ���������

Hours of
all persons 2

Output 1

Compensation
per hour 3

Real
compensation
per hour 4

Unit labor
costs

Value-added output
price deflator 5

Nonfarm
Nonfarm
Nonfarm
Nonfarm
Nonfarm
Business Nonfarm
Business Nonfarm
business Business business Business business Business business Business business Business business
sector business
sector sector sector sector sector sector sector sector sector sector sector sector sector
3.0
–1.7
3.5
3.3
1.8
1.2
.1
.0
2.1
–.6
3.4
2.9
2.3
2.8
.5
1.5
1.1
2.0
1.6
4.6
.1
.6
.7
2.4
2.2
3.4
4.1
3.1
2.6
4.2
3.8
3.1
2.2
1.0
1.6
1.4
4.1
3.2
–.2
.7
1.1
.8
1.2
.8
1.3
1.5
2.1
5.2
2.2
–1.4
1.7
3.3
.5
–2.1
3.1
–5.4
–2.7
–.1
3.2
.2
3.6
3.7
3.3
.9
2.2
1.7

3.1
–1.7
2.7
3.5
1.7
1.4
–.2
.0
1.5
–.8
4.1
2.2
1.7
3.0
.5
1.6
.9
1.7
1.6
4.5
.1
.7
1.1
2.1
1.9
3.3
3.9
3.0
2.6
4.3
3.7
3.0
2.2
1.0
1.7
1.4
4.0
3.3
–.1
.8
.8
.9
1.3
.8
1.3
1.4
2.2
5.4
2.0
–1.5
1.6
3.2
.2
–2.5
2.8
–5.0
–3.0
–.2
2.9
.3
3.7
3.8
3.1
.7
2.1
2.2

6.9
–1.5
–.9
6.8
5.7
6.4
3.6
–.9
2.9
–2.9
5.3
8.9
4.7
3.6
3.6
4.3
3.8
1.6
–.6
4.2
2.9
4.8
3.1
4.6
5.2
5.5
5.8
4.5
.6
1.7
3.2
4.4
3.9
3.3
2.1
–.9
–3.6
3.2
2.0
3.2
2.8
3.3
3.7
2.1
2.9
3.4
3.0
–2.7
7.6
2.5
2.9
7.3
7.5
3.4
9.2
–2.1
–.4
2.6
3.7
2.5
2.5
4.9
3.4
1.4
3.3
3.2

7.2
–1.5
–1.6
7.2
5.7
6.7
3.4
–.8
2.3
–3.1
6.2
8.5
4.4
3.8
3.6
4.5
3.7
1.5
–.6
4.1
3.1
4.6
3.4
4.5
5.2
5.6
5.8
4.4
.7
1.7
3.1
4.3
3.9
3.3
2.3
–.9
–3.8
3.3
2.1
3.3
2.6
3.4
3.7
2.0
3.0
3.4
3.1
–2.7
7.6
2.5
2.9
7.2
7.6
3.4
9.1
–2.0
–.3
2.6
3.7
2.5
2.4
5.0
3.4
1.3
3.0
3.5

3.8
.2
–4.3
3.3
3.8
5.1
3.4
–.9
.8
–2.3
1.8
5.8
2.3
.8
3.0
2.7
2.7
–.4
–2.2
–.4
2.8
4.2
2.4
2.2
3.0
2.0
1.6
1.3
–2.0
–2.4
–.6
1.2
1.7
2.3
.5
–2.2
–7.4
.0
2.2
2.5
1.7
2.6
2.5
1.3
1.6
1.9
.8
–7.6
5.3
3.9
1.2
3.9
6.9
5.6
5.9
3.5
2.4
2.7
.4
2.2
–1.0
1.1
.1
.5
1.0
1.5

4.1
.2
–4.2
3.6
3.9
5.2
3.6
–.8
.8
–2.3
2.0
6.1
2.6
.8
3.1
2.9
2.8
–.2
–2.2
–.4
3.0
3.9
2.3
2.4
3.2
2.2
1.8
1.3
–1.9
–2.5
–.6
1.3
1.7
2.3
.5
–2.3
–7.5
.0
2.2
2.5
1.9
2.4
2.4
1.2
1.6
2.0
.8
–7.7
5.4
4.1
1.2
3.9
7.4
6.0
6.1
3.2
2.7
2.8
.8
2.1
–1.3
1.1
.2
.6
.9
1.2

7.9
9.3
10.6
8.0
8.0
8.4
9.7
10.7
9.4
7.4
4.4
4.4
5.1
5.6
3.7
5.3
3.0
6.2
4.6
6.1
1.5
.7
2.4
3.6
4.0
5.9
4.8
7.0
4.6
2.2
3.8
4.7
3.6
3.8
4.5
3.1
1.2
1.8
1.9
2.4
1.4
2.5
2.9
1.3
3.5
3.4
3.8
8.1
5.2
3.7
3.9
.8
6.9
5.8
6.1
1.4
1.0
7.2
.8
3.8
6.0
5.1
4.3
9.3
.9
2.7

7.6
9.4
10.4
7.8
8.2
8.6
9.5
10.7
9.6
7.3
4.5
4.3
4.9
5.8
3.8
5.1
2.9
6.0
4.7
6.2
1.2
1.0
2.5
3.4
3.9
5.8
4.6
7.0
4.3
2.3
3.7
4.6
3.7
3.8
4.3
3.2
1.3
1.8
2.0
2.4
1.3
2.6
3.1
1.3
3.4
3.4
3.8
8.2
5.1
3.5
3.9
.9
6.5
5.4
5.8
1.5
.7
7.2
.4
3.8
6.4
5.1
4.1
9.3
1.0
3.1

1.6
–1.6
1.4
2.1
1.4
1.3
.2
–.5
.0
1.3
.1
.3
1.7
3.9
.4
1.6
–1.3
1.2
.9
3.6
–1.0
–1.3
.0
.9
1.8
4.5
2.7
3.4
1.7
.6
1.4
2.0
.2
.6
1.6
–.7
1.6
.1
–1.2
.3
–.1
.8
2.7
.0
1.3
.9
2.0
6.7
.3
–4.1
–.2
–3.3
–1.2
–.7
–2.4
–7.2
–8.3
1.8
–3.2
.0
2.9
1.5
1.5
5.3
–1.8
1.5

1.3
–1.5
1.2
1.9
1.6
1.5
.0
–.4
.1
1.2
.2
.1
1.4
4.0
.4
1.4
–1.4
1.0
1.1
3.6
–1.3
–1.1
.1
.8
1.7
4.4
2.5
3.5
1.4
.7
1.4
1.8
.2
.6
1.5
–.6
1.6
.2
–1.2
.3
–.3
.9
2.9
.1
1.3
.9
2.0
6.8
.2
–4.2
–.2
–3.2
–1.6
–1.1
–2.7
–7.1
–8.6
1.8
–3.5
.1
3.3
1.6
1.4
5.3
–1.8
1.8

4.8
11.2
6.9
4.5
6.1
7.1
9.5
10.7
7.1
8.0
1.0
1.5
2.7
2.8
3.2
3.7
1.8
4.2
3.0
1.4
1.4
.2
1.7
1.1
1.8
2.4
.7
3.7
1.9
–1.9
–.1
1.5
1.4
2.8
2.8
1.7
–2.8
–1.4
2.1
1.7
.4
1.7
1.7
.6
2.1
1.9
1.6
2.8
2.9
5.2
2.2
–2.4
6.3
8.1
2.9
7.2
3.9
7.3
–2.4
3.5
2.3
1.3
1.0
8.4
–1.3
1.0

4.4
11.3
7.6
4.2
6.4
7.0
9.7
10.8
8.0
8.2
.3
2.0
3.1
2.7
3.2
3.4
2.0
4.2
3.1
1.7
1.1
.3
1.4
1.3
1.9
2.4
.7
3.9
1.7
–1.9
.0
1.5
1.4
2.8
2.6
1.7
–2.7
–1.4
2.1
1.5
.5
1.7
1.8
.6
2.1
2.0
1.6
2.7
3.0
5.1
2.2
–2.3
6.3
8.0
2.9
6.9
3.7
7.4
–2.4
3.5
2.6
1.2
.9
8.5
–1.1
.8

5.2
9.8
9.7
5.2
5.9
6.9
8.4
8.9
9.2
5.7
3.6
2.8
2.6
1.4
1.9
3.2
3.7
3.3
2.9
1.6
2.3
1.8
1.8
1.6
1.5
.3
.6
1.8
1.7
.7
1.5
2.5
3.1
2.8
2.3
1.5
.0
1.2
2.3
1.8
1.4
1.5
.4
.7
1.6
2.1
1.4
.3
5.1
8.0
3.4
6.4
7.4
6.7
8.0
9.7
10.9
4.3
3.6
3.7
1.3
2.8
.8
2.2
2.2
1.3

3.6
10.4
10.7
5.5
6.2
6.5
8.4
9.5
9.6
6.2
3.5
2.8
3.1
1.4
1.9
3.1
3.7
3.4
3.1
1.7
2.3
1.9
1.8
1.4
1.7
.4
.7
1.9
1.6
.8
1.4
2.3
3.4
2.9
2.0
1.5
.3
1.1
1.9
1.8
1.3
1.6
.7
.9
1.6
2.1
1.4
.4
4.8
7.7
3.6
6.2
6.4
6.6
8.4
9.1
10.3
4.2
3.5
4.0
1.9
3.0
1.3
2.6
2.3
1.1

1 Output refers to real gross domestic product in the sector.
2 Hours at work of all persons engaged in the sector. See footnote 2, Table B–32.
3 Wages and salaries of employees plus employers’ contributions for social insurance and private benefit plans. Also includes an estimate of wages,

salaries, and supplemental payments for the self-employed.
4 Hourly compensation divided by a consumer price index. See footnote 4, Table B–32.
5 Current dollar output divided by the output index.
Note: Percent changes are calculated using index numbers to three decimal places.
Source: Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics).

Labor Market Indicators | 429

Production and Business Activity
Table B–34. Industrial production indexes, major industry divisions, 1978–2024
[2017=100, except as noted; monthly data seasonally adjusted]
Total industrial production 1
Year or month

1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2023: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct �������������
      Nov ������������
      Dec �������������
2024: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July p ����������
      Aug p ����������
      Sept p ���������
      Oct p �����������

Index,
2017=100
50.1
51.6
50.3
51.0
48.3
49.6
54.1
54.7
55.3
58.2
61.2
61.7
62.3
61.4
63.2
65.3
68.7
71.9
75.2
80.6
85.3
89.0
92.5
89.7
90.0
91.1
93.6
96.7
98.9
101.5
97.9
86.8
91.6
94.5
97.4
99.3
102.3
100.9
98.7
100.0
103.2
102.4
95.1
99.3
102.7
102.9
102.7
102.8
102.8
103.2
103.0
102.4
103.1
103.1
103.3
102.6
102.9
102.6
101.5
102.7
102.5
102.4
103.0
103.3
102.5
103.0
102.5
102.3

Percent
change
from year
earlier 2
5.5
3.0
–2.6
1.3
–5.2
2.7
8.9
1.2
1.0
5.2
5.2
.9
1.0
–1.5
2.9
3.3
5.3
4.6
4.5
7.2
5.9
4.4
3.9
–3.0
.3
1.3
2.7
3.4
2.3
2.6
–3.5
–11.4
5.6
3.1
3.0
2.0
3.0
–1.4
–2.1
1.3
3.2
–.7
–7.1
4.4
3.4
.2
1.5
.9
.1
.3
.0
–.4
.0
–.1
–.2
–.8
–.2
.8
–1.2
–.1
–.3
–.8
–.0
.9
–.5
–.0
–.7
–.3

Manufacturing
Total 1
48.5
50.0
48.2
48.7
46.0
48.2
52.9
53.8
55.0
58.1
61.2
61.7
62.2
61.0
63.2
65.5
69.4
72.9
76.5
82.9
88.5
92.9
96.7
93.3
93.7
95.0
97.9
101.9
104.6
107.5
102.3
88.2
93.5
96.2
98.7
99.6
100.7
100.2
99.4
100.0
101.3
99.3
92.8
97.4
100.0
99.5
99.9
99.8
99.2
99.9
99.8
99.2
99.4
99.5
99.6
98.9
99.3
99.2
97.9
99.3
99.5
98.8
99.5
99.4
98.8
99.4
99.0
98.5

Percent
change
from year
earlier 2
6.1
3.1
–3.6
1.0
–5.5
4.8
9.8
1.6
2.2
5.7
5.3
.8
.8
–1.9
3.7
3.6
5.9
5.1
4.9
8.4
6.7
5.1
4.1
–3.6
.5
1.4
3.1
4.1
2.6
2.8
–4.8
–13.8
6.0
2.9
2.6
.9
1.1
–.5
–.8
.6
1.3
–2.0
–6.5
4.9
2.7
–.5
1.1
.1
–1.4
–.7
–.6
–.9
–.7
–.9
–1.0
–1.8
–.6
1.1
–2.0
–.5
.3
–1.1
–.3
.3
–.6
–.1
–.6
–.3

Durable
30.9
32.4
31.0
31.3
28.6
30.0
34.3
35.0
35.6
37.7
40.5
41.0
41.1
39.9
41.9
44.3
48.1
52.1
56.8
63.6
70.3
76.3
81.8
78.6
78.9
81.0
84.9
89.9
94.2
98.9
95.5
77.7
86.2
91.5
96.5
98.6
101.5
100.4
98.4
100.0
103.1
100.2
91.3
96.8
100.7
100.9
101.1
101.0
100.2
101.2
101.5
100.9
101.5
101.0
101.0
99.6
101.0
100.6
99.4
100.9
101.0
100.3
100.8
100.3
99.2
100.4
99.7
98.5

Nondurable

Other
(non-NAICS) 1

75.6
76.1
73.8
74.4
73.3
76.7
80.3
80.7
83.0
87.5
90.4
91.0
92.5
92.1
94.6
95.9
99.2
101.0
101.3
105.1
106.7
107.4
107.9
104.8
106.0
106.2
107.9
110.6
111.2
112.5
105.8
97.7
99.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
99.3
99.7
100.5
100.0
99.6
98.7
94.9
98.5
100.0
99.1
99.4
99.5
99.1
99.6
99.1
98.5
98.4
99.0
99.2
99.1
98.8
99.1
97.6
98.9
99.2
98.4
99.3
99.7
99.7
99.6
99.7
99.8

159.7
163.0
168.6
172.7
174.7
179.7
188.0
195.3
199.4
210.8
209.8
206.9
204.4
196.1
192.1
193.4
191.7
191.7
189.9
205.9
218.2
224.5
223.8
209.3
202.3
196.5
197.4
196.7
194.5
183.4
167.4
140.0
129.4
123.4
116.3
110.6
109.2
105.2
102.5
100.0
96.7
92.5
85.3
87.7
88.3
82.4
87.7
86.4
84.5
82.1
81.6
81.4
80.6
80.9
82.2
83.0
79.9
78.0
80.0
80.3
79.7
78.6
79.1
78.9
76.2
77.1
77.0
77.5

Mining

89.0
91.8
93.5
96.1
91.4
86.5
92.1
90.4
83.8
84.7
86.9
86.0
87.1
85.3
83.7
83.5
85.0
85.0
86.5
88.1
86.5
82.1
83.9
84.1
80.2
80.4
80.3
79.3
81.2
81.9
83.0
78.7
82.5
87.7
94.8
100.6
111.3
104.6
91.5
100.0
113.3
120.8
103.1
106.4
114.4
119.9
119.7
118.8
119.3
120.2
119.5
120.1
120.4
119.9
120.9
120.0
119.8
120.5
115.3
120.3
119.6
119.5
118.3
119.5
118.5
120.0
117.8
118.2

Utilities

55.7
56.9
57.3
58.1
56.1
56.5
59.9
61.4
61.9
64.9
68.9
71.0
72.4
74.2
74.2
76.7
78.3
81.1
83.4
83.2
85.5
88.1
90.7
90.3
93.0
94.5
95.9
98.0
97.7
100.8
100.4
97.5
101.2
100.8
98.5
100.7
102.0
101.2
100.8
100.0
104.9
104.0
101.0
103.0
106.2
104.1
99.7
101.8
106.0
104.0
103.3
101.7
105.9
106.2
106.2
105.8
105.6
103.1
107.5
103.6
101.0
104.7
107.0
108.9
107.5
106.3
106.7
107.4

1 Total industry and total manufacturing series include manufacturing as defined in the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) plus those
industries—logging and newspaper, periodical, book, and directory publishing—that have traditionally been considered to be manufacturing and included in the
industrial sector.
2 Percent changes based on unrounded indexes.
Note: Data based on NAICS; see footnote 1.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

430 |

Appendix B

Table B–35. Capacity utilization rates, 1978–2024
[Percent 1; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

Manufacturing
Year or month

1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2023: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct �������������
      Nov ������������
      Dec �������������
2024: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July p ����������
      Aug p ����������
      Sept p ���������
      Oct p �����������

Total
industry 2

Total 2

85.1
84.9
80.7
79.7
73.7
74.9
80.5
79.3
78.5
81.1
84.3
83.7
82.3
79.8
80.6
81.4
83.3
83.8
83.3
84.0
82.7
81.8
81.5
76.2
75.0
76.1
78.3
80.3
80.6
80.8
77.8
68.5
73.4
76.1
77.0
77.3
78.9
77.3
75.6
76.8
79.8
78.6
72.9
77.7
80.7
79.0
79.8
79.6
79.4
79.6
79.2
78.6
79.0
78.9
78.9
78.3
78.4
78.1
77.2
78.1
77.8
77.7
78.1
78.2
77.6
77.9
77.4
77.1

84.4
83.9
78.6
77.2
71.0
73.5
79.4
78.2
78.4
80.9
84.0
83.2
81.4
78.5
79.6
80.3
82.5
83.0
82.0
82.9
81.5
80.6
79.8
73.9
73.1
74.1
76.6
78.7
78.9
79.0
74.7
65.3
70.4
73.3
74.5
74.7
76.0
76.4
75.7
76.6
78.4
77.2
72.7
77.2
79.4
78.2
79.0
78.8
78.3
78.7
78.5
78.0
78.1
78.1
78.1
77.4
77.7
77.6
76.5
77.5
77.5
76.9
77.3
77.2
76.7
77.0
76.7
76.2

Durable
goods
83.9
84.0
77.6
75.5
66.7
69.0
77.1
75.9
75.5
77.6
81.9
81.6
79.1
75.5
77.2
78.6
81.4
81.9
81.2
82.2
80.8
80.6
80.1
71.9
70.4
71.5
74.3
76.6
77.7
78.3
74.6
61.4
68.8
72.7
75.3
75.4
77.2
76.6
74.9
76.0
78.7
76.8
70.1
74.9
77.5
76.7
77.3
77.1
76.4
77.1
77.3
76.8
77.2
76.8
76.7
75.6
76.5
76.2
75.1
76.2
76.1
75.6
75.8
75.4
74.4
75.2
74.5
73.6

Stage-of-process

Nondurable
Other
goods
(non-NAICS) 2
85.4
84.0
79.8
78.9
76.4
79.4
82.1
80.5
81.9
84.9
86.3
85.1
84.3
82.4
82.8
82.8
84.6
84.6
83.2
83.8
82.2
80.1
78.9
75.7
76.0
77.0
79.0
80.7
80.3
80.0
74.5
69.9
73.2
74.9
74.7
75.0
75.5
76.8
77.1
77.6
78.6
77.8
75.8
79.8
81.3
79.6
80.6
80.5
80.1
80.4
79.8
79.2
79.0
79.4
79.4
79.2
78.9
79.0
77.7
78.7
78.9
78.2
78.8
79.0
79.0
78.8
78.8
78.8

81.3
82.4
82.9
86.5
85.3
84.1
85.6
89.2
86.4
88.8
88.8
85.6
81.7
77.3
77.5
78.6
78.2
81.1
81.0
83.5
83.4
84.1
84.4
80.1
78.9
78.8
81.4
82.3
79.5
76.9
78.5
66.1
61.6
62.7
61.7
62.1
64.9
66.3
68.1
70.3
71.3
72.2
70.6
76.5
81.5
80.1
83.3
82.5
80.9
79.0
78.9
79.0
78.5
79.2
80.8
81.9
79.1
77.6
79.9
80.5
80.2
79.4
80.2
80.3
77.9
79.1
79.3
80.1

Mining

89.5
91.1
91.3
90.9
84.1
79.9
86.0
84.7
76.6
80.3
84.1
85.1
86.9
85.4
85.2
85.7
86.7
87.6
90.5
91.8
89.2
86.2
90.5
89.8
85.9
87.7
88.2
88.4
90.1
89.4
90.0
80.8
84.2
86.5
87.9
86.9
89.6
80.8
71.6
78.0
87.5
87.5
72.1
82.5
89.8
90.0
91.3
90.2
90.3
90.6
89.8
89.9
90.0
89.5
90.1
89.4
89.2
89.7
85.9
89.7
89.2
89.3
88.5
89.4
88.8
90.0
88.4
88.7

Utilities

87.2
87.2
85.5
84.4
80.0
79.3
81.9
81.8
80.9
83.5
86.8
86.9
86.6
87.8
86.4
88.2
88.3
89.4
90.8
90.1
92.6
94.2
94.3
90.1
87.6
85.6
84.4
85.0
83.6
85.8
84.1
80.5
82.9
81.4
78.4
80.0
80.9
80.0
78.9
77.3
80.6
79.1
75.2
75.3
76.3
72.4
70.5
71.8
74.5
72.9
72.2
70.8
73.5
73.6
73.3
72.8
72.5
70.6
73.4
70.5
68.6
70.8
72.2
73.3
72.1
71.1
71.1
71.4

Crude
88.6
89.9
89.3
89.3
82.3
79.9
85.9
84.0
78.5
83.0
86.4
86.9
88.0
85.7
86.0
85.9
88.0
89.1
89.1
90.4
87.0
86.1
88.6
85.5
83.2
85.0
86.6
86.8
88.2
88.8
87.7
78.5
83.7
85.2
86.1
86.1
87.7
79.6
74.0
78.4
85.9
85.4
73.1
82.1
87.9
87.7
88.2
88.1
88.2
88.3
87.6
87.6
87.7
87.5
88.1
87.1
87.0
87.6
83.9
86.8
86.9
86.6
86.7
87.8
86.9
87.8
86.6
86.7

Primary
and
semifinished
86.0
85.8
78.7
77.4
70.6
74.4
81.0
79.8
79.6
82.7
85.9
84.6
82.3
79.6
81.1
82.9
85.9
86.2
85.4
85.8
84.0
84.3
84.0
77.5
77.6
78.4
80.6
82.2
81.6
81.1
77.1
65.7
71.6
74.4
74.8
76.0
77.6
77.5
76.8
77.5
80.1
78.7
73.5
77.6
79.7
77.4
77.6
77.8
78.0
77.7
77.5
76.8
77.4
77.4
77.6
77.0
77.0
76.5
76.5
76.5
76.1
76.2
76.9
76.9
76.2
76.3
76.4
76.2

Finished
82.5
81.6
79.3
77.7
73.2
73.2
77.3
76.7
77.2
78.7
81.7
81.6
80.5
78.5
78.5
78.5
79.1
79.6
79.2
80.3
80.3
78.0
76.9
72.6
70.5
71.4
73.3
75.6
76.3
77.2
73.7
67.8
70.9
73.3
74.5
73.7
74.9
76.0
74.8
75.4
76.8
75.8
72.2
75.9
77.8
77.1
78.2
77.7
77.0
77.9
77.7
76.9
77.2
77.1
76.8
76.2
76.6
76.3
75.3
76.3
76.2
75.7
75.8
75.7
75.2
75.5
74.7
74.1

1 Output as percent of capacity.
2 See footnote 1 and Note, Table B–34.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

Production and Business Activity | 431

Table B–36. New private housing units started, authorized, and completed and houses sold,
1978–2024
[Thousands; monthly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

Year or month
Total
1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2023: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct �������������
      Nov ������������
      Dec �������������
2024: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept p ���������
      Oct p �����������

2,020.3
1,745.1
1,292.2
1,084.2
1,062.2
1,703.0
1,749.5
1,741.8
1,805.4
1,620.5
1,488.1
1,376.1
1,192.7
1,013.9
1,199.7
1,287.6
1,457.0
1,354.1
1,476.8
1,474.0
1,616.9
1,640.9
1,568.7
1,602.7
1,704.9
1,847.7
1,955.8
2,068.3
1,800.9
1,355.0
905.5
554.0
586.9
608.8
780.6
924.9
1,003.3
1,111.8
1,173.8
1,203.0
1,249.9
1,290.0
1,379.6
1,601.0
1,552.6
1,420.0
1,361
1,404
1,342
1,368
1,583
1,415
1,473
1,305
1,363
1,365
1,510
1,568
1,376
1,546
1,299
1,377
1,315
1,329
1,262
1,379
1,353
1,311

New housing units started

New housing units authorized 1

Type of structure

Type of structure

1 unit
1,433.3
1,194.1
852.2
705.4
662.6
1,067.6
1,084.2
1,072.4
1,179.4
1,146.4
1,081.3
1,003.3
894.8
840.4
1,029.9
1,125.7
1,198.4
1,076.2
1,160.9
1,133.7
1,271.4
1,302.4
1,230.9
1,273.3
1,358.6
1,499.0
1,610.5
1,715.8
1,465.4
1,046.0
622.0
445.1
471.2
430.6
535.3
617.6
647.9
714.5
781.5
848.9
875.8
887.7
990.5
1,127.2
1,005.2
947.7
834
827
822
876
999
930
999
943
973
975
1,126
1,078
1,011
1,134
1,041
1,037
992
983
861
1,006
1,042
970

2 to 4
units 2
125.1
122.0
109.5
91.2
80.1
113.5
121.4
93.5
84.0
65.1
58.7
55.3
37.6
35.6
30.9
29.4
35.2
33.8
45.3
44.5
42.6
31.9
38.7
36.6
38.5
33.5
42.3
41.1
42.7
31.7
17.5
11.6
11.4
10.9
11.4
13.6
13.7
11.5
11.5
11.4
13.9
13.4
12.3
11.7
16.4
13.4
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�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
�������������������
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5 units
or more
462.0
429.0
330.5
287.7
319.6
522.0
543.9
576.0
542.0
408.7
348.0
317.6
260.4
137.9
139.0
132.6
223.5
244.1
270.8
295.8
302.9
306.6
299.1
292.8
307.9
315.2
303.0
311.4
292.8
277.3
266.0
97.3
104.3
167.3
233.9
293.7
341.7
385.8
380.8
342.7
360.3
388.9
376.8
462.1
531.0
458.8
516
564
498
480
575
470
464
355
376
373
371
471
347
396
251
334
305
329
376
339
297
326

Total
1,800.5
1,551.8
1,190.6
985.5
1,000.5
1,605.2
1,681.8
1,733.3
1,769.4
1,534.8
1,455.6
1,338.4
1,110.8
948.8
1,094.9
1,199.1
1,371.6
1,332.5
1,425.6
1,441.1
1,612.3
1,663.5
1,592.3
1,636.7
1,747.7
1,889.2
2,070.1
2,155.3
1,838.9
1,398.4
905.4
583.0
604.6
624.1
829.7
990.8
1,052.1
1,182.6
1,206.6
1,282.0
1,328.8
1,386.0
1,471.1
1,737.0
1,680.4
1,511.1
1,443
1,620
1,493
1,470
1,532
1,493
1,501
1,578
1,515
1,534
1,508
1,530
1,508
1,563
1,485
1,440
1,399
1,454
1,406
1,470
1,425
1,419

1 unit
1,182.6
981.5
710.4
564.3
546.4
901.5
922.4
956.6
1,077.6
1,024.4
993.8
931.7
793.9
753.5
910.7
986.5
1,068.5
997.3
1,069.5
1,062.4
1,187.6
1,246.7
1,198.1
1,235.6
1,332.6
1,460.9
1,613.4
1,682.0
1,378.2
979.9
575.6
441.1
447.3
418.5
518.7
620.8
640.3
696.0
750.8
820.0
855.3
862.1
979.4
1,115.4
973.9
920.0
763
807
848
876
918
946
953
972
982
986
999
1,017
1,031
1,027
984
977
956
939
941
967
963
971

2 to 4
units
130.6
125.4
114.5
101.8
88.3
133.7
142.6
120.1
108.4
89.3
75.7
66.9
54.3
43.1
45.8
52.4
62.2
63.8
65.8
68.4
69.2
65.8
64.9
66.0
73.7
82.5
90.4
84.0
76.6
59.6
34.4
20.7
22.0
21.6
25.9
29.0
29.9
32.1
34.8
37.2
39.7
42.6
47.2
52.9
55.2
54.7
58
50
55
64
57
55
49
64
51
51
50
51
51
57
52
56
57
49
49
57
57
54

5 units
or more
487.3
444.8
365.7
319.4
365.8
570.1
616.8
656.6
583.5
421.1
386.1
339.8
262.6
152.1
138.4
160.2
241.0
271.5
290.3
310.3
355.5
351.1
329.3
335.2
341.4
345.8
366.2
389.3
384.1
359.0
295.4
121.1
135.3
184.0
285.1
341.1
382.0
454.5
421.1
424.8
433.8
481.4
444.5
568.8
651.3
536.4
622
763
590
530
557
492
499
542
482
497
459
462
426
479
449
407
386
466
416
446
405
394

New
housing
units
completed
1,867.5
1,870.8
1,501.6
1,265.7
1,005.5
1,390.3
1,652.2
1,703.3
1,756.4
1,668.8
1,529.8
1,422.8
1,308.0
1,090.8
1,157.5
1,192.7
1,346.9
1,312.6
1,412.9
1,400.5
1,474.2
1,604.9
1,573.7
1,570.8
1,648.4
1,678.7
1,841.9
1,931.4
1,979.4
1,502.8
1,119.7
794.4
651.7
584.9
649.2
764.4
883.8
968.2
1,059.7
1,152.9
1,184.9
1,255.1
1,286.9
1,341.0
1,390.5
1,448.8
1,389
1,540
1,516
1,416
1,499
1,480
1,343
1,373
1,466
1,382
1,466
1,557
1,504
1,698
1,491
1,659
1,557
1,725
1,640
1,763
1,688
1,614

New
houses
sold
817
709
545
436
412
623
639
688
750
671
676
650
534
509
610
666
670
667
757
804
886
880
877
908
973
1,086
1,203
1,283
1,051
776
485
375
323
306
368
429
437
501
561
613
617
683
822
771
641
666
639
625
644
687
741
666
700
652
694
673
611
654
664
643
683
736
672
672
707
690
738
610

1 Authorized by issuance of local and building permits in permit-issuing places: beginning with 2023, annually updated universe of approximately 20,000
places; 20,100 for 2014–2022; 19,300 for 2004–2013; 19,000 for 1994–2003; 17,000 for 1984–93; and 16,000 for 1978–83.
2 Monthly data do not meet publication standards because tests for identifiable and stable seasonality do not meet reliability standards.
Note: One-unit estimates prior to 1999, for new housing units started and completed and for new houses sold, include an upward adjustment of 3.3 percent
to account for structures in permit-issuing areas that did not have permit authorization.
Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census).

