Full text of Economic Report of the President : 2001
The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.
107th Congress, 1st Session ...................................H.Doc. 107-2 Economic Report of the President Transmitted to the Congress January 2001 together with THE ANNUAL REPORT of the COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2001 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 ISBN 0-16-050616-6 Economic Report of the President | i C O N T E N T S Page ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT ...................................... 1 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS* ................................................................... 7 CHAPTER 1. THE MAKING OF THE NEW ECONOMY .............................. 19 CHAPTER 2. MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE .................. 55 CHAPTER 3. THE CREATION AND DIFFUSION OF THE NEW ECONOMY .. 95 CHAPTER 4. THE NEW ECONOMY IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT ................... 145 CHAPTER 5. LIVING IN THE NEW ECONOMY ......................................... 187 CONCLUSION: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES IN THE NEW ECONOMY ................................................................................. 245 APPENDIX A. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS DURING 2000 ............................. 255 APPENDIX B. STATISTICAL TABLES RELATING TO INCOME, EMPLOYMENT, AND PRODUCTION ............................................................................ 269 * For a detailed table of contents of the Council’s Report, see page 11 Economic Report of the President | iii ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT Economic Report of the President | v ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT To the Congress of the United States: I am pleased to report that the American economy today is strong. We are enjoying the longest economic expansion ever recorded, with more than 22 million new jobs since 1993, the lowest unemployment rate in 30 years, the lowest female unemployment rate in 40 years, the lowest Hispanic and African-American unemployment rates ever recorded, and the highest home ownership rate on record. This economic expansion has been not only unusually long, but also broad and deep. For the first time in decades, wages are rising at all income levels. We have the lowest child poverty in 20 years and the lowest poverty rate for single mothers ever recorded. Since 1993 the median family income has gone up more than $6,000, and for African-American families it has risen even more. The number of families who own stock has grown by 40 percent. Our current economic strength is the result not of chance, but of a choice the American people made 8 years ago. At that time, 10 million of our fellow citizens were out of work. Interest rates were high. The Federal budget deficit was $290 billion and rising. And the Federal debt had quadrupled in the previous 12 years, imposing a crushing burden on our economy and on our children. The American people chose to change direction, and empowered by that choice, Vice President Gore and I put in place a new economic strategy: fiscal discipline, greater investment in our people, and expanded trade. The result of that three-part strategy has been 8 years of prosperity and progress. Continuing with this proven strategy is the best way to keep that prosperity and progress going. The Administration’s Economic Agenda Our strategy has been based, first and foremost, on a commitment to fiscal discipline. By first cutting and then eliminating the deficit, we have helped to create a virtuous cycle of lower interest rates, greater investment, more jobs, higher productivity, and higher wages. In the process we have gone from the largest deficits in history to the largest surpluses in history. We have extended the life of the Medicare trust fund to 2025—when I was elected President, it was scheduled to go bankrupt in 1999. And we have paid off $362.5 billion in debt. Economic Report of the President | 3 Second, our strategy has focused on investing more in education, health care, and science and technology, to strengthen our people’s capacity to make the most of the new opportunities of the 21st century. We have doubled funding for Head Start, provided after-school opportunities and mentoring to more than a million young people, and begun putting 100,000 new, well-trained teachers in the early grades to lower class size. These investments, combined with an insistence on high standards for all students and accountability for results, have helped improve student achievement nationwide: reading, math, and SAT scores are all up. And with the largest expansion of college aid since the G.I. Bill, more students than ever are going on to college. We have also invested in our people through targeted tax relief, to help Americans meet the challenges of work and child rearing. Last year alone, our HOPE Scholarship and Lifetime Learning tax credits helped 10 million families pay for college. Our expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit will help 15 million families work their way toward the middle class. And 25 million families will get a $500 child tax credit. The typical American family today is paying a lower share of its income in Federal income taxes than at any time during the past 35 years. Since 1993 we have increased funding for long-term research and development—investments that lead to more economic growth, more high-wage jobs, more cures for diseases, and a cleaner environment. Funding for the National Institutes of Health, for instance, has nearly doubled over the past 7 years. Meanwhile we have continued to make important investments in our Nation’s communities. Our Empowerment Zone tax credits are bringing new business and new jobs to our hardest pressed communities, from the inner cities to Appalachia to the Mississippi Delta to Native American communities. With the help of 100,000 more community police officers funded for our streets, and commonsense measures such as the Brady law and the assault weapons ban that keep guns out of the wrong hands, crime has fallen to a 26-year low. Under the State Children’s Health Insurance Program, 2 million previously uninsured children now have health coverage. Third, our economic strategy has focused on opening markets around the world. Today, with more than 300 new trade agreements in place, including the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Uruguay Round agreements, American workers and firms are competing in more markets than ever before, and our economy is stronger for it. 4 | Economic Report of the President Continuing Our Economic Strategy Last year we took important new actions to secure our economic future, guided by the same three-part strategy. We normalized trade with China, a move that will open China’s markets to American products from wheat to cars to consulting services. It will also ensure that American companies will be better able to sell goods in China without having to move factories or investments there. Congress also passed, and I signed, a 2001 budget that maintains our commitment to fiscal discipline. Under this new budget we will continue to pay down the debt. If we stay on this path, we can make America debt-free by 2012 for the first time since Andrew Jackson was President in 1835, thereby keeping interest rates low and prosperity going strong. The 2001 budget also continues our strategy of investing in our people. It includes the largest-ever increase in funding for the National Science Foundation and major increases in funding for education. A new, $1.2 billion investment will help thousands of school districts make emergency repairs and renovations to our children’s classrooms. We have increased by 25 percent the funding dedicated to our goal of hiring 100,000 new, highly qualified teachers, to reduce class size. We have nearly doubled funding for after-school programs to help more than 1.3 million students, while increasing support for teacher training and for turning around failing schools. And to open the doors of college even wider, we have increased the maximum Pell grant to an all-time high of $3,750—up nearly $1,500 since 1993. The new budget also includes our historic New Markets and Renewal Communities Initiative, the most significant effort ever to help hard-pressed communities lift themselves up through entrepreneurship and access to new capital. With our New Markets tax credit, 40 Empowerment Zones, and 40 renewal communities, this initiative will spur billions in private investment in communities that have not yet shared in our great economic revival. This is a unique moment in U.S. history, a time of unrivaled prosperity and progress, with few internal crises or external threats. We have the responsibility to use our good fortune wisely. If we maintain our current economic strategy, we can sustain our prosperity, expand the circle of opportunity, meet the long-term challenges of this new century, and provide our children the chance to live their dreams. THE WHITE HOUSE JANUARY 2001 Economic Report of the President | 5 THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS Economic Report of the President | 7 LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, Washington, D.C., December 29, 2000. MR. PRESIDENT: The Council of Economic Advisers herewith submits its 2001 Annual Report in accordance with the provisions of the Employment Act of 1946 as amended by the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978. Sincerely, Martin N. Baily, Chairman Robert Z. Lawrence, Member Kathryn L. Shaw, Member Economic Report of the President | 9 C O N T E N T S Page CHAPTER 1. THE MAKING OF THE NEW ECONOMY ............................. The Economy from 1973 to 1993 ..................................................... What Makes the Economy New? ....................................................... Sustaining the Virtuous Cycle ............................................................ Information Technology and the New Economy................................ The New Trend in Productivity Growth............................................. Sources of Growth: Capital, Labor Quality, and Total Factor Productivity........................................................ Productivity Increases by Sector and Industry................................. Learning from the New Productivity Trends................................... Innovations in the Information Technology Sector............................. Growing Competition .................................................................... Organizational Changes.................................................................. Innovations in Compensation and Finance..................................... New Complementarities................................................................. Innovation Throughout the Economy................................................ New Production Methods .............................................................. Changes in Inventory and Supply Chain Management .................. New Relationships with Customers ................................................ Shifting Corporate Boundaries ....................................................... Behind the New Trends: The Role of Policy ....................................... Fiscal Discipline.............................................................................. Investing in People and Technology................................................ Setting the Rules for Fair and Open Competition .......................... Social Policies ................................................................................. Challenges for the Future ................................................................... Preserving Fiscal Discipline............................................................. Nurturing a Vibrant Private Sector ................................................. Ensuring That Globalization Enhances the New Economy ............ Creating an Economy That Works for All ...................................... 19 21 22 24 25 26 CHAPTER 2. MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE ................ The Year in Review............................................................................. Private Domestic Spending............................................................. 55 57 60 Contents | 11 26 30 33 34 34 36 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41 42 43 45 47 48 49 50 50 51 Page Government Spending and Fiscal Policy......................................... International Influences .................................................................. Monetary Policy and Financial Markets.......................................... Labor Markets and Inflation........................................................... The Economic Outlook ..................................................................... The Near-Term Outlook ................................................................ Productivity and the NAIRU.......................................................... Inflation Measurement and the Federal Surplus.............................. The Stock Market, Saving, and Consumption Prospects ................ The Long-Term Projection ............................................................. The Fiscal Terrain in the New Economy ............................................ Strong Public Saving: The Payoff from Deficit Reduction .............. What Caused the Surpluses? ........................................................... The Importance of Maintaining Fiscal Discipline........................... Conclusion......................................................................................... 63 64 65 68 70 71 73 74 75 77 79 80 83 87 93 CHAPTER 3. THE CREATION AND DIFFUSION OF THE NEW ECONOMY ... The Advance and Convergence of Information Technologies............. Why Is the U.S. Economy Awash in Technology? .............................. The Demand for New Technology ................................................. Financial Market Developments ..................................................... R&D in the New Economy............................................................ Intellectual Property Protection ...................................................... A Favorable Alignment ................................................................... Doing Business in the New Economy ................................................ New Developments Inside Plants and Firms................................... Changes in Firm Boundaries .......................................................... Competition and Strategy............................................................... Understanding Performance Gains..................................................... How Do Technology and Organizational Change Improve Performance? .................................................................. The Dynamics of Market Competition .......................................... Conclusion......................................................................................... 95 98 103 104 106 110 118 119 120 121 128 136 138 138 140 142 CHAPTER 4. THE NEW ECONOMY IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT ..................... The Role of Trade Liberalization in Promoting Globalization ............ Globalization and Economic Performance ......................................... Scale and Network Effects .............................................................. 145 147 148 148 12 | Economic Report of the President Page Competition and Innovation.......................................................... Changes in the Global Organization of Production........................ Better Technology, More Trade........................................................... Technology and Knowledge-Based Products in U.S. Trade and Investment Flows ............................................................................. New Challenges.................................................................................. The U.S. Trade Balance and Current Account................................ Raising Performance in Other Countries........................................ The Importance of Institutions and Policy ..................................... Raising Incomes in Developing Countries...................................... Adjusting to Change at Home........................................................ Trade and the Environment and Labor Standards........................... Challenges for Legal Frameworks ................................................... Making Globalization Work............................................................... Opening Markets to Trade and Investment ........................................ Conclusion......................................................................................... 149 150 153 155 157 158 161 166 169 173 175 176 180 182 185 CHAPTER 5. LIVING IN THE NEW ECONOMY .......................................... Good News from the American Economy.......................................... Helping Families Help Themselves..................................................... Welfare Reform .............................................................................. Making Work Pay........................................................................... Reaching out to Underserved Communities ................................... Education in the New Economy ........................................................ A Role for Federal Education Policy ............................................... Reducing Class Size ........................................................................ The Importance of Teachers ........................................................... The Need for Modern Schools ....................................................... New Educational Technology and Internet Access.......................... Standards and Accountability ......................................................... Increasing Public School Choice..................................................... Helping Students Make the Transition from Secondary School to College.......................................................................... Innovation and Access in Health Care................................................ Technological Innovations .............................................................. Organizational Innovations to Control Health Care Costs ............. Improving Health Insurance Coverage ........................................... Building Livable Communities........................................................... 187 188 193 193 198 204 209 209 211 212 216 216 219 220 Contents | 13 222 223 223 225 229 236 Page Business and Suburbanization......................................................... Sprawl and Its Challenges ............................................................... Regional Coordination and Sprawl................................................. Individual Decisions and Sprawl..................................................... The Administration’s Response....................................................... Conclusion......................................................................................... 237 238 239 239 241 242 CONCLUSION: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES IN THE NEW ECONOMY ................................................................................... Technology’s Role in the New Economy......................................... The Role of Policy in Supporting the New Economy ..................... Globalization and the New Economy ............................................. Harnessing the New Economy ....................................................... 245 247 249 250 250 APPENDIXES A. Report to the President on the Activities of the Council of Economic Advisers During 2000 .......................................... 253 B. Statistical Tables Relating to Income, Employment, and Production .............................................................................. 267 1-1. 1-2. 2-1. 2-2. 2-3. 2-4. 3-1. 4-1. 4-2. LIST OF TABLES Accounting for the Productivity Acceleration in the 1990s ..... 28 Labor Productivity Growth by Industry, Selected Periods, 1989 to 1999 ............................................. 32 Growth of Real GDP and Its Components During 1998–99 and 2000................................................................ 58 Administration Forecast .......................................................... 72 Accounting for Growth in Real GDP, 1960–2008 .................. 78 Components of Federal Budget Outlays.................................. 84 Content and Commerce on the Internet................................. 102 Source of Inputs Used in Production by U.S. Multinational Corporations at Home and in Foreign Affiliates.................... 153 Changing Composition of U.S. Trade Flows........................... 156 14 | Economic Report of the President Page 1-1. 1-2. 1-3. 1-4. 1-5. 1-6. 1-7. 1-8. 1-9. 1-10. 2-1. 2-2. 2-3. 2-4. 2-5. 2-6. 2-7. 2-8. 2-9. 2-10. 2-11. 2-12. 2-13. 2-14. 2-15. 2-16. 2-17. 2-18. 3-1. 3-2. LIST OF CHARTS Growth in Real Household Income by Quintile, 1973–93 and 1993–99.......................................................... Growth in Gross Domestic Income Due to the Information Technology Sector ................................................................. Output per Hour in the Nonfarm Business Sector.................. Producer Price Index for Electronic Computers ...................... Indicators of Growth in Information Technology Activity....... Information Technology Firms................................................ Inventory-to-Sales Ratio in Manufacturing and Trade............. Mergers and Acquisitions Involving U.S. Firms ...................... Federal Budget Balance ........................................................... Computer Imports and Exports as a Share of Computer Purchases and Production ..................................................... Growth in Real GDP .............................................................. Growth in Output per Hour in the Nonfarm Business Sector.. Consumption and Disposable Income .................................... Personal and Wealth-Adjusted Saving Rates ............................ Real Investment in Equipment and Software .......................... Actual and Structural Federal Budget Balances........................ Equity Prices ........................................................................... Contributions to Growth in Market Capitalization................. Selected Interest Rates and Yields ............................................ Consumer and Import Prices .................................................. Nonfarm Business Compensation per Hour and Unit Labor Costs................................................................... Net Worth-to-Income Ratio and Consumption Rate.............. Actual and Projected Federal Budget Balances......................... Actual and Projected Debt Held by the Public ........................ Public, Private, and National Saving ....................................... Growth in GDP and Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) ............... Population Aged 65 and Over and Outlays for Social Security and Medicare........................................................... Long-Term Budget Balance Projections Under Different Policy Assumptions ............................................................... Real Investment in Information Technology ........................... Prices and Real Investment in Computers and Peripheral Equipment ........................................................... Contents 20 25 27 30 35 36 40 41 43 46 58 59 60 61 63 64 66 67 68 70 71 75 81 81 82 86 89 90 98 99 | 15 Page 3-3. 3-4. 3-5. 3-6. 3-7. 3-8. 3-9. 3-10. 3-11. 3-12. 3-13. 3-14. 3-15. 4-1. 4-2. 4-3. 4-4. 4-5. 4-6. 4-7. 4-8. 5-1. 5-2. 5-3. 5-4. 5-5. 5-6. 5-7. Prices and Real Investment in Software ................................... Employment in Computer and Data Processing Services ........ Venture Capital Investment..................................................... Number and Gross Proceeds of Initial Public Offerings .......... First-Day Returns for Initial Public Offerings ......................... Real Research and Development Spending by Source and Type ............................................................................... Total Expenditures on Industrial R&D by Firm Size............... New Domestic Strategic Technology Alliances ........................ Firms Introducing or Expanding Nonexecutive Stock Option Plans, 1996–98......................................................... Employment in Management Consulting and Employment Agencies........................................................... Tobin’s q in the Nonfinancial Corporate Sector....................... Business Failures...................................................................... Real Corporate Profits............................................................. Imports and Exports by End-Use Category............................. Trade in Capital Goods and Selected Components ................. Growth in Real GDP by Region ............................................. The Trade Deficit and the Real Effective Exchange Rate of the Dollar.................................................................. Saving, Investment, and the Current Account Balance............ OECD Estimates of Growth in Potential Output ................... Change in Average Annual Productivity Growth from 1990–95 to 1996–99 ............................................................ Indicators of the Pervasiveness of Information Technology...... Unemployment Rates by Race and Hispanic Origin ............... Poverty Rates by Race and Hispanic Origin ............................ Maximum Real EITC Benefit by Family Earnings, 1993 and 1999...................................................................... EITC Benefit and Labor Force Participation of Unmarried Women with Children ........................................ Real Minimum Wage Combined with the Real Maximum EITC Subsidy .............................................. Poverty Rates in Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Areas, 1993 and 1999...................................................................... Revenue per Pupil by Source and Income Quartile of School District, 1994–95 ...................................................... 16 | Economic Report of the President 100 101 107 109 110 111 113 117 127 131 137 141 141 156 157 158 159 159 162 163 165 190 190 199 200 201 208 210 Page 5-8. 5-9. Share of U.S. Public Schools with Internet Access................... Sources of New Computers Received by Elementary Schools in 1997–98 .............................................................. 5-10. Health Expenditures and Enrollment in Health Maintenance Organizations .................................................. 5-11. Average Federal Tax Benefit for Health Expenses, 2000 .......... 5-12. Health Insurance Coverage of Those under Age 65, by Type and Income, 1999.................................................... 2-1. 3-1. 3-2. 4-1. 4-2. 4-3. 4-4. 5-1. 5-2. 5-3. 5-4. 5-5. 5-6. 5-7. LIST OF BOXES Are Treasuries Being Swapped out of Their Benchmark Role? .. Federal R&D and Commercial Technology: Licensing, Cooperation, and Partnerships ............................. Information Technology in the Machine Tool Industry: The New Economy Helps the Old........................................ A New Role for Multinational Firms....................................... Information Technology and Cross-Country Differences in Measuring Economic Growth ............................................... Reforming International Institutions....................................... The Global Promise of Biotechnology..................................... The Workforce Investment Act ............................................... Rewarding Effective Teachers .................................................. Reducing the Digital Divide.................................................... Ensuring That Gains Are Maintained...................................... The Rise of E-Health: On-Line Medical Information ............. Challenges to Smart Growth in Atlanta................................... Examples of Smart Growth ..................................................... Contents 217 219 228 230 231 69 116 123 151 164 180 183 196 214 218 221 227 240 242 | 17 C H A P T E R 1 The Making of the New Economy O ver the last 8 years the American economy has transformed itself so radically that many believe we have witnessed the creation of a New Economy. This Report presents evidence of fundamental and unanticipated changes in economic trends that justify this claim. In the 1990s, after two decades of disappointing performance, the economy enjoyed one of its most prosperous periods ever. Strong and rising growth in real gross domestic product (GDP), declining and then very low unemployment, and a low, stable core inflation rate characterize the long expansion. Even though growth moderated in the second half of 2000, the achievements of the past 8 years remain impressive. From the first quarter of 1993 through the third quarter of 2000, real GDP grew at an average annual rate of 4.0 percent—46 percent faster than the average from 1973 to 1993. This exceptional growth reflects both strong job creation and increased productivity growth. Americans are working in record numbers: the number of payroll jobs has increased by more than 22 million since January 1993, and in 2000 the share of the population employed reached its highest level on record. Also in 2000 the unemployment 19 rate dipped to 3.9 percent, the lowest level in a generation. Unemployment rates for African Americans and Hispanic Americans were the lowest since separate statistics for these groups were first collected in the early 1970s. Americans are not only working more; they are also working smarter. The economy has rapidly become more productive. Since the beginning of 1993, output per hour in the nonfarm business sector has grown at an average rate of 2.3 percent per year, compared with an average of 1.4 percent per year for the previous 20 years. Even more remarkably, since the fourth quarter of 1995 productivity growth has averaged 3 percent per year. This acceleration in productivity has produced higher incomes and greater wealth. From 1993 to 1999, the real income of the median household grew more than in any period of similar length in the last 30 years. Meanwhile the value of corporate stocks has nearly trebled, even after taking into account the downward adjustment in stock prices during 2000. These income gains have also been widely shared: even incomes at the bottom of the distribution have risen rapidly (Chart 1-1). Disadvantaged groups have seen their situation improve markedly. The overall poverty rate declined to 11.8 percent in 1999 (the most recent year for which data are available), its lowest level since 1979 and 3.3 percentage points below the rate in 1993. The poverty rate for African Americans was 23.6 percent in 1999—still too high, but far below the 1993 level of 33.1 percent. The poverty rates for Hispanic Americans and elderly Americans have also fallen sharply. 20 | Economic Report of the President This chapter describes the remarkable achievements of the 1990s and the factors that gave rise to the New Economy. The chapter identifies the sources of the economy’s faster growth and estimates the contribution of each. The focus is on information technology and the factors that reinforce its impact: organizational change and sound economic policy. Updated, sector-specific data on productivity gains indicate that those sectors that have invested the most in information technology—wholesale trade and finance, among others—experienced some of the greatest productivity gains during the 1990s. The chapter then highlights the importance of innovation in business practices in firms throughout the economy. It goes on to discuss the importance of sound fiscal policy, competition-enhancing trade and technology policy, and effective social policy—all working together to further the progress of the New Economy—and the gains that have already been made. The chapter concludes by looking ahead to the challenges we will face in the coming years to sustain the virtuous cycle of growth and innovation—and to share fully in its rewards. The Economy from 1973 to 1993 The remarkable economic trends of the 1990s took many by surprise. They represent a distinct change from the 1970s and 1980s, decades in which the economy was plagued by persistent inflation, periodically high unemployment, slow growth in productivity, rising inequality, and large Federal budget deficits. Stagflation was an unwelcome phenomenon of the 1970s, as two major oil shocks were followed by simultaneous inflation and recession. The massive and costly recession of the early 1980s and the collapse of oil prices in 1986 broke the back of the very high inflation rates that had emerged in the late 1970s. But as unemployment fell below 6 percent in the late 1980s, core inflation started to climb again. Between 1973 and 1993, GDP growth received a boost from the large numbers of women and baby-boomers entering the work force. But at the same time, persistently slow productivity growth (averaging less than half of what it had been during the preceding 25 years) kept GDP growth in check. These trends affected the incidence of poverty. In the 1960s and early 1970s, poverty had been declining as economic progress gradually raised the incomes of those at the bottom. The nationwide poverty rate, which had stood at 22.2 percent in 1960, fell to 11.1 percent in 1973. But the combination of slow productivity growth and a relatively slack labor market likely played a role in ending this improvement, dragging down household incomes, especially for the poorest. The poverty rate continued to fluctuate, falling during expansions in the business cycle and rising during contractions. Chapter 1 | 21 However, throughout the 1980s it never fell lower than 12.8 percent, far above the low of the early 1970s. And by 1993 poverty had risen to 15.1 percent, almost matching the 1983 level of 15.2 percent, its worst since the 1960s. Federal budget deficits had become commonplace in the 1970s, but they increased rapidly in the 1980s in the presence of a fiscal policy based on overly optimistic budget forecasts. Efforts to restore fiscal discipline in 1990 failed because of a weakening economy, and deficits grew worse rather than better, reaching almost $300 billion in fiscal 1992. By the end of fiscal 1981, publicly held Federal debt had fallen to 25.8 percent of GDP. By the end of fiscal 1993 it had almost doubled, to 49.5 percent. Given these problems, few believed in 1993 that the U.S. economy could achieve and sustain low unemployment rates, moderate inflation, or robust productivity growth, let alone all three. The Federal Government seemed incapable of balancing its budget, and there was little to suggest that U.S. incomes could grow more rapidly than those in other major industrial countries. Yet in the years that followed, all of these seemingly improbable events occurred—and at the same time. What Makes the Economy New? The U.S. economy today displays several exceptional features. The first is its strong rate of productivity growth. Since 1995 the trend rate of productivity growth has been more than double that of the 1973–95 period. A second is its unusually low levels of both inflation and unemployment. In the past, low levels of unemployment have usually meant sharply rising inflation. Yet despite an unemployment rate that has been close to (and at times below) 4 percent for 2 years, core inflation has remained in the 2 to 3 percent range. A third is the disappearance of Federal budget deficits. Federal fiscal policy often becomes more expansionary as a period of economic growth is sustained, yet in the past 8 years the structural budget balance has moved steadily from a massive deficit to a large surplus. A fourth is the strength of the U.S. economy’s performance relative to other industrial economies. As a world technological leader, the United States might have been expected to grow more slowly than countries that can benefit from imitating the leader’s technological advances. Yet over the second half of the 1990s, the United States continued to enjoy both the highest income per capita and the fastest income growth of the major industrial nations. These developments reveal profound changes in economic trends that justify the term “New Economy.” Three interrelated factors lie behind these extraordinary economic gains: technological innovation, organizational changes in businesses, and public 22 | Economic Report of the President policy. Information technology has long been important to the economy. But in the early 1990s a number of simultaneous advances in information technology—computer hardware, software, and telecommunications— allowed these new technologies to be combined in ways that sharply increased their economic potential. In part to realize this potential, entrepreneurs instituted widespread changes in business organizations, reconfiguring their existing businesses and starting new ones. These changes included new production methods and human resource management practices, new types of relationships with suppliers and customers, new business strategies (with some firms expanding the scope of their enterprises through mergers and acquisitions, and others streamlining them to best utilize core competencies), and new forms of finance and compensation. Public policy was the third driving force. This Administration embraced policies and strategies based on fiscal discipline, investing in people and technologies, opening new markets at home and abroad, and developing an institutional framework that supported continued global integration. Together these created an environment in which the new technologies and organizational changes could flourish. The interactions among these three factors have created a virtuous cycle in which developments in one area reinforce and stimulate developments in another. The result is an economic system in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. New technologies have created opportunities for organizational innovations, and these innovations in turn have engendered demand for these technologies and others still newer. The increased growth prompted by the new technologies helped the Federal Government restrain its spending growth and boosted its revenue; the resulting smaller budget deficits (and later surpluses) have helped keep interest rates down, encouraging further investment in new technologies. Economic policies directed toward promoting competition have prodded firms to adopt the new technologies, spurring other firms to innovate or be left behind. Policies aimed at opening foreign markets have increased earnings in the U.S. technology sector, leading to yet more innovation, including innovation in information technologies, which have lowered barriers to trade and investment still further. These market-opening policies have also allowed U.S. producers to become more productive, by expanding the variety of key inputs available to them. This Report defines the New Economy by the extraordinary gains in performance—including rapid productivity growth, rising incomes, low unemployment, and moderate inflation—that have resulted from this combination of mutually reinforcing advances in technologies, business practices, and economic policies. Chapter 1 | 23 Sustaining the Virtuous Cycle Americans can be gratified by the achievements of the last 8 years, but we must not become complacent. The economy has been performing well for so long now that there is a danger of taking growth for granted. There are good reasons to believe that the long-term trend rate of productivity growth has increased relative to the post-1973 trend, and many new technologies do not yet appear to have exhausted their potential for further improvements. On the other hand, more moderate economic growth is projected for 2001 and beyond. Hence the economic forecast described in Chapter 2 is optimistic, but also cautious about the future. In addition, it would be a grave error to assume that the economy has been so transformed that the basic rules of economics no longer apply. The potential for faster growth exists, but demand cannot run ahead of supply without the danger of rising inflation. The economy also remains susceptible to cyclical fluctuations. Indeed, the rewards of the New Economy are associated with increased risk, since the economy depends more heavily than before on financial markets, which remain volatile. Abandoning the public policies that have helped transform the economy would also be a mistake. The current prosperity certainly reflects, above all, the efforts of the private sector, but it would be wrong—and dangerous—to ignore the contribution of policy. In particular, it would be risky to put aside the policies that have helped us move from huge budget deficits to large surpluses and have laid the groundwork for the capital formation that has been so important in stimulating growth. It would be just as dangerous to undermine the policies that have supported the investments in people and technologies that are the keys to advancing productivity. It would be folly to abandon the efforts to increase competition in markets at home and abroad, because it is this competition that helped create a domestic business environment in which entrepreneurs can flourish and a global economy from which all Americans can benefit. Finally, the government should continue its efforts to ensure that prosperity is more widely shared, because this is something the private sector will not automatically accomplish on its own. A strong economy, even the extraordinary economy of the last 8 years, cannot solve all America’s problems or guarantee that every American will be better off. Important steps have been taken to spread the benefits of economic growth to disadvantaged regions and families. But much remains to be done. The resources are available to tackle the problems of insufficient access to health insurance, of aging educational facilities, and of a Social Security system that lacks adequate long-term reserves, to name a few. The challenge is how best to use these resources to improve the well-being of all Americans. 24 | Economic Report of the President Information Technology and the New Economy Spending on information technology has clearly played a leading role in the recent acceleration of economic growth. Although this sector remains a fairly small part of the economy—its share of GDP was an estimated 8.3 percent in 2000—it accounted for almost one-third of all output growth between 1995 and 1999 (Chart 1-2). Even more remarkable, in 1999 business spending on information technology equipment and software was responsible for more than 11 percentage points of the 14 percent real growth in total equipment and software spending by business. The information technology sector is also one that has seen a surge in innovation. To be sure, the computer, the cell phone, optical fibers, lasers, and the Internet had all been invented before the mid-1990s. But over the course of that decade, a series of innovations in computer hardware and software and in telecommunications took place that has allowed for new and complementary interactions among these technologies on an unprecedented scale— a dramatic example of which is the emergence and increasing commercial use of the World Wide Web. There is a broad consensus that information technology has been important in the recent surge in economic performance. But the role of developments beyond this sector remains more controversial. One view of the recent economic transformation identifies the New Economy narrowly with the production and use of information technology. Some proponents of Chapter 1 | 25 this view argue that performance in the rest of the economy has simply followed previous trends, or that the recent strong economic growth has boosted it only temporarily. Although the innovation and diffusion of information technology have clearly been important, the broader definition of the New Economy adopted in this Report more accurately conveys the pervasiveness of the recent economic changes. A growing body of evidence now shows that the widespread application of information technologies has stimulated remarkable improvements in production processes and other business practices outside the information technology sector. But innovations in information technology and its use have not been the only source of such change. Indeed, there has been a surge in innovation in other technologies as well. Together with supportive public policies, these changes have fundamentally transformed the economy. An examination of recent productivity growth supports this view. The New Trend in Productivity Growth Productivity is now growing considerably faster than it did over the 20 years after 1973 (Chart 1-3). What can be said about the sources of this acceleration? Two simple analyses help to answer this question. The first estimates the contributions to growth in aggregate private nonfarm business productivity from each of the different sources of that growth, such as increases in the amount of capital per worker. The second uses data on output and employment by industry to pinpoint the areas of economic activity where the acceleration has taken place. Sources of Growth: Capital, Labor Quality, and Total Factor Productivity A standard model of economic growth allows us to estimate how various sources have contributed to the recent acceleration of productivity. Table 1-1 shows that productivity, measured as output per hour in the private nonfarm business sector, accelerated in the late 1990s. Its growth rate rose from an annual average of 1.4 percent before 1995 to an annual average of 3.0 percent from 1995 through 2000. The total acceleration from the first period to the second is thus slightly more than 1.6 percentage points. (The results reported in Chart 1-3 and Table 1-1 are based on real output increases that are averages of growth in production and growth in income, each of which is a valid measure of private nonfarm output. The chart and the table differ slightly in that the latter covers the private nonfarm sector and therefore excludes government enterprises.) The first question to ask about this 26 | Economic Report of the President total acceleration is how much, if any, of it is the result of business cycle effects and how much is structural. Productivity Growth and the Business Cycle Productivity growth varies over the course of the business cycle, typically speeding up in the early stages of booms and slowing or even turning negative in slumps. But changes in productivity also have an underlying structural, or trend, component. There is no foolproof way to tease apart these cyclical and structural components in the productivity changes one actually observes. The increase in productivity growth after 1995, however, is noteworthy in that it occurred at a time when the economy already was enjoying a high rate of resource utilization. Sharp increases in productivity have usually occurred in economies recovering from recession (Chart 1-3). By contrast, since 1995 the U.S. economy has followed a steeper productivity trend, which started well after the 1990–91 recession was over. Statistical estimates suggest that almost none of the acceleration in productivity after 1995 has been cyclical. An econometric model in which hours worked adjust gradually to changes in output indicates that, by 1995, strong demand had already pushed actual productivity about 2 percentage points above where it would have been otherwise. From 1995 through 2000, the cyclical component of productivity edged up only slightly relative to its trend, so that actual productivity grew only slightly faster (by 0.04 percentage point) than structural productivity (Table 1-1). As of the third quarter of Chapter 1 | 27 TABLE 1-1.— Accounting for the Productivity Acceleration in the 1990s [Private nonfarm business sector; average annual rates] Item 1973 to 1995 1995 to 2000 Change (percentage points) Labor productivity growth rate (percent) .......................................... 1.39 3.01 1.63 Percentage point contributions: Less: Business cycle effect......................................................... Equals: Structural labor productivity ............................................ .00 1.39 .04 2.97 .04 1.58 Less: Capital services ................................................................. Information capital services.......................................... Other capital services.................................................... Labor quality ..................................................................... .70 .41 .30 .27 1.09 1.03 .06 .27 .38 .62 -.23 .00 Equals: Structural TFP ................................................................... .40 1.59 1.19 Less: Equals: Computer sector TFP ......................................................... TFP excluding computer sector TFP .................................. .18 .22 .36 1.22 .18 1.00 Note.— Labor productivity is the average of income- and product-side measures of output per hour worked. Total factor productivity (TFP) is labor productivity less the contributions of capital services per hour (capital deepening) and labor quality. Productivity for 2000 is inferred from the first three quarters. Detail may not add to totals because of rounding. Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) for output and computer prices; Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics) for hours and for capital services and labor quality through 1998; and Council of Economic Advisers for the business cycle effect and for capital services and labor quality for 1999 and 2000. 2000, the cyclical component of productivity was still above trend, suggesting that actual productivity growth is likely to fall below trend growth over the next year or so, as GDP growth moderates. But the estimates indicate that there has been a structural acceleration in productivity since 1995 of slightly less than 1.6 percentage points. Even though economists differ as to the correct way to adjust for responses to the business cycle, the finding that a structural acceleration has taken place is robust. For instance, even if the cyclical adjustment used here proved to be in error, and in fact productivity growth after 1995 received a boost of as much as 0.5 percentage point a year from shifts due to the business cycle, one would still conclude that a structural acceleration of productivity of greater than 1 percentage point has taken place. The fact of a shift in the trend of structural productivity growth does not tell us how permanent that shift will turn out to be. All one can say is that the post-1995 acceleration does not appear to be associated with the normal business cycle variation of productivity. Whether the structural trend that emerged in 1995–2000 will continue for many more years, or whether structural productivity growth will moderate sooner, remains uncertain. We could be observing not a long-term shift to a faster productivity growth rate but simply a shift to a higher level of productivity, with faster growth for a while followed by a return to the pre-1995 trend. Or we may be witnessing 28 | Economic Report of the President the opportunity for faster trend growth over a longer time span. Chapter 2 revisits this issue in the discussion of the forecast. Contributors to the Structural Productivity Acceleration In general, a structural acceleration in productivity can come from an increase in any of the following four sources of growth or their combination: • growth in the amount of capital per worker-hour throughout the economy (capital deepening) • improvements in the measurable skills of the work force, or labor quality • total factor productivity (TFP) growth in computer-producing industries, and • TFP growth in other industries. TFP growth is the increase in aggregate output over and above that due to increases in the quantities of capital or labor inputs. For example, TFP growth may result when a firm redesigns its production line in a way that increases output while keeping the same number of machines, materials, and workers as before. Capital investment has been extremely strong during the current expansion. Particularly after 1995, investment in computers and software responded markedly to robust economic growth, low real interest rates, a strong stock market, and rapidly falling computer prices. As Table 1-1 shows, investment in information technologies added slightly more than 0.6 percentage point to the increase in structural productivity growth after 1995. Because the rate of investment in capital goods other than computer hardware and software slowed during that period, the contribution of overall capital deepening to increased productivity growth was only about 0.4 percentage point, or roughly 24 percent of the post-1995 acceleration of structural productivity. The Bureau of Labor Statistics measures labor quality in terms of the education, gender, and experience of the work force. Using statistical methods, the Bureau determines differences in earnings paid to workers with different characteristics and infers that these relative wage differences reflect relative productivity differences. Measured in this way, labor quality has risen as the education and skills of the work force have increased. Because that increase occurred at about the same rate before and after 1995, however, the contribution of labor quality to the recent acceleration in productivity has been negligible. The rate of growth in TFP in computer-producing industries has been rising. Computer prices have been falling as technological improvements are adopted and made available commercially. The decline in prices was particularly marked from 1997 to 1999 (Chart 1-4). Calculations based on Chapter 1 | 29 these price changes indicate that computer manufacturing accounts for about 0.2 percentage point, or about 11 percent, of the acceleration in structural productivity. The final contribution comes from accelerating TFP in the economy outside the computer-producing industries. The contribution of this “non–computer sector TFP” category is calculated as a residual; it captures the extent to which technological change and other business and workplace improvements outside the computer sector have boosted productivity growth since 1995. This factor accounts for about 1.0 percentage point of the acceleration in productivity, or about 63 percent of the total. (The percentages do not sum to 100 because of rounding.) This implies that improvements in the ways capital and labor are used throughout the economy are central to the recent acceleration in productivity. Some of these gains have likely resulted as firms learn to apply innovative information technology to their particular business and production methods. Productivity Increases by Sector and Industry The figures reported above indicate that both the more widespread use of information technology and improvements in business practices have boosted productivity growth. Data on productivity growth by industry provide a further means of exploring this idea. If the story is correct, these 30 | Economic Report of the President data should show, for example, an acceleration in productivity in wholesale and retail trade as a result of improvements in distribution and supply chain management. Improvements would also be expected in financial and business services, both of which are heavy users of information technology. Table 1-2 shows growth in value added per full-time equivalent employee by industry in 1989–95 and 1995–99. With some important qualifications, the evidence does show that productivity growth increased after 1995 in industries that are heavy users of information technology. A further analysis sorted industries into two groups according to the intensity with which they use information technology (as indicated by the ratio of their spending on information technology to their value added in 1996). The dividing line between the two groups was determined such that each group accounted for roughly half of the value added in the economy in 1996. The analysis found that growth in value added per employee was considerably more rapid in the more information technology–intensive group of industries between 1989 and 1999. In addition, the acceleration of value added per employee in this group was more than 50 percent greater than the acceleration in the less information technology–intensive group (Table 1-2). Striking evidence of improvements in distribution and in the management of the supply chain comes from wholesale and retail trade, both of which experienced much faster productivity growth after 1995. In 1999 these industries accounted for 25 percent of full-time equivalent employees in private industry. Output in these industries increased significantly without corresponding increases in employment. Data for financial institutions as a group also show an acceleration in productivity after 1995, supporting the view that these heavy users of information technology have performed well. Within financial institutions, however, this observation holds true only for nondepository institutions and brokers. Banks and other depository institutions experienced a reduction in productivity growth after 1995. The insurance industry also experienced an acceleration in productivity, reversing what had previously been negative productivity growth. The services sector showed an acceleration in productivity, but this sector still experienced negative productivity growth after 1995. Business services shifted from negative to positive productivity growth, as did personal services. Health services, the largest industry in this sector, reduced its rate of productivity decline. On balance, the pattern of productivity growth by industry is consistent with (although it does not prove) the view that improved business practices and more-productive use of information technology have played an important role in the acceleration of productivity. In addition, some of the gain in productivity is presumably associated with capital deepening. Chapter 1 | 31 TABLE 1-2.— Labor Productivity Growth by Industry, Selected Periods, 1989–99 [Value added per full-time equivalent employee; average annual percent change] Item 2 1989 to 1995 1995 to 1999 Change 1 Private industries ...................................................................... 0.88 2.31 1.43 Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries .................................... Mining ...................................................................................... Construction............................................................................. .34 4.56 -.10 1.18 4.06 -.89 .84 -.50 -.79 Manufacturing ................................................................. 3.18 4.34 1.16 Durable goods ............................................................... Nondurable goods................................................................. 4.34 1.65 6.84 1.07 2.51 -.59 Transportation ......................................................................... 2.48 1.72 -.76 Trucking and warehousing ................................................... Transportation by air............................................................ Other transportation............................................................. 2.09 4.52 1.51 -.73 4.52 2.14 -2.82 .00 .63 Communications ...................................................................... Electric, gas, and sanitary services ........................................ Wholesale trade ....................................................................... Retail trade .............................................................................. 5.07 2.51 2.84 .68 2.66 2.42 7.84 4.93 -2.41 -.09 4.99 4.25 Finance, insurance, and real estate ........................................ 1.70 2.67 .97 Finance ................................................................................. Insurance.............................................................................. Real estate ........................................................................... 3.18 -.28 1.38 6.76 .44 2.87 3.58 .72 1.49 Services.................................................................................... -1.12 -.19 .93 Personal services.................................................................. Business services ................................................................. Health services ..................................................................... Other services....................................................................... -1.47 -.16 -2.31 -.72 1.09 1.69 -1.06 -.71 2.55 1.85 1.26 .01 Addenda: Intense information technology users ..................................... Less intense information technology users ............................. 2.43 -.10 4.18 1.05 1.75 1.15 1 Percentage points. Not directly comparable with the private nonfarm business sector results shown in Table 1-1, because the incomeside data used here include agriculture and because data in Table 1-1 are based on the average of income- and product-side measures of output per hour worked. 2 Source: Council of Economic Advisers, based on data from Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis). Some difficulties in the data, however, both help explain certain puzzles or anomalies in Table 1-2 and suggest that these results should not be taken as definitive. First, consistent data on output and labor input by industry are available only for 1987–99. The cyclical peak year of 1989 is taken as the starting point here, further shortening the span of the data. The brevity of the time periods before and after 1995 mean that observed growth rates may not reflect actual industry trends. Second, output in the private sector (or in nonfarm business) is computed initially at the aggregate level and then broken down by industry. Because this process is inexact, productivity growth can be overestimated in one industry and underestimated in another. 32 | Economic Report of the President Third, difficulties in constructing price deflators for industries such as business services, insurance, and health care add errors and uncertainties to estimates of productivity in these industries and in every industry that purchases inputs from these hard-to-measure industries. The negative productivity growth reported for health care, for example, seems inconsistent with the rapid pace of technological innovation in that industry (see Chapter 5). Despite these data problems, the industry results are important. Some prior analyses based on earlier data appeared to conflict with the view that productivity growth was increasing in computer-using industries. This new evidence, however, broadly supports the view that the new technologies are yielding economic benefits. Learning from the New Productivity Trends The breakdown of the sources of accelerated productivity and the analysis of industry data suggest three important lessons: • The information technology sector itself has provided a direct boost to productivity growth. Part of the recent surge in productivity is the direct result of productivity growth within this sector. • The spread of information technology throughout the economy has been a major factor in the acceleration of productivity through capital deepening. Increasingly, companies have been eager and able to buy powerful computers at relatively low prices. The rapid advances in computer technology, together with favorable economic conditions, have fueled a computer and software investment boom. • Outside the information technology sector, organizational innovations and better ways of applying information technology are boosting the productivity of skilled workers. A variety of changes that go beyond the direct application of new computer technology, including structural changes in private businesses and more effective use of worker skills, have further boosted productivity. What accounts for the changes revealed in this productivity analysis? Answering this question requires moving behind the aggregate and industry numbers to consider three sets of complementary developments: changes within the information technology sector, changes in other sectors, and changes in economic policy. Chapter 1 | 33 Innovations in the Information Technology Sector Dramatic developments occurred within the information technology sector in the 1990s, particularly in the second half of the decade, when the pace of innovation accelerated. The top left panel of Chart 1-5 shows the surge in private research and development (R&D) spending on information technology, and the top right panel shows the increase in the pace of innovation (as measured by the number of information technology patents granted annually). The bottom left panel depicts the surge in the production of computers, semiconductors, and communications equipment: between 1992 and 2000, real output in this sector increased more than 13-fold. The bottom right panel shows the rapid increase in employment in the industries providing computer, data processing, and communications services. The process by which new information technologies are created in the United States has undergone a number of major changes that have transformed the ways in which such innovation occurs. In much of the postwar period, defense spending was a major driver of innovation, and the Federal budget was a more important source of R&D funding than it is today. Innovation, however, was undertaken predominantly by large manufacturers, and the U.S. economy was less integrated with the international economy than it is today. That situation has changed considerably, as Chapter 3 describes in detail. Four developments in particular deserve mention: changes in the competitive environment, changes in organizational structures, changes in compensation and finance, and innovations in complementary technologies. Growing Competition The information technology sector is being driven by heightened competition in an increasingly deregulated economy in which international trade plays an ever-growing role. These pressures foster the creation and adoption of new technologies, especially in the private sector, which has begun to play a greater role in innovation since the end of the Cold War. When businesses bring innovations to market, their rivals are given strong incentives to innovate as well. In the area of information technology, the firm that is the first to gain market acceptance for a new type of product often gets to set the standard for that product, and therefore is most likely to capture the lion’s share of the market. The innovating firm can then exploit its early success, to develop the next generation of technology and products. The prospect of second-generation success thus raises the premium on rapid innovation. 34 | Economic Report of the President Chapter 1 | 35 For firms to have strong financial incentives to innovate, there must be strong demand for such innovation from other firms in other industries. Almost 70 percent of all information technology products are purchased by the wholesale and retail trade, finance, and telecommunications industries. Competition in these industries (often on a global level) encourages them to seek out new technologies to improve their own productivity. Unlike in some other countries, in which barriers to entry, pricing restrictions, and other business restrictions restrain competition, in the United States competitive pressures are generally strong. Deregulation in finance and telecommunications has helped create an increasingly competitive environment. The number of new firms in the information technology sector is a measure of the incentives and opportunity to innovate—and the figures paint a dramatic picture. Between 1990 and 1997 the number of information technology firms more than doubled (Chart 1-6). Many innovations have come from talented individuals in small startup companies that are willing to take risks. Organizational Changes Competitive pressures have increased the importance of introducing new products and processes quickly. Yet the know-how required to create these products has become more complex and more dispersed. Today it is rarely 36 | Economic Report of the President cost-effective for a single firm to control an entire innovation process. As a result, businesses have altered the organizational structures within which innovation takes place. A smaller fraction of R&D now takes place within large, integrated companies. Small firms are responsible for an increasing share of the Nation’s industrial research. Collaboration between innovating firms has become commonplace, as the dramatic growth in interfirm technology alliances in the 1990s demonstrates. Furthermore, today’s innovations increasingly draw upon scientific knowledge, much of which is developed by universities and national laboratories. To take advantage of this science base, private firms are now performing more basic research than ever before. And because proximity to these universities and national laboratories matters—by improving a firm’s chances of capturing spillovers and of hiring high-quality researchers— innovation today is often characterized by geographic concentration into high-technology clusters such as Silicon Valley, California. In these clusters and elsewhere, many new firms, free of the constraints often imposed in large, established corporations, continually enter the market with new technologies and innovative business ideas. Innovations in Compensation and Finance New methods of financing have evolved to address the needs of new entrants and of R&D in the information technology sector. Traditionally, firms have used their physical plant and equipment as collateral for financing. But the unique challenges of promoting innovation in sectors where much of the know-how is based on intangible capital, plus the considerable risks involved in financing high-technology companies, have generated new institutional arrangements. Venture capital, in particular, has played a crucial role, supplying funds and providing management know-how and connections for entrepreneurs. Initial public offerings (IPOs) have also been instrumental. The information technology sector has made extensive use of new compensation mechanisms that provide incentives to talented workers and managers. For example, stock options enable firms to attract and retain talent while passing some risk on to workers. The vibrant stock market has also been important, allowing venture capitalists to cash out more easily through IPOs and enabling workers holding stock options to boost their earnings. In an important sense, success has generated success, as venture capitalists score big and then use their augmented capital to seek out new profit opportunities. The excitement over the technology revolution drove technology stocks to extraordinary heights in the spring of 2000, although they have retreated since then. The volatility in technology equity markets can be disruptive to companies seeking new funding, but investors’ willingness to take risks and Chapter 1 | 37 the availability of financial resources for successful entrepreneurs continue to make U.S. financial markets important contributors to the New Economy. Even after the recent decline in the technology sector, price-earnings ratios remain high. This indicates that investors are still willing to take a chance on companies with low current earnings but the potential for rapid future growth. New Complementarities The changes in the information technology sector have been both cumulative and complementary. Innovations in one area have created demands in another. Breakthroughs in communications and data compression techniques, for instance, generate demand for improved software and for more powerful computers. Complementarities operate on both the supply and the demand sides. In particular, the falling costs associated with the use of computers have made certain types of research feasible for the first time— the mapping of the human genome, for instance, was made feasible by computers. Information technology is becoming increasingly important in the development of new treatment options, and the Food and Drug Administration uses computers to streamline the analysis and approval of new drugs. Demand is particularly powerful when it generates positive feedback through network effects. E-mail, for example, becomes increasingly useful as more people use it. The evidence suggests, then, that a number of factors have combined to create a uniquely favorable climate for entrepreneurs. These factors include a growing demand for new and improved technologies (spurred by intense domestic and global competition and technological complementarities), the improved capacity of reorganized firms and networks to supply the new technologies, and innovations in thriving financial markets. Innovation Throughout the Economy Simply buying and installing new technology does not automatically increase productivity, profitability, or job creation. Yet some views of the New Economy reveal a kind of naïve technological determinism that ignores the vital role of complementary changes in production and business practices. Companies throughout the U.S. economy have been radically transformed by new technologies that enable entire product networks to become more efficient, effective, and integrated. These transformations are detailed in Chapter 3, but a few of the most important changes are noted here, including changes in production, inventory and supply management, customer relations, and corporate structure. 38 | Economic Report of the President New Production Methods Innovations in information technology have generated many changes in manufacturing processes. New technologies permit workers to analyze data and make detailed adjustments to production lines on the plant floor, boosting productivity, improving quality, and lowering costs. The availability of data, often on a real-time basis, allows for continuous performance evaluation that can improve efficiency. Workers who have access to information technology can be empowered with more decisionmaking responsibility. In addition, the new technology allows organizations to disseminate information and coordinate their activities more easily, resulting in less hierarchical organizational structures. In turn, these new structures may reduce costs and further increase efficiency. Finally, as in the information technology sector itself, innovations in the way workers are compensated can help firms achieve greater productivity gains from new technology, spurring further innovation in compensation and finance. Studies suggest that worker performance improves when incentives are tied more closely to performance. Stock options have become more common as a method of attracting, retaining, and rewarding employees. Changes in Inventory and Supply Chain Management Firms typically hold inventories as a cushion against uncertainties. Producers keep excess raw materials and other inputs on hand to prevent shortages on the production line, for example, and stores maintain inventories to meet fluctuations in demand. The need for inventories springs in part from incomplete information about demand. For this reason, technologies that improve the dissemination of information enable companies to react more promptly to market signals and to economize on inventories (by sharing point-of-sale data, for example). Indeed, aggregate inventory-to-sales ratios have fallen significantly since the early 1990s (Chart 1-7). The new information technologies have also changed the nature of relationships between firms and their suppliers. Procurement practices have changed radically, as firms become linked to suppliers through Internetbased business-to-business marketplaces. This capability allows businesses to streamline procurement activities, lower transactions costs, improve the management of supplier relationships, and even engage in collaborative product design. “Just-in-time” delivery, facilitated by a more efficient transportation network including both surface and aviation infrastructure, has been instrumental in allowing firms to reduce inventories and lower costs while continuing to provide essential services to producers and consumers. Chapter 1 | 39 New Relationships with Customers Information technologies give firms the ability to develop richer, more targeted relationships with their customers. Firms are able to tailor marketing and product design more precisely to customer needs. Customers, in turn, are able to find and compare the products that most closely match their preferences. Scanner data from retail stores allow companies to monitor which items are selling and which are not. This information can be transmitted back to manufacturers, who can then adjust their production schedules. This avoids stockouts and surplus inventory. The information from scanners can also be used for marketing. Customers who have purchased outdoor adventure products, for example, can be sent information on related gear or travel opportunities that they may wish to purchase. Shifting Corporate Boundaries Markets allocate resources efficiently by setting prices, expanding choices, and encouraging competition. But in situations where pricing and writing contracts is costly and difficult, where uncertainty is high, and where information is difficult to come by, some activities may be more efficiently undertaken within the firm than in the marketplace. Transactions costs thus affect the make-or-buy decision, which determines where the firm’s boundaries end and the market begins. Information technologies can radically change where these boundaries should be drawn, and this sets in motion 40 | Economic Report of the President both centrifugal and centripetal forces. An example of the latter is the large number of recent mergers, some motivated by the belief on the part of some firms that new technology allows the span of organization to be extended. As Chart 1-8 shows, both the number and the value of mergers and acquisitions have moved to new heights as firms seek to capitalize on both efficiency gains and increased market power. On the other hand, many small firms may be able to benefit by specializing in a few core activities. This can lead companies to spin off parts of their operations—an example of centrifugal forces at work. Behind the New Trends: The Role of Policy The Administration’s policy strategy has complemented and fostered the private sector initiatives that generated these new trends. The approach has rested on three major pillars: fiscal discipline, investing in people and technologies, and opening markets at home and abroad. Each of these policy emphases has contributed to the economic environment in which the New Economy has thrived. They have promoted the emergence of an economy in which innovative new businesses are stimulated by relatively low interest rates, an abundant supply of risk capital, world-class educational and research institutions, a well-educated and well-trained work force, competitive product and labor markets, and the development and diffusion of the Chapter 1 | 41 Internet. In addition, the Administration has pursued new social policies to ensure that the American people have the opportunities to share in the gains of the New Economy. Fiscal Discipline The Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1993 was the right policy package at the right time. The Federal funds rate had been moved to a low 3 percent in 1992 in an attempt to stimulate the economy and create jobs. But long-term interest rates remained stubbornly high. The 10-year Treasury bond rate averaged 7.0 percent in 1992—unusually high for a weak economy. Bond yields were being predictably affected by the forces of supply and demand: the Federal Government was set to run a deficit of almost $300 billion, adding a massive new increment to the already swollen stock of outstanding debt. With an oversupply of government bonds and the prospect of even more to come, bond and stock prices were depressed, and yields were correspondingly high. In 1992 the new Administration was elected on a promise to turn the deficits around. After a tough political battle in 1993, the Administration was able to deliver on that promise. The 1981 reductions in tax rates for those in the upper income brackets were partly rolled back, and Federal spending was restrained. The markets responded quickly to this serious effort to address the deficit by lowering expectations of future inflation, and longterm interest rates accordingly fell. The 10-year Treasury rate hit a low of 5.3 percent in October 1993. Over the next year or so, the combination of a stronger economy and the Federal Reserve’s decision to boost short-term rates pushed long-term rates slightly upward again, but they remained lower than they would have been without deficit reduction. As economic growth and further restraints on spending (including the bipartisan 1997 budget agreement) turned the huge deficits into surpluses, a new fiscal environment emerged. The 10-year Treasury rate fell below 6 percent in 1998 and 1999. And despite the extraordinarily strong economy and associated upward movement in short-term rates, that rate stood at only 5.7 percent in November 2000. With a swing in the budget balance of an impressive $492 billion over the last 7 years, the budget surplus for fiscal 2000 came in at $236 billion, or 2.4 percent of GDP. Chart 1-9 shows budget deficits and surpluses in each fiscal year from 1970 to 2000. The ups and downs caused by the business cycle are clearly visible. But even clearer are the trend prior to 1993 and the subsequent sharp turnaround. The 1993 deficit reduction act and subsequent restraints on spending both fueled and capitalized on the private sector’s potential for rapid growth. (See Chapter 2 for more discussion of fiscal policy and the deficit.) 42 | Economic Report of the President The most direct link between improved fiscal discipline and growth is that through low interest rates, which encourage investment. As interest rates fall, financing of all kinds of activities becomes less costly. In addition, low interest rates help keep the stock market strong, allowing companies both old and new to lower their cost of capital. Ultimately, the combination of falling prices for investment goods and reduced interest costs stimulated dramatic growth in investment. Led by equipment and software purchases, investment grew 13 percent per year between the first quarter of 1993 and the third quarter of 2000. Investment is not the only engine of growth, but new technologies cannot be acquired without it. Strong investment is essential to rapid growth, and by reducing the amount of saving that must go to finance the public debt, fiscal discipline has made room for strong investment. The result has been a virtuous cycle, in which the right policies in 1993 kicked off a chain reaction of smaller deficits, lower costs of capital, higher investment, increased technology in the workplace, and faster economic growth. As the deficit became a surplus, the virtuous cycle kept turning. Investing in People and Technology If fiscal discipline had been achieved through cutbacks in education, training, and technological development, it probably would have failed. At the least it would have undermined the potential for long-term growth. But Chapter 1 | 43 the Administration did not make this mistake; instead its budget proposals consistently pushed for increased spending for growth-oriented programs while reducing total outlays. And although not all the requests were approved in the final budgets, substantial funding increases did occur in these areas. Investments in people have come along several fronts. The Administration has invested in children through support of kindergarten through 12th grade (K-12) education, it has helped Americans attend college, and it has worked hard to improve the training opportunities available to American workers. Our public schools play a crucial role in determining the future productivity of American workers. The Federal Government has been an important contributor to K-12 education by helping to ensure a more equitable distribution of opportunities. Federal funds offset a good deal of the difference in educational spending between rich and poor districts. Through the E-rate program, the Administration has helped schools invest in new technologies for the classroom. The Administration has also provided leadership on initiatives to reduce class size, raise standards, and improve accountability. Programs such as the 21st Century Community Learning Centers Program help communities utilize their school buildings after school hours to provide enriching programs for children. The New Economy has provided increasing rewards for higher education. Responding to this fundamental change in the labor market, the Administration has helped students prepare for college through the GEAR UP (Gaining Early Awareness and Readiness for Undergraduate Programs) and TRIO programs. These programs help students in high-poverty schools and from low-income families through academic enrichment programs and mentoring. For students who are admitted to college, Administration programs such as the HOPE Scholarship tax credit and the Lifetime Learning tax credit help students and their families afford the tuition. The Administration has also substantially increased the funds available through the Pell grant program. Because learning continues throughout a lifetime, and skills often need to be updated, the Administration has strongly supported training programs for those already in the work force or seeking to rejoin it. The Workforce Investment Act provides job training and job search assistance, with priority given to low-income and displaced workers. In conjunction with the programs of the Workforce Investment Act, Youth Opportunity Grants help at-risk youths develop job skills. The Administration has also supported the NAFTA Transitional Adjustment Assistance program to address the needs of workers affected by economic dislocations resulting from the North American Free Trade Agreement. During the past 8 years, research funding at the National Science Foundation has been increased by more than 60 percent, and that for the 44 | Economic Report of the President National Institutes of Health by more than 80 percent. Information technology has also been targeted for increased research. For fiscal 2001 the President requested more than $2 billion in Federal support for information technology research, which will substantially increase the Federal commitment to R&D in this area. He also called for a new initiative in nanotechnology, which could someday lead to the ability to store the information equivalent of the Library of Congress in a device the size of a sugar cube, and the development of materials that are 10 times stronger than steel but a fraction of the weight. Of equal importance has been the Administration’s commitment to fostering innovation in the private sector. The Research and Experimentation tax credit has been extended through 2004. The Administration supported the Internet Tax Freedom Act, which imposed a moratorium on Internet taxes, enhancing the ability of entrepreneurs to explore new commercial applications of this medium. The White House’s Framework for Global Electronic Commerce called for private sector leadership and limited government involvement: government should intervene only to support a predictable, consistent, and simple legal environment for e-commerce. The Administration has also supported reform through the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which encouraged competition in the telecommunications industry and has led to lower prices, more customer choice, and faster deployment of broadband networks to homes and businesses. Setting the Rules for Fair and Open Competition The United States has long had a bipartisan agenda aimed at expanding world trade and investment, and a succession of Administrations have negotiated trade agreements in various forums. Over the past 8 years, this Administration has sustained the Nation’s agenda for international trade, signing and achieving ratification of a series of important international agreements. These include the North American Free Trade Agreement establishing a free-trade area throughout Canada, Mexico, and the United States; the Uruguay Round agreement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which set up the World Trade Organization (WTO), a rules-based, memberdriven organization that regulates tariffs and trade worldwide; multilateral agreements within the WTO on trade in financial services, basic telecommunications, and information technology; a moratorium on tariffs on digitally delivered goods; and an agreement with China that has paved the way for its entry into the WTO. This extraordinary record of achievement has already paid off in improved economic performance and will contribute to continued growth ahead. Chapter 1 | 45 Globalization, spurred in part by these and other agreements, has been particularly important in promoting the competitive pressures that have made the U.S. economy so innovative. Foreign competition encourages U.S. firms to improve and innovate, as firms that compete against the best companies in the world are likely to adopt best practices themselves. U.S. companies have also had the opportunity to take their own best technologies and practices overseas through exports and foreign direct investment. Globalization has also increased price competition, helping to keep inflation down. Globalization has also played a key role in enhancing domestic production and adoption of information technologies. By exporting to global markets, U.S. innovators have achieved scale economies that can increase the returns to R&D in information technology. U.S.-based producers also use components that can be produced more cheaply abroad than at home to make products that are internationally competitive. The importance of such global linkages for the computer industry is vividly indicated in Chart 1-10, which shows that, in 1999, imports accounted for fully 60 percent of U.S. domestic spending on computers, while about 50 percent of domestically produced computers were exported. International competition has reinforced competition at home. The vast U.S. market provides a competitive environment for most industries, even without foreign trade. This large national market has been one of the great strengths of the U.S. economy over the years. But competition can be threat- 46 | Economic Report of the President ened if a single company abuses its dominance in a market. Under this Administration, this threat has been met by the active enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws. These laws do not discourage successful companies from growing and gaining market share by creating competitive products and services. Rather, they prevent companies from seeking to gain a market position that would threaten competition in an industry. Antitrust laws limit corporate conduct that undermines competition and consequently harms consumers. Indeed, the ultimate goal of antitrust legislation is to protect consumers’ interests. Regulatory policies have also promoted competition. The regulatory reform movement has been bipartisan ever since its beginnings in the 1970s, and the 1990s have been no exception. The 1996 Telecommunications Act and auctions of portions of the electromagnetic spectrum to telecommunications providers have allowed new companies to compete against existing ones and dramatically expand the availability of wireless service. This industry has exploded with new investment and new services, and with a third generation of wireless service on the horizon, it is vital that progress not be slowed. In financial services, the Glass-Steagall provisions instituted in the 1930s prevented banks from joining with stockbrokers and insurance companies to create financial monopolies. Restrictions on interstate banking prevented bankers from straying too far from the geographic areas they knew well. Given the massive financial instability of the 1930s, narrowing the range of banks’ activities was arguably important for that day and age. But those rules are not needed today, and the easing of interstate banking rules, along with the passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, have removed them, while maintaining appropriate safeguards. These steps allow consolidation in the financial sector that will result in efficiency gains and provide new services for consumers. Social Policies As shown earlier, the stunning economic performance over the past 8 years has generated sharp reductions in poverty and across-the-board improvements in income. The expansion has created a high-employment economy that has provided economic opportunities for disadvantaged workers and those who have not yet acquired marketable skills. Faster growth in labor hours made an important contribution to the acceleration in output that occurred in the second half of the 1990s. In a tight labor market, employers hire and train workers they might previously have passed over. During the 1990s employers hired and trained young people and older workers, who typically comprise an untapped pool of potential. But specific policies have also expanded opportunities. Chapter 1 | 47 The Earned Income Tax Credit increases the payoff from work for lowincome families, especially those with children. Since 1993 the benefits and coverage of this credit have been expanded. In 1999 beneficiaries received a total of nearly $31 billion (compared with $15.5 billion in 1993), and the number of families receiving assistance increased by one-third, from 15 million to nearly 20 million. The minimum wage operates in tandem with the Earned Income Tax Credit to raise the incomes of working families. The Administration proposed an additional $1 increase in the minimum wage in 2000. Even without this change, when combined with the maximum 40 percent subsidy from the Earned Income Tax Credit, the effective minimum wage is $7.21 per hour of work. The cost to employers, however, is much lower. Meanwhile welfare reform has encouraged families to become self-sufficient and has supported them as they make the transition to work. The Administration is reaching out to communities left behind by economic growth with its New Markets Initiative, passed with bipartisan support. Some have suggested that all government programs designed to help the disadvantaged reduce incentives and discourage economic growth. This argument maintains that only a laissez-faire policy is compatible with the labor market flexibility necessary to achieve strong economic performance. But the Earned Income Tax Credit, welfare reform, assistance with the transition from welfare to work, and support for lifelong learning all indicate that government intervention can both improve incentives to work and reduce economic inequality. Challenges for the Future Economic performance in the last 8 years has been so strong and so qualitatively different from that of the previous two decades that it may seem obvious that a New Economy has emerged. When productivity growth and GDP growth both accelerate sharply, when unemployment and inflation fall to their lowest levels in 30 years, when poverty starts to fall again after years of worsening, and when incomes accelerate across the board, clearly a significant change has occurred. In addition, the economic transformations described in this Report point to a truly New Economy. Information technology has become a pervasive part of economic life, changing the way nearly all Americans work—from farmers using the Internet to check a satellite report on soil moisture, to software designers using the latest technology to create a new learning program. Computers have been facilitating change in business systems for some time, but the explosive growth in the production and use of information technology that has taken place in recent years has gone much further. The 48 | Economic Report of the President American economy has been profoundly altered. The innovations that have taken place both within the information technology sector and throughout the rest of the economy have included complementary developments in organization, business practices, and public policies. But the New Economy label is easy to misuse. The New Economy cannot be invoked as the solution to all of America’s problems. Its emergence does not mean that the lessons of economic history can be discarded or that concern for the disadvantaged and elderly can be forgotten. As we describe in the rest of the Report, there remain many challenges ahead. This chapter concludes with a brief summary of each of the remaining chapters and the principal challenges that they identify for policy. Preserving Fiscal Discipline Chapter 2 describes how changes associated with the New Economy continued to be reflected in macroeconomic performance during 2000. Although growth began to moderate in the third quarter, it was still on track to be about 4 percent over the course of the year. The remarkable combination of very low unemployment and tame inflation remained evident even as the economy proceeded through its 10th year of expansion. Investment in equipment and software remained robust, and productivity growth was very strong. The chapter goes on to describe the challenges faced in 2000 as the economy negotiated some speed bumps, such as the cooling off of the stock market and rising oil prices. Although risks can never be eliminated, the virtuous cycle of sound budget policies and strong economic performance has left future policymakers with an economy that is well positioned to weather possible storms. The chapter also presents the Administration’s forecast for the next 11 years. For the longer term, the chapter examines the historic turnaround in the budget outlook since 1993 and the challenge of preserving the fiscal discipline that has been achieved. The aging of the population will put increased pressure on budget resources for such programs as Social Security and Medicare as the new century progresses. The chapter describes how, by taking appropriate actions now to preserve the budget surplus and make sound investments, the resources can be made available to deal with these pressures when they arise. And although the New Economy will not stop the population from aging, its continued manifestation in strong productivity growth can be a further help in dealing with this challenge. Chapter 1 | 49 Nurturing a Vibrant Private Sector Chapter 3 looks at the sources of performance improvements in plants, firms, and industries. It traces these improvements to technological innovation, particularly in information technology, along with complementary organizational practices that enhance the productivity of this technology and the emergence of a more competitive business environment. The analysis attributes the recent surge of technological innovation to strong demand for new technologies, financial market innovations such as venture capital and initial public offerings, organizational changes, increases in private sector R&D (including funding for basic research), and strong legal protection for intellectual property. Technological innovation has been particularly important for two reasons. First, the information technology–producing sector itself is highly productive, and the growth of this sector has led to increased performance for the economy as a whole. Second, the adoption of information technology has led to performance gains in other sectors of the economy, making other inputs more productive by changing the way firms do business. Manufacturing plants are increasingly automated, and workers are being given more flexible job assignments and stronger incentives through new compensation arrangements. Supplier relationships are becoming more closely integrated through the use of computer systems that coordinate the various aspects of production and warehousing, allowing firms to reduce inventories dramatically. Firm boundaries are also shifting rapidly, as firms outsource their noncore businesses and move toward flexible, collaborative relationships such as strategic alliances with suppliers, customers, and even rivals. The end result is an economy that is unusually vibrant, dynamic, and entrepreneurial, with a high rate of business formation—and of business failure. It is important that this dynamic, competitive framework be retained. Although government action is often needed to lay out the rules of the competitive game, it is essential that market participants be allowed to innovate and experiment. For example, the Administration took important steps in September 2000 to ensure that adequate electromagnetic spectrum will be available for new commercial communications technologies such as thirdgeneration wireless technology. At the same time, however, U.S. wireless carriers will be free to work with their customers and suppliers to determine exactly how these technologies should be delivered. Ensuring That Globalization Enhances the New Economy Chapter 4 examines two interrelated phenomena: how advances in communications and technology allow for expanded international trade and 50 | Economic Report of the President financial flows, and how increased globalization is spurring competition and innovation. Indeed, it is no coincidence that the New Economy has emerged in the United States at the same time that U.S. participation in the global economy has reached new heights, because globalization and the recent advances in information technology are inextricably linked. On the one hand, globalization has played a crucial role in promoting the technological innovation and facilitating the organizational restructuring that has yielded a New Economy. On the other hand, improvements in information technology have spurred deeper integration between the United States and the world economy. The economic policy of this Administration has played a vital role in fostering globalization, and thus in raising the incentives for competition and innovation. Among the accomplishments of the Administration are the historic agreements listed earlier in this chapter. At the same time, a focus of U.S. trade policy has been to ensure that these and other agreements safeguard global natural resources and respect our Nation’s values, including our commitment to core labor standards. The effects of globalization and improved communications and technology are evident in U.S. international transactions. Trade in capital goods has soared since 1996, with particularly strong growth in items central to the New Economy, such as computers, semiconductors, and telecommunications equipment. There has also been strong export growth in intellectual properties and in services that reflect the value of U.S. innovation, such as business and technical services and financial services. Although increased globalization and technological improvements have raised U.S. economic performance and contributed to our prosperity, they have also brought new challenges. Chapter 4 focuses on several of these, including the widened U.S. current account deficit, ways to increase growth in our major trading partners, and the implication of globalization and technology for developing countries. Along with the gains, globalization and technology have required adjustments as change affects workers, industries, and communities in the United States. The chapter therefore discusses the Administration’s efforts to ensure that those who have not shared in the gains are helped to acquire the tools that will allow them to do so. Finally, the chapter examines the ways in which U.S. economic policy seeks to preserve the environment and support labor standards, and discusses the challenges that technology poses for countries’ legal institutions, for example through its misuse for tax evasion. Creating an Economy That Works for All The New Economy has brought a great many good things to our Nation. But it cannot solve all our problems. Left unassisted, it will not guarantee an Chapter 1 | 51 equitable distribution of opportunities or an optimal use of all resources. Chapter 5 analyzes the programs and policies designed to help those who might otherwise be left behind and to improve the quality of life for all Americans. The chapter focuses on four important topics that have a direct impact on the well-being of Americans. It examines the Nation’s welfare, education, and health care programs and the best ways to manage the growing pains of our most rapidly growing communities. Each of these areas has been characterized by important innovations during the last 8 years. Our system of providing for the least well off Americans has changed substantially. Public assistance programs now reward work, making it easier for families to leave welfare and share in the New Economy. Policies such as the Earned Income Tax Credit, child care subsidies, and extensions of health insurance coverage provide assistance to low-income working families. Innovations in health care are directly improving the quality of life for many, and new programs are bringing computers and the Internet to the classroom, helping improve teacher effectiveness, reducing class size, and narrowing the digital divide. Finally, policies that aim to reduce sprawl and encourage smart growth are being implemented by forward-looking communities nationwide. Despite the vast improvements in the quality of life experienced by many Americans, several challenges remain. Welfare rolls have fallen sharply: the number of people receiving welfare benefits is down by 59 percent since January 1993. However, some who have left welfare are in jobs that leave them with less income than they had while on welfare, and these individuals are likely to be among the first to lose their jobs should the economy slow. There is also the challenge of what to do for those who remain on welfare. Current law sets a lifetime limit of 5 years on receipt of welfare benefits. It is not clear what will happen to those who exhaust these benefits and are unable to find jobs. More broadly, substantial disparities in economic wellbeing remain across racial groups and across regions; minorities and residents of the Nation’s central cities and rural areas suffer disproportionately high rates of poverty and unemployment. Educational opportunities are also unevenly distributed. Wealthy school districts spend more per pupil than poor ones, and white children continue to score substantially higher on national examinations than African-American or Hispanic children. They are also more likely to go on to college. Our health care system presents numerous challenges as well. It is important to continue to control health expenditures to ensure that care is affordable to all. Issues related to managed care must be resolved in a way that appropriately aligns incentives so that health care is not overly restricted or overly prescribed. Even with these issues under control, many Americans will continue to lack health insurance coverage and will therefore be unable to take advantage of the quality of care 52 | Economic Report of the President available to the majority. Finally, the New Economy has allowed certain geographical regions to experience enormous growth in jobs and population. This growth, where left unchecked, has led to suburban sprawl and serious environmental consequences. The final chapter of the Report recaps the story of the New Economy: where it came from, how it is affecting our lives, and the challenges it poses for the future. Chapter 1 | 53 C H A P T E R 2 Macroeconomic Policy and Performance T he United States achieved a growth milestone early in 2000. In February the duration of the economic expansion, measured from the last business cycle trough in March 1991, reached 107 months, eclipsing the previous record set in the 1960s. With private payroll employment growth strong in November 2000, the expansion appeared to still have steam left after 116 months. Even more remarkable than the length of this marathon expansion has been its ongoing strength. In the ninth consecutive year of economic growth, driven by vigorous investment and accelerating productivity, real GDP grew a torrid 6 percent between the second quarter of 1999 and the second quarter of 2000, yet core inflation (which excludes changes in food and energy prices) remained tame. It is probably not surprising after such a surge that growth moderated in the third quarter. Nevertheless, the unemployment rate in November remained a low 4.0 percent. Strong and rising productivity growth well into an expansion and the prolonged coexistence of low unemployment and low inflation have not previously been seen together in the postwar period. Together with a sustained high rate of investment in new technology, this confluence of 55 indicators is evidence that the United States is indeed in a New Economy. But even a New Economy cannot claim to have banished the business cycle, and indeed risks remain. For example, oil price shocks were associated with the onset of recession twice in the 1970s and again in 1990, and oil prices have increased sharply in the past 2 years. Yet the fundamental soundness of today’s economy augurs well for its ability to weather the oil price storm, just as it weathered the turmoil of the Asian, Russian, and Latin American financial crises in 1997–98. Indeed, the U.S. economy appears to be at a unique juncture in its modern history, reaping the benefits of sound policies and a business environment rife with new technological possibilities. This chapter describes the fruits of these policies and technological developments as they manifest in the recent performance of the overall economy. But it also looks to the future. In particular, the chapter discusses the importance of preserving the fiscal discipline that has contributed in a major way to encouraging investment and supporting the strong economic performance of recent years. The chapter begins with a review of macroeconomic developments during 2000. This review identifies several positive trends that herald a New Economy, such as sustained high investment rates, continued strong productivity growth, and low unemployment with stable core inflation. But it also notes two potential caution signals: a low and falling private saving rate and a widening trade deficit. Although either of these could become the source of problems, each appears, in the short run at least, to be a side effect of the economy’s investment-led growth rather than an indicator of poor performance. Low private saving, as measured in the standard national income accounts, has been accompanied by large increases in wealth that are not part of saving as conventionally measured. In large part these increases in wealth stem from the unprecedented recent rise in the stock market, reflecting, among other things, investors’ optimism about the prospects for continued rapid growth in corporate profits. Similarly, the widening deficit in the Nation’s international accounts may well reflect not only low private saving out of current income here at home but also, as discussed in Chapter 4, the attractiveness to foreigners of investing in the United States. Although the evidence is widespread that there really is something new about the economy, it is not clear just how much the basic parameters of macroeconomic performance have changed. Productivity growth has certainly been strong of late. But just how much of the increase in productivity growth is due to temporary factors such as the phase of the business cycle, and how much represents an improved long-term trend? The economy has been able to achieve remarkably low unemployment rates without igniting inflation. But has the concept of a minimum sustainable rate of unemployment consistent with stable inflation lost relevance, and if not, has 56 | Economic Report of the President that rate changed? Recently, the succession of positive developments that suggest we are in a New Economy has also led forecasters to keep revising their short-term forecasts upward. But does this mean simply that those particular forecasts were wrong, as forecasts have been before, or has the New Economy rendered the forecasters’ models obsolete? None of these questions can yet be answered definitively, but this chapter’s discussion of the Administration’s forecast and the short-term economic outlook addresses some of them. Because the forecast plays such an important role in the budget process, this Administration has consistently been cautious about giving too much weight to recent favorable deviations from longer term trends. But if productivity continues to accelerate and policy remains sound, the economy could yet again outperform the forecast. The last part of the chapter shifts the focus from the short-term performance of the economy and the economic outlook to the long-term fiscal outlook. The remarkable turnaround in Federal Government finances over the past 8 years has created a virtuous cycle in which fiscal prudence has helped keep interest rates attractive for investment, and the resulting strong, productive investment has generated a healthy and growing economy that yields ever-larger budget surpluses. As a result, the United States is on track to be free of public Federal debt before the middle of the next decade. Even if the economy continues to perform reasonably well, however, that outcome is not guaranteed if the government makes unwise fiscal choices. Moreover, as this chapter will document, demographic trends are pushing us toward a situation in which an aging population will put pressure on the budget and deficits could reemerge. Maintaining fiscal discipline today is critical to building up the resources and the economic strength needed to address these demographic pressures down the road. The Year in Review After growing rapidly between mid-1999 and mid-2000, the economy showed signs of moderating in the second half of 2000. Nevertheless, real GDP grew at a 4.2 percent annual rate over the first three quarters of 2000, following 4 consecutive years of growth in excess of 4 percent. Once all the data are in, growth in 2000 is likely to have been near the 4 percent average annual rate that has been achieved since 1993 (Chart 2-1). The pattern of spending in 2000 was similar to what it had been in the preceding 2 years (Table 2-1), with consumer expenditures growing faster than income, business investment in equipment and software growing robustly, and domestic spending outpacing domestic income to produce a further decline in net exports. With the economy already operating at a very low level of Chapter 2 | 57 TABLE 2-1.— Growth of Real GDP and Its Components During 1998-99 and 2000 Growth rate (percent) Item 1998-1999 Contribution to GDP growth (percentage points) 1998-1999 2000 2000 Gross domestic product ......................................... 4.8 4.2 4.8 4.2 Final sales ........................................................ 4.7 4.3 4.7 4.3 Consumer expenditures ............................... Residential investment ................................. 5.3 6.5 5.0 -2.2 3.5 .3 3.4 -.1 Business equipment and software ............... Business structures ...................................... 15.0 1.6 14.5 13.5 1.4 .0 1.4 .4 Exports of goods and services ...................... Imports of goods and services...................... 3.3 11.6 11.4 15.8 .4 -1.5 1.2 -2.2 2.8 -2.9 .2 -.2 3.9 2.7 Federal Government consumption and gross investment ...................................... State and local government consumption and gross investment............................... Change in inventories ....................................... Final sales to domestic purchasers........................ Net exports.............................................................. 5.8 5.1 .4 .3 .1 -.1 5.8 -.9 5.2 -.9 Note.— Growth rates for 1998-99 are from fourth quarter 1997 to fourth quarter 1999 at an annual rate; rates for 2000 are from fourth quarter 1999 to third quarter 2000 at an annual rate. Contributions are approximate. Detail may not add to totals because of rounding. Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis). 58 | Economic Report of the President unemployment, one measure of labor input, hours worked, grew at only a 1.3 percent annual rate in the first 11 months of 2000, and the labor force participation rate was flat. Nevertheless, economic growth continued to be strong because of surging labor productivity (Chart 2-2). Although rising energy prices contributed to an increase in overall inflation, core inflation increased only modestly despite continued tight labor markets. In 2000 the economy had to negotiate several speed bumps. First, the explosive growth in the stock market that in recent years has fueled both consumer spending and investment came to a halt. Technology stocks in general and Internet stocks in particular fell sharply after peaking in the spring, and near the end of the year they were down from their 1999 close. This cooling of the stock market most likely played a role in slowing growth in consumer spending and business investment as the year progressed. Rising energy prices probably also helped slow the economy, as did increases in interest rates associated with monetary tightening by the Federal Reserve between June 1999 and May 2000. The challenge for policymakers has been to negotiate these speed bumps and keep the economy on a sustainable growth path with low unemployment and stable inflation. Success in doing so thus far has given the United States a record-breaking economic expansion that has now lasted almost 10 years. Chapter 2 | 59 Private Domestic Spending The rich technological opportunities and booming stock market that characterize the New Economy have affected the shape of aggregate demand in recent years. The effect of these technological opportunities can be seen most directly in the very high rates of investment in business equipment and software. And it is the expectation of substantial payoffs from those investments that has fueled much of the increase in the stock market. The surge in the stock market between 1994 and 1999, in turn, generated enough wealth to affect consumption noticeably. And even though the stock market stumbled in 2000, consumption retained considerable momentum from the buildup of wealth in prior years. Households Consumer spending was exceptionally strong in the first quarter of 2000 and then slowed somewhat in the second and third quarters. Even with the slowdown, real consumer expenditures rose 5.3 percent between the third quarter of 1999 and the third quarter of last year, continuing to outpace growth in disposable personal income (Chart 2-3). Purchases of motor vehicles and parts, which surged in the first quarter, fell back later in the year. Even so, through November at least, 2000 was on track to become the bestselling year ever for light motor vehicles. After growing at a very rapid pace in 1998 and 1999, residential investment was lower in the third quarter of 2000 60 | Economic Report of the President than it had been a year earlier, as higher mortgage interest rates contributed to slowing demand. The increase in consumption expenditures in 1999 and 2000 is generally explained by the sharp increase in household wealth since 1994. According to the standard life-cycle model of consumer behavior, increases in wealth are not spent all at once; instead, people generally aim to raise their living standards over the remainder of their lives by spending only a portion of that new wealth each year. Historical evidence suggests that each $1 change in stock market wealth leads to a permanent change in future consumer spending of about 3½ cents per year, with most of the effect phasing in by the third year. The rate of growth in consumption is affected during the transition from one permanent level to another, but persistent changes in the rate of growth of consumption require persistent changes in wealth. The increase in stock market wealth from 1994 into early 2000 raised consumption growth by about 1⅓ percent per year. The lagged effects of these past increases in stock market wealth probably continued to boost consumption in 2000. Increased consumption due to this wealth effect reduces saving out of current income, and in fact the household saving rate as conventionally measured in the national income and product accounts fell below zero in the third quarter of last year (Chart 2-4). However, this measure of saving does not include capital gains, because these gains do not represent income earned from current production. When income and saving are augmented by changes in net worth—mainly capital gains—that are not related to current Chapter 2 | 61 saving, the picture is quite different: the resulting “wealth-adjusted saving rate” jumped up in 1995 and has generally stayed high since. To the extent that these changes in household net worth reflect revised views of the future productivity of the underlying assets, the low official personal saving rate is not evidence that households are overextended or living beyond their means. It does mean, however, that households are contributing little or nothing to the pool of national saving available for new investment. Looking more closely at the financial condition of households, there is little question that, even with some stock market setbacks last year, the overall picture of household net worth remains strong. Within this sector, however, some households are net creditors, while others are net debtors and could be subject to financial stress. The Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances shows, for example, that 14.5 percent of families in 1998 (up from 13.6 percent in 1995) owed annual debt payments exceeding 40 percent of their income. Other indicators of the financial condition of households, such as credit card delinquencies and bankruptcies, show less potential stress. Although these indicators suggest that some households could find themselves in trouble if economic conditions weakened sufficiently, the kinds of credit imbalances that could precipitate financial problems for the macroeconomy are not in evidence. Businesses Very strong investment in the equipment and software category, and especially in information processing equipment and software, is one of the hallmarks of the New Economy. In 1999 and 2000 growth in investment in information processing equipment and software was roughly 25 percent at an annual rate (Chart 2-5). An important component of this growth appears to reflect replacement of the large but rapidly depreciating stock of this equipment that has been built up in recent years. The primary motivation for this strong pace of investment continued to be rapidly declining prices of computer equipment. Fears of year-2000 (Y2K) problems may have suppressed computer investment in the fourth quarter of 1999. But when these worries passed with the New Year, computer investment rebounded strongly in the first half of 2000. Moreover, the strong stock market gains since 1994 have made such investment easier to finance. Stock market valuations continued to support investment spending in 2000, as the dividend-to-price ratio remained low. Construction of office buildings was strong in 2000, but industrial construction continued at a pace below rates seen earlier in the decade. With energy prices up sharply, investment in drilling and mining was also strong, accounting for nearly one-third of the growth in total investment in nonresidential structures between the third quarter of 1999 and the third quarter of 2000. 