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FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

135

The B usiness Situation
Business activity continued to expand as the summer
began. The pace of advance has recently been slower than
in the unusual first quarter of the year, which has led to
a more cautious reassessment of future prospects by
a number of observers. Some of this reassessment has
shown up in a change in the previously highly buoyant
atmosphere of the stock market. The underlying sources
of strength in the economy remain intact, however, and
are being recognized both by business analysts and in cur­
rent official appraisals. These positive factors include
business plans for further increases in plant and equip­
ment spending, the stimulus to consumer spending ex­
pected from the excise tax cut effective June 22, and a
further expansion in the combined spending of Federal and
state and local governments on goods and services in the
months ahead.
That the economy has in fact remained strong over
the past several weeks is reflected in the gains in such key
indicators of activity in May as industrial production,
durables manufacturers’ unfilled orders, employment, and
retail sales. Fragmentary data for June suggest that both
automobile assemblies and steel ingot production were
well maintained, while retail sales apparently continued
near the record rate of the month before. The unemploy­
ment rate, to be sure, did edge up in June after a marked
decline in the month before. Nevertheless, there has been
a distinct improvement in the labor market situation dur­
ing the second quarter as a whole, compared with both the
first quarter of 1965 and the second quarter of 1964.
The economy continues to show signs of increased vul­
nerability to upward price pressures. The over-all con­
sumer price index was up by 0.6 percentage point in
the April-May period, largely reflecting higher prices
for meats. The excise tax cut has already resulted in
price reductions in a significant number of consumer
items, and these decreases should show up in the index




for July, but it must be remembered that this is essentially
a one-time effect (until the next round of reductions that
becomes effective January 1). The wholesale price index
was also up again in May, and apparently in June as well.
It is true that some of the wholesale price increase in the
past several weeks also reflected special factors relating
to possibly temporary shortfalls in food supplies, which
may ease again soon. Nevertheless, there continues to be a
noticeable upcreep in prices for industrial commodities,
and while the rate of advance in this component of the
wholesale price index is still modest in comparison with
the inflationary surge of the mid-1950’s, it nevertheless
contrasts with the stability the country achieved during
the earlier portion of the current expansion. Against the
background of these developments, the need for restraint
in price-wage decisions has become even more pro­
nounced. The steel industry, in which labor negotiations
were recently resumed, will clearly be a bellwether of
the future.
PR O D U C T IO N , O R D E R S, A N D E M P L O Y M E N T

The Federal Reserve’s seasonally adjusted index of
industrial production rose by 0.5 percentage point in May
to 141.3 per cent of the 1957-59 average (see chart).
Output in industries producing business equipment
showed particular strength in the month and reached a
level 11 per cent higher than in the corresponding month
a year earlier. Production of consumer goods was also up
in May, buoyed by a slight rise in automobile assemblies
as well as by some increase in output of consumer staples.
Output of industrial materials, on the other hand, was
essentially unchanged, following the sharp run-up that re­
flected the surge in steel production earlier in the year.
In June, steel ingot production edged back close to the
record rate reached in April, and producers in the auto-

MONTHLY REVIEW, JULY 1965

136

RECENT BUSINESS INDICATORS
Seasonally adjusted monthly data
Per cent

Per cent

the steel industry. Outside the manufacturing sector, gains
were widespread in May. For the April-May period com­
bined, the total number of persons on establishment pay­
rolls averaged more than 300,000 persons above the fig­
ure for the first quarter. Along with the continuing rise in
business activity in June, both total employment and the
number of persons seeking jobs expanded further. The
over-all unemployment rate in the month was 4.7 per cent,
a shade above the 4.6 per cent rate in May, reflecting a
rise in unemployment among adult women. The unemploy­
ment rate for adult men, and married men, on the other
hand, edged downward; and unemployment among teen­
agers was also down a bit. For the second quarter as a
whole, the over-all unemployment rate averaged 4.7 per
cent, compared with 4.8 per cent in the first quarter and
5.3 per cent in the corresponding year-ago period.
C O N S U M E R SP E N D IN G A N D
R E SID E N T IA L C O N S T R U C T IO N

Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System;United States Departments
of Commerce and Labor.

mobile industry assembled new cars at a seasonally ad­
justed annual rate of 9.6 million units— a further slight gain
in comparison with the advanced rate of the month before.
Prospects for future strength in production remain
good. Although the volume of incoming new orders for
durable goods declined somewhat in May, such orders
were still well above the current rate of shipments. As a
result, the backlog of unfilled orders held by durables
manufacturers rose for the seventeenth consecutive
month (see chart). This brought the stock of unfilled
orders to a level equal to more than 2.7 times the current
monthly rate of shipments, which is 7 per cent above the
ratio for the corresponding month a year ago.
Nonfarm payroll employment also rose in May, more
than recouping the mild decline that occurred in April
(see chart). Employment was off slightly in the manu­
facturing sector in May, but this decline largely reflected
a smaller number of persons at work in the primary
metals industry following the interim labor settlement in




Retail sales rose by 2.2 per cent in May to a record sea­
sonally adjusted annual rate of nearly $281 billion. The
dollar volume of both nondurables and durables sales ad­
vanced by slightly more than 2 per cent. In June, new-car
sales surged to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 8.8 mil­
lion units. Over-all retail volume was well maintained in the
month as a whole, and sales in the last few days of the
month probably received some stimulus from the excise
tax cut, which the President signed into law June 21 to
take effect the following day. (In the case of both new auto­
mobiles and air conditioners, the reductions were retro­
active to cover purchases made on or after May 15.)
There were, to be sure, some reports of disappointment
with the initial consumer reaction to the excise tax cuts
in terms of actual purchases. Past experience indicates,
however, that there tends to be a lag between the enact­
ment of tax cuts and the response in consumer spending.
It would seem that such a lag is especially likely in the
case of an excise tax cut which has its immediate effect
only on specific goods. As consumers in the weeks ahead
come to realize more fully that previously taxed items
now take less of their income to purchase, they will find
more income left over for spending on other things. There
will therefore be a tendency for the effects of the excise
tax cut to spread over the entire range of consumer goods
and services.
Developments in residential construction continued, on
balance, to suggest improvement, although the erratic
fluctuations in many of the statistical series relating to this
sector of activity make it difficult to draw conclusions
from any one month’s returns. One way of gaining per­

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

spective is to look at average levels of activity over sev­
eral months. The number of nonfarm housing starts, for
example, fell by 4 per cent in May. This decline, however,
followed an advance the month before, and the average

137

level of starts in the April-May period shows an increase
from the January-March average. With respect to actual
outlays for residential construction, activity in the second
quarter was on a par with the previous quarter.