432 |

Appendix B

Table B–37. Manufacturing and trade sales and inventories, 1981–2024
[Amounts in millions of dollars; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

Year or month

SIC: 6
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
NAICS: 6
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2023: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct �������������
      Nov ������������
      Dec �������������
2024: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct p �����������

Total manufacturing
and trade
Sales 2

Inventories 3

355,822
347,625
369,286
410,124
422,583
430,419
457,735
497,157
527,039
545,909
542,815
567,176

545,786
573,908
590,287
649,780
664,039
662,738
709,848
767,222
815,455
840,594
834,609
842,809

540,199
567,195
609,854
654,689
686,923
723,443
742,391
786,178
833,868
818,160
823,234
854,700
926,002
1,005,821
1,069,032
1,128,176
1,160,778
988,905
1,089,044
1,206,873
1,267,540
1,306,220
1,346,110
1,303,169
1,295,591
1,357,498
1,437,438
1,434,972
1,381,735
1,633,430
1,834,934
1,837,800
1,857,864
1,844,710
1,819,075
1,822,598
1,824,192
1,817,570
1,828,313
1,852,225
1,872,609
1,850,897
1,849,411
1,855,254
1,834,816
1,860,134
1,857,124
1,861,389
1,860,554
1,860,120
1,880,483
1,876,300
1,881,922
1,882,034

835,800
863,125
926,395
985,385
1,004,646
1,045,495
1,077,183
1,137,260
1,195,894
1,118,552
1,139,523
1,147,795
1,241,744
1,314,161
1,408,680
1,488,223
1,465,714
1,331,497
1,450,371
1,567,171
1,658,022
1,727,113
1,789,576
1,822,793
1,857,230
1,917,272
2,001,961
2,042,803
1,991,890
2,257,524
2,529,366
2,534,336
2,527,240
2,523,989
2,522,573
2,520,942
2,517,951
2,515,043
2,511,946
2,521,778
2,530,405
2,526,625
2,523,556
2,534,336
2,533,958
2,540,743
2,537,490
2,546,223
2,558,827
2,565,930
2,574,892
2,583,708
2,584,108
2,586,523

Merchant
wholesalers 1

Manufacturing
Sales 2

Inventories 3

1.53
1.67
1.56
1.53
1.56
1.55
1.50
1.49
1.52
1.52
1.53
1.48

168,129
163,351
172,547
190,682
194,538
194,657
206,326
224,619
236,698
242,686
239,847
250,394

283,413
311,852
312,379
339,516
334,749
322,654
338,109
369,374
391,212
405,073
390,950
382,510

1.53
1.50
1.46
1.48
1.45
1.42
1.44
1.40
1.41
1.42
1.36
1.34
1.30
1.27
1.28
1.28
1.31
1.38
1.27
1.26
1.28
1.29
1.32
1.39
1.42
1.39
1.36
1.42
1.44
1.28
1.34
1.37
1.36
1.37
1.39
1.38
1.38
1.38
1.37
1.36
1.35
1.37
1.36
1.37
1.38
1.37
1.37
1.37
1.38
1.38
1.37
1.38
1.37
1.37

242,002
251,708
269,843
289,973
299,766
319,558
324,984
335,991
350,715
330,875
326,227
334,616
359,081
395,173
417,963
443,288
455,750
368,648
409,273
457,658
474,727
484,511
490,751
461,086
446,966
462,400
490,889
477,871
433,655
506,634
576,843
577,637
584,913
578,183
574,975
573,283
573,155
573,441
576,861
584,412
585,941
576,419
579,280
578,735
574,543
581,885
584,267
589,029
584,836
588,438
593,195
589,180
586,598
585,376

378,609
379,806
399,934
424,802
430,366
443,227
448,373
463,004
480,748
427,353
423,028
408,302
441,222
474,639
523,476
563,043
543,273
505,025
553,726
607,035
625,245
631,955
642,832
638,229
635,803
659,025
677,549
707,662
702,416
808,491
859,100
856,182
860,078
858,759
851,923
855,017
852,708
851,754
852,256
855,172
856,349
856,209
855,757
856,182
855,052
857,285
857,397
858,304
859,416
858,851
859,018
859,939
857,285
856,844

Ratio 4

Retail
trade

Sales 2

1.69
1.95
1.78
1.73
1.73
1.68
1.59
1.57
1.63
1.65
1.65
1.54

101,180
95,211
99,225
112,199
113,459
114,960
122,968
134,521
143,760
149,506
148,306
154,150

129,654
127,428
130,075
142,452
147,409
153,574
163,903
178,801
187,009
195,833
200,448
208,302

1.28
1.36
1.28
1.23
1.28
1.32
1.29
1.30
1.28
1.29
1.33
1.32

86,514
89,062
97,514
107,243
114,586
120,803
128,442
138,017
146,581
153,718
154,661
162,632

132,719
134,628
147,833
167,812
181,881
186,510
207,836
219,047
237,234
239,688
243,211
251,997

1.53
1.49
1.44
1.49
1.52
1.56
1.55
1.54
1.58
1.56
1.54
1.52

�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������

1.57
1.50
1.44
1.44
1.44
1.37
1.39
1.35
1.35
1.38
1.29
1.25
1.19
1.17
1.20
1.22
1.26
1.39
1.28
1.29
1.30
1.30
1.31
1.40
1.42
1.39
1.37
1.46
1.62
1.49
1.47
1.48
1.47
1.49
1.48
1.49
1.49
1.49
1.48
1.46
1.46
1.49
1.48
1.48
1.49
1.47
1.47
1.46
1.47
1.46
1.45
1.46
1.46
1.46

147,261
154,018
164,575
179,915
190,362
198,154
202,260
216,597
234,546
232,096
236,294
248,190
277,501
303,208
328,438
351,956
377,085
319,217
361,600
407,302
434,294
450,122
468,666
448,277
444,712
475,081
508,768
506,978
484,270
583,475
671,342
660,152
669,455
668,253
653,494
654,353
654,349
646,123
652,182
663,626
677,538
668,810
664,096
667,789
658,352
671,529
662,797
663,902
665,708
663,696
671,328
672,585
675,913
675,068

196,914
204,842
221,978
238,392
241,058
258,454
272,297
290,182
309,191
297,536
301,310
308,274
340,128
367,822
398,792
424,602
445,745
398,058
443,258
488,893
525,589
550,312
585,479
596,937
611,409
632,608
671,067
679,805
666,011
785,340
922,988
898,541
916,744
915,265
915,732
911,195
906,386
902,011
899,737
899,125
900,668
896,628
894,166
898,541
896,497
898,704
894,435
896,304
901,184
901,488
903,730
905,386
903,300
905,023

1.31
1.30
1.29
1.29
1.27
1.26
1.32
1.30
1.29
1.32
1.26
1.22
1.17
1.17
1.17
1.17
1.20
1.29
1.15
1.15
1.18
1.19
1.22
1.33
1.35
1.31
1.28
1.35
1.37
1.24
1.31
1.37
1.37
1.37
1.40
1.39
1.39
1.40
1.38
1.35
1.33
1.34
1.35
1.35
1.36
1.34
1.35
1.35
1.35
1.36
1.35
1.35
1.34
1.34

150,936
161,469
175,436
184,801
196,796
205,731
215,147
233,591
248,606
255,189
260,713
271,894
289,421
307,440
322,631
332,932
327,943
301,039
318,171
341,913
358,519
371,587
386,694
393,805
403,913
420,018
437,782
450,123
463,809
543,320
586,750
600,011
603,496
598,274
590,606
594,962
596,688
598,006
599,270
604,187
609,130
605,668
606,035
608,730
601,921
606,720
610,060
608,458
610,010
607,986
615,960
614,535
619,411
621,590

260,277
278,477
304,483
322,191
333,222
343,814
356,513
384,074
405,955
393,663
415,185
431,219
460,394
471,700
486,412
500,578
476,696
428,414
453,387
471,243
507,188
544,846
561,265
587,627
610,018
625,639
653,345
655,336
623,463
663,693
747,278
779,613
750,418
749,965
754,918
754,730
758,857
761,278
759,953
767,481
773,388
773,788
773,633
779,613
782,409
784,754
785,658
791,615
798,227
805,591
812,144
818,383
823,523
824,656

1.67
1.68
1.66
1.72
1.67
1.64
1.62
1.59
1.59
1.58
1.55
1.56
1.56
1.51
1.49
1.49
1.52
1.47
1.39
1.35
1.38
1.41
1.43
1.46
1.50
1.47
1.46
1.47
1.34
1.15
1.24
1.27
1.24
1.25
1.28
1.27
1.27
1.27
1.27
1.27
1.27
1.28
1.28
1.28
1.30
1.29
1.29
1.30
1.31
1.33
1.32
1.33
1.33
1.33

167,842
179,425
194,186
204,219
216,983
227,178
237,746
257,249
273,961
281,576
288,256
301,038
320,550
340,479
357,863
369,978
365,965
338,706
357,081
383,192
402,199
416,887
434,766
445,849
458,743
477,739
498,707
514,480
518,310
613,705
668,429
691,185
693,826
686,434
679,067
683,698
686,672
688,810
690,641
696,238
702,109
698,956
700,707
703,256
695,631
700,519
703,738
702,681
704,309
702,350
710,851
710,038
716,026
718,867

Ratio 4

Ratio 4 Sales 2, 5

Inventories 3

Retail
and food
services
sales

Inventories 3

Ratio 4

1 Excludes manufacturers’ sales branches and offices.
2 Annual data are averages of monthly not seasonally adjusted figures.
3 Seasonally adjusted, end of period. Inventories beginning with January 1982 for manufacturing are not comparable with earlier periods.
4 Inventory/sales ratio. Monthly inventories are inventories at the end of the month to sales for the month. Annual data beginning with 1982 are the average

of monthly ratios for the year. Annual data for 1981 are the ratio of December inventories to monthly average sales for the year.
5 Food services included on Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) basis and excluded on North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) basis. See
last column for retail and food services sales.
6 Effective in 2001, data classified based on NAICS. Data on NAICS basis available beginning with 1992. Earlier data based on SIC. Data on both NAICS and
SIC basis include semiconductors.
Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census).

Production and Business Activity | 433

Prices
Table B–38. Changes in consumer price indexes, 1981–2024
[For all urban consumers; percent change]
All items less food and energy

Year
or
month

All items

Total 1

Energy 4

Food

Shelter 2

Medical
care 3

Apparel

New
vehicles

Total 1

At
home

Away from Total 1, 3 Gasoline
home

C-CPI-U 5

December to December, NSA
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������

8.9
3.8
3.8
3.9
3.8
1.1
4.4
4.4
4.6
6.1
3.1
2.9
2.7
2.7
2.5
3.3
1.7
1.6
2.7
3.4
1.6
2.4
1.9
3.3
3.4
2.5
4.1
.1
2.7
1.5
3.0
1.7
1.5
.8
.7
2.1
2.1
1.9
2.3
1.4
7.0
6.5
3.4

9.5
4.5
4.8
4.7
4.3
3.8
4.2
4.7
4.4
5.2
4.4
3.3
3.2
2.6
3.0
2.6
2.2
2.4
1.9
2.6
2.7
1.9
1.1
2.2
2.2
2.6
2.4
1.8
1.8
.8
2.2
1.9
1.7
1.6
2.1
2.2
1.8
2.2
2.3
1.6
5.5
5.7
3.9

9.9
2.4
4.7
5.2
6.0
4.6
4.8
4.5
4.9
5.2
3.9
2.9
3.0
3.0
3.5
2.9
3.4
3.3
2.5
3.4
4.2
3.1
2.2
2.7
2.6
4.2
3.1
1.9
.3
.4
1.9
2.2
2.5
2.9
3.2
3.6
3.2
3.2
3.2
1.8
4.1
7.5
6.2

12.5
11.0
6.4
6.1
6.8
7.7
5.8
6.9
8.5
9.6
7.9
6.6
5.4
4.9
3.9
3.0
2.8
3.4
3.7
4.2
4.7
5.0
3.7
4.2
4.3
3.6
5.2
2.6
3.4
3.3
3.5
3.2
2.0
3.0
2.6
4.1
1.8
2.0
4.6
1.8
2.2
4.0
.5

3.5
1.6
2.9
2.0
2.8
.9
4.8
4.7
1.0
5.1
3.4
1.4
.9
–1.6
.1
–.2
1.0
–.7
–.5
–1.8
–3.2
–1.8
–2.1
–.2
–1.1
.9
–.3
–1.0
1.9
–1.1
4.6
1.8
.6
–2.0
–.9
–.1
–1.6
–.1
–1.2
–3.9
5.8
2.9
1.0

2023: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct �������������
      Nov ������������
      Dec �������������
2024: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct �������������
      Nov ������������

6.4
6.0
5.0
4.9
4.0
3.0
3.2
3.7
3.7
3.2
3.1
3.4
3.1
3.2
3.5
3.4
3.3
3.0
2.9
2.5
2.4
2.6
2.7

5.6
5.5
5.6
5.5
5.3
4.8
4.7
4.3
4.1
4.0
4.0
3.9
3.9
3.8
3.8
3.6
3.4
3.3
3.2
3.2
3.3
3.3
3.3

7.9
8.1
8.2
8.1
8.0
7.8
7.7
7.3
7.2
6.7
6.5
6.2
6.0
5.7
5.7
5.5
5.4
5.2
5.1
5.2
4.9
4.9
4.7

3.1
2.3
1.5
1.1
.7
.1
–.5
–1.0
–1.4
–.8
.2
.5
1.1
1.4
2.2
2.6
3.1
3.3
3.2
3.0
3.3
3.3
3.1

3.1
3.3
3.3
3.6
3.5
3.1
3.2
3.1
2.3
2.6
1.1
1.0
.1
.0
.4
1.3
.8
.8
.2
.3
1.8
.3
1.1

6.8
1.4
3.3
2.5
3.6
5.6
1.8
2.2
2.4
2.0
3.2
2.3
3.3
3.3
1.9
1.8
–.9
.0
–.3
.0
–.1
–2.0
–1.8
.6
–.4
–.9
–.3
–3.2
4.9
–.2
3.2
1.6
.4
.5
.2
.3
–.5
–.3
.1
2.0
11.8
5.9
1.0

4.3
3.1
2.7
3.8
2.6
3.8
3.5
5.2
5.6
5.3
1.9
1.5
2.9
2.9
2.1
4.3
1.5
2.3
1.9
2.8
2.8
1.5
3.6
2.7
2.3
2.1
4.9
5.9
–.5
1.5
4.7
1.8
1.1
3.4
.8
–.2
1.6
1.6
1.8
3.9
6.3
10.4
2.7

2.9
2.3
1.8
3.6
2.0
3.7
3.5
5.6
6.2
5.8
1.3
1.5
3.5
3.5
2.0
4.9
1.0
2.1
1.7
2.9
2.6
.8
4.5
2.4
1.7
1.4
5.6
6.6
–2.4
1.7
6.0
1.3
.4
3.7
–.4
–2.0
.9
.6
.7
3.9
6.5
11.8
1.3

7.1
5.1
4.1
4.2
3.8
4.3
3.7
4.4
4.6
4.5
2.9
1.4
1.9
1.9
2.2
3.1
2.6
2.5
2.3
2.4
3.0
2.3
2.3
3.0
3.2
3.2
4.0
5.0
1.9
1.3
2.9
2.5
2.1
3.0
2.6
2.3
2.5
2.8
3.1
3.9
6.0
8.3
5.2

11.9
1.3
–.5
.2
1.8
–19.7
8.2
.5
5.1
18.1
–7.4
2.0
–1.4
2.2
–1.3
8.6
–3.4
–8.8
13.4
14.2
–13.0
10.7
6.9
16.6
17.1
2.9
17.4
–21.3
18.2
7.7
6.6
.5
.5
–10.6
–12.6
5.4
6.9
–.3
3.4
–7.0
29.3
7.3
–2.0

9.4
–6.7
–1.6
–2.5
3.0
–30.7
18.6
–1.8
6.5
36.8
–16.2
2.0
–5.9
6.4
–4.2
12.4
–6.1
–15.4
30.1
13.9
–24.9
24.8
6.8
26.1
16.1
6.4
29.6
–43.1
53.5
13.8
9.9
1.7
–1.0
–21.0
–19.7
9.1
10.7
–2.1
7.9
–15.2
49.6
–1.5
–1.9

����������������
����������������
����������������
����������������
����������������
����������������
����������������
����������������
����������������
����������������
����������������
����������������
����������������
����������������
����������������
����������������
����������������
����������������
����������������
2.6
1.3
2.0
1.7
3.2
2.9
2.3
3.7
.2
2.5
1.3
2.9
1.5
1.3
.5
.4
1.8
1.7
1.5
1.8
1.5
6.5
6.4
2.9

11.3
10.2
8.4
7.1
5.8
4.7
3.6
3.0
2.4
2.1
1.7
1.3
1.2
1.0
1.2
1.1
1.0
1.1
1.1
.9
1.3
1.1
1.6

8.2
8.4
8.8
8.6
8.3
7.7
7.1
6.5
6.0
5.4
5.3
5.2
5.1
4.5
4.2
4.1
4.0
4.1
4.1
4.0
3.9
3.8
3.6

8.7
5.2
–6.4
–5.1
–11.7
–16.7
–12.5
–3.6
–.5
–4.5
–5.4
–2.0
–4.6
–1.9
2.1
2.6
3.7
1.0
1.1
–4.0
–6.8
–4.9
–3.2

1.5
–2.0
–17.4
–12.2
–19.7
–26.5
–19.9
–3.3
3.0
–5.3
–8.9
–1.9
–6.4
–3.9
1.3
1.2
2.2
–2.5
–2.2
–10.3
–15.3
–12.2
–8.1

6.4
6.0
4.8
4.7
3.8
2.9
3.0
3.5
3.4
2.9
2.7
2.9
2.6
2.8
3.2
3.0
3.0
2.6
2.7
2.3
2.2
2.4
2.6

Change from year earlier, NSA
5.8
5.8
6.1
5.4
4.7
4.1
3.5
2.9
2.5
1.9
1.3
1.0
.7
.4
–.1
–.4
–.8
–.9
–1.0
–1.2
–1.3
–1.3
–.7

10.1
9.5
8.5
7.7
6.7
5.7
4.9
4.3
3.7
3.3
2.9
2.7
2.6
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.1
2.2
2.2
2.1
2.3
2.1
2.4

1 Includes other items not shown separately.
2 Data beginning with 1983 incorporate a rental equivalence measure for homeowners’ costs.
3 Commodities and services.
4 Household energy--electricity, utility (piped) gas service, fuel oil, etc.--and motor fuel.
5 Chained consumer price index (C-CPI-U) introduced in 2002. Reflects the effect of substitution that consumers make across item categories in response to

changes in relative prices. Data for 2024 are subject to revision.
Source: Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics).

434 |

Appendix B

Table B–39. Price indexes for personal consumption expenditures, and percent changes,
1973–2024
[Chain-type price index numbers, 2017=100; monthly data seasonally adjusted]
Personal consumption expenditures (PCE)
Year or month

1973 ����������������������
1974 ����������������������
1975 ����������������������
1976 ����������������������
1977 ����������������������
1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2023: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct �������������
      Nov ������������
      Dec �������������
2024: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug p ����������
      Sept p ���������
      Oct p �����������

Total

Goods

Services

Food 1

22.455
24.793
26.860
28.333
30.176
32.276
35.143
38.928
42.415
44.771
46.676
48.439
50.128
51.219
52.802
54.865
57.261
59.775
61.774
63.420
65.000
66.356
67.754
69.203
70.407
70.967
72.001
73.822
75.302
76.291
77.894
79.827
82.127
84.440
86.607
89.170
88.921
90.514
92.804
94.534
95.781
97.121
97.299
98.284
100.000
102.047
103.509
104.641
108.972
116.111
120.491
119.007
119.401
119.553
119.970
120.140
120.435
120.598
120.965
121.387
121.421
121.415
121.602
122.115
122.494
122.912
123.234
123.224
123.369
123.564
123.708
123.931
124.226

37.970
42.709
46.159
47.966
50.526
53.626
58.698
65.271
70.120
72.031
73.331
74.718
75.917
75.562
77.992
80.048
83.128
86.532
88.647
89.717
90.496
91.417
92.271
93.285
93.177
91.777
92.258
94.089
94.018
93.122
93.003
94.311
96.203
97.494
98.576
101.524
99.084
100.533
104.325
105.620
105.049
104.542
101.350
99.710
100.000
100.811
100.426
99.656
104.597
113.638
115.030
114.837
115.092
114.910
115.216
115.094
115.023
114.732
115.419
115.622
115.310
114.679
114.430
114.245
114.783
114.950
115.201
114.784
114.587
114.558
114.387
114.247
114.177

16.389
17.778
19.302
20.641
22.203
23.910
25.915
28.610
31.541
34.017
36.106
37.985
39.843
41.480
42.726
44.769
46.880
49.029
50.946
52.758
54.582
56.066
57.632
59.214
60.883
62.172
63.409
65.210
67.292
69.033
71.336
73.528
75.998
78.750
81.388
83.783
84.432
86.077
87.742
89.648
91.659
93.795
95.462
97.629
100.000
102.626
104.965
107.055
111.045
117.146
123.067
120.915
121.382
121.707
122.182
122.502
122.985
123.383
123.584
124.120
124.332
124.649
125.060
125.930
126.225
126.771
127.128
127.326
127.646
127.956
128.261
128.670
129.153

24.492
28.217
30.338
30.902
32.722
35.853
39.374
42.685
45.726
46.929
47.468
48.894
49.426
50.589
52.186
53.742
56.576
59.340
61.203
61.673
62.535
63.582
64.960
66.942
68.218
69.075
70.206
71.850
73.946
75.063
76.484
78.870
80.248
81.597
84.781
89.944
91.013
91.285
94.930
97.183
98.140
100.016
101.141
100.130
100.000
100.517
101.528
104.892
108.159
119.324
125.334
124.674
124.952
124.823
124.839
125.057
125.039
125.305
125.580
125.811
126.065
125.901
125.960
126.550
126.711
126.659
126.445
126.527
126.612
126.819
126.900
127.346
127.370

Percent change from year earlier

Energy
PCE
goods
less
and
food and
services 2 energy
14.317
18.667
20.507
21.883
23.732
25.068
31.260
40.840
46.332
47.141
47.582
48.182
48.690
42.663
43.135
43.465
46.033
49.925
50.146
50.380
50.838
51.036
51.438
53.846
54.411
49.818
51.836
61.307
62.839
59.176
66.654
74.217
87.026
96.940
102.776
117.422
95.195
104.698
121.281
123.001
121.900
120.890
99.190
91.982
100.000
108.054
105.725
96.753
116.900
146.923
138.935
142.114
141.654
137.741
139.120
134.791
135.440
135.355
141.965
143.778
140.249
137.704
137.314
135.416
138.513
140.103
141.783
138.801
135.875
135.904
134.876
132.111
131.913

23.003
24.825
26.899
28.534
30.369
32.382
34.743
37.936
41.260
43.942
46.191
48.106
50.060
51.788
53.460
55.732
58.045
60.397
62.554
64.456
66.206
67.688
69.163
70.474
71.718
72.630
73.583
74.898
76.317
77.593
78.845
80.396
82.158
84.126
86.001
87.688
88.503
89.785
91.209
92.897
94.285
95.697
96.874
98.426
100.000
101.897
103.573
104.951
108.705
114.521
119.268
117.526
117.963
118.304
118.715
119.063
119.370
119.536
119.658
120.040
120.200
120.309
120.528
121.128
121.418
121.829
122.140
122.239
122.510
122.710
122.904
123.225
123.561

Total
5.4
10.4
8.3
5.5
6.5
7.0
8.9
10.8
9.0
5.6
4.3
3.8
3.5
2.2
3.1
3.9
4.4
4.4
3.3
2.7
2.5
2.1
2.1
2.1
1.7
.8
1.5
2.5
2.0
1.3
2.1
2.5
2.9
2.8
2.6
3.0
–.3
1.8
2.5
1.9
1.3
1.4
.2
1.0
1.7
2.0
1.4
1.1
4.1
6.6
3.8
5.5
5.2
4.4
4.5
4.0
3.3
3.4
3.4
3.4
3.0
2.7
2.7
2.6
2.6
2.8
2.7
2.6
2.4
2.5
2.3
2.1
2.3

Goods
6.0
12.5
8.1
3.9
5.3
6.1
9.5
11.2
7.4
2.7
1.8
1.9
1.6
–.5
3.2
2.6
3.8
4.1
2.4
1.2
.9
1.0
.9
1.1
–.1
–1.5
.5
2.0
–.1
–1.0
–.1
1.4
2.0
1.3
1.1
3.0
–2.4
1.5
3.8
1.2
–.5
–.5
–3.1
–1.6
.3
.8
–.4
–.8
5.0
8.6
1.2
4.6
3.7
2.0
2.2
1.2
–.4
–.2
.8
1.0
.3
–.2
.1
–.5
–.3
.0
.0
–.3
–.4
–.2
–.9
–1.2
–1.0

Services
4.8
8.5
8.6
6.9
7.6
7.7
8.4
10.4
10.2
7.9
6.1
5.2
4.9
4.1
3.0
4.8
4.7
4.6
3.9
3.6
3.5
2.7
2.8
2.7
2.8
2.1
2.0
2.8
3.2
2.6
3.3
3.1
3.4
3.6
3.3
2.9
.8
1.9
1.9
2.2
2.2
2.3
1.8
2.3
2.4
2.6
2.3
2.0
3.7
5.5
5.1
6.0
6.0
5.7
5.6
5.4
5.1
5.2
4.7
4.6
4.3
4.2
4.0
4.1
4.0
4.2
4.0
3.9
3.8
3.7
3.8
3.7
3.9

Energy
PCE
goods
less
and
food and
services 2 energy

Food 1
12.7
15.2
7.5
1.9
5.9
9.6
9.8
8.4
7.1
2.6
1.1
3.0
1.1
2.4
3.2
3.0
5.3
4.9
3.1
.8
1.4
1.7
2.2
3.1
1.9
1.3
1.6
2.3
2.9
1.5
1.9
3.1
1.7
1.7
3.9
6.1
1.2
.3
4.0
2.4
1.0
1.9
1.1
–1.0
–.1
.5
1.0
3.3
3.1
10.3
5.0
10.7
9.5
8.0
7.0
5.9
4.8
3.7
3.2
2.8
2.5
1.9
1.5
1.5
1.4
1.5
1.3
1.2
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.2
1.0

8.6
30.4
9.9
6.7
8.4
5.6
24.7
30.6
13.4
1.7
.9
1.3
1.1
–12.4
1.1
.8
5.9
8.5
.4
.5
.9
.4
.8
4.7
1.0
–8.4
4.1
18.3
2.5
–5.8
12.6
11.3
17.3
11.4
6.0
14.3
–18.9
10.0
15.8
1.4
–.9
–.8
–18.0
–7.3
8.7
8.1
–2.2
–8.5
20.8
25.7
–5.4
8.0
4.3
–7.7
–5.7
–12.2
–17.6
–13.2
–3.7
–.1
–4.7
–5.9
–2.0
–4.7
–2.2
1.7
1.9
3.0
.3
.4
–5.0
–8.1
–5.9

3.8
7.9
8.4
6.1
6.4
6.6
7.3
9.2
8.8
6.5
5.1
4.1
4.1
3.5
3.2
4.2
4.2
4.1
3.6
3.0
2.7
2.2
2.2
1.9
1.8
1.3
1.3
1.8
1.9
1.7
1.6
2.0
2.2
2.4
2.2
2.0
.9
1.4
1.6
1.9
1.5
1.5
1.2
1.6
1.6
1.9
1.6
1.3
3.6
5.4
4.1
4.9
4.9
4.8
4.8
4.7
4.4
4.3
3.8
3.7
3.4
3.2
3.0
3.1
2.9
3.0
2.9
2.7
2.6
2.7
2.7
2.7
2.8

1 Food consists of food and beverages purchased for off-premises consumption; food services, which include purchased meals and beverages, are not
classified as food.
2 Consists of gasoline and other energy goods and of electricity and gas services.
Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).

Prices | 435

Money Stock, Credit, and Finance
Table B–40. Money stock and debt measures, 1986–2024
[Averages of daily figures, except debt end-of-period basis; billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted]

Year and month

December:
1986 ����������������������������������������
1987 ����������������������������������������
1988 ����������������������������������������
1989 ����������������������������������������
1990 ����������������������������������������
1991 ����������������������������������������
1992 ����������������������������������������
1993 ����������������������������������������
1994 ����������������������������������������
1995 ����������������������������������������
1996 ����������������������������������������
1997 ����������������������������������������
1998 ����������������������������������������
1999 ����������������������������������������
2000 ����������������������������������������
2001 ����������������������������������������
2002 ����������������������������������������
2003 ����������������������������������������
2004 ����������������������������������������
2005 ����������������������������������������
2006 ����������������������������������������
2007 ����������������������������������������
2008 ����������������������������������������
2009 ����������������������������������������
2010 ����������������������������������������
2011 ����������������������������������������
2012 ����������������������������������������
2013 ����������������������������������������
2014 ����������������������������������������
2015 ����������������������������������������
2016 ����������������������������������������
2017 ����������������������������������������
2018 ����������������������������������������
2019 ����������������������������������������
2020 ����������������������������������������
2021 ����������������������������������������
2022 ����������������������������������������
2023 ����������������������������������������
2023: Jan �������������������������������������
      Feb �������������������������������������
      Mar ������������������������������������
      Apr �������������������������������������
      May ������������������������������������
      June �����������������������������������
      July ������������������������������������
      Aug ������������������������������������
      Sept �����������������������������������
      Oct �������������������������������������
      Nov ������������������������������������
      Dec �������������������������������������
2024: Jan �������������������������������������
      Feb �������������������������������������
      Mar ������������������������������������
      Apr �������������������������������������
      May ������������������������������������
      June �����������������������������������
      July ������������������������������������
      Aug ������������������������������������
      Sept �����������������������������������
      Oct p �����������������������������������

M1

M2

Debt

Sum of currency, demand
deposits, travelers checks,
and other checkable
deposits; includes savings
deposits beginning May
2020 1

M1 plus
savings deposits,
retail MMMF
balances,
and small
time deposits 2

Debt of
domestic
nonfinancial
sectors 3

724.7
750.2
786.7
792.9
824.7
897.0
1,024.9
1,129.6
1,150.7
1,127.5
1,081.3
1,072.3
1,095.0
1,122.2
1,088.6
1,183.2
1,220.2
1,306.2
1,376.0
1,374.3
1,366.6
1,373.4
1,601.7
1,692.8
1,836.7
2,165.7
2,460.7
2,674.2
2,955.8
3,104.1
3,345.1
3,613.3
3,764.3
4,008.4
17,803.0
20,436.2
19,724.2
17,971.3
19,512.8
19,321.1
18,927.7
18,606.4
18,554.8
18,444.4
18,340.5
18,230.1
18,110.3
18,028.9
17,967.7
17,971.3
17,934.5
17,923.5
17,990.1
17,975.0
18,011.6
18,045.2
18,031.8
18,094.5
18,152.6
18,237.4

2,728.0
2,826.4
2,988.2
3,152.5
3,271.8
3,372.2
3,424.7
3,474.5
3,486.4
3,629.5
3,818.6
4,032.9
4,375.6
4,639.3
4,927.7
5,440.7
5,779.5
6,074.0
6,424.7
6,688.0
7,080.4
7,484.2
8,205.0
8,512.5
8,822.9
9,677.4
10,474.4
11,047.8
11,701.9
12,361.5
13,215.3
13,860.3
14,369.9
15,334.3
19,109.9
21,507.8
21,273.2
20,725.5
21,188.1
21,117.6
20,870.5
20,711.9
20,804.6
20,788.4
20,762.6
20,735.1
20,681.4
20,662.5
20,675.8
20,725.5
20,726.0
20,762.0
20,863.0
20,881.2
20,959.5
21,020.1
21,039.4
21,141.3
21,222.7
21,311.2

Percent change
From year or
6 months earlier 4
M1

8,227.1
16.9
8,979.4
3.5
9,803.7
4.9
10,556.8
.8
11,276.3
4.0
11,807.4
8.8
12,360.1
14.3
13,088.5
10.2
13,784.5
1.9
14,478.7
–2.0
15,246.6
–4.1
16,126.4
–.8
17,266.0
2.1
18,447.2
2.5
19,305.4
–3.0
20,412.8
8.7
21,790.5
3.1
23,534.3
7.0
26,467.1
5.3
28,791.2
–.1
31,251.4
–.6
33,761.9
.5
35,591.2
16.6
36,565.1
5.7
37,943.5
8.5
39,205.5
17.9
40,852.4
13.6
42,492.0
8.7
44,081.9
10.5
45,890.5
5.0
47,848.1
7.8
50,009.5
8.0
52,685.9
4.2
55,143.9
6.5
61,935.9 �����������������
66,410.5
14.8
70,100.0
–3.5
73,683.2
–8.9
������������������������������������������
–10.0
������������������������������������������
–11.1
70,759.7
–13.2
������������������������������������������
–14.9
������������������������������������������
–13.8
71,870.4
–13.0
������������������������������������������
–12.0
������������������������������������������
–11.3
72,826.8
–8.6
������������������������������������������
–6.2
������������������������������������������
–6.3
73,683.2
–5.1
������������������������������������������
–4.4
������������������������������������������
–3.4
74,510.1
–1.3
������������������������������������������
–.6
������������������������������������������
.5
75,388.5
.8
������������������������������������������
1.1
������������������������������������������
1.9
������������������������������������������
1.8
������������������������������������������
2.9

M2
9.5
3.6
5.7
5.5
3.8
3.1
1.6
1.5
.3
4.1
5.2
5.6
8.5
6.0
6.2
10.4
6.2
5.1
5.8
4.1
5.9
5.7
9.6
3.7
3.6
9.7
8.2
5.5
5.9
5.6
6.9
4.9
3.7
6.7
24.6
12.5
–1.1
–2.6
–4.2
–4.7
–5.9
–6.7
–5.3
–4.6
–4.0
–3.6
–1.8
–.5
–1.2
–.6
–.4
.3
1.8
2.1
2.7
2.8
3.0
3.7
3.4
4.1

From
previous
period 5
Debt
12.0
9.0
9.2
7.5
6.6
4.7
4.7
5.8
5.3
4.9
5.3
5.8
7.1
6.6
4.7
5.8
6.7
7.8
9.1
8.8
8.5
8.1
5.8
3.6
4.2
3.7
4.7
4.3
3.9
4.5
4.3
4.3
4.7
4.7
12.3
6.3
5.6
5.1
�����������������������
�����������������������
3.8
�����������������������
�����������������������
6.3
�����������������������
�����������������������
5.3
�����������������������
�����������������������
4.7
�����������������������
�����������������������
4.5
�����������������������
�����������������������
4.7
�����������������������
�����������������������
�����������������������
�����������������������

1 Beginning May 2020, M1 includes savings deposits. Prior to May 2020, savings deposits were not included in M1. See the H.6 statistical release for
additional details.
2 Money market mutual fund (MMMF). Savings deposits include money market deposit accounts.
3 Consists of outstanding debt securities and loans of the U.S. Government, State and local governments, and private nonfinancial sectors. Quarterly data
shown in last month of quarter. End-of-year data are for fourth quarter.
4 Annual changes are from December to December; monthly changes are from six months earlier at an annual rate.
5 Debt growth of domestic nonfinancial sectors is the seasonally adjusted borrowing flow divided by the seasonally adjusted level of debt outstanding in the
previous period. Annual changes are from fourth quarter to fourth quarter; quarterly changes are from previous quarter at an annual rate.
Note: For further information on the composition of M1 and M2, see the H.6 release.
For further information on the debt of domestic nonfinancial sectors and the derivation of debt growth, see the Z.1 release.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

436 |

Appendix B

Table B–41. Consumer credit outstanding, 1973–2024
[Amount outstanding (end of month); millions of dollars, seasonally adjusted]
Year and month
December:
1973 ���������������������������������������������
1974 ���������������������������������������������
1975 ���������������������������������������������
1976 ���������������������������������������������
1977 ���������������������������������������������
1978 ���������������������������������������������
1979 ���������������������������������������������
1980 ���������������������������������������������
1981 ���������������������������������������������
1982 ���������������������������������������������
1983 ���������������������������������������������
1984 ���������������������������������������������
1985 ���������������������������������������������
1986 ���������������������������������������������
1987 ���������������������������������������������
1988 3 �������������������������������������������
1989 ���������������������������������������������
1990 ���������������������������������������������
1991 ���������������������������������������������
1992 ���������������������������������������������
1993 ���������������������������������������������
1994 ���������������������������������������������
1995 ���������������������������������������������
1996 ���������������������������������������������
1997 ���������������������������������������������
1998 ���������������������������������������������
1999 ���������������������������������������������
2000 ���������������������������������������������
2001 ���������������������������������������������
2002 ���������������������������������������������
2003 ���������������������������������������������
2004 ���������������������������������������������
2005 3 �������������������������������������������
2006 ���������������������������������������������
2007 ���������������������������������������������
2008 ���������������������������������������������
2009 ���������������������������������������������
2010 3 �������������������������������������������
2011 ���������������������������������������������
2012 ���������������������������������������������
2013 ���������������������������������������������
2014 ���������������������������������������������
2015 3 �������������������������������������������
2016 ���������������������������������������������
2017 ���������������������������������������������
2018 ���������������������������������������������
2019 ���������������������������������������������
2020 ���������������������������������������������
2021 ���������������������������������������������
2022 ���������������������������������������������
2023 ���������������������������������������������
2023: Jan �������������������������������������������
      Feb �������������������������������������������
      Mar ������������������������������������������
      Apr �������������������������������������������
      May ������������������������������������������
      June �����������������������������������������
      July ������������������������������������������
      Aug ������������������������������������������
      Sept �����������������������������������������
      Oct �������������������������������������������
      Nov ������������������������������������������
      Dec �������������������������������������������
2024: Jan �������������������������������������������
      Feb �������������������������������������������
      Mar ������������������������������������������
      Apr �������������������������������������������
      May ������������������������������������������
      June �����������������������������������������
      July ������������������������������������������
      Aug ������������������������������������������
      Sept �����������������������������������������
      Oct p �����������������������������������������

Total
consumer
credit 1

Nonrevolving 2

Revolving

190,086.31
198,917.84
204,002.00
225,721.59
260,562.70
306,100.39
348,589.11
351,920.05
371,301.44
389,848.74
437,068.86
517,278.98
599,711.23
654,750.24
686,318.77
731,917.76
794,612.18
808,230.57
798,028.97
806,118.69
865,650.58
997,301.74
1,140,744.36
1,253,437.09
1,324,757.33
1,420,996.44
1,531,105.96
1,716,969.72
1,867,852.87
1,972,112.21
2,077,360.69
2,192,246.17
2,290,928.13
2,456,715.70
2,609,476.53
2,643,788.96
2,555,016.64
2,646,811.26
2,756,224.85
2,912,905.02
3,090,467.79
3,309,539.83
3,400,223.22
3,636,435.65
3,830,751.63
4,007,041.92
4,192,191.45
4,184,852.53
4,548,529.88
4,894,243.59
5,023,696.41
4,912,509.90
4,924,094.62
4,943,543.57
4,957,277.43
4,962,664.73
4,986,482.03
4,999,503.29
4,981,690.62
4,991,355.14
4,999,659.91
5,016,854.50
5,023,696.41
5,039,309.88
5,050,397.19
5,048,180.06
5,049,732.94
5,059,304.32
5,061,610.82
5,085,597.38
5,090,165.79
5,093,374.69
5,112,614.12

11,342.22
13,241.26
14,495.27
16,489.05
37,414.82
45,690.95
53,596.43
54,970.05
60,928.00
66,348.30
79,027.25
100,385.63
124,465.80
141,068.15
160,853.91
184,593.12
211,229.83
238,642.62
263,768.55
278,449.67
309,908.02
365,569.56
443,920.09
507,516.57
540,005.56
581,414.78
610,696.47
682,646.37
714,840.73
750,947.45
768,258.31
799,552.18
829,518.36
923,876.78
1,001,625.30
1,003,997.04
916,076.63
839,102.67
840,164.23
839,980.84
854,138.80
887,381.64
898,082.65
960,095.49
1,016,806.67
1,053,847.42
1,091,988.96
974,594.44
1,053,523.79
1,212,599.87
1,318,813.24
1,221,135.83
1,226,513.53
1,240,618.20
1,252,098.39
1,259,996.69
1,266,325.98
1,276,251.31
1,287,789.32
1,294,539.20
1,299,020.49
1,312,506.16
1,318,813.24
1,328,294.04
1,339,506.41
1,340,308.10
1,340,895.44
1,349,310.82
1,347,886.44
1,357,953.85
1,356,151.27
1,357,786.28
1,373,502.45

178,744.09
185,676.58
189,506.73
209,232.54
223,147.88
260,409.43
294,992.67
296,950.00
310,373.44
323,500.44
358,041.61
416,893.35
475,245.43
513,682.08
525,464.86
547,324.64
583,382.34
569,587.95
534,260.42
527,669.02
555,742.56
631,732.19
696,824.27
745,920.52
784,751.77
839,581.66
920,409.49
1,034,323.35
1,153,012.14
1,221,164.76
1,309,102.38
1,392,693.99
1,461,409.78
1,532,838.92
1,607,851.24
1,639,791.92
1,638,940.01
1,807,708.59
1,916,060.62
2,072,924.19
2,236,328.98
2,422,158.19
2,502,140.57
2,676,340.16
2,813,944.95
2,953,194.50
3,100,202.49
3,210,258.08
3,495,006.09
3,681,643.72
3,704,883.17
3,691,374.07
3,697,581.09
3,702,925.37
3,705,179.04
3,702,668.05
3,720,156.04
3,723,251.97
3,693,901.30
3,696,815.94
3,700,639.41
3,704,348.34
3,704,883.17
3,711,015.84
3,710,890.77
3,707,871.96
3,708,837.51
3,709,993.50
3,713,724.38
3,727,643.53
3,734,014.51
3,735,588.41
3,739,111.66

1 Covers most short- and intermediate-term credit extended to individuals. Credit secured by real estate is excluded.
2 Includes automobile loans and all other loans not included in revolving credit, such as loans for mobile homes, education, boats, trailers, or vacations.