62 | Economic Report of the President After declining sharply relative to sales in 1998 and 1999, inventories moved up a bit in late 2000. Nevertheless, the aggregate inventory-to-sales ratio remains very low by historical standards, and an inventory overhang that could threaten the expansion is not in evidence. Credit conditions tightened for some borrowers over the course of 2000. Arguably, however, credit markets were doing a good job of distinguishing among borrowers according to their credit risk. As the year progressed, lower rated corporate borrowers faced higher interest rates, and banks appeared to have tightened their lending standards. High-quality borrowers did not see the same increase in borrowing costs, and profits in general remained high, suggesting that business investment in general was not subject to a credit crunch. As with households, some businesses would have trouble borrowing or meeting their debt service obligations if economic conditions weakened sufficiently, but the overall financial condition of businesses was sound in 2000, with little or no indication of the kinds of imbalances that would precipitate an economic or financial crisis. Government Spending and Fiscal Policy Government expenditures for consumption and investment have grown more slowly than GDP during this expansion, and Federal expenditures have fallen in real terms. In the first three quarters of 2000, Federal Government expenditures fell at a 2.9 percent annual rate. Increases were recorded at the Chapter 2 | 63 State and local level, but government in the aggregate made a negligible contribution to growth in GDP. One measure of whether fiscal policy is stimulating or restraining economic activity is the change in the standardized, or structural, budget balance. In contrast to the actual budget balance, the structural balance controls for the effect of cyclical economic activity by estimating what receipts and outlays would be if the economy were operating at potential output. After 1995 the structural deficit shrank, although not as fast as the actual deficit (Chart 2-6), indicating that fiscal policy was restrictive. The structural balance turned positive in 1999 and is estimated to have increased further in 2000 as fiscal restraint has continued. As discussed later in this chapter, the turnaround in the Federal budget balance has been so substantial that, until recently, increases in public saving have more than offset declines in private saving, and national saving has increased as a share of GDP. International Influences U.S. exports grew robustly in 2000 as many of our foreign trading partners experienced renewed economic growth after a slump caused by the Asian economic crisis. But imports grew even more rapidly, reflecting strong growth in consumption and investment. Imports of capital equipment accounted for more than one-third of the growth in imports during the first three quarters of the year. As a result, the U.S. current account deficit 64 | Economic Report of the President continued to widen. And real net exports (exports minus imports) continued to make a negative contribution to aggregate demand. As discussed in Chapter 4, however, the widening of the trade and current account deficits in the past few years most likely is a sign of the strength of the new American economy, not a sign of weakness. A country runs a current account deficit when its domestic spending exceeds its income earned from production and it borrows abroad to fund that extra spending. Put another way, a current account deficit reflects an excess of domestic investment over domestic saving, with the excess investment funded by foreigners. The wealth effects discussed previously have generated substantial growth in consumption, some of which has been met through imports. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 4, imports represent a significant share of U.S. investment, including investment in information technology. At the same time, investment in the New Economy of the United States has been attractive to foreigners, and this has supported the dollar. Arguably, the U.S. economy is in a transitory phase in which national saving is being held down by especially low private saving out of current income, and foreign saving is being attracted by the extraordinary investment opportunities in the United States, the clear frontrunner in making New Economy investments. Monetary Policy and Financial Markets Monetary and financial market developments in 2000 were not particularly unusual for an economy experiencing a long expansion with a period of extraordinary stock market gains. The stock market took a breather last year, and credit conditions reflected the exercise of monetary restraint by the Federal Reserve. Equity Markets The 1990s saw a remarkable bull market in stocks. The Wilshire 5000 index (the most comprehensive index of U.S. stock prices) quadrupled between the end of 1989 and the end of 1999, with more than three-quarters of the gain coming after 1995. At the end of 1999 the market value of U.S. stocks was over $17 trillion—more than $10 trillion higher than at the end of 1995. Indicative of the importance of the New Economy, technology stocks, and particularly Internet stocks, showed spectacular gains in 1998–99. The market capitalization of Internet companies (defined as those in the Wilshire 5000 Internet index, which seeks to include all companies that derive a substantial fraction of their business from the Internet) increased from $145 billion in December 1997 to $1.6 trillion in December 1999. Internet stocks alone accounted for about 23 percent of the total increase in stock market wealth over that period. Chapter 2 | 65 The sharp increase in stock prices came to a halt in 2000. The Standard & Poor’s 500 index of large-company stocks was down 11 percent as of December 15, while the Nasdaq Composite Index, after climbing 22 percent between January and its peak in March, fell sharply and was down 35 percent as of December 15. Total stock market wealth had fallen by 10 percent as of November 30, compared with an average annual increase of around 17¾ percent over the past decade. Reversing their previous pattern of outperforming the overall market, technology and Internet stocks did even worse than stocks generally in 2000 (Chart 2-7). Internet stocks were particularly notable for their roller-coaster ride. Instead of being a major contributor to growth in market capitalization as in 1999, Internet stocks subtracted $630 billion from the broader market in 2000 (Chart 2-8). In the absence of irrational investor behavior, stock market prices reflect the discounted present value of future corporate cash flows, where the discount rate includes a risk factor. Thus, rational explanations for the performance of the stock market last year are likely to be found in the factors affecting such a valuation. For example, a rise in interest rates reduces the present value of future cash flows; hence the rise in interest rates since last summer was probably a dampening factor. Increasing expectations that Federal Reserve tightening and other factors would slow the economy could also have reduced expectations of future profits and hence of future cash flows. Disappointing earnings reports may have reduced expectations of future profitability as well. Finally, it is possible that the higher growth 66 | Economic Report of the President potential that technology companies have enjoyed—and continue to enjoy—has already been priced into the market, as this sector ceased to outperform the rest of the market. Interest Rates Between June 1999 and May 2000 the Federal Reserve raised its target for the Federal funds rate (the rate banks charge each other for overnight lending) by 175 basis points, from 4.75 percent to 6.5 percent. (A basis point is 1/100th of a percentage point.) In the second half of 1999, when the Fed began its rate hikes, both Treasury yields and corporate bond yields rose as the Federal funds rate rose. Yields on Treasury and other fixed-income securities of all maturities increased (Chart 2-9). Beginning in early 2000, however, the Treasury yield curve (which plots the yields of Treasury securities of different maturities, from shortest to longest) began to exhibit atypical behavior. Instead of displaying its normal, upward-sloping shape, the yield curve became inverted: yields on longer term securities fell below those on shorter term securities. This development appears to have been determined mostly by supply conditions in the market for Treasury securities, associated with a growing recognition that substantial Federal budget surpluses were likely to emerge, and therefore that the stock of Treasury securities might decline. This perception was reinforced in January 2000, when the Treasury detailed plans for buying back Federal debt. Chapter 2 | 67 The decline in intermediate- and long-term Treasury yields was not mirrored in the market for private sector securities, where yields on longer term corporate bonds did not retreat much from their late-1999 levels. The anomalous behavior of Treasury yields raised questions about their role as a benchmark for evaluating interest rates (Box 2-1). Although yield curves for corporate bonds and other privately issued instruments did not become inverted, they were flatter than usual in the first half of the year, reflecting the Fed tightening and the perceived likelihood that economic activity would slow to a sustainable, noninflationary pace. As discussed earlier, borrowing costs increased for the riskiest borrowers, but yields on higher quality corporate debt remained relatively stable. Labor Markets and Inflation For the most part, 2000 marked another year in which the unemployment rate remained very low without generating excessive inflation or inflationary expectations. The unemployment rate averaged 4.0 percent in the first 11 months of 2000. Sharp increases in oil prices beginning in early 1999 did push up the overall consumer price index (CPI) by 3.4 percent in the 12 months ending in November. Until very recently, however, the rise in oil prices did not feed into most other prices, and core inflation (which does not include changes in oil prices) rose only 2.6 percent over the same period. On the other hand, import prices are no longer as much of a restraint on overall inflation as they were for several years in the late 1990s. In contrast to earlier 68 | Economic Report of the President Box 2-1. Are Treasuries Being Swapped out of Their Benchmark Role? U.S. Treasury securities provide investors with a financial vehicle that is both free of default risk and highly liquid (that is, easily turned into cash). These properties have made Treasuries a widely used benchmark for determining and assessing interest rates on other assets that are less liquid or less safe. Historically, for example, new corporate debt has typically been marketed in terms of its yield relative to that of a benchmark asset, such as Treasury securities, rather than at a price in dollars or a yield in percent, and the performance of corporate bonds is often assessed relative to that of Treasuries. Thus changes in the pricing of the credit risk associated with other financial instruments (the spread between their yield and that of Treasuries) can be separated from changes in interest rates generally (as represented by changes in the yield on Treasuries). The Treasury yield curve is also a useful tool in economic forecasting. For example, a narrowing of the spread between short-term and long-term rates is often taken as a sign that economic activity is expected to moderate. Many observers believe that yields on long-term Treasuries were driven down in 2000 by the growing consensus that the supply of these securities would be markedly reduced in the future. Interest rate swaps began to receive more attention as an alternative benchmark. A swap is the exchange of a stream of variable-interest-rate payments, usually tied to the London interbank offer rate (LIBOR), for a stream of fixed-interest-rate payments. Swaps have durations ranging from a few months to many years. For example, one party to a swap may expect to receive a variable stream of payments tied to LIBOR (and an implicit principal balance) over the next 5 years but would prefer the certainty of fixed payments. The second party agrees to pay a fixed periodic amount in exchange for that variable stream of payments. The swap rate is expressed as a fixed rate that market participants are willing to exchange for a floating rate. Underlying implicit balances are not exchanged. The swaps market is sufficiently deep and liquid, and trading takes place across a sufficiently broad range of maturities, to provide an alternative yield curve to that of Treasuries and an alternative benchmark for assessing other interest rates. The increased prominence of the swaps market illustrates how financial markets have begun to adapt to the anticipated paydown of marketable Federal debt associated with the improved U.S. fiscal situation. years when import prices (including oil prices prior to 1999) were falling, nonpetroleum import prices are now on a rising trend, although the rates of increase have so far been modest (Chart 2-10). Chapter 2 | 69 Wages and compensation registered solid increases in nominal terms in 2000. From the standpoint of businesses, however, these wage increases were more than offset by strong productivity gains, with the result that unit labor costs (compensation per unit of output) did not put upward pressure on product prices (Chart 2-11). From the standpoint of workers, increases in the CPI associated with higher energy prices have meant smaller increases in real wages and compensation than in some recent years. The Economic Outlook Although economic performance remained strong in 2000, the resilience of the new macroeconomy of fast productivity growth and a very strong labor market could be tested in the coming year or so. Chapter 3 provides ample reason to be optimistic about future productivity increases, but it remains uncertain how much of the recent increase in productivity growth will be sustained in the long run. Absorbing the inflationary pressures from the recent rise in oil prices, as well as diminishing restraint from non-oil import prices, will be easier if productivity growth continues strong. On the demand side, the very low private saving rates of recent years might not persist, raising the question of whether the transition from a stock market– fueled consumption boom to a more sustainable consumption pace will be 70 | Economic Report of the President accomplished smoothly. Toward the year’s end, stock market declines and higher interest rates charged to high-risk corporate borrowers added a note of uncertainty to financial markets. Fortunately, the economy remains remarkably free of the kinds of imbalances typically associated with the ends of expansions. Core inflation remains low, inventories in most industries remain lean in relation to sales, and the outlook for the economy remains good. Growth of GDP is projected to moderate to 3.2 percent during 2001 and to remain at or near this growth rate through 2007 (Table 2-2). These growth rates are below estimates of the trend growth in aggregate supply, and as a result, the unemployment rate is projected to edge up gradually to 5.1 percent, the middle of the range of unemployment compatible in the long run with stable inflation. The growth of aggregate supply is projected to edge down over the 11-year budget window, reflecting a return to more traditional rates of productivity growth, a slower rate of population growth, and the anticipated retirement of the first wave of the baby-boom generation. The Near-Term Outlook The prospects for another year of solid growth rest on continued growth of aggregate supply, stable core inflation, and the sound application of fiscal and monetary policy. When inflation is used as an indicator, economic activity Chapter 2 | 71 TABLE 2-2.— Administration Forecast 1 Year Nominal GDP Real GDP (chaintype) GDP price index (chaintype) Consumer price index (CPI-U) Unemployment rate (percent) Percent change, fourth quarter to fourth quarter Interest rate, 91-day Treasury bills (percent) Interest rate, 10-year Treasury notes (percent) Nonfarm payroll employment (millions) Level, calendar year 1999 (actual) ..... 6.5 5.0 1.6 2.6 4.2 4.7 5.6 128.8 2000 ................. 2001 ................. 2002 ................ 2003 ................. 2004 ................. 6.7 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.4 4.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 2.4 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 3.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.7 4.0 4.1 4.4 4.6 4.7 5.9 6.0 5.7 5.4 5.3 6.1 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 131.5 133.4 135.0 136.5 138.2 2005 ................. 2006 ................. 2007 ................. 2008 ................. 2009 ................. 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.1 5.1 3.2 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 139.8 141.4 143.0 144.6 146.2 2010 ................. 2011 ................. 5.1 5.1 2.9 2.9 2.1 2.1 2.7 2.7 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.3 5.8 5.8 147.8 149.4 1 Based on data available as of November 17, 2000. Sources: Council of Economic Advisers, Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis), Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics), Department of the Treasury, and Office of Management and Budget. now appears to be in the neighborhood of its potential, as measures of core inflation have risen slightly or not at all. Potential output is expected to increase at a solid 3.8 percent annual rate in 2001 and 2002, about the same as its growth rate from 1995 to 2000. This estimate is based on the prospect that a large and rapidly growing level of investment spending will continue to support rapid growth of capital services per hour worked. At these levels of investment spending, structural productivity is expected to increase at about a 2.8 percent annual rate. The labor force, another component of aggregate supply, is expected to grow at about a 1 percent annual rate. The projected real GDP growth rate of 3.2 percent per year during 2001 and 2002 is somewhat slower than the rise in potential output, and as a consequence the unemployment rate is projected to edge up 0.3 percentage point per year during those years. At these growth rates, any tightness in labor and product markets will unwind. Consumption, which constitutes two-thirds of GDP, is expected to be the major factor in the deceleration of GDP, as the stimulus to consumption growth from the 1995–99 bull market in stocks recedes into the past. Real private nonresidential investment, which has grown more than twice as fast 72 | Economic Report of the President as real GDP during the past 2 years, is projected to continue to outpace activity as a whole. Even so, its growth is expected to moderate. The fall in the relative price of investment goods, a cause of the recent investment strength, is expected to persist. Exports have rebounded strongly since mid-1999, reflecting the rebound in activity from the depressed levels of the Asian economic crisis. Looking ahead, activity in the industrial countries as a group—which has grown rapidly in the past year—is projected to slow slightly in 2001. As a result, exports are projected to grow at a slower, but still strong, rate in 2001. As fast as exports have grown, imports have grown even faster, and so both net exports and the current account deficit have deteriorated. During the next few years, import growth is expected to come down with the projected deceleration of U.S. GDP. Nevertheless, imports generally grow roughly two times faster than GDP, and as a result, the current account deficit is projected to widen further before it narrows. Productivity and the NAIRU The level of unemployment consistent with stable inflation remains temporarily depressed by the still-surprising increase in productivity growth. Permanent declines in this unemployment rate may have been caused by, among other things, the development of the temporary help industry and the Internet job market. These factors were discussed in more detail in last year’s Report. The acceleration of productivity after 1995 appears to have initiated a process that allows the unemployment rate to fall lower temporarily, with less consequence for inflation, than would have been possible otherwise. The rate of growth of nominal hourly compensation has increased during the past 4 years, but these nominal increases have not resulted in much of an increase in price inflation. Businesses have been able to grant these larger pay increases without higher inflation, partly because increases in unit labor costs have remained stable, as rising productivity growth offset the rising compensation gains. The new, higher trend growth of productivity since 1995 has temporarily lowered the NAIRU (the nonaccelerating-inflation rate of unemployment, that is, the unemployment rate consistent with stable inflation), because it can take many years for firms and workers to recognize this favorable development and incorporate it into their wage setting. In the meantime the productivity surprise can stabilize inflation of unit labor costs and prices even at unemployment rates below the previous NAIRU. A 1-percentage-point surprise in trend productivity growth is estimated to lower the NAIRU by 1¼ percentage points. The effect of the increase in productivity growth in holding down the NAIRU cannot last indefinitely, however. If productivity growth is maintained at the current high level, it will cease to be unexpected, Chapter 2 | 73 demands for real wage increases will eventually rise to match productivity growth, and the short-term NAIRU will gravitate back to its long-term level. Some evidence points to an upward drift of real wage expectations— although the jury is still out. Private sector wages, as measured by the employment cost index, have increased 1½ percentage points faster than expected inflation over the past four quarters (as measured by the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers). This is the largest gain in expected real wages in more than 15 years. Even so, this growth in expected real wages remains well below recent productivity increases. Nor has real hourly compensation (deflated by the price of output) grown as fast as productivity. As a result, the labor share of GDP has continued to erode and is now about 1 percentage point below its 40-year average. As the slow process of adjustment by wage setters to a higher level of productivity growth proceeds, the NAIRU—currently estimated to be in a range centered around 4¼ percent—is expected to edge up gradually to 5.1 percent by 2007. This upward drift closely mirrors the projected path for the unemployment rate. As a result, the Administration expects price inflation to flatten out at levels barely above current rates: 2.1 percent for the GDP price index and 2.7 percent for the CPI. Inflation Measurement and the Federal Surplus The wedge between the CPI and the GDP measures of inflation has an important effect on Federal budget projections. A larger wedge reduces the Federal budget surplus because cost-of-living adjustments for Social Security and other indexed programs increase with the CPI, whereas Federal revenue increases roughly in line with the slower growing GDP price index. The effect is reinforced by the use of the CPI to index income tax brackets and other features of the tax code. Of the two indexes, the CPI tends to increase faster because it measures the price of a fixed market basket. In contrast, the GDP price index increases less rapidly than the CPI, because it reflects choices of economic agents to shift their purchases away from items with increasing relative prices and toward items with decreasing relative prices. In addition, the GDP price index includes investment goods, particularly computers, whose relative prices have been falling rapidly. Computers, in particular, receive a much larger weight in the GDP price index (1.2 percent) than in the CPI (0.08 percent in November 2000). Over the past 6 years, the version of the CPI designed to be consistent with current methods (the CPI-U-RS) has increased 0.6 percentage point per year faster than the GDP price index. The projected wedge is in line with this 6-year average, and this is reflected in the Administration’s inflation projections. 74 | Economic Report of the President The Stock Market, Saving, and Consumption Prospects Consumption has been an engine of demand growth during this expansion, growing faster than income in 7 of the past 8 years. By the third quarter of 2000, personal outlays exceeded disposable personal income, and the personal saving rate dropped to –0.2 percent. The rise in the ratio of net worth to income—a consequence of the 5-year surge in stock prices from 1995 to 1999—accounts for the strength of consumption over this period (Chart 2-12). The increase in the consumption-to-income ratio over the past 5 years is roughly consistent with the rule of thumb that attributes an eventual 3½-cent gain in consumption from every dollar increase in stock market wealth. In the near term, current stock market values support the current level of the consumption rate. The growth rate of consumption, however, is another matter. The stock market declined in the second half of 2000, foreshadowing a period when consumption growth is unlikely to exceed the growth of income. As a result, it appears probable that consumption will decelerate in the year ahead. Because consumption accounts for about two-thirds of GDP, this deceleration, if it comes to pass, will have a restraining effect on aggregate demand. Over the long term (the next 5 years or so) the saving rate is likely to increase from its current level. But predicting whether the saving rate will rise from a pickup of income or from a slowdown of consumption depends on Chapter 2 | 75 the interpretation of the increase in the stock market from 1995 to 1999. Today’s stock valuations do not bear the same relation to apparent dividend prospects as in the past. Through about 1996, a stable rule of thumb tied the value of the stock market to a proxy for the apparent present value of dividends. But this relationship broke down after 1996 as the stock market soared ahead of this valuation model. Assuming that the current value of the stock market is appropriate, either dividend prospects have greatly improved or the so-called equity risk premium (discussed below) has fallen. These two alternative explanations for the rise in stock market values have different implications for the sustainability of consumption growth. If dividend prospects have improved, the low saving rate means that consumers are spending some of their future dividend income today. In this scenario, consumption need not slow; rather, the saving rate will rise if and when dividend income outpaces other components of income. A substantial but still controversial literature suggests that stocks have been undervalued for most of the past century. As discussed in last year’s Report, the additional riskiness of stock returns over that of bond returns does not appear to be enough to justify the higher returns on stocks (the equity risk premium), unless investors are extraordinarily risk averse or their investment horizon is very short. According to this line of argument, it follows that the lower initial price (and higher expected return) traditionally demanded by investors has been excessive. As investors have come to regard the equity risk premium as excessive, they have bid up stock prices to current levels. But if stock prices have risen because of erosion of the equity risk premium, then investors are paying more for the rights to a given stream of dividends—that future stream has not increased. And without any change in the stream of dividends, the path of future consumption cannot differ much from the one that the consumer had planned before the decline in the equity risk premium. Certainly those investors who have received large capital gains are richer and can spend more, but this effect should be partly offset by those who wish to become stockholders and who must now save more to purchase a given quantity of stock. With the actual prospects for dividends and profits uncertain, one cannot know today which of these explanations for the 1995–99 stock market rise is correct. But some may incorrectly perceive that the rise in stock prices foreshadows higher dividends when it only reflects a decline in the equity risk premium. If the increased stream of dividends fails to materialize, consumption will probably slow relative to income. In any case, the present value of future consumption must equal the present value of future income. It follows that either dividends must grow much faster than other forms of income, or consumption must grow more slowly than nondividend income, or some combination of these two. In either case, the saving rate would be expected to increase. 76 | Economic Report of the President The Long-Term Projection Growth of productivity during the past 5 years has been impressive—so impressive that it seems reasonable to wonder whether it can be sustained. As discussed in Chapter 1, productivity accelerated by 1.6 percentage points from 1973–95 to 1995–2000, about 0.4 percentage point of which can be explained by capital deepening and the direct contribution of productivity growth in the computer sector. Although business cycle dynamics often underlie much of the year-to-year variation in productivity growth, this factor appears to have played only a minor role in the post-1995 acceleration. The growth of output from 1991 to 1994 put underutilized labor back to work, and so the traditional cyclical rebound from the 1990–91 recession had largely played itself out by 1995. The Council of Economic Advisers estimates that the level of productivity had risen about 2 percent above its trend by 1995, and that it edged up only slightly further above its trend from 1995 through 2000. Another 1.2 percentage points of the productivity acceleration can be attributed to faster growth in total factor productivity, the variation in aggregate output that is not explained by changes in inputs. This acceleration represents improvements in technology and means of organization, and Chapter 3 describes evidence that supports this view. However, the evidence is not conclusive, and forecasters are left wondering whether some of the acceleration represents one-time improvements that have shifted productivity to a higher level rather than a permanently higher rate of growth. Capital deepening is projected to play just as strong a role in the near future as in the recent past. However, it is not prudent to expect the same contribution from total factor productivity as in the recent past, and therefore the Administration projects that structural productivity will grow at about a 2.8 percent annual rate during the next 2 years. Actual productivity may grow somewhat less rapidly, as the economy slows. With the labor force and the other components of aggregate supply expected to grow about 1 percent per year, potential output is projected to grow about 3.8 percent at an annual rate. Structural productivity is projected to slow a bit further in the later years of the 10-year budget window. It is expected to grow at a 2.3 percent annual rate from 2003 to 2007, and then to trail off to 2.1 percent from 2007 to 2011. These slower growth rates are more in keeping with the pace of productivity growth over the past two decades or so. In addition to productivity, the factors on the supply side whose growth rates affect GDP growth include population, the labor force participation rate, the employment rate, and the workweek, as shown in Table 2-3. In line with the latest projection from the Bureau of the Census, the working-age population is projected to grow at a 1.1 percent annual rate through 2008. Chapter 2 | 77 TABLE 2-3.—Accounting for Growth in Real GDP, 1960-2008 [Average annual percent change] Item 1960 Q2 to 1973 Q4 1973 Q4 to 1990 Q3 1990 Q3 to 2000 Q3 2000 Q3 to 2008 Q4 1) Civilian noninstitutional population aged 16 and over ...... 2) PLUS: Civilian labor force participation rate 1 ................ 1.8 .2 1.5 .5 1.0 .0 1.1 .1 3) EQUALS: Civilian labor force 1 ............................................. 4) PLUS: Civilian employment rate 1 ................................... 2.0 .0 2.0 -.1 1.0 .2 1.1 -.1 5) EQUALS: Civilian employment 1 ........................................... 6) PLUS: Nonfarm business employment as a share of civilian employment 1 2 ........................ 2.0 1.9 1.2 1.0 .1 .1 .4 .3 7) EQUALS: Nonfarm business employment ............................ 8) PLUS: Average weekly hours (nonfarm business) .......... 2.1 -.5 2.0 -.4 1.7 .0 1.2 .0 9) EQUALS: Hours of all persons (nonfarm business) ............. 10) PLUS: Output per hour (productivity, nonfarm business) 1.6 2.9 1.7 1.4 1.7 2.2 11) EQUALS: Nonfarm business output ..................................... 12) PLUS: Ratio of real GDP to nonfarm business output 4 .. 4.6 -.3 3.1 -.2 3.9 -.5 3 13) EQUALS: Real GDP ............................................................... 4.2 2.9 3.4 3 1.2 2.3 3 2.5 4.2 -.6 3.6 -.4 3 3.5 5 3.1 1 Adjusted for 1994 revision of the Current Population Survey. Line 6 translates the civilian employment growth rate into the nonfarm business employment growth rate. Income-side definition. 4 Line 12 translates nonfarm business output back into output for all sectors (GDP), which includes the output of farms and general government. 5 GDP growth is projected to fall below its underlying trend for this period (about 3.4 percent) as the employment rate is projected to fall 0.13 percent per year over this period. 2 3 Note.— The periods 1960 Q2, 1973 Q4, and 1990 Q3 are business cycle peaks. Detail may not add to totals because of rounding. Sources: Council of Economic Advisers, Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis), and Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics). The labor force participation rate is expected to inch up by less than 0.1 percent per year. The average workweek is projected to remain flat over the entire projection period. In contrast, the employment rate is projected to decline roughly 0.1 percent per year as the unemployment rate edges up to 5.1 percent—the middle of the range judged consistent with long-run inflation stability. From 2008 forward, growth in the working-age population is projected to slow a bit, and the labor force participation rate will begin to fall as the first cohort of the baby boom, those born in 1946, reach the early retirement age of 62. Together, the supply-side factors imply potential real GDP growth of 2.9 percent by the end of the decade. Long-term interest rates are expected to remain flat over the entire 11-year projection span at a yield of 5.8 percent on 10-year Treasury notes. The 91-day Treasury bill rate is currently above the yield on 10-year notes—an unusual situation that tends to occur when the market expects the economy to slow. Another reason for this inversion of the yield curve is that the ongoing reduction in Federal debt has led investors to expect a diminishing supply of Treasury securities. (See the earlier discussion of the yield curve.) 78 | Economic Report of the President Consistent with the projected slowdown in real activity, the interest rate on 91-day Treasury bills (which was 6.2 percent at the time the Administration projection was finalized) is projected to decline to 5.3 percent during the next several years. Real long-term interest rates, calculated by subtracting the Administration’s expected rate of inflation (2.7 percent as measured by the CPI) from projected nominal rates, are projected to be similar to their historical average. On the income side, the Administration’s projection is based on the longrun stability of the labor share of GDP. At present, the labor share of GDP is the lowest it has been in more than 30 years, and the Administration projects this share to rise, returning partway toward its long-run average. Wages as a share of total compensation are expected to erode, as other labor income, especially employer-provided medical insurance, is expected to grow faster than wages. With the labor share of GDP rising, the capital share is expected to edge down. Within the capital share, a rise in the depreciation share (a consequence of a high-investment economy) is projected to come at the expense of the profit share. Profits before tax, which were 9.4 percent of GDP in the third quarter of 2000, are projected to fall to 7.1 percent by 2011. The Administration does not believe that an annual growth rate of just over 3 percent is the best the economy can do. Rather, it is hoped that the policies that this Administration has in place will generate even better results than in the projection. For the purpose of prudent budget planning, however, this projection reflects a balance between upside and downside risks. As of November 2000 the current expansion, having lasted 116 months, was the longest on record, and there is no apparent reason why it cannot continue. Expansions do not die of old age. The current situation of low inflation, high productivity growth, and lean inventories reveals no sign of an end to the expansion, although growth is expected to moderate. The likely prognosis remains similar to that of last year: sustained job creation and continued noninflationary growth. The Fiscal Terrain in the New Economy The turnaround in the finances of the Federal Government since 1993 has completely changed the fiscal outlook for decades to come. Whereas just a few years ago the Nation faced deficits as far as the eye could see, the prospect now—if appropriate budget discipline is maintained—is for an extended period of surpluses that would wipe out the entire outstanding public Federal debt. Instead of being a drain on the saving available to finance investment, the Federal Government is acting as an additional source of national saving. Indeed, until very recently the annual rise in public (Federal plus State and local government) saving has more than offset the Chapter 2 | 79 annual decline in private saving. A virtuous cycle has been created in which fiscal discipline has promoted strong economic growth, and that strong growth has boosted the surplus. Challenges lie ahead, however, and it will be important to preserve the fiscal discipline that was so hard won. In particular, the aging of the population will begin to put downward pressure on the surplus just a few years from now, as the number of Social Security and Medicare beneficiaries rises relative to the number of workers paying into these systems. Imprudent, irreversible decisions to dissipate the surplus now would leave little time to recover before the first members of the baby-boom generation begin to retire. Prudent decisions today about what to do with the surpluses currently projected will not only help sustain the current performance of the economy but also address the fiscal policy challenges posed by population aging. Fiscal responsibility requires restraint in cutting taxes and in launching new spending programs, so that the public debt will continue to fall. It also calls for flexibility in our policy priorities, as the composition and hence the needs of our population change. Strong Public Saving: The Payoff from Deficit Reduction Changes in Federal policy produced large budget deficits in the 1980s, and despite deficit reduction measures taken in the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1990, the country still faced a bleak budget outlook in 1993. But a succession of subsequent actions helped to turn this situation around. The Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93) reduced the deficit through progressive changes in the income tax structure and effective constraints on spending. Welfare reform legislation changed the Nation’s welfare programs in ways that encouraged work and hence reduced government spending needs. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 dramatically reduced real growth in Medicare expenses through restraint on provider prices and payment systems. The difference between the pre-OBRA93 deficit path and the current situation is stunning. Where Federal deficits were once projected to grow from 4.6 percent of GDP in 1992 to double-digit percentages by 2009, the current outlook is for a long string of surpluses in excess of 2 percent of GDP (Chart 2-13). The national debt, which had reached almost half of GDP in 1992 and was projected to surpass GDP by 2009, has instead begun to decline and, under June 2000 projections, will be eliminated before the middle of the next decade (Chart 2-14). One very important consequence of this turnaround has been an increase in national saving. The large Federal budget deficits in the 1980s and early 1990s represented public dissaving (that is, negative saving) and thus were a drain on the pool of national saving (the sum of public and private saving) 80 | Economic Report of the President Chapter 2 | 81 available for investment. The improvement in the Federal budget balance since 1993 has turned the public sector into a net saver. National saving rose as a share of GDP in the 1990s (Chart 2-15). As discussed earlier, private saving has been particularly low recently, and this has restrained national saving. Thus, without the improvement in the Federal budget balance since 1993, national saving would have been lower than it has been, interest rates would have been higher, and investment would have been constrained. In the 1980s the Federal Reserve sought to keep the economy stable in the face of the fiscal stimulus from large Federal budget deficits, and the result was to push interest rates up. Although fiscal stimulus can be helpful in propelling an economy out of a recession, it is a source of inflationary pressure when the economy is close to full employment. Moreover, a mix of loose fiscal policy and tight monetary policy produces high interest rates, which discourage investment relative to current consumption. This is what happened in the 1980s. In the 1990s, by contrast, an improved Federal budget outlook and fiscal restraint allowed the Fed to pursue an accommodative monetary policy—one that not only promoted economic expansion but also was more conducive to keeping interest rates down and stimulating investment. Lower interest rates and a declining national debt have important direct consequences for the budget. Federal interest outlays have already fallen from their 1991 high of 3.3 percent of GDP (or nearly 15 percent of total Federal outlays) to less than 2½ percent of GDP most recently (12 percent of 82 | Economic Report of the President outlays), and they are projected to fall still further. The cumulative savings in interest payments on the national debt since 1993 amount to over $330 billion, compared with the pre-OBRA93 baseline. Lower interest rates have also benefited household borrowers. In mid-2000 each percentage point added to interest rates would have added about $860 per year to payments on a $100,000, 30-year mortgage; $70 per year to payments on a $10,000, 4-year car loan; and $140 per year to payments on a $20,000, 10-year student loan. A rough estimate is that interest rates would be 2½ to 3 percentage points higher if pre-OBRA93 economic and budget conditions had prevailed. Under that scenario Federal debt held by the public would be roughly 1½ times as large as GDP by the middle of the next decade, rather than essentially eliminated as under current projections. What Caused the Surpluses? The changes in fiscal policy that began in 1993 played an important role in bringing down the budget deficit. In addition to those already mentioned, these changes included budget enforcement rules that Congress imposed on itself requiring that tax cuts or increased spending in one area be offset by deficit-reducing measures elsewhere in the budget. Finally, changes in the economy generated large increases in income that caused Federal tax revenue, particularly individual income tax receipts, to rise faster than GDP despite no further increase in statutory tax rates. Controlling Expenditure Spending discipline and a strong economy have combined to push Federal budget outlays to their lowest level as a share of GDP since 1974. Total outlays declined from 22.2 percent of GDP in fiscal 1992 to 18.2 percent in the most recent fiscal year. Only 1 percentage point of this decline represents a retracing of the increase in spending between 1989 and 1992 associated with the 1990–91 recession (Table 2-4). The changes in net interest outlays already mentioned accounted for 0.9 percentage point of the 4.0-percentagepoint reduction from 1992 to 2000. Declines in discretionary outlays for national defense accounted for another 1.9 percentage points. Discretionary outlays are outlays for defense and nondefense programs subject to annual appropriations by the Congress; they account for about a third of total Federal spending. Discretionary spending has been subject to dollar caps since 1990, and these caps were generally effective over the 1990s in limiting the growth of outlays. The rest of the budget besides interest and discretionary spending consists of mandatory outlays for programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and food stamps. Spending on these programs generally depends on the number of beneficiaries and the benefit amounts to which they are entitled by law. Budget enforcement provisions did not put Chapter 2 | 83 TABLE 2-4.— Components of Federal Budget Outlays [Percent of GDP; fiscal years] Change1 Category 1989 1992 2000 1989 to 1992 1992 to 2000 Total outlays ................................................ 21.2 22.2 18.2 1.0 -4.0 Discretionary outlays ................................. 9.0 8.6 6.3 -.4 -2.3 National defense ................................... Nondefense............................................. 5.6 3.4 4.9 3.7 3.0 3.3 -.7 .3 -1.9 -.4 Mandatory outlays ..................................... 9.0 10.4 9.7 1.4 -.7 Social Security ....................................... Means-tested entitlements.................... Other....................................................... Undistributed offsetting receipts........... 4.3 1.6 4.0 -.8 4.6 2.3 4.1 -.6 4.1 (2) (2) (2) .3 .7 .1 .2 -.5 (2) (2) (2) Net interest................................................. 3.1 3.2 2.3 .1 -.9 1 2 Percentage points. Not available. Note.—Detail may not add to totals because of rounding. Sources: Office of Management and Budget and Council of Economic Advisers. specific dollar limits on spending for mandatory programs but did require that any legislation that would increase mandatory spending be offset by an equivalent amount of deficit reduction elsewhere in the budget. Some Federal Government expenditures, such as unemployment compensation, are sensitive to the business cycle, so that overall spending might be expected to fall as the economy booms. In general, however, the cyclical component of spending is much smaller than that of revenue, which is discussed below. In the past, spending for welfare was also sensitive to the business cycle, but the 1996 welfare reform legislation devolved control of program spending to the States and transformed this component of Federal spending into fixed block grants. Thus any cyclical fluctuations in spending on these programs are now more likely to occur at the State and the local levels than at the Federal level. The combination of low inflation and low unemployment has been especially helpful in keeping government spending down during this economic expansion, because both keep down the levels of expenditure from transfer programs whose benefits are indexed to inflation. Changes to expenditure programs during this Administration have also been a factor. As already noted, the 1996 reform reduced welfare caseloads by encouraging work, and the 1997 Balanced Budget Act made changes to the Medicare payments system that have at least temporarily constrained growth in health care spending. 84 | Economic Report of the President Rising Incomes and Revenue Federal Government receipts vary with the business cycle in the opposite direction from expenditures, growing during booms and shrinking in recessions. In fact, receipts, especially income tax revenues, play an important role as an automatic stabilizer of the economy. The progressivity of the income tax system causes income tax receipts to fall faster than income during a recession, cushioning the impact of the recession on after-tax income. Thus some of the improvement in the Federal budget since 1993 reflects a normal cyclical recovery. But growth in receipts, especially personal income tax receipts, has been especially strong in the past few years, when the economy has been expanding rapidly. This has happened even though statutory tax rates have not increased. Individual income tax receipts have risen from less than 8 percent of GDP in 1994 to nearly 10 percent most recently. From 1994 to 1998 the growth in that ratio contributed approximately $140 billion in additional cumulative revenue. This faster growth in revenue relative to GDP reflects two main factors: faster growth in taxable income than in income generally, and a rise in receipts due to rising real incomes and the progressive structure of income tax rates. According to Treasury Department and Congressional Budget Office analyses of the 1994–98 period, nearly 60 percent of the increase in individual income tax liabilities relative to GDP arose from rapid growth in adjusted gross income (AGI) relative to GDP. Of this 60 percent, about 17 percentage points occurred because the taxable components of personal income grew faster than the other income components of GDP. The rest reflects strong growth in sources of AGI that are not included in GDP (because this income is not earned as a result of current production), such as capital gains realizations and retirement benefits. The former have been particularly important (Chart 2-16): growth of capital gains alone accounts for 30 to 40 percent of the additional revenue. The remaining growth in individual income tax liabilities relative to GDP (about 40 percent) reflects the growth of revenue that results from rising real incomes in a progressive tax system. Although statutory individual income tax rates have not increased since 1993, the average tax rate on non–capital gains AGI has increased. Two factors account for most of this increase. First, for taxpayers in general, income has grown faster than inflation. As a result, more taxpayers have more income taxed in the higher brackets, even though the brackets are indexed for inflation. Second, more taxable income is accruing at the top of the distribution of taxpayers, and hence more is subject to the top tax rates. Tax return data indicate that the share of taxpayers with AGIs above $200,000 (in 1998 dollars) rose over the 1994–98 period, and those taxpayers experienced faster growth in income Chapter 2 | 85 than the average taxpayer. Incomes grew even faster for taxpayers with more than $1 million in AGI. The share of income taxes collected from taxpayers at the top of the distribution has increased in recent years, but only because their before-tax incomes have increased significantly; their share of total after-tax income has increased as well. Impressive growth in the stock market contributed to the taxable incomes of these households through higher capital gains realizations, greater taxable retirement benefits, and increased compensation in the form of stock options. Labor earnings, which have increased the most for married couples at the top of the income distribution, have also contributed. Capital gains, and the taxes on those gains, had already been surging for a few years before the significant reduction in tax rates on capital gains that took place in 1997—and both capital gains and the taxes on those gains continued to surge after tax rates were cut. It bears repeating that the additional tax revenue that has contributed to an improved budget outlook has come during a period in which income tax rates have not been increased at all for the overwhelming majority of taxpayers, and no income tax rates have been increased since 1993. The increases in marginal tax rates in OBRA93 affected only the highest-income households (1.2 percent of all taxpayers), but many of these households (and others) got tax relief in 1997 when capital gains tax rates were reduced. Many taxpayers with more modest incomes enjoyed meaningful tax relief over this period from other changes in the tax code. The Earned Income Tax Credit 86 | Economic Report of the President was expanded several times in the 1990s, most significantly in 1993, and taxes were reduced substantially for lower and middle-income families in 1997 through the child tax credit and new, education-related tax credits, which are phased out at higher income levels. Thus, at any given level of real taxable income, average tax rates have been constant or falling since 1993. For a family of four earning the median income, real income has been rising while the average tax rate has fallen, even after accounting for payroll taxes. Thus the strong revenue growth that has helped produce growing budget surpluses and rising national saving has been associated with very strong increases in income. Indeed, real after-tax incomes throughout almost all of the income distribution rose strongly over the 1993–99 period. The rising tide has lifted all boats, even after inflation and taxes, and even as government deficits were eliminated. This experience contrasts with that of the 1980s, when higher after-tax private incomes came at the expense of public saving, and increases in income were more skewed toward the top of the income distribution. The Importance of Maintaining Fiscal Discipline The improved budget outlook since 1993 reflects real changes in the economy and in policy and represents the achievement of budget discipline. The U.S. economy has reaped the benefits of reduction in the public debt and increased public saving. Nevertheless, the course of the budget and of the economy in the years ahead remains highly uncertain. This makes it especially important to maintain fiscal discipline now, when the economy is strong and the Nation can most afford it—just as a prudent family saves extra income in good times for a future rainy day. Economic and Policy Uncertainty As noted in the discussion of the economic outlook, the economic assumptions underlying the budget projections reflect a cautious view of whether recent favorable economic developments will continue. However, a serious economic downturn or an adverse productivity shock would cut into the projected surpluses and slow the paydown of the national debt. Also, the recent very strong growth in revenue relative to GDP is unlikely to be sustained, because taxable income—in particular, the capital gains component—cannot continue to grow faster than GDP indefinitely. (The surplus projections do, in fact, assume a leveling off of individual income tax collections relative to GDP, and a decline in total taxes relative to GDP.) Even when uncertainties are acknowledged, however, it seems most likely that the budget can be kept in surplus if budget policy remains disciplined. Maintaining that discipline entails an appropriate recognition of current policy priorities while preserving significant amounts of the available Chapter 2 | 87 surpluses as a margin of safety and to meet future needs. Budget projections are typically based on current law and practice, but there are always pressures to change current law. For example, analysts have pointed to the possibility that discretionary spending might well rise faster than projected. Also, various tax provisions now scheduled to expire could be extended, and changes could be made to the alternative minimum tax, in ways that would reduce revenue. The pressures to deviate from existing policies do not invalidate the usefulness of projections based on those policies, but they do remind us that part of the challenge of maintaining fiscal discipline will involve addressing these issues. The Demographic Challenge One force affecting future budget surpluses that is both large and inevitable is the aging of the population. Projections indicate that the population aged 65 and over will rise from its current share of about 12½ percent of the total population to nearly 21 percent by 2040 (Chart 2-17). As a result, the share of the population that is at or beyond retirement age relative to that of the working-age population (the elderly dependency ratio) will rise dramatically. These demographic changes imply changes in the demands that certain government programs place on the Nation’s resources and in the role these programs play in the dynamics of the Federal budget. Currently, Federal outlays for health and retirement programs for the elderly are a large share of the budget, but payroll contributions tied to Social Security and Medicare are even larger. Thus the Social Security and Medicare systems are net contributors to the unified budget surplus today. Fairly quickly, however, the surpluses in these systems will start to shrink and eventually turn into deficits if changes are not made. At the same time, retirement and health programs for the elderly will take up an increasing share of Federal outlays. The costs per beneficiary of both Social Security and Medicare are expected to rise in the future, implying an even more dramatic increase in spending on the elderly than population projections alone would suggest. The Medicaid program will also be affected through its coverage of nursing home care: over time, Medicaid is projected to pay an increasing share of the health care bills of the elderly. Long-term projections indicate that, under current policies, spending on Social Security and Medicare will grow dramatically as a share of GDP, from 6.1 percent in fiscal 2000 to 11.2 percent in 2040 (Chart 2-17) and 12.4 percent by 2075. The Social Security trust fund has been growing since the 1980s and will continue to grow over the next several years. But current projections (based on assumptions of the Social Security trustees) show that Social Security payroll tax revenue will fall short of outlays starting in 2015 and that the trust fund will be depleted in 2037. At that point current 88 | Economic Report of the President receipts will cover only about 70 percent of outlays. In addition to the demographic challenge, Medicare faces pressures associated with projected increases in health care costs. During this Administration the strong economy, along with a slowing in the growth of health costs, have significantly brightened the short-term outlook for Medicare. However, policy changes still appear necessary to maintain its financial soundness in the long run. Outlays for the hospital insurance portion of Medicare are now expected to exceed corresponding tax receipts starting in 2010, and the hospital insurance trust fund is expected to run out in 2025. Finally, the long-term implications of demographic change for national saving are aggravated by the fact that private saving is also likely to decline as the population ages, because older people tend to draw down their private assets during retirement. The projected erosion of the Social Security surpluses will reduce the unified budget surplus starting fairly soon. Moreover, the gap between benefits and receipts continues to widen beyond the 75-year window used for the long-run projections of the Social Security trustees; hence the pressure on the budget intensifies over time. Although they have not eliminated these longterm pressures, developments in the economy that have produced a long expansion and higher productivity growth have improved the budget outlook over that 75-year period even more dramatically (primarily through the power of compounding) than they have improved the shortterm outlook. A projection of the Administration’s economic and policy assumptions based on the June 2000 Mid-Session Review of the budget Chapter 2 | 89 suggests that the unified budget could remain in surplus throughout the next 75 years (Chart 2-18). Of course, 75-year projections are fraught with uncertainty, because over this span it is easy for a particular set of economic and policy assumptions to be proved wrong. For example, starting with the baseline projection in Chart 2-18, slower-than-expected growth in tax revenue—or a tax cut—that reduced receipts as a share of GDP to their 1994 level of 18.1 percent would hasten the return of deficits. A similar outcome would occur if discretionary spending were to rise proportionally with GDP instead of merely rising with inflation, as the projections assume. Obviously, various combinations of tax cuts and spending increases could produce even more adverse changes. Other assumptions could also prove inaccurate. More rapid productivity growth or a larger-than-expected increase in immigration would improve the long-term surplus outlook. Slower productivity growth or continuing rapid growth in health care costs would significantly worsen it. So, too, could a lower fertility rate or longer life expectancy than is assumed by the Social Security trustees. Addressing the Challenge Current economic and demographic projections indicate that, with the benefits and tax rates specified under current law, Social Security and Medicare will not pay for themselves over the long run. Some combination of modified benefits, increased payroll taxes, or alternative financing will 90 | Economic Report of the President be necessary to resolve the imbalance. A growing economy helps with this resolution, even if needed changes are postponed to the future. But starting to address the challenge now would reduce uncertainty about what, if any, adjustments future generations will face and would give today’s workers greater notice so that they can better plan for their retirement. A strong economy with adequate saving is critical. The virtuous cycle of fiscal discipline and changes in the economy that have boosted productivity and growth has already paid off: with the vastly improved long-run budget outlook, national saving has increased in a way that contributes to preserving prosperity over the long run and meeting the demographic challenge. But even in a New Economy policymakers must confront scarcity and trade-offs. New tax cuts or spending programs should be well thought out, target highpriority public needs, and include an assessment of overall benefits, costs, and risks. The most effective fiscal strategy to prepare for the future is to pursue policies that boost the productive capacity of the economy. These include encouraging productive public investments in infrastructure and human capital—as well as maintaining fiscal discipline, to encourage public saving and private investment. Productive public investment complements private investment in raising the economy’s capacity to produce goods and services. For example, decades of economic growth have overwhelmed many of the Nation’s sanitation, public transportation, and road systems whose original designs date back 50 to 100 years. Investments in modernizing and expanding this infrastructure can improve health outcomes, reduce pollution, ease congestion, and enhance job prospects. As discussed in Chapter 5, education is especially important for preparing Americans to prosper in the New Economy, yet an estimated $127 billion in additional repairs is needed to rebuild the Nation’s schools. Clean, safe schools are better learning environments that will pay dividends well into the middle of this century. To the extent such investments in infrastructure increase the Nation’s capital stock and productive capacity, they contribute to stronger economic growth and raise real incomes. This in turn increases future revenue and reduces the payout of government transfers. But such investment must be undertaken wisely. Poorly thought out investments could prove counterproductive by crowding out more-productive private investment. Investments in human capital provide another means of maintaining prosperity and preparing for the future. Increased education and training can enhance workers’ productivity in much the same way that increases in the amount and quality of physical capital do. State and local governments are mainly responsible for primary and secondary education, but as described in Chapter 5, the Federal Government’s more limited role can be crucial as well. Federal programs are also important for postsecondary education and lifetime learning. In recent years the Federal student loan program has been Chapter 2 | 91 especially successful at making college more affordable, helped along by the fiscal discipline that has allowed an easing of interest rates; at the same time the Administration’s efforts to improve loan repayment have saved taxpayers more than $14 billion. The Administration’s Lifetime Learning tax credit allows some educational expenses to be deducted from income, further improving the affordability of college. Although such tax credits reduce current government revenue, the investment in human capital that they stimulate adds significantly to future private income and income tax receipts. In 1998 the mean earnings of high-school graduates aged 18 or over amounted to $22,895, whereas persons with a bachelor’s degree had mean earnings of $40,478. This difference in income generated an estimated tax liability for the bachelor’s degree holder that was 2.4 times as large as that of the high-school graduate, suggesting that funding education can be good for the Nation’s fiscal integrity as well as for personal incomes. Finally, preserving some share of future budget surpluses will allow public saving to continue to contribute to national saving, increase the amount of capital available in the economy, and support continued economic growth. It will also allow a continued paying down of the public debt, perpetuating the virtuous cycle that has been so good for the New Economy. Debt reduction also helps shrink the demands on the Federal budget as interest payments are reduced and eventually eliminated. Interest savings alone could pay for a large share of the added expenses associated with demographic change and provide a margin of safety against unforeseen adverse economic events. One way to emphasize the importance of not spending the surplus is to create a “lockbox” for the Social Security and Medicare trust fund surpluses. Funds placed in a lockbox could not be used to pay for other programs, but instead would have to be saved. Although the precise amount that the government should save is not necessarily equal to that which would accumulate in the lockbox, such a provision might be an effective way to ensure that significant saving does occur. Fiscal prudence that preserves the current surpluses, combined with appropriate public investment, would generate more national saving and investment than a policy of large tax cuts or spending increases. Greater saving and investment, in turn, would produce a stronger and more productive economy in the future. Besides directly improving the outlook for Social Security and Medicare under their current structure, such an outcome would provide more resources to deal with any changes to those programs in the future. 92 | Economic Report of the President Conclusion U.S. economic performance in 2000 continued to illustrate the benefits that have accrued from a combination of sound policies and a blossoming of technological opportunities. Strong growth, accelerating productivity, low unemployment, and low inflation continue to characterize the longest economic expansion on record. The fiscal stance of the Federal Government has been completely turned around, from one of spiraling deficits to one in which it is reasonable to contemplate the elimination of the public debt. The critical task now is to maintain the fiscal discipline that has been achieved and to focus on ensuring that adequate resources are available for the coming demographic challenge. Chapter 2 | 93 C H A P T E R 3 The Creation and Diffusion of the New Economy A t the heart of the New Economy lie the many dramatic technological innovations of the last several decades. Advances in computing, information storage, and communications have reduced firms’ costs, created markets for new products and services, expanded existing markets, and intensified competition at home and abroad. These innovations have sprung from a remarkable recent flourishing of entrepreneurship, much of it concentrated in high-technology corridors such as California’s Silicon Valley. Indeed, the rapid growth of the information technology sector was one of the most remarkable features of the 1990s. Domestic revenue in this sector—which comprises computer hardware, software, and communications—has grown by 120 percent over the last decade. In just the last few years, the Internet has spawned thousands of new companies and created billions of dollars in market value. Wireless telephone carriers alone now employ over 150,000 people in the United States and generate 10 times the annual revenue they posted a decade ago. 95 The information technology sector has been going about its highly innovative business since the 1970s. The last decade, however, saw a rapid convergence of several of its most important technologies—processing power, data storage and transmission, and software—that translated these innovations into real productivity gains. This chapter will show that these improvements in technology, along with intense competition and innovative organizational practices, have brought significant benefits to many industries throughout the economy. In manufacturing industries such as steel and automobiles, and in service industries such as retail trade and financial services, firms that have embraced information technology and developed custom applications are increasingly productive. Steel furnaces now use highspeed computers running what are called neural networks to improve quality and reduce wear and tear on equipment. In automobile production, networked computers are used for a whole range of activities from the design of new products to the coordination of supplier relationships. In financial services, advances in information technology have led to significant scale economies, reducing the costs of back-office operations, risk management, and customer support. Similar patterns of technological innovation are visible in many other industries. Technology, however, is not the sole driver of this exceptional performance. During the 1990s, firms in many industries found that technology had its biggest impact when combined with complementary organizational innovations such as incentive pay, flexible work assignments, and increased training. Meanwhile intense competition, both at home and abroad, has forced firms to improve their performance—and weeded out those that do not. This chapter surveys recent technological improvements, explores the causes of the recent surge in innovation, and explains how changes in technology, regulation, and competition have transformed organizations throughout the economy, leading to significant performance gains. The story is told in four parts. The first part reviews recent improvements within the information technology sector, focusing on microprocessors, disk drives, and data transmission, and showing how costs have plummeted as capabilities have increased. Future advances in networking, wireless communications, and biotechnology—all fueled by the rapid technological advances of the last 20 years—will likely lead to even more impressive gains. The second part examines the causes of the surge of innovation. Although the ultimate cause of all innovation is human creativity, the scope and complexity of technical innovation today require a particular support structure. Scientific and technical research and development (R&D) must be 96 | Economic Report of the President funded, researchers must be trained and equipped, inventors must receive adequate legal protection for their intellectual property, and so on. The discussion here focuses on the demand for technology, on financial market developments such as the growth in venture capital and a stronger market for initial public offerings (IPOs), on private and public R&D activity, and on intellectual property protection. None of these factors alone explains why the United States now finds itself awash in new technology. Rather, it is the convergence of these factors during the last decade that has created a unique climate for entrepreneurs to discover new technologies and bring them to market. The chapter’s third part explains how firms are producing goods and services more efficiently through greater use of computers and other information technologies and the development of complementary organizational practices. The emphasis is on how technology, regulation, and competition interact to create new business opportunities and spur performance gains. The financial services industry provides a useful illustration. As mentioned above, advances in information technology have led to significant scale economies in this industry. Deregulation now provides financial institutions the opportunity—and increased global competition provides the incentive— to exploit these scale economies. The combination of these factors helps explain the dramatic consolidation seen in this industry during the last few years. Further examples of changes in firm boundaries, internal organization, and performance are discussed, from the use of outsourcing and strategic interfirm alliances to new arrangements for compensation and job design. These changes in firm behavior, in many cases facilitated by the dramatic improvements in information technology, are immediate causes of the rapid productivity growth of the last 5 years. The chapter turns finally to an investigation of the performance gains brought about by these new ways of doing business. There is considerable evidence that information technology and organizational change improve the performance of plants, firms, and industries. Globalization is also closely linked to improvements in firm performance: access to global markets gives firms strong incentives to improve their products and services, and the presence of foreign competitors in domestic markets forces firms to make those improvements or perish. As the competitive environment has changed, firms in many industries are increasingly turning to intangible capital—patents and trade secrets, organizational routines, reputation, and the like—as a source of competitive advantage. This has important implications for firm strategy, as firms seek new ways to build and exploit their stocks of these intangibles. Chapter 3 | 97 The Advance and Convergence of Information Technologies The productivity improvements associated with the New Economy have their origins in a series of gradually unfolding advances in information technology that grew out of post–World War II defense research. Over the decades following these discoveries, the costs of processing, storing, and transmitting information fell dramatically. During the 1990s this process accelerated rapidly as computers became increasingly powerful, communications networks became much faster and cheaper, and firms developed the necessary software and organizational capabilities to translate these new technologies into performance gains. The emergence of the commercial Internet in the mid-1990s promises to extend these gains even further. Clearly, the information technology sector has been one of the most innovative and visible in the New Economy. The sector now accounts for an estimated 8.3 percent of GDP, up from 5.8 percent in 1990. Private investment in information technology rose at a 19 percent annual rate over the 1990s as a whole and accelerated to 28 percent after 1995 (Chart 3-1). Advances within each area of information technology have created new markets, extended existing markets, and improved the efficiency of firms and industries. 98 | Economic Report of the President The most impressive technological advances have come in terms of speed, storage capacity, data transmission capacity, and the improvement of user interfaces. Moore’s law—the prediction by semiconductor pioneer Gordon Moore back in 1968 that transistor density on silicon wafers would continue to double every 18 months—has generally held true, generating one of the most remarkable phenomena of the late 20th century. Since 1980 the speed of microprocessors used in personal computers has increased more than a hundredfold, while the cost of performing 1 million instructions per second has fallen from over $100 to less than 20 cents. These advances, along with intense competition in computer assembly and distribution, drove qualityadjusted prices for computers and peripheral equipment down by 71 percent between 1995 and 2000. This coincided with a dramatic increase in private investment in computers and peripheral equipment (Chart 3-2). Complementary investment in software has nearly doubled. However, quality-adjusted prices of software have fallen by only 2 percent, reflecting in part the fact that labor is the major input into software production, and in part the difficulty of measuring quality improvements in this area (Chart 3-3). Advances in data storage, which complement these advances in computer processing power, have also been impressive. The cost per megabyte of hard disk storage has fallen from over $100 in 1980 to less than 1 cent today. The newest generation of “microdrives,” designed for handheld devices such as Chapter 3 | 99 wireless phones and digital music players, hold a gigabyte of data, are smaller than a matchbook, weigh less than an ounce, and sell for under $500. (By contrast, the first gigabyte-capacity disk drive, introduced in 1980, was the size of a refrigerator, weighed 550 pounds, and cost $40,000.) Finally, data transmission capacity has skyrocketed: since 1996 the capacity of a single fiber-optic cable has increased by a factor of 20 in widely available commercial systems, and experts expect such technological progress to be sustained over at least the next 5 years. These improvements, again along with healthy competition, have reduced the cost of communications dramatically. Information can now be accessed from anywhere in the world via the public Internet at no cost once the user has connected. The emerging communications infrastructure allows firms to collect, store, process, and transmit information at ever-higher volume and lower cost. Between 1980 and 1999 the cost of sending 1 trillion bits of information electronically fell from $129,000 to 12 cents. A revolution in software development has been built upon these advances in hardware. Private investment in software has risen from $11 billion in 1980 to $50 billion in 1990 and about $225 billion in 2000. The trend in software design is toward independent modules that can be combined for a variety of applications, and away from less flexible programs designed for individual users. Software has also become more sophisticated. Since about 1990, large firms have been spending billions on “enterprise resource 100 | Economic Report of the President management” programs: complex systems that integrate ordering, procurement, inventory, finance, and human resources. Smaller firms can get similar services from what are called applications service providers operating over the Internet. To reap the full benefit of these technological advances, firms are reorganizing many of their business practices. In some industries, firms are taking advantage of technological improvements by refining, expanding, and consolidating their operations so as to reduce costs; in others, startup companies are using technology to create new products, processes, and markets. Consumers are now being offered an increasing array of goods and services for wireless communication, digital entertainment, shopping, education, and other activities. As firms have rushed to adopt this increasingly ubiquitous, lower cost technology and incorporate it into their businesses, employment in the computer and data processing services sector has exploded, more than doubling between January 1993 and November 2000 (Chart 3-4). This compares with only a 23 percent increase in total private U.S. employment during the same period. Each on its own, these dramatic technological advances would have been unlikely to generate the profound transformations of firms and of consumer behavior that define the New Economy. Rather, it is the simultaneous convergence of these technologies that has made the difference. The rapid expansion of computer networks, culminating in the commercial Internet, Chapter 3 | 101 clearly illustrates this convergence. Economists use the term “network effects” to describe how the benefits of participating in a network depend on how many other people are also on the network. (Who would want to be the only person in the world with a fax machine?) The number of Internet hosts, a proxy for the number of existing connections to the Internet, has increased exponentially since 1990 (Table 3-1). Nearly 42 percent of U.S. households have access to the Internet, and surveys indicate that over 50 percent of U.S. businesses sold products on line in 2000. The number of secure web servers for e-commerce in the United States rose from 7,513 in 1997 to 65,565 in 2000. Traditional firms and new firms alike are competing to deliver consumers higher speed access to the Internet and more sophisticated content and services for this new medium. Together this evidence suggests that the benefits of being on the Internet are growing at an extraordinary rate. As the case of the Internet clearly shows, the most important breakthroughs of this information era have resulted from the convergence of fast processing, inexpensive data storage, and rapid communications. This technology is considerably more valuable to firms when combined with complementary human capital and the appropriate organizational routines, and when contractors outside the organization are available for development, implementation, and maintenance. The convergence of these technological advances, in combination with changing firm routines, has fueled much of the development of the New Economy. TABLE 3-1.— Content and Commerce on the Internet Year Worldwide Internet hosts (thousands) U.S. secure web servers for electronic commerce 1990 ....................................................................................................... 1991 ....................................................................................................... 1992 ....................................................................................................... 1993 ....................................................................................................... 1994 ........................................................................................................ 313 535 992 1,776 3,212 ... ... ... ... ... 1995 ........................................................................................................ 1996 ........................................................................................................ 1997 ........................................................................................................ 1998 ........................................................................................................ 1999 ........................................................................................................ 6,642 12,881 19,540 36,739 56,218 ... ... 7,513 16,663 33,792 2000 ........................................................................................................ 93,048 65,565 Note.— Internet hosts as of July of each year, except 1990 figure is for October. Secure web servers measured in September 1997, August 1998, August 1999, and July 2000, respectively. Sources: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and Internet Software Consortium. 102 | Economic Report of the President Why Is the U.S. Economy Awash in Technology? What explains the recent surge of technical innovation? Of course, the ultimate cause of all innovation is human creativity. But technical innovation does not occur in a vacuum; it requires a structure of incentives and institutions. Firms demand new technology that will let them reduce costs and provide new products and services valued by their customers. For other firms to respond to that demand, scientific and technical R&D must be funded, researchers must be trained, their inventions must receive legal protection, and so on. Government policies that foster competition, encourage R&D, and reduce trade barriers are important in this regard. The Administration has worked hard to provide an environment that allows entrepreneurship to flourish, particularly in the high-technology sector. For instance, the Administration supported a moratorium on U.S. Internet taxes under the Internet Tax Freedom Act and worked for a freeze on trade duties for electronically traded goods within the World Trade Organization (WTO). To encourage open markets in high-technology goods and services, the Administration signed the WTO’s Information Technology Agreement, which will eventually eliminate tariffs on $600 billion worth of goods, and the WTO’s Basic Telecommunications Agreement, which will promote competition and privatization in a global telecommunications services market worth $1 trillion. To help ensure the competitiveness of U.S. firms in that market, the President signed the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the first comprehensive telecommunications reform legislation in over 60 years. In September 2000 the President signed an executive memorandum directing Federal agencies to work with the Federal Communications Commission and the private sector to identify the radio spectrum needed for third-generation wireless technology. To encourage private sector R&D across the gamut of U.S. industries, the Administration worked to extend the Research and Experimentation tax credit through 2004, the longest extension of this policy ever. At the same time, the Administration has supported significant increases in funding for the National Science Foundation (NSF), an independent government agency responsible for promoting science and engineering. The NSF budget was increased by more than 13 percent in fiscal 2001, the largest increase ever. Overall, the President’s 2001 budget request included more than $2 billion for R&D in information technology, a marked increase over the previous year’s amount. Within this favorable climate, technological innovation has proceeded at a rapid pace. This part of the chapter discusses the demand for technology, Chapter 3 | 103 financial market developments such as the surge in venture capital and initial public offerings that support technology firms, the role of R&D expenditure in technological development, and the importance of legal protection for technical discoveries. It highlights four important features of the New Economy. First, intense competition and feedback drive the development and adoption of new technologies. The availability of one technology stimulates demand for complementary technologies, which in turn lowers production costs and encourages further demand for the initial technology. Second, significant financial market developments have lowered the cost of capital for new businesses. Although the public stock markets are still extremely important, providers of private equity such as venture capital firms are playing a larger role, particularly in the technology sector. Third, the process of funding R&D has changed. The Federal Government continues to be a major provider of this funding. However, the emphasis of Federal funding has shifted from defense-related technologies to civilian products and services. More important, private R&D has soared, particularly at smaller firms and service firms. Private firms are also devoting an increasing fraction of their research budgets to basic, rather than applied, research. This suggests that the current technology boom is far from over. Fourth, the innovative process has itself been transformed. Traditionally, innovation has been a highly integrated activity, performed mostly by large firms working independently of each other. Today, innovation is a less integrated process, performed increasingly by large and small firms in collaboration with each other, with academic institutions, and with government agencies. This is seen clearly in the computer hardware industry. Formerly dominated by large, vertically integrated firms, the industry is now frequently led by smaller, more specialized firms using modular technologies that are easily shared among market participants. The combination of these features explains why the United States has seen so much technological innovation over the last decade. For the most part, these appear to be long-term trends, implying that technological progress will continue to be an important driver of U.S. economic performance. The Demand for New Technology Central to the dynamics of the demand for new technology is positive feedback: technological improvements generate increased demand for technology, which fuels further improvements. Several types of feedback are important here. First, in a market characterized by network effects, the more users have adopted a particular technology, the more valuable that technology will be for additional users. For example, the telephone, the fax machine, e-mail, and instant Internet messaging all are more valuable to any 104 | Economic Report of the President given user the larger the number of other users. Today, household telephone penetration in the United States is nearly 95 percent, more than 9 million fax machines are in use, over 100 million Americans have e-mail accounts, and more than 60 million use instant messaging software. Second, for products that exhibit increasing returns to scale or strong learning effects in production, sufficient demand can generate larger markets by reducing the unit cost of production, which in a competitive market lowers price and drives demand even higher. Firms in the commercial aircraft and chemicals industries have long recognized the need to “price down the learning curve” to drive demand and maximize the returns on their investments. Semiconductor manufacturing, for example, is characterized by increasing returns to scale. Producing microprocessors or memory chips entails high fixed costs and low variable costs. The more the firm sells, the lower it can price its chips and still profit from its investment. As technological innovation brought ever-faster chips, the fixed costs of building a semiconductor manufacturing plant rose from $100 million in the early 1980s to $1.2 billion in the late 1990s. This suggests that increasing returns in the semiconductor industry are becoming increasingly important. Finally, feedback can occur when strong complementarities between component products of a given system create an interdependent system of demand. For example, the demand for computers depends on the price and quality of software and of peripherals such as printers, modems, and scanners. Yet the demand for software and peripherals is, to a certain extent, determined by the price and quality of computers. More generally, since the complexity of so many information technology products makes it efficient to design each component for a particular purpose, and to establish standardized interfaces between components and even entire products, demand for individual components and given products becomes highly interdependent. In the United States, deregulation, openness to foreign competition, and low administrative barriers to entry and exit have led to highly competitive markets, providing strong incentives for firms to adopt new technologies. Yet organizations often resist technological change. Adopting new technologies can be costly and risky for firms; some of this risk stems from the changes in relationships, communications practices, and organizational structures that are required to take full advantage of the new technology. A firm with a protected market position can avoid making these productivity-enhancing changes and still remain viable and profitable. Firms in competitive environments cannot. Beyond the highly competitive information technology manufacturing sector, which has been a remarkable user of new technology, competition has driven the demand for new technology in such service industries as telecommunications services, trucking, banking, and retailing, to name a few. Chapter 3 | 105 Financial Market Developments Firms—especially small, innovative startup companies—need funds, guidance, and other forms of support for all aspects of their operations. The United States has offered a uniquely supportive climate for technology startups. In many cases a single individual investor, or “angel,” has provided money at the seed stage, where a new firm’s product concept is developed. Additional funds may be obtained through the private placement market— essentially equity offerings to a limited group. The Federal Government has also played a role in supporting innovation through the Small Business Innovation Research program. One of the most important factors in the financing of new technology, however, has been the recent acceleration in growth of venture capital, which itself has benefited from a thriving market for IPOs. The availability of venture capital has lowered the startup costs for aspiring entrepreneurs, and favorable taxation of capital gains has increased the demand of entrepreneurs for capital. Furthermore, a rising stock market may encourage venture capitalists to support startups, in the expectation that a subsequent public offering or private sale will generate large returns. Venture Capital Venture capital is a form of private equity that targets startup firms primarily in emerging industries. Venture capitalists do much more than supply funds, however. Besides matching entrepreneurs with investors, such as wealthy individuals, banks, and pension funds, they also advise, monitor, and support the projects they fund. Technology firms face two special obstacles in procuring finance. First, the profitability of the projects they pursue is extremely difficult to assess, and second, the entrepreneur’s behavior is difficult for providers of capital to monitor and evaluate. Venture capital firms address these difficulties by getting deeply involved in the development of the typical startup. Typically, one or more of the venture capital firm’s lead investors join the board of directors of the new firm, and from that vantage point they closely monitor the entrepreneur’s activities. The method in which financing is provided allows additional control: the investment is typically staged, with funds disbursed only as the firm passes certain preset milestones. Venture capitalists often advise firms on the selection of key personnel and on the acquisition of legal and financial services. They are also deeply involved in the firm’s strategic choices. During the 1980s venture capital investment grew on average by 17 percent per year; then, during the 1990s, the pace doubled. Total venture capital investment jumped from $14.3 billion in all of 1998 to $54.5 billion in the first three quarters of 2000 alone (Chart 3-5). One company that tracks the venture capital industry estimates that $134.5 billion was under venture capital management at the end of 1999. Analysts pointed to the large 106 | Economic Report of the President sums raised at the beginning of 1999, and to a new group of promising projects in Internet-related businesses, as the driving factors behind this surge in financing. Whether the rapid pace of growth can be maintained depends on a number of economic factors, one of which is the strength of the IPO market. Venture capital firms frequently move on to new projects once a firm has been successfully launched. For example, 3 years after an IPO, only 12 percent of lead venture capitalists retain 5 percent or more of the funded company’s shares. And the most profitable manner for venture capital investors to exit their investment positions and take their profits is by having the new firm float a public issue. Therefore maintenance of a large and buoyant public equity market is critical. The Federal Government has long been active in the venture capital business. Congress created the Small Business Investment Corporation (SBIC) program in 1958. This program allows the formation of SBICs, which are privately owned and managed investment firms, licensed by the Small Business Administration, that may borrow funds from the government in order to provide venture capital funding to entrepreneurs. In 1999 SBICs provided $3.7 billion to 3,700 companies. Does the enormous growth in the amount of funds described as venture capital really signal a correspondingly large increase in the net resources available to entrepreneurs, or does some of it merely substitute for other sources of funding? There is evidence that not all venture capital is new money: some Chapter 3 | 107 large firms, often in the computer hardware and software industries, now make about 15 percent of total venture capital investments through semiautonomous organizations they set up. These investments might have been counted as internal corporate investment in the past. However, venture capital and traditional corporate R&D do seem to have different effects. In particular, recent evidence suggests that venture capital spurs innovation, as measured by patent activity. More generally, the thriving venture capital industry is but one part of a growing domestic private equity sector (as distinguished from the public capital markets, that is, the stock and bond markets). In the United States the private equity sector has largely divided itself into two subsectors, each focusing on different types of investments. One consists of the venture capital firms already described, which focus on early-stage investments in startup or newly formed entities. The other consists of investment groups that pursue opportunities in existing, more mature companies. At least 800 established buyout firms operated in the United States during the 1990s. These privately held firms specialize in leveraged acquisitions, recapitalizations, management buyouts, and other restructurings. In principle, buyout firms perform an important function by actively monitoring corporate managers, thus avoiding the collective action problems that limit effective control of management by institutional owners such as banks and pension funds. During the last five years or so, the distinction between venture capital and buyout firms has blurred: several buyout firms have begun investing in Internet startups, while venture capital firms that previously specialized in managing early-stage ventures have participated in buyouts of established technology firms. Initial Public Offerings In addition to venture capital, the public capital markets have also served as an extremely important source of capital during the second half of the 1990s and beyond. Between 1993 and the end of November 2000, IPOs raised $319 billion, more than twice the amount raised in the preceding 20 years, even after adjusting for inflation (Chart 3-6). Although some of the largest IPOs have been those of established firms seeking to raise additional capital, IPOs have also been an important source of capital for new firms, particularly in information technology and biotechnology. An active IPO market fosters innovation by providing capital for new enterprises and, as already mentioned, by providing an attractive exit mechanism for financiers of early-stage, risky ventures, making these financiers more willing to provide risky capital. It also provides liquidity for entrepreneurs, who can appropriate some of the value their efforts have created while retaining at least partial control of their firms. 108 | Economic Report of the President Of some concern, however, is the recent strange behavior of IPO pricing, especially in 1999 and 2000. In 1999 the average first-day return (calculated as the percentage by which the price at the end of the first day of trading exceeds the offering price) for IPO securities was an amazing 69 percent (Chart 3-7). This was three times higher than the average first-day return in any year between 1975 and 1999. This anomaly could be due to either “irrational exuberance” on the part of investors, persistent underpricing by the underwriters of these securities, or both. Economists have developed several possible explanations for the underpricing of IPO securities. Some focus on differences in the information held by the firm and the market, whereas others focus on the incentives of managers, underwriters, and investors. In general, underpricing is not necessarily the result of a market failure. Evidence on the long-term performance of IPOs is mixed. Equity markets, particularly in the technology and Internet sectors, were extremely volatile in 2000. Internet commerce and Internet services firms recorded remarkably high market values between 1998 and early 2000, but their market values fell sharply after peaking in March 2000. Consequently, although the average number of IPOs per month in late 2000 was only slightly less than the average for the first half of 2000, the average monthly proceeds from IPOs fell by nearly 40 percent. The overall market value of equities remains high, Chapter 3 | 109 however. As of December 2000, the price-to-earnings ratio of S&P 500 firms stood at 26, substantially above its average of 22 in the 1990s. The price-toearnings ratio of the Nasdaq composite stock index, which includes a high concentration of technology firms, was 98 near the end of 2000. The availability of well-developed, sophisticated capital markets has provided important support for the technological advances of the last decade, although whether they will continue to do so in the next decade remains to be seen. The flourishing venture capital market and the dynamic IPO market are unique features of the U.S. economy and may help explain why the New Economy emerged here rather than in Europe or Asia. R&D in the New Economy As the economy has become “lighter,” shifting toward products that embody more knowledge capital and less physical capital, R&D—the principal means by which knowledge capital is created—has risen dramatically. The entire R&D process today is in the midst of a transformation away from the vertically integrated model pursued by large R&D laboratories and toward a more decentralized model involving more small-firm R&D and increasing collaboration between firms to bring products and services to market. 110 | Economic Report of the President Between 1995 and 1999, real R&D spending in the United States grew at an annual rate of nearly 6 percent, evidence of a substantially increased commitment to innovation. Private sector R&D accounts for most of this growth, having increased at a remarkable 8 percent annual rate over the same period. In this era of budgetary restraint, real Federal support for R&D remained approximately constant but shifted somewhat away from defense R&D toward civilian applications (Chart 3-8). Other key indicators offer corroborating evidence of an increase in R&D activity. The number of scientists and engineers doing R&D rose 34 percent between 1995 and 1999. Immigration has been an important source of engineers and scientists in the United States, not only in R&D but in many other activities as well. Foreignborn persons make up only about 10 percent of the U.S. population, but about 13 percent of scientists and engineers. Private sector support of basic research also increased rapidly in the 1990s, growing at an astounding 17 percent annual rate since 1995. Indeed, one survey observes that “industry is doing more long-range, high-risk, discoverytype research than ever before.” This is somewhat surprising, because economists have typically argued that private firms will tend to focus on applied, rather than basic, research. Because basic research may not produce commercially exploitable results, and because firms fear that competitors will free-ride on their basic research investment if it does bear fruit, private firms are thought to invest little in basic research. In the early 1990s, in fact, several Chapter 3 | 111 large firms famous for supporting basic research scaled back their research budgets after experiencing sharp declines in earnings, raising concerns that private sector support for basic research would dwindle. Why, then, did private sector support for basic research increase in the 1990s? A recent study shows that patent applications increasingly cite scientific research, and not just existing patents; this suggests that basic science is becoming more important for technological change. (This trend has been particularly strong in information technology and in biotechnology.) For this reason, firms that employ individuals skilled in performing basic R&D may be better able to take advantage of the scientific research performed by universities, the national laboratories, and other firms. Furthermore, as a recent study of postdoctoral biologists’ job choices suggests, allowing researchers to pursue basic science and publish their results helps firms attract high-quality researchers and reduces the financial compensation that researchers demand. The Organization of Innovation Small firms have been responsible for much of the growth in private R&D. Between 1993 and 1998, real spending on R&D by firms with more than 25,000 employees increased by 8 percent, but R&D conducted by firms with fewer than 500 employees nearly doubled. In 1998 R&D conducted by firms with fewer than 500 employees accounted for 18 percent of all industrial R&D spending (Chart 3-9), and firms with 500 to 4,999 employees accounted for an additional 16 percent, compared with 12 and 14 percent, respectively, in 1993. More than 40 percent of all privately employed scientific researchers now work in these small firms. The increasing importance of small-firm R&D is consistent with an observed shift, in a number of industries, toward the distribution of innovative activity across multiple independent firms. For example, in the 1950s and 1960s, computer firms usually sold fully integrated, proprietary systems comprising both hardware and software. They developed and manufactured the majority of the components for these systems inside their own company. Today, in contrast, the most popular systems are based on modular architectures. Production of software and hardware is separated, and hardware manufacturing typically involves components designed and developed by dozens of different firms. Many of today’s semiconductor design companies own no manufacturing facilities and focus exclusively on creating the intellectual property—the design itself. Still others perform contract production for dozens of these design companies. Important changes have also occurred in pharmaceuticals. Before the 1970s the discovery of new drugs relied on what was called the random screening approach, which drew mainly on medicinal chemistry and pharmacology. Large, established pharmaceutical firms were the primary 112 | Economic Report of the President innovators. Today, in the wake of the molecular biology revolution, firms use a more profound understanding of the biological basis of disease to guide their search for drugs. Biotechnology has also become a technology for producing new drugs as well as discovering them, and the industry has seen the large-scale entry of firms that do both. In today’s pharmaceutical industry, collaboration among major pharmaceutical firms, biotechnology firms, and academic institutions has become commonplace. The large drug companies have recognized that it is difficult to acquire all of the capabilities necessary to do modern pharmaceutical R&D; they must rely to some extent on external partners. The new biotechnology firms, for their part, have formed partnerships with the large drug companies that possess skills in conducting clinical trials and marketing that they themselves lack. Many biotechnology startups are closely linked to universities, and universities now routinely enter into licensing agreements with firms to commercialize the patents they hold. In another departure from traditional R&D patterns, service firms also account for a considerable share of the recent growth of private R&D. The most recent data from the NSF show that service firms have stepped up their performance of R&D over the past few years. R&D by engineering and management services firms, for example, doubled between 1995 and 1998, to $8 billion, and in the same period R&D by business services firms increased by 69 percent, to $15 billion. Consistent with today’s more Chapter 3 | 113 decentralized approach to R&D, these service firms provide essential software for data processing and product development for their clients in manufacturing and other sectors of the economy. Recent attention has focused on the management of innovation within and between firms. The design of incentives offered to researchers is important here. Incentive schemes must be carefully designed, particularly when multiple tasks—for instance, both basic and applied research—compete for a researcher’s time and attention. Studies have suggested that firms seeking to develop promising but immature technologies with the potential to challenge their current business should establish separate, independent business units to develop these technologies. Otherwise the incentives of researchers and others within the organization could come in conflict. Developments in information technology, meanwhile, have made possible entirely new R&D processes that further challenge the traditional centralized models. “Open-source” software design, which encourages users to modify the source code of a program and to share these improvements with others, has become increasingly widespread. Tens of thousands of programmers in the United States and abroad have contributed to open-source programs for such widely used products as Internet server software, e-mail routing software, and even some personal computer operating systems. Widespread Internet access has led to a dramatic acceleration in open-source activity, despite the fact that open-source programmers typically do this work without pay and distribute their source code for free. They may be motivated by reputation, which can lead to better future job offers and greater respect among peers, or by the sheer pleasure of solving the problem. Another key feature of innovation and R&D in the New Economy is geographic concentration. Such concentration persists even in a world where declining telecommunications costs and improved software have made it easier for researchers in distant parts of the globe to collaborate. Knowledge spillovers between firms, and between firms and academic institutions, are particularly important in the technology sector. One study that looked at patent citations as a measure of these spillovers suggests that they are geographically localized; this finding remains even after controlling for preexisting research activity. Spillovers involving what economists call tacit knowledge—knowledge that is not easily codified or communicated except through close interaction—may be even more geographically localized, since they are likely to be mediated through social ties (for example, between an entrepreneur and a venture capitalist) or face-to-face contact. This creates geographic clusters of firms in a set of related industries. Many of the Nation’s high-technology clusters benefit greatly from proximity to major research universities; besides Silicon Valley, examples include the Research Triangle in North Carolina, Route 128 in Massachusetts, and Austin, Texas. 114 | Economic Report of the President Aside from the benefits from research spillovers, firms may choose to locate in these clusters to have better access to sophisticated customers, to benefit from the presence of supporting industries, and because startup costs— particularly the costs of hiring employees with a specific type of expertise—are lower. Clustering has been pronounced in industries where university R&D, private R&D, and skilled labor are particularly important. Government Funding for R&D The Federal Government continues to supply over half of all basic research funds in the United States, as it has since World War II (Box 3-1). Between 1993 and 1999, Federal funding for basic research increased at a 2 percent annual real rate. This funding increased a further 9 percent in fiscal 2000 and is budgeted to increase an additional 7 percent in fiscal 2001. Many New Economy technologies, such as the web browser and the Internet, have their origins in federally funded basic research. Other important technologies such as bar codes, fiber optics, and data compression also benefited from public funding in their early stages. This Administration has increased basic research funding for many important technologies, computer science and biotechnology in particular. In 1999, 20 percent of the Federal research budget went toward health and human services research, and 50 percent of Federal basic research funds went toward the life sciences. Recently, Federal funding for basic research in information technology has increased. The Administration has established the Information Technology for the 21st Century Initiative, a basic research initiative targeted at software development, supercomputing, and networking infrastructure and examining the societal implications of the information technology revolution. This program had a budget of $309 million in fiscal 2000 and $704 million in fiscal 2001. Any discussion of the Federal role in R&D requires careful consideration of whether public R&D complements or substitutes for private R&D. Some forms of R&D performed by the Federal Government are clearly complementary to private R&D spending. For example, providing information about the genetic basis of disease could increase the productivity of private R&D efforts to design new drugs. However, public R&D may at times crowd out private R&D if firms perceive that they can free-ride on government-supported projects, particularly those that focus on developing specific products. Time considerations may also be important. Today’s Federal spending may support tomorrow’s private spending but reduce the incentives for the private sector to do research today. Partly because of these considerations, the focus of Federal R&D spending has typically been on basic research, where underinvestment by private firms is thought to be most likely, and on R&D related to the missions of government agencies. Chapter 3 | 115 Encouraging Private Research and Collaboration Besides providing direct funding, government policy has created a favorable climate for private R&D through the tax code and through encouraging collaboration among private sector firms. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the tax treatment of Box 3-1. Federal R&D and Commercial Technology: Licensing, Cooperation, and Partnerships A significant fraction of federally funded R&D supports the needs of Federal agencies pursuing public purposes such as national defense. However, the technology created by this research often has potentially valuable private sector applications as well. A series of new laws in the 1980s encouraged the realization of this potential by making technology transfer an explicit mission of the Federal laboratories. These laboratories were also given the authority to grant licenses on their patents to U.S. businesses and universities, and Federal agencies were allowed to enter into cooperative research and development agreements (CRADAs) with private firms to conduct research benefiting both the government and the CRADA partner. In the 1990s these technology transfer mechanisms took root and flowered in the Federal research enterprise. In 1998 Federal laboratories granted licenses for nearly twice as many inventions as in 1993, and nearly three times as many as in 1990. Not surprisingly, income from these licenses has risen dramatically. The number of active CRADA projects has doubled since 1993, with most such projects in the defense and energy spheres. The missions of some Federal agencies target commercial applications specifically. The Advanced Technology Program (ATP), administered by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, supports research projects that focus on the long-term technology needs of U.S. industry, by sharing the cost of peer-approved, high-risk projects. Over 460 ATP awards—many of which have gone to cooperative ventures between firms and universities—have been made in fields as diverse as photonics, manufacturing, materials science, information technology, and biotechnology. Founded in 1993, the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles (PNGV) is another example of how Federal agencies and industry have joined forces to pursue mutual interests. The PNGV brings together the three major U.S. automakers, over 300 automotive suppliers and universities, and seven Federal agencies to develop technology for environmentally friendly vehicles. The vehicles developed under this program promise to achieve up to triple the fuel efficiency of today’s vehicles, and very low emissions, without sacrificing affordability, performance, or safety. 