The M oney and Bond M ark ets in June
The money market remained firm in June while han­
dling readily the substantial financial flows generated by
quarterly corporate dividend and tax payments. Heavy
midmonth credit demands associated with these payments
increased the pressure on the reserve positions of the
money market banks. While these banks were able to
cover part of the special needs of the period in the Fed­
eral funds market, their borrowings from the Federal
Reserve Banks also increased. Treasury bill rates gen­
erally declined during most of the month in response to
a steady demand from commercial banks, public funds,
and other sources, but edged higher toward the end of June.
Prices of Treasury notes and bonds fluctuated nar­
rowly in the early part of June when the outlook for
interest rates was clouded by the congestion evident in
the corporate and tax-exempt bond markets. Around
midmonth, as selling of Governments by investors failed
to expand, a more confident tone developed. Demand for
coupon issues picked up, and prices moved higher in fairly
active trading until late in the month when both activity
and prices receded. In the corporate and tax-exempt bond
sectors, market supplies of new and recent issues remained
very heavy and prices declined during the first third of
the month. A better tone subsequently emerged in the
corporate sector, as progress was gradually made in dis­
tributing bonds to investors, but prices of tax-exempt bonds
continued to move lower throughout the month in the
face of persistent market congestion.
THE M ONEY M ARKET A N D BANK RESERVES

Nationwide net reserve availability in June fluctuated
in approximately the same range which had prevailed in
other recent months. The money market remained firm,
with Federal funds trading on most days primarily at 4Vs




per cent. Rates on new call loans to Government securities
dealers were most frequently quoted in a 4V4 to AVz per
cent range by the major New York City banks, while rates
on renewal call loans were generally in a 4V4 to 4% per
cent range (see the left-hand panel of the chart on page
139). Offering rates for new time certificates of deposit
issued by leading New York City banks edged slightly
higher in early June and then receded. The range of rates
at which such certificates traded in the secondary market
moved irregularly lower during the month. Rates on bank­
ers’ acceptances were unchanged and dealer inventories
increased only slightly in June, as the usual substantial ex­
pansion in dealer portfolios over the June 30 statement
date for banks failed to materialize. On June 1, the major
sales finance companies raised their offering rates on 30to 89-day directly placed paper by Vs of a percentage
point, thus setting a uniform rate of 4V4 per cent for all
such paper in the 30- to 270-day maturity category.
The month began with a consistently firm tone in
the money market. System open market operations re­
leased reserves in the two statement weeks ended June
2 and June 9 as an offset to the absorption of reserves
resulting from the movements in “market” factors. The dis­
tribution of reserves favored the major New York City
banks, which continued to add to their negotiable cer­
tificates of deposit outstanding, presumably to be in a
good position to meet credit demands expected over
the June dividend and tax dates. In the meantime, these
banks sold Federal funds on balance, including the siz­
able volume which they normally purchase from their
correspondents. The major money center banks outside
New York City were able to cover a good portion of their
substantial reserve needs in the Federal funds market.
Member bank borrowings from the Reserve Banks, how­
ever, remained around the half billion dollar mark.

138

MONTHLY REVIEW, JULY 1965
Table I

CHANGES IN FACTORS TENDING TO INCREASE OR DECREASE
MEMBER BANK RESERVES, JUNE 1965
In millions of dollars; (+ ) denotes increase,
(—) decrease in excess reserves
Daily averages— week ended
F actor

Net
changes

June

June

June

June

2

June

9

16

23

30

4- 493
4- 405

— 305

4 - 229
76
+ 18
— 25
4- 97

63

— 173
— 359
4- 90
— 98
4-122

+ 4

4 - 63

4- 70

4- 72

4- 48

+

48

4- 95

4 - 12

4- 169
— 3

4-

+ 1

44

4- 952
— 9

211

4-

51

— 62

“ M arke t” factors

Member bank required
reserves* ..................................
Operating transactions
(subtotal) ..............................
Federal Reserve float . . .
Treasury operationsf . . . .
Gold and foreign account.
Currency outside banks* .
Other Federal Reserve
accounts (net) t ................

-f

- 728
- 152
- 63
- 43
- 311

— 398

20

— 169
110

+
8
-j- 16

Total “ m arket" factors.

—

68

4- 22
+

— 502
— 348
4 - 80
— 15
— 12S

— 334

Direct Federal Reserve credit
transactions

Open m arket instrum ents
O utright holdings:
Government securities .
Bankers’ acceptances ..
Repurchase agreements:
Government securities .
Bankers’ acceptances ..
Member bank borrowings ..
Other loans, discounts, and
advances ................................
Total
Excess

..............................

reserves*

..................

+ 674
+

63

4* 9

4 - 35

+

53

—

4

4- 119

—

7
44

—

—
—

—
+

-f

778

4- 124

84

10
4- 137

—

—

5

+ 976

—

+ 1

5

4 - 49

22

+ 3
4- 876

+

4- 26

14

21,414
21,087
327
518
— 191

21,369
21,067
302
474
— 172
20,895

21,647
21,248
399
611
—

212

21,036

22,059
21,646
413
583
— 170
21,476

21,892
21,561
331
486
_ 155
21,406

21,6765
21.322S
354 §
534§
— 180§
21,1421

Note: Because of rounding, figures do not necessarily add to totals.
* These figures are estimated.
t Includes changes in Treasury currency and cash.
X Includes assets denominated in foreign currencies.
§ Average for five weeks ended June 30, 1965.