These loans may be secured or unsecured. Beginning with 1977, includes student loans extended by the Federal Government and by SLM Holding Corporation.
3 Data newly available result in breaks in these series between the prior period and subsequent months.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

Money Stock, Credit, and Finance | 437

Table B–42. Bond yields and interest rates, 1953–2024
[Percent per annum]
U.S. Treasury securities
Bills
(at auction) 1

Year

3-month 6-month 3-year
1953 �������������������
1954 �������������������
1955 �������������������
1956 �������������������
1957 �������������������
1958 �������������������
1959 �������������������
1960 �������������������
1961 �������������������
1962 �������������������
1963 �������������������
1964 �������������������
1965 �������������������
1966 �������������������
1967 �������������������
1968 �������������������
1969 �������������������
1970 �������������������
1971 �������������������
1972 �������������������
1973 �������������������
1974 �������������������
1975 �������������������
1976 �������������������
1977 �������������������
1978 �������������������
1979 �������������������
1980 �������������������
1981 �������������������
1982 �������������������
1983 �������������������
1984 �������������������
1985 �������������������
1986 �������������������
1987 �������������������
1988 �������������������
1989 �������������������
1990 �������������������
1991 �������������������
1992 �������������������
1993 �������������������
1994 �������������������
1995 �������������������
1996 �������������������
1997 �������������������
1998 �������������������
1999 �������������������
2000 �������������������
2001 �������������������
2002 �������������������
2003 �������������������
2004 �������������������
2005 �������������������
2006 �������������������
2007 �������������������
2008 �������������������
2009 �������������������
2010 �������������������
2011 �������������������
2012 �������������������
2013 �������������������
2014 �������������������
2015 �������������������
2016 �������������������
2017 �������������������
2018 �������������������
2019 �������������������
2020 �������������������
2021 �������������������
2022 �������������������
2023 �������������������

1.931
.953
1.753
2.658
3.267
1.839
3.405
2.93
2.38
2.78
3.16
3.56
3.95
4.88
4.32
5.34
6.68
6.43
4.35
4.07
7.04
7.89
5.84
4.99
5.27
7.22
10.05
11.51
14.03
10.69
8.63
9.53
7.47
5.98
5.82
6.69
8.12
7.51
5.42
3.45
3.02
4.29
5.51
5.02
5.07
4.81
4.66
5.85
3.44
1.62
1.01
1.38
3.16
4.73
4.41
1.48
.16
.14
.06
.09
.06
.03
.06
.33
.94
1.94
2.08
.38
.04
2.04
5.08

������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
3.832
3.25
2.61
2.91
3.25
3.69
4.05
5.08
4.63
5.47
6.85
6.53
4.51
4.47
7.18
7.93
6.12
5.27
5.52
7.58
10.02
11.37
13.78
11.08
8.75
9.77
7.64
6.03
6.05
6.92
8.04
7.47
5.49
3.57
3.14
4.66
5.59
5.09
5.18
4.85
4.76
5.92
3.39
1.69
1.06
1.57
3.40
4.80
4.48
1.71
.29
.20
.10
.13
.09
.06
.17
.46
1.05
2.10
2.07
.39
.06
2.44
5.08

Corporate
bonds
(Moody’s)

Constant
maturities 2

2.47
1.63
2.47
3.19
3.98
2.84
4.46
3.98
3.54
3.47
3.67
4.03
4.22
5.23
5.03
5.68
7.02
7.29
5.66
5.72
6.96
7.84
7.50
6.77
6.68
8.29
9.70
11.51
14.46
12.93
10.45
11.92
9.64
7.06
7.68
8.26
8.55
8.26
6.82
5.30
4.44
6.27
6.25
5.99
6.10
5.14
5.49
6.22
4.09
3.10
2.10
2.78
3.93
4.77
4.35
2.24
1.43
1.11
.75
.38
.54
.90
1.02
1.00
1.58
2.63
1.94
.42
.46
3.05
4.30

10-year 30-year
2.85
2.40
2.82
3.18
3.65
3.32
4.33
4.12
3.88
3.95
4.00
4.19
4.28
4.93
5.07
5.64
6.67
7.35
6.16
6.21
6.85
7.56
7.99
7.61
7.42
8.41
9.43
11.43
13.92
13.01
11.10
12.46
10.62
7.67
8.39
8.85
8.49
8.55
7.86
7.01
5.87
7.09
6.57
6.44
6.35
5.26
5.65
6.03
5.02
4.61
4.01
4.27
4.29
4.80
4.63
3.66
3.26
3.22
2.78
1.80
2.35
2.54
2.14
1.84
2.33
2.91
2.14
.89
1.45
2.95
3.96

������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
������������
7.75
8.49
9.28
11.27
13.45
12.76
11.18
12.41
10.79
7.78
8.59
8.96
8.45
8.61
8.14
7.67
6.59
7.37
6.88
6.71
6.61
5.58
5.87
5.94
5.49
5.43
������������
������������
������������
4.91
4.84
4.28
4.08
4.25
3.91
2.92
3.45
3.34
2.84
2.59
2.89
3.11
2.58
1.56
2.06
3.11
4.09

Aaa 3
3.20
2.90
3.06
3.36
3.89
3.79
4.38
4.41
4.35
4.33
4.26
4.40
4.49
5.13
5.51
6.18
7.03
8.04
7.39
7.21
7.44
8.57
8.83
8.43
8.02
8.73
9.63
11.94
14.17
13.79
12.04
12.71
11.37
9.02
9.38
9.71
9.26
9.32
8.77
8.14
7.22
7.96
7.59
7.37
7.26
6.53
7.04
7.62
7.08
6.49
5.67
5.63
5.24
5.59
5.56
5.63
5.31
4.94
4.64
3.67
4.24
4.16
3.89
3.67
3.74
3.93
3.39
2.48
2.70
4.07
4.81

Baa
3.74
3.51
3.53
3.88
4.71
4.73
5.05
5.19
5.08
5.02
4.86
4.83
4.87
5.67
6.23
6.94
7.81
9.11
8.56
8.16
8.24
9.50
10.61
9.75
8.97
9.49
10.69
13.67
16.04
16.11
13.55
14.19
12.72
10.39
10.58
10.83
10.18
10.36
9.80
8.98
7.93
8.62
8.20
8.05
7.86
7.22
7.87
8.36
7.95
7.80
6.77
6.39
6.06
6.48
6.48
7.45
7.30
6.04
5.66
4.94
5.10
4.85
5.00
4.72
4.44
4.80
4.38
3.60
3.39
5.07
5.86

Highgrade
municipal Home
bonds mortgage
(Stanyields 4
dard &
Poor’s)
2.72
2.37
2.53
2.93
3.60
3.56
3.95
3.73
3.46
3.18
3.23
3.22
3.27
3.82
3.98
4.51
5.81
6.51
5.70
5.27
5.18
6.09
6.89
6.49
5.56
5.90
6.39
8.51
11.23
11.57
9.47
10.15
9.18
7.38
7.73
7.76
7.24
7.25
6.89
6.41
5.63
6.19
5.95
5.75
5.55
5.12
5.43
5.77
5.19
5.05
4.73
4.63
4.29
4.42
4.42
4.80
4.64
4.16
4.29
3.14
3.96
3.78
3.48
3.07
3.36
3.53
3.38
2.41
2.00
3.85
4.31

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���������������
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���������������
���������������
���������������
���������������
���������������
���������������
���������������
���������������
���������������
���������������
���������������
���������������
���������������
���������������
7.54
7.38
8.04
9.19
9.05
8.87
8.85
9.64
11.20
13.74
16.63
16.04
13.24
13.88
12.43
10.19
10.21
10.34
10.32
10.13
9.25
8.39
7.31
8.38
7.93
7.81
7.60
6.94
7.44
8.05
6.97
6.54
5.83
5.84
5.87
6.41
6.34
6.03
5.04
4.69
4.45
3.66
3.98
4.17
3.85
3.65
3.99
4.54
3.94
3.11
2.96
5.34
6.81

Prime
rate
charged
by
banks 5
3.17
3.05
3.16
3.77
4.20
3.83
4.48
4.82
4.50
4.50
4.50
4.50
4.54
5.63
5.63
6.31
7.96
7.91
5.73
5.25
8.03
10.81
7.86
6.84
6.83
9.06
12.67
15.26
18.87
14.85
10.79
12.04
9.93
8.33
8.21
9.32
10.87
10.01
8.46
6.25
6.00
7.15
8.83
8.27
8.44
8.35
8.00
9.23
6.91
4.67
4.12
4.34
6.19
7.96
8.05
5.09
3.25
3.25
3.25
3.25
3.25
3.25
3.26
3.51
4.10
4.91
5.28
3.54
3.25
4.86
8.20

Discount window
(Federal Reserve Bank
of New York) 5, 6
Primary Adjustment
credit
credit
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����������������
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����������������
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2.12
2.34
4.19
5.96
5.86
2.39
.50
.72
.75
.75
.75
.75
.76
1.01
1.60
2.41
2.78
.64
.25
1.86
5.20

Federal
funds
rate 7

1.99 ���������������
1.60 ���������������
1.89
1.79
2.77
2.73
3.12
3.11
2.15
1.57
3.36
3.31
3.53
3.21
3.00
1.95
3.00
2.71
3.23
3.18
3.55
3.50
4.04
4.07
4.50
5.11
4.19
4.22
5.17
5.66
5.87
8.21
5.95
7.17
4.88
4.67
4.50
4.44
6.45
8.74
7.83
10.51
6.25
5.82
5.50
5.05
5.46
5.54
7.46
7.94
10.29
11.20
11.77
13.35
13.42
16.39
11.01
12.24
8.50
9.09
8.80
10.23
7.69
8.10
6.32
6.80
5.66
6.66
6.20
7.57
6.93
9.21
6.98
8.10
5.45
5.69
3.25
3.52
3.00
3.02
3.60
4.21
5.21
5.83
5.02
5.30
5.00
5.46
4.92
5.35
4.62
4.97
5.73
6.24
3.40
3.88
1.17
1.67
����������������
1.13
����������������
1.35
����������������
3.22
����������������
4.97
����������������
5.02
����������������
1.92
����������������
.16
����������������
.18
����������������
.10
����������������
.14
����������������
.11
����������������
.09
����������������
.13
����������������
.39
����������������
1.00
����������������
1.83
����������������
2.16
����������������
.37
����������������
.08
����������������
1.69
����������������
5.03

1 High bill rate at auction, issue date within period, bank-discount basis. On or after October 28, 1998, data are stop yields from uniform-price auctions.
Before that date, they are weighted average yields from multiple-price auctions.
See next page for continuation of table.

438 |

Appendix B

Table B–42. Bond yields and interest rates, 1953–2024—Continued
[Percent per annum]
U.S. Treasury securities
Year and month

Bills
(at auction) 1
3-month 6-month 3-year

2020: Jan ����������
      Feb ����������
      Mar ���������
      Apr ����������
      May ���������
      June ��������
      July ���������
      Aug ���������
      Sept ��������
      Oct ����������
      Nov ���������
      Dec ����������
2021: Jan ����������
      Feb ����������
      Mar ���������
      Apr ����������
      May ���������
      June ��������
      July ���������
      Aug ���������
      Sept ��������
      Oct ����������
      Nov ���������
      Dec ����������
2022: Jan ����������
      Feb ����������
      Mar ���������
      Apr ����������
      May ���������
      June ��������
      July ���������
      Aug ���������
      Sept ��������
      Oct ����������
      Nov ���������
      Dec ����������
2023: Jan ����������
      Feb ����������
      Mar ���������
      Apr ����������
      May ���������
      June ��������
      July ���������
      Aug ���������
      Sept ��������
      Oct ����������
      Nov ���������
      Dec ����������
2024: Jan ����������
      Feb ����������
      Mar ���������
      Apr ����������
      May ���������
      June ��������
      July ���������
      Aug ���������
      Sept ��������
      Oct ����������
      Nov ���������

1.53
1.54
.46
.15
.12
.16
.13
.10
.11
.10
.09
.09
.09
.04
.03
.02
.02
.03
.05
.06
.04
.05
.05
.06
.14
.34
.46
.80
.98
1.48
2.24
2.61
3.09
3.67
4.14
4.29
4.53
4.65
4.72
4.98
5.14
5.20
5.25
5.30
5.32
5.33
5.29
5.26
5.23
5.23
5.24
5.24
5.25
5.25
5.21
5.07
4.79
4.51
4.42

1.53
1.50
.45
.17
.15
.18
.15
.12
.12
.11
.10
.09
.09
.06
.05
.04
.03
.04
.05
.05
.05
.06
.07
.14
.31
.64
.82
1.24
1.46
2.07
2.75
3.01
3.53
4.13
4.47
4.58
4.68
4.80
4.78
4.80
4.99
5.22
5.26
5.29
5.30
5.33
5.26
5.15
5.02
5.07
5.11
5.14
5.16
5.15
5.04
4.78
4.46
4.29
4.31

1.52
1.31
.50
.28
.22
.22
.17
.16
.16
.19
.22
.19
.20
.21
.32
.35
.32
.39
.40
.42
.47
.67
.82
.95
1.25
1.65
2.09
2.72
2.79
3.15
3.03
3.23
3.88
4.38
4.34
4.05
3.91
4.23
4.09
3.76
3.82
4.27
4.47
4.59
4.74
4.89
4.64
4.19
4.11
4.33
4.38
4.71
4.66
4.50
4.29
3.79
3.51
3.90
4.21

10-year 30-year

1.76
1.50
.87
.66
.67
.73
.62
.65
.68
.79
.87
.93
1.08
1.26
1.61
1.64
1.62
1.52
1.32
1.28
1.37
1.58
1.56
1.47
1.76
1.93
2.13
2.75
2.90
3.14
2.90
2.90
3.52
3.98
3.89
3.62
3.53
3.75
3.66
3.46
3.57
3.75
3.90
4.17
4.38
4.80
4.50
4.02
4.06
4.21
4.21
4.54
4.48
4.31
4.25
3.87
3.72
4.10
4.36

Highgrade
municipal Home
bonds mortgage
(Stanyields 4
dard &
Poor’s)

Corporate
bonds
(Moody’s)

Constant
maturities 2

2.22
1.97
1.46
1.27
1.38
1.49
1.31
1.36
1.42
1.57
1.62
1.67
1.82
2.04
2.34
2.30
2.32
2.16
1.94
1.92
1.94
2.06
1.94
1.85
2.10
2.25
2.41
2.81
3.07
3.25
3.10
3.13
3.56
4.04
4.00
3.66
3.66
3.80
3.77
3.68
3.86
3.87
3.96
4.28
4.47
4.95
4.66
4.14
4.26
4.38
4.36
4.66
4.62
4.44
4.46
4.15
4.04
4.38
4.54

Aaa 3

2.94
2.78
3.02
2.43
2.49
2.41
2.14
2.25
2.31
2.35
2.30
2.26
2.45
2.70
3.04
2.90
2.96
2.79
2.57
2.55
2.53
2.68
2.62
2.65
2.93
3.25
3.43
3.76
4.13
4.24
4.06
4.07
4.59
5.10
4.90
4.43
4.40
4.56
4.60
4.47
4.67
4.65
4.66
4.95
5.13
5.61
5.28
4.74
4.87
5.03
5.01
5.28
5.25
5.13
5.12
4.87
4.68
4.95
5.14

Baa

3.77
3.61
4.29
4.13
3.95
3.65
3.31
3.27
3.36
3.44
3.30
3.16
3.24
3.42
3.74
3.60
3.62
3.44
3.24
3.24
3.23
3.35
3.28
3.30
3.58
3.97
4.29
4.66
5.12
5.27
5.21
5.15
5.69
6.26
6.07
5.59
5.50
5.59
5.71
5.53
5.77
5.75
5.74
6.02
6.16
6.63
6.29
5.64
5.68
5.77
5.75
6.00
5.95
5.82
5.84
5.60
5.42
5.63
5.78

3.00
2.66
3.07
2.86
2.69
2.69
1.75
1.88
2.10
2.15
2.10
1.97
1.61
1.13
1.74
1.84
1.63
2.16
2.22
2.38
2.30
2.43
2.30
2.24
2.47
2.78
3.22
3.74
4.06
4.01
3.96
3.99
4.53
4.70
4.52
4.19
4.03
4.18
4.19
4.06
4.20
4.14
4.19
4.43
4.58
4.99
4.62
4.09
4.24
4.16
4.17
4.36
4.28
4.21
4.21
4.16
4.09
4.21
4.19

3.62
3.47
3.45
3.31
3.23
3.16
3.02
2.94
2.89
2.83
2.77
2.68
2.74
2.81
3.08
3.06
2.96
2.98
2.87
2.84
2.90
3.07
3.07
3.10
3.45
3.76
4.17
4.98
5.23
5.52
5.41
5.22
6.11
6.90
6.81
6.36
6.27
6.26
6.54
6.34
6.43
6.71
6.84
7.07
7.20
7.62
7.44
6.82
6.64
6.78
6.82
6.99
7.06
6.92
6.85
6.50
6.18
6.43
6.81

Prime
rate
charged
by
banks 5

Discount window
(Federal Reserve Bank
of New York) 5, 6
Primary Adjustment
credit
credit

High-low

High-low

High-low

4.75–4.75
4.75–4.75
4.75–3.25
3.25–3.25
3.25–3.25
3.25–3.25
3.25–3.25
3.25–3.25
3.25–3.25
3.25–3.25
3.25–3.25
3.25–3.25
3.25–3.25
3.25–3.25
3.25–3.25
3.25–3.25
3.25–3.25
3.25–3.25
3.25–3.25
3.25–3.25
3.25–3.25
3.25–3.25
3.25–3.25
3.25–3.25
3.25–3.25
3.25–3.25
3.50–3.25
3.50–3.50
4.00–3.50
4.75–4.00
5.50–4.75
5.50–5.50
6.25–5.50
6.25–6.25
7.00–6.25
7.50–7.00
7.50–7.50
7.75–7.50
8.00–7.75
8.00–8.00
8.25–8.00
8.25–8.25
8.50–8.25
8.50–8.50
8.50–8.50
8.50–8.50
8.50–8.50
8.50–8.50
8.50–8.50
8.50–8.50
8.50–8.50
8.50–8.50
8.50–8.50
8.50–8.50
8.50–8.50
8.50–8.50
8.50–8.00
8.00–8.00
8.00–7.75

2.25–2.25
2.25–2.25
2.25–0.25
0.25–0.25
0.25–0.25
0.25–0.25
0.25–0.25
0.25–0.25
0.25–0.25
0.25–0.25
0.25–0.25
0.25–0.25
0.25–0.25
0.25–0.25
0.25–0.25
0.25–0.25
0.25–0.25
0.25–0.25
0.25–0.25
0.25–0.25
0.25–0.25
0.25–0.25
0.25–0.25
0.25–0.25
0.25–0.25
0.25–0.25
0.50–0.25
0.50–0.50
1.00–0.50
1.75–1.00
2.50–1.75
2.50–2.50
3.25–2.50
3.25–3.25
4.00–3.25
4.50–4.00
4.50–4.50
4.75–4.50
5.00–4.75
5.00–5.00
5.25–5.00
5.25–5.25
5.50–5.25
5.50–5.50
5.50–5.50
5.50–5.50
5.50–5.50
5.50–5.50
5.50–5.50
5.50–5.50
5.50–5.50
5.50–5.50
5.50–5.50
5.50–5.50
5.50–5.50
5.50–5.50
5.50–5.00
5.00–5.00
5.00–4.75

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Federal
funds
rate 7

1.55
1.58
.65
.05
.05
.08
.09
.10
.09
.09
.09
.09
.09
.08
.07
.07
.06
.08
.10
.09
.08
.08
.08
.08
.08
.08
.20
.33
.77
1.21
1.68
2.33
2.56
3.08
3.78
4.10
4.33
4.57
4.65
4.83
5.06
5.08
5.12
5.33
5.33
5.33
5.33
5.33
5.33
5.33
5.33
5.33
5.33
5.33
5.33
5.33
5.13
4.83
4.64

2 Yields on the more actively traded issues adjusted to constant maturities by the Department of the Treasury. The 30-year Treasury constant maturity series
was discontinued on February 18, 2002, and reintroduced on February 9, 2006.
3 Beginning with December 7, 2001, data for corporate Aaa series are industrial bonds only.
4 Contract interest rate on commitments for 30-year first-lien prime conventional conforming home purchase mortgage with a loan-to-value of 80 percent.
5 For monthly data, high and low for the period.
6 Primary credit replaced adjustment credit as the Federal Reserve’s principal discount window lending program effective January 9, 2003.
7 Beginning March 1, 2016, the daily effective federal funds rate is a volume-weighted median of transaction-level data collected from depository institutions
in the Report of Selected Money Market Rates (FR 2420). Between July 21, 1975 and February 29, 2016, the daily effective rate was a volume-weighted mean
of rates on brokered trades. Prior to that, the daily effective rate was the rate considered most representative of the day’s transactions, usually the one at which
most transactions occurred.
Sources: Department of the Treasury, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Moody’s Investors
Service, Bloomberg, and Standard & Poor’s.

Money Stock, Credit, and Finance | 439

Table B–43. Mortgage debt outstanding by type of property and of financing, 1964–2024
[Billions of dollars]
Nonfarm properties

End of year or quarter

1964 �����������������������������������
1965 �����������������������������������
1966 �����������������������������������
1967 �����������������������������������
1968 �����������������������������������
1969 �����������������������������������
1970 �����������������������������������
1971 �����������������������������������
1972 �����������������������������������
1973 �����������������������������������
1974 �����������������������������������
1975 �����������������������������������
1976 �����������������������������������
1977 �����������������������������������
1978 �����������������������������������
1979 �����������������������������������
1980 �����������������������������������
1981 �����������������������������������
1982 �����������������������������������
1983 �����������������������������������
1984 �����������������������������������
1985 �����������������������������������
1986 �����������������������������������
1987 �����������������������������������
1988 �����������������������������������
1989 �����������������������������������
1990 �����������������������������������
1991 �����������������������������������
1992 �����������������������������������
1993 �����������������������������������
1994 �����������������������������������
1995 �����������������������������������
1996 �����������������������������������
1997 �����������������������������������
1998 �����������������������������������
1999 �����������������������������������
2000 �����������������������������������
2001 �����������������������������������
2002 �����������������������������������
2003 �����������������������������������
2004 �����������������������������������
2005 �����������������������������������
2006 �����������������������������������
2007 �����������������������������������
2008 �����������������������������������
2009 �����������������������������������
2010 �����������������������������������
2011 �����������������������������������
2012 �����������������������������������
2013 �����������������������������������
2014 �����������������������������������
2015 �����������������������������������
2016 �����������������������������������
2017 �����������������������������������
2018 �����������������������������������
2019 �����������������������������������
2020 �����������������������������������
2021 �����������������������������������
2022 �����������������������������������
2023 �����������������������������������
2023: I �������������������������������
      II ������������������������������
      III �����������������������������
      IV �����������������������������
2024: I �������������������������������
      II p ����������������������������

All
properties

307.0
334.5
358.5
382.1
411.4
439.9
469.4
517.9
589.8
666.5
728.4
785.6
870.5
999.2
1,150.7
1,317.0
1,457.8
1,579.5
1,661.3
1,850.6
2,092.0
2,368.5
2,655.6
2,958.0
3,277.1
3,529.0
3,785.7
3,937.3
4,047.3
4,177.7
4,342.3
4,528.8
4,808.9
5,121.5
5,609.7
6,216.6
6,773.3
7,456.6
8,365.4
9,379.6
10,663.7
12,129.5
13,544.6
14,632.9
14,710.5
14,465.4
13,913.2
13,586.0
13,346.8
13,350.0
13,490.1
13,876.4
14,319.2
14,895.3
15,444.2
16,020.8
16,762.4
18,281.6
19,514.0
20,123.1
19,657.3
19,803.3
19,976.5
20,123.1
20,210.0
20,347.4

Farm
properties

18.9
21.2
23.1
25.0
27.2
29.0
30.5
32.4
35.4
39.8
44.9
49.9
55.4
63.9
72.8
86.8
97.5
107.2
111.3
113.7
112.4
94.1
84.1
75.8
70.8
68.8
67.6
67.5
67.9
68.4
69.9
71.7
74.4
78.5
83.1
87.2
84.7
88.5
95.4
83.2
95.7
104.8
108.0
112.7
134.7
146.0
154.1
167.2
173.4
185.2
196.8
208.8
226.0
236.2
245.8
267.9
288.6
324.4
334.8
355.0
339.8
344.8
349.9
355.0
360.5
366.0

Nonfarm properties by type of mortgage

Total

288.1
313.3
335.5
357.0
384.2
410.9
438.9
485.5
554.4
626.7
683.5
735.7
815.1
935.3
1,077.9
1,230.3
1,360.3
1,472.3
1,550.0
1,736.9
1,979.6
2,274.5
2,571.5
2,882.2
3,206.2
3,460.2
3,718.1
3,869.8
3,979.4
4,109.3
4,272.4
4,457.1
4,734.5
5,043.0
5,526.6
6,129.4
6,688.5
7,368.0
8,270.0
9,296.5
10,568.0
12,024.8
13,436.6
14,520.2
14,575.8
14,319.4
13,759.1
13,418.8
13,173.4
13,164.8
13,293.3
13,667.6
14,093.2
14,659.1
15,198.4
15,752.9
16,473.8
17,957.2
19,179.2
19,768.1
19,317.5
19,458.4
19,626.6
19,768.1
19,849.5
19,981.4

1- to 4family
houses

Multifamily
properties

202.3
219.4
232.7
246.0
262.9
278.7
292.2
318.4
357.4
399.8
435.2
474.0
535.0
627.7
738.3
855.8
957.9
1,030.2
1,070.2
1,186.3
1,321.5
1,526.9
1,730.1
1,928.9
2,163.3
2,370.0
2,607.4
2,775.2
2,942.6
3,101.6
3,279.1
3,447.0
3,683.3
3,918.0
4,276.4
4,701.7
5,125.5
5,678.5
6,434.9
7,264.7
8,297.5
9,454.0
10,536.9
11,260.5
11,157.8
10,967.4
10,530.0
10,286.8
10,051.3
9,957.4
9,933.2
10,067.3
10,265.4
10,581.2
10,880.7
11,165.6
11,631.9
12,762.9
13,571.7
13,951.7
13,636.5
13,733.3
13,855.1
13,951.7
13,989.6
14,094.0

34.6
38.2
41.3
44.8
48.3
53.2
60.1
70.1
82.9
93.2
100.0
100.7
105.9
114.3
125.2
135.0
142.5
142.4
146.1
161.2
186.1
205.9
239.4
258.7
275.1
287.6
288.1
284.8
271.7
268.5
269.3
275.3
287.6
299.6
335.4
376.1
405.4
447.0
487.3
563.8
614.2
679.3
723.1
817.9
859.1
868.6
868.9
868.4
894.9
940.5
1,008.0
1,113.8
1,228.4
1,355.1
1,478.9
1,615.1
1,743.7
1,896.8
2,058.9
2,162.7
2,091.5
2,116.1
2,139.4
2,162.7
2,186.3
2,206.1

Commercial
properties
51.2
55.7
61.5
66.2
73.0
79.1
86.5
97.0
114.2
133.7
148.3
161.0
174.2
193.3
214.5
239.4
259.9
299.7
333.7
389.4
471.9
541.7
602.0
694.5
767.9
802.6
822.6
809.7
765.2
739.1
724.0
734.8
763.6
825.4
914.7
1,051.5
1,157.6
1,242.4
1,347.8
1,468.0
1,656.3
1,891.5
2,176.5
2,441.7
2,559.0
2,483.3
2,360.3
2,263.7
2,227.2
2,266.9
2,352.1
2,486.6
2,599.4
2,722.8
2,838.8
2,972.3
3,098.2
3,297.5
3,548.6
3,653.7
3,589.5
3,609.0
3,632.1
3,653.7
3,673.5
3,681.3

1- to 4-family houses
Total 1

77.2
81.2
84.1
88.2
93.4
100.2
109.2
120.7
131.1
135.0
140.2
147.0
154.0
161.7
176.4
199.0
225.1
238.9
248.9
279.8
294.8
328.3
370.5
431.4
459.7
486.8
517.9
537.2
533.3
513.4
559.3
584.3
620.3
656.7
674.0
731.5
773.1
772.7
759.3
709.2
660.2
606.6
600.2
609.2
807.2
1,005.0
1,227.6
1,368.6
1,544.8
3,927.2
4,130.9
4,432.7
4,764.8
5,079.1
5,380.0
5,664.1
6,053.8
6,480.3
6,784.7
7,053.2
6,839.1
6,909.2
6,687.8
7,053.2
7,115.1
7,191.2

Total

FHAinsured

69.2
73.1
76.1
79.9
84.4
90.2
97.3
105.2
113.0
116.2
121.3
127.7
133.5
141.6
153.4
172.9
195.2
207.6
217.9
248.8
265.9
288.8
328.6
387.9
414.2
440.1
470.9
493.3
489.8
469.5
514.2
537.1
571.2
605.7
623.8
678.8
719.9
718.5
704.0
653.3
604.1
550.4
543.5
552.6
750.7
944.3
1,156.1
1,291.3
1,459.7
3,832.6
4,028.1
4,326.7
4,654.9
4,958.2
5,246.5
5,522.9
5,908.0
6,325.5
6,626.5
6,889.9
6,679.1
6,747.5
6,525.2
6,889.9
6,951.2
7,026.0

38.3
42.0
44.8
47.4
50.6
54.5
59.9
65.7
68.2
66.2
65.1
66.1
66.5
68.0
71.4
81.0
93.6
101.3
108.0
127.4
136.7
153.0
185.5
235.5
258.8
282.8
310.9
330.6
326.0
303.2
336.8
352.3
379.2
405.7
417.9
462.3
499.9
497.4
486.2
438.7
398.1
348.4
336.9
342.6
534.0
752.6
934.4
1,036.0
1,165.4
3,480.8
3,615.3
3,851.3
4,106.9
4,344.3
4,562.3
4,788.6
5,108.2
5,442.1
5,670.9
5,884.1
5,711.7
5,767.8
5,530.5
5,884.1
5,935.8
5,996.5

VAguaranteed

1 Includes Federal Housing Administration (FHA)–insured multi-family properties, not shown separately.
2 Derived figures. Total includes multi-family and commercial properties with conventional mortgages, not shown separately.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, based on data from various Government and private organizations.