116 | Economic Report of the President R&D in the United States is one of the more favorable among OECD nations. Federal policy has also encouraged the formation of strategic technology alliances, which are particularly important for new modes of R&D. Two hundred and fifty-five domestic U.S. technology alliances were formed in 1998, up from a mere 51 in 1980 (Chart 3-10). The number of alliances formed between U.S. and foreign firms climbed from 88 in 1980 to 222 in 1998. This growth in new alliances was driven largely by agreements between firms in information technology and biotechnology. One particularly intensive type of technology alliance is the research joint venture. Research joint ventures allow participating firms to take advantage of their different and often complementary capabilities, to spread the risk of a project, and to pool resources. For example, two major firms working on computer memory technology recently announced a joint effort to develop magnetic random access memory (MRAM). This technology promises more efficient computing—machines using MRAM will start up instantly, for example. One company has created the early MRAM technology itself, whereas the other brings to the venture additional expertise in complex semiconductor memory. Combining the efforts of some 80 engineers, the firms hope to develop commercially viable MRAM by 2004. Research joint ventures limit wasteful duplication and are particularly important for projects whose payoffs are likely to be years away. Most important, they allow firms to internalize some of the benefits of knowledge Chapter 3 | 117 spillovers; the difficulty in capturing these externalities is presumably a reason why firms are thought to underinvest in R&D in the first place. Although technology alliances existed before the mid-1980s, U.S. antitrust law created some confusion about the extent to which firms could cooperate on R&D. With passage of the National Cooperative Research Act in 1984, the treatment of research joint ventures under antitrust law was modified in two important respects: the application of antitrust law to such ventures was clarified, and the maximum penalty that could be assessed in a successful private lawsuit was reduced. The 1993 National Cooperative Research and Production Act further liberalized the environment for cooperation by extending these provisions to include the application of technologies developed by joint efforts. Seven hundred and forty-one research joint ventures were registered under this act through 1998, with most occurring in the communications, electronics, and transportation equipment industries. Intellectual Property Protection Perhaps the chief incentive for innovation is the potential financial reward from owning a unique resource, product, or service. Innovators often profit simply by being first to market, but legal protection for their discoveries provides an additional attraction. U.S. law provides particularly strong intellectual property protection. For example, it allows the patenting of most biological material that occurs as a result of substantial human intervention, and this protection has contributed to the rapid innovation in the U.S. biotechnology industry. European case law for biotechnology patents is evolving but inconsistent, and the European Union does not currently grant patents for plant varieties. Japanese law for the patenting of living material is similar to that in the United States, but Japan prohibits the protection of biotechnology inventions related to the human body for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of disease. In addition, the United States grants clear protection to a variety of computer-related innovations, an area that Japanese and European laws protect more loosely. The European Patent Convention specifically notes that computer programs as such are not to be regarded as inventions. Although court rulings have interpreted this as requiring that software inventions make a technical contribution to be eligible for a patent, considerable misunderstanding remains in the European Union about the extent of patent protection for software, particularly among small and medium-size enterprises. In Japan a software patent claim can only be expressed as a claim on the process, whereas in the United States claims can cover a product or a process. This means that, in Japan, many more patents may be required to fully cover a new software package; this increases the possibility of a gap in protection that a competitor can exploit. In both the European Union and 118 | Economic Report of the President Japan, a software patent is substantially narrower than one granted in the United States. As more new technologies emerge, challenges to incorporating these innovations into the intellectual property framework will continue to surface. As it did with earlier innovations, the existing intellectual property framework is adapting to accommodate today’s new technologies. For instance, the increasing use of software has blurred the line between a physical transformation, which is traditionally covered by the patent system, and a concept, which is not. Court rulings have consistently upheld the patent protection of “business methods”—financial techniques or software programs that suffuse technology and concept. However, the legal rulings in favor of business methods patents have generated controversy, as illustrated by the debate surrounding a large Internet retailer’s patenting of its website ordering process. Critics argue that patents of business methods are of low quality and overly broad, and that they might stifle innovation. In response, the Patent and Trademark Office announced the Business Methods Patent Initiative in early 2000. The initiative establishes new procedures for reviewing such patents, including a second layer of patent review, enhanced training for examiners, and expanded searches for prior work. The proliferation of new technologies has also raised issues related to copyright and trademark law. “Peer-to-peer” file-sharing systems permit the easy exchange of copyrighted media, including music, software, video, and texts. The Administration has supported the extension of copyright protection to the digital realm and has worked to establish an international standard of copyright. One achievement in this area was the passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which implements the Copyright Treaty and the Performances and Phonograms Treaty of the World Intellectual Property Organization. Among other provisions, the DMCA limits the extent to which Internet service providers can be held accountable for copyright infringement by their users. As biotechnology, the Internet, and other innovative technologies become more widespread, important legal challenges will continue to emerge. For example, e-signature legislation recently took effect, providing standards under which legally binding signatures can be created and sent electronically. This advance brings with it important new challenges in contracting. A Favorable Alignment Why, then, is the U.S. economy awash in technology? The evidence suggests that the combination of increased, competition-driven demand for technology, thriving financial markets, increased public and private R&D, and legal protection have created a uniquely favorable climate for entrepreneurship in the technology sector. As this chapter has emphasized, it is not Chapter 3 | 119 any one of these factors in isolation but rather the convergence of these favorable conditions that has led to the recent surge in technological innovation. Technology flourishes when markets are allowed to work, and where government policy provides essential support. Doing Business in the New Economy How has growth in technological innovation affected the economy as a whole? Chapters 1 and 2 of this Report detailed the effects of information technology on economy-wide productivity. Here the focus is on the effects of technology, along with complementary organizational practices and increased global competition, on the behavior of individual plants, firms, and industries. The remarkable productivity of the information technology sector itself over the last several decades has already been discussed. This part of the chapter turns to other sectors of the economy, to show how the technologies and business methods of the New Economy have spread beyond the information technology sector. Chapter 1 presented aggregate evidence that the New Economy has diffused outside the information technology sector to the service-producing industries. Between 1989 and 1999, labor productivity accelerated in retail and wholesale trade and in finance and business services (Table 1-2). These industries are heavy users of information technology, and this technology may have contributed to these gains. However, the aggregate statistics do not provide the whole picture. Productivity gains in these industries are difficult to gauge: measuring output and prices is an imperfect exercise, and the productivity numbers do not incorporate important changes in quality. To understand and extend these findings, then, it is essential to look at evidence within firms and industries. This section focuses on the underlying mechanisms by which performance gains might arise. These performance gains come mainly from two sources. First, the level of investment in information technology has increased sharply, in both the manufacturing and the services sectors. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, only since 1995 has investment in information technology grown to the point where the stock of information technology capital can itself have a noticeable effect on aggregate productivity. However, computers are more than just another factor of production. As this section will emphasize, another important driver of productivity growth is the way computers and electronic communications together enhance the efficiency of labor and other factors, as firms adapt these technologies to their own unique business applications. It is these increases in the productivity of all factors that explain the economy-wide gains documented in Chapters 1 and 2. 120 | Economic Report of the President Information technology has made inputs more productive by changing the way firms do business. In manufacturing, increasing computing power and decreasing cost have brought about performance gains through automation, numeric control, computer-aided design, and other channels. Information technology has also facilitated changes in job design, giving manufacturing workers more decisionmaking authority on the shop floor and placing a premium on technical skills. Firms are also relying increasingly on performance-based pay, including profit-sharing and stock option plans. Supplier and customer relations have also changed. Supplier contacts that were formerly kept at arm’s length have become more closely integrated and coordinated, thanks in part to automated procurement systems. Data that used to be kept proprietary are now increasingly shared between business partners. Inventories have shrunk. Firms use databases of transaction histories to target products and services to individual customers, while setting up telephone call centers and other operations to improve service. The structure of many markets has changed. In some sectors high fixed costs and low marginal costs, combined with first-mover advantages and network effects, have led to highly concentrated markets. Other sectors are populated by smaller, newer firms. Firm boundaries are also shifting more rapidly as firms move toward flexible, collaborative relationships such as strategic alliances with suppliers and even potential rivals. Finally, competition in the New Economy is more vibrant, more dynamic than ever before. Many markets have become more “entrepreneurial” as new business starts—and business failures—have increased. The increase in global trade brought about by trade liberalization along with lower communications and transportation costs has led to improved performance. This section outlines the effect of technology, organization, and other factors on performance. New Developments Inside Plants and Firms Many people associate the New Economy with semiconductor plants or biotechnology research laboratories. Those are, of course, important drivers of recent performance improvements. However, information technology has had significant effects on old-economy industries as well. Applying Computing Power Outside the Information Technology Sector As computing power has gotten cheaper and firms have made greater investments in information technology, they have learned to apply that greater power to improving the performance of the firm. Manufacturing firms have done this by investing in information technology that is embedded in much of the new machinery they install, and by investing in information technology in their business processes. Service firms have used Chapter 3 | 121 the new technologies to introduce new products and processes as well. Although the case studies presented below do not add up to an economywide measure of the impact of information technology, they do show clearly that it is improving productivity in many sectors of the economy—even old-economy industries such as steel, transportation, and banking. In the manufacturing sector, computers allow the automation of many tasks, improving the flexibility, speed, and reliability of the production process. The machine tool industry provides an example (Box 3-2). These improvements in the production process are also combined with the use of new software that governs scheduling mechanisms, to reduce work in process and shorten lead times for order fulfillment. In the services sector, the availability of information and the increased ability to process that information have enabled retailers and service providers to respond more quickly to changing customer demand and to provide more customized service. The changes witnessed in the steel industry exemplify these changes in production processes and management practices. The fundamental processes of steelmaking remain much as they always were: melting raw material, forming it into an intermediate product, and shaping and treating that product into final goods. But a number of technological advances, many incorporating information technology to measure, monitor, and control these processes, have affected almost every step in steel production. As recently as 10 or 15 years ago, steelmaking involved extensive manual control and setup and relied heavily on operators’ experience, observation, and intuition in determining how to control the process. Computer processing of data from sensors, using innovative software, has improved the ability to control the process, allowing faster, more efficient operation, in addition to more uniform product quality. For example, the availability of computing power to quickly process data has enabled steelmakers to combine sophisticated software decisionmaking algorithms (called neural networks) with precision sensing devices to continuously monitor and adjust the ever-changing conditions in the electric arc furnaces widely used for melting steel. This closer control reduces both energy consumption and wear and tear on the equipment. The setup to cast the molten steel into an intermediate product has changed from a process in which several operators would “walk the line,” setting the controls for every motor and pump, to one in which a single operator uses an automatic control system that synchronizes and sets the equipment. The rolling process now incorporates sensors that constantly inspect for deviations from the desired shape, allowing the operators to make corrections before material is wasted. Operators can remotely control the speed and clearance of the rolls using computercontrolled motors to correct problems as they develop. 122 | Economic Report of the President Box 3-2. Information Technology in the Machine Tool Industry: The New Economy Helps the Old The machine tool industry, one of the oldest and most basic of U.S. manufacturing industries, appears to have experienced accelerated performance in the 1990s as a result of improvements based on information technology. Because this industry makes the machines used in the rest of the manufacturing sector, improvements in the quality of its products can result in productivity gains for the entire sector. The annual productivity growth rate for this industry rose to 2.5 percent from 1990 through 1998 after more than a decade of decline. But even this figure underestimates the performance gains that have arisen from improvements in such factors as reduced inventories and higher product quality. The use of computerized, numerically controlled machines in this industry has had a major impact. Although developed in the 1970s, numerically controlled machines made up only 5 percent of the machining base by 1983. By 1997, however, this share had risen to 68 percent. These machines increase operating speed: one study found that as of 1987 they had already reduced unit production time by 40 percent relative to manual production. They also increase output quality and reduce setup times, so that products can be switched more frequently and inventories can be kept smaller. One industry that uses these production methods is valve production: valves are seen in virtually every industrial environment, where they are used in pipelines to control the flow of liquids or gases of various kinds. Data described below from a typical valve-making firm document pronounced productivity gains in three primary areas of the firm: new product design, production, and inspection. To envision these phases, imagine that the firm is making a complicated valve part starting with a chunk of steel, then boring a hole in the middle for liquid flow, turning grooves on the end, and finally drilling and tapping additional holes and turning protrusions that permit control devices to be attached. New Product Design New product design is a primary element of production, because valve production is often very specialized; small numbers of valves must be produced that are unique to the new application for which they are ordered. In the 1990s the computer-aided design software used by valve-producing firms became capable of displaying threedimensional images, showing the valve as a solid model rather than as a flat planar representation. This change speeded design time enormously. The new software also allows all the properties of the valve, continued on next page... Chapter 3 | 123 Box 3-2.—continued such as stress loads and the center of gravity, to be calculated automatically, thus eliminating the need for extensive manual calculations. It also eliminates the need for a demonstration model and significantly improves design quality. One firm estimates that the new software has reduced design time by more than 50 percent and cut the required number of engineers and draftsmen on a typical job by 30 percent. Thus, although at least 84 percent of all manufacturers had introduced computer-aided design in some form by 1997, the very recent move to three-dimensional design is likely to have a particularly strong impact on performance. New Production Methods Numerically controlled machines were introduced 25 years ago, but the recently developed computer numerical control (CNC) machines can produce valve parts much more rapidly. These machines are run by sophisticated software with a simple graphical user interface that enables the operator to produce a typical complicated part in one day, compared with the four days it would have taken previously. Moreover, the CNC machine is much more versatile. Two CNC machines are enough to produce a new valve that might have required eight of the earlier-generation machines 10 years ago. New Inspection Techniques A complicated valve often must be machined in each dimension to a tolerance of 1/1000th of an inch. Therefore inspection is a critical part of the production process. For many years inspection was done with manual measuring devices, which was very time consuming. Inspection machines developed in the last few years instead use a probe technology, so that the operator simply touches each surface of the valve with a probe, which then generates a three-dimensional image and measures all dimensions. The new device can cut inspection time for a typical complicated valve part from 20 hours to 4. The Importance of Information Technology The machines that make today’s complicated valves are run by sophisticated software programs that require high-speed computing and extensive data storage. These new machines are now available and affordable because the costs of computing have plummeted, and because capital goods makers have had time to learn how to harness cheap computing power by developing the applied software needed to run the machines. Thus the performance improvement in valve production has come about partly as a result of high levels of new investment, but also because the information technology imbedded in all new machinery enables these machines to perform at rates previously unachievable. 124 | Economic Report of the President The result of this integration of computers into steelmaking has been a significant improvement in performance. Together with other technological changes, such as larger furnaces and improvements in casting practices, and the closing of older, inefficient plants, the new technologies have also contributed to higher product quality and productivity. Steelmakers today use less than 4 worker-hours to produce a ton of steel, down from about 6 worker-hours in 1990. The best-performing mills have achieved results of less than 1 worker-hour per ton. Service industries, too, have harnessed information technology to change the way they do business. The trucking industry is using the new technology to better serve its customers’ logistics needs. To be efficient, trucking firms must satisfy customers with prompt pickup and delivery of loads while minimizing unused capacity in the form of both idle equipment and empty and incompletely loaded trips. By coordinating information from many shippers and consignees in a geographical area, firms can reduce wasted movement. To track and dispatch trucks efficiently, they use sophisticated locating technology, such as the satellite-based global positioning system; real-time traffic, weather, and road construction information; computers on board the trucks themselves; complex software and algorithms; and supporting hardware to organize customers and loads. The ability to effectively use information to manage shipments not only contributes to efficiency but also enables other innovative processes such as automated exchange of information. Banks have also used new technologies to improve their processes. In the mid-1990s retail banks introduced imaging technology to process checks more efficiently. Digital images of checks are stored on a central computer and scanned by software that reads the amounts on the images. Checks are then balanced against deposit slips automatically. Introducing this technology has freed employees from having to record check amounts manually, lowered transactions costs by eliminating the need to move checks physically, and allowed banks to reorganize their workflow around a more extensive division of labor. Complementary Changes in Organizational Practices To fully realize the performance gains from the applied use of information technology, firms often must make complementary changes in organizational practices. For example, the information that the new technology puts in the hands of production line operators is valuable only if those operators have the authority to use it to make decisions about the operation of the line. The move to place greater decisionmaking authority in the hands of line personnel is one key example of an organizational change that complements the adoption of information technology and enhances its value. Another Chapter 3 | 125 complementary change is in the incentives that operators and other employees have to use information to make better decisions. There is evidence that in the last 10 years more firms have placed greater decisionmaking authority in the hands of the average employee. The growth of processes to increase employee involvement and the delegation of decisionmaking to the shop floor, for example through off-line problem-solving teams or self-directed work teams, indicate how line employees are performing functions that used to be retained as management prerogatives. A survey of manufacturing establishments found that the share of establishments adopting at least one employee involvement practice (defined as quality circles, job rotation, teams, or total quality management) rose from 65 percent in 1992 to 85 percent in 1997. The share of establishments reporting the use of multiple employee involvement practices rose from 37 percent to 71 percent over the same period. As employees take on more responsibility and are involved in more complex production processes, a greater premium is placed on skills and cognitive ability. One study showed a rapid increase during the 1980s and 1990s in the proportion of the labor force engaged in tasks requiring interactive or analytical skills, as opposed to tasks based more on following prescribed rules. Thus firms have an incentive to undertake more extensive screening of prospective employees and provide more continuing education and training to those on the payroll. Job rotation can serve as another way of improving employees’ understanding of the firm’s processes, thereby enhancing their ability to solve problems and improve productivity. Much of this shift in decisionmaking authority to production workers began before the recent surge of investment in information technology. In the 1980s the high performance of Japanese manufacturing and the competitive threat it posed led many U.S. firms to experiment with or adopt Japanese-like practices. These practices have become even more valuable as firms have made large investments in information technology that complement their human resource investments. A second major complementary change is the greater use of performancebased pay. Various incentive pay schemes—from production-based pay to profit sharing to stock option plans—have been designed to improve employee motivation. A 1998–99 survey found that 63 percent of respondent firms used some form of variable pay for nonexecutives. Between 1987 and 1999 the use of profit sharing and other performance-based incentives at Fortune 1000 firms increased from 26 percent to over 50 percent. These incentives perform two functions. First, they motivate employees to improve firm performance, because the employees share in the resulting monetary rewards. Second, they provide a screening function, as more highly skilled and more motivated employees are more likely to be willing to work in firms 126 | Economic Report of the President where pay is based on performance. One study of finishing lines in the steel industry found that lines with a set of supporting innovative work organization and incentive practices reduced downtime by 7 percentage points. Stock option grants are a particularly important form of incentive pay. They have been a part of executive compensation for years, but grants for nonexecutive personnel are a relatively new phenomenon. Although only 5 percent of all nonexecutive employees in publicly held firms received stock option grants in 1999, the proportion rises to almost 27 percent for those earning more than $75,000 a year. Moreover, the use of this compensation vehicle appears to be diffusing rapidly. A 1998 survey of 415 firms found that 34 percent had some type of stock option plan for nonexecutives. Although this was not necessarily a representative sample of all U.S. firms, other studies reach similar findings. This study also found that, of the 88.4 percent of firms that reported the use of any type of variable pay, 17.7 percent indicated that they had introduced a stock option plan within the past 2 years (Chart 3-11); 8.2 percent reported introducing profit sharing, and 13.8 percent offered bonuses. Eligibility for stock options was also broadened more rapidly than were plans for profit sharing or bonuses. A study of 125 firms that accounted for about 75 percent of 1997 market capitalization of firms in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index estimated the value of these grants at about 4 percent of total compensation in 1998. Chapter 3 | 127 The use of stock options appears to be highly concentrated in the hightechnology sector. Stock options might be a preferred method of compensating workers in high-technology firms because they allow firms with low current (but high expected future) cash flows to offer higher compensation than they otherwise could. Stock options may also elicit greater worker effort and productivity by tying the worker’s compensation to the firm’s long-term performance. There is little actual evidence, however, on the performance effects of stock options. One study did find that the presence of an employee stock ownership plan or a stock option plan increases labor productivity at the establishment level, after controlling for other aspects of workplace practices and establishment attributes. Another study found that, after controlling for firm size and industry classification, sales per worker in 1997 were higher in firms that had implemented a broad-based employee stock option plan. However, it is too early to draw firm conclusions on the net effects of options on compensation, especially because the expansion in their use came at a time when stock prices, and hence the value of stock options, were increasing. The effect of employee stock option plans may be substantially different when stock prices are flat or falling. Significant changes in human resource practices have been documented in several other industries, including steel, automobiles, apparel, and customer call centers. These changes have allowed firms to make better use of the new information technology that has recently become available. Changes in Firm Boundaries Information technology, along with the complementary human resource practices just described, has also had important effects on firm boundaries in many industries. (A firm’s “boundary” is simply the line between the set of activities a firm performs for itself and the set of activities that it pays other firms to perform for it.) Vertical boundaries describe the firm’s relationships with its suppliers and its customers: vertically integrated firms manage their own supply lines and have their own marketing and distribution networks, whereas firms that are not vertically integrated prefer to purchase supplies from independent dealers and to contract out their marketing and distribution to retailers. Horizontal boundaries describe the firm’s relationships with its rivals: some markets are dominated by a few large, horizontally integrated firms, whereas in others many smaller firms compete for customers. Information technology has frequently led to tighter, more closely integrated relationships between firms and their suppliers and between firms and their customers, without necessarily leading to full vertical integration. Indeed, the declining cost of exchanging information between firms has led many firms to outsource functions previously performed in house. At the same time, information technology has led to substantial consolidation in 128 | Economic Report of the President industries such as telecommunications and financial services, representing an increase in horizontal integration, although in some cases changes in regulation and competition have been more important motives for consolidating. Supplier Relationships Today’s consumer goods pass through complex supply chains, which the application of information technology can make more efficient. In many industries today, the supply chain involves a number of firms performing a variety of distinct functions, all of which are necessary to bring a product to market. These firms may create or extract primary materials, design and assemble those materials into more complex components, transport intermediate and finished products, or offer them for sale to the consumer. The efficiency of this system depends on the speed with which it delivers final products to consumers, the amount of inventory that is locked up in the supply chain at any given time, and, of course, the efficiency of each firm in the chain. Information technology, combined with changes in business practices, has enabled firms to reduce costs and increase efficiency in their supply chains, as is evident in retail trade. In the retail sector, sharing of point-of-sale data between a firm and its suppliers, a practice that received considerable attention in the 1980s, has become increasingly widespread, improving the flexibility and efficiency of distribution systems and lowering costs for consumers. For example, over 97 percent of grocery stores now use scanners to collect point-of-sale data. Efficient customer response (ECR) systems that share this point-of-sale data with suppliers to improve the efficiency of the supply chain were introduced in 1992. These systems take into account customer demand in an individual store as well as the complete economics of the supply chain. One recent study showed that ECR adoption was associated with higher productivity: firms that had gone further in their efforts to adopt ECR had higher sales per labor hour and per square foot and turned over their inventories more often than other firms. The study was not able to establish the direction of causation, however. In many industries these changes have redefined, or promise to redefine, the relationship between a firm and its suppliers. More drastic improvements in efficiency, driven by Internet technology, are occurring in other industries. In some cases, new firms have entered the market to simplify complex purchasing processes. For example, in the highly specialized life science research supply business, scientists at tens of thousands of different laboratories in hundreds of firms and universities purchase over 1 million distinct products manufactured by hundreds of firms to conduct their experiments. For a laboratory scientist, ordering these products has traditionally involved searching through 500-page catalogues from multiple suppliers, filling out forms to send to the purchasing department, and faxing Chapter 3 | 129 or phoning in an order. The typical cost of processing orders in this way, including paperwork and employee time, has been estimated to be around $100 per order. Using the Internet, one firm has created an on-line marketplace with over 1 million products and has streamlined the ordering process and the interface between the purchasing department and the scientist. This technology promises to reduce the total cost of placing an order to about $10. On-line business-to-business (B2B) exchanges have emerged to seek even greater efficiencies in the industrial procurement process. Some of these exchanges are industry-specific, whereas others offer a broad range of industrial products, commodities, and services to multiple industries. B2B exchanges offer a range of transaction tools, such as auctions, centralized clearing for payments, credit information about trading partners, and other custom services that allow greater efficiency in procurement. One on-line exchange claims to have saved customers $2 billion during its 5 years in operation. An on-line exchange for the steel industry boasts a clientele of 220 mills, 647 service centers, 909 fabricators, 352 distributors, and 626 trading companies. One market research firm estimates that B2B sales over the Internet rose to $200 billion in 2000, from about $40 billion in 1998. Projections vary widely but tend to agree that this dramatic growth will continue in the near future. The efficiencies of B2B commerce are likely to extend the performance gains already realized in aggregate inventory statistics. Inventories in a wide range of industries have fallen steadily over the past decade, with significant declines in apparel and department stores and among manufacturers of industrial and electronic goods. For example, in the early to mid-1990s, firms in the apparel industry reduced their inventories by an average of 1.2 percent per year, and their inventory-to-sales ratios by an average of 5.2 percent per year, by adopting information technology and a modular, team-based system of production that improved flexibility. Many firms are outsourcing, or contracting out, functions they previously performed themselves. Indeed, outsourcing has grown rapidly. Between January 1993 and October 2000, employment agency payrolls grew 99 percent, and management consulting services grew about 94 percent (Chart 3-12), while economy-wide employment growth was a much smaller 20 percent. Firms routinely outsource strategic development and the management of their information technology, human resources, and facilities operations to firms that specialize in these functions. Firms choose to outsource for any of several reasons. Contractors that specialize in a particular function may have competitive advantages in performing these functions relative to in-house staff and service groups, and reducing operating costs is one of the most frequently cited reasons for outsourcing. Contracting out can contribute to a firm’s productivity in other ways. By letting others provide services that are ancillary to the company’s 130 | Economic Report of the President primary business, outsourcing allows management to focus its effort on doing its core business better. In addition, outsourcing provides firms with access to expertise that would be costly and time-consuming for the firm to recruit and bring on staff. This expertise can also bring in new ideas and innovations learned from other firms in the industry or beyond. Finally, firms can use outsourcing to achieve greater flexibility: they can quickly access capabilities as needed and with less investment in physical plant and less overhead. At the same time, however, outsourcing carries risk for firms and for their employees. Management may lose control of key operational functions or skills. And some temporary employees may be paid less than regular employees and be less likely to receive benefits such as health insurance. Firms have other choices besides outsourcing and in-house production. They can engage in strategic alliances, which are long-term agreements between firms to share facilities, expertise, and other resources to accomplish joint goals. U.S. firms have been particularly active in this area, accounting for about half of all alliances among firms based in OECD countries during the 1990s. Strategic alliances, like other long-term contracts, allow firms to combine some aspects of their operations without incurring the costs of full integration. For example, an alliance with a key supplier can help stabilize the supply chain, whereas a marketing alliance may allow firms producing complementary products to pool their resources for greater joint gains. (A movie studio might form an alliance with a fast-food restaurant chain to promote a new release, for example.) Also, as discussed earlier in this chapter, Chapter 3 | 131 firms may ally in order to develop a new technology or to exchange existing technical capabilities. Customer Relationships Information technology has also enabled firms to communicate more closely with their customers, and thus to be more responsive to customer preferences and to produce goods and services that reflect those preferences. Firms are using information technology in a number of ways to improve marketing and customer service. As the costs of computing and data storage have fallen, firms’ efforts have shifted away from mass marketing, in which each potential consumer receives the same message, to more interactive marketing (sometimes called micromarketing). Interactive marketing uses information about a customer’s prior purchase behavior, credit history, location, and income to provide that customer with information about products he or she might be likely to purchase. Database technology has made this type of marketing feasible on a broad scale. On-line book and music retailers now provide their customers with real-time recommendations for additional purchases based on the customer’s purchase history, and grocery stores use customer data to tailor the choice of cents-off coupons offered at checkout. The same database technology, combined with reduced costs of communication, has enabled firms in a number of industries to provide customer service at lower cost over the phone. Firms in industries from telecommunications to financial services to consumer goods have established telephone call centers to handle customer questions and to provide product support. Information technology allows these centers to be based almost anywhere in the world, and service representatives at these centers to access the entire history of a customer’s account during the call. The ability to store and retrieve these data quickly has made customer information a strategic asset, one that firms are increasingly looking to take advantage of. The Internet is radically altering how producers and sellers of consumer goods interact with their customers. A manufacturer or retailer can now communicate with customers anywhere in the world at relatively low cost. A number of firms have taken advantage of this capability, offering products and product information via the Internet. Consumers with access to the Internet can now do comparison shopping at very low cost before leaving the house or placing an on-line order. Internet sales to consumers reached $17.1 billion in the first three quarters of 2000 (but still account for less than 1 percent of all retail sales). The Internet has also created whole new transaction mechanisms, such as on-line auctions. A significant fraction of all Internet consumer auctions are for secondary goods and remainders. This suggests that total trade in these goods may be on the rise. 132 | Economic Report of the President Market Structure Technology has also affected the structure of many markets, making some more highly concentrated while leading others to become more fragmented. Markets for many software products and information services, for example, have been dominated by big players with large market shares. Ownership of a particular technology standard is often an important source of competitive advantage if that technology cannot be imitated, and this can lead to market concentration. In the United States, information technology standards are often established in a decentralized manner, through the free play of the market, rather than through a centrally coordinated effort. Markets with strong network effects are often characterized by “tipping.” When it becomes apparent that one technology has a large enough lead, the market may “tip,” with nearly all new consumers from that point forward adopting the dominant technology. In such winner-take-all (or winner-take-most) markets, a firm faces crucial decisions about whether to make its product compatible with past and future generations of products, and whether to base its product on open or proprietary technology. Intense early competition to build a base of loyal users may result. Firms may also use strategic product preannouncements to establish a stake in a new market and head off competition. This propensity of markets with network effects to tip poses challenges for regulators and antitrust authorities as one or a few firms begin to dominate. It also encourages cooperation among competitors within an industry to promote a standardized technology. In cases where formal alliances or joint ventures are created, the costs of developing intellectual property are often shared, as are marketing expenses. As the U.S. legal code and U.S. antitrust authorities have recognized, such collaboration need not preclude vigorous competition in the product market. In industries such as telecommunications, energy, and financial services, many markets have become more concentrated as firms combine their operations through mergers and acquisitions. In financial services the primary sources of structural change have been information technology and deregulation. For instance, ever since passage of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, geographic restrictions on banks have been slowly lifted, enabling them to expand gradually across State lines. Although barriers to interstate banking were not completely removed until the enactment of the RiegleNeal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, regional and interstate pacts enabled bank holding companies to operate across State lines. One study estimates that, by 1994, a bank holding company in a typical State had competitive access to nearly 70 percent of U.S. gross domestic banking assets. Chapter 3 | 133 As banks have expanded, they have also begun to consolidate. Over a third of all banking organizations nationwide disappeared between 1979 and 1994, even as total banking assets continued to increase. Between 1988 and 1997 the numbers of stand-alone banks and top-level bank holding companies both fell by almost 30 percent, while the share of U.S. banking assets held by the top eight banking organizations rose from 22.3 percent to 35.5 percent. In 1998, 4 of the top 10 U.S. “mega-mergers,” based on market value, occurred in financial services. These changes are not confined to the United States: two Japanese bank mergers currently pending will create the two largest banks in the world, with about $2.5 trillion in assets between them. Deregulation is thus an important spur to geographic diversification and consolidation. Past geographic restrictions on competition may have allowed inefficient banks to survive, and consequently the gradual removal of these restrictions has transformed the structure of the industry. One study shows that bank efficiency improved substantially as restrictions on intrastate branching and interstate banking were removed. As a result, the share of deposits held by subsidiaries of out-of-State bank holding companies increased from 2 percent in 1979 to 28 percent in 1994. Meanwhile, the Glass-Steagall prohibition on combining commercial and investment banking in the same enterprise is slowly being lifted. In 1987 the Federal Reserve Board began permitting bank holding companies to engage in limited nonbank activities through so-called Section 20 affiliates. Section 20 activities were originally limited to 5 percent of a subsidiary’s total revenue, but the limit was raised to 10 percent in 1989 and 25 percent in 1996. In 1999 many of the Depression-era restrictions on banks were formally removed with passage of the Financial Modernization Act (also known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act). This legislation lifts these regulatory barriers by creating a uniform regulatory framework governing affiliations among different financial services institutions, and by expanding the range of investments available to these firms. The new law allows banks, security firms, and insurance firms to affiliate under a new rubric, that of a financial holding company. By November 2000, 456 such companies had been formed, with assets totaling 13 percent of all U.S. financial sector assets. Expansion, consolidation, and diversification can bring about performance improvements by allowing financial institutions to realize economies of scale. These scale economies are largely driven by innovations such as new financial instruments, new risk management techniques, automatic tellers, improved back-office operations, phone centers, and Internet banking. Recent evidence indicates that bank efficiency has indeed improved, particularly when new banking organizations have been created through mergers and acquisitions. Large banks have also made significant improvements in their abilities to manage risk; the costs of financial distress, bankruptcy, and loss of charter 134 | Economic Report of the President have been reduced. Moreover, despite fears that large banking organizations would focus exclusively on large customers, bank mergers and acquisitions have not adversely affected small business lending. The Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, along with the Federal Reserve Board, is careful to consider the impact of mergers on the communities to be served before approving any reorganization. Explaining Changes in Firm Boundaries As these examples have shown, firms are tightening some supplier and customer relationships, outsourcing other aspects of their operations, and in many cases consolidating business activities with former rivals. These and other changes in firm boundaries are best understood within the contractual framework associated with the Nobel Prize–winning economist Ronald Coase. Coase was the first to explain that the boundaries of an organization depend not only on its productive technology but also on the costs of transacting business. In the Coasian framework, the decision whether to organize transactions within the firm or on the open market—the make-or-buy decision—depends on the relative costs of internal and external exchange. Use of the market mechanism entails certain costs: discovering the relevant prices, negotiating and enforcing contracts, and so on. Within the firm, entrepreneurs may be able to reduce these transactions costs by coordinating these activities themselves. However, internalizing brings other kinds of transactions costs, namely, problems of information flow, preserving incentives, monitoring effort, and evaluating performance. The boundary of the firm, then, is determined by the trade-off, at the margin, between the relative transactions costs of external and internal exchange. In this sense a firm’s boundaries depend not only on technology but also on organizational considerations, that is, on the costs and benefits of various contracting alternatives. The above examples suggest ways in which information technology may alter these boundaries by influencing transactions costs. In the case of supplier relations, communications and coordination with suppliers is facilitated by e-mail, automated information exchange, and particularly by B2B Internet use, all of which should reduce firms’ tendency to be vertically integrated. However, at the same time, information technology also reduces the costs of coordinating activities within the firm, so the net effect on vertical boundaries is ambiguous. Moreover, information technology may lead to expanded horizontal boundaries, as high-speed communications across plants in different countries now allows firms to grow as they exploit their comparative advantages in global markets. Perhaps for these reasons, it is difficult to detect any economy-wide changes in vertical or horizontal boundaries, although distinct patterns are discernible within particular industries. Chapter 3 | 135 Competition and Strategy Firms face a variety of strategic decisions. So far this chapter has discussed the decisions surrounding the adoption of information technology, reorganization of the workplace, and the fixing of the firm’s vertical and horizontal boundaries. These and other decisions are made with the goal of outperforming rivals, that is, of achieving what the strategic management literature calls sustained competitive advantage. An important source of sustained competitive advantage is the possession of unique resources, such as firmspecific knowledge or capabilities, an installed base of users, valuable patents, or a popular proprietary standard. In the new, knowledge-based economy, such intangible resources have become increasingly important. Intangible Capital Success in the New Economy relies on intangible capital. In a market characterized by intensified competition (driven by globalization and deregulation) and rapid product and service innovation, corporations must innovate continuously—creating new products or services and producing them with new, more efficient processes—to stay competitive. Thus, intangible assets—organizational practices, human resources, R&D capability, and reputation—are now much more prominent features of a firm’s competitive strategy, because they are the foundation for innovations that lead to success. New organizational practices provide the ability to respond quickly to new opportunities. Appropriate human resource practices, such as an emphasis on training and the design of appropriate incentives, provide firms with employees who are able and eager to recognize, create, and develop opportunities. An R&D program that is good at conceiving ideas and converting them into products provides a stream of innovations. A favorable reputation, embodied in brand names, trademarks, and customer loyalty, can provide the trust on the part of customers that encourages their acceptance of a firm’s latest product innovations. One indicator of the importance of intangible capital is what economists call Tobin’s q, which is the ratio of a firm’s market value to the cost of replacing its underlying tangible capital. One interpretation of a high q is that a large part of the firm’s value derives from intangible capital. As Chart 3-13 shows, Tobin’s q for publicly traded U.S. firms rose throughout the 1990s. This is consistent with an increasing importance of intangible capital. Information Goods It is said that information, not tangible products, is the most important economic good in the New Economy. Of course, so-called information goods, from books, music, and television programs to the yellow pages and real-time stock quotes, have long been important to the U.S. economy. 136 | Economic Report of the President During the last decade, however, innovations in duplication, storage, and transmission have sharply reduced the cost of delivering information goods to consumers. These falling costs have led to increased entry by firms seeking to deliver new information products and have led incumbent firms to revisit their strategies for maximizing the value of the information they create and distribute. The production of information tends to be characterized by high fixed costs and low variable costs; computing and the Internet reduce the latter nearly to zero. When consumers’ preferences are relatively similar, markets for information goods may be highly concentrated. For example, few markets are served by more than two yellow pages providers. However, when consumers’ preferences vary widely, multiple producers may enter the market and find it profitable to focus on small groups of consumers. For example, although the major television networks still account for over half of viewership in prime time, hundreds of other cable television channels now cater to specific viewer tastes. The low cost of distributing information via the Internet has led information providers to rethink yet again their strategies for reaching consumers. Many magazines and newspapers now offer free on-line versions of their paper products. Some of these firms offer additional unique on-line content for free; others offer premium services such as customized content for an additional fee. Some information providers have integrated with distribution channels such as cable operators and even Internet access providers, whereas others have chosen to remain independent. Chapter 3 | 137 Internet Retailing For retailers and manufacturers of branded consumer goods, the Internet has created a whole new distribution channel. This has raised significant issues about how to compete, especially for firms with investments in physical distribution infrastructure. For manufacturers that have traditionally sold through intermediaries such as department stores or specialty retailers, the Internet makes direct sales to customers possible. However, for these firms to sell directly through the Internet, they must undertake activities that are new to them, such as retail billing, order fulfillment, delivery, and handling of individual returns. The potential profits from additional sales at retail prices must be measured against the cost of developing these new capabilities and against potential loss of sales through existing channels. A major sports apparel producer now sells through four different channels: sporting goods stores, department stores, company-owned stores, and the Internet. For traditional bricks-and-mortar retailers, on-line sales may compete directly with their own retail business. This has led some firms, such as one large book retailer, to separate their on-line and bricks-and-mortar operations in order to offer greater flexibility to both. Other retailers have chosen hybrid strategies, allowing customers to buy on line but funneling all returns and customer service through existing stores. Some bricks-and-mortar retailers have forged partnerships with on-line retailers to satisfy the needs of on-line shoppers. Understanding Performance Gains This chapter has documented the extensive changes in firm organization and strategy brought about by technological change. Ultimately, however, to explain the effects of information technology on the aggregate productivity gains reported in Chapter 1, these technological and organizational improvements must be linked to realized performance gains. Fortunately, new studies are beginning to document the performance effects of information technology and associated organizational changes at individual plants and firms. This evidence strongly supports the idea that the new technology, when combined with the appropriate organizational structures, has improved performance, and did so especially in the 1990s. How Do Technology and Organizational Change Improve Performance? As already emphasized, investments in information technology work best when combined with complementary changes in business and production 138 | Economic Report of the President practices. Performance improvements are most likely to be realized when firms couple these investments with changes in basic business practices, such as in job design, organizational structure, and interactions with customers and suppliers, and changes in human resource practices, such as in incentives and decisionmaking authority, that are designed to allow employees to use the new technology most effectively. Differences in the patterns and rates at which plants adopt these complementary practices may explain why the productivity effects of investments in information technology did not come immediately and still have not been realized by all firms. The lag and variability in productivity gains after investing in information technology may be due to the time it takes for employees to adjust to the new technology. Implementing automated equipment initially causes disruption, as employees must learn new practices and understand that the operating procedures and priorities in place under the old technology may not be appropriate with the new technology. Introducing the newly needed skills into the work force—either by retraining or by hiring new workers with the appropriate skills—takes time, and productivity can fall during the transition. For instance, the introduction of electronic controls into automobile engines, transmissions, and auxiliary equipment and the development of computerized diagnostic equipment forced some mechanics to learn new skills. Several studies note that the disruptions caused by retraining can be so severe that firms choose to implement new technologies in greenfield sites— newly built plants with new employees who do not have to unlearn the old practices. A second reason for the lag and variance is the need to match organizational structure to technological capabilities. In particular, giving employees authority to make decisions on workflow and machine scheduling, structuring employee compensation systems to align employees’ interests with those of the firm, and implementing teamwork structures that effectively use employee skills all can increase the productivity of information technology. Those plants that adopt complementary human resource practices along with information technology tend to see greater performance improvements. For example, precision metal-cutting plants that redesigned work responsibilities to allow the operators to perform program editing were found to be 30 percent more efficient than plants where no production workers were given these responsibilities. Research on information technology–related productivity at the firm level is difficult, in part because investment in the new technology is difficult to measure. However, a few studies have assessed the impact of such investments at the firm level. These also suggest that information technology, when combined with complementary human resource practices, can lead to performance gains. One study of the use of information technology in a nationally representative sample of over 1,600 firms found that increasing the share of Chapter 3 | 139 the production work force that uses computers from 10 percent to 50 percent increased labor productivity by 4.8 percent. When increased computer utilization was coupled with profit sharing and implementation of employee involvement practices such as self-managed teams, labor productivity rose by another 6 percent in nonunion plants and 15 percent in union plants. Another study, this one of service and sales teams at call centers, found that self-managed teams improved sales productivity by 9.3 percent, and introducing new technology improved it by 5.3 percent. But when new technology and self-managed teams were combined, the result was an additional 17 percent rise in productivity above and beyond the individual effects. Although these studies cannot establish definitive causal relationships, the examples described in this chapter strongly suggest that information technology, when combined with appropriate organizational practices, can improve performance. The Dynamics of Market Competition The New Economy is characterized by both high profitability and high risk. Over a hundred new e-commerce startups have already shut their doors. Others, however, have made inroads against the established firms in their industries, and some have even transformed their industries. Competition and Creative Destruction Market competition is a dynamic process whereby entrepreneurs constantly launch new companies to challenge existing ones, occasionally replacing them but just as often failing. This process—what the economist Joseph Schumpeter called creative destruction—is apparent in the U.S. economy today. As Chart 3-14 shows, the remarkable growth of the U.S. economy in the 1990s brought no reduction in business failures. Throughout the current expansion, business failures have hovered near their post-1980 average. As these statistics suggest, today’s firms are subject to remarkably intense competitive pressure, from both domestic and foreign sources. Nonetheless, corporate profits have exhibited strong growth, rising in real terms at a 5.7 percent annual rate from 1993 through mid-2000. This compares more than favorably with the period between 1980 and 1992, when real corporate profits rose at a 2.2 percent annual rate, and with the period between 1950 and 1992, when real corporate profits rose at a 3.2 percent annual rate (Chart 3-15). In short, a high rate of business failure is not necessarily a sign of economic weakness. Rather, it may simply reflect the market-driven process of shifting resources and adjusting the structure of production to meet consumers’ changing needs. 140 | Economic Report of the President Chapter 3 | 141 The Impact of Globalization Along with the technological and organizational changes that this chapter has described, increasing global trade has made markets more competitive, with dramatic effects on firm behavior and performance. If a firm is exporting and competing in a variety of markets, it might be forced to improve its performance in order to penetrate overseas markets with strong domestic suppliers. Likewise, an increase in imports may lead domestic industries to search out ways to be more efficient, ultimately making them better at competing with foreign producers. Evidence from the manufacturing sector suggests that good firms become exporters. Less clear is the answer to the opposite question: does exporting make a firm better? At the firm level there appears to be no significant causal link between exports and productivity. Microeconomic evidence from the Republic of Korea and from Taiwan reveals few industries where it can be argued that exporting alone aids performance. However, aggregate data show a correlation between trend productivity and export demand: an economy that exports more will likely have higher aggregate performance than one that exports less. This relationship appears to be stronger for high-technology industries. Nonetheless, the effect is smaller than that found for an equivalent increase in domestic demand. It could be that firms find it difficult to meet a wide variety of foreign regulations and satisfy a wide range of foreign preferences while maintaining efficiency. Increased import competition is also associated with an increase in trend productivity. Combined with the observed link between export demand and productivity, this suggests that the economy as a whole allocates resources better when subjected to global competition. In part, this may be because imports spur imitation and innovation: a new foreign good introduced into the United States creates new demand, which challengers then seek to capture or duplicate with products of their own. Evidence from Japan suggests that it was import competition, not increased exports, that boosted the Japanese economy during its high-growth period from 1964 to 1973. A study of the aftermath of Chile’s massive trade liberalization in the 1980s found that productivity in import-competing firms improved an average of 3 to 10 percent more than that in firms producing nontraded goods. Conclusion Technology has been a driving force behind the performance gains that are associated with the New Economy. With advances in information technology, firms have accelerated their investments in the new technology. It appears that sustained investment in information technology began to pay off 142 | Economic Report of the President handsomely in the 1990s, in the form of higher productivity within and across sectors. But it takes time for firms to realize these performance gains. They must first integrate information technology into their business or production processes, often through the development of highly specialized software. They also face important organizational and strategic choices about the best uses of new technologies and the increased availability of information. At the same time, increasing global competition and deregulation have given firms the incentives and the opportunities to seek ways of accelerating their performance. Not all firms will be equally successful at implementing technological and organizational changes, and cyclical factors will diminish the gains at times. As discussed above, new firms have been important drivers of change, particularly in the information technology sector. However, innovation is by nature a risky endeavor, and many new ventures will fail. Equity values will continue to fluctuate. Entrepreneurs, investors, and workers must be prepared for the disturbances that typically accompany economic change. Moreover, the economy as a whole will continue to experience the rise and fall of the business cycle, making underlying productivity trends difficult to discern. Although the impressive performance of the New Economy is ultimately due to the creativity and hard work of market participants, U.S. policies have helped create an environment that encourages entrepreneurship. The United States places relatively few restrictions on the movement of capital and labor, so that firms and individuals can respond when profit opportunities arise. The United States also imposes relatively low tax rates, so that individuals can realize the rewards of their innovation and effort. Extensive and relatively unfettered capital markets in the United States give entrepreneurs access to the financial resources they need to innovate. The U.S. government has practiced fiscal restraint, reducing interest rates and freeing capital for private sector use. And U.S. policies have provided direct support for R&D, along with indirect support through tax incentives for private sector investments. These policies have proved extremely valuable to firms and industries, and it is essential that they be continued. Chapter 3 | 143 C H A P T E R 4 The New Economy in a Global Context P articipation in the global economy has made a vital contribution toward U.S. economic performance. It is no coincidence that a New Economy has emerged in the United States at the same time that our involvement in the global economy has reached new heights. Indeed, globalization and the recent advances in information technology at the core of the New Economy are inextricably linked. On the one hand, globalization has played a crucial role in promoting the technological innovation and investment and facilitating the organizational restructuring that built the New Economy. On the other hand, improvements in information technology have spurred deeper integration between the United States and the world economy. An increasingly open global economy—which the policies of this Administration have helped promote—boosts innovation in several ways. First, it makes available the expanded markets that yield the scale economies so important for activities that require large up-front research and development expenditure. Second, it gives producers access to key imported components and machines at lower prices and in greater variety. Importing these goods allows U.S. innovators to concentrate on activities that make the best use of their knowledge and skills. Third, by heightening competition, 145 globalization spurs not only innovation but also the adoption of new technologies. This in turn creates still larger markets for innovative goods and thus greater rewards for those who innovate. In addition, the availability of information technologies facilitates the global reorganization of production and the continued increase in trade. It allows multinational firms to coordinate their activities and to manage supply chains on a global scale. It also brings increased numbers of buyers and sellers into global markets. Globalization has also helped support the high rate of investment that has played an important role in the current economic expansion. Increased capital flows into the United States have made it possible to maintain investment in excess of domestic saving. An example of the importance of global markets can be seen in the increased production and use of computers in the United States in recent years. Domestic purchases of computers, peripherals, and parts grew at an annual rate of more than 12 percent from 1993 to 1999, far outstripping growth in the value of domestic shipments of these goods, which averaged only 9 percent. Filling the gap has been a rise in imports, which now account for more than 60 percent of the value of new U.S. computer purchases—nearly twice the level in 1987. At the same time, half of U.S. computer shipments are exported. The United States gains in both directions from this two-way trade in computers and parts. U.S. computer firms can lower their costs by obtaining components from efficient foreign producers, and later profit from selling finished computers in the larger global market. At the same time, lower prices for computer imports are good for consumers and for businesses. In an age of international economic integration, continued success in the United States requires effective engagement with the global economy, strengthening international connections and building larger markets overseas. At issue is not whether we should welcome the emergence of a truly global market economy, but rather what kind of global market economy we should work to build. To ensure that globalization proceeds in a constructive way, the policies of the Administration have sought to make international institutions both more effective in helping to maintain global economic stability and more transparent in their operation. This Administration has consistently stressed that making economic integration work means making it work for all people—and making sure that all voices are heard when policies are decided. Toward this end, even as it has adopted policies that promote globalization, the Administration has sought to address genuine and deeply felt concerns about its effects. These include its effects on the incomes of working people, the health of the environment, social and labor standards, and the divergence of incomes between rich and poor countries across the globe. The goal has been to foster an interconnected global economy that both increases prosperity and provides genuine opportunity for people everywhere. 146 | Economic Report of the President The Role of Trade Liberalization in Promoting Globalization Trade policy has been an important factor in our prosperity here at home. The focus of this Administration has been on fostering a world of open markets governed by the rule of law, in which lower tariff and nontariff barriers allow all countries, including the United States, to enjoy the benefits of increased trade and investment. The achievements of the past 8 years include numerous international agreements—over 300 in all—that have liberalized both trade and investment, helping to ensure that foreign markets are open to U.S. exports. Among these are a number of especially notable accomplishments, including passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), completion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, enactment of legislation to extend permanent normal trade relations to China, a moratorium on customs duties on electronically delivered products, and agreements to liberalize trade in such crucial technology-related sectors as telecommunications, computer technology, and financial services. In addition, the member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have benefited from an agreement to reduce subsidies in tied aid export credit competition. This agreement limits the ability of countries to make the financial aid they offer to developing countries contingent on purchases from their domestic producers, and thus helps level the playing field for U.S. exporters. A host of other bilateral and regional initiatives have also helped create more open markets. These include initiatives that encourage trade with developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean and Central America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. These programs not only benefit the United States through more diverse and cheaper imports and expanded exports, but also afford developing countries an important opportunity for growth through increased access to the U.S. and other markets. The trade agreements to which the United States has been a party nearly always result in a lowering of barriers on both sides, but typically it is the foreign barriers to American firms operating abroad, rather than barriers to foreign firms in U.S. markets, that fall the most. This is true for the simple reason that, in nearly all cases, the U.S. barriers were lower to begin with. This was the case with both the Uruguay Round agreement and NAFTA, both of which removed substantial impediments to U.S. exporters. Similarly, the bilateral agreements concluded with Japan under the 1993 Framework Agreement and the 1997 Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and Competition Policy have helped eliminate obstacles to U.S. exports to that country, in the form of border barriers and domestic regulations that unnecessarily hindered trade and investment. Opening foreign markets can Chapter 4 | 147 stimulate exports by providing firms with a larger arena in which to sell their goods and services. For example, one result of China’s recent trade liberalization was that exports of U.S. oranges to that country grew from less than 350,000 kilograms in all of 1999 to more than 10 million kilograms in the first 9 months of 2000. Trade liberalization has also focused on industries of special relevance for the improved communications and technology that are at the heart of the New Economy. Several multilateral treaties have been negotiated under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The 1996 Information Technology Agreement eliminates tariffs on the preponderance of world trade in semiconductors, computers, software, telecommunications equipment, and other high-technology products. The Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services, which came into force in February 1998, has already made an important start toward opening world telecommunications markets to competition. The Financial Services Agreement, which took effect in March 1999, similarly opens markets in banking, insurance, and securities transactions. This allows U.S. financial services companies to better serve overseas markets through investments in foreign banking institutions, brokerages, and insurance concerns. Work is now under way to expand these agreements to include new products and services and achieve further deregulation and liberalization. The United States stands to reap sizable gains from increased exports in these industries where U.S. firms are strong competitors. But all countries will benefit from these agreements through lower prices and the diffusion of knowledge that goes hand in hand with trade and investment. Globalization and Economic Performance Trade and investment spur innovation and competition and thus contribute to better economic performance. This benefits society at large through the development of new goods and technologies, through higher productivity, and ultimately through lower costs for consumers and entrepreneurs. Scale and Network Effects Openness to the global economy increases the size of markets. This is particularly important for the development of goods and services subject to scale and network effects, including items that are central to the New Economy, such as technology and communications. Production of these items is subject to economies of scale—that is, the average cost of production 148 | Economic Report of the President declines with the quantity sold. Among these products are those characterized by learning curves: the more the firm produces, the more it learns how to reduce production costs, so that, on average, each additional unit costs less to produce than the one before. Scale effects are present as well for products with high fixed costs of development; because these fixed costs do not depend on the number of units produced, the average cost per unit falls as the number produced rises. This kind of cost structure describes most pharmaceuticals: developing and testing a new drug is expensive, but the cost of producing it, once the formula is known, is typically quite small. For goods like computer software and entertainment, development costs are again quite high, but the products, once created, can be reproduced relatively cheaply. Moreover, these products can be used by many consumers simultaneously without diminishing their value. The availability of a global marketplace gives firms a greater incentive to undertake the costly research and development necessary to create these kinds of products. Globalization is similarly important in industries characterized by network effects. In most such industries, which include telecommunications, the value of the network grows as more users are added. Indeed, this value grows exponentially, in a phenomenon known as Metcalfe’s law. Expansion of markets from a local or national to a global scale clearly benefits network industries. An example is the expansion of the Internet itself, which after all is a network of computer networks. As the number of global Internet users grows, the Internet becomes more valuable to all, including those who were already on line. The larger market that the growing Internet community represents provides added incentives for innovation by entrepreneurs, thus contributing to increased employment and wealth creation. The new products and services thus made available entice still more users throughout the world to seek access to the network. In this way, technology and openness combine to encourage innovation, which in turn further enhances globalization itself. Competition and Innovation Firms in an open global economy can choose from a broader range of inputs, thereby increasing efficiency and lowering production costs. Consumers are also made better off from access to a wider choice of goods and services. Even a large economy such as the United States benefits from greater specialization in a global economy, because it allows Americans to pick and choose from the best ideas and the most advanced and cost-efficient sources of goods from all over the world. These include not only consumer goods but also capital goods and intermediate inputs, which make our own final products more competitive. Chapter 4 | 149 Globalization increases the number of competitors in a market, and increased competition compels firms to continually innovate and improve their productive efficiency. For example, in the early 1980s U.S. computer firms and other manufacturers that used memory chips in their products are reported to have preferred chips from Japanese rather than American producers, because the Japanese-made chips had lower defect rates. This led the U.S. producers to study and apply Japanese quality management techniques, so that by the early 1990s their defect rates matched those of their Japanese competitors. Changes in the Global Organization of Production Together, competition, globalization, and technological innovation induce changes in the organization of firms and in the geographic division of production. The worldwide reach of the Internet and open access to global transportation networks make it easier for businesses everywhere to go global, by reducing the cost of setting up an international presence. Increased openness and improved communications expand the scope of the firm, allowing multinationals to apply advanced production techniques to larger markets and thus benefit from scale economies (Box 4-1). At the same time, the countries that host the multinationals’ expanded activities gain from the transfer of technology and production experience that often accompanies such activity. To help ensure that the operations of multinational enterprises are in harmony with government policies, in June 2000 the OECD member countries, joined by several nonmembers, adopted a set of voluntary guidelines for multinational enterprises. The opening of national economies and markets has given rise to global supply chains, in which production is spread across numerous locations worldwide, to take advantage of different countries’ relative strengths in producing different goods and services. This again results in improved efficiency for firms and lower prices for consumers. U.S. producers of computer hard disks, for example, have kept most of their product development operations in the United States but have shifted production to countries in Asia to take advantage of low costs of raw materials there. (It turns out that this consideration is more important in this industry than low labor costs.) But they have not gone so far as to outsource assembly to independent suppliers; it continues to be done almost entirely by the U.S. firms themselves, through foreign subsidiaries. And these firms remain among the world leaders in innovation. This runs counter to the argument that manufacturing must be done at home to maintain competitiveness. A different approach to production organization can be seen in the semiconductor industry, where the trend has been toward a split between “fabless” firms that design chips but do not operate fabrication facilities, and 150 | Economic Report of the President Box 4-1. A New Role for Multinational Firms Firms become multinational corporations when they perceive advantages to establishing production and other activities in foreign locations. Firms globalize their activities both to supply their homecountry market more cheaply and to serve foreign markets more directly. Keeping foreign activities within the corporate structure lets firms avoid the costs inherent in arm’s-length dealings with separate entities while utilizing their own firm-specific knowledge such as advanced production techniques. By internalizing what would otherwise be cross-border transactions, multinationals can bridge the information obstacles that often hinder trade. For example, they may be able to more carefully monitor product quality or worker conditions in factories they own than in those of contractors, or adapt the composition of output more quickly to changes in market conditions. Improvements in information technology have reduced the impediments to exerting corporate control across borders. These advances have combined in recent years with an increased openness on the part of governments to foreign multinationals, as the economic benefits of a foreign presence to the host country have become more widely recognized. These benefits include the increased investment and the associated jobs and income that the multinational firm brings, as well as technological transfer and improved productivity. The role of multinationals in spreading industry best practices is likely to be especially important in services, many of which are not easily traded across national boundaries. Evidence of the heightened role of multinationals can be seen in the quickened pace of foreign direct investment (FDI) in recent years. In 1999 FDI flows both in and out of OECD countries reached record levels: over 2.5 percent of their combined GDP for inflows and 3.0 percent for outflows. Most FDI is between developed countries: since 1982, 75 percent of FDI outflows from OECD countries have gone to other OECD members. Multinationals are increasingly opting to acquire existing enterprises rather than develop a foreign presence from scratch. In developed countries from 1991 to 1997, cross-border majority mergers and acquisitions accounted for 62 percent of total FDI inflows in OECD countries. The value of these mergers and acquisitions rose from $85 billion in 1991 to $558 billion in 1998. The average size of such deals rose substantially, from $29 million in 1990 to $157 million in 1999. Acquiring a foreign firm offers a relatively quick route to enter a foreign market. It can also provide intangibles in the form of country-specific knowledge, including familiarity with the host-country business culture and regulatory structure. continued on next page... Chapter 4 | 151 Box 4-1.—continued The posts and telecommunications sector appears to be particularly fertile territory for restructuring. The value of cross-border majority mergers in this sector in the period from 1995 to 1998 was nearly 10 times that from 1991 to 1994. This reflects two factors. First, dramatic changes in technology such as the growth of mobile telephony, the Internet, and the rising importance of broadband capabilities require both increased capital and first-rate technological prowess. Firms may seek to combine in order to amass the capital and technological capabilities needed to compete. Second, a worldwide movement toward deregulation in the telecommunications industry, together with policies such as auctions of cellular licenses and the liberalization of fixed telephone networks, has allowed new entrants to compete in this once-protected sector. Complementing this, the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services, which took effect in February 1998, has made progress in opening global telecommunications markets to competition. In the air transportation industry the trend has been toward global alliances rather than mergers and acquisitions. This stems from the bilateral system of route rights established under the 1944 Chicago Convention, and foreign ownership and control provisions established to protect those rights. Nonetheless, deregulation and the advent of these alliances have meant that airlines are able to serve customers through global networks. Technology has enabled these alliances to act as multinationals in some respects, with improved information technology helping to provide reasonably seamless global travel (although flights may not always be on time or provide the utmost of comfort) through the linkage of computerized reservations services. Information technology similarly allows multinational express cargo carriers to ship, track, clear through customs, and deliver goods to customers’ doors—whether the address is in Beijing or New York. “pure-play foundry firms” that produce chips from other companies’ designs. Like that of hard disks, most semiconductor design is still done in the industrial countries—North America was the home of the majority of fabless firms in 1998—while production takes place mainly in Asia. This division of labor allows U.S. firms to focus on their core competencies while benefiting from improved production techniques devised by the specialized foundries. And of course, this arrangement is feasible only because new technology allows the designing firms to rapidly transmit chip designs to the foundries, because 152 | Economic Report of the President cost-effective cargo services are available to transport finished products to markets worldwide, and because intellectual property laws are in place to safeguard the rights of designers in the producing countries. Older, more established industries can also benefit from the use of a global supply chain. In the apparel industry, for example, it is typical for high-value-added activities such as design and marketing to be performed in the United States, with assembly carried out in locations with lower production costs. The exceptions occur mainly in niches where capital-intensive techniques can be applied, such as the production of socks, or in specialty items for which labor costs are relatively less important. This division generally results in lower prices for consumers. This is not to deny, however, that there are costs to these developments, notably in the dislocation of some U.S. workers as production has shifted overseas. The effects of this dislocation and the Administration’s response are discussed at length later in this chapter. Evidence of the increased globalization of inputs to production can be seen in statistics on the activities of American multinationals. The foreign share of inputs in production by U.S.-based parent companies more than doubled from 1977 to 1997, although domestic content continues to account for more than 90 percent of their total inputs (Table 4-1). TABLE 4-1.— Source of Inputs Used in Production by U.S. Multinational Corporations at Home and in Foreign Affiliates [Percent of total value of inputs] Category 1977 1989 1997 Parents in United States: U.S. content................................................................................ Foreign content .......................................................................... 96.0 4.0 93.2 6.8 90.8 9.2 12.7 87.3 12.9 87.1 14.1 85.9 Affiliates abroad: U.S. content................................................................................ Foreign content .......................................................................... Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis). Better Technology, More Trade Just as globalization spurs innovation, so, too, do improvements in technology contribute to increased globalization. Improved communications and technology, in effect, make the world smaller. They bring a wider variety of the world’s goods, services, and information to consumers everywhere, and they lower the costs of cross-border transactions in goods, services, and financial Chapter 4 | 153 flows. These lower transactions costs should lead to increased trade and investment, which in turn lead to higher incomes. Examples of how technology lowers transactions costs abound. Firms can use sophisticated information technology to implement cost-reducing just-in-time inventory practices while managing a vast flow of components from a global web of suppliers. The cost of air freight is a fraction of what it was just 20 years ago, thanks not only to better technology but also to deregulation of global air services and the expanded use of open skies agreements. These agreements permit unrestricted service by the airlines of each country to, from, and beyond the other’s territory. The United States has entered into numerous such agreements, most recently in November 2000 with Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore. Novel though some of these cost-saving technologies are, they are in one sense nothing new, but simply the continuation of a centuries-long procession of human innovation. Declining transport costs, for example through more efficient ship design and improved navigation techniques, have been linked to the expansion of trade in Europe at least since the Middle Ages. More recently, the introduction of standardized shipping containers and systems for handling them has revolutionized the international shipping industry, yielding enormous increases in productivity. Together with improved communications, containerization has made integrated global production and distribution networks a reality. A comprehensive list of innovations that have improved the speed and lowered the cost of telecommunications would include the telegraph, the telephone, radio, television, fax machines, and most recently the Internet. Like the other advances in telecommunications that preceded it, only more so, the Internet transcends the barrier of physical distance and helps overcome geographic obstacles to economic integration. Its power to transmit vast quantities of information to and from individual users gives it great promise for lowering transactions costs and facilitating trade. Its commercial reach extends across borders; for example, one major on-line retailer reports that consumers from more than 160 different countries have visited its website. And the Internet allows not just information about products but some products themselves, such as software and entertainment, to be delivered electronically at minimal cost. This type of globalization clearly benefits consumers and entrepreneurs by expanding the variety of products available for consumption and use and providing easier access to low-cost suppliers, wherever they are located. The effect that the Internet is having on international trade is difficult to estimate, in part because it is hard to accurately measure Internet usage in some countries. One analysis of trade flows found no clear effect of the Internet in 1995 or 1996, but an increasing effect in later years. This result was found after taking into account a number of other factors that influence a country’s trade, including the size of its economy, its distance from other countries, and 154 | Economic Report of the President common borders, languages, and colonial heritage. Moreover, poor countries appear to gain more from expanded Internet access than rich countries. This suggests that access to the Internet might lessen the burden of shortcomings in traditional infrastructure that presently hinder trade for developing countries. In other words, bridging the international “digital divide” between rich and poor countries can have measurable economic benefits, not just in high-technology areas but in all sectors. The effect of the Internet on international trade might indeed be larger than even these encouraging results suggest, because that analysis covered only trade in goods—it did not include services, such as education, financial, medical, and other professional services. Yet these are likely to reap especially large benefits from the possibilities of electronic commerce. Improved communications allows for commerce in these services that were previously difficult to deliver without a physical presence. Technology and Knowledge-Based Products in U.S. Trade and Investment Flows The growing importance of technology in the U.S. economy is evident not just from anecdotal examples but in the broad patterns of the Nation’s international transactions as well. The clearest sign is the rapid growth of U.S. trade in capital goods, a category that includes items such as computers, machinery, and telecommunications equipment (Chart 4-1). Capital goods today make up 45 percent of the value of U.S. exports, by far the single largest component (Table 4-2). They also constitute the largest share of the value of U.S. imports. Since 1996, increased trade in capital goods has accounted for about 70 percent of the growth in the value of U.S. exports and nearly 30 percent of that of imports. Strong growth in both imports and exports partly reflects roundtrip trade, as components such as semiconductors are exported from the United States and then return inside computers. But it also reflects the role of trade in supporting investment through equipment imports. Within the category of capital goods, trade in information technology products has grown especially rapidly (Chart 4-2). Computers, semiconductors, and telecommunications goods now account for nearly half of the value of capital goods imports and exports. There has also been strong growth in exports of services, reflecting the growing value of ideas and of knowledge-based activities. Income from royalty and licensing fees grew by 8.3 percent each year on average from 1992 to 1999, compared with 6.5 percent a year for all services exports. Business, technical, and professional services grew at an 11 percent clip over the same period, and financial services income grew on average by 19.4 percent a year. Sales of these services are examples of “weightless” trade, since the value is in the idea or Chapter 4 | 155 TABLE 4-2.— Changing Composition of U.S. Trade Flows [Percent of total value of trade] Imports Category 19891990 Exports 19992000 19891990 19992000 Total ....................................................................... 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Autos and parts ........................................... Capital goods ................................................ 17.7 23.0 16.6 28.2 9.3 37.8 10.6 44.8 Consumer goods............................................ Food............................................................... 21.0 5.2 22.5 3.9 10.5 9.4 11.5 6.3 Industrial supplies ........................................ Other ............................................................. 27.2 5.9 21.9 6.9 25.8 7.2 20.6 6.2 Note.— Data are on a national income and product accounts basis. Estimates for 2000 are based on data for the first three quarters. Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis). service itself rather than in a material good. Although some services, such as haircuts, are not tradable (at least under current technology), there remains substantial scope for services trade to continue to grow. In 1999 services still accounted for less than 30 percent of the value of U.S. exports and less than 156 | Economic Report of the President 16 percent of imports, even though service-producing industries (excluding the government sector) accounted for 65 percent of U.S. GDP in 1998, the most recent year for which data are available. Stronger growth in our trading partners may actually favor U.S. services exports over goods exports, since there is evidence that higher income abroad stimulates foreign demand for services more than it does foreign demand for goods. New Challenges The confluence of increased globalization and improvements in communications and technology have raised U.S. economic performance and contributed to our prosperity. But these developments bring with them new challenges. The rest of this chapter focuses on six such challenges: • raising U.S. saving and thus contributing to adjustment of the current account deficit • increasing growth in our major trading partners • making sure that developing countries are not left behind • adjusting to the changes at home brought about by globalization • safeguarding the environment and labor standards, and • addressing the challenges that technologies pose for international legal institutions. Chapter 4 | 157 These challenges and the policy responses of the Administration are discussed below. The U.S. Trade Balance and Current Account The recent rapid growth in investment and the resulting strong performance of the U.S. economy have contributed to an increase in the Nation’s trade deficit. Robust income growth and increased wealth from rising asset prices have contributed to higher domestic consumption, and thus to rapid growth in imports. Growth was slower in major U.S. trading partners in Europe and Asia than in the United States in 1998 and the first part of 1999 (Chart 4-3). This contributed to weaker import demand in those regions and slower growth of U.S. exports. A strong dollar, reflecting in part capital inflows from foreigners eager to participate in attractive investment opportunities in the United States, has also contributed to the growing trade deficit by lowering prices of foreign-made goods relative to those of U.S. products. Through the first three quarters of 2000, the trade balance in goods and services was about $270 billion in deficit. That would correspond to roughly $360 billion for the whole year, or about 3.6 percent of GDP (Chart 4-4). Meanwhile the current account (a comprehensive measure that comprises not only the trade balance in goods and services but also net income and transfers) recorded a deficit of roughly 4.3 percent of GDP (Chart 4-5). 158 | Economic Report of the President Chapter 4 | 159 The current account balance equals by definition the difference between national saving and national investment. A current account deficit reflects an excess of investment over domestic saving, and thus an inflow of foreign capital that makes up for the shortfall. The widened current account deficit reflects the fact that although net saving has risen, net domestic investment has risen even more. The share of net domestic investment in GDP (Chart 4-5) grew by 4.6 percentage points from 1992 through the first three quarters of 2000 (from 4.8 percent to 9.4 percent), while the share of net national saving rose by only 2.3 percentage points (from 3.5 percent to 5.8 percent). What explains the willingness of the rest of the world to provide the United States with the capital inflows needed to finance its current account deficit? The answer is simply that the attractive opportunities for investment in the United States today exceed those in other countries. This can be seen by comparing the deficits of today with the comparably large (as a percentage of GDP) deficits of the 1980s. In the earlier decade, most of the inflows went to the purchase of U.S. government debt securities. The more recent inflows, in contrast, have mainly been invested in privately issued assets. Indeed, much of the inflow has come in the form of foreign direct investment (equity investment for purposes of control of the enterprise) rather than purchases of bonds or portfolio equity participation: the value of inward direct investment into the United States rose from $51 billion in 1993 to $271 billion in 1999. With saving from the rest of the world continuing to flow to the United States, the U.S. net international investment position—the value of U.S. assets abroad less the value of foreign assets in the United States—will continue to turn more negative. At the end of 1999 the net international investment position was approaching a negative $1.5 trillion, or almost 16 percent of GDP that year; foreigners held more than $8.6 trillion of U.S. assets, while Americans held foreign assets valued at more than $7.1 trillion. Part of the income from these international investment holdings consists of retained earnings and reinvested dividends and interest payments, which are recorded as an outflow in the current account and an offsetting inflow in the capital account. This would tend to raise the apparent magnitude of capital flows. On net, however, income on investment now flows out of the United States, as foreigners repatriate earnings on their U.S. investments by a greater amount than Americans are bringing their earnings on foreign investments back to the United States. The availability of foreign saving has permitted the United States to maintain the high rate of investment that has expanded productive capacity and raised economic performance. This shows that foreign capital inflows are not in themselves a bad thing: it is better to finance attractive investment opportunities using foreign capital than not to undertake them at all. But our income would be even higher if that investment were financed instead by domestic 160 | Economic Report of the President saving. Saving trends in the United States over the last several years present a mixed picture. From 1992 through the third quarter of 2000, the share of net saving by the public sector (Federal, State, and local governments) in GDP has risen by 7.8 percentage points. But this rise has been largely offset by a decline in the share of net private saving of 5.5 percentage points. Higher private saving would help to ensure the continued ability of the United States to finance domestic investment. The saving rate can be raised without threatening continued strong growth in income if the composition of demand for U.S. goods shifts, with external demand replacing some domestic consumption. In the meantime, it is important to maintain public saving, through continued fiscal discipline at all levels of government, in order to support national saving. It is difficult to say what level of the current account balance would be most appropriate. But if some adjustment in the current account is deemed necessary, the way it is accomplished matters. It would be better to reduce the current account deficit through higher domestic saving than through lower investment, because reducing investment would mean a smaller capital stock and thus lower national income than would otherwise be the case. In the best of all possible world economies, increased growth in the rest of the world would lead to increased U.S. exports, which would compensate for the reduced domestic demand that higher domestic saving would entail, and thus maintain strong income growth in the United States. More rapid growth abroad would cause saving by foreigners to shift from the accumulation of U.S. assets to investment in their own domestic economies, made newly attractive by their increased domestic growth. The rebound in investment abroad would further spur U.S. exports, which, as we have seen, consist largely of capital goods. Opening foreign markets can play a role in adjustment by encouraging U.S. exports. In contrast, efforts to narrow the trade deficit or the current account by raising barriers to imports into the United States would likely make the economy less efficient and thus lower national income, without necessarily increasing national saving. Raising Performance in Other Countries At present, the U.S. current account deficit is supporting too large a share of the global economic expansion. It would be desirable for other countries to take steps to accelerate their growth and promote a smooth return to a more balanced global distribution of growth. As this adjustment occurs, the U.S. current account deficit should return to levels in line with the historical U.S. saving and investment relationship. To ensure sustained, balanced global growth, the major industrial economies need to maintain supportive fiscal and monetary policies and push ahead with structural reforms to remove barriers to investment opportunities (including opportunities for new technologies). Chapter 4 | 161 The same innovations that have raised economic performance in the United States would likewise be expected to raise foreign productivity and growth as those innovations are adopted abroad. The global diffusion of innovative technology is thus one avenue through which to increase growth in other countries. Technological development is not a race, where the first to make a discovery is the only winner. The spread of our own technological discoveries to other countries leads to higher productivity and economic growth in those countries, raising their incomes and thus creating new opportunities for innovative and competitive U.S. firms to export. And when productivity rises in other countries, the prices of the goods they produce fall, and to the extent that these goods are exported to the United States, Americans benefit from lower prices and greater choice. Throughout the 1990s, the beneficial effects of technology on productivity and growth appear to have been enjoyed most strongly in the United States. Although growth has rebounded in Europe and the emerging market economies of East Asia, these events so far appear to be cyclical rather than structural in nature. That is, recovery in these countries seems to be bringing them back up to their economic potential, but not yet accelerating the expansion of that potential. The situation in the United States has been otherwise. From 1995 to 2000, according to OECD estimates, potential output in the United States grew at an annual rate of 3.5 percent, compared with only 2.2 percent for the countries that have adopted the euro, and only 1.4 percent for Japan (Chart 4-6). Growth in total factor productivity—the 162 | Economic Report of the President efficiency with which capital and labor are used in combination—also lags in most European and other industrial countries, with little sign of the acceleration the United States has experienced over the past several years (Chart 4-7). The lagging pace of investment in information technology in much of Europe compared with the United States may be one reason for the divergence in trend growth. This lag is evident even after taking into account differences in the measurement of purchases of high-technology products (Box 4-2). The United States also leads other industrial countries on several measures of the usage of information technology, including numbers of telephone lines, Internet hosts, and secure servers used in e-commerce (Chart 4-8). Yet the United States is not ahead in every aspect of information technology: wireless technology has taken off in Europe far more than in the United States. There are some signs that the use of the new technologies whose pervasiveness has so benefited the United States is beginning to approach critical mass in other advanced economies, including Germany, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries, and the United Kingdom. For example, Germany now boasts a technology-oriented stock market similar to the Nasdaq, the Neuer Markt, and is reported to have the largest European contingent of Internet enterprises, larger even than in the United Kingdom. Firms in Scandinavia are innovators in important areas of technology, notably wireless communication. Perhaps not coincidentally, the Nordic Chapter 4 | 163 Box 4-2. Information Technology and Cross-Country Differences in Measuring Economic Growth The rapid rate of technological improvement in information technology products makes it difficult to distinguish between changes in prices and changes in quantities produced. Statisticians face the problem that traditional price indexes fail to adequately account for quality changes in the face of rapid technological change: a computer that cost $2,500 in 2000 provides several times the computing power of a $2,500 computer only a few years earlier. To account for rapid quality upgrading in computing equipment, the United States has adopted a hedonic price deflator for computers and hardware, which measures computing power as a combination of characteristics such as processor clock speed, memory capacity, and hard disk size. Using this methodology, computer prices in the United States are estimated to have fallen at an average rate of 17 percent per year since 1990, and 24 percent per year since 1997. Growth in the volume of computer sales contributed nearly 1 percentage point to real GDP growth in 1999, even though the value of computer spending in current dollars accounted for less than 0.1 percentage point of nominal GDP growth. The use of this hedonic index makes international comparisons of information technology spending difficult, since most other countries do not use hedonic price indexes (exceptions include Canada, France, and Japan). Using traditional measures that do not fully adjust for quality improvements understates real computer expenditure and thus overall real investment. This in turn lowers the statistical measure of output and affects productivity calculations. Compared with the United States, a country using a traditional price deflator appears to produce less high-technology output for any given amount of inputs such as workers and nontechnology capital. Applying the U.S. deflator to German information technology investment, for example, results in a substantially larger measure of real investment—as much as 170 percent larger—than with the traditional deflator. Over the period since 1991, use of a hedonic price index would have implied that real investment in information technology equipment in Germany increased at a rate of 27.5 percent per year, versus 6 percent using the traditional approach. However, even after correcting for the different statistical methodologies, investment and GDP growth in the United States remain far stronger than in Europe. A study that applied the U.S. deflator for information technology investment to France found that the contribution of this investment to growth was similar for the two countries continued on next page... 164 | Economic Report of the President Box 4-2.—continued from 1973 to 1990, but that investment then grew by twice as much in the United States from 1995 to 1998. An alternative approach found that the contribution of information technology investment to growth in France was smaller than in the United States before 1990 as well as in more recent years. Another study took the difference between the price index for U.S. information technology investment and the price index of all other investment goods and applied this to non– information technology price indexes in other G-7 countries to derive a new price index. The contribution of information technology equipment to GDP growth from 1990 to 1996 was found to be still nearly twice as large in the United States as in most other G-7 countries. Only the United Kingdom and Canada experienced contributions to growth of even two-thirds that of the United States. The difficulty of accurately measuring the rapid technological change occurring in information technology makes international growth comparisons difficult, but it does not qualitatively affect a comparison of growth in the United States with that in many other industrial countries. The success story of the U.S. economy is more than a statistical artifact. Chapter 4 | 165 countries (excluding Denmark) benefited more from higher total factor productivity growth in the latter half of the 1990s than did other European countries. Meanwhile other developed countries that have lagged in productivity growth are attempting to catch up. Japan, for example, has recently taken steps to deregulate its telecommunications industry and provide incentives for firms to upgrade their information technology equipment and employee skills. Burgeoning information technology sectors have also begun to appear in some developing countries. One notable example is the development of an Indian software programming industry. However, additional policy steps are needed to ensure that these countries fully enjoy the benefits of the new technologies. The Importance of Institutions and Policy In addition to removing barriers to international trade, improved economic performance requires a combination of institutions that facilitate the allocation of human and financial resources to activities with the highest rates of return. These include flexible labor markets, efficient capital markets, and government regulatory structures that encourage competition. Labor Market Flexibility Flexibility of labor markets has been an important aspect of economic success in the United States. This flexibility encompasses both the ability of workers with desirable skills to switch to more rewarding jobs, and the ability of firms to adapt their work force to changing economic prospects. It also entails a work force that can adapt to new technologies and production techniques, businesses that effectively manage human resources, and pro-competitive government policies, such as supportive tax regimes that encourage investments in new skills and technologies. Among OECD member countries from 1980 to 1997, those with relatively low tax rates on labor income, and low costs to firms of restructuring their work force, generally had lower rates of unemployment and higher rates of job creation than other countries. Labor market flexibility is particularly important in high-technology industries, where the pace of innovation and industry evolution is especially rapid. The important role of research and development in these industries means that sophisticated human capital—strong education, specialized skills, and the ability to innovate—becomes an essential input. Expanding firms must be able to attract skilled workers, who are the main users and producers of technology; indeed, the movement of labor between technology firms has been found to be an important channel for knowledge transfer. This includes movement of skilled workers across borders. Immigrants, 166 | Economic Report of the President especially from India and Taiwan, have made important contributions to high-technology firms in the United States. Here too, U.S. policy has supported labor market flexibility, by allowing firms to bring in highly skilled foreign workers through the recently expanded H-1B visa program, while providing assistance for training of U.S. workers. Capital Market Efficiency The efficiency of capital markets in the United States has also contributed to the superior economic performance we have seen. The more widespread availability in this country of equity finance, including venture capital, facilitates business creation and propels the development of new technologies. In contrast, in Japan and some European countries, banks and other large financial institutions provide most business financing, hold some firm equity, and usually exert a measure of corporate control. These differences between the two systems give rise to different incentive structures. Returns to bank loans are limited by the interest rate; returns to equity investments are determined by profits and capital gains. This makes bank lending better suited to financing low-risk activities, whereas an equity-based system has the potential to generate greater capital investment in activities where expected returns are high but uncertain. When most job creation and investment are undertaken by large and established firms, these differences in the mode of financing are not likely to be important, since such companies finance most investment out of their own retained earnings. However, it is likely that the performance of the two systems will diverge in high-technology sectors, for at least two reasons. In the telecommunications sector, the large outlays required to finance the emerging new technologies could well exceed the financing available from retained earnings and from banks. In other areas of information technology, banks have not been especially successful in supporting the new firms that play an important role in generating innovation. These considerations put the bank-centered systems of Europe and Japan at a relative disadvantage. In contrast, economies that have liquid, efficient capital markets tend to invest more heavily in research and development activity, and particularly in high-technology startups. Venture capital has flourished in the equity-based U.S. system as an important financing mode for risky new enterprises, since the returns on venture capital can best be realized when firms can readily issue new equity to the public. Of course, it is not impossible for information technology startups to be financed within the framework of bank-oriented systems, but such systems have had difficulty matching the success of the equity finance model. In Europe and Japan, for example, venture capital is supplied primarily through the financing arms of banks and other financial corporations. Venture capital in these countries has thus far tended to focus Chapter 4 | 167 on the later stages of firm development, or to finance leveraged buyouts of existing firms rather than fund the creation of new ones. The distinctions between the two systems may be eroding in continental Europe. For example, the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP has been trending upward in many of these countries since the mid-1990s, although in most of them it remains well below the U.S. level. The form of firm ownership and control also influences the creation and diffusion of information technology. In the “outsider” model of corporate governance common in the United States and the United Kingdom, management is given incentives to focus on stockholder returns, and minority shareholders enjoy substantial protections. In contrast, the “insider” model common in Japan and continental Europe gives more power to other stakeholders, including large ownership groups such as banks as well as employees and management itself. The insider model may allow stakeholders to more effectively monitor management efforts in a way that avoids a focus on shortterm financial results. But there is evidence that in recent years the outsider model has fostered superior performance, including a more rapid pace of research and development, investment, and technological diffusion. The Role of the Regulatory Framework The need for flexibility applies to the institutions of government as well. Regulatory frameworks must be transparent and avoid raising hurdles to the creation of new businesses. Startup firms are a vehicle for the introduction of new products and techniques, since they face a lower opportunity cost of switching to newer, better technologies. Moreover, the presence (or the threat) of new entrants limits the possibility of monopolistic behavior by incumbents. A challenge in this regard is how to distinguish regulation that is necessary to prevent anticompetitive behavior, and thus promote innovation, from regulation that hinders innovation. This can be a difficult task when large, potentially monopolistic firms are also among the most innovative. Ensuring that domestic markets are open to competition has been found to be particularly important in the telecommunications industry. Here as elsewhere, competition leads to lower prices; in telecommunications it also spurs increased investment and network size. But it is in the nature of networks to tend toward monopoly, in part because of the scale economies discussed above. Hence regulatory authorities must be vigilant. Privatization of state-owned telecommunications firms has also been found to lead to lower costs and increased usage. But for this to occur, privatization must be complemented by effective regulatory oversight so that a dominant firm does not impede competition by new entrants, through such means as excessive charges for connecting competitors’ calls over the “last 168 | Economic Report of the President mile” of telephone line to homes or businesses. An inexpensive, high-quality telecommunications network is not only a basic element of the business infrastructure of any modern economy but also an important determinant of the adoption of information technology, in particular the Internet. Raising Incomes in Developing Countries The global imperative to combat poverty and support economic development in the poorest countries gains added urgency today, when the AIDS epidemic, international and civil conflict, and other catastrophes threaten to reverse years of gains in many countries. The divergence in national incomes between the developed and the developing world continues not because so many countries are effectively integrating themselves into the global economy, but because so many are not. Bridging this gap remains a challenge for economic development. Meanwhile the emergence of new technologies threatens to create an international “digital divide” parallel to, and to some degree predicated on, that in economic development. Economic integration holds out enormous potential for improving the lives of the world’s people through increased access to goods, services, and ideas. Economies that are relatively open to international trade and investment appear to grow faster than closed economies, although it is difficult to separate out the causal linkages between openness and growth. The growth-enhancing effects of economic integration are especially vital for the poorest of developing countries, because a central lesson of history has been that rapid and sustained economic growth is essential to rapid and long-lasting reductions in poverty. But for this to happen, globalization must proceed in a stable global economy, so that it can be harnessed to advance a prosperity that is shared by all. Ensuring a Stable Global Economy Growth in global flows of private capital has accompanied and in many cases supported growth in trade. Access to global capital helps countries finance their expanding trade. It is also a vehicle for the development and transfer of new technology and a creator of new economic opportunities. But wherever there is finance, there is the inherent risk of financial crisis. In tandem with the global expansion of capital flows, therefore, policies and institutions must be developed that minimize this risk while maximizing the potential of capital flows to support rapid growth. A well-functioning system that ensures a strong and stable flow of capital to emerging economies is a crucial part of building a successful, truly global, economy. The recent financial crises in Asia and elsewhere have underlined the economic and humanitarian imperatives of a stronger international financial architecture. The memory is still fresh of how millions of people around the Chapter 4 | 169 world, many of them poor people going about the business of improving their lives, instead saw their lives turned upside down when their countries’ financial systems were thrown into crisis. The international community must work diligently to provide the greatest possible assurance that such crises will be less frequent—and less costly—in the future. Making crises less frequent and less costly means having a clear understanding of what has caused them in the past. There is now widespread agreement that the financial crises of the late 1990s were caused by two elements coming together. The first was weakness in many countries’ economic fundamentals, including weak banking systems, questionable investments, domestic credit bubbles (supported by large amounts of short-term external debt), unsustainable exchange rates, and in some cases, deteriorating fiscal positions. These weaknesses were thrown into relief when international investors began to reassess these countries’ capacity to safely absorb large amounts of foreign capital. The second element was an element of panic, as the focus of domestic and foreign investors shifted from being the first to discover the latest new opportunities in these countries, to how to avoid being the last out the door. This understanding of the causes of the crisis is increasingly informing the redesign of the international financial architecture. This shows itself in three fundamental ways: • More effective means of preventing crises. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has strengthened its surveillance of the global economy, with a focus on preventing the adoption of policies that create vulnerabilities and thus augment the risk of financial panic. Reform is proceeding on several fronts: toward a revolution in the transparency of national macroeconomic frameworks that will make surprises less likely; toward the development of a wide-ranging framework of international codes and standards, to provide benchmarks for national policies in areas such as bank supervision and securities market regulation; and toward more systematic incorporation of indicators of liquidity and balance sheet risks in IMF surveillance reports. • Safer policies in the emerging market economies. Here there are already signs of progress as a result of greater global understanding and wariness of economic risks. For example, the ratio of short-term external debt to foreign reserves has nearly halved since 1996 in those countries that experienced liquidity crises in the late 1990s. In the same countries, short-term debt fell from 34 percent of total external debt in 1996 to 21 percent in 1999. Some 14 countries have moved away from unstable pegged exchange rate systems. But constant vigilance is needed to make sure that problems do not reemerge. 170 | Economic Report of the President • An IMF that is better equipped for modern crisis response. With the creation of the Supplemental Reserve Facility and the Contingent Credit Line, and more recently with the November 2000 decision of the IMF’s executive board on the reform of IMF facilities, the IMF now has tools that are a match for the kinds of crises that today threaten the global economy. The design of these facilities seeks to avoid, as far as possible, distorting the incentives both of private investors and of governments. IMF policy is increasingly oriented toward providing short-term, emergency finance, priced to discourage its casual use and to encourage rapid repayment. These changes have been accompanied by efforts to increase the flow of information to financial markets and to improve communication between borrowing countries and their creditors. They also build on the experience gained in recent cases of debt restructuring, putting in practical terms the broad guidelines on private sector involvement in crisis resolution outlined by the Group of Seven (G-7) major industrial countries in July 2000. A stable international economy is not enough to ensure rapid and sustained growth. Governments need to put in place institutions and rules that allow markets to function well. Governments also need to promote the effective rule of law, through good governance, transparent decisionmaking, and support for the emergence of a healthy civil society. Overcoming the Global Digital Divide In the same way that a lack of access to international trade and capital markets hinders growth in the least developed countries, an issue now arises with the new networks of information. The rapid pace of technological advance threatens to create an international digital divide that leaves some developing countries lagging ever further behind the more advanced economies. This is a particular concern for less developed countries in SubSaharan Africa; it is less of a concern for many emerging market economies in East Asia and Latin America, which are already experiencing rapidly expanding use of technology and increased access to the Internet. Some argue that acquiring advanced technology should be a relatively low priority for countries still struggling to meet basic needs, such as clean water and adequate health care, and to lower their poverty rates. Recent studies suggest, however, that information technology (including telecommunications) not only can address some of these basic needs, but may also generate higher social returns than more traditional infrastructure investment. The effects of information technology on growth and development are difficult to assess, but some studies have found a positive correlation between the stock of telecommunications capital and economic growth. Evidence on the Chapter 4 | 171 success of individual projects suggests that this association reflects more than just rising demand for technology as a country’s income rises. Information technology holds great potential to raise incomes and improve the quality of education, health care, and public services. It makes it easier for individuals to both obtain and disseminate the information they need to empower themselves, and it promotes a more active civil society. Of course, information technology is not a panacea for the problems of development; each country’s circumstances will ultimately govern its decision whether to invest in technology or in other projects. Seizing the opportunities that technology offers to developing countries requires the right policies. Despite the potential for high returns, gaps in policies and institutions can lead to significant underinvestment in information technology in these countries. Obstacles to the diffusion of information technology and its applications, such as e-commerce, are in large measure the same as the impediments to economic development more broadly. These include a lack of well-developed credit markets to channel domestic saving to productive investments, deficiencies in basic infrastructure, and shortcomings in education. Moreover, institutions in many developing countries lack the capabilities to enforce property rights and provide an effective set of commercial laws. The result is that individuals and firms hesitate to invest in costly equipment and software even when the potential rates of return are high. Developing countries also face a number of underlying problems that hinder the increased use of new technology. These include: • High costs to users. At current prices, information technology may be prohibitively expensive for most potential users in developing countries. And in many countries the presence of a monopoly telecommunications provider keeps prices high and network size and usage low. However, creative financing structures and business plans can overcome this obstacle, as exemplified by thriving Internet cafés in several developing countries. Another example comes from Bangladesh, where individuals (often women) use microcredit financing to purchase a single cell phone, which they then profitably rent out to others in the community. • Human capacity. A country’s successful assimilation of information technology requires a generally educated populace. Developing countries cannot make full use of information technology without the right training and skills. • Applications. Applications of information technology that have been successfully marketed in developed countries may not be well suited to conditions in developing countries. Local communities and nongovernmental organizations have demonstrated remarkable ingenuity in adapting 172 | Economic Report of the President information technology to local uses such as micro e-commerce, distance education, and the dissemination of public health information. However, software companies must still be encouraged to develop applications that do not require high bandwidth or high levels of literacy or English proficiency. Not all the elements are yet in place for market forces to close the international digital divide. Developing countries need help in narrowing the parallel gaps in policy, infrastructure, and training before they can successfully harness information technology for economic development. In 1999 the United States launched the Internet for Economic Development Initiative to provide targeted assistance in these areas to a number of developing countries. The United States has also been active in providing direct support for high-technology infrastructure in developing countries. The Leland Initiative has provided African countries with financial and technical assistance aimed at helping them benefit from increased Internet connectivity. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation has established a $200 million credit line for U.S. companies seeking support for projects that will help developing countries close the digital divide. The United States has also provided assistance with policy development; for example, the Federal Communications Commission has helped developing countries devise appropriate regulatory regimes. The Okinawa Charter promulgated by the G-8 countries (the G-7 plus Russia) in July 2000 provides a framework within which work can proceed on policy development, human capacity building, and brokering of private-public partnerships to diffuse information. It also established the Digital Opportunity Task Force, or DOTforce, to coordinate policy formation to implement these general principles and help catalyze resource allocation to remedy shortcomings that the private sector alone cannot. Investment in information technology can contribute greatly to economic development. Market forces will ultimately provide the dynamism to drive information technology investment, but policymakers need to establish the conditions in which these forces can flourish. Adjusting to Change at Home Globalization and the effects of technology pose challenges at home as well. Even though the increased openness of the United States to the international economy provides substantial benefits for the Nation as a whole, not everyone gains. The rewards of improved technology and increased globalization are not spread equally: for some, change inevitably means dislocation. Therefore an important complement to the Administration’s international economic policy has been assistance to those here at home adversely affected by changes in technology or increased globalization. Chapter 4 | 173 A number of Federal programs help individuals obtain the tools they need to succeed in the New Economy. The Dislocated Worker Program provides services to workers who have lost their jobs and are unlikely to return to their previous industry or occupation, as well as to formerly self-employed persons and displaced homemakers no longer supported by the income of another family member. The available benefits include assistance with job search and placement, individual counseling and career planning, and training assistance. Some workers also receive financial support toward transportation and child care expenses. It is estimated that around 836,000 people participated in the program in fiscal 2000. Workers affected by international competition receive support from programs such as Trade Adjustment Assistance and NAFTA Transitional Adjustment Assistance. Benefits include training, job search aid, and relocation allowances. An estimated 175,000 workers were eligible for assistance in fiscal 1999; of these, nearly 40 percent were cited as having been affected by trade with our NAFTA partners. In addition to giving financial support to individuals, government can serve as a catalyst in helping whole communities adjust to dislocation. The Administration has proposed the Community Economic Adjustment Initiative, now being implemented in a pilot program in Connecticut. This initiative would bring together resources from across the Federal Government to provide coordinated assistance and information on new employment opportunities, along the lines of the successful approach taken in response to military base closures. Assistance would be provided to communities in two stages: first to assess their resources and needs, and then to develop an economic response. Government agencies would also help connect displaced workers with enterprises seeking to bolster their work force or looking for locations in which to expand. As a further step, a Commission on Workers, Communities, and Economic Change in the New Economy, established by the President, will examine the effectiveness of Federal programs that help with adjustment and identify the best practices of employers, communities, and public-private partnerships that have responded successfully to economic dislocations. Dislocation is an unavoidable side effect of economic growth and technological change. Economic progress—whether it results from changes brought about by globalization, technology, institutions, or regulation— affects workers in various ways, not always for the better. Wages change in industries impacted by new competition, jobs shift from industry to industry and from location to location, and the range of jobs available within a firm or factory changes as well. All these factors interact: competitive pressure, domestic or foreign, might lead a firm to adopt new technology, which in turn might eliminate the need for some workers while creating jobs for others to develop and manage the technology. Such changes in the skill mix have been the predominant factor in past changes in employment: around 174 | Economic Report of the President 70 percent of changes in employment in U.S. manufacturing as a whole in the 1980s resulted from a shift from relatively low-skilled workers to highskilled workers within the same industry. That is, jobs did not, as a rule, move from industries that faced foreign competition to those that did not; instead the types of jobs available changed as firms shifted their labor force toward more highly skilled workers. This evidence suggests that worker displacement is largely the result of changes in technology rather than the result of import competition, since the latter would have been expected to lead to employment declines in certain affected industries rather than changes in the composition of employment. A similar phenomenon can be observed in the behavior of multinational firms. Increased production by foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational enterprises in the 1980s and early 1990s has been found to lead to increased domestic employment—in other words, parent and foreign employment rose together, not one at the expense of the other. But here, too, the composition of jobs changed, with domestic employment shifting to jobs requiring higher skill, such as design and management, while production jobs often moved overseas. A number of studies of U.S. multinationals in the 1980s and early 1990s similarly found that the shift of production activities to developing countries had little overall effect on wages in the parent company. To be sure, these findings mean only that import competition and outsourcing did not have large overall effects on employment or wages. Behind the aggregate numbers are individual people whose lives have been disrupted by the shift toward more highly skilled workers and high-technology jobs. The differing impact of globalization on different groups of workers is reflected in public opinion surveys, which suggest that how one perceives the effects of increased trade depends on one’s level of skill. Less skilled workers are more likely to favor trade protection than are workers with relatively high skills. This is understandable: globalization contributes, as we have seen, to technological change, and technological change favors workers with higher levels of skills and education. This makes globalization especially threatening to less skilled, less educated workers. Anxiety about dislocation and job loss will thus likely remain so long as the pace of technological change remains rapid. This evidence further emphasizes the need for policies to ensure that individuals adversely affected by globalization and technological change are not left behind but instead receive help to take advantage of new opportunities created in the dynamic U.S. economy. Trade and the Environment and Labor Standards This Administration has made a commitment that at the same time that trade fosters openness and prosperity, it must also protect global natural resources and be consonant with our national values. This means making Chapter 4 | 175 sure that trade liberalization takes account of the environmental effects of economic activity and complements policies that seek cleaner air, cleaner water, and protection of our natural heritage, while still promoting growth. It also includes making sure that trade liberalization does not hinder countries’ adherence to labor standards. Indeed, growth in trade and the economy should be accompanied by respect for recognized core labor standards and the elimination of practices such as exploitative child labor. In support of the Nation’s environmental goals, the President in November 1999 issued an executive order mandating environmental review of certain trade agreements, including multilateral and bilateral free-trade agreements and major agreements in natural resource sectors. The recently signed freetrade agreement between the United States and Jordan includes provisions addressing trade and the environment and, for the first time ever in the text of a trade agreement, provisions on labor standards. (Such standards were addressed in side letters to NAFTA but not in the agreement itself.) Increased globalization need not conflict with improved environmental standards and social protections. To the contrary, international trade can contribute to a cleaner environment, by giving all countries access to technologies and production methods that help prevent pollution and conserve natural resources. Examples include technologies that promote energy efficiency and reduce polluting emissions from automobiles and factories. Liberalized international investment policies can also contribute: multinational corporations that invest in new plants in developing countries can bring with them global best practices in environmental and labor standards. Challenges for Legal Frameworks Technological change and globalization present a number of new challenges for international legal frameworks. Law Enforcement Globalization and the possibilities created by new technology raise new challenges for the legal system in combating cross-border criminal activities. These activities include the unleashing of destructive computer viruses, violations of computer security, and the use of the Internet for the sale of illegal products, for tax evasion, and to disguise the origin of illegally generated funds. An important issue here is that of determining jurisdiction. Using the Internet, a single person with modest resources, operating from anywhere, can undertake criminal activity that has consequences for the entire world. A recent example is the proliferation of the “I Love You” computer virus, which allegedly originated in the Philippines but caused worldwide problems with e-mail systems. 176 | Economic Report of the President To begin to address these issues, the National Plan for Information Systems Protection established the first national strategy for protecting computer networks from deliberate attack, and the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security was set up to maximize cooperation between government and private sector initiatives in the area of cybersecurity. The G-8 countries have also agreed to work together to combat the use of the Internet for international criminal activity. The same improvements in technology and communications that have made global capital flows more liquid also pose new challenges for law enforcement. A computer network that can efficiently transfer massive amounts of capital to productive uses can with equal ease transfer funds obtained illicitly without being detected. The challenges include both tax evasion and the illegal practice of money laundering, in which individuals seek to disguise the origin of funds generated through criminal activity. To combat these activities within an international framework, the United States has participated in the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), a multilateral group that develops recommendations covering criminal justice systems, law enforcement, financial market regulation, and international cooperation. The FATF took a major step forward in June 2000, when it identified 15 jurisdictions as noncooperative in the fight against money laundering. That action prodded several of the listed jurisdictions to take steps to combat the practice. Meanwhile the finance ministers of the G-7 countries announced the coordinated issuance of advisories to their domestic financial institutions, urging them to give enhanced scrutiny to transactions involving the identified jurisdictions. Taxation The growing globalization of financial transactions also raises issues for taxation, because technological advances in this area can facilitate tax evasion as well as tax avoidance. Tax evasion is any effort to escape the payment of taxes actually due, and is illegal. The OECD has taken steps to combat tax evasion in cross-border transactions, notably by promoting the exchange of information among national tax authorities. This includes evaluating barriers to the effective exchange of information as well as examining ways in which information technology can be used to combat the problem. Tax inspectors from the OECD countries regularly meet to share information about the detection of evasion and avoidance schemes in financial transactions. Tax avoidance, in contrast, is the arrangement of one’s affairs so as not to incur taxes on one’s economic activity in any national jurisdiction. Unlike tax evasion, tax avoidance is not illegal per se—indeed, a major reason why it exists is that some countries actively encourage it, by setting up preferential tax regimes to attract multinational corporations. However, tax avoidance Chapter 4 | 177 can distort the global allocation of capital and lead to an unequal distribution among countries of the burden of raising tax revenue. The United States has participated in OECD initiatives to identify and limit policies that give rise to harmful tax avoidance and erode countries’ tax bases. Such policies include the lack of effective exchange of tax information with other countries, lack of transparency within national tax systems, and discrimination in favor of foreign investors. OECD members have committed not to introduce new measures that strengthen such features of their tax systems, and to remove the identified harmful features by April 2003. The initiative has also identified 35 jurisdictions as tax havens—locations in which the tax regime facilitates harmful tax avoidance. Six jurisdictions examined as tax havens but not included on this list have already agreed to eliminate harmful features of their tax regimes by the end of 2005. The 35 listed jurisdictions have been given the opportunity to consider such cooperation in advance of a July 2001 publication of a list of uncooperative tax havens, and the adoption by OECD members of policies aimed at directly addressing the concerns thus raised. Tax practices will also have to evolve to address the new possibilities of a globalized economy. For example, a software product might be conceptualized in the United States, programmed in India, manufactured in Singapore, and then sold all over the world. In such situations it may be difficult to allocate the resulting income in an accounting sense for purposes of assigning tax liability. This issue arises as well with electronic commerce. The global nature of the Internet confounds present definitions of geographic origin and even of what constitutes a transaction. This complicates both the identification of the jurisdiction to which taxes are due and the collection of those taxes. Because the structure of the Internet makes it difficult to trace the identity or even the location of those involved in a taxable activity, national authorities are understandably concerned about the erosion of revenue as activities shift away from “bricks and mortar” firms to amorphous entities operating in cyberspace. Indeed, countries have already encountered difficulties in assigning and collecting taxes on goods ordered through the Internet but delivered in physical form. Future trade agreements will have to address the status of cross-border trade in electronically delivered products, many of which combine features of both goods and services. To foster growth in electronic commerce, the Administration led the 1998 initiative in the WTO in which members agreed to place a temporary moratorium on duties on electronic transmissions. But electronic commerce is transforming what was formerly trade in goods, such as software diskettes or music on compact disks, into the bits and bytes of purely electronic transmissions. Under the 1998 moratorium these transactions escape international duties, even though otherwise identical products delivered in physical form face the customary tariff regime. 178 | Economic Report of the President The leaders of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation countries, in their November 2000 Brunei declaration, called for a WTO task force to address the treatment of these items in international commerce. Intellectual Property Protection of the intellectual property generated by innovation is crucial to preserving the incentives for the creators of knowledge to continue to innovate. In an international context, differences in legal frameworks and social attitudes toward property rights for these intangible goods can make such protection difficult to establish or enforce. The Administration has been instrumental in pushing for international standards of intellectual property protection, notably through the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement included in the Uruguay Round agreement. That agreement has led most U.S. trading partners to adopt modern laws to protect intellectual property and improve enforcement. In addition, the Administration has continued the rigorous review of our trading partners’ intellectual property protection. This includes use of the Special 301 provision of U.S. trade law, under which the United States identifies countries that do not provide adequate and effective protection of intellectual property or that deny equitable market access to U.S. holders of intellectual property. Enforcement has been a priority. Since 1996 the United States has filed 14 intellectual property–related complaints with the WTO against countries with lax intellectual property laws. These actions have paid off in increased U.S. exports to countries that are technology imitators. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has also provided assistance to numerous foreign countries seeking to improve their intellectual property systems. The Administration has also taken steps to assist developing countries in addressing certain critical health issues peculiar to those countries, while encouraging the implementation of international treaty obligations concerning intellectual property rights. The United States is helping developing countries gain access to essential medicines through the Millennium Vaccine Initiative, which is designed to accelerate the development of vaccines for such diseases as AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. These are diseases that disproportionately affect poor countries and to which private firms might not otherwise devote concentrated research efforts. The initiative includes a proposal for sharply increased funding for disease and vaccine research, as well as $50 million for the vaccine purchase fund of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, a $1 billion tax credit for sales of new vaccines, and the securing of over $150 million in vaccine donations from U.S. corporations. The Administration has also called on multilateral development banks such as the World Bank to increase their concessional lending to basic health care services by $400 million to $900 million annually. In addition, a joint initiative of the U.S. Trade Representative and Chapter 4 | 179 the Department of Health and Human Services is seeking ways to provide direct and effective assistance to developing countries to help them effectively address major health crises. Making Globalization Work The continuing challenge for international economic policy will be to ensure that globalization proceeds in a way that allows the United States and the rest of the world to enjoy its benefits, while at the same time seeing that the gains are universally shared. Policies aimed at continued liberalization of capital, labor, and goods markets will help speed economic growth, the diffusion of technology, and the expansion of international trade and investment. It is all too easy—and wrong—to frame the choice as one between unfettered, unregulated global capitalism on the one hand, and protectionism and self-imposed isolation on the other. The reality is more comforting, but also more complicated. We can build a vibrant, more inclusive global economy, but it means finding some way between these two extremes. Building the right kind of integrated global economy depends on the success of the international community in developing an institutional framework in which global integration can take place and in providing assistance to developing countries so that they benefit from it. To help maintain a stable international economy, the Administration has made considerable efforts to ensure that multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO foster economic growth and operate in a transparent manner that promotes economic and social harmony (Box 4-3). Box 4-3. Reforming International Institutions The United States has taken the lead in efforts to make sure that international institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO are equipped to meet the challenges presented by changes in the global economy. The IMF has taken several important steps, among them to: • increase dramatically the transparency of its operations • strengthen its surveillance of member countries’ policies, in particular with a view to reducing vulnerability and encouraging implementation of internationally agreed best practices in areas such as banking supervision and data dissemination continued on next page... 180 | Economic Report of the President Box 4-3.—continued • increase the focus on poverty reduction and growth in its support for the poorest countries, and • streamline its financing instruments, discourage persistent reliance on IMF lending, and encourage early repayment. The United States has also helped promote important dialogues on international financial issues between industrial and developing economies through forums such as the new G-20 finance ministers group. In the World Bank and other multilateral development banks, policies and practices have similarly evolved in response to the challenges of globalization. There is now broad agreement that good governance, participation of civil society, country responsibility for sound development strategies, performance-based lending, and effective coordination are key pillars of development assistance. The United States has been a leading advocate of a greater emphasis on the policies that most contribute to poverty reduction and is promoting an agenda for reform that includes: • greater selectivity in lending, across both sectors and countries • multiyear operational frameworks that would map out commitments to support governments in tackling social, institutional, and economic barriers that prevent the poor from contributing to and benefiting from growth • expansion of the provisioning for global public goods, which tend to be underfinanced and undersupplied, particularly in areas where the benefits accrue predominantly to developing countries • establishment of performance-based frameworks for the allocation of resources to borrowers, and • increased transparency and accountability, including a presumption of openness in information disclosure policies and a serious set of internal controls that ensure that policies are clearly defined and consistently applied. The United States is seeking to make the WTO more transparent and thus better understood. The avenues being explored include crafting an agreement among members to provide for more rapid release of documents, ensuring that citizens and nongovernmental organizations can file amicus briefs in dispute settlement proceedings, and opening these proceedings to public observers. As a first step, the Administration has offered to open any dispute panel in which the United States is involved, provided the partner to the dispute also agrees. Chapter 4 | 181 To assist the poorest countries, the Administration has also pressed international institutions to focus on increased provision of global public goods such as environmental protection and control of infectious disease. The Administration has also worked to offer debt relief to heavily indebted poor countries serious about undertaking economic reform. Successful globalization requires a parallel international process of harmonization of national rules, including rules governing the financial system. Such an effort has been going on largely silently for many years in the central banking community: for example, a revision of the Basel capital accord of 1988 is now under way. More recently, in the wake of the Mexican and Asian financial crises of the 1990s, these efforts at harmonization have accelerated, with a focus on the role of international standards and codes in the discussion of reform of the international financial architecture. Opening Markets to Trade and Investment Continued progress in opening markets to international trade and investment will contribute to increased growth. One possible direction is to revitalize efforts to expand on the Uruguay Round agreement through a new round of multilateral trade liberalization. Even without a new multilateral round, however, the challenge remains of building on the landmark trade agreements of the past 8 years. This includes extending the Information Technology Agreement to cover a wider range of high-technology products and to begin to address nontariff barriers, and expanding the market-opening initiatives in services trade under the Financial Services Agreement and the General Agreement on Trade in Services. Increased market access for services is particularly important for the United States given the rising importance of services in U.S. exports. Much work also remains to be done in liberalizing trade in agricultural products. Steps to be taken include lowering tariffs, improving U.S. access to potential markets, and reducing trade-distorting domestic supports and export subsidies. An important priority is to remove barriers to trade in biotechnology products, which offer great promise to make agriculture both more productive and friendlier to the environment (Box 4-4). Continued progress in the accession of new WTO members will also help liberalize global markets by extending the reach of WTO disciplines. As this chapter has argued, trade policy that leads to greater openness helps ensure competition in domestic markets. Although this puts pressure on certain domestic interests—notably on stakeholders in industries newly exposed to international competition—society at large is the real winner, through expanded choice and lower prices for goods and services. This is likely to be particularly true in sectors such as information technology, where lower prices 182 | Economic Report of the President Box 4-4.The Global Promise of Biotechnology Agricultural biotechnology based on the application of cellular and molecular biology, by dramatically improving the productivity and environmental sustainability of global food production, has the potential to usher in a new agricultural revolution. Biotechnological methods can be used to increase a plant’s ability to control pests and disease or tolerate environmental stress, or to enhance food qualities such as flavor, texture, shelf life, and nutritional content. Biotechnology can also be used to develop diagnostic techniques for testing food safety, to genetically incorporate specific proteins into plants for harvesting as pharmaceuticals, and in animal husbandry to diagnose disease, promote growth, and develop vaccines. Perhaps the greatest gains from agricultural biotechnology are in store for developing countries, where an estimated 840 million people, or 13 percent of the global population, are subject to uncertain food supply, including 200 million estimated to suffer from malnutrition. Use of droughttolerant, pest-resistant, and nutrition-enhanced crops leads to improved yields and thus enhances food security. Moreover, since their introduction in 1996, the use of genetically modified crops has allowed insecticide and herbicide use in those crops to be reduced in the United States. Lower reliance on toxic insecticides has important benefits for farm workers and wildlife and may reduce the dietary exposure of children and adults to these chemicals. Applications of agricultural biotechnology have not been developed and introduced as rapidly as medical applications. In part this can be attributed to the uncertain economics of new crops and the need to evaluate risks to human health and the environment. The latter concerns are reflected in consumer resistance to biotechnology products, especially in Europe. By 2000 about 70 million acres of transgenic crops were under cultivation in the United States, out of more than 255 million total acres planted with major crops. However, several U.S. farm and commodity groups have alerted their members to potential economic risks from planting biotech crops. These risks are increasing as some food processors have banned genetically engineered crops from their products. Increased economic risk is also reflected in other countries’ export restrictions on certain agricultural products derived from biotechnology. For example, a lengthy EU approval process and a virtual moratorium since 1998 on bioengineered grain varieties were significant factors behind the 90 percent decline in the volume of corn exports to the European Union in 1998. Restrictions on agricultural commodities and food products derived from biotechnology in industrial countries have raised continued on next page... Chapter 4 | 183 Box 4-4.—continued concerns in developing countries as well. However, wide differences exist within the developing world, with some countries strongly embracing the technology for reasons of food security and other potential economic gains, while others have shown reticence. A central goal of this Administration has been to ensure that decisions on the use and regulation of biotechnology products are made on the basis of scientific evaluation—a principle enshrined in the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures concluded as part of the Uruguay Round. The agreement requires that food, animal, and plant health and safety regulations that affect trade flows be based on scientific evidence. The Codex Alimentarius of the United Nations’ Food and Agricultural Organization provides a universal food standard that may be used as a basis for countries’ regulatory measures. Scientific evaluation is the appropriate basis on which to define which measures are appropriate to achieve the legitimate goal of public health protection. The United States continues a more than 20-year program to evaluate the implications of scientific advances such as biotechnology on public health. This includes assessment of the long-term impacts of genetically modified foods on human health and the environment. The National Academy of Sciences has undertaken a series of projects to examine the efficiency and integrity of U.S. biotechnology regulation. These include analyses of the assessment and monitoring of environmental risks and a broad review of available evidence on human health effects associated with genetically engineered foods. The Council on Environmental Quality and the Office of Science and Technology Policy are coordinating an interagency assessment of Federal environmental regulations pertaining to agricultural biotechnology. As a complement to these two steps, the Administration has also called for an expanded program of research focusing on current and future biotechnology safety issues. that lead to increased network usage will have positive spillovers for the entire economy. In many developing countries, these are also sectors with dominant local firms for which foreign entry is likely to provide the only sustainable competition. Continuing efforts to open foreign markets to U.S. exports can thus lead to a win-win situation for the United States and its trade partners. To make this happen, it is vital to ensure that the market-opening provisions of trade agreements are fully implemented and U.S. trade laws vigorously enforced. Efforts at enforcement have included recourse to the improved dispute settlement mechanism at the WTO and, at home, creation of a trade compliance center at the Department of Commerce. 184 | Economic Report of the President Arguments for the benefits of open markets apply with equal force here at home. Here the task is to extend the decades-long process of reducing U.S. trade barriers, particularly those faced by the least-developed countries, while spreading the benefits of trade liberalization as widely as possible and taking care that the costs of adjustment are not borne solely by a few. Substantial progress has been made in this regard, including the elimination of tariffs on some 2,000 items. Moreover, through the Generalized System of Preferences, the United States provides duty-free access to some 4,600 items from developing countries. This program promotes economic growth and development in these countries by stimulating their exports. Additional liberalization has been targeted to particular regions, including Sub-Saharan Africa through the African Growth and Opportunity Act, and the Caribbean through the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act. One challenge for trade policy is to know when to do nothing—to resist the inevitable domestic pressures for protection from imports while at the same time enforcing U.S. trade laws that aim for trade to be free and fair. The political economy of trade protection is well understood: the benefits of trade liberalization are spread over a large number of consumers, each of whom gains only a little, whereas the beneficiaries of trade restrictions tend to be more concentrated and thus have greater incentives to push for protection. The challenge for policymakers is to remain focused on the benefits of free trade while helping those individuals and communities adversely affected by change. Conclusion Access to global trade and investment flows has played a vital role in creating the New Economy in the United States. Openness gives us crucial inputs of goods and capital that have lowered costs and raised efficiency. And the availability of the larger world market allows U.S. firms to enjoy scale economies and thus increases the rewards from innovation. The achievements of the past 8 years have provided solid momentum toward opening markets and expanding trade. Building on this progress is vital for both the United States and the rest of the world. Continued globalization is central to ensuring that the diffusion of technology and knowledge to other countries leads to improved economic performance on a global scale, mirroring what has already occurred in the United States. Stronger world growth is in the profound national interest of the United States. Global prosperity is not only likely to result in increased U.S. exports and continued strong growth in domestic employment and income; it can also be a major contributor to international harmony. Chapter 4 | 185 C H A P T E R 5 Living in the New Economy T his Administration came to office on a platform of “putting people first.” The Administration has kept that pledge. Although the phrase “New Economy” typically brings to mind technological innovation and globalization, arguably one of the most important changes from the old economy to the new has been an improvement in the well-being of the American people. By virtually any measure, Americans are better off today than they were 8 years ago. The private sector has demonstrated great entrepreneurial dynamism and technological sophistication in bringing us the New Economy. But we need to recognize that even in a New Economy, private markets alone, for all their virtues, will not guarantee that all our national goals will be met. Private markets can create wealth, but they cannot ensure that all citizens, even those able to find jobs, will have adequate incomes. Nor will private markets ensure that all citizens have access to quality education and health care. Similarly, although private markets can generate growth, they cannot ensure that growth will reach all communities. Nor will purely private markets necessarily deal with the side effects of growth on both the environment and urban congestion. Many of our most difficult national challenges will require government intervention through policies that assist individuals and communities in danger of 187 being left behind. This chapter, therefore, considers policy areas that have a major impact on the opportunities given to all Americans to create a better life for themselves and their children. In particular, the chapter outlines recent reforms in the Nation’s welfare system and policies designed to improve the educational system, expand health insurance coverage, and ensure smart growth. It also describes the considerable progress that has been made and identifies the tasks that remain to be accomplished. Although the New Economy may not meet these challenges on its own, the faster growth it has generated does make meeting them considerably easier. In addition, the innovations that have occurred in information technologies, organizational redesign, and policy provide better tools with which to meet them. In each section of the chapter, particular attention is paid to the contributions such innovations have made and can make in improving the quality of life for all Americans. For example, in the welfare system, new policies that make work pay have dramatically reduced the number of families receiving cash assistance, while increasing employment. In education, educators have worked to implement higher standards for students and teachers and have brought aspects of the New Economy into the classroom through the increased use of computers. In health care, innovations in medical technology and managerial practices have increased the quality of care and helped rein in costs. Finally, across our communities, some localities are taking advantage of new techniques to combat problems of congestion and pollution and ensure smart growth practices. This chapter elaborates on these and similar policies that have helped grow the work force, sustain strong economic growth, and improve the quality of life for all Americans. Good News from the American Economy Record-setting gains in the stock market and growth in the net worth of wealthy individuals have received wide media coverage. But the most noteworthy aspects of the current economic expansion are its duration and its reach. The last few years in particular have brought tremendous gains to all segments of our society. Employment gains have been dramatic. Between January 1993 and November 2000, 22.4 million new jobs were created. In 1999 the unemployment rate reached 4.2 percent—the lowest annual rate since 1969. Just as important, unemployment has stayed low, remaining below 5 percent for 41 consecutive months through November 2000. At the same time, wages have been increasing. After declining consistently from 1986 to 1993, real hourly wages for private sector workers rose by 7.4 percent between 1993 and 1999. These gains in employment and wages are echoed in growth in 188 | Economic Report of the President income and reductions in poverty. The real median household income reached a new high of $40,816 in 1999, an increase of 2.7 percent since 1998 and a total increase of 13.3 percent from 1993. In 1999 the poverty rate fell to 11.8 percent, its lowest level since 1979 and 3.3 percentage points below the 1993 rate of 15.1 percent. These gains were shared by Americans at all income levels. Between 1998 and 1999, real income grew by 4.4 percent for those at the 20th percentile and by 3.5 percent for those at the 80th percentile. (The household at the 20th percentile has an income higher than 20 percent of all households and lower than the other 80 percent.) From 1993 to 1999 the comparable figures for real income growth were 15.0 percent and 14.2 percent, respectively. In addition, the most disadvantaged groups tended to experience the greatest improvements in financial well-being. Household incomes for African Americans and Hispanics saw record one-year increases, rising to all-time highs. The real median income for African-American households increased 7.7 percent between 1998 and 1999 (it is up 23.9 percent since 1993), climbing to $27,910. The real median household income for Hispanics rose to $30,735, an increase of 6.1 percent between 1998 and 1999 (and 16.5 percent since 1993). In 1999, unemployment for African Americans and Hispanics fell to the lowest rates on record. African Americans saw unemployment fall from 13.0 percent in 1993 to an average of 7.6 percent for the first 11 months of 2000, while Hispanics saw their unemployment rate drop to an 11-month average of 5.7 percent (Chart 5-1). Male earnings have also increased, particularly for African Americans. Between 1998 and 1999 the real median earnings for full-time African-American male workers increased by $2,379 in 1999 dollars, or 8.6 percent—a dramatic rise for a single year. With this sharp increase, the ratio of African-American male to white male earnings rose to 0.81, the highest level ever recorded. Along with record increases in income have come record lows in poverty rates (Chart 5-2). The decrease in the poverty rate for African Americans between 1998 and 1999 was the largest 1-year decline in percentage terms since 1967-68, and the poverty rate for this group in 1999 reached an all-time low of 23.6 percent. Hispanics also experienced a record drop in poverty. At 22.8 percent, the poverty rate for this group is now at its lowest since 1979. In the past, economic gains have often had a limited impact on households headed by women. Since 1993, however, the strong economy and a social welfare policy that emphasizes work have brought substantial benefits to this group. In March 1993 just 56.8 percent of women maintaining a family on their own were employed; this figure rose to 63.4 percent in March 1998 and 65.2 percent in March 1999. This increase in employment corresponded to an increase in income. Between 1993 and 1999 the median income for these Chapter 5 | 189 190 | Economic Report of the President families increased by 18.0 percent. Between 1998 and 1999 alone, the increase was 4.8 percent. The poverty rate for people in families headed by females also fell, from 38.7 percent in 1993 to 33.1 percent in 1998 and 30.4 percent in 1999. Within this group are those most likely to have been affected by welfare reform: low-income single mothers and their children. (Low income is defined here as an income below 200 percent of the poverty line.) An analysis of a recently completed survey indicates that between 1997 and 1999 the proportion of low-income single mothers between 25 and 54 who were employed increased from 59.7 percent to 65.2 percent. Children as well as their mothers benefited from this change. Between 1998 and 1999 the poverty rate for children fell by 2 percentage points, to 16.9 percent, the lowest level since 1979 and the largest percentage-point decline since 1966. Poverty among AfricanAmerican children declined by even more in absolute terms, falling by 3.6 percentage points to 33.1 percent. Since 1993 the poverty rate for all children has fallen by 5.8 percentage points. Older Americans have also benefited from economic growth. In 1999 the poverty rate among the elderly fell below 10 percent for the first time on record. With the elimination last year of the Social Security earnings test for those aged 65 and over, older Americans will likely participate in the labor force in greater numbers, further improving their financial status. In the past, residents of our central cities have seen little change in their poverty levels, yet here, too, the situation is improving. Over the last several years, central-city residents in large metropolitan areas experienced an aboveaverage increase in median income and the largest declines in poverty of any geographic category. The gains experienced by Americans over the past 8 years have not been limited to financial gains but include a long list of improvements in the quality of life. Low interest rates and a strong economy have contributed to the highest home ownership rate ever in America. In the third quarter of 2000, 67.7 percent of American families owned a home, up from 63.7 percent in the first quarter of 1993 and surpassing the Administration’s goal, set in 1995, of 67.5 percent. Improvements in job opportunities, in combination with Administration initiatives to hire additional police officers, strengthen gun laws, and increase local resources to improve public safety, have contributed to a dramatic reduction in crime. In 1999 the overall crime rate fell to its lowest level in 26 years. Again, some of the least well off Americans have benefited most. The violent crime victimization rate among those with annual household incomes of less than $7,500 fell at an average annual rate of 4.7 percent between 1993 and 1999, while victimization rates for those with incomes of $75,000 or more fell Chapter 5 | 191 at an average annual rate of 2.8 percent. During the same period the number of violent crimes perpetrated against African Americans declined by an average of 4.6 percent per year, while whites experienced a 3.0 percent annual decline. Patterns by race for property crimes are similar. The Nation’s schools today are also showing improvements on several fronts. Between 1993 and 1998 the proportion of high-school graduates going directly to college grew by nearly 7 percent, and college enrollment is at an all-time high. Math SAT test scores have reached their highest level in 30 years, and average verbal SAT scores have held steady even though the number of nonnative English speakers taking the exam has increased. Minorities have also made notable academic achievements. Among high-school graduates aged 18–24, the proportions of African-American and Hispanic students continuing their education at a 4-year college are at record highs. Improvements have also been made in the public health arena. The birth rate among teenagers declined 17 percent between 1993 and 1999. Infant mortality was down from 8.4 deaths per thousand in 1993 to 7.2 per thousand in 1998. Between 1997 and 2000 smoking among teenagers declined after rising for most of the decade. Over the past several years, death rates attributable to heart disease, cancer, stroke, and AIDS are down, and life expectancy has improved. A child born in 1998 can expect to live 76.7 years, up from 75.5 years in 1993. Although these statistics present a glowing picture of the New Economy and the well-being of the Nation as a whole, more work remains to be done. Despite the recent gains, the incomes of minority groups remain significantly below those of whites, and their poverty rates significantly above. Infant mortality rates and life expectancy also differ substantially by race and ethnicity, as does access to a quality education. Certain areas of the country continue to experience unemployment rates of more than 10 percent, as well as distressingly high levels of poverty. Many Americans still lack health insurance coverage and access to adequate medical care. Innovative policies have helped us share many of the gains of the New Economy, reduce the number of people on welfare, and improve employment opportunities. But new policies may be needed to contend with future changes in the economy. A slowing of economic growth will likely be felt most severely by those who have only recently begun to share in its benefits. Those most recently employed may lose their jobs and accompanying benefits such as health insurance. Federal, State, and local governments may feel pressure to cut back on investments in education if their revenues decline. Thus, continued improvements in the well-being of the American people likely depend on both sustained economic growth and active public policy. 192 | Economic Report of the President Helping Families Help Themselves The New Economy is popularly characterized by new technologies, new methods of communication, and new avenues of trade. But it also brings innovative ways of providing for the least well off Americans. Substantial changes have taken place in the organization of our welfare system and in the incentives it provides. These innovations, and in particular policies designed to increase the benefits of work, such as child care subsidies and rules that increase the fraction of earnings that welfare recipients can keep, have changed the tenor of American social welfare policy. Public policy now emphasizes employment and investment in the skills of those who are less well off. In doing so the Administration has helped low-income families leave welfare and enter the labor market, thereby promoting a more equitable distribution of the gains from the New Economy. Welfare Reform Two of the most impressive achievements of the past 8 years have been the reduction in the number of Americans receiving welfare, and the increase in the numbers of current and former welfare recipients who are working. The Administration has worked hard to reform welfare. It began by allowing a record number of States to implement changes in their welfare programs on an experimental basis, through waivers from Federal welfare regulations. As of August 1996, 43 States had received waivers and set up alternative programs that emphasized work and parental responsibility. These changes at the State level were followed by changes at the national level, in particular the bipartisan Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act signed by the President in 1996. This act replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program with one that provides needy families with temporary assistance, established time limits for receiving welfare benefits, and shifted the emphasis from simply providing assistance to helping families leave welfare and enter the labor market. Policies that offer tax credits to subsidize the earnings of low-income workers, provide assistance with child care, and expand eligibility for health insurance support the welfare-towork transition. The new program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), differs from the AFDC program in three fundamental ways. First, it gives States much more discretion in using Federal funds. Under the AFDC program, States set eligibility and benefit levels (within Federal guidelines) and received matching funds from the Federal Government to help with the program costs. The new program provides States with block grants that are used to finance cash benefits, job preparation, and other worker support programs. States now have much Chapter 5 | 193 more flexibility in spending, and they have used this flexibility to meet the particular demands of their constituencies—for example, allocating additional funds for child care subsidies or allowing welfare recipients to keep a greater fraction of their earnings. States are also eligible for bonuses for helping people get and keep jobs and decreasing out-of-wedlock births. In the future, bonuses will be offered for increasing participation in the food stamp, Medicaid, and children’s health insurance programs; for providing child care to a larger fraction of eligible children; and for increasing the proportion of children living in married-couple families. Second, the new system imposes time limits and work requirements on welfare recipients. In general, States can no longer use Federal funds to pay benefits to recipients beyond a lifetime limit of 60 months. States can exempt some recipients from this requirement, set even shorter time limits, or use their own funds to continue support beyond the 5-year limit. In 1999, 38 States used the 60-month time limit, and the remainder implemented other policies (8 States had shorter time limits, 3 had no time limit, and others intended to use longer periods). Recipients must also work in some capacity after receiving benefits for 2 years, but States have flexibility in deciding how to implement this requirement, particularly in terms of strengthening it. In 1999, 28 States had welfare policies that imposed immediate work requirements rather than the 2year requirement. Finally, States can now design the parameters of their program to suit the needs of their residents. Although even before 1996 States had the freedom to set benefit levels, the new program allows them to set income and asset limits for eligibility as well and to establish their own methods of calculating the income of potentially eligible families. The majority of States have used this freedom to decrease the implicit tax on earnings. The AFDC program reduced benefits dollar for dollar for any earnings of more than $90 per month after 12 months of work. This 100 percent “tax” on earnings created a strong disincentive to work, as it was possible for a recipient to see little if any increase in income from additional hours of work. Many States now use a more gradual benefit reduction rate to encourage greater work force participation. They are also investing in a wide range of supports to help welfare recipients and other low-income working families enter the work force and succeed on the job. The Effects of Welfare-to-Work Programs Since August 1996, welfare caseloads have fallen dramatically. Between August 1996 and June 2000, the number of people receiving welfare declined by half, to 5.8 million. Including reductions that have taken place since 1993, caseloads have fallen by 8.3 million, or 59 percent. Declines in some States have been even more dramatic. In Wisconsin, for example, the number of welfare recipients fell by 75 percent between August 1996 and June 2000, and it has fallen by 84 percent since 1993. 194 | Economic Report of the President The 1996 reforms have undeniably been successful in reducing the number of people receiving welfare. But reductions in caseloads are not the only measure by which to judge the reforms: the well-being of the millions of former welfare recipients is at least as important. Much of what we know about outcomes for welfare leavers comes from studies undertaken in individual States. To date, studies monitoring the outcomes of those who have left welfare have been conducted in over 30 states. In addition, some of the data from State waiver experiments undertaken before the nationwide welfare reform have implications for current programs. Available data on the results of welfare reform often differ from State to State and do not represent nationwide averages. This Report therefore supplements this information with new results based on the Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), providing some of the first evidence on the effects of welfare reform for a nationally representative sample. The results from the SIPP are based on a sample of people who were observed for at least 12 months after leaving the welfare rolls. These individuals were first observed between December 1995 and March 1996 and were reinterviewed every 4 months until the period between November 1998 and February 1999, the exact month depending on the month of the initial interview. The new data cover the experiences of some of those first affected by welfare reform and may not reveal the effects of the time limits on receiving benefits or the long-term impact on families. One of the most important issues in evaluating welfare reform is the incidence of recidivism, that is, the return of individuals to the welfare rolls. Both SIPP data and a synthesis of State studies show that approximately 25 percent of those who leave welfare return within 12 months. (Most studies of recidivism, including those cited here, do not treat transitions of less than 2 months as true changes.) The majority of those who do return to welfare do so quickly: the SIPP data show that 18 percent of those who exit return within the first 6 months of leaving, and only 7 percent during the second 6-month window. Further, the probability of returning to welfare declines with time. In Maryland 25 percent of former recipients returned to welfare within 12 months, but only 10 percent returned in the next 12 months, and approximately 1 percent did so in the third 12-month period. Helping Welfare Leavers Find and Keep Jobs A key factor in success after welfare is the ability to obtain a job and remain employed. The Administration provided a total of $3 billion in fiscal 1998 and fiscal 1999 in the form of Welfare-to-Work grants to help States and local communities move long-term welfare recipients and noncustodial parents into jobs. The Administration also implemented the Workforce Investment Act, which allows States to provide job placement assistance to residents, with priority given to low-income individuals (Box 5-1). Chapter 5 | 195 Box 5-1.The Workforce Investment Act The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 was the result of a bipartisan effort by the Congress and the Administration. The law requires that basic job and career information and assistance be available to all Americans and creates a system developed around one-stop career centers in order to knit together multiple programs at the local level. The law also provides for intensive assessment, counseling, job search assistance, and training, with priority given to people on public assistance and to low-income individuals. The law initiates three reforms that are designed to maximize training choices: individual training accounts, systems for identifying eligible training providers and their programs, and extensive information on program performance such as success in job placement, postplacement earnings, and rates of skill attainment. These reforms were designed so that trainees will have the opportunity and the purchasing power to enter the training program of their choice rather than be channeled into one of a handful of locally contracted programs. The reforms provide an abundance of reliable information that will empower trainees, allowing them to make informed choices. Employment programs for welfare recipients generally use one of two approaches to helping welfare leavers find jobs. The “work first” approach aims to get people employed as quickly as possible. It is based on the belief that work itself will give inexperienced workers the skills (human capital) they need to remain in the labor force and move to increasingly better jobs. This approach focuses on maintaining an attachment to the labor force rather than on initial wages. The alternative approach relies on comparatively extensive education and training before welfare leavers enter the labor market. It delays their entrance into the work force in the expectation that, once employed, they will have better jobs than they could otherwise have obtained. The work-first approach is the more common, and past studies of initial outcomes have indicated that it is the more successful: gains in employment levels and earnings for program participants were higher in areas with workfirst programs than in areas using a training-based approach. However, a new study comparing outcomes across counties in California over a 9-year period finds that results for the two approaches are similar in the long term. A separate study comparing the outcomes of 11 different welfare-to-work programs over a 2-year period finds that the most successful approach combined an emphasis on work with assistance in completing the General Educational Development (GED) diploma. 196 | Economic Report of the President Employment rates among former welfare recipients are high. Administrative data from studies conducted in several different States show that between 62 and 75 percent of those leaving welfare were employed at some point in the following year, and approximately 40 percent were employed in all four quarters. Results are similar at the national level. SIPP data show that 66 percent of welfare leavers were employed at some point in the following 12 months, and 43 percent had earnings in all four quarters. However, few leavers were continuously employed. Only 32 percent of welfare leavers worked 50 weeks or more during the year, and just 40 percent of this group (12.8 percent of all leavers) worked 35 or more hours in each week. Thus, although labor force participation has increased significantly among former welfare recipients, there is considerable room for further gains. Importantly, employment rates increased even among those who remained on welfare. In fiscal 1999, 33 percent of welfare recipients were working, compared with fewer than 7 percent in 1992. Developing an attachment to the labor market even while on welfare is important, because it increases the probability of success after leaving welfare. The importance of the booming economy to these successes should not be understated. Theories of human capital accumulation and the tenets behind work-first programs suggest that time spent working increases productivity, job skills, and wages. The long economic expansion and historically low unemployment rates have given current and former welfare recipients the chance to accumulate work experience that would be expected to serve them well in a future downturn. The longer the expansion continues, the better prepared they will be to weather the consequences. Earnings Although employment is important in and of itself, so, too, are earnings. Welfare leavers are unlikely to thrive in the workplace if they are no better off financially than they were before leaving the welfare rolls. Evidence from State studies indicates that, at least initially, few leavers are significantly better off. Median quarterly earnings for those who found employment varied from $2,000 to $3,000, or approximately $700 to $1,000 per month. For the majority of leavers in Wisconsin, earnings after leaving welfare were lower than the sum of earnings and welfare benefits prior to exit. For the sample of SIPP leavers, the median monthly household income plus food stamps for the year following exit was $1,605, compared with $1,509 in the 2 months preceding exit. For 44 percent of leavers, household income plus food stamps in the year following exit was more than $50 per month higher than in the months before; for 49 percent it was at least $50 lower. The idea behind work-first programs is that an initial job will lead to earnings growth over time. Because many former welfare recipients find Chapter 5 | 197 employment in low-wage industries such as food services, their prospects for earnings growth may not seem extremely bright. Yet 39 percent of SIPP leavers had monthly earnings in the second 6 months after leaving welfare that were $50 or more higher than in the first 6 months. Twenty-eight percent saw a reduction in earnings of $50 or more over the two 6-month periods immediately following exit. Thus at least some former welfare recipients did have earnings growth in the year of exit through increases in hours, wages, or both. Income gains from the Earned Income Tax Credit (the EITC is discussed in detail below) are not included in these calculations. Although its benefits are not recorded in the SIPP data, the credit provides a substantial subsidy to low-income workers, and including its effects would improve incomes and poverty rates considerably. Although its figures do not focus specifically on welfare leavers, the Census Bureau estimates that in 1999 the fraction of households with after-tax incomes of less than $10,000 a year falls from 9.9 percent to 9.3 percent when the EITC is factored in. At a maximum credit of $3,880 in 2000 for a low-income worker with two children, the EITC could add up to $323 per month to a family’s income. Making Work Pay As the earnings of welfare recipients increase, they can lose not only their cash assistance but also other benefits such as food stamps and Medicaid. At the same time, they incur explicit payroll taxes and additional expenses associated with work such as child care and transportation costs. In the past these costs have been large. One study found that the implicit marginal tax rate for AFDC recipients —the net amount paid in taxes, forgone benefits, and work-related expenses from a $1 increase in income—could easily exceed 50 percent. In other words, earning $1 more in the labor market increased their disposable income by less than 50 cents. The Administration’s welfare reform proposals have attempted to reduce these implicit taxes and increase the rewards from work, through a higher minimum wage and an increased EITC, through increased subsidies for child care, and through expanded health insurance coverage that includes working families not previously eligible for public programs. The Administration has also worked to help single parents collect the child support payments due them. These programs do more than help ease the transition from welfare to work; they also benefit working families who may have never received welfare. By reaching out to both groups, the Administration has worked to ensure that no working family is left behind. 198 | Economic Report of the President The Earned Income Tax Credit Operating through the income tax system, the EITC provides a wage subsidy for many low-income workers. The amount of the subsidy depends on how much the family earns and on whether the family has zero, one, or two or more children. By effectively increasing the wage rate, the EITC offers those eligible an added incentive to participate in the labor force. In 2000, families with two or more children received a subsidy of 40 cents for every dollar of earned income up to $9,700, for a maximum credit of $3,880. This tax credit is refundable, so that even families who pay little or no income tax can benefit fully from the tax provision. Rather than falling to zero when earnings surpass $9,700, the credit remains at $3,880 until earnings reach $12,700 and then gradually declines. For two-child families it phases out completely when earned income reaches $31,152 (Chart 5-3). The gradual phaseout reduces the disincentive to earn income beyond the level at which the credit peaks. The EITC has been expanded greatly since 1990, with increases in both benefits and scope of coverage. The 1993 expansions increased benefits for approximately 15 million tax-filing units (assumed to be roughly equivalent Chapter 5 | 199 in number to households), in large part by raising the subsidy for families with two or more children. The 1993 expansion also, for the first time, allowed workers without children to claim a tax credit. As a result of both the 1990 and the 1993 expansions, credits paid increased from $15.5 billion in 1993 to nearly $31 billion in tax year 1999. At the same time, the number of tax returns claiming the EITC increased by roughly 30 percent, from 15 million to nearly 19 million. The program now pays out nearly as much as the Federal outlays on the TANF and food stamp programs combined. This wage subsidy has been effective in attracting more workers into the labor market (Chart 5-4). According to one estimate, the EITC alone was responsible for 34 percent of the increase in annual employment among unmarried mothers between 1992 and 1996. In addition to increasing the probability of employment for low-income people, the EITC has done much to improve the well-being of those who receive it. Many workers do not have jobs that pay enough to raise their incomes above the poverty level. But when the credit is taken into account, the earnings of these workers can rise substantially. Calculations of after-tax income excluding and including the EITC indicate that in 1999 the credit lifted 4.1 million individuals out of poverty. Of these, 2.3 million were children. The provision has also been effective in targeting benefits to the most needy. Estimates based on 1997 data indicate that between 50 and 60 percent of its benefits accrue to families with incomes below the poverty line. 200 | Economic Report of the President The Minimum Wage The minimum wage operates in tandem with the EITC: the credit provides an effective wage subsidy, and the minimum wage laws ensure that the subsidy is based on an acceptable wage. The real value of the minimum wage declined substantially from 1992 to 1995, falling to just 71 percent of its peak value, recorded in 1968. Subsequent Administration-backed efforts led to increases in the minimum wage in 1996 and 1997. Even with these most recent increases, however, the minimum wage in 1999 was less than 80 percent of its 1968 level (after controlling for inflation). However, when the minimum wage is combined with a possible 40 percent subsidy from the EITC, the true minimum wage for workers with two or more children and earnings of less than $9,700 is $7.21 an hour (Chart 5-5). This hourly rate is higher in real terms than the peak minimum wage rates of the 1960s. Even so, an individual working full-time at the minimum wage would have a yearly income of just $14,188 (including the credit), well below the poverty line for a family of two adults and two children. Child Care For many parents, one of the most difficult barriers to employment is finding affordable, good-quality child care. For low-income families and new entrants to the labor market, the costs of child care may make working impossible. Recognizing these costs as a barrier to work, the Administration Chapter 5 | 201 has worked to make child care more affordable for low-income families and to provide assistance with child care expenses to a greater number of families. Federal funding for child care has increased substantially, and the various existing child care programs have been combined to create the Child Care and Development Fund. This fund provides States with block grants for the purpose of subsidizing approved child care arrangements. States can transfer additional funds from their TANF block grants to help finance child care subsidies. In fiscal 1999, States spent a total of $5.2 billion in Federal dollars on child care, including both child care allocations and TANF block grant transfers. They also added $1.6 billion of their own funding. These resources benefited an average of 1.8 million children per month. Despite this investment, however, many States have waiting lists for benefits, and many families who qualify for the subsidies do not receive benefits. It is estimated that only 12 percent of eligible children were served by this program in fiscal 1999. The Food Stamp Program The food stamp program helps to ensure that low-income individuals receive adequate nutrition. Benefits are available to households with incomes up to 130 percent of the poverty line. In fiscal 1998 the vast majority of benefits (nearly 90 percent in dollar terms) went to households with children or elderly individuals. In 1999, 27 percent of participating households had earned income. Enrollment in the food stamp program has fallen dramatically since 1994, from a high of 27.5 million participants to 18.2 million in 1999, in part because of the strong economy. Of concern, however, is the fact that the participation rate for eligible families declined from 71 percent in September 1994 to 62 percent in September 1997. This decline is particularly marked for families with children. In 1999 only 51 percent of children in families with incomes below the poverty line received food stamps. Even among the very poorest children—those in families with incomes less than 50 percent of the poverty line—data indicate that only 58 percent received food stamps in 1999, down from 76 percent in 1993. (Not all poor families are eligible for food stamps. Limitations on the value of assets that an eligible family may hold may exclude some families.) Several factors could be responsible for the decline in participation. Changes in the laws governing the program have excluded some immigrants and restricted the eligibility of able-bodied adults without dependents, decreasing the pool of potential participants. The strong economy and the growing number of people with jobs may have further reduced the number of eligible individuals. But these factors alone cannot explain all of the steep decline in participation rates, and it is likely that some eligible families are not receiving the benefits they need (and are entitled to receive). This is especially true of families just leaving the welfare rolls. Rules governing participation in the program are often a factor here. States require that wage-earning food stamp recipients have 202 | Economic Report of the President their incomes recertified at regular intervals, often every 3 months and even more frequently in some States. For low-wage earners without much time off, this requirement could well be a substantial deterrent to participation. A recent study underscored this concern, attributing a large portion of nonparticipation to the costs to recipients of regular recertification. In response to these recent trends, the Administration has implemented a series of changes in the regulations governing the food stamp program. These changes substantially reduce the need for recertification for those leaving welfare and the newly employed and give States greater flexibility in processing applications. States will soon be able to receive bonus awards under the TANF program for increasing participation rates for low-income working households. In the future, $20 million will be allocated for these awards. Finally, the Administration has provided funding for educational and outreach campaigns aimed at improving nutrition for low-income families and the elderly. Child Support Child support payments from noncustodial parents are an important source of income for poor children. In 1997 child support lifted an estimated half a million children out of poverty. Child support is particularly important for families leaving welfare. Divorced or separated women who leave welfare and do not receive child support have a significantly greater chance of returning within 6 months than those receiving even small amounts of child support. An important component of the Administration’s policies to help working families is ensuring that single and divorced parents receive the child support payments they are entitled to under the law. Between fiscal 1992 and fiscal 1999 the dollar value of child support collections doubled, from $8 billion to $16 billion—an increase of more than two-thirds after adjusting for inflation. During the same period the number of child support cases involving collections increased from 2.6 million to 6.1 million. However, much of the money collected never reaches the custodial parent. Many States reduce TANF benefits dollar for dollar when a noncustodial parent provides support, lowering the incentive for noncustodial parents to provide for their children. The President proposed legislative changes that would make it easier for States to pass along a portion of child support payments to custodial parents receiving assistance. This change would give parents an incentive to cooperate with the system. Some States, such as Wisconsin, are already experimenting with this type of policy, with some success. Results show that noncustodial parents are more willing to pay child support when they know that at least some of the money will go to benefit their child. Ultimately, widespread use of this policy should increase collections of child support payments. Chapter 5 | 203 Access to Health Insurance Historically, individuals and families leaving the welfare rolls have lost their Medicaid coverage as they did so. During the 1980s a series of Medicaid expansions and the introduction of Transitional Medical Assistance began providing health insurance benefits to former welfare recipients and lowincome families, easing the transition to work. Before the 1996 welfare reform a Federal mandate required that States offer Medicaid coverage to children and pregnant women in low-income families, regardless of whether they were already receiving welfare. This group included children under the age of 6 and pregnant women in families with incomes below 133 percent of the poverty line, and children between the ages of 6 and 19 in families with incomes below 100 percent of the poverty line. Many States opted for even broader coverage, setting higher income thresholds and covering children of all ages. Adults could obtain Medicaid for up to 12 months after leaving welfare under the Transitional Medical Assistance program or through State programs for the medically needy. The 1996 legislation expanded Medicaid coverage to low-income single-parent and some two-parent families, and to families leaving welfare. In 1997 the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) was created to target children in low-income families. SCHIP is further discussed later in the chapter. Looking to the Future The success thus far in helping families leave welfare is tempered by the realization that many families still depend on public assistance. As the time limits for TANF begin to bind, the focus must be on how to help those who have been unable to secure employment. Furthermore, as already noted, some who have left the welfare rolls are no better off financially than they were while receiving benefits. Investments in job skills, a continued strong economy, and policies that ensure a living wage can all help these people succeed in the labor force. However, when the economy does begin to slow, policies must be in place to help those who lose their jobs. If former welfare recipients are among the last hired, they may be among the first laid off, and they run the risk of returning to public assistance. These challenges are not insurmountable, but they require the continued commitment of government and the private sector to reach workable solutions. Reaching out to Underserved Communities Providing opportunity and independence for American families sometimes requires more than a strong national economy and responsible welfare policy. Areas where poverty has become entrenched and the local economy is weak may need additional assistance. Some of the most intractable poverty is 204 | Economic Report of the President found in America’s central cities and rural areas. Because these areas are home to large numbers of Americans—in 1999, 30 percent of the population lived in the central cities and 20 percent outside metropolitan areas—this situation is cause for great concern. In 1967, when statistics for these areas were first recorded separately, the poverty rate for central cities was 15.0 percent, compared with a nationwide rate of 14.2 percent. In contrast, poverty in nonmetropolitan areas was over 20 percent. By this measure the central cities were nearly as well off as the rest of the country, but nonmetropolitan areas suffered from disproportionately high poverty. Between 1967 and the early 1990s, however, the incidence of poverty shifted: conditions in the central cities worsened, and nonmetropolitan areas saw a slight improvement. By 1993 the proportion of central-city residents living in poverty had reached an all-time high of 21.5 percent, and the poverty rate in nonmetropolitan areas had declined slightly, to 17.2 percent—well above the national poverty rate of 15.1 percent in both cases. Since 1993, however, the situation has improved dramatically, especially for central cities. In 1999 the poverty rate for central cities was 16.4 percent and that in nonmetropolitan areas stood at 14.3 percent. Yet these rates remain well above the national average of 11.8 percent. The strong national economy and current policies to make work pay, discourage out-of-wedlock births, and improve schools in poor neighborhoods can be expected to provide some relief. But given the persistently high poverty rates in these locales, additional strategies may be required. To reach out to residents of these locales, the Administration has enacted a series of programs that directly target communities. Central Cities Central cities offer some advantages for low-income workers. Central-city residents likely have ready access to public transportation, and city governments often provide more generous support services than governments in other locales. But cities often have one key drawback: fewer job opportunities. Recent research shows that most job creation today is taking place in the suburbs. One study by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) found that, from 1992 to 1997, job growth was slower in the cities than in the suburbs and that the job mix in cities is increasingly shifting toward high-technology industries, which provide fewer opportunities for low-skilled workers. Central-city residents also face other barriers to employment. Low-income workers are unlikely to own a car and must rely on public transportation. Yet a recent study found that nearly half of all low-skilled jobs in the suburbs are not accessible by public transportation. Compounding this situation is the fact that minorities still face discrimination in housing and employment Chapter 5 | 205 markets. Studies have shown that minorities have difficulty renting and purchasing housing in the suburbs and are less likely to be hired by white-owned or suburban firms. The cost of housing in the suburbs may also make it difficult to move to homes near suburban jobs. From a policy perspective, several approaches are available to address the mismatch between where low-skilled workers live and where they can find work. The first is to rebuild the economies of our central cities. The second involves seeking ways to overcome the transportation hurdles that commuters from the central city face. The third approach is to help low-income families obtain housing in areas where jobs are available. Providing training is yet another way to address this issue, improving workers’ skills and thus their employability at a range of jobs. The Administration has pursued policies that incorporate all four approaches. When this Administration took office, a number of programs already addressed underserved communities. The long-standing problems in these areas, however, clearly called for additional policy measures. The Administration developed a number of strategies for rebuilding the economies of America’s central cities, including Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities. The Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community initiative aims to assist communities by encouraging investment from private businesses through tax credits, wage credits, and improved access to credit markets. Since 1995 over $1 billion has gone to 78 designated urban areas under these initiatives, supplemented by over $10 billion leveraged through other public investment. To help solve commuting problems, the Administration’s Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century established a new Job Access and Reverse Commute Program designed specifically to connect low-income persons to employment and support services. Similarly, the Bridges to Work program provides job placement, transportation, and job retention services in a select group of cities. In addition, the Administration has made owning a car easier for low-income families receiving food stamps, by giving States the flexibility to raise the limit on the value of a car counted as an asset for eligibility purposes. HUD programs also address transportation problems by subsidizing low-income families in both public and private sector housing. HUD’s housing voucher and certificate programs help over 1.4 million families pay the rent for apartments in the private market. This portable form of assistance helps families locate near jobs. Two Administration housing initiatives focus on improving employment outcomes for low-income families. The Moving to Opportunity demonstration program combines counseling with voucher assistance to help families move from high-poverty public housing projects to private housing in lowpoverty areas. The Welfare-to-Work voucher program provides housing 206 | Economic Report of the President subsidies and services to families eligible for or recently leaving TANF to help adults in the family obtain and keep jobs. Preliminary evidence from a Moving to Opportunity program in Baltimore suggests that the program also helps children by improving their educational outcomes. Rural Communities Like the central cities, many of America’s rural communities face high rates of poverty and unemployment. But these communities also face a number of unique problems. First, they tend to have smaller, less diversified economies than do the central cities and thus can be severely affected by the closing of only one or two industrial plants. Second, many rural communities are geographically isolated from major markets, making it hard for residents to find jobs and for businesses to reach their customers. Third, rural communities often offer little in the way of public transportation, so that commuting problems are likely to be more acute than in urban areas. Although recent advances in telecommunications promise to reduce some of this disadvantage, rural communities also lag behind urban communities in access to this technology. Finally, rural governments often lack the economies of scale needed to make investments in public services economical. A variety of agencies and programs exist to help these communities. Technical assistance, grants, and loans offered through the Rural Utilities Service provide assistance with basic infrastructure needs such as electricity, telecommunications, and water and waste facilities. The Rural Housing Service helps rural communities build and renovate community facilities and housing. Its programs provide housing assistance to families with moderate and low incomes; it also helps communities develop and improve facilities such as fire stations, libraries, and hospitals. The Rural Business-Cooperative Service cultivates partnerships between the private sector and community-based organizations. It also provides technical assistance and funding for projects that generate employment. Rural businesses also get a boost from the Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community initiative, as many of the areas these programs target are in rural communities. Finally, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is addressing the digital divide by providing funds to help schools and libraries and rural medical facilities in lowincome communities develop modern communications infrastructure. At the regional level the Administration has supported several initiatives addressing the problems of rural development, including a Task Force on the Economic Development of the Southwest Border, the Mississippi Delta regional initiative, and the Denali Commission in Alaska. These initiatives coordinate Federal, State, and local development assistance to areas with historically high poverty rates and limited employment opportunities. Chapter 5 | 207 Results These programs, coupled with the strong national economy and policies aimed at making work pay, have led to substantial improvements in the quality of life for those living in central cities and rural areas. The unemployment rate in the Nation’s central cities fell from 8.2 percent in 1993 to 5.3 percent in 1999, while unemployment in rural areas declined from 5.9 percent to 3.7 percent. Increased employment has meant reductions in poverty and increases in median incomes (Chart 5-6). As noted, the poverty rates in both central cities and nonmetropolitan areas fell significantly between 1993 and 1999, with the largest drop in central-city rates (2.1 percentage points) occurring in the last year. This change was so large and affected so many people that it accounted for 80 percent of the total reduction in poverty from 1998 to 1999. The median household income in the central city has also increased, rising 5 percent in real terms from 1998 to 1999—more than double the 2.1 percent increase in the median income in metropolitan areas as a whole. The gains in income for African Americans were particularly striking. After adjusting for inflation, the median income for African-American households in central cities increased by 13.9 percent between 1998 and 1999. These economic gains have been accompanied by a decline in the number of people on welfare. Caseloads in the largest central-city areas declined by 40.6 percent between 1994 and 1999. Increases in the median household income in rural areas were less dramatic than those in the cities, rising just 0.9 percent in real terms between 1998 and 1999. 208 | Economic Report of the President Despite these clear improvements in the well-being of our poorest communities, much remains to be done. Poverty rates and unemployment are still too high. It is too soon to judge the effectiveness of the Administration’s community-based policies, but reaching out to these communities demonstrates a willingness to seek creative solutions to some of the Nation’s most pressing problems. Education in the New Economy What students learn in school is crucial in determining their future options and, more broadly, in enhancing the productivity of the Nation. Thus it is imperative that all children be given adequate opportunities to learn. To this end the United States has invested in a quality public education system. Unfortunately, not all communities can afford to invest equally in the education of their children, and the Federal Government has worked to reduce this inequality. And by promoting educational innovations such as more challenging curricula and the increased use of technology in the classroom, the Federal Government is working to improve the quality of schooling for all children. Investments in human capital play an important role in the New Economy. Last year’s Report focused on the demand for educated workers and on postsecondary education and training. This year’s Report examines America’s public elementary and secondary schools—institutions that are also important to the development of our future work force. Although many factors go into producing a quality education, and parents, families, and communities surely rank among the most important, the discussion here focuses on the components of the education system more directly under the control of Federal, State, and local governments. This discussion highlights the effects of class size, teacher quality, and school infrastructure and equipment. Strengthening these inputs to the education process is key to improving educational outcomes. A Role for Federal Education Policy To prepare America’s young people to join the New Economy, innovations must be sought in the provision of education that will increase its quality for all. These innovations include a committed effort to reduce class size, investments in teachers, higher standards for schools, the widespread adoption of computer technologies in the classroom, and new charter schools that provide parents with a choice in their children’s education but retain public accountability. Chapter 5 | 209 The Federal Government has long sought to improve access to education for the Nation’s poorest children and to help States ensure that their public schools are of high quality. Federal funds are used primarily to help implement needed reforms, expand new programs, provide access to new technology, and pay part of the cost of education for students with disabilities. Many Federal education programs are targeted to schools and school districts serving students from lower income families. By directing funds to these important areas, the Federal investment in schooling can have an impact greater than the expenditure itself would suggest. In the United States, primary responsibility for elementary and secondary education rests with the States and with local school districts. Excluding school-based health and nutrition programs, the Federal Government provides just a little more than 6 percent of all funding for kindergarten, elementary, and secondary education. However, this figure belies the disproportionately large impact that Federal dollars can have on schools. Federal spending in the poorest schools reduces inequalities across school districts but does not fully compensate for the overall pattern of funding disparities created by differences in local property tax bases and State funding levels (Chart 5-7). A study of 1994–95 data found that the Federal Government spent more than four times as much per student in the poorest quartile of school districts as in the wealthiest quartile, but that the wealthiest school districts still had the highest level of expenditure per student. 210 | Economic Report of the President The largest Federal education program for kindergarten through 12th grade (K-12) is Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which provides funds to schools based on the number of poor children and the child poverty rate in the local area. Since passage of this legislation in 1965, these funds have been targeted to schools serving the poorest children. The ability to target funding to the most needy schools improved significantly after 1994, when the distribution of funding began to be based on newly available biennial data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census on child poverty in smaller geographic areas (such as counties). In the 1997–98 academic year, 96 percent of those schools with the highest poverty levels received Title I funds, up from 79 percent in 1993–94. In 1997–98 the highest-poverty quartile of school districts received 43 percent of all Federal funds for K-12 education and 50 percent of Title I funds—amounts that reflect the share of the Nation’s poor children in these districts (49 percent). At the same time, these school districts received less than a quarter of all State and local funds. Clearly, Federal funds in general and Title I funds in particular are a critical resource for improving equality in education. Reducing Class Size For decades the merits of various educational spending programs, including those aimed at reducing class size, have been the subject of much debate. Are they in fact effective in improving student achievement? Mounting evidence is showing that smaller classes are beneficial, especially for disadvantaged students and those in the early grades. The most compelling evidence comes from the Project STAR (StudentTeacher Achievement Ratio) experiment in Tennessee in the late 1980s. To determine to what extent smaller classes improve academic outcomes, Tennessee authorized and financed an experiment that randomly assigned students and teachers in kindergarten through third grade to classes with a standard number of students (22–25) or to smaller classes (13–17 students). The results showed better performance for children in the smaller classes: these children did better on standardized tests of reading and math than students in larger classes. A follow-up study showed that the students enrolled in smaller classes in the early grades continued to do better on standardized tests in middle school than other students. These students were also more likely to take college-entrance exams in high school. The results were especially strong for minority students. For example, white students in general are more likely to take a college-entrance exam than African-American students. But when the probabilities were calculated for white and African-American students who had been placed in small classes in elementary school, this difference narrowed substantially. Some 46 percent of white students and 40 percent of Chapter 5 | 211 African-American students who had been in small classes took a collegeentrance exam; the corresponding figures for students in standard-size classes were 45 percent and 32 percent, respectively. The quality of the Tennessee experiment’s design and the outcomes it generated persuaded many scholars that reductions in class size can improve educational outcomes for children. Teachers in smaller classes can spend more time on individual instruction and review, and less on student discipline and routine administrative tasks, than teachers in larger classes. Teachers of small classes are also more likely to get to know their students, interact with them frequently on a one-to-one basis, and provide frequent, in-depth feedback. Results are now emerging from programs in other States that reinforce the conclusions of the Tennessee study. In 1998 the Administration proposed a 7-year initiative to reduce class sizes in grades 1–3. Its goal is an average of 18 students per class nationwide. In its first 2 years the program enabled school districts to hire an estimated 29,000 new teachers, reducing class size for 1.7 million children. Smaller classes are expensive, however. One study estimates that reducing class size in grades 1–3 nationwide to an average of 18 students would cost $5 billion per year. Despite the expense, the expected gains in students’ future earnings appear to be large enough to make the investment worthwhile. The Importance of Teachers The quality of teachers may play an even more important role than class size in improving student outcomes. Parents, students, and professional educators agree that teacher effectiveness is an important factor in student achievement, and several recent studies find that differences among teachers have significant effects. Further, these analyses show that some measurable characteristics, such as holding a master’s degree, are not necessarily indicative of a teacher’s ability to enhance student performance. And although a teacher’s effectiveness seems to increase with experience in the first years of teaching, these gains to seniority are not significant beyond 3 to 5 years. These results suggest that much of the difference in teachers’ effectiveness stems from variations in attributes that are hard to measure, such as talent and motivation. Many schools are finding it difficult to attract and retain highly effective teachers. Some of this difficulty likely stems from the existing pay scales in public schools. In the last several decades, teachers’ salaries have fallen relative to those in other occupations. A large majority of public school teachers are women, and for women in particular the rewards of teaching have shrunk by comparison with other opportunities. In 1940 fewer than 32 percent of 212 | Economic Report of the President women with a college degree earned more than the average female teacher. By 1990 this fraction had risen to 55 percent. This trend continued throughout the 1990s, with starting salaries in most occupations increasing at a much faster rate than starting salaries in the teaching profession. One study found that from 1994 to 1998 the average salary for persons with a master’s degree in nonteaching fields increased by 32 percent in real terms, while the real increase in the average salary for teachers was less than 1 percent. Other factors that affect job quality for teachers, such as crowded classrooms, unsafe schools, and limited opportunities for professional development and advancement, also affect schools’ ability to attract and retain teachers. The challenge of attracting and retaining effective teachers in sufficient numbers will become particularly acute in coming years. Between July 2000 and July 2008, the number of children aged 5–17 will rise by nearly 1 million, significantly increasing the need for teachers nationwide. Yet in this same period about 750,000 teachers are expected to retire, and many others are likely to leave the field to pursue other occupations. Given these statistics, the United States will need an estimated 2 million new teachers in the next 8 years. The demand for teachers will be further heightened by mandates to reduce class size. Meeting the target of 18 students per class in grades 1–3 will require staffing an estimated 100,000 additional classrooms. These increases in the demand for teachers will make it increasingly difficult to maintain consistently high teacher quality in all classrooms. The magnitude of the challenge is already becoming clear. In 1996 California began a massive program designed to reduce class size in the early grades (K–3). Expenditures for the program, which seeks a statewide class size reduction from an average of 28 students to a maximum of 20, are running $1.5 billion per year. The State has been largely successful in achieving its goal: by the 1998–99 school year, more than 92 percent of California’s students in the targeted grades were in classes of 20 or fewer students. But the share of fully credentialed teachers instructing these classes fell from 98 percent in the 1995–96 school year to 87 percent in 1998–99. This decline indicates that the demand for well-trained teachers is outstripping the supply and that continued increases in this demand will likely make it more difficult for schools to find qualified instructors. Ultimately, the benefits of nationwide reductions in class size will depend on the ability to attract and retain greater numbers of talented teachers (Box 5-2). This Administration has supported investments in teachers. Its Class Size Reduction Initiative requires that teachers hired with Federal funds available under the program be fully certified. The initiative allows school districts to spend up to 25 percent of their allocated funds on professional development and testing for new teachers. Districts that have met the appropriate goals for Chapter 5 | 213 Box 5-2. Rewarding Effective Teachers Traditionally, teacher salaries have been based on education levels, experience, and responsibilities, leaving school systems little room to reward the most effective teachers. Recently some schools and school districts have experimented with alternative, performance-based pay systems. These new methods may help improve the quality of instruction in several ways. First, by establishing specific criteria for evaluation, performance-based awards can help clarify and prioritize goals, thus providing better guidance for teachers. The awards may also provide teachers with additional motivation to work to achieve these goals. Tying teacher compensation to performance may also help attract talented people to the teaching profession and retain them, if they know that their hard work and skills will be rewarded. But although performance-based pay systems may offer new ways to reward exemplary teachers, they should not substitute for appropriate baseline salaries. To be effective, performance-based pay systems must be carefully designed. Because student achievement depends on many factors that teachers cannot control, such as family circumstances and previous education, fair, performance-based systems should reward teachers for gains in student achievement rather than for absolute levels of performance. Furthermore, because student learning involves cooperative effort, incentives must be designed to create a cooperative, not a competitive, environment for teachers. For example, team-spiritedness might be enhanced by basing a portion of the awards on schoolwide rather than class-by-class achievement. Finally, the standards used to assess performance must be carefully constructed. If student outcomes are to be the basis of a performance-based pay system, measures such as gains in student test scores, increases in attendance, and increases in graduation rates should be considered—and they have been in a few schools. The design of these school-based performance awards systems varies widely. In some cases the awards are given directly to individual teachers; in others the rewards benefit all teachers in a school equally. In the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district in North Carolina, for example, awards were based on a broad array of student outcomes including subject mastery, dropout rates, and absenteeism. Schools received points for meeting annual improvement goals, and teachers in these schools benefited directly: in the highest-performing schools (classified as “exemplary”), each teacher received $1,000. Teachers in “outstanding” schools (those with slightly lower gains) received $750. In contrast to this equal division of awards, the program implemented at the Vaughn charter school in Los Angeles offers awards that vary continued on next page... 214 | Economic Report of the President Box 5-2.—continued substantially from teacher to teacher. Teachers at Vaughn are provided the opportunity to receive cash bonuses in each semester for effective performance in a number of areas, including the teaching of specific academic subjects and more general skills such as classroom management and lesson planning. Performance is assessed through self-evaluations, peer review, and reviews by administrators. For a veteran teacher, performance-related awards can total up to $13,100 per year. A nationwide program that can also provide incentives to teachers beyond the traditional pay scales has been developed by the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards. The board has established distinct programs of national board certification, which have drawn the support of policymakers and educators alike. Many States and local school districts are providing incentives to teachers to complete this certification process.To become certified, teachers must compile an extensive portfolio of their work, including classroom videotaping, and take a fullday exam. Once certified, teachers are encouraged to act as mentors to new teachers and to support colleagues seeking such certification. Studies of their effects on teachers have found that many award systems that are based on schools’ performance help improve cooperation among teachers, but that these programs vary in their effectiveness in increasing teacher motivation. Teachers in many programs also reported that they feel increased pressure at work and work longer hours. Systems that reward individual teachers also have positive aspects. The system at Vaughn has helped attract new recruits, and many current teachers were pleased with the program. However, some problems were also encountered. One teacher complained that the peer review process, which result in differing amounts being paid to teachers, “pits teacher against teacher.” These difficulties indicate that additional research and experimentation might be useful in arriving at the best compensation strategies. reducing class size in the early grades have the option of using their entire allocation for activities to improve teacher quality. The Teacher Quality Enhancement Grant program helps States improve the quality of teaching. To date it has helped prepare about 20,000 new teachers for high-need school districts, and it will help prepare many thousands more in coming years. Funding for another Federal professional development program—the largest in the budget (and currently called the Eisenhower Professional Development Program)—increased from $275 million in 1993 to $335 million in fiscal 2000. Chapter 5 | 215 The Need for Modern Schools The physical condition of classrooms may also affect the quality of the educational experience and, in the most severe cases, the safety of students. Communities across the country are struggling to address the problems of aging schools. In 1999 the average public school was 40 years old, and schools in largely poor or minority districts were even older. Many of these aging buildings have outdated electrical systems that must be upgraded for computers, and asbestos in the walls of some schools increases the cost of such upgrades. Some buildings need to be renovated extensively to accommodate disabled students. Many schools will need more classrooms as enrollments increase and average class size is reduced, putting additional pressure on aging facilities. The National Center for Education Statistics estimates that getting America’s schools into good physical condition will require an investment of $127 billion. Some 39 percent of our public schools already have temporary additions, about one-fifth of which are in less than adequate condition. Schools with a relatively high proportion of poor and minority students are more likely than other public schools to have temporary buildings, and thus will have the most difficulty housing additional classes. New Educational Technology and Internet Access Today’s workers are increasingly required to be computer literate. Schools must be able to teach students the skills they will need to work with computers and other new technologies. In addition, Internet access is becoming an important classroom resource, helping students learn by connecting them to libraries, museums, and educational materials around the world. Internet access has become increasingly widespread in American classrooms over the past 8 years, and Federal programs, especially the E-rate program discussed below, have played a large role. The E-rate program provides up to $2.25 billion per year to schools and libraries to offset the cost of telecommunications services, Internet access, and internal connections. Tremendous strides have been made in connecting public schools to the Internet (Chart 5-8). With the help of the E-rate program, the number of public schools with Internet access nearly tripled between 1994 and 1999, and by 1999 some 95 percent of all public schools were on line. Increases in Internet connectivity within classrooms were even more dramatic. In 1994 only 3 percent of public school classrooms had Internet hookups; by 1999 that figure had risen to 63 percent. The Federal Government has helped local school districts make the transition to the digital age, committing $5.7 billion over the last 3 years through its E-rate program to connect school and library computers to each other and 216 | Economic Report of the President to the Internet (Box 5-3). These funds have targeted schools with a high proportion of low-income students. Schools where 75 percent or more of students are eligible for free school lunches receive approximately 10 times as much funding per student from the program as schools with the smallest percentage of such students. Other Federal programs have also helped schools purchase new educational technology. In addition to the E-rate program, in fiscal 2000 the Federal Government spent $766 million on education technology programs through Title III of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Some $425 million of this was provided through the Technology Literacy Challenge Fund. Schools also used portions of their Title I funding to invest in technology. A large share of these funds was used to purchase computers and train staffing using new technology. During the 1997–98 school year, Federal funds paid for one-fourth of all new computers in schools (Chart 5-9). Federal funds were especially important in helping elementary schools with large numbers of low-income students acquire technology, accounting for nearly 60 percent of new computers in these schools. For computers to improve the quality of instruction, teachers must know how to use them and how to integrate them into the classroom. A recent study found that only 53 percent of all public school teachers with computers or Internet access used these resources for classroom instruction. Teachers Chapter 5 | 217 Box 5-3. Reducing the Digital Divide Since 1993, computer use in America has grown at an enormous rate, revolutionizing the way Americans communicate, work, and do business. Access to a computer—and knowing how to use it—are increasingly important for success in today’s society. Currently more than half of all U.S. households have computers, and more than two-fifths have Internet access at home. But computer use varies greatly with income and education. People in households earning more than $75,000 per year are almost four times as likely to use the Internet as those in households earning less than $15,000 per year. Adults with college degrees are more than eight times as likely to use the Internet as adults who have not completed high school. Race is also a factor. African Americans and Hispanics are substantially less likely than white and Asian Americans to use the Internet. A recent study finds that income and education explain only around half of this difference. Individuals from disadvantaged groups that already face obstacles in the workplace are at risk of falling even further behind if they lack computer know-how. There is encouraging news, however. Notable changes are occurring among school-age children, suggesting that the widespread availability of computers in the classroom is playing a role. Across all income and demographic groups, Internet usage among children aged 9–17 is higher than the national average. And over the last few years Internet usage has grown faster among African-American and Hispanic children than among white children, and faster among children in households earning less than $35,000 per year than among children from wealthier households. who have received more professional development in using computers and the Internet, and teachers in schools with relatively few low-income students, were the most likely to report using computers and the Internet. Newer teachers were also more likely to use computers “a lot” to create instructional materials. Despite the growth in the number of classrooms with computers, only one-third of teachers with access to computers and the Internet said that they felt well or very well prepared to use them. These results clearly show that more investment in teacher preparation is needed. The Federal Government has addressed this issue through its Preparing Tomorrow’s Teachers to Use Technology grant program. This program supports 352 partnerships among colleges, educational agencies, and nonprofit organizations, providing training for teachers in integrating technology into the classroom. 