During the midmonth statement week, the money mar­
ket dealt smoothly with the huge flows set in motion by
the most popular dividend payment date, June 10, and the
quarterly corporate tax date, both of which fell in the same
statement week. Total demand deposits (including checks
in process of collection) at weekly reporting member banks
rose by $8.4 billion during the week, as corporations
acquired the deposits to pay out a substantial amount of
dividends and several billion dollars in Federal taxes.
On the assets side, the weekly reporting member banks
extended approximately $2.7 billion in loans over the
week ended June 16, over 50 per cent more than in
the same period of 1964. Commercial and industrial
loans rose substantially, while loans to sales finance
companies and to brokers and dealers for purchas-




Table H
RESERVE POSITIONS OF MAJOR RESERVE CITY BANKS
JUNE 1965

D a ily average level of member
bank:

Total reserves, including
vault cash* ............................
Required reserves* ..............
Excess reserves* .................. .
Borrowings ............................
Free reserves* ..........................
Nonborrowed reserves* ------

ing or carrying securities also increased considerably.
(During this period corporations not only borrowed from
banks, but: also reduced their holdings of Government
securities under repurchase agreements with securities
dealers as well as their holdings of finance company paper.)
These heavy credit demands brought a notable increase
in reserve pressure on the New York City banks,
while other major banks continued to have sizable basic
reserve deficits. However, reserves were in good supply at
4Vs per cent in the Federal funds market, and borrowings
from the Reserve Banks increased only moderately.
The pressures generated by the tax date led to heavy
borrowing at the Federal Reserve “discount window” over
the June 18-20 weekend. Subsequently, the money market
became easier and Federal funds were available to buyers
at a nominal rate at the end of the June 23 statement
week. A comfortable atmosphere carried over into the
following statement week, but the tone of the money mar­
ket tightened as the week progressed. Borrowings from the
Reserve Banks rose very sharply on the eve of the midyear

In millions of dollars
Daily averages—week ended
Factors affecting
basic reserve positions

June
2

June
9

June
16

June
23

Average of
five weeks
ended
June 30*

June
30*

Eight banks in New York City
Reserve excess or
13
4
deficiency(—)t .......................
Less borrowings from
Reserve Banks .....................
18
47
Less net interbank Federal
funds purchases or sales(—).. — 124 — 83
779
Gross purchases ...............
891
Gross sales .......................
903
974
Equals net basic reserve
surplus or deficit (—) .........
119
40
Net loans to Government
securities dealers .................
486
424

1

64

2

17

166

213

96

108

38
937
899

158 - 26
934
782
777
808

— 203

— 306 — 68

831

942

998

_

7

865
872
— 84
736

Thirty-eight banks outside New York City
Reserve excess or
deficiency(—) f ..........................
16
26
Less borrowings from
129
Reserve Banks .....................
118
Less net interbank Federal
funds purchases or sales(—)..
289
503
Gross purchases ............... 1,206 1,391
Gross sales ......................
917
888
Equals net basic reserve
surplus or deficit (—) ......... - 4 0 1 - 5 9 5
Net loans to Government
securities dealers .................
247
179

21

52

13

26

129

118

141

127

493
1,281
788

691
1,303
612

367
1,110
743

469
1,258
790

— 757 — 495

— 570

-6 0 2
282

401

365

295

Note: Because of rounding, figures do not necessarily add to totals.
* Estimated reserve figures have not been adjusted for so-called “as of” debits
and credits. These items are taken into account in final data,
t Reserves held after all adjustments applicable to the reporting period less re­
quired reserves and carry-over reserve deficiencies.

139

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

SELECTED INTEREST RATES*
A p rij-J u n e 1965

Per cent

Percenfr

4.80

-4 .8 0

4.60

4.60

•4.40

-4 .4 0

4.20

4.20

4.00

-3 .2 0

3.80

3.60

14 21

28

5

Apr

12

19

M ay

14 21

28

5

Apr

12

19

26 2

M ay

9

16
June

Note: Data are shown for business daysonly.

from underwriting syndicate reoffering yield o fa given issue to m arketyield of the sam e issue

^ M O N E Y MARKET RATES QUOTED: Daily range of rates posted by major New York City banks on new

immediately after it has been released from syndicate restrictions); d aily averages of yields of

•call lo a n s(in Federal funds) secured by United States Governm ent securities (a point indicates the

long -term Governm ent securities (bonds due or callable in ten years or mo re) and of Governm ent

absence of any range); offering rates for directly placed finance com pany p a per; the effective

securities due in three to five y e a rs, computed on the b a siso f closing bid prices;Thursday

rate on Federalfunds (the rate most representative of the transactions executed);closing bid rates

av e ra g e s of yields of twenty se ason ed twenty-y e ar tax-exem pt bonds (carrying M o o d y 's

(quoted in terms of rate of discount) on newest outstanding three-and six-month Treasury bills.
B O N D MARKET YIELDSQUOTED: Yields of new A a a - and Aa-rated public utility bonds are plotted
around a line showing daily average yields of seasoned A aa-rated corporate bonds (arrows point

statement date, on which banks ordinarily like to keep
their borrowings small.
Over the month as a whole, market factors absorbed
$850 million of reserves, while System open market opera­
tions provided $874 million. The weekly average of System
outright holdings of Government securities rose by $952
million from the final statement week in May through the
last week in June, and average System holdings of Govern­
ment securities under repurchase agreements fell by $62
million. Average net System holdings of bankers’ accept­
ances (outright and under repurchase agreements), de­
clined by $16 million during the month. From Wednesday,
May 26, through Wednesday, June 30, System holdings
of Government securities maturing in less than one year




ratings of A a a , A a , A, and Baa).
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of N ew York, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
M o o d y 's Investors Service, a n d TheW eekly Bond Buyer.

expanded by $359 million, while holdings of issues matur­
ing in more than one year rose by $452 million.
TH E G O V E R N M E N T S E C U R IT IES M A R K E T

Treasury bills were in broadly based demand in the
opening days of the month. Market scarcities developed,
particularly in the short-term maturity area, and rates
continued along the downtrend which had begun in
March (see left-hand panel of the chart). The June 3 reduc­
tion in the British bank rate from 7 per cent to 6 per cent
was a factor contributing to the strength of Treasury bill
prices. Around the June 10 corporate dividend payment
date, bill rates generally edged a trifle higher, as dealers