440 |

Appendix B

Conventional 2

Government underwritten

30.9
31.1
31.3
32.5
33.8
35.7
37.3
39.5
44.7
50.0
56.2
61.6
67.0
73.6
82.0
92.0
101.6
106.2
109.9
121.4
129.1
135.8
143.1
152.4
155.4
157.3
160.0
162.7
163.8
166.2
177.3
184.7
192.0
200.0
205.9
216.5
220.1
221.2
217.7
214.6
206.0
202.0
206.6
210.0
216.7
191.7
221.7
255.3
294.2
351.8
412.8
475.4
548.1
613.9
684.2
734.3
799.7
883.4
955.5
1,005.8
967.4
979.7
994.7
1,005.8
1,015.5
1,029.5

Total

1- to 4family
houses

210.9
133.1
232.2
146.3
251.4
156.7
268.9
166.0
290.8
178.5
310.7
188.5
329.6
195.0
364.8
213.2
423.3
244.4
491.7
283.6
543.3
313.9
588.7
346.3
661.1
401.5
773.5
486.1
901.5
584.9
1,031.3
682.8
1,135.3
762.7
1,233.4
822.6
1,301.1
852.3
1,457.1
937.4
1,684.7 1,055.7
1,946.1 1,238.1
2,201.0 1,401.5
2,450.7 1,541.0
2,746.6 1,749.1
2,973.4 1,929.9
3,200.1 2,136.5
3,332.6 2,281.9
3,446.1 2,452.9
3,595.9 2,632.2
3,713.0 2,764.9
3,872.8 2,909.9
4,114.2 3,112.1
4,386.3 3,312.3
4,852.5 3,652.6
5,397.9 4,023.0
5,915.4 4,405.5
6,595.4 4,960.0
7,510.7 5,730.9
8,587.3 6,611.4
9,907.8 7,693.4
11,418.2 8,903.6
12,836.4 9,993.4
13,911.0 10,707.9
13,768.6 10,407.0
13,314.3 10,023.1
12,531.5 9,373.9
12,050.2 8,995.5
11,628.5 8,591.6
9,237.6 6,124.8
9,162.4 5,905.1
9,234.9 5,740.6
9,328.4 5,610.4
9,580.0 5,623.0
9,818.4 5,634.2
10,088.8 5,642.6
10,420.0 5,724.0
11,476.9 6,437.4
12,394.5 6,945.2
12,714.9 7,061.8
12,478.4 6,957.4
12,549.3 6,985.9
12,938.8 7,329.9
12,714.9 7,061.8
12,734.4 7,038.4
12,790.2 7,068.0

Table B–44. Mortgage debt outstanding by holder, 1964–2024
[Billions of dollars]
Major financial institutions
End of year or quarter

1964 ������������������������������������������
1965 ������������������������������������������
1966 ������������������������������������������
1967 ������������������������������������������
1968 ������������������������������������������
1969 ������������������������������������������
1970 ������������������������������������������
1971 ������������������������������������������
1972 ������������������������������������������
1973 ������������������������������������������
1974 ������������������������������������������
1975 ������������������������������������������
1976 ������������������������������������������
1977 ������������������������������������������
1978 ������������������������������������������
1979 ������������������������������������������
1980 ������������������������������������������
1981 ������������������������������������������
1982 ������������������������������������������
1983 ������������������������������������������
1984 ������������������������������������������
1985 ������������������������������������������
1986 ������������������������������������������
1987 ������������������������������������������
1988 ������������������������������������������
1989 ������������������������������������������
1990 ������������������������������������������
1991 ������������������������������������������
1992 ������������������������������������������
1993 ������������������������������������������
1994 ������������������������������������������
1995 ������������������������������������������
1996 ������������������������������������������
1997 ������������������������������������������
1998 ������������������������������������������
1999 ������������������������������������������
2000 ������������������������������������������
2001 ������������������������������������������
2002 ������������������������������������������
2003 ������������������������������������������
2004 ������������������������������������������
2005 ������������������������������������������
2006 ������������������������������������������
2007 ������������������������������������������
2008 ������������������������������������������
2009 ������������������������������������������
2010 ������������������������������������������
2011 ������������������������������������������
2012 ������������������������������������������
2013 ������������������������������������������
2014 ������������������������������������������
2015 ������������������������������������������
2016 ������������������������������������������
2017 ������������������������������������������
2018 ������������������������������������������
2019 ������������������������������������������
2020 ������������������������������������������
2021 ������������������������������������������
2022 ������������������������������������������
2023 ������������������������������������������
2023: I ��������������������������������������
      II �������������������������������������
      III ������������������������������������
      IV ������������������������������������
2024: I ��������������������������������������
      II p �����������������������������������

Total

307.0
334.5
358.5
382.1
411.4
439.9
469.4
517.9
589.8
666.5
728.4
785.6
870.5
999.2
1,150.7
1,317.0
1,457.8
1,579.5
1,661.3
1,850.6
2,092.0
2,368.5
2,655.6
2,958.0
3,277.1
3,529.0
3,785.7
3,937.3
4,047.3
4,177.7
4,342.3
4,528.8
4,808.9
5,121.5
5,609.7
6,216.6
6,773.3
7,456.6
8,365.4
9,379.6
10,663.7
12,129.5
13,544.6
14,632.9
14,710.5
14,465.4
13,913.2
13,586.0
13,346.8
13,350.0
13,490.1
13,876.4
14,319.2
14,895.3
15,444.2
16,020.8
16,762.4
18,281.6
19,514.0
20,123.1
19,657.3
19,803.3
19,976.5
20,123.1
20,210.0
20,347.4

Total
238.8
262.4
279.5
296.4
317.3
336.6
352.9
389.2
443.8
500.7
539.3
576.1
640.7
735.3
837.5
928.6
988.0
1,034.1
1,019.6
1,108.4
1,248.2
1,368.7
1,483.3
1,635.2
1,803.0
1,902.9
1,925.1
1,852.7
1,777.0
1,790.5
1,838.5
1,910.8
1,990.7
2,090.5
2,201.6
2,401.6
2,625.8
2,797.4
3,096.2
3,394.9
3,934.1
4,403.4
4,792.3
5,074.1
5,063.9
4,803.8
4,599.6
4,461.3
4,449.3
4,424.5
4,558.8
4,817.2
5,111.2
5,324.2
5,505.2
5,728.9
5,793.0
5,994.5
6,599.1
6,851.9
6,683.2
6,746.0
6,803.1
6,851.9
6,882.3
6,931.9

Depository
Institutions 1, 2
183.6
202.4
214.8
228.9
247.3
264.6
278.5
313.7
366.8
419.4
453.1
486.9
549.1
638.4
731.3
810.2
857.0
896.4
877.6
957.4
1,091.5
1,196.9
1,289.5
1,419.1
1,564.9
1,643.2
1,651.0
1,586.7
1,528.5
1,560.4
1,616.7
1,691.0
1,776.2
1,877.9
1,981.3
2,163.6
2,383.1
2,547.9
2,839.3
3,126.4
3,653.0
4,110.8
4,479.8
4,738.6
4,711.8
4,467.6
4,271.8
4,117.9
4,092.5
4,047.0
4,159.2
4,373.7
4,631.3
4,801.5
4,919.5
5,090.4
5,131.0
5,285.0
5,819.7
6,027.3
5,892.3
5,941.7
5,986.2
6,027.3
6,045.7
6,081.7

Other holders
Life
insurance
companies
55.2
60.0
64.6
67.5
70.0
72.0
74.4
75.5
76.9
81.4
86.2
89.2
91.6
96.8
106.2
118.4
131.1
137.7
142.0
151.0
156.7
171.8
193.8
216.1
238.0
259.6
274.1
266.1
248.5
230.1
221.8
219.9
214.6
212.6
220.2
238.0
242.8
249.6
256.8
268.5
281.1
292.6
312.4
335.5
352.1
336.2
327.9
343.4
356.8
377.5
399.6
443.5
479.9
522.8
585.7
638.5
662.0
709.5
779.4
824.6
790.8
804.3
816.9
824.6
836.6
850.3

Federal
and
related
agencies 3
11.6
12.7
16.2
18.9
22.6
27.9
33.6
36.8
40.1
46.6
60.7
72.6
76.0
83.7
100.2
121.2
142.9
160.4
176.9
188.5
201.6
213.0
202.1
188.5
192.5
197.8
239.0
266.0
286.1
311.9
307.8
303.9
291.9
284.4
291.5
319.6
339.9
372.0
432.3
694.1
703.2
665.4
687.5
725.2
791.3
800.5
5,121.9
5,031.7
4,933.7
4,992.3
4,987.0
5,036.4
5,146.8
5,313.4
5,456.9
5,634.5
6,269.6
7,057.2
7,491.5
7,603.7
7,491.6
7,526.9
7,574.4
7,603.7
7,609.2
7,637.1

Mortgage
pools
or
trusts 4
0.6
.9
1.3
2.0
2.5
3.2
4.8
9.5
14.4
18.0
21.5
28.5
40.7
56.8
70.4
94.8
114.0
129.0
178.5
244.8
300.0
392.4
549.5
700.8
785.7
922.2
1,085.9
1,269.6
1,440.0
1,561.1
1,696.9
1,812.0
1,989.1
2,166.5
2,487.1
2,832.3
3,097.5
3,532.4
3,978.4
4,330.3
4,834.5
5,710.0
6,629.5
7,434.4
7,592.7
7,649.8
3,108.4
3,034.3
2,947.6
2,773.5
2,742.7
2,793.6
2,826.6
2,971.5
3,143.7
3,255.3
3,261.6
3,391.0
3,587.9
3,795.5
3,630.2
3,677.6
3,745.3
3,795.5
3,850.9
3,896.5

Individuals
and
others
56.0
58.6
61.5
64.7
69.0
72.2
78.2
82.3
91.5
101.1
106.9
108.4
113.2
123.4
142.7
172.4
213.0
256.0
286.3
309.0
342.2
394.4
420.6
433.4
495.9
506.1
535.7
549.0
544.3
514.2
499.1
502.0
537.1
580.1
629.5
663.1
710.1
754.7
858.6
960.3
1,191.9
1,350.8
1,435.4
1,399.1
1,262.5
1,211.3
1,083.4
1,058.7
1,016.2
1,159.8
1,201.7
1,229.2
1,234.6
1,286.1
1,338.5
1,402.2
1,438.2
1,838.9
1,865.5
1,872.0
1,852.3
1,852.8
1,853.7
1,872.0
1,867.6
1,881.9

1 Includes savings banks and savings and loan associations. Data reported by Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation–insured institutions include
loans in process for 1987 and exclude loans in process beginning with 1988.
2 Includes loans held by nondeposit trust companies but not loans held by bank trust departments.
3 Includes Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA or Ginnie Mae), Federal Housing Administration, Veterans Administration, Farmers Home
Administration (FmHA), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Resolution Trust Corporation (through 1995), and in earlier years Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, Homeowners Loan Corporation, Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation, and Public Housing Administration. Also includes U.S.-sponsored agencies
such as Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA or Fannie Mae), Federal Land Banks, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or Freddie Mac),
Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac, beginning 1994), Federal Home Loan Banks (beginning 1997), and mortgage pass-through securities
issued or guaranteed by GNMA, FHLMC, FNMA, FmHA, or Farmer Mac. Other U.S. agencies (amounts small or current separate data not readily available)
included with “individuals and others.”
4 Includes private mortgage pools.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, based on data from various Government and private organizations.

Money Stock, Credit, and Finance | 441

Government Finance
Table B–45. Federal receipts, outlays, surplus or deficit, and debt, fiscal years 1960–2025
[Billions of dollars; fiscal years]
Total
Fiscal year or
period

1960 �������������������������
1961 �������������������������
1962 �������������������������
1963 �������������������������
1964 �������������������������
1965 �������������������������
1966 �������������������������
1967 �������������������������
1968 �������������������������
1969 �������������������������
1970 �������������������������
1971 �������������������������
1972 �������������������������
1973 �������������������������
1974 �������������������������
1975 �������������������������
1976 �������������������������
Transition quarter ����
1977 �������������������������
1978 �������������������������
1979 �������������������������
1980 �������������������������
1981 �������������������������
1982 �������������������������
1983 �������������������������
1984 �������������������������
1985 �������������������������
1986 �������������������������
1987 �������������������������
1988 �������������������������
1989 �������������������������
1990 �������������������������
1991 �������������������������
1992 �������������������������
1993 �������������������������
1994 �������������������������
1995 �������������������������
1996 �������������������������
1997 �������������������������
1998 �������������������������
1999 �������������������������
2000 �������������������������
2001 �������������������������
2002 �������������������������
2003 �������������������������
2004 �������������������������
2005 �������������������������
2006 �������������������������
2007 �������������������������
2008 �������������������������
2009 �������������������������
2010 �������������������������
2011 �������������������������
2012 �������������������������
2013 �������������������������
2014 �������������������������
2015 �������������������������
2016 �������������������������
2017 �������������������������
2018 �������������������������
2019 �������������������������
2020 �������������������������
2021 �������������������������
2022 �������������������������
2023 �������������������������
2024 (estimates) 1 ����
2025 (estimates) 1 ����

Receipts Outlays
92.5
94.4
99.7
106.6
112.6
116.8
130.8
148.8
153.0
186.9
192.8
187.1
207.3
230.8
263.2
279.1
298.1
81.2
355.6
399.6
463.3
517.1
599.3
617.8
600.6
666.4
734.0
769.2
854.3
909.2
991.1
1,032.0
1,055.0
1,091.2
1,154.3
1,258.6
1,351.8
1,453.1
1,579.2
1,721.7
1,827.5
2,025.2
1,991.1
1,853.1
1,782.3
1,880.1
2,153.6
2,406.9
2,568.0
2,524.0
2,105.0
2,162.7
2,303.5
2,450.0
2,775.1
3,021.5
3,249.9
3,268.0
3,316.2
3,329.9
3,463.4
3,421.2
4,047.1
4,897.3
4,440.9
5,001.1
5,561.6

92.2
97.7
106.8
111.3
118.5
118.2
134.5
157.5
178.1
183.6
195.6
210.2
230.7
245.7
269.4
332.3
371.8
96.0
409.2
458.7
504.0
590.9
678.2
745.7
808.4
851.8
946.3
990.4
1,004.0
1,064.4
1,143.7
1,253.0
1,324.2
1,381.5
1,409.4
1,461.8
1,515.7
1,560.5
1,601.1
1,652.5
1,701.8
1,789.0
1,862.8
2,010.9
2,159.9
2,292.8
2,472.0
2,655.1
2,728.7
2,982.5
3,517.7
3,457.1
3,603.1
3,526.6
3,454.9
3,506.3
3,691.9
3,852.6
3,981.6
4,109.0
4,447.0
6,553.6
6,822.5
6,273.3
6,134.7
6,874.6
7,439.3

On-budget
Surplus
or
deficit
(–)
0.3
–3.3
–7.1
–4.8
–5.9
–1.4
–3.7
–8.6
–25.2
3.2
–2.8
–23.0
–23.4
–14.9
–6.1
–53.2
–73.7
–14.7
–53.7
–59.2
–40.7
–73.8
–79.0
–128.0
–207.8
–185.4
–212.3
–221.2
–149.7
–155.2
–152.6
–221.0
–269.2
–290.3
–255.1
–203.2
–164.0
–107.4
–21.9
69.3
125.6
236.2
128.2
–157.8
–377.6
–412.7
–318.3
–248.2
–160.7
–458.6
–1,412.7
–1,294.4
–1,299.6
–1,076.6
–679.8
–484.8
–442.0
–584.7
–665.5
–779.1
–983.6
–3,132.5
–2,775.4
–1,375.9
–1,693.7
–1,873.5
–1,877.6

Receipts Outlays
81.9
82.3
87.4
92.4
96.2
100.1
111.7
124.4
128.1
157.9
159.3
151.3
167.4
184.7
209.3
216.6
231.7
63.2
278.7
314.2
365.3
403.9
469.1
474.3
453.2
500.4
547.9
568.9
640.9
667.7
727.4
750.3
761.1
788.8
842.4
923.5
1,000.7
1,085.6
1,187.2
1,305.9
1,383.0
1,544.6
1,483.6
1,337.8
1,258.5
1,345.4
1,576.1
1,798.5
1,932.9
1,865.9
1,451.0
1,531.0
1,737.7
1,880.5
2,101.8
2,285.9
2,479.5
2,457.8
2,465.6
2,475.2
2,549.1
2,455.7
3,094.8
3,831.4
3,247.2
3,742.0
4,255.3

81.3
86.0
93.3
96.4
102.8
101.7
114.8
137.0
155.8
158.4
168.0
177.3
193.5
200.0
216.5
270.8
301.1
77.3
328.7
369.6
404.9
477.0
543.0
594.9
660.9
685.6
769.4
806.8
809.2
860.0
932.8
1,027.9
1,082.5
1,129.2
1,142.8
1,182.4
1,227.1
1,259.6
1,290.5
1,335.9
1,381.1
1,458.2
1,516.0
1,655.2
1,796.9
1,913.3
2,069.7
2,233.0
2,275.0
2,507.8
3,000.7
2,902.4
3,104.5
3,019.0
2,821.1
2,800.2
2,948.8
3,077.9
3,180.4
3,260.4
3,540.3
5,598.0
5,818.6
5,192.1
4,913.6
5,559.0
6,035.5

Federal debt
(end of period)

Off-budget
Surplus
or
deficit
(–)
0.5
–3.8
–5.9
–4.0
–6.5
–1.6
–3.1
–12.6
–27.7
–.5
–8.7
–26.1
–26.1
–15.2
–7.2
–54.1
–69.4
–14.1
–49.9
–55.4
–39.6
–73.1
–73.9
–120.6
–207.7
–185.3
–221.5
–237.9
–168.4
–192.3
–205.4
–277.6
–321.4
–340.4
–300.4
–258.8
–226.4
–174.0
–103.2
–29.9
1.9
86.4
–32.4
–317.4
–538.4
–568.0
–493.6
–434.5
–342.2
–641.8
–1,549.7
–1,371.4
–1,366.8
–1,138.5
–719.2
–514.3
–469.3
–620.2
–714.9
–785.2
–991.3
–3,142.3
–2,723.8
–1,360.7
–1,666.4
–1,817.0
–1,780.2

Receipts Outlays
10.6
12.1
12.3
14.2
16.4
16.7
19.1
24.4
24.9
29.0
33.5
35.8
39.9
46.1
53.9
62.5
66.4
18.0
76.8
85.4
98.0
113.2
130.2
143.5
147.3
166.1
186.2
200.2
213.4
241.5
263.7
281.7
293.9
302.4
311.9
335.0
351.1
367.5
392.0
415.8
444.5
480.6
507.5
515.3
523.8
534.7
577.5
608.4
635.1
658.0
654.0
631.7
565.8
569.5
673.3
735.6
770.4
810.2
850.6
854.7
914.3
965.4
952.3
1,066.0
1,193.8
1,259.1
1,306.4

10.9
11.7
13.5
15.0
15.7
16.5
19.7
20.4
22.3
25.2
27.6
32.8
37.2
45.7
52.9
61.6
70.7
18.7
80.5
89.2
99.1
113.9
135.3
150.9
147.4
166.2
176.9
183.5
194.8
204.4
210.9
225.1
241.7
252.3
266.6
279.4
288.7
300.9
310.6
316.6
320.8
330.8
346.8
355.7
363.0
379.5
402.2
422.1
453.6
474.8
517.0
554.7
498.6
507.6
633.8
706.1
743.1
774.7
801.2
848.6
906.6
955.6
1,003.8
1,081.2
1,221.1
1,315.6
1,403.8

Surplus
or
deficit
(–)
–0.2
.4
–1.3
–.8
.6
.2
–.6
4.0
2.6
3.7
5.9
3.0
2.7
.3
1.1
.9
–4.3
–.7
–3.7
–3.8
–1.1
–.7
–5.1
–7.4
–.1
–.1
9.2
16.7
18.6
37.1
52.8
56.6
52.2
50.1
45.3
55.7
62.4
66.6
81.4
99.2
123.7
149.8
160.7
159.7
160.8
155.2
175.3
186.3
181.5
183.3
137.0
77.0
67.2
61.9
39.5
29.5
27.3
35.5
49.4
6.2
7.7
9.8
–51.5
–15.2
–27.3
–56.5
–97.4

Gross
Federal

Held by
the
public

290.5
292.6
302.9
310.3
316.1
322.3
328.5
340.4
368.7
365.8
380.9
408.2
435.9
466.3
483.9
541.9
629.0
643.6
706.4
776.6
829.5
909.0
994.8
1,137.3
1,371.7
1,564.6
1,817.4
2,120.5
2,346.0
2,601.1
2,867.8
3,206.3
3,598.2
4,001.8
4,351.0
4,643.3
4,920.6
5,181.5
5,369.2
5,478.2
5,605.5
5,628.7
5,769.9
6,198.4
6,760.0
7,354.7
7,905.3
8,451.4
8,950.7
9,986.1
11,875.9
13,528.8
14,764.2
16,050.9
16,719.4
17,794.5
18,120.1
19,539.5
20,205.7
21,462.3
22,669.5
26,902.5
28,385.6
30,838.6
32,989.0
35,166.2
37,271.7

236.8
238.4
248.0
254.0
256.8
260.8
263.7
266.6
289.5
278.1
283.2
303.0
322.4
340.9
343.7
394.7
477.4
495.5
549.1
607.1
640.3
711.9
789.4
924.6
1,137.3
1,307.0
1,507.3
1,740.6
1,889.8
2,051.6
2,190.7
2,411.6
2,689.0
2,999.7
3,248.4
3,433.1
3,604.4
3,734.1
3,772.3
3,721.1
3,632.4
3,409.8
3,319.6
3,540.4
3,913.4
4,295.5
4,592.2
4,829.0
5,035.1
5,803.1
7,544.7
9,018.9
10,128.2
11,281.1
11,982.7
12,779.9
13,116.7
14,167.6
14,665.4
15,749.6
16,800.7
21,016.7
22,284.0
24,253.4
26,235.6
28,201.3
30,102.4

Addendum:
Gross
domestic
product

1 Estimates from Mid-Session Review, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2025, issued July 2024.

Note: Fiscal years through 1976 were on a July 1–June 30 basis; beginning with October 1976 (fiscal year 1977), the fiscal year is on an October 1–
September 30 basis. The transition quarter is the three-month period from July 1, 1976 through September 30, 1976.
See Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2025, for additional information.
Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis), Department of the Treasury, and Office of Management and Budget.

442 |

Appendix B

534.3
546.6
585.7
618.2
661.7
709.3
780.5
836.5
897.6
980.3
1,046.7
1,116.6
1,216.3
1,352.7
1,482.9
1,606.9
1,786.1
471.7
2,024.3
2,273.5
2,565.6
2,791.9
3,133.2
3,313.4
3,536.0
3,949.2
4,265.1
4,526.3
4,767.7
5,138.6
5,554.7
5,898.8
6,093.2
6,416.3
6,775.3
7,176.9
7,560.4
7,951.3
8,451.0
8,930.8
9,479.6
10,117.1
10,525.7
10,828.9
11,278.8
12,028.4
12,840.0
13,636.8
14,305.4
14,796.6
14,467.3
14,884.4
15,466.5
16,109.4
16,687.8
17,428.1
18,164.3
18,641.3
19,375.2
20,436.3
21,275.3
21,292.4
22,936.5
25,305.7
26,973.8
28,445.1
29,744.0

Table B–46. Federal receipts, outlays, surplus or deficit, and debt, as percent of gross
domestic product, fiscal years 1954–2025
[Percent; fiscal years]
Outlays
Fiscal year or period
1954 ���������������������������������������������
1955 ���������������������������������������������
1956 ���������������������������������������������
1957 ���������������������������������������������
1958 ���������������������������������������������
1959 ���������������������������������������������
1960 ���������������������������������������������
1961 ���������������������������������������������
1962 ���������������������������������������������
1963 ���������������������������������������������
1964 ���������������������������������������������
1965 ���������������������������������������������
1966 ���������������������������������������������
1967 ���������������������������������������������
1968 ���������������������������������������������
1969 ���������������������������������������������
1970 ���������������������������������������������
1971 ���������������������������������������������
1972 ���������������������������������������������
1973 ���������������������������������������������
1974 ���������������������������������������������
1975 ���������������������������������������������
1976 ���������������������������������������������
Transition quarter ������������������������
1977 ���������������������������������������������
1978 ���������������������������������������������
1979 ���������������������������������������������
1980 ���������������������������������������������
1981 ���������������������������������������������
1982 ���������������������������������������������
1983 ���������������������������������������������
1984 ���������������������������������������������
1985 ���������������������������������������������
1986 ���������������������������������������������
1987 ���������������������������������������������
1988 ���������������������������������������������
1989 ���������������������������������������������
1990 ���������������������������������������������
1991 ���������������������������������������������
1992 ���������������������������������������������
1993 ���������������������������������������������
1994 ���������������������������������������������
1995 ���������������������������������������������
1996 ���������������������������������������������
1997 ���������������������������������������������
1998 ���������������������������������������������
1999 ���������������������������������������������
2000 ���������������������������������������������
2001 ���������������������������������������������
2002 ���������������������������������������������
2003 ���������������������������������������������
2004 ���������������������������������������������
2005 ���������������������������������������������
2006 ���������������������������������������������
2007 ���������������������������������������������
2008 ���������������������������������������������
2009 ���������������������������������������������
2010 ���������������������������������������������
2011 ���������������������������������������������
2012 ���������������������������������������������
2013 ���������������������������������������������
2014 ���������������������������������������������
2015 ���������������������������������������������
2016 ���������������������������������������������
2017 ���������������������������������������������
2018 ���������������������������������������������
2019 ���������������������������������������������
2020 ���������������������������������������������
2021 ���������������������������������������������
2022 ���������������������������������������������
2023 ���������������������������������������������
2024 (estimates) ��������������������������
2025 (estimates) ��������������������������

Receipts

Total
18.0
16.1
17.0
17.3
16.8
15.7
17.3
17.3
17.0
17.2
17.0
16.5
16.8
17.8
17.0
19.1
18.4
16.8
17.0
17.1
17.8
17.4
16.7
17.2
17.6
17.6
18.1
18.5
19.1
18.6
17.0
16.9
17.2
17.0
17.9
17.7
17.8
17.5
17.3
17.0
17.0
17.5
17.9
18.3
18.7
19.3
19.3
20.0
18.9
17.1
15.8
15.6
16.8
17.6
18.0
17.1
14.5
14.5
14.9
15.2
16.6
17.3
17.9
17.5
17.1
16.3
16.3
16.1
17.6
19.4
16.5
17.6
18.7

Surplus
or
deficit
(–)

National
defense
18.3
16.8
16.1
16.5
17.4
18.3
17.3
17.9
18.2
18.0
17.9
16.7
17.2
18.8
19.8
18.7
18.7
18.8
19.0
18.2
18.2
20.7
20.8
20.3
20.2
20.2
19.6
21.2
21.6
22.5
22.9
21.6
22.2
21.9
21.1
20.7
20.6
21.2
21.7
21.5
20.8
20.4
20.0
19.6
18.9
18.5
18.0
17.7
17.7
18.6
19.2
19.1
19.3
19.5
19.1
20.2
24.3
23.2
23.3
21.9
20.7
20.1
20.3
20.7
20.6
20.1
20.9
30.8
29.7
24.8
22.7
24.2
25.0

12.7
10.5
9.7
9.8
9.9
9.7
9.0
9.1
8.9
8.6
8.3
7.1
7.4
8.5
9.1
8.4
7.8
7.1
6.5
5.7
5.4
5.4
5.0
4.7
4.8
4.6
4.5
4.8
5.0
5.6
5.9
5.8
5.9
6.0
5.9
5.7
5.5
5.1
4.5
4.6
4.3
3.9
3.6
3.3
3.2
3.0
2.9
2.9
2.9
3.2
3.6
3.8
3.9
3.8
3.9
4.2
4.6
4.7
4.6
4.2
3.8
3.5
3.2
3.2
3.1
3.1
3.2
3.4
3.3
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.1

–0.3
–.7
.9
.7
–.6
–2.5
.1
–.6
–1.2
–.8
–.9
–.2
–.5
–1.0
–2.8
.3
–.3
–2.1
–1.9
–1.1
–.4
–3.3
–4.1
–3.1
–2.7
–2.6
–1.6
–2.6
–2.5
–3.9
–5.9
–4.7
–5.0
–4.9
–3.1
–3.0
–2.7
–3.7
–4.4
–4.5
–3.8
–2.8
–2.2
–1.4
–.3
.8
1.3
2.3
1.2
–1.5
–3.3
–3.4
–2.5
–1.8
–1.1
–3.1
–9.8
–8.7
–8.4
–6.7
–4.1
–2.8
–2.4
–3.1
–3.4
–3.8
–4.6
–14.7
–12.1
–5.4
–6.3
–6.6
–6.3

Federal debt (end of period)
Gross
Federal

Held by
public
70.0
67.5
62.2
58.8
59.1
57.0
54.4
53.5
51.7
50.2
47.8
45.4
42.1
40.7
41.1
37.3
36.4
36.6
35.8
34.5
32.6
33.7
35.2
34.1
34.9
34.2
32.3
32.6
31.8
34.3
38.8
39.6
42.6
46.8
49.2
50.6
51.6
54.4
59.1
62.4
64.2
64.7
65.1
65.2
63.5
61.3
59.1
55.6
54.8
57.2
59.9
61.1
61.6
62.0
62.6
67.5
82.1
90.9
95.5
99.6
100.2
102.1
99.8
104.8
104.3
105.0
106.6
126.3
123.8
121.9
122.3
123.6
125.3

58.0
55.8
50.7
47.3
47.8
46.5
44.3
43.6
42.3
41.1
38.8
36.8
33.8
31.9
32.3
28.4
27.1
27.1
26.5
25.2
23.2
24.6
26.7
26.3
27.1
26.7
25.0
25.5
25.2
27.9
32.2
33.1
35.3
38.5
39.6
39.9
39.4
40.9
44.1
46.8
47.9
47.8
47.7
47.0
44.6
41.7
38.3
33.7
31.5
32.7
34.7
35.7
35.8
35.4
35.2
39.2
52.2
60.6
65.5
70.0
71.8
73.3
72.2
76.0
75.7
77.1
79.0
98.7
97.2
95.8
97.3
99.1
101.2

Note: See footnote 1 and Note, Table B–45.
Sources: Department of the Treasury and Office of Management and Budget.

Government Finance | 443

Table B–47. Federal receipts and outlays, by major category, and surplus or deficit,
fiscal years 1960–2025
[Billions of dollars; fiscal years]
Receipts (on-budget and off-budget)

Fiscal year or
period

1960 ����������������������
1961 ����������������������
1962 ����������������������
1963 ����������������������
1964 ����������������������
1965 ����������������������
1966 ����������������������
1967 ����������������������
1968 ����������������������
1969 ����������������������
1970 ����������������������
1971 ����������������������
1972 ����������������������
1973 ����������������������
1974 ����������������������
1975 ����������������������
1976 ����������������������
Transition quarter �
1977 ����������������������
1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2024 (estimates) 1 �
2025 (estimates) 2 �

Social
insurIndi- Corpo- ance
vidual
ration
and Other
Total income income retiretaxes taxes ment
receipts
92.5
94.4
99.7
106.6
112.6
116.8
130.8
148.8
153.0
186.9
192.8
187.1
207.3
230.8
263.2
279.1
298.1
81.2
355.6
399.6
463.3
517.1
599.3
617.8
600.6
666.4
734.0
769.2
854.3
909.2
991.1
1,032.0
1,055.0
1,091.2
1,154.3
1,258.6
1,351.8
1,453.1
1,579.2
1,721.7
1,827.5
2,025.2
1,991.1
1,853.1
1,782.3
1,880.1
2,153.6
2,406.9
2,568.0
2,524.0
2,105.0
2,162.7
2,303.5
2,450.0
2,775.1
3,021.5
3,249.9
3,268.0
3,316.2
3,329.9
3,463.4
3,421.2
4,047.1
4,897.3
4,440.9
4,918.7
5,561.6

40.7
41.3
45.6
47.6
48.7
48.8
55.4
61.5
68.7
87.2
90.4
86.2
94.7
103.2
119.0
122.4
131.6
38.8
157.6
181.0
217.8
244.1
285.9
297.7
288.9
298.4
334.5
349.0
392.6
401.2
445.7
466.9
467.8
476.0
509.7
543.1
590.2
656.4
737.5
828.6
879.5
1,004.5
994.3
858.3
793.7
809.0
927.2
1,043.9
1,163.5
1,145.7
915.3
898.5
1,091.5
1,132.2
1,316.4
1,394.6
1,540.8
1,546.1
1,587.1
1,683.5
1,717.9
1,608.7
2,044.4
2,632.1
2,176.5
2,426.1
2,686.3

21.5
21.0
20.5
21.6
23.5
25.5
30.1
34.0
28.7
36.7
32.8
26.8
32.2
36.2
38.6
40.6
41.4
8.5
54.9
60.0
65.7
64.6
61.1
49.2
37.0
56.9
61.3
63.1
83.9
94.5
103.3
93.5
98.1
100.3
117.5
140.4
157.0
171.8
182.3
188.7
184.7
207.3
151.1
148.0
131.8
189.4
278.3
353.9
370.2
304.3
138.2
191.4
181.1
242.3
273.5
320.7
343.8
299.6
297.0
204.7
230.2
211.8
371.8
424.9
419.6
529.9
702.5

14.7
16.4
17.0
19.8
22.0
22.2
25.5
32.6
33.9
39.0
44.4
47.3
52.6
63.1
75.1
84.5
90.8
25.2
106.5
121.0
138.9
157.8
182.7
201.5
209.0
239.4
265.2
283.9
303.3
334.3
359.4
380.0
396.0
413.7
428.3
461.5
484.5
509.4
539.4
571.8
611.8
652.9
694.0
700.8
713.0
733.4
794.1
837.8
869.6
900.2
890.9
864.8
818.8
845.3
947.8
1,023.5
1,065.3
1,115.1
1,161.9
1,170.7
1,243.1
1,310.0
1,314.1
1,483.5
1,614.5
1,709.6
1,919.6

15.6
15.7
16.5
17.6
18.5
20.3
19.8
20.7
21.7
23.9
25.2
26.8
27.8
28.3
30.6
31.5
34.3
8.8
36.6
37.7
40.8
50.6
69.5
69.3
65.6
71.8
73.0
73.2
74.5
79.2
82.7
91.5
93.1
101.3
98.8
113.7
120.1
115.4
120.1
132.6
151.5
160.6
151.7
146.0
143.9
148.4
154.0
171.2
164.7
173.7
160.5
207.9
212.1
230.2
237.4
282.7
300.0
307.3
270.1
270.9
272.1
290.7
316.8
356.8
230.4
253.2
253.2

Outlays (on-budget and off-budget)
National
defense

Total
Total

92.2
97.7
106.8
111.3
118.5
118.2
134.5
157.5
178.1
183.6
195.6
210.2
230.7
245.7
269.4
332.3
371.8
96.0
409.2
458.7
504.0
590.9
678.2
745.7
808.4
851.8
946.3
990.4
1,004.0
1,064.4
1,143.7
1,253.0
1,324.2
1,381.5
1,409.4
1,461.8
1,515.7
1,560.5
1,601.1
1,652.5
1,701.8
1,789.0
1,862.8
2,010.9
2,159.9
2,292.8
2,472.0
2,655.1
2,728.7
2,982.5
3,517.7
3,457.1
3,603.1
3,526.6
3,454.9
3,506.3
3,691.9
3,852.6
3,981.6
4,109.0
4,447.0
6,553.6
6,822.5
6,273.3
6,134.7
6,751.6
7,439.3

De- InterpartnaMedi- Income Social
ment tional Health care secu- security
rity
of affairs
Defense,
military

48.1 ����������
49.6 ����������
52.3 50.1
53.4 51.1
54.8 52.6
50.6 48.8
58.1 56.6
71.4 70.1
81.9 80.4
82.5 80.8
81.7 80.1
78.9 77.5
79.2 77.6
76.7 75.0
79.3 77.9
86.5 84.9
89.6 87.9
22.3 21.8
97.2 95.1
104.5 102.3
116.3 113.6
134.0 130.9
157.5 153.9
185.3 180.7
209.9 204.4
227.4 220.9
252.7 245.1
273.4 265.4
282.0 273.9
290.4 281.9
303.6 294.8
299.3 289.7
273.3 262.3
298.3 286.8
291.1 278.5
281.6 268.6
272.1 259.4
265.7 253.1
270.5 258.3
268.2 255.8
274.8 261.2
294.4 281.0
304.7 290.2
348.5 331.8
404.7 387.1
455.8 436.4
495.3 474.1
521.8 499.3
551.3 528.5
616.1 594.6
661.0 636.7
693.5 666.7
705.6 678.1
677.9 650.9
633.4 607.8
603.5 577.9
589.7 562.5
593.4 565.4
598.7 568.9
631.3 600.8
685.7 653.7
724.6 690.4
753.9 717.6
765.6 726.5
820.3 775.9
874.0 826.3
930.8 881.2

3.0
3.2
5.6
5.3
4.9
5.3
5.6
5.6
5.3
4.6
4.3
4.2
4.8
4.1
5.7
7.1
6.4
2.5
6.4
7.5
7.5
12.7
13.1
12.3
11.8
15.9
16.2
14.1
11.6
10.5
9.6
13.8
15.8
16.1
17.2
17.1
16.4
13.5
15.2
13.1
15.2
17.2
16.5
22.3
21.2
26.9
34.6
29.5
28.5
28.9
37.5
45.2
45.7
36.8
46.5
46.9
52.0
45.3
46.3
48.9
53.0
67.7
47.0
71.9
69.3
72.0
83.1

0.8
.9
1.2
1.5
1.8
1.8
2.5
3.4
4.4
5.2
5.9
6.8
8.7
9.4
10.7
12.9
15.7
3.9
17.3
18.5
20.5
23.2
26.9
27.4
28.6
30.4
33.5
35.9
40.0
44.5
48.4
57.7
71.1
89.4
99.3
107.1
115.4
119.3
123.8
131.4
141.0
154.5
172.2
196.5
219.6
240.1
250.6
252.8
266.4
280.6
334.4
369.1
372.5
346.8
358.3
409.5
482.3
511.3
533.2
551.2
584.8
747.6
796.5
914.1
888.6
911.7
967.3

1 Estimates from Final Monthly Treasury Statement, issued October 2024.
2 Estimates from Mid-Session Review, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2025, issued July 2024.

Note: See Note, Table B–45.
Sources: Department of the Treasury and Office of Management and Budget.