218 | Economic Report of the President Standards and Accountability Over the last decade, changes have taken place in America’s public schools that go far beyond increasing the investments just described. Among the most important changes are new ways of improving accountability for educational outcomes. Initiatives that establish clear performance outcomes and systematically test student progress aim to help teachers and students focus their efforts on those areas needing the most work. Spurred in part by legislation passed in 1994 (the Improving America’s Schools Act and the Goals 2000: Educate America Act), State after State has implemented standards for what students need to learn. As of October 2000, 48 States and the District of Columbia had adopted such standards; the majority of States adopting standards have done so since 1994. The establishment of these standards has been followed by an increase in standards-based assessment. Forty-eight States and the District of Columbia now administer tests to assess student performance relative to these standards in reading and math, and many States do so for science and social studies as well. Thirty-six States currently publish some form of report card for each school, measuring school performance against a number of indicators, including student assessment test scores. Both the standards themselves and the assessments based on them have been controversial. Many argue that classroom instruction is now geared Chapter 5 | 219 toward preparing students for the exams—that teachers are, in effect, “teaching to the test.” However, when implemented correctly, such assessments can help improve the quality of the educational experience—and educational outcomes—in several ways. First, tests that are challenging and well constructed can help raise the expectations of students, teachers, and parents. These expectations can motivate all parties to improve their performance. Second, by clearly outlining the material to be covered and the degree of mastery required, these measures of accountability may help teachers focus on what are generally agreed to be the most important topics. Finally, these tests provide parents, teachers, and students with information that highlights those areas in which students are less than fully prepared. The Federal Government has played an important role in the standards movement. Since 1994 it has devoted more than $2.6 billion to helping agencies in every State implement school reforms through the Goals 2000 Act. Even before that legislation was passed, the government supported the development of voluntary national standards that States could use as a basis for their own standards. In addition, the Improving America’s Schools Act tightened Title I accountability at the school and the district levels by requiring States to hold students in Title I schools to the same challenging standards as other students and to assess all students in Title I schools against these standards. The Federal Government has also increased its efforts to track student progress, undertaking evaluations that help in assessing State-level reforms. In recent years the National Assessment of Educational Progress has been expanded to track student performance in each State. Thanks to these assessments a valuable set of baseline indicators now exists for measuring student progress that can help researchers and education professionals evaluate the effectiveness of new policies (Box 5-4). The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997 further require that children with disabilities be included in State- and district-level assessment programs, so that the performance of these children will be measured as well. Increasing Public School Choice A persistent thread during the last decade of educational change has been the call for parental choice in their children’s education. Allowing parents to choose among different public school models would likely benefit students by allowing them to choose the method of instruction that offers the best fit for their child’s learning skills and interests. In responding to parental demand, educators would offer the most effective educational models and innovations. Many States have responded to the demand for choice by allowing parents, teachers, and other interested parties to establish independent public schools 220 | Economic Report of the President Box 5-4. Ensuring That Gains Are Maintained Effective teachers, adequate facilities, and well-constructed standards can help students learn more. However, these investments are of little value unless students retain what they have learned. Numerous studies have demonstrated that knowledge and skills deteriorate while children are away from school, especially during summer vacations. Drawing their conclusions from an analysis of many previous studies, one group of researchers found that children lost an average of a month’s worth of learning over summer break. Much of the Federal Government’s role in education policy has been aimed at helping children in low-income families receive a quality education, thus mitigating the effect of family income on schooling outcomes. When children are not in school, it appears that family characteristics play an important role in determining learning. Many studies have noted that the deterioration of skills associated with summer vacation was greatest for children in low-income families. These differences appear to be particularly large for reading: students from middle-class families experienced a small gain in test scores over the summer, whereas students from low-income families fell behind. The result was a gap between the two groups in reading skills equal to approximately 3 months of schooling. These differences suggest that public schools can do even more to help children from low-income families succeed. One possibility is to lengthen the school year. If students attended school year-round, there would be less opportunity for skills to deteriorate. Alternatively, summer enrichment programs targeting low-income communities can help poor children overcome some of the disadvantages they face at home and in their neighborhoods. In addition to changes in the school calendar, communities can offer after-school enrichment programs. Both after-school and summer learning programs can also be a boon for working parents, particularly for lower income parents who may have difficulty arranging alternative care for their children. Not only can such programs assure parents that their children are in a safe, enriching environment, but they can also allow working parents to invest in their jobs and gain important labor market skills that can further benefit their children through increases in family income and exits from welfare. The Administration has worked to assist local communities develop after-school activities through its 21st Century Community Learning Centers Program. This program has funded more than 3,600 afterschool and summer programs. Preliminary evaluations indicate that these programs have had beneficial impacts on the academic and social behaviors of participating children. Chapter 5 | 221 chartered by State or local education agencies. These charter schools are given autonomy over their operations and are exempted from certain State and local regulations (although not from standards-based assessment) in exchange for strict public accountability and results. Charter schools have great potential as laboratories of educational innovation, allowing individual schools to explore a variety of educational methods while remaining publicly accountable. The Administration has strongly supported the development of charter schools, having overseen the creation of the Public Charter Schools Program in 1994 and passage of the Charter School Expansion Act in 1998. In 1991 Minnesota became the first State to allow charter schools, and by the end of 1999, 36 States and the District of Columbia had made provisions allowing for such schools. At the beginning of the 2000–01 school year, 2,069 charter schools were operating nationwide, up from just 34 at the start of the 1993–94 school year. Helping Students Make the Transition from Secondary School to College Federal programs are also helping students make the transition from secondary school to college or work. The Gaining Early Awareness and Readiness for Undergraduate Programs (GEAR UP) bring middle schools with a high proportion of poor students together with local colleges and universities. These partnerships helped prepare more than 250,000 students for college in fiscal 2000. The programs provide entire classes of students and their families with academic enrichment programs as well as information about choosing a college, applying for financial aid, and preparing for college entry; in some cases they will also provide college scholarships. The TRIO programs such as Upward Bound currently serve 730,000 low-income, firstgeneration college and disabled students, helping them prepare for and succeed in college. And after 6 years of receiving seed money from the Federal Government, all States have instituted local school-to-work programs to benefit secondary school students as they prepare for their working lives. Over the past 8 years, Federal assistance to Americans investing in their college education has also increased. Direct Pell grants have risen from a maximum of $2,300 per student per year to $3,300. The HOPE Scholarship and Lifetime Learning tax credits have also reduced the cost of education for American families. Fees and interest rates on student loans have been reduced, and restructuring the Federal student loan program has saved billions in taxpayer dollars. 222 | Economic Report of the President Innovation and Access in Health Care The American health care system today reflects the successes and the promise of the New Economy. Americans are healthier now than they were just 10 years ago. Between 1990 and 1998 life expectancy at birth rose approximately 1.3 years, and life expectancy at age 65 rose more than half a year. The rate of chronic disability among the elderly declined by 14.5 percent between 1982 and 1994. Medical innovations are in part responsible for these improvements, as are factors such as improved nutrition and exercise. Yet health care continues to present challenges that demand an ongoing role for the government. A stream of technological innovations has raised the quality of care and improved health outcomes. Innovative diagnostic tools and new treatments have improved the medical system’s ability to treat many diseases and conditions. These innovations enable medical professionals to identify health problems more accurately and to offer treatments that are less invasive and promise better outcomes. One good example is the use of drug therapy to treat some conditions that formerly required surgery. These improvements in treatment are expensive, however, and overall health care costs have risen as people demand more and better care. The upward pressures on expenditures are exacerbated by traditional fee-forservice insurance, which offers weak incentives for patients or providers to limit their health care consumption. Managed care has evolved as an organizational innovation to control rising health care expenditures. It attempts to create incentives for both patients and providers to make efficient health care consumption choices—to utilize treatments, especially costly technological innovations, only when they are medically appropriate. However, health insurance coverage remains a problem. Around 42.6 million Americans have no health insurance coverage, often because they cannot afford it. Thus the government has a continuing role to play in providing health insurance to those in need of assistance. The Administration recognizes the importance of health insurance and has worked to extend coverage to those most in need of it. The State Children’s Health Insurance Program, for instance, has extended health insurance to an estimated 2.5 million children nationwide. Technological Innovations Dramatic innovations in medical care, often driven by computer technology or research in fields such as biotechnology, have led to more accurate diagnostic techniques, better surgical procedures, and treatments for previously untreatable conditions. Evidence indicates that technological innovations have been beneficial as a whole. One study found that the lifetime value of Chapter 5 | 223 improved health (including longer life) attributable to improved medical care outweighed the significant costs. Nevertheless, examples of innovations are particularly revealing, because aggregate studies are unable to fully measure the impact of these innovations. For example, by providing very high resolution anatomical and pathological images, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) enables much more precise diagnosis of a number of diseases and conditions than traditional computed tomography (CT) scanning. In the 1990s MRI technology and computers were further combined to create “open MRI” systems, which can be used to provide continuous pictures to guide surgeons during brain operations. Modern techniques for abdominal aneurysms illustrate how surgical procedures have improved. The development in the 1990s of endovascular surgery, a minimally invasive procedure that uses intraluminal stents (scaffolding-like wire-mesh devices used to prop open artery walls), has led to remarkable improvements over open surgery to repair abdominal aneurysms. Experts reporting on the results of clinical trials have testified that endovascular surgery reduces operating procedure time by 20 percent, reduces blood loss by two-thirds, halves the number of patients requiring a transfusion, and reduces intensive care unit time from 3.5 days to less than 1 day and the hospital length of stay from 9.3 days to 3.4 days. Mortality is comparable to that from open surgery, but endovascular surgery produces only half the number of severe treatment-related adverse effects. In addition, innovative techniques and treatments now allow physicians to treat some previously untreatable conditions, such as Alzheimer’s disease, which affects some 4 million Americans. A new drug therapy that enhances cognitive function and delays the progress of the disease was introduced in 1993, the result of advances in neurobiological research. New drug treatments for other conditions have also come on the market. Facilitated by the streamlining of the drug approval process in 1997, the number of new drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration that are significant improvements over existing drugs grew from an average of 12.5 per year in 1990–93 and 13.3 in 1994–96 to 14.7 in 1997–99. Innovations that produce better care can save money by reducing the number of medical inputs required to produce the same or a better health outcome. The development of minimally invasive laparoscopic surgery, made possible by advanced digital technology, has reduced the costs of abdominal surgery. Laparoscopy has reduced the postoperative hospital stay for gall bladder surgery by up to 6 days, and the time patients need to take off work by a month, reducing overall costs. Drug therapies can prevent peptic ulcers or substitute for expensive abdominal surgery for severe ulcers, and new psychotropic drugs may keep many people who suffer from depression out of the hospital and reduce or eliminate the need for extensive psychotherapy. 224 | Economic Report of the President However, many innovations actually raise the cost of health care because they require more medical staff time and more expensive equipment than traditional treatments in order to produce better outcomes. MRI scans, for example, are extremely expensive, as are certain types of highly innovative brain surgery. Intensive cardiac interventions are being offered with increasing frequency. Among Medicare patients, the use of coronary bypass surgery tripled between 1984 and 1991. Catheterization procedures quadrupled, and angioplasty use rose 15-fold. As a result, the cost of treating a heart attack rose 36 percent faster than inflation between 1984 and 1991. But life expectancy after a heart attack rose by 8 months during the same period. Overall, innovations in acute interventions accounted for about 55 percent of the decline in mortality from heart attacks between 1975 and 1995. Both interventions that lower costs and interventions that increase them can contribute to higher total expenditure. Cost-saving innovations may lower the cost per patient of treating a condition, but if more people then use them, or use them more often, total costs are likely to increase. Innovations that raise per-patient costs unambiguously raise the total cost of health care, even if the number of treatments does not rise. More frequent use of these expensive new procedures raises costs even further. Treatments for previously untreatable conditions also raise overall health care expenditure. Organizational Innovations to Control Health Care Costs Medical innovations have been the primary reason for the rapid growth in health care expenditure in the last two decades, accounting for more than half of the long-term increase. These technological innovations have exacerbated the dilemma of providing high-quality care while holding costs at a reasonable level. To balance these conflicting goals, health care decisionmakers must meet two challenges: they must determine when improved outcomes justify the additional expense, and they must structure the health care system so that it uses medical technology in the most cost-effective way. Because health insurers pay for most health care, the incentives embedded in the health insurance system strongly influence the efficiency of the entire health care system. Before the 1990s the predominant health insurance arrangement was that known as fee-for-service. Under this system patients face low copayments, and providers are reimbursed on a cost-based method after each medical encounter. The system provides those who determine a course of medical treatment with great flexibility and satisfies health care consumers’ desire to obtain the highest-quality care available (including expensive technologies). From a physician’s point of view, fee-for-service plans are desirable because they take into account the complex nature of medical needs and the variety of appropriate responses available. However, Chapter 5 | 225 because reimbursements are based strictly on utilization, patients and medical personnel using these plans have few direct incentives to use the most cost-effective technologies and practices. Physicians have incentives to overprescribe services and procedures, and patients have incentives to let them. To address these problems, managed care has introduced an incentive structure that encourages providers to choose services more efficiently. Managed care employs two mechanisms, one financial and one nonfinancial, to alter providers’ incentives and treatment choices. The first is capitation, a method of payment that gives providers a fixed payment for each patient in a risk pool. Under this arrangement, providers have a strong incentive to reduce treatment costs, because they retain whatever is left over from the payment after all medical treatment is provided. The second mechanism is utilization management, which includes establishing treatment guidelines, controlling access to specialists, and monitoring physicians’ performance to reduce low-valued services. Managed care organizations can influence the expected profitability of new technology by reducing reimbursement and restricting utilization. When they do, hospitals and physicians are likely to acquire and use fewer new and expensive technologies. By balancing patients’ desire for better health care with incentives for providers to reduce costs, managed care can encourage more cost-effective use of technology while promoting innovations that improve health and keep costs in line. At the same time that it seeks this balance, however, managed care creates a different set of problems. These include incentives for health insurance plans to select only healthy patients and to underprovide services. Managed care organizations have a strong incentive to sign up healthy patients whose health care costs will be low. This incentive can override the goal of improving efficiency. Furthermore, providers have an incentive to restrict even cost-effective services because they receive no additional revenue from providing them. Because patients frequently lack information about the effectiveness of alternative treatments and are thus unable to act as knowledgeable consumers, this problem can be severe (Box 5-5). As a result, patients may not get expensive but medically necessary services. Thus patients need meaningful protections against incentives that lead to too little care being provided. The optimal reimbursement design, in terms of offering incentives that balance cost and access, likely lies somewhere between fee-for-service and capitation plans. Such a plan would involve partial cost sharing by providers and patients through copayments and coinsurance, but the ideal incentive structure has not yet been identified. As managed care plans have evolved to allow patients more choices, the plans’ ability to influence utilization has diminished. Consolidation among physicians and hospitals in the 1990s created intermediary organizations between providers and managed care 226 | Economic Report of the President Box 5-5.The Rise of E-Health: On-Line Medical Information The Internet is becoming an important source of medical information for consumers, for at least two reasons. First, it empowers patients by providing them with medical information that increases the value of a medical appointment. Interactions with physicians are more efficient if patients know what questions and concerns to raise beforehand. Second, for general information the Internet offers an attractive alternative to a costly consultation. Tens of thousands of Internet websites provide medical and healthrelated information. About 60 million Americans searched for health information on line in 1998, and that number was expected to increase in 2000. An analysis of patient electronic inquiries to a university dermatology department found that 40 percent of the inquiries could be answered by a librarian, 28 percent could be answered by a physician via e-mail, and only 27 percent required a visit with a physician. Without the Internet many of these questions might not have been asked or answered at all, and unnecessary visits might have occurred. The Internet thus has the potential to effectively supplement the physician’s role in providing medical information and thereby to improve efficiency. However, the websites currently available may present problems. Not all on-line medical information is easily comprehensible to the lay reader, and some sites raise conflict-of-interest issues. Although the Internet can reduce the cost of obtaining medical information, it cannot make information on complex medical issues understandable to all. To the extent that it leads patients to self-diagnose and self-treat inappropriately, then, on-line information can be harmful. Furthermore, the quality of information varies greatly, in part because commercial interests can influence content. These problems can actually increase the demands on physicians, who must spend time clarifying misleading or misinterpreted information. For these reasons the government has a role in overseeing and regulating medical information websites. Several government agencies, including the National Institutes of Health, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, have taken the initiative either to provide information directly or to provide links to reliable medical websites. plans, so that fewer providers actually operate on a strict capitation basis. For these reasons managed care plans at the beginning of the 21st century differ markedly from the original managed care organizations, and the mechanisms that managed care uses to influence cost-effectiveness have been significantly altered. Chapter 5 | 227 Empirical evidence suggests that managed care was one of the factors that slowed the growth in total health care expenditure in the 1990s (Chart 5-10). Managed care slowed health care inflation not only by reducing the use of expensive procedures, but also by lowering physician and hospital fees relative to fees under traditional insurance. However, further reductions in utilization may not be feasible, simply because continued reductions could prevent patients from receiving medically necessary treatment. In addition, managed care’s ability to restrict fees in the future is uncertain, because fees cannot fall below costs. Whether reductions in health care expenditure will continue is thus an open question, and recent indications suggest that expenditures are again beginning to grow. If technological progress remains the key factor behind rising health care costs, managed care can continue to generate significant cost reductions only by influencing the types of innovations that are used. If managed care can increase the use of cost-saving innovations, the rate of growth may be slowed. But if patients continue to demand access to the latest technology and are willing to pay for any innovation regardless of its medical efficacy or costeffectiveness, managed care may be unwilling or unable to impose further cost-saving innovations. Evidence of managed care’s impact on the types of technology that are adopted and the rate at which innovations are introduced is mixed. Some researchers have found that increasing enrollment in managed care organizations restricts the adoption and use of cost-increasing technologies. One study, for example, found evidence that neonatal intensive 228 | Economic Report of the President care units are introduced and used more cost-effectively in areas with a high concentration of managed care organizations. However, another study found evidence that health maintenance organizations (HMOs) slowed general technological growth in the early and mid-1980s but had little effect on technological growth by the early 1990s. Thus managed care’s ability to influence how innovations will affect costs remains to be seen. Improving Health Insurance Coverage Considering the progress that has been made in medical innovation, access to high-quality health services is becoming increasingly valuable. Because these services, particularly treatments for nonroutine health care, can be very expensive, health insurance is the best means of ensuring that people receive the care they need. The number and proportion of Americans without health insurance decreased in 1999 for the first time since 1987, when comparable statistics first became available. As has been noted, however, around 42.6 million Americans remained without insurance coverage. This section discusses the current state of the health insurance system and some approaches that have been considered for extending health insurance to more people. The Health Insurance System The American health insurance system relies primarily on employersponsored health plans. Employer-sponsored programs cover about 63 percent of all Americans, and 74 percent of all who are insured. One reason for the prevalence of this type of group insurance is that the Federal tax code favors it. The insurance premiums that firms pay on behalf of their employees are not included in the employees’ taxable income. In addition, certain arrangements, such as flexible spending accounts, allow employees to make contributions toward their health care expenses with before-tax dollars. The employer-sponsored insurance system offers several important benefits. First, it encourages groups, especially large groups, to pool risks effectively. In addition, firms can hire benefits administrators to evaluate policies and ensure that quality plans are offered. Finally, insurance companies can offer large employers lower premiums, in part because economies of scale reduce their administrative costs. Because low-income individuals have a lower marginal tax rate and are less likely to have insurance, the tax-preferred treatment of employer-sponsored health insurance often does not provide them with significant benefits (Chart 5-11). People who do not obtain health insurance through their employer must buy insurance with after-tax dollars. This group includes not only the unemployed but also people who work for employers that do not offer health insurance. These groups are more likely to need a subsidy to be able to purchase health insurance. Chapter 5 | 229 People without employer-sponsored health insurance who do not qualify for publicly funded programs must enter the individual insurance market in order to obtain coverage. This market can present problems that limit affordable access. Some insurers may choose not to cover people with preexisting health problems or may cover them but exclude the preexisting condition. Insurers may also charge premiums based on an individual’s perceived risk. For example, people with diabetes may have to pay significantly higher premiums because they are more likely to experience health problems. In some cases the premiums can become unaffordable. The fact that the cost of administering policies is higher for individual than for group policies raises the premiums for individuals still further. Publicly provided health insurance programs—Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP—are an important source of coverage for many people. Created in 1965, Medicare and Medicaid provide health insurance for the elderly, people with disabilities, and low-income Americans. Over 39 million individuals received medical insurance through Medicare in 1999. Medicaid, which offers Federal assistance to States in providing medical care to lowincome Americans, served more than 40 million people in 1998. Historically, eligibility for Medicaid was linked to eligibility for welfare assistance—that is, eligibility was primarily restricted to single-parent families with very low incomes. In the late 1980s and the early and mid-1990s, Medicaid coverage was gradually extended through a series of expansions. The 1996 Personal 230 | Economic Report of the President Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act formally delinked Medicaid from cash assistance eligibility and further extended it to cover more low-income households, including two-parent families. In 1997 the Federal Government created SCHIP to target the growing number of uninsured children in families with incomes that are too high for Medicaid but not sufficient to cover the cost of private insurance. Through SCHIP, States can provide eligible children with Medicaid coverage, coverage through a separate non-Medicaid program, or a combination of both. The likelihood that an individual will have health insurance and the source of that insurance vary with income and other demographic characteristics (Chart 5-12). Because Medicare covers virtually all elderly Americans, only 1.3 percent of this group were uninsured in 1999, compared with 17 percent of the nonelderly. Among the nonelderly, those in low-income households are more likely to be without insurance. Among nonelderly people in households below the poverty line, 36 percent were uninsured in 1999. Medicaid was the source of insurance for almost two-thirds of the non-elderly in this group who had coverage, whereas 28 percent were covered by an employer’s plan. In contrast, 91 percent of nonelderly people in households with incomes above 300 percent of the poverty line were covered, and of these, 92 percent were covered by an employer plan. Part-time employees are less likely than full-time employees to be insured, because employers often exclude part-time and temporary workers from Chapter 5 | 231 their health insurance plans. Twenty-five percent of those in households with only part-time workers were uninsured in 1999. Seventy-four percent of adult workers employed in small businesses were insured, compared with 88 percent of those working in large firms, although some in both groups were covered under another person’s policy. These figures reflect the fact that small businesses are less likely to offer health benefits than large firms, possibly because small businesses have a large share of part-time workers. Health insurance coverage also differs significantly across racial and ethnic groups. Non-Hispanic whites are least likely to be uninsured (11 percent), compared with African Americans (21 percent), Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders (21 percent), and Hispanics (33 percent). Lack of health insurance can be costly not just for individuals but for society. The uninsured often obtain care in an emergency room rather than in a physician’s office, and emergency room care is more expensive than office visits. Because they often receive inadequate care, the uninsured tend to have more severe health problems and are therefore more likely to require more expensive care when they do seek treatment. Evidence indicates that initiatives to expand Medicaid coverage have been associated with significant increases in the use of primary care facilities and reductions in expensive and avoidable hospitalizations. One recent study found that expanding Medicaid eligibility was associated with a 22 percent decline in avoidable hospitalizations. The costs of hospital care for people who cannot pay are often absorbed by providers, passed on to the insured through increases in the cost of both health care and health insurance, or borne by taxpayers through tax increases imposed to finance public hospitals and insurance programs. Reforming Health Insurance Proposals to expand health insurance coverage must be considered carefully, because of the risk that unintended consequences can so severely erode the existing system that the overall effect is to worsen coverage. Some proposals, such as expanding tax deductions to all purchases of individual insurance, might have such unintended consequences. To evaluate such proposals, this Report uses three measures: how much the proposal would reduce the ranks of the uninsured, how much it would cost to insure each additional individual, and how the prices and coverage of existing insurance plans would be affected. How many formerly uninsured people an initiative is able to cover depends on how generous the subsidy is, how the subsidy is provided, and who is eligible. For instance, a partial subsidy may fail to increase coverage, because even modest out-of-pocket expenses can discourage participation, especially by relatively healthy low-income families. Such families may choose to forgo health insurance, unless it is made very inexpensive, to pay 232 | Economic Report of the President for immediate necessities such as food and housing. Similarly, subsidies that become available only after premiums are paid may not help people who lack the funds to pay even these up-front costs. Further, a complex application process may have the unintended side effect of keeping qualified individuals from participating. Eligibility criteria must also be carefully designed, not only to determine how many uninsured people can use the new subsidy, but also to limit the number of people who already have insurance but are eligible for the new subsidy. The second measure—the subsidy’s total cost relative to the amount of increased coverage—reflects how efficiently the proposal expands health insurance coverage. This relative cost can be driven much higher if a new subsidy crowds out existing insurance arrangements. This situation can occur when people drop their current coverage in favor of a newly subsidized alternative, or when an employer, expecting its employees to use a newly offered subsidy, stops offering insurance coverage. When crowding out occurs, government expenditures go not just to the newly insured but also to people who had coverage and are simply switching to the new plan to take advantage of the subsidy. If for these people the new subsidy is more generous than their old subsidy, the cost to the government increases. If firms drop coverage and employees do not get replacement coverage, the net increase in coverage drops and the cost relative to increased coverage again rises. Third, newly enacted subsidies may affect the prices and coverage of existing insurance plans, for instance through adverse selection. Adverse selection occurs when relatively healthy, low-risk individuals decide that the cost of their current health insurance is greater than the benefits and therefore seek cheaper insurance or go without. As these people (whose health care costs tend to be low) leave the original pool, the average cost of insuring each person remaining in the pool increases. When the medical costs of treating the remaining participants rise and premiums increase as a result, still more people leave the pool. The result is a spiral of rising premiums and declining enrollment, so that those who still wish to purchase health insurance sometimes find that the premiums are prohibitively high, and they may remain (or become) uninsured. Employer-sponsored group health insurance is a good basis for risk pooling. Workers are attracted to a firm for many reasons, of which health insurance is but one, and so a wide range of health risks is likely to exist within each firm. The existing tax subsidy encourages workers to remain in the group pool. But any subsidy that makes individual insurance more attractive can lead to adverse selection in the group pool. Adverse selection can also affect the market for individual insurance. Proposals to reduce premium variability due to health risk rating in the individual insurance market must also be careful to employ pooling mechanisms in order not to Chapter 5 | 233 drive out healthy individuals. Increased reliance on the individual insurance market also raises concerns about the quality of the insurance plans purchased, because of limited regulation and consumer bargaining power. Empirical evidence indicates that crowding out and adverse selection do occur and thus are real concerns in proposals to expand health insurance coverage. Studies of the expansion of Medicaid coverage to children in the late 1980s and the first half of the 1990s found that the crowding out of private insurance coverage was responsible for around 10–20 percent of the increase in Medicaid coverage. Because Medicaid covers mostly low-income people who are less likely to have private insurance, the crowding out was particularly modest. Studies of the choices employees make when offered a choice of several health insurance plans found evidence of adverse selection. One study found that premiums for plans with relatively generous benefits increased much faster than premiums for other plans, presumably because of the poorer health status of the people selecting the more generous plans. Another study found that, in one firm, healthy employees were the least likely to choose the most generous benefit plan. The premiums for that plan ultimately became so expensive that the employer dropped it. Types of Subsidies In general, efforts to extend health care coverage by offering public subsidies use one of three approaches. The first approach, tax deductions, allows individuals who purchase health insurance in the individual insurance market to reduce their taxes by deducting their health insurance premiums from their taxable income. A second approach, tax credits, reduces an individual’s taxes by the full amount of the credit. A third approach extends government-provided insurance to more people. SCHIP, for instance, finances health insurance for children in lower income households. These three options differ in how well they extend coverage, in their cost relative to increased coverage, and in their effects on existing insurance plans. Tax deductions provide only partial subsidies, and the subsidy is smaller for those with low incomes, who are the most likely to be uninsured. These weaknesses mean that tax deductions are unlikely to effectively expand health insurance coverage. By making individual coverage more attractive, tax deductions could also crowd out employer-sponsored plans, reducing the number of newly insured people on a net basis. Because a tax deduction for individual insurance would provide many who already purchase individual coverage with a more generous benefit than they currently receive, but is not likely to significantly increase coverage, the cost relative to increased coverage is also high. By subsidizing individual coverage, a tax deduction can also cause adverse selection that undermines existing coverage, and it can lead to increased reliance on the 234 | Economic Report of the President individual insurance market, with its associated concerns. Thus tax deductions fare poorly on all three criteria. Tax credits, if well designed, can help many people, including lower income families and individuals, purchase insurance. To be effective, the credits must be generous enough to make insurance affordable. Further, to enable lower income people to afford premiums, the credits ideally would be refundable, so that those with little or no tax liability can receive the credit. Ideally, they would also be payable incrementally through the year, so that those who have difficulties paying up-front costs are helped. However, these features also make administering the credits more difficult. Because such credits would apply to individual insurance, they have the drawbacks discussed earlier. They can raise the cost relative to the amount of increased coverage and reduce current risk pooling. These problems can be ameliorated through income cutoffs that restrict eligibility to those populations least likely to be able to afford coverage. Government-provided insurance can fully subsidize insurance and thus cover many of the uninsured. But if such a program provides full insurance, some individuals who are already insured and become eligible for the program can be expected to switch, increasing the cost relative to the amount of increased coverage. Again, income cutoffs to restrict eligibility to uninsured populations can limit the crowding out. Because government-provided insurance does not increase the subsidy for individual insurance, adverse selection is much less likely to occur. Meeting the Challenge of Covering More People The Administration has taken a number of steps to extend coverage to more people. As noted above, the number of uninsured nationwide declined in 1999 for the first time in 12 years. Particularly noteworthy successes include the creation of SCHIP, which is intended to cover up to 5 million children when fully implemented. Other successes include extending Medicare and Medicaid coverage to persons with disabilities who are returning to work, providing Medicaid coverage to young adults leaving foster care, and covering low-income uninsured women diagnosed with breast and cervical cancer. In addition, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 limits exclusions for preexisting conditions in employer health insurance plans and plans sold to people converting from an employer’s plan to individual insurance. In its last budget, submitted in February 2000, the Administration proposed a health insurance initiative to extend publicly provided health insurance to around 5 million more people. This proposal included a FamilyCare program to extend SCHIP to the parents of children covered by Medicaid and SCHIP; accelerated enrollment of eligible but uninsured children in Medicaid and SCHIP; and expanded Chapter 5 | 235 health insurance options for vulnerable populations such as legal immigrants, early retirees, and displaced workers. Although much has been done to ensure access to health care for millions of Americans, a number of challenges lie ahead. The benefits of innovative prescription drugs make access to these drugs more valuable, especially for the elderly and persons with disabilities. As a result, in its last budget the Administration proposed a prescription drug benefit within the Medicare program. We must also prepare for a growing elderly population and expected increases in long-term care needs. Meeting this challenge requires increased investments to ensure the solvency of the Medicare program and provide financial assistance to the increasing number of families with members needing long-term care. To address these needs, in its last budget the Administration proposed providing tax credits for long-term care, and in the midsession review of that budget it proposed placing the Medicare trust funds in a lockbox. Finally, we must continue to work toward providing access to the health care system for the millions of Americans who remain uninsured. Building Livable Communities Just as the New Economy has transformed the structure of economic activity to provide better options and opportunities for Americans, so has it transformed the way we organize our communities and build new ones. The economic forces stimulating today’s rapid growth do not automatically create incentives to preserve community amenities and environmental quality. With the support of Federal and State initiatives, regional governments are beginning to experiment with new economic and planning tools that can channel the economic drivers of growth in ways that preserve the quality of life Americans desire. Changing the way people think about growth in their communities will also change the kinds of public investments and policies that shape the landscapes of the new century. The 20th century witnessed the evolution of the American suburb, especially in the 1990s, when suburban growth accelerated. From 1990 to 1999 the suburban population grew by nearly 19 percent, compared with 6 percent in the central cities. The New Economy has brought about a change in the patterns of job location as well. Job creation is shifting away from the central city. New jobs and new industries are springing up on the fringes of cities, often in so-called technology parks and research corridors. Between 1979 and 1999 the central cities’ share of overall metropolitan office space fell significantly. In 1979 central cities accounted for 74 percent of office space and suburbs for only 26 percent. By 1999 the share of the central cities had dropped to 58 percent, and the suburban share had mushroomed to 42 percent. 236 | Economic Report of the President Rural areas just beyond the edge of urban settlements have experienced particularly rapid growth. In metropolitan counties that were primarily rural in 1990, the population rose by 20 percent between 1990 and 1999—a much higher rate than in any other type of county. As farmland is converted to other uses, these counties are becoming low-density urban areas. Although many Americans still seek the high quality of life available in America’s cities, the suburbs have a special attraction. They promise American families the best of both worlds: the amenities and quality of life that many prefer and the availability of jobs formerly associated primarily with cities. But this trend has its drawbacks. Rapid growth can create problems that affect an entire region. Local communities, especially those experiencing rapid development, must invest in plans to channel growth in ways that are consistent with social well-being and environmental quality. Business and Suburbanization Economists have noted a positive relationship between the concentration of economic activity and productivity. In the past, access to natural resources and effective means of transportation were often the driving force behind a region’s economic gains. In contrast, economic growth today is often based on so-called agglomeration economies. These develop when firms in the same industry cluster together in a region in order to share ideas, customers, and pools of workers with specialized skills. Agglomeration economies exist in Manhattan’s financial industry, among Boston’s mutual fund companies, and in California’s Silicon Valley, where many high-technology firms have gathered. Because they are often free of the traditional resource-related needs that tied earlier industries to specific locations, New Economy firms are able to choose from a wide array of potential business sites. They can choose to locate in a community because of the proximity of other firms or simply because of its cultural and recreational amenities and general livability. Several economic explanations have been offered for the resulting pattern of development. First, for many firms, central cities may exhibit diseconomies that offset the benefits associated with locating there. The building stock may be costly to upgrade, making rents in revitalized or redeveloped urban areas expensive. Similarly, the unintended consequences of environmental clean-up laws can discourage firms from reusing contaminated or abandoned urban properties. Despite more than $2.3 billion in leveraged economic development devoted to these “brownfields” through the national Brownfields Initiative, hundreds of thousands of properties remain unused because of real or perceived environmental contamination. For these reasons it may be more cost-effective for firms to start from scratch in outlying areas. Chapter 5 | 237 Sprawl and Its Challenges With growth occurring more on the outskirts of cities than in the central cities themselves, land in many metropolitan areas is now being consumed at a rate that exceeds population growth. An average of 2.3 million acres of land undergoes development each year, and a significant share is used for lowdensity residential development in fringe suburbs and smaller cities. This growing, often unplanned development is commonly known as sprawl. Sprawl is characterized by low-density residential and commercial settlements and often forces residents to rely exclusively on automobiles for transportation. Sprawl often imposes significant costs on entire regions. Many suburban communities are becoming increasingly congested and are thus in danger of losing the very attributes that make them attractive places to live and work. Growing populations strain public resources such as schools and parks. Affordable housing moves farther away from jobs, increasing average commuting distances throughout metropolitan areas. Commuting is only one factor in increasing traffic congestion. Four out of five household automobile trips are now taken for noncommuting purposes, and distances from homes to destinations such as stores, schools, and recreational facilities are increasing. Limited public transportation makes congestion even worse, increasing demand for new roads—and creating more congestion. Unplanned growth affects the quality of the environment, including water, air, and land resources. Increases in paved surfaces, including roads, buildings, and parking lots, can contribute to deteriorating water quality and to an overall loss of greenspace. This leads to less effective natural drainage, diminishes water quality, and in some areas dramatically increases the potential for flooding. For example, residents along California’s Russian River experienced four major floods in 3 consecutive years. Hydrologists attribute such events in part to urbanization’s effects on stream flow: downstream runoff into streams and rivers increases as the area devoted to roads, parking lots, and other impervious surfaces that keep water from filtering into the soil increases. Increased traffic affects not only the daily commute but also ambient air quality. Automobile emissions lead to hazardous air pollution by elevating concentrations of ozone and particulate matter. Although national air quality trends have improved over the last 20 years, in 1999 approximately 62 million people nationwide still lived in counties with pollution levels that exceeded national standards. Pollution affects the health of residents, and some are more vulnerable than others. Pediatric asthma, for instance, is aggravated by particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, and ozone. Between 1982 and 1996 the incidence of this disease increased by 76 percent. 238 | Economic Report of the President Regional Coordination and Sprawl Jurisdiction over transportation routes and systems, as well as over housing and economic development decisions, is often fragmented among different local and State governments, resulting in little coordination of land-use planning. Regional commissions can help to deal with the spillover effects that community decisions have on neighboring municipalities. Sprawling communities are often divided by great fiscal disparities and distinctly zoned land uses. Planners with an interest in regional growth may be able to help communities accommodate new growth collaboratively. Regional coordination has been particularly important in transportation. Communities are making significant investments in transportation and are coordinating their land-use plans with these investments. Ridership on public transportation is up nationwide. In 1999 transit riders made more than 9 billion trips, the most in nearly 40 years. The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century provided $36 billion in Federal funding for transit for fiscal 1998–2003, around 50 percent more than during the previous 6-year period. Finally, State and local officials are increasingly choosing to tap into financial assistance available for surface mass transit, transferring over $1.5 billion to transit projects in fiscal 2000 alone. Individual Decisions and Sprawl One of the difficulties in dealing with development issues is that the costs and the benefits of development are typically borne by different entities. Decisions benefiting private individuals may have adverse public effects, but private decisionmakers are unlikely to weigh these social costs. For example, many individuals prefer homes on large private lots far from both city centers and major highways. But these homes require new roads and the installation of public utilities. If many people choose to live in such homes, the negative spillovers their decisions generate—increases in traffic congestion, air pollution, impervious surfaces, and property taxes—may outweigh the benefits they and their neighbors receive. The results of such decisions are evident in many areas of the country and are particularly vivid in Atlanta (Box 5-6). The true economic costs of building a new home include the costs of associated spillovers, and these costs should be recognized, but quantifying these social and environmental burdens is more difficult than identifying the private costs of development. Some positive steps can be taken in this direction, however. For instance, studies have found that the additional tax revenue received from new development does not cover the costs of building new roads and providing public services (including utilities) to new residents. If developers and homeowners were required to bear the full cost of these services, including infrastructure, the resulting pattern of development would look much less like sprawl. Many Chapter 5 | 239 Box 5-6. Challenges to Smart Growth in Atlanta Ranked by some as the U.S. city most threatened by sprawl, Atlanta continues to expand at a phenomenal pace. From 1980 to 1998 the Atlanta area’s population grew almost 68 percent, with virtually all of this growth occurring beyond the city limits. According to one study, the Atlanta metropolitan area loses 500 acres of greenspace, forest, and farmland each week. Water quality in the Chattahoochee River and Lake Allatoona is deteriorating, and the city’s air is in violation of clean air standards. The costs of traffic congestion from lost time and wasted fuel are estimated at an overwhelming $2.3 billion a year. The average time spent per person per day in a vehicle on Atlanta’s roads and highways has been estimated at 1 hour and 11 minutes. Motorists in Atlanta lead the Nation in miles driven per person per day, logging a total of over 100 million miles daily. The region’s growth has further isolated minority and lowincome communities and created tremendous geographical imbalances in the availability of jobs and housing. Atlanta’s residents may be enjoying the benefits of the New Economy, but they are clearly suffering the resulting costs of sprawl. The Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC) is attempting to limit this expansive growth and coordinate development. To help this coalition of regional governments, in 1999 the State created the Georgia Regional Transportation Authority (GRTA), assigning to it broad powers to manage projects involving transportation, air quality, and land use in heavily polluted areas, particularly the city of Atlanta itself. Metropolitan governments are opposing a perimeter highway proposal because it threatens investment in the center city and encourages further sprawl. The ARC, supported by the State government, is trying hard to provide and encourage alternatives to single-motorist auto-mobile transportation. The ARC and the GRTA are also seeking to encourage development that incorporates elements of smart growth by revitalizing older communities and emerging population centers through efforts to promote livability and increase the mix of land uses and housing types. But the sprawl continues, and Atlanta faces a serious challenge: it must channel future growth in order to build sustainable, attractive communities. governments have begun to assess impact fees on new construction so that the financial burdens of infrastructure and public service provision are taken into account in development decisions. Communities are beginning to use other kinds of economic incentives to achieve outcomes more consistent with smart growth. For example, communities such as South Bend, Washington, have imposed fees on 240 | Economic Report of the President development that increases impervious surface area, in order to encourage development that has fewer detrimental effects on water quality and minimizes the potential for flooding. Other communities are using road pricing to improve traffic patterns. In San Diego, solo drivers in the express lanes of one major freeway pay higher prices during congested times than during off-peak hours. Electronic transponder technology helps identify individual motorists and assess tolls, making this system possible without the significant slowdowns caused by toll plazas. Other communities are using transferable development rights to provide incentives for keeping land in agriculture and other uses that maintain open space and provide ecological benefits. The Administration’s Response The Administration’s 30-point Livable Communities Initiative encourages smart growth. It sets forth several principles aimed at aligning Federal policy efforts with smart growth priorities and encouraging planning and coordination over larger regions to resolve negative spillovers. The Livable Communities Initiative seeks to sustain prosperity, expand economic opportunity, enhance the quality of life, and build a stronger sense of community. It provides funds for regional smart growth efforts, including Better America Bonds for State, local, and tribal governments. The initiative aims to reuse brownfields and preserve greenspaces, ease traffic congestion, restore a sense of community, promote collaboration among neighboring municipalities through regional governance, and enhance economic competitiveness. In addition, its smart growth initiatives attempt to counter various socially undesirable effects of sprawl such as racial segregation, concentrated poverty, decreased personal interaction, and a less active civil society. Initiatives at the State and the local level are beginning to have real impacts on communities— for instance, in the State of Maryland and the city of Chattanooga, Tennessee (Box 5-7). An educated work force that views quality of life and favorable economic conditions as priorities often characterizes areas of new and rapid growth. These communities have both the constituency needed to demand change and the resources necessary to implement it. Business and community leaders are already recognizing the costs and impacts of sprawl and acting to mitigate the negative effects. In metropolitan areas such as Chicago, Denver, Omaha, and Philadelphia, leaders are acting to improve land use and transportation decisions and enhance environmental quality. The success of these endeavors will depend on the ability of these communities to make hard choices and find creative solutions to the challenges of sprawl. Chapter 5 | 241 Box 5-7. Examples of Smart Growth Maryland has established several specific goals for its smart growth program. These include preserving the State’s most valuable remaining natural resources, supporting existing communities and neighborhoods by targeting State resources to development in areas where the necessary infrastructure is already in place, and saving taxpayer dollars by avoiding the unnecessary cost of building the infrastructure required to support sprawl. The program also stipulates that the State will regularly evaluate the program’s effectiveness. By winning Federal grant money, reprioritizing within the State budget, and designing financial incentives for businesses, local governments, and home-owners, Maryland has been able to leverage the funds necessary to emerge as a leader in the smart growth community while preserving local decisionmaking authority. Similarly, the success of Chattanooga, Tennessee’s, smart growth initiative affirms the conviction that Americans can enjoy both economic prosperity and a high quality of life. Chattanooga’s economy was historically based on iron foundries, textile mills, and chemical plants, but in recent decades these were not providing the growth and employment the city required. However, through thoughtful economic development efforts, Chattanooga has become a model for other cities seeking environmentally sound urban renewal. Using extensive grants from private foundations together with Federal and local public funds, Chattanooga has built successful public-private partnerships throughout its visionary redevelopment process. The city now prides itself on being a laboratory for sustainable development projects involving rezoning, reclamation, revitalization, and redevelopment. Illustrating how older cities can thrive in the New Economy, Chattanooga boasts a 22-mile Riverwalk with picnic areas, the world’s largest freshwater aquarium, a sculpture garden, waterfront housing developments, an electric-bus public transit system, footbridges, and an arts district. Conclusion The ongoing, unprecedented economic expansion has done much to improve the well-being of the American people. However, an important part of the Administration’s role during the expansion has been to ensure that no one is left behind. And indeed, government policies have helped—and will continue to help—many of the most disadvantaged Americans. Policies easing the transition from welfare to work, improving educational 242 | Economic Report of the President opportunities, increasing access to health care, and improving the health of our communities have helped distribute recent economic gains more fully. Improving outcomes for those in danger of being left behind benefits the Nation as well as disadvantaged populations. This Administration has maintained policies that support strong economic growth and low inflation. Many previously unemployed Americans have been moved from welfare to work, increasing the supply of workers at a time when the demand for workers is high. Investments in the education of young people help ensure that future generations will have the necessary skills to succeed in the New Economy and increase productivity. Health care initiatives have helped Americans maintain access to recently developed, innovative technologies. The Administration has also worked to guarantee that our communities enjoy the amenities that families desire: safe streets, clean air and water, reliable transportation, and access to greenspace. Despite this substantial progress, many challenges remain. Confronting these challenges will require ongoing public policies that combine initiatives to support economic growth with efforts to reach out to those still in need of assistance. The Nation has made enormous strides in helping the least well off among us, but substantial disparities persist in income levels, educational quality, access to health care, and quality of life. These differences must be addressed. At the same time, we must consider how to help those who need additional assistance even in this period of strong economic growth: our elderly, our disabled, and our children. We are certainly better off than we were 8 years ago, but we can do more to ensure an even brighter future for all Americans. Chapter 5 | 243 C O N C L U S I O N Achievements and Challenges in the New Economy T he past 8 years have been a period of extraordinary achievement for the U.S. economy. With support from sound policies and strategic investments in the future, the United States has experienced an unprecedented economic expansion. This expansion is remarkable not only for being the longest ever recorded but also for its breadth and inclusiveness. Its benefits have been widely and generously shared, raising Americans’ average real income to record highs and creating opportunities for groups that have long been left behind. The economy this expansion has created is not just greater in sheer size but “new” in its structure and performance. It is dramatically more information intensive and more technology driven, more productive and more innovative. Today’s economy utilizes new, more efficient business practices and has redefined many traditional relationships between suppliers, manufacturers, investors, and customers to achieve ever-greater efficiency. The cumulative 245 result of these trends and their interactions is a New Economy, one that is currently providing Americans in all walks of life the benefits of high growth, low inflation, high productivity, rising incomes, and low unemployment. The New Economy did not emerge by chance. A policy strategy centered on fiscal discipline, investment in education and technology, and opening markets abroad has been key to its development. Prudent policy choices, sustained over 8 years, have fostered the flourishing of innovation and entrepreneurship. The combination of private sector innovation, new technologies, Americans’ hard work, and sound policies and investments in the future has created vibrant economic growth. On average since 1993, the economy has grown at a healthy 4.0 percent per year. Core inflation has remained near its lowest rate since the 1960s. Meanwhile productivity growth has risen rather than stagnated over the course of the expansion. Productivity has grown 3.9 percent a year on average over the past 2 years, and it grew a robust 4.8 percent in the 12 months ending in the third quarter of 2000. Importantly, the resulting prosperity has been shared in a remarkably equitable manner compared with the previous expansion. There have been solid, across-the-board income gains, with some of the strongest gains realized among the least well off. Americans in the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution have actually seen much stronger average income growth than the average for all other income groups: a total real gain of 16.3 percent since 1993. In the last 8 years the economy has created more than 22 million jobs, more than 80 percent of which are good jobs in industries paying wages above the median. The median family income has increased by $6,338 since 1993, rising to $48,950 in 1999. Meanwhile 7 million Americans have been lifted out of poverty. Home ownership reached 67.7 percent last year—the highest percentage on record. Unemployment is at its lowest level in more than 30 years. Unemployment rates for African Americans and Hispanics are at their lowest on record. This Report has explored the phenomena that together have come to be known as the New Economy. It has examined the driving forces of innovation, organizational change, and sound policy that have created that New Economy. It has analyzed the effects those forces have had on macroeconomic performance, on business practices, and on our ability as a Nation to address the longstanding challenges of reducing poverty, improving education, and enhancing the long-term welfare of all our citizens. Last but not least, the Report has considered those areas where growth on its own may not meet all the challenges, and where targeted government policies can help widen the circle of opportunity to include as many of our fellow citizens as possible. 246 | Economic Report of the President The United States today stands at a unique juncture in its own history— and indeed in world history. It enjoys unprecedented prosperity and therefore faces a unique set of opportunities as well as challenges. Used wisely and cautiously, our prosperity can be harnessed in ways that will further enrich all Americans for decades to come. We can and should continue to strengthen research and development, to drive long-term innovation and further productivity increases. We can and should continue to invest in education and training, to build the skills and ingenuity of our work force. And we can and should continue to shore up Social Security and Medicare, to improve our ability to provide for the long-term needs of our aging population. The right path, in short, is one that continues the policies of the last 8 years. Those policies have created a virtuous cycle in which fiscal discipline helps keep interest rates attractive for investment, and strong, productive investment in turn generates a healthy and growing economy, yielding ever larger budget surpluses. Today’s economy is strong, but it is far from invulnerable. The virtuous cycle can all too easily be broken if fiscal discipline is abandoned and priority is given to large tax cuts for a few rather than long-term investments for the country as a whole. Abandoning fiscal discipline in favor of a large, permanent cut in tax rates would raise interest rates and threaten investment and growth. Such a reversal of policy would be particularly ill advised at a time when the country faces a significant demographic challenge: over the next 40 years the share of the U.S. population aged 65 and over will rise from about 12.5 percent to nearly 21 percent. This demographic shift alone implies that retirement and health programs for the elderly will take up an increasing share of Federal outlays. But in addition, the costs per capita of Social Security and Medicare are expected to rise in the future, implying an even more dramatic increase in spending on the elderly. The confluence of these two trends means that spending on Social Security and Medicare as a share of GDP will almost double over the next 40 years, from around 6 percent today to 11.2 percent in 2040. The emergence of the New Economy provides a precious opportunity to continue to build for the future, educate our children, secure the well-being of older generations now and for decades hence, and make the investments that will fuel the engines of innovation, enterprise, and productivity in our economy. Defining and pursuing the right priorities for continuing the expansion will be critical to the Nation’s long-term welfare. Technology’s Role in the New Economy At the heart of the New Economy is a bubbling cauldron of creativity and innovation. Advances in computing, information storage, and telecommunications have proliferated, yielding whole arrays of new products, services, and Conclusion | 247 industries. Discoveries in all these fields have been decades in the making, but for most of that time they proceeded on separate tracks, with little joint impact on productivity and output. Recently, however, the paths of these technologies—telecommunications, computers, and the Internet— have converged, opening the way to a whole new range of capabilities previously unimagined. Through the dynamic interaction of these powerful innovations, the economy has become “lighter,” shifting toward products that embody more knowledge capital and less physical capital. Spending on information technology has played a leading role in the acceleration of economic growth. Although it accounts for an estimated 8.3 percent of GDP, information technology contributed almost a third of output growth between 1995 and 1999. Investment in information processing equipment and software now makes up more than a third of all private nonresidential fixed investment. Between 1990 and 1997 the number of information technology firms increased by 120 percent. Technological innovation has been particularly important to the New Economy for two reasons. First, the information technology sector itself is highly productive, and as this sector has grown, its improved productivity performance has boosted that of the economy as a whole. Second, the adoption of information technology by other sectors of the economy has led to performance gains there, making other inputs—both physical and human capital—more productive through changes in the way firms do business. Manufacturing plants are increasingly automated. Workers are being given more flexible job assignments and stronger incentive pay. Supplier relationships are becoming more closely integrated through the use of computer systems that coordinate the various aspects of production and warehousing, allowing firms to slash their inventories. Firm boundaries are also shifting rapidly, as firms outsource noncore businesses and move toward flexible, collaborative relationships such as strategic alliances with suppliers, customers, and even rivals. But technology alone is just a tool. It is only when firms use technology wisely that it becomes a transforming agent. Performance improvements are most likely to be realized when firms use information technology to bring about changes in basic business practices, job design, organizational structure, interactions with customers and suppliers, and human resource practices. One example of how technology is inspiring changes in business practices is the use of the Internet to reduce companies’ procurement costs. On-line business-to-business exchanges now offer a range of transaction tools, such as on-line auctions, billing, insurance, information, and other custom services, that make procurement far more efficient. One on-line exchange claims to have saved customers $2 billion during its 5 years in operation. These kinds 248 | Economic Report of the President of improvements, in turn, help make the economy more resilient: more efficient procurement and inventory management have greatly reduced the tendency toward inventory overhang in the economy as a whole, thus reducing the likelihood that a period of slowing growth will tip into a recession. The Role of Policy in Supporting the New Economy The surge in innovation and entrepreneurship that is driving the New Economy has been fostered by supportive government policies. First and foremost, policy played a critical role in boosting national saving, which provides the fuel on which the New Economy runs. The Federal budget deficit had ballooned to $290 billion in 1992, the largest ever, and it was projected then to grow to more than $455 billion by fiscal 2000. These massive deficits placed a huge drain on investment capital, and partly as a consequence, economy-wide productivity growth had fallen to anemic levels. However, with the program of fiscal discipline that President Clinton and Vice President Gore put in place in 1993, the fiscal balance has improved 8 years in a row. The surplus in fiscal 2000 was $237 billion, the largest as a share of GDP since 1948. These mounting surpluses mean that the government, rather than draining resources away from private investment, is now freeing them up. And indeed, the last 8 years have seen a dramatic increase in investment. From the first quarter of 1993 to the third quarter of 2000, investment grew at an average rate of 13 percent per year. This long investment boom has been key to the increasing productivity growth we have seen over the course of the expansion, which, in turn, has enabled the economy to continue on a path of strong yet noninflationary growth. The ascent of the New Economy was also helped along by strong, pro-competitive policies that allowed innovation to flourish. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, for example, opened up competition among local telephone companies, long distance providers, and cable companies. That competition, in turn, helped spur innovation not only within telecommunications but also in computer technology and related sectors that have been key drivers of the New Economy. The act also provided guidelines to ensure that the benefits of increased competition would be harnessed so as to increase the circle of opportunity. It established the E-rate program, through which schools and libraries gained access to discounted telecommunications and Internet connections. Today 95 percent of public schools are connected to the Internet. This program, paired with a massive increase in Federal funding for education technology (to $872 million in fiscal 2001, up from just $23 million in fiscal 1994) constitutes a long-term investment in the technologically skilled work force needed to sustain economic growth. Conclusion | 249 Globalization and the New Economy Globalization has also played a crucial role in promoting the technological innovation and organizational changes that have yielded a New Economy. Globalization turns national markets with few competitors into worldwide markets with many competitors. The resulting, more intense competition induces firms to innovate. That innovation contributes to increased productivity and economic growth. Globalization, by expanding markets, also gives producers greater scope to specialize in what they do best. And with open markets, they are able to use the best and most cost-effective inputs from sources around the world to lower their costs. Improvements in information technology have spurred deeper integration between the United States and the world economy. Indeed, it is no coincidence that the New Economy emerged in the United States at the same time that U.S. participation in the global economy has reached new heights, because globalization and the recent advances in information technology are integrally linked. Over the past 8 years, fostering globalization and its benefits has been a high policy priority. The United States has been a partner to more than 300 trade agreements, including the North America Free Trade Agreement, the Uruguay Round multilateral trade agreements, the accord establishing permanent normal trade relations with China, the international moratorium on tariffs on e-commerce, and multilateral agreements in telecommunications, information technology equipment, and financial services. At the same time, U.S. trade policy has taken pains to ensure that these agreements safeguard global natural resources and respect our values, including our commitment to core labor standards. The effects of globalization and improved communications and technology are evident in the record of U.S. international transactions. Trade in capital goods has soared since 1996, with particularly strong growth in products that are central to the New Economy, such as computers, semiconductors, and telecommunications equipment. Exports of services have also grown, in particular in those service industries where valuable innovation has taken place, such as professional, business, technical, and financial services. Harnessing the New Economy For all the power and promise of the New Economy, we cannot take for granted that its benefits will flow spontaneously to all. That is where policymakers have played a critical role in harnessing the dynamism of today’s New Economy to benefit all Americans, including groups that have too long been left behind. 250 | Economic Report of the President A robust economy that creates 22 million new jobs certainly provides broad-reaching benefits. Unemployment rates for African Americans and Hispanics, for example, have hit record lows during this expansion. But rather than rely on the pure market effects of an economy running on all cylinders, this Administration has enlisted additional means to empower and assist struggling families. Among the accomplishments thus far have been two hikes in the minimum wage, an expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit, a more than doubling of funding for child care for working parents, and the extension of health insurance coverage to a greater number of lowincome children and working families. Together with the effects of the strong economy, these measures have helped 7 million people move out of poverty since 1993. Over the past 8 years, the welfare rolls dropped by more than 8 million, or nearly 60 percent, to their lowest level in 32 years. Recent data submitted by States competing for high-performance bonuses available under welfare reform show that 1.2 million welfare recipients nationwide went to work in fiscal 1999 alone. Seventy-seven percent of those who got jobs were still working in the next quarter, and average quarterly earnings were up 31 percent from the first to the third quarter of employment: from $2,027 to $2,647. And as more people move off of welfare, into the job market, and out of poverty, their greater economic participation has a positive feedback effect on the economy as a whole, lessening the burden on the budget and on taxpayers and increasing the productive force in the economy. Here, too, technology can make important contributions, by improving the delivery of many social services. In health care, such innovations are yielding new treatment methods that can directly improve the quality of life for many. In education, new Federal programs are bringing computers and the Internet into the classroom, narrowing the digital divide, helping improve teacher effectiveness, and reducing class size. Despite vast improvements in the quality of life experienced by many Americans, challenges remain. There are still substantial disparities in economic well-being across regions. Minority groups and residents of central cities and rural areas suffer disproportionately high rates of poverty and unemployment. Our health care system also presents challenges. We need to control health expenditures and ensure that care is affordable to all. Issues related to managed care and the appropriate way to align incentives must be resolved so that health care is neither overly restricted nor overly prescribed. Even after these problems are brought under control, many Americans may continue to lack health insurance. If this is allowed to happen, they will be unable to take advantage of the quality care available to the majority. Conclusion | 251 Finally, one side effect of the New Economy is that certain parts of the country, especially the perimeters of some of our large cities, have experienced enormous growth in jobs and population. Such growth, when left unchecked, has led to sprawl and serious environmental consequences. Even at this moment of great prosperity, then, great challenges remain to be confronted. We have a unique opportunity today to harness the power of the high-technology, high-productivity, high-growth New Economy in a way that sustains the current prosperity and uses it to improve the lives of all Americans. The challenges of the future—from saving Social Security, to improving education, to expanding health care coverage, to paying down the national debt—are significant and will require concerted effort. The tools and capabilities of the New Economy, combined with the right, targeted policies, can provide a powerful solution toward addressing these challenges as a Nation. 252 | Economic Report of the President Appendix A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS DURING 2000 LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, Washington, D.C., December 31, 2000. MR. PRESIDENT: The Council of Economic Advisers submits this report on its activities during the calendar year 2000 in accordance with the requirements of the Congress, as set forth in section 10(d) of the Employment Act of 1946 as amended by the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978. Sincerely, Martin N. Baily, Chairman Robert Z. Lawrence, Member Kathryn L. Shaw, Member Appendix A | 255 Council Members and Their Dates of Service Name Edwin G. Nourse............................. Leon H. Keyserling ......................... John D. Clark.................................. Roy Blough ..................................... Robert C. Turner ............................ Arthur F. Burns............................... Neil H. Jacoby................................. Walter W. Stewart .......................... Raymond J. Saulnier ...................... Joseph S. Davis .............................. Paul W. McCracken ........................ Karl Brandt .................................... Henry C. Wallich............................. Walter W. Heller ............................. James Tobin ................................... Kermit Gordon................................ Gardner Ackley............................... John P. Lewis.................................. Otto Eckstein.................................. Arthur M. Okun............................... James S. Duesenberry.................... Merton J. Peck................................ Warren L. Smith ............................. Paul W. McCracken ........................ Hendrik S. Houthakker................... Herbert Stein.................................. Ezra Solomon ................................. Marina v.N. Whitman ..................... Gary L. Seevers .............................. William J. Fellner............................ Alan Greenspan.............................. Paul W. MacAvoy............................ Burton G. Malkiel ........................... Charles L. Schultze ........................ William D. Nordhaus ...................... Lyle E. Gramley .............................. George C. Eads............................... Stephen M. Goldfeld....................... Murray L. Weidenbaum .................. William A. Niskanen....................... Jerry L. Jordan................................ Martin Feldstein............................. William Poole ................................. Beryl W. Sprinkel............................ Thomas Gale Moore ....................... Michael L. Mussa ........................... Michael J. Boskin ........................... John B. Taylor................................. Richard L. Schmalensee ................ David F. Bradford ........................... Paul Wonnacott.............................. Laura D’Andrea Tyson.................... Alan S. Blinder ............................... Joseph E. Stiglitz............................ Martin N. Baily ............................... Alicia H. Munnell............................ Janet L. Yellen................................ Jeffrey A. Frankel ........................... Rebecca M. Blank .......................... Martin N. Baily ............................... Robert Z. Lawrence ........................ Kathryn L. Shaw............................. Position Oath of office date Chairman...................................... Vice Chairman .............................. Acting Chairman........................... Chairman...................................... Member......................................... Vice Chairman .............................. Member......................................... Member......................................... Chairman...................................... Member......................................... Member......................................... Member......................................... Chairman...................................... Member......................................... Member......................................... Member......................................... Member......................................... Chairman...................................... Member......................................... Member......................................... Member......................................... Chairman...................................... Member......................................... Member......................................... Member......................................... Chairman...................................... Member......................................... Member......................................... Member......................................... Chairman...................................... Member......................................... Member......................................... Chairman...................................... Member......................................... Member......................................... Member......................................... Member......................................... Chairman .................................... Member......................................... Member......................................... Chairman...................................... Member......................................... Member......................................... Member......................................... Member......................................... Chairman...................................... Member......................................... Member......................................... Chairman...................................... Member......................................... Chairman...................................... Member......................................... Member......................................... Chairman...................................... Member......................................... Member......................................... Member......................................... Member......................................... Chair ............................................. Member......................................... Member......................................... Chairman...................................... Member......................................... Member......................................... Chair ............................................. Member......................................... Member......................................... Chairman...................................... Member......................................... Member......................................... August 9, 1946 ......................... August 9, 1946 ......................... November 2, 1949..................... May 10, 1950 ............................ August 9, 1946 ......................... May 10, 1950 ............................ June 29, 1950 ........................... September 8, 1952 ................... March 19, 1953 ........................ September 15, 1953 ................. December 2, 1953..................... April 4, 1955 ............................. December 3, 1956..................... May 2, 1955 .............................. December 3, 1956..................... November 1, 1958..................... May 7, 1959 .............................. January 29, 1961 ...................... January 29, 1961 ...................... January 29, 1961 ...................... August 3, 1962 ......................... November 16, 1964 .................. May 17, 1963 ............................ September 2, 1964 ................... November 16, 1964 .................. February 15, 1968..................... February 2, 1966....................... February 15, 1968..................... July 1, 1968............................... February 4, 1969....................... February 4, 1969....................... February 4, 1969....................... January 1, 1972 ........................ September 9, 1971 ................... March 13, 1972 ........................ July 23, 1973 ............................ October 31, 1973 ...................... September 4, 1974 ................... June 13, 1975 ........................... July 22, 1975 ............................ January 22, 1977 ...................... March 18, 1977 ........................ March 18, 1977 ........................ June 6, 1979 ............................. August 20, 1980 ....................... February 27, 1981..................... June 12, 1981 ........................... July 14, 1981 ............................ October 14, 1982 ...................... December 10, 1982................... April 18, 1985 ........................... July 1, 1985............................... August 18, 1986 ....................... February 2, 1989....................... June 9, 1989 ............................. October 3, 1989 ........................ November 13, 1991 .................. November 13, 1991 .................. February 5, 1993....................... July 27, 1993 ............................ July 27, 1993 ............................ June 28, 1995 ........................... June 30, 1995 ........................... January 29, 1996 ...................... February 18, 1997..................... April 23, 1997 ........................... October 22, 1998 ...................... August 12, 1999 ....................... August 12, 1999 ....................... May 31, 2000 ............................ 256 | Economic Report of the President Separation date November 1, 1949. January 20, 1953. February 11, 1953. August 20, 1952. January 20, 1953. December 1, 1956. February 9, 1955. April 29, 1955. January 20, 1961. October 31, 1958. January 31, 1959. January 20, 1961. January 20, 1961. November 15, 1964. July 31, 1962. December 27, 1962. February 15, 1968. August 31, 1964. February 1, 1966. January 20, 1969. June 30, 1968. January 20, 1969. January 20, 1969. December 31, 1971. July 15, 1971. August 31, 1974. March 26, 1973. August 15, 1973. April 15, 1975. February 25, 1975. January 20, 1977. November 15, 1976. January 20, 1977. January 20, 1981. February 4, 1979. May 27, 1980. January 20, 1981. January 20, 1981. August 25, 1982. March 30, 1985. July 31, 1982. July 10, 1984. January 20, 1985. January 20, 1989. May 1, 1989. September 19, 1988. January 12, 1993. August 2, 1991. June 21, 1991. January 20, 1993. January 20, 1993. April 22, 1995. June 26, 1994. February 10, 1997. August 30, 1996. August 1, 1997. August 3, 1999. March 2, 1999. July 9, 1999. Report to the President on the Activities of the Council of Economic Advisers During 2000 The Council of Economic Advisers was established by the Employment Act of 1946 to provide the President with objective economic analysis and advice on the development and implementation of a wide range of domestic and international economic policy issues. The Chairman of the Council Martin N. Baily continued to chair the Council during 2000. Before joining the Council, Dr. Baily was a Principal at McKinsey & Company, Inc., at the McKinsey Global Institute in Washington. Dr. Baily is responsible for communicating the Council’s views on economic matters directly to the President through personal discussions and written reports. He also represents the Council at Cabinet meetings, meetings of the National Economic Council (NEC), daily White House senior staff meetings, budget team meetings with the President, and other formal and informal meetings with the President, senior White House staff, and other senior government officials. Dr. Baily is the Council’s chief public spokesperson. He directs the work of the Council and exercises ultimate responsibility for the work of the professional staff. The Members of the Council Robert Z. Lawrence is a Member of the Council of Economic Advisers. Dr. Lawrence is on leave from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, where he is the Albert L. Williams Professor of International Trade and Investment at the Center for Business and Government. Kathryn L. Shaw is also a Member of the Council of Economic Advisers. Dr. Shaw is on leave from Carnegie Mellon University, where she is Professor of Economics in the Graduate School of Industrial Administration. Appendix A | 257 The Chairman and the Members work as a team on most economic policy issues. Dr. Lawrence was primarily responsible for the Administration’s economic forecast, macroeconomic analysis, international economic issues, and certain microeconomic issues, including those relating to natural resources, the environment, and industrial organization. Dr. Shaw was primarily responsible for policy analysis relating to the budget and taxation, labor, retirement security, health care, welfare reform, and child and family issues. The Chairman and the Members participate in the deliberations of the NEC, and Dr. Baily is a member of the NEC Principals Committee. Weekly Economic Briefings Dr. Baily and the Members continued to prepare the Weekly Economic Briefing of the President of the United States for the President, the Vice President, and the President’s other senior economic and policy advisers. The Council, in cooperation with the Office of the Vice President, prepares a written briefing, which provides analysis of current economic developments, more extended discussions of a wide range of economic issues and problems, and summaries of economic developments in different regions and sectors of the economy. Macroeconomic Policies A primary function of the Council is to advise the President on all major macroeconomic issues and developments. The Council prepares for the President, the Vice President, and the White House senior staff almost daily memoranda that report key economic data and analyze current economic events. The Council, the Department of the Treasury, and the Office of Management and Budget—the Administration’s economic “troika”—are responsible for producing the economic forecasts that underlie the Administration’s budget proposals. The Council, under the leadership of the Chairman and the Members, initiates the forecasting process twice each year. In preparing these forecasts, the Council consults with a variety of outside sources, including leading private sector forecasters. In 2000 the Council took part in discussions on a range of macroeconomic issues, with particular focus on the markets for energy and capital. The Council engaged in discussions with other agencies concerning pressures in the market for oil and quantifying possible effects on the U.S. economy. The Council continued to participate in the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, an interagency group that monitors developments related to financial markets and the banking sector. In 2000 this 258 | Economic Report of the President group emphasized continuing deregulation of capital markets, increasing international harmonization across markets, and regulation of new financial instruments. The Council continued to study a range of budget and tax issues, including the positive effects of continued fiscal discipline for the economy. The Council works closely with the Office of Management and Budget, the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the NEC, as well as other government agencies, in providing analyses to the Administration on these topics of concern. The Council continued its efforts to improve the public’s understanding of economic issues and of the Administration’s economic agenda through regular briefings with the economic and financial press, frequent discussions with outside economists, and presentations to outside organizations. The Chairman and the Members also regularly exchanged views on the macroeconomy with the Chairman and Members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. International Economic Policies The Council continued its role as an active participant in international economic policymaking during 2000, providing both analytical support and policy guidance. The Council played an important role in evaluating and explaining the case for trade liberalization and increased U.S. participation in the multilateral trading system. Its involvement included active participation in the Administration’s successful efforts to grant permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to China. For example, the Council contributed to Administration discussions of the benefits to the United States of PNTR and of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization. The Council was also involved in a range of other international trade issues, including evaluation of trade disputes, the state of the steel industry, and the negotiation of free-trade agreements with Singapore and Chile. The Council is a leading participant in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the principal forum for economic cooperation among the high-income industrial countries. The Chairman heads the U.S. delegation to the semiannual meetings of the OECD’s Economic Policy Committee (EPC) and serves as the EPC Chairman. Dr. Shaw led the U.S. delegation to the OECD’s Working Party 1, which focused on economic growth, structural adjustment, sustainable growth, and climate change issues. In 2000 Dr. Lawrence participated in the OECD’s Working Party 3 meeting on macroeconomic policy and coordination. He also participated in a meeting of subcabinet officials from the United States and Japan. Appendix A | 259 Council members regularly met with representatives of the Council’s counterpart agencies in foreign countries, as well as with foreign trade ministers, other government officials, and members of the private sector. During the year the Council continued its dialogue with the State Development Planning Commission—the Council’s counterpart in China—and initiated a new dialogue with economic officials in Ukraine. The Council also continued its annual meetings with the Economic Planning Agency of Japan. The Council represented the United States at other international forums as well, including meetings of the Economic Committee of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. Council members were active in helping to formulate Administration policymaking on international climate change. Robert Lawrence participated in the OECD’s High Level Working Group on Sustainable Development and was a member of the U.S. delegation to the Convention of the Parties (COP6) negotiations under the Kyoto Protocol, which were held in The Hague in November 2000. Microeconomic Policies During 2000 the Council was an active participant in policy discussions on an extensive range of microeconomic issues, including Medicare, the minimum wage, financial privacy, reform of the Federal Aviation Administration, energy supply, the digital divide, and the digital economy. In addition to providing economic policy guidance on these issues, the Council released several research papers on policy issues in the forefront of current affairs. The Uses of Census Data: An Analytical Review, released in April, provided an overview of the myriad uses of census data by the different segments of society. It stressed the importance of accurate census data in light of its use by government at the Federal, State, and local level as well as by the business and academic communities. Teenagers and Their Parents in the 21st Century: An Examination of Trends in Teen Behavior and the Role of Parental Involvement was released by the President in May. The report outlined several positive trends among today’s teenagers, including increases in student achievement, college access, and participation in community service. It also emphasized the important role played by parents in helping teens confront the many challenges they face on a daily basis. 260 | Economic Report of the President Opportunities and Gender Pay Equity in New Economy Occupations was also released by the President in May. It reports on women’s progress in the New Economy, focusing on information technology fields and the challenges remaining for women to share fully in the benefits of jobs in that sector. Educational Attainment and Success in the New Economy: An Analysis of Challenges for Improving Hispanic Students’ Achievement was released by the President in June. The study focuses on the progress being made by, and the remaining challenges for, Hispanic students in the United States. It looks primarily at the progress of Hispanics in the information technology sector, as a good example of a rapidly expanding, high-paying sector of the economy, and it emphasizes the role of education in achieving success. Reaching the Uninsured: Alternative Approaches to Expanding Health Insurance Access was released by the President in September. The report studies the lack of health insurance for tens of millions of Americans as a serious policy issue with adverse health and economic consequences. It also evaluates major policy options designed to make health insurance more affordable. The Economic Impact of Third-Generation Wireless Technology was also released in September. This report documented the expected benefits of a new generation of wireless technologies that provide high-speed mobile access to the Internet and other communications networks, and explained why adequate spectrum is needed to provide these services efficiently. The report was released in conjunction with a Presidential Memorandum directing Federal agencies to work together with the private sector to identify suitable spectrum for these new services. Philanthropy in the American Economy was released by the President in his weekly radio address on November 25. The report discusses trends in giving over the past several decades and highlights the economic explanations behind the observed increase in donations. The report also discusses possible future directions for philanthropy and how even greater giving might be encouraged. The Council has also participated actively in interagency discussions on regulation, privatization, and competition policy. Domestically, the Council has been involved in discussions related to mergers, telecommunications policy, air traffic control, airline reservation systems, and the effects of government ownership on competition. The Council has also continued to participate in the Digital Economy Working Group, which discusses such issues as business-to-business electronic commerce and the role of venture capital in fostering innovation. Appendix A | 261 The Staff of the Council of Economic Advisers The professional staff of the Council consists of the Chief of Staff, the Senior Statistician, the Chief Economist, the Director of Macroeconomic Forecasting, 8 senior economists, 6 staff economists, and 4 research assistants. The professional staff and their areas of concentration at the end of 2000 were: Chief of Staff Audrey Choi Senior Statistician Catherine H. Furlong Chief Economist and Editor of the Weekly Economic Briefing of the President Director of Macroeconomic Forecasting Charles F. Stone Steven N. Braun Senior Economists William B. Boning........ Menzie D. Chinn.......... Andrew G. Keeler ......... Peter G. Klein ............... Michael R. LeBlanc....... Kathleen M. McGarry .. Diane Lim Rogers......... Phillip L. Swagel ........... Labor International Finance Environment Industrial Organization Energy and Agriculture Labor Macroeconomics, Public Finance, and Editor, Weekly Economic Briefing of the President International Trade Staff Economists Daniel W. Elfenbein...... Judson L. Jaffe............... Terry L. Lumish............ Jason S. Seligman.......... Matthew C. Wilson ...... Vivian Y. Wu................. Industrial Organization Microeconomics and Environment Weekly Economic Briefing of the President Macroeconomics, Financial Markets, and Energy Labor Health and Labor 262 | Economic Report of the President Research Assistants Olivier Coibion ............ Kevin F. Erickson.......... Nathaniel F. Stankard.... Elizabeth A. Weber ....... Weekly Economic Briefing of the President and International Economics Macroeconomics Weekly Economic Briefing of the President and International Economics Weekly Economic Briefing of the President and Labor Statistical Office Mrs. Furlong directs the Statistical Office. The Statistical Office maintains and updates the Council’s statistical information, oversees the publication of the monthly Economic Indicators and the statistical appendix to the Economic Report of the President, and verifies statistics in Presidential and Council memoranda, testimony, and speeches. Susan P. Clements ......... Linda A. Reilly.............. Brian A. Amorosi .......... Heather L. Jambrosic .... Statistician Statistician Statistical Assistant Research Assistant Administrative Office Catherine Fibich ........... Administrative Officer Office of the Chairman Alice H. Williams ......... Sandra F. Daigle............ Lisa D. Branch.............. Francine P. Obermiller .. Executive Assistant to the Chairman Executive Assistant to the Chairman and Assistant to the Chief of Staff Executive Assistant to Dr. Lawrence Executive Assistant to Dr. Shaw Staff Support Mary E. Jones ............... Rosalind V. Rasin.......... Mary A. Thomas........... Executive Assistant for International Economics, Labor, and Health Care Executive Assistant for Environment, Industrial Organization, and Agriculture Program Assistant for the Weekly Economic Briefing of the President and Macroeconomics Appendix A | 263 Michael Treadway and Emily Chalmers provided editorial assistance in the preparation of the 2001 Economic Report of the President. Student interns during the year were Sean D. Bernsohn, Aneta K. Binienda, April Botton, Karin A. Braack, Patrick M. Byrne, Carol L. Capece, Zachariah Friend, Avery W. Gardiner, Michael A. Gottfried, Claire E. Gries, Warren A. Herold, Radha K. Iyengar, Julie M. Meyers, Cameron M. Porsandeh, Claudia A. Sitgraves, and Kevin P. Sweeney. Goldie Greenstein joined the staff of the Council in January as a student intern. Departures The Council’s senior economists, in most cases, are on leave of absence from faculty positions at academic institutions or from other government agencies or research institutions. Their tenure with the Council is usually limited to 1 or 2 years. Some of the senior economists who resigned during the year returned to their previous affiliations. They are Michael J. Brien (University of Virginia), John G. Fernald (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), William H. Gillespie (Department of Justice), Lowell J. Taylor (Carnegie Mellon University), and John C. Williams (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). Victoria A. Greenfield accepted a position with RAND. Joseph E. Aldy is enrolled in a graduate program at Harvard University. Staff economists are generally graduate students who spend 1 year with the Council and then return to complete their dissertations. Those who returned to their graduate studies in 2000 are Douglas V. Almond (University of California, Berkeley), Yu-chin Chen (Harvard University), Leigh L. Linden (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), and Noah Y. Weisberger (Harvard University). Andrew R. Feldman began graduate studies at Harvard University. Jason A. Bernstein returned to his position at the Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service, and Christopher W. Snow accepted a position at The Urban Institute. After serving as research assistants at the Council, Stephen F. Lin began graduate studies at Harvard University, John L. Goldie accepted a position at Cornerstone Research, and Sarah L. Rosen accepted a position at the National Bureau of Economic Research. 264 | Economic Report of the President Public Information The Council’s annual Economic Report of the President is an important vehicle for presenting the Administration’s domestic and international economic policies. It is now available for distribution as a bound volume and on the Internet, where it is accessible at www.access.gpo.gov/eop. The Council also has primary responsibility for compiling the monthly Economic Indicators, which is issued by the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress. The Internet address for the Economic Indicators is www.access.gpo.gov/congress/cong002.html. The Council’s home page is located at www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/CEA/html/index.html. Appendix A | 265 Appendix B STATISTICAL TABLES RELATING TO INCOME, EMPLOYMENT, AND PRODUCTION C O N T E N T S NATIONAL INCOME OR EXPENDITURE: B–1. B–2. B–3. B–4. B–5. B–6. B–7. B–8. B–9. B–10. B–11. B–12. B–13. B–14. B–15. B–16. B–17. B–18. B–19. B–20. B–21. B–22. B–23. B–24. B–25. B–26. B–27. B–28. B–29. B–30. B–31. B–32. Gross domestic product, 1959–2000 ................................................. Real gross domestic product, 1959–2000 .......................................... Quantity and price indexes for gross domestic product, and percent changes, 1959–2000 ................................................................ Percent changes in real gross domestic product, 1959–2000 .......... Contributions to percent change in real gross domestic product, 1959–2000 ....................................................................................... Chain-type quantity indexes for gross domestic product, 1959– 2000 ................................................................................................. Chain-type price indexes for gross domestic product, 1959–2000 Gross domestic product by major type of product, 1959–2000 ....... Real gross domestic product by major type of product, 1959–2000 Gross domestic product by sector, 1959–2000 ................................. Real gross domestic product by sector, 1959–2000 ......................... Gross domestic product by industry, 1959–99 ................................. Real gross domestic product by industry, 1987–99 ......................... Gross product of nonfinancial corporate business, 1959–2000 ....... Output, price, costs, and profits of nonfinancial corporate business, 1959–2000 .............................................................................. Personal consumption expenditures, 1959–2000 ............................. Real personal consumption expenditures, 1987–2000 .................... Private fixed investment by type, 1959–2000 .................................. Real private fixed investment by type, 1987–2000 ......................... Government consumption expenditures and gross investment by type, 1959–2000 .............................................................................. Real government consumption expenditures and gross investment by type, 1987–2000 ............................................................... Private inventories and final sales of domestic business, 1959– 2000 ................................................................................................. Real private inventories and final sales of domestic business, 1987–2000 ....................................................................................... Foreign transactions in the national income and product accounts, 1959–2000 .......................................................................... Real exports and imports of goods and services and receipts and payments of income, 1987–2000 .................................................... Relation of gross domestic product, gross national product, net national product, and national income, 1959–2000 ..................... Relation of national income and personal income, 1959–2000 ....... National income by type of income, 1959–2000 ............................... Sources of personal income, 1959–2000 ........................................... Disposition of personal income, 1959–2000 ..................................... Total and per capita disposable personal income and personal consumption expenditures, and per capita gross domestic product, in current and real dollars, 1959–2000 ................................. Gross saving and investment, 1959–2000 ........................................ 269 Page 274 276 278 279 280 282 284 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 308 310 311 312 Page B–33. Median money income (in 1999 dollars) and poverty status of families and persons, by race, selected years, 1981–99 ............... 314 POPULATION, EMPLOYMENT, WAGES, AND PRODUCTIVITY: B–34. B–35. B–36. B–37. B–38. B–39. B–40. B–41. B–42. B–43. B–44. B–45. B–46. B–47. B–48. B–49. B–50. Population by age group, 1929–2000 ................................................ Civilian population and labor force, 1929–2000 .............................. Civilian employment and unemployment by sex and age, 1950– 2000 ................................................................................................. Civilian employment by demographic characteristic, 1955–2000 .. Unemployment by demographic characteristic, 1955–2000 ........... Civilian labor force participation rate and employment/population ratio, 1950–2000 .................................................................. Civilian labor force participation rate by demographic characteristic, 1955–2000 ...................................................................... Civilian employment/population ratio by demographic characteristic, 1955–2000 ...................................................................... Civilian unemployment rate, 1950–2000 ......................................... Civilian unemployment rate by demographic characteristic, 1955–2000 ....................................................................................... Unemployment by duration and reason, 1950–2000 ....................... Unemployment insurance programs, selected data, 1969–2000 .... Employees on nonagricultural payrolls, by major industry, 1950– 2000 ................................................................................................. Hours and earnings in private nonagricultural industries, 1959– 2000 ................................................................................................. Employment cost index, private industry, 1980–2000 .................... Productivity and related data, business sector, 1959–2000 ........... Changes in productivity and related data, business sector, 1959– 2000 ................................................................................................. 315 316 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 330 331 332 333 PRODUCTION AND BUSINESS ACTIVITY: B–51. B–52. B–53. B–54. B–55. B–56. B–57. B–58. B–59. Industrial production indexes, major industry divisions, 1950– 2000 ................................................................................................. Industrial production indexes, market groupings, 1950–2000 ....... Industrial production indexes, selected manufactures, 1950–2000 Capacity utilization rates, 1950–2000 .............................................. New construction activity, 1959–2000 .............................................. New housing units started and authorized, 1959–2000 ................. Manufacturing and trade sales and inventories, 1954–2000 ......... Manufacturers’ shipments and inventories, 1954–2000 ................. Manufacturers’ new and unfilled orders, 1954–2000 ...................... 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 PRICES: B–60. B–61. B–62. B–63. B–64. B–65. B–66. Consumer price indexes for major expenditure classes, 1958– 2000 ................................................................................................. Consumer price indexes for selected expenditure classes, 1958– 2000 ................................................................................................. Consumer price indexes for commodities, services, and special groups, 1958–2000 .......................................................................... Changes in special consumer price indexes, 1960–2000 ................. Changes in consumer price indexes for commodities and services, 1929–99 ........................................................................................... Producer price indexes by stage of processing, 1954–2000 ............. Producer price indexes by stage of processing, special groups, 1974–2000 ....................................................................................... 270 343 344 346 347 348 349 351 B–67. B–68. Producer price indexes for major commodity groups, 1954–2000 Changes in producer price indexes for finished goods, 1960–2000 Page 352 354 MONEY STOCK, CREDIT, AND FINANCE: B–69. B–70. B–71. B–72. B–73. B–74. B–75. B–76. B–77. Money stock and debt measures, 1959–2000 ................................... Components of money stock measures, 1959–2000 ......................... Aggregate reserves of depository institutions and monetary base, 1959–2000 ....................................................................................... Bank credit at all commercial banks, 1973–2000 ............................ Bond yields and interest rates, 1929–2000 ...................................... Credit market borrowing, 1991–2000 ............................................... Mortgage debt outstanding by type of property and of financing, 1945–2000 ....................................................................................... Mortgage debt outstanding by holder, 1945–2000 .......................... Consumer credit outstanding, 1950–2000 ........................................ 355 356 358 359 360 362 364 365 366 GOVERNMENT FINANCE: B–78. B–79. B–80. B–81. B–82. B–83. B–84. B–85. B–86. B–87. B–88. B–89. Federal receipts, outlays, surplus or deficit, and debt, selected fiscal years, 1939–2000 .................................................................. Federal budget receipts, outlays, surplus or deficit, and debt, as percent of gross domestic product, fiscal years 1934–2000 ......... Federal receipts and outlays, by major category, and surplus or deficit, fiscal years 1940–2000 ....................................................... Federal receipts, outlays, deficit, and debt, fiscal years 1995– 2000 ................................................................................................. Federal and State and local government current receipts and expenditures, national income and product accounts (NIPA), 1959–2000 ....................................................................................... Federal and State and local government current receipts and expenditures, national income and product accounts (NIPA), by major type, 1959–2000 ................................................................... Federal Government current receipts and expenditures, national income and product accounts (NIPA), 1959–2000 ....................... State and local government current receipts and expenditures, national income and product accounts (NIPA), 1959–2000 ........ State and local government revenues and expenditures, selected fiscal years, 1927–97 ...................................................................... Interest-bearing public debt securities by kind of obligation, 1967–2000 ....................................................................................... Maturity distribution and average length of marketable interestbearing public debt securities held by private investors, 1967– 2000 ................................................................................................. Estimated ownership of U.S. Treasury securities, 1989–2000 ....... 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 CORPORATE PROFITS AND FINANCE: B–90. B–91. B–92. B–93. B–94. B–95. B–96. Corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments, 1959–2000 ......................................................... Corporate profits by industry, 1959–2000 ........................................ Corporate profits of manufacturing industries, 1959–2000 ............ Sales, profits, and stockholders’ equity, all manufacturing corporations, 1954–2000 ..................................................................... Relation of profits after taxes to stockholders’ equity and to sales, all manufacturing corporations, 1947–2000 ................................. Common stock prices and yields, 1959–2000 ................................... Business formation and business failures, 1955–98 ....................... 271 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 Page AGRICULTURE: B–97. B–98. B–99. B–100. B–101. B–102. Farm income, 1945–2000 ................................................................... Farm business balance sheet, 1950–99 ............................................ Farm output and productivity indexes, 1948–96 ............................. Farm input use, selected inputs, 1948–2000 ................................... Indexes of prices received and prices paid by farmers, 1975–2000 U.S. exports and imports of agricultural commodities, 1940–2000 386 387 388 389 390 391 INTERNATIONAL STATISTICS: B–103. U.S. international transactions, 1946–2000 ..................................... B–104. U.S. international trade in goods by principal end-use category, 1965–2000 ....................................................................................... B–105. U.S. international trade in goods by area, 1991–2000 .................... B–106. U.S. international trade in goods on balance of payments (BOP) and Census basis, and trade in services on BOP basis, 1974– 2000 ................................................................................................. B–107. International investment position of the United States at yearend, 1991–99 ................................................................................... B–108. Industrial production and consumer prices, major industrial countries, 1975–2000 ...................................................................... B–109. Civilian unemployment rate, and hourly compensation, major industrial countries, 1975–2000 ....................................................... B–110. Foreign exchange rates, 1979–2000 .................................................. B–111. International reserves, selected years, 1962–2000 .......................... B–112. Growth rates in real gross domestic product, 1982–2000 ............... 272 392 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 General Notes Detail in these tables may not add to totals because of rounding. Because of the formula used for calculating real gross domestic product (GDP), the chained (1996) dollar estimates for the detailed components do not add to the chained-dollar value of GDP or to any intermediate aggregates. The Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) no longer publishes chained-dollar estimates prior to 1987, except for selected series. Unless otherwise noted, all dollar figures are in current dollars. Symbols used: p Preliminary. ...Not available (also, not applicable). Data in these tables reflect revisions made by the source agencies from late January 2000 through December 21, 2000. In particular, tables containing national income and product accounts (NIPA) estimates reflect revisions released by the Department of Commerce in April and July 2000. 273 NATIONAL INCOME OR EXPENDITURE TABLE B–1.—Gross domestic product, 1959–2000 [Billions of dollars, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Personal consumption expenditures Gross private domestic investment Fixed investment Year or quarter Gross domestic product Nonresidential Total Durable goods Nondurable goods Services Total Total Total Structures Equipment and software Residential Change in private inventories 1959 ................... 507.4 318.1 42.7 148.5 127.0 78.5 74.6 46.5 18.1 28.4 28.1 3.9 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... 527.4 545.7 586.5 618.7 664.4 720.1 789.3 834.1 911.5 985.3 332.3 342.7 363.8 383.1 411.7 444.3 481.8 508.7 558.7 605.5 43.3 41.8 46.9 51.6 56.7 63.3 68.3 70.4 80.8 85.9 152.9 156.6 162.8 168.2 178.7 191.6 208.8 217.1 235.7 253.2 136.1 144.3 154.1 163.4 176.4 189.5 204.7 221.2 242.3 266.4 78.9 78.2 88.1 93.8 102.1 118.2 131.3 128.6 141.2 156.4 75.7 75.2 82.0 88.1 97.2 109.0 117.7 118.7 132.1 147.3 49.4 48.8 53.1 56.0 63.0 74.8 85.4 86.4 93.4 104.7 19.6 19.7 20.8 21.2 23.7 28.3 31.3 31.5 33.6 37.7 29.8 29.1 32.3 34.8 39.2 46.5 54.0 54.9 59.9 67.0 26.3 26.4 29.0 32.1 34.3 34.2 32.3 32.4 38.7 42.6 3.2 3.0 6.1 5.6 4.8 9.2 13.6 9.9 9.1 9.2 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... 1,039.7 1,128.6 1,240.4 1,385.5 1,501.0 1,635.2 1,823.9 2,031.4 2,295.9 2,566.4 648.9 702.4 770.7 852.5 932.4 1,030.3 1,149.8 1,278.4 1,430.4 1,596.3 85.0 96.9 110.4 123.5 122.3 133.5 158.9 181.2 201.7 214.4 272.0 285.5 308.0 343.1 384.5 420.7 458.3 497.2 550.2 624.4 292.0 320.0 352.3 385.9 425.5 476.1 532.6 600.0 678.4 757.4 152.4 178.2 207.6 244.5 249.4 230.2 292.0 361.3 436.0 490.6 150.4 169.9 198.5 228.6 235.4 236.5 274.8 339.0 410.2 472.7 109.0 114.1 128.8 153.3 169.5 173.7 192.4 228.7 278.6 331.6 40.3 42.7 47.2 55.0 61.2 61.4 65.9 74.6 91.4 114.9 68.7 71.5 81.7 98.3 108.2 112.4 126.4 154.1 187.2 216.7 41.4 55.8 69.7 75.3 66.0 62.7 82.5 110.3 131.6 141.0 2.0 8.3 9.1 15.9 14.0 −6.3 17.1 22.3 25.8 18.0 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... 2,795.6 3,131.3 3,259.2 3,534.9 3,932.7 4,213.0 4,452.9 4,742.5 5,108.3 5,489.1 1,762.9 1,944.2 2,079.3 2,286.4 2,498.4 2,712.6 2,895.2 3,105.3 3,356.6 3,596.7 214.2 231.3 240.2 281.2 326.9 363.3 401.3 419.7 450.2 467.8 696.1 758.9 787.6 831.2 884.7 928.8 958.5 1,015.3 1,082.9 1,165.4 852.7 954.0 1,051.5 1,174.0 1,286.9 1,420.6 1,535.4 1,670.3 1,823.5 1,963.5 477.9 570.8 516.1 564.2 735.5 736.3 747.2 781.5 821.1 872.9 484.2 541.0 531.0 570.0 670.1 714.5 740.7 754.3 802.7 845.2 360.9 418.4 425.3 417.4 490.3 527.6 522.5 526.7 568.4 613.4 133.9 164.6 175.0 152.7 176.0 193.3 175.8 172.1 181.6 193.4 227.0 253.8 250.3 264.7 314.3 334.3 346.8 354.7 386.8 420.0 123.2 122.6 105.7 152.5 179.8 186.9 218.1 227.6 234.2 231.8 −6.3 29.8 −14.9 −5.8 65.4 21.8 6.6 27.1 18.5 27.7 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... .................. 5,803.2 5,986.2 6,318.9 6,642.3 7,054.3 7,400.5 7,813.2 8,318.4 8,790.2 9,299.2 3,831.5 3,971.2 4,209.7 4,454.7 4,716.4 4,969.0 5,237.5 5,529.3 5,850.9 6,268.7 467.6 443.0 470.8 513.4 560.8 589.7 616.5 642.5 693.9 761.3 1,246.1 1,278.8 1,322.9 1,375.2 1,438.0 1,497.3 1,574.1 1,641.6 1,707.6 1,845.5 2,117.8 2,249.4 2,415.9 2,566.1 2,717.6 2,882.0 3,047.0 3,245.2 3,449.3 3,661.9 861.7 800.2 866.6 955.1 1,097.1 1,143.8 1,242.7 1,390.5 1,549.9 1,650.1 847.2 630.3 800.4 608.9 851.6 626.1 934.0 682.2 1,034.6 748.6 1,110.7 825.1 1,212.7 899.4 1,327.7 999.4 1,472.9 1,107.5 1,606.8 1,203.1 202.5 183.4 172.2 179.4 187.5 204.6 225.0 255.8 283.2 285.6 427.8 425.4 453.9 502.8 561.1 620.5 674.4 743.6 824.3 917.4 216.8 191.5 225.5 251.8 286.0 285.6 313.3 328.2 365.4 403.8 14.5 −.2 15.0 21.1 62.6 33.0 30.0 62.9 77.0 43.3 1995: I ................ II ............... III .............. IV .............. 7,297.5 7,342.6 7,432.8 7,529.3 4,868.6 4,943.7 5,005.2 5,058.4 578.2 584.4 596.2 600.0 1,475.8 1,492.2 1,502.6 1,518.5 2,814.7 2,867.1 2,906.3 2,939.9 1,162.8 1,133.1 1,123.5 1,155.6 1,100.1 1,097.2 1,110.1 1,135.4 812.5 820.3 825.2 842.3 200.5 204.8 206.2 207.0 612.0 615.5 619.0 635.3 287.6 276.9 284.9 293.1 62.7 35.8 13.4 20.2 1996: I ................ II ............... III .............. IV .............. 7,629.6 7,782.7 7,859.0 7,981.4 5,130.5 5,218.0 5,263.7 5,337.9 606.4 621.3 616.7 621.5 1,539.6 1,569.4 1,578.8 1,608.4 2,984.4 3,027.4 3,068.2 3,107.9 1,172.4 1,231.5 1,282.6 1,284.3 1,165.6 1,201.7 1,232.6 1,250.9 865.1 885.4 913.6 933.7 213.4 220.0 226.3 240.3 651.7 665.4 687.3 693.4 300.5 316.3 319.0 317.2 6.8 29.8 50.0 33.5 1997: I ................ II ............... III .............. IV .............. 8,124.2 8,279.8 8,390.9 8,478.6 5,429.9 5,470.8 5,575.9 5,640.6 635.1 624.4 652.4 658.3 1,626.8 1,627.3 1,653.1 1,659.0 3,168.0 3,219.1 3,270.4 3,323.3 1,324.2 1,397.7 1,405.7 1,434.5 1,275.5 955.5 1,310.0 984.3 1,355.8 1,026.0 1,369.3 1,031.8 246.9 247.7 260.6 267.9 708.6 736.6 765.4 764.0 320.0 325.7 329.8 337.5 48.8 87.7 49.9 65.1 1998: I ................ II ............... III .............. IV .............. 8,634.7 8,722.0 8,829.1 8,974.9 5,712.6 5,811.4 5,893.4 5,986.0 670.5 689.3 692.5 723.4 1,672.5 1,694.8 1,717.9 1,745.2 3,369.7 3,427.4 3,482.9 3,517.4 1,532.1 1,523.9 1,553.0 1,590.8 1,419.7 1,465.4 1,482.4 1,524.1 1,073.0 1,105.8 1,110.5 1,140.7 275.1 286.3 283.9 287.6 797.9 819.5 826.6 853.1 346.7 359.6 371.9 383.4 112.4 58.5 70.5 66.6 1999: I ................ II ............... III .............. IV ............. 9,104.5 9,191.5 9,340.9 9,559.7 6,095.3 6,213.2 6,319.9 6,446.2 733.9 756.3 767.2 787.6 1,786.4 1,825.3 1,860.0 1,910.2 3,575.0 3,631.5 3,692.7 3,748.5 1,609.8 1,607.9 1,659.1 1,723.7 1,560.6 1,593.4 1,622.4 1,651.0 1,165.3 1,188.0 1,216.8 1,242.2 287.2 283.7 281.2 290.4 878.1 904.3 935.6 951.8 395.3 405.4 405.6 408.8 49.2 14.5 36.7 72.7 9,752.7 6,621.7 9,945.7 6,706.3 10,039.4 6,810.8 826.3 814.3 824.7 1,963.9 1,997.6 2,031.5 3,831.6 1,755.7 1,725.8 1,308.5 3,894.4 1,852.6 1,780.5 1,359.2 3,954.6 1,869.3 1,803.0 1,390.6 308.9 315.1 330.1 999.6 1,044.1 1,060.5 417.3 421.3 412.4 29.9 72.0 66.4 2000: I ................ II ............... III ............. See next page for continuation of table. 274 TABLE B–1.—Gross domestic product, 1959–2000—Continued [Billions of dollars, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Net exports of goods and services Year or quarter Government consumption expenditures and gross investment Federal Net exports Exports Imports Total Total National defense Nondefense State and local AddenFinal Gross dum: sales of domesGross domestic national tic purproduct chases 1 product 2 Percent change from preceding period Gross Gross domes- domestic tic prodpuruct chases 1 1959 .......... −1.7 20.6 22.3 112.5 67.4 56.0 11.4 45.1 503.5 509.1 510.3 8.4 8.9 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 2.4 3.4 2.4 3.3 5.5 3.9 1.9 1.4 −1.3 −1.2 25.3 26.0 27.4 29.4 33.6 35.4 38.9 41.4 45.3 49.3 22.8 22.7 25.0 26.1 28.1 31.5 37.1 39.9 46.6 50.5 113.8 121.5 132.2 138.5 145.1 153.7 174.3 195.3 212.8 224.6 65.9 69.5 76.9 78.5 79.8 82.1 94.4 106.8 114.0 116.1 55.2 58.1 62.8 62.7 61.8 62.4 73.8 85.8 92.2 92.6 10.7 11.3 14.1 15.8 18.0 19.7 20.7 21.0 21.8 23.5 47.9 52.0 55.3 59.9 65.3 71.6 79.9 88.6 98.8 108.5 524.1 542.7 580.4 613.1 659.6 710.9 775.7 824.2 902.4 976.2 525.0 542.3 584.1 615.4 658.9 716.2 787.4 832.6 912.7 986.5 530.6 549.3 590.7 623.2 669.4 725.5 794.5 839.5 917.6 991.5 3.9 3.5 7.5 5.5 7.4 8.4 9.6 5.7 9.3 8.1 3.1 3.3 7.7 5.4 7.1 8.7 9.9 5.7 9.6 8.1 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 1.2 −3.0 −8.0 .6 −3.1 13.6 −2.3 −23.7 −26.1 −24.0 57.0 59.3 66.2 91.8 124.3 136.3 148.9 158.8 186.1 228.7 55.8 62.3 74.2 91.2 127.5 122.7 151.1 182.4 212.3 252.7 237.1 251.0 270.1 287.9 322.4 361.1 384.5 415.3 455.6 503.5 116.4 117.6 125.6 127.8 138.2 152.1 160.6 176.0 191.9 211.6 90.9 89.0 93.5 93.9 99.7 107.9 113.2 122.6 132.0 146.7 25.5 28.6 32.2 33.9 38.5 44.2 47.4 53.5 59.8 65.0 120.7 133.5 144.4 160.1 184.2 209.0 223.9 239.3 263.8 291.8 1,037.7 1,120.3 1,231.3 1,369.7 1,487.0 1,641.4 1,806.8 2,009.1 2,270.1 2,548.4 1,038.5 1,131.6 1,248.4 1,384.9 1,504.2 1,621.6 1,826.2 2,055.1 2,322.0 2,590.4 1,046.1 1,136.2 1,249.1 1,398.2 1,516.7 1,648.4 1,841.0 2,052.1 2,318.0 2,599.3 5.5 8.6 9.9 11.7 8.3 8.9 11.5 11.4 13.0 11.8 5.3 9.0 10.3 10.9 8.6 7.8 12.6 12.5 13.0 11.6 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... −14.9 −15.0 −20.5 −51.7 −102.0 −114.2 −131.9 −142.3 −106.3 −80.7 278.9 302.8 282.6 277.0 303.1 303.0 320.3 365.6 446.9 509.0 293.8 569.7 317.8 631.4 303.2 684.4 328.6 735.9 405.1 800.8 417.2 878.3 452.2 942.3 507.9 997.9 553.2 1,036.9 589.7 1,100.2 245.3 281.8 312.8 344.4 376.4 413.4 438.7 460.4 462.6 482.6 169.6 197.8 228.3 252.5 283.5 312.4 332.2 351.2 355.9 363.2 75.6 84.0 84.5 92.0 92.8 101.0 106.5 109.3 106.8 119.3 324.4 349.6 371.6 391.5 424.4 464.9 503.6 537.5 574.3 617.7 2,801.9 3,101.5 3,274.1 3,540.7 3,867.3 4,191.2 4,446.3 4,715.3 5,089.8 5,461.4 2,810.5 3,146.3 3,279.8 3,586.6 4,034.7 4,327.2 4,584.7 4,884.7 5,214.6 5,569.8 2,830.8 3,166.1 3,295.7 3,571.8 3,968.1 4,238.4 4,468.3 4,756.2 5,126.8 5,509.4 8.9 12.0 4.1 8.5 11.3 7.1 5.7 6.5 7.7 7.5 8.5 12.0 4.2 9.4 12.5 7.2 6.0 6.5 6.8 6.8 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... −71.4 −20.7 −27.9 −60.5 −87.1 −84.3 −89.0 −89.3 −151.5 −254.0 557.2 601.6 636.8 658.0 725.1 818.6 874.2 966.4 966.0 990.2 628.6 622.3 664.6 718.5 812.1 902.8 963.1 1,055.8 1,117.5 1,244.2 1,181.4 1,235.5 1,270.5 1,293.0 1,327.9 1,372.0 1,421.9 1,487.9 1,540.9 1,634.4 508.4 527.4 534.5 527.3 521.1 521.5 531.6 538.2 540.6 568.6 374.9 384.5 378.5 364.9 355.1 350.6 357.0 352.6 349.2 365.0 133.6 673.0 142.9 708.1 156.0 736.0 162.4 765.7 165.9 806.8 170.9 850.5 174.6 890.4 185.6 949.7 191.4 1,000.3 203.5 1,065.8 5,788.7 5,986.4 6,303.9 6,621.2 6,991.8 7,367.5 7,783.2 8,255.5 8,713.2 9,255.9 5,874.7 6,006.9 6,346.8 6,702.8 7,141.4 7,484.8 7,902.1 8,407.7 8,941.7 9,553.2 5,832.2 6,010.9 6,342.3 6,666.7 7,071.1 7,420.9 7,831.2 8,325.4 8,786.7 9,288.2 5.7 3.2 5.6 5.1 6.2 4.9 5.6 6.5 5.7 5.8 5.5 2.3 5.7 5.6 6.5 4.8 5.6 6.4 6.4 6.8 1995: I ....... II ...... III ..... IV ..... −94.5 −109.0 −74.2 −59.3 787.7 802.5 834.1 850.0 882.2 911.5 908.3 909.3 1,360.6 1,374.9 1,378.3 1,374.5 523.4 525.5 525.0 512.3 352.2 353.9 352.7 343.6 171.2 171.6 172.3 168.7 837.1 849.4 853.3 862.2 7,234.8 7,306.8 7,419.4 7,509.1 7,392.0 7,451.6 7,507.0 7,588.5 7,318.9 7,367.9 7,444.1 7,552.7 4.5 2.5 5.0 5.3 4.5 3.3 3.0 4.4 1996: I ....... II ...... III ..... IV ..... −75.8 −89.8 −110.6 −79.7 853.3 864.7 865.6 913.1 929.1 954.5 976.1 992.8 1,402.6 1,423.0 1,423.4 1,438.9 530.6 537.2 529.1 529.4 356.1 361.3 355.6 355.0 174.5 175.9 173.5 174.5 872.0 885.7 894.3 909.4 7,622.8 7,752.9 7,809.0 7,947.9 7,705.4 7,872.4 7,969.6 8,061.1 7,656.5 7,800.3 7,870.5 7,997.7 5.4 8.3 4.0 6.4 6.3 9.0 5.0 4.7 1997: I ....... II ...... III ..... IV ..... −89.2 −75.0 −88.6 −104.6 927.8 966.8 988.7 982.4 1,017.1 1,041.7 1,077.3 1,087.0 1,459.2 1,486.3 1,498.0 1,508.2 529.2 543.4 541.3 538.9 346.4 355.0 354.7 354.4 182.8 188.4 186.6 184.5 930.0 942.9 956.6 969.3 8,075.4 8,192.1 8,341.1 8,413.5 8,213.4 8,354.7 8,479.5 8,583.2 8,131.8 8,291.8 8,397.7 8,480.4 7.3 7.9 5.5 4.2 7.8 7.1 6.1 5.0 1998: I ....... II ...... III ..... IV ..... −117.5 −151.8 −167.6 −169.0 975.0 962.8 947.8 978.3 1,092.6 1,114.7 1,115.4 1,147.3 1,507.6 1,538.6 1,550.3 1,567.2 528.0 544.9 541.4 548.0 338.6 349.3 355.0 353.8 189.3 979.6 195.6 993.7 186.4 1,008.9 194.2 1,019.2 8,522.4 8,663.5 8,758.5 8,908.3 8,752.3 8,873.8 8,996.7 9,143.9 8,640.3 8,725.0 8,814.9 8,966.6 7.6 4.1 5.0 6.8 8.1 5.7 5.7 6.7 1999: I ....... II ...... III ..... IV .... −196.1 957.3 −240.4 973.0 −280.5 999.5 −299.1 1,031.0 1,153.4 1,213.4 1,280.0 1,330.1 1,595.5 1,610.9 1,642.4 1,688.8 554.1 558.3 570.4 591.6 356.5 355.3 367.5 380.8 197.6 203.0 202.8 210.7 9,055.3 9,177.0 9,304.2 9,486.9 9,300.6 9,432.0 9,621.4 9,858.8 9,097.2 9,181.8 9,327.3 9,546.3 5.9 3.9 6.7 9.7 7.0 5.8 8.3 10.2 2000: I ....... II ...... III .... −335.2 1,051.9 −355.4 1,092.9 −389.5 1,130.8 1,387.1 1,710.4 1,448.3 1,742.2 1,520.3 1,748.8 580.1 604.5 594.2 366.6 381.9 375.0 213.5 1,130.4 222.6 1,137.7 219.2 1,154.6 9,722.8 10,087.9 9,745.0 9,873.7 10,301.1 9,937.4 9,973.1 10,429.0 10,030.5 8.3 8.2 3.8 9.6 8.7 5.1 1 Gross 1,041.4 1,052.6 1,072.1 1,097.3 domestic product (GDP) less exports of goods and services plus imports of goods and services. plus net income receipts from rest of the world. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2 GDP 275 TABLE B–2.—Real gross domestic product, 1959–2000 [Billions of chained (1996) dollars, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Personal consumption expenditures Gross private domestic investment Fixed investment Year or quarter Gross domestic product Nonresidential Total Durable goods Nondurable goods Services Total Total Total 1959 ............... 2,319.0 1,470.7 .............. ................ .............. 1960 ............... 1961 ............... 1962 ............... 1963 ............... 1964 ............... 1965 ............... 1966 ............... 1967 ............... 1968 ............... 1969 ............... 1970 ............... 1971 ............... 1972 ............... 1973 ............... 1974 ............... 1975 ............... 1976 ............... 1977 ............... 1978 ............... 1979 ............... 1980 ............... 1981 ............... 1982 ............... 1983 ............... 1984 ............... 1985 ............... 1986 ............... 1987 ............... 1988 ............... 1989 ............... 1990 ............... 1991 ............... 1992 ............... 1993 ............... 1994 ............... 1995 ............... 1996 ............... 1997 ............... 1998 ............... 1999 .............. 1995: I ............ II .......... III ......... IV ......... 1996: I ............ II .......... III ......... IV ......... 1997: I ............ II .......... III ......... IV ......... 1998: I ............ II .......... III ......... IV ......... 1999: I ............ II .......... III ......... IV ......... 2000: I ............ II .......... III ......... 2,376.7 2,432.0 2,578.9 2,690.4 2,846.5 3,028.5 3,227.5 3,308.3 3,466.1 3,571.4 3,578.0 3,697.7 3,898.4 4,123.4 4,099.0 4,084.4 4,311.7 4,511.8 4,760.6 4,912.1 4,900.9 5,021.0 4,919.3 5,132.3 5,505.2 5,717.1 5,912.4 6,113.3 6,368.4 6,591.8 6,707.9 6,676.4 6,880.0 7,062.6 7,347.7 7,543.8 7,813.2 8,159.5 8,515.7 8,875.8 7,488.7 7,503.3 7,561.4 7,621.9 7,676.4 7,802.9 7,841.9 7,931.3 8,016.4 8,131.9 8,216.6 8,272.9 8,404.9 8,465.6 8,537.6 8,654.5 8,730.0 8,783.2 8,905.8 9,084.1 9,191.8 9,318.9 9,369.5 1,510.8 1,541.2 1,617.3 1,684.0 1,784.8 1,897.6 2,006.1 2,066.2 2,184.2 2,264.8 2,317.5 2,405.2 2,550.5 2,675.9 2,653.7 2,710.9 2,868.9 2,992.1 3,124.7 3,203.2 3,193.0 3,236.0 3,275.5 3,454.3 3,640.6 3,820.9 3,981.2 4,113.4 4,279.5 4,393.7 4,474.5 4,466.6 4,594.5 4,748.9 4,928.1 5,075.6 5,237.5 5,423.9 5,678.7 5,978.8 5,011.6 5,059.6 5,099.2 5,132.1 5,174.3 5,229.5 5,254.3 5,291.9 5,350.7 5,375.7 5,462.1 5,507.1 5,572.4 5,651.6 5,711.0 5,779.8 5,860.2 5,940.2 6,013.8 6,101.0 6,213.5 6,260.6 6,329.8 .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. 455.2 481.5 491.7 487.1 454.9 479.0 518.3 557.7 583.5 616.5 657.3 727.3 817.8 570.4 577.4 590.7 595.7 601.7 620.4 618.1 625.7 641.5 636.5 670.5 680.9 696.4 719.4 726.7 766.7 782.7 810.5 826.2 851.8 898.2 886.7 903.2 ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ 1,274.5 1,315.1 1,351.0 1,369.6 1,364.0 1,389.7 1,430.3 1,485.1 1,529.0 1,574.1 1,619.9 1,684.8 1,779.4 1,514.3 1,525.3 1,531.7 1,544.6 1,553.9 1,569.9 1,578.6 1,593.9 1,605.6 1,608.2 1,631.7 1,634.1 1,652.8 1,676.3 1,694.2 1,716.0 1,748.5 1,765.0 1,786.1 1,818.1 1,844.8 1,861.1 1,882.6 .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. 2,379.3 2,477.2 2,546.0 2,616.2 2,651.8 2,729.7 2,802.5 2,886.2 2,963.4 3,047.0 3,147.0 3,269.4 3,390.8 2,927.3 2,957.4 2,977.0 2,992.0 3,018.8 3,039.2 3,057.7 3,072.2 3,103.7 3,130.6 3,160.6 3,193.0 3,224.5 3,258.2 3,292.4 3,302.8 3,335.8 3,373.4 3,411.1 3,443.0 3,487.2 3,526.7 3,559.3 Structures Equipment and software Residential Change in private inventories 272.9 .............. .............. .............. .............. ............ .............. 272.8 271.0 305.3 325.7 352.6 402.0 437.3 417.2 441.3 466.9 436.2 485.8 543.0 606.5 561.7 462.2 555.5 639.4 713.0 735.4 655.3 715.6 615.2 673.7 871.5 863.4 857.7 879.3 902.8 936.5 907.3 829.5 899.8 977.9 1,107.0 1,140.6 1,242.7 1,393.3 1,566.8 1,669.7 1,162.4 1,128.5 1,119.1 1,152.4 1,172.3 1,233.4 1,281.4 1,283.7 1,325.4 1,400.6 1,408.6 1,438.5 1,545.1 1,540.8 1,571.4 1,609.9 1,623.2 1,623.1 1,680.8 1,751.6 1,773.6 1,863.0 1,871.1 See next page for continuation of table. 276 .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. 856.0 887.1 911.2 894.6 832.5 886.5 958.4 1,045.9 1,109.2 1,212.7 1,328.6 1,485.3 1,621.4 1,101.9 1,095.0 1,107.1 1,132.7 1,165.2 1,203.7 1,231.6 1,250.2 1,275.4 1,311.1 1,356.7 1,371.3 1,427.4 1,477.6 1,496.4 1,539.7 1,574.0 1,607.1 1,637.8 1,666.6 1,730.9 1,777.6 1,791.3 .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. 572.5 603.6 637.0 641.7 610.1 630.6 683.6 744.6 817.5 899.4 1,009.3 1,140.3 1,255.3 806.4 811.4 816.7 835.5 861.6 885.6 914.3 936.2 960.8 992.7 1,037.0 1,047.0 1,096.0 1,136.4 1,146.3 1,182.3 1,209.4 1,237.5 1,272.5 1,301.8 1,365.3 1,412.5 1,438.8 .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. 224.3 227.1 232.7 236.1 210.1 197.3 198.9 200.5 210.1 225.0 245.4 263.0 259.2 208.1 211.0 210.9 210.4 215.9 221.3 225.4 237.3 241.1 239.3 248.5 252.7 257.5 266.2 263.0 265.1 262.9 258.7 254.6 260.6 274.0 277.0 286.6 .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. 360.0 386.9 414.0 415.7 407.2 437.5 487.1 544.9 607.6 674.4 764.2 879.0 1,003.1 598.5 600.7 606.0 625.0 645.8 664.3 688.9 698.8 719.6 753.7 788.9 794.5 839.4 871.3 885.2 920.0 950.9 985.0 1,026.6 1,050.1 1,100.4 1,146.6 1,162.4 ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ 290.7 289.2 277.3 253.5 221.1 257.2 276.0 302.7 291.7 313.3 319.7 346.1 368.3 295.8 283.5 290.4 297.3 303.6 318.1 317.3 314.0 314.7 318.7 320.3 324.9 332.4 342.4 350.9 358.5 365.7 370.9 368.0 368.5 371.4 372.6 362.3 .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. 29.6 18.4 29.6 16.5 −1.0 17.1 20.0 66.8 30.4 30.0 63.8 80.2 45.3 62.2 32.5 9.0 18.0 5.6 30.3 51.2 32.9 49.3 88.3 51.3 66.1 117.3 60.9 73.1 69.4 48.1 13.1 39.1 80.9 36.6 78.6 72.5 TABLE B–2.—Real gross domestic product, 1959–2000—Continued [Billions of chained (1996) dollars, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Net exports of goods and services Year or quarter Government consumption expenditures and gross investment Federal Net exports Exports Imports Total National defense Nondefense Total State and local Final Gross sales of domesdomestic tic purproduct chases 1 Addendum: Gross national product 2 Percent change from preceding period Gross Gross domes- domestic tic prodpuruct chases 1 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. 72.4 87.5 88.9 93.7 100.7 114.2 116.5 124.3 127.0 136.3 143.7 106.6 108.0 107.3 119.5 122.7 129.2 142.9 164.2 176.2 202.4 213.9 661.4 661.3 693.2 735.0 752.4 767.1 791.1 862.1 927.1 956.6 952.5 ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. 2,317.4 2,378.5 2,435.5 2,569.5 2,683.6 2,844.1 3,008.5 3,191.1 3,288.2 3,450.0 3,555.9 2,377.2 2,417.5 2,471.5 2,626.9 2,734.7 2,883.0 3,079.1 3,292.3 3,382.6 3,555.9 3,664.5 2,332.8 2,391.9 2,448.8 2,598.0 2,710.8 2,868.5 3,051.7 3,248.9 3,330.4 3,489.8 3,594.1 7.2 2.5 2.3 6.0 4.3 5.8 6.4 6.6 2.5 4.8 3.0 7.6 1.7 2.2 6.3 4.1 5.4 6.8 6.9 2.7 5.1 3.1 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. 159.3 160.4 173.5 211.4 231.6 230.0 243.6 249.7 275.9 302.4 223.1 931.1 235.0 913.8 261.3 914.9 273.4 908.3 267.2 924.8 237.5 942.5 284.0 943.3 315.0 952.7 342.3 982.2 347.9 1,001.1 ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. 3,588.6 3,688.1 3,887.7 4,094.3 4,080.7 4,118.5 4,288.8 4,478.8 4,722.9 4,894.4 3,659.6 3,791.1 4,003.8 4,196.6 4,136.5 4,085.2 4,354.2 4,586.4 4,834.8 4,956.3 3,600.6 3,722.9 3,925.7 4,161.0 4,142.3 4,117.7 4,351.4 4,556.6 4,805.3 4,973.9 .2 3.3 5.4 5.8 −.6 −.4 5.6 4.6 5.5 3.2 −.1 3.6 5.6 4.8 −1.4 −1.2 6.6 5.3 5.4 2.5 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. −156.2 −112.1 −79.4 334.8 338.6 314.6 306.9 332.6 341.6 366.8 408.0 473.5 529.4 324.8 333.4 329.2 370.7 461.0 490.7 531.9 564.2 585.6 608.8 1,020.9 1,030.0 1,046.0 1,081.0 1,118.4 1,190.5 1,255.2 1,292.5 1,307.5 1,343.5 ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ 597.8 586.9 594.7 .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. 450.2 446.8 443.3 ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ 146.5 138.9 150.5 .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. 695.6 721.4 749.5 4,928.1 4,989.5 4,954.9 5,154.5 5,427.9 5,698.8 5,912.6 6,088.8 6,352.6 6,565.4 4,863.8 4,990.0 4,916.6 5,194.1 5,646.6 5,883.1 6,096.2 6,286.2 6,489.5 6,674.6 4,962.3 5,075.4 4,973.6 5,184.9 5,553.8 5,750.9 5,932.5 6,130.8 6,391.1 6,615.5 −.2 2.5 −2.0 4.3 7.3 3.8 3.4 3.4 4.2 3.5 −1.9 2.6 −1.5 5.6 8.7 4.2 3.6 3.1 3.2 2.9 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. −56.5 575.7 632.2 −15.8 613.2 629.0 −19.8 651.0 670.8 −59.1 672.7 731.8 −86.5 732.8 819.4 −78.4 808.2 886.6 −89.0 874.2 963.1 −113.3 981.5 1,094.8 −221.0 1,003.6 1,224.6 −322.4 1,033.0 1,355.3 1,387.3 1,403.4 1,410.0 1,398.8 1,400.1 1,406.4 1,421.9 1,455.4 1,486.4 1,536.1 606.8 604.9 595.1 572.0 551.3 536.5 531.6 529.6 526.9 540.1 443.2 438.4 417.1 394.7 375.9 361.9 357.0 347.7 341.7 348.5 163.0 166.0 177.9 177.3 175.5 174.6 174.6 181.8 185.2 191.5 781.1 798.9 815.3 827.0 848.9 869.9 890.4 925.8 959.2 995.6 6,695.6 6,681.5 6,867.7 7,043.8 7,285.8 7,512.2 7,783.2 8,095.2 8,435.2 8,826.9 6,764.9 6,688.4 6,896.4 7,120.6 7,434.2 7,621.8 7,902.1 8,271.7 8,727.9 9,179.1 6,740.0 6,703.4 6,905.8 7,087.8 7,364.3 7,564.0 7,831.2 8,168.1 8,515.1 8,868.3 1.8 −.5 3.0 2.7 4.0 2.7 3.6 4.4 4.4 4.2 1.4 −1.1 3.1 3.3 4.4 2.5 3.7 4.7 5.5 5.2 1995: I ........... II .......... III ......... IV ......... −92.5 −97.5 −67.3 −56.4 780.6 788.9 821.9 841.4 873.1 886.4 889.1 897.8 1,407.3 1,414.0 1,410.8 1,393.5 544.1 544.3 540.4 517.1 366.9 367.0 363.3 350.4 177.2 177.3 177.1 166.8 863.3 869.7 870.4 876.4 7,427.3 7,469.6 7,549.7 7,602.5 7,581.3 7,601.1 7,627.9 7,677.2 7,510.2 7,528.6 7,572.3 7,645.2 1.5 .8 3.1 3.2 1.7 1.0 1.4 2.6 1996: I ........... II .......... III ......... IV ......... −75.0 −90.4 −115.9 −74.6 846.1 860.1 867.0 923.5 921.1 950.4 982.9 998.1 1,404.8 1,430.4 1,422.0 1,430.6 529.1 540.2 529.5 527.6 356.4 363.0 355.4 353.3 172.7 177.2 174.1 174.4 875.7 890.2 892.5 903.0 7,669.6 7,773.4 7,792.1 7,897.6 7,751.0 7,893.1 7,957.9 8,006.5 7,703.1 7,820.4 7,853.5 7,947.9 2.9 6.8 2.0 4.6 3.9 7.5 3.3 2.5 1997: I ........... II .......... III ......... IV ......... −94.0 940.3 1,034.3 −100.6 979.2 1,079.8 −119.6 1,004.2 1,123.8 −139.2 1,002.1 1,141.2 1,434.6 1,457.0 1,464.8 1,465.3 521.7 534.8 533.4 528.4 341.6 350.3 350.4 348.5 180.1 184.5 182.9 179.8 912.8 922.2 931.4 936.8 7,966.4 8,043.2 8,164.9 8,206.3 8,110.6 8,232.3 8,334.5 8,409.4 8,025.1 8,145.6 8,225.1 8,276.9 4.4 5.9 4.2 2.8 5.3 6.1 5.1 3.6 1998: I ........... II .......... III ......... IV ......... −175.3 1,004.5 1,179.8 1,461.6 −219.8 996.8 1,216.6 1,487.6 −244.1 988.8 1,232.9 1,492.9 −244.9 1,024.1 1,269.0 1,503.3 515.9 531.8 527.5 532.4 332.0 342.4 347.2 345.1 183.8 189.3 180.3 187.2 945.5 955.7 965.1 970.7 8,289.4 8,402.7 8,463.4 8,585.0 8,575.2 8,676.8 8,771.4 8,888.2 8,412.9 8,471.4 8,526.7 8,649.3 6.5 2.9 3.4 5.6 8.1 4.8 4.4 5.4 1999: I ........... II .......... III ......... IV ........ −279.8 −314.6 −342.6 −352.5 1,517.1 1,519.9 1,537.8 1,569.5 529.5 532.1 541.0 558.1 342.4 340.3 350.4 360.9 187.0 987.2 191.6 987.5 190.5 996.4 197.1 1,011.2 8,680.3 8,764.9 8,861.8 9,000.5 8,996.2 9,079.6 9,226.7 9,414.1 8,726.0 8,776.7 8,895.4 9,075.0 3.5 2.5 5.7 8.3 4.9 3.8 6.6 8.4 2000: I ........... II .......... III ........ −376.8 1,084.8 1,461.7 1,565.1 −403.4 1,121.8 1,525.2 1,583.7 −427.7 1,158.8 1,586.4 1,578.2 537.1 558.8 545.8 341.5 355.1 346.2 195.4 1,027.4 9,148.0 203.6 1,024.6 9,235.3 199.4 1,031.9 9,290.9 9,543.6 9,694.3 9,766.0 9,187.7 9,313.7 9,362.8 4.8 5.6 2.2 5.6 6.5 3.0 1,003.3 1,017.6 1,042.6 1,068.4 1,283.1 1,332.2 1,385.2 1,420.9 1 Gross 2 GDP domestic product (GDP) less exports of goods and services plus imports of goods and services. plus net income receipts from rest of the world. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 277 TABLE B–3.—Quantity and price indexes for gross domestic product, and percent changes, 1959–2000 [Quarterly data are seasonally adjusted] Gross domestic product (GDP) Index numbers, 1996=100 Year or quarter GDP (current dollars) 1959 .......................................... Real GDP (chain-type quantity index) GDP chain-type price index Percent change from preceding period GDP implicit price deflator GDP (current dollars) Real GDP (chain-type quantity index) GDP chain-type price index 1 GDP implicit price deflator 6.49 29.68 21.88 21.88 8.4 7.2 1.1 1.1 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... 6.75 6.98 7.51 7.92 8.50 9.22 10.10 10.68 11.67 12.61 30.42 31.13 33.01 34.43 36.43 38.76 41.31 42.34 44.36 45.71 22.19 22.43 22.74 22.99 23.34 23.77 24.45 25.21 26.29 27.59 22.19 22.44 22.74 23.00 23.34 23.78 24.46 25.21 26.30 27.59 3.9 3.5 7.5 5.5 7.4 8.4 9.6 5.7 9.3 8.1 2.5 2.3 6.0 4.3 5.8 6.4 6.6 2.5 4.8 3.0 1.4 1.1 1.4 1.1 1.5 1.9 2.8 3.1 4.3 4.9 1.4 1.1 1.4 1.1 1.5 1.9 2.9 3.1 4.3 4.9 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... 13.31 14.44 15.88 17.73 19.21 20.93 23.34 26.00 29.38 32.85 45.80 47.33 49.90 52.78 52.46 52.28 55.19 57.75 60.93 62.87 29.05 30.52 31.81 33.60 36.60 40.03 42.29 45.02 48.22 52.24 29.06 30.52 31.82 33.60 36.62 40.03 42.30 45.02 48.23 52.25 5.5 8.6 9.9 11.7 8.3 8.9 11.5 11.4 13.0 11.8 .2 3.3 5.4 5.8 −.6 −.4 5.6 4.6 5.5 3.2 5.3 5.0 4.2 5.6 9.0 9.4 5.7 6.4 7.1 8.3 5.3 5.0 4.3 5.6 9.0 9.3 5.7 6.4 7.1 8.3 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... 35.78 40.08 41.71 45.24 50.33 53.92 56.99 60.70 65.38 70.25 62.73 64.26 62.96 65.69 70.46 73.17 75.67 78.24 81.51 84.37 57.05 62.37 66.26 68.87 71.44 73.69 75.32 77.58 80.22 83.27 57.04 62.37 66.25 68.88 71.44 73.69 75.31 77.58 80.21 83.27 8.9 12.0 4.1 8.5 11.3 7.1 5.7 6.5 7.7 7.5 −.2 2.5 −2.0 4.3 7.3 3.8 3.4 3.4 4.2 3.5 9.2 9.3 6.2 3.9 3.7 3.2 2.2 3.0 3.4 3.8 9.2 9.3 6.2 4.0 3.7 3.2 2.2 3.0 3.4 3.8 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... 74.28 76.62 80.88 85.01 90.29 94.72 100.00 106.47 112.50 119.02 85.85 85.45 88.06 90.39 94.04 96.55 100.00 104.43 108.99 113.60 86.53 89.66 91.85 94.05 96.01 98.10 100.00 101.95 103.23 104.77 86.51 89.66 91.84 94.05 96.01 98.10 100.00 101.95 103.22 104.77 5.7 3.2 5.6 5.1 6.2 4.9 5.6 6.5 5.7 5.8 1.8 −.5 3.0 2.7 4.0 2.7 3.6 4.4 4.4 4.2 3.9 3.6 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.3 1.5 3.9 3.6 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.3 1.5 1995: I ....................................... II ...................................... III .................................... IV ..................................... 93.40 93.98 95.13 96.37 95.85 96.03 96.78 97.55 97.45 97.86 98.31 98.79 97.45 97.86 98.30 98.78 4.5 2.5 5.0 5.3 1.5 .8 3.1 3.2 3.0 1.7 1.8 2.0 3.0 1.7 1.8 2.0 1996: I ....................................... II ...................................... III .................................... IV ..................................... 97.65 99.61 100.59 102.15 98.25 99.87 100.37 101.51 99.40 99.74 100.23 100.63 99.39 99.74 100.22 100.63 5.4 8.3 4.0 6.4 2.9 6.8 2.0 4.6 2.5 1.4 2.0 1.6 2.5 1.4 1.9 1.7 1997: I ....................................... II ...................................... III .................................... IV ..................................... 103.98 105.97 107.39 108.52 102.60 104.08 105.16 105.88 101.36 101.82 102.12 102.49 101.34 101.82 102.12 102.49 7.3 7.9 5.5 4.2 4.4 5.9 4.2 2.8 2.9 1.9 1.2 1.4 2.9 1.9 1.2 1.4 1998: I ....................................... II ...................................... III .................................... IV ..................................... 110.52 111.63 113.00 114.87 107.57 108.35 109.27 110.77 102.75 103.04 103.42 103.69 102.74 103.03 103.41 103.70 7.6 4.1 5.0 6.8 6.5 2.9 3.4 5.6 1.0 1.1 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.5 1.1 1999: I ....................................... II ...................................... III .................................... IV ..................................... 116.53 117.64 119.55 122.35 111.73 112.42 113.98 116.27 104.25 104.63 104.90 105.31 104.29 104.65 104.89 105.24 5.9 3.9 6.7 9.7 3.5 2.5 5.7 8.3 2.2 1.4 1.1 1.6 2.3 1.4 .9 1.3 2000: I ....................................... II ...................................... III .................................... 124.82 127.29 128.49 117.65 119.27 119.92 106.17 106.80 107.22 106.10 106.73 107.15 8.3 8.2 3.8 4.8 5.6 2.2 3.3 2.4 1.6 3.3 2.4 1.6 1 Percent changes based on unrounded data. Quarterly percent changes are at annual rates. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 278 TABLE B–4.—Percent changes in real gross domestic product, 1959–2000 [Percent change from preceding period; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Personal consumption expenditures Year or quarter Gross domestic product Gross private domestic investment Exports and imports of goods and services Government consumption expenditures and gross investment Exports Imports Total Nonresidential fixed Total Durable goods Nondurable goods Services Total Structures Equipment and software Residential Federal State and local 1959 ............ 7.2 5.6 12.1 4.1 5.2 8.0 2.4 11.9 25.5 0.9 10.5 5.6 7.1 3.5 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ 2.5 2.3 6.0 4.3 5.8 6.4 6.6 2.5 4.8 3.0 2.7 2.0 4.9 4.1 6.0 6.3 5.7 3.0 5.7 3.7 2.0 −3.8 11.7 9.7 9.3 12.6 8.5 1.6 11.0 3.6 1.5 1.8 3.1 2.1 4.9 5.3 5.5 1.6 4.6 2.7 4.4 4.1 4.9 4.5 6.1 5.3 5.1 4.9 5.2 4.7 5.7 −.6 8.7 5.5 11.9 17.4 12.5 −1.4 4.4 7.6 7.9 1.3 4.5 1.1 10.4 15.9 6.8 −2.5 1.4 5.4 4.2 −1.9 11.5 8.4 12.7 18.3 15.9 −.7 6.2 8.8 −7.1 .3 9.6 11.8 5.8 −2.9 −8.9 −3.1 13.6 3.0 20.8 1.7 5.4 7.5 13.3 2.0 6.7 2.2 7.3 5.4 1.3 −.7 11.3 2.7 5.3 10.6 14.9 7.3 14.9 5.7 .0 4.8 6.0 2.4 2.0 3.1 9.0 7.5 3.2 −.4 −3.0 3.9 8.3 −.3 −1.7 .2 11.3 9.7 .9 −3.3 4.4 6.1 3.0 6.1 6.8 6.7 6.3 5.0 5.9 2.9 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ .2 3.3 5.4 5.8 −.6 −.4 5.6 4.6 5.5 3.2 2.3 3.8 6.0 4.9 −.8 2.2 5.8 4.3 4.4 2.5 −3.2 10.0 12.7 10.3 −6.9 .0 12.8 9.3 5.3 −.3 2.4 1.8 4.4 3.3 −2.0 1.5 4.9 2.4 3.7 2.7 4.0 3.8 5.5 4.7 2.2 3.4 4.7 4.4 4.7 3.2 −.5 −.1 9.1 14.5 .8 −9.9 4.9 11.3 14.1 10.0 .3 −1.6 3.1 8.1 −2.1 −10.5 2.5 4.1 11.8 12.6 −1.0 .9 12.8 18.3 2.5 −9.6 6.2 15.0 15.2 8.7 −6.0 27.4 17.8 −.6 −20.6 −13.0 23.5 21.5 6.3 −3.7 10.8 .7 8.1 21.9 9.5 −.7 5.9 2.5 10.5 9.6 4.3 5.3 11.2 4.6 −2.3 −11.1 19.6 10.9 8.7 1.7 −2.3 −1.9 .1 −.7 1.8 1.9 .1 1.0 3.1 1.9 −7.0 −7.1 −2.2 −4.9 −.4 .0 −1.2 1.8 2.6 2.4 2.8 3.2 2.2 2.9 3.6 3.3 1.0 .4 3.4 1.6 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ −.2 2.5 −2.0 4.3 7.3 3.8 3.4 3.4 4.2 3.5 −.3 1.3 1.2 5.5 5.4 5.0 4.2 3.3 4.0 2.7 −7.9 1.3 .0 14.9 14.6 9.9 9.1 1.7 5.8 2.1 −.2 1.2 1.0 3.3 4.0 2.7 3.6 2.4 3.2 2.7 1.7 1.5 1.7 4.9 4.2 5.2 3.3 4.3 4.1 2.8 −.1 5.6 −3.7 −1.0 17.6 6.7 −2.7 −.1 5.4 5.5 6.6 7.9 −1.5 −10.4 14.3 7.3 −10.8 −3.6 1.3 2.5 −3.6 4.2 −5.2 5.4 19.5 6.4 2.0 1.7 7.5 7.0 −21.1 −8.0 −18.2 41.1 14.6 1.4 12.0 .2 −.5 −4.1 10.7 1.1 −7.1 −2.4 8.4 2.7 7.4 11.2 16.1 11.8 −6.6 2.6 −1.3 12.6 24.3 6.5 8.4 6.1 3.8 3.9 2.0 .9 1.5 3.3 3.5 6.5 5.4 3.0 1.2 2.8 4.8 4.7 3.6 6.3 3.1 7.6 5.5 3.7 −1.8 1.3 −.1 −2.0 −.1 .9 3.8 5.4 5.4 2.3 3.7 3.9 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ 1.8 −.5 3.0 2.7 4.0 2.7 3.6 4.4 4.4 4.2 1.8 −.2 2.9 3.4 3.8 3.0 3.2 3.6 4.7 5.3 −.9 −6.6 5.3 8.2 7.6 4.6 5.6 6.6 10.6 12.4 1.4 −.4 1.9 2.9 3.8 3.0 2.9 2.9 4.0 5.6 2.8 1.4 2.9 2.7 3.0 2.7 2.8 3.3 3.9 3.7 .7 −4.9 3.4 8.4 8.9 9.8 10.0 12.2 13.0 10.1 1.5 −11.0 −6.1 .8 .8 4.8 7.1 9.1 7.2 −1.4 .4 −2.0 7.4 11.3 11.9 11.5 11.0 13.3 15.0 14.1 −8.6 −12.8 16.3 7.3 9.7 −3.6 7.4 2.0 8.3 6.4 8.7 6.5 6.2 3.3 8.9 10.3 8.2 12.3 2.3 2.9 3.8 −.5 6.6 9.1 12.0 8.2 8.6 13.7 11.9 10.7 3.3 1.2 .5 −.8 .1 .5 1.1 2.4 2.1 3.3 2.0 −.3 −1.6 −3.9 −3.6 −2.7 −.9 −.4 −.5 2.5 4.2 2.3 2.0 1.4 2.6 2.5 2.3 4.0 3.6 3.8 1995: I ......... II ........ III ....... IV ....... 1.5 .8 3.1 3.2 1.4 3.9 3.2 2.6 −2.7 5.0 9.5 3.4 2.1 2.9 1.7 3.4 2.0 4.2 2.7 2.0 16.0 2.5 2.6 9.5 8.8 5.8 −.3 −.8 18.4 1.5 3.6 13.1 −7.7 −15.6 10.1 9.7 7.2 4.3 17.8 9.8 8.8 6.2 1.2 3.9 .8 1.9 −.9 −4.8 −1.4 .1 −2.8 −16.1 2.2 3.0 .3 2.8 1996: I ......... II ........ III ....... IV ....... 2.9 6.8 2.0 4.6 3.3 4.3 1.9 2.9 4.1 13.0 −1.5 5.0 2.4 4.2 2.2 4.0 3.6 2.7 2.5 1.9 13.1 11.6 13.6 10.0 10.8 10.5 7.5 23.0 14.0 12.0 15.7 5.9 8.8 20.6 −1.0 −4.1 2.3 6.7 3.3 28.7 10.8 13.3 14.4 6.3 3.3 7.5 −2.3 2.4 9.6 8.6 −7.7 −1.4 −.3 6.8 1.0 4.8 1997: I ......... II ........ III ....... IV ....... 4.4 5.9 4.2 2.8 4.5 1.9 6.6 3.3 10.5 −3.1 23.1 6.3 3.0 .7 6.0 .6 4.2 3.5 3.9 4.2 10.9 14.0 19.1 3.9 6.4 −2.9 16.3 7.0 12.4 20.4 20.0 2.9 .9 5.1 2.1 5.8 7.5 17.6 10.6 −.8 15.3 18.8 17.3 6.4 1.1 6.4 2.2 .1 −4.4 10.4 −1.1 −3.7 4.4 4.2 4.1 2.3 1998: I ......... II ........ III ....... IV ....... 6.5 2.9 3.4 5.6 4.8 5.8 4.3 4.9 9.4 13.9 4.1 23.9 4.7 5.8 4.3 5.2 4.0 4.3 4.3 1.3 20.1 15.6 3.5 13.2 7.9 14.1 −4.7 3.3 24.6 16.1 6.5 16.7 9.6 12.6 10.3 8.9 1.0 −3.0 −3.2 15.1 14.2 13.1 5.5 12.2 −1.0 7.3 1.4 2.8 −9.1 12.9 −3.2 3.7 3.8 4.4 4.0 2.3 1999: I ......... II ........ III ....... IV ...... 3.5 2.5 5.7 8.3 5.7 5.6 5.0 5.9 8.6 15.0 8.0 13.0 7.8 3.8 4.9 7.4 4.1 4.6 4.5 3.8 9.5 9.6 11.8 9.5 −3.4 −6.2 −6.2 9.7 14.1 15.2 18.0 9.5 8.2 5.9 −3.1 .5 −7.9 5.8 10.2 10.3 4.5 16.2 16.9 10.7 3.7 .8 4.8 8.5 −2.2 2.0 6.9 13.2 7.0 .1 3.7 6.1 2000: I ......... II ........ III ...... 4.8 5.6 2.2 7.6 3.1 4.5 23.6 −5.0 7.6 6.0 3.6 4.7 5.2 4.6 3.7 21.0 14.6 7.7 22.3 4.4 14.6 20.6 17.9 5.6 3.2 1.3 −10.6 6.3 14.3 13.9 12.0 18.6 17.0 −1.1 4.8 −1.4 −14.2 17.2 −9.0 6.6 −1.1 2.9 Note.—Percent changes based on unrounded data. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 279 TABLE B–5.—Contributions to percent change in real gross domestic product, 1959–2000 [Percentage points, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Personal consumption expenditures Year or quarter Gross domestic product (percent change) Gross private domestic investment Fixed investment Nonresidential Total NonDurable durable goods goods Services Total Total Total Structures Equipment and software Change in priResivate dential inventories 1959 ....................................... 7.2 3.55 0.97 1.25 1.33 2.82 1.94 0.73 0.09 0.64 1.21 0.88 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... 2.5 2.3 6.0 4.3 5.8 6.4 6.6 2.5 4.8 3.0 1.71 1.27 3.10 2.55 3.71 3.91 3.52 1.83 3.48 2.26 .17 −.31 .89 .77 .77 1.06 .73 .13 .92 .31 .44 .53 .90 .59 1.33 1.43 1.46 .42 1.18 .69 1.10 1.05 1.31 1.20 1.61 1.42 1.33 1.28 1.37 1.26 .00 −.10 1.80 1.00 1.25 2.15 1.44 −.76 .89 .90 .13 −.05 1.23 1.07 1.37 1.49 .86 −.28 .99 .90 .52 −.06 .77 .50 1.07 1.64 1.29 −.15 .46 .77 .28 .05 .16 .04 .36 .57 .27 −.10 .05 .20 .24 −.11 .61 .46 .71 1.07 1.02 −.05 .40 .57 −.39 .01 .46 .58 .30 −.15 −.43 −.13 .53 .13 −.13 −.05 .57 −.08 −.12 .66 .58 −.48 −.10 .00 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... .2 3.3 5.4 5.8 −.6 −.4 5.6 4.6 5.5 3.2 1.43 2.35 3.74 3.05 −.51 1.33 3.67 2.71 2.79 1.57 −.28 .81 1.07 .90 −.61 .00 1.04 .80 .47 −.03 .61 .47 1.11 .82 −.51 .37 1.25 .60 .91 .65 1.09 1.07 1.56 1.33 .60 .96 1.38 1.30 1.41 .95 −1.04 1.66 1.86 1.96 −1.31 −2.98 2.84 2.43 2.06 .60 −.31 1.09 1.80 1.46 −1.04 −1.71 1.42 2.18 1.94 1.01 −.06 −.01 .92 1.50 .09 −1.14 .52 1.19 1.59 1.22 .01 −.06 .12 .31 −.08 −.43 .09 .15 .44 .51 −.07 .06 .80 1.18 .17 −.71 .42 1.04 1.15 .71 −.26 1.10 .89 −.04 −1.13 −.57 .91 .99 .35 −.21 −.72 .58 .06 .50 −.27 −1.27 1.42 .25 .12 −.41 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... −.2 2.5 −2.0 4.3 7.3 3.8 3.4 3.4 4.2 3.5 −.20 .85 .76 3.49 3.49 3.15 2.71 2.17 2.65 1.76 −.66 .10 .00 1.09 1.15 .81 .78 .16 .51 .18 −.04 .29 .23 .80 .93 .61 .78 .52 .68 .58 .49 .46 .53 1.61 1.41 1.73 1.14 1.49 1.46 1.00 −2.09 1.58 −2.54 1.48 4.62 −.17 −.11 .42 .44 .60 −1.18 .38 −1.21 1.19 2.67 .89 .20 .00 .58 .42 −.01 .73 −.50 −.13 2.04 .83 −.34 −.01 .60 .61 .30 .39 −.08 −.54 .61 .33 −.49 −.14 .05 .09 −.30 .34 −.42 .41 1.43 .50 .16 .13 .56 .52 −1.17 −.35 −.71 1.32 .63 .06 .54 .01 −.02 −.19 −.91 1.20 −1.34 .29 1.95 −1.06 −.32 .42 −.14 .17 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ...................................... 1.8 −.5 3.0 2.7 4.0 2.7 3.6 4.4 4.4 4.2 1.21 −.12 1.90 2.24 2.53 2.00 2.14 2.39 3.12 3.52 −.08 −.53 .39 .61 .59 .37 .44 .51 .81 .96 .30 −.09 .40 .61 .79 .60 .60 .58 .79 1.10 .99 .50 1.11 1.02 1.16 1.04 1.10 1.29 1.53 1.46 −.49 −1.26 1.12 1.18 1.89 .47 1.37 1.91 2.06 1.15 −.28 −1.00 .86 1.09 1.28 .88 1.39 1.47 1.87 1.53 .08 −.53 .34 .83 .91 1.03 1.10 1.39 1.54 1.26 .05 −.38 −.18 .02 .02 .13 .20 .26 .22 −.05 .03 −.15 .52 .80 .89 .90 .91 1.13 1.32 1.30 −.36 −.47 .52 .26 .37 −.15 .28 .08 .33 .27 −.21 −.26 .26 .10 .61 −.41 −.02 .44 .20 −.37 1995: I .................................... II .................................. III ................................. IV ................................. 1.5 .8 3.1 3.2 1.07 2.60 2.15 1.76 −.20 .39 .74 .27 .46 .60 .35 .69 .81 1.60 1.06 .80 .51 −1.90 −.53 1.81 1.31 −.38 .66 1.38 1.63 .27 .29 1.02 .23 .16 −.01 −.02 1.39 .11 .30 1.04 −.31 −.65 .37 .36 −.80 −1.51 −1.19 .42 1996: I .................................... II .................................. III ................................. IV ................................. 2.9 6.8 2.0 4.6 2.17 2.95 1.25 1.94 .32 .99 −.12 .39 .47 .86 .44 .79 1.38 1.10 .94 .76 1.16 3.26 2.50 .15 1.74 2.04 1.43 .95 1.41 1.28 1.47 1.12 .28 .29 .21 .61 1.13 .99 1.27 .51 .33 .76 −.04 −.17 −.58 1.22 1.07 −.80 1997: I .................................... II .................................. III ................................. IV ................................. 4.4 5.9 4.2 2.8 3.01 1.32 4.29 2.20 .78 −.23 1.60 .48 .60 .16 1.16 .12 1.62 1.40 1.52 1.61 2.06 3.69 .38 1.42 1.24 1.76 2.20 .69 1.20 1.56 2.12 .47 .19 −.09 .46 .21 1.01 1.65 1.65 .26 .04 .20 .09 .22 .82 1.93 −1.82 .73 1998: I .................................... II .................................. III ................................. IV ................................. 6.5 2.9 3.4 5.6 3.24 3.77 2.83 3.29 .71 1.02 .32 1.72 .93 1.10 .84 1.02 1.60 1.65 1.67 .54 5.04 −.18 1.40 1.75 2.67 2.31 .86 1.95 2.30 1.83 .44 1.58 .25 .43 −.16 .11 2.05 1.40 .60 1.47 .37 .48 .41 .37 2.37 −2.50 .55 −.20 1999: I .................................... II .................................. III ................................. IV ................................. 3.5 2.5 5.7 8.3 3.73 3.67 3.43 4.08 .67 1.14 .64 1.04 1.48 .75 .97 1.47 1.58 1.78 1.81 1.58 .60 .01 2.50 3.04 1.49 1.43 1.33 1.26 1.15 1.18 1.47 1.22 −.11 −.20 −.19 .29 1.26 1.38 1.66 .94 .34 .25 −.13 .03 −.89 −1.42 1.17 1.78 2000: I .................................... II .................................. III ................................. 4.8 5.6 2.2 5.03 2.14 2.99 1.79 −.42 .61 1.19 .74 .93 2.04 1.83 1.46 .92 3.66 .33 2.68 1.93 .55 2.54 1.87 1.02 .63 .14 .44 1.91 1.73 .58 .14 .06 −.47 −1.76 1.73 −.22 See next page for continuation of table. 280 TABLE B–5.—Contributions to percent change in real gross domestic product, 1959–2000—Continued [Percentage points, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Net exports of goods and services Year or quarter Exports Net exports Total Goods Government consumption expenditures and gross investment Imports Services Total Goods Federal Services Total Total NaNontional defense defense State and local −0.41 0.04 −0.02 0.06 −0.45 −0.48 0.03 1.27 0.95 0.29 0.65 0.33 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... .79 .11 −.21 .24 .41 −.35 −.32 −.23 −.35 −.02 .85 .08 .25 .35 .63 .10 .33 .11 .36 .27 .76 .02 .17 .29 .51 .02 .27 .02 .30 .20 .09 .06 .08 .06 .12 .08 .06 .09 .06 .07 −.06 .03 −.47 −.12 −.23 −.45 −.65 −.34 −.70 −.29 .05 .00 −.40 −.12 −.19 −.41 −.49 −.17 −.68 −.20 −.11 .02 −.07 .00 −.03 −.04 −.16 −.16 −.03 −.09 .00 1.04 1.35 .53 .44 .69 1.93 1.67 .75 −.10 −.39 .48 1.06 −.04 −.22 .02 1.29 1.16 .12 −.42 −.21 .43 .63 −.27 −.44 −.17 1.25 1.19 .18 −.48 −.18 .06 .43 .23 .23 .19 .04 −.03 −.07 .06 .39 .56 .29 .57 .66 .66 .64 .51 .63 .32 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... .32 −.25 −.20 .92 .85 .89 −.96 −.71 .04 .63 .54 .04 .43 1.21 .67 −.06 .49 .20 .81 .79 .44 −.02 .43 1.01 .46 −.16 .31 .08 .68 .77 .10 .06 .00 .21 .22 .10 .17 .12 .14 .03 −.22 −.29 −.63 −.29 .18 .94 −1.45 −.91 −.78 −.16 −.15 −.33 −.57 −.34 .17 .87 −1.35 −.84 −.67 −.14 −.07 .04 −.06 .05 .00 .07 −.10 −.07 −.11 −.02 −.52 −.43 .03 −.16 .38 .41 .02 .21 .63 .38 −.84 −.81 −.23 −.50 −.04 .00 −.11 .16 .23 .20 −.80 −.90 −.40 −.49 −.17 −.08 −.14 .05 .05 .16 −.04 .10 .17 −.01 .13 .08 .03 .11 .18 .04 .32 .38 .26 .34 .42 .41 .13 .05 .40 .18 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... 1.67 −.16 −.55 −1.34 −1.57 −.44 −.31 .18 .84 .60 .96 .11 −.67 −.21 .65 .20 .52 .81 1.25 1.02 .86 −.09 −.67 −.19 .46 .19 .26 .56 1.04 .80 .10 .20 .00 −.02 .19 .02 .26 .25 .21 .23 .71 −.27 .12 −1.13 −2.22 −.65 −.83 −.62 −.41 −.43 .67 −.18 .20 −1.00 −1.83 −.51 −.82 −.39 −.36 −.37 .04 −.09 −.08 −.13 −.39 −.13 −.01 −.23 −.05 −.05 .39 .18 .31 .70 .72 1.31 1.13 .63 .24 .56 .40 .41 .33 .60 .31 .73 .54 .36 −.18 .12 .24 .37 .47 .47 .35 .60 .46 .35 −.06 −.05 .16 .04 −.15 .13 −.04 .13 .07 .01 −.12 .17 −.01 −.23 −.02 .10 .42 .59 .60 .27 .42 .44 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... ....................................... .39 .67 −.07 −.61 −.41 .11 −.15 −.29 −1.20 −1.03 .80 .62 .61 .33 .88 1.06 .89 1.35 .26 .32 .55 .48 .48 .21 .67 .86 .68 1.12 .18 .30 .25 .14 .13 .12 .22 .20 .22 .23 .08 .02 −.41 .05 −.68 −.94 −1.29 −.95 −1.04 −1.64 −1.46 −1.35 −.26 .00 −.76 −.85 −1.18 −.87 −.94 −1.43 −1.21 −1.32 −.15 .05 .08 −.09 −.11 −.08 −.09 −.21 −.24 −.04 .65 .24 .10 −.16 .02 .09 .21 .43 .38 .59 .18 −.03 −.14 −.33 −.29 −.20 −.06 −.03 −.03 .16 .00 −.07 −.31 −.32 −.26 −.19 −.06 −.12 −.07 .08 .18 .04 .17 −.01 −.02 −.01 .00 .09 .04 .08 .48 .26 .24 .17 .31 .28 .27 .45 .41 .43 1995: I .................................... II ................................... III .................................. IV .................................. −.27 −.29 1.66 .58 .74 .46 1.82 1.06 .66 .37 1.13 .84 .08 .09 .69 .22 −1.01 −.74 −.16 −.48 −.68 −.83 −.11 −.36 −.33 .09 −.05 −.12 .18 .36 −.15 −.90 −.09 .01 −.20 −1.22 −.04 .01 −.19 −.67 −.05 .01 −.01 −.55 .27 .35 .04 .32 1996: I .................................... II ................................... III .................................. IV .................................. −1.02 −.82 −1.31 2.10 .26 .75 .36 2.86 .40 .35 .61 1.75 −.14 .40 −.25 1.12 −1.28 −1.57 −1.66 −.76 −1.17 −1.49 −1.44 −.76 −.11 −.08 −.22 .00 .59 1.36 −.43 .45 .63 .59 −.54 −.09 .32 .36 −.38 −.10 .31 .23 −.16 .02 −.04 .77 .11 .54 1997: I .................................... II ................................... III .................................. IV .................................. −.92 −.27 −.84 −.88 .84 1.90 1.19 −.10 1.04 1.59 .99 .02 −.20 .31 .20 −.11 −1.76 −2.17 −2.03 −.79 −1.39 −2.05 −1.60 −.62 −.37 −.11 −.43 −.17 .21 1.14 .40 .03 −.29 .66 −.07 −.24 −.58 .44 .01 −.09 .29 .22 −.07 −.15 .50 .48 .46 .27 1998: I .................................... II ................................... III .................................. IV .................................. −1.61 −1.91 −1.04 .05 .13 −.34 −.35 1.54 −.05 −.55 −.01 1.21 .17 .21 −.34 .33 −1.73 −1.57 −.68 −1.49 −1.35 −1.43 −.48 −1.44 −.39 −.14 −.20 −.05 −.15 1.24 .25 .50 −.60 .75 −.20 .23 −.79 .49 .23 −.09 .20 .26 −.42 .32 .44 .49 .45 .27 1999: I .................................... II ................................... III .................................. IV ................................. −1.44 −1.35 −1.08 −.37 −.89 .60 1.05 1.09 −.76 .51 1.13 .94 −.13 .08 −.08 .15 −.55 −1.95 −2.13 −1.45 −.72 −1.89 −1.99 −1.28 .17 −.05 −.13 −.17 .64 .13 .84 1.50 −.13 .12 .41 .79 −.12 −.09 .46 .48 −.01 .21 −.05 .30 .78 .01 .43 .71 2000: I .................................... II ................................... III ................................. −.94 −1.00 −.90 .67 1.48 1.45 .46 1.37 1.54 .21 .11 −.09 −1.61 −2.48 −2.35 −1.28 −2.26 −1.90 −.33 −.22 −.44 −.18 .85 −.24 −.93 .97 −.57 −.86 .60 −.38 −.07 .37 −.18 .75 −.12 .33 1959 ....................................... Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 281 TABLE B–6.—Chain-type quantity indexes for gross domestic product, 1959–2000 [Index numbers, 1996=100; quarterly data seasonally adjusted] Personal consumption expenditures Gross private domestic investment Fixed investment Year or quarter 1959 ........................ 1960 ........................ 1961 ........................ 1962 ........................ 1963 ........................ 1964 ........................ 1965 ........................ 1966 ........................ 1967 ........................ 1968 ........................ 1969 ........................ 1970 ........................ 1971 ........................ 1972 ........................ 1973 ........................ 1974 ........................ 1975 ........................ 1976 ........................ 1977 ........................ 1978 ........................ 1979 ........................ 1980 ........................ 1981 ........................ 1982 ........................ 1983 ........................ 1984 ........................ 1985 ........................ 1986 ........................ 1987 ........................ 1988 ........................ 1989 ........................ 1990 ........................ 1991 ........................ 1992 ........................ 1993 ........................ 1994 ........................ 1995 ........................ 1996 ........................ 1997 ....................... 1998 ........................ 1999 ....................... 1995: I ..................... II .................... III ................... IV ................... 1996: I ..................... II .................... III ................... IV ................... 1997: I ..................... II .................... III ................... IV ................... 1998: I ..................... II .................... III ................... IV ................... 1999: I ..................... II .................... III ................... IV .................. 2000: I ..................... II .................... III .................. Gross domestic product 29.68 30.42 31.13 33.01 34.43 36.43 38.76 41.31 42.34 44.36 45.71 45.80 47.33 49.90 52.78 52.46 52.28 55.19 57.75 60.93 62.87 62.73 64.26 62.96 65.69 70.46 73.17 75.67 78.24 81.51 84.37 85.85 85.45 88.06 90.39 94.04 96.55 100.00 104.43 108.99 113.60 95.85 96.03 96.78 97.55 98.25 99.87 100.37 101.51 102.60 104.08 105.16 105.88 107.57 108.35 109.27 110.77 111.73 112.42 113.98 116.27 117.65 119.27 119.92 Nonresidential Total 28.08 28.85 29.43 30.88 32.15 34.08 36.23 38.30 39.45 41.70 43.24 44.25 45.92 48.70 51.09 50.67 51.76 54.78 57.13 59.66 61.16 60.96 61.79 62.54 65.95 69.51 72.95 76.01 78.54 81.71 83.89 85.43 85.28 87.72 90.67 94.09 96.91 100.00 103.56 108.42 114.15 95.69 96.60 97.36 97.99 98.79 99.85 100.32 101.04 102.16 102.64 104.29 105.15 106.39 107.91 109.04 110.35 111.89 113.42 114.82 116.49 118.63 119.54 120.86 Durable goods 16.49 16.82 16.19 18.08 19.84 21.67 24.42 26.48 26.90 29.85 30.92 29.91 32.91 37.08 40.91 38.10 38.09 42.95 46.95 49.43 49.26 45.39 45.98 45.98 52.81 60.54 66.52 72.58 73.84 78.11 79.75 79.01 73.79 77.70 84.08 90.46 94.66 100.00 106.63 117.97 132.65 92.53 93.66 95.81 96.62 97.61 100.64 100.26 101.50 104.06 103.25 108.77 110.45 112.96 116.69 117.88 124.36 126.96 131.47 134.01 138.17 145.70 143.83 146.50 Nondurable goods 38.35 38.93 39.64 40.89 41.75 43.80 46.12 48.65 49.42 51.67 53.05 54.32 55.30 57.73 59.62 58.42 59.28 62.17 63.67 66.05 67.81 67.71 68.51 69.17 71.47 74.31 76.33 79.07 80.97 83.55 85.83 87.01 86.65 88.29 90.87 94.35 97.14 100.00 102.91 107.04 113.05 96.20 96.90 97.31 98.13 98.72 99.73 100.29 101.26 102.00 102.17 103.67 103.81 105.00 106.50 107.63 109.02 111.08 112.13 113.47 115.50 117.20 118.24 119.60 Services Total Total Structures Equipment and software 15.94 16.84 16.74 18.19 19.20 21.47 25.20 28.35 27.95 29.19 31.39 31.22 31.21 34.04 38.99 39.30 35.41 37.14 41.32 47.15 51.88 51.85 54.77 52.72 52.19 61.37 65.49 63.73 63.65 67.11 70.83 71.35 67.83 70.11 76.00 82.78 90.89 100.00 112.22 126.78 139.56 89.66 90.22 90.80 92.89 95.80 98.46 101.65 104.09 106.82 110.37 115.29 116.41 121.85 126.35 127.45 131.45 134.47 137.59 141.47 144.73 151.79 157.04 159.97 43.65 47.12 47.76 49.91 50.46 55.71 64.59 69.02 67.26 68.21 71.89 72.12 70.94 73.12 79.08 77.43 69.32 71.02 73.97 82.66 93.08 99.23 107.09 105.47 94.53 108.03 115.92 103.43 99.69 100.95 103.42 104.95 93.38 87.70 88.39 89.14 93.39 100.00 109.07 116.88 115.22 92.49 93.79 93.72 93.53 95.95 98.38 100.18 105.49 107.15 106.35 110.45 112.32 114.47 118.30 116.89 117.85 116.85 115.01 113.18 115.83 121.80 123.12 127.40 9.74 10.16 9.96 11.11 12.04 13.58 16.06 18.61 18.48 19.62 21.34 21.12 21.31 24.04 28.44 29.13 26.35 27.98 32.18 37.09 40.33 38.88 40.52 38.42 40.50 48.40 51.48 52.51 53.37 57.37 61.39 61.63 60.38 64.86 72.22 80.79 90.08 100.00 113.30 130.33 148.74 88.74 89.06 89.86 92.67 95.75 98.49 102.15 103.61 106.69 111.75 116.97 117.79 124.46 129.19 131.25 136.41 140.98 146.05 152.21 155.70 163.16 170.00 172.34 Total 24.90 25.99 27.04 28.38 29.67 31.47 33.15 34.83 36.54 38.42 40.24 41.87 43.46 45.86 48.02 49.07 50.73 53.13 55.48 58.12 59.99 60.99 61.90 62.96 66.06 68.84 72.44 74.86 78.09 81.30 83.56 85.86 87.03 89.59 91.98 94.72 97.26 100.00 103.28 107.30 111.29 96.07 97.06 97.71 98.20 99.08 99.74 100.35 100.83 101.86 102.75 103.73 104.79 105.83 106.93 108.05 108.40 109.48 110.71 111.95 113.00 114.45 115.75 116.82 See next page for continuation of table. 282 21.96 21.95 21.81 24.57 26.21 28.37 32.35 35.19 33.57 35.51 37.58 35.10 39.09 43.70 48.81 45.20 37.20 44.70 51.45 57.38 59.18 52.73 57.59 49.51 54.22 70.13 69.48 69.02 70.76 72.65 75.36 73.01 66.75 72.41 78.69 89.08 91.79 100.00 112.12 126.08 134.36 93.54 90.82 90.05 92.74 94.33 99.25 103.12 103.30 106.66 112.71 113.35 115.76 124.34 123.99 126.45 129.55 130.62 130.61 135.25 140.95 142.72 149.92 150.57 22.20 22.39 22.32 24.33 26.21 28.74 31.66 33.47 32.84 35.12 37.30 36.51 39.26 43.96 47.97 44.96 40.13 44.08 50.41 56.22 59.37 55.58 56.79 52.81 56.76 66.28 69.77 70.60 70.58 73.15 75.14 73.77 68.65 73.10 79.03 86.25 91.46 100.00 109.56 122.48 133.70 90.86 90.29 91.29 93.40 96.08 99.26 101.56 103.10 105.17 108.11 111.88 113.08 117.70 121.84 123.39 126.97 129.80 132.53 135.05 137.43 142.73 146.59 147.71 Residential 47.26 43.89 44.02 48.24 53.92 57.05 55.39 50.43 48.84 55.50 57.14 53.73 68.46 80.63 80.11 63.57 55.32 68.34 83.02 88.26 85.03 67.05 61.68 50.45 71.19 81.56 82.67 92.58 92.79 92.32 88.53 80.92 70.57 82.09 88.09 96.64 93.13 100.00 102.04 110.47 117.56 94.42 90.50 92.71 94.89 96.91 101.56 101.30 100.24 100.47 101.73 102.26 103.71 106.12 109.30 112.02 114.45 116.73 118.41 117.48 117.63 118.56 118.93 115.64 TABLE B–6.—Chain-type quantity indexes for gross domestic product, 1959–2000—Continued [Index numbers, 1996=100; quarterly data seasonally adjusted] Exports of goods and services Imports of goods and services Government consumption expenditures and gross investment Year or quarter Federal Total Goods Services Total Goods Services Total Total 1959 ........................ 1960 ........................ 1961 ........................ 1962 ........................ 1963 ........................ 1964 ........................ 1965 ........................ 1966 ........................ 1967 ........................ 1968 ........................ 1969 ........................ 1970 ........................ 1971 ........................ 1972 ........................ 1973 ........................ 1974 ........................ 1975 ........................ 1976 ........................ 1977 ........................ 1978 ........................ 1979 ........................ 1980 ........................ 1981 ........................ 1982 ........................ 1983 ........................ 1984 ........................ 1985 ........................ 1986 ........................ 1987 ........................ 1988 ........................ 1989 ........................ 1990 ........................ 1991 ........................ 1992 ........................ 1993 ........................ 1994 ........................ 1995 ........................ 1996 ........................ 1997 ........................ 1998 ........................ 1999 ....................... 1995: I ..................... II .................... III ................... IV ................... 1996: I ..................... II .................... III ................... IV ................... 1997: I ..................... II .................... III ................... IV ................... 1998: I ..................... II .................... III ................... IV ................... 1999: I ..................... II .................... III ................... IV ................... 2000: I ..................... II .................... III .................. 8.28 10.00 10.17 10.72 11.52 13.06 13.33 14.22 14.53 15.59 16.44 18.22 18.35 19.84 24.19 26.49 26.32 27.87 28.57 31.56 34.59 38.30 38.74 35.99 35.11 38.05 39.08 41.96 46.67 54.17 60.56 65.85 70.15 74.47 76.95 83.83 92.45 100.00 112.27 114.80 118.17 89.29 90.25 94.02 96.25 96.80 98.39 99.18 105.64 107.57 112.02 114.87 114.63 114.91 114.03 113.11 117.15 114.77 116.41 119.27 122.22 124.10 128.33 132.56 8.41 10.38 10.43 10.89 11.75 13.36 13.43 14.36 14.43 15.57 16.39 18.26 18.18 20.14 24.77 26.73 26.11 27.35 27.71 30.81 34.45 38.55 38.14 34.70 33.70 36.36 37.58 39.51 43.89 52.16 58.74 63.58 68.09 72.73 74.93 82.18 91.97 100.00 114.51 117.01 121.63 88.91 89.98 93.26 95.73 96.89 97.92 99.81 105.39 108.80 114.13 117.53 117.58 117.39 115.38 115.33 119.92 116.93 118.97 123.45 127.18 129.06 134.79 141.37 7.35 8.13 8.67 9.46 10.06 11.26 12.15 12.85 13.97 14.69 15.59 16.97 17.77 17.70 20.85 24.29 25.91 28.65 30.67 33.10 33.64 35.59 39.32 39.29 38.86 42.62 43.01 48.73 54.38 59.45 65.18 71.73 75.40 78.86 82.07 88.01 93.65 100.00 106.98 109.58 110.14 90.24 90.90 95.92 97.56 96.57 99.55 97.67 106.21 104.64 107.02 108.59 107.67 109.04 110.74 107.86 110.67 109.61 110.36 109.67 110.92 112.79 113.78 112.98 11.07 11.21 11.14 12.40 12.74 13.41 14.84 17.05 18.29 21.02 22.21 23.16 24.40 27.13 28.39 27.75 24.66 29.49 32.70 35.54 36.13 33.73 34.61 34.18 38.49 47.86 50.95 55.23 58.58 60.81 63.21 65.64 65.31 69.64 75.98 85.08 92.05 100.00 113.67 127.15 140.72 90.65 92.04 92.32 93.21 95.64 98.68 102.05 103.63 107.39 112.11 116.68 118.49 122.50 126.32 128.01 131.76 133.22 138.32 143.82 147.53 151.76 158.36 164.72 8.82 8.67 8.66 9.94 10.34 11.03 12.59 14.57 15.34 18.51 19.52 20.29 21.99 24.98 26.74 26.00 22.72 27.86 31.25 34.05 34.64 32.06 32.72 31.90 36.24 45.00 47.80 52.70 55.15 57.38 59.80 61.60 61.56 67.26 74.03 83.86 91.43 100.00 114.20 127.67 143.64 89.75 91.58 91.80 92.59 95.22 98.65 102.13 104.00 107.58 112.95 117.27 119.00 122.72 126.90 128.34 132.73 135.01 141.02 147.28 151.23 155.29 162.54 168.74 Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 283 22.61 24.38 23.96 25.08 25.06 25.71 26.47 29.83 33.47 34.08 36.22 38.11 37.03 38.54 37.24 37.20 35.59 38.04 39.94 42.78 43.37 42.40 44.85 47.24 51.06 63.86 68.71 68.94 77.64 79.75 81.98 88.23 86.18 82.69 86.60 91.65 95.40 100.00 110.94 124.42 126.54 95.55 94.45 95.05 96.53 97.86 98.85 101.64 101.65 106.39 107.86 113.61 115.89 121.30 123.29 126.21 126.89 124.36 125.13 127.05 129.59 134.66 138.07 145.20 46.52 46.51 48.75 51.69 52.91 53.95 55.64 60.63 65.20 67.27 66.99 65.48 64.26 64.34 63.87 65.04 66.28 66.34 67.00 69.07 70.40 71.80 72.44 73.56 76.02 78.65 83.72 88.28 90.89 91.95 94.48 97.56 98.69 99.16 98.37 98.46 98.91 100.00 102.35 104.53 108.03 98.97 99.44 99.22 98.00 98.79 100.59 100.00 100.61 100.89 102.47 103.02 103.05 102.79 104.62 104.99 105.72 106.69 106.89 108.14 110.38 110.07 111.37 110.99 70.91 68.81 71.46 77.38 77.16 75.85 76.00 84.59 92.84 93.69 90.57 84.21 78.24 76.53 72.77 72.47 72.47 71.63 72.89 74.82 76.63 80.31 84.08 87.13 92.61 95.50 102.79 108.45 112.45 110.41 111.88 114.16 113.80 111.95 107.60 103.71 100.92 100.00 99.62 99.12 101.61 102.35 102.39 101.66 97.28 99.53 101.61 99.60 99.26 98.15 100.60 100.34 99.39 97.04 100.04 99.24 100.15 99.60 100.09 101.77 104.98 101.04 105.13 102.67 National defense Nondefense 88.19 86.49 90.02 95.29 92.88 88.86 87.28 99.90 112.64 114.65 109.24 100.03 89.85 85.39 79.86 77.91 76.96 75.35 75.92 76.51 78.69 81.99 86.98 93.46 99.79 104.57 113.32 120.44 126.10 125.15 124.18 124.15 122.80 116.83 110.57 105.28 101.37 100.00 97.40 95.70 97.62 102.76 102.80 101.77 98.14 99.82 101.68 99.55 98.95 95.70 98.12 98.15 97.61 92.99 95.90 97.25 96.66 95.90 95.33 98.14 101.09 95.65 99.46 96.97 37.04 34.05 34.98 42.21 46.30 50.33 53.82 54.54 53.98 52.60 53.92 53.09 55.19 58.89 58.70 61.78 63.71 64.45 67.14 71.83 72.89 77.39 78.60 74.35 78.03 76.81 80.97 83.47 83.93 79.57 86.22 93.38 95.10 101.89 101.55 100.52 100.02 100.00 104.15 106.06 109.72 101.52 101.56 101.44 95.56 98.94 101.49 99.70 99.87 103.15 105.66 104.78 103.01 105.28 108.43 103.30 107.23 107.12 109.74 109.14 112.88 111.95 116.62 114.24 State and local 31.42 32.79 34.81 35.87 38.04 40.61 43.34 46.08 48.37 51.22 52.71 54.21 55.96 57.18 58.84 60.96 62.99 63.62 63.90 66.08 67.12 67.08 65.75 65.66 66.24 68.73 72.44 76.34 78.13 81.02 84.18 87.73 89.73 91.56 92.88 95.34 97.71 100.00 103.98 107.74 111.82 96.96 97.68 97.76 98.43 98.35 99.99 100.24 101.42 102.52 103.57 104.61 105.22 106.20 107.34 108.39 109.02 110.88 110.91 111.91 113.57 115.40 115.07 115.89 TABLE B–7.—Chain-type price indexes for gross domestic product, 1959–2000 [Index numbers, 1996=100, except as noted; quarterly data seasonally adjusted] Personal consumption expenditures Gross private domestic investment Fixed investment Year or quarter Gross domestic product Nonresidential Total Durable goods Nondurable goods Services Total Total Total Structures Equipment and software Residential 1959 ........................ 21.88 21.63 41.97 24.60 16.74 28.78 27.72 32.44 18.48 43.15 18.99 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 22.19 22.43 22.74 22.99 23.34 23.77 24.45 25.21 26.29 27.59 22.00 22.23 22.49 22.75 23.07 23.41 24.02 24.62 25.58 26.74 41.77 41.86 42.05 42.20 42.40 42.03 41.83 42.48 43.89 45.10 24.95 25.10 25.30 25.59 25.92 26.39 27.26 27.91 28.98 30.32 17.19 17.51 17.82 18.07 18.40 18.76 19.29 19.86 20.69 21.73 28.92 28.84 28.87 28.78 28.95 29.42 30.03 30.83 31.99 33.51 27.87 27.78 27.81 27.73 27.90 28.39 28.99 29.81 31.02 32.56 32.59 32.41 32.42 32.43 32.60 32.99 33.49 34.36 35.58 37.07 18.46 18.35 18.50 18.67 18.94 19.49 20.19 20.82 21.87 23.31 43.51 43.28 43.08 42.86 42.84 42.91 43.05 44.03 45.24 46.52 19.12 19.15 19.18 19.02 19.18 19.72 20.44 21.15 22.27 23.81 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 29.05 30.52 31.81 33.60 36.60 40.03 42.29 45.02 48.22 52.24 28.00 29.20 30.22 31.86 35.14 38.01 40.08 42.73 45.78 49.83 46.09 47.77 48.28 48.98 52.08 56.84 59.99 62.61 66.20 70.60 31.82 32.80 33.90 36.56 41.82 45.09 46.83 49.61 52.93 58.50 22.89 24.17 25.22 26.37 28.46 30.80 32.90 35.49 38.31 41.43 34.93 36.69 38.24 40.31 44.33 49.80 52.57 56.51 61.15 66.71 33.96 35.69 37.23 39.30 43.18 48.59 51.42 55.46 60.17 65.65 38.82 40.67 42.08 43.71 47.95 54.55 57.59 61.54 65.69 71.07 24.83 26.74 28.68 30.91 35.15 39.34 41.25 44.81 49.15 54.87 48.25 49.73 50.37 51.25 55.08 63.24 67.02 71.02 74.84 79.67 24.58 26.00 27.58 30.03 33.12 36.20 38.53 42.41 47.61 52.95 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 57.05 62.37 66.26 68.87 71.44 73.69 75.32 77.58 80.22 83.27 55.21 60.08 63.48 66.19 68.63 70.99 72.72 75.49 78.44 81.86 76.54 81.62 84.76 86.38 87.58 88.59 89.69 92.21 93.49 95.14 65.31 70.37 72.34 73.89 75.64 77.30 77.01 79.66 82.34 86.26 45.88 50.58 54.81 58.33 61.35 64.36 67.31 70.20 73.61 77.12 73.01 79.77 83.91 83.73 84.40 85.30 87.19 88.86 90.96 93.22 71.83 78.55 82.91 82.81 83.37 84.45 86.51 88.12 90.48 92.76 77.39 84.93 89.69 88.93 88.83 89.57 91.17 92.01 94.17 96.29 59.97 68.31 73.76 71.82 72.42 74.11 75.54 76.72 79.98 83.10 86.58 92.86 96.60 96.91 96.29 96.28 97.92 98.53 99.95 101.45 58.68 63.47 66.87 68.40 70.37 72.18 75.21 78.29 80.99 83.59 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ....................... 86.53 89.66 91.85 94.05 96.01 98.10 100.00 101.95 103.23 104.77 85.63 88.91 91.62 93.81 95.70 97.90 100.00 101.94 103.03 104.85 96.00 97.39 98.28 99.06 100.56 101.06 100.00 97.75 95.42 93.09 90.98 93.76 95.20 96.15 96.83 97.93 100.00 101.34 101.35 103.71 80.95 84.82 88.50 91.57 94.16 97.25 100.00 103.12 105.50 107.99 95.08 96.46 96.32 97.70 99.11 100.29 100.00 99.80 98.93 98.84 94.70 96.14 96.07 97.46 98.92 100.14 100.00 99.93 99.17 99.10 98.23 99.80 99.29 99.81 100.54 100.93 100.00 99.02 97.13 95.84 85.77 87.32 87.29 90.22 93.50 97.39 100.00 104.23 107.71 110.19 102.93 104.48 103.75 103.24 102.98 102.12 100.00 97.32 93.78 91.46 85.54 86.64 87.69 91.24 94.48 97.91 100.00 102.68 105.59 109.64 1995: I ..................... II .................... III ................... IV ................... 97.45 97.86 98.31 98.79 97.15 97.71 98.16 98.57 101.36 101.22 100.94 100.72 97.46 97.83 98.10 98.31 96.16 96.95 97.63 98.27 100.04 100.40 100.42 100.31 99.84 100.20 100.27 100.25 100.75 101.09 101.04 100.82 96.35 97.06 97.79 98.38 102.25 102.45 102.14 101.64 97.23 97.69 98.09 98.62 1996: I ..................... II .................... III ................... IV ................... 99.40 99.74 100.23 100.63 99.16 99.79 100.18 100.87 100.78 100.13 99.77 99.32 99.09 99.98 100.02 100.92 98.87 99.62 100.35 101.17 100.03 99.84 100.11 100.02 100.04 99.84 100.08 100.05 100.40 99.97 99.92 99.71 98.87 99.42 100.44 101.28 100.91 100.16 99.74 99.19 99.00 99.44 100.53 101.03 1997: I ..................... II .................... III ................... IV ................... 101.36 101.82 102.12 102.49 101.49 101.77 102.09 102.43 98.99 98.08 97.27 96.65 101.33 101.18 101.31 101.53 102.08 102.83 103.48 104.09 99.94 99.78 99.77 99.71 100.00 99.91 99.93 99.86 99.44 99.14 98.93 98.55 102.47 103.56 104.89 106.02 98.44 97.69 97.00 96.14 101.66 102.22 102.96 103.89 1998: I ..................... II .................... III ................... IV ................... 102.75 103.04 103.42 103.69 102.52 102.83 103.20 103.58 96.26 95.79 95.28 94.34 101.19 101.10 101.41 101.71 104.51 105.20 105.80 106.51 99.23 98.93 98.81 98.74 99.46 99.17 99.06 98.98 97.90 97.29 96.86 96.46 106.84 107.58 107.95 108.47 95.04 94.03 93.36 92.69 104.31 105.06 106.01 106.98 1999: I ..................... II .................... III ................... IV .................. 104.25 104.63 104.90 105.31 104.02 104.60 105.10 105.67 93.76 93.30 92.86 92.44 102.18 103.43 104.15 105.09 107.18 107.66 108.26 108.88 98.94 98.90 98.76 98.76 99.14 99.14 99.06 99.07 96.34 95.99 95.62 95.42 109.25 109.65 110.44 111.42 92.32 91.77 91.11 90.62 108.11 109.28 110.21 110.94 2000: I ..................... II .................... III .................. 106.17 106.80 107.22 106.58 107.13 107.61 91.98 91.83 91.30 106.48 107.35 107.93 109.88 110.43 111.12 99.32 99.76 100.22 99.71 100.17 100.66 95.84 96.23 96.64 112.72 113.75 115.15 90.82 91.05 91.22 112.36 113.08 113.83 See next page for continuation of table. 284 TABLE B–7.—Chain-type price indexes for gross domestic product, 1959–2000—Continued [Index numbers, 1996=100, except as noted; quarterly data seasonally adjusted] Exports and imports of goods and services Government consumption expenditures and gross investment Federal Year or quarter Total Exports Imports Total State and local NaNontional defense defense Percent change 2 Gross domestic purchases 1 Final sales of domestic product Total Less food and energy Gross national product Gross domestic Gross purdochases 1 mestic Less prodfood uct Total and energy 1959 ......... 28.53 20.95 16.99 17.85 17.76 17.64 16.11 21.72 21.41 ............ 21.87 1.1 1.1 ........ 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 28.88 29.29 29.27 29.22 29.42 30.38 31.32 32.56 33.23 34.29 21.15 21.15 20.90 21.30 21.75 22.06 22.57 22.66 23.00 23.60 17.19 17.51 17.97 18.39 18.90 19.41 20.20 21.05 22.23 23.56 17.98 18.25 18.66 19.12 19.75 20.28 20.96 21.60 22.85 24.08 17.86 18.07 18.44 18.90 19.45 20.01 20.66 21.31 22.50 23.72 17.90 18.48 19.05 19.51 20.45 20.85 21.62 22.22 23.67 24.88 16.41 16.79 17.32 17.70 18.06 18.56 19.48 20.56 21.66 23.11 22.03 22.28 22.59 22.84 23.19 23.62 24.30 25.06 26.15 27.45 21.71 21.94 22.23 22.50 22.85 23.26 23.91 24.61 25.66 26.92 ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ 22.18 22.43 22.73 22.99 23.33 23.77 24.45 25.20 26.29 27.58 1.4 1.1 1.4 1.1 1.5 1.9 2.8 3.1 4.3 4.9 1.4 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.6 1.8 2.8 2.9 4.3 4.9 ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 35.77 36.98 38.17 43.40 53.68 59.24 61.11 63.58 67.48 75.63 25.00 26.53 28.40 33.34 47.70 51.67 53.22 57.92 62.01 72.62 25.44 27.44 29.49 31.67 34.83 38.28 40.72 43.55 46.37 50.28 25.95 28.20 30.81 32.98 35.80 39.41 42.07 45.33 48.20 51.93 25.43 27.69 30.61 32.91 35.82 39.24 42.02 45.15 48.29 52.19 27.36 29.56 31.17 32.94 35.50 39.57 41.88 45.44 47.68 51.01 25.01 26.79 28.38 30.56 33.94 37.26 39.53 42.05 44.83 48.84 28.91 30.37 31.67 33.45 36.43 39.85 42.12 44.85 48.06 52.07 28.37 29.84 31.17 32.99 36.35 39.69 41.93 44.80 48.02 52.26 ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ 29.05 30.52 31.81 33.60 36.60 40.03 42.30 45.03 48.24 52.25 5.3 5.0 4.2 5.6 9.0 9.4 5.7 6.4 7.1 8.3 5.4 5.2 4.5 5.8 10.2 9.2 5.7 6.8 7.2 8.8 ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 83.32 89.41 89.83 90.24 91.13 88.70 87.33 89.62 94.39 96.15 90.45 95.32 92.10 88.65 87.89 85.02 85.01 90.02 94.46 96.87 55.80 61.30 65.43 68.08 71.61 73.78 75.08 77.21 79.30 81.89 57.45 63.06 67.53 69.95 74.14 75.67 76.10 77.03 78.82 81.12 57.93 63.71 68.44 70.86 75.95 77.24 77.27 78.01 79.65 81.91 56.01 61.22 65.05 67.48 69.25 71.45 73.06 74.58 76.84 79.26 54.32 59.71 63.57 66.39 69.36 72.07 74.10 77.26 79.60 82.41 56.86 62.16 66.08 68.69 71.25 73.55 75.20 77.44 80.12 83.18 57.79 ............ 63.05 ............ 66.71 65.18 69.05 67.76 71.46 70.26 73.56 72.56 75.22 74.89 77.70 77.46 80.36 80.29 83.45 83.20 57.06 62.38 66.27 68.89 71.45 73.70 75.33 77.58 80.22 83.28 9.2 9.3 6.2 3.9 3.7 3.2 2.2 3.0 3.4 3.8 10.6 ........ 9.1 ........ 5.8 ........ 3.5 4.0 3.5 3.7 2.9 3.3 2.3 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.7 3.8 3.6 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 96.79 98.10 97.82 97.82 98.94 101.29 100.00 98.47 96.26 95.86 99.43 98.93 99.09 98.18 99.12 101.83 100.00 96.44 91.26 91.80 85.16 88.04 90.11 92.44 94.84 97.56 100.00 102.23 103.67 106.41 83.78 87.18 89.83 92.18 94.51 97.21 100.00 101.63 102.60 105.27 84.57 87.70 90.75 92.45 94.48 96.88 100.00 101.41 102.20 104.75 81.96 86.06 87.72 91.58 94.55 97.90 100.00 102.06 103.38 106.27 86.16 88.64 90.28 92.59 95.04 97.77 100.00 102.58 104.28 107.06 86.46 89.60 91.79 94.00 95.97 98.07 100.00 101.98 103.30 104.86 86.85 89.81 92.03 94.14 96.06 98.20 100.00 101.64 102.45 104.08 86.33 89.43 91.90 94.16 96.22 98.44 100.00 101.64 102.77 104.26 86.54 89.67 91.84 94.06 96.02 98.11 100.00 101.93 103.19 104.74 3.9 3.6 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.3 1.5 4.1 3.4 2.5 2.3 2.0 2.2 1.8 1.6 .8 1.6 3.8 3.6 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.3 1.6 1.6 1.1 1.4 1995: I ...... II ..... III ... IV ... 100.92 101.73 101.48 101.01 101.05 102.84 102.15 101.28 96.67 97.23 97.69 98.63 96.18 96.52 97.11 99.04 95.98 96.41 97.07 98.06 96.57 96.74 97.21 101.06 96.98 97.66 98.04 98.39 97.41 97.82 98.28 98.78 97.51 98.04 98.42 98.85 97.71 98.23 98.67 99.15 97.46 97.87 98.31 98.80 3.0 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.7 2.2 1.6 1.8 2.9 2.2 1.8 1.9 1996: I ...... II ..... III ... IV ... 100.83 100.51 99.81 98.85 100.87 100.42 99.28 99.43 99.84 99.48 100.10 100.58 100.27 99.45 99.93 100.35 99.93 99.52 100.06 100.49 100.97 99.31 99.66 100.06 99.58 99.50 100.20 100.72 99.40 99.74 100.22 100.64 99.42 99.74 100.16 100.68 99.60 99.72 100.13 100.55 99.40 99.75 100.23 100.63 2.5 1.4 2.0 1.6 2.3 1.3 1.7 2.1 1.9 .5 1.7 1.7 1997: I ...... II ..... III ... IV ... 98.66 98.72 98.46 98.04 98.28 96.43 95.82 95.21 101.72 102.01 102.26 102.93 101.42 101.60 101.49 102.00 101.38 101.33 101.23 101.71 101.51 102.14 102.00 102.58 101.90 102.25 102.71 103.47 101.37 101.86 102.16 102.53 101.28 101.49 101.74 102.07 101.13 101.56 101.78 102.09 101.34 101.80 102.10 102.46 2.9 1.9 1.2 1.4 2.4 .8 1.0 1.3 2.3 1.7 .9 1.2 1998: I ...... II ..... III ... IV ... 97.06 96.59 95.85 95.53 92.57 91.59 90.45 90.41 103.15 103.43 103.85 104.26 102.36 102.47 102.63 102.94 102.02 102.01 102.24 102.51 103.02 103.35 103.37 103.76 103.61 103.98 104.55 105.00 102.82 103.11 103.49 103.77 102.08 102.28 102.57 102.87 102.30 102.58 102.93 103.27 102.72 103.00 103.38 103.66 1.0 1.1 1.5 1.1 .1 .8 1.1 1.2 .8 1.1 1.4 1.3 1999: I ...... II ..... III ... IV ... 95.42 95.62 95.88 96.51 89.92 91.13 92.47 93.68 105.18 106.00 106.82 107.62 104.68 104.95 105.45 106.02 104.14 104.42 104.92 105.54 105.70 105.97 106.45 106.95 105.49 106.61 107.60 108.52 104.33 104.71 105.00 105.41 103.35 103.86 104.30 104.80 103.78 104.09 104.38 104.78 104.22 104.59 104.87 105.27 2.2 1.4 1.1 1.6 1.9 2.0 1.7 1.9 2.0 1.2 1.1 1.5 2000: I ...... II ..... III ... 96.98 97.43 97.60 94.97 95.03 95.91 109.30 110.02 110.82 108.01 108.18 108.88 107.35 107.57 108.34 109.26 109.35 109.92 110.03 111.05 111.90 106.29 106.92 107.35 105.78 106.33 106.86 105.49 105.95 106.33 106.14 106.77 107.20 3.3 2.4 1.6 3.8 2.1 2.0 2.8 1.7 1.5 1 Gross domestic product (GDP) less exports of goods and services plus imports of goods and services. changes based on unrounded data. Quarterly percent changes are at annual rates. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2 Percent 285 TABLE B–8.—Gross domestic product by major type of product, 1959–2000 [Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Goods Year or quarter Change Final in Gross sales of pridomestic domesvate product tic product inventories Total Total Final sales Durable goods Change in private inventories Final sales Change in private inventories Nondurable goods Final sales Change in private inventories Services Structures 1959 ............................ 507.4 503.5 3.9 251.7 247.8 3.9 92.4 2.9 155.5 1.1 193.2 62.5 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ 527.4 545.7 586.5 618.7 664.4 720.1 789.3 834.1 911.5 985.3 524.1 542.7 580.4 613.1 659.6 710.9 775.7 824.2 902.4 976.2 3.2 3.0 6.1 5.6 4.8 9.2 13.6 9.9 9.1 9.2 258.0 260.7 281.5 293.2 313.6 343.3 381.7 395.3 428.3 457.7 254.7 257.7 275.4 287.6 308.8 334.1 368.0 385.5 419.2 448.5 3.2 3.0 6.1 5.6 4.8 9.2 13.6 9.9 9.1 9.2 95.2 94.5 104.7 111.5 121.2 134.2 150.2 155.3 169.5 180.9 1.7 −.1 3.4 2.6 3.8 6.2 10.0 4.8 4.5 6.0 159.5 163.2 170.7 176.1 187.6 199.9 217.8 230.2 249.8 267.6 1.6 3.0 2.7 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.6 5.0 4.5 3.2 207.5 221.4 237.2 252.8 272.3 292.1 319.6 349.1 383.2 419.3 61.9 63.6 67.8 72.7 78.4 84.7 88.0 89.6 100.0 108.3 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ 1,039.7 1,128.6 1,240.4 1,385.5 1,501.0 1,635.2 1,823.9 2,031.4 2,295.9 2,566.4 1,037.7 1,120.3 1,231.3 1,369.7 1,487.0 1,641.4 1,806.8 2,009.1 2,270.1 2,548.4 2.0 8.3 9.1 15.9 14.0 −6.3 17.1 22.3 25.8 18.0 470.3 468.3 496.1 487.9 542.7 533.6 622.0 606.1 670.9 656.9 724.8 731.1 811.4 794.3 890.7 868.4 1,004.5 978.7 1,128.7 1,110.7 2.0 8.3 9.1 15.9 14.0 −6.3 17.1 22.3 25.8 18.0 183.2 190.2 213.0 245.8 262.1 294.7 329.6 374.6 426.2 487.3 −.2 2.9 6.4 13.0 10.9 −7.5 10.8 9.5 18.2 12.8 285.1 297.6 320.6 360.3 394.9 436.4 464.7 493.8 552.5 623.4 2.2 5.3 2.7 2.9 3.1 1.2 6.3 12.8 7.6 5.2 459.6 504.0 550.8 600.6 664.4 743.6 821.3 913.9 1,019.6 1,127.1 109.7 128.4 146.9 162.9 165.6 166.7 191.2 226.8 271.8 310.6 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ 2,795.6 3,131.3 3,259.2 3,534.9 3,932.7 4,213.0 4,452.9 4,742.5 5,108.3 5,489.1 2,801.9 3,101.5 3,274.1 3,540.7 3,867.3 4,191.2 4,446.3 4,715.3 5,089.8 5,461.4 −6.3 29.8 −14.9 −5.8 65.4 21.8 6.6 27.1 18.5 27.7 1,207.6 1,362.8 1,354.6 1,452.1 1,637.0 1,702.7 1,758.2 1,853.5 2,000.0 2,175.3 1,213.9 1,333.0 1,369.6 1,457.8 1,571.6 1,680.9 1,751.7 1,826.4 1,981.5 2,147.6 −6.3 29.8 −14.9 −5.8 65.4 21.8 6.6 27.1 18.5 27.7 518.0 564.5 566.1 611.8 686.6 750.0 781.5 809.9 886.4 963.8 −2.3 7.3 −16.0 2.5 41.4 4.4 −1.9 22.9 22.7 20.0 695.9 768.5 803.4 846.1 885.0 930.9 970.2 1,016.5 1,095.1 1,183.8 −4.0 22.5 1.1 −8.2 24.0 17.4 8.4 4.2 −4.3 7.7 1,268.9 1,418.6 1,562.6 1,716.1 1,872.2 2,054.0 2,217.2 2,399.6 2,599.5 2,792.8 319.1 350.0 342.0 366.8 423.6 456.3 477.4 489.3 508.8 521.0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ 5,803.2 5,986.2 6,318.9 6,642.3 7,054.3 7,400.5 7,813.2 8,318.4 8,790.2 9,299.2 5,788.7 5,986.4 6,303.9 6,621.2 6,991.8 7,367.5 7,783.2 8,255.5 8,713.2 9,255.9 14.5 −.2 15.0 21.1 62.6 33.0 30.0 62.9 77.0 43.3 2,266.4 2,296.1 2,391.4 2,503.2 2,680.2 2,798.1 2,951.3 3,145.4 3,316.4 3,510.2 2,251.9 2,296.3 2,376.4 2,482.1 2,617.6 2,765.1 2,921.3 3,082.5 3,239.3 3,466.9 14.5 −.2 15.0 21.1 62.6 33.0 30.0 62.9 77.0 43.3 994.3 988.3 1,029.4 1,090.7 1,161.6 1,239.8 1,331.9 1,436.2 1,532.3 1,651.1 7.7 −13.6 −3.0 17.1 35.7 33.6 19.1 33.1 45.8 27.2 1,257.6 1,308.0 1,346.9 1,391.4 1,456.0 1,525.3 1,589.4 1,646.3 1,707.1 1,815.8 6.8 13.4 18.0 4.0 26.8 −.5 10.9 29.8 31.2 16.1 3,010.8 3,203.9 3,416.0 3,593.5 3,782.6 3,985.1 4,191.0 4,442.0 4,673.0 4,934.6 526.0 486.2 511.5 545.6 591.6 617.3 670.9 730.9 800.9 854.3 1995: I ......................... II ........................ III ....................... IV ....................... 7,297.5 7,342.6 7,432.8 7,529.3 7,234.8 7,306.8 7,419.4 7,509.1 62.7 35.8 13.4 20.2 2,781.5 2,767.6 2,796.4 2,847.1 2,718.8 2,731.7 2,782.9 2,826.9 62.7 35.8 13.4 20.2 1,215.9 1,218.7 1,251.4 1,273.0 48.0 32.5 23.3 30.4 1,502.8 1,513.0 1,531.5 1,553.9 14.7 3.3 −9.8 −10.2 3,902.0 3,965.1 4,018.8 4,054.5 614.0 610.0 617.7 627.7 1996: I ......................... II ........................ III ....................... IV ....................... 7,629.6 7,782.7 7,859.0 7,981.4 7,622.8 7,752.9 7,809.0 7,947.9 6.8 29.8 50.0 33.5 2,876.6 2,945.2 2,977.5 3,005.9 2,869.8 2,915.4 2,927.5 2,972.4 6.8 29.8 50.0 33.5 1,298.8 1,329.8 1,339.2 1,359.8 10.2 18.8 38.7 8.6 1,571.0 1,585.6 1,588.3 1,612.7 −3.4 10.9 11.3 24.8 4,109.6 4,167.8 4,204.0 4,282.4 643.4 669.6 677.6 693.1 1997: I ......................... II ........................ III ....................... IV ....................... 8,124.2 8,279.8 8,390.9 8,478.6 8,075.4 8,192.1 8,341.1 8,413.5 48.8 87.7 49.9 65.1 3,070.3 3,140.6 3,176.8 3,194.0 3,021.5 3,052.9 3,126.9 3,128.8 48.8 87.7 49.9 65.1 1,388.4 1,418.3 1,472.3 1,465.8 26.0 58.3 19.8 28.2 1,633.1 1,634.6 1,654.7 1,663.0 22.8 29.4 30.1 36.9 4,343.4 4,418.7 4,473.9 4,532.2 710.5 720.5 740.2 752.4 1998: I ......................... II ........................ III ....................... IV ...................... 8,634.7 8,722.0 8,829.1 8,974.9 8,522.4 8,663.5 8,758.5 8,908.3 112.4 58.5 70.5 66.6 3,288.4 3,271.6 3,313.1 3,392.2 3,176.0 3,213.1 3,242.6 3,325.6 112.4 58.5 70.5 66.6 1,498.4 1,521.3 1,529.6 1,579.7 64.2 29.2 44.7 45.2 1,677.6 1,691.8 1,713.0 1,745.9 48.2 29.3 25.9 21.4 4,575.1 4,654.1 4,705.4 4,757.3 771.3 796.3 810.5 825.4 1999: I ......................... II ........................ III ....................... IV ....................... 9,104.5 9,191.5 9,340.9 9,559.7 9,055.3 9,177.0 9,304.2 9,486.9 49.2 14.5 36.7 72.7 3,423.7 3,451.2 3,527.3 3,638.7 3,374.5 3,436.7 3,490.6 3,566.0 49.2 14.5 36.7 72.7 1,597.3 1,635.9 1,669.4 1,701.8 28.8 5.0 27.6 47.5 1,777.2 1,800.8 1,821.1 1,864.1 20.4 9.5 9.1 25.2 4,831.8 4,891.2 4,965.2 5,050.3 849.0 849.1 848.5 870.7 2000: I ......................... II ........................ III ...................... 9,752.7 9,945.7 10,039.4 9,722.8 9,873.7 9,973.1 29.9 72.0 66.4 3,710.2 3,680.3 3,806.1 3,734.1 3,842.9 3,776.5 29.9 1,773.7 72.0 1,809.6 66.4 1,830.6 20.7 48.3 39.2 1,906.6 1,924.5 1,945.9 9.2 23.7 27.2 5,135.2 5,231.4 5,281.6 907.4 908.2 915.0 Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 286 TABLE B–9.—Real gross domestic product by major type of product, 1959–2000 [Billions of chained (1996) dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Goods Year or quarter Change Final in Gross sales of pridomestic domesvate product tic product inventories Total Final sales Total Durable goods Change in private inventories Final sales Change in private inventories Nondurable goods Final sales Change in private inventories 764.7 .............. ............ .............. ............ .............. ............ Services Structures 1959 ........................ 2,319.0 2,317.4 12.1 1,222.2 340.6 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 2,376.7 2,432.0 2,578.9 2,690.4 2,846.5 3,028.5 3,227.5 3,308.3 3,466.1 3,571.4 2,378.5 2,435.5 2,569.5 2,683.6 2,844.1 3,008.5 3,191.1 3,288.2 3,450.0 3,555.9 10.9 9.5 19.6 18.4 15.1 30.6 42.8 31.7 28.4 27.4 777.1 780.6 837.0 866.1 919.2 994.9 1,083.4 1,095.2 1,146.7 1,180.6 .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ 1,279.7 1,337.4 1,400.7 1,465.7 1,541.4 1,613.8 1,705.9 1,795.9 1,876.5 1,943.9 337.4 346.8 366.6 391.3 417.7 438.6 439.2 432.7 459.3 465.2 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 3,578.0 3,697.7 3,898.4 4,123.4 4,099.0 4,084.4 4,311.7 4,511.8 4,760.6 4,912.1 3,588.6 3,688.1 3,887.7 4,094.3 4,080.7 4,118.5 4,288.8 4,478.8 4,722.9 4,894.4 4.4 23.9 23.7 35.6 25.0 −9.4 32.5 40.8 44.1 26.1 1,166.5 1,194.3 1,280.1 1,395.0 1,378.5 1,357.9 1,453.8 1,524.1 1,621.8 1,686.1 .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ 1,999.0 2,056.8 2,123.2 2,199.5 2,259.6 2,327.5 2,403.5 2,483.1 2,577.9 2,642.9 445.1 486.4 522.4 533.7 478.4 435.0 475.9 521.1 567.1 582.7 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 4,900.9 5,021.0 4,919.3 5,132.3 5,505.2 5,717.1 5,912.4 6,113.3 6,368.4 6,591.8 4,928.1 4,989.5 4,954.9 5,154.5 5,427.9 5,698.8 5,912.6 6,088.8 6,352.6 6,565.4 −10.5 37.9 −15.6 −9.7 76.1 27.1 9.6 29.6 18.4 29.6 1,677.0 1,753.6 1,678.4 1,754.8 1,941.1 1,990.0 2,057.5 2,136.3 2,255.3 2,379.6 .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. 2,112.2 2,239.0 2,353.6 ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ 29.6 18.4 29.6 .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. 837.8 919.1 982.7 ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ 25.0 23.9 20.6 .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. 1,285.3 1,325.4 1,374.2 ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ 3.1 −6.9 8.7 2,695.2 2,733.9 2,780.7 2,877.3 2,968.4 3,107.7 3,227.9 3,354.6 3,485.3 3,584.9 541.4 533.5 487.8 524.3 595.2 626.1 635.2 631.1 632.8 626.5 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ....................... 6,707.9 6,676.4 6,880.0 7,062.6 7,347.7 7,543.8 7,813.2 8,159.5 8,515.7 8,875.8 6,695.6 6,681.5 6,867.7 7,043.8 7,285.8 7,512.2 7,783.2 8,095.2 8,435.2 8,826.9 16.5 −1.0 17.1 20.0 66.8 30.4 30.0 63.8 80.2 45.3 2,404.2 2,372.7 2,455.0 2,548.2 2,708.3 2,813.8 2,951.3 3,145.9 3,340.0 3,543.8 2,391.1 2,375.6 2,441.5 2,528.5 2,647.0 2,782.3 2,921.3 3,081.3 3,258.7 3,495.7 16.5 −1.0 17.1 20.0 66.8 30.4 30.0 63.8 80.2 45.3 1,000.0 976.8 1,018.0 1,076.5 1,144.2 1,231.8 1,331.9 1,457.5 1,591.2 1,752.5 7.9 −14.0 −2.9 17.7 35.9 33.3 19.1 33.4 46.9 28.2 1,394.2 1,403.6 1,427.2 1,454.4 1,504.4 1,551.0 1,589.4 1,624.4 1,670.2 1,749.3 8.6 13.5 20.6 2.0 30.8 −3.6 10.9 30.4 33.3 17.1 3,692.3 3,752.1 3,847.3 3,916.8 4,010.3 4,097.5 4,191.0 4,307.6 4,427.1 4,563.3 614.8 559.5 584.9 602.5 630.7 632.9 670.9 706.9 751.8 776.5 1995: I ..................... II .................... III ................... IV ................... 7,488.7 7,503.3 7,561.4 7,621.9 7,427.3 7,469.6 7,549.7 7,602.5 62.2 32.5 9.0 18.0 2,800.3 2,784.9 2,810.0 2,860.0 2,739.5 2,751.3 2,798.1 2,840.3 62.2 32.5 9.0 18.0 1,202.4 1,209.8 1,246.9 1,268.3 47.7 32.2 23.1 30.3 1,537.8 1,542.1 1,551.6 1,572.3 13.6 −.3 −14.7 −12.8 4,053.0 4,091.8 4,120.6 4,124.5 635.5 627.3 631.3 637.6 1996: I ..................... II .................... III ................... IV ................... 7,676.4 7,802.9 7,841.9 7,931.3 7,669.6 7,773.4 7,792.1 7,897.6 5.6 30.3 51.2 32.9 2,879.4 2,942.3 2,976.3 3,007.1 2,872.4 2,912.8 2,926.4 2,973.6 5.6 30.3 51.2 32.9 1,292.5 1,330.2 1,340.8 1,364.0 10.2 18.7 38.7 8.7 1,580.0 1,582.5 1,585.6 1,609.5 −4.7 11.5 12.7 24.2 4,147.0 4,187.1 4,191.1 4,238.6 650.2 673.5 674.5 685.5 1997: I ..................... II .................... III ................... IV ................... 8,016.4 8,131.9 8,216.6 8,272.9 7,966.4 8,043.2 8,164.9 8,206.3 49.3 88.3 51.3 66.1 3,065.5 3,135.2 3,179.3 3,203.5 3,015.4 3,045.7 3,127.5 3,136.4 49.3 88.3 51.3 66.1 1,394.9 1,434.3 1,499.4 1,501.5 26.2 58.8 20.0 28.7 1,620.4 1,611.8 1,629.2 1,636.0 23.1 29.6 31.3 37.4 4,254.7 4,297.2 4,325.3 4,353.1 696.5 700.4 713.2 717.6 1998: I ..................... II .................... III ................... IV .................. 8,404.9 8,465.6 8,537.6 8,654.5 8,289.4 8,402.7 8,463.4 8,585.0 117.3 60.9 73.1 69.4 3,304.6 3,294.1 3,335.9 3,425.4 3,187.1 3,231.1 3,261.2 3,355.5 117.3 60.9 73.1 69.4 1,542.6 1,574.7 1,590.8 1,656.7 65.3 29.7 45.9 46.6 1,646.4 1,658.7 1,672.9 1,702.7 52.1 31.2 27.1 22.6 4,372.2 4,422.6 4,445.6 4,468.0 731.7 750.7 758.6 766.4 1999: I ..................... II .................... III ................... IV .................. 8,730.0 8,783.2 8,905.8 9,084.1 8,680.3 8,764.9 8,861.8 9,000.5 48.1 13.1 39.1 80.9 3,450.0 3,475.6 3,565.3 3,684.4 3,401.1 3,459.8 3,522.4 3,599.6 48.1 13.1 39.1 80.9 1,684.0 1,730.9 1,776.9 1,818.2 30.0 5.2 28.6 48.9 1,721.2 1,734.6 1,752.7 1,788.9 18.0 7.9 10.5 32.1 4,503.4 4,537.8 4,581.1 4,631.0 781.3 774.7 768.1 781.9 2000: I ..................... II .................... III .................. 9,191.8 9,318.9 9,369.5 9,148.0 9,235.3 9,290.9 36.6 78.6 72.5 3,741.9 3,818.8 3,857.8 3,699.5 3,733.9 3,778.3 36.6 78.6 72.5 1,899.0 1,933.9 1,955.2 21.2 49.5 40.2 1,811.5 1,813.1 1,836.2 15.5 29.5 32.5 4,659.3 4,718.8 4,733.6 804.9 798.8 797.6 Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 287 TABLE B–10.—Gross domestic product by sector, 1959–2000 [Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Business 1 Year or quarter Gross domestic product Households and institutions Nonfarm 1 Total Total 1 Nonfarm less housing Housing Farm Total Private households Nonprofit institutions General government 2 Total Federal State and local 1959 ............... 507.4 436.6 417.7 382.1 35.6 18.9 12.4 3.6 8.9 58.4 32.0 26.5 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 ............... ............... ............... ............... ............... ............... ............... ............... ............... ............... 527.4 545.7 586.5 618.7 664.4 720.1 789.3 834.1 911.5 985.3 451.3 465.1 500.0 526.3 565.2 613.9 671.0 703.4 766.1 825.4 431.5 445.0 479.8 506.0 546.0 592.1 648.2 681.1 743.4 800.2 392.9 403.6 435.2 458.5 495.8 538.5 591.2 620.3 678.6 730.3 38.6 41.4 44.6 47.4 50.2 53.5 57.0 60.8 64.8 69.9 19.8 20.1 20.2 20.4 19.3 21.9 22.9 22.2 22.7 25.2 13.9 14.5 15.6 16.7 17.9 19.3 21.3 23.4 26.1 29.5 3.8 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.4 10.1 10.7 11.8 12.8 14.0 15.3 17.2 19.2 21.7 25.0 62.1 66.1 70.9 75.7 81.3 86.8 97.0 107.3 119.3 130.5 33.2 34.5 36.7 38.6 40.9 42.6 47.4 51.8 56.7 60.5 28.9 31.6 34.2 37.1 40.4 44.2 49.6 55.5 62.5 70.0 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 ............... ............... ............... ............... ............... ............... ............... ............... ............... ............... 1,039.7 1,128.6 1,240.4 1,385.5 1,501.0 1,635.2 1,823.9 2,031.4 2,295.9 2,566.4 863.1 935.7 1,030.0 1,156.8 1,250.5 1,356.8 1,521.6 1,702.8 1,937.3 2,174.9 836.9 907.6 997.3 1,107.1 1,203.1 1,308.1 1,475.1 1,655.6 1,882.5 2,110.5 761.9 825.9 908.6 1,010.1 1,097.2 1,193.8 1,350.1 1,516.2 1,726.7 1,934.4 74.9 81.7 88.7 96.9 105.9 114.3 125.0 139.4 155.8 176.1 26.2 28.1 32.6 49.8 47.4 48.8 46.4 47.2 54.7 64.5 32.4 35.6 38.9 43.0 47.1 52.0 57.1 62.4 69.7 77.3 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.8 4.6 4.6 5.4 5.9 6.5 6.4 27.9 31.0 34.3 38.2 42.6 47.3 51.6 56.4 63.2 70.9 144.2 157.3 171.5 185.7 203.4 226.4 245.3 266.2 288.9 314.2 64.7 68.6 73.6 76.4 81.6 89.1 95.6 103.6 111.0 118.7 79.5 88.7 97.9 109.3 121.8 137.2 149.7 162.7 177.9 195.5 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 ............... ............... ............... ............... ............... ............... ............... ............... ............... ............... 2,795.6 3,131.3 3,259.2 3,534.9 3,932.7 4,213.0 4,452.9 4,742.5 5,108.3 5,489.1 2,358.8 2,647.3 2,729.8 2,968.1 3,313.9 3,546.8 3,740.9 3,976.0 4,281.2 4,600.9 2,302.7 2,577.4 2,664.6 2,918.9 3,245.3 3,479.7 3,678.0 3,910.9 4,217.4 4,524.7 2,097.6 2,342.2 2,405.2 2,642.2 2,942.8 3,147.4 3,318.9 3,523.9 3,799.0 4,074.5 205.1 235.2 259.4 276.7 302.6 332.3 359.0 387.0 418.4 450.2 56.1 69.9 65.1 49.2 68.5 67.1 63.0 65.1 63.8 76.2 87.1 97.6 108.2 119.2 131.2 141.0 153.7 173.3 195.1 214.6 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.3 7.3 7.3 7.7 7.7 8.3 8.9 81.0 91.4 102.0 112.9 123.9 133.6 146.0 165.6 186.8 205.7 349.7 386.5 421.2 447.7 487.7 525.3 558.2 593.1 632.0 673.6 132.1 148.3 163.1 173.0 194.0 206.3 213.9 224.5 235.9 247.6 217.5 238.2 258.1 274.7 293.7 319.1 344.3 368.7 396.2 426.0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ............... ............... ............... ............... ............... ............... ............... .............. ............... ............... 5,803.2 5,986.2 6,318.9 6,642.3 7,054.3 7,400.5 7,813.2 8,318.4 8,790.2 9,299.2 4,842.0 4,962.4 5,242.1 5,518.0 5,886.6 6,190.1 6,556.0 7,010.5 7,425.7 7,872.4 4,762.4 4,889.2 5,161.6 5,444.4 5,803.0 6,116.9 6,463.8 6,922.2 7,345.0 7,798.2 4,281.1 4,381.3 4,626.2 4,895.5 5,218.3 5,499.4 5,820.9 6,255.6 6,642.7 7,054.0 481.3 507.9 535.4 548.9 584.7 617.5 642.8 666.7 702.3 744.3 79.6 73.2 80.5 73.6 83.6 73.2 92.2 88.3 80.8 74.2 237.9 257.5 279.5 297.0 313.3 330.3 348.6 363.2 385.1 401.7 9.4 9.1 10.1 10.7 11.1 11.9 12.0 12.0 14.0 11.5 228.6 248.4 269.4 286.3 302.2 318.4 336.5 351.2 371.2 390.3 723.3 766.3 797.3 827.3 854.5 880.1 908.7 944.6 979.3 1,025.0 259.7 275.8 282.8 287.0 287.4 286.8 292.0 295.4 298.6 309.5 463.6 490.4 514.5 540.3 567.0 593.3 616.7 649.2 680.7 715.5 1995: I ............ II ........... III .......... IV .......... 7,297.5 7,342.6 7,432.8 7,529.3 6,100.3 6,137.0 6,218.5 6,304.7 6,028.7 6,067.5 6,147.6 6,223.8 5,420.9 5,455.3 5,530.1 5,591.3 607.8 612.2 617.6 632.5 71.6 69.5 70.8 80.9 324.1 328.4 332.1 336.7 11.6 11.8 12.0 12.1 312.5 316.6 320.1 324.6 873.0 877.1 882.3 887.9 287.0 286.5 287.3 286.4 586.1 590.7 595.0 601.4 1996: I ............ II ........... III .......... IV .......... 7,629.6 7,782.7 7,859.0 7,981.4 6,388.5 6,530.3 6,596.0 6,709.1 6,301.6 6,435.5 6,498.2 6,619.8 5,668.3 5,797.3 5,852.0 5,966.2 633.2 638.2 646.2 653.7 86.9 94.8 97.7 89.3 341.9 346.0 350.5 355.8 12.1 12.0 12.0 11.9 329.8 334.0 338.6 343.8 899.3 906.4 912.5 916.5 292.0 292.5 292.6 290.9 607.2 613.9 619.9 625.6 1997: I ............ II ........... III .......... IV ......... 8,124.2 8,279.8 8,390.9 8,478.6 6,833.3 6,977.9 7,077.3 7,153.5 6,744.5 6,890.0 6,988.5 7,065.9 6,085.6 6,226.3 6,319.8 6,390.5 658.9 663.7 668.7 675.4 88.7 87.9 88.9 87.6 357.8 360.8 364.9 369.4 11.7 11.8 12.1 12.6 346.1 349.0 352.8 356.8 933.1 941.1 948.7 955.7 296.2 295.9 295.4 294.2 636.9 645.2 653.3 661.5 1998: I ............ II ........... III .......... IV .......... 1999: I ............ II ........... III .......... IV .......... 8,634.7 8,722.0 8,829.1 8,974.9 9,104.5 9,191.5 9,340.9 9,559.7 7,292.7 7,365.2 7,456.5 7,588.5 7,697.9 7,773.0 7,908.0 8,110.8 7,208.7 7,284.0 7,378.3 7,508.8 7,619.3 7,695.4 7,837.1 8,041.1 6,525.0 6,586.9 6,668.5 6,790.2 6,889.6 6,957.3 7,088.4 7,280.5 683.7 697.0 709.8 718.6 729.7 738.2 748.7 760.6 84.0 81.3 78.1 79.6 78.6 77.6 70.9 69.8 376.5 382.9 388.3 392.8 396.4 399.9 403.2 407.4 13.9 14.2 14.1 13.8 13.1 12.2 11.0 9.5 362.6 368.8 374.2 379.1 383.3 387.7 392.2 397.9 965.5 973.8 984.3 993.6 1,010.2 1,018.7 1,029.7 1,041.4 297.2 297.4 299.1 300.6 308.3 308.3 309.7 311.7 668.3 676.5 685.2 693.0 701.8 710.3 720.0 729.8 2000: I ............ II ........... III ......... 9,752.7 9,945.7 10,039.4 8,277.9 8,449.9 8,526.9 8,207.0 8,375.0 8,454.2 7,431.1 7,589.9 7,660.3 775.9 785.0 793.9 71.0 74.9 72.8 412.0 418.2 425.1 9.1 9.3 9.5 402.9 408.9 415.7 1,062.7 1,077.6 1,087.4 322.9 328.6 328.6 739.8 749.0 758.8 1 Gross domestic business product equals gross domestic product less gross product of households and institutions and of general government. Nonfarm product equals gross domestic business product less gross farm product. 2 Equals compensation of general government employees plus general government consumption of fixed capital. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 288 TABLE B–11.—Real gross domestic product by sector, 1959–2000 [Billions of chained (1996) dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Business 1 Year or quarter Gross domestic product Households and institutions Nonfarm 1 Total Total 1 Nonfarm less housing Housing Farm Total Private households Nonprofit institutions General government 2 Total Federal State and local 1959 ........... 2,319.0 1,788.0 1,738.5 1,567.3 167.8 40.2 115.6 22.6 86.1 460.3 250.4 211.1 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... 2,376.7 2,432.0 2,578.9 2,690.4 2,846.5 3,028.5 3,227.5 3,308.3 3,466.1 3,571.4 1,827.9 1,868.1 1,988.1 2,079.0 2,209.0 2,362.0 2,520.3 2,572.3 2,699.7 2,783.4 1,775.1 1,815.5 1,938.9 2,029.0 2,163.6 2,314.5 2,478.3 2,525.7 2,657.6 2,740.2 1,593.4 1,624.0 1,734.8 1,814.4 1,938.2 2,076.0 2,227.5 2,263.6 2,384.8 2,455.9 179.2 189.8 202.2 212.7 222.9 235.5 246.9 259.2 269.3 281.4 42.2 42.5 41.7 42.9 41.5 43.8 42.4 45.2 43.7 44.9 123.5 124.4 129.0 132.1 135.9 140.8 146.0 150.8 155.3 160.3 22.8 22.1 21.9 21.6 21.4 20.7 19.9 20.0 19.0 18.0 94.1 96.1 101.0 104.7 108.9 115.0 121.5 126.3 132.2 138.7 476.3 493.3 512.6 527.8 545.7 564.0 599.4 631.5 656.5 673.6 255.3 260.8 271.7 274.1 276.6 278.4 296.8 316.4 322.1 323.5 222.3 233.7 242.3 254.9 270.2 286.6 303.7 316.4 335.4 350.7 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... 3,578.0 3,697.7 3,898.4 4,123.4 4,099.0 4,084.4 4,311.7 4,511.8 4,760.6 4,912.1 2,788.7 2,897.9 3,085.6 3,295.5 3,261.1 3,235.1 3,446.7 3,629.7 3,855.5 3,992.1 2,743.0 2,850.0 3,040.7 3,256.4 3,223.9 3,177.1 3,397.0 3,577.7 3,810.5 3,940.8 2,451.5 2,546.7 2,721.5 2,921.0 2,874.6 2,825.8 3,033.3 3,200.8 3,412.5 3,523.2 289.7 301.7 316.6 331.4 349.1 353.1 362.1 373.4 393.4 414.4 46.3 48.4 48.3 48.1 47.0 55.5 53.3 56.0 54.1 58.3 158.8 162.3 166.9 170.9 172.2 177.7 179.8 185.0 188.4 192.5 16.9 16.1 15.6 15.2 13.1 12.3 12.7 12.9 13.3 11.8 138.7 143.3 148.6 153.2 157.1 163.8 165.4 170.4 173.3 179.5 676.4 678.0 677.6 680.5 693.7 704.4 709.9 716.4 729.8 737.2 310.0 296.4 282.9 272.7 271.4 269.5 269.4 269.2 272.3 271.7 366.2 381.2 394.5 408.1 422.9 435.8 441.5 448.3 458.7 466.9 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... 4,900.9 5,021.0 4,919.3 5,132.3 5,505.2 5,717.1 5,912.4 6,113.3 6,368.4 6,591.8 3,969.1 4,077.9 3,970.0 4,168.3 4,518.2 4,700.4 4,865.0 5,035.9 5,251.5 5,440.1 3,921.0 4,005.4 3,892.4 4,125.4 4,454.1 4,620.5 4,788.7 4,958.5 5,183.8 5,362.5 3,482.7 3,551.6 3,436.5 3,662.2 3,970.0 4,120.1 4,278.6 4,433.0 4,640.7 4,801.5 441.8 459.3 465.3 468.3 486.4 502.4 511.2 526.3 543.5 561.4 56.5 72.6 75.7 50.5 67.4 80.7 77.5 78.8 70.2 79.5 198.1 202.6 208.4 213.0 218.2 224.9 236.0 247.8 265.5 279.8 10.4 9.7 9.3 9.2 10.4 10.1 10.4 10.2 10.6 11.1 187.0 192.6 199.0 203.8 207.6 214.7 225.5 237.6 254.8 268.6 747.4 751.4 758.6 763.2 772.4 794.3 813.7 831.4 852.8 873.0 275.7 279.8 283.9 290.2 296.5 304.7 309.9 318.0 321.8 325.6 473.2 473.0 476.0 474.1 476.9 490.6 504.8 514.5 532.1 548.5 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... .......... 6,707.9 6,676.4 6,880.0 7,062.6 7,347.7 7,543.8 7,813.2 8,159.5 8,515.7 8,875.8 5,523.5 5,475.7 5,668.9 5,838.3 6,111.8 6,295.9 6,556.0 6,881.8 7,215.9 7,557.0 5,440.8 5,391.6 5,575.3 5,753.4 6,013.7 6,210.3 6,463.8 6,778.9 7,114.7 7,450.2 4,869.5 4,806.6 4,976.6 5,154.3 5,392.4 5,574.2 5,820.9 6,130.0 6,452.5 6,767.8 571.8 586.4 599.8 599.5 621.6 636.2 642.8 649.0 662.6 683.1 84.2 85.6 95.7 85.8 100.3 85.5 92.2 103.6 100.2 106.3 291.5 300.9 308.6 319.7 330.9 341.5 348.6 360.5 371.7 378.3 11.4 10.5 11.3 11.7 11.8 12.2 12.0 11.7 13.3 10.6 280.1 290.4 297.3 308.0 319.1 329.3 336.5 348.8 358.4 367.8 895.1 903.6 904.9 906.2 905.6 906.7 908.7 917.3 928.7 942.1 331.4 333.3 326.2 319.7 309.9 299.1 292.0 287.9 286.4 286.5 564.7 571.2 579.4 587.1 596.1 607.7 616.7 629.3 642.2 655.4 1995: I ........ II ....... III ...... IV ...... 7,488.7 7,503.3 7,561.4 7,621.9 6,243.2 6,254.1 6,310.4 6,375.9 6,154.9 6,167.5 6,228.6 6,290.1 5,521.2 5,534.1 5,594.6 5,646.9 633.9 633.6 634.1 643.4 88.9 86.7 80.8 85.3 338.3 340.8 342.7 344.3 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.3 326.2 328.5 330.3 332.0 907.6 908.8 908.5 901.8 303.1 302.2 300.5 290.5 604.7 606.7 608.1 611.2 1996: I ........ II ....... III ...... IV ...... 7,676.4 7,802.9 7,841.9 7,931.3 6,431.7 6,543.3 6,581.0 6,667.9 6,341.9 6,450.6 6,488.3 6,574.2 5,702.9 5,810.1 5,844.0 5,926.8 639.1 640.5 644.3 647.4 89.6 92.7 92.7 93.7 345.1 347.2 349.7 352.3 12.2 12.1 11.9 11.8 332.8 335.0 337.8 340.5 899.8 912.5 911.2 911.1 291.2 294.2 292.9 289.8 608.6 618.3 618.4 621.4 1997: I ........ II ....... III ...... IV ...... 8,016.4 8,131.9 8,216.6 8,272.9 6,748.1 6,857.1 6,934.5 6,987.5 6,649.1 6,755.9 6,827.8 6,882.7 6,000.7 6,107.3 6,179.4 6,232.5 648.5 648.7 648.5 650.3 99.3 101.6 108.0 105.4 355.2 358.8 362.6 365.6 11.6 11.5 11.7 12.1 343.6 347.3 350.9 353.4 913.0 916.2 919.6 920.1 289.4 288.6 288.2 285.4 623.7 627.6 631.4 634.6 1998: I ........ II ....... III ...... IV ...... 8,404.9 8,465.6 8,537.6 8,654.5 7,113.5 7,168.7 7,234.5 7,346.8 7,011.1 7,069.0 7,133.6 7,245.3 6,358.2 6,407.9 6,466.8 6,577.0 653.2 661.4 667.1 668.9 102.2 98.7 99.9 100.2 368.7 370.7 372.7 374.7 13.4 13.5 13.3 12.9 355.3 357.2 359.4 361.8 923.0 926.7 931.0 933.9 285.9 286.0 286.7 287.0 637.1 640.7 644.2 646.9 1999: I ........ II ....... III ...... IV ..... 8,730.0 8,783.2 8,905.8 9,084.1 7,417.5 7,467.0 7,585.1 7,758.4 7,311.4 7,357.3 7,479.2 7,652.7 6,637.0 6,678.6 6,794.1 6,961.6 674.9 679.3 685.9 692.3 106.1 111.4 104.5 103.1 376.0 377.7 378.7 380.9 12.2 11.3 10.1 8.6 363.8 366.4 368.7 372.3 937.6 939.7 943.6 947.4 286.7 286.0 286.3 287.0 650.8 653.5 657.1 660.2 2000: I ........ II ....... III ..... 9,191.8 9,318.9 9,369.5 7,859.0 7,975.8 8,021.9 7,749.9 7,868.5 7,912.9 7,050.6 7,165.4 7,206.7 700.6 704.7 707.9 107.3 104.1 106.2 382.3 384.5 386.5 8.2 8.2 8.3 374.2 376.4 378.3 953.5 962.0 964.6 289.1 294.5 292.9 664.2 667.4 671.6 1 Gross domestic business product equals gross domestic product less gross product of households and institutions and of general government. Nonfarm product equals gross domestic business product less gross farm product. 2 Equals compensation of general government employees plus general government consumption of fixed capital. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 289 TABLE B–12.—Gross domestic product by industry, 1959–99 [Billions of dollars] Private industries Year Based on 1972 SIC: 1959 ............................ Gross domes- Total tic prod- private indusuct tries Agriculture, forestry, and fishing Mining TransFiportanance, Con- Manu- tion Whole- Retail insurstruc- facand sale ance, tion turing public trade trade and utilireal ties estate Services Statis- Governtical ment discrepancy 1 507.4 442.1 20.3 12.6 23.6 140.3 45.3 35.7 49.5 65.5 48.4 0.8 65.3 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ 527.4 545.7 586.5 618.7 664.4 457.9 472.0 507.6 533.9 573.4 21.4 21.7 22.1 22.3 21.4 13.0 13.1 13.3 13.6 14.0 24.1 25.1 26.9 28.8 31.4 142.5 143.0 156.8 166.2 178.1 47.5 49.1 52.2 55.1 58.6 37.4 38.4 41.0 42.8 46.0 50.7 52.0 55.7 58.2 63.9 70.3 74.7 79.5 83.8 89.5 51.6 55.0 59.4 63.5 69.2 −.6 −.2 .7 −.4 1.2 69.5 73.7 79.0 84.8 90.9 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ 720.1 789.3 834.1 911.5 985.3 623.0 681.6 715.5 779.4 841.1 24.2 25.4 24.9 25.7 28.5 14.2 14.8 15.3 16.4 17.3 34.5 37.6 39.4 43.1 48.3 196.6 215.8 221.3 241.8 254.6 62.7 67.6 70.9 76.8 83.1 49.7 54.1 57.5 63.1 68.3 68.4 73.1 78.7 87.1 94.6 96.0 103.9 111.6 121.5 132.3 74.8 82.8 91.0 99.7 111.1 1.9 6.4 4.8 4.3 2.9 97.1 107.7 118.6 132.0 144.3 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ 1,039.7 880.7 1,128.6 955.4 1,240.4 1,051.1 1,385.5 1,180.9 1,501.0 1,276.4 29.8 32.1 37.3 55.0 53.2 18.9 19.1 20.0 24.0 37.1 50.9 55.9 62.1 70.2 75.0 249.8 263.2 290.5 321.9 337.1 88.7 97.8 109.0 119.7 130.1 72.0 77.7 86.9 97.8 111.1 100.7 109.7 119.2 131.1 137.0 142.1 157.6 172.0 189.5 206.1 120.9 130.8 145.4 163.7 179.6 6.9 11.3 8.7 8.0 10.0 158.9 173.2 189.3 204.6 224.7 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ 1,635.2 1,823.9 2,031.4 2,295.9 2,566.4 1,386.5 1,553.1 1,738.3 1,976.8 2,219.5 54.9 53.7 54.3 63.3 74.5 42.8 47.5 54.0 61.7 71.5 75.5 85.8 94.8 112.0 126.5 354.8 405.8 462.8 517.5 571.0 142.4 161.4 179.4 202.3 219.0 121.1 129.1 142.2 162.1 183.8 153.2 172.7 190.9 214.8 233.5 224.6 248.0 282.2 327.0 369.7 199.5 224.4 256.2 295.1 334.3 17.7 24.5 21.6 21.0 35.7 248.7 270.8 293.1 319.1 346.8 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ 2,795.6 3,131.3 3,259.2 3,534.9 3,932.7 2,410.8 2,704.3 2,794.8 3,039.7 3,392.3 66.7 81.1 77.1 62.6 83.8 113.1 152.6 150.4 129.1 135.9 129.8 131.5 130.8 139.8 166.1 587.5 652.2 650.7 693.3 782.5 242.4 274.6 295.4 324.0 357.5 196.9 218.5 224.2 236.9 271.1 245.4 270.6 288.1 322.4 361.9 416.2 467.5 500.7 559.0 619.6 378.9 428.1 474.9 525.5 595.3 33.9 27.5 2.5 47.0 18.6 384.8 427.0 464.5 495.3 540.5 1985 ............................ 1986 ............................ 4,213.0 3,627.9 4,452.9 3,830.8 84.7 82.4 135.3 88.2 186.3 207.9 804.4 829.5 379.0 395.5 289.1 301.2 394.4 415.2 686.5 750.9 656.5 716.3 11.7 43.9 585.1 622.0 Based on 1987 SIC: 1987 ............................ 1988 ............................ 1989 ............................ 4,742.5 4,081.4 5,108.3 4,401.8 5,489.1 4,735.5 88.9 89.1 102.0 92.2 99.2 97.1 219.3 888.6 237.2 979.9 245.8 1,017.7 426.2 449.0 468.7 308.9 346.6 364.7 434.5 461.5 492.7 829.7 893.7 954.5 789.9 887.9 976.0 3.3 −42.2 16.3 661.0 706.5 753.6 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ 5,803.2 5,986.2 6,318.9 6,642.3 7,054.3 4,996.7 5,129.1 5,424.5 5,717.5 6,096.7 108.3 102.9 111.7 108.3 118.5 111.9 96.7 87.6 88.4 90.2 248.7 232.7 234.4 248.9 275.3 1,040.6 1,043.5 1,082.0 1,131.4 1,223.2 490.9 518.3 538.5 573.3 611.4 376.1 395.6 414.6 432.5 479.2 507.8 523.7 551.7 578.0 620.6 1,010.3 1,072.2 1,140.9 1,205.3 1,254.8 1,071.5 1,123.8 1,219.4 1,287.7 1,365.0 30.6 19.6 43.7 63.8 58.5 806.6 857.1 894.4 924.8 957.6 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ 7,400.5 7,813.2 8,318.4 8,790.2 9,299.2 6,411.1 6,792.8 7,253.6 7,684.4 8,140.8 109.8 130.4 130.0 127.2 125.4 95.7 113.0 118.9 105.6 111.8 290.3 316.4 338.2 378.1 416.4 1,289.1 1,316.0 1,379.6 1,436.0 1,500.8 642.6 666.3 688.4 728.0 779.6 500.6 529.6 566.8 610.9 643.3 646.8 687.1 740.5 796.8 856.4 1,347.2 1,436.8 1,569.9 1,689.5 1,792.1 1,462.4 1,564.2 1,691.5 1,837.1 1,986.9 26.5 32.8 29.7 −24.8 −71.9 989.5 1,020.4 1,064.8 1,05.88 1,158.4 1 Equals gross domestic product (GDP) measured as the sum of expenditures less gross domestic income. Note.—For details regarding these data, see Survey of Current Business, June 2000. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 290 TABLE B–13.—Real gross domestic product by industry, 1987–99 [Billions of chained (1996) dollars] Private industries Year Based on 1987 SIC: 1987 ............................ 1988 ............................ 1989 ............................ Gross domes- Total tic prod- private indusuct tries Agriculture, forestry, and fishing Mining TransFiportanance, Con- Manu- tion Whole- Retail insurstruc- facand sale ance, tion turing public trade trade and utilireal ties estate Services 6,113.3 5,212.0 6,368.4 5,445.6 6,591.8 5,648.2 110.3 101.2 111.4 98.5 114.5 102.8 278.4 1,046.3 294.1 1,120.2 296.3 1,111.6 460.4 479.0 500.4 353.5 379.4 399.3 512.1 1,169.1 1,181.0 544.6 1,209.1 1,255.1 562.5 1,234.3 1,313.8 Statis- Governtical ment discrepancy 1 4.2 −51.8 19.3 938.0 961.0 984.3 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ 6,707.9 6,676.4 6,880.0 7,062.6 7,347.7 5,736.8 5,707.8 5,880.3 6,043.2 6,314.4 118.5 121.3 130.7 122.6 135.8 105.8 101.1 95.7 101.1 108.1 290.7 268.8 271.7 279.2 297.2 1,102.3 1,066.3 1,085.0 1,122.9 1,206.0 525.0 543.1 555.7 576.3 606.1 395.1 416.6 444.9 452.4 481.6 559.5 554.6 569.7 581.8 617.2 1,250.6 1,270.6 1,297.4 1,328.9 1,347.6 1,361.9 1,352.4 1,391.4 1,418.0 1,458.1 34.9 21.7 47.3 67.5 60.7 1,008.2 1,012.1 1,015.3 1,013.1 1,016.0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ 7,543.8 7,813.2 8,159.5 8,515.7 8,875.8 6,508.7 6,792.8 7,151.3 7,449.9 7,860.7 123.1 130.4 143.7 144.0 150.9 113.0 113.0 117.0 126.2 121.9 299.6 316.4 324.6 345.8 361.1 1,284.7 1,316.0 1,387.3 1,446.4 1,529.4 634.5 666.3 668.7 686.4 752.3 483.0 529.6 584.1 665.3 709.3 641.4 687.1 745.3 805.5 847.3 1,393.0 1,436.8 1,520.8 1,605.9 1,692.1 1,510.4 1,564.2 1,632.2 1,704.4 1,772.6 27.0 32.8 29.2 −24.1 −69.0 1,017.1 1,020.4 1,035.5 1,049.8 1,070.4 1 Equals the current-dollar statistical discrepancy deflated by the implicit price deflator for gross domestic business product. Note.—For details regarding these data, see Survey of Current Business, June 2000. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureaus of Economic Analysis. 291 TABLE B–14.—Gross product of nonfinancial corporate business, 1959–2000 [Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Net product Domestic income Gross product of nonfinancial corporate business Consumption of fixed capital 1959 ........ 267.3 23.1 244.2 26.1 218.2 171.3 43.7 43.6 20.7 22.9 10.0 12.9 −0.3 0.4 3.1 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ 278.0 285.5 311.7 331.8 358.2 393.7 431.4 453.9 501.0 543.9 24.0 24.6 25.5 26.5 27.9 29.9 32.7 35.9 39.7 43.9 254.0 260.9 286.2 305.4 330.3 363.8 398.7 418.0 461.4 500.0 28.4 29.6 32.1 34.1 36.7 39.3 40.5 43.2 49.8 54.8 225.6 231.3 254.1 271.2 293.7 324.6 358.2 374.9 411.5 445.2 181.0 185.2 200.0 210.9 226.5 246.3 273.8 292.2 323.1 358.5 41.1 42.1 49.6 55.5 61.9 72.2 77.0 73.9 78.3 73.5 40.3 40.1 44.9 49.8 56.1 66.3 71.6 67.7 74.1 71.1 19.2 19.5 20.6 22.8 24.0 27.2 29.5 27.8 33.6 33.3 21.1 20.6 24.3 27.1 32.1 39.1 42.1 39.9 40.6 37.8 10.6 10.6 11.4 12.6 13.7 15.6 16.8 17.5 19.1 19.1 10.5 10.1 12.9 14.4 18.4 23.5 25.3 22.4 21.4 18.7 −.2 .3 .0 .1 −.5 −1.2 −2.1 −1.6 −3.7 −5.9 1.0 1.8 4.6 5.6 6.2 7.1 7.5 7.8 7.8 8.2 3.5 4.0 4.5 4.8 5.3 6.1 7.4 8.8 10.1 13.2 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ 562.0 606.9 673.9 755.6 816.7 883.0 997.1 1,127.8 1,285.0 1,431.5 48.5 513.5 53.1 553.8 58.4 615.6 63.8 691.8 74.7 742.0 89.2 793.8 98.9 898.2 111.0 1,016.9 126.8 1,158.2 147.0 1,284.6 59.0 454.6 64.6 489.1 69.4 546.2 76.6 615.2 81.9 660.1 88.0 705.8 95.9 802.4 104.9 912.0 114.4 1,043.8 123.3 1,161.3 378.1 401.2 445.9 504.5 555.1 578.6 655.0 740.0 851.0 966.2 59.4 69.8 81.1 88.2 76.7 98.5 119.9 141.3 156.5 150.1 58.5 67.3 79.0 99.0 109.6 110.5 137.9 159.2 184.4 197.1 27.2 29.9 33.8 40.2 42.2 41.5 53.0 59.9 67.1 69.6 31.4 37.4 45.3 58.8 67.4 69.0 84.9 99.3 117.3 127.5 18.5 18.5 20.1 21.1 21.7 24.8 28.0 31.5 36.4 38.1 12.8 18.9 25.2 37.8 45.7 44.2 56.9 67.8 80.9 89.4 −6.6 −4.6 −6.6 −19.6 −38.2 −10.5 −14.1 −15.7 −23.7 −40.1 7.4 7.1 8.7 8.8 5.3 −1.4 −3.8 −2.3 −4.2 −6.9 17.1 18.1 19.2 22.5 28.3 28.7 27.5 30.7 36.3 45.0 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ 1,556.6 1,770.1 1,831.4 1,953.3 2,194.8 2,329.3 2,414.4 2,595.3 2,814.5 2,961.4 169.4 195.9 216.8 225.1 237.3 253.9 270.3 283.8 302.0 322.8 1,387.2 1,574.2 1,614.6 1,728.2 1,957.5 2,075.4 2,144.1 2,311.6 2,512.5 2,638.6 139.5 168.1 169.7 185.3 205.4 219.0 231.2 241.9 256.3 275.9 1,247.8 1,406.1 1,444.9 1,542.9 1,752.1 1,856.4 1,912.9 2,069.7 2,256.2 2,362.7 1,056.9 1,169.9 1,216.1 1,279.9 1,421.4 1,522.3 1,603.8 1,716.3 1,844.1 1,946.6 132.7 164.4 146.3 186.4 242.9 243.7 210.7 248.3 288.6 264.2 183.6 184.2 136.9 160.7 195.3 172.3 147.9 209.5 257.3 235.6 67.0 63.9 46.3 59.4 73.7 69.9 75.6 93.5 101.9 98.9 116.6 120.3 90.7 101.3 121.6 102.3 72.3 116.0 155.5 136.7 45.3 53.3 53.3 64.2 67.8 72.3 73.9 75.9 79.8 104.2 71.3 67.0 37.4 37.1 53.8 30.1 −1.6 40.1 75.7 32.6 −42.1 −24.6 −7.5 −7.4 −4.0 .0 7.1 −16.2 −22.2 −16.3 −8.8 58.1 4.8 71.8 16.9 82.5 33.1 76.6 51.7 87.7 71.4 90.4 55.8 98.4 55.0 105.1 53.4 123.6 45.0 151.8 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ....... 3,096.2 3,150.6 3,288.0 3,457.6 3,737.2 3,945.9 4,159.5 4,435.1 4,728.1 5,048.8 338.4 354.9 369.6 386.4 414.5 437.5 462.7 493.0 526.8 569.6 2,757.9 2,795.7 2,918.5 3,071.3 3,322.7 3,508.4 3,696.9 3,942.1 4,201.3 4,479.3 290.6 313.1 332.0 349.3 382.1 397.3 411.9 431.4 456.5 482.5 2,467.3 2,482.6 2,586.5 2,721.9 2,940.6 3,111.0 3,284.9 3,510.7 3,744.9 3,996.8 2,052.7 2,086.9 2,194.2 2,290.7 2,430.2 2,552.7 2,667.1 2,835.1 3,055.1 3,267.0 258.5 252.8 278.9 325.3 402.5 442.5 509.1 555.6 560.4 588.5 237.2 221.6 258.0 305.8 381.4 422.1 460.2 496.1 489.9 539.5 95.8 85.5 91.2 105.2 128.9 136.7 150.1 158.3 159.4 166.6 141.4 136.1 166.8 200.5 252.6 285.4 310.1 337.7 330.5 373.0 119.2 125.8 135.0 149.3 158.6 179.3 201.9 218.1 240.5 250.9 22.2 10.3 31.9 51.2 94.0 106.0 108.2 119.6 90.0 122.1 −12.9 4.9 −2.8 −4.0 −12.4 −18.3 3.1 8.4 17.0 −9.1 34.3 26.3 23.7 23.6 33.5 38.7 45.8 51.1 53.5 58.0 156.0 143.0 113.3 105.9 107.9 115.8 108.7 120.0 129.4 141.3 1995: I ..... II ... III .. IV .. 3,875.9 3,911.4 3,979.8 4,016.5 425.3 433.9 440.7 450.0 3,450.5 3,477.5 3,539.1 3,566.4 394.8 397.2 396.0 401.4 3,055.7 3,080.3 3,143.1 3,165.0 2,517.8 2,538.5 2,566.7 2,587.9 420.9 424.7 460.6 463.8 414.1 414.5 431.3 428.7 134.4 134.1 139.5 139.0 279.6 280.4 291.8 289.7 172.7 173.5 183.2 188.0 107.0 106.9 108.5 101.7 −32.5 −28.2 −9.8 −2.6 39.4 38.4 39.2 37.7 117.0 117.2 115.8 113.3 1996: I ..... II ... III .. IV .. 4,056.5 4,130.9 4,187.6 4,263.3 453.1 458.9 465.9 472.9 3,603.3 3,672.0 3,721.7 3,790.4 405.4 410.7 412.0 419.5 3,197.9 3,261.3 3,309.6 3,370.9 2,600.0 2,649.2 2,689.1 2,730.1 491.1 504.0 511.4 529.8 445.9 460.2 460.1 474.7 144.9 150.0 150.0 155.5 300.9 310.2 310.1 319.2 198.9 195.0 203.8 210.1 102.0 115.2 106.3 109.1 2.1 −1.7 4.7 7.1 43.1 45.5 46.6 48.0 106.9 108.0 109.1 111.0 1997: I ..... II ... III .. IV .. 4,319.1 4,389.6 4,479.0 4,552.6 480.1 488.6 497.4 505.8 3,839.0 3,901.0 3,981.6 4,046.8 421.6 432.2 435.4 436.2 3,417.4 3,468.8 3,546.2 3,610.5 2,768.9 2,805.3 2,850.1 2,916.1 534.5 544.7 573.9 569.2 473.9 481.6 517.0 511.8 150.9 153.4 165.5 163.6 323.0 328.2 351.5 348.2 210.4 214.0 218.9 229.1 112.6 114.2 132.6 119.1 10.4 12.1 5.6 5.7 50.2 51.1 51.3 51.8 113.9 118.8 122.2 125.2 1998: I ..... II ... III .. IV .. 4,619.1 4,681.7 4,773.0 4,838.5 512.9 521.6 531.3 541.3 4,106.2 4,160.1 4,241.7 4,297.2 445.6 452.4 453.2 474.6 3,660.6 3,707.7 3,788.5 3,822.6 2,979.7 3,027.6 3,080.3 3,132.7 555.3 550.9 576.8 558.5 480.0 490.2 505.6 483.8 155.3 159.3 165.3 157.7 324.7 330.9 340.2 326.1 234.4 239.9 239.9 247.8 90.3 91.0 100.3 78.3 22.6 7.7 17.7 19.9 52.7 53.0 53.6 54.8 125.6 129.3 131.5 131.4 1999: I ..... II ... III .. IV .. 4,923.1 4,999.7 5,080.6 5,191.9 550.6 564.5 579.2 584.0 4,372.6 4,453.2 4,501.4 4,607.9 469.3 477.3 482.3 501.1 3,903.3 3,958.0 4,019.0 4,106.8 3,183.5 3,236.5 3,295.8 3,352.2 586.6 586.0 579.1 602.0 517.2 538.1 539.9 563.0 158.5 167.2 167.1 173.5 358.6 370.9 372.8 389.5 237.6 256.3 252.1 257.5 121.0 114.6 120.6 132.0 11.4 −8.9 −19.7 −19.2 58.0 56.9 58.9 58.2 133.1 135.5 144.1 152.6 2000: I ..... II ... III .. 5,300.3 5,414.0 5,480.1 597.5 4,702.7 613.4 4,800.7 628.8 4,851.3 511.7 4,191.0 3,401.6 517.8 4,282.9 3,460.0 520.6 4,330.7 3,510.7 632.8 660.1 653.0 599.9 620.1 607.4 186.0 193.5 188.3 413.8 426.7 419.2 262.5 264.5 269.7 151.3 162.2 149.5 −25.0 −13.6 −4.5 57.9 156.6 53.7 162.7 50.1 167.0 Year or quarter Total Indirect business taxes 1 Corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments Total Compensation of employees Profits Inventory valuation Divi- Undis- adjustdends tributed profits ment Profits after tax Total 1 Indirect Profits Profits before tax tax liability Total business tax and nontax liability plus business transfer payments less subsidies. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 292 Capital Net con- intersump- est tion adjustment TABLE B–15.—Output, price, costs, and profits of nonfinancial corporate business, 1959–2000 [Quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Year or quarter Gross product of nonfinancial corporate business (billions of dollars) Current dollars Price, costs, and profit per unit of real output (dollars) Chained (1996) dollars Price per unit of real gross product of nonfinancial corporate business 1 Compensation of employees (unit labor cost) Unit nonlabor cost Total Corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments 3 Consumption of fixed capital Indirect business taxes 2 Net interest Total Profits tax liability Profits after tax 4 1959 .................................. 267.3 986.1 0.271 0.174 0.052 0.023 0.026 0.003 0.044 0.021 0.023 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. 278.0 285.5 311.7 331.8 358.2 393.7 431.4 453.9 501.0 543.9 1,018.7 1,041.5 1,128.0 1,194.5 1,278.5 1,384.3 1,480.9 1,519.2 1,615.8 1,680.2 .273 .274 .276 .278 .280 .284 .291 .299 .310 .324 .178 .178 .177 .177 .177 .178 .185 .192 .200 .213 .055 .056 .055 .055 .055 .054 .054 .058 .062 .067 .024 .024 .023 .022 .022 .022 .022 .024 .025 .026 .028 .028 .028 .029 .029 .028 .027 .028 .031 .033 .003 .004 .004 .004 .004 .004 .005 .006 .006 .008 .040 .040 .044 .046 .048 .052 .052 .049 .048 .044 .019 .019 .018 .019 .019 .020 .020 .018 .021 .020 .022 .022 .026 .027 .030 .032 .032 .030 .028 .024 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. 562.0 606.9 673.9 755.6 816.7 883.0 997.1 1,127.8 1,285.0 1,431.5 1,663.3 1,730.0 1,865.8 1,975.4 1,941.2 1,910.5 2,062.3 2,212.7 2,360.3 2,434.2 .338 .351 .361 .382 .421 .462 .484 .510 .544 .588 .227 .232 .239 .255 .286 .303 .318 .334 .361 .397 .074 .078 .078 .082 .095 .108 .107 .111 .117 .130 .029 .031 .031 .032 .038 .047 .048 .050 .054 .060 .035 .037 .037 .039 .042 .046 .046 .047 .048 .051 .010 .010 .010 .011 .015 .015 .013 .014 .015 .019 .036 .040 .043 .045 .040 .052 .058 .064 .066 .062 .016 .017 .018 .020 .022 .022 .026 .027 .028 .029 .019 .023 .025 .024 .018 .030 .032 .037 .038 .033 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. 1,556.6 1,770.1 1,831.4 1,953.3 2,194.8 2,329.3 2,414.4 2,595.3 2,814.5 2,961.4 2,400.4 2,479.5 2,426.6 2,542.0 2,782.4 2,907.9 2,978.9 3,146.6 3,322.1 3,377.5 .648 .714 .755 .768 .789 .801 .811 .825 .847 .877 .440 .472 .501 .503 .511 .523 .538 .545 .555 .576 .153 .176 .193 .192 .191 .193 .202 .200 .205 .223 .071 .079 .089 .089 .085 .087 .091 .090 .091 .096 .058 .068 .070 .073 .074 .075 .078 .077 .077 .082 .024 .029 .034 .030 .032 .031 .033 .033 .037 .045 .055 .066 .060 .073 .087 .084 .071 .079 .087 .078 .028 .026 .019 .023 .026 .024 .025 .030 .031 .029 .027 .041 .041 .050 .061 .060 .045 .049 .056 .049 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. 3,096.2 3,150.6 3,288.0 3,457.6 3,737.2 3,945.9 4,159.5 4,435.1 4,728.1 5,048.8 3,409.2 3,381.9 3,468.4 3,573.8 3,801.5 3,960.1 4,159.5 4,404.2 4,679.9 4,957.1 .908 .932 .948 .967 .983 .996 1.000 1.007 1.010 1.019 .602 .617 .633 .641 .639 .645 .641 .644 .653 .659 .230 .240 .236 .236 .238 .239 .236 .237 .239 .241 .099 .105 .107 .108 .109 .110 .111 .112 .113 .115 .085 .093 .096 .098 .101 .100 .099 .098 .098 .097 .046 .042 .033 .030 .028 .029 .026 .027 .028 .029 .076 .075 .080 .091 .106 .112 .122 .126 .120 .119 .028 .025 .026 .029 .034 .035 .036 .036 .034 .034 .048 .049 .054 .062 .072 .077 .086 .090 .086 .085 1995: I ............................... II .............................. III ............................. IV ............................. 3,875.9 3,911.4 3,979.8 4,016.5 3,900.4 3,927.0 3,988.4 4,024.8 .994 .996 .998 .998 .646 .646 .644 .643 .240 .241 .239 .240 .109 .110 .111 .112 .101 .101 .099 .100 .030 .030 .029 .028 .108 .108 .115 .115 .034 .034 .035 .035 .073 .074 .081 .081 1996: I ............................... II .............................. III ............................. IV ............................. 4,056.5 4,130.9 4,187.6 4,263.3 4,057.3 4,130.3 4,187.0 4,263.5 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 .641 .641 .642 .640 .238 .236 .235 .235 .112 .111 .111 .111 .100 .099 .098 .098 .026 .026 .026 .026 .121 .122 .122 .124 .036 .036 .036 .036 .085 .086 .086 .088 1997: I ............................... II .............................. III ............................. IV ............................. 4,319.1 4,389.6 4,479.0 4,552.6 4,295.3 4,358.7 4,447.3 4,515.7 1.006 1.007 1.007 1.008 .645 .644 .641 .646 .237 .238 .237 .237 .112 .112 .112 .112 .098 .099 .098 .097 .027 .027 .027 .028 .124 .125 .129 .126 .035 .035 .037 .036 .089 .090 .092 .090 1998: I ............................... II .............................. III ............................. IV ............................. 4,619.1 4,681.7 4,773.0 4,838.5 4,580.9 4,640.0 4,718.0 4,780.7 1.008 1.009 1.012 1.012 .650 .652 .653 .655 .236 .238 .237 .239 .112 .112 .113 .113 .097 .098 .096 .099 .027 .028 .028 .027 .121 .119 .122 .117 .034 .034 .035 .033 .087 .084 .087 .084 1999: I ............................... II .............................. III ............................. IV ............................. 4,923.1 4,999.7 5,080.6 5,191.9 4,843.5 4,904.4 4,987.0 5,093.6 1.016 1.019 1.019 1.019 .657 .660 .661 .658 .238 .240 .242 .243 .114 .115 .116 .115 .097 .097 .097 .098 .027 .028 .029 .030 .121 .119 .116 .118 .033 .034 .034 .034 .088 .085 .083 .084 2000: I ............................... II .............................. III ............................ 5,300.3 5,414.0 5,480.1 5,171.0 5,251.2 5,308.1 1.025 1.031 1.032 .658 .659 .661 .245 .247 .247 .116 .117 .118 .099 .099 .098 .030 .031 .031 .122 .126 .123 .036 .037 .035 .086 .089 .088 1 The implicit price deflator for gross product of nonfinancial corporate business divided by 100. business tax and nontax liability plus business transfer payments less subsidies. profits from current production. 4 With inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2 Indirect 3 Unit 293 TABLE B–16.—Personal consumption expenditures, 1959–2000 [Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Durable goods Year or quarter 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Personal conMotor sumption vehiexpendi- Total 1 cles tures and parts Nondurable goods Furniture and household equipment Total 1 Food Cloth- Gasoing line and and shoes oil Services Fuel oil and coal Household operation Total 1 Housing 2 ElecTotal 1 tricity and gas Transportation Medical care ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ..... 318.1 332.3 342.7 363.8 383.1 411.7 444.3 481.8 508.7 558.7 605.5 648.9 702.4 770.7 852.5 932.4 1,030.3 1,149.8 1,278.4 1,430.4 1,596.3 1,762.9 1,944.2 2,079.3 2,286.4 2,498.4 2,712.6 2,895.2 3,105.3 3,356.6 3,596.7 3,831.5 3,971.2 4,209.7 4,454.7 4,716.4 4,969.0 5,237.5 5,529.3 5,850.9 6,268.7 42.7 43.3 41.8 46.9 51.6 56.7 63.3 68.3 70.4 80.8 85.9 85.0 96.9 110.4 123.5 122.3 133.5 158.9 181.2 201.7 214.4 214.2 231.3 240.2 281.2 326.9 363.3 401.3 419.7 450.2 467.8 467.6 443.0 470.8 513.4 560.8 589.7 616.5 642.5 693.9 761.3 18.9 19.7 17.8 21.5 24.4 26.0 29.9 30.3 30.0 36.1 38.4 35.5 44.5 51.1 56.1 49.5 54.8 71.3 83.5 93.1 93.5 87.0 95.8 102.9 126.9 152.5 175.7 192.4 193.1 206.1 211.4 206.4 182.8 200.2 222.1 242.3 249.3 256.3 264.2 288.8 320.7 18.1 18.0 18.3 19.3 20.7 23.2 25.1 28.2 30.0 32.9 34.7 35.7 37.8 42.4 47.9 51.5 54.5 60.2 67.2 74.3 82.7 86.7 92.1 93.4 106.6 119.0 128.5 143.0 153.4 163.6 171.4 171.4 171.5 178.7 192.4 211.2 225.0 236.9 248.9 266.1 288.5 148.5 152.9 156.6 162.8 168.2 178.7 191.6 208.8 217.1 235.7 253.2 272.0 285.5 308.0 343.1 384.5 420.7 458.3 497.2 550.2 624.4 696.1 758.9 787.6 831.2 884.7 928.8 958.5 1,015.3 1,082.9 1,165.4 1,246.1 1,278.8 1,322.9 1,375.2 1,438.0 1,497.3 1,574.1 1,641.6 1,707.6 1,845.5 80.7 82.3 84.0 86.1 88.3 93.6 100.7 109.3 112.5 122.2 131.5 143.8 149.7 161.4 179.6 201.8 223.2 242.5 262.7 289.6 324.7 356.0 383.5 403.4 423.8 447.4 467.6 492.0 515.3 553.5 591.9 636.9 657.6 669.3 697.9 728.2 755.8 786.0 812.2 845.8 897.8 26.4 27.0 27.6 29.0 29.8 32.4 34.1 37.4 39.2 43.2 46.5 47.8 51.7 56.4 62.5 66.0 70.8 76.6 84.1 94.3 101.2 107.3 117.2 120.5 130.9 142.5 152.1 163.1 174.4 185.5 198.9 204.1 208.7 221.9 231.1 240.7 247.8 258.6 271.7 286.4 307.0 11.3 12.0 12.0 12.6 13.0 13.6 14.8 16.0 17.1 18.6 20.5 21.9 23.2 24.4 28.1 36.1 39.7 43.0 46.9 50.1 66.2 86.7 97.9 94.1 93.1 94.6 97.2 80.1 85.4 87.7 97.0 107.3 102.5 104.9 106.6 109.0 113.3 124.2 128.1 115.2 128.3 4.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 4.0 4.1 4.4 4.7 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.4 4.6 5.1 6.3 7.8 8.4 10.1 11.1 11.5 14.4 15.4 15.8 14.5 13.6 13.9 13.6 11.3 11.2 11.7 11.9 12.9 12.4 12.2 12.9 13.5 14.1 15.6 15.1 12.8 14.4 127.0 136.1 144.3 154.1 163.4 176.4 189.5 204.7 221.2 242.3 266.4 292.0 320.0 352.3 385.9 425.5 476.1 532.6 600.0 678.4 757.4 852.7 954.0 1,051.5 1,174.0 1,286.9 1,420.6 1,535.4 1,670.3 1,823.5 1,963.5 2,117.8 2,249.4 2,415.9 2,566.1 2,717.6 2,882.0 3,047.0 3,245.2 3,449.3 3,661.9 45.0 48.2 51.2 54.7 58.0 61.4 65.4 69.5 74.1 79.7 86.8 94.0 102.7 112.1 122.7 134.1 147.0 161.5 179.5 201.7 226.5 255.1 287.7 313.0 338.7 370.3 406.8 442.0 476.4 511.9 546.4 585.6 616.0 641.3 666.5 704.7 740.8 772.5 810.5 858.2 906.2 18.7 20.3 21.2 22.4 23.6 25.0 26.5 28.2 30.2 32.4 35.2 37.9 41.3 45.7 50.2 56.0 64.3 73.1 82.7 92.1 101.0 114.2 127.3 143.0 157.6 169.8 182.2 188.9 196.9 208.4 221.3 227.6 238.6 248.3 268.9 284.0 298.1 317.3 333.0 345.6 360.2 7.6 8.3 8.8 9.4 9.9 10.4 10.9 11.5 12.2 13.0 14.1 15.3 16.9 18.8 20.4 24.0 29.2 33.2 38.5 43.0 47.8 57.5 64.8 74.2 82.4 86.5 90.8 89.2 90.9 96.3 101.0 101.0 107.4 108.9 118.6 119.8 122.5 128.7 130.4 128.5 128.9 10.5 11.2 11.7 12.2 12.7 13.4 14.5 15.9 17.3 18.9 20.9 23.7 27.1 29.8 31.2 33.3 35.7 41.3 49.2 53.5 59.1 64.7 68.7 70.9 79.4 90.0 100.0 107.3 118.2 129.9 136.6 141.8 142.8 155.0 166.2 180.9 197.7 214.2 234.4 244.5 256.5 16.4 17.6 18.7 20.8 22.6 25.8 27.9 30.7 33.9 39.2 44.8 50.4 56.9 63.9 71.5 80.4 93.4 106.5 122.6 140.0 158.1 181.2 213.0 239.3 267.9 294.6 322.5 346.8 381.8 429.9 479.2 540.6 591.0 652.6 700.6 737.3 780.7 814.4 854.6 898.6 943.6 1995: I ... II .. III IV 1996: I ... II .. III IV 1997: I ... II .. III IV 1998: I ... II .. III IV 1999: I ... II .. III IV 2000: I ... II .. III 4,868.6 4,943.7 5,005.2 5,058.4 5,130.5 5,218.0 5,263.7 5,337.9 5,429.9 5,470.8 5,575.9 5,640.6 5,712.6 5,811.4 5,893.4 5,986.0 6,095.3 6,213.2 6,319.9 6,446.2 6,621.7 6,706.3 6,810.8 578.2 584.4 596.2 600.0 606.4 621.3 616.7 621.5 635.1 624.4 652.4 658.3 670.5 689.3 692.5 723.4 733.9 756.3 767.2 787.6 826.3 814.3 824.7 245.0 248.2 252.3 251.7 256.3 259.2 255.4 254.2 264.5 251.0 270.1 271.0 275.2 288.9 283.5 307.7 307.6 321.8 323.2 330.3 349.3 335.5 341.4 220.4 221.9 227.0 231.0 230.4 238.2 237.7 241.2 243.1 246.4 251.4 254.9 260.2 262.5 268.3 273.2 279.4 284.7 291.0 298.8 309.7 311.1 314.1 1,475.8 1,492.2 1,502.6 1,518.5 1,539.6 1,569.4 1,578.8 1,608.4 1,626.8 1,627.3 1,653.1 1,659.0 1,672.5 1,694.8 1,717.9 1,745.2 1,786.4 1,825.3 1,860.0 1,910.2 1,963.9 1,997.6 2,031.5 745.5 753.6 758.8 765.3 773.9 781.8 788.8 799.3 806.9 808.2 817.4 816.2 825.4 838.9 851.5 867.2 878.1 886.6 900.4 926.1 938.4 948.3 959.9 244.5 246.0 249.3 251.2 253.0 259.0 259.3 263.0 266.6 267.8 274.8 277.6 282.3 285.1 286.5 291.7 301.1 306.1 308.7 311.9 323.1 325.6 330.9 113.9 114.3 112.7 112.2 117.7 127.0 123.3 128.6 132.0 125.1 127.3 128.1 119.5 115.7 114.0 111.8 110.7 127.3 133.4 142.0 154.5 163.3 165.5 13.2 14.4 14.2 14.6 16.1 15.1 15.0 16.0 15.3 15.3 15.1 14.6 12.8 13.1 13.0 12.3 12.9 14.0 15.1 15.6 18.5 18.7 20.3 2,814.7 2,867.1 2,906.3 2,939.9 2,984.4 3,027.4 3,068.2 3,107.9 3,168.0 3,219.1 3,270.4 3,323.3 3,369.7 3,427.4 3,482.9 3,517.4 3,575.0 3,631.5 3,692.7 3,748.5 3,831.6 3,894.4 3,954.6 727.7 736.9 744.9 753.7 760.4 768.1 776.6 785.1 794.6 805.0 815.7 826.7 839.3 852.2 864.4 877.1 888.7 900.8 911.6 923.5 936.7 950.0 962.2 287.8 295.7 304.6 304.2 314.6 318.3 313.4 322.7 325.9 329.0 332.9 344.4 336.6 346.7 353.7 345.4 353.9 357.2 366.7 363.0 369.0 380.6 385.7 116.2 121.8 127.3 124.7 131.3 130.0 124.6 129.1 128.7 128.8 128.1 135.8 125.0 131.8 134.1 122.9 127.5 127.4 133.7 126.7 129.5 138.4 141.1 190.4 195.5 200.8 204.2 206.5 211.7 215.9 222.6 229.1 232.9 236.2 239.5 240.9 244.0 245.8 247.4 250.8 254.7 258.1 262.3 267.4 272.8 275.5 767.6 776.2 784.8 794.3 798.2 810.7 817.9 831.0 839.6 850.0 860.8 868.1 885.4 893.9 902.5 912.4 924.5 935.9 950.0 964.0 979.3 989.6 1,005.6 1 Includes other items not shown separately. imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2 Includes 294 TABLE B–17.