140

MONTHLY REVIEW, JULY '1965

took on securities returning from maturing corporate re­
purchase agreements. A steady investment demand per­
sisted, however, and moderate offerings related to the div­
idend payment date and to the subsequent midmonth
corporate tax date were readily absorbed. In the latter
part of June, a keen investment interest centered upon
bills coming due within three months as well as on bills
maturing during future tax and dividend payment periods
in September and December 1965 and in 1966. The gen­
eral downward movement of bill rates resumed and con­
tinued until the closing days of the month, when demand
tapered off and rates rose slightly.
At the last regular weekly auction of the month, held
on June 28, average issuing rates were 3.784 per cent for
the new three-month issue and 3.824 per cent for the new
six-month bills, about 9 and 10 basis points lower than
the average rates at the final weekly auction in May. The
June 24 auction of $1 billion of new one-year bills pro­
duced an average issuing rate of 3.807 per cent, as
against 3.954 per cent on the comparable issue sold a
month earlier. The newest outstanding three- and sixmonth bills closed the month at bid rates of 3.81 per cent
and 3.85 per cent, respectively.
In the market for Treasury notes and bonds, the atmos­
phere of caution which had developed in the latter part of
May persisted in the opening days of June. Throughout
this period, participants continued to react warily to the
substantial calendar of offerings scheduled for flotation
elsewhere in the capital markets. In particular, as corporate
bond yields moved higher, the widening spread between
yields of corporate bonds and those of Government secu­
rities of comparable maturity generated some concern
over the tenability of prevailing yield levels of Treasury
issues. Against this background, dealer offerings of Gov­
ernment notes and bonds expanded somewhat. However,
a moderate demand remained in evidence and provided a
steadying influence. Thus, after declining slightly on June
1, prices fluctuated narrowly from June 2 through June
10 (the right-hand panel of the chart illustrates the cor­
responding general stability of yields early in June).
Subsequently, investment demand and switching opera­
tions increased, and the coupon sector of the Government
securities market strengthened. Participants were influ­
enced by an improved atmosphere in the corporate bond
market and by the excellent reception accorded a $525
million offering of Federal National Mortgage Association
participation certificates. The bond market was also influ­
enced by the decline in stock market prices— partially re­
versed late in the month— which was interpreted as being
likely to lead to some increase in the demand for fixedinterest securities. The expansion in investor interest in




coupon issues stimulated professional demand, offerings
were easily taken up, and prices generally moved higher
from June 11 through 24. Demand favored the short- and
intermediate-term maturities— particularly the 2l/ i per
cent wartime issues. The System Account also made open
market purchases of coupon issues during the month to
supply reserves in anticipation of large needs over the
July 4 holiday weekend. In the last few trading sessions,
investor interest declined and prices receded on profes­
sional profit taking.
O TH E R SE C U R IT IE S M A R K E T S

In the early part of the month, prices of corporate and
tax-exempt bonds generally moved lower in a hesitant
atmosphere. Considerable investor resistance contributed
to, and was reinforced by, the substantial backlog of new
issues and older bonds which crowded dealers’ shelves.
Market participants were also aware of the heavy volume of
impending flotations, including two large issues of capital
notes by commercial banks. In the corporate sector, a
steadier tone appeared in the latter part of the month as
price reductions facilitated the distribution of new and
recent corporate bonds. In the tax-exempt sector, how­
ever, dealer inventories remained large and prices con­
tinued to decline over the remainder of the month. Over
the month as a whole, the average yield on Moody’s sea­
soned Aaa-rated corporate bonds rose by 2 basis points to
4.47 per cent. During the same period, the average yield
on The Weekly Bond Buyer's series for twenty seasoned
tax-exempt issues (carrying ratings ranging from Aaa to
Baa) increased by 11 basis points to 3.30 per cent. (These
yield series are shown in the right-hand panel of the
chart.)
The volume of new corporate bonds publicly floated in
June amounted to an estimated $720 million, compared
with $675 million in May 1965 and $460 million in June
1964. A $250 million offering of commercial bank capi­
tal notes maturing in 1990 reached the market early in
the month. Reoffered at par to yield 4.60 per cent, the
issue—which cannot be called for five years— initially en­
countered investor resistance, but demand for the notes
subsequently expanded. Another major commercial bank
also offered new capital notes in June. The latter issue con­
sisted of $266 million of 4 per cent notes maturing in
1990, which were offered at par to stockholders and were
convertible into stock. The notes, which carried five-year
call protection, were well received. The largest publicly
offered new corporate bond issue of the month consisted
of $40 million of Aaa-rated 4% per cent utility company
debentures maturing in 2005. The debentures, which can­

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

not be called for five years, were reoffered to yield 4.55
per cent and were accorded a fair investor reception. New
tax-exempt flotations totaled about $885 million, as
against $895 million in May 1965 and $780 million in
June 1964. The Blue List of tax-exempt securities adver­
tised for sale closed the month at $834 million, compared
with $872 million at the end of May. The largest new tax-

141

exempt bond flotation during the month consisted of $67
million of state bonds which were reoffered to yield from
2.50 per cent in 1968 to 2.95 per cent in 1980. The bonds
were Aaa rated by Moody’s and were accorded a fair re­
ception. Most other new corporate and tax-exempt bonds
publicly offered during the period were accorded fairly
good investor receptions.

The Initial Effects of Federal B udgetary C h an ges on A g g re g a te Spending*
Statistics describing how much the Federal Government
spends and how much it collects in revenues are available
in great quantity and on a variety of different accounting
bases.1 Despite this wealth of data, however, and despite
the increasing importance of fiscal policy as a tool for
promoting cyclical stability and long-run growth, the task
of assessing the precise impact of Federal budgetary oper­
ations on aggregate production and income remains diffi­
cult. This article presents one possible technique for
quantifying the effect on the economy implicit in any
particular set of changes in Federal budgetary programs.
Essentially, the technique seeks to measure the direction
and size of the budget’s initial influence on aggregate de­
mand through changes in Federal outlays and through the
direct effects on private incomes associated with changes
in tax rates.
It should be stressed at the outset that no single measure
of fiscal impact— including the relatively simple and tenta­
tive one presented here—will prove satisfactory in all
analytical situations. The virtue of the procedure here
presented is that it attempts to distinguish the independent
effects of the budget on the economy from the “feedback”
effects of the economy on the budget, effects which op­

* A number of persons in the Research Department of this Bank
have worked toward developing the method of analysis presented
here. Camille B. Pantuliano had primary responsibility for the
preparation of this article.