444 |

Appendix B

����������
7.4
11.6
����������
9.7
12.5
����������
9.2
14.4
����������
9.3
15.8
����������
9.7
16.6
����������
9.5
17.5
0.1
9.7
20.7
2.7
10.3
21.7
4.6
11.8
23.9
5.7
13.1
27.3
6.2
15.6
30.3
6.6
22.9
35.9
7.5
27.6
40.2
8.1
28.3
49.1
9.6
33.7
55.9
12.9
50.2
64.7
15.8
60.8
73.9
4.3
15.0
19.8
19.3
61.0
85.1
22.8
61.5
93.9
26.5
66.4 104.1
32.1
86.5 118.5
39.1 100.3 139.6
46.6 108.1 156.0
52.6 123.0 170.7
57.5 113.4 178.2
65.8 129.0 188.6
70.2 120.7 198.8
75.1 124.1 207.4
78.9 130.4 219.3
85.0 137.6 232.5
98.1 148.8 248.6
104.5 172.6 269.0
119.0 199.7 287.6
130.6 210.1 304.6
144.7 217.2 319.6
159.9 223.8 335.8
174.2 229.7 349.7
190.0 235.0 365.3
192.8 237.7 379.2
190.4 242.4 390.0
197.1 253.7 409.4
217.4 269.7 433.0
230.9 312.7 456.0
249.4 334.6 474.7
269.4 333.0 495.5
298.6 345.8 523.3
329.9 352.4 548.5
375.4 365.9 586.2
390.8 431.2 617.0
430.1 533.1 683.0
451.6 622.1 706.7
485.7 597.3 730.8
471.8 541.2 773.3
497.8 536.4 813.6
511.7 513.6 850.5
546.2 508.8 887.8
594.5 514.1 916.1
597.3 503.4 944.9
588.7 495.3 987.8
651.0 514.8 1,044.4
776.2 1,263.6 1,095.8
696.5 1,647.7 1,134.6
755.1 866.1 1,218.7
847.5 774.7 1,354.3
874.1 671.1 1,460.9
963.4 927.0 1,558.5

Net
interest

Other

6.9
6.7
6.9
7.7
8.2
8.6
9.4
10.3
11.1
12.7
14.4
14.8
15.5
17.3
21.4
23.2
26.7
6.9
29.9
35.5
42.6
52.5
68.8
85.0
89.8
111.1
129.5
136.0
138.6
151.8
169.0
184.3
194.4
199.3
198.7
202.9
232.1
241.1
244.0
241.1
229.8
222.9
206.2
170.9
153.1
160.2
184.0
226.6
237.1
252.8
186.9
196.2
230.0
220.4
220.9
229.0
223.2
240.0
262.6
325.0
375.2
345.5
352.3
475.9
658.3
881.7
984.3

14.4
15.2
17.2
18.3
22.6
25.0
28.5
32.1
35.1
32.6
37.2
40.0
47.3
52.8
52.9
74.9
82.8
21.4
93.0
114.7
120.2
131.3
133.0
125.0
121.8
117.9
131.0
141.3
125.2
138.7
158.2
202.4
223.4
172.1
157.8
171.5
160.3
167.3
157.4
189.0
218.1
239.7
243.2
273.2
302.6
311.8
339.8
393.5
317.9
365.2
651.7
372.6
435.7
458.4
348.0
341.7
402.0
437.9
495.3
480.9
538.0
1,532.6
1,394.1
1,205.9
721.8
1,006.1
1,024.9

Surplus
or
deficit
(–)
(onbudget
and
offbudget)

0.3
–3.3
–7.1
–4.8
–5.9
–1.4
–3.7
–8.6
–25.2
3.2
–2.8
–23.0
–23.4
–14.9
–6.1
–53.2
–73.7
–14.7
–53.7
–59.2
–40.7
–73.8
–79.0
–128.0
–207.8
–185.4
–212.3
–221.2
–149.7
–155.2
–152.6
–221.0
–269.2
–290.3
–255.1
–203.2
–164.0
–107.4
–21.9
69.3
125.6
236.2
128.2
–157.8
–377.6
–412.7
–318.3
–248.2
–160.7
–458.6
–1,412.7
–1,294.4
–1,299.6
–1,076.6
–679.8
–484.8
–442.0
–584.7
–665.5
–779.1
–983.6
–3,132.5
–2,775.4
–1,375.9
–1,693.7
–1,832.8
–1,877.6

Table B–48. Federal receipts, outlays, surplus or deficit, and debt, fiscal years 2019–2024
[Millions of dollars; fiscal years]
Description
RECEIPTS, OUTLAYS, AND SURPLUS OR DEFICIT
Total:
Receipts �������������������������������������������������������������������������������
Outlays ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������
Surplus or deficit (–) ������������������������������������������������������������
On-budget:
Receipts �������������������������������������������������������������������������������
Outlays ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������
Surplus or deficit (–) ������������������������������������������������������������
Off-budget:
Receipts �������������������������������������������������������������������������������
Outlays ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������
Surplus or deficit (–) ������������������������������������������������������������
OUTSTANDING DEBT, END OF PERIOD
Gross Federal debt ���������������������������������������������������������������������
Held by Federal Government accounts �������������������������������
Held by the public ����������������������������������������������������������������
Federal Reserve System �����������������������������������������������
Other �����������������������������������������������������������������������������

Estimates 1

Actual
2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

3,463,364
4,446,952
–983,588

3,421,164
6,553,620
–3,132,456

4,047,111
6,822,461
–2,775,350

4,897,339
6,273,259
–1,375,920

4,440,947
6,134,672
–1,693,725

4,918,736
6,751,552
–1,832,816

2,549,061
3,540,335
–991,274

2,455,736
5,598,038
–3,142,302

3,094,788
5,818,614
–2,723,826

3,831,364
5,192,104
–1,360,740

3,247,192
4,913,572
–1,666,380

3,658,853
5,431,240
–1,772,387

914,303
906,617
7,686

965,428
955,582
9,846

952,323
1,003,847
–51,524

1,065,975
1,081,155
–15,180

1,193,755
1,221,100
–27,345

1,259,883
1,320,311
–60,429

22,669,466
5,868,766
16,800,700
2,113,329
14,687,371

26,902,455
5,885,786
21,016,669
4,445,477
16,571,192

28,385,562
6,101,522
22,284,040
5,433,156
16,850,884

30,838,586
6,585,141
24,253,445
5,634,940
18,618,505

32,988,990
35,229,758
6,753,388
7,030,445
26,235,602
28,199,313
4,952,914 �����������������������
21,282,688 �����������������������

RECEIPTS BY SOURCE
Total: On-budget and off-budget �����������������������������������������������
3,463,364
3,421,164
4,047,111
4,897,339
4,440,947
Individual income taxes �������������������������������������������������������
1,717,857
1,608,663
2,044,377
2,632,146
2,176,481
Corporation income taxes ���������������������������������������������������
230,245
211,845
371,831
424,865
419,584
Social insurance and retirement receipts ���������������������������
1,243,113
1,309,955
1,314,088
1,483,527
1,614,456
On-budget ���������������������������������������������������������������������
328,810
344,527
361,765
417,552
420,701
Off-budget ��������������������������������������������������������������������
914,303
965,428
952,323
1,065,975
1,193,755
Excise taxes �������������������������������������������������������������������������
98,914
86,780
75,274
87,728
75,802
Estate and gift taxes �����������������������������������������������������������
16,672
17,624
27,140
32,550
33,668
Customs duties and fees �����������������������������������������������������
70,784
68,551
79,985
99,908
80,338
Miscellaneous receipts �������������������������������������������������������
85,779
117,746
134,416
136,615
40,618
Deposits of earnings by Federal Reserve System ��������
52,793
81,880
100,054
106,674
581
All other ������������������������������������������������������������������������
32,986
35,866
34,362
29,941
40,037
OUTLAYS BY FUNCTION
Total: On-budget and off-budget �����������������������������������������������
4,446,952
6,553,620
6,822,461
6,273,259
6,134,672
National defense �����������������������������������������������������������������
685,707
724,588
753,897
765,649
820,263
International affairs �������������������������������������������������������������
53,035
67,722
46,951
71,873
69,313
General science, space, and technology �����������������������������
32,414
34,022
35,534
37,404
41,276
Energy ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������
5,041
7,083
5,977
–9,132
–406
Natural resources and environment ������������������������������������
37,836
42,450
44,151
41,384
47,387
Agriculture ���������������������������������������������������������������������������
38,257
47,298
47,398
33,065
33,651
Commerce and housing credit ���������������������������������������������
–25,715
572,071
307,847
–19,075
100,765
On-budget ���������������������������������������������������������������������
–24,612
574,474
310,581
–18,658
94,996
Off-budget ��������������������������������������������������������������������
–1,103
–2,403
–2,734
–417
5,769
Transportation ����������������������������������������������������������������������
95,756
145,623
154,291
131,024
126,417
Community and regional development �������������������������������
26,784
81,878
44,655
69,963
86,553
Education, training, employment, and social services ��������
136,700
237,754
298,406
677,305
–2,189
Health ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������
584,816
747,582
796,450
914,081
888,555
Medicare �����������������������������������������������������������������������������
650,996
776,225
696,458
755,094
847,544
Income security �������������������������������������������������������������������
514,787
1,263,639
1,647,729
866,097
774,655
Social security ���������������������������������������������������������������������
1,044,409
1,095,816
1,134,586
1,218,663
1,354,317
On-budget ���������������������������������������������������������������������
36,130
39,893
34,862
48,524
50,800
Off-budget ��������������������������������������������������������������������
1,008,279
1,055,923
1,099,724
1,170,139
1,303,517
Veterans benefits and services �������������������������������������������
199,843
218,655
234,282
274,404
301,600
Administration of justice �����������������������������������������������������
65,832
71,997
71,430
71,323
80,432
General government ������������������������������������������������������������
23,488
180,109
273,941
133,214
38,199
Net interest �������������������������������������������������������������������������
375,158
345,470
352,338
475,887
658,267
On-budget ���������������������������������������������������������������������
457,662
424,274
425,591
543,625
724,774
Off-budget ��������������������������������������������������������������������
–82,504
–78,804
–73,253
–67,738
–66,507
Allowances �������������������������������������������������������������������������� ��������������������� ��������������������� ��������������������� ��������������������� ���������������������
Undistributed offsetting receipts ����������������������������������������
–98,192
–106,362
–123,860
–234,964
–131,927
On-budget ���������������������������������������������������������������������
–80,137
–87,228
–103,970
–214,135
–110,248
Off-budget ��������������������������������������������������������������������
–18,055
–19,134
–19,890
–20,829
–21,679

4,918,736
2,426,067
529,867
1,709,559
�����������������������
�����������������������
101,435
31,616
77,037
43,155
�����������������������
43,155
6,751,552
874,041
71,992
41,562
13,790
56,892
34,747
35,568
�����������������������
�����������������������
137,122
87,766
305,026
911,684
874,134
671,076
1,460,914
�����������������������
�����������������������
325,363
85,034
29,928
881,651
�����������������������
�����������������������
�����������������������
–146,738
�����������������������
�����������������������

1 Estimates from Final Monthly Treasury Statement, issued October 2024.

Note: See Note, Table B–45.
Sources: Department of the Treasury and Office of Management and Budget.

Government Finance | 445

Table B–49. Federal and State and local government current receipts and expenditures,
national income and product accounts (NIPA) basis, 1973–2024
[Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]
Total government

Year or quarter

1973 ����������������������
1974 ����������������������
1975 ����������������������
1976 ����������������������
1977 ����������������������
1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2021: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III p ��������������

Current
receipts

388.8
430.2
441.2
505.7
567.4
646.1
729.3
799.9
919.1
940.9
1,002.1
1,115.0
1,217.0
1,292.9
1,406.6
1,507.1
1,632.0
1,713.3
1,763.6
1,848.6
1,953.1
2,097.3
2,223.5
2,388.2
2,565.5
2,738.0
2,908.9
3,138.2
3,124.4
2,968.3
3,044.6
3,274.1
3,677.8
4,012.2
4,209.6
4,125.0
3,698.5
3,932.7
4,128.3
4,309.6
4,829.6
5,054.1
5,285.5
5,329.2
5,456.9
5,643.7
5,883.9
5,969.6
6,900.3
7,862.6
7,584.1
6,478.0
6,827.2
7,009.0
7,286.9
7,813.8
7,951.4
7,839.3
7,846.0
7,481.1
7,511.4
7,617.4
7,726.5
7,892.2
7,930.1
8,029.5

Current
expenditures

421.5
473.9
549.9
591.0
640.3
703.3
777.9
894.6
1,017.4
1,131.0
1,227.7
1,311.7
1,418.7
1,512.8
1,586.7
1,678.3
1,810.7
1,952.9
2,072.2
2,254.2
2,339.3
2,417.2
2,536.5
2,621.8
2,699.9
2,767.4
2,879.5
3,019.9
3,229.2
3,419.8
3,624.0
3,817.4
4,075.3
4,320.1
4,599.6
4,972.0
5,284.0
5,560.0
5,639.5
5,667.1
5,729.5
5,885.7
6,059.5
6,238.7
6,418.5
6,749.9
7,133.4
8,961.6
9,493.7
8,794.6
9,312.1
10,778.4
9,421.3
9,083.8
8,691.2
8,546.8
8,706.3
8,847.1
9,078.2
9,163.7
9,240.7
9,387.4
9,456.6
9,692.1
9,815.2
9,998.6

Federal Government
Net
government
saving
(NIPA)
–32.7
–43.7
–108.6
–85.3
–72.9
–57.2
–48.6
–94.7
–98.2
–190.1
–225.6
–196.7
–201.7
–219.9
–180.1
–171.3
–178.7
–239.5
–308.5
–405.6
–386.2
–319.9
–312.9
–233.6
–134.4
–29.3
29.5
118.2
–104.7
–451.4
–579.4
–543.3
–397.4
–307.9
–390.0
–847.0
–1,585.5
–1,627.3
–1,511.2
–1,357.5
–899.9
–831.6
–774.0
–909.5
–961.6
–1,106.2
–1,249.6
–2,992.0
–2,593.4
–932.0
–1,728.0
–4,300.5
–2,594.1
–2,074.8
–1,404.3
–733.0
–754.9
–1,007.8
–1,232.2
–1,682.5
–1,729.3
–1,770.0
–1,730.1
–1,799.9
–1,885.1
–1,969.1

Current
receipts

249.2
278.5
276.8
322.6
363.9
423.8
487.0
533.7
621.1
618.7
644.8
711.2
775.7
817.9
899.5
962.4
1,042.5
1,087.6
1,107.8
1,154.4
1,231.0
1,329.3
1,417.4
1,536.3
1,667.4
1,789.8
1,906.0
2,067.8
2,032.4
1,870.9
1,896.1
2,028.1
2,304.7
2,538.8
2,668.3
2,582.1
2,242.1
2,446.3
2,573.6
2,700.8
3,136.3
3,294.4
3,448.4
3,460.7
3,503.7
3,583.1
3,704.3
3,767.3
4,423.8
5,120.8
4,834.0
4,141.9
4,368.6
4,514.1
4,670.8
5,099.9
5,160.7
5,128.9
5,093.8
4,772.1
4,785.2
4,850.2
4,928.4
5,026.7
5,073.0
5,119.9

Current
expenditures

287.6
319.8
374.8
403.5
437.3
485.9
534.4
622.5
709.1
786.0
851.9
907.7
975.0
1,033.8
1,065.2
1,122.4
1,201.8
1,290.9
1,356.2
1,488.9
1,544.6
1,585.0
1,659.5
1,715.7
1,759.4
1,788.4
1,836.8
1,908.1
2,017.3
2,138.7
2,293.5
2,421.6
2,598.5
2,760.7
2,928.0
3,207.0
3,485.2
3,764.6
3,807.8
3,773.5
3,770.3
3,888.4
4,005.8
4,128.0
4,240.5
4,489.5
4,748.1
6,708.0
7,262.6
6,141.1
6,500.4
8,312.3
7,728.1
6,784.5
6,225.5
5,997.3
6,068.5
6,181.5
6,317.1
6,409.7
6,444.7
6,527.4
6,619.8
6,772.8
6,864.6
7,053.6

State and local government
Net
Federal
Government
saving
(NIPA)
–38.3
–41.3
–97.9
–80.9
–73.4
–62.0
–47.4
–88.8
–88.1
–167.4
–207.2
–196.5
–199.2
–215.9
–165.7
–160.0
–159.4
–203.3
–248.4
–334.5
–313.5
–255.6
–242.1
–179.4
–92.0
1.4
69.1
159.7
15.0
–267.8
–397.4
–393.5
–293.8
–221.9
–259.7
–624.9
–1,243.2
–1,318.4
–1,234.1
–1,072.7
–633.9
–594.0
–557.4
–667.3
–736.8
–906.4
–1,043.8
–2,940.8
–2,838.8
–1,020.3
–1,666.4
–4,170.4
–3,359.5
–2,270.4
–1,554.7
–897.4
–907.9
–1,052.5
–1,223.3
–1,637.5
–1,659.5
–1,677.2
–1,691.4
–1,746.1
–1,791.6
–1,933.7

Current
receipts

173.0
186.6
208.0
232.2
258.3
285.8
306.3
335.9
367.5
388.5
425.3
476.1
517.5
557.4
585.5
630.4
681.4
730.0
779.8
836.0
877.8
934.8
980.6
1,033.3
1,086.2
1,149.0
1,222.1
1,303.5
1,353.3
1,386.2
1,470.2
1,578.4
1,716.6
1,814.4
1,900.4
1,914.1
1,914.6
1,991.7
2,027.2
2,053.3
2,143.4
2,254.7
2,370.2
2,425.3
2,513.5
2,643.2
2,788.5
3,081.1
3,586.5
3,690.1
3,700.8
3,113.8
4,099.4
3,580.5
3,552.5
3,643.9
3,742.1
3,666.8
3,707.6
3,686.7
3,694.1
3,682.8
3,739.4
3,806.5
3,806.2
3,891.2

Current
expenditures

167.4
189.0
218.7
236.6
257.8
280.9
307.5
341.8
377.6
411.3
443.7
476.3
519.9
561.3
599.9
641.7
700.7
766.3
840.0
907.0
950.4
999.1
1,051.4
1,087.5
1,128.7
1,179.7
1,261.8
1,345.0
1,473.1
1,569.8
1,652.2
1,728.2
1,820.3
1,900.4
2,030.7
2,136.2
2,256.9
2,300.6
2,304.2
2,338.1
2,409.4
2,492.3
2,586.8
2,667.4
2,738.4
2,843.0
2,994.3
3,132.3
3,341.2
3,601.8
3,762.3
3,243.9
3,333.9
3,384.9
3,402.0
3,479.5
3,589.1
3,622.0
3,716.5
3,731.7
3,763.9
3,775.6
3,778.1
3,860.3
3,899.8
3,926.6

Net
State
and
local
government
saving
(NIPA)

Addendum:
Grantsin-aid
to
State
and
local
governments

5.6
–2.3
–10.7
–4.4
.5
4.9
–1.2
–5.9
–10.2
–22.8
–18.4
–.2
–2.4
–4.0
–14.4
–11.3
–19.3
–36.3
–60.1
–71.1
–72.6
–64.2
–70.8
–54.2
–42.4
–30.7
–39.7
–41.5
–119.8
–183.6
–182.0
–149.8
–103.7
–86.0
–130.4
–222.1
–342.3
–309.0
–277.0
–284.8
–266.0
–237.6
–216.6
–242.2
–224.8
–199.9
–205.8
–51.2
245.4
88.3
–61.6
–130.1
765.5
195.6
150.4
164.4
153.0
44.8
–8.9
–45.0
–69.8
–92.8
–38.7
–53.8
–93.5
–35.4

Note: Federal grants-in-aid to State and local governments are reflected in Federal current expenditures and State and local current receipts. Total
government current receipts and expenditures have been adjusted to eliminate this duplication.
Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).

446 |

Appendix B

33.5
34.9
43.6
49.1
54.8
63.5
64.0
69.7
69.4
66.3
67.9
72.3
76.2
82.4
78.4
85.7
91.8
104.4
124.0
141.7
155.7
166.8
174.5
181.5
188.1
200.8
219.2
233.1
261.3
288.7
321.7
332.3
343.5
341.0
359.1
371.2
458.1
505.2
472.5
444.4
450.1
495.0
533.1
556.7
560.4
582.6
608.9
878.7
1,110.1
948.3
950.7
777.7
1,640.8
1,085.6
936.3
930.0
951.4
956.4
955.4
977.7
967.9
915.6
941.4
941.0
949.1
981.6

Table B–50. State and local government revenues and expenditures, fiscal years 1959–2022
[Millions of dollars]
General revenues by source 2
Fiscal year 1

1959 ����������������������
1960 ����������������������
1961 ����������������������
1962 ����������������������
1963 ����������������������
1963–64 ����������������
1964–65 ����������������
1965–66 ����������������
1966–67 ����������������
1967–68 ����������������
1968–69 ����������������
1969–70 ����������������
1970–71 ����������������
1971–72 ����������������
1972–73 ����������������
1973–74 ����������������
1974–75 ����������������
1975–76 ����������������
1976–77 ����������������
1977–78 ����������������
1978–79 ����������������
1979–80 ����������������
1980–81 ����������������
1981–82 ����������������
1982–83 ����������������
1983–84 ����������������
1984–85 ����������������
1985–86 ����������������
1986–87 ����������������
1987–88 ����������������
1988–89 ����������������
1989–90 ����������������
1990–91 ����������������
1991–92 ����������������
1992–93 ����������������
1993–94 ����������������
1994–95 ����������������
1995–96 ����������������
1996–97 ����������������
1997–98 ����������������
1998–99 ����������������
1999–2000 ������������
2000–01 ����������������
2001–02 ����������������
2002–03 ����������������
2003–04 ����������������
2004–05 ����������������
2005–06 ����������������
2006–07 ����������������
2007–08 ����������������
2008–09 ����������������
2009–10 ����������������
2010–11 ����������������
2011–12 ����������������
2012–13 ����������������
2013–14 ����������������
2014–15 ����������������
2015–16 ����������������
2016–17 ����������������
2017–18 ����������������
2018–19 ����������������
2019–20 ����������������
2020–21 ����������������
2021–22 ����������������

Total

Property
taxes

45,306
50,505
54,037
58,252
62,891
68,443
74,000
83,036
91,197
101,264
114,550
130,756
144,927
167,535
190,222
207,670
228,171
256,176
285,157
315,960
343,236
382,322
423,404
457,654
486,753
542,730
598,121
641,486
686,860
726,762
786,129
849,502
902,207
979,137
1,041,643
1,100,490
1,169,505
1,222,821
1,289,237
1,365,762
1,434,029
1,541,322
1,647,161
1,684,879
1,763,212
1,887,397
2,026,034
2,197,475
2,330,611
2,421,977
2,429,672
2,510,846
2,618,037
2,598,745
2,687,495
2,768,260
2,920,320
3,018,372
3,120,509
3,303,773
3,465,482
3,627,999
4,083,722
4,538,773

14,983
16,405
18,002
19,054
20,089
21,241
22,583
24,670
26,047
27,747
30,673
34,054
37,852
42,877
45,283
47,705
51,491
57,001
62,527
66,422
64,944
68,499
74,969
82,067
89,105
96,457
103,757
111,709
121,203
132,212
142,400
155,613
167,999
180,337
189,744
197,141
203,451
209,440
218,877
230,150
239,672
249,178
263,689
279,191
296,683
317,941
335,779
364,559
388,905
409,540
434,818
443,947
445,771
445,854
453,458
465,100
484,251
504,593
524,664
547,515
576,735
601,048
630,414
649,034

Sales
Corpora- Revenue
and
Individual
tion
from
gross
income
net
Federal
receipts
taxes
income Governtaxes
taxes
ment
10,437
11,849
12,463
13,494
14,456
15,762
17,118
19,085
20,530
22,911
26,519
30,322
33,233
37,518
42,047
46,098
49,815
54,547
60,641
67,596
74,247
79,927
85,971
93,613
100,247
114,097
126,376
135,005
144,091
156,452
166,336
177,885
185,570
197,731
209,649
223,628
237,268
248,993
261,418
274,883
290,993
309,290
320,217
324,123
337,787
361,027
384,266
417,735
440,470
449,945
434,128
435,571
463,979
482,172
503,553
522,014
544,359
559,625
580,963
618,091
644,205
652,427
690,216
789,243

1,994
2,463
2,613
3,037
3,269
3,791
4,090
4,760
5,825
7,308
8,908
10,812
11,900
15,227
17,994
19,491
21,454
24,575
29,246
33,176
36,932
42,080
46,426
50,738
55,129
64,871
70,361
74,365
83,935
88,350
97,806
105,640
109,341
115,638
123,235
128,810
137,931
146,844
159,042
175,630
189,309
211,661
226,334
202,832
199,407
215,215
242,273
268,667
290,278
304,902
270,942
261,510
285,293
307,897
339,666
343,001
368,862
375,310
384,678
429,820
446,770
424,741
545,122
600,617

General expenditures by function 2
All
other 3

1,001
6,377
10,514
1,180
6,974
11,634
1,266
7,131
12,562
1,308
7,871
13,488
1,505
8,722
14,850
1,695
10,002
15,952
1,929
11,029
17,251
2,038
13,214
19,269
2,227
15,370
21,198
2,518
17,181
23,599
3,180
19,153
26,117
3,738
21,857
29,973
3,424
26,146
32,372
4,416
31,342
36,156
5,425
39,264
40,210
6,015
41,820
46,542
6,642
47,034
51,735
7,273
55,589
57,191
9,174
62,444
61,125
10,738
69,592
68,435
12,128
75,164
79,822
13,321
83,029
95,467
14,143
90,294 111,599
15,028
87,282 128,925
14,258
90,007 138,008
16,798
96,935 153,571
19,152 106,158 172,317
19,994 113,099 187,314
22,425 114,857 200,350
23,663 117,602 208,482
25,926 125,824 227,838
23,566 136,802 249,996
22,242 154,099 262,955
23,880 179,174 282,376
26,417 198,663 293,935
28,320 215,492 307,099
31,406 228,771 330,677
32,009 234,891 350,645
33,820 244,847 371,233
34,412 255,048 395,639
33,922 270,628 409,505
36,059 291,950 443,186
35,296 324,033 477,592
28,152 360,546 490,035
31,369 389,264 508,702
33,716 423,112 536,386
43,256 438,558 581,902
53,081 452,975 640,458
60,955 464,914 685,089
57,231 477,441 722,919
46,280 537,949 705,555
44,108 623,801 701,909
48,422 647,606 726,966
48,877 580,604 733,341
52,853 583,294 754,672
54,558 602,175 781,412
57,130 658,012 807,707
53,581 693,989 831,274
52,805 711,827 865,573
56,871 741,523 909,953
67,841 762,910 967,020
60,791 912,083 976,909
98,715 1,127,124 992,131
159,660 1,257,879 1,082,341

Total 4

Education

Highways

Public
welfare 4

All
other 4, 5

48,887
51,876
56,201
60,206
64,815
69,302
74,678
82,843
93,350
102,411
116,728
131,332
150,674
168,549
181,357
199,222
230,722
256,731
274,215
296,984
327,517
369,086
407,449
436,733
466,516
505,008
553,899
605,623
657,134
704,921
762,360
834,818
908,108
981,253
1,030,434
1,077,665
1,149,863
1,193,276
1,249,984
1,318,042
1,402,369
1,506,797
1,626,063
1,736,866
1,821,917
1,908,543
2,012,110
2,123,663
2,264,035
2,406,183
2,500,796
2,542,231
2,583,805
2,595,947
2,631,945
2,723,022
2,844,289
2,964,238
3,084,229
3,213,995
3,359,781
3,513,437
3,693,785
4,030,718

17,283
18,719
20,574
22,216
23,776
26,286
28,563
33,287
37,919
41,158
47,238
52,718
59,413
65,813
69,713
75,833
87,858
97,216
102,780
110,758
119,448
133,211
145,784
154,282
163,876
176,108
192,686
210,819
226,619
242,683
263,898
288,148
309,302
324,652
342,287
353,287
378,273
398,859
418,416
450,365
483,259
521,612
563,572
594,694
621,335
655,182
688,314
728,917
774,170
826,061
851,689
860,118
862,271
870,321
878,957
906,016
934,353
973,025
1,016,295
1,048,521
1,094,234
1,133,735
1,145,918
1,264,379

9,592
9,428
9,844
10,357
11,135
11,664
12,221
12,770
13,932
14,481
15,417
16,427
18,095
19,021
18,615
19,946
22,528
23,907
23,058
24,609
28,440
33,311
34,603
34,520
36,655
39,419
44,989
49,368
52,355
55,621
58,105
61,057
64,937
67,351
68,370
72,067
77,109
79,092
82,062
87,214
93,018
101,336
107,235
115,295
117,696
117,215
126,350
136,502
145,011
153,831
154,338
155,912
153,895
159,498
160,260
165,051
171,084
177,982
181,295
194,646
202,789
205,810
206,229
210,639

4,136
4,404
4,720
5,084
5,481
5,766
6,315
6,757
8,218
9,857
12,110
14,679
18,226
21,117
23,582
25,085
28,156
32,604
35,906
39,140
41,898
47,288
54,105
57,996
60,906
66,414
71,479
75,868
82,650
89,090
97,879
110,518
130,402
158,723
170,705
183,394
196,703
197,354
203,779
208,120
218,957
237,336
261,622
285,464
310,783
340,523
365,295
373,846
389,259
408,920
437,184
460,230
494,682
491,158
518,035
547,889
616,515
655,532
679,848
709,463
748,319
794,119
865,061
974,680

17,876
19,325
21,063
22,549
24,423
25,586
27,579
30,029
33,281
36,915
41,963
47,508
54,940
62,598
69,447
78,358
92,180
103,004
112,472
122,478
137,731
155,276
172,957
189,935
205,080
223,068
244,745
269,568
295,510
317,527
342,479
375,094
403,467
430,526
449,072
468,916
497,779
517,971
545,727
572,343
607,134
646,512
693,634
741,413
772,102
795,622
832,151
884,398
955,595
1,017,372
1,057,586
1,065,971
1,072,957
1,074,971
1,074,693
1,104,066
1,122,338
1,157,699
1,206,791
1,261,365
1,314,439
1,379,774
1,476,578
1,581,020

1 Fiscal years not the same for all governments. See Note.
2 Excludes revenues or expenditures of publicly owned utilities and liquor stores and of insurance-trust activities. Intergovernmental receipts and payments

between State and local governments are also excluded.
3 Includes motor vehicle license taxes, other taxes, and charges and miscellaneous revenues.
4 Includes intergovernmental payments to the Federal Government.
5 Includes expenditures for libraries, hospitals, health, employment security administration, veterans’ services, air transportation, sea and inland port
facilities, parking facilities, police protection, fire protection, correction, protective inspection and regulation, sewerage, natural resources, parks and recreation,
housing and community development, solid waste management, financial administration, judicial and legal, general public buildings, other government
administration, interest on general debt, and other general expenditures, not elsewhere classified.
Note: Except for States listed, data for fiscal years listed from 1963–64 to 2021–22 are the aggregation of data for government fiscal years that ended in the
12-month period from July 1 to June 30 of those years; Texas used August and Alabama and Michigan used September as end dates. Data for 1963 and earlier
years include data for government fiscal years ending during that particular calendar year.
Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census).

Government Finance | 447

Table B–51. U.S. Treasury securities outstanding by kind of obligation, 1984–2024
[Billions of dollars]

End of
fiscal year or
month

1984 �����������������
1985 �����������������
1986 �����������������
1987 �����������������
1988 �����������������
1989 �����������������
1990 �����������������
1991 �����������������
1992 �����������������
1993 �����������������
1994 �����������������
1995 �����������������
1996 �����������������
1997 �����������������
1998 �����������������
1999 �����������������
2000 �����������������
2001 1 ���������������
2002 �����������������
2003 �����������������
2004 �����������������
2005 �����������������
2006 �����������������
2007 �����������������
2008 �����������������
2009 �����������������
2010 �����������������
2011 �����������������
2012 �����������������
2013 �����������������
2014 �����������������
2015 �����������������
2016 �����������������
2017 �����������������
2018 �����������������
2019 �����������������
2020 �����������������
2021 �����������������
2022 �����������������
2023 �����������������
2024 �����������������
2023: Jan ��������
      Feb ��������
      Mar �������
      Apr ��������
      May �������
      June ������
      July �������
      Aug �������
      Sept ������
      Oct ��������
      Nov �������
      Dec ��������
2024: Jan ��������
      Feb ��������
      Mar �������
      Apr ��������
      May �������
      June ������
      July �������
      Aug �������
      Sept ������
      Oct ��������
      Nov �������

Total
Treasury
securities
outstanding 1
1,560.4
1,822.3
2,124.9
2,349.4
2,601.4
2,837.9
3,212.7
3,664.5
4,063.8
4,410.7
4,691.7
4,953.0
5,220.8
5,407.6
5,518.7
5,647.3
5,622.1
5,807.5
6,228.2
6,783.2
7,379.1
7,932.7
8,507.0
9,007.7
10,024.7
11,909.8
13,561.6
14,790.3
16,066.2
16,738.2
17,824.1
18,150.6
19,573.4
20,244.9
21,516.1
22,719.4
26,945.4
28,428.9
30,928.9
33,167.4
35,464.7
31,455.0
31,459.3
31,458.4
31,458.2
31,464.5
32,332.3
32,608.6
32,914.1
33,167.4
33,699.6
33,878.7
34,001.5
34,191.1
34,471.1
34,586.9
34,617.0
34,667.1
34,831.9
35,104.8
35,256.1
35,464.7
35,951.6
36,087.5

Marketable

Total 2

1,176.6
1,360.2
1,564.3
1,676.0
1,802.9
1,892.8
2,092.8
2,390.7
2,677.5
2,904.9
3,091.6
3,260.4
3,418.4
3,439.6
3,331.0
3,233.0
2,992.8
2,930.7
3,136.7
3,460.7
3,846.1
4,084.9
4,303.0
4,448.1
5,236.0
7,009.7
8,498.3
9,624.5
10,749.7
11,596.2
12,294.2
12,853.8
13,660.6
14,199.8
15,278.0
16,347.3
20,374.9
21,878.7
23,694.1
25,753.8
27,728.3
24,127.6
24,282.6
24,382.2
24,286.2
24,328.2
24,886.6
25,138.0
25,477.6
25,753.8
26,003.5
26,271.9
26,371.7
26,510.3
26,818.8
26,951.8
26,918.4
27,042.2
27,050.3
27,362.4
27,595.9
27,728.3
27,990.8
28,223.2

Treasury Treasury Treasury
bills
notes
bonds
356.8
384.2
410.7
378.3
398.5
406.6
482.5
564.6
634.3
658.4
697.3
742.5
761.2
701.9
637.6
653.2
616.2
734.9
868.3
918.2
961.5
914.3
911.5
958.1
1,489.8
1,992.5
1,788.5
1,477.5
1,616.0
1,530.0
1,411.0
1,358.0
1,647.0
1,801.9
2,239.9
2,377.0
5,028.9
3,714.1
3,644.6
5,260.4
6,004.8
3,938.9
4,057.8
4,068.8
3,942.6
3,993.4
4,466.7
4,770.5
5,073.9
5,260.4
5,457.0
5,671.1
5,675.8
5,780.2
6,011.2
6,062.9
5,866.8
5,866.8
5,765.8
5,915.8
6,121.8
6,004.8
6,186.8
6,389.8

661.7
776.4
896.9
1,005.1
1,089.6
1,133.2
1,218.1
1,387.7
1,566.3
1,734.2
1,867.5
1,980.3
2,098.7
2,122.2
2,009.1
1,828.8
1,611.3
1,433.0
1,521.6
1,799.5
2,109.6
2,328.8
2,447.2
2,458.0
2,624.8
3,773.8
5,255.9
6,412.5
7,120.7
7,758.0
8,167.8
8,372.7
8,631.0
8,805.5
9,154.4
9,762.8
10,663.8
12,578.9
13,703.8
13,729.5
14,343.4
13,753.8
13,730.5
13,737.9
13,774.3
13,718.3
13,724.0
13,732.1
13,702.5
13,729.5
13,762.3
13,729.6
13,758.2
13,831.2
13,829.8
13,863.2
13,994.9
14,013.8
14,046.7
14,227.0
14,192.2
14,343.4
14,443.6
14,409.5