—Real personal consumption expenditures, 1987–2000 [Billions of chained (1996) dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Durable goods Year or quarter Personal consumption expendi- Total 1 tures FurniMotor ture vehiand cles houseand hold parts equipment Nondurable goods Total 1 Food Clothing and shoes Gasoline and oil Services Fuel oil and coal Household operation Total 1 Housing 2 Total 1 Electricity and gas Trans- Mediporta- cal tion care 1987 ......... 1988 ......... 1989 ......... 4,113.4 4,279.5 4,393.7 455.2 481.5 491.7 242.4 254.9 253.9 133.3 1,274.5 142.3 1,315.1 149.9 1,351.0 664.6 690.7 703.5 182.4 187.8 198.6 112.8 114.9 116.4 14.2 2,379.3 14.7 2,477.2 14.4 2,546.0 644.8 663.4 679.9 238.0 248.2 257.2 106.9 112.3 114.7 164.6 631.0 172.8 659.9 174.6 678.5 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 4,474.5 4,466.6 4,594.5 4,748.9 4,928.1 5,075.6 5,237.5 5,423.9 5,678.7 5,978.8 487.1 454.9 479.0 518.3 557.7 583.5 616.5 657.3 727.3 817.8 246.1 211.8 225.7 242.2 255.1 253.4 256.3 264.8 291.7 323.0 150.9 152.7 161.5 177.4 196.3 215.4 236.9 261.9 294.4 338.7 1,369.6 1,364.0 1,389.7 1,430.3 1,485.1 1,529.0 1,574.1 1,619.9 1,684.8 1,779.4 722.4 721.4 725.6 745.1 764.9 777.0 786.0 794.5 812.8 845.9 197.2 197.8 208.8 218.5 231.6 244.3 258.6 271.6 292.2 318.5 113.1 109.4 112.5 115.4 117.4 120.2 124.2 128.1 131.2 134.2 13.1 12.9 13.2 14.0 15.0 15.7 15.6 15.0 14.0 15.5 2,616.2 2,651.8 2,729.7 2,802.5 2,886.2 2,963.4 3,047.0 3,147.0 3,269.4 3,390.8 696.2 709.8 719.3 728.1 749.1 763.7 772.6 787.2 807.7 828.3 259.8 262.9 267.6 282.3 293.0 304.0 317.3 327.4 343.0 358.0 112.8 116.3 115.7 122.2 122.8 125.3 128.7 127.5 130.0 130.9 173.4 164.7 171.1 176.6 189.0 201.0 214.2 226.4 233.1 241.2 710.9 734.4 765.4 775.4 783.1 797.7 814.4 835.4 859.8 881.7 1995: I ...... II ..... III .... IV .... 5,011.6 5,059.6 5,099.2 5,132.1 570.4 577.4 590.7 595.7 250.7 252.2 256.4 254.4 207.7 211.1 218.1 224.6 1,514.3 1,525.3 1,531.7 1,544.6 773.4 776.0 778.0 780.6 240.1 242.4 246.3 248.4 119.5 120.0 120.0 121.5 14.8 16.1 15.7 16.3 2,927.3 2,957.4 2,977.0 2,992.0 759.8 762.6 764.9 767.6 293.9 302.2 310.5 309.3 118.8 125.1 130.3 127.2 196.7 198.8 202.5 206.0 791.1 795.6 799.8 804.5 1996: I ...... II ..... III .... IV .... 5,174.3 5,229.5 5,254.3 5,291.9 601.7 620.4 618.1 625.7 257.0 259.6 255.2 253.4 226.1 237.2 238.7 245.5 1,553.9 1,569.9 1,578.6 1,593.9 784.5 785.5 785.3 788.5 250.7 257.8 261.6 264.3 121.9 124.4 124.5 125.9 16.6 15.3 15.5 14.9 3,018.8 3,039.2 3,057.7 3,072.2 768.7 770.8 773.6 777.0 317.6 319.1 312.3 320.1 132.8 130.5 123.8 127.9 210.2 212.7 215.3 218.5 804.1 812.7 816.3 824.6 1997: I ...... II ..... III .... IV .... 5,350.7 5,375.7 5,462.1 5,507.1 641.5 636.5 670.5 680.9 262.9 250.8 271.8 273.7 250.5 257.6 266.5 273.2 1,605.6 1,608.2 1,631.7 1,634.1 794.0 792.8 797.8 793.2 267.1 265.2 275.0 279.1 126.6 128.3 128.7 128.9 14.2 15.2 15.4 15.1 3,103.7 3,130.6 3,160.6 3,193.0 781.1 784.7 789.1 793.9 319.6 324.1 327.7 338.4 124.6 126.8 125.9 132.9 223.6 225.3 227.8 228.8 825.9 832.5 839.3 844.0 1998: I ...... II ..... III .... IV .... 5,572.4 5,651.6 5,711.0 5,779.8 696.4 719.4 726.7 766.7 278.3 292.6 284.9 311.1 281.9 286.9 299.1 309.9 1,652.8 1,676.3 1,694.2 1,716.0 798.3 809.2 816.8 827.0 287.0 291.3 292.0 298.7 129.4 130.7 132.2 132.2 13.6 14.1 14.3 14.0 3,224.5 3,258.2 3,292.4 3,302.8 800.0 806.1 810.3 814.4 333.9 343.1 351.3 343.6 125.5 132.6 136.2 125.8 230.4 233.4 233.7 235.1 855.2 857.7 861.5 864.8 1999: I ...... II ..... III .... IV .... 5,860.2 5,940.2 6,013.8 6,101.0 782.7 810.5 826.2 851.8 311.0 325.3 324.9 330.9 320.9 331.7 343.9 358.2 1,748.5 1,765.0 1,786.1 1,818.1 832.7 838.0 846.7 866.0 313.3 316.5 322.1 322.1 132.5 134.3 133.6 136.2 15.0 15.7 16.0 15.3 3,335.8 3,373.4 3,411.1 3,443.0 820.4 825.7 830.7 836.5 351.9 355.9 364.7 359.3 130.3 130.2 135.5 127.7 237.3 239.7 242.7 245.0 870.5 878.1 885.6 892.8 2000: I ...... II ..... III .... 6,213.5 6,260.6 6,329.8 898.2 886.7 903.2 351.8 335.9 342.0 374.1 1,844.8 379.3 1,861.1 387.2 1,882.6 872.2 876.5 879.1 337.7 342.3 350.2 131.2 132.2 133.8 14.7 3,487.2 15.3 3,526.7 15.8 3,559.3 841.4 847.0 851.7 364.7 374.8 375.2 130.0 136.5 133.9 247.5 897.4 249.9 903.8 250.8 909.1 1 Includes other items not shown separately. imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing. Note.—See Table B-2 for data for total personal consumption expenditures for 1959-86. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2 Includes 295 TABLE B–18.—Private fixed investment by type, 1959–2000 [Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Nonresidential Structures Year or quarter 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ...... Private fixed investment Total nonresidential Total 1 Nonresidential buildings including farm Utilities Equipment and software Information processing equipment and software Mining exploration, shafts, and wells Total 1 Total Computers and peripheral equipment 2 Software3 Other Industrial equipment Transportation equipment Residential 74.6 46.5 75.7 49.4 75.2 48.8 82.0 53.1 88.1 56.0 97.2 63.0 109.0 74.8 117.7 85.4 118.7 86.4 132.1 93.4 147.3 104.7 150.4 109.0 169.9 114.1 198.5 128.8 228.6 153.3 235.4 169.5 236.5 173.7 274.8 192.4 339.0 228.7 410.2 278.6 472.7 331.6 484.2 360.9 541.0 418.4 531.0 425.3 570.0 417.4 670.1 490.3 714.5 527.6 740.7 522.5 754.3 526.7 802.7 568.4 845.2 613.4 847.2 630.3 800.4 608.9 851.6 626.1 934.0 682.2 1,034.6 748.6 1,110.7 825.1 1,212.7 899.4 1,327.7 999.4 1,472.9 1,107.5 1,606.8 1,203.1 18.1 19.6 19.7 20.8 21.2 23.7 28.3 31.3 31.5 33.6 37.7 40.3 42.7 47.2 55.0 61.2 61.4 65.9 74.6 91.4 114.9 133.9 164.6 175.0 152.7 176.0 193.3 175.8 172.1 181.6 193.4 202.5 183.4 172.2 179.4 187.5 204.6 225.0 255.8 283.2 285.6 10.6 12.0 12.7 13.7 13.9 15.8 19.5 21.3 20.6 21.1 24.4 25.4 27.1 30.1 35.5 38.3 35.6 35.9 39.9 49.7 65.7 73.7 86.3 94.5 90.5 110.0 128.0 123.3 126.0 133.8 142.7 149.1 124.2 113.2 119.3 129.0 144.3 161.7 182.7 202.3 208.5 4.9 5.0 4.6 4.6 5.0 5.4 6.1 7.1 7.8 9.2 9.6 11.1 11.9 13.1 15.0 16.5 17.1 20.0 21.5 24.1 27.5 30.2 33.0 32.5 28.7 30.0 30.6 31.2 26.5 26.6 29.5 28.4 33.7 36.7 34.8 34.0 35.8 36.0 36.1 44.5 45.0 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.7 3.1 3.5 5.2 7.4 8.6 11.5 15.4 19.0 27.4 42.5 44.8 30.0 31.3 27.9 15.7 13.1 15.7 14.9 17.9 18.5 14.2 17.7 17.4 17.2 21.1 30.1 29.3 24.3 28.4 29.8 29.1 32.3 34.8 39.2 46.5 54.0 54.9 59.9 67.0 68.7 71.5 81.7 98.3 108.2 112.4 126.4 154.1 187.2 216.7 227.0 253.8 250.3 264.7 314.3 334.3 346.8 354.7 386.8 420.0 427.8 425.4 453.9 502.8 561.1 620.5 674.4 743.6 824.3 917.4 4.0 4.9 5.2 5.7 6.5 7.3 8.5 10.6 11.2 11.9 14.6 16.7 17.3 19.3 23.0 26.8 28.2 32.4 38.6 48.3 58.6 69.6 82.4 88.9 100.8 121.7 130.8 137.6 141.9 155.9 173.0 176.1 181.4 197.5 215.0 233.7 262.0 287.3 325.2 367.4 433.0 0.0 .2 .3 .3 .7 .9 1.2 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.4 2.7 2.8 3.5 3.5 3.9 3.6 4.4 5.7 7.6 10.2 12.5 17.1 18.9 23.9 31.6 33.7 33.4 35.8 38.0 43.1 38.6 37.7 43.6 47.2 51.3 64.6 70.9 79.6 84.9 94.3 0.0 .1 .2 .2 .4 .5 .7 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.8 2.3 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.9 4.8 5.2 5.5 6.6 8.7 10.7 12.9 15.4 18.0 22.1 25.6 27.8 31.4 36.7 44.4 50.2 56.6 60.8 69.4 75.5 83.5 95.1 116.5 144.1 180.1 4.0 4.5 4.8 5.1 5.3 5.8 6.6 7.9 8.1 8.6 10.4 11.6 12.1 13.1 16.3 19.0 19.9 22.8 27.5 34.2 39.8 46.4 52.3 54.6 58.9 68.0 71.5 76.4 74.8 81.2 85.5 87.3 87.1 93.1 98.4 106.9 113.8 121.3 129.2 138.4 158.6 8.4 9.3 8.7 9.2 10.0 11.4 13.6 16.1 16.8 17.2 18.9 20.2 19.4 21.3 25.9 30.5 31.1 33.9 39.2 47.4 55.9 60.4 65.2 62.3 58.4 67.6 71.9 74.8 76.1 83.5 92.7 91.5 88.7 92.4 101.8 113.3 128.7 136.4 141.0 148.9 150.7 8.3 8.5 8.0 9.8 9.4 10.6 13.2 14.5 14.3 17.6 18.9 16.2 18.4 21.8 26.6 26.3 25.2 30.0 39.3 47.3 53.6 48.4 50.6 46.8 53.7 64.8 69.7 71.8 70.4 76.1 71.4 75.7 79.5 86.1 98.1 117.8 126.1 138.9 151.4 168.2 193.5 28.1 26.3 26.4 29.0 32.1 34.3 34.2 32.3 32.4 38.7 42.6 41.4 55.8 69.7 75.3 66.0 62.7 82.5 110.3 131.6 141.0 123.2 122.6 105.7 152.5 179.8 186.9 218.1 227.6 234.2 231.8 216.8 191.5 225.5 251.8 286.0 285.6 313.3 328.2 365.4 403.8 1995: I .... II ... III .. IV .. 1,100.1 1,097.2 1,110.1 1,135.4 812.5 820.3 825.2 842.3 200.5 204.8 206.2 207.0 140.2 144.7 145.2 147.2 35.4 36.1 36.2 35.5 17.6 16.5 17.0 17.8 612.0 615.5 619.0 635.3 250.5 261.1 263.1 273.2 57.7 64.3 65.6 70.7 78.8 81.8 85.0 88.6 114.0 115.0 112.5 113.9 124.7 128.9 130.8 130.4 134.0 122.4 121.8 126.4 287.6 276.9 284.9 293.1 1996: I .... II ... III .. IV .. 1,165.6 1,201.7 1,232.6 1,250.9 865.1 885.4 913.6 933.7 213.4 220.0 226.3 240.3 151.8 157.4 163.2 174.2 35.8 35.5 35.5 37.3 19.0 20.7 21.6 23.0 651.7 665.4 687.3 693.4 280.0 283.4 290.9 294.8 70.5 69.6 71.6 71.7 91.7 94.0 96.1 98.9 117.8 119.8 123.2 124.2 135.0 137.7 135.9 137.2 129.1 134.6 146.5 145.5 300.5 316.3 319.0 317.2 1997: I .... II ... III .. IV .. 1,275.5 955.5 1,310.0 984.3 1,355.8 1,026.0 1,369.3 1,031.8 246.9 247.7 260.6 267.9 178.5 177.1 187.6 187.4 34.9 35.2 36.4 37.8 27.8 29.5 30.1 32.8 708.6 736.6 765.4 764.0 307.0 319.0 335.5 339.5 74.8 78.8 83.0 81.9 106.2 113.5 120.1 126.0 126.0 126.7 132.4 131.6 135.7 141.0 142.9 144.5 145.3 151.7 157.8 150.9 320.0 325.7 329.8 337.5 1998: I .... II ... III .. IV .. 1,419.7 1,465.4 1,482.4 1,524.1 1,073.0 1,105.8 1,110.5 1,140.7 275.1 286.3 283.9 287.6 194.6 202.1 202.6 209.9 42.9 44.4 45.2 45.6 30.7 32.4 29.2 24.9 797.9 819.5 826.6 853.1 353.5 362.9 371.3 381.8 85.4 85.5 84.0 85.0 131.9 140.0 148.5 155.9 136.3 137.4 138.8 141.0 147.0 148.6 149.7 150.2 161.1 166.7 162.6 182.3 346.7 359.6 371.9 383.4 1999: I .... II ... III .. IV 1,560.6 1,593.4 1,622.4 1,651.0 1,165.3 1,188.0 1,216.8 1,242.2 287.2 283.7 281.2 290.4 212.9 207.7 204.7 208.7 44.7 44.5 45.1 45.8 22.3 23.2 23.8 27.8 878.1 904.3 935.6 951.8 401.7 423.6 445.5 461.4 88.1 92.8 97.6 98.9 165.4 173.3 184.7 196.8 148.2 157.5 163.2 165.7 146.5 148.3 151.8 156.3 185.5 191.6 200.3 196.5 395.3 405.4 405.6 408.8 2000: I .... II ... III .. 1,725.8 1,308.5 1,780.5 1,359.2 1,803.0 1,390.6 308.9 315.1 330.1 224.5 229.3 235.0 47.1 45.4 48.5 29.8 999.6 495.3 33.2 1,044.1 527.5 37.6 1,060.5 548.6 104.3 113.6 120.3 210.5 224.5 238.4 180.6 189.3 189.9 162.7 168.0 171.8 198.7 201.6 193.8 417.3 421.3 412.4 1 Includes 2 Includes 3 Excludes other items, not shown separately. new computers and peripheral equipment only. software ‘‘embedded,’’ or bundled, in computers and other equipment. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 296 TABLE B–19.—Real private fixed investment by type, 1987–2000 [Billions of chained (1996) dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Nonresidential Structures Year or quarter 1987 ....... 1988 ....... 1989 ....... Private fixed investment Total nonresidential Total 1 Nonresidential buildings including farm Equipment and software Information processing equipment and software Utilities Mining exploration, shafts, and wells Total 1 Total Computers Softand pe- ware 3 ripheral equip2 ment Other Industrial equipment Transportation equipment Residential 856.0 887.1 911.2 572.5 603.6 637.0 224.3 227.1 232.7 162.6 166.5 171.4 34.9 33.6 35.4 18.6 20.4 18.4 360.0 386.9 414.0 105.1 116.4 131.3 10.3 11.8 14.4 27.9 32.4 40.1 78.0 83.5 86.8 99.9 104.9 112.4 88.0 93.6 84.9 290.7 289.2 277.3 ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... 894.6 832.5 886.5 958.4 1,045.9 1,109.2 1,212.7 1,328.6 1,485.3 1,621.4 641.7 610.1 630.6 683.6 744.6 817.5 899.4 1,009.3 1,140.3 1,255.3 236.1 210.1 197.3 198.9 200.5 210.1 225.0 245.4 263.0 259.2 173.6 142.7 129.2 131.7 137.2 147.6 161.7 177.0 189.1 187.4 33.0 38.9 41.8 38.4 36.1 36.8 36.0 35.3 43.0 43.5 21.3 20.8 17.2 20.5 19.8 18.2 21.1 26.2 24.4 21.5 415.7 407.2 437.5 487.1 544.9 607.6 674.4 764.2 879.0 1,003.1 136.4 142.7 163.0 183.4 206.6 242.8 287.3 349.8 431.6 542.2 14.2 15.4 20.8 26.4 32.6 49.2 70.9 102.9 149.3 217.3 45.9 51.4 58.7 66.8 74.3 82.0 95.1 119.0 151.0 188.0 87.6 86.4 91.5 96.4 104.9 113.1 121.3 129.8 140.7 163.1 105.8 99.0 100.8 109.6 119.6 131.3 136.4 140.0 146.9 147.8 87.4 87.7 92.3 103.4 120.4 128.2 138.9 150.5 168.0 191.8 253.5 221.1 257.2 276.0 302.7 291.7 313.3 319.7 346.1 368.3 1995: I .... II ... III .. IV .. 1,101.9 1,095.0 1,107.1 1,132.7 806.4 811.4 816.7 835.5 208.1 211.0 210.9 210.4 144.5 148.3 148.1 149.4 36.9 37.3 37.0 36.0 19.1 17.6 17.9 18.4 598.5 600.7 606.0 625.0 227.5 239.2 245.0 259.4 40.5 47.0 50.8 58.4 77.5 80.1 83.3 87.2 112.8 113.9 111.9 113.8 129.3 131.8 132.7 131.6 137.3 124.7 123.3 127.5 295.8 283.5 290.4 297.3 1996: I .... II ... III .. IV .. 1,165.2 1,203.7 1,231.6 1,250.2 861.6 885.6 914.3 936.2 215.9 221.3 225.4 237.3 153.4 158.3 162.4 172.4 36.1 35.7 35.5 36.8 19.6 21.0 21.5 22.3 645.8 664.3 688.9 698.8 271.7 281.4 293.6 302.4 63.1 67.9 73.9 78.5 90.7 93.6 96.4 99.8 117.8 119.7 123.3 124.3 135.6 138.0 135.7 136.5 130.2 134.7 145.8 144.9 303.6 318.1 317.3 314.0 1997: I .... II ... III .. IV .. 1,275.4 1,311.1 1,356.7 1,371.3 960.8 992.7 1,037.0 1,047.0 241.1 239.3 248.5 252.7 175.4 172.8 180.9 178.8 34.4 34.4 35.5 36.7 25.5 26.1 25.7 27.4 719.6 753.7 788.9 794.5 320.9 339.4 363.7 375.2 87.2 98.1 110.5 115.8 107.7 115.3 123.0 130.1 126.5 127.4 132.8 132.5 134.9 140.2 141.8 143.2 144.5 150.8 156.2 150.3 314.7 318.7 320.3 324.9 1998: I .... II ... III .. IV .. 1,427.4 1,477.6 1,496.4 1,539.7 1,096.0 1,136.4 1,146.3 1,182.3 257.5 266.2 263.0 265.1 184.5 190.1 188.6 193.2 41.5 43.0 43.6 44.0 25.1 26.2 24.6 21.7 839.4 871.3 885.2 920.0 401.4 422.2 440.7 462.0 131.8 144.0 153.4 168.0 137.8 146.7 155.7 163.9 137.7 139.7 141.6 143.9 145.5 146.9 147.6 147.7 161.1 167.1 162.3 181.6 332.4 342.4 350.9 358.5 1999: I .... II ... III .. IV .. 1,574.0 1,607.1 1,637.8 1,666.6 1,209.4 1,237.5 1,272.5 1,301.8 262.9 258.7 254.6 260.6 193.6 187.7 183.2 185.1 43.3 43.2 43.6 44.0 19.7 20.6 21.3 24.6 950.9 985.0 1,026.6 1,050.1 492.9 526.9 561.1 587.9 186.1 208.5 230.9 243.8 173.3 181.1 192.5 205.3 151.4 161.3 168.1 171.6 143.7 145.7 148.9 152.8 183.1 189.0 199.1 195.9 365.7 370.9 368.0 368.5 2000: I .... II ... III 1,730.9 1,777.6 1,791.3 1,365.3 1,412.5 1,438.8 274.0 277.0 286.6 196.5 199.5 202.7 44.9 42.8 45.6 26.1 28.4 30.5 1,100.4 1,146.6 1,162.4 629.4 669.1 695.6 264.1 297.3 324.3 215.0 224.5 234.3 187.3 196.6 197.5 158.9 164.0 167.4 197.3 199.2 190.6 371.4 372.6 362.3 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1 Includes other items, not shown separately. new computers and peripheral equipment only. software ‘‘embedded,’’ or bundled, in computers and other equipment. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2 Includes 3 Excludes 297 TABLE B–20.—Government consumption expenditures and gross investment by type, 1959–2000 [Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Government consumption expenditures and gross investment Federal State and local National defense Year or quarter Total Total Total Consumption expenditures Nondefense Gross investment Equipment and software Total Structures Consumption expenditures Gross investment Structures Equipment and software Total Consumption expenditures Gross investment Structures Equipment and software 1959 ....... 112.5 67.4 56.0 42.2 2.5 11.2 11.4 9.8 1.5 0.2 45.1 31.1 12.8 1.1 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... 113.8 65.9 121.5 69.5 132.2 76.9 138.5 78.5 145.1 79.8 153.7 82.1 174.3 94.4 195.3 106.8 212.8 114.0 224.6 116.1 55.2 58.1 62.8 62.7 61.8 62.4 73.8 85.8 92.2 92.6 42.8 44.3 48.3 50.1 50.3 52.4 61.4 71.5 79.0 80.1 2.2 2.4 2.0 1.6 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.5 10.1 11.5 12.5 11.0 10.2 8.9 11.1 13.1 11.9 11.0 10.7 11.3 14.1 15.8 18.0 19.7 20.7 21.0 21.8 23.5 8.7 8.9 11.2 12.3 13.9 15.0 15.8 16.9 18.0 19.9 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.2 2.1 1.9 .3 .6 .8 1.2 1.6 1.9 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.7 47.9 52.0 55.3 59.9 65.3 71.6 79.9 88.6 98.8 108.5 34.0 37.0 39.4 42.4 46.3 50.8 56.8 63.2 71.1 80.2 12.7 13.8 14.5 16.0 17.2 19.0 21.0 23.0 25.2 25.6 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.7 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... 237.1 251.0 270.1 287.9 322.4 361.1 384.5 415.3 455.6 503.5 116.4 117.6 125.6 127.8 138.2 152.1 160.6 176.0 191.9 211.6 90.9 89.0 93.5 93.9 99.7 107.9 113.2 122.6 132.0 146.7 78.7 79.3 82.3 82.6 87.5 93.4 97.9 105.8 114.2 125.3 1.3 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.4 2.5 2.5 10.9 7.9 9.4 9.2 10.1 12.1 13.2 14.4 15.3 18.9 25.5 28.6 32.2 33.9 38.5 44.2 47.4 53.5 59.8 65.0 21.7 24.4 27.6 29.0 32.9 37.7 40.1 45.5 50.1 54.7 2.1 2.5 2.7 3.1 3.4 4.1 4.6 5.0 6.1 6.3 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.7 4.0 120.7 133.5 144.4 160.1 184.2 209.0 223.9 239.3 263.8 291.8 92.0 103.4 113.8 126.9 144.5 165.4 180.1 196.5 214.3 235.0 25.8 27.0 27.1 29.1 34.7 38.1 38.1 36.9 42.8 49.0 3.0 3.1 3.5 4.1 4.9 5.5 5.7 5.9 6.6 7.8 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 ....... 569.7 245.3 ....... 631.4 281.8 ....... 684.4 312.8 ....... 735.9 344.4 ....... 800.8 376.4 ....... 878.3 413.4 ....... 942.3 438.7 ....... 997.9 460.4 ....... 1,036.9 462.6 ....... 1,100.2 482.6 169.6 197.8 228.3 252.5 283.5 312.4 332.2 351.2 355.9 363.2 145.3 168.9 193.6 210.6 234.9 254.9 269.3 284.8 294.6 300.5 3.2 3.2 4.0 4.8 4.9 6.2 6.8 7.7 7.4 6.4 21.1 25.7 30.8 37.1 43.8 51.3 56.1 58.8 53.9 56.3 75.6 84.0 84.5 92.0 92.8 101.0 106.5 109.3 106.8 119.3 63.6 71.0 71.7 77.4 77.1 84.1 89.0 89.9 88.2 99.1 7.1 7.7 6.8 6.7 7.0 7.3 8.0 9.0 6.8 6.9 4.9 5.3 6.0 7.8 8.7 9.6 9.5 10.4 11.7 13.4 324.4 349.6 371.6 391.5 424.4 464.9 503.6 537.5 574.3 617.7 260.5 284.6 306.8 325.1 349.5 380.5 410.8 439.0 467.9 503.0 55.1 55.4 54.2 54.2 60.5 67.6 74.2 78.8 84.8 88.7 8.9 9.5 10.6 12.2 14.4 16.8 18.6 19.6 21.5 26.0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... 1,181.4 1,235.5 1,270.5 1,293.0 1,327.9 1,372.0 1,421.9 1,487.9 1,540.9 1,634.4 508.4 527.4 534.5 527.3 521.1 521.5 531.6 538.2 540.6 568.6 374.9 384.5 378.5 364.9 355.1 350.6 357.0 352.6 349.2 365.0 308.9 321.1 316.9 309.2 301.1 297.5 302.4 304.2 299.7 311.2 6.1 4.6 5.2 5.1 5.7 6.3 6.7 5.7 5.4 5.3 59.8 58.8 56.3 50.7 48.3 46.9 47.9 42.7 44.0 48.5 133.6 142.9 156.0 162.4 165.9 170.9 174.6 185.6 191.4 203.5 111.0 118.1 128.8 133.4 138.6 141.8 142.9 152.7 154.0 159.6 8.0 9.2 10.3 11.2 10.5 10.8 11.1 9.7 11.1 11.0 14.6 673.0 15.7 708.1 16.9 736.0 17.7 765.7 16.8 806.8 18.4 850.5 20.5 890.4 23.2 949.7 26.3 1,000.3 33.0 1,065.8 545.8 576.1 601.6 629.5 662.6 694.7 726.5 766.4 808.4 855.0 98.5 103.2 104.2 104.5 108.7 117.3 122.5 139.3 144.0 157.5 28.7 28.9 30.1 31.7 35.5 38.6 41.3 44.0 48.0 53.4 1995: I .... II ... III .. IV .. 1,360.6 1,374.9 1,378.3 1,374.5 523.4 525.5 525.0 512.3 352.2 353.9 352.7 343.6 298.2 299.3 301.2 291.2 6.8 6.0 5.9 6.4 47.2 48.6 45.6 46.0 171.2 171.6 172.3 168.7 141.0 142.0 143.3 140.6 11.4 10.7 11.0 10.1 18.8 18.9 17.9 17.9 837.1 849.4 853.3 862.2 685.0 692.6 697.3 703.8 115.0 118.6 117.1 118.5 37.2 38.2 38.9 39.9 1996: I .... II ... III .. IV .. 1,402.6 1,423.0 1,423.4 1,438.9 530.6 537.2 529.1 529.4 356.1 361.3 355.6 355.0 298.4 304.1 301.4 305.6 6.7 7.2 6.5 6.4 51.0 50.0 47.7 43.0 174.5 175.9 173.5 174.5 143.4 142.9 141.5 143.8 11.2 12.0 11.4 10.0 19.8 21.1 20.5 20.7 872.0 885.7 894.3 909.4 712.5 723.0 730.6 740.0 119.1 121.8 122.1 127.1 40.5 41.0 41.6 42.3 1997: I .... II ... III .. IV .. 1,459.2 1,486.3 1,498.0 1,508.2 529.2 543.4 541.3 538.9 346.4 355.0 354.7 354.4 301.1 308.0 304.1 303.6 5.9 5.6 5.7 5.7 39.4 41.4 44.9 45.1 182.8 188.4 186.6 184.5 150.2 153.5 153.3 153.6 10.2 9.9 10.4 8.4 22.4 25.0 22.8 22.5 930.0 942.9 956.6 969.3 751.9 760.0 770.7 783.2 135.4 139.4 141.6 141.0 42.7 43.6 44.4 45.1 1998: I .... II ... III .. IV .. 1,507.6 1,538.6 1,550.3 1,567.2 528.0 544.9 541.4 548.0 338.6 349.3 355.0 353.8 291.9 301.2 301.7 304.1 5.6 5.0 5.9 5.1 41.2 43.1 47.4 44.5 189.3 195.6 186.4 194.2 153.7 156.3 149.4 156.6 10.8 10.8 11.5 11.5 24.9 979.6 28.5 993.7 25.6 1,008.9 26.2 1,019.2 792.2 803.5 814.5 823.4 141.1 142.8 145.7 146.2 46.3 47.5 48.7 49.6 1999: I .... II ... III .. IV .. 1,595.5 1,610.9 1,642.4 1,688.8 554.1 558.3 570.4 591.6 356.5 355.3 367.5 380.8 305.7 302.2 312.2 324.7 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.2 45.4 47.8 50.1 50.8 197.6 203.0 202.8 210.7 158.8 158.0 159.1 162.3 11.4 10.5 10.6 11.6 27.4 34.5 33.1 36.8 1,041.4 1,052.6 1,072.1 1,097.3 832.1 847.2 863.1 877.4 158.3 153.0 154.8 163.9 50.9 52.4 54.2 56.0 2000: I .... 1,710.4 580.1 366.6 II ... 1,742.2 604.5 381.9 III .. 1,748.8 594.2 375.0 311.2 325.7 319.6 4.7 4.5 4.6 50.6 213.5 51.7 222.6 50.8 219.2 167.5 173.3 170.3 10.9 10.6 10.5 35.1 1,130.4 38.7 1,137.7 38.4 1,154.6 897.5 911.3 925.2 175.0 166.2 167.1 57.9 60.1 62.2 Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 298 TABLE B–21.—Real government consumption expenditures and gross investment by type, 1987–2000 [Billions of chained (1996) dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Government consumption expenditures and gross investment Federal State and local National defense Year or quarter Total Total Total Consumption expenditures Nondefense Gross investment Structures Equipment and software Total Consumption expenditures Gross investment Structures Equipment and software Total Consumption expenditures Gross investment Structures Equipment and software 1987 ......... 1988 ......... 1989 ......... 1,292.5 1,307.5 1,343.5 597.8 586.9 594.7 450.2 446.8 443.3 373.2 376.1 372.4 11.2 10.4 8.3 65.7 60.7 62.6 146.5 138.9 150.5 125.4 119.2 129.6 11.6 8.6 8.3 10.6 11.7 13.2 695.6 721.4 749.5 577.3 596.8 617.9 99.9 104.3 106.5 20.3 21.9 26.0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 1,387.3 1,403.4 1,410.0 1,398.8 1,400.1 1,406.4 1,421.9 1,455.4 1,486.4 1,536.1 606.8 604.9 595.1 572.0 551.3 536.5 531.6 529.6 526.9 540.1 443.2 438.4 417.1 394.7 375.9 361.9 357.0 347.7 341.7 348.5 369.7 369.5 350.6 336.1 320.5 308.7 302.4 298.5 290.7 293.8 7.7 5.7 6.3 5.7 6.2 6.5 6.7 5.5 5.1 4.8 65.4 62.9 60.0 52.8 49.2 46.8 47.9 43.6 45.9 50.3 163.0 166.0 177.9 177.3 175.5 174.6 174.6 181.8 185.2 191.5 140.1 140.9 150.0 147.8 148.0 145.7 142.9 148.6 147.2 147.5 9.3 10.4 11.6 12.4 11.2 11.1 11.1 9.4 10.5 10.1 14.2 15.0 16.5 17.2 16.5 17.9 20.5 23.9 27.8 35.0 781.1 798.9 815.3 827.0 848.9 869.9 890.4 925.8 959.2 995.6 638.9 653.4 667.8 680.4 697.5 711.3 726.5 745.7 772.6 794.6 114.5 118.3 118.7 116.1 117.0 120.9 122.5 134.7 135.5 143.2 28.4 28.1 29.4 31.0 34.6 37.8 41.3 45.4 51.6 58.9 1995: I ...... II ..... III .... IV ... 1,407.3 1,414.0 1,410.8 1,393.5 544.1 544.3 540.4 517.1 366.9 367.0 363.3 350.4 312.2 312.2 311.8 298.5 7.1 6.2 6.0 6.5 47.6 48.5 45.5 45.4 177.2 177.3 177.1 166.8 147.1 147.9 148.5 139.2 11.9 11.1 11.2 10.3 18.3 18.4 17.5 17.4 863.3 869.7 870.4 876.4 707.1 709.7 712.1 716.4 119.9 122.7 120.2 120.7 36.4 37.4 38.2 39.3 1996: I ...... II ..... III .... IV .... 1,404.8 1,430.4 1,422.0 1,430.6 529.1 540.2 529.5 527.6 356.4 363.0 355.4 353.3 300.5 305.2 300.6 303.2 6.7 7.3 6.5 6.3 49.1 50.6 48.4 43.7 172.7 177.2 174.1 174.4 141.9 144.1 142.0 143.6 11.3 12.0 11.4 9.9 19.5 21.1 20.6 20.9 875.7 890.2 892.5 903.0 715.5 727.0 729.2 734.5 120.2 122.4 121.6 125.7 40.0 40.8 41.8 42.7 1997: I ...... II ..... III .... IV ... 1,434.6 1,457.0 1,464.8 1,465.3 521.7 534.8 533.4 528.4 341.6 350.3 350.4 348.5 295.7 302.6 298.9 296.8 5.7 5.4 5.5 5.4 40.1 42.1 46.0 46.3 180.1 184.5 182.9 179.8 147.3 149.3 149.3 148.4 10.0 9.7 10.1 8.0 22.8 25.6 23.6 23.5 912.8 922.2 931.4 936.8 736.6 742.2 748.7 755.2 132.7 135.2 136.6 134.4 43.5 44.8 46.2 47.3 1998: I ...... II ..... III .... IV ... 1,461.6 1,487.6 1,492.9 1,503.3 515.9 531.8 527.5 532.4 332.0 342.4 347.2 345.1 283.9 292.9 292.5 293.7 5.4 4.8 5.5 4.8 42.7 44.7 49.5 46.8 183.8 189.3 180.3 187.2 147.6 149.5 142.7 148.9 10.3 10.2 10.8 10.7 26.1 30.1 27.1 27.9 945.5 955.7 965.1 970.7 762.6 769.9 776.4 781.6 134.1 135.3 136.7 135.8 49.1 50.9 52.5 53.9 1999: I ...... II ..... III .... IV .... 1,517.1 1,519.9 1,537.8 1,569.5 529.5 532.1 541.0 558.1 342.4 340.3 350.4 360.9 290.6 286.4 294.1 304.0 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.7 47.0 49.5 52.0 52.7 187.0 191.6 190.5 197.1 147.7 146.6 146.8 148.9 10.6 9.7 9.7 10.5 29.1 987.2 36.6 987.5 35.1 996.4 39.1 1,011.2 786.0 791.2 797.6 803.7 146.0 139.6 140.2 146.9 55.8 57.7 60.0 62.1 2000: I ...... II ..... III ... 1,565.1 1,583.7 1,578.2 537.1 558.8 545.8 341.5 355.1 346.2 285.7 298.4 290.5 4.2 4.0 4.0 52.4 53.4 52.3 195.4 203.6 199.4 150.0 155.4 151.9 9.8 9.5 9.3 36.7 1,027.4 40.2 1,024.6 39.7 1,031.9 809.8 815.1 820.8 155.2 145.5 145.2 64.0 66.3 68.4 Note.—See Table B-2 for data for total Government consumption expenditures and gross investment for 1959-86. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 299 TABLE B–22.—Private inventories and final sales of domestic business, 1959–2000 [Billions of dollars, except as noted; seasonally adjusted] Private inventories 1 Nonfarm Quarter Total 2 Farm Total 2 Fourth quarter: 1959 ........................ Manufacturing Wholesale trade Retail trade Other Final sales of domestic business 3 Ratio of private inventories to final sales of domestic business Total Nonfarm 121.4 30.6 90.8 47.7 16.5 20.5 6.1 36.5 3.33 2.49 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 125.0 128.2 135.3 137.7 143.1 157.2 173.7 184.0 197.4 215.8 31.4 33.0 34.9 32.2 30.8 35.0 35.4 35.0 38.1 41.2 93.5 95.2 100.5 105.5 112.2 122.2 138.3 149.1 159.3 174.6 48.7 50.1 53.2 55.1 58.6 63.4 73.0 79.9 85.1 92.6 16.9 17.3 18.0 19.5 20.8 22.5 25.8 28.1 29.3 32.5 21.9 21.3 22.7 23.9 25.2 28.0 30.6 30.9 34.2 37.5 6.1 6.6 6.6 7.1 7.7 8.3 8.9 10.1 10.6 12.0 37.7 39.5 41.9 44.5 47.5 52.5 55.7 59.2 65.1 69.4 3.31 3.24 3.23 3.09 3.01 2.99 3.12 3.11 3.03 3.11 2.48 2.41 2.40 2.37 2.36 2.33 2.48 2.52 2.45 2.52 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 222.9 240.6 266.7 322.7 382.3 387.3 419.3 462.7 546.8 644.7 39.6 46.3 56.9 73.4 64.2 68.3 65.1 71.3 95.1 112.1 183.3 194.4 209.9 249.4 318.1 319.0 354.2 391.4 451.7 532.6 95.5 96.6 102.1 121.5 162.6 162.2 178.7 193.2 219.8 261.8 36.4 39.4 43.1 51.7 66.9 66.5 74.1 84.0 99.0 119.5 38.5 44.7 49.8 58.4 63.9 64.4 73.0 80.9 94.1 104.7 12.9 13.7 14.8 17.7 24.7 25.9 28.5 33.3 38.8 46.6 73.1 79.6 88.7 97.8 105.8 118.5 130.3 145.6 168.3 187.3 3.05 3.02 3.01 3.30 3.61 3.27 3.22 3.18 3.25 3.44 2.51 2.44 2.37 2.55 3.01 2.69 2.72 2.69 2.68 2.84 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 710.7 754.9 752.1 769.6 845.5 856.5 839.4 901.0 968.8 1,016.3 112.1 103.2 109.5 104.5 108.0 106.3 94.3 96.6 99.7 101.6 598.7 651.7 642.6 665.1 737.6 750.2 745.1 804.4 869.1 914.7 293.4 313.1 304.6 308.9 344.5 333.3 320.6 339.6 372.4 390.5 139.4 148.8 147.9 153.4 169.1 175.9 182.0 195.8 213.9 222.8 111.7 123.2 123.2 137.6 157.0 171.4 176.2 199.1 213.2 231.4 54.1 66.6 66.8 65.2 66.9 69.5 66.3 69.9 69.5 70.1 205.8 223.0 234.2 257.2 279.2 300.2 318.5 336.5 366.0 388.5 3.45 3.39 3.21 2.99 3.03 2.85 2.64 2.68 2.65 2.62 2.91 2.92 2.74 2.59 2.64 2.50 2.34 2.39 2.37 2.35 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 1,054.5 1,028.0 1,052.0 1,082.8 1,163.0 105.7 94.0 102.4 99.1 102.9 948.9 934.0 949.5 983.7 1,060.0 404.5 384.1 377.6 380.1 404.3 236.8 239.2 248.3 258.6 281.5 236.6 240.2 249.4 268.6 293.6 71.0 70.5 74.3 76.5 80.6 406.2 417.5 446.6 470.0 496.8 2.60 2.46 2.36 2.30 2.34 2.34 2.24 2.13 2.09 2.13 1995: I .......................... II ........................ III ....................... IV ....................... 1,196.2 1,211.7 1,213.5 1,222.4 104.1 99.5 94.4 96.3 1,092.1 1,112.2 1,119.1 1,126.1 417.0 422.9 425.1 424.5 290.9 297.4 301.1 303.7 301.5 308.1 310.0 312.2 82.7 83.7 82.9 85.6 503.1 508.4 517.1 523.7 2.38 2.38 2.35 2.33 2.17 2.19 2.16 2.15 1996: I .......................... II ........................ III ....................... IV ....................... 1,223.0 1,235.6 1,247.5 1,251.5 95.8 104.1 107.7 103.4 1,127.2 1,131.5 1,139.8 1,148.1 424.9 423.3 425.9 428.9 305.4 306.2 305.3 305.2 309.2 313.8 320.3 322.0 87.8 88.1 88.3 92.1 531.8 541.7 545.5 556.3 2.30 2.28 2.29 2.25 2.12 2.09 2.09 2.06 1997: I .......................... II ........................ III ....................... IV ....................... 1,259.1 1,274.1 1,289.1 1,296.5 107.7 107.1 108.9 107.3 1,151.4 1,167.0 1,180.2 1,189.1 429.6 433.5 436.3 438.0 309.7 316.6 320.9 324.7 320.9 323.4 326.6 330.4 91.2 93.5 96.4 96.1 565.4 574.2 585.6 590.7 2.23 2.22 2.20 2.19 2.04 2.03 2.02 2.01 1998: I ......................... II ........................ III ....................... IV ....................... 1,316.0 1,320.5 1,323.2 1,331.9 107.9 102.4 93.3 92.7 1,208.1 1,218.1 1,229.9 1,239.2 442.5 445.6 447.3 444.5 329.3 331.2 335.8 339.2 337.1 338.0 341.7 347.3 99.3 103.3 105.2 108.2 598.4 608.9 615.5 626.8 2.20 2.17 2.15 2.12 2.02 2.00 2.00 1.98 1999: I .......................... II ........................ III ....................... IV ....................... 1,348.8 1,362.5 1,387.9 1,416.3 98.3 98.0 96.4 100.3 1,250.5 1,264.5 1,291.4 1,316.0 443.4 445.3 452.6 458.6 342.2 347.1 356.4 363.4 353.0 356.5 363.5 374.6 111.9 115.6 118.9 119.5 637.4 646.5 655.9 669.8 2.12 2.11 2.12 2.11 1.96 1.96 1.97 1.96 2000: I .......................... II ........................ III ...................... 1,446.5 1,472.4 1,492.8 108.3 108.0 105.3 1,338.3 1,364.3 1,387.5 466.1 472.6 480.7 373.2 381.3 387.8 375.5 382.2 387.4 123.5 128.2 131.5 687.3 698.2 705.0 2.10 2.11 2.12 1.95 1.95 1.97 1 Inventories at end of quarter. Quarter-to-quarter change calculated from this table is not the current-dollar change in private inventories component of GDP. The former is the difference between two inventory stocks, each valued at their respective end-of-quarter prices. The latter is the change in the physical volume of inventories valued at average prices of the quarter. In addition, changes calculated from this table are at quarterly rates, whereas change in private inventories is stated at annual rates. 2 Inventories of construction establishments are included in ‘‘other’’ nonfarm inventories. 3 Quarterly totals at monthly rates. Final sales of domestic business equals final sales of domestic product less gross product of households and institutions and of general government and includes a small amount of final sales by farms. Note.—The industry classification of inventories is on an establishment basis. Estimates for nonfarm industries other than manufacturing and trade for 1986 and earlier periods are based on the 1972 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). Manufacturing estimates for 1981 and earlier periods and trade estimates for 1966 and earlier periods are based on the 1972 SIC; later estimates for these industries are based on the 1987 SIC. The resulting discontinuities are small. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 300 TABLE B–23.—Real private inventories and final sales of domestic business, 1987–2000 [Billions of chained (1996) dollars, except as noted; seasonally adjusted] Private inventories 1 Nonfarm Quarter Total 2 Farm Total 2 Fourth quarter: 1987 .................... 1988 .................... 1989 .................... Manufacturing Wholesale trade Retail trade Other Final sales of domestic business 3 Ratio of private inventories to final sales of domestic business Total Nonfarm 1,024.1 1,042.5 1,072.1 110.7 96.5 96.6 911.7 945.4 975.2 361.6 378.5 392.7 228.6 238.5 243.2 239.7 247.4 261.9 81.6 80.4 76.8 422.7 443.0 454.7 2.42 2.35 2.36 2.16 2.13 2.14 .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... 1,088.6 1,087.6 1,104.7 1,124.6 1,191.5 99.2 96.9 103.1 95.2 108.1 989.0 990.4 1,001.1 1,029.8 1,083.3 401.6 394.9 390.1 393.7 405.8 252.2 257.3 266.2 273.1 290.2 260.2 260.8 265.4 280.8 301.4 73.8 76.8 79.1 81.9 85.9 457.2 457.5 479.7 493.9 512.2 2.38 2.38 2.30 2.28 2.33 2.16 2.17 2.09 2.08 2.11 1995: I ...................... II .................... III ................... IV ................... 1,207.0 1,215.1 1,217.4 1,221.9 106.7 103.0 97.2 95.9 1,100.3 1,112.1 1,120.1 1,126.0 411.1 415.0 418.1 419.9 295.5 299.3 302.7 304.5 307.0 311.4 312.7 313.6 86.7 86.4 86.5 88.0 515.2 518.4 524.9 529.7 2.34 2.34 2.32 2.31 2.14 2.15 2.13 2.13 1996: I ...................... II .................... III ................... IV ................... 1,223.3 1,230.8 1,243.6 1,251.9 95.8 98.7 102.9 103.7 1,127.5 1,132.1 1,140.7 1,148.1 424.2 423.3 426.8 430.0 305.4 306.7 305.2 307.7 309.9 313.8 319.6 321.0 87.9 88.3 88.9 89.5 535.4 542.8 544.3 552.8 2.28 2.27 2.28 2.26 2.11 2.09 2.10 2.08 1997: I ...................... II .................... III ................... IV ................... 1,264.2 1,286.3 1,299.1 1,315.6 103.5 103.5 105.7 106.9 1,160.7 1,182.8 1,193.4 1,208.7 434.4 440.2 442.5 445.2 313.7 323.2 326.8 333.1 320.1 324.4 327.6 332.3 92.5 95.0 96.5 98.2 558.2 564.0 573.6 576.7 2.26 2.28 2.26 2.28 2.08 2.10 2.08 2.10 1998: I ...................... II .................... III ................... IV ................... 1,344.9 1,360.2 1,378.4 1,395.8 108.8 108.4 106.6 108.1 1,236.1 1,251.8 1,271.5 1,287.4 454.7 462.0 468.0 470.8 340.3 344.0 351.4 355.7 338.6 338.9 342.1 347.1 102.6 107.1 110.3 114.1 583.2 592.2 596.7 606.4 2.31 2.30 2.31 2.30 2.12 2.11 2.13 2.12 1999: I ...................... II .................... III ................... IV ................... 1,407.8 1,411.1 1,420.8 1,441.1 107.7 107.4 106.2 108.2 1,299.7 1,303.2 1,314.1 1,332.4 470.5 468.2 469.0 470.9 358.9 362.7 368.5 373.1 352.6 353.6 357.5 368.0 117.8 118.9 119.1 120.2 614.0 620.7 628.4 639.6 2.29 2.27 2.26 2.25 2.12 2.10 2.09 2.08 2000: I ...................... II .................... III ................... 1,450.2 1,469.9 1,488.0 109.1 110.6 111.9 1,340.6 1,358.7 1,375.6 473.5 477.9 483.5 378.5 386.6 392.1 366.9 372.2 377.2 121.7 121.9 122.6 651.3 657.7 661.9 2.23 2.23 2.25 2.06 2.07 2.08 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1 Inventories at end of quarter. Quarter-to-quarter changes calculated from this table are at quarterly rates, whereas the change in private inventories component of GDP is stated at annual rates. 2 Inventories of construction establishments are included in ‘‘other’’ nonfarm inventories. 3 Quarterly totals at monthly rates. Final sales of domestic business equals final sales of domestic product less gross product of households and institutions and of general government and includes a small amount of final sales by farms. Note.—The industry classification of inventories is on an establishment basis. Estimates for nonfarm industries other than manufacturing and trade for 1986 and earlier periods are based on the 1972 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). Manufacturing estimates for 1981 and earlier periods and trade estimates for 1966 and earlier periods are based on the 1972 SIC; later estimates for these industries are based on the 1987 SIC. The resulting discontinuities are small. See Survey of Current Business, Table 5.13, for detailed information on calculation of the chained (1996) dollar inventory series. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 301 TABLE B–24.—Foreign transactions in the national income and product accounts, 1959–2000 [Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Receipts from rest of the world Year or quarter Exports of goods and services Total Total Goods 1 Services 1 Payments to rest of the world Income receipts Imports of goods and services Total Total Goods 1 Services 1 Income payments Transfer payments (net) Total From persons (net) From government (net) From business Net foreign investment 1959 ............. 25.0 20.6 16.5 4.2 4.3 25.0 22.3 15.3 7.0 1.5 2.4 0.5 1.8 0.1 −1.2 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. 30.2 31.4 33.5 36.1 41.0 43.5 47.2 50.2 55.6 61.2 25.3 26.0 27.4 29.4 33.6 35.4 38.9 41.4 45.3 49.3 20.5 20.9 21.7 23.3 26.7 27.8 30.7 32.2 35.3 38.3 4.8 5.1 5.7 6.1 6.9 7.6 8.2 9.2 10.0 11.0 5.0 5.4 6.1 6.6 7.4 8.1 8.3 8.9 10.3 11.9 30.2 31.4 33.5 36.1 41.0 43.5 47.2 50.2 55.6 61.2 22.8 22.7 25.0 26.1 28.1 31.5 37.1 39.9 46.6 50.5 15.2 15.1 16.9 17.7 19.4 22.2 26.3 27.8 33.9 36.8 7.6 7.6 8.1 8.4 8.7 9.3 10.7 12.2 12.6 13.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.7 3.1 3.4 4.1 5.8 2.4 2.7 2.8 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.2 3.2 .5 .5 .5 .7 .7 .8 .8 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.8 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.8 .1 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .2 .2 .3 .3 3.2 4.3 3.9 5.0 7.5 6.2 3.9 3.5 1.7 1.8 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. 69.9 73.4 82.6 115.6 154.6 164.4 181.7 196.6 233.5 299.1 57.0 59.3 66.2 91.8 124.3 136.3 148.9 158.8 186.1 228.7 44.5 45.6 51.8 73.9 101.0 109.6 117.8 123.7 145.4 184.0 12.4 13.8 14.4 17.8 23.3 26.7 31.1 35.1 40.7 44.7 13.0 14.1 16.4 23.8 30.3 28.2 32.9 37.9 47.4 70.4 69.9 73.4 82.6 115.6 154.6 164.4 181.7 196.6 233.5 299.1 55.8 62.3 74.2 91.2 127.5 122.7 151.1 182.4 212.3 252.7 40.9 46.6 56.9 71.8 104.5 99.0 124.6 152.6 177.4 212.8 14.9 15.8 17.3 19.3 22.9 23.7 26.5 29.8 34.8 39.9 6.6 6.4 7.7 11.1 14.6 14.9 15.7 17.2 25.3 37.5 3.6 4.1 4.3 4.6 5.4 5.4 6.0 6.0 6.4 7.5 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.9 2.3 2.5 2.4 3.1 3.4 3.6 3.3 3.6 3.9 .4 .4 .5 .7 1.0 .7 1.1 1.4 1.4 2.0 4.0 .6 −3.6 8.7 7.1 21.4 8.9 −9.0 −10.4 1.4 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. 360.7 398.4 385.0 379.5 426.0 416.1 431.4 488.5 598.7 686.2 278.9 302.8 282.6 277.0 303.1 303.0 320.3 365.6 446.9 509.0 225.8 239.1 215.0 207.3 225.6 222.2 226.0 257.5 325.8 371.7 53.2 63.7 67.6 69.7 77.5 80.8 94.3 108.1 121.1 137.3 81.8 95.6 102.4 102.5 122.9 113.1 111.1 122.9 151.8 177.2 360.7 398.4 385.0 379.5 426.0 416.1 431.4 488.5 598.7 686.2 293.8 317.8 303.2 328.6 405.1 417.2 452.2 507.9 553.2 589.7 248.6 267.8 250.5 272.7 336.3 343.3 370.0 414.8 452.1 484.5 45.3 49.9 52.6 56.0 68.8 73.9 82.2 93.1 101.1 105.2 46.5 60.9 65.9 65.6 87.6 87.8 95.6 109.2 133.4 156.8 9.0 13.4 16.1 17.2 20.3 22.1 24.2 23.4 25.4 26.3 1.8 5.5 6.5 6.8 7.7 8.1 9.0 9.9 10.6 11.4 4.8 4.8 6.1 7.0 9.1 11.1 12.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 2.4 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.5 2.9 3.2 3.4 4.5 4.6 11.4 6.3 −.2 −32.0 −87.0 −110.9 −140.6 −152.0 −113.2 −86.7 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............ ............ ............ 745.5 769.3 787.8 812.5 909.3 1,050.8 1,119.7 1,247.7 1,251.4 1,296.1 557.2 601.6 636.8 658.0 725.1 818.6 874.2 966.4 966.0 990.2 398.5 426.4 448.7 459.7 509.6 583.8 618.4 688.9 682.0 699.2 158.6 175.2 188.1 198.3 215.5 234.7 255.8 277.5 284.0 291.0 188.3 167.7 151.1 154.4 184.3 232.3 245.6 281.3 285.4 305.9 745.5 628.6 508.0 769.3 622.3 500.7 787.8 664.6 544.9 812.5 718.5 592.8 909.3 812.1 676.7 1,050.8 902.8 757.6 1,119.7 963.1 808.3 1,247.7 1,055.8 885.1 1,251.4 1,117.5 930.5 1,296.1 1,244.2 1,048.6 120.6 121.6 119.8 125.7 135.4 145.2 154.8 170.7 187.0 195.6 159.3 143.0 127.6 130.1 167.5 211.9 227.5 274.2 288.9 316.9 26.8 −11.0 34.2 36.8 38.0 34.0 39.8 40.8 44.1 48.1 12.0 13.0 12.5 14.4 15.6 16.5 18.2 21.2 24.0 26.6 10.0 −29.0 16.2 16.7 15.3 9.8 13.6 10.6 10.8 11.6 4.8 5.0 5.5 5.7 7.1 7.7 8.0 8.9 9.3 9.9 −69.2 14.9 −38.7 −72.9 −108.3 −98.0 −110.7 −123.1 −199.1 −313.2 1995: I .......... II ......... III ........ IV ........ 1,011.9 1,037.0 1,065.7 1,088.7 787.7 802.5 834.1 850.0 563.6 574.3 593.0 604.4 224.1 228.2 241.1 245.6 224.2 234.5 231.6 238.7 1,011.9 1,037.0 1,065.7 1,088.7 882.2 911.5 908.3 909.3 740.4 766.9 761.9 761.5 141.8 144.6 146.4 147.8 202.8 209.2 220.4 215.3 34.3 32.3 33.7 35.7 15.9 15.6 16.4 18.0 10.5 9.3 9.5 10.0 7.9 −107.5 7.4 −116.1 7.8 −96.7 7.7 −71.6 1996: I .......... II ......... III ........ IV ........ 1,092.4 1,102.4 1,111.2 1,172.9 853.3 864.7 865.6 913.1 607.8 611.4 615.4 639.0 245.5 253.3 250.1 274.0 239.1 237.7 245.6 259.8 1,092.4 1,102.4 1,111.2 1,172.9 929.1 954.5 976.1 992.8 778.6 801.9 818.6 834.3 150.5 152.6 157.5 158.5 212.3 220.0 234.1 243.5 41.7 34.6 35.4 47.6 17.4 18.0 18.2 19.3 16.8 8.6 9.0 19.9 7.5 −90.7 8.1 −106.7 8.2 −134.5 8.4 −111.0 1997: I .......... II ......... III ........ IV ........ 1,195.9 1,249.3 1,278.2 1,267.4 927.8 966.8 988.7 982.4 658.2 688.5 706.7 702.3 269.6 278.2 282.0 280.1 268.1 282.6 289.5 285.0 1,195.9 1,249.3 1,278.2 1,267.4 1,017.1 1,041.7 1,077.3 1,087.0 852.3 874.5 903.1 910.3 164.8 167.2 174.1 176.6 260.4 270.6 282.8 283.2 36.0 37.2 38.3 51.7 20.3 20.4 21.2 22.9 7.2 7.8 8.0 19.6 8.4 9.0 9.1 9.2 −117.5 −100.2 −120.2 −154.4 1998: I .......... II ......... III ........ IV ........ 1,264.4 1,255.4 1,225.0 1,260.9 975.0 962.8 947.8 978.3 692.9 675.8 668.3 690.9 282.1 287.0 279.5 287.4 289.3 292.6 277.2 282.6 1,264.4 1,255.4 1,225.0 1,260.9 1,092.6 1,114.7 1,115.4 1,147.3 911.9 929.2 926.0 954.8 180.6 185.4 189.4 192.5 283.8 289.6 291.4 290.9 39.3 40.4 42.8 53.9 22.6 24.1 24.3 25.1 8.1 7.0 9.1 19.1 8.6 9.3 9.4 9.7 −151.3 −189.3 −224.7 −231.3 1999: I .......... II ......... III ........ IV ....... 1,239.2 957.3 1,268.9 973.0 1,314.0 999.5 1,362.2 1,031.0 671.3 682.1 708.9 734.6 286.0 290.9 290.7 296.4 281.9 295.9 314.4 331.2 1,239.2 1,268.9 1,314.0 1,362.2 1,153.4 965.0 1,213.4 1,020.4 1,280.0 1,081.7 1,330.1 1,127.3 188.4 193.0 198.3 202.8 289.2 305.6 328.0 344.6 43.4 46.3 45.7 57.0 25.6 26.7 26.6 27.6 8.3 10.0 9.1 18.9 9.5 9.7 10.0 10.5 −246.8 −296.5 −339.8 −369.6 2000: I .......... 1,402.8 1,051.9 747.5 II ......... 1,468.3 1,092.9 783.6 III ....... 1,503.6 1,130.8 821.9 304.4 309.2 308.9 350.9 1,402.8 1,387.1 1,176.1 375.4 1,468.3 1,448.3 1,233.9 372.8 1,503.6 1,520.3 1,294.7 211.0 214.4 225.6 358.6 383.7 381.7 47.8 48.9 51.7 28.5 28.3 29.5 8.3 9.1 11.4 11.0 −390.7 11.4 −412.5 10.8 −450.1 1 Certain goods, primarily military equipment purchased and sold by the Federal Government, are included in services. Beginning with 1986, repairs and alterations of equipment were reclassified from goods to services. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 302 TABLE B–25.—Real exports and imports of goods and services and receipts and payments of income, 1987–2000 [Billions of chained (1996) dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Exports of goods and services Imports of goods and services Goods 1 Year or quarter Total Total 1987 ...................................... 1988 ...................................... 1989 ...................................... 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Durable goods Nondurable goods Services 1 Income receipts 408.0 473.5 529.4 271.4 322.6 363.2 154.7 191.9 221.3 123.0 135.6 146.3 139.1 152.0 166.7 161.6 192.6 215.7 ...................................... 575.7 ...................................... 613.2 ...................................... 651.0 ...................................... 672.7 ...................................... 732.8 ...................................... 808.2 ..................................... 874.2 ...................................... 981.5 ...................................... 1,003.6 ..................................... 1,033.0 393.2 421.1 449.8 463.4 508.2 568.8 618.4 708.1 723.6 752.2 243.0 261.6 280.8 295.2 330.5 378.0 421.7 498.3 514.0 538.7 154.0 163.3 172.7 170.6 178.9 191.0 196.7 209.8 209.6 213.4 183.5 192.9 201.7 209.9 225.1 239.5 255.8 273.6 280.3 281.7 219.2 188.4 165.1 164.6 191.9 236.5 245.6 276.8 278.7 294.1 Goods 1 Total Total 564.2 585.6 608.8 Durable goods Nondurable goods Services 1 Income payments 445.8 463.9 483.4 267.9 279.1 291.2 181.5 188.5 195.9 120.2 123.4 126.9 144.0 169.8 192.0 632.2 497.9 629.0 497.6 670.8 543.7 731.8 598.4 819.4 677.9 886.6 739.1 963.1 808.3 1,094.8 923.1 1,224.6 1,032.0 1,355.3 1,161.1 299.2 300.9 331.9 370.9 432.2 481.7 533.3 619.8 700.4 802.6 202.7 200.5 215.5 230.8 247.4 257.8 275.1 303.5 331.8 358.8 136.6 133.4 128.0 134.0 141.9 147.7 154.8 171.7 192.6 195.9 186.9 161.1 139.1 139.2 175.2 216.2 227.5 268.0 279.3 301.5 1995: I ................................... II .................................. III ................................. IV ................................. 780.6 788.9 821.9 841.4 549.8 556.5 576.7 592.0 360.9 368.9 385.1 397.2 189.6 187.9 191.7 194.8 230.8 232.5 245.3 249.5 230.0 239.2 235.3 241.3 873.1 886.4 889.1 897.8 725.5 740.3 742.1 748.4 472.2 481.6 481.1 492.0 253.7 259.2 261.7 256.5 147.9 146.2 147.1 149.4 208.6 214.0 224.3 218.0 1996: I ................................... II .................................. III ................................. IV ................................. 846.1 860.1 867.0 923.5 599.2 605.5 617.2 651.7 403.0 413.3 423.9 446.6 196.2 192.2 193.3 205.2 247.0 254.6 249.8 271.6 240.5 238.4 245.3 258.1 921.1 950.4 982.9 998.1 769.7 797.4 825.6 840.7 508.0 524.4 544.8 556.0 261.7 273.1 280.8 284.7 151.5 153.0 157.3 157.3 213.9 220.8 233.8 241.5 1997: I ................................... 940.3 II .................................. 979.2 III ................................. 1,004.2 IV ................................ 1,002.1 672.8 705.8 726.8 727.1 468.4 496.9 515.3 512.7 204.4 208.9 211.5 214.5 267.6 273.7 277.7 275.4 264.8 278.5 284.5 279.2 1,034.3 1,079.8 1,123.8 1,141.2 869.6 913.0 948.0 961.9 584.1 611.1 635.0 649.1 285.8 302.0 313.0 313.0 164.7 166.9 175.9 179.4 256.1 264.8 275.9 275.1 1998: I ................................... 1,004.5 II .................................. 996.8 III ................................. 988.8 IV ................................. 1,024.1 726.0 713.5 713.2 741.6 515.4 504.6 507.1 528.8 210.6 209.0 206.1 212.7 278.9 283.2 275.9 283.0 283.5 286.1 270.3 275.0 1,179.8 992.0 1,216.6 1,025.8 1,232.9 1,037.4 1,269.0 1,072.9 671.9 692.9 700.1 736.6 320.3 333.2 337.6 336.3 187.8 190.8 195.4 196.4 275.5 280.2 281.3 280.2 1999: I ................................... II .................................. III ................................. IV ................................ 1,003.3 1,017.6 1,042.6 1,068.4 723.1 735.7 763.4 786.5 517.5 525.3 547.8 564.2 205.4 210.4 215.5 222.1 280.3 282.3 280.5 283.7 273.2 285.4 301.9 316.2 1,283.1 1,332.2 1,385.2 1,420.9 1,091.4 1,139.9 1,190.5 1,222.5 746.9 785.0 824.3 854.4 344.6 355.0 366.5 369.1 192.5 193.7 196.7 200.6 277.2 291.8 312.0 325.0 2000: I ................................... 1,084.8 II .................................. 1,121.8 III ................................ 1,158.8 798.1 833.5 874.2 575.3 608.1 633.8 222.7 225.4 240.3 288.5 291.0 288.9 332.0 353.2 348.7 1,461.7 1,255.3 1,525.2 1,313.9 1,586.4 1,364.0 880.5 920.8 958.8 376.2 394.5 407.2 208.4 213.7 224.8 335.8 357.9 354.8 1 Certain goods, primarily military equipment purchased and sold by the Federal Government, are included in services. Beginning with 1986, repairs and alterations of equipment were reclassified from goods to services. Note.—See Table B-2 for data for total exports of goods and services and total imports of goods and services for 1959-86. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 303 TABLE B–26.—Relation of gross domestic product, gross national product, net national product, and national income, 1959–2000 [Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Year or quarter Plus: Income Gross receipts domestic from product rest of the world Less: Income payments to rest of the world Less: Consumption of fixed capital Equals: Gross national product Total Less: Equals: Indirect Net businaness tional tax Private Governand ment product nontax liability Business transfer payments Plus: Subsidies less Statis- rent cursur- Equals: tical plus of National disincome governcrepan- ment cy enterprises 1959 ........... 507.4 4.3 1.5 510.3 54.8 40.2 14.6 455.5 41.9 1.4 0.8 0.1 411.5 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... 527.4 545.7 586.5 618.7 664.4 720.1 789.3 834.1 911.5 985.3 5.0 5.4 6.1 6.6 7.4 8.1 8.3 8.9 10.3 11.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.7 3.1 3.4 4.1 5.8 530.6 549.3 590.7 623.2 669.4 725.5 794.5 839.5 917.6 991.5 56.9 58.5 61.0 63.6 66.6 70.8 76.5 83.1 90.9 99.8 41.8 42.8 44.3 46.0 48.4 51.7 56.3 61.4 67.4 74.5 15.2 15.7 16.7 17.6 18.3 19.1 20.2 21.7 23.4 25.2 473.6 490.8 529.7 559.6 602.8 654.7 717.9 756.4 826.7 891.7 45.5 48.1 51.7 54.7 58.8 62.7 65.4 70.4 79.0 86.6 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.8 3.1 −.6 −.2 .7 −.4 1.2 1.9 6.4 4.8 4.3 2.9 .2 1.2 1.4 .9 1.4 1.7 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.5 427.5 442.5 477.1 504.4 542.1 589.6 646.7 681.7 743.6 802.7 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... 1,039.7 1,128.6 1,240.4 1,385.5 1,501.0 1,635.2 1,823.9 2,031.4 2,295.9 2,566.4 13.0 14.1 16.4 23.8 30.3 28.2 32.9 37.9 47.4 70.4 6.6 6.4 7.7 11.1 14.6 14.9 15.7 17.2 25.3 37.5 1,046.1 1,136.2 1,249.1 1,398.2 1,516.7 1,648.4 1,841.0 2,052.1 2,318.0 2,599.3 109.1 118.9 130.9 142.9 164.8 190.9 209.0 231.6 261.5 300.4 81.8 89.8 99.4 109.1 126.9 149.1 164.5 184.4 210.7 244.9 27.3 29.2 31.5 33.8 37.9 41.8 44.4 47.2 50.8 55.5 937.0 1,017.3 1,118.2 1,255.3 1,351.9 1,457.5 1,632.1 1,820.5 2,056.5 2,298.9 94.3 103.6 111.4 121.0 129.3 140.0 151.6 165.5 177.8 188.7 3.2 3.4 3.9 4.5 5.0 5.2 6.5 7.3 8.2 9.9 6.9 11.3 8.7 8.0 10.0 17.7 24.5 21.6 21.0 35.7 4.8 4.9 6.1 5.6 4.2 7.7 6.9 9.7 10.6 11.0 837.5 903.9 1,000.4 1,127.4 1,211.9 1,302.2 1,456.4 1,635.8 1,860.2 2,075.6 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... 2,795.6 3,131.3 3,259.2 3,534.9 3,932.7 4,213.0 4,452.9 4,742.5 5,108.3 5,489.1 81.8 95.6 102.4 102.5 122.9 113.1 111.1 122.9 151.8 177.2 46.5 60.9 65.9 65.6 87.6 87.8 95.6 109.2 133.4 156.8 2,830.8 3,166.1 3,295.7 3,571.8 3,968.1 4,238.4 4,468.3 4,756.2 5,126.8 5,509.4 345.2 394.8 436.5 456.1 482.4 516.5 551.6 586.1 627.4 677.2 282.6 323.9 357.5 372.7 393.5 422.5 450.8 478.2 512.4 554.0 62.7 71.0 79.0 83.3 88.8 94.0 100.8 107.8 115.0 123.2 2,485.6 2,771.2 2,859.2 3,115.7 3,485.7 3,721.9 3,916.8 4,170.1 4,499.4 4,832.2 212.0 249.3 256.7 280.3 309.1 329.4 346.8 369.3 392.6 420.7 11.2 13.4 15.2 16.2 18.6 20.7 23.8 24.2 25.3 25.8 33.9 27.5 2.5 47.0 18.6 11.7 43.9 3.3 −42.2 16.3 14.5 16.1 18.1 24.3 22.9 20.4 23.6 30.1 27.4 22.6 2,243.0 2,497.1 2,603.0 2,796.5 3,162.3 3,380.4 3,525.8 3,803.4 4,151.1 4,392.1 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... 5,803.2 5,986.2 6,318.9 6,642.3 7,054.3 7,400.5 7,813.2 8,318.4 8,790.2 9,299.2 188.3 167.7 151.1 154.4 184.3 232.3 245.6 281.3 285.4 305.9 159.3 143.0 127.6 130.1 167.5 211.9 227.5 274.2 288.9 316.9 5,832.2 711.3 6,010.9 748.0 6,342.3 787.5 6,666.7 812.8 7,071.1 874.9 7,420.9 911.7 7,831.2 956.2 8,325.4 1,013.3 8,786.7 1,077.3 9,288.2 1,161.0 579.5 608.1 642.2 660.1 714.6 743.6 781.9 832.4 889.4 961.4 131.8 140.0 145.3 152.6 160.3 168.1 174.3 180.9 188.0 199.6 5,120.9 5,262.8 5,554.9 5,853.9 6,196.2 6,509.1 6,875.0 7,312.1 7,709.3 8,127.1 447.3 482.3 510.6 540.1 575.3 594.6 620.0 646.2 679.6 718.1 26.1 25.9 28.1 27.8 30.8 33.5 34.4 36.8 38.0 39.7 30.6 19.6 43.7 63.8 58.5 26.5 32.8 29.7 −24.8 −71.9 25.3 21.5 22.4 29.6 25.2 22.2 22.6 19.1 21.5 28.4 4,642.1 4,756.6 4,994.9 5,251.9 5,556.8 5,876.7 6,210.4 6,618.4 7,038.1 7,469.7 1995: I ......... II ........ III ....... IV ....... 7,297.5 7,342.6 7,432.8 7,529.3 224.2 234.5 231.6 238.7 202.8 209.2 220.4 215.3 7,318.9 7,367.9 7,444.1 7,552.7 889.6 904.1 915.9 937.4 724.2 736.7 747.0 766.6 165.5 167.3 168.9 170.8 6,429.2 6,463.8 6,528.2 6,615.3 589.3 594.1 593.6 601.3 33.0 33.1 33.9 34.0 53.7 24.9 3.1 24.4 21.8 22.0 22.5 22.5 5,775.0 5,833.7 5,920.0 5,978.1 1996: I ......... II ........ III ....... IV ....... 7,629.6 7,782.7 7,859.0 7,981.4 239.1 237.7 245.6 259.8 212.3 220.0 234.1 243.5 7,656.5 7,800.3 7,870.5 7,997.7 938.4 948.6 962.5 975.3 766.1 775.3 787.5 798.9 172.3 173.3 175.0 176.4 6,718.1 6,851.7 6,908.0 7,022.4 606.8 613.2 615.7 644.3 33.6 34.3 34.6 35.2 34.4 49.6 25.1 22.3 23.3 22.9 22.0 22.2 6,066.6 6,177.5 6,254.5 6,342.9 1997: I ......... II ....... III ...... IV ...... 8,124.2 8,279.8 8,390.9 8,478.6 268.1 282.6 289.5 285.0 260.4 270.6 282.8 283.2 8,131.8 989.7 8,291.8 1,005.2 8,397.7 1,021.0 8,480.4 1,037.4 811.5 825.1 839.5 853.6 178.2 180.1 181.5 183.8 7,142.1 7,286.6 7,376.6 7,443.1 632.0 643.8 654.1 655.0 35.7 36.7 37.2 37.6 40.6 69.5 26.9 −18.0 21.1 19.2 18.0 18.2 6,454.8 6,555.8 6,676.4 6,786.7 1998: I ......... II ....... III ...... IV ...... 8,634.7 8,722.0 8,829.1 8,974.9 289.3 292.6 277.2 282.6 283.8 289.6 291.4 290.9 8,640.3 8,725.0 8,814.9 8,966.6 1,050.9 1,067.1 1,086.0 1,105.3 866.0 880.6 897.1 913.8 184.9 186.4 188.9 191.5 7,589.4 7,657.9 7,728.8 7,861.3 664.4 671.9 679.2 702.7 37.1 37.9 38.2 38.8 16.4 −20.8 −63.7 −31.0 17.8 17.8 18.0 32.4 6,889.3 6,986.7 7,093.0 7,183.2 1999: I ......... II ....... III ...... IV ...... 9,104.5 9,191.5 9,340.9 9,559.7 281.9 295.9 314.4 331.2 289.2 305.6 328.0 344.6 9,097.2 9,181.8 9,327.3 9,546.3 1,124.9 1,148.8 1,181.8 1,188.5 930.3 951.0 980.8 983.5 194.6 197.8 201.0 205.0 7,972.3 8,033.0 8,145.5 8,357.7 697.2 707.9 721.6 745.5 38.9 39.3 39.9 40.6 −53.6 −76.8 −89.5 −67.8 22.9 29.7 19.5 41.4 7,312.7 7,392.3 7,493.1 7,680.7 2000: I ......... 9,752.7 II ....... 9,945.7 III ...... 10,039.4 350.9 375.4 372.8 358.6 9,745.0 1,215.4 1,005.6 383.7 9,937.4 1,244.3 1,029.8 381.7 10,030.5 1,272.3 1,053.3 209.8 8,529.6 214.6 8,693.1 219.0 8,758.2 755.9 764.6 772.0 41.3 −77.7 42.0 −72.5 41.6 −101.8 23.5 24.2 42.0 7,833.5 7,983.2 8,088.5 Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 304 TABLE B–27.—Relation of national income and personal income, 1959–2000 [Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Less: Year or quarter National income Corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments Plus: Net interest Contributions for social insurance Wage accruals less disbursements Personal interest income Personal dividend income Equals: Government transfer payments to persons Business transfer payments to persons Personal income 1959 ......................... 411.5 53.7 9.7 13.8 0.0 23.0 12.6 22.9 1.3 394.0 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... 427.5 442.5 477.1 504.4 542.1 589.6 646.7 681.7 743.6 802.7 52.3 53.5 61.6 67.6 74.8 86.0 92.0 89.6 96.5 93.7 10.7 12.4 14.1 15.2 17.3 19.7 22.6 25.4 27.2 32.2 16.4 17.0 19.1 21.7 22.4 23.4 31.3 34.9 38.7 44.1 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 25.6 27.3 30.2 33.0 36.9 40.8 45.3 49.4 54.1 62.3 13.4 13.9 15.0 16.2 18.2 20.2 20.7 21.5 23.5 24.2 24.4 28.1 28.8 30.3 31.3 33.9 37.5 45.4 53.0 58.8 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.8 412.7 430.3 457.9 481.0 515.8 557.4 606.4 650.4 714.5 780.8 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... 837.5 903.9 1,000.4 1,127.4 1,211.9 1,302.2 1,456.4 1,635.8 1,860.2 2,075.6 81.6 95.1 109.8 123.9 114.5 133.0 160.6 190.9 217.2 222.5 38.4 42.6 46.2 53.9 68.8 76.6 80.8 95.7 114.5 144.2 46.4 51.2 59.2 75.5 85.2 89.3 101.3 113.1 131.3 152.7 .0 .6 .0 −.1 −.5 .1 .1 .1 .3 −.2 71.5 77.5 84.2 97.6 116.1 128.0 140.5 161.9 191.3 233.5 24.3 25.0 26.8 29.9 33.2 32.9 39.0 44.7 50.7 57.4 71.6 85.2 94.6 108.1 128.4 163.0 176.9 188.7 202.5 226.4 2.8 3.0 3.4 3.8 4.0 4.5 5.5 5.9 6.8 7.9 841.1 905.1 994.3 1,113.4 1,225.6 1,331.7 1,475.4 1,637.1 1,848.3 2,081.5 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... 2,243.0 2,497.1 2,603.0 2,796.5 3,162.3 3,380.4 3,525.8 3,803.4 4,151.1 4,392.1 198.5 219.0 201.2 254.1 309.8 322.4 300.7 346.6 405.0 395.7 183.9 226.5 256.3 267.2 309.6 326.7 343.6 361.5 389.4 443.1 166.2 195.7 208.9 226.0 257.5 281.4 303.4 323.1 361.5 385.2 .0 .1 .0 −.4 .2 −.2 .0 .0 .0 .0 286.4 352.7 401.6 431.6 505.3 546.4 579.2 609.7 650.5 736.5 64.0 73.6 76.1 83.5 90.8 97.5 106.1 112.1 129.4 154.8 270.2 307.0 342.3 369.4 378.3 403.1 428.4 447.8 476.1 519.2 8.8 10.2 11.8 12.8 15.1 17.8 20.7 20.8 20.8 21.1 2,323.9 2,599.4 2,768.4 2,946.9 3,274.8 3,515.0 3,712.4 3,962.5 4,272.1 4,599.8 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... ......................... ........................ 4,642.1 4,756.6 4,994.9 5,251.9 5,556.8 5,876.7 6,210.4 6,618.4 7,038.1 7,469.7 408.6 431.2 453.1 510.5 573.2 668.8 754.0 833.8 815.0 856.0 452.4 429.8 399.5 374.3 380.5 389.8 386.3 423.9 482.7 507.1 410.1 430.2 455.0 477.8 508.4 533.2 555.8 587.8 622.1 662.1 .1 −.1 −15.8 6.4 17.6 16.4 3.6 −2.9 2.1 5.2 772.4 771.8 750.1 725.5 742.4 792.5 810.6 864.0 940.8 963.7 165.4 178.3 185.3 203.0 234.7 254.0 297.4 334.9 351.1 370.3 573.1 649.1 729.2 776.5 810.1 860.1 902.4 934.4 954.3 986.5 21.3 20.8 22.5 22.1 23.7 25.8 26.4 27.9 28.7 29.7 4,903.2 5,085.4 5,390.4 5,610.0 5,888.0 6,200.9 6,547.4 6,937.0 7,391.0 7,789.6 1995: I ...................... II ..................... III .................... IV .................... 5,775.0 5,833.7 5,920.0 5,978.1 630.0 655.5 692.8 696.7 396.8 392.8 386.7 383.0 525.6 530.4 535.9 540.9 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 784.8 791.9 794.7 798.7 248.4 250.8 251.8 264.8 845.4 856.3 865.0 873.7 25.1 25.7 26.1 26.3 6,109.9 6,163.3 6,225.9 6,304.6 1996: I ...................... II ..................... III .................... IV .................... 6,066.6 6,177.5 6,254.5 6,342.9 736.7 748.6 755.0 775.8 378.2 385.5 388.1 393.3 544.7 552.9 559.5 566.1 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 797.2 805.9 814.6 824.6 285.9 290.4 302.4 310.9 892.6 900.0 905.5 911.5 26.1 26.2 26.5 26.8 6,405.1 6,509.4 6,597.1 6,677.9 1997: I ...................... II ..................... III .................... IV .................... 6,454.8 6,555.8 6,676.4 6,786.7 798.5 825.6 858.3 852.7 402.2 417.5 429.0 446.8 576.4 583.2 590.8 600.9 −2.9 −2.9 −2.9 −2.9 834.8 854.1 871.9 895.1 321.1 331.5 340.3 346.7 928.7 933.2 937.1 938.5 27.3 27.7 28.1 28.3 6,792.4 6,879.1 6,978.6 7,097.9 1998: I ...................... II ..................... III .................... IV .................... 6,889.3 6,986.7 7,093.0 7,183.2 824.5 814.0 818.0 803.4 464.4 483.5 493.3 489.8 610.8 617.8 625.8 634.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 917.7 940.6 954.5 950.3 348.4 349.4 351.0 355.7 948.7 951.7 957.0 959.8 28.4 28.6 28.8 29.1 7,230.7 7,339.5 7,445.1 7,548.6 1999: I ...................... II ..................... III .................... IV ................... 7,312.7 7,392.3 7,493.1 7,680.7 852.0 836.8 842.0 893.2 490.1 494.1 513.8 530.6 648.2 657.0 666.9 676.1 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 945.1 951.3 969.4 989.0 360.8 366.8 373.5 380.2 975.7 982.6 990.4 997.3 29.4 29.6 29.9 30.1 7,628.1 7,729.7 7,828.5 7,972.3 2000: I ...................... II ..................... III ................... 7,833.5 7,983.2 8,088.5 936.3 963.6 970.3 545.4 565.9 575.7 691.2 701.7 710.2 .0 .0 .0 1,011.6 1,031.3 1,042.9 386.9 392.6 399.7 1,016.5 1,035.5 1,043.5 30.4 30.6 30.8 8,105.8 8,242.1 8,349.0 Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 305 TABLE B–28.—National income by type of income, 1959–2000 [Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Compensation of employees Year or quarter National income 1 Proprietors’ income with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments Wage and salary accruals Supplements to wages and salaries Government Total Employer contributions for social insurance Other labor income Total Total Other Farm Nonfarm Total Proprietors’ income 2 Total Proprietors’ income 3 Total 1959 ........ 411.5 281.0 259.8 46.0 213.8 21.2 7.9 13.4 51.8 10.9 11.8 40.9 40.3 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ 427.5 442.5 477.1 504.4 542.1 589.6 646.7 681.7 743.6 802.7 296.4 305.3 327.2 345.3 370.7 399.5 442.6 475.2 524.3 577.6 272.8 280.5 299.3 314.8 337.7 363.7 400.3 428.9 471.9 518.3 49.2 52.4 56.3 60.0 64.9 69.9 78.3 86.4 96.6 105.5 223.7 228.0 243.0 254.8 272.9 293.8 321.9 342.5 375.3 412.7 23.6 24.8 27.9 30.4 33.0 35.8 42.4 46.2 52.4 59.4 9.3 9.6 11.2 12.4 12.6 13.1 16.8 18.0 20.0 22.8 14.4 15.2 16.7 18.0 20.3 22.7 25.5 28.2 32.5 36.6 51.9 54.4 56.5 57.8 60.6 65.2 69.6 71.1 75.4 78.9 11.4 12.1 12.1 11.9 10.8 13.1 14.1 12.8 12.8 14.2 12.3 12.9 12.9 12.7 11.6 13.9 15.0 13.7 13.9 15.4 40.4 42.3 44.4 45.8 49.9 52.2 55.5 58.4 62.6 64.7 40.0 42.0 44.1 45.5 49.5 52.2 55.7 58.7 63.4 65.5 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ 837.5 903.9 1,000.4 1,127.4 1,211.9 1,302.2 1,456.4 1,635.8 1,860.2 2,075.6 617.2 658.8 725.1 811.2 890.2 949.0 1,059.3 1,180.4 1,336.0 1,500.8 551.5 584.5 638.7 708.6 772.2 814.7 899.6 994.0 1,121.0 1,255.6 117.1 126.7 137.8 148.7 160.4 176.1 188.7 202.4 219.8 236.9 434.3 457.8 500.9 560.0 611.8 638.6 710.8 791.6 901.2 1,018.7 65.7 74.4 86.5 102.6 118.0 134.4 159.7 186.4 215.0 245.2 23.8 26.4 31.2 39.8 44.7 46.7 54.4 61.1 71.5 82.6 41.9 48.0 55.3 62.8 73.3 87.6 105.3 125.3 143.4 162.6 79.8 86.1 97.7 115.2 115.5 121.6 134.3 148.3 170.1 183.7 14.3 14.9 18.8 30.7 25.2 23.5 18.7 17.5 21.5 23.7 15.7 16.5 20.5 32.6 27.7 26.9 22.6 21.7 26.3 29.4 65.5 71.2 78.9 84.5 90.3 98.1 115.6 130.8 148.5 160.0 66.6 72.6 79.9 86.6 94.1 99.9 117.2 131.9 149.9 161.4 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ 2,243.0 2,497.1 2,603.0 2,796.5 3,162.3 3,380.4 3,525.8 3,803.4 4,151.1 4,392.1 1,651.7 1,825.7 1,926.0 2,042.7 2,255.9 2,425.2 2,570.7 2,755.6 2,973.8 3,151.0 1,377.4 1,517.3 1,593.4 1,684.3 1,854.8 1,995.2 2,114.4 2,270.2 2,452.7 2,596.8 261.2 285.6 307.3 324.5 347.8 373.5 396.6 422.2 450.9 479.7 1,116.2 1,231.7 1,286.1 1,359.8 1,507.0 1,621.7 1,717.8 1,848.0 2,001.8 2,117.1 274.3 308.5 332.6 358.5 401.1 430.0 456.3 485.4 521.1 554.2 88.9 103.6 109.8 119.9 139.0 147.7 157.9 166.3 184.6 193.7 185.4 204.8 222.8 238.6 262.1 282.3 298.4 319.1 336.5 360.5 177.6 186.2 179.9 195.5 247.5 267.0 278.6 303.9 338.8 361.8 13.1 20.3 14.4 7.2 21.6 21.5 23.0 29.0 26.0 32.2 20.2 28.6 23.4 16.0 30.2 29.7 31.1 36.9 33.9 40.0 164.5 165.9 165.4 188.3 225.9 245.5 255.6 274.8 312.7 329.6 165.7 161.4 158.9 172.8 200.3 211.2 216.3 239.8 277.4 293.5 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ 4,642.1 4,756.6 4,994.9 5,251.9 5,556.8 5,876.7 6,210.4 6,618.4 7,038.1 7,469.7 3,351.0 3,454.9 3,644.8 3,814.4 4,016.2 4,202.5 4,395.6 4,651.3 4,984.2 5,299.8 2,754.6 2,824.2 2,966.8 3,091.6 3,254.3 3,441.1 3,630.1 3,886.0 4,192.8 4,475.1 516.8 545.6 567.7 584.9 603.9 622.7 641.0 664.3 692.7 724.4 2,237.9 2,278.6 2,399.1 2,506.8 2,650.4 2,818.4 2,989.1 3,221.7 3,500.1 3,750.7 596.4 630.7 677.9 722.8 761.9 761.4 765.4 765.3 791.4 824.6 206.5 215.1 228.4 240.0 254.4 264.5 275.4 289.9 305.9 323.6 390.0 415.6 449.5 482.8 507.5 497.0 490.0 475.4 485.5 501.0 381.0 384.2 434.3 461.8 476.6 497.7 544.7 581.2 620.7 663.5 31.1 26.4 32.7 30.1 31.9 22.2 34.3 29.7 25.4 25.3 39.2 34.4 40.9 38.2 39.9 30.2 42.1 37.5 33.1 33.6 349.9 357.8 401.7 431.7 444.6 475.5 510.5 551.5 595.2 638.2 323.2 333.0 373.4 401.4 421.7 447.8 476.0 507.2 545.1 586.9 1995: I ..... II .... III ... IV ... 5,775.0 5,833.7 5,920.0 5,978.1 4,142.7 4,178.8 4,224.3 4,264.1 3,379.6 3,417.2 3,463.6 3,503.8 618.8 620.9 623.9 627.3 2,760.8 2,796.4 2,839.7 2,876.5 763.1 761.6 760.7 760.2 260.9 263.1 265.7 268.2 502.2 498.5 495.0 492.1 488.6 491.4 499.7 511.1 21.4 19.6 20.5 27.3 29.4 27.7 28.5 35.2 467.2 471.8 479.2 483.9 441.8 444.8 450.8 453.7 1996: I ..... II .... III ... IV ... 6,066.6 6,177.5 6,254.5 6,342.9 4,297.4 4,367.8 4,427.8 4,489.4 3,537.4 3,604.6 3,660.9 3,717.6 634.3 639.3 643.1 647.3 2,903.1 2,965.3 3,017.8 3,070.3 760.0 763.2 766.8 771.8 270.0 274.0 277.2 280.4 490.0 489.1 489.6 491.4 525.9 546.6 553.5 553.0 31.1 36.3 38.0 31.7 39.0 44.2 45.8 39.5 494.8 510.3 515.5 521.4 463.6 477.1 479.8 483.4 1997: I ..... II .... III ... IV ... 6,454.8 6,555.8 6,676.4 6,786.7 4,553.7 4,607.8 4,675.8 4,767.9 3,786.5 3,845.0 3,912.7 3,999.7 656.9 661.2 666.5 672.5 3,129.6 3,183.8 3,246.2 3,327.2 767.2 762.8 763.0 768.2 284.5 287.7 291.3 296.2 482.7 475.2 471.7 471.9 570.0 576.0 586.0 592.7 30.6 29.6 29.8 28.9 38.4 37.4 37.5 36.6 539.4 546.4 556.2 563.8 498.4 502.5 511.0 516.9 1998: I ..... II .... III ... IV ... 6,889.3 6,986.7 7,093.0 7,183.2 4,867.5 4,943.1 5,023.4 5,102.7 4,087.0 4,155.5 4,228.3 4,300.3 681.7 688.8 696.7 703.5 3,405.3 3,466.7 3,531.6 3,596.8 780.5 787.6 795.1 802.4 300.5 303.8 307.7 311.6 480.0 483.8 487.4 490.9 606.2 613.3 619.5 643.7 25.3 23.3 21.2 32.0 32.9 30.8 28.8 39.8 580.9 590.0 598.4 611.7 531.1 541.6 547.9 559.8 1999: I ..... II .... III ... IV ... 7,312.7 7,392.3 7,493.1 7,680.7 5,181.6 5,255.4 5,340.9 5,421.1 4,369.4 4,435.5 4,512.2 4,583.5 715.3 720.3 727.5 734.5 3,654.1 3,715.2 3,784.7 3,849.0 812.2 819.9 828.7 837.7 317.0 321.2 325.9 330.3 495.1 498.7 502.8 507.4 644.1 660.4 659.7 689.6 25.0 29.0 15.5 31.7 32.9 37.0 24.8 39.8 619.1 631.4 644.2 657.9 567.2 581.0 593.7 605.7 2000: I .... II .... III .. 7,833.5 7,983.2 8,088.5 5,512.2 5,603.5 5,679.6 4,660.4 4,740.1 4,804.9 749.9 760.2 765.4 3,910.5 3,980.0 4,039.5 851.8 863.3 874.7 337.8 342.9 347.1 514.0 520.5 527.6 693.9 709.5 724.8 19.1 21.5 31.7 27.4 29.9 40.3 674.8 688.1 693.1 624.1 635.2 639.6 1 National income is the total net income earned in production. It differs from gross domestic product mainly in that it excludes depreciation charges and other allowances for business and institutional consumption of durable capital goods and indirect business taxes. See Table B-26. See next page for continuation of table. 306 TABLE B–28.—National income by type of income, 1959–2000—Continued [Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Rental income of persons with capital consumption adjustment Year or quarter Total Rental income of persons Capital consumption adjustment Corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments Profits with inventory valuation adjustment and without capital consumption adjustment Profits Profits before tax Profits tax liability Total Dividends Undistributed profits Inventory valuation adjustment Total Profits after tax Total Capital consumption adjustment Net interest 1959 ............. 15.2 17.3 −2.1 53.7 53.4 53.7 23.6 30.0 12.6 17.5 −0.3 0.3 9.7 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. 16.2 16.9 17.8 18.5 18.6 19.2 19.9 20.4 20.2 20.3 18.3 19.0 19.9 20.5 20.6 21.4 22.4 23.2 23.4 24.3 −2.1 −2.1 −2.1 −2.0 −2.0 −2.2 −2.5 −2.8 −3.3 −3.9 52.3 53.5 61.6 67.6 74.8 86.0 92.0 89.6 96.5 93.7 51.4 51.7 56.9 62.0 68.4 78.7 84.4 81.7 88.5 85.2 51.5 51.5 56.9 61.9 68.9 80.0 86.5 83.3 92.2 91.1 22.7 22.8 24.0 26.2 28.0 30.9 33.7 32.7 39.4 39.7 28.8 28.7 32.9 35.7 40.9 49.1 52.8 50.6 52.8 51.4 13.4 13.9 15.0 16.2 18.2 20.2 20.7 21.5 23.5 24.2 15.5 14.8 17.9 19.5 22.7 28.9 32.1 29.1 29.3 27.2 −.2 .3 .0 .1 −.5 −1.2 −2.1 −1.6 −3.7 −5.9 1.0 1.7 4.6 5.6 6.4 7.2 7.6 7.9 8.0 8.5 10.7 12.4 14.1 15.2 17.3 19.7 22.6 25.4 27.2 32.2 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. 20.3 21.2 21.6 23.1 23.0 22.0 21.5 20.4 22.4 24.5 24.6 26.1 27.7 30.1 31.7 32.3 33.0 34.0 38.9 44.5 −4.3 −5.0 −6.1 −7.0 −8.7 −10.3 −11.5 −13.6 −16.5 −20.0 81.6 95.1 109.8 123.9 114.5 133.0 160.6 190.9 217.2 222.5 74.0 87.9 100.7 114.6 108.5 134.3 164.5 193.3 221.2 229.9 80.6 92.4 107.3 134.2 146.8 144.8 178.6 209.0 244.9 270.1 34.4 37.7 41.9 49.3 51.8 50.9 64.2 73.0 83.5 88.0 46.2 54.7 65.5 84.9 95.0 93.9 114.4 136.0 161.4 182.1 24.3 25.0 26.8 29.9 33.2 33.0 39.0 44.8 50.8 57.5 21.9 29.7 38.6 55.0 61.8 60.9 75.4 91.2 110.6 124.6 −6.6 −4.6 −6.6 −19.6 −38.2 −10.5 −14.1 −15.7 −23.7 −40.1 7.6 7.3 9.0 9.4 5.9 −1.2 −4.0 −2.4 −4.0 −7.4 38.4 42.6 46.2 53.9 68.8 76.6 80.8 95.7 114.5 144.2 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. 31.3 39.6 39.6 36.9 39.5 39.1 32.2 35.8 44.1 40.5 54.9 66.1 68.0 65.9 68.8 70.3 63.7 68.9 79.1 80.2 −23.6 −26.5 −28.5 −28.9 −29.4 −31.2 −31.5 −33.1 −35.0 −39.7 198.5 219.0 201.2 254.1 309.8 322.4 300.7 346.6 405.0 395.7 209.3 216.3 188.0 223.9 262.0 255.2 250.5 298.4 359.8 360.4 251.4 240.9 195.5 231.4 266.0 255.2 243.4 314.6 381.9 376.7 84.8 81.1 63.1 77.2 94.0 96.5 106.5 127.1 137.2 141.5 166.6 159.8 132.4 154.1 172.0 158.7 136.9 187.5 244.8 235.3 64.1 73.8 76.2 83.6 91.0 97.7 106.3 112.2 129.6 155.0 102.6 86.0 56.2 70.5 81.0 61.0 30.6 75.3 115.2 80.2 −42.1 −24.6 −7.5 −7.4 −4.0 .0 7.1 −16.2 −22.2 −16.3 −10.8 2.7 13.3 30.2 47.7 67.2 50.3 48.2 45.3 35.3 183.9 226.5 256.3 267.2 309.6 326.7 343.6 361.5 389.4 443.1 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. 49.1 56.4 63.3 90.9 110.3 117.9 129.7 128.3 135.4 143.4 87.2 96.0 111.4 133.6 157.8 165.4 177.4 178.3 187.6 199.4 −38.1 −39.6 −48.1 −42.8 −47.5 −47.5 −47.6 −50.0 −52.2 −56.0 408.6 431.2 453.1 510.5 573.2 668.8 754.0 833.8 815.0 856.0 388.6 421.1 448.8 506.4 561.0 650.2 729.4 800.8 775.1 813.9 401.5 416.1 451.6 510.4 573.4 668.5 726.3 792.4 758.2 823.0 140.6 133.6 143.1 165.4 186.7 211.0 223.6 237.2 244.6 255.9 260.9 282.6 308.4 345.0 386.7 457.5 502.7 555.2 513.6 567.1 165.6 178.4 185.5 203.1 234.9 254.2 297.7 335.2 351.5 370.7 95.3 104.1 122.9 141.9 151.8 203.3 205.0 220.0 162.1 196.4 −12.9 4.9 −2.8 −4.0 −12.4 −18.3 3.1 8.4 17.0 −9.1 19.9 10.2 4.3 4.1 12.2 18.6 24.6 32.9 39.9 42.1 452.4 429.8 399.5 374.3 380.5 389.8 386.3 423.9 482.7 507.1 1995: I .......... II ......... III ........ IV ........ 116.9 115.1 116.6 123.2 163.0 161.3 163.0 174.4 −46.1 −46.2 −46.4 −51.3 630.0 655.5 692.8 696.7 610.7 637.1 673.7 679.2 643.2 665.3 683.5 681.8 203.1 208.8 218.7 213.3 440.1 456.6 464.8 468.5 248.6 251.1 252.1 265.0 191.5 205.5 212.7 203.4 −32.5 −28.2 −9.8 −2.6 19.4 18.4 19.2 17.5 396.8 392.8 386.7 383.0 1996: I .......... II ......... III ........ IV ........ 128.4 129.0 130.1 131.4 175.2 176.1 178.2 179.9 −46.8 −47.0 −48.1 −48.5 736.7 748.6 755.0 775.8 715.3 724.7 729.6 748.1 713.2 726.3 724.9 741.0 219.7 225.3 224.0 225.6 493.5 501.0 500.9 515.4 286.2 290.7 302.7 311.3 207.3 210.3 198.2 204.1 2.1 −1.7 4.7 7.1 21.4 23.9 25.4 27.7 378.2 385.5 388.1 393.3 1997: I .......... II ......... III ........ IV ........ 130.4 128.9 127.4 126.7 179.5 178.6 177.6 177.5 −49.1 −49.7 −50.3 −50.8 798.5 825.6 858.3 852.7 768.1 793.3 824.7 817.3 757.7 781.2 819.0 811.6 227.0 231.8 245.2 244.8 530.7 549.4 573.8 566.9 321.4 331.8 340.6 347.1 209.3 217.5 233.2 219.8 10.4 12.1 5.6 5.7 30.4 32.3 33.6 35.4 402.2 417.5 429.0 446.8 1998: I .......... II ......... III ........ IV ........ 126.7 132.8 138.8 143.5 178.0 184.6 191.2 196.6 −51.3 −51.9 −52.5 −53.1 824.5 814.0 818.0 803.4 786.2 774.4 777.8 762.2 763.5 766.7 760.1 742.3 244.1 245.9 249.0 239.4 519.4 520.9 511.1 502.9 348.8 349.8 351.4 356.1 170.6 171.1 159.7 146.9 22.6 7.7 17.7 19.9 38.4 39.6 40.2 41.2 464.4 483.5 493.3 489.8 1999: I .......... II ......... III ........ IV ........ 144.9 145.7 136.6 146.2 198.7 200.2 196.3 202.3 −53.8 −54.5 −59.7 −56.1 852.0 836.8 842.0 893.2 809.1 795.6 799.3 851.5 797.6 804.5 819.0 870.7 247.8 250.8 254.2 270.8 549.9 553.7 564.8 599.9 361.1 367.2 373.9 380.6 188.7 186.5 190.9 219.3 11.4 −8.9 −19.7 −19.2 42.9 41.2 42.7 41.6 490.1 494.1 513.8 530.6 2000: I .......... II ......... III ....... 145.6 140.8 138.1 203.1 198.8 196.6 −57.5 −58.0 −58.5 936.3 963.6 970.3 895.7 928.8 940.5 920.7 942.5 945.1 286.3 292.0 290.6 634.4 650.4 654.4 387.3 393.0 400.1 247.1 257.4 254.4 −25.0 −13.6 −4.5 40.6 34.7 29.7 545.4 565.9 575.7 2 Without capital consumption adjustment. inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 3 Without 307 TABLE B–29.—Sources of personal income, 1959–2000 [Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Wage and salary disbursements 1 Private industries Year or quarter Personal income Total Total Goodsproducing industries Total Manufacturing Distributive industries Service industries Government Other labor income 1 Proprietors’ income with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments Farm Nonfarm 1959 .......... 394.0 259.8 213.8 109.9 86.9 65.1 38.8 46.0 13.4 10.9 40.9 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 412.7 430.3 457.9 481.0 515.8 557.4 606.4 650.4 714.5 780.8 272.8 280.5 299.3 314.8 337.7 363.7 400.3 428.9 471.9 518.3 223.7 228.0 243.0 254.8 272.9 293.8 321.9 342.5 375.3 412.7 113.4 114.0 122.2 127.4 136.0 146.6 161.6 169.0 184.1 200.4 89.8 89.9 96.8 100.7 107.3 115.7 128.2 134.3 146.0 157.7 68.6 69.6 73.3 76.8 82.0 87.9 95.1 101.6 110.8 121.7 41.7 44.4 47.6 50.7 54.9 59.4 65.3 72.0 80.4 90.6 49.2 52.4 56.3 60.0 64.9 69.9 78.3 86.4 96.6 105.5 14.4 15.2 16.7 18.0 20.3 22.7 25.5 28.2 32.5 36.6 11.4 12.1 12.1 11.9 10.8 13.1 14.1 12.8 12.8 14.2 40.4 42.3 44.4 45.8 49.9 52.2 55.5 58.4 62.6 64.7 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 841.1 905.1 994.3 1,113.4 1,225.6 1,331.7 1,475.4 1,637.1 1,848.3 2,081.5 551.5 583.9 638.7 708.7 772.6 814.6 899.5 993.9 1,120.7 1,255.8 434.3 457.4 501.2 560.0 611.8 638.6 710.8 791.6 901.2 1,018.7 203.7 209.1 228.2 255.9 276.5 277.1 309.7 346.1 392.6 442.3 158.4 160.5 175.6 196.6 211.8 211.6 238.0 266.7 300.1 335.2 131.2 140.4 153.3 170.3 186.8 198.1 219.5 242.7 274.9 308.5 99.4 107.9 119.7 133.9 148.6 163.4 181.6 202.8 233.7 267.8 117.1 126.5 137.4 148.7 160.9 176.0 188.6 202.3 219.6 237.1 41.9 48.0 55.3 62.8 73.3 87.6 105.3 125.3 143.4 162.6 14.3 14.9 18.8 30.7 25.2 23.5 18.7 17.5 21.5 23.7 65.5 71.2 78.9 84.5 90.3 98.1 115.6 130.8 148.5 160.0 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 2,323.9 2,599.4 2,768.4 2,946.9 3,274.8 3,515.0 3,712.4 3,962.5 4,272.1 4,599.8 1,377.5 1,517.2 1,593.4 1,684.7 1,854.6 1,995.4 2,114.4 2,270.2 2,452.7 2,596.8 1,116.2 1,231.7 1,286.1 1,359.8 1,507.0 1,621.7 1,717.8 1,848.0 2,001.8 2,117.1 472.3 514.5 514.6 527.7 586.1 620.2 636.8 660.1 706.7 732.2 356.2 387.6 385.7 400.7 445.4 468.5 480.7 496.9 529.9 547.9 336.7 368.5 385.9 405.7 445.2 476.5 501.6 535.4 575.1 606.5 307.2 348.6 385.6 426.4 475.6 524.9 579.3 652.4 720.1 778.5 261.3 285.6 307.3 325.0 347.6 373.8 396.6 422.2 450.9 479.7 185.4 204.8 222.8 238.6 262.1 282.3 298.4 319.1 336.5 360.5 13.1 20.3 14.4 7.2 21.6 21.5 23.0 29.0 26.0 32.2 164.5 165.9 165.4 188.3 225.9 245.5 255.6 274.8 312.7 329.6 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 4,903.2 5,085.4 5,390.4 5,610.0 5,888.0 6,200.9 6,547.4 6,937.0 7,391.0 7,789.6 2,754.6 2,824.2 2,982.6 3,085.2 3,236.7 3,424.7 3,626.5 3,888.9 4,190.7 4,470.0 2,237.9 2,278.6 2,414.9 2,500.3 2,632.8 2,802.0 2,985.5 3,224.7 3,498.0 3,745.6 754.4 746.3 765.7 780.6 824.0 863.6 908.2 975.1 1,038.6 1,089.2 561.4 562.5 583.5 592.4 620.3 647.5 673.7 718.4 756.6 782.4 633.6 646.3 680.2 697.3 738.4 782.1 822.4 879.6 949.1 1,020.3 849.9 886.0 969.0 1,022.4 1,070.4 1,156.3 1,254.9 1,369.9 1,510.3 1,636.0 516.7 545.6 567.7 584.9 603.9 622.7 641.0 664.3 692.7 724.4 390.0 415.6 449.5 482.8 507.5 497.0 490.0 475.4 485.5 501.0 31.1 26.4 32.7 30.1 31.9 22.2 34.3 29.7 25.4 25.3 349.9 357.8 401.7 431.7 444.6 475.5 510.5 551.5 595.2 638.2 1995: I ....... II ...... III .... IV .... 6,109.9 6,163.3 6,225.9 6,304.6 3,363.2 3,400.9 3,447.2 3,487.5 2,744.5 2,780.0 2,823.3 2,860.1 852.8 858.4 868.1 875.0 641.1 644.5 650.4 654.0 768.4 777.5 787.8 794.7 1,123.2 1,144.1 1,167.4 1,190.5 618.8 620.9 623.9 627.3 502.2 498.5 495.0 492.1 21.4 19.6 20.5 27.3 467.2 471.8 479.2 483.9 1996: I ....... II ...... III .... IV .... 6,405.1 6,509.4 6,597.1 6,677.9 3,533.8 3,601.0 3,657.3 3,713.9 2,899.4 2,961.6 3,014.2 3,066.7 882.1 903.0 917.6 930.0 656.0 671.1 680.2 687.6 803.5 816.6 828.3 841.2 1,213.9 1,242.0 1,268.3 1,295.6 634.3 639.3 643.1 647.3 490.0 489.1 489.6 491.4 31.1 36.3 38.0 31.7 494.8 510.3 515.5 521.4 1997: I ...... II ...... III .... IV .... 6,792.4 6,879.1 6,978.6 7,097.9 3,789.4 3,847.9 3,915.7 4,002.6 3,132.5 3,186.7 3,249.2 3,330.2 951.4 964.8 979.9 1,004.4 702.0 710.7 721.1 739.6 856.4 869.3 886.4 906.3 1,324.8 1,352.6 1,382.9 1,419.4 656.9 661.2 666.5 672.5 482.7 475.2 471.7 471.9 30.6 29.6 29.8 28.9 539.4 546.4 556.2 563.8 1998: I ....... II ...... III .... IV .... 7,230.7 7,339.5 7,445.1 7,548.6 4,084.9 4,153.4 4,226.2 4,298.2 3,403.2 3,464.6 3,529.5 3,594.7 1,021.8 1,031.7 1,042.9 1,058.1 748.8 753.9 758.3 765.4 924.1 939.5 957.8 975.0 1,457.4 1,493.3 1,528.8 1,561.7 681.7 688.8 696.7 703.5 480.0 483.8 487.4 490.9 25.3 23.3 21.2 32.0 580.9 590.0 598.4 611.7 1999: I ....... II ...... III .... IV .... 7,628.1 7,729.7 7,828.5 7,972.3 4,364.3 4,430.4 4,507.0 4,578.3 3,649.0 3,710.0 3,779.6 3,843.8 1,066.4 1,081.6 1,097.8 1,111.2 768.1 777.4 789.0 795.1 992.1 1,009.9 1,029.9 1,049.4 1,590.4 1,618.6 1,651.8 1,683.2 715.3 720.3 727.5 734.5 495.1 498.7 502.8 507.4 25.0 29.0 15.5 31.7 619.1 631.4 644.2 657.9 2000: I ....... II ...... III .... 8,105.8 8,242.1 8,349.0 4,660.4 4,740.1 4,804.9 3,910.5 3,980.0 4,039.5 1,130.9 1,147.1 1,161.4 802.8 813.1 821.4 1,070.9 1,095.7 1,118.1 1,708.6 1,737.2 1,760.1 749.9 760.2 765.4 514.0 520.5 527.6 19.1 21.5 31.7 674.8 688.1 693.1 1 The total of wage and salary disbursements and other labor income differs from compensation of employees in Table B-28 in that it excludes employer contributions for social insurance and the excess of wage accruals over wage disbursements. See next page for continuation of table. 308 TABLE B–29.—Sources of personal income, 1959–2000—Continued [Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Year or quarter Rental income of persons with capital consumption adjustment Transfer payments to persons Personal dividend income Personal interest income Total Old-age, survivors, Government disability, unemand Veterans ployment health benefits insurinsurance ance benefits benefits Family assistance 1 Other Less: Personal contributions for social insurance 1959 .................................... 15.2 12.6 23.0 24.2 10.2 2.8 4.6 0.9 5.7 6.0 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... 16.2 16.9 17.8 18.5 18.6 19.2 19.9 20.4 20.2 20.3 13.4 13.9 15.0 16.2 18.2 20.2 20.7 21.5 23.5 24.2 25.6 27.3 30.2 33.0 36.9 40.8 45.3 49.4 54.1 62.3 25.7 29.5 30.3 32.0 33.2 35.9 39.6 47.6 55.6 61.6 11.1 12.6 14.3 15.2 16.0 18.1 20.8 25.5 30.2 32.9 3.0 4.3 3.1 3.0 2.7 2.3 1.9 2.2 2.1 2.2 4.6 5.0 4.7 4.8 4.7 4.9 4.9 5.6 5.9 6.7 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.3 2.8 3.5 6.1 6.5 7.0 7.6 8.2 9.0 10.2 12.1 14.5 16.2 7.2 7.4 7.9 9.3 9.8 10.3 14.5 16.8 18.7 21.4 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... 20.3 21.2 21.6 23.1 23.0 22.0 21.5 20.4 22.4 24.5 24.3 25.0 26.8 29.9 33.2 32.9 39.0 44.7 50.7 57.4 71.5 77.5 84.2 97.6 116.1 128.0 140.5 161.9 191.3 233.5 74.3 88.2 98.0 111.9 132.3 167.5 182.3 194.6 209.3 234.2 38.5 44.5 49.6 60.4 70.1 81.4 92.9 104.9 116.2 131.8 4.0 5.8 5.7 4.4 6.8 17.6 15.8 12.7 9.7 9.8 7.7 8.8 9.7 10.4 11.8 14.5 14.4 13.8 13.9 14.4 4.8 6.2 6.9 7.2 8.0 9.3 10.1 10.6 10.8 11.1 19.4 23.0 26.1 29.5 35.6 44.7 49.2 52.5 58.7 67.1 22.5 24.7 28.0 35.7 40.5 42.6 46.9 52.0 59.7 70.2 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... 31.3 39.6 39.6 36.9 39.5 39.1 32.2 35.8 44.1 40.5 64.0 73.6 76.1 83.5 90.8 97.5 106.1 112.1 129.4 154.8 286.4 352.7 401.6 431.6 505.3 546.4 579.2 609.7 650.5 736.5 279.0 317.2 354.2 382.2 393.4 420.9 449.0 468.6 496.9 540.4 154.2 182.0 204.5 221.7 235.7 253.4 269.2 282.9 300.5 325.2 16.1 15.9 25.2 26.3 15.9 15.7 16.3 14.5 13.2 14.3 15.0 16.1 16.4 16.6 16.4 16.7 16.7 16.6 16.9 17.3 12.5 13.1 12.9 13.8 14.5 15.2 16.1 16.4 16.9 17.5 81.3 90.2 95.2 103.8 111.0 119.9 130.6 138.2 149.5 166.1 77.2 92.1 99.1 106.1 118.4 133.6 145.6 156.8 176.8 191.6 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... .................................... 49.1 56.4 63.3 90.9 110.3 117.9 129.7 128.3 135.4 143.4 165.4 178.3 185.3 203.0 234.7 254.0 297.4 334.9 351.1 370.3 772.4 771.8 750.1 725.5 742.4 792.5 810.6 864.0 940.8 963.7 594.4 669.9 751.7 798.6 833.9 885.9 928.8 962.2 983.0 1,016.2 352.1 382.4 414.0 444.4 473.0 508.0 537.6 565.8 578.0 588.0 18.0 26.6 38.9 34.1 23.6 21.5 22.1 19.9 19.5 20.3 17.8 18.3 19.3 20.1 20.1 20.9 21.7 22.5 23.4 24.3 19.2 21.1 22.2 22.8 23.2 22.6 20.3 17.7 17.0 17.8 187.3 221.5 257.3 277.2 294.0 313.0 327.1 336.3 345.0 365.8 203.7 215.1 226.6 237.8 254.1 268.8 280.4 297.9 316.2 338.5 1995: I ................................. II ................................ III ............................... IV ............................... 116.9 115.1 116.6 123.2 248.4 250.8 251.8 264.8 784.8 791.9 794.7 798.7 870.5 881.9 891.1 900.1 498.1 505.7 511.3 516.7 20.7 21.2 21.7 22.2 20.8 20.8 21.0 20.9 22.9 22.8 22.6 22.3 308.0 311.5 314.5 318.1 264.7 267.3 270.2 272.7 1996: I ................................. II ................................ III ............................... IV ............................... 128.4 129.0 130.1 131.4 285.9 290.4 302.4 310.9 797.2 805.9 814.6 824.6 918.7 926.3 931.9 938.3 528.8 534.9 540.2 546.4 22.9 22.4 21.5 21.5 21.5 21.9 21.6 21.8 21.4 20.8 20.2 18.9 324.0 326.3 328.4 329.6 274.7 278.8 282.3 285.7 1997: I ................................. II ................................ III ............................... IV ............................... 130.4 128.9 127.4 126.7 321.1 331.5 340.3 346.7 834.8 854.1 871.9 895.1 955.9 961.0 965.1 966.9 560.0 565.0 568.7 569.5 20.7 20.1 19.4 19.3 22.4 22.3 22.5 22.8 18.4 17.9 17.5 17.2 334.4 335.6 337.1 338.1 291.9 295.5 299.5 304.6 1998: I ................................. II ................................ III ............................... IV ............................... 126.7 132.8 138.8 143.5 348.4 349.4 351.0 355.7 917.7 940.6 954.5 950.3 977.1 980.3 985.8 988.8 577.1 577.8 579.5 577.8 19.2 19.1 20.1 19.8 23.3 23.3 23.4 23.7 17.0 16.9 17.0 17.1 340.6 343.2 345.7 350.4 310.3 314.0 318.2 322.5 1999: I ................................. II ................................ III ............................... IV ............................... 144.9 145.7 136.6 146.2 360.8 366.8 373.5 380.2 945.1 951.3 969.4 989.0 1,005.0 1,012.2 1,020.3 1,027.4 583.4 586.1 589.7 592.8 20.5 20.6 20.2 20.1 24.2 24.2 24.4 24.5 17.4 17.6 17.9 18.1 359.6 363.7 368.2 371.9 331.2 335.8 341.0 345.9 2000: I ................................. II ................................ III .............................. 145.6 140.8 138.1 386.9 392.6 399.7 1,011.6 1,031.3 1,042.9 1,046.9 1,066.1 1,074.2 607.9 624.3 627.2 20.1 19.4 19.9 24.9 24.9 25.1 18.3 18.5 18.7 375.6 379.0 383.2 353.4 358.8 363.1 1 Consists of aid to families with dependent children and, beginning with 1996, assistance programs operating under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. Note.—The industry classification of wage and salary disbursements and proprietors’ income is on an establishment basis and is based on the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) beginning 1987 and on the 1972 SIC for earlier years shown. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 309 TABLE B–30.—Disposition of personal income, 1959–2000 [Billions of dollars, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Less: Personal outlays Year or quarter Personal income Less: Personal tax and nontax payments Equals: Disposable personal income Total Percent of disposable personal income 1 Personal Personal Interest transfer conpaypaid sumption ments by expendi- persons to rest tures of the world (net) Personal outlays Equals: Personal saving Total Personal Personal consumption saving expenditures 1959 ..................... 394.0 42.8 351.2 324.7 318.1 6.1 0.5 26.5 92.4 90.6 7.6 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... 412.7 430.3 457.9 481.0 515.8 557.4 606.4 650.4 714.5 780.8 46.6 47.9 52.3 55.3 52.8 58.4 67.3 74.2 88.3 105.9 366.2 382.4 405.6 425.8 463.0 498.9 539.1 576.2 626.2 675.0 339.8 350.5 372.2 392.7 422.4 456.2 494.6 522.3 573.6 622.3 332.3 342.7 363.8 383.1 411.7 444.3 481.8 508.7 558.7 605.5 7.0 7.3 7.8 8.9 10.0 11.1 12.0 12.5 13.8 15.7 .5 .5 .5 .7 .7 .8 .8 1.0 1.0 1.1 26.4 31.9 33.5 33.1 40.5 42.7 44.5 54.0 52.7 52.6 92.8 91.7 91.7 92.2 91.2 91.4 91.7 90.6 91.6 92.2 90.7 89.6 89.7 90.0 88.9 89.0 89.4 88.3 89.2 89.7 7.2 8.3 8.3 7.8 8.8 8.6 8.3 9.4 8.4 7.8 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... 841.1 905.1 994.3 1,113.4 1,225.6 1,331.7 1,475.4 1,637.1 1,848.3 2,081.5 104.6 103.4 125.6 134.5 153.3 150.3 175.5 201.2 233.5 273.3 736.5 801.7 868.6 979.0 1,072.3 1,181.4 1,299.9 1,436.0 1,614.8 1,808.2 667.0 721.6 791.7 876.5 957.9 1,056.2 1,177.8 1,310.4 1,469.4 1,642.4 648.9 702.4 770.7 852.5 932.4 1,030.3 1,149.8 1,278.4 1,430.4 1,596.3 16.8 17.8 19.6 22.4 24.2 24.5 26.6 30.7 37.5 44.5 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.6 69.5 80.1 76.9 102.5 114.3 125.2 122.1 125.6 145.4 165.8 90.6 90.0 91.1 89.5 89.3 89.4 90.6 91.3 91.0 90.8 88.1 87.6 88.7 87.1 87.0 87.2 88.5 89.0 88.6 88.3 9.4 10.0 8.9 10.5 10.7 10.6 9.4 8.7 9.0 9.2 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... 2,323.9 2,599.4 2,768.4 2,946.9 3,274.8 3,515.0 3,712.4 3,962.5 4,272.1 4,599.8 304.2 351.5 361.6 360.9 387.2 428.5 449.9 503.0 519.7 583.5 2,019.8 2,247.9 2,406.8 2,586.0 2,887.6 3,086.5 3,262.5 3,459.5 3,752.4 4,016.3 1,814.1 2,004.2 2,144.6 2,358.2 2,581.1 2,803.9 2,994.7 3,206.7 3,460.1 3,714.4 1,762.9 1,944.2 2,079.3 2,286.4 2,498.4 2,712.6 2,895.2 3,105.3 3,356.6 3,596.7 49.4 54.6 58.8 65.0 75.0 83.2 90.6 91.5 92.9 106.4 1.8 5.5 6.5 6.8 7.7 8.1 9.0 9.9 10.6 11.4 205.6 243.7 262.2 227.8 306.5 282.6 267.8 252.8 292.3 301.8 89.8 89.2 89.1 91.2 89.4 90.8 91.8 92.7 92.2 92.5 87.3 86.5 86.4 88.4 86.5 87.9 88.7 89.8 89.5 89.6 10.2 10.8 10.9 8.8 10.6 9.2 8.2 7.3 7.8 7.5 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... 4,903.2 5,085.4 5,390.4 5,610.0 5,888.0 6,200.9 6,547.4 6,937.0 7,391.0 7,789.6 609.6 610.5 635.8 674.6 722.6 778.3 869.7 968.8 1,070.9 1,152.0 4,293.6 4,474.8 4,754.6 4,935.3 5,165.4 5,422.6 5,677.7 5,968.2 6,320.0 6,637.7 3,959.3 4,103.2 4,340.9 4,584.5 4,849.9 5,120.2 5,405.6 5,715.3 6,054.7 6,490.1 3,831.5 3,971.2 4,209.7 4,454.7 4,716.4 4,969.0 5,237.5 5,529.3 5,850.9 6,268.7 115.8 118.9 118.7 115.4 117.9 134.7 149.9 164.8 179.8 194.8 12.0 13.0 12.5 14.4 15.6 16.5 18.2 21.2 24.0 26.6 334.3 371.7 413.7 350.8 315.5 302.4 272.1 252.9 265.4 147.6 92.2 91.7 91.3 92.9 93.9 94.4 95.2 95.8 95.8 97.8 89.2 88.7 88.5 90.3 91.3 91.6 92.2 92.6 92.6 94.4 7.8 8.3 8.7 7.1 6.1 5.6 4.8 4.2 4.2 2.2 1995: I .................. II ................. III ................ IV ................ 6,109.9 6,163.3 6,225.9 6,304.6 751.8 780.5 781.6 799.5 5,358.1 5,382.8 5,444.4 5,505.1 5,012.1 5,091.3 5,158.4 5,218.8 4,868.6 4,943.7 5,005.2 5,058.4 127.5 132.1 136.8 142.4 15.9 15.6 16.4 18.0 346.0 291.5 285.9 286.3 93.5 94.6 94.7 94.8 90.9 91.8 91.9 91.9 6.5 5.4 5.3 5.2 1996: I .................. II ................. III ................ IV ................ 6,405.1 6,509.4 6,597.1 6,677.9 830.7 872.5 877.3 898.1 5,574.4 5,637.0 5,719.8 5,779.7 5,292.2 5,383.9 5,433.7 5,512.6 5,130.5 5,218.0 5,263.7 5,337.9 144.3 147.9 151.8 155.5 17.4 18.0 18.2 19.3 282.2 253.1 286.1 267.1 94.9 95.5 95.0 95.4 92.0 92.6 92.0 92.4 5.1 4.5 5.0 4.6 1997: I .................. II ................. III ................ IV ................ 6,792.4 6,879.1 6,978.6 7,097.9 935.1 954.9 978.9 1,006.3 5,857.3 5,924.2 5,999.7 6,091.6 5,609.2 5,654.1 5,763.7 5,834.3 5,429.9 5,470.8 5,575.9 5,640.6 159.0 162.9 166.5 170.9 20.3 20.4 21.2 22.9 248.1 270.1 236.0 257.3 95.8 95.4 96.1 95.8 92.7 92.3 92.9 92.6 4.2 4.6 3.9 4.2 1998: I .................. II ................. III ................ IV ................ 7,230.7 7,339.5 7,445.1 7,548.6 1,035.8 1,056.4 1,084.0 1,107.5 6,194.9 6,283.1 6,361.1 6,441.1 5,909.2 6,012.9 6,099.5 6,197.1 5,712.6 5,811.4 5,893.4 5,986.0 174.0 177.4 181.8 186.0 22.6 24.1 24.3 25.1 285.6 270.2 261.6 244.0 95.4 95.7 95.9 96.2 92.2 92.5 92.6 92.9 4.6 4.3 4.1 3.8 1999: I .................. II ................. III ................ IV ............... 7,628.1 7,729.7 7,828.5 7,972.3 1,113.2 1,133.4 1,164.0 1,197.3 6,514.9 6,596.3 6,664.5 6,775.0 6,310.3 6,432.8 6,543.3 6,674.1 6,095.3 6,213.2 6,319.9 6,446.2 189.5 192.9 196.8 200.2 25.6 26.7 26.6 27.6 204.6 163.6 121.1 101.0 96.9 97.5 98.2 98.5 93.6 94.2 94.8 95.1 3.1 2.5 1.8 1.5 2000: I .................. II ................. III ............... 8,105.8 8,242.1 8,349.0 1,239.3 1,277.2 1,308.1 6,866.5 6,964.9 7,040.9 6,855.6 6,944.3 7,054.7 6,621.7 6,706.3 6,810.8 205.3 209.7 214.4 28.5 28.3 29.5 11.0 20.6 −13.8 99.8 99.7 100.2 96.4 96.3 96.7 .2 .3 −.2 1 Percents based on data in millions of dollars. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 310 TABLE B–31.—Total and per capita disposable personal income and personal consumption expenditures, and per capita gross domestic product, in current and real dollars, 1959–2000 [Quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates, except as noted] Disposable personal income Year or quarter Total (billions of dollars) Personal consumption expenditures Per capita (dollars) Total (billions of dollars) Per capita (dollars) Gross domestic product per capita (dollars) Population (thousands) 1 Current dollars Chained (1996) dollars Current dollars Chained (1996) dollars Current dollars Chained (1996) dollars Current dollars Chained (1996) dollars Current dollars Chained (1996) dollars 1959 ........ 351.2 1,623.8 1,983 9,167 318.1 1,470.7 1,796 8,303 2,865 13,092 177,130 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ 366.2 382.4 405.6 425.8 463.0 498.9 539.1 576.2 626.2 675.0 1,664.8 1,720.0 1,803.5 1,871.5 2,006.9 2,131.0 2,244.6 2,340.5 2,448.2 2,524.3 2,026 2,081 2,174 2,249 2,412 2,567 2,742 2,899 3,119 3,329 9,210 9,361 9,666 9,886 10,456 10,965 11,417 11,776 12,196 12,451 332.3 342.7 363.8 383.1 411.7 444.3 481.8 508.7 558.7 605.5 1,510.8 1,541.2 1,617.3 1,684.0 1,784.8 1,897.6 2,006.1 2,066.2 2,184.2 2,264.8 1,838 1,865 1,950 2,024 2,145 2,286 2,451 2,559 2,783 2,987 8,358 8,388 8,668 8,896 9,300 9,764 10,204 10,396 10,881 11,171 2,918 2,970 3,143 3,268 3,462 3,705 4,015 4,197 4,540 4,860 13,148 13,236 13,821 14,212 14,831 15,583 16,416 16,646 17,266 17,616 180,760 183,742 186,590 189,300 191,927 194,347 196,599 198,752 200,745 202,736 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ 736.5 801.7 868.6 979.0 1,072.3 1,181.4 1,299.9 1,436.0 1,614.8 1,808.2 2,630.0 2,745.3 2,874.3 3,072.3 3,051.9 3,108.5 3,243.5 3,360.7 3,527.5 3,628.6 3,591 3,860 4,138 4,619 5,013 5,470 5,960 6,519 7,253 8,033 12,823 13,218 13,692 14,496 14,268 14,393 14,873 15,256 15,845 16,120 648.9 702.4 770.7 852.5 932.4 1,030.3 1,149.8 1,278.4 1,430.4 1,596.3 2,317.5 2,405.2 2,550.5 2,675.9 2,653.7 2,710.9 2,868.9 2,992.1 3,124.7 3,203.2 3,164 3,382 3,671 4,022 4,359 4,771 5,272 5,803 6,425 7,091 11,300 11,581 12,149 12,626 12,407 12,551 13,155 13,583 14,035 14,230 5,069 5,434 5,909 6,537 7,017 7,571 8,363 9,221 10,313 11,401 17,446 17,804 18,570 19,456 19,163 18,911 19,771 20,481 21,383 21,821 205,089 207,692 209,924 211,939 213,898 215,981 218,086 220,289 222,629 225,106 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ 2,019.8 2,247.9 2,406.8 2,586.0 2,887.6 3,086.5 3,262.5 3,459.5 3,752.4 4,016.3 3,658.0 3,741.1 3,791.7 3,906.9 4,207.6 4,347.8 4,486.6 4,582.5 4,784.1 4,906.5 8,869 9,773 10,364 11,036 12,215 12,941 13,555 14,246 15,312 16,235 16,063 16,265 16,328 16,673 17,799 18,229 18,641 18,870 19,522 19,833 1,762.9 1,944.2 2,079.3 2,286.4 2,498.4 2,712.6 2,895.2 3,105.3 3,356.6 3,596.7 3,193.0 3,236.0 3,275.5 3,454.3 3,640.6 3,820.9 3,981.2 4,113.4 4,279.5 4,393.7 7,741 8,453 8,954 9,757 10,569 11,373 12,029 12,787 13,697 14,539 14,021 14,069 14,105 14,741 15,401 16,020 16,541 16,938 17,463 17,760 12,276 13,614 14,035 15,085 16,636 17,664 18,501 19,529 20,845 22,188 21,521 21,830 21,184 21,902 23,288 23,970 24,565 25,174 25,987 26,646 227,726 230,008 232,218 234,332 236,394 238,506 240,682 242,842 245,061 247,387 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ....... 4,293.6 4,474.8 4,754.6 4,935.3 5,165.4 5,422.6 5,677.7 5,968.2 6,320.0 6,637.7 5,014.2 5,033.0 5,189.3 5,261.3 5,397.2 5,539.1 5,677.7 5,854.5 6,134.1 6,331.0 17,176 17,710 18,616 19,121 19,820 20,613 21,385 22,262 23,359 24,314 20,058 19,919 20,318 20,384 20,709 21,055 21,385 21,838 22,672 23,191 3,831.5 3,971.2 4,209.7 4,454.7 4,716.4 4,969.0 5,237.5 5,529.3 5,850.9 6,268.7 4,474.5 4,466.6 4,594.5 4,748.9 4,928.1 5,075.6 5,237.5 5,423.9 5,678.7 5,978.8 15,327 15,717 16,482 17,259 18,097 18,888 19,727 20,625 21,625 22,962 17,899 17,677 17,989 18,399 18,910 19,294 19,727 20,232 20,989 21,901 23,215 23,691 24,741 25,735 27,068 28,131 29,428 31,029 32,489 34,063 26,834 26,423 26,938 27,363 28,194 28,676 29,428 30,436 31,474 32,512 249,981 252,677 255,403 258,107 260,616 263,073 265,504 268,087 270,560 272,996 1995: I ..... II .... III ... IV ... 5,358.1 5,382.8 5,444.4 5,505.1 5,515.4 5,509.0 5,546.6 5,585.3 20,441 20,489 20,670 20,849 21,041 20,970 21,058 21,153 4,868.6 4,943.7 5,005.2 5,058.4 5,011.6 5,059.6 5,099.2 5,132.1 18,573 18,818 19,002 19,157 19,119 19,259 19,359 19,436 27,839 27,949 28,219 28,515 28,569 28,561 28,707 28,866 262,129 262,714 263,400 264,047 1996: I ..... II .... III ... IV ... 5,574.4 5,637.0 5,719.8 5,779.7 5,622.0 5,649.4 5,709.7 5,729.9 21,072 21,261 21,517 21,687 21,252 21,308 21,478 21,500 5,130.5 5,218.0 5,263.7 5,337.9 5,174.3 5,229.5 5,254.3 5,291.9 19,394 19,681 19,801 20,029 19,560 19,724 19,765 19,857 28,841 29,354 29,564 29,948 29,018 29,430 29,499 29,761 264,542 265,134 265,834 266,504 1997: I ..... II .... III ... IV ... 5,857.3 5,924.2 5,999.7 6,091.6 5,771.8 5,821.2 5,877.3 5,947.5 21,929 22,129 22,351 22,637 21,609 21,744 21,895 22,102 5,429.9 5,470.8 5,575.9 5,640.6 5,350.7 5,375.7 5,462.1 5,507.1 20,329 20,435 20,772 20,961 20,032 20,080 20,348 20,465 30,416 30,928 31,259 31,508 30,012 30,376 30,609 30,743 267,105 267,713 268,433 269,096 1998: I ..... II .... III ... IV ... 6,194.9 6,283.1 6,361.1 6,441.1 6,042.8 6,110.3 6,164.1 6,219.2 22,976 23,254 23,483 23,720 22,412 22,615 22,756 22,903 5,712.6 5,811.4 5,893.4 5,986.0 5,572.4 5,651.6 5,711.0 5,779.8 21,188 21,509 21,756 22,044 20,667 20,917 21,083 21,285 32,025 32,281 32,594 33,051 31,173 31,332 31,518 31,871 269,623 270,188 270,882 271,548 1999: I ..... II .... III ... IV ... 6,514.9 6,596.3 6,664.5 6,775.0 6,263.7 6,306.6 6,341.7 6,412.2 23,946 24,196 24,384 24,728 23,022 23,133 23,203 23,404 6,095.3 6,213.2 6,319.9 6,446.2 5,860.2 5,940.2 6,013.8 6,101.0 22,403 22,791 23,123 23,528 21,539 21,789 22,003 22,268 33,464 33,716 34,176 34,892 32,087 32,218 32,584 33,156 272,070 272,619 273,315 273,980 2000: I ..... II .... III .. 6,866.5 6,964.9 7,040.9 6,443.1 6,502.0 6,543.7 25,014 25,322 25,535 23,472 23,639 23,732 6,621.7 6,706.3 6,810.8 6,213.5 6,260.6 6,329.8 24,122 24,381 24,701 22,635 22,761 22,956 35,528 36,158 36,410 33,485 33,880 33,980 274,508 275,059 275,735 1 Population of the United States including Armed Forces overseas; includes Alaska and Hawaii beginning 1960. Annual data are averages of quarterly data. Quarterly data are averages for the period. Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of the Census). 311 TABLE B–32.—Gross saving and investment, 1959–2000 [Billions of dollars, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Gross saving Gross private saving Year or quarter Total Total Personal saving Total 1 Gross government saving Gross business saving Federal UndisCortribporate uted consumpcorpotion of rate fixed profits 2 capital Consump- Current tion surplus or Total of fixed deficit (¥) capital Noncorporate consumption of fixed capital Total Total State and local Consump- Current tion surplus or of fixed deficit (¥) capital 1959 ......... 1960 ......... 1961 ......... 1962 ......... 1963 ......... 1964 ......... 1965 ......... 1966 ......... 1967 ......... 1968 ......... 1969 ......... 1970 ......... 1971 ......... 1972 ......... 1973 ......... 1974 ......... 1975 ......... 1976 ......... 1977 ......... 1978 ......... 1979 ......... 1980 ......... 1981 ......... 1982 ......... 1983 ......... 1984 ......... 1985 ......... 1986 ......... 1987 ......... 1988 ......... 1989 ......... 1990 ......... 1991 ......... 1992 ......... 1993 ......... 1994 ......... 1995 ......... 1996 ......... 1997 ......... 1998 ......... 1999 ........ 1995: I ...... II ..... III ... IV ... 105.8 110.9 113.9 124.6 132.8 143.0 158.1 169.1 171.1 183.3 199.8 194.3 211.4 241.6 294.6 304.0 298.4 342.7 398.2 481.6 544.9 555.5 656.5 625.7 608.0 769.4 772.5 735.9 810.4 936.2 967.6 977.7 1,015.8 1,007.4 1,039.4 1,155.9 1,257.5 1,349.3 1,502.3 1,654.4 1,717.6 1,238.0 1,233.1 1,260.1 1,298.5 84.2 84.4 91.5 100.4 104.3 117.6 129.4 138.5 150.8 153.7 157.0 174.3 202.6 217.0 256.4 270.7 323.5 344.0 383.1 439.1 487.8 537.8 631.7 681.6 693.8 824.8 833.4 806.5 838.3 943.0 955.1 1,016.2 1,098.9 1,164.6 1,159.4 1,199.3 1,266.0 1,290.4 1,343.7 1,375.7 1,343.5 1,264.9 1,240.2 1,271.3 1,287.6 26.5 26.4 31.9 33.5 33.1 40.5 42.7 44.5 54.0 52.7 52.6 69.5 80.1 76.9 102.5 114.3 125.2 122.1 125.6 145.4 165.8 205.6 243.7 262.2 227.8 306.5 282.6 267.8 252.8 292.3 301.8 334.3 371.7 413.7 350.8 315.5 302.4 272.1 252.9 265.4 147.6 346.0 291.5 285.9 286.3 57.7 58.0 59.6 66.9 71.2 77.1 86.7 94.0 96.8 101.0 104.4 104.8 122.5 140.1 153.9 156.4 198.3 221.9 257.5 293.7 322.0 332.2 388.0 419.4 466.0 518.3 550.8 538.7 585.5 650.7 653.3 681.9 727.2 750.9 808.6 883.8 963.6 1,018.3 1,090.8 1,110.3 1,195.9 918.9 948.7 985.4 1,001.3 17.5 16.3 16.8 22.6 25.2 28.6 34.9 37.6 35.4 33.6 29.8 23.0 32.4 41.1 44.8 29.5 49.1 57.3 73.1 82.9 77.0 49.6 64.1 61.9 93.2 124.7 128.3 88.0 107.3 138.3 99.2 102.4 119.2 124.4 142.0 151.6 203.6 232.7 261.3 218.9 229.4 178.4 195.6 222.0 218.4 23.7 24.7 25.2 26.2 27.2 28.7 30.8 33.7 37.1 41.1 45.6 50.5 55.4 60.9 66.8 78.5 94.0 104.5 117.5 134.5 156.4 181.1 210.1 233.4 244.4 260.2 280.9 302.1 320.8 344.3 370.6 391.1 411.2 427.9 448.5 482.7 512.1 543.5 581.5 624.3 676.9 497.5 507.8 516.3 527.0 16.5 21.6 13.6 17.1 26.5 17.8 17.6 22.5 13.5 18.1 24.2 14.0 18.7 28.5 17.5 19.7 25.5 13.4 21.0 28.8 16.0 22.6 30.7 16.1 24.3 20.3 5.8 26.4 29.6 13.8 29.0 42.8 25.5 31.4 20.0 2.3 34.4 8.8 −9.5 38.5 24.6 −3.8 42.3 38.2 8.3 48.4 33.3 6.4 55.2 −25.1 −47.7 60.0 −1.3 −29.9 66.9 15.1 −20.6 76.2 42.5 −.6 88.5 57.1 16.6 101.5 17.7 −22.8 113.7 24.8 −18.9 124.0 −55.9 −93.1 128.3 −85.7 −131.5 133.4 −55.4 −121.6 141.7 −60.9 −127.9 148.7 −70.5 −139.2 157.4 −27.9 −91.6 168.1 −6.7 −77.2 183.4 12.5 −65.6 188.4 −38.6 −104.3 196.8 −83.2 −142.3 214.3 −157.2 −222.2 211.6 −120.0 −195.4 231.9 −43.4 −130.9 231.5 −8.5 −108.0 238.5 58.9 −51.5 250.9 158.6 33.4 265.1 278.7 137.4 284.5 374.0 217.3 226.7 −26.8 −124.9 228.9 −7.0 −105.1 230.8 −11.2 −113.4 239.6 10.9 −88.4 10.4 10.7 11.0 11.6 12.3 12.5 12.8 13.3 14.2 15.1 15.9 16.7 17.4 18.7 19.5 20.2 21.6 23.2 24.6 26.3 28.0 30.9 34.7 39.5 42.4 46.4 49.3 52.9 56.3 60.2 64.4 68.7 73.0 75.4 78.7 81.4 84.0 85.3 86.8 88.4 92.8 83.3 83.9 84.1 84.8 3.2 7.1 2.5 2.4 5.2 .8 3.2 2.7 −8.3 −1.3 9.6 −14.4 −26.8 −22.5 −11.2 −13.9 −69.3 −53.0 −45.2 −26.9 −11.4 −53.8 −53.7 −132.6 −173.9 −168.1 −177.1 −192.1 −147.9 −137.4 −130.0 −173.0 −215.3 −297.5 −274.1 −212.3 −192.0 −136.8 −53.3 49.0 124.4 −208.3 −188.9 −197.6 −173.2 8.0 8.7 9.0 10.2 11.0 12.1 12.7 14.6 14.5 15.8 17.3 17.6 18.2 28.4 30.0 27.0 22.7 28.6 35.7 43.1 40.5 40.6 43.8 37.2 45.7 66.2 67.0 68.7 63.7 70.5 78.1 65.7 59.1 65.0 75.4 87.5 99.4 110.4 125.1 141.2 156.8 98.1 98.1 102.3 99.3 4.2 4.4 4.7 5.0 5.4 5.7 6.2 6.9 7.5 8.3 9.3 10.6 11.8 12.9 14.3 17.7 20.2 21.3 22.6 24.4 27.4 31.7 36.3 39.5 40.9 42.4 44.7 47.9 51.5 54.9 58.8 63.1 66.9 69.9 73.9 78.9 84.1 88.9 94.2 99.5 106.8 82.2 83.5 84.8 86.1 3.8 4.3 4.3 5.2 5.7 6.4 6.5 7.7 7.0 7.5 8.0 7.1 6.4 15.6 15.7 9.3 2.4 7.3 13.1 18.7 13.0 8.8 7.5 −2.3 4.8 23.8 22.3 20.8 12.2 15.6 19.3 2.6 −7.8 −4.9 1.5 8.6 15.3 21.4 31.0 41.7 50.0 15.9 14.6 17.5 13.3 1996: I ...... II ..... III ... IV ... 1997: I ...... II ..... III ... IV ... 1998: I ...... II ..... III ... IV ... 1999: I ...... II ..... III ... IV ... 1,295.6 1,328.2 1,372.8 1,400.5 1,422.1 1,492.9 1,528.4 1,565.8 1,634.3 1,633.1 1,676.7 1,673.5 1,715.5 1,691.7 1,716.8 1,746.3 1,282.7 1,264.6 1,305.6 1,308.6 1,306.8 1,354.2 1,345.1 1,368.8 1,385.3 1,371.4 1,378.3 1,367.9 1,383.2 1,338.5 1,321.1 1,331.4 282.2 253.1 286.1 267.1 248.1 270.1 236.0 257.3 285.6 270.2 261.6 244.0 204.6 163.6 121.1 101.0 1,000.5 1,011.5 1,019.5 1,041.5 1,058.7 1,084.1 1,109.1 1,111.5 1,099.7 1,101.2 1,116.7 1,123.9 1,178.6 1,174.9 1,200.0 1,230.4 230.8 232.6 228.4 238.9 250.1 261.9 272.5 260.8 231.6 218.4 217.6 208.0 243.1 218.7 214.0 241.7 531.5 538.7 547.5 556.2 565.6 576.0 587.0 597.6 606.8 617.8 630.1 642.5 654.4 670.7 687.7 694.8 234.6 236.6 240.1 242.7 245.9 249.1 252.6 256.0 259.2 262.8 267.0 271.3 276.0 280.3 293.1 288.7 12.9 63.5 67.2 92.0 115.3 138.7 183.3 197.0 248.9 261.7 298.4 305.7 332.3 353.3 395.7 414.9 −91.5 −51.9 −44.6 −18.0 −.3 18.5 53.1 62.4 113.4 129.8 160.6 145.9 180.6 209.5 240.6 238.4 85.0 85.1 85.5 85.7 86.2 86.6 86.8 87.5 87.5 87.9 88.7 89.5 90.9 92.0 93.4 95.0 −176.5 −137.0 −130.1 −103.7 −86.5 −68.0 −33.7 −25.0 25.9 41.9 71.9 56.4 89.7 117.5 147.3 143.3 104.3 115.4 111.8 109.9 115.6 120.2 130.2 134.6 135.5 131.9 137.8 159.8 151.7 143.7 155.1 176.6 87.3 88.3 89.5 90.7 92.1 93.6 94.7 96.3 97.4 98.5 100.3 102.1 103.7 105.8 107.7 109.9 17.0 27.2 22.3 19.3 23.5 26.6 35.5 38.3 38.1 33.4 37.5 57.7 47.9 38.0 47.4 66.6 2000: I ...... II ..... III ... 1,777.0 1,279.2 11.0 1,268.2 1,844.5 1,328.8 20.6 1,308.2 1,854.7 1,319.2 −13.8 1,333.0 262.7 278.5 279.6 711.5 731.1 750.0 294.1 298.7 303.3 497.7 333.0 515.7 339.9 535.5 354.1 97.2 98.9 100.8 235.8 164.7 240.9 175.8 253.3 181.4 112.7 115.6 118.2 52.0 60.1 63.2 1 Includes private wage accruals less disbursements not shown separately. inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments. See next page for continuation of table. 2 With 312 TABLE B–32.—Gross saving and investment, 1959–2000—Continued [Billions of dollars, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Gross investment Year or quarter Total Gross private domestic investment Gross government investment 3 Addenda: Net foreign investment 4 Statistical discrepancy Gross saving as a percent of gross national product Personal saving as a percent of disposable personal income 1959 ............................................................................................ 106.7 78.5 29.3 −1.2 0.8 20.7 7.6 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ 110.4 113.8 125.3 132.4 144.2 160.0 175.6 175.9 187.6 202.7 78.9 78.2 88.1 93.8 102.1 118.2 131.3 128.6 141.2 156.4 28.3 31.3 33.3 33.6 34.6 35.6 40.4 43.8 44.7 44.4 3.2 4.3 3.9 5.0 7.5 6.2 3.9 3.5 1.7 1.8 −.6 −.2 .7 −.4 1.2 1.9 6.4 4.8 4.3 2.9 20.9 20.7 21.1 21.3 21.4 21.8 21.3 20.4 20.0 20.1 7.2 8.3 8.3 7.8 8.8 8.6 8.3 9.4 8.4 7.8 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ 201.2 222.7 250.3 302.6 314.0 316.1 367.2 419.8 502.6 580.6 152.4 178.2 207.6 244.5 249.4 230.2 292.0 361.3 436.0 490.6 44.8 44.0 46.3 49.4 57.4 64.5 66.4 67.5 77.1 88.5 4.0 .6 −3.6 8.7 7.1 21.4 8.9 −9.0 −10.4 1.4 6.9 11.3 8.7 8.0 10.0 17.7 24.5 21.6 21.0 35.7 18.6 18.6 19.3 21.1 20.0 18.1 18.6 19.4 20.8 21.0 9.4 10.0 8.9 10.5 10.7 10.6 9.4 8.7 9.0 9.2 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ 589.5 684.0 628.2 655.0 787.9 784.2 779.8 813.8 894.0 983.9 477.9 570.8 516.1 564.2 735.5 736.3 747.2 781.5 821.1 872.9 100.3 106.9 112.3 122.8 139.4 158.8 173.2 184.3 186.2 197.7 11.4 6.3 −.2 −32.0 −87.0 −110.9 −140.6 −152.0 −113.2 −86.7 33.9 27.5 2.5 47.0 18.6 11.7 43.9 3.3 −42.2 16.3 19.6 20.7 19.0 17.0 19.4 18.2 16.5 17.0 18.3 17.6 10.2 10.8 10.9 8.8 10.6 9.2 8.2 7.3 7.8 7.5 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ 1,008.2 1,035.4 1,051.1 1,103.2 1,214.4 1,284.0 1,382.1 1,532.1 1,629.6 1,645.6 861.7 800.2 866.6 955.1 1,097.1 1,143.8 1,242.7 1,390.5 1,549.9 1,650.1 215.8 220.3 223.1 220.9 225.6 238.2 250.1 264.6 278.8 308.7 −69.2 14.9 −38.7 −72.9 −108.3 −98.0 −110.7 −123.1 −199.1 −313.2 30.6 19.6 43.7 63.8 58.5 26.5 32.8 29.7 −24.8 −71.9 16.8 16.9 15.9 15.6 16.3 16.9 17.2 18.0 18.8 18.5 7.8 8.3 8.7 7.1 6.1 5.6 4.8 4.2 4.2 2.2 1995: I ......................................................................................... II ........................................................................................ III ....................................................................................... IV ....................................................................................... 1,291.7 1,258.0 1,263.3 1,322.9 1,162.8 1,133.1 1,123.5 1,155.6 236.4 241.0 236.4 238.9 −107.5 −116.1 −96.7 −71.6 53.7 24.9 3.1 24.4 16.9 16.7 16.9 17.2 6.5 5.4 5.3 5.2 1996: I ......................................................................................... II ........................................................................................ III ....................................................................................... IV ....................................................................................... 1,330.0 1,377.7 1,397.9 1,422.8 1,172.4 1,231.5 1,282.6 1,284.3 248.3 253.0 249.9 249.4 −90.7 −106.7 −134.5 −111.0 34.4 49.6 25.1 22.3 16.9 17.0 17.4 17.5 5.1 4.5 5.0 4.6 1997: I ......................................................................................... II ........................................................................................ III ....................................................................................... IV ....................................................................................... 1,462.8 1,562.4 1,555.4 1,547.8 1,324.2 1,397.7 1,405.7 1,434.5 256.0 264.8 269.8 267.7 −117.5 −100.2 −120.2 −154.4 40.6 69.5 26.9 −18.0 17.5 18.0 18.2 18.5 4.2 4.6 3.9 4.2 1998: I ......................................................................................... II ........................................................................................ III ....................................................................................... IV ....................................................................................... 1,650.6 1,612.3 1,613.0 1,642.6 1,532.1 1,523.9 1,553.0 1,590.8 269.9 277.6 284.7 283.1 −151.3 −189.3 −224.7 −231.3 16.4 −20.8 −63.7 −31.0 18.9 18.7 19.0 18.7 4.6 4.3 4.1 3.8 1999: I ......................................................................................... II ........................................................................................ III ....................................................................................... IV ...................................................................................... 1,661.9 1,614.9 1,627.3 1,678.5 1,609.8 1,607.9 1,659.1 1,723.7 298.9 303.5 308.0 324.4 −246.8 −296.5 −339.8 −369.6 −53.6 −76.8 −89.5 −67.8 18.9 18.4 18.4 18.3 3.1 2.5 1.8 1.5 2000: I ......................................................................................... II ........................................................................................ III ...................................................................................... 1,699.3 1,771.9 1,752.8 1,755.7 1,852.6 1,869.3 334.2 331.9 333.6 −390.7 −412.5 −450.1 −77.7 −72.5 −101.8 18.2 18.6 18.5 .2 .3 −.2 3 For details on government investment, see Table B-20. exports of goods and services plus net income receipts from rest of the world less net transfers. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 4 Net 313 TABLE B–33.—Median money income (in 1999 dollars) and poverty status of families and persons, by race, selected years, 1981–99 Families 1 Persons below poverty level Below poverty level Year ALL RACES 1981 3 ....................... 1982 ......................... 1983 4 ....................... 1984 ......................... 1985 ......................... 1986 ......................... 1987 5 ....................... 1988 ......................... 1989 ......................... 1990 ......................... 1991 ......................... 1992 6 ....................... 1993 ......................... 1994 ......................... 1995 ......................... 1996 ......................... 1997 ......................... 1998 ......................... 1999 ......................... WHITE 1981 3 ....................... 1982 ......................... 1983 4 ....................... 1984 ......................... 1985 ......................... 1986 ......................... 1987 5 ....................... 1988 ......................... 1989 ......................... 1990 ......................... 1991 ......................... 1992 6 ....................... 1993 ......................... 1994 ......................... 1995 ......................... 1996 ......................... 1997 ......................... 1998 ......................... 1999 ......................... BLACK 1981 3 ....................... 1982 ......................... 1983 4 ....................... 1984 ......................... 1985 ......................... 1986 ......................... 1987 5 ....................... 1988 ......................... 1989 ......................... 1990 ......................... 1991 ......................... 1992 6 ....................... 1993 ......................... 1994 ......................... 1995 ......................... 1996 ......................... 1997 ......................... 1998 ......................... 1999 ......................... Number (millions) Median money income (in 1999 dollars) 2 Female householder Total Number (millions) Percent Number (millions) Percent Median money income (in 1999 dollars) of persons 15 years old and over with income 2 Males Number (millions) Percent Females All persons Yearround full-time workers All persons Yearround full-time workers 61.0 61.4 62.0 62.7 63.6 64.5 65.2 65.8 66.1 66.3 67.2 68.2 68.5 69.3 69.6 70.2 70.9 71.6 72.0 $41,397 40,836 41,272 42,385 42,943 44,779 45,419 45,334 45,967 45,064 43,961 43,428 42,612 43,597 44,395 44,916 46,262 47,769 48,950 6.9 7.5 7.6 7.3 7.2 7.0 7.0 6.9 6.8 7.1 7.7 8.1 8.4 8.1 7.5 7.7 7.3 7.2 6.7 11.2 12.2 12.3 11.6 11.4 10.9 10.7 10.4 10.3 10.7 11.5 11.9 12.3 11.6 10.8 11.0 10.3 10.0 9.3 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.8 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.0 3.8 3.5 34.6 36.3 36.0 34.5 34.0 34.6 34.2 33.4 32.2 33.4 35.6 35.4 35.6 34.6 32.4 32.6 31.6 29.9 27.8 31.8 34.4 35.3 33.7 33.1 32.4 32.2 31.7 31.5 33.6 35.7 38.0 39.3 38.1 36.4 36.5 35.6 34.5 32.3 14.0 15.0 15.2 14.4 14.0 13.6 13.4 13.0 12.8 13.5 14.2 14.8 15.1 14.5 13.8 13.7 13.3 12.7 11.8 $24,912 24,310 24,523 25,015 25,255 26,014 26,084 26,627 26,728 25,867 25,038 24,290 24,330 24,417 24,664 25,308 26,171 27,077 27,275 $38,261 37,738 37,646 38,490 38,707 39,361 39,129 38,505 38,182 36,939 37,101 36,612 35,830 35,537 35,199 35,611 36,588 37,053 37,574 $10,092 10,259 10,714 11,013 11,174 11,568 12,165 12,511 12,930 12,836 12,814 12,722 12,735 12,890 13,261 13,607 14,223 14,749 15,311 $23,034 23,810 24,234 24,729 25,163 25,603 25,758 26,117 26,385 26,247 25,987 26,234 25,905 26,154 25,992 26,477 27,018 27,448 27,370 53.3 53.4 53.9 54.4 55.0 55.7 56.1 56.5 56.6 56.8 57.2 57.7 57.9 58.4 58.9 58.9 59.5 60.1 60.3 43,485 42,875 43,217 44,393 45,136 46,832 47,494 47,762 48,334 47,055 46,217 45,919 45,310 45,960 46,619 47,523 48,531 50,106 51,224 4.7 5.1 5.2 4.9 5.0 4.8 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.6 5.0 5.3 5.5 5.3 5.0 5.1 5.0 4.8 4.4 8.8 9.6 9.7 9.1 9.1 8.6 8.1 7.9 7.8 8.1 8.8 9.1 9.4 9.1 8.5 8.6 8.4 8.0 7.3 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.1 1.9 27.4 27.9 28.3 27.1 27.4 28.2 26.9 26.5 25.4 26.8 28.4 28.5 29.2 29.0 26.6 27.3 27.7 24.9 22.5 21.6 23.5 24.0 23.0 22.9 22.2 21.2 20.7 20.8 22.3 23.7 25.3 26.2 25.4 24.4 24.7 24.4 23.5 21.9 11.1 12.0 12.1 11.5 11.4 11.0 10.4 10.1 10.0 10.7 11.3 11.9 12.2 11.7 11.2 11.2 11.0 10.5 9.8 26,434 25,701 25,799 26,405 26,493 27,452 27,725 28,108 28,031 26,985 26,171 25,418 25,343 25,484 26,121 26,491 27,108 28,257 28,564 39,159 38,743 38,651 39,808 39,781 40,460 40,041 39,801 39,866 38,343 37,862 37,482 36,700 36,468 36,638 36,889 37,491 38,018 39,331 10,205 10,399 10,901 11,143 11,391 11,796 12,476 12,820 13,183 13,151 13,114 13,018 12,989 13,074 13,464 13,762 14,316 14,940 15,362 23,418 24,131 24,558 24,974 25,520 25,995 26,235 26,508 26,698 26,563 26,366 26,538 26,493 26,861 26,525 26,926 27,476 27,907 28,023 6.4 6.5 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.1 7.2 7.4 7.5 7.5 7.7 8.0 8.0 8.1 8.1 8.5 8.4 8.5 8.7 24,530 23,697 24,356 24,743 25,991 26,759 26,993 27,221 27,152 27,307 26,358 25,058 24,837 27,764 28,389 28,162 29,690 30,053 31,778 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.9 30.8 33.0 32.3 30.9 28.7 28.0 29.4 28.2 27.8 29.3 30.4 31.1 31.3 27.3 26.4 26.1 23.6 23.4 21.9 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 52.9 56.2 53.7 51.7 50.5 50.1 51.1 49.0 46.5 48.1 51.2 50.2 49.9 46.2 45.1 43.7 39.8 40.8 39.3 9.2 9.7 9.9 9.5 8.9 9.0 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.8 10.2 10.8 10.9 10.2 9.9 9.7 9.1 9.1 8.4 34.2 35.6 35.7 33.8 31.3 31.1 32.4 31.3 30.7 31.9 32.7 33.4 33.1 30.6 29.3 28.4 26.5 26.1 23.6 15,719 15,402 15,088 15,149 16,672 16,450 16,447 16,962 16,941 16,402 15,856 15,513 16,839 16,842 17,497 17,510 18,784 19,748 20,579 27,706 27,517 27,558 27,168 27,825 28,526 28,630 29,174 27,817 27,381 27,679 27,301 27,170 27,435 27,109 28,814 27,919 28,079 30,297 9,066 9,172 9,315 9,884 9,719 9,981 10,191 10,350 10,581 10,615 10,784 10,553 10,962 11,853 11,982 12,500 13,544 13,427 14,771 21,150 21,567 21,800 22,506 22,590 22,746 23,433 23,754 24,011 23,638 23,405 24,055 23,422 23,189 23,043 23,349 23,629 24,391 25,142 1 The term ‘‘family’’ refers to a group of two or more persons related by birth, marriage, or adoption and residing together. Every family must include a reference person. Beginning 1979, based on householder concept and restricted to primary families. 2 Current dollar median money income adjusted by CPI-U-X1. 3 Based on 1980 census population controls (beginning 1979); comparable with succeeding years. 4 Reflects implementation of Hispanic population controls; comparable with succeeding years. 5 Based on revised methodology; comparable with succeeding years. 6 Based on 1990 census adjusted population controls; comparable with succeeding years. Note.—Poverty rates (percent of persons below poverty level) for all races for years not shown above are: 1959, 22.4; 1960, 22.2; 1961, 21.9; 1962, 21.0; 1963, 19.5; 1964, 19.0; 1965, 17.3; 1966, 14.7; 1967, 14.2; 1968, 12.8; 1969, 12.1; 1970, 12.6; 1971, 12.5; 1972, 11.9; 1973, 11.1; 1974, 11.2; 1975, 12.3; 1976, 11.8; 1977, 11.6; 1978, 11.4; 1979, 11.7; and 1980, 13.0. Poverty thresholds are updated each year to reflect changes in the consumer price index (CPI-U). For details see ‘‘Current Population Reports,’’ Series P-60. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 314 POPULATION, EMPLOYMENT, WAGES, AND PRODUCTIVITY TABLE B–34.—Population by age group, 1929–2000 [Thousands of persons] Age (years) July 1 Total Under 5 5-15 16-19 20-24 25-44 45-64 65 and over 1929 .......................... 121,767 11,734 26,800 9,127 10,694 35,862 21,076 6,474 1933 .......................... 125,579 10,612 26,897 9,302 11,152 37,319 22,933 7,363 1939 .......................... 130,880 10,418 25,179 9,822 11,519 39,354 25,823 8,764 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... 132,122 133,402 134,860 136,739 138,397 10,579 10,850 11,301 12,016 12,524 24,811 24,516 24,231 24,093 23,949 9,895 9,840 9,730 9,607 9,561 11,690 11,807 11,955 12,064 12,062 39,868 40,383 40,861 41,420 42,016 26,249 26,718 27,196 27,671 28,138 9,031 9,288 9,584 9,867 10,147 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... 139,928 141,389 144,126 146,631 149,188 12,979 13,244 14,406 14,919 15,607 23,907 24,103 24,468 25,209 25,852 9,361 9,119 9,097 8,952 8,788 12,036 12,004 11,814 11,794 11,700 42,521 43,027 43,657 44,288 44,916 28,630 29,064 29,498 29,931 30,405 10,494 10,828 11,185 11,538 11,921 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... 152,271 154,878 157,553 160,184 163,026 16,410 17,333 17,312 17,638 18,057 26,721 27,279 28,894 30,227 31,480 8,542 8,446 8,414 8,460 8,637 11,680 11,552 11,350 11,062 10,832 45,672 46,103 46,495 46,786 47,001 30,849 31,362 31,884 32,394 32,942 12,397 12,803 13,203 13,617 14,076 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... 165,931 168,903 171,984 174,882 177,830 18,566 19,003 19,494 19,887 20,175 32,682 33,994 35,272 36,445 37,368 8,744 8,916 9,195 9,543 10,215 10,714 10,616 10,603 10,756 10,969 47,194 47,379 47,440 47,337 47,192 33,506 34,057 34,591 35,109 35,663 14,525 14,938 15,388 15,806 16,248 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... 180,671 183,691 186,538 189,242 191,889 20,341 20,522 20,469 20,342 20,165 38,494 39,765 41,205 41,626 42,297 10,683 11,025 11,180 12,007 12,736 11,134 11,483 11,959 12,714 13,269 47,140 47,084 47,013 46,994 46,958 36,203 36,722 37,255 37,782 38,338 16,675 17,089 17,457 17,778 18,127 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... 194,303 196,560 198,712 200,706 202,677 19,824 19,208 18,563 17,913 17,376 42,938 43,702 44,244 44,622 44,840 13,516 14,311 14,200 14,452 14,800 13,746 14,050 15,248 15,786 16,480 46,912 47,001 47,194 47,721 48,064 38,916 39,534 40,193 40,846 41,437 18,451 18,755 19,071 19,365 19,680 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... 205,052 207,661 209,896 211,909 213,854 17,166 17,244 17,101 16,851 16,487 44,816 44,591 44,203 43,582 42,989 15,289 15,688 16,039 16,446 16,769 17,202 18,159 18,153 18,521 18,975 48,473 48,936 50,482 51,749 53,051 41,999 42,482 42,898 43,235 43,522 20,107 20,561 21,020 21,525 22,061 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... 215,973 218,035 220,239 222,585 225,055 16,121 15,617 15,564 15,735 16,063 42,508 42,099 41,298 40,428 39,552 17,017 17,194 17,276 17,288 17,242 19,527 19,986 20,499 20,946 21,297 54,302 55,852 57,561 59,400 61,379 43,801 44,008 44,150 44,286 44,390 22,696 23,278 23,892 24,502 25,134 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... 227,726 229,966 232,188 234,307 236,348 16,451 16,893 17,228 17,547 17,695 38,838 38,144 37,784 37,526 37,461 17,167 16,812 16,332 15,823 15,295 21,590 21,869 21,902 21,844 21,737 63,470 65,528 67,692 69,733 71,735 44,504 44,500 44,462 44,474 44,547 25,707 26,221 26,787 27,361 27,878 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... 238,466 240,651 242,804 245,021 247,342 17,842 17,963 18,052 18,195 18,508 37,450 37,404 37,333 37,593 37,972 15,005 15,024 15,215 15,198 14,913 21,478 20,942 20,385 19,846 19,442 73,673 75,651 77,338 78,595 79,943 44,602 44,660 44,854 45,471 45,882 28,416 29,008 29,626 30,124 30,682 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... 249,973 252,665 255,410 258,119 260,637 18,853 19,189 19,492 19,674 19,700 38,600 39,183 39,855 40,452 41,084 14,462 13,969 13,739 13,890 14,144 19,307 19,335 19,173 18,897 18,492 81,216 82,451 82,514 82,814 83,119 46,295 46,759 48,342 49,579 50,888 31,241 31,779 32,296 32,814 33,211 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... 263,082 265,502 268,048 270,509 272,945 19,532 19,292 19,099 18,989 18,942 41,751 42,244 42,739 43,064 43,316 14,413 14,920 15,271 15,663 15,942 18,073 17,596 17,570 17,761 18,106 83,456 83,777 83,736 83,400 82,902 52,237 53,716 55,448 57,247 59,198 33,619 33,957 34,185 34,385 34,540 2000 .......................... 275,372 18,936 43,605 15,952 18,552 82,374 61,136 34,817 Note.—Includes Armed Forces overseas beginning 1940. Includes Alaska and Hawaii beginning 1950. All estimates are consistent with decennial census enumerations. Data for 2000 are based on the 1990 census. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 315 TABLE B–35.—Civilian population and labor force, 1929–2000 [Monthly data seasonally adjusted, except as noted] Civilian labor force Year or month Civilian noninstitutional population 1 Employment Total Total Agricultural Nonagricultural Unemployment Not in labor force Civil- Civilian ian emlabor ployforce ment/ parpopticipation ulation rate 2 ratio 3 Thousands of persons 14 years of age and over 1929 .............................................................. ................ 1933 .............................................................. ................ 1939 .............................................................. ................ 49,180 51,590 55,230 47,630 38,760 45,750 10,450 10,090 9,610 37,180 28,670 36,140 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 Unemployment rate, civilian workers 4 Percent 1,550 ............ 12,830 ............ 9,480 ............ .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 3.2 24.9 17.2 .............................................................. .............................................................. .............................................................. .............................................................. .............................................................. 99,840 99,900 98,640 94,640 93,220 55,640 55,910 56,410 55,540 54,630 47,520 50,350 53,750 54,470 53,960 9,540 9,100 9,250 9,080 8,950 37,980 41,250 44,500 45,390 45,010 8,120 5,560 2,660 1,070 670 44,200 43,990 42,230 39,100 38,590 55.7 56.0 57.2 58.7 58.6 47.6 50.4 54.5 57.6 57.9 14.6 9.9 4.7 1.9 1.2 1945 .............................................................. 1946 .............................................................. 1947 .............................................................. 94,090 103,070 106,018 53,860 57,520 60,168 52,820 55,250 57,812 8,580 8,320 8,256 44,240 46,930 49,557 1,040 2,270 2,356 40,230 45,550 45,850 57.2 55.8 56.8 56.1 53.6 54.5 1.9 3.9 3.9 Thousands of persons 16 years of age and over 1947 .............................................................. 1948 .............................................................. 1949 .............................................................. 101,827 103,068 103,994 59,350 60,621 61,286 57,038 58,343 57,651 7,890 7,629 7,658 49,148 50,714 49,993 2,311 2,276 3,637 42,477 42,447 42,708 58.3 58.8 58.9 56.0 56.6 55.4 3.9 3.8 5.9 1950 .............................................................. 1951 .............................................................. 1952 .............................................................. 1953 5 ............................................................ 1954 .............................................................. 1955 .............................................................. 1956 .............................................................. 1957 .............................................................. 1958 .............................................................. 1959 .............................................................. 104,995 104,621 105,231 107,056 108,321 109,683 110,954 112,265 113,727 115,329 62,208 62,017 62,138 63,015 63,643 65,023 66,552 66,929 67,639 68,369 58,918 59,961 60,250 61,179 60,109 62,170 63,799 64,071 63,036 64,630 7,160 6,726 6,500 6,260 6,205 6,450 6,283 5,947 5,586 5,565 51,758 53,235 53,749 54,919 53,904 55,722 57,514 58,123 57,450 59,065 3,288 2,055 1,883 1,834 3,532 2,852 2,750 2,859 4,602 3,740 42,787 42,604 43,093 44,041 44,678 44,660 44,402 45,336 46,088 46,960 59.2 59.2 59.0 58.9 58.8 59.3 60.0 59.6 59.5 59.3 56.1 57.3 57.3 57.1 55.5 56.7 57.5 57.1 55.4 56.0 5.3 3.3 3.0 2.9 5.5 4.4 4.1 4.3 6.8 5.5 1960 5 ............................................................ 