erate mainly on the revenues side of the budget. In this
respect, the technique developed in this article has a goal
similar to that of the so-called “full employment surplus”,
a concept which also attempts to separate out the feed­
back effects and which has become familiar from the re­
ports of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers.2
The concept of the full employment surplus, of course,
goes beyond this limited end; in particular, the concept
has been used in discussions of the upward trend in tax
revenues that would be generated by the economy as it
approaches or maintains full employment of a growing
labor force and productive capacity. The technique here
discussed avoids the complications that arise in estimating
tax revenues at a hypothetical full employment level of
activity. The current employment and output situation is
taken as given, and the computations are designed only to
estimate the direct effect on total spending of actual
changes in Federal expenditures and tax rates.
As will be apparent from the discussion below, the
basic methodology and all the numerical computations
shown in this article rest on a long series of assumptions,
any one of which might prove to be a fit subject for
lengthy debate. Moreover, there are some aspects of the
over-all economic impact of Federal fiscal operations that
cannot be examined at all in the context of the technique

2 The reader who wishes to examine the concept of the “full
employment surplus” may consult an article by Robert Solomon,
1 See Joseph Scherer, “A Primer on Federal Budgets”, this “A Note on the Full Employment Surplus”, Review of Economics
and Statistics, February 1964, pp. 105-108.
Review, April 1965, pp. 79-88.




142

MONTHLY REVIEW, JULY 1965

discussed here. Thus, even with the help of this technique,
or any other such simple procedure, the analyst will still
find it imperative to undertake a thorough investigation
of all the circumstances prevailing in the particular period
in which he is interested.
S U M M A R Y OF B A SIC A P P R O A C H

The technique described here is designed to measure
the initial and direct effects of the changes in the Federal
budget on aggregate spending by computing a weighted
sum of the change in total Federal expenditures and the
change in aggregate after-tax incomes due to statutory or
administrative modifications in the Federal tax system.
Additions to expenditures and reductions in tax rates are
considered to be “stimulative”, while reductions in expen­
ditures and tax rate increases are considered to be “re­
strictive”. The aim of the procedure is to assess the
combined effects of expenditures and tax rate changes in
pushing up or pulling down aggregate spending in a given
period relative to spending in the immediately preceding
period. Consequently, changes on both the expenditures
and tax sides are measured in terms of levels prevailing in
the previous period.
In the case of expenditures, the relevant figure is simply
the absolute dollar amount of change from period to
period, modified for certain timing factors (and adjusted
for seasonal variation when periods of less than one year
are used as the unit of analysis). For reasons explained in
the Appendix, the data most suitable for this analysis repre­
sent a compromise between the “cash” and the “national
income accounts” expenditures figures of the Federal bud­
get. A more sophisticated technique would obviously also
take into account the expenditures “mix”, since it is very
likely that different types of Government expenditures will
have different effects on the economy. (One example that
is frequently listed is the distinction between direct pur­
chases of goods and services and “transfer” payments such
as social security payments which stimulate the demand
for goods and services less directly.) Such refinements
can be built into the technique once further research on
Government spending by components has yielded work­
able empirical generalizations.
The procedure for estimating the effects of changes in
tax rates is somewhat more complex. Essentially, an at­
tempt is made to estimate the extra amount of income left
in (or taken from) private hands as a result of the tax
rate change. Clearly, this estimate should eliminate feed­
back effects— the effects of tax-change-induced variations
in the tax base, and hence in tax revenues. Therefore, the
evaluation is made on the basis of levels of personal




income or corporate profits (or other relevant tax bases)
prevailing in the period before the tax change becomes
effective. This figure is then multiplied by 90 per cent in
order to obtain an estimate of the initial and direct effect
on aggregate spending of the tax rate change itself.3 The
over-all impact of fiscal operations in any period is said
to be stimulative when the net outcome of changes on the
expenditures and tax sides so computed is positive. When
the net outcome is negative, fiscal operations are said to
be restrictive.
It should be noted explicitly that the fiscal impact
measure developed here differs conceptually both from
levels of the actual surplus or deficit—however measured
in terms of the standard budget accounts— and from
changes in the surplus or deficit. The amount of the
deficit at any one time depends of course on the level of
expenditures relative to revenues, while the present con­
cept takes into account changes in both expenditures and
tax laws. Moreover, since the level of the standard deficits
depends upon the level of revenues actually realized
rather than merely upon changes in the tax laws, it is the
net result of two factors: the effects of the budget on the
economy, and the effects of the economy on the budget.
The latter represents mainly the previously mentioned
feedback of changes in personal income and corporate
profits on the tax receipts of the Federal Government.
Since the present procedure seeks to measure the “in­
dependent” impact of budget changes on the economy,
this independent effect must be isolated from the feed­
back effects.
The same factors account for the conceptual difference
between changes over time in the realized deficit or surplus
on the one hand, and the present measure on the other hand.
Changes in the deficit, of course, depend upon changes
in expenditures and changes in realized revenues. The
measure developed here does make use of changes in ex­
penditures, but on the revenues side it records only the
effects on income due to changes in tax laws. Suppose, for

3 The 90 per cent figure is based on the fact that consumers on
average tend to lay out a little more than 90 per cent of their after­
tax (or “disposable”) income for “personal consumption expen­
ditures”, while the remainder of disposable income is saved. This
90 per cent weight was also — somewhat arbitrarily — applied
to the dollar amounts released by corporate tax reductions. Avail­
able data were not helpful in determining a more appropriate weight
for corporate tax changes. Imperfect as it is, this method does allow
for the virtual certainty that tax reductions (and increases) have a
slightly smaller initial impact on the economy than expenditure
increases (and reductions). The alternative of treating personal and
corporate tax cuts as equivalent to expenditure increases (and tax
increases as equivalent to expenditure reductions) would most likely
lead to overestimates of the fiscal impact from tax changes.