158.1
199.5
241.7
277.6
299.9
338.0
377.2
423.4
461.8
497.4
511.8
522.6
543.5
576.2
610.4
643.7
635.3
613.0
593.0
576.9
552.0
520.7
534.7
561.1
582.9
679.8
849.9
1,020.4
1,198.2
1,366.2
1,534.1
1,688.3
1,825.5
1,951.7
2,127.8
2,319.1
2,673.5
3,347.6
3,874.4
4,246.9
4,708.3
4,001.9
4,033.7
4,063.7
4,082.8
4,140.5
4,170.5
4,200.4
4,226.9
4,246.9
4,292.9
4,333.6
4,354.6
4,401.5
4,445.1
4,467.1
4,515.3
4,560.4
4,581.1
4,631.8
4,657.6
4,708.3
4,743.8
4,759.3

Nonmarketable
Treasury
inflation-protected
securities
Total

Notes

Bonds

�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
24.4
58.8
92.4
115.0
134.9
138.9
166.1
223.0
307.1
395.6
456.9
524.5
551.7
593.8
705.7
807.7
936.4
1,044.7
1,135.4
1,210.0
1,286.5
1,376.4
1,455.7
1,523.2
1,652.7
1,840.5
1,935.9
2,051.7
1,870.8
1,876.3
1,905.6
1,880.1
1,904.9
1,933.6
1,902.0
1,917.1
1,935.9
1,966.3
1,986.7
2,006.2
1,966.3
1,973.7
1,999.7
1,995.6
2,025.8
2,054.1
2,023.7
2,032.2
2,051.7
2,033.9
2,054.0

�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
24.4
41.9
67.6
81.6
95.1
93.7
120.0
164.5
229.1
293.9
335.7
380.2
396.2
421.1
509.4
584.7
685.5
765.2
832.1
881.6
933.3
993.4
1,044.9
1,092.7
1,180.2
1,306.8
1,364.9
1,447.0
1,334.5
1,330.6
1,355.7
1,327.2
1,350.0
1,376.0
1,342.9
1,347.2
1,364.9
1,392.8
1,411.7
1,431.4
1,392.6
1,391.2
1,414.3
1,406.8
1,433.1
1,459.4
1,427.9
1,428.0
1,447.0
1,429.2
1,448.3

�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
�������������
17.0
24.8
33.4
39.7
45.1
46.1
58.5
78.0
101.7
121.2
144.3
155.5
172.7
196.3
223.0
250.8
279.5
303.3
328.3
353.2
383.0
410.8
430.5
472.5
533.7
571.1
604.8
536.3
545.7
549.9
552.9
554.9
557.6
559.1
569.9
571.1
573.5
575.0
574.8
573.7
582.5
585.4
588.8
592.7
594.8
595.8
604.2
604.8
604.7
605.7

Total

383.8
462.1
560.5
673.4
798.5
945.2
1,119.9
1,273.9
1,386.3
1,505.8
1,600.1
1,692.6
1,802.4
1,968.0
2,187.6
2,414.3
2,629.4
2,876.7
3,091.5
3,322.5
3,533.0
3,847.8
4,203.9
4,559.5
4,788.7
4,900.1
5,063.3
5,165.8
5,316.5
5,142.0
5,529.9
5,296.9
5,912.8
6,045.1
6,238.0
6,372.1
6,570.5
6,550.2
7,234.8
7,413.7
7,736.3
7,327.4
7,176.7
7,076.2
7,172.0
7,136.3
7,445.6
7,470.6
7,436.6
7,413.7
7,696.1
7,606.8
7,629.8
7,680.8
7,652.2
7,635.0
7,698.6
7,624.9
7,781.6
7,742.4
7,660.2
7,736.3
7,960.8
7,864.3

U.S.
savings
securities 3

Foreign
series 4

Government
account
series

73.7
78.2
87.8
98.5
107.8
115.7
123.9
135.4
150.3
169.1
178.6
183.5
184.1
182.7
180.8
180.0
177.7
186.5
193.3
201.6
204.2
203.6
203.7
197.1
194.3
192.5
188.7
185.1
183.8
180.0
176.7
172.8
167.5
161.7
156.8
152.3
148.6
143.6
166.2
175.7
161.1
176.4
177.1
177.8
178.8
178.5
178.2
177.7
176.6
175.7
174.1
172.9
171.9
169.3
168.0
166.8
165.9
164.8
163.9
162.8
161.8
161.1
160.4
159.6

8.8
6.6
4.1
4.4
6.3
6.8
36.0
41.6
37.0
42.5
42.0
41.0
37.5
34.9
35.1
31.0
25.4
18.3
12.5
11.0
5.9
3.1
3.0
3.0
3.0
4.9
4.2
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
.0
.0
.3
.3
.0
.0
.0
.0
.0
.0
.0
.0
.0
.0
.0
.0
.0
.0
.0
.0
.0
.0
.0
.0
.0

259.5
313.9
365.9
440.7
536.5
663.7
779.4
908.4
1,011.0
1,114.3
1,211.7
1,324.3
1,454.7
1,608.5
1,777.3
2,005.2
2,242.9
2,492.1
2,707.3
2,912.2
3,130.0
3,380.6
3,722.7
4,026.8
4,297.7
4,454.3
4,645.3
4,793.9
4,939.3
4,803.1
5,212.5
5,013.5
5,604.1
5,771.1
5,977.6
6,133.7
6,196.3
6,243.3
6,929.8
7,117.3
7,444.5
7,024.1
6,872.1
6,772.6
6,863.2
6,835.3
7,150.7
7,178.6
7,148.9
7,117.3
7,402.4
7,315.1
7,344.7
7,400.1
7,374.1
7,355.2
7,417.1
7,340.5
7,499.8
7,455.1
7,372.5
7,444.5
7,666.2
7,579.3

Other 5

41.8
63.3
102.8
129.8
148.0
159.0
180.6
188.5
188.0
179.9
167.8
143.8
126.1
141.9
194.4
198.1
183.3
179.9
178.4
197.7
192.9
260.5
274.5
332.6
293.8
248.4
225.1
183.8
190.4
156.0
137.7
110.3
141.0
112.0
103.4
85.8
225.3
163.0
138.5
120.7
130.7
126.6
127.3
125.8
130.0
122.4
116.7
114.3
111.0
120.7
119.6
118.7
113.1
111.4
110.2
112.9
115.6
119.7
118.0
124.5
125.9
130.7
134.2
125.5

1 Data beginning with January 2001 are interest-bearing and non-interest-bearing securities; prior data are interest-bearing securities only.
2 Data from 1986 to 2002 and 2005 forward include Federal Financing Bank securities, not shown separately. Beginning with data for January 2014, includes

Floating Rate Notes, not shown separately.
3 Through 1996, series is U.S. savings bonds. Beginning 1997, includes U.S. retirement plan bonds, U.S. individual retirement bonds, and U.S. savings notes
previously included in “other” nonmarketable securities.
4 Nonmarketable certificates of indebtedness, notes, bonds, and bills in the Treasury foreign series of dollar-denominated and foreign-currency-denominated
issues.
5 Includes depository bonds; retirement plan bonds through 1996; Rural Electrification Administration bonds; State and local bonds; special issues held
only by U.S. Government agencies and trust funds and the Federal home loan banks; for the period July 2003 through February 2004, depositary compensation
securities; and for the period August 2008 through April 2016, Hope bonds for the HOPE For Homeowners Program.
Note: The fiscal year is on an October 1–September 30 basis.
Source: Department of the Treasury.

448 |

Appendix B

Table B–52. Estimated ownership of U.S. Treasury securities, 2010–2024
[Billions of dollars]

End of month

2010: Mar ������������
      June �����������
      Sept �����������
      Dec �������������
2011: Mar ������������
      June �����������
      Sept �����������
      Dec �������������
2012: Mar ������������
      June �����������
      Sept �����������
      Dec �������������
2013: Mar ������������
      June �����������
      Sept �����������
      Dec �������������
2014: Mar ������������
      June �����������
      Sept �����������
      Dec �������������
2015: Mar ������������
      June �����������
      Sept �����������
      Dec �������������
2016: Mar ������������
      June �����������
      Sept �����������
      Dec �������������
2017: Mar ������������
      June �����������
      Sept �����������
      Dec �������������
2018: Mar ������������
      June �����������
      Sept �����������
      Dec �������������
2019: Mar ������������
      June �����������
      Sept �����������
      Dec �������������
2020: Mar ������������
      June �����������
      Sept �����������
      Dec �������������
2021: Mar ������������
      June �����������
      Sept �����������
      Dec �������������
2022: Mar ������������
      June �����������
      Sept �����������
      Dec �������������
2023: Mar ������������
      June �����������
      Sept �����������
      Dec �������������
2024: Mar ������������
      June �����������
      Sept �����������

Total
public
debt 1

12,773.1
13,201.8
13,561.6
14,025.2
14,270.0
14,343.1
14,790.3
15,222.8
15,582.3
15,855.5
16,066.2
16,432.7
16,771.6
16,738.2
16,738.2
17,352.0
17,601.2
17,632.6
17,824.1
18,141.4
18,152.1
18,152.0
18,150.6
18,922.2
19,264.9
19,381.6
19,573.4
19,976.9
19,846.4
19,844.6
20,244.9
20,492.7
21,089.9
21,195.3
21,516.1
21,974.1
22,028.0
22,023.5
22,719.4
23,201.4
23,686.9
26,477.4
26,945.4
27,747.8
28,132.6
28,529.4
28,428.9
29,617.2
30,401.0
30,568.6
30,928.9
31,419.9
31,458.4
32,332.3
33,167.4
34,001.5
34,592.4
34,831.9
35,464.7

Federal
Reserve
and IntragovernTotal
mental privately
holdheld
ings 2
5,259.8
5,345.1
5,350.5
5,656.2
5,958.9
6,220.4
6,328.0
6,439.6
6,397.2
6,475.8
6,446.8
6,523.7
6,656.8
6,773.3
6,834.2
7,205.3
7,301.5
7,461.0
7,490.8
7,578.9
7,521.3
7,536.5
7,488.7
7,711.2
7,801.4
7,911.2
7,863.5
8,005.6
7,941.1
7,943.4
8,036.9
8,132.1
8,086.6
8,106.9
8,068.1
8,095.0
7,999.1
7,945.2
8,023.6
8,359.9
9,279.7
10,157.7
10,371.9
10,809.2
11,095.5
11,382.9
11,579.1
12,125.9
12,281.3
12,399.7
12,264.7
12,401.4
12,044.6
11,976.9
11,790.1
11,848.1
11,689.3
11,672.4
11,521.7

Held by private investors
Pension funds
Depository
institutions 3

7,513.3
269.3
7,856.7
266.1
8,211.1
322.8
8,368.9
319.3
8,311.1
321.0
8,122.7
279.4
8,462.4
293.8
8,783.3
279.7
9,185.1
317.0
9,379.7
303.2
9,619.4
338.2
9,909.1
347.7
10,114.8
338.9
9,964.9
300.2
9,904.0
293.2
10,146.6
321.1
10,299.7
368.4
10,171.6
409.5
10,333.2
471.1
10,562.6
516.8
10,630.8
518.1
10,615.5
518.5
10,661.9
519.1
11,211.0
547.4
11,463.6
562.9
11,470.4
580.6
11,709.9
626.8
11,971.3
663.1
11,905.3
657.4
11,901.1
620.5
12,208.0
610.5
12,360.6
636.7
13,003.3
637.8
13,088.5
663.1
13,447.9
682.0
13,879.1
769.7
14,028.9
769.5
14,078.4
808.2
14,695.8
909.4
14,841.5
935.1
14,407.2
947.6
16,319.6 1,157.9
16,573.5 1,241.1
16,938.6 1,265.2
17,037.1 1,347.9
17,146.5 1,433.1
16,849.8 1,540.3
17,491.3 1,734.0
18,119.7 1,754.1
18,168.9 1,807.7
18,664.2 1,736.8
19,018.5 1,713.9
19,413.8 1,615.9
20,355.4 1,556.3
21,377.4 1,555.2
22,153.4 1,646.8
22,903.1 1,738.3
23,159.5 1,726.3
23,943.0 ���������������

U.S.
savings
bonds 4

Private 5

State
and
local
governments

Insurance
companies

Mutual
funds 6

State
and
local
governments

190.2
183.0
153.6
225.7
678.5
585.0
189.6
190.8
150.1
231.8
676.8
584.4
188.7
198.2
145.2
240.6
671.0
586.0
187.9
206.8
153.7
248.4
721.7
595.7
186.7
215.8
157.9
253.5
749.4
585.3
186.0
251.8
158.0
254.8
753.7
572.2
185.1
373.6
155.7
259.6
788.7
557.9
185.2
391.9
160.7
297.3
927.9
562.2
184.8
406.6
169.4
298.1 1,015.4
567.4
184.7
427.4
171.2
293.6
997.8
585.4
183.8
453.9
181.7
292.6 1,080.7
596.9
182.5
468.0
183.6
292.7 1,031.8
599.6
181.7
463.4
193.4
284.3 1,066.7
615.6
180.9
444.5
187.7
281.3 1,000.1
612.6
180.0
347.8
187.5
276.6
986.1
624.3
179.2
464.9
181.3
274.5
983.3
633.6
178.3
474.3
184.3
280.1 1,060.4
632.0
177.6
482.6
198.3
291.0
986.2
638.8
176.7
490.7
198.7
301.4 1,075.8
628.7
175.9
507.1
199.2
310.5 1,121.8
654.5
174.9
447.8
176.7
308.5 1,170.4
663.3
173.9
373.8
185.7
307.7 1,139.8
652.8
172.8
305.3
171.0
310.0 1,195.1
646.0
171.6
504.7
174.5
310.1 1,318.3
680.9
170.3
524.4
170.4
319.1 1,404.1
694.9
169.0
537.9
185.0
333.7 1,434.2
712.6
167.5
545.6
203.8
345.2 1,600.4
710.9
165.8
538.0
218.8
334.2 1,705.4
717.3
164.2
444.2
239.5
342.6 1,715.2
724.6
162.8
425.9
262.8
352.8 1,645.8
710.1
161.7
570.8
266.5
364.3 1,739.6
704.0
160.4
432.1
289.4
377.9 1,850.8
735.0
159.0
589.7
300.1
366.9 2,048.2
715.8
157.8
605.0
307.3
360.2 1,902.9
726.8
156.8
615.3
301.7
361.3 1,957.2
730.7
155.7
637.3
367.9
360.5 2,094.9
713.2
154.5
443.6
357.6
366.8 2,189.2
752.7
153.4
470.4
386.5
369.3 2,037.0
751.4
152.3
691.1
343.3
372.7 2,319.7
701.8
151.3
705.3
333.4
374.8 2,412.8
718.6
150.0
758.9
330.4
402.6 2,501.7
715.2
149.8
766.9
290.1
408.9 3,695.4
880.6
148.6
772.6
318.0
420.3 3,724.9
940.0
147.1
770.6
354.4
404.1 3,784.6
992.1
145.7
761.2
345.8
397.7 3,951.4
990.5
144.6
787.5
395.5
427.0 3,778.5 1,301.7
143.6
622.7
390.5
429.7 3,238.0 1,344.2
146.2
809.6
413.6
425.0 3,411.7 1,379.1
149.7
803.4
381.9
379.8 3,290.7 1,366.7
160.4
785.3
368.5
371.1 2,890.3 1,401.7
166.2
756.0
336.2
371.7 2,604.3 1,403.8
173.5
733.6
321.4
396.0 2,408.7 1,427.2
177.8
476.0
356.2
407.7 2,412.7 1,499.6
178.2
747.2
349.6
409.3 2,591.9 1,510.1
175.7
734.6
365.1
427.7 3,086.9 1,493.6
171.9
452.9
402.8
444.1 3,647.8 1,566.7
166.8
454.6
415.9
469.9 3,956.0 1,589.9
163.9
459.8
429.7
549.2 3,841.9 1,621.4
161.1 ��������������� ��������������� ��������������� ��������������� ���������������

Foreign
and
international 7

Other
investors 8

3,877.9
1,350.1
4,070.0
1,497.1
4,324.2
1,534.4
4,435.6
1,499.9
4,481.4
1,360.1
4,690.6
976.1
4,912.1
935.8
5,006.9
971.4
5,145.1
1,081.2
5,310.9
1,105.4
5,476.1
1,015.4
5,573.8
1,229.4
5,725.0
1,245.7
5,595.0
1,362.6
5,652.8
1,355.7
5,792.6
1,316.2
5,948.3
1,173.7
6,018.7
968.8
6,069.2
920.8
6,157.7
919.0
6,172.6
998.4
6,163.1
1,100.1
6,105.9
1,236.8
6,146.2
1,357.1
6,284.4
1,333.0
6,279.1
1,238.3
6,155.9
1,353.8
6,006.3
1,622.4
6,075.3
1,542.3
6,151.9
1,568.5
6,301.9
1,488.7
6,211.3
1,667.1
6,223.4
1,962.5
6,225.0
2,140.4
6,225.9
2,417.0
6,270.1
2,509.9
6,474.0
2,521.0
6,625.9
2,476.3
6,923.5
2,281.9
6,844.2
2,366.0
6,949.5
1,651.2
7,052.1
1,917.9
7,069.2
1,938.8
7,070.7
2,149.8
7,038.3
2,058.6
7,518.9
1,359.6
7,570.9
1,569.8
7,740.4
1,431.7
7,604.2
2,389.2
7,416.9
2,967.1
7,251.5
4,037.6
7,197.8
4,646.6
7,471.4
4,996.6
7,559.0
5,453.8
7,515.1
6,023.6
7,944.4
5,875.8
8,114.9
5,996.9
8,210.6
6,156.7
8,672.9 ����������������

1 Face value.
2 Federal Reserve holdings exclude Treasury securities held under repurchase agreements.
3 Includes U.S. chartered depository institutions, foreign banking offices in U.S., banks in U.S. affiliated areas, credit unions, and bank holding companies.
4 Current accrual value includes myRA.
5 Includes Treasury securities held by the Federal Employees Retirement System Thrift Savings Plan “G Fund.”
6 Includes money market mutual funds, mutual funds, and closed-end investment companies.
7 Includes nonmarketable foreign series, Treasury securities, and Treasury deposit funds. Excludes Treasury securities held under repurchase agreements

in custody accounts at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Estimates reflect benchmarks to this series at differing intervals; for further detail, see Treasury
Bulletin and http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/pages/index.aspx.
8 Includes individuals, Government-sponsored enterprises, brokers and dealers, bank personal trusts and estates, corporate and noncorporate businesses,
and other investors.
Source: Department of the Treasury.

Government Finance | 449

Corporate Profits and Finance
Table B–53. Corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption
adjustments, 1973–2024
[Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

Year or quarter

Corporate profits
with inventory
valuation and
capital consumption
adjustments

1973 ��������������������������������
1974 ��������������������������������
1975 ��������������������������������
1976 ��������������������������������
1977 ��������������������������������
1978 ��������������������������������
1979 ��������������������������������
1980 ��������������������������������
1981 ��������������������������������
1982 ��������������������������������
1983 ��������������������������������
1984 ��������������������������������
1985 ��������������������������������
1986 ��������������������������������
1987 ��������������������������������
1988 ��������������������������������
1989 ��������������������������������
1990 ��������������������������������
1991 ��������������������������������
1992 ��������������������������������
1993 ��������������������������������
1994 ��������������������������������
1995 ��������������������������������
1996 ��������������������������������
1997 ��������������������������������
1998 ��������������������������������
1999 ��������������������������������
2000 ��������������������������������
2001 ��������������������������������
2002 ��������������������������������
2003 ��������������������������������
2004 ��������������������������������
2005 ��������������������������������
2006 ��������������������������������
2007 ��������������������������������
2008 ��������������������������������
2009 ��������������������������������
2010 ��������������������������������
2011 ��������������������������������
2012 ��������������������������������
2013 ��������������������������������
2014 ��������������������������������
2015 ��������������������������������
2016 ��������������������������������
2017 ��������������������������������
2018 ��������������������������������
2019 ��������������������������������
2020 ��������������������������������
2021 ��������������������������������
2022 ��������������������������������
2023 ��������������������������������
2021: I ����������������������������
      II ���������������������������
      III ��������������������������
      IV ��������������������������
2022: I ����������������������������
      II ���������������������������
      III ��������������������������
      IV ��������������������������
2023: I ����������������������������
      II ���������������������������
      III ��������������������������
      IV ��������������������������
2024: I ����������������������������
      II ���������������������������
      III p ������������������������

Taxes
on
corporate
income

133.4
125.7
138.9
174.3
205.8
238.6
249.2
223.1
245.9
227.8
277.9
337.3
353.1
323.6
370.8
416.2
418.7
419.3
448.7
481.3
530.7
634.1
716.7
803.6
889.9
835.2
866.8
826.4
787.2
930.4
1,077.1
1,320.5
1,530.0
1,696.1
1,595.8
1,345.6
1,425.7
1,774.5
1,862.4
2,057.7
2,081.1
2,212.8
2,173.1
2,144.3
2,225.2
2,365.2
2,471.3
2,411.3
3,077.6
3,316.7
3,546.5
2,863.1
3,130.7
3,138.9
3,177.6
3,132.3
3,318.3
3,422.4
3,394.0
3,405.4
3,443.7
3,587.0
3,749.9
3,684.8
3,817.2
3,807.1

Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).

450 |

Appendix B

Corporate profits after tax with inventory valuation
and capital consumption adjustments

Total

45.6
47.2
46.3
59.4
68.5
77.9
80.7
75.5
70.3
51.3
66.4
81.5
81.6
91.9
112.7
124.3
124.4
121.8
117.8
131.9
155.0
172.7
194.4
211.4
224.8
221.8
227.4
233.4
170.1
160.7
213.8
278.5
379.7
430.1
391.8
255.9
203.9
272.3
280.8
334.6
362.4
406.9
396.1
376.0
297.2
297.4
297.2
311.8
464.2
579.3
624.7
386.2
451.3
478.3
541.1
566.0
590.3
576.7
584.1
608.6
608.2
633.9
648.0
648.0
675.7
665.9

Net dividends

87.8
78.5
92.6
114.9
137.3
160.7
168.5
147.6
175.6
176.5
211.5
255.8
271.5
231.7
258.1
292.0
294.3
297.5
330.9
349.4
375.7
461.4
522.2
592.2
665.1
613.4
639.4
593.0
617.0
769.7
863.3
1,042.0
1,150.3
1,266.0
1,204.0
1,089.7
1,221.7
1,502.2
1,581.7
1,723.1
1,718.7
1,805.9
1,777.0
1,768.3
1,928.1
2,067.7
2,174.1
2,099.5
2,613.4
2,737.5
2,921.8
2,476.9
2,679.4
2,660.6
2,636.6
2,566.3
2,728.1
2,845.7
2,809.9
2,796.8
2,835.5
2,953.0
3,101.8
3,036.7
3,141.6
3,141.1

34.2
38.8
38.3
44.9
50.7
57.8
67.0
76.0
83.9
88.5
96.4
102.0
111.7
121.1
119.9
145.5
179.3
193.6
202.1
206.5
221.7
258.6
283.5
323.9
359.9
386.6
375.4
413.1
402.9
427.5
455.0
579.8
579.3
715.8
818.3
841.4
634.7
636.0
788.0
945.3
997.3
1,059.9
1,128.7
1,139.4
1,253.9
1,319.9
1,416.8
1,496.7
1,816.0
1,921.9
1,938.0
1,656.4
1,788.0
1,880.2
1,939.4
1,948.6
1,947.2
1,895.7
1,896.0
1,913.8
1,943.1
1,934.2
1,960.8
1,995.8
1,996.0
1,984.9

Undistributed profits
with inventory
valuation and
capital consumption
adjustments
53.5
39.7
54.3
70.0
86.6
102.9
101.5
71.6
91.7
88.0
115.1
153.8
159.7
110.6
138.2
146.5
115.0
104.0
128.8
142.9
154.0
202.9
238.7
268.3
305.2
226.7
264.0
179.9
214.1
342.2
408.3
462.2
571.0
550.1
385.7
248.3
587.0
866.2
793.7
777.8
721.4
746.0
648.3
628.9
674.2
747.8
757.3
602.8
797.3
815.6
983.8
820.4
891.4
780.4
697.2
617.6
780.8
950.0
913.9
883.1
892.4
1,018.8
1,141.0
1,040.9
1,145.5
1,156.2

Table B–54. Corporate profits by industry, 1973–2024
[Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]
Corporate profits with inventory valuation adjustment and without capital consumption adjustment
Domestic industries
Year or quarter

SIC: 2
1973 ����������������������
1974 ����������������������
1975 ����������������������
1976 ����������������������
1977 ����������������������
1978 ����������������������
1979 ����������������������
1980 ����������������������
1981 ����������������������
1982 ����������������������
1983 ����������������������
1984 ����������������������
1985 ����������������������
1986 ����������������������
1987 ����������������������
1988 ����������������������
1989 ����������������������
1990 ����������������������
1991 ����������������������
1992 ����������������������
1993 ����������������������
1994 ����������������������
1995 ����������������������
1996 ����������������������
1997 ����������������������
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
NAICS: 2
1998 ����������������������
1999 ����������������������
2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2022: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III p ��������������

Total

Financial
Total

Total

Federal
Reserve
banks

Nonfinancial
Other

126.6
123.3
144.2
182.1
212.8
246.7
261.2
240.2
250.4
222.7
254.6
293.6
288.3
272.4
319.4
368.0
377.5
392.8
430.4
463.9
508.1
598.6
677.4
755.9
831.1
770.5
793.8
769.6

111.7
105.8
129.6
165.6
193.7
223.8
226.6
204.7
220.7
190.1
219.5
257.1
250.2
233.0
271.4
311.0
310.3
316.7
353.9
390.8
431.1
520.6
584.5
653.9
723.6
667.8
672.0
624.0

21.1
20.8
20.4
25.6
32.6
40.8
42.0
34.8
28.7
25.1
34.3
34.1
45.1
55.5
65.1
68.7
82.7
91.2
116.6
136.5
126.1
135.2
150.8
161.9
182.4
165.6
186.4
189.6

4.5
5.7
5.6
5.9
6.1
7.6
9.4
11.8
14.4
15.2
14.6
16.4
16.3
15.5
16.2
18.1
20.6
21.8
20.7
18.3
16.7
18.5
22.9
22.5
24.3
25.6
26.7
31.2

16.6
15.1
14.8
19.7
26.5
33.1
32.6
23.0
14.3
9.9
19.7
17.7
28.8
40.0
48.9
50.6
62.1
69.4
95.9
118.2
109.4
116.7
127.8
139.4
158.1
140.0
159.8
158.3

770.5
793.8
769.6
725.6
815.7
976.1
1,248.3
1,670.2
1,861.7
1,770.5
1,403.9
1,508.3
1,831.1
1,802.2
2,203.9
2,234.1
2,356.1
2,295.5
2,245.2
2,247.5
2,266.6
2,376.0
2,503.2
3,090.0
3,388.7
3,723.3
3,181.2
3,387.5
3,506.3
3,479.9
3,582.4
3,622.1
3,760.4
3,928.1
3,945.9
4,084.8
4,078.3

667.8
672.0
624.0
556.8
659.0
817.2
1,053.2
1,444.5
1,622.0
1,432.8
1,013.7
1,159.5
1,445.3
1,389.6
1,798.6
1,835.2
1,951.2
1,900.3
1,825.3
1,748.6
1,746.0
1,843.0
2,058.0
2,687.8
2,943.9
3,233.7
2,787.7
2,946.1
3,034.6
3,007.0
3,118.1
3,131.8
3,253.1
3,431.9
3,447.3
3,605.0
3,636.7

165.6
186.4
189.6
223.7
280.4
317.9
368.3
436.1
443.3
345.8
138.3
389.5
437.5
414.3
519.0
480.7
536.1
512.4
511.8
491.6
478.9
575.0
536.1
642.5
627.4
614.9
664.5
619.8
633.7
591.6
631.7
590.9
599.5
637.4
701.2
745.9
745.9

25.6
26.7
31.2
28.9
23.5
20.0
20.0
26.5
33.8
36.0
35.1
47.3
71.6
76.0
71.8
79.7
103.5
100.7
92.0
78.3
68.1
59.2
85.4
108.3
59.5
–117.5
134.7
123.4
38.4
–58.6
–105.8
–134.5
–135.1
–94.7
–95.1
–84.2
–93.2

140.0
159.8
158.3
194.8
256.9
297.8
348.3
409.6
409.5
309.8
103.2
342.2
365.9
338.3
447.2
401.0
432.7
411.7
419.8
413.4
410.8
515.8
450.7
534.2
567.9
732.4
529.8
496.4
595.3
650.2
737.5
725.4
734.6
732.0
796.4
830.1
839.1

Total

90.6
85.1
109.2
140.0
161.1
183.1
184.6
169.9
192.0
165.0
185.2
223.0
205.1
177.4
206.2
242.3
227.6
225.5
237.3
254.2
305.1
385.4
433.7
492.0
541.2
502.1
485.6
434.4

Manufacturing
55.0
51.0
63.0
82.5
91.5
105.8
107.1
97.6
112.5
89.6
97.3
114.2
107.1
75.6
101.8
132.8
122.3
120.9
109.3
109.8
122.9
162.6
199.8
220.4
248.5
220.4
219.4
205.9

TransWholeporta- Utilities sale
tion 1
trade
10.2
9.1
11.7
17.5
21.2
25.5
21.6
22.2
25.1
28.1
34.3
44.7
39.1
39.3
42.0
46.8
41.9
43.5
54.5
57.7
70.1
83.9
89.0
91.2
81.0
72.6
49.3
33.8

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8.8
12.2
14.3
13.7
16.4
16.7
20.0
18.5
23.7
20.7
21.9
30.4
24.6
24.4
18.9
20.4
22.0
19.4
22.3
25.3
26.5
31.4
28.0
39.9
48.1
50.6
46.8
50.4

Retail
trade
7.0
2.8
8.4
10.9
12.8
13.1
10.7
7.0
10.7
14.3
19.3
21.5
22.8
23.4
23.3
19.8
20.9
20.3
26.9
28.1
39.7
46.3
43.9
52.0
63.4
72.3
72.5
68.9

Information
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Other

Rest
of
the
world

9.6
10.0
11.8
15.3
19.2
22.0
25.2
24.6
20.1
12.3
12.3
12.1
11.4
14.7
20.3
22.5
20.5
21.3
24.3
33.4
45.8
61.2
73.1
88.5
100.3
86.3
97.6
75.4

14.9
17.5
14.6
16.5
19.1
22.9
34.6
35.5
29.7
32.6
35.1
36.6
38.1
39.5
48.0
57.0
67.1
76.1
76.5
73.1
76.9
78.0
92.9
102.0
107.6
102.8
121.7
145.7

502.1 193.4
12.7
33.3
57.3
62.6
33.0 109.7
485.6 188.0
7.2
34.4
55.5
48.4
28.5 123.5
434.4 175.5
9.5
24.3
59.5
51.5 –11.9 126.1
333.1
75.1
–.7
22.5
51.1
71.3 –26.4 140.1
378.6
78.2
–6.5
10.5
53.5
83.3
5.0 154.6
499.3 123.8
4.4
13.2
56.6
87.9
28.1 185.4
684.9 186.1
11.9
21.1
72.7
94.0
61.6 237.5
1,008.4 279.7
28.4
32.4
96.0 123.3 100.7 347.9
1,178.6 352.9
40.8
55.2 105.0 133.6 115.2 376.0
1,087.0 321.1
23.3
49.6 102.8 119.4 120.5 350.3
875.4 240.0
29.3
30.4
92.7
82.2
98.8 302.1
770.0 164.7
21.7
23.4
88.9 107.9
87.0 276.4
1,007.8 281.8
44.6
30.6
99.3 115.9 102.3 333.4
975.4 296.0
30.6
10.2
97.2 115.1
95.7 330.6
1,279.6 403.0
54.4
13.8 137.9 155.7 112.0 402.8
1,354.5 440.0
45.0
27.8 146.3 153.3 138.6 403.5
1,415.1 453.1
55.7
32.4 151.2 157.8 131.0 433.9
1,387.9 421.5
61.1
19.9 153.9 170.4 134.8 426.3
1,313.5 327.9
64.7
9.4 130.0 176.6 163.3 441.6
1,257.0 299.9
59.6
13.8 127.4 151.7 143.0 461.5
1,267.1 361.7
45.1
16.5 108.2 145.6 115.2 474.6
1,268.0 353.6
34.5
11.7 125.8 149.5 134.5 458.3
1,521.9 331.8
39.2
27.4 158.5 248.8 120.0 596.3
2,045.3 471.5
93.9
33.3 167.6 298.2 151.6 829.1
2,316.5 664.2 107.4
40.8 254.0 281.1 162.8 806.2
2,618.9 696.7 123.4
51.4 290.5 344.5 210.9 901.5
2,123.2 611.3
81.8
35.3 187.9 266.8 152.7 787.5
2,326.3 664.9 119.6
37.7 220.0 284.7 156.2 843.1
2,400.9 677.3 119.2
48.1 301.5 283.6 163.5 807.7
2,415.4 703.2 109.0
42.2 306.6 289.2 178.8 786.4
2,486.4 706.0 116.4
46.8 283.8 306.3 185.4 841.8
2,541.0 656.2 131.4
56.7 288.2 334.4 208.9 865.2
2,653.6 694.2 119.3
52.2 288.0 360.7 219.0 920.3
2,794.5 730.4 126.6
49.9 302.1 376.7 230.2 978.5
2,746.1 643.7 129.4
57.6 284.2 373.8 250.5 1,006.9
2,859.1 695.0 129.4
66.9 286.0 379.7 272.8 1,029.2
2,890.8 ������������ ������������ ������������ ������������ ������������ ������������ ������������

102.8
121.7
145.7
168.8
156.8
158.9
195.1
225.7
239.7
337.8
390.2
348.8
385.8
412.6
405.4
398.8
404.9
395.2
419.9
498.9
520.6
533.0
445.3
402.2
444.9
489.5
393.5
441.4
471.6
472.9
464.2
490.3
507.3
496.2
498.6
479.8
441.6

1 Data on Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) basis include transportation and public utilities. Those on North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS) basis include transporation and warehousing. Utilities classified separately in NAICS (as shown beginning 1998).
2 SIC-based industry data use the 1987 SIC for data beginning in 1987 and the 1972 SIC for prior data. NAICS-based data use 2017 NAICS.
Note: Industry data on SIC basis and NAICS basis are not necessarily the same and are not strictly comparable.
Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).