1961 .............................................................. 1962 5 ............................................................ 1963 .............................................................. 1964 .............................................................. 1965 .............................................................. 1966 .............................................................. 1967 .............................................................. 1968 .............................................................. 1969 .............................................................. 117,245 118,771 120,153 122,416 124,485 126,513 128,058 129,874 132,028 134,335 69,628 70,459 70,614 71,833 73,091 74,455 75,770 77,347 78,737 80,734 65,778 65,746 66,702 67,762 69,305 71,088 72,895 74,372 75,920 77,902 5,458 5,200 4,944 4,687 4,523 4,361 3,979 3,844 3,817 3,606 60,318 60,546 61,759 63,076 64,782 66,726 68,915 70,527 72,103 74,296 3,852 4,714 3,911 4,070 3,786 3,366 2,875 2,975 2,817 2,832 47,617 48,312 49,539 50,583 51,394 52,058 52,288 52,527 53,291 53,602 59.4 59.3 58.8 58.7 58.7 58.9 59.2 59.6 59.6 60.1 56.1 55.4 55.5 55.4 55.7 56.2 56.9 57.3 57.5 58.0 5.5 6.7 5.5 5.7 5.2 4.5 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.5 1970 .............................................................. 1971 .............................................................. 1972 5 ............................................................ 1973 5 ............................................................ 1974 .............................................................. 1975 .............................................................. 1976 .............................................................. 1977 .............................................................. 1978 5 ............................................................ 1979 .............................................................. 137,085 140,216 144,126 147,096 150,120 153,153 156,150 159,033 161,910 164,863 82,771 84,382 87,034 89,429 91,949 93,775 96,158 99,009 102,251 104,962 78,678 79,367 82,153 85,064 86,794 85,846 88,752 92,017 96,048 98,824 3,463 3,394 3,484 3,470 3,515 3,408 3,331 3,283 3,387 3,347 75,215 75,972 78,669 81,594 83,279 82,438 85,421 88,734 92,661 95,477 4,093 5,016 4,882 4,365 5,156 7,929 7,406 6,991 6,202 6,137 54,315 55,834 57,091 57,667 58,171 59,377 59,991 60,025 59,659 59,900 60.4 60.2 60.4 60.8 61.3 61.2 61.6 62.3 63.2 63.7 57.4 56.6 57.0 57.8 57.8 56.1 56.8 57.9 59.3 59.9 4.9 5.9 5.6 4.9 5.6 8.5 7.7 7.1 6.1 5.8 1980 .............................................................. 1981 .............................................................. 1982 .............................................................. 1983 .............................................................. 1984 .............................................................. 1985 .............................................................. 1986 5 ............................................................ 1987 .............................................................. 1988 .............................................................. 1989 .............................................................. 167,745 170,130 172,271 174,215 176,383 178,206 180,587 182,753 184,613 186,393 106,940 108,670 110,204 111,550 113,544 115,461 117,834 119,865 121,669 123,869 99,303 100,397 99,526 100,834 105,005 107,150 109,597 112,440 114,968 117,342 3,364 3,368 3,401 3,383 3,321 3,179 3,163 3,208 3,169 3,199 95,938 97,030 96,125 97,450 101,685 103,971 106,434 109,232 111,800 114,142 7,637 8,273 10,678 10,717 8,539 8,312 8,237 7,425 6,701 6,528 60,806 61,460 62,067 62,665 62,839 62,744 62,752 62,888 62,944 62,523 63.8 63.9 64.0 64.0 64.4 64.8 65.3 65.6 65.9 66.5 59.2 59.0 57.8 57.9 59.5 60.1 60.7 61.5 62.3 63.0 7.1 7.6 9.7 9.6 7.5 7.2 7.0 6.2 5.5 5.3 1990 5 ............................................................ 1991 .............................................................. 1992 .............................................................. 1993 .............................................................. 1994 5 ............................................................ 1995 .............................................................. 1996 .............................................................. 1997 5 ............................................................ 1998 5 ............................................................ 1999 5 ............................................................ 189,164 190,925 192,805 194,838 196,814 198,584 200,591 203,133 205,220 207,753 125,840 126,346 128,105 129,200 131,056 132,304 133,943 136,297 137,673 139,368 118,793 117,718 118,492 120,259 123,060 124,900 126,708 129,558 131,463 133,488 3,223 3,269 3,247 3,115 3,409 3,440 3,443 3,399 3,378 3,281 115,570 114,449 115,245 117,144 119,651 121,460 123,264 126,159 128,085 130,207 7,047 8,628 9,613 8,940 7,996 7,404 7,236 6,739 6,210 5,880 63,324 64,578 64,700 65,638 65,758 66,280 66,647 66,837 67,547 68,385 66.5 66.2 66.4 66.3 66.6 66.6 66.8 67.1 67.1 67.1 62.8 61.7 61.5 61.7 62.5 62.9 63.2 63.8 64.1 64.3 5.6 6.8 7.5 6.9 6.1 5.6 5.4 4.9 4.5 4.2 1 Not seasonally adjusted. labor force as percent of civilian noninstitutional population. employment as percent of civilian noninstitutional population. 4 Unemployed as percent of civilian labor force. 2 Civilian 3 Civilian See next page for continuation of table. 316 TABLE B–35.—Civilian population and labor force, 1929–2000—Continued [Monthly data seasonally adjusted, except as noted] Civilian labor force Year or month Civilian noninstitutional population 1 Employment Total Total Agricultural Nonagricultural Unemployment Not in labor force Civil- Civilian ian emlabor ployforce ment/ parpopticipation ulation rate 2 ratio 3 Thousands of persons 16 years of age and over Unemployment rate, civilian workers 4 Percent 1997: Jan 5 .................................................... Feb ...................................................... Mar ..................................................... Apr ...................................................... May ..................................................... June .................................................... 202,285 202,389 202,513 202,674 202,832 203,000 135,576 135,496 135,958 136,043 136,061 136,218 128,387 128,350 128,922 129,191 129,383 129,417 3,459 3,358 3,422 3,468 3,434 3,398 124,928 124,992 125,500 125,723 125,949 126,019 7,189 7,146 7,036 6,852 6,678 6,801 66,709 66,893 66,555 66,631 66,771 66,782 67.0 66.9 67.1 67.1 67.1 67.1 63.5 63.4 63.7 63.7 63.8 63.8 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.0 4.9 5.0 July ...................................................... Aug ...................................................... Sept ..................................................... Oct ...................................................... Nov ...................................................... Dec ...................................................... 203,166 203,364 203,570 203,767 203,941 204,098 136,421 136,590 136,612 136,547 136,860 137,097 129,812 129,987 129,982 130,121 130,577 130,646 3,421 3,359 3,400 3,309 3,375 3,395 126,391 126,628 126,582 126,812 127,202 127,251 6,609 6,603 6,630 6,426 6,283 6,451 66,745 66,774 66,958 67,220 67,081 67,001 67.1 67.2 67.1 67.0 67.1 67.2 63.9 63.9 63.9 63.9 64.0 64.0 4.8 4.8 4.9 4.7 4.6 4.7 1998: Jan 5 .................................................... Feb ...................................................... Mar ..................................................... Apr ...................................................... May ..................................................... June .................................................... 204,238 204,400 204,547 204,731 204,899 205,085 137,225 137,263 137,333 137,216 137,329 137,449 130,819 130,911 130,854 131,255 131,278 131,234 3,334 3,354 3,180 3,341 3,347 3,345 127,485 127,557 127,674 127,914 127,931 127,889 6,406 6,352 6,479 5,961 6,051 6,215 67,013 67,137 67,214 67,515 67,570 67,636 67.2 67.2 67.1 67.0 67.0 67.0 64.1 64.0 64.0 64.1 64.1 64.0 4.7 4.6 4.7 4.3 4.4 4.5 July ...................................................... Aug ...................................................... Sept ..................................................... Oct ...................................................... Nov ...................................................... Dec ...................................................... 205,270 205,479 205,699 205,919 206,104 206,270 137,476 137,565 138,156 138,189 138,230 138,545 131,274 131,381 131,922 131,950 132,156 132,517 3,408 3,498 3,499 3,585 3,340 3,241 127,866 127,883 128,423 128,365 128,816 129,276 6,202 6,184 6,234 6,239 6,074 6,028 67,794 67,914 67,543 67,730 67,874 67,725 67.0 66.9 67.2 67.1 67.1 67.2 64.0 63.9 64.1 64.1 64.1 64.2 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.4 1999: Jan 5 .................................................... Feb ...................................................... Mar ..................................................... Apr ...................................................... May ..................................................... June .................................................... 206,719 206,873 207,036 207,236 207,427 207,632 139,232 139,137 138,804 139,086 139,013 139,332 133,225 133,029 132,976 133,054 133,190 133,398 3,297 3,328 3,290 3,341 3,290 3,330 129,928 129,701 129,686 129,713 129,900 130,068 6,007 6,108 5,828 6,032 5,823 5,934 67,487 67,736 68,232 68,150 68,414 68,300 67.4 67.3 67.0 67.1 67.0 67.1 64.4 64.3 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 4.3 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.2 4.3 July ...................................................... Aug ...................................................... Sept ..................................................... Oct ...................................................... Nov ...................................................... Dec ...................................................... 207,828 208,038 208,265 208,483 208,666 208,832 139,336 139,372 139,475 139,697 139,834 140,108 133,399 133,530 133,650 133,940 134,098 134,420 3,278 3,234 3,179 3,238 3,310 3,279 130,121 130,296 130,471 130,702 130,788 131,141 5,937 5,842 5,825 5,757 5,736 5,688 68,492 68,666 68,790 68,786 68,832 68,724 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.1 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.3 64.4 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 2000: Jan 5 .................................................... Feb ...................................................... Mar ..................................................... Apr ...................................................... May ..................................................... June .................................................... 208,782 208,907 209,053 209,216 209,371 209,543 140,910 141,165 140,867 141,230 140,489 140,762 135,221 135,362 135,159 135,706 134,715 135,179 3,371 3,408 3,359 3,355 3,298 3,321 131,850 131,954 131,801 132,351 131,417 131,858 5,689 5,804 5,708 5,524 5,774 5,583 67,872 67,742 68,187 67,986 68,882 68,781 67.5 67.6 67.4 67.5 67.1 67.2 64.8 64.8 64.7 64.9 64.3 64.5 4.0 4.1 4.1 3.9 4.1 4.0 July ...................................................... Aug ...................................................... Sept ..................................................... Oct ...................................................... Nov ...................................................... 209,727 209,935 210,161 210,378 210,577 140,399 140,742 140,639 140,918 141,052 134,749 134,912 135,161 135,422 135,373 3,299 3,344 3,340 3,233 3,154 131,450 131,569 131,821 132,188 132,219 5,650 5,829 5,477 5,496 5,679 69,329 69,193 69,522 69,460 69,525 66.9 67.0 66.9 67.0 67.0 64.2 64.3 64.3 64.4 64.3 4.0 4.1 3.9 3.9 4.0 5 Not strictly comparable with earlier data due to population adjustments as follows: Beginning 1953, introduction of 1950 census data added about 600,000 to population and 350,000 to labor force, total employment, and agricultural employment. Beginning 1960, inclusion of Alaska and Hawaii added about 500,000 to population, 300,000 to labor force, and 240,000 to nonagricultural employment. Beginning 1962, introduction of 1960 census data reduced population by about 50,000 and labor force and employment by 200,000. Beginning 1972, introduction of 1970 census data added about 800,000 to civilian noninstitutional population and 333,000 to labor force and employment. A subsequent adjustment based on 1970 census in March 1973 added 60,000 to labor force and to employment. Beginning 1978, changes in sampling and estimation procedures introduced into the household survey added about 250,000 to labor force and to employment. Unemployment levels and rates were not significantly affected. Beginning 1986, the introduction of revised population controls added about 400,000 to the civilian population and labor force and 350,000 to civilian employment. Unemployment levels and rates were not significantly affected. Beginning 1990, the introduction of 1990 census-based population controls, adjusted for the estimated undercount, added about 1.1 million to the civilian population and labor force, 880,000 to civilian employment, and 175,000 to unemployment. The overall unemployment rate rose by about 0.1 percentage point. Beginning 1994, data are not strictly comparable with earlier data because of the introduction of a major redesign of the Current Population Survey and collection methodology. Beginning 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000 data are not strictly comparable due to the introduction of revised population controls. See February issues Employment and Earnings for details on the effects. Also, for 1998, data reflect the introduction of a new composite estimation procedure for the Current Population Survey. Note.—Labor force data in Tables B-35 through B-44 are based on household interviews and relate to the calendar week including the 12th of the month. For definitions of terms, area samples used, historical comparability of the data, comparability with other series, etc., see ‘‘Employment and Earnings.’’ Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 317 TABLE B–36.—Civilian employment and unemployment by sex and age, 1950–2000 [Thousands of persons 16 years of age and over; monthly data seasonally adjusted] Civilian employment Males Year or month Total Total 16-19 years Unemployment Females 20 years and over Total 16-19 years Males 20 years and over Total Total Females 20 16-19 years years and over Total 20 16-19 years years and over 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... 58,918 59,961 60,250 61,179 60,109 62,170 63,799 64,071 63,036 64,630 41,578 41,780 41,682 42,430 41,619 42,621 43,379 43,357 42,423 43,466 2,186 2,156 2,107 2,136 1,985 2,095 2,164 2,115 2,012 2,198 39,394 39,626 39,578 40,296 39,634 40,526 41,216 41,239 40,411 41,267 17,340 18,181 18,568 18,749 18,490 19,551 20,419 20,714 20,613 21,164 1,517 1,611 1,612 1,584 1,490 1,547 1,654 1,663 1,570 1,640 15,824 16,570 16,958 17,164 17,000 18,002 18,767 19,052 19,043 19,524 3,288 2,055 1,883 1,834 3,532 2,852 2,750 2,859 4,602 3,740 2,239 1,221 1,185 1,202 2,344 1,854 1,711 1,841 3,098 2,420 318 191 205 184 310 274 269 300 416 398 1,922 1,029 980 1,019 2,035 1,580 1,442 1,541 2,681 2,022 1,049 834 698 632 1,188 998 1,039 1,018 1,504 1,320 195 854 145 689 140 559 123 510 191 997 176 823 209 832 197 821 262 1,242 256 1,063 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... 65,778 65,746 66,702 67,762 69,305 71,088 72,895 74,372 75,920 77,902 43,904 43,656 44,177 44,657 45,474 46,340 46,919 47,479 48,114 48,818 2,361 2,315 2,362 2,406 2,587 2,918 3,253 3,186 3,255 3,430 41,543 41,342 41,815 42,251 42,886 43,422 43,668 44,294 44,859 45,388 21,874 22,090 22,525 23,105 23,831 24,748 25,976 26,893 27,807 29,084 1,768 1,793 1,833 1,849 1,929 2,118 2,468 2,496 2,526 2,687 20,105 20,296 20,693 21,257 21,903 22,630 23,510 24,397 25,281 26,397 3,852 4,714 3,911 4,070 3,786 3,366 2,875 2,975 2,817 2,832 2,486 2,997 2,423 2,472 2,205 1,914 1,551 1,508 1,419 1,403 426 479 408 501 487 479 432 448 426 440 2,060 2,518 2,016 1,971 1,718 1,435 1,120 1,060 993 963 1,366 1,717 1,488 1,598 1,581 1,452 1,324 1,468 1,397 1,429 286 349 313 383 385 395 405 391 412 413 1,080 1,368 1,175 1,216 1,195 1,056 921 1,078 985 1,015 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... 78,678 79,367 82,153 85,064 86,794 85,846 88,752 92,017 96,048 98,824 48,990 49,390 50,896 52,349 53,024 51,857 53,138 54,728 56,479 57,607 3,409 3,478 3,765 4,039 4,103 3,839 3,947 4,174 4,336 4,300 45,581 45,912 47,130 48,310 48,922 48,018 49,190 50,555 52,143 53,308 29,688 29,976 31,257 32,715 33,769 33,989 35,615 37,289 39,569 41,217 2,735 2,730 2,980 3,231 3,345 3,263 3,389 3,514 3,734 3,783 26,952 27,246 28,276 29,484 30,424 30,726 32,226 33,775 35,836 37,434 4,093 5,016 4,882 4,365 5,156 7,929 7,406 6,991 6,202 6,137 2,238 2,789 2,659 2,275 2,714 4,442 4,036 3,667 3,142 3,120 599 693 711 653 757 966 939 874 813 811 1,638 2,097 1,948 1,624 1,957 3,476 3,098 2,794 2,328 2,308 1,855 2,227 2,222 2,089 2,441 3,486 3,369 3,324 3,061 3,018 506 568 598 583 665 802 780 789 769 743 1,349 1,658 1,625 1,507 1,777 2,684 2,588 2,535 2,292 2,276 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... 99,303 100,397 99,526 100,834 105,005 107,150 109,597 112,440 114,968 117,342 57,186 57,397 56,271 56,787 59,091 59,891 60,892 62,107 63,273 64,315 4,085 3,815 3,379 3,300 3,322 3,328 3,323 3,381 3,492 3,477 53,101 53,582 52,891 53,487 55,769 56,562 57,569 58,726 59,781 60,837 42,117 43,000 43,256 44,047 45,915 47,259 48,706 50,334 51,696 53,027 3,625 3,411 3,170 3,043 3,122 3,105 3,149 3,260 3,313 3,282 38,492 7,637 4,267 913 3,353 3,370 39,590 8,273 4,577 962 3,615 3,696 40,086 10,678 6,179 1,090 5,089 4,499 41,004 10,717 6,260 1,003 5,257 4,457 42,793 8,539 4,744 812 3,932 3,794 44,154 8,312 4,521 806 3,715 3,791 45,556 8,237 4,530 779 3,751 3,707 47,074 7,425 4,101 732 3,369 3,324 48,383 6,701 3,655 667 2,987 3,046 49,745 6,528 3,525 658 2,867 3,003 755 800 886 825 687 661 675 616 558 536 2,615 2,895 3,613 3,632 3,107 3,129 3,032 2,709 2,487 2,467 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... 118,793 117,718 118,492 120,259 123,060 124,900 126,708 129,558 131,463 133,488 65,104 64,223 64,440 65,349 66,450 67,377 68,207 69,685 70,693 71,446 3,427 3,044 2,944 2,994 3,156 3,292 3,310 3,401 3,558 3,685 61,678 61,178 61,496 62,355 63,294 64,085 64,897 66,284 67,135 67,761 53,689 53,496 54,052 54,910 56,610 57,523 58,501 59,873 60,771 62,042 3,154 2,862 2,724 2,811 3,005 3,127 3,190 3,260 3,493 3,487 50,535 50,634 51,328 52,099 53,606 54,396 55,311 56,613 57,278 58,555 7,047 8,628 9,613 8,940 7,996 7,404 7,236 6,739 6,210 5,880 3,906 4,946 5,523 5,055 4,367 3,983 3,880 3,577 3,266 3,066 667 751 806 768 740 744 733 694 686 633 3,239 4,195 4,717 4,287 3,627 3,239 3,146 2,882 2,580 2,433 3,140 3,683 4,090 3,885 3,629 3,421 3,356 3,162 2,944 2,814 544 608 621 597 580 602 573 577 519 529 2,596 3,074 3,469 3,288 3,049 2,819 2,783 2,585 2,424 2,285 1999: Jan ............ Feb ............ Mar ............ Apr ............. May ........... June ........... 133,225 133,029 132,976 133,054 133,190 133,398 71,368 71,230 71,269 71,208 71,207 71,330 3,597 3,703 3,641 3,646 3,737 3,685 67,771 67,527 67,628 67,562 67,470 67,645 61,857 61,799 61,707 61,846 61,983 62,068 3,484 3,538 3,491 3,510 3,500 3,421 58,373 58,261 58,216 58,336 58,483 58,647 6,007 6,108 5,828 6,032 5,823 5,934 3,138 3,232 2,949 3,062 3,111 3,084 707 648 643 632 603 613 2,431 2,584 2,306 2,430 2,508 2,471 2,869 2,876 2,879 2,970 2,712 2,850 551 546 541 541 487 509 2,318 2,330 2,338 2,429 2,225 2,341 July ............ Aug ............ Sept ........... Oct ............. Nov ............ Dec ............ 133,399 133,530 133,650 133,940 134,098 134,420 71,437 71,436 71,630 71,623 71,732 71,927 3,734 3,668 3,687 3,725 3,695 3,730 67,703 67,768 67,943 67,898 68,037 68,197 61,962 62,094 62,020 62,317 62,366 62,493 3,485 3,446 3,390 3,517 3,528 3,535 58,477 58,648 58,630 58,800 58,838 58,958 5,937 5,842 5,825 5,757 5,736 5,688 3,061 3,063 3,013 3,057 2,996 3,003 597 591 628 616 645 671 2,464 2,472 2,385 2,441 2,351 2,332 2,876 2,779 2,812 2,700 2,740 2,685 501 523 582 545 526 489 2,375 2,256 2,230 2,155 2,214 2,196 2000: Jan ............ Feb ............ Mar ............ Apr ............. May ........... June ........... 135,221 135,362 135,159 135,706 134,715 135,179 72,358 72,473 72,313 72,307 71,948 72,217 3,773 3,782 3,833 3,825 3,718 3,787 68,585 68,691 68,480 68,481 68,230 68,430 62,863 62,889 62,846 63,399 62,767 62,962 3,584 3,491 3,424 3,642 3,519 3,684 59,280 59,398 59,422 59,757 59,248 59,278 5,689 5,804 5,708 5,524 5,774 5,583 2,946 3,121 2,885 2,882 2,934 2,903 613 691 543 603 562 619 2,332 2,429 2,342 2,280 2,373 2,284 2,743 2,683 2,823 2,642 2,839 2,680 447 505 574 479 472 362 2,279 2,178 2,249 2,163 2,367 2,318 July ............ Aug ............ Sept ........... Oct ............. Nov ............ 134,749 134,912 135,161 135,422 135,373 72,063 72,407 72,352 72,378 72,286 3,623 3,650 3,654 3,635 3,640 68,440 68,757 68,699 68,743 68,646 62,686 62,505 62,809 63,044 63,087 3,464 3,556 3,541 3,628 3,632 59,222 58,949 59,268 59,417 59,456 5,650 5,829 5,477 5,496 5,679 2,854 3,005 2,881 2,936 3,058 591 695 578 551 582 2,263 2,309 2,303 2,385 2,476 2,796 2,824 2,597 2,560 2,621 510 514 479 496 516 2,286 2,311 2,118 2,065 2,105 Note.—See footnote 5 and Note, Table B-35. Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 318 TABLE B–37.—Civilian employment by demographic characteristic, 1955–2000 [Thousands of persons 16 years of age and over; monthly data seasonally adjusted] White Year or month All civilian workers Black and other Total Males Females Both sexes Total 16-19 Males Females Black Both sexes 16-19 Total Both Fe- sexes Males males 16-19 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... 62,170 63,799 64,071 63,036 64,630 55,833 57,269 57,465 56,613 58,006 38,719 39,368 39,349 38,591 39,494 17,114 17,901 18,116 18,022 18,512 3,225 3,389 3,374 3,216 3,475 6,341 6,534 6,604 6,423 6,623 3,904 4,013 4,006 3,833 3,971 2,437 2,521 2,598 2,590 2,652 418 430 407 365 362 ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... 65,778 65,746 66,702 67,762 69,305 71,088 72,895 74,372 75,920 77,902 58,850 58,913 59,698 60,622 61,922 63,446 65,021 66,361 67,750 69,518 39,755 39,588 40,016 40,428 41,115 41,844 42,331 42,833 43,411 44,048 19,095 19,325 19,682 20,194 20,807 21,602 22,690 23,528 24,339 25,470 3,700 3,693 3,774 3,851 4,076 4,562 5,176 5,114 5,195 5,508 6,928 6,833 7,003 7,140 7,383 7,643 7,877 8,011 8,169 8,384 4,149 4,068 4,160 4,229 4,359 4,496 4,588 4,646 4,702 4,770 2,779 2,765 2,843 2,911 3,024 3,147 3,289 3,365 3,467 3,614 430 414 420 404 440 474 545 568 584 609 ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... 78,678 79,367 82,153 85,064 86,794 85,846 88,752 92,017 96,048 98,824 70,217 70,878 73,370 75,708 77,184 76,411 78,853 81,700 84,936 87,259 44,178 44,595 45,944 47,085 47,674 46,697 47,775 49,150 50,544 51,452 26,039 26,283 27,426 28,623 29,511 29,714 31,078 32,550 34,392 35,807 5,571 8,464 5,670 8,488 6,173 8,783 6,623 9,356 6,796 9,610 6,487 9,435 6,724 9,899 7,068 10,317 7,367 11,112 7,356 11,565 4,813 4,796 4,952 5,265 5,352 5,161 5,363 5,579 5,936 6,156 3,650 3,692 3,832 4,092 4,258 4,275 4,536 4,739 5,177 5,409 574 ............ .......... .......... .......... 538 ............ .......... .......... .......... 573 7,802 4,368 3,433 509 647 8,128 4,527 3,601 570 652 8,203 4,527 3,677 554 615 7,894 4,275 3,618 507 611 8,227 4,404 3,823 508 619 8,540 4,565 3,975 508 703 9,102 4,796 4,307 571 727 9,359 4,923 4,436 579 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... 99,303 87,715 100,397 88,709 99,526 87,903 100,834 88,893 105,005 92,120 107,150 93,736 109,597 95,660 112,440 97,789 114,968 99,812 117,342 101,584 51,127 51,315 50,287 50,621 52,462 53,046 53,785 54,647 55,550 56,352 36,587 37,394 37,615 38,272 39,659 40,690 41,876 43,142 44,262 45,232 7,021 6,588 5,984 5,799 5,836 5,768 5,792 5,898 6,030 5,946 11,588 11,688 11,624 11,941 12,885 13,414 13,937 14,652 15,156 15,757 6,059 6,083 5,983 6,166 6,629 6,845 7,107 7,459 7,722 7,963 5,529 5,606 5,641 5,775 6,256 6,569 6,830 7,192 7,434 7,795 689 637 565 543 607 666 681 742 774 813 9,313 9,355 9,189 9,375 10,119 10,501 10,814 11,309 11,658 11,953 4,798 4,794 4,637 4,753 5,124 5,270 5,428 5,661 5,824 5,928 4,515 4,561 4,552 4,622 4,995 5,231 5,386 5,648 5,834 6,025 547 505 428 416 474 532 536 587 601 625 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... .......................................... 118,793 117,718 118,492 120,259 123,060 124,900 126,708 129,558 131,463 133,488 102,261 101,182 101,669 103,045 105,190 106,490 107,808 109,856 110,931 112,235 56,703 55,797 55,959 56,656 57,452 58,146 58,888 59,998 60,604 61,139 45,558 45,385 45,710 46,390 47,738 48,344 48,920 49,859 50,327 51,096 5,779 5,216 4,985 5,113 5,398 5,593 5,667 5,807 6,089 6,204 16,533 8,401 8,131 16,536 8,426 8,110 16,823 8,482 8,342 17,214 8,693 8,521 17,870 8,998 8,872 18,409 9,231 9,179 18,900 9,319 9,580 19,701 9,687 10,014 20,532 10,089 10,443 21,253 10,307 10,945 801 690 684 691 763 826 832 853 962 968 12,175 12,074 12,151 12,382 12,835 13,279 13,542 13,969 14,556 15,056 5,995 5,961 5,930 6,047 6,241 6,422 6,456 6,607 6,871 7,027 6,180 6,113 6,221 6,334 6,595 6,857 7,086 7,362 7,685 8,029 598 494 492 494 552 586 613 631 736 691 1999: Jan ................................... Feb ................................... Mar .................................. Apr ................................... May .................................. June ................................. 133,225 133,029 132,976 133,054 133,190 133,398 111,978 112,017 112,030 111,886 111,898 112,115 60,946 60,959 61,075 60,993 60,892 61,053 51,032 51,058 50,955 50,893 51,006 51,062 6,130 6,218 6,154 6,167 6,259 6,113 21,253 21,022 20,977 21,125 21,230 21,264 10,406 10,262 10,215 10,198 10,261 10,278 10,847 10,760 10,762 10,927 10,969 10,986 968 1,001 998 979 984 972 15,056 14,924 14,925 15,011 15,053 15,069 7,114 7,002 6,985 6,982 7,038 7,015 7,942 7,922 7,940 8,029 8,015 8,054 724 720 705 684 696 704 July .................................. Aug .................................. Sept ................................. Oct ................................... Nov .................................. Dec .................................. 133,399 133,530 133,650 133,940 134,098 134,420 112,193 112,308 112,303 112,548 112,611 112,951 61,207 61,193 61,322 61,301 61,294 61,436 50,986 51,115 50,981 51,247 51,317 51,515 6,238 6,161 6,191 6,302 6,271 6,244 21,143 21,270 21,378 21,421 21,519 21,433 10,175 10,302 10,297 10,342 10,456 10,499 10,968 10,968 11,081 11,079 11,063 10,934 958 935 905 948 954 1,016 14,962 15,047 15,114 15,124 15,187 15,204 6,922 7,018 7,016 7,030 7,076 7,127 8,040 8,029 8,098 8,094 8,111 8,077 682 660 659 662 663 732 2000: Jan ................................... Feb ................................... Mar .................................. Apr ................................... May .................................. June ................................. 135,221 135,362 135,159 135,706 134,715 135,179 113,704 113,634 113,630 113,915 112,988 113,484 61,751 61,823 61,839 61,661 61,429 61,735 51,953 51,810 51,791 52,253 51,559 51,748 6,360 6,211 6,270 6,379 6,237 6,458 21,528 21,714 21,574 21,766 21,628 21,685 10,595 10,641 10,541 10,619 10,432 10,491 10,933 11,073 11,034 11,146 11,197 11,194 997 1,055 1,004 1,074 1,003 988 15,254 15,471 15,356 15,444 15,261 15,275 7,192 7,319 7,212 7,244 7,074 7,100 8,062 8,152 8,144 8,200 8,187 8,174 701 756 718 773 724 722 July .................................. Aug .................................. Sept ................................. Oct ................................... Nov .................................. 134,749 134,912 135,161 135,422 135,373 113,156 113,352 113,450 113,516 113,359 61,494 61,941 61,723 61,739 61,539 51,662 51,411 51,727 51,776 51,820 6,153 6,264 6,219 6,252 6,176 21,572 21,634 21,761 21,889 22,056 10,512 10,531 10,622 10,646 10,796 11,060 11,103 11,138 11,242 11,260 901 935 1,002 995 1,106 15,190 15,190 15,246 15,380 15,509 7,127 7,091 7,127 7,186 7,289 8,064 8,098 8,119 8,194 8,221 696 682 709 735 811 Note.—See footnote 5 and Note, Table B-35. Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 319 TABLE B–38.—Unemployment by demographic characteristic, 1955–2000 [Thousands of persons 16 years of age and over; monthly data seasonally adjusted] White Year or month All civilian workers Total Males Black and other Females Both sexes 16-19 Total Black Males Females Both sexes 16-19 Total Males Females Both sexes 16-19 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. 2,852 2,750 2,859 4,602 3,740 2,252 2,159 2,289 3,680 2,946 1,478 1,366 1,477 2,489 1,903 774 793 812 1,191 1,043 373 382 401 541 525 601 591 570 923 793 376 345 364 610 517 225 246 206 313 276 77 95 96 138 128 ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. 3,852 4,714 3,911 4,070 3,786 3,366 2,875 2,975 2,817 2,832 3,065 3,743 3,052 3,208 2,999 2,691 2,255 2,338 2,226 2,260 1,988 2,398 1,915 1,976 1,779 1,556 1,241 1,208 1,142 1,137 1,077 1,345 1,137 1,232 1,220 1,135 1,014 1,130 1,084 1,123 575 669 580 708 708 705 651 635 644 660 788 971 861 863 787 678 622 638 590 571 498 599 509 496 426 360 310 300 277 267 290 372 352 367 361 318 312 338 313 304 138 159 142 176 165 171 186 203 194 193 ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. 4,093 5,016 4,882 4,365 5,156 7,929 7,406 6,991 6,202 6,137 3,339 4,085 3,906 3,442 4,097 6,421 5,914 5,441 4,698 4,664 1,857 2,309 2,173 1,836 2,169 3,627 3,258 2,883 2,411 2,405 1,482 1,777 1,733 1,606 1,927 2,794 2,656 2,558 2,287 2,260 871 1,011 1,021 955 1,104 1,413 1,364 1,284 1,189 1,193 754 930 977 924 1,058 1,507 1,492 1,550 1,505 1,473 380 481 486 440 544 815 779 784 731 714 374 450 491 484 514 692 713 766 774 759 235 249 288 280 318 355 355 379 394 362 ............ ............ 906 846 965 1,369 1,334 1,393 1,330 1,319 ........... ........... 448 395 494 741 698 698 641 636 ........... ........... 458 451 470 629 637 695 690 683 .......... .......... 279 262 297 330 330 354 360 333 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. 7,637 8,273 10,678 10,717 8,539 8,312 8,237 7,425 6,701 6,528 5,884 6,343 8,241 8,128 6,372 6,191 6,140 5,501 4,944 4,770 3,345 3,580 4,846 4,859 3,600 3,426 3,433 3,132 2,766 2,636 2,540 2,762 3,395 3,270 2,772 2,765 2,708 2,369 2,177 2,135 1,291 1,374 1,534 1,387 1,116 1,074 1,070 995 910 863 1,752 1,930 2,437 2,588 2,167 2,121 2,097 1,924 1,757 1,757 922 997 1,334 1,401 1,144 1,095 1,097 969 888 889 830 933 1,104 1,187 1,022 1,026 999 955 869 868 377 388 443 441 384 394 383 353 316 331 1,553 1,731 2,142 2,272 1,914 1,864 1,840 1,684 1,547 1,544 815 891 1,167 1,213 1,003 951 946 826 771 773 738 840 975 1,059 911 913 894 858 776 772 343 357 396 392 353 357 347 312 288 300 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. 7,047 8,628 9,613 8,940 7,996 7,404 7,236 6,739 6,210 5,880 5,186 6,560 7,169 6,655 5,892 5,459 5,300 4,836 4,484 4,273 2,935 3,859 4,209 3,828 3,275 2,999 2,896 2,641 2,431 2,274 2,251 2,701 2,959 2,827 2,617 2,460 2,404 2,195 2,053 1,999 903 1,029 1,037 992 960 952 939 912 876 844 1,860 2,068 2,444 2,285 2,104 1,945 1,936 1,903 1,726 1,606 971 1,087 1,314 1,227 1,092 984 984 935 835 792 889 981 1,130 1,058 1,011 961 952 967 891 814 308 330 390 373 360 394 367 359 329 318 1,565 1,723 2,011 1,844 1,666 1,538 1,592 1,560 1,426 1,309 806 890 1,067 971 848 762 808 747 671 626 758 833 944 872 818 777 784 813 756 684 268 280 324 313 300 325 310 302 281 268 1999: Jan ....... Feb ....... Mar ...... Apr ....... May ...... June ..... 6,007 6,108 5,828 6,032 5,823 5,934 4,378 4,438 4,207 4,458 4,295 4,403 2,341 2,422 2,200 2,274 2,318 2,325 2,037 2,016 2,007 2,184 1,977 2,078 892 851 841 852 807 834 1,573 1,650 1,623 1,590 1,545 1,532 796 793 743 781 771 761 777 857 880 809 774 771 358 340 352 323 292 281 1,281 1,326 1,306 1,277 1,237 1,239 611 629 588 595 599 583 670 697 718 682 638 656 295 281 302 263 234 232 July ...... Aug ...... Sept ..... Oct ....... Nov ...... Dec ...... 5,937 5,842 5,825 5,757 5,736 5,688 4,299 4,311 4,192 4,106 4,092 4,057 2,276 2,372 2,209 2,174 2,167 2,163 2,023 1,939 1,983 1,932 1,925 1,894 803 813 870 842 857 864 1,651 1,550 1,654 1,654 1,633 1,622 787 713 814 904 826 831 864 837 840 750 807 791 282 300 345 317 319 300 1,404 1,274 1,360 1,365 1,321 1,309 650 576 648 735 649 644 754 698 712 630 672 665 251 258 294 294 263 248 2000: Jan ....... Feb ....... Mar ...... Apr ....... May ...... June ..... 5,689 5,804 5,708 5,524 5,774 5,583 4,011 4,187 4,202 4,073 4,108 3,967 2,156 2,293 2,164 2,154 2,086 2,087 1,855 1,894 2,038 1,920 2,022 1,880 772 888 832 835 740 672 1,640 1,606 1,514 1,465 1,671 1,617 799 821 717 722 822 814 841 785 797 743 848 802 281 302 295 249 300 303 1,368 1,314 1,216 1,191 1,335 1,302 659 649 573 594 654 662 709 665 643 598 681 640 220 243 240 220 227 245 July ...... Aug ...... Sept ..... Oct ....... Nov ...... 5,650 5,829 5,477 5,496 5,679 4,103 4,199 4,085 3,984 4,148 2,107 2,154 2,175 2,140 2,281 1,996 2,045 1,909 1,845 1,867 800 869 806 780 831 1,537 1,628 1,410 1,516 1,524 741 857 712 815 777 796 772 698 702 747 290 332 254 265 268 1,266 1,322 1,156 1,213 1,245 596 690 576 640 610 669 633 580 573 636 252 262 223 234 215 Note.—See footnote 5 and Note, Table B-35. Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 320 TABLE B–39.—Civilian labor force participation rate and employment/population ratio, 1950–2000 [Percent;1 monthly data seasonally adjusted] Labor force participation rate Year or month 1950 ............................. 1951 ............................. 1952 ............................. 1953 ............................. 1954 ............................. 1955 ............................. 1956 ............................. 1957 ............................. 1958 ............................. 1959 ............................. 1960 ............................. 1961 ............................. 1962 ............................. 1963 ............................. 1964 ............................. 1965 ............................. 1966 ............................. 1967 ............................. 1968 ............................. 1969 ............................. 1970 ............................. 1971 ............................. 1972 ............................. 1973 ............................. 1974 ............................. 1975 ............................. 1976 ............................. 1977 ............................. 1978 ............................. 1979 ............................. 1980 ............................. 1981 ............................. 1982 ............................. 1983 ............................. 1984 ............................. 1985 ............................. 1986 ............................. 1987 ............................. 1988 ............................. 1989 ............................. 1990 ............................. 1991 ............................. 1992 ............................. 1993 ............................. 1994 ............................. 1995 ............................. 1996 ............................. 1997 ............................. 1998 ............................. 1999 ............................. 1999: Jan ...................... Feb ..................... Mar .................... Apr ..................... May .................... June ................... July ..................... Aug ..................... Sept .................... Oct ..................... Nov ..................... Dec ..................... 2000: Jan ...................... Feb ..................... Mar .................... Apr ..................... May .................... June ................... July ..................... Aug ..................... Sept .................... Oct ..................... Nov ..................... All civilian Males Feworkmales ers 59.2 59.2 59.0 58.9 58.8 59.3 60.0 59.6 59.5 59.3 59.4 59.3 58.8 58.7 58.7 58.9 59.2 59.6 59.6 60.1 60.4 60.2 60.4 60.8 61.3 61.2 61.6 62.3 63.2 63.7 63.8 63.9 64.0 64.0 64.4 64.8 65.3 65.6 65.9 66.5 66.5 66.2 66.4 66.3 66.6 66.6 66.8 67.1 67.1 67.1 67.4 67.3 67.0 67.1 67.0 67.1 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.1 67.5 67.6 67.4 67.5 67.1 67.2 66.9 67.0 66.9 67.0 67.0 86.4 86.3 86.3 86.0 85.5 85.4 85.5 84.8 84.2 83.7 83.3 82.9 82.0 81.4 81.0 80.7 80.4 80.4 80.1 79.8 79.7 79.1 78.9 78.8 78.7 77.9 77.5 77.7 77.9 77.8 77.4 77.0 76.6 76.4 76.4 76.3 76.3 76.2 76.2 76.4 76.4 75.8 75.8 75.4 75.1 75.0 74.9 75.0 74.9 74.7 75.1 75.0 74.7 74.7 74.6 74.7 74.7 74.6 74.7 74.6 74.6 74.7 75.1 75.3 74.9 74.8 74.5 74.6 74.4 74.8 74.5 74.5 74.5 33.9 34.6 34.7 34.4 34.6 35.7 36.9 36.9 37.1 37.1 37.7 38.1 37.9 38.3 38.7 39.3 40.3 41.1 41.6 42.7 43.3 43.4 43.9 44.7 45.7 46.3 47.3 48.4 50.0 50.9 51.5 52.1 52.6 52.9 53.6 54.5 55.3 56.0 56.6 57.4 57.5 57.4 57.8 57.9 58.8 58.9 59.3 59.8 59.8 60.0 60.2 60.1 60.0 60.1 60.0 60.1 60.0 60.0 59.9 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.5 60.4 60.4 60.7 60.3 60.3 60.1 59.9 59.9 60.0 60.1 Both sexes 16-19 years 51.8 52.2 51.3 50.2 48.3 48.9 50.9 49.6 47.4 46.7 47.5 46.9 46.1 45.2 44.5 45.7 48.2 48.4 48.3 49.4 49.9 49.7 51.9 53.7 54.8 54.0 54.5 56.0 57.8 57.9 56.7 55.4 54.1 53.5 53.9 54.5 54.7 54.7 55.3 55.9 53.7 51.6 51.3 51.5 52.7 53.5 52.3 51.6 52.8 52.0 52.4 52.9 52.0 52.0 51.9 51.4 51.8 51.2 51.5 52.1 52.1 52.3 52.1 52.4 51.7 53.1 51.6 52.9 51.3 52.7 51.6 52.1 52.4 Employment/population ratio White Black and other Black .......... .......... .......... .......... 58.2 58.7 59.4 59.1 58.9 58.7 58.8 58.8 58.3 58.2 58.2 58.4 58.7 59.2 59.3 59.9 60.2 60.1 60.4 60.8 61.4 61.5 61.8 62.5 63.3 63.9 64.1 64.3 64.3 64.3 64.6 65.0 65.5 65.8 66.2 66.7 66.9 66.6 66.8 66.8 67.1 67.1 67.2 67.5 67.3 67.3 67.5 67.5 67.3 67.4 67.2 67.4 67.3 67.3 67.2 67.2 67.2 67.3 67.7 67.8 67.7 67.8 67.2 67.4 67.2 67.3 67.3 67.2 67.1 .......... .......... .......... .......... 64.0 64.2 64.9 64.4 64.8 64.3 64.5 64.1 63.2 63.0 63.1 62.9 63.0 62.8 62.2 62.1 61.8 60.9 60.2 60.5 60.3 59.6 59.8 60.4 62.2 62.2 61.7 61.3 61.6 62.1 62.6 63.3 63.7 64.3 64.0 64.7 64.4 63.8 64.6 63.8 63.9 64.3 64.6 65.2 66.0 65.9 66.5 65.9 65.6 65.8 65.9 65.8 65.7 65.6 66.1 66.1 66.2 65.9 66.2 66.6 65.8 66.1 66.2 66.1 65.5 65.8 65.4 66.0 66.3 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 59.9 60.2 59.8 58.8 59.0 59.8 61.5 61.4 61.0 60.8 61.0 61.5 62.2 62.9 63.3 63.8 63.8 64.2 64.0 63.3 63.9 63.2 63.4 63.7 64.1 64.7 65.6 65.8 66.2 65.8 65.6 65.8 65.7 65.7 65.8 65.5 66.0 66.0 66.0 65.9 66.4 66.9 66.0 66.2 66.0 65.8 65.2 65.4 64.8 65.5 66.0 1 Civilian All civilian Males Feworkmales ers 56.1 57.3 57.3 57.1 55.5 56.7 57.5 57.1 55.4 56.0 56.1 55.4 55.5 55.4 55.7 56.2 56.9 57.3 57.5 58.0 57.4 56.6 57.0 57.8 57.8 56.1 56.8 57.9 59.3 59.9 59.2 59.0 57.8 57.9 59.5 60.1 60.7 61.5 62.3 63.0 62.8 61.7 61.5 61.7 62.5 62.9 63.2 63.8 64.1 64.3 64.4 64.3 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.3 64.4 64.8 64.8 64.7 64.9 64.3 64.5 64.2 64.3 64.3 64.4 64.3 82.0 84.0 83.9 83.6 81.0 81.8 82.3 81.3 78.5 79.3 78.9 77.6 77.7 77.1 77.3 77.5 77.9 78.0 77.8 77.6 76.2 74.9 75.0 75.5 74.9 71.7 72.0 72.8 73.8 73.8 72.0 71.3 69.0 68.8 70.7 70.9 71.0 71.5 72.0 72.5 72.0 70.4 69.8 70.0 70.4 70.8 70.9 71.3 71.6 71.6 71.9 71.7 71.7 71.6 71.5 71.6 71.6 71.5 71.6 71.6 71.6 71.7 72.2 72.2 72.0 72.0 71.5 71.7 71.5 71.8 71.7 71.6 71.4 32.0 33.1 33.4 33.3 32.5 34.0 35.1 35.1 34.5 35.0 35.5 35.4 35.6 35.8 36.3 37.1 38.3 39.0 39.6 40.7 40.8 40.4 41.0 42.0 42.6 42.0 43.2 44.5 46.4 47.5 47.7 48.0 47.7 48.0 49.5 50.4 51.4 52.5 53.4 54.3 54.3 53.7 53.8 54.1 55.3 55.6 56.0 56.8 57.1 57.4 57.5 57.4 57.3 57.4 57.5 57.5 57.3 57.4 57.3 57.5 57.5 57.6 57.9 57.9 57.8 58.3 57.7 57.8 57.5 57.3 57.5 57.7 57.7 Both sexes 16-19 years White Black and other Black 45.5 47.9 46.9 46.4 42.3 43.5 45.3 43.9 39.9 39.9 40.5 39.1 39.4 37.4 37.3 38.9 42.1 42.2 42.2 43.4 42.3 41.3 43.5 45.9 46.0 43.3 44.2 46.1 48.3 48.5 46.6 44.6 41.5 41.5 43.7 44.4 44.6 45.5 46.8 47.5 45.3 42.0 41.0 41.7 43.4 44.2 43.5 43.4 45.1 44.7 44.5 45.4 44.6 44.7 45.1 44.4 44.9 44.3 44.0 44.9 44.8 45.1 45.6 45.0 44.8 46.4 45.1 46.7 44.4 45.1 45.0 45.5 45.5 .......... .......... .......... .......... 55.2 56.5 57.3 56.8 55.3 55.9 55.9 55.3 55.4 55.3 55.5 56.0 56.8 57.2 57.4 58.0 57.5 56.8 57.4 58.2 58.3 56.7 57.5 58.6 60.0 60.6 60.0 60.0 58.8 58.9 60.5 61.0 61.5 62.3 63.1 63.8 63.7 62.6 62.4 62.7 63.5 63.8 64.1 64.6 64.7 64.8 65.0 64.9 64.9 64.8 64.7 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 65.0 65.4 65.3 65.3 65.4 64.9 65.1 64.9 64.9 64.9 64.9 64.8 .......... .......... .......... .......... 58.0 58.7 59.5 59.3 56.7 57.5 57.9 56.2 56.3 56.2 57.0 57.8 58.4 58.2 58.0 58.1 56.8 54.9 54.1 55.0 54.3 51.4 52.0 52.5 54.7 55.2 53.6 52.6 50.9 51.0 53.6 54.7 55.4 56.8 57.4 58.2 57.9 56.7 56.4 56.3 57.2 58.1 58.6 59.4 60.9 61.3 61.9 61.1 60.9 61.2 61.4 61.4 60.9 61.2 61.4 61.4 61.6 61.2 61.6 62.0 61.5 62.0 61.5 61.6 61.1 61.2 61.4 61.7 62.1 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 53.7 54.5 53.5 50.1 50.8 51.4 53.6 53.8 52.3 51.3 49.4 49.5 52.3 53.4 54.1 55.6 56.3 56.9 56.7 55.4 54.9 55.0 56.1 57.1 57.4 58.2 59.7 60.6 61.0 60.4 60.4 60.6 60.7 60.7 60.2 60.4 60.6 60.5 60.7 60.7 60.9 61.7 61.2 61.4 60.7 60.6 60.2 60.1 60.3 60.7 61.1 labor force or civilian employment as percent of civilian noninstitutional population in group specified. Note.—Data relate to persons 16 years of age and over. See footnote 5 and Note, Table B-35. Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 321 TABLE B–40.—Civilian labor force participation rate by demographic characteristic, 1955–2000 [Percent;1 monthly data seasonally adjusted] White Year or month All civilian workers Black and other or black Males Total Total 16-19 years Females 20 years and over Total 87.5 87.6 86.9 86.6 86.3 86.0 85.7 84.9 84.4 84.2 83.9 83.6 83.5 83.2 83.0 82.8 82.3 82.0 34.5 35.7 35.7 35.8 36.0 36.5 36.9 36.7 37.2 37.5 38.1 39.2 40.1 40.7 41.8 42.6 42.6 43.2 16-19 years Males 20 years and over Total 34.0 35.1 35.2 35.5 35.6 36.2 36.6 36.5 37.0 37.5 38.0 38.8 39.8 40.4 41.5 42.2 42.3 42.7 64.2 64.9 64.4 64.8 64.3 64.5 64.1 63.2 63.0 63.1 62.9 63.0 62.8 62.2 62.1 61.8 60.9 60.2 Total 16-19 years Females 20 years and over Total 16-19 years 20 years and over Black and other 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. 59.3 60.0 59.6 59.5 59.3 59.4 59.3 58.8 58.7 58.7 58.9 59.2 59.6 59.6 60.1 60.4 60.2 60.4 58.7 59.4 59.1 58.9 58.7 58.8 58.8 58.3 58.2 58.2 58.4 58.7 59.2 59.3 59.9 60.2 60.1 60.4 85.4 85.6 84.8 84.3 83.8 83.4 83.0 82.1 81.5 81.1 80.8 80.6 80.6 80.4 80.2 80.0 79.6 79.6 58.6 60.4 59.2 56.5 55.9 55.9 54.5 53.8 53.1 52.7 54.1 55.9 56.3 55.9 56.8 57.5 57.9 60.1 40.7 43.1 42.2 40.1 39.6 40.3 40.6 39.8 38.7 37.8 39.2 42.6 42.5 43.0 44.6 45.6 45.4 48.1 85.1 85.1 84.2 84.1 83.4 83.0 82.2 80.8 80.2 80.1 79.6 79.0 78.5 77.7 76.9 76.5 74.9 73.9 60.8 61.5 58.8 57.3 55.5 57.6 55.8 53.5 51.5 49.9 51.3 51.4 51.1 49.7 49.6 47.4 44.7 46.0 87.8 87.8 87.0 87.1 86.7 86.2 85.5 84.2 83.9 84.1 83.7 83.3 82.9 82.2 81.4 81.4 80.0 78.6 46.1 47.3 47.1 48.0 47.7 48.2 48.3 48.0 48.1 48.6 48.6 49.4 49.5 49.3 49.8 49.5 49.2 48.8 32.7 36.3 33.2 31.9 28.2 32.9 32.8 33.1 32.6 31.7 29.5 33.5 35.2 34.8 34.6 34.1 31.2 32.3 47.5 48.4 48.6 49.8 49.8 49.9 50.1 49.6 49.9 50.7 51.1 51.6 51.6 51.4 52.0 51.8 51.8 51.2 48.7 49.3 49.0 48.8 49.8 50.8 53.1 53.1 53.1 53.5 53.7 54.2 55.2 56.5 56.9 58.0 58.0 58.7 58.3 57.5 58.5 57.9 58.7 59.5 60.4 61.7 62.8 63.5 63.3 63.2 63.4 63.8 63.2 63.6 64.1 63.5 64.0 63.3 63.7 63.3 63.5 63.8 63.5 63.5 63.9 63.5 62.8 62.7 62.4 62.8 63.4 32.2 34.2 33.4 34.2 32.9 32.9 37.3 36.8 34.9 34.0 33.5 33.0 35.0 37.9 39.1 39.6 37.9 40.4 36.8 33.5 35.2 34.6 36.3 39.8 38.9 39.9 42.5 38.8 39.9 40.3 40.3 38.8 37.7 38.9 38.2 38.5 39.1 37.4 37.9 38.2 36.2 37.6 37.6 40.3 38.5 37.2 41.2 40.0 40.2 42.4 42.2 51.2 51.6 51.4 51.1 52.5 53.6 55.5 55.4 55.6 56.0 56.2 56.8 57.6 58.6 58.9 60.0 60.1 60.6 60.6 60.0 60.8 60.2 60.9 61.4 62.6 64.0 64.8 66.1 65.6 65.6 65.8 66.3 65.8 66.1 66.7 66.1 66.5 65.9 66.3 65.8 66.3 66.4 66.1 65.8 66.5 66.1 65.0 65.0 64.6 64.8 65.4 Black 1972 ............. 1973 ............. 1974 ............. 1975 ............. 1976 ............. 1977 ............. 1978 ............. 1979 ............. 1980 ............. 1981 ............. 1982 ............. 1983 ............. 1984 ............. 1985 ............. 1986 ............. 1987 ............. 1988 ............. 1989 ............. 1990 ............. 1991 ............. 1992 ............. 1993 ............. 1994 ............. 1995 ............. 1996 ............. 1997 ............. 1998 ............. 1999 ............. 1999: Jan ...... Feb ...... Mar ..... Apr ...... May ..... June .... July ..... Aug ..... Sept .... Oct ...... Nov ..... Dec ..... 2000: Jan ...... Feb ...... Mar ..... Apr ...... May ..... June .... July ..... Aug ..... Sept .... Oct ...... Nov ..... 60.4 60.8 61.3 61.2 61.6 62.3 63.2 63.7 63.8 63.9 64.0 64.0 64.4 64.8 65.3 65.6 65.9 66.5 66.5 66.2 66.4 66.3 66.6 66.6 66.8 67.1 67.1 67.1 67.4 67.3 67.0 67.1 67.0 67.1 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.1 67.5 67.6 67.4 67.5 67.1 67.2 66.9 67.0 66.9 67.0 67.0 60.4 60.8 61.4 61.5 61.8 62.5 63.3 63.9 64.1 64.3 64.3 64.3 64.6 65.0 65.5 65.8 66.2 66.7 66.9 66.6 66.8 66.8 67.1 67.1 67.2 67.5 67.3 67.3 67.5 67.5 67.3 67.4 67.2 67.4 67.3 67.3 67.2 67.2 67.2 67.3 67.7 67.8 67.7 67.8 67.2 67.4 67.2 67.3 67.3 67.2 67.1 79.6 79.4 79.4 78.7 78.4 78.5 78.6 78.6 78.2 77.9 77.4 77.1 77.1 77.0 76.9 76.8 76.9 77.1 77.1 76.5 76.5 76.2 75.9 75.7 75.8 75.9 75.6 75.6 75.7 75.8 75.6 75.5 75.4 75.5 75.6 75.6 75.5 75.4 75.3 75.4 75.8 76.0 75.8 75.5 75.1 75.4 75.1 75.6 75.3 75.2 75.1 60.1 62.0 62.9 61.9 62.3 64.0 65.0 64.8 63.7 62.4 60.0 59.4 59.0 59.7 59.3 59.0 60.0 61.0 59.6 57.3 56.9 56.6 57.7 58.5 57.1 56.1 56.6 56.4 56.3 56.5 55.6 55.8 57.1 56.2 56.5 55.7 56.6 56.8 56.8 57.0 57.3 57.3 57.2 57.9 55.9 57.7 56.2 57.6 55.8 55.6 55.0 82.0 81.6 81.4 80.7 80.3 80.2 80.1 80.1 79.8 79.5 79.2 78.9 78.7 78.5 78.5 78.4 78.3 78.5 78.5 78.0 78.0 77.7 77.3 77.1 77.3 77.5 77.2 77.2 77.4 77.4 77.3 77.2 77.0 77.2 77.2 77.3 77.1 77.0 76.9 77.0 77.3 77.6 77.4 77.0 76.7 76.9 76.7 77.1 77.0 76.9 76.8 43.2 44.1 45.2 45.9 46.9 48.0 49.4 50.5 51.2 51.9 52.4 52.7 53.3 54.1 55.0 55.7 56.4 57.2 57.4 57.4 57.7 58.0 58.9 59.0 59.1 59.5 59.4 59.6 59.7 59.7 59.6 59.6 59.5 59.6 59.4 59.4 59.3 59.5 59.5 59.7 60.1 60.0 60.1 60.4 59.8 59.8 59.8 59.5 59.6 59.6 59.6 48.1 50.1 51.7 51.5 52.8 54.5 56.7 57.4 56.2 55.4 55.0 54.5 55.4 55.2 56.3 56.5 57.2 57.1 55.3 54.1 52.5 53.5 55.1 55.5 54.7 54.1 55.4 54.5 54.9 55.4 55.0 55.0 54.2 53.0 54.0 53.7 54.2 55.4 55.1 54.6 54.7 54.2 54.4 55.5 53.8 54.5 53.2 54.7 54.8 55.2 55.4 1 Civilian 42.7 43.5 44.4 45.3 46.2 47.3 48.7 49.8 50.6 51.5 52.2 52.5 53.1 54.0 54.9 55.6 56.3 57.2 57.6 57.6 58.1 58.3 59.2 59.2 59.4 59.9 59.7 59.9 60.1 60.0 59.9 60.0 59.9 60.1 59.8 59.9 59.7 59.8 59.9 60.1 60.5 60.4 60.5 60.8 60.2 60.2 60.2 59.8 60.0 59.9 59.9 59.9 60.2 59.8 58.8 59.0 59.8 61.5 61.4 61.0 60.8 61.0 61.5 62.2 62.9 63.3 63.8 63.8 64.2 64.0 63.3 63.9 63.2 63.4 63.7 64.1 64.7 65.6 65.8 66.2 65.8 65.6 65.8 65.7 65.7 65.8 65.5 66.0 66.0 66.0 65.9 66.4 66.9 66.0 66.2 66.0 65.8 65.2 65.4 64.8 65.5 66.0 labor force as percent of civilian noninstitutional population in group specified. Note.—See Note, Table B-39. Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 322 73.6 73.4 72.9 70.9 70.0 70.6 71.5 71.3 70.3 70.0 70.1 70.6 70.8 70.8 71.2 71.1 71.0 71.0 71.0 70.4 70.7 69.6 69.1 69.0 68.7 68.3 69.0 68.7 69.9 68.9 68.3 68.3 68.7 68.2 67.9 68.0 68.5 69.3 68.8 69.2 69.9 70.8 69.1 69.5 68.4 68.7 68.2 68.6 67.8 68.8 69.3 46.3 45.7 46.7 42.6 41.3 43.2 44.9 43.6 43.2 41.6 39.8 39.9 41.7 44.6 43.7 43.6 43.8 44.6 40.7 37.3 40.6 39.5 40.8 40.1 39.5 37.4 40.7 38.6 42.6 40.7 41.2 37.7 37.3 36.5 36.8 35.4 37.6 39.7 36.8 40.9 38.2 43.3 39.9 40.0 38.5 41.2 35.6 36.6 35.5 36.3 41.1 78.5 78.4 77.6 76.0 75.4 75.6 76.2 76.3 75.1 74.5 74.7 75.2 74.8 74.4 74.8 74.7 74.6 74.4 75.0 74.6 74.3 73.2 72.5 72.5 72.3 72.2 72.5 72.4 73.3 72.4 71.7 72.0 72.6 72.1 71.7 72.0 72.3 72.9 72.8 72.6 73.7 74.2 72.6 73.0 72.0 72.0 72.1 72.4 71.7 72.6 72.7 TABLE B–41.—Civilian employment/population ratio by demographic characteristic, 1955–2000 [Percent;1 monthly data seasonally adjusted] White Year or month All civilian workers Black and other or black Males Females Total 16-19 years 20 years and over 82.2 82.7 81.8 79.2 79.9 79.4 78.2 78.4 77.7 77.8 77.9 78.3 78.4 78.3 78.2 76.8 75.7 76.0 52.0 54.1 52.4 47.6 48.1 48.1 45.9 46.4 44.7 45.0 47.1 50.1 50.2 50.3 51.1 49.6 49.2 51.5 84.7 85.0 84.1 81.8 82.8 82.4 81.4 81.5 81.1 81.3 81.5 81.7 81.7 81.6 81.4 80.1 79.0 79.0 Total Total 33.0 34.2 34.2 33.6 34.0 34.6 34.5 34.7 35.0 35.5 36.2 37.5 38.3 38.9 40.1 40.3 39.9 40.7 Males 16-19 years 20 years and over Total 37.0 38.9 38.2 35.0 34.8 35.1 34.6 34.8 32.9 32.2 33.7 37.5 37.7 37.8 39.5 39.5 38.6 41.3 32.7 33.8 33.9 33.5 34.0 34.5 34.5 34.7 35.2 35.8 36.5 37.5 38.3 39.1 40.1 40.4 40.1 40.6 58.7 59.5 59.3 56.7 57.5 57.9 56.2 56.3 56.2 57.0 57.8 58.4 58.2 58.0 58.1 56.8 54.9 54.1 Total 16-19 years 77.6 78.4 77.2 72.5 73.8 74.1 71.7 72.0 71.8 72.9 73.7 74.0 73.8 73.3 72.8 70.9 68.1 67.3 52.7 52.2 48.0 42.0 41.4 43.8 41.0 41.7 37.4 37.8 39.4 40.5 38.8 38.7 39.0 35.5 31.8 32.4 Females 20 years and over 16-19 years 20 years and over 42.2 43.0 43.7 42.8 43.2 43.6 42.6 42.7 42.7 43.4 44.1 45.1 45.0 45.2 45.9 44.9 43.9 43.3 26.4 28.0 26.5 22.8 20.3 24.8 23.2 23.1 21.3 21.8 20.2 23.1 24.8 24.7 25.1 22.4 20.2 19.9 43.9 44.7 45.5 45.0 45.7 45.8 44.8 44.9 45.2 46.1 47.3 48.2 47.9 48.2 48.9 48.2 47.3 46.7 43.0 43.8 43.5 41.6 42.8 43.3 45.8 46.0 45.7 45.1 44.2 44.1 46.7 48.1 48.8 50.3 51.2 52.0 51.9 50.6 50.8 50.9 52.3 53.4 54.4 55.6 57.2 58.6 58.3 58.1 58.2 58.8 58.6 58.8 58.6 58.4 58.9 58.7 58.8 58.5 58.4 59.0 58.8 59.2 59.0 58.9 58.0 58.2 58.2 58.7 58.8 19.2 22.0 20.9 20.2 19.2 18.5 22.1 22.4 21.0 19.7 17.7 17.0 20.1 23.1 23.8 25.8 25.8 27.1 25.8 21.5 22.1 21.6 24.5 26.1 27.1 28.5 31.8 29.0 30.2 30.2 29.2 29.6 29.2 30.7 29.3 28.2 26.8 27.6 28.0 29.4 27.6 27.6 26.7 31.3 30.7 30.4 29.7 31.0 31.5 33.5 33.4 46.5 47.2 46.9 44.9 46.4 47.0 49.3 49.3 49.1 48.5 47.5 47.4 49.8 50.9 51.6 53.0 53.9 54.6 54.7 53.6 53.6 53.8 55.0 56.1 57.1 58.4 59.7 61.5 61.2 61.0 61.1 61.7 61.6 61.6 61.6 61.5 62.1 61.9 61.9 61.4 61.5 62.1 62.1 62.0 61.9 61.7 60.8 60.9 60.9 61.2 61.3 Total Black and other 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... 56.7 57.5 57.1 55.4 56.0 56.1 55.4 55.5 55.4 55.7 56.2 56.9 57.3 57.5 58.0 57.4 56.6 57.0 56.5 57.3 56.8 55.3 55.9 55.9 55.3 55.4 55.3 55.5 56.0 56.8 57.2 57.4 58.0 57.5 56.8 57.4 80.4 81.3 80.5 76.0 77.6 77.9 75.5 75.7 76.2 77.7 78.7 79.2 79.4 78.9 78.4 76.8 74.2 73.2 Black 1972 ..................... 1973 ..................... 1974 ..................... 1975 ..................... 1976 ..................... 1977 ..................... 1978 ..................... 1979 ..................... 1980 ..................... 1981 ..................... 1982 ..................... 1983 ..................... 1984 ..................... 1985 ..................... 1986 ..................... 1987 ..................... 1988 ..................... 1989 ..................... 1990 ..................... 1991 ..................... 1992 ..................... 1993 ..................... 1994 ..................... 1995 ..................... 1996 ..................... 1997 ..................... 1998 ..................... 1999 ..................... 1999: Jan .............. Feb .............. Mar ............. Apr .............. May ............. June ............ July ............. Aug ............. Sept ............ Oct .............. Nov ............. Dec ............. 2000: Jan .............. Feb .............. Mar ............. Apr .............. May ............. June ............ July ............. Aug ............. Sept ............ Oct .............. Nov ............. 57.0 57.8 57.8 56.1 56.8 57.9 59.3 59.9 59.2 59.0 57.8 57.9 59.5 60.1 60.7 61.5 62.3 63.0 62.8 61.7 61.5 61.7 62.5 62.9 63.2 63.8 64.1 64.3 64.4 64.3 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.3 64.4 64.8 64.8 64.7 64.9 64.3 64.5 64.2 64.3 64.3 64.4 64.3 57.4 58.2 58.3 56.7 57.5 58.6 60.0 60.6 60.0 60.0 58.8 58.9 60.5 61.0 61.5 62.3 63.1 63.8 63.7 62.6 62.4 62.7 63.5 63.8 64.1 64.6 64.7 64.8 65.0 64.9 64.9 64.8 64.7 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 65.0 65.4 65.3 65.3 65.4 64.9 65.1 64.9 64.9 64.9 64.9 64.8 76.0 76.5 75.9 73.0 73.4 74.1 75.0 75.1 73.4 72.8 70.6 70.4 72.1 72.3 72.3 72.7 73.2 73.7 73.3 71.6 71.1 71.4 71.8 72.0 72.3 72.7 72.7 72.8 72.9 72.9 73.0 72.8 72.7 72.8 72.9 72.8 72.9 72.8 72.7 72.9 73.2 73.3 73.3 73.0 72.7 73.0 72.6 73.1 72.8 72.7 72.4 51.5 54.3 54.4 50.6 51.5 54.4 56.3 55.7 53.4 51.3 47.0 47.4 49.1 49.9 49.6 49.9 51.7 52.6 51.0 47.2 46.4 46.6 48.3 49.4 48.2 48.1 48.6 49.3 48.6 49.3 48.5 48.7 50.1 49.5 49.9 48.9 49.4 50.0 49.6 49.4 50.1 49.1 50.7 50.4 50.0 51.2 49.2 49.9 49.0 49.2 48.1 79.0 79.2 78.6 75.7 76.0 76.5 77.2 77.3 75.6 75.1 73.0 72.6 74.3 74.3 74.3 74.7 75.1 75.4 75.1 73.5 73.1 73.3 73.6 73.8 74.2 74.7 74.7 74.8 75.0 74.9 75.0 74.9 74.5 74.7 74.8 74.8 74.9 74.7 74.7 74.8 75.2 75.3 75.1 74.9 74.6 74.8 74.6 75.0 74.7 74.7 74.4 40.7 41.8 42.4 42.0 43.2 44.5 46.3 47.5 47.8 48.3 48.1 48.5 49.8 50.7 51.7 52.8 53.8 54.6 54.7 54.2 54.2 54.6 55.8 56.1 56.3 57.0 57.1 57.3 57.4 57.5 57.3 57.2 57.3 57.3 57.2 57.3 57.1 57.3 57.4 57.6 58.1 57.9 57.8 58.3 57.5 57.7 57.5 57.2 57.5 57.5 57.5 41.3 43.6 44.3 42.5 44.2 45.9 48.5 49.4 47.9 46.2 44.6 44.5 47.0 47.1 47.9 49.0 50.2 50.5 48.3 45.9 44.2 45.7 47.5 48.1 47.6 47.2 49.3 48.3 48.6 49.1 48.8 48.6 48.4 46.7 48.1 47.8 47.8 48.9 48.9 48.7 49.8 48.5 47.8 49.9 48.2 50.4 47.7 48.7 48.9 49.3 49.2 1 Civilian 40.6 41.6 42.2 41.9 43.1 44.4 46.1 47.3 47.8 48.5 48.4 48.9 50.0 51.0 52.0 53.1 54.0 54.9 55.2 54.8 54.9 55.2 56.4 56.7 57.0 57.8 57.7 58.0 58.1 58.1 57.9 57.8 57.9 58.1 57.9 58.0 57.8 58.0 58.0 58.2 58.7 58.6 58.6 58.9 58.2 58.2 58.3 57.8 58.2 58.1 58.1 53.7 54.5 53.5 50.1 50.8 51.4 53.6 53.8 52.3 51.3 49.4 49.5 52.3 53.4 54.1 55.6 56.3 56.9 56.7 55.4 54.9 55.0 56.1 57.1 57.4 58.2 59.7 60.6 61.0 60.4 60.4 60.6 60.7 60.7 60.2 60.4 60.6 60.5 60.7 60.7 60.9 61.7 61.2 61.4 60.7 60.6 60.2 60.1 60.3 60.7 61.1 employment as percent of civilian noninstitutional population in group specified. Note.—See Note, Table B-39. Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 323 66.8 67.5 65.8 60.6 60.6 61.4 63.3 63.4 60.4 59.1 56.0 56.3 59.2 60.0 60.6 62.0 62.7 62.8 62.6 61.3 59.9 60.0 60.8 61.7 61.1 61.4 62.9 63.1 64.4 63.3 63.0 62.9 63.3 63.0 62.1 62.8 62.7 62.7 63.1 63.4 64.0 65.0 64.0 64.2 62.6 62.8 62.9 62.5 62.7 63.2 64.0 31.6 32.8 31.4 26.3 25.8 26.4 28.5 28.7 27.0 24.6 20.3 20.4 23.9 26.3 26.5 28.5 29.4 30.4 27.7 23.8 23.6 23.6 25.4 25.2 24.9 23.7 28.4 26.7 28.4 28.0 27.8 25.7 26.9 26.0 25.5 24.9 26.2 25.7 25.4 29.6 29.0 33.6 31.4 31.2 27.8 28.0 26.7 24.3 26.0 26.2 32.5 73.0 73.7 71.9 66.5 66.8 67.5 69.1 69.1 65.8 64.5 61.4 61.6 64.1 64.6 65.1 66.4 67.1 67.0 67.1 65.9 64.3 64.3 65.0 66.1 65.5 66.1 67.1 67.5 68.8 67.6 67.4 67.5 67.8 67.6 66.6 67.5 67.2 67.3 67.7 67.5 68.2 68.9 68.0 68.2 66.8 67.0 67.3 67.1 67.1 67.6 67.7 TABLE B–42.—Civilian unemployment rate, 1950–2000 [Percent;1 monthly data seasonally adjusted] Males Year or month 1950 ................ 1951 ................ 1952 ................ 1953 ................ 1954 ................ 1955 ................ 1956 ................ 1957 ................ 1958 ................ 1959 ................ 1960 ................ 1961 ................ 1962 ................ 1963 ................ 1964 ................ 1965 ................ 1966 ................ 1967 ................ 1968 ................ 1969 ................ 1970 ................ 1971 ................ 1972 ................ 1973 ................ 1974 ................ 1975 ................ 1976 ................ 1977 ................ 1978 ................ 1979 ................ 1980 ................ 1981 ................ 1982 ................ 1983 ................ 1984 ................ 1985 ................ 1986 ................ 1987 ................ 1988 ................ 1989 ................ 1990 ................ 1991 ................ 1992 ................ 1993 ................ 1994 ................ 1995 ................ 1996 ................ 1997 ................ 1998 ................ 1999 ................ 1999: Jan ......... Feb ........ Mar ........ Apr ........ May ....... June ....... July ........ Aug ........ Sept ....... Oct ........ Nov ........ Dec ........ 2000: Jan ......... Feb ........ Mar ........ Apr ........ May ....... June ....... July ........ Aug ........ Sept ....... Oct ........ Nov ........ All civilian work- Total ers 5.3 3.3 3.0 2.9 5.5 4.4 4.1 4.3 6.8 5.5 5.5 6.7 5.5 5.7 5.2 4.5 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.5 4.9 5.9 5.6 4.9 5.6 8.5 7.7 7.1 6.1 5.8 7.1 7.6 9.7 9.6 7.5 7.2 7.0 6.2 5.5 5.3 5.6 6.8 7.5 6.9 6.1 5.6 5.4 4.9 4.5 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.1 3.9 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.1 3.9 3.9 4.0 5.1 2.8 2.8 2.8 5.3 4.2 3.8 4.1 6.8 5.2 5.4 6.4 5.2 5.2 4.6 4.0 3.2 3.1 2.9 2.8 4.4 5.3 5.0 4.2 4.9 7.9 7.1 6.3 5.3 5.1 6.9 7.4 9.9 9.9 7.4 7.0 6.9 6.2 5.5 5.2 5.7 7.2 7.9 7.2 6.2 5.6 5.4 4.9 4.4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.0 4.0 3.9 4.1 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.8 4.0 3.8 3.9 4.1 Females 1619 years 20 years and over 12.7 8.1 8.9 7.9 13.5 11.6 11.1 12.4 17.1 15.3 15.3 17.1 14.7 17.2 15.8 14.1 11.7 12.3 11.6 11.4 15.0 16.6 15.9 13.9 15.6 20.1 19.2 17.3 15.8 15.9 18.3 20.1 24.4 23.3 19.6 19.5 19.0 17.8 16.0 15.9 16.3 19.8 21.5 20.4 19.0 18.4 18.1 16.9 16.2 14.7 16.4 14.9 15.0 14.8 13.9 14.3 13.8 13.9 14.6 14.2 14.9 15.2 14.0 15.5 12.4 13.6 13.1 14.1 14.0 16.0 13.6 13.2 13.8 4.7 2.5 2.4 2.5 4.9 3.8 3.4 3.6 6.2 4.7 4.7 5.7 4.6 4.5 3.9 3.2 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.1 3.5 4.4 4.0 3.3 3.8 6.8 5.9 5.2 4.3 4.2 5.9 6.3 8.8 8.9 6.6 6.2 6.1 5.4 4.8 4.5 5.0 6.4 7.1 6.4 5.4 4.8 4.6 4.2 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.7 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.4 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.4 3.5 Total 1619 years 20 years and over 5.7 4.4 3.6 3.3 6.0 4.9 4.8 4.7 6.8 5.9 5.9 7.2 6.2 6.5 6.2 5.5 4.8 5.2 4.8 4.7 5.9 6.9 6.6 6.0 6.7 9.3 8.6 8.2 7.2 6.8 7.4 7.9 9.4 9.2 7.6 7.4 7.1 6.2 5.6 5.4 5.5 6.4 7.0 6.6 6.0 5.6 5.4 5.0 4.6 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.1 4.3 4.0 4.3 4.1 4.3 4.3 4.0 3.9 4.0 11.4 8.3 8.0 7.2 11.4 10.2 11.2 10.6 14.3 13.5 13.9 16.3 14.6 17.2 16.6 15.7 14.1 13.5 14.0 13.3 15.6 17.2 16.7 15.3 16.6 19.7 18.7 18.3 17.1 16.4 17.2 19.0 21.9 21.3 18.0 17.6 17.6 15.9 14.4 14.0 14.7 17.5 18.6 17.5 16.2 16.1 15.2 15.0 12.9 13.2 13.7 13.4 13.4 13.4 12.2 13.0 12.6 13.2 14.7 13.4 13.0 12.2 11.1 12.6 14.4 11.6 11.8 8.9 12.8 12.6 11.9 12.0 12.4 5.1 4.0 3.2 2.9 5.5 4.4 4.2 4.1 6.1 5.2 5.1 6.3 5.4 5.4 5.2 4.5 3.8 4.2 3.8 3.7 4.8 5.7 5.4 4.9 5.5 8.0 7.4 7.0 6.0 5.7 6.4 6.8 8.3 8.1 6.8 6.6 6.2 5.4 4.9 4.7 4.9 5.7 6.3 5.9 5.4 4.9 4.8 4.4 4.1 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.9 4.0 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.8 3.5 3.4 3.4 1 Unemployed as percent of civilian labor force in group specified. for 1950 are for March; data for 1951-54 are for April. Note.—Data relate to persons 16 years of age and over. See footnote 5 and Note, Table B-35. Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2 Data 324 Both sexes 16-19 years White Black and other Black Experienced wage and salary workers 12.2 8.2 8.5 7.6 12.6 11.0 11.1 11.6 15.9 14.6 14.7 16.8 14.7 17.2 16.2 14.8 12.8 12.9 12.7 12.2 15.3 16.9 16.2 14.5 16.0 19.9 19.0 17.8 16.4 16.1 17.8 19.6 23.2 22.4 18.9 18.6 18.3 16.9 15.3 15.0 15.5 18.7 20.1 19.0 17.6 17.3 16.7 16.0 14.6 13.9 15.1 14.2 14.2 14.1 13.1 13.6 13.2 13.5 14.6 13.8 14.0 13.8 12.6 14.1 13.3 12.7 12.5 11.6 13.4 14.4 12.8 12.6 13.1 4.9 3.1 2.8 2.7 5.0 3.9 3.6 3.8 6.1 4.8 5.0 6.0 4.9 5.0 4.6 4.1 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.1 4.5 5.4 5.1 4.3 5.0 7.8 7.0 6.2 5.2 5.1 6.3 6.7 8.6 8.4 6.5 6.2 6.0 5.3 4.7 4.5 4.8 6.1 6.6 6.1 5.3 4.9 4.7 4.2 3.9 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.8 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.5 9.0 5.3 5.4 4.5 9.9 8.7 8.3 7.9 12.6 10.7 10.2 12.4 10.9 10.8 9.6 8.1 7.3 7.4 6.7 6.4 8.2 9.9 10.0 9.0 9.9 13.8 13.1 13.1 11.9 11.3 13.1 14.2 17.3 17.8 14.4 13.7 13.1 11.6 10.4 10.0 10.1 11.1 12.7 11.7 10.5 9.6 9.3 8.8 7.8 7.0 6.9 7.3 7.2 7.0 6.8 6.7 7.2 6.8 7.2 7.2 7.1 7.0 7.1 6.9 6.6 6.3 7.2 6.9 6.7 7.0 6.1 6.5 6.5 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 10.4 9.4 10.5 14.8 14.0 14.0 12.8 12.3 14.3 15.6 18.9 19.5 15.9 15.1 14.5 13.0 11.7 11.4 11.4 12.5 14.2 13.0 11.5 10.4 10.5 10.0 8.9 8.0 7.8 8.2 8.0 7.8 7.6 7.6 8.6 7.8 8.3 8.3 8.0 7.9 8.2 7.8 7.3 7.2 8.0 7.9 7.7 8.0 7.0 7.3 7.4 6.0 3.7 3.4 3.2 6.2 4.8 4.4 4.6 7.3 5.7 5.7 6.8 5.6 5.6 5.0 4.3 3.5 3.6 3.4 3.3 4.8 5.7 5.3 4.5 5.3 8.2 7.3 6.6 5.6 5.5 6.9 7.3 9.3 9.2 7.1 6.8 6.6 5.8 5.2 5.0 5.3 6.6 7.2 6.6 5.9 5.4 5.2 4.7 4.3 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.0 3.7 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 Married men, spouse present 2 4.6 1.5 1.4 1.7 4.0 2.6 2.3 2.8 5.1 3.6 3.7 4.6 3.6 3.4 2.8 2.4 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5 2.6 3.2 2.8 2.3 2.7 5.1 4.2 3.6 2.8 2.8 4.2 4.3 6.5 6.5 4.6 4.3 4.4 3.9 3.3 3.0 3.4 4.4 5.1 4.4 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.3 Women who maintain families ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. 4.9 4.4 4.4 5.4 7.3 7.2 7.1 7.0 10.0 10.1 9.4 8.5 8.3 9.2 10.4 11.7 12.2 10.3 10.4 9.8 9.2 8.1 8.1 8.3 9.3 10.0 9.7 8.9 8.0 8.2 8.1 7.2 6.4 6.3 6.5 6.6 7.1 6.0 6.5 6.4 6.3 6.4 6.0 6.0 6.2 6.2 6.1 6.8 6.3 6.5 6.1 5.6 6.0 5.3 5.4 5.1 TABLE B–43.—Civilian unemployment rate by demographic characteristic, 1955–2000 [Percent; 1 monthly data seasonally adjusted] White Year or month All civilian workers Black and other or black Males Females Total 16-19 years 20 years and over Total Total Males 16-19 years 20 years and over Total Total 16-19 years Females 20 years and over 16-19 years 20 years and over 8.5 8.9 7.3 10.8 9.4 9.4 11.9 11.0 11.2 10.7 9.2 8.7 9.1 8.3 7.8 9.3 10.9 11.4 19.2 22.8 20.2 28.4 27.7 24.8 29.2 30.2 34.7 31.6 31.7 31.3 29.6 28.7 27.6 34.5 35.4 38.4 7.7 7.8 6.4 9.5 8.3 8.3 10.6 9.6 9.4 9.0 7.5 6.6 7.1 6.3 5.8 6.9 8.7 8.8 Total Black and other 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... 4.4 4.1 4.3 6.8 5.5 5.5 6.7 5.5 5.7 5.2 4.5 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.5 4.9 5.9 5.6 3.9 3.6 3.8 6.1 4.8 5.0 6.0 4.9 5.0 4.6 4.1 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.1 4.5 5.4 5.1 3.7 3.4 3.6 6.1 4.6 4.8 5.7 4.6 4.7 4.1 3.6 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 4.0 4.9 4.5 11.3 10.5 11.5 15.7 14.0 14.0 15.7 13.7 15.9 14.7 12.9 10.5 10.7 10.1 10.0 13.7 15.1 14.2 3.3 3.0 3.2 5.5 4.1 4.2 5.1 4.0 3.9 3.4 2.9 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 3.2 4.0 3.6 4.3 4.2 4.3 6.2 5.3 5.3 6.5 5.5 5.8 5.5 5.0 4.3 4.6 4.3 4.2 5.4 6.3 5.9 9.1 9.7 9.5 12.7 12.0 12.7 14.8 12.8 15.1 14.9 14.0 12.1 11.5 12.1 11.5 13.4 15.1 14.2 3.9 3.7 3.8 5.6 4.7 4.6 5.7 4.7 4.8 4.6 4.0 3.3 3.8 3.4 3.4 4.4 5.3 4.9 8.7 8.3 7.9 12.6 10.7 10.2 12.4 10.9 10.8 9.6 8.1 7.3 7.4 6.7 6.4 8.2 9.9 10.0 8.8 7.9 8.3 13.7 11.5 10.7 12.8 10.9 10.5 8.9 7.4 6.3 6.0 5.6 5.3 7.3 9.1 8.9 13.4 15.0 18.4 26.8 25.2 24.0 26.8 22.0 27.3 24.3 23.3 21.3 23.9 22.1 21.4 25.0 28.8 29.7 8.4 7.4 7.6 12.7 10.5 9.6 11.7 10.0 9.2 7.7 6.0 4.9 4.3 3.9 3.7 5.6 7.3 6.9 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... ..................... 5.6 4.9 5.6 8.5 7.7 7.1 6.1 5.8 7.1 7.6 9.7 9.6 7.5 7.2 7.0 6.2 5.5 5.3 5.6 6.8 7.5 6.9 6.1 5.6 5.4 4.9 4.5 4.2 5.1 4.3 5.0 7.8 7.0 6.2 5.2 5.1 6.3 6.7 8.6 8.4 6.5 6.2 6.0 5.3 4.7 4.5 4.8 6.1 6.6 6.1 5.3 4.9 4.7 4.2 3.9 3.7 4.5 3.8 4.4 7.2 6.4 5.5 4.6 4.5 6.1 6.5 8.8 8.8 6.4 6.1 6.0 5.4 4.7 4.5 4.9 6.5 7.0 6.3 5.4 4.9 4.7 4.2 3.9 3.6 14.2 12.3 13.5 18.3 17.3 15.0 13.5 13.9 16.2 17.9 21.7 20.2 16.8 16.5 16.3 15.5 13.9 13.7 14.3 17.6 18.5 17.7 16.3 15.6 15.5 14.3 14.1 12.6 3.6 3.0 3.5 6.2 5.4 4.7 3.7 3.6 5.3 5.6 7.8 7.9 5.7 5.4 5.3 4.8 4.1 3.9 4.3 5.8 6.4 5.7 4.8 4.3 4.1 3.6 3.2 3.0 5.9 5.3 6.1 8.6 7.9 7.3 6.2 5.9 6.5 6.9 8.3 7.9 6.5 6.4 6.1 5.2 4.7 4.5 4.7 5.6 6.1 5.7 5.2 4.8 4.7 4.2 3.9 3.8 14.2 13.0 14.5 17.4 16.4 15.9 14.4 14.0 14.8 16.6 19.0 18.3 15.2 14.8 14.9 13.4 12.3 11.5 12.6 15.2 15.8 14.7 13.8 13.4 12.9 12.8 10.9 11.3 4.9 4.3 5.1 7.5 6.8 6.2 5.2 5.0 5.6 5.9 7.3 6.9 5.8 5.7 5.4 4.6 4.1 4.0 4.1 5.0 5.5 5.2 4.6 4.3 4.1 3.7 3.4 3.3 10.4 9.4 10.5 14.8 14.0 14.0 12.8 12.3 14.3 15.6 18.9 19.5 15.9 15.1 14.5 13.0 11.7 11.4 11.4 12.5 14.2 13.0 11.5 10.4 10.5 10.0 8.9 8.0 9.3 8.0 9.8 14.8 13.7 13.3 11.8 11.4 14.5 15.7 20.1 20.3 16.4 15.3 14.8 12.7 11.7 11.5 11.9 13.0 15.2 13.8 12.0 10.6 11.1 10.2 8.9 8.2 31.7 27.8 33.1 38.1 37.5 39.2 36.7 34.2 37.5 40.7 48.9 48.8 42.7 41.0 39.3 34.4 32.7 31.9 31.9 36.3 42.0 40.1 37.6 37.1 36.9 36.5 30.1 30.9 7.0 6.0 7.4 12.5 11.4 10.7 9.3 9.3 12.4 13.5 17.8 18.1 14.3 13.2 12.9 11.1 10.1 10.0 10.4 11.5 13.5 12.1 10.3 8.8 9.4 8.5 7.4 6.7 11.8 11.1 11.3 14.8 14.3 14.9 13.8 13.3 14.0 15.6 17.6 18.6 15.4 14.9 14.2 13.2 11.7 11.4 10.9 12.0 13.2 12.1 11.0 10.2 10.0 9.9 9.0 7.8 40.5 36.1 37.4 41.0 41.6 43.4 40.8 39.1 39.8 42.2 47.1 48.2 42.6 39.2 39.2 34.9 32.0 33.0 29.9 36.0 37.2 37.4 32.6 34.3 30.3 28.7 25.3 25.1 9.0 8.6 8.8 12.2 11.7 12.3 11.2 10.9 11.9 13.4 15.4 16.5 13.5 13.1 12.4 11.6 10.4 9.8 9.7 10.6 11.8 10.7 9.8 8.6 8.7 8.8 7.9 6.8 1999: Jan ............. Feb .............. Mar ............. Apr .............. May ............. June ............ July ............. Aug ............. Sept ............ Oct .............. Nov ............. Dec ............. 4.3 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.8 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.4 13.8 12.6 12.8 12.6 12.2 12.0 11.7 12.3 12.7 11.9 12.8 13.3 3.1 3.3 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.2 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 4.1 3.7 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.5 11.5 11.4 11.2 11.6 10.6 12.0 11.1 11.0 11.9 11.7 11.2 10.9 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.6 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.0 7.8 8.2 8.0 7.8 7.6 7.6 8.6 7.8 8.3 8.3 8.0 7.9 7.9 8.2 7.8 7.9 7.8 7.7 8.6 7.6 8.5 9.5 8.4 8.3 33.3 31.2 32.4 32.0 27.9 28.8 30.7 29.6 30.3 35.3 31.0 27.5 6.1 6.7 6.0 6.3 6.6 6.4 7.2 6.3 7.1 7.7 7.0 7.0 7.8 8.1 8.3 7.8 7.4 7.5 8.6 8.0 8.1 7.2 7.7 7.6 24.5 25.0 27.6 23.8 22.5 21.2 23.4 26.7 31.4 26.1 25.9 23.0 6.7 7.0 7.1 6.9 6.5 6.7 7.7 6.9 6.7 6.1 6.6 6.7 2000: Jan ............. Feb .............. Mar ............. Apr .............. May ............. June ............ July ............. Aug ............. Sept ............ Oct .............. Nov ............. 4.0 4.1 4.1 3.9 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.1 3.9 3.9 4.0 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.6 12.4 14.4 11.3 13.0 10.7 11.2 12.6 13.3 12.2 11.5 12.6 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.4 3.5 3.8 3.5 3.8 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.5 9.1 10.4 12.1 10.0 10.5 7.4 10.3 11.0 10.7 10.6 11.1 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.1 2.9 3.0 8.2 7.8 7.3 7.2 8.0 7.9 7.7 8.0 7.0 7.3 7.4 8.4 8.1 7.4 7.6 8.5 8.5 7.7 8.9 7.5 8.2 7.7 24.0 22.3 21.3 22.0 27.7 32.0 25.0 33.7 26.7 28.0 20.9 7.4 7.1 6.4 6.6 7.2 6.9 6.7 7.4 6.3 7.0 6.8 8.1 7.5 7.3 6.8 7.7 7.3 7.7 7.2 6.7 6.5 7.2 23.8 26.6 28.9 22.4 20.2 18.2 27.9 22.5 21.5 21.0 21.0 7.2 6.5 6.1 5.8 7.0 6.6 6.4 6.3 5.8 5.6 6.3 Black 1 Unemployed as percent of civilian labor force in group specified. Note.—See Note, Table B-42. Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 325 TABLE B–44.—Unemployment by duration and reason, 1950–2000 [ Thousands of persons, except as noted; monthly data seasonally adjusted 1 ] Duration of unemployment Year or month 1950 ......................... 1951 ......................... 1952 ......................... 1953 ......................... 1954 ......................... 1955 ......................... 1956 ......................... 1957 ......................... 1958 ......................... 1959 ......................... 1960 ......................... 1961 ......................... 1962 ......................... 1963 ......................... 1964 ......................... 1965 ......................... 1966 ......................... 1967 2 ....................... 1968 ......................... 1969 ......................... 1970 ......................... 1971 ......................... 1972 ......................... 1973 ......................... 1974 ......................... 1975 ......................... 1976 ......................... 1977 ......................... 1978 ......................... 1979 ......................... 1980 ......................... 1981 ......................... 1982 ......................... 1983 ......................... 1984 ......................... 1985 ......................... 1986 ......................... 1987 ......................... 1988 ......................... 1989 ......................... 1990 ......................... 1991 ......................... 1992 ......................... 1993 ......................... 1994 ......................... 1995 ......................... 1996 ......................... 1997 ......................... 1998 ......................... 1999 ......................... 1999: Jan ................. Feb ................. Mar ................. Apr .................. May ................ June ................ July ................. Aug ................. Sept ................ Oct .................. Nov ................. Dec ................. 2000: Jan ................. Feb ................. Mar ................. Apr .................. May ................ June ................ July ................. Aug ................. Sept ................ Oct .................. Nov ................. Unemployment 3,288 2,055 1,883 1,834 3,532 2,852 2,750 2,859 4,602 3,740 3,852 4,714 3,911 4,070 3,786 3,366 2,875 2,975 2,817 2,832 4,093 5,016 4,882 4,365 5,156 7,929 7,406 6,991 6,202 6,137 7,637 8,273 10,678 10,717 8,539 8,312 8,237 7,425 6,701 6,528 7,047 8,628 9,613 8,940 7,996 7,404 7,236 6,739 6,210 5,880 6,007 6,108 5,828 6,032 5,823 5,934 5,937 5,842 5,825 5,757 5,736 5,688 5,689 5,804 5,708 5,524 5,774 5,583 5,650 5,829 5,477 5,496 5,679 Reason for unemployment Less than 5 weeks 5-14 weeks 15-26 weeks 27 weeks and over Average (mean) duration (weeks) 1,450 1,177 1,135 1,142 1,605 1,335 1,412 1,408 1,753 1,585 1,719 1,806 1,663 1,751 1,697 1,628 1,573 1,634 1,594 1,629 2,139 2,245 2,242 2,224 2,604 2,940 2,844 2,919 2,865 2,950 3,295 3,449 3,883 3,570 3,350 3,498 3,448 3,246 3,084 3,174 3,265 3,480 3,376 3,262 2,728 2,700 2,633 2,538 2,622 2,568 2,397 2,585 2,521 2,741 2,502 2,540 2,640 2,599 2,582 2,545 2,601 2,620 2,447 2,603 2,824 2,455 2,531 2,595 2,470 2,594 2,487 2,497 2,547 1,055 574 516 482 1,116 815 805 891 1,396 1,114 1,176 1,376 1,134 1,231 1,117 983 779 893 810 827 1,290 1,585 1,472 1,314 1,597 2,484 2,196 2,132 1,923 1,946 2,470 2,539 3,311 2,937 2,451 2,509 2,557 2,196 2,007 1,978 2,257 2,791 2,830 2,584 2,408 2,342 2,287 2,138 1,950 1,832 2,012 1,925 1,884 1,868 1,832 1,775 1,778 1,798 1,805 1,811 1,760 1,694 1,754 1,864 1,719 1,868 1,953 1,759 1,812 1,846 1,717 1,703 1,783 425 166 148 132 495 366 301 321 785 469 503 728 534 535 491 404 287 271 256 242 428 668 601 483 574 1,303 1,018 913 766 706 1,052 1,122 1,708 1,652 1,104 1,025 1,045 943 801 730 822 1,246 1,453 1,297 1,237 1,085 1,053 995 763 755 776 754 752 794 784 806 779 747 708 719 725 693 667 673 657 670 677 593 654 679 602 715 735 357 137 84 78 317 336 232 239 667 571 454 804 585 553 482 351 239 177 156 133 235 519 566 343 381 1,203 1,348 1,028 648 535 820 1,162 1,776 2,559 1,634 1,280 1,187 1,040 809 646 703 1,111 1,954 1,798 1,623 1,278 1,262 1,067 875 725 715 785 715 680 735 828 732 716 704 715 676 695 705 604 637 580 660 649 677 705 624 605 596 12.1 9.7 8.4 8.0 11.8 13.0 11.3 10.5 13.9 14.4 12.8 15.6 14.7 14.0 13.3 11.8 10.4 8.7 8.4 7.8 8.6 11.3 12.0 10.0 9.8 14.2 15.8 14.3 11.9 10.8 11.9 13.7 15.6 20.0 18.2 15.6 15.0 14.5 13.5 11.9 12.0 13.7 17.7 18.0 18.8 16.6 16.7 15.8 14.5 13.4 13.5 13.8 13.6 13.2 13.4 14.3 13.5 13.2 13.0 13.2 13.0 12.8 13.2 12.5 12.8 12.4 12.6 12.4 13.3 13.0 11.9 12.4 12.4 1 Because Job losers 3 Median duration (weeks) Total On layoff Other Job leavers Reentrants New entrants ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ 2.3 4.5 4.4 4.9 6.3 6.2 5.2 5.2 8.4 8.2 7.0 5.9 5.4 6.5 6.9 8.7 10.1 7.9 6.8 6.9 6.5 5.9 4.8 5.3 6.8 8.7 8.3 9.2 8.3 8.3 8.0 6.7 6.4 6.8 6.9 6.8 6.1 6.6 6.3 5.8 6.4 5.9 6.3 6.2 5.9 5.7 6.1 6.0 6.0 5.8 5.8 6.0 6.2 5.2 6.2 6.1 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 1,229 1,070 1,017 1,811 2,323 2,108 1,694 2,242 4,386 3,679 3,166 2,585 2,635 3,947 4,267 6,268 6,258 4,421 4,139 4,033 3,566 3,092 2,983 3,387 4,694 5,389 4,848 3,815 3,476 3,370 3,037 2,822 2,622 2,708 2,721 2,646 2,695 2,678 2,670 2,670 2,629 2,573 2,518 2,493 2,401 2,477 2,616 2,541 2,306 2,483 2,450 2,417 2,615 2,511 2,428 2,492 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 394 334 339 675 735 582 472 746 1,671 1,050 865 712 851 1,488 1,430 2,127 1,780 1,171 1,157 1,090 943 851 850 1,028 1,292 1,260 1,115 977 1,030 1,021 931 866 848 863 854 833 843 837 876 847 893 869 802 851 795 739 838 781 703 894 959 856 940 823 791 871 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 836 736 678 1,137 1,588 1,526 1,221 1,495 2,714 2,628 2,300 1,873 1,784 2,459 2,837 4,141 4,478 3,250 2,982 2,943 2,623 2,241 2,133 2,359 3,402 4,129 3,733 2,838 2,446 2,349 2,106 1,957 1,774 1,845 1,867 1,813 1,852 1,841 1,794 1,823 1,736 1,704 1,716 1,642 1,606 1,739 1,778 1,759 1,602 1,589 1,491 1,561 1,674 1,688 1,637 1,621 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 438 431 436 550 590 641 683 768 827 903 909 874 880 891 923 840 830 823 877 1,015 965 983 1,024 1,041 1,004 1,002 976 791 824 774 795 734 783 729 750 774 810 781 831 768 793 758 778 821 825 776 759 824 833 774 671 799 782 746 837 768 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 945 909 965 1,228 1,472 1,456 1,340 1,463 1,892 1,928 1,963 1,857 1,806 1,927 2,102 2,384 2,412 2,184 2,256 2,160 1,974 1,809 1,843 1,930 2,139 2,285 2,198 2,786 2,525 2,512 2,338 2,132 2,005 2,009 2,090 2,007 2,039 2,034 2,038 2,003 1,942 1,967 1,958 1,935 2,036 2,043 1,975 1,979 1,961 2,093 2,076 1,961 1,919 1,774 1,842 1,961 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 396 407 413 504 630 677 649 681 823 895 953 885 817 872 981 1,185 1,216 1,110 1,039 1,029 920 816 677 688 792 937 919 604 579 580 569 520 469 519 498 446 473 440 359 459 481 504 511 485 453 393 387 434 408 500 343 402 514 411 383 430 of independent seasonal adjustment of the various series, detail will not add to totals. for 1967 by reason for unemployment are not equal to total unemployment. January 1994, job losers and persons who completed temporary jobs. Note.—Data relate to persons 16 years of age and over. See footnote 5 and Note, Table B-35. Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2 Data 3 Beginning 326 TABLE B–45.—Unemployment insurance programs, selected data, 1969–2000 All programs Year or month Covered employment 1 Insured unemployment (weekly average) 2 3 State programs Total benefits paid (millions of dollars) 2 4 Thousands 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Insured unemployment 3 Initial claims Exhaustions 5 Insured unemployment as percent of covered employment Benefits paid Total (millions of dollars) 4 Average weekly check (dollars) 6 2,128 3,849 4,957 4,471 4,008 5,975 11,755 8,975 8,357 7,717 8,613 13,761 13,262 20,649 18,549 13,237 14,707 15,950 14,211 13,086 14,205 17,932 25,479 25,056 21,661 21,537 21,226 21,820 19,736 19,431 20,271 46.17 50.34 54.02 56.76 59.00 64.25 70.23 75.16 78.79 83.67 89.67 98.95 106.70 119.34 123.59 123.47 128.09 135.65 140.39 144.74 151.43 161.20 169.56 173.38 179.41 181.91 187.04 189.27 192.84 200.29 211.75 2,057.8 2,032.2 2,336.9 1,757.2 1,540.0 1,666.8 1,577.7 1,662.5 1,421.7 1,300.9 1,496.7 1,721.8 2,106.3 2,146.5 2,077.2 1,605.8 1,611.5 1,453.9 1,600.9 1,639.4 1,370.5 1,499.0 ................ 210.01 213.05 213.81 210.69 210.99 209.76 208.05 208.81 212.11 214.83 214.18 214.96 219.41 223.88 222.55 220.63 220.33 216.95 215.99 215.10 220.15 221.64 ................ Weekly average; thousands .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. .................................. ................................. ................................. ................................. 59,999 59,526 59,375 66,458 69,897 72,451 71,037 73,459 76,419 88,804 92,062 92,659 93,300 91,628 91,898 96,474 99,186 101,099 103,936 107,156 109,929 111,500 109,606 110,167 112,146 115,255 118,068 120,567 121,044 124,184 127,040 1,177 2,070 2,608 2,192 1,793 2,558 4,937 3,846 3,308 2,645 2,592 3,837 3,410 4,592 3,774 2,560 2,699 2,739 2,369 2,135 2,205 2,575 3,406 3,348 2,845 2,746 2,639 2,656 2,370 2,260 2,222 2,299 4,209 6,154 5,491 4,517 6,934 16,802 12,345 10,999 9,007 9,401 16,175 15,287 24,491 20,968 13,739 15,217 16,563 14,684 13,481 14,569 18,387 26,327 7 26,035 7 22,629 22,508 21,991 22,495 20,324 19,941 20,729 1999: Jan .......................... Feb .......................... Mar ......................... Apr .......................... May ......................... June ........................ July ......................... Aug ......................... Sept ........................ Oct .......................... Nov .......................... Dec ......................... 2000: Jan .......................... Feb .......................... Mar ......................... Apr ......................... May ........................ June ........................ July ......................... Aug ......................... Sept ........................ Oct .......................... Nov p ....................... .................. .................. .................. .................. .................. .................. .................. .................. .................. .................. .................. .................. .................. .................. .................. .................. .................. .................. .................. .................. .................. .................. .................. 2,867 2,773 2,732 2,217 2,105 2,129 2,064 2,175 1,784 1,764 1,944 2,053 2,850 2,670 2,296 2,167 1,886 1,805 2,202 1,935 1,774 1,905 .................... 2,106.5 2,075.2 2,381.9 1,792.1 1,570.4 1,699.0 1,608.3 1,699.2 1,454.5 1,333.9 1,534.5 1,760.1 2,148.3 2,186.7 2,117.1 1,637.7 1,643.5 1,481.2 1,632.1 1,677.2 1,406.3 1,544.3 .................. 1,101 1,805 2,150 1,848 1,632 2,262 3,986 2,991 2,655 2,359 2,434 3,350 3,047 4,059 3,395 2,475 2,617 2,640 2,300 2,081 2,156 2,522 3,342 3,245 2,751 2,670 2,572 2,595 2,323 2,222 2,188 ** 2,258 2,204 2,178 2,183 2,189 2,213 2,215 2,203 2,184 2,142 2,130 2,131 2,082 2,097 2,000 1,966 1,975 2,063 2,120 2,160 2,157 2,190 2,277 200 296 295 261 247 363 478 386 375 346 388 488 460 583 438 377 397 378 328 310 330 388 447 408 341 340 357 356 323 321 298 ** 317 292 296 308 307 304 295 290 294 290 287 284 281 283 265 278 291 302 295 313 307 313 345 16 25 39 35 29 37 81 63 55 39 39 59 57 80 80 50 49 52 46 38 37 45 67 74 62 57 51 53 48 44 44 48 45 47 46 46 45 45 46 40 39 41 40 50 44 41 45 42 37 44 40 35 39 ................ 2.1 3.4 4.1 3.5 2.7 3.5 6.0 4.6 3.9 3.3 2.9 3.9 3.5 4.6 3.9 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.4 2.0 2.1 2.4 3.2 3.1 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.7 ** 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 ** Monthly data are seasonally adjusted. 1 Through 1996 includes persons under the State, UCFE (Federal employee, effective January 1955), RRB (Railroad Retirement Board) programs, and UCX (unemployment compensation for ex-servicemembers, effective October 1958) programs. Beginning 1997, covered employment data are for State and UCFE programs only. Workers covered by State programs account for about 97 percent of wage and salary earners. 2 Includes State, UCFE, RR, UCX, UCV (unemployment compensation for veterans, October 1952-January 1960), and SRA (Servicemen’s Readjustment Act, September 1944-September 1951) programs. Also includes Federal and State extended benefit programs. Does not include FSB (Federal supplemental benefits), SUA (special unemployment assistance), Federal Supplemental Compensation, and Emergency Unemployment Compensation programs, except as noted in footnote 8. 3 Covered workers who have completed at least 1 week of unemployment. 4 Annual data are net amounts and monthly data are gross amounts. 5 Individuals receiving final payments in benefit year. 6 For total unemployment only. 7 Including Emergency Unemployment Compensation and Federal Supplemental Compensation, total benefits paid for 1992 and 1993 would be approximately (in millions of dollars): for 1992, 39,990 and for 1993, 34,876. Note.—Insured unemployment and initial claims programs include Puerto Rican sugar cane workers beginning 1963. Source: Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration. 327 TABLE B–46.—Employees on nonagricultural payrolls, by major industry, 1950–2000 [Thousands of persons; monthly data seasonally adjusted] Goods-producing industries Year or month Manufacturing Total Total Mining Construction Total Durable goods Nondurable goods 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. 45,197 47,819 48,793 50,202 48,990 50,641 52,369 52,855 51,322 53,270 18,506 19,959 20,198 21,074 19,751 20,513 21,104 20,967 19,513 20,411 901 929 898 866 791 792 822 828 751 732 2,364 2,637 2,668 2,659 2,646 2,839 3,039 2,962 2,817 3,004 15,241 16,393 16,632 17,549 16,314 16,882 17,243 17,176 15,945 16,675 8,066 9,059 9,320 10,080 9,101 9,511 9,802 9,825 8,801 9,342 7,175 7,334 7,313 7,468 7,213 7,370 7,442 7,351 7,144 7,333 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. 54,189 53,999 55,549 56,653 58,283 60,763 63,901 65,803 67,897 70,384 20,434 19,857 20,451 20,640 21,005 21,926 23,158 23,308 23,737 24,361 712 672 650 635 634 632 627 613 606 619 2,926 2,859 2,948 3,010 3,097 3,232 3,317 3,248 3,350 3,575 16,796 16,326 16,853 16,995 17,274 18,062 19,214 19,447 19,781 20,167 9,429 9,041 9,450 9,586 9,785 10,374 11,250 11,408 11,594 11,862 7,367 7,285 7,403 7,410 7,489 7,688 7,963 8,039 8,187 8,304 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. 70,880 71,211 73,675 76,790 78,265 76,945 79,382 82,471 86,697 89,823 23,578 22,935 23,668 24,893 24,794 22,600 23,352 24,346 25,585 26,461 623 609 628 642 697 752 779 813 851 958 3,588 3,704 3,889 4,097 4,020 3,525 3,576 3,851 4,229 4,463 19,367 18,623 19,151 20,154 20,077 18,323 18,997 19,682 20,505 21,040 11,176 10,604 11,022 11,863 11,897 10,662 11,051 11,570 12,245 12,730 8,190 8,019 8,129 8,291 8,181 7,661 7,946 8,112 8,259 8,310 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. 90,406 91,152 89,544 90,152 94,408 97,387 99,344 101,958 105,209 107,884 25,658 25,497 23,812 23,330 24,718 24,842 24,533 24,674 25,125 25,254 1,027 1,139 1,128 952 966 927 777 717 713 692 4,346 4,188 3,904 3,946 4,380 4,668 4,810 4,958 5,098 5,171 20,285 20,170 18,780 18,432 19,372 19,248 18,947 18,999 19,314 19,391 12,159 12,082 11,014 10,707 11,476 11,458 11,195 11,154 11,363 11,394 8,127 8,089 7,766 7,725 7,896 7,790 7,752 7,845 7,951 7,997 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................. ................................................................ 109,403 108,249 108,601 110,713 114,163 117,191 119,608 122,690 125,865 128,786 24,905 23,745 23,231 23,352 23,908 24,265 24,493 24,962 25,414 25,482 709 689 635 610 601 581 580 596 590 535 5,120 4,650 4,492 4,668 4,986 5,160 5,418 5,691 6,020 6,404 19,076 18,406 18,104 18,075 18,321 18,524 18,495 18,675 18,805 18,543 11,109 10,569 10,277 10,221 10,448 10,683 10,789 11,010 11,205 11,103 7,968 7,837 7,827 7,854 7,873 7,841 7,706 7,665 7,600 7,440 1999: Jan .......................................................... Feb ......................................................... Mar ......................................................... Apr ......................................................... May ........................................................ June ........................................................ 127,463 127,883 128,054 128,282 128,377 128,630 25,470 25,514 25,479 25,493 25,436 25,432 557 551 549 539 532 529 6,246 6,337 6,328 6,380 6,364 6,388 18,667 18,626 18,602 18,574 18,540 18,515 11,139 11,127 11,123 11,106 11,091 11,083 7,528 7,499 7,479 7,468 7,449 7,432 July ......................................................... Aug ......................................................... Sept ........................................................ Oct ......................................................... Nov ......................................................... Dec ......................................................... 128,898 129,057 129,265 129,523 129,788 130,038 25,488 25,430 25,460 25,483 25,527 25,561 528 526 527 529 527 530 6,408 6,401 6,439 6,470 6,516 6,552 18,552 18,503 18,494 18,484 18,484 18,479 11,125 11,097 11,090 11,083 11,085 11,087 7,427 7,406 7,404 7,401 7,399 7,392 2000: Jan .......................................................... Feb ......................................................... Mar ......................................................... Apr ......................................................... May ........................................................ June ........................................................ 130,387 130,482 131,009 131,419 131,590 131,647 25,677 25,624 25,738 25,725 25,684 25,700 530 533 536 539 539 539 6,652 6,618 6,726 6,694 6,666 6,668 18,495 18,473 18,476 18,492 18,479 18,493 11,099 11,088 11,094 11,104 11,106 11,120 7,396 7,385 7,382 7,388 7,373 7,373 July ......................................................... Aug ......................................................... Sept ........................................................ Oct p ....................................................... Nov p ....................................................... 131,607 131,528 131,723 131,800 131,894 25,756 25,644 25,639 25,660 25,656 538 537 539 541 542 6,670 6,675 6,720 6,742 6,736 18,548 18,432 18,380 18,377 18,378 11,161 11,087 11,052 11,053 11,068 7,387 7,345 7,328 7,324 7,310 Note.—Data in Tables B-46 and B-47 are based on reports from employing establishments and relate to full- and part-time wage and salary workers in nonagricultural establishments who received pay for any part of the pay period which includes the 12th of the month. Not comparable with labor force data (Tables B-35 through B-44), which include proprietors, self-employed persons, domestic servants, See next page for continuation of table. 328 TABLE B–46.—Employees on nonagricultural payrolls, by major industry, 1950–2000—Continued [Thousands of persons; monthly data seasonally adjusted] Service-producing industries Year or month Total 1950 ................... 1951 ................... 1952 ................... 1953 ................... 1954 ................... 1955 ................... 1956 ................... 1957 ................... 1958 ................... 1959 ................... 1960 ................... 1961 ................... 1962 ................... 1963 ................... 1964 ................... 1965 ................... 1966 ................... 1967 ................... 1968 ................... 1969 ................... 1970 ................... 1971 ................... 1972 ................... 1973 ................... 1974 ................... 1975 ................... 1976 ................... 1977 ................... 1978 ................... 1979 ................... 1980 ................... 1981 ................... 1982 ................... 1983 ................... 1984 ................... 1985 ................... 1986 ................... 1987 ................... 1988 ................... 1989 ................... 1990 ................... 1991 ................... 1992 ................... 1993 ................... 1994 ................... 1995 ................... 1996 ................... 1997 ................... 1998 ................... 1999 .................. 1999: Jan ........... Feb ........... Mar .......... Apr ........... May .......... June ......... July ........... Aug ........... Sept .......... Oct ........... Nov ........... Dec ........... 2000: Jan ........... Feb ........... Mar .......... Apr ........... May .......... June ......... July ........... Aug ........... Sept .......... Oct p ......... Nov p ........ 26,691 27,860 28,595 29,128 29,239 30,128 31,264 31,889 31,811 32,857 33,755 34,142 35,098 36,013 37,278 38,839 40,743 42,495 44,158 46,023 47,302 48,276 50,007 51,897 53,471 54,345 56,030 58,125 61,113 63,363 64,748 65,655 65,732 66,821 69,690 72,544 74,811 77,284 80,084 82,630 84,497 84,504 85,370 87,361 90,256 92,925 95,115 97,727 100,451 103,304 101,993 102,369 102,575 102,789 102,941 103,198 103,410 103,627 103,805 104,040 104,261 104,477 104,710 104,858 105,271 105,694 105,906 105,947 105,851 105,884 106,084 106,140 106,238 Transportation and public utilities 4,034 4,226 4,248 4,290 4,084 4,141 4,244 4,241 3,976 4,011 4,004 3,903 3,906 3,903 3,951 4,036 4,158 4,268 4,318 4,442 4,515 4,476 4,541 4,656 4,725 4,542 4,582 4,713 4,923 5,136 5,146 5,165 5,081 4,952 5,156 5,233 5,247 5,362 5,512 5,614 5,777 5,755 5,718 5,811 5,984 6,132 6,253 6,408 6,611 6,826 6,736 6,755 6,772 6,782 6,797 6,817 6,834 6,848 6,866 6,875 6,898 6,911 6,925 6,937 6,953 6,970 6,962 6,985 7,010 6,941 7,037 7,046 7,062 Wholesale trade 2,643 2,735 2,821 2,862 2,875 2,934 3,027 3,037 2,989 3,092 3,153 3,142 3,207 3,258 3,347 3,477 3,608 3,700 3,791 3,919 4,006 4,014 4,127 4,291 4,447 4,430 4,562 4,723 4,985 5,221 5,292 5,375 5,295 5,283 5,568 5,727 5,761 5,848 6,030 6,187 6,173 6,081 5,997 5,981 6,162 6,378 6,482 6,648 6,800 6,924 6,847 6,870 6,877 6,892 6,898 6,905 6,927 6,946 6,962 6,973 6,989 7,002 7,005 7,011 7,033 7,055 7,048 7,049 7,050 7,062 7,070 7,088 7,102 Retail trade 6,743 7,007 7,184 7,385 7,360 7,601 7,831 7,848 7,761 8,035 8,238 8,195 8,359 8,520 8,812 9,239 9,637 9,906 10,308 10,785 11,034 11,338 11,822 12,315 12,539 12,630 13,193 13,792 14,556 14,972 15,018 15,171 15,158 15,587 16,512 17,315 17,880 18,422 19,023 19,475 19,601 19,284 19,356 19,773 20,507 21,187 21,597 21,966 22,295 22,788 22,560 22,662 22,702 22,744 22,763 22,810 22,833 22,841 22,844 22,863 22,893 22,936 22,973 22,978 23,027 23,197 23,064 23,122 23,196 23,191 23,179 23,190 23,236 Finance, insurance, and real estate 1,888 1,956 2,035 2,111 2,200 2,298 2,389 2,438 2,481 2,549 2,628 2,688 2,754 2,830 2,911 2,977 3,058 3,185 3,337 3,512 3,645 3,772 3,908 4,046 4,148 4,165 4,271 4,467 4,724 4,975 5,160 5,298 5,340 5,466 5,684 5,948 6,273 6,533 6,630 6,668 6,709 6,646 6,602 6,757 6,896 6,806 6,911 7,109 7,389 7,569 7,518 7,524 7,536 7,546 7,559 7,573 7,583 7,590 7,589 7,599 7,604 7,613 7,612 7,624 7,621 7,610 7,600 7,588 7,586 7,608 7,622 7,637 7,648 Government Services Total 5,356 5,547 5,699 5,835 5,969 6,240 6,497 6,708 6,765 7,087 7,378 7,619 7,982 8,277 8,660 9,036 9,498 10,045 10,567 11,169 11,548 11,797 12,276 12,857 13,441 13,892 14,551 15,302 16,252 17,112 17,890 18,615 19,021 19,664 20,746 21,927 22,957 24,110 25,504 26,907 27,934 28,336 29,052 30,197 31,579 33,117 34,454 36,040 37,533 39,027 38,330 38,483 38,589 38,718 38,821 38,970 39,070 39,191 39,321 39,482 39,606 39,707 39,844 39,914 40,090 40,195 40,220 40,401 40,403 40,572 40,685 40,685 40,750 6,026 6,389 6,609 6,645 6,751 6,914 7,278 7,616 7,839 8,083 8,353 8,594 8,890 9,225 9,596 10,074 10,784 11,391 11,839 12,195 12,554 12,881 13,334 13,732 14,170 14,686 14,871 15,127 15,672 15,947 16,241 16,031 15,837 15,869 16,024 16,394 16,693 17,010 17,386 17,779 18,304 18,402 18,645 18,841 19,128 19,305 19,419 19,557 19,823 20,170 20,002 20,075 20,099 20,107 20,103 20,123 20,163 20,211 20,223 20,248 20,271 20,308 20,351 20,394 20,547 20,667 21,012 20,802 20,606 20,510 20,491 20,494 20,440 Federal 1,928 2,302 2,420 2,305 2,188 2,187 2,209 2,217 2,191 2,233 2,270 2,279 2,340 2,358 2,348 2,378 2,564 2,719 2,737 2,758 2,731 2,696 2,684 2,663 2,724 2,748 2,733 2,727 2,753 2,773 2,866 2,772 2,739 2,774 2,807 2,875 2,899 2,943 2,971 2,988 3,085 2,966 2,969 2,915 2,870 2,822 2,757 2,699 2,686 2,669 2,700 2,710 2,705 2,684 2,664 2,662 2,656 2,655 2,655 2,647 2,646 2,646 2,663 2,700 2,816 2,885 3,238 3,092 2,819 2,657 2,627 2,625 2,612 State and local 4,098 4,087 4,188 4,340 4,563 4,727 5,069 5,399 5,648 5,850 6,083 6,315 6,550 6,868 7,248 7,696 8,220 8,672 9,102 9,437 9,823 10,185 10,649 11,068 11,446 11,937 12,138 12,399 12,919 13,174 13,375 13,259 13,098 13,096 13,216 13,519 13,794 14,067 14,415 14,791 15,219 15,436 15,676 15,926 16,257 16,484 16,662 16,857 17,137 17,502 17,302 17,365 17,394 17,423 17,439 17,461 17,507 17,556 17,568 17,601 17,625 17,662 17,688 17,694 17,731 17,782 17,774 17,710 17,787 17,853 17,864 17,869 17,828 Note (cont’d).—which count persons as employed when they are not at work because of industrial disputes, bad weather, etc., even if they are not paid for the time off; and which are based on a sample of the working-age population. For description and details of the various establishment data, see ‘‘Employment and Earnings.’’ Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 329 TABLE B–47.—Hours and earnings in private nonagricultural industries, 1959–2000 1 [Monthly data seasonally adjusted] Average weekly hours Year or month Average hourly earnings Manufacturing Current dollars 1982 dollars 2 Manufacturing (current dollars) Total private Total private Total Overtime Average weekly earnings, total private Percent change from year earlier Level Current dollars 1982 dollars 2 Current dollars 1982 dollars 2 1959 .................................................. 39.0 40.3 2.7 $2.02 $6.69 $2.19 $78.78 $260.86 4.9 4.2 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. 38.6 38.6 38.7 38.8 38.7 38.8 38.6 38.0 37.8 37.7 39.7 39.8 40.4 40.5 40.7 41.2 41.4 40.6 40.7 40.6 2.5 2.4 2.8 2.8 3.1 3.6 3.9 3.4 3.6 3.6 2.09 2.14 2.22 2.28 2.36 2.46 2.56 2.68 2.85 3.04 6.79 6.88 7.07 7.17 7.33 7.52 7.62 7.72 7.89 7.98 2.26 2.32 2.39 2.45 2.53 2.61 2.71 2.82 3.01 3.19 80.67 82.60 85.91 88.46 91.33 95.45 98.82 101.84 107.73 114.61 261.92 265.59 273.60 278.18 283.63 291.90 294.11 293.49 298.42 300.81 2.4 2.4 4.0 3.0 3.2 4.5 3.5 3.1 5.8 6.4 .4 1.4 3.0 1.7 2.0 2.9 .8 −.2 1.7 .8 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. 37.1 36.9 37.0 36.9 36.5 36.1 36.1 36.0 35.8 35.7 39.8 39.9 40.5 40.7 40.0 39.5 40.1 40.3 40.4 40.2 3.0 2.9 3.5 3.8 3.3 2.6 3.1 3.5 3.6 3.3 3.23 3.45 3.70 3.94 4.24 4.53 4.86 5.25 5.69 6.16 8.03 8.21 8.53 8.55 8.28 8.12 8.24 8.36 8.40 8.17 3.35 3.57 3.82 4.09 4.42 4.83 5.22 5.68 6.17 6.70 119.83 127.31 136.90 145.39 154.76 163.53 175.45 189.00 203.70 219.91 298.08 303.12 315.44 315.38 302.27 293.06 297.37 300.96 300.89 291.66 4.6 6.2 7.5 6.2 6.4 5.7 7.3 7.7 7.8 8.0 −.9 1.7 4.1 −.0 −4.2 −3.0 1.5 1.2 −.0 −3.1 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. 35.3 35.2 34.8 35.0 35.2 34.9 34.8 34.8 34.7 34.6 39.7 39.8 38.9 40.1 40.7 40.5 40.7 41.0 41.1 41.0 2.8 2.8 2.3 3.0 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.7 3.9 3.8 6.66 7.25 7.68 8.02 8.32 8.57 8.76 8.98 9.28 9.66 7.78 7.69 7.68 7.79 7.80 7.77 7.81 7.73 7.69 7.64 7.27 7.99 8.49 8.83 9.19 9.54 9.73 9.91 10.19 10.48 235.10 255.20 267.26 280.70 292.86 299.09 304.85 312.50 322.02 334.24 274.65 270.63 267.26 272.52 274.73 271.16 271.94 269.16 266.79 264.22 6.9 8.5 4.7 5.0 4.3 2.1 1.9 2.5 3.0 3.8 −5.8 −1.5 −1.2 2.0 .8 −1.3 .3 −1.0 −.9 −1.0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .................................................. ................................................. 34.5 34.3 34.4 34.5 34.7 34.5 34.4 34.6 34.6 34.5 40.8 40.7 41.0 41.4 42.0 41.6 41.6 42.0 41.7 41.7 3.6 3.6 3.8 4.1 4.7 4.4 4.5 4.8 4.6 4.6 10.01 10.32 10.57 10.83 11.12 11.43 11.82 12.28 12.78 13.24 7.52 7.45 7.41 7.39 7.40 7.39 7.43 7.55 7.75 7.86 10.83 11.18 11.46 11.74 12.07 12.37 12.77 13.17 13.49 13.91 345.35 353.98 363.61 373.64 385.86 394.34 406.61 424.89 442.19 456.78 259.47 255.40 254.99 254.87 256.73 255.07 255.73 261.31 268.32 271.25 3.3 2.5 2.7 2.8 3.3 2.2 3.1 4.5 4.1 3.3 −1.8 −1.6 −.2 −.0 .7 −.6 .3 2.2 2.7 1.1 1999: Jan ........................................... Feb ........................................... Mar .......................................... Apr ........................................... May .......................................... June ......................................... 34.5 34.6 34.5 34.5 34.5 34.5 41.6 41.6 41.6 41.7 41.7 41.8 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.6 4.7 13.04 13.06 13.10 13.14 13.19 13.23 7.83 7.84 7.86 7.83 7.86 7.88 13.65 13.68 13.73 13.80 13.85 13.93 449.88 451.88 451.95 453.33 455.06 456.44 270.20 271.40 271.12 270.00 271.03 271.85 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.0 3.4 1.7 1.7 1.6 .9 .9 1.4 July .......................................... Aug .......................................... Sept ......................................... Oct ........................................... Nov .......................................... Dec .......................................... 34.5 34.5 34.5 34.5 34.5 34.5 41.8 41.8 41.8 41.8 41.7 41.7 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 13.27 13.30 13.35 13.38 13.41 13.44 7.88 7.87 7.86 7.87 7.87 7.87 13.98 14.01 14.04 14.06 14.07 14.10 457.82 458.85 460.58 461.61 462.65 463.68 271.70 271.67 271.25 271.38 271.51 271.48 3.5 3.2 3.7 3.3 3.3 3.2 1.2 .9 .9 .5 .5 .3 2000: Jan ........................................... Feb ........................................... Mar .......................................... Apr ........................................... May .......................................... June ......................................... 34.5 34.6 34.5 34.6 34.4 34.5 41.7 41.8 41.7 42.2 41.4 41.6 4.6 4.7 4.6 4.9 4.5 4.6 13.49 13.54 13.58 13.64 13.66 13.70 7.88 7.87 7.83 7.87 7.87 7.85 14.15 14.21 14.23 14.28 14.27 14.36 465.41 468.48 468.51 471.94 469.90 472.65 272.01 272.37 270.19 272.17 270.84 270.86 3.5 3.7 3.7 4.1 3.3 3.6 .7 .4 −.3 .8 −.1 −.4 July .......................................... Aug .......................................... Sept ......................................... Oct p ......................................... Nov p ........................................ 34.4 34.3 34.4 34.4 34.3 41.7 41.4 41.3 41.4 41.1 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.3 13.75 13.80 13.83 13.88 13.94 7.86 7.90 7.87 7.89 7.91 14.39 14.43 14.43 14.56 14.64 473.00 473.34 475.75 477.47 478.14 270.44 271.10 270.77 271.44 271.21 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.3 −.5 −.2 −.2 .0 −.1 1 For production or nonsupervisory workers; total includes private industry groups shown in Table B-46. dollars divided by the consumer price index for urban wage earners and clerical workers on a 1982=100 base. 2 Current Note.—See Note, Table B-46. Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 330 TABLE B–48.—Employment cost index, private industry, 1980–2000 Total private Year and month Total Wages comand pen- salasation ries Goods-producing Benefits 1 Total Wages comand pen- salasation ries Service-producing Total Wages comand Benepen- sala- fits 1 sation ries Benefits 1 Manufacturing Nonmanufacturing Total Wages Total Wages comand Bene- comand Benepen- sala- fits 1 pen- sala- fits 1 sation ries sation ries Index, June 1989=100; not seasonally adjusted December: 1980 .......... 1981 .......... 1982 .......... 1983 .......... 1984 .......... 1985 .......... 1986 .......... 1987 .......... 1988 .......... 1989 .......... 1990 .......... 1991 .......... 1992 .......... 1993 .......... 1994 .......... 1995 .......... 1996 .......... 1997 .......... 1998 .......... 1999 .......... 2000: Mar ...... June ..... Sept ..... 64.8 71.2 75.8 80.1 84.0 87.3 90.1 93.1 97.6 102.3 107.0 111.7 115.6 119.8 123.5 126.7 130.6 135.1 139.8 144.6 146.8 148.5 149.9 67.1 73.0 77.6 81.4 84.8 88.3 91.1 94.1 98.0 102.0 106.1 110.0 112.9 116.4 119.7 123.1 127.3 132.3 137.4 142.2 143.9 145.4 146.8 59.4 66.6 71.4 76.7 81.7 84.6 87.5 90.5 96.7 102.6 109.4 116.2 122.2 128.3 133.0 135.9 138.6 141.8 145.2 150.2 153.8 155.7 157.5 66.7 73.3 77.8 81.6 85.4 88.2 91.0 93.8 97.9 102.1 107.0 111.9 116.1 120.6 124.3 127.3 130.9 134.1 137.8 142.5 144.8 146.6 147.9 69.7 75.7 80.0 83.2 86.4 89.4 92.3 95.2 98.2 102.0 105.8 109.7 112.8 116.1 119.6 122.9 126.8 130.6 135.2 139.7 141.3 143.0 144.3 1999: Mar ...... June ..... Sept ..... Dec ....... 2000: Mar ...... June ..... Sept ..... 140.3 141.8 143.1 144.5 146.6 148.2 149.7 138.1 139.7 140.9 142.2 143.9 145.4 146.7 145.4 146.8 148.2 149.9 153.4 155.3 157.0 139.0 139.9 141.1 142.6 144.9 146.6 148.0 136.3 137.3 138.5 139.7 141.3 143.0 144.3 60.5 68.2 73.2 78.3 83.2 85.7 88.3 90.9 97.3 102.6 109.9 116.7 123.4 130.3 134.8 137.1 139.7 141.5 143.2 148.2 152.3 154.2 155.7 63.3 69.5 74.1 78.9 82.9 86.6 89.3 92.6 97.3 102.3 107.0 111.6 115.2 119.3 122.8 126.2 130.2 135.3 140.5 145.3 147.4 149.1 150.6 65.3 71.1 75.9 80.2 83.7 87.7 90.3 93.4 97.8 102.2 106.3 110.2 113.0 116.6 119.7 123.2 127.5 133.1 138.4 143.3 145.0 146.5 147.9 58.4 65.1 69.6 75.2 80.4 83.6 86.8 90.2 96.1 102.6 109.0 115.7 121.2 126.7 131.5 134.7 137.4 141.4 145.7 150.7 154.0 156.0 157.9 66.0 72.5 76.9 80.8 85.0 87.8 90.7 93.4 97.6 102.0 107.2 112.2 116.5 121.3 125.1 128.3 132.1 135.3 138.9 143.6 146.0 147.5 148.7 68.9 74.9 79.1 82.5 86.1 89.2 92.1 95.2 98.1 101.9 106.2 110.3 113.7 117.3 120.8 124.3 128.4 132.2 136.8 141.5 142.9 144.4 145.7 59.9 67.5 72.4 77.5 82.7 85.0 87.5 89.8 96.6 102.3 109.5 116.1 122.6 130.0 134.3 136.7 139.8 141.7 142.7 147.8 152.3 153.9 154.9 64.2 70.4 75.1 79.6 83.4 87.0 89.7 92.9 97.5 102.3 106.9 111.5 115.1 119.0 122.6 125.9 129.8 134.7 139.7 144.5 146.7 148.4 150.0 66.2 72.1 76.8 81.0 84.2 88.0 90.6 93.7 97.8 102.2 106.1 109.8 112.6 116.0 119.1 122.5 126.8 132.1 137.4 142.1 143.9 145.5 146.9 59.1 66.1 70.6 76.2 81.1 84.4 87.5 91.0 96.8 102.8 109.3 116.2 122.0 127.4 132.3 135.3 137.9 141.5 145.8 150.7 154.0 156.1 158.1 137.9 139.0 140.2 141.5 142.9 144.4 145.7 143.6 144.4 145.8 147.8 152.3 153.8 155.0 140.4 142.0 143.2 144.6 146.8 148.4 149.8 137.9 139.8 140.9 142.2 143.9 145.6 146.8 146.3 148.0 149.3 150.7 154.0 156.1 158.0 10.5 12.7 7.3 7.0 6.7 2.8 2.9 2.6 7.6 5.9 7.0 6.0 5.6 6.0 3.3 1.8 2.3 1.4 .7 3.4 6.1 6.5 6.3 9.7 9.7 6.7 6.0 4.8 4.3 3.1 3.6 5.0 4.9 4.5 4.3 3.2 3.4 3.0 2.7 3.1 3.8 3.7 3.4 4.6 4.5 4.6 8.9 8.9 6.5 5.5 4.0 4.5 3.0 3.4 4.4 4.5 3.8 3.5 2.6 3.0 2.7 2.9 3.5 4.2 4.0 3.4 4.4 4.2 4.2 12.6 11.8 6.8 7.9 6.4 4.1 3.7 4.0 6.4 6.2 6.3 6.3 5.0 4.4 3.8 2.3 1.9 2.6 3.0 3.4 5.3 5.5 5.8 0.6 .6 1.0 1.4 3.0 1.0 .8 0.4 1.1 .8 1.0 1.5 1.1 .9 0.3 1.4 .8 .9 1.2 1.2 .8 0.3 1.2 .9 .9 2.2 1.4 1.2 Index, June 1989=100; seasonally adjusted 144.3 145.1 146.3 148.3 152.3 154.1 155.7 140.9 142.7 144.0 145.4 147.4 149.0 150.5 138.9 140.8 142.0 143.3 145.0 146.5 147.8 146.0 147.9 149.3 150.9 153.9 156.0 157.8 139.8 140.8 142.0 143.6 145.9 147.4 148.7 Percent change from 12 months earlier, not seasonally adjusted December: 1980 .......... 1981 .......... 1982 .......... 1983 .......... 1984 .......... 1985 .......... 1986 .......... 1987 .......... 1988 .......... 1989 .......... 1990 .......... 1991 .......... 1992 .......... 1993 .......... 1994 .......... 1995 .......... 1996 .......... 1997 .......... 1998 .......... 1999 .......... 2000: Mar ...... June ..... Sept ..... 9.6 9.9 6.5 5.7 4.9 3.9 3.2 3.3 4.8 4.8 4.6 4.4 3.5 3.6 3.1 2.6 3.1 3.4 3.5 3.4 4.6 4.6 4.6 9.1 8.8 6.3 4.9 4.2 4.1 3.2 3.3 4.1 4.1 4.0 3.7 2.6 3.1 2.8 2.8 3.4 3.9 3.9 3.5 4.2 4.1 4.1 11.7 12.1 7.2 7.4 6.5 3.5 3.4 3.4 6.9 6.1 6.6 6.2 5.2 5.0 3.7 2.2 2.0 2.3 2.4 3.4 5.5 5.7 6.0 9.9 9.9 6.1 4.9 4.7 3.3 3.2 3.1 4.4 4.3 4.8 4.6 3.8 3.9 3.1 2.4 2.8 2.4 2.8 3.4 4.2 4.8 4.8 1999: Mar ...... June ..... Sept ..... Dec ....... 2000: Mar ...... June ..... Sept ..... 0.4 1.1 .9 1.0 1.5 1.1 1.0 0.4 1.2 .9 .9 1.2 1.0 .9 0.3 1.0 1.0 1.1 2.3 1.2 1.1 0.8 .6 .9 1.1 1.6 1.2 1.0 9.4 8.6 5.7 4.0 3.8 3.5 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.9 3.7 3.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 2.8 3.2 3.0 3.5 3.3 3.7 4.2 4.2 10.8 12.7 7.3 7.0 6.3 3.0 3.0 2.9 7.0 5.4 7.1 6.2 5.7 5.6 3.5 1.7 1.9 1.3 1.2 3.4 5.6 6.2 6.4 9.7 9.8 6.6 6.5 5.1 4.5 3.1 3.7 5.1 5.1 4.6 4.3 3.2 3.6 2.9 2.8 3.2 3.9 3.8 3.4 4.6 4.4 4.5 8.8 8.9 6.8 5.7 4.4 4.8 3.0 3.4 4.7 4.5 4.0 3.7 2.5 3.2 2.7 2.9 3.5 4.4 4.0 3.5 4.4 4.0 4.1 12.5 11.5 6.9 8.0 6.9 4.0 3.8 3.9 6.5 6.8 6.2 6.1 4.8 4.5 3.8 2.4 2.0 2.9 3.0 3.4 5.4 5.5 5.7 9.8 9.8 6.1 5.1 5.2 3.3 3.3 3.0 4.5 4.5 5.1 4.7 3.8 4.1 3.1 2.6 3.0 2.4 2.7 3.4 4.4 4.7 4.6 9.4 8.7 5.6 4.3 4.4 3.6 3.3 3.4 3.0 3.9 4.2 3.9 3.1 3.2 3.0 2.9 3.3 3.0 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.9 3.9 Percent change from 3 months earlier, seasonally adjusted 0.8 .7 .9 .9 1.1 1.2 .9 0.7 .6 .8 1.4 2.7 1.2 1.0 0.3 1.3 .9 1.0 1.4 1.1 1.0 1 Employer 0.3 1.4 .9 .9 1.2 1.0 .9 0.1 1.3 .9 1.1 2.0 1.4 1.2 0.7 .7 .9 1.1 1.6 1.0 .9 0.8 .8 .9 .9 1.0 1.0 .9 costs for employee benefits. Note.—The employment cost index is a measure of the change in the cost of labor, free from the influence of employment shifts among occupations and industries. Data exclude farm and household workers. Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 331 TABLE B–49.—Productivity and related data, business sector, 1959–2000 [Index numbers, 1992=100; quarterly data seasonally adjusted] Output per hour of all persons Year or quarter Hours of all persons 2 Output 1 Compensation per hour 3 Real compensation per hour 4 Unit labor costs Implicit price deflator 5 Busi- Nonfarm Busi- Nonfarm Busi- Nonfarm Busi- Nonfarm Busi- Nonfarm Busi- Nonfarm Busi- Nonfarm ness business ness business ness business ness business ness business ness business ness business sector sector sector sector sector sector sector sector sector sector sector sector sector sector 1959 .......... 47.9 51.3 31.9 31.6 66.6 61.6 13.1 13.7 58.5 61.2 27.4 26.7 26.7 26.2 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 48.8 50.6 52.9 55.0 57.5 51.9 53.7 56.1 58.1 60.6 32.5 33.1 35.2 36.8 39.2 32.1 32.8 35.0 36.6 39.1 66.6 65.4 66.6 67.0 68.1 61.9 61.1 62.4 63.1 64.6 13.7 14.2 14.9 15.4 16.2 14.3 14.8 15.4 16.0 16.7 60.0 61.8 63.9 65.4 67.9 62.8 64.4 66.3 67.8 69.9 28.0 28.1 28.1 28.0 28.2 27.5 27.6 27.5 27.5 27.6 27.0 27.2 27.4 27.6 27.9 26.5 26.7 26.9 27.1 27.5 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 59.6 62.0 63.4 65.4 65.7 62.4 64.6 65.8 67.8 67.9 41.9 44.8 45.6 47.9 49.4 41.9 44.9 45.7 48.1 49.5 70.4 72.3 72.0 73.4 75.2 67.1 69.5 69.4 70.9 72.9 16.8 17.9 19.0 20.4 21.9 17.2 18.2 19.3 20.7 22.2 69.4 71.9 73.8 76.3 77.4 71.1 73.2 75.1 77.5 78.5 28.2 28.9 29.9 31.3 33.3 27.6 28.2 29.4 30.6 32.6 28.4 29.1 29.9 31.0 32.4 27.8 28.5 29.4 30.5 31.9 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 67.0 69.9 72.2 74.5 73.2 68.9 71.8 74.2 76.6 75.4 49.4 51.3 54.7 58.5 57.6 49.5 51.4 54.9 58.9 58.0 73.7 73.3 75.7 78.5 78.6 71.8 71.5 73.9 76.9 77.0 23.5 25.0 26.6 28.9 31.7 23.7 25.3 26.9 29.1 32.0 78.9 80.4 82.7 84.5 83.5 79.5 81.1 83.6 85.1 84.2 35.1 35.8 36.8 38.8 43.2 34.4 35.2 36.2 38.0 42.4 33.9 35.3 36.5 38.4 42.1 33.3 34.7 35.8 37.0 40.8 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 75.8 78.5 79.8 80.7 80.7 77.4 80.3 81.5 82.6 82.3 57.0 60.9 64.3 68.3 70.6 57.0 61.1 64.6 68.8 70.9 75.2 77.6 80.6 84.7 87.5 73.6 76.1 79.2 83.3 86.3 34.9 38.0 41.0 44.6 48.9 35.2 38.2 41.3 45.0 49.3 84.4 86.8 87.9 89.5 89.7 85.0 87.3 88.5 90.2 90.3 46.1 48.4 51.4 55.3 60.7 45.5 47.6 50.7 54.5 59.9 46.1 48.5 51.4 55.1 59.8 45.1 47.6 50.6 54.1 58.7 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 80.4 82.0 81.7 84.6 87.0 82.0 83.0 82.5 86.3 88.1 69.8 71.7 69.6 73.3 79.7 70.2 71.6 69.4 73.8 80.0 86.8 87.4 85.2 86.6 91.6 85.6 86.2 84.1 85.6 90.7 54.2 59.4 63.8 66.5 69.5 54.6 59.9 64.3 67.1 70.0 89.5 89.5 90.9 91.0 91.3 90.0 90.3 91.6 91.8 92.0 67.4 72.4 78.2 78.6 79.8 66.5 72.1 77.9 77.8 79.4 65.2 71.2 75.3 77.8 80.0 64.3 70.5 74.8 77.2 79.4 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 88.7 91.4 91.9 93.0 93.9 89.3 92.0 92.3 93.5 94.2 83.1 86.1 89.2 92.9 96.2 83.0 93.6 86.2 94.2 89.3 97.0 93.3 100.0 96.5 102.4 93.0 93.8 96.7 99.8 102.4 72.9 76.7 79.7 83.5 85.8 73.2 77.0 80.0 83.6 85.8 92.7 95.8 96.3 97.3 95.9 93.2 96.3 96.6 97.5 95.9 82.1 83.9 86.7 89.8 91.3 82.0 83.7 86.6 89.4 91.1 82.2 83.5 85.6 88.3 91.5 81.9 83.2 85.4 87.9 91.2 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 95.2 96.3 100.0 100.5 101.9 95.3 97.6 96.4 96.5 100.0 100.0 100.5 103.1 101.8 108.1 97.8 96.6 100.0 103.3 108.2 102.6 100.2 100.0 102.6 106.1 102.7 90.7 100.2 95.0 100.0 100.0 102.9 102.5 106.2 104.5 90.5 95.0 100.0 102.2 104.3 96.5 97.5 100.0 99.9 99.7 96.3 95.3 97.5 98.7 100.0 100.0 99.6 101.9 99.5 102.6 95.0 94.8 98.5 98.1 100.0 100.0 101.7 102.2 102.5 104.0 94.5 98.0 100.0 102.2 104.1 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 102.6 105.4 107.6 110.5 114.0 102.8 105.4 107.3 110.2 113.4 111.5 116.4 122.5 128.6 134.8 111.8 116.7 122.7 129.0 135.1 108.7 110.4 113.8 116.4 118.3 108.8 110.7 114.3 117.1 119.2 106.7 110.1 113.3 119.3 125.2 106.6 109.8 112.9 118.6 124.4 99.3 99.7 100.4 104.3 107.3 99.2 99.5 100.0 103.8 106.5 104.1 104.5 105.3 107.9 109.9 103.7 104.2 105.1 107.7 109.7 106.0 107.7 109.7 110.6 111.8 106.1 107.6 109.8 110.8 112.3 1995: I ....... II ...... III ..... IV ..... 102.0 102.3 102.5 103.4 102.2 102.6 102.8 103.6 110.5 110.8 111.8 112.9 110.8 111.1 112.2 113.3 108.3 108.2 109.1 109.2 108.4 108.3 109.2 109.4 105.5 106.4 107.1 108.0 105.4 106.2 106.9 107.7 99.1 99.1 99.3 99.5 99.0 99.0 99.1 99.3 103.5 104.0 104.5 104.4 103.1 103.6 104.0 104.0 105.5 105.9 106.3 106.6 105.6 106.0 106.3 106.5 1996: I ....... II ...... III ..... IV ..... 104.5 105.6 105.6 106.0 104.6 105.6 105.5 105.9 114.0 116.1 116.8 118.4 114.4 116.4 117.2 118.7 109.2 110.0 110.7 111.7 109.4 110.3 111.0 112.1 108.6 109.7 110.7 111.5 108.4 109.4 110.3 111.1 99.4 99.5 99.9 99.9 99.2 99.3 99.6 99.6 104.0 103.9 104.8 105.2 103.7 103.7 104.5 104.9 107.0 107.5 108.0 108.4 106.9 107.3 107.7 108.3 1997: I ....... II ...... III ..... IV ..... 106.3 107.3 108.3 108.5 106.1 107.1 108.0 108.1 119.9 122.0 123.5 124.4 120.2 122.2 123.6 124.7 112.8 113.7 114.1 114.7 113.3 114.1 114.5 115.3 112.0 112.3 113.5 115.3 111.7 112.0 113.0 114.7 99.8 99.8 100.4 101.5 99.5 99.5 100.0 101.0 105.4 104.7 104.8 106.3 105.2 104.5 104.7 106.1 109.1 109.6 109.9 110.2 109.1 109.7 110.1 110.4 1998: I ....... II ...... III ..... IV ..... 109.7 110.0 110.6 111.6 109.3 109.8 110.3 111.2 126.8 127.7 128.9 131.0 127.1 128.1 129.2 131.4 115.6 116.1 116.6 117.4 116.3 116.7 117.2 118.1 117.1 118.5 120.0 121.4 116.4 117.9 119.4 120.8 102.9 103.8 104.7 105.5 102.3 103.2 104.2 104.9 106.7 107.7 108.5 108.8 106.5 107.5 108.3 108.5 110.3 110.5 110.7 110.9 110.5 110.7 111.0 111.2 1999: I ....... II ...... III ..... IV ..... 112.6 112.8 114.2 116.3 112.0 112.1 113.6 115.8 132.3 133.1 135.3 138.5 132.6 133.4 135.6 138.9 117.5 118.0 118.5 119.1 118.4 118.9 119.4 120.0 123.0 124.5 126.1 127.3 122.1 123.6 125.2 126.5 106.4 106.9 107.6 107.8 105.7 106.1 106.8 107.2 109.3 110.4 110.5 109.5 109.0 110.2 110.3 109.3 111.4 111.8 111.9 112.2 111.8 112.2 112.4 112.7 2000: I ....... II ...... III ..... 116.7 118.7 119.5 116.3 140.3 118.1 142.4 119.1 143.3 120.9 128.4 121.0 130.6 120.8 132.4 127.8 129.6 131.6 107.7 108.5 109.2 107.1 110.0 107.7 110.0 108.5 110.8 109.8 113.0 109.7 113.7 110.5 114.1 113.6 114.1 114.7 140.7 120.2 142.9 120.0 143.8 119.9 1 Output refers to real gross domestic product in the sector. 2 Hours at work of all persons engaged in the sector, including hours of proprietors and unpaid family workers. Estimates based primarily on establishment data. 3 Wages and salaries of employees plus employers’ contributions for social insurance and private benefit plans. Also includes an estimate of wages, salaries, and supplemental payments for the self-employed. 4 Hourly compensation divided by the consumer price index for all urban consumers for recent quarters. The trend from 1978-99 is based on the consumer price index research series (CPI-U-RS). 5 Current dollar output divided by the output index. Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 332 TABLE B–50.—Changes in productivity and related data, business sector, 1959–2000 [Percent change from preceding period; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates] Output per hour of all persons Year or quarter Hours of all persons 2 Output 1 Compensation per hour 3 Busi- Nonfarm Busi- Nonfarm Busi- Nonfarm Busi- Nonfarm ness business ness business ness business ness business sector sector sector sector sector sector sector sector Real compensation per hour 4 Business sector Nonfarm business sector Unit labor costs Business sector Implicit price deflator 5 Nonfarm Busi- Nonfarm business ness business sector sector sector 1959 .......... 4.0 4.0 8.3 8.8 4.1 4.6 4.2 4.0 3.5 3.3 0.1 0.0 0.7 1.2 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 1.9 3.7 4.6 3.9 4.6 1.3 3.4 4.5 3.5 4.2 1.9 2.0 6.4 4.6 6.4 1.7 2.0 6.8 4.6 6.7 .0 −1.7 1.7 .6 1.7 .4 −1.3 2.2 1.1 2.4 4.3 4.1 4.5 3.7 5.1 4.5 3.6 4.0 3.5 4.6 2.6 3.1 3.4 2.3 3.8 2.7 2.5 3.0 2.2 3.2 2.4 .4 −.1 −.2 .5 3.1 .2 −.5 .0 .3 1.1 .8 1.0 .6 1.1 1.2 .8 1.0 .7 1.2 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 3.6 4.1 2.2 3.1 .5 3.1 3.5 1.7 3.1 .1 7.0 6.8 1.9 5.0 3.0 7.1 7.2 1.7 5.3 3.0 3.3 2.6 −.3 1.8 2.5 3.8 3.6 −.1 2.1 2.9 3.8 6.7 5.7 7.7 7.0 3.3 5.8 5.9 7.4 6.8 2.1 3.7 2.6 3.4 1.5 1.7 2.9 2.7 3.1 1.3 .2 2.5 3.5 4.4 6.5 .2 2.2 4.1 4.2 6.7 1.6 2.5 2.7 3.9 4.5 1.4 2.3 3.2 3.8 4.4 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 2.0 4.4 3.3 3.2 −1.7 1.5 4.2 3.4 3.1 −1.6 .0 3.9 6.6 7.0 −1.5 −.1 3.8 6.9 7.3 −1.5 −2.0 −.4 3.3 3.7 .1 −1.6 −.3 3.4 4.0 .1 7.7 6.4 6.2 8.5 9.7 7.2 6.5 6.4 8.2 9.8 1.9 1.9 2.9 2.2 −1.2 1.4 2.0 3.0 1.9 −1.1 5.6 1.9 2.8 5.2 11.6 5.6 2.2 2.9 4.9 11.6 4.4 4.3 3.3 5.2 9.6 4.5 4.4 2.9 3.6 10.2 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 3.5 3.6 1.6 1.1 .0 2.7 3.7 1.5 1.3 −.4 −1.0 6.8 5.6 6.2 3.3 −1.7 7.2 5.6 6.5 3.2 −4.3 3.1 3.9 5.0 3.4 −4.3 3.4 4.0 5.1 3.6 10.3 8.8 7.9 8.8 9.7 10.1 8.6 8.0 8.9 9.5 1.0 2.9 1.3 1.8 .3 .9 2.7 1.4 1.9 .1 6.5 5.1 6.1 7.6 9.8 7.2 4.7 6.4 7.6 10.0 9.6 5.2 6.1 7.2 8.5 10.6 5.4 6.4 6.8 8.5 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... −.3 1.9 −.4 3.6 2.8 −.3 1.2 −.6 4.5 2.2 −1.1 2.7 −2.9 5.4 8.8 −1.1 2.0 −3.1 6.4 8.3 −.9 .7 −2.6 1.6 5.8 −.8 .8 −2.5 1.8 6.0 10.8 9.5 7.5 4.2 4.4 10.8 9.7 7.5 4.3 4.3 −.3 .1 1.5 .1 .3 −.3 .3 1.5 .2 .2 11.1 7.4 8.0 .6 1.5 11.1 8.3 8.1 −.2 2.1 9.1 9.2 5.7 3.4 2.9 9.7 9.5 6.2 3.2 2.8 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 2.0 3.0 .5 1.2 1.0 1.3 3.0 .4 1.3 .8 4.2 3.7 3.5 4.3 3.5 3.9 3.8 3.5 4.5 3.4 2.2 .7 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.5 .8 3.2 3.2 2.6 4.9 5.2 3.9 4.7 2.8 4.7 5.2 3.8 4.5 2.7 1.5 3.3 .5 1.1 −1.5 1.3 3.3 .4 .9 −1.6 2.9 2.1 3.4 3.5 1.8 3.3 2.1 3.4 3.2 1.9 2.7 1.6 2.5 3.1 3.7 3.2 1.7 2.5 3.0 3.7 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 1.3 1.1 3.9 .5 1.3 1.1 1.2 3.7 .5 1.3 1.5 −1.2 3.7 3.1 4.9 1.4 −1.3 3.5 3.3 4.7 .2 −2.3 −.2 2.6 3.5 .3 −2.4 −.2 2.9 3.3 5.7 4.7 5.3 2.5 2.0 5.5 4.9 5.3 2.2 2.1 .6 1.0 2.6 −.1 −.2 .4 1.2 2.6 −.4 −.1 4.3 3.6 1.4 1.9 .7 4.3 3.6 1.6 1.7 .8 3.5 3.5 2.0 2.2 1.8 3.6 3.7 2.1 2.2 1.9 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .7 2.8 2.1 2.7 3.1 .9 2.5 1.8 2.6 2.9 3.1 4.4 5.2 5.0 4.8 3.4 4.3 5.1 5.1 4.8 2.4 1.6 3.1 2.3 1.6 2.4 1.7 3.2 2.4 1.8 2.1 3.2 2.9 5.3 5.0 2.1 3.0 2.8 5.1 4.8 −.4 .4 .7 3.9 2.9 −.4 .3 .6 3.7 2.7 1.4 .4 .8 2.5 1.8 1.2 .5 .9 2.4 1.8 2.0 1.6 1.8 .8 1.1 2.0 1.4 2.1 .9 1.3 1995: I ....... II ...... III ..... IV ..... −1.3 1.3 .6 3.6 −.8 1.3 .9 3.1 1.4 .8 3.7 4.1 1.8 1.0 4.1 3.8 2.7 −.5 3.2 .4 2.6 −.3 3.2 .8 1.7 3.3 2.6 3.4 1.7 3.2 2.7 3.1 −.7 .0 .5 1.1 −.8 −.1 .6 .9 3.1 1.9 2.0 −.2 2.5 1.8 1.8 .1 2.7 1.6 1.5 1.2 2.7 1.6 1.1 .7 1996: I ....... II ...... III ..... IV ..... 4.1 4.3 .0 1.6 4.0 3.8 −.1 1.4 4.1 7.6 2.4 5.5 3.9 7.4 2.5 5.6 .0 3.1 2.5 3.9 −.1 3.5 2.6 4.1 2.4 4.1 3.6 3.0 2.5 3.8 3.2 3.0 −.6 .6 1.5 .1 −.5 .3 1.1 .1 −1.7 −.2 3.6 1.4 −1.4 .0 3.3 1.6 1.7 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.4 2.1 1997: I ....... II ...... III ..... IV ..... 1.2 4.0 3.6 .8 .7 3.9 3.2 .6 5.2 7.1 4.9 3.2 4.8 7.1 4.6 3.4 4.0 3.0 1.3 2.4 4.1 3.0 1.4 2.8 1.9 1.1 4.2 6.5 2.0 1.1 3.8 6.1 −.6 .0 2.5 4.4 −.5 .1 2.1 4.1 .7 −2.8 .7 5.7 1.3 −2.7 .6 5.5 2.6 1.9 1.0 1.1 3.1 2.2 1.3 1.1 1998: I ....... II ...... III ..... IV ..... 4.7 1.1 2.1 3.9 4.5 1.6 1.8 3.6 7.9 2.9 3.7 6.8 8.2 3.1 3.7 6.8 3.1 1.7 1.5 2.8 3.5 1.5 1.8 3.1 6.2 5.1 5.1 4.8 6.1 5.3 5.2 4.5 5.5 3.5 3.6 3.2 5.3 3.8 3.7 2.8 1.5 3.9 3.0 .9 1.5 3.6 3.3 .8 .3 .7 1.1 .6 .4 .7 1.3 .6 1999: I ....... II ...... III ..... IV ..... 3.3 .9 4.9 7.7 2.6 .6 5.2 8.0 3.8 2.6 6.6 9.9 3.6 2.4 7.0 10.0 .5 1.7 1.7 2.1 1.0 1.8 1.7 1.8 5.2 5.0 5.3 3.8 4.5 5.0 5.5 4.2 3.6 1.7 2.6 .9 2.8 1.7 2.8 1.3 1.9 4.1 .4 −3.6 1.8 4.3 .3 −3.5 1.9 1.2 .5 1.0 2.2 1.5 .6 1.0 2000: I ....... II ...... III ..... 1.6 6.9 2.8 1.9 6.1 3.3 5.3 6.3 2.6 5.2 6.5 2.5 3.7 −.6 −.2 3.2 .4 −.8 3.5 7.0 5.7 3.9 5.9 6.3 −.6 3.2 2.6 −.2 2.2 3.1 1.9 .0 2.8 1.9 −.2 2.9 3.0 2.4 1.7 3.2 2.0 1.9 1 Output refers to real gross domestic product in the sector. at work of all persons engaged in the sector. See footnote 2, Table B-49. and salaries of employees plus employers’ contributions for social insurance and private benefit plans. Also includes an estimate of wages, salaries, and supplemental payments for the self-employed. 4 Hourly compensation divided by the consumer price index. See footnote 4, Table B-49. 5 Current dollar output divided by the output index. Note.—Percent changes are based on original data and may differ slightly from percent changes based on indexes in Table B-49. Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2 Hours 3 Wages 333 PRODUCTION AND BUSINESS ACTIVITY TABLE B–51.—Industrial production indexes, major industry divisions, 1950–2000 [1992=100; monthly data seasonally adjusted] Manufacturing Year or month 1950 ........................................................................... 1951 ........................................................................... 1952 ........................................................................... 1953 ........................................................................... 1954 ........................................................................... 1955 ........................................................................... 1956 ........................................................................... 1957 ........................................................................... 1958 ........................................................................... 1959 ........................................................................... 1960 ........................................................................... 1961 ........................................................................... 1962 ........................................................................... 1963 ........................................................................... 1964 ........................................................................... 1965 ........................................................................... 1966 ........................................................................... 1967 ........................................................................... 1968 ........................................................................... 1969 ........................................................................... 1970 ........................................................................... 1971 ........................................................................... 1972 ........................................................................... 1973 ........................................................................... 1974 ........................................................................... 1975 ........................................................................... 1976 ........................................................................... 1977 ........................................................................... 1978 ........................................................................... 1979 ........................................................................... 1980 ........................................................................... 1981 ........................................................................... 1982 ........................................................................... 1983 ........................................................................... 1984 ........................................................................... 1985 ........................................................................... 1986 ........................................................................... 1987 ........................................................................... 1988 ........................................................................... 1989 ........................................................................... 1990 ........................................................................... 1991 ........................................................................... 1992 ........................................................................... 1993 ........................................................................... 1994 ........................................................................... 1995 ........................................................................... 1996 ........................................................................... 1997 ........................................................................... 1998 ........................................................................... 1999 .......................................................................... 1999: Jan ................................................................... Feb ................................................................... Mar .................................................................. Apr ................................................................... May .................................................................. June ................................................................. July ................................................................... Aug ................................................................... Sept .................................................................. Oct ................................................................... Nov ................................................................... Dec ................................................................... 2000: Jan ................................................................... Feb ......
@FedFRASER