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

143

Some further limitations of the procedure should be
mentioned explicitly. First, it does not yield a measurement
of the adequacy of fiscal policy in attaining full employment
goals. Second, this measure gives no indication of the effect
on the economy that occurs through the growth of Gov­
ernment revenues with the growth in the economy. (The
“full employment surplus” concept does give such an indi­
cation, as noted earlier.) The present analysis skirts these
issues by concentrating strictly on the narrower question
whether changes in the budget are tending to push up or
pull down aggregate demand from the level of the pre­
ceding period. Naturally, this also means the sacrifice of
L IM IT A T IO N S OF B A SIC A P P R O A C H
some of the valuable results yielded by the “full em­
Since the procedure is designed solely to measure the ployment budget” analysis.
initial and direct effects of changes in fiscal operations on
Third, the technique described here does not take
aggregate demand, a change in expenditures or in tax rates account of the impact of fiscal operations on the capital
is allowed to affect the computations only for the period in market, interest rates, or liquidity. For example, a fiscal
which the change takes effect. If the expenditures or tax program that is stimulative in terms of the present analysis
change remains in effect during subsequent periods, the might— though need not— involve a cash deficit requiring
economy will of course behave differently in those periods the flotation of additional Government securities. This
than if the change had never been made. In the present additional supply of securities in the market might, in
technique, however, the test is whether additional stimu­ turn, tend to push up interest rates, make funds more ex­
lus is being provided relative to the previous period. pensive for private borrowers, and possibly discourage
Thus, the assumption is made that a tax cut or an in­ private demands for funds. This process could con­
crease in expenditures will raise aggregate demand to a new ceivably offset part or all of the fiscal stimulus as here
higher level during the period in which the budgetary measured. Therefore, such possibilities should be explored
change occurs. The mere continuance of a tax cut or of an in a more nearly complete analysis of fiscal effects on the
already elevated level of expenditures in subsequent economy than that here given.
periods is not considered as an additional stimulus causing
Fourth, the present technique cannot, of course, take
demand to rise still further.4
any account of the “psychological” effects of fiscal opera­
Thus, the technique does not deal with the secondary tions. There is no way of attaching a dollar-and-cents fig­
repercussions of fiscal operations. This is certainly not to ure to the contribution to business optimism in much of
deny the occurrence of such repercussions. It is usually 1963 made by the widely held expectation that a tax cut
assumed that additional disposable income resulting would eventually be enacted. Similarly, the prospect of a
from a tax cut will be spent and that the additional in­ particularly large budgetary deficit might introduce a note
comes so generated will go on to stimulate still fur­ of uneasiness into business sentiment that could not be
ther spending, via the so-called “multiplier” process. readily measured.
This process is likely to operate with lags. Therefore, the
In addition to these broad considerations, two par­
economy may continue to move up in subsequent periods ticularly thorny technical problems concerning the data
as a result of the initial momentum generated by a tax had to be resolved and should be mentioned before the
cut even though no further cuts take place. An analysis of results are presented. (Most of the technical problems are
the precise size and timing of these secondary effects left for the Appendix.) One of these problems concerns
would be both necessary and worthwhile to attempt, but the treatment of Federal lending activity; the other in­
would go beyond the bounds of this article.
volves the treatment of corporate taxes.
Federal lending obviously shares some, but not all, of
the characteristics of outright expenditures. On the one
hand, it is in fact stimulative insofar as the borrowers will
spend much, if not all, of the proceeds on goods and
4 In somewhat the same sense, a rise in business spending on plant
and equipment may be thought of as a stimulus for aggregate services. On the other hand, the borrowers assume a
demand to rise in the period in which it occurs and yet not be liability which may dampen the stimulative effects sig­
counted as a further stimulus if plant and equipment outlays re­
nificantly. There is no clear-cut answer to the question
main at the same higher level in subsequent periods.
example, that expenditures change by a constant amount
from year to year and that there are no changes in the tax
laws. In such a case, the concept here developed would
show a constant amount of fiscal stimulus in each year,
which would correspond to the change in expenditures. If
the economy were growing, however, actual tax receipts
would be growing from year to year. Hence the actual
deficit or surplus and changes in these figures would
probably vary from year to year, while the present measure
would remain constant, as noted.




144

MONTHLY REVIEW, JULY 1965

whether Federal lending should be included in or ex­
cluded from the fiscal stimulus. Therefore, the figures are
given on both bases. (Further difficult problems related
to the impact of Federal lending are treated in the Ap­
pendix.)
In the case of corporate tax changes, the issues—
which are also treated more fully in the Appendix— re­
volve around the choice of the proper basis for the tim­
ing of the impact of such changes. It makes a great deal
of difference whether one chooses the time of accrual of
tax liabilities or the time of cash payments. In the ab­
sence of a convincing rationale for the exclusive choice
of either basis, a simple arithmetic average of the two
possibilities was computed for the present purpose.

Table I
INITIAL EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET ON
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
Seasonally adjusted at annual rates; in billions of dollars

C alendar
years by
h alf years

1960:

1961:

1962:

1963:

RESULTS
1964:

The present technique yields the figures of the chart
and of Table I for the effects of changes in the Federal

1 .............................

Fiscal effects
(excluding net Federal lending)

Fiscal effects
(in clu d in g net Federal lending)

From
expendi­
tu re
changes

From
tax
changes

Total
fiscal
effects

From
expendi­
tu re
changes

- 0 .4

- 1 .9

- 2 .3

2 .............................

2 .7

—

1 .............................

4 .8

—

From
tax
changes

T otal
fiscal
effects

2 .0

- 1 .9

0 .1

2 .7

2 .2

—

2 .2

4 .8

6 .0

—

6 .0
4 .6

2 .............................

2 .7

—

2 .7

4 .6

—

1 .............................

5 .5

- 0 .5

5 .0

4 .1

- 0 .5

3 .6

2 .............................

2 .0

2 .0

4 .0

0 .9

2 .0

2 .9

1 .............................

3 .1

— 2.1

1 .0

3 .4

— 2.1

1.3

2 .............................

1 .3

—

1.3

2 .4

—

2 .4

1 .............................

3 .0

5 .4

8 .4

1 .0

5 .4

6 .4

2 .............................

0 .4

3 .9

4 .3

1 .2

3 .9

5.1

Note: Absence of a sign denotes fiscal stimulus; a negative sign denotes a re­
strictive effect. Increases in expenditures or tax cuts are positive, decreases in
expenditures or tax rises negative. The initial effect from expenditures is the
period-to-period change in a series derived in Table II. The initial effect
from taxes is the change in after-tax income due to tax revisions calculated
in Tables III, IV and V (Tables II-V are in the Appendix).
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York from United States Treasury data.

INITIAL EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET
ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
S e aso n ally adjusted at annual rates b y calendar half years
Billions of dollars

8

-i

Billions of dollars

i

r~f\^

8

E x clu sive o f the net effects
o f F e deral le n d in g

_L

J ______ I______ 1______ I______ I_____

I

E FFECTS F R O M E X P E N D IT U R E C H A N G E S

I

E xclusive o f the net effects
o f F e deral le n d in g

U

i

In c lu siv e o f the net e ffe c t s /
_ o f F e d e ral le n d in g .

1st

2 nd

1960

1st

2 nd

1961

1st

2 nd

3962

1st

2 nd

1963

1st

2nd

1964

Note: Positive changes denote fiscal stimulus; negative changes denote a restrictive effect.
Source: FederalReserveBankof New York fromUnitedStatesTreasury data.




budget in the calendar years 1960-64. At the beginning of
the period for which calculations were made, i.e., in early
1960, budgetary changes were moving in the direction of
restrictiveness as a result of an increase in social security
taxes without any expenditures stimulus. The calculations
suggest, however, that since that time changes in the Fed­
eral budget have been stimulative in each half-year period,
regardless of whether the calculation includes or excludes
the Government’s loan operations.
Nevertheless, there have been significant fluctuations in
the degree of stimulus occasioned by budgetary changes
during the period under review. Generally, the effects of
budgetary changes became gradually less stimulative be­
tween early 1961 and early 1963 but considerably more
stimulative thereafter. This pattern is primarily the result
of declining amounts of stimulus from changes in expendi­
tures after 1961, followed by the significantly expansionary
tax cut in 1964. Because that tax cut fell into early 1964,
this period emerges as the most stimulative within the five
years for which calculations were made.
It is interesting to note that the inclusion of net Federal
lending activities in expenditures tends to smooth out some
of the fluctuations in stimulus produced by changes in out­
right expenditures. Moreover, the broader measure was to
some degree stimulative in each of the periods since 1960

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

—most particularly in early 1961, when business activity
reached the trough of a recession. The measure excluding
loans shows sharper variations from period to period and
suggests that expenditures changes were most expansionary
not in early 1961 but in early 1962.
As was noted earlier, there is no reason to expect the
numerical value of changes in the realized deficit from
period to period to be the same as the numerical value of
the present measure for comparable periods. Indeed, the
differences have in fact been rather marked over the past
few years. For example, the half-yearly changes in the
cash deficit (at annual rates) have ranged from plus $1.7
billion to minus $1.9 billion in the 1962-64 period. The
measure developed here, in contrast, has been positive
throughout this period, ranging for the half years (at annual
rates) from a low of $1.3 billion to a high of $6.4 billion
(including net Federal lending), and from a low of $1.0
billion to a high of $8.4 billion (excluding net Federal
lending).
T E C H N IC A L A P P E N D IX

The conceptual content of the measure of fiscal impact
developed here requires information as exact as may be
obtainable on the timing of the economic effect of Gov­
ernment expenditures and taxation: just when do outlays
become an income flow to the private sector of the econ­
omy, and when do taxes become a withdrawal of income
from the private economy? Unfortunately, many of the of­
ficial series on important components of the budget are not
entirely satisfactory in this respect. Therefore, a com­
promise series had to be developed, based on information
available in different sets of published data.

e x p e n d i t u r e s . W hat data to use? With respect to in­
clusiveness, the expenditures figures listed in either the cash
budget or the national income accounts budget are about
equally satisfactory. Both cover virtually all Government
payments to the private sector, though the national income
accounts data do not include Government loans and though
there is considerable “netting” of receipts and expenditures
in both budgets.5 Administrative budget statistics, on the
other hand, are not particularly useful for the analysis
presented here, since they do not include the operations

145

of the social insurance funds or of the Government’s other
trust fund accounts.
As already suggested, the construction of a series in
which expenditures are dated at the time of their im­
pact on incomes presents a difficult problem. Cash bud­
get data are not quite satisfactory for three reasons.
First, the bulk of spending for the farm price support pro­
gram has an income effect at a time other than the time
of listing as a cash expenditure. These outlays are recorded
in the cash budget when farmers default on their crop
loans and forfeit their crops to the Commodity Credit
Corporation.6 Yet, the income effect of these loans prob­
ably occurs several months earlier when the farmers
initially borrow the funds.
Second, “payment” in cash budget terminology means
that the check issued by the Treasury has actually been
cleared through the banking system, whereas the income
effect probably occurs when the person or firm receiving
the check cashes or deposits it. Although the time lag
between check issuance and check clearance is relatively
short, the magnitude of the fluctuations in outstanding
checks in the clearing accounts can be substantial, par­
ticularly around the end of a fiscal year.
Third, no data are published which permit, on a sea­
sonally adjusted basis, a separation of expenditures under
the Government’s lending programs from other expendi­
tures. The necessity for such a separation stems from the
difficulties surrounding the measurement of the fiscal im­
pact from changes in Government loans. Unlike the recipi­
ents of outright expenditures, the recipients of loans incur
a financial liability to the Government. Moreover, some
types of lending programs— such as those of the Federal
National Mortgage Association— are so operated as to
influence primarily credit conditions rather than expendi­
tures in the private sector; and some loans made to foreign
borrowers may have a smaller direct impact on the Amer­
ican economy than other types of loans or outright
expenditures. Nevertheless, the bulk of Federal lending
consists of loans which would not otherwise be available
and generates additional spending by the recipients (or,
in periods of net repayments to the Government, sub­
tracts from spending that would otherwise take place).
The analysis developed here skirts the issue by the cal­
culation of two separate measures of fiscal effects— one
excluding loans, the other including loans.

6 It should be understood that this “default” is actually one major
5 Expenditures for the Post Office are a case in point. These are way in which the farm price support program is implemented. It is
included in both budgets as net of receipts of income from the sales a type of default that, in its implications, does not correspond to
of stamps and of other postal services.
defaults on private bank loans.




146

MONTHLY REVIEW, JULY 1965
Table n
DERIVATION OF FISCAL EFFECTS FROM CHANGES IN FEDERAL EXPENDITURES
Seasonally adjusted at annual rates; in billions of dollars

C alendar
years by
half years

N ational income accounts
expenditures

Excess of
in te rest accru als
over paym ents

Excess of
deliveries
over paym ents

(1)

(2)

(3)

1959: 2..........................

92,4

0.8

- 0 .8

1960: 1...........................

91.7

0.3

- 0 .6
- 0 .1

Modified cash
expenditures

Modified cash
e xpenditures
including loans

(4 )+ (6 )

Fiscal effects
of modified cash
expenditures
including loans*

(7)

(8)

(1)—(2) —(3)

Fiscal effects
of modified
cash expenditures*

Net
Federal
lending

(4)

(5)

(6)

92.4

—

0.7

93.1

—

92.0

- 0 .4

3.1

95.1

2.0
2.2

2...........................

94.7

0.1

94.7

2.7

2.6

97.3

1961: 1...........................

100.8

0.3

1.0

99.5

4.8

3.8

103.3

6.0

2...........................

104.3

0.5

1.6

102.2

2.7

5.7

107.9

4.6

1962: 1...........................

109.5

0.7

1.1

107.7

5.5

4.3

112.0

4.1

2..........................

111.4

0.9

0.8

109.7

2.0

3.2

112.9

0.9

I

1963: 1..........................

114.6

0.9

0.9

112.8

3.1

3.5

116.3

3.4

2...........................

115.8

0.9

0.8

114.1

1.3

4.6

118.7

2.4

1964: 1..........................

118.7

0.8

0.8

117.1

3.0

2.6

119.7

1.0

2...........................

119.7

0.8f

1.4t

117.5

0.4

3.4f

120.9

1.2

* Figures shown are period-to-period changes in preceding column,
f Estimated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Source: The data through 1963 are from the July 1964 issue of the Survey of Current Business with seasonal adjustments of columns 2, 3, and 6 by the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York. The adjustments for the first half of 1964 were derived as the difference between the totals for fiscal 1964 listed in the Budget
Document for fiscal 1966 (and other sources) and the totals for the second half of 1963. National income accounts expenditures for 1964 are available in the
February issue of the Survey of Current Business.

The national income accounts budget also has its short­
comings as a source of expenditures data in terms of the
present concept, most particularly because of the dating
of expenditures. To be sure, price support payments to
farmers are recorded as of the time the loan is made
rather than when it goes into default, and checks are re­
corded when issued rather than when cleared. On the other
hand, a number of expenditures items are listed in the na­
tional income accounts budget either as of the time of
delivery of the goods to the Government (which may post­
date the cash income effect), or when payments accrue to
the private sector (which may precede the cash income
effect).
The national income accounts data do, however, pro­
vide a “clean” seasonally adjusted expenditures series
(excluding the Government’s lending operations). As a
practical matter, therefore, it is simpler to start with the
national income accounts data rather than with the cash
budget data. What follows, therefore, is a summary of the
steps taken in adjusting the published expenditures data
in the national income accounts budget to the “modified
cash” basis needed for the present analysis.
Derivation o f m odified cash expenditures. In col­
umn 1 of Table II, expenditures in the national income
accounts budget are listed by half years at seasonally ad­




justed annual rates.7 Many of the adjustments of these
data that might be made to arrive at the measure needed
for the present analysis are so small or so stable from
period to period that they may be safely ignored. The
two major adjustments that cannot be ignored are shown
in columns 2 and 3 of the table.8
The first of these adjustments, shown in column 2,
concerns the dating of interest payments. The national
income accounts budget lists interest on the Federal debt
as an expenditure as interest accrues. The effect on pri­
vate income, however, occurs when interest is actually
paid out and is so listed in the cash budget. In order to

7 Historical data for expenditures in the national income accounts
budget are available by quarters and the adjustments needed are
available by half years in the various July issues of the Survey of
Current Business. Annual data, including the Administration’s pro­
jections for the coming fiscal year, are published in the Budget Docu­
ment, the Economic Report of the President, and the February
issue of the Survey of Current Business.
8 Among the adjustments that have been ignored are expenditures
for the District of Columbia (these are recorded as state and local
expenditures in the national income accounts budget), and such
adjustments for netting and consolidation as: contributions to Fed­
eral employee retirement funds by the Government and by Federal
employees, contributions to the veterans’ life insurance funds by the
Federal Government, and an adjustment for the receipt of interest
and for the proceeds of Government sales.

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

put interest payments in the national income accounts
on a cash budget basis, the excess of interest accruals
over interest payments, shown in column 2, should be
removed from total expenditures. A similar problem
occurs with respect to the payment for goods purchased
by the Government. The national income accounts budget
contains these payments when goods are actually de­
livered to the Government, but the impact is more likely
to occur when cash payments for the goods are made,
whether or not they have been delivered at that point. The
adjustment which places expenditures on a payments
basis is listed in column 3.
The two adjustments just described, and the total for
loans shown in column 6 of Table II, are part of the reg­
ular public record, but only in amounts unadjusted for
seasonal variation. The seasonally adjusted data shown
in the table were developed at this Bank.9
Subtraction of the adjustments in columns 2 and 3 from
the data in column 1 yields the “modified cash” version
of expenditures listed in column 4 of Table II. Half-yearly
changes in these modified cash expenditures are shown in
column 5 as the fiscal effects from the expenditures side of
the budget excluding the Government’s lending operations.
The addition to column 4 of Government loans, shown in
column 6, gives a measure of modified cash expenditures
including loans. These are shown in column 7, and halfyearly changes in this total, or the fiscal effects including
loans, are shown in column 8.

What accounting basis? The choice of an ac­
counting basis by which to measure taxes presents an even
thornier problem than in the case of expenditures. The
main problem relates to corporate taxes since the use of
different possible bases typically results in substantial vari­
ations in the figures.
The cash budget counts tax revenues when they are
received by the Government; the national income accounts
budget lists some types of taxes when they accrue. In the
case of corporate taxes, this difference in timing can
lead to widely disparate revenues totals in the two bud­
gets for the same period because of the considerable lag
between the time when corporations accrue taxes and the
ta x es.

147

time when these are paid.10 As an example, during early
1964 the effects of the Revenue Act of 1964 could be
considered either restrictive or stimulative as regards cor­
porate taxes, depending upon the basis used for measure­
ment. On a liabilities basis the law provided for a
corporate tax cut during the