Corporate Profits and Finance | 451

Table B–55. Historical stock prices and yields, 1949–2003
Common stock yields
(Standard & Poor’s)
(percent) 5

Common stock prices
(end of period) 1
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) indexes 2

End of year

December 31, 1965=50
Composite
(Dec. 31,
2002=
Transpor- Utility 4
5,000) 3 Composite Industrial
tation
1949 �����������������
1950 �����������������
1951 �����������������
1952 �����������������
1953 �����������������
1954 �����������������
1955 �����������������
1956 �����������������
1957 �����������������
1958 �����������������
1959 �����������������
1960 �����������������
1961 �����������������
1962 �����������������
1963 �����������������
1964 �����������������
1965 �����������������
1966 �����������������
1967 �����������������
1968 �����������������
1969 �����������������
1970 �����������������
1971 �����������������
1972 �����������������
1973 �����������������
1974 �����������������
1975 �����������������
1976 �����������������
1977 �����������������
1978 �����������������
1979 �����������������
1980 �����������������
1981 �����������������
1982 �����������������
1983 �����������������
1984 �����������������
1985 �����������������
1986 �����������������
1987 �����������������
1988 �����������������
1989 �����������������
1990 �����������������
1991 �����������������
1992 �����������������
1993 �����������������
1994 �����������������
1995 �����������������
1996 �����������������
1997 �����������������
1998 �����������������
1999 �����������������
2000 �����������������
2001 �����������������
2002 �����������������
2003 3 ���������������

�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
528.69
462.28
569.18
622.79
544.86
531.12
596.68
681.79
547.93
382.03
503.73
612.01
555.12
566.96
655.04
823.27
751.90
856.79
1,006.41
1,013.91
1,285.66
1,465.31
1,461.61
1,652.25
2,062.30
1,908.45
2,426.04
2,539.92
2,739.44
2,653.37
3,484.15
4,148.07
5,405.19
6,299.94
6,876.10
6,945.57
6,236.39
5,000.00
6,440.30

�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
13.60
19.40
23.71
24.35
21.11
28.85
32.15
30.94
38.93
33.81
39.92
45.65
50.00
43.72
53.83
58.90
51.53
50.23
56.43
64.48
51.82
36.13
47.64
57.88
52.50
53.62
61.95
77.86
71.11
81.03
95.18
96.38
121.59
138.59
138.23
156.26
195.04
180.49
229.44
240.21
259.08
250.94
329.51
392.30
511.19
595.81
650.30
656.87
589.80
472.87
572.56

�����������������
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�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
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�����������������
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50.00
43.13
56.59
61.69
54.74
52.91
60.53
70.33
56.60
39.15
52.73
63.36
56.43
58.87
70.24
91.52
80.89
93.02
111.35
110.58
139.27
160.11
167.04
189.42
232.76
223.60
285.82
294.39
315.26
318.10
413.29
494.38
630.38
743.65
828.21
803.29
735.71
583.95
735.50

�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
50.00
47.56
49.66
56.27
37.85
35.70
49.56
47.69
37.53
26.36
32.98
42.57
40.50
41.58
50.64
76.19
66.85
73.63
98.09
90.61
113.97
117.65
118.57
146.60
178.33
141.49
201.87
214.72
270.48
222.46
301.96
352.30
466.25
482.38
466.70
462.76
438.81
395.81
519.58

�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
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50.00
90.38
86.76
91.64
77.54
81.64
78.78
84.34
68.66
53.30
66.94
82.54
81.08
75.38
73.80
76.90
80.10
86.94
92.48
103.14
126.38
147.54
134.62
149.38
204.00
182.60
204.26
209.66
229.92
198.41
252.90
259.91
335.19
445.94
511.15
440.54
329.84
233.08
265.58

Finance
�����������������
�����������������
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�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
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�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
50.00
44.91
53.80
76.48
67.87
64.34
73.83
83.34
64.51
39.84
45.20
59.23
53.85
55.01
63.45
70.83
73.68
85.00
94.32
97.63
131.29
140.05
114.57
128.19
156.15
122.06
172.68
200.83
216.82
195.80
274.25
351.17
495.96
521.42
516.61
646.95
593.69
510.46
655.12

Standard
Nasdaq
Dow
& Poor’s
composite DividendJones
composite
index
price
industrial
index
(Feb. 5,
ratio 6
average 2 (1941–43=10)
2 1971=100) 2
200.52
235.42
269.23
291.90
280.90
404.39
488.40
499.47
435.69
583.65
679.36
615.89
731.14
652.10
762.95
874.13
969.26
785.69
905.11
943.75
800.36
838.92
890.20
1,020.02
850.86
616.24
852.41
1,004.65
831.17
805.01
838.74
963.99
875.00
1,046.54
1,258.64
1,211.57
1,546.67
1,895.95
1,938.83
2,168.57
2,753.20
2,633.66
3,168.83
3,301.11
3,754.09
3,834.44
5,117.12
6,448.27
7,908.25
9,181.43
11,497.12
10,786.85
10,021.50
8,341.63
10,453.92

16.76
20.41
23.77
26.57
24.81
35.98
45.48
46.67
39.99
55.21
59.89
58.11
71.55
63.10
75.02
84.75
92.43
80.33
96.47
103.86
92.06
92.15
102.09
118.05
97.55
68.56
90.19
107.46
95.10
96.11
107.94
135.76
122.55
140.64
164.93
167.24
211.28
242.17
247.08
277.72
353.40
330.22
417.09
435.71
466.45
459.27
615.93
740.74
970.43
1,229.23
1,469.25
1,320.28
1,148.08
879.82
1,111.92

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�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
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�����������������
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�����������������
�����������������
�����������������
114.12
133.73
92.19
59.82
77.62
97.88
105.05
117.98
151.14
202.34
195.84
232.41
278.60
247.35
324.93
348.83
330.47
381.38
454.82
373.84
586.34
676.95
776.80
751.96
1,052.13
1,291.03
1,570.35
2,192.69
4,069.31
2,470.52
1,950.40
1,335.51
2,003.37

6.59
6.57
6.13
5.80
5.80
4.95
4.08
4.09
4.35
3.97
3.23
3.47
2.98
3.37
3.17
3.01
3.00
3.40
3.20
3.07
3.24
3.83
3.14
2.84
3.06
4.47
4.31
3.77
4.62
5.28
5.47
5.26
5.20
5.81
4.40
4.64
4.25
3.49
3.08
3.64
3.45
3.61
3.24
2.99
2.78
2.82
2.56
2.19
1.77
1.49
1.25
1.15
1.32
1.61
1.77

Earningsprice
ratio 7
15.48
13.99
11.82
9.47
10.26
8.57
7.95
7.55
7.89
6.23
5.78
5.90
4.62
5.82
5.50
5.32
5.59
6.63
5.73
5.67
6.08
6.45
5.41
5.50
7.12
11.59
9.15
8.90
10.79
12.03
13.46
12.66
11.96
11.60
8.03
10.02
8.12
6.09
5.48
8.01
7.42
6.47
4.79
4.22
4.46
5.83
6.09
5.24
4.57
3.46
3.17
3.63
2.95
2.92
3.84

1 End of period.
2 Includes stocks as follows: for NYSE, all stocks listed; for Dow Jones industrial average, 30 stocks; for Standard & Poor’s (S&P) composite index, 500
stocks; and for Nasdaq composite index, over 5,000.
3 The NYSE relaunched the composite index on January 9, 2003, incorporating new definitions, methodology, and base value. (The composite index based on
December 31, 1965=50 was discontinued.) Subset indexes on financial, energy, and health care were released by the NYSE on January 8, 2004 (see Table B–56).
NYSE indexes shown in this table for industrials, utilities, transportation, and finance were discontinued.
4 Effective April 1993, the NYSE doubled the value of the utility index to facilitate trading of options and futures on the index. Indexes prior to 1993 reflect
the doubling.
5 Based on 500 stocks in the S&P composite index.
6 Aggregate cash dividends (based on latest known annual rate) divided by aggregate market value based on Wednesday closing prices. Monthly data are
averages of weekly figures; annual data are averages of monthly figures.
7 Quarterly data are ratio of earnings (after taxes) for four quarters ending with particular quarter-to-price index for last day of that quarter. Annual data are
averages of quarterly ratios.
Sources: New York Stock Exchange, Dow Jones & Co., Inc., Standard & Poor’s, and Nasdaq Stock Market.

452 |

Appendix B

Table B–56. Common stock prices and yields, 2000–2024
Common stock yields
(Standard & Poor’s)
(percent) 4

Common stock prices
(end of period) 1
End of year
or month

New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) indexes
(December 31, 2002=5,000) 2, 3
Composite

2000 ����������������������
2001 ����������������������
2002 ����������������������
2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2022: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct �������������
      Nov ������������
      Dec �������������
2023: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct �������������
      Nov ������������
      Dec �������������
2024: Jan �������������
      Feb �������������
      Mar ������������
      Apr �������������
      May ������������
      June �����������
      July ������������
      Aug ������������
      Sept �����������
      Oct �������������
      Nov ������������

Financial

Energy

Health
care

6,945.57 ��������������������� ��������������������� ���������������������
6,236.39 ��������������������� ��������������������� ���������������������
5,000.00
5,000.00
5,000.00
5,000.00
6,440.30
6,676.42
6,321.05
5,925.97
7,250.06
7,493.92
7,934.49
6,119.07
7,753.95
7,996.94
10,109.61
6,458.20
9,139.02
9,552.22
11,967.88
6,958.64
9,740.32
8,300.68
15,283.81
7,170.42
5,757.05
3,848.42
9,434.01
5,340.73
7,184.96
4,721.02
11,415.03
6,427.27
7,964.02
4,958.62
12,520.29
6,501.53
7,477.03
4,062.88
12,409.61
7,045.61
8,443.51
5,114.54
12,606.06
7,904.06
10,400.33
6,353.68
14,557.54
10,245.31
10,839.24
6,707.16
12,533.54
11,967.04
10,143.42
6,305.68
9,343.81
12,385.19
11,056.89
6,961.56
11,503.76
11,907.20
12,808.84
8,235.89
11,470.58
14,220.58
11,374.39
6,969.48
9,341.44
15,158.38
13,913.03
8,700.11
10,037.30
18,070.10
14,524.80
8,292.85
6,502.78
20,045.67
17,164.13
10,175.36
9,146.18
24,345.65
15,184.31
8,668.77
13,051.89
23,439.84
16,852.89
9,881.78
13,259.54
24,167.14
16,659.78
10,200.96
10,648.50
22,894.30
16,313.89
9,875.64
11,142.11
22,757.28
16,670.91
9,971.24
12,065.19
23,828.90
15,615.25
9,139.65
11,791.27
22,944.86
15,827.05
9,297.74
13,336.34
23,217.06
14,487.64
8,313.35
11,252.27
22,640.69
15,327.71
8,901.55
12,171.38
23,258.76
14,801.25
8,563.40
12,304.08
21,713.32
13,472.18
7,747.27
11,004.62
20,936.54
14,747.03
8,481.92
13,240.72
22,560.24
15,780.02
9,083.61
13,551.07
23,695.65
15,184.31
8,668.77
13,051.89
23,439.84
16,036.39
9,432.80
13,434.64
23,027.98
15,428.97
9,139.29
12,724.58
22,041.91
15,374.91
8,494.23
12,455.61
22,550.28
15,545.88
8,699.82
12,895.29
23,395.71
14,887.14
8,346.55
11,635.80
22,397.48
15,875.91
8,907.96
12,504.78
23,378.02
16,427.29
9,305.43
13,328.62
23,604.11
16,000.37
8,988.61
13,467.87
23,602.11
15,398.21
8,668.91
13,852.13
22,951.48
14,919.20
8,332.44
13,275.28
22,337.96
16,088.84
9,258.87
13,250.97
23,464.37
16,852.89
9,881.78
13,259.54
24,167.14
16,911.13
9,903.28
13,132.77
24,943.26
17,607.43
10,247.93
13,259.84
25,971.64
18,312.67
10,702.54
14,361.75
26,551.78
17,603.34
10,212.57
14,395.24
25,455.64
18,083.69
10,647.38
14,471.13
25,982.73
18,026.50
10,577.82
14,073.60
26,375.22
18,710.01
11,252.91
14,279.73
26,913.78
19,292.23
11,642.16
14,092.64
28,478.56
19,516.44
11,677.14
13,544.51
27,656.89
19,238.95
11,781.25
13,535.19
26,201.34
20,272.04
12,763.92
14,184.72
26,175.03

Dow
Jones
industrial
average 2
10,786.85
10,021.50
8,341.63
10,453.92
10,783.01
10,717.50
12,463.15
13,264.82
8,776.39
10,428.05
11,577.51
12,217.56
13,104.14
16,576.66
17,823.07
17,425.03
19,762.60
24,719.22
23,327.46
28,538.44
30,606.48
36,338.30
33,147.25
37,689.54
35,131.86
33,892.60
34,678.35
32,977.21
32,990.12
30,775.43
32,845.13
31,510.43
28,725.51
32,732.95
34,589.77
33,147.25
34,086.04
32,656.70
33,274.15
34,098.16
32,908.27
34,407.60
35,559.53
34,721.91
33,507.50
33,052.87
35,950.89
37,689.54
38,150.30
38,996.39
39,807.37
37,815.92
38,686.32
39,118.86
40,842.79
41,563.08
42,330.15
41,763.46
44,910.65

Standard
Nasdaq
& Poor’s
composite
composite
index
index
(Feb. 5,
(1941–43=10) 2 1971=100) 2
1,320.28
1,148.08
879.82
1,111.92
1,211.92
1,248.29
1,418.30
1,468.36
903.25
1,115.10
1,257.64
1,257.60
1,426.19
1,848.36
2,058.90
2,043.94
2,238.83
2,673.61
2,506.85
3,230.78
3,756.07
4,766.18
3,839.50
4,769.83
4,515.55
4,373.94
4,530.41
4,131.93
4,132.15
3,785.38
4,130.29
3,955.00
3,585.62
3,871.98
4,080.11
3,839.50
4,076.60
3,970.15
4,109.31
4,169.48
4,179.83
4,450.38
4,588.96
4,507.66
4,288.05
4,193.80
4,567.80
4,769.83
4,845.65
5,096.27
5,254.35
5,035.69
5,277.51
5,460.48
5,522.30
5,648.40
5,762.48
5,705.45
6,032.38

2,470.52
1,950.40
1,335.51
2,003.37
2,175.44
2,205.32
2,415.29
2,652.28
1,577.03
2,269.15
2,652.87
2,605.15
3,019.51
4,176.59
4,736.05
5,007.41
5,383.12
6,903.39
6,635.28
8,972.60
12,888.28
15,644.97
10,466.48
15,011.35
14,239.88
13,751.40
14,220.52
12,334.64
12,081.39
11,028.74
12,390.69
11,816.20
10,575.62
10,988.15
11,468.00
10,466.48
11,584.55
11,455.54
12,221.91
12,226.58
12,935.29
13,787.92
14,346.02
14,034.97
13,219.32
12,851.24
14,226.22
15,011.35
15,164.01
16,091.92
16,379.46
15,657.82
16,735.02
17,732.60
17,599.40
17,713.62
18,189.17
18,095.15
19,218.17

Dividendprice
ratio 5
1.15
1.32
1.61
1.77
1.72
1.83
1.87
1.86
2.37
2.40
1.98
2.05
2.24
2.14
2.04
2.10
2.19
1.97
1.90
1.93
1.89
1.38
1.57
1.62
1.33
1.38
1.41
1.42
1.55
1.64
1.64
1.56
1.71
1.78
1.70
1.72
1.71
1.67
1.73
1.67
1.67
1.59
1.54
1.55
1.57
1.62
1.56
1.50
1.48
1.42
1.38
1.40
1.37
1.34
1.31
1.34
1.31
1.28
1.26

Earningsprice
ratio 6
3.63
2.95
2.92
3.84
4.89
5.36
5.78
5.29
3.54
1.86
6.04
6.77
6.20
5.57
5.25
4.59
4.17
4.22
4.66
4.53
3.28
3.79
4.79
4.17
�����������������������
�����������������������
4.37
�����������������������
�����������������������
5.08
�����������������������
�����������������������
5.22
�����������������������
�����������������������
4.50
�����������������������
�����������������������
4.26
�����������������������
�����������������������
4.07
�����������������������
�����������������������
4.30
�����������������������
�����������������������
4.03
�����������������������
�����������������������
3.64
�����������������������
�����������������������
3.59
�����������������������
�����������������������
3.48
�����������������������
�����������������������

1 End of year or month.
2 Includes stocks as follows: for NYSE, all stocks listed (in 2023, over 2,270); for Dow Jones industrial average, 30 stocks; for Standard & Poor’s (S&P)

composite index, 500 stocks; and for Nasdaq composite index, in 2023, about 3,400.
3 The NYSE relaunched the composite index on January 9, 2003, incorporating new definitions, methodology, and base value. Subset indexes on financial,
energy, and health care were released by the NYSE on January 8, 2004.
4 Based on 500 stocks in the S&P composite index.
5 Aggregate cash dividends (based on latest known annual rate) divided by aggregate market value based on Wednesday closing prices. Monthly data are
averages of weekly figures, annual data are averages of monthly figures.
6 Quarterly data are ratio of earnings (after taxes) for four quarters ending with particular quarter-to-price index for last day of that quarter. Annual data are
averages of quarterly ratios.
Sources: New York Stock Exchange, Dow Jones & Co., Inc., Standard & Poor’s, and Nasdaq Stock Market.

Corporate Profits and Finance | 453

International Statistics
Table B–57. U.S. international transactions, 1973–2024
[Millions of dollars; quarterly data seasonally adjusted]
Current Account 1
Goods 2
Year or
quarter
Exports

1973 �����������
1974 �����������
1975 �����������
1976 �����������
1977 �����������
1978 �����������
1979 �����������
1980 �����������
1981 �����������
1982 �����������
1983 �����������
1984 �����������
1985 �����������
1986 �����������
1987 �����������
1988 �����������
1989 �����������
1990 �����������
1991 �����������
1992 �����������
1993 �����������
1994 �����������
1995 �����������
1996 �����������
1997 �����������
1998 �����������
1999 �����������
2000 �����������
2001 �����������
2002 �����������
2003 �����������
2004 �����������
2005 �����������
2006 �����������
2007 �����������
2008 �����������
2009 �����������
2010 �����������
2011 �����������
2012 �����������
2013 �����������
2014 �����������
2015 �����������
2016 �����������
2017 �����������
2018 �����������
2019 �����������
2020 �����������
2021 �����������
2022 �����������
2023 �����������
2021: I �������
      II ������
      III �����
      IV �����
2022: I �������
      II ������
      III �����
      IV �����
2023: I �������
      II ������
      III �����
      IV �����
2024: I �������
      II p ����

71,410
98,306
107,088
114,745
120,816
142,075
184,439
224,250
237,044
211,157
201,799
219,926
215,915
223,344
250,208
320,230
359,916
387,401
414,083
439,631
456,943
502,859
575,204
612,113
678,366
670,416
698,524
784,940
731,331
698,036
730,446
823,584
913,016
1,040,905
1,165,151
1,308,795
1,070,331
1,290,279
1,498,887
1,562,630
1,593,708
1,635,563
1,511,381
1,457,393
1,557,003
1,676,913
1,655,098
1,433,852
1,765,853
2,090,339
2,045,221
411,870
434,365
441,784
477,833
489,628
536,202
546,427
518,082
518,316
497,038
515,998
513,869
516,760
516,708

Imports

Services
Balance
on
goods

Exports

Imports

70,499
911
19,832 18,843
103,811
–5,505
22,591 21,378
98,185
8,903
25,497 21,996
124,228
–9,483
27,971 24,570
151,907
–31,091
31,486 27,640
176,002
–33,927
36,353 32,189
212,007
–27,568
39,693 36,689
249,750
–25,500
47,585 41,492
265,067
–28,023
57,355 45,503
247,642
–36,485
64,078 51,750
268,901
–67,102
64,307 54,973
332,418 –112,492
71,168 67,748
338,088 –122,173
73,156 72,863
368,425 –145,081
86,690 80,147
409,765 –159,557
98,661 90,788
447,189 –126,959
110,920 98,525
477,665 –117,749
127,087 102,480
498,438 –111,037
147,833 117,660
491,020
–76,937
164,260 118,459
536,528
–96,897
177,251 119,566
589,394 –132,451
185,920 123,780
668,690 –165,831
200,395 133,057
749,374 –174,170
219,183 141,397
803,113 –191,000
239,489 152,554
876,794 –198,428
256,087 165,932
918,637 –248,221
262,758 180,677
1,035,592 –337,068
278,001 196,742
1,231,722 –446,783
298,023 220,927
1,153,701 –422,370
284,035 222,039
1,173,281 –475,245
288,059 233,480
1,272,089 –541,643
297,740 252,340
1,488,349 –664,766
344,536 290,609
1,695,820 –782,804
378,487 312,225
1,878,194 –837,289
423,086 349,329
1,986,347 –821,196
495,664 385,464
2,141,287 –832,492
540,791 420,650
1,580,025 –509,694
522,461 407,538
1,938,950 –648,671
582,041 436,456
2,239,886 –740,999
644,665 458,188
2,303,749 –741,119
684,823 469,610
2,294,247 –700,539
719,413 465,736
2,385,480 –749,917
757,051 491,086
2,273,249 –761,868
769,397 498,305
2,207,195 –749,801
783,431 513,088
2,356,345 –799,343
837,474 555,070
2,555,662 –878,749
865,549 565,395
2,512,358 –857,260
891,177 593,313
2,346,727 –912,875
726,296 467,111
2,849,043 –1,083,190
804,948 569,829
3,270,281 –1,179,941
949,065 713,886
3,108,509 –1,063,288 1,026,596 748,198
672,346 –260,476
189,042 123,849
701,135 –266,769
196,006 133,875
713,466 –271,682
203,524 152,103
762,096 –284,263
216,377 160,001
821,627 –331,999
224,073 166,624
845,281 –309,079
236,736 178,503
812,460 –266,033
239,704 184,449
790,913 –272,831
248,552 184,310
785,166 –266,851
249,316 183,267
771,030 –273,992
255,875 185,511
773,827 –257,829
258,072 186,703
778,485 –264,616
263,332 192,717
793,707 –276,947
268,590 194,884
813,854 –297,146
271,662 197,741

Balance
on
services
989
1,212
3,500
3,402
3,845
4,164
3,003
6,093
11,851
12,330
9,335
3,418
294
6,543
7,874
12,394
24,607
30,173
45,802
57,685
62,141
67,338
77,786
86,935
90,155
82,081
81,258
77,096
61,997
54,579
45,401
53,927
66,262
73,756
110,199
120,142
114,923
145,584
186,477
215,213
253,678
265,965
271,092
270,343
282,404
300,155
297,865
259,185
235,120
235,179
278,398
65,193
62,131
51,421
56,375
57,450
58,233
55,255
64,242
66,049
70,364
71,369
70,616
73,706
73,921

Primary income receipts and
payments

Balance
on
goods
and
services

Receipts

1,900
–4,293
12,403
–6,082
–27,247
–29,763
–24,566
–19,407
–16,172
–24,156
–57,767
–109,074
–121,879
–138,539
–151,683
–114,566
–93,142
–80,865
–31,136
–39,212
–70,311
–98,493
–96,384
–104,065
–108,273
–166,140
–255,809
–369,686
–360,373
–420,666
–496,243
–610,838
–716,542
–763,533
–710,997
–712,350
–394,771
–503,087
–554,522
–525,906
–446,861
–483,952
–490,776
–479,458
–516,939
–578,594
–559,395
–653,691
–848,070
–944,762
–784,890
–195,283
–204,639
–220,261
–227,887
–274,549
–250,846
–210,778
–208,589
–200,801
–203,628
–186,461
–194,001
–203,241
–223,225

21,809
9,656
27,587
12,084
25,351
12,565
29,374
13,312
32,355
14,218
42,087
21,680
63,835
32,961
72,605
42,533
86,529
53,626
96,522
61,359
96,031
59,643
115,639
80,574
105,046
79,324
102,798
87,304
113,603
99,309
141,666 122,981
166,384 146,560
176,894 148,345
155,327 131,198
139,082 114,845
141,606 116,287
169,447 152,302
213,661 192,771
229,530 207,212
261,357 248,750
266,244 261,978
302,540 292,566
365,612 350,980
311,364 288,120
306,391 288,886
346,931 317,677
432,839 386,256
536,294 492,108
669,919 653,945
816,938 752,582
820,244 708,225
653,222 537,684
723,223 553,311
791,469 589,038
791,613 593,754
811,501 616,041
845,858 645,623
824,929 639,724
857,240 660,798
995,442 737,501
1,102,964 847,689
1,139,310 891,911
954,005 776,288
1,048,567 929,509
1,184,423 1,068,464
1,376,721 1,309,692
254,021 216,575
255,188 231,097
266,642 241,179
272,716 240,658
273,035 251,980
289,846 257,941
305,686 269,864
315,857 288,679
328,098 311,356
338,467 320,540
355,262 338,382
354,894 339,413
359,632 352,956
362,377 361,254

Payments

Balance
on
primary
income
12,153
15,503
12,786
16,062
18,137
20,407
30,874
30,072
32,903
35,163
36,388
35,065
25,722
15,494
14,294
18,685
19,824
28,549
24,129
24,237
25,319
17,145
20,890
22,318
12,607
4,266
9,974
14,632
23,244
17,506
29,254
46,583
44,186
15,974
64,356
112,019
115,539
169,911
202,431
197,859
195,460
200,235
185,205
196,442
257,942
255,275
247,400
177,717
119,058
115,959
67,029
37,446
24,092
25,463
32,058
21,055
31,905
35,822
27,177
16,742
17,926
16,880
15,481
6,676
1,122

Balance
on
secondary
Income 3

Balance
on
current
account

–6,914
–9,248
–7,076
–5,686
–5,227
–5,788
–6,593
–8,349
–11,702
–16,545
–17,311
–20,334
–21,999
–24,131
–23,265
–25,274
–26,169
–26,654
9,904
–36,635
–39,811
–40,265
–38,074
–43,017
–45,062
–53,187
–40,777
–46,863
–56,953
–52,949
–55,300
–71,634
–76,876
–69,088
–89,910
–96,192
–100,496
–98,834
–103,211
–90,134
–88,115
–86,339
–102,882
–113,199
–108,618
–116,530
–129,756
–125,227
–138,968
–183,295
–187,515
–31,666
–30,688
–40,196
–36,418
–38,325
–44,158
–55,573
–45,239
–46,271
–46,901
–51,078
–43,264
–44,419
–44,684

7,140
1,961
18,117
4,296
–14,336
–15,143
–285
2,318
5,029
–5,537
–38,691
–94,344
–118,155
–147,176
–160,655
–121,153
–99,487
–78,969
2,897
–51,613
–84,805
–121,612
–113,567
–124,764
–140,726
–215,062
–286,612
–401,918
–394,082
–456,110
–522,289
–635,890
–749,232
–816,646
–736,550
–696,523
–379,729
–432,009
–455,302
–418,181
–339,516
–370,056
–408,453
–396,216
–367,616
–439,849
–441,751
–601,201
–867,980
–1,012,098
–905,376
–189,504
–211,235
–234,993
–232,248
–291,819
–263,099
–230,529
–226,651
–230,330
–232,603
–220,659
–221,784
–240,984
–266,787

Current
account
balance
as a
percentage
of GDP
0.5
.1
1.1
.2
–.7
–.6
.0
.1
.2
–.2
–1.1
–2.3
–2.7
–3.2
–3.3
–2.3
–1.8
–1.3
.0
–.8
–1.2
–1.7
–1.5
–1.5
–1.6
–2.4
–3.0
–3.9
–3.7
–4.2
–4.6
–5.2
–5.7
–5.9
–5.1
–4.7
–2.6
–2.9
–2.9
–2.6
–2.0
–2.1
–2.2
–2.1
–1.9
–2.1
–2.1
–2.8
–3.7
–3.9
–3.3
–3.3
–3.6
–3.9
–3.7
–4.6
–4.1
–3.5
–3.4
–3.4
–3.4
–3.2
–3.1
–3.4
–3.7

1 Current and capital account statistics in the international transactions accounts differ slightly from statistics in the National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPAs) because of adjustments made to convert the international statistics to national accounting concepts. A reconciliation can be found in NIPA table 4.3B.
2 Adjusted from Census data to align with concepts and definitions used to prepare the international and national economic accounts. The adjustments are
necessary to supplement coverage of Census data, to eliminate duplication of transactions recorded elsewhere in the international accounts, to value transactions
according to a standard definition, and for earlier years, to record transactions in the appropriate period.
See next page for continuation of table.

454 |

Appendix B

Table B–57. U.S. international transactions, 1973–2024—Continued
[Millions of dollars; quarterly data seasonally adjusted]
Financial account

Year or
quarter

Balance
on
capital
account 1

Net U.S. acquisition of financial assets excluding
financial derivatives
[net increase in assets / financial outflow (+)]

Total

1973 �����������
1974 �����������
1975 �����������
1976 �����������
1977 �����������
1978 �����������
1979 �����������
1980 �����������
1981 �����������
1982 �����������
1983 �����������
1984 �����������
1985 �����������
1986 �����������
1987 �����������
1988 �����������
1989 �����������
1990 �����������
1991 �����������
1992 �����������
1993 �����������
1994 �����������
1995 �����������
1996 �����������
1997 �����������
1998 �����������
1999 �����������
2000 �����������
2001 �����������
2002 �����������
2003 �����������
2004 �����������
2005 �����������
2006 �����������
2007 �����������
2008 �����������
2009 �����������
2010 �����������
2011 �����������
2012 �����������
2013 �����������
2014 �����������
2015 �����������
2016 �����������
2017 �����������
2018 �����������
2019 �����������
2020 �����������
2021 �����������
2022 �����������
2023 �����������
2021: I �������
      II ������
      III �����
      IV �����
2022: I �������
      II ������
      III �����
      IV �����
2023: I �������
      II ������
      III �����
      IV �����
2024: I �������
      II p ����

��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
–207
–7,221
–5,129
1,449
–714
–1,112
–221
–8
–256
–7
–6,428
–4,217
12,170
–3,825
–8,499
–4,344
950
–7,439
–6,057
–172
–5,877
–6,891
–9,020
931
–6,559
–6,535
–7,940
–6,606
12,394
–4,261
–6,456
–5,610
–1,423
–181
–6,320
–2,343
–649
3,231
–1,662
–1,367
–2,462
6,272
–2,624
–2,520
–1,061
–994
–1,745
–1,813
–1,470

Direct
investment
assets

Portfolio
investment
assets

22,874 11,353
672
34,745
9,052
1,853
39,703 14,244
6,247
51,269 11,949
8,885
34,785 11,891
5,459
61,130 16,057
3,626
66,053 25,223 12,430
86,968 19,222
6,042
114,147
9,624 15,650
142,722 19,397 12,395
74,690 20,844
2,063
50,740 26,770
3,498
47,064 21,241
3,008
107,252 19,524
8,984
84,058 39,795
7,903
105,747 21,701
4,589
182,908 50,973 31,166
103,985 59,934 30,557
75,753 49,253 32,053
84,899 58,755 50,684
199,399 82,799 137,917
188,758 89,988 54,088
363,555 110,041 143,506
424,548 103,024 160,179
502,024 121,352 121,036
385,936 174,751 132,186
526,612 247,484 141,007
587,682 186,371 159,713
386,313 146,041 106,919
319,175 178,984 79,532
371,104 195,218 133,059
1,058,661 374,006 191,956
562,996 52,591 267,290
1,324,623 283,800 493,366
1,563,467 523,889 380,807
–317,592 343,584 –284,269
131,082 312,597 375,883
958,737 349,829 199,620
492,556 436,615 85,365
171,359 377,239 243,182
626,189 392,796 457,734
865,694 387,528 581,668
144,104 302,072 107,154
336,438 299,814 37,489
1,161,984 409,413 540,728
429,710 –130,720 381,863
315,580 114,924 –11,453
954,808 282,333 406,368
1,191,028 341,955 711,540
747,109 388,510 322,719
978,604 454,085 81,562
435,739 65,307 337,343
240,110 121,535 175,898
460,634 82,927 303,444
54,545 72,185 –105,144
395,757 144,052 191,983
364,634 96,648 236,902
295,807 34,770 270,789
–309,090 113,039 –376,955
199,533 89,192 18,614
209,246 78,657 53,042
270,003 119,890 48,595
299,822 166,346 –38,689
361,707 112,254 162,791
153,140 47,475 109,445

Other
investment
assets

Net U.S. incurrence of liabilities excluding
financial derivatives
Financial
[net increase in liabilities / financial inflow (+)] derivatives
other
than
Direct in- Portfolio
Other in- reserves,
Reserve
invest- vestment
Total
vestment
4
net
transassets
ment
liabilities liabilities
liabilities actions

11,007
–158
18,388
22,373
1,467
35,228
18,363
849
16,870
27,877
2,558
37,840
17,060
375
52,770
42,179
–732
66,275
27,267
1,133
40,693
53,550
8,154
62,036
83,697
5,176
85,684
105,965
4,965 109,897
50,588
1,195
95,715
17,340
3,132 126,413
18,957
3,858 146,544
79,057
–313 223,854
45,508 –9,148 251,863
75,544
3,913 244,008
75,476 25,293 230,302
11,336
2,158 162,109
210 –5,763 119,586
–20,639 –3,901 178,842
–22,696
1,379 278,607
50,028 –5,346 312,995
100,266
9,742 446,393
168,013 –6,668 559,027
258,626
1,010 720,999
72,216
6,783 452,901
146,868 –8,747 765,215
241,308
290 1,066,074
128,442
4,911 788,345
56,978
3,681 821,844
44,351 –1,524 911,660
495,505 –2,806 1,600,881
257,210 –14,094 1,277,056
549,830 –2,373 2,120,480
658,649
122 2,190,087
–381,754
4,848 462,408
–609,654 52,256 325,644
407,454
1,835 1,391,042
–45,301 15,877 983,522
–453,522
4,460 632,034
–221,242 –3,099 1,052,068
–99,920 –3,583 1,109,443
–258,831 –6,292 503,468
–2,955
2,090 706,693
213,533 –1,690 1,559,219
173,578
4,989 712,178
207,450
4,659 832,266
257,133
8,974 1,621,666
23,541 113,993 1,975,626
30,066
5,814 1,535,516
442,916
41 1,887,085
35,189 –2,100 630,216
–57,800
477 443,865
–38,339 112,603 677,733
84,491
3,013 223,811
58,790
932 681,897
29,903
1,181 451,649
–10,549
797 526,270
–48,077
2,903 –124,300
90,948
778 585,035
77,276
272 309,433
101,118
400 467,099
173,574 –1,408 525,518
84,154
2,509 544,659
–4,459
679 387,006

2,800
4,761
2,603
4,347
3,728
7,896
11,876
16,918
25,196
27,475
18,688
34,832
22,057
30,946
63,232
56,910
75,801
71,247
34,535
30,315
50,211
55,942
69,067
97,644
122,150
211,152
312,449
349,124
172,496
111,056
117,107
213,642
142,345
298,464
346,615
341,091
161,082
264,039
263,499
250,343
288,131
251,857
511,434
474,388
380,823
214,716
315,983
137,068
475,803
408,982
348,784
56,963
124,861
162,914
131,065
136,221
71,867
127,356
73,537
93,218
88,890
66,740
99,936
67,900
89,452

4,790
5,500
12,761
16,165
37,615
30,083
–13,502
23,825
17,509
19,695
18,382
38,695
68,004
104,497
79,631
86,786
74,852
25,767
72,562
92,199
174,387
131,849
254,431
392,107
311,105
225,878
278,697
441,966
431,492
504,155
550,163
867,340
832,037
1,126,735
1,156,612
523,683
357,352
820,434
311,626
747,017
511,987
697,607
213,910
231,265
790,810
303,075
233,469
946,560
614,103
760,384
1,231,077
393,559
146,867
200,792
–127,115
264,368
384,377
262,003
–150,364
349,775
392,385
261,558
227,358
395,359
258,737

10,798
24,967
1,506
17,328
11,427
28,296
42,319
21,293
42,979
62,727
58,645
52,886
56,483
88,411
109,000
100,312
79,649
65,095
12,489
56,328
54,009
125,204
122,895
69,276
287,744
15,871
174,069
274,984
184,357
206,634
244,390
519,899
302,673
695,280
686,860
–402,367
–192,789
306,569
408,397
–365,327
251,949
159,979
–221,876
1,040
387,586
194,387
282,814
538,038
885,720
366,150
307,224
179,694
172,138
314,027
219,861
281,307
–4,595
136,912
–47,474
142,042
–171,842
138,801
198,223
81,400
38,816

��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
��������������
–29,710
–6,222
32,947
–44,816
–14,076
–35,006
7,064
2,222
–54,335
–27,035
7,827
23,998
–20,404
–41,670
–5,107
–39,028
–80,698
–15,642
–2,216
–7,319
–6,796
–22,697
6,102
–45,911
–33,940
–6,949
–1,727
–4,741
1,068
–10,242
–2,865
–70,471

Net lending (+)
or net Statistical
borrow- discreping (–)
ancy
from
financial
account
transactions 5
4,486
–2,654
–483
–2,444
22,833
4,717
13,429
9,134
–17,985
–3,651
–5,145
9,997
25,360
25,647
24,932
22,614
28,463
23,433
32,825
38,362
–21,025
17,666
–75,673
18,673
–99,480
18,677
–116,602
30,570
–167,805
–7,149
–138,261 –17,108
–47,394
52,299
–58,124
28,066
–43,833 –41,601
–93,943 –43,776
–79,208
6,313
–124,237
–1,514
–82,838
30,951
–134,479
–9,706
–218,975 –77,995
–66,965 148,106
–238,603
54,437
–478,392 –72,257
–402,032 –20,120
–502,668 –42,734
–540,556
–9,768
–542,220
98,014
–714,059
34,223
–825,567
–1,482
–632,841 109,765
–747,053 –50,358
–239,379 146,227
–446,381
–7,481
–525,972 –61,650
–453,611 –36,361
–423,657 –77,582
–298,084
78,506
–386,400
29,993
–362,427
40,394
–373,237 –18,016
–302,872 141,238
–558,356 –110,149
–671,965 –65,154
–823,625
45,778
–869,105 143,174
–924,123 –12,427
–196,693
–4,846
–211,075
809
–223,895
7,867
–191,962
41,948
–280,037
13,149
–132,925 132,636
–264,404 –40,147
–191,739
37,535
–387,229 –154,379
–104,928 128,736
–196,028
25,624
–235,937 –12,408
–185,817
56,980
–304,337 –36,081

3 Includes U.S. government and private transfers, such as U.S. government grants and pensions, fines and penalties, withholding taxes, personal transfers,
insurance-related transfers, and other current transfers.
4 Consists of monetary gold, special drawing rights (SDRs), the U.S. reserve position in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other reserve assets,
including foreign currencies.
5 Net lending means that U.S. residents are net suppliers of funds to foreign residents, and net borrowing means the opposite.
Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).

International Statistics | 455

Table B–58. U.S. international trade in goods on balance of payments (BOP) and Census
basis, and trade in services on BOP basis, 1994–2024
[Billions of dollars; monthly data seasonally adjusted]
Goods: Exports
(f.a.s. value) 1, 2

Goods: Imports
(customs value) 6

Census basis (by end-use category)
Year or month

1994 ��������������
1995 ��������������
1996 ��������������
1997 ��������������
1998 ��������������
1999 ��������������
2000 ��������������
2001 ��������������
2002 ��������������
2003 ��������������
2004 ��������������
2005 ��������������
2006 ��������������
2007 ��������������
2008 ��������������
2009 ��������������
2010 ��������������
2011 ��������������
2012 ��������������
2013 ��������������
2014 ��������������
2015 ��������������
2016 ��������������
2017 ��������������
2018 ��������������
2019 ��������������
2020 ��������������
2021 ��������������
2022 ��������������
2023 ��������������
2023: Jan �����
      Feb �����
      Mar ����
      Apr �����
      May ����
      June ���
      July ����
      Aug ����
      Sept ���
      Oct �����
      Nov ����
      Dec �����
2024: Jan �����
      Feb �����
      Mar ����
      Apr �����
      May ����
      June ���
      July ����
      Aug ����
      Sept ���
      Oct p ���

IndusTotal,
Foods, trial Capital
BOP
Total,
feeds,
sup- goods
basis 3, 4 Census and plies except
basis 3, 5 bevand automoerages materi- tive
als
502.9
575.2
612.1
678.4
670.4
698.5
784.9
731.3
698.0
730.4
823.6
913.0
1,040.9
1,165.2
1,308.8
1,070.3
1,290.3
1,498.9
1,562.6
1,593.7
1,635.6
1,511.4
1,457.4
1,557.0
1,676.9
1,655.1
1,433.9
1,765.9
2,090.3
2,045.2
175.2
169.9
173.1
166.3
165.4
165.4
168.4
172.5
175.0
173.4
168.8
171.6
170.4
175.7
170.7
172.5
169.7
174.2
174.9
179.1
176.0
170.7

512.6
584.7
625.1
689.2
682.1
695.8
781.9
729.1
693.1
724.8
814.9
901.1
1,026.0
1,148.2
1,287.4
1,056.0
1,278.5
1,482.5
1,545.8
1,578.5
1,621.9
1,503.3
1,451.5
1,547.2
1,665.8
1,645.9
1,430.0
1,757.7
2,066.5
2,018.1
173.7
168.4
171.1
163.6
162.7
163.0
165.6
170.1
172.3
171.2
166.2
170.2
168.9
174.1
169.1
171.1
168.3
173.0
172.9
177.8
174.3
169.0

42.0
50.5
55.5
51.5
46.4
46.0
47.9
49.4
49.6
55.0
56.6
59.0
66.0
84.3
108.3
93.9
107.7
126.2
133.0
136.2
143.7
127.7
130.5
132.8
133.1
131.0
139.3
164.5
179.9
161.9
14.8
14.7
14.1
13.4
12.6
12.5
12.6
12.8
13.4
13.5
13.6
13.9
13.6
14.8
13.7
12.9
12.7
13.3
13.5
13.4
14.1
13.5

121.4
146.2
147.7
158.2
148.3
147.5
172.6
160.1
156.8
173.0
203.9
233.0
276.0
316.4
388.0
296.5
391.7
501.1
501.2
508.2
505.8
427.0
397.3
465.2
541.2
529.5
466.5
637.4
829.4
729.7
63.6
61.7
63.5
59.2
57.8
57.1
58.7
61.6
61.9
63.1
59.2
62.2
60.6
64.0
62.1
60.8
58.8
60.2
60.4
61.2
59.8
57.3

205.0
233.0
253.0
294.5
299.4
310.8
356.9
321.7
290.4
293.7
327.5
358.4
404.0
433.0
457.7
391.2
447.5
494.0
527.2
534.4
551.5
539.5
519.7
533.4
563.2
550.5
463.2
521.3
572.9
602.2
49.7
49.1
49.3
49.1
49.0
49.9
50.0
51.1
51.3
51.2
51.3
51.1
51.4
52.8
50.8
52.7
52.3
54.3
56.1
57.8
55.9
51.9

Automotive
vehicles,
parts,
and
engines
57.8
61.8
65.0
74.0
72.4
75.3
80.4
75.4
78.9
80.6
89.2
98.4
107.3
121.3
121.5
81.7
112.0
133.0
146.2
152.7
159.8
151.9
150.4
157.9
158.8
163.1
129.4
146.4
163.0
180.0
15.5
13.9
14.5
14.4
15.3
15.2
16.2
15.4
15.7
15.1
14.6
14.2
14.9
14.1
14.2
14.9
14.4
15.1
13.4
14.3
14.8
12.0

Services
(BOP basis)

Census basis (by end-use category)
Consumer Total,
Foods,
goods BOP
Total, feeds,
(non- basis 4 Census
and
food)
basis 5 bevexcept
erages
automotive
60.0
64.4
70.1
77.4
80.3
80.9
89.4
88.3
84.4
89.9
103.2
115.3
129.1
146.0
161.3
149.5
165.2
175.3
181.7
188.8
199.0
197.7
193.7
197.7
206.0
205.6
175.0
222.3
245.1
259.5
23.3
21.8
22.3
21.1
21.5
21.2
21.2
22.2
22.2
20.9
20.5
21.4
21.4
21.2
21.0
22.2
22.5
22.6
21.8
22.8
21.3
20.1

668.7
749.4
803.1
876.8
918.6
1,035.6
1,231.7
1,153.7
1,173.3
1,272.1
1,488.3
1,695.8
1,878.2
1,986.3
2,141.3
1,580.0
1,939.0
2,239.9
2,303.7
2,294.2
2,385.5
2,273.2
2,207.2
2,356.3
2,555.7
2,512.4
2,346.7
2,849.0
3,270.3
3,108.5
266.5
262.4
256.3
262.0
255.2
253.8
256.8
256.2
260.8
261.2
257.2
260.1
261.4
268.6
263.6
272.0
270.0
271.5
278.1
274.1
285.0
269.3

663.3
743.5
795.3
869.7
911.9
1,024.6
1,218.0
1,141.0
1,161.4
1,257.1
1,469.7
1,673.5
1,853.9
1,957.0
2,103.6
1,559.6
1,913.9
2,208.0
2,276.3
2,268.0
2,356.4
2,248.8
2,186.8
2,339.6
2,536.1
2,491.7
2,331.5
2,828.5
3,239.9
3,080.2
264.0
259.8
253.7
259.6
253.0
251.7
254.7
253.8
258.4
258.8
254.8
257.7
258.7
265.9
261.3
269.3
267.4
269.5
275.8
272.1
282.9
267.2

31.0
33.2
35.7
39.7
41.2
43.6
46.0
46.6
49.7
55.8
62.1
68.1
74.9
81.7
89.0
81.6
91.7
107.5
110.3
115.1
125.9
127.8
130.0
137.8
147.3
150.5
154.3
182.1
208.3
200.2
17.2
16.9
16.7
16.4
16.1
16.4
16.8
16.7
16.7
16.7
16.8
16.7
16.8
18.1
17.6
17.5
17.5
17.2
17.5
17.9
18.8
18.1

Industrial
supplies
and
materials

Capital
goods
except
automotive

Automotive
vehicles,
parts,
and
engines

162.1
181.8
204.5
213.8
200.1
221.4
299.0
273.9
267.7
313.8
412.8
523.8
602.0
634.7
779.5
462.4
603.1
755.8
730.6
681.5
667.0
486.0
443.3
507.0
574.6
520.6
478.7
649.1
809.7
675.4
60.7
59.3
57.0
59.4
56.2
54.0
52.5
54.9
55.9
55.2
54.6
55.7
54.6
54.9
54.0
55.3
56.7
54.8
57.6
53.7
55.9
52.7

184.4
221.4
228.1
253.3
269.5
295.7
347.0
298.0
283.3
295.9
343.6
379.3
418.3
444.5
453.7
370.5
449.4
510.8
548.7
555.7
594.1
602.5
589.7
639.8
690.9
674.8
643.4
760.0
864.5
859.1
72.3
72.6
70.6
71.1
71.7
70.2
71.7
70.7
71.5
72.8
72.0
72.0
74.5
75.3
75.7
78.1
77.9
80.2
83.5
83.4
86.2
78.7

118.3
123.8
128.9
139.8
148.7
179.0
195.9
189.8
203.7
210.1
228.2
239.4
256.6
256.7
231.2
157.7
225.1
254.6
297.8
308.8
328.6
349.2
349.9
358.2
371.1
374.5
309.2
345.5
397.9
458.2
37.4
36.4
35.5
37.1
37.2
38.6
39.0
38.5
40.0
39.5
39.6
39.4
40.4
42.0
37.7
41.7
40.2
40.0
39.8
38.5
39.6
38.1

Consumer
goods Exports 4 Im- 4
ports
(nonfood)
except
automotive
146.3
159.9
172.0
193.8
217.0
241.9
281.8
284.3
307.8
333.9
372.9
407.2
442.6
474.6
481.6
427.3
483.2
514.1
516.9
531.7
557.1
594.2
583.1
601.4
645.4
653.0
639.6
767.3
838.2
757.7
66.2
63.3
63.3
65.0
60.7
61.9
63.7
62.3
63.5
63.8
60.9
63.1
61.9
64.5
65.9
65.7
63.7
66.0
66.6
67.0
71.0
69.0

200.4
219.2
239.5
256.1
262.8
278.0
298.0
284.0
288.1
297.7
344.5
378.5
423.1
495.7
540.8
522.5
582.0
644.7
684.8
719.4
757.1
769.4
783.4
837.5
865.5
891.2
726.3
804.9
949.1
1,026.6
82.6
83.0
83.8
84.7
85.5
85.7
85.5
86.0
86.6
87.4
87.7
88.3
88.6
89.9
90.0
89.9
91.2
91.1
92.3
93.5
94.0
95.1

133.1
141.4
152.6
165.9
180.7
196.7
220.9
222.0
233.5
252.3
290.6
312.2
349.3
385.5
420.7
407.5
436.5
458.2
469.6
465.7
491.1
498.3
513.1
555.1
565.4
593.3
467.1
569.8
713.9
748.2
61.3
61.0
60.9
61.7
61.7
62.1
61.7
61.9
63.1
63.9
64.1
64.7
64.0
65.8
65.0
65.8
67.0
67.4
68.2
69.1
68.8
70.2

1 Department of Defense shipments of grant-aid military supplies and equipment under the Military Assistance Program are excluded from total exports
through 1985 and included beginning 1986.
2 F.a.s. (free alongside ship) value basis at U.S. port of exportation for exports.
3 Beginning with data for 1989, exports have been adjusted for undocumented exports to Canada and are included in the appropriate end-use categories. For
prior years, only total exports include this adjustment.
4 Beginning with data for 1999, exports of goods under the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program and fuel purchases by foreign air and ocean carriers in U.S.
ports are included in goods exports (BOP basis) and excluded from services exports. Beginning with data for 1999, imports of petroleum abroad by U.S. military
agencies and fuel purchases by U.S. air and ocean carriers in foreign ports are included in goods imports (BOP basis) and excluded from services imports.
5 Total includes “other” exports or imports, not shown separately.
6 Total arrivals of imported goods other than in-transit shipments.
7 Total includes revisions not reflected in detail.
8 Total exports are on a revised statistical month basis; end-use categories are on a statistical month basis.
Note: Goods on a Census basis are adjusted to a BOP basis by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, in line with concepts and definitions used to prepare
international and national accounts. The adjustments are necessary to supplement coverage of Census data, to eliminate duplication of transactions recorded
elsewhere in international accounts, to value transactions according to a standard definition, and for earlier years, to record transactions in the appropriate period.
Data include international trade of the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and U.S. Foreign Trade Zones.
Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census and Bureau of Economic Analysis).

456 |

Appendix B

Table B–59. U.S. international trade in goods and services by area and country, 2000–2023
[Millions of dollars]
Item
EXPORTS
Total, all countries �����������������������������������������������������
Europe ������������������������������������������������������������������
Euro area 1 ����������������������������������������������������
France ����������������������������������������������������
Germany ������������������������������������������������
Italy ��������������������������������������������������������
United Kingdom ��������������������������������������������
Canada �����������������������������������������������������������������
Latin America and Other Western Hemisphere ��
Brazil �������������������������������������������������������������
Mexico ����������������������������������������������������������
Venezuela �����������������������������������������������������
Asia and Pacific ���������������������������������������������������
China �������������������������������������������������������������
India ��������������������������������������������������������������
Japan ������������������������������������������������������������
Korea, Republic of ����������������������������������������
Singapore �����������������������������������������������������
Taiwan ����������������������������������������������������������
Middle East ���������������������������������������������������������
Africa �������������������������������������������������������������������
IMPORTS
Total, all countries �����������������������������������������������������
Europe ������������������������������������������������������������������
Euro area 1 ����������������������������������������������������
France ����������������������������������������������������
Germany ������������������������������������������������
Italy ��������������������������������������������������������
United Kingdom ��������������������������������������������
Canada �����������������������������������������������������������������
Latin America and Other Western Hemisphere ��
Brazil �������������������������������������������������������������
Mexico ����������������������������������������������������������
Venezuela �����������������������������������������������������
Asia and Pacific ���������������������������������������������������
China �������������������������������������������������������������
India ��������������������������������������������������������������
Japan ������������������������������������������������������������
Korea, Republic of ����������������������������������������
Singapore �����������������������������������������������������
Taiwan ����������������������������������������������������������
Middle East ���������������������������������������������������������
Africa �������������������������������������������������������������������
BALANCE (excess of exports +)
Total, all countries �����������������������������������������������������
Europe ������������������������������������������������������������������
Euro area 1 ����������������������������������������������������
France ����������������������������������������������������
Germany ������������������������������������������������
Italy ��������������������������������������������������������
United Kingdom ��������������������������������������������
Canada �����������������������������������������������������������������
Latin America and Other Western Hemisphere ��
Brazil �������������������������������������������������������������
Mexico ����������������������������������������������������������
Venezuela �����������������������������������������������������
Asia and Pacific ���������������������������������������������������
China �������������������������������������������������������������
India ��������������������������������������������������������������
Japan ������������������������������������������������������������
Korea, Republic of ����������������������������������������
Singapore �����������������������������������������������������
Taiwan ����������������������������������������������������������
Middle East ���������������������������������������������������������
Africa �������������������������������������������������������������������

2000

2005

2010

2015

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

1,082,963 1,291,503 1,872,320 2,280,778 2,546,276 2,160,147 2,570,802 3,039,405
298,654 366,823 510,936 608,049 735,529 633,089 725,381 912,722
174,591 214,207 292,815 350,143 433,677 377,779 431,621 541,133
30,821
35,241
45,279
50,074
60,012
42,890
46,744
68,187
45,379
55,246
75,023
81,184
96,758
87,700
97,301 113,079
16,665
18,556
22,787
24,628
33,279
25,767
28,146
36,880
73,995
83,456 104,891 126,762 147,130 120,202 129,714 159,387
204,237 246,291 307,571 341,365 362,297 309,637 367,774 436,720
228,633 259,832 416,623 551,389 584,967 476,315 612,902 728,411
22,112
21,574
53,767
58,667
66,965
49,381
61,957
75,964
127,581 141,856 187,487 267,794 289,849 236,067 308,594 363,097
9,476
9,395
15,918
14,212
3,623
2,264
3,109
3,774
301,451 342,228 523,350 633,923 716,470 628,631 739,273 817,505
21,862
50,685 113,576 163,329 167,475 166,311 192,225 197,361
6,731
13,294
29,243
38,838
58,012
43,335
58,032
73,514
101,554
93,383 104,991 106,619 124,628 102,244 111,690 119,897
35,106
37,867
56,700
66,254
80,967
69,150
85,975
96,277
24,557
26,657
39,743
43,049
54,105
53,098
67,043
80,221
30,603
29,104
36,896
39,016
42,910
39,821
47,256
55,251
28,617
48,702
70,477 102,159 102,183
76,038
82,536
94,429
17,203
22,891
40,278
41,229
41,748
33,066
38,648
45,202

3,071,816
945,982
569,804
68,092
118,884
39,996
165,915
440,939
711,992
69,560
367,195
4,183
818,044
195,524
74,479
120,365
91,290
79,771
52,364
105,298
45,733

1,452,650 2,008,045 2,375,407 2,771,554 3,105,670 2,813,838 3,418,871 3,984,167
359,220 493,562 566,372 704,961 854,846 775,804 909,244 1,032,525
216,802 304,574 341,235 444,164 537,759 464,418 550,329 642,753
41,344
47,725
56,562
66,202
78,324
57,254
69,191
84,868
75,710 110,075 114,861 158,863 163,947 146,319 168,852 190,223
31,593
39,767
37,778
53,782
69,467
53,996
67,286
80,811
70,962
84,200
96,034 115,152 128,550 105,331 119,885 140,080
253,312 319,543 310,341 334,249 363,420 308,988 403,979 494,285
255,760 362,652 468,190 528,383 597,459 509,794 630,628 759,949
15,340
26,401
30,094
35,155
37,469
27,945
36,495
45,374
148,493 188,385 248,694 327,768 393,822 346,681 417,386 499,213
19,192
34,662
33,394
16,215
2,144
317
437
556
507,527 682,521 841,359 1,091,819 1,180,349 1,140,548 1,358,960 1,543,878
103,340 251,791 377,619 499,697 469,514 448,652 526,413 563,558
12,480
23,426
44,940
69,771
87,528
77,516 102,400 118,621
164,972 162,613 147,993 164,737 181,022 152,737 167,172 188,808
45,726
51,175
59,293
82,529
89,204
86,527 109,094 131,987
21,837
19,241
23,668
25,232
37,219
39,927
38,893
41,480
44,272
40,690
41,740
47,629
61,676
66,763
87,247 106,058
44,500
81,361
95,038
79,353
70,169
49,505
69,560
99,250
31,076
69,516
93,001
32,713
39,343
29,143
45,000
52,480

3,856,707
1,047,373
677,669
85,477
205,884
87,092
151,440
481,566
791,197
45,922
529,299
3,747
1,398,374
447,668
120,119
186,516
132,070
52,115
99,894
86,587
51,536

–369,686
–60,566
–42,211
–10,523
–30,330
–14,927
3,033
–49,075
–27,127
6,772
–20,912
–9,716
–206,076
–81,478
–5,749
–63,418
–10,620
2,720
–13,668
–15,883
–13,872

–784,890
–101,391
–107,865
–17,384
–87,000
–47,096
14,475
–40,627
–79,205
23,638
–162,104
436
–580,330
–252,144
–45,640
–66,151
–40,779
27,657
–47,530
18,711
–5,802

–716,542 –503,087 –490,776 –559,395
–126,739 –55,436 –96,911 –119,317
–90,367 –48,420 –94,021 –104,082
–12,484 –11,284 –16,128 –18,312
–54,830 –39,838 –77,679 –67,188
–21,211 –14,991 –29,154 –36,188
–744
8,856
11,611
18,580
–73,252
–2,770
7,116
–1,123
–102,820 –51,567
23,005 –12,492
–4,827
23,672
23,512
29,496
–46,528 –61,207 –59,974 –103,973
–25,266 –17,476
–2,003
1,479
–340,293 –318,009 –457,897 –463,879
–201,106 –264,042 –336,368 –302,039
–10,132 –15,697 –30,933 –29,516
–69,230 –43,002 –58,118 –56,395
–13,308
–2,593 –16,275
–8,238
7,415
16,075
17,817
16,887
–11,586
–4,843
–8,612 –18,766
–32,659 –24,561
22,806
32,014
–46,625 –52,723
8,516
2,405

–653,691
–142,715
–86,639
–14,365
–58,620
–28,229
14,871
649
–33,479
21,437
–110,614
1,948
–511,917
–282,341
–34,181
–50,494
–17,377
13,172
–26,942
26,533
3,923

–848,070
–183,863
–118,708
–22,448
–71,551
–39,140
9,829
–36,205
–17,726
25,462
–108,792
2,673
–619,687
–334,188
–44,368
–55,483
–23,118
28,150
–39,991
12,976
–6,352

–944,762
–119,803
–101,619
–16,681
–77,144
–43,931
19,307
–57,565
–31,537
30,590
–136,115
3,218
–726,373
–366,197
–45,107
–68,911
–35,710
38,741
–50,807
–4,821
–7,278

1 Euro area consists of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Greece (beginning in 2001),
Slovenia (2007), Cyprus and Malta (2008), Slovakia (2009), Estonia (2011), Latvia (2014), Lithuania (2015), and Croatia (2023).
Note: Data are on a balance of payments basis. For further details, and additional data by country, see Survey of Current Business, October 2024.
Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).

International Statistics | 457

Table B–60. Foreign exchange rates, 2003–2024
[Foreign currency units per U.S. dollar, except as noted; certified noon buying rates in New York]
Australia
(dollar) 1

Period

Brazil
(real)

Canada
(dollar)

China,
P.R.
(yuan)

EMU
Members
(euro)

Japan
(yen)

Mexico
(peso)

1, 2

March 1973 ����������

1.4129 ���������������

0.9967

2.2401 ���������������

2003 ����������������������
2004 ����������������������
2005 ����������������������
2006 ����������������������
2007 ����������������������
2008 ����������������������
2009 ����������������������
2010 ����������������������
2011 ����������������������
2012 ����������������������
2013 ����������������������
2014 ����������������������
2015 ����������������������
2016 ����������������������
2017 ����������������������
2018 ����������������������
2019 ����������������������
2020 ����������������������
2021 ����������������������
2022 ����������������������
2023 ����������������������
2023: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������
      IV ����������������
2024: I ������������������
      II �����������������
      III ����������������

.6524
.7365
.7627
.7535
.8391
.8537
.7927
.9200
1.0332
1.0359
.9683
.9034
.7522
.7445
.7671
.7481
.6952
.6899
.7515
.6951
.6644
.6833
.6681
.6548
.6513
.6573
.6589
.6698

1.4008
1.3017
1.2115
1.1340
1.0734
1.0660
1.1412
1.0298
.9887
.9995
1.0300
1.1043
1.2791
1.3243
1.2984
1.2957
1.3269
1.3422
1.2533
1.3014
1.3494
1.3529
1.3430
1.3410
1.3613
1.3486
1.3681
1.3641

8.2772
8.2768
8.1936
7.9723
7.6058
6.9477
6.8307
6.7696
6.4630
6.3093
6.1478
6.1620
6.2827
6.6400
6.7569
6.6090
6.9081
6.9042
6.4508
6.7290
7.0809
6.8423
7.0130
7.2445
7.2247
7.1885
7.2410
7.1641

3.0750
2.9262
2.4352
2.1738
1.9461
1.8326
1.9976
1.7600
1.6723
1.9535
2.1570
2.3512
3.3360
3.4839
3.1910
3.6513
3.9440
5.1587
5.3958
5.1605
4.9946
5.1948
4.9515
4.8811
4.9529
4.9528
5.2096
5.5447

India
(rupee)

1.1321
1.2438
1.2449
1.2563
1.3711
1.4726
1.3935
1.3261
1.3931
1.2859
1.3281
1.3297
1.1096
1.1072
1.1301
1.1817
1.1194
1.1410
1.1830
1.0534
1.0817
1.0730
1.0888
1.0884
1.0761
1.0855
1.0766
1.0987

South
Korea
(won)

Sweden
(krona)

Switzerland
(franc)

United
Kingdom
(pound) 1

7.55

261.90

0.013

398.85

4.4294

3.2171

2.4724

46.59
45.26
44.00
45.19
41.18
43.39
48.33
45.65
46.58
53.37
58.51
61.00
64.11
67.16
65.07
68.37
70.38
74.14
73.94
78.58
82.57
82.20
82.17
82.69
83.24
83.03
83.41
83.75

115.94
108.15
110.11
116.31
117.76
103.39
93.68
87.78
79.70
79.82
97.60
105.74
121.05
108.66
112.10
110.40
109.02
106.78
109.84
131.46
140.50
132.44
137.35
144.53
147.78
148.56
155.78
149.10

10.793
11.290
10.894
10.906
10.928
11.143
13.498
12.624
12.427
13.154
12.758
13.302
15.874
18.667
18.884
19.218
19.247
21.546
20.284
20.121
17.733
18.653
17.689
17.055
17.546
16.984
17.222
18.925

1,192.08
1,145.24
1,023.75
954.32
928.97
1,098.71
1,274.63
1,155.74
1,106.94
1,126.16
1,094.67
1,052.29
1,130.96
1,159.34
1,129.04
1,099.29
1,165.80
1,180.56
1,144.89
1,291.78
1,306.76
1,276.34
1,315.68
1,313.19
1,321.85
1,329.61
1,370.14
1,355.48

8.0787
7.3480
7.4710
7.3718
6.7550
6.5846
7.6539
7.2053
6.4878
6.7721
6.5124
6.8576
8.4350
8.5541
8.5430
8.6945
9.4604
9.2167
8.5812
10.1177
10.6089
10.4426
10.5291
10.8059
10.6571
10.3986
10.6937
10.4252

1.3450
1.2428
1.2459
1.2532
1.1999
1.0816
1.0860
1.0432
.8862
.9377
.9269
.9147
.9628
.9848
.9842
.9784
.9937
.9389
.9144
.9550
.8984
.9251
.8988
.8832
.8864
.8749
.9047
.8662

1.6347
1.8330
1.8204
1.8434
2.0020
1.8545
1.5661
1.5452
1.6043
1.5853
1.5642
1.6484
1.5284
1.3555
1.2890
1.3363
1.2768
1.2829
1.3764
1.2371
1.2440
1.2153
1.2519
1.2663
1.2419
1.2682
1.2618
1.3005

Trade-weighted value of the U.S. dollar
Real 6

Nominal
Broad index
(January
2006=100) 3

Advanced foreign
economies index
(January
2006=100) 4

Emerging market
economies index
(January
2006=100) 5

Broad index
(January
2006=100) 3

Advanced foreign
economies index
(January
2006=100) 4

Emerging market
economies index
(January
2006=100) 5

2003 ���������������������� ���������������������������������� ���������������������������������� ���������������������������������� ���������������������������������� ���������������������������������� �����������������������������������
2004 ���������������������� ���������������������������������� ���������������������������������� ���������������������������������� ���������������������������������� ���������������������������������� �����������������������������������
2005 ���������������������� ���������������������������������� ���������������������������������� ���������������������������������� ���������������������������������� ���������������������������������� �����������������������������������
2006 ����������������������
98.6005
97.6833
99.8103
98.9168
98.3159
99.7084
2007 ����������������������
93.8100
92.0715
96.1170
94.2522
93.6198
95.0827
2008 ����������������������
90.8801
88.4517
94.1271
90.9667
90.8429
91.1695
2009 ����������������������
96.7509
92.8232
101.9953
95.3231
94.7210
96.0769
2010 ����������������������
93.0541
90.1336
97.1416
90.7875
92.0389
89.5776
2011 ����������������������
88.7767
84.8522
93.9916
86.2906
87.3412
85.2632
2012 ����������������������
91.6361
88.0233
96.5231
88.5011
90.8670
86.1579
2013 ����������������������
92.7611
90.6492
96.0312
88.7134
93.8601
83.7863
2014 ����������������������
95.5876
93.4349
98.9391
90.7054
97.0250
84.7467
2015 ����������������������
108.1696
108.1483
109.5239
101.1728
111.8302
91.5462
2016 ����������������������
113.0665
109.3636
118.1858
105.3910
114.0182
97.3560
2017 ����������������������
112.8101
108.9520
118.0903
104.8407
114.1622
96.2487
2018 ����������������������
112.0032
106.4902
119.0076
104.0712
112.2297
96.4255
2019 ����������������������
115.7334
110.2673
122.7186
107.1792
116.7241
98.3341
2020 ����������������������
117.7809
109.0631
128.3959
108.7517
116.4068
101.4458
2021 ����������������������
113.1162
104.5205
123.5588
106.2746
114.1767
98.7923
2022 ����������������������
120.7044
115.0954
128.0962
115.0563
126.9626
104.3588
2023 ����������������������
120.4892
115.4193
127.3109
114.4569
126.5280
103.6341
2023: I ������������������
120.3423
115.5038
126.9249
114.4352
126.6064
103.5361
      II �����������������
119.5897
114.5662
126.3512
113.7631
125.5572
103.1613
      III ����������������
120.2048
115.0455
127.1142
114.0824
125.9772
103.3996
      IV ����������������
121.8611
116.6005
128.8976
115.5468
127.9713
104.4395
2024: I ������������������
121.0047
115.5340
128.2452
114.7476
127.3336
103.5294
      II �����������������
122.8774
117.3299
130.2260
116.6022
129.4336
105.1742
      III ����������������
122.9346
114.9510
132.8545
116.1751
126.4480
106.7260
1 U.S. dollars per foreign currency unit.
2 European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) members consists of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain and Greece (beginning in 2001), Slovenia (2007), Cyprus and Malta (2008), Slovakia (2009), Estonia (2011), Latvia (2014), Lithuania (2015), and
Croatia (2023).
3 Weighted average of the foreign exchange value of the U.S. dollar against the currencies of a broad group of major U.S. trading partners.
4 Subset of the broad index. Consists of currencies of the Euro area, Australia, Canada, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
5 Subset of the broad index currencies that are emerging market economies. For details, see Revisions to the Federal Reserve Dollar Indexes, January 2019.
6 Adjusted for changes in consumer price indexes for the United States and other countries.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

458 |

Appendix B

Table B–61. Growth rates in real gross domestic product by area and country, 2006–2025
[Percent change]

Area and country

World �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
Advanced economies �����������������������������������������������������������
Of which:
United States ������������������������������������������������������������������
Euro area 2 ����������������������������������������������������������������������
Germany ������������������������������������������������������������������
France ����������������������������������������������������������������������
Italy ��������������������������������������������������������������������������
Spain ������������������������������������������������������������������������
Japan ������������������������������������������������������������������������������
United Kingdom ��������������������������������������������������������������
Canada ����������������������������������������������������������������������������
Other advanced economies ��������������������������������������������
Emerging market and developing economies ����������������������
Regional groups:
Emerging and Developing Asia ��������������������������������������
China ������������������������������������������������������������������������
India 3 �����������������������������������������������������������������������
ASEAN-5 4 ���������������������������������������������������������������
Emerging and Developing Europe ����������������������������������
Russia ����������������������������������������������������������������������
Latin America and the Caribbean �����������������������������������
Brazil ������������������������������������������������������������������������
Mexico ���������������������������������������������������������������������
Middle East and Central Asia ����������������������������������������
Saudi Arabia ������������������������������������������������������������
Sub-Saharan Africa ��������������������������������������������������������
Nigeria ���������������������������������������������������������������������
South Africa �������������������������������������������������������������

2006–
2015
annual 2016
average

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024 1 2025 1

3.6
1.5

3.3
1.8

3.8
2.6

3.6
2.3

2.9
1.9

–2.7
–4.0

6.6
6.0

3.6
2.9

3.3
1.7

3.2
1.8

3.2
1.8

1.6
0.8
1.4
1.0
–0.5
0.5
0.5
1.2
1.6
3.1
5.6

1.8
1.8
2.3
.7
1.2
2.9
.8
1.9
1.0
2.7
4.4

2.5
2.6
2.7
2.3
1.6
2.9
1.7
2.7
3.0
3.2
4.8

3.0
1.8
1.1
1.6
.8
2.4
.6
1.4
2.7
2.8
4.7

2.6 –2.2
1.6 –6.1
1.0 –4.1
2.1 –7.6
.4 –8.9
2.0 –10.9
–.4 –4.2
1.6 –10.3
1.9 –5.0
2.0 –1.6
3.7 –1.8

6.1
6.2
3.7
6.8
8.9
6.7
2.7
8.6
5.3
5.9
7.0

2.5
3.3
1.4
2.6
4.7
6.2
1.2
4.8
3.8
2.7
4.0

2.9
.4
–.3
1.1
.7
2.7
1.7
.3
1.2
1.8
4.4

2.8
.8
.0
1.1
.7
2.9
.3
1.1
1.3
2.1
4.2

2.2
1.2
.8
1.1
.8
2.1
1.1
1.5
2.4
2.2
4.2

7.9
9.6
6.8
5.1
3.1
2.6
3.0
2.8
1.9
4.2
4.3
5.2
6.4
2.6

6.8
6.8
8.3
4.8
1.7
.2
–.8
–3.3
1.8
4.3
1.9
1.5
–1.6
.7

6.6
6.9
6.8
5.2
4.2
1.8
1.4
1.3
1.9
2.6
.9
3.0
.8
1.2

6.4
6.7
6.5
5.0
3.6
2.8
1.1
1.8
2.0
2.7
3.2
3.3
1.9
1.6

5.3
6.0
3.9
4.2
2.5
2.2
.2
1.2
–.4
1.9
1.1
3.2
2.2
.3

7.7
8.4
9.7
4.1
7.1
5.9
7.4
4.8
6.0
4.4
5.1
4.8
3.6
5.0

4.4
3.0
7.0
5.4
.6
–1.2
4.2
3.0
3.7
5.5
7.5
4.1
3.3
1.9

5.7
5.2
8.2
4.0
3.3
3.6
2.2
2.9
3.2
2.1
–.8
3.6
2.9
.7

5.3
4.8
7.0
4.5
3.2
3.6
2.1
3.0
1.5
2.4
1.5
3.6
2.9
1.1

5.0
4.5
6.5
4.5
2.2
1.3
2.5
2.2
1.3
3.9
4.6
4.2
3.2
1.5

–.5
2.2
–5.8
–4.4
–1.8
–2.7
–6.9
–3.3
–8.4
–2.2
–3.6
–1.6
–1.8
–6.2

1 All figures are forecasts as published by the International Monetary Fund.
2 Euro area consists of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Greece (beginning in 2001),
Slovenia (2007), Cyprus and Malta (2008), Slovakia (2009), Estonia (2011), Latvia (2014), Lithuania (2015), and Croatia (2023).
3 Data and forecasts are presented on a fiscal year basis and output growth is based on GDP at market prices.
4 Consists of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
Note: For details on data shown in this table, see World Economic Outlook, October 2024, published by the International Monetary Fund.
Source: International Monetary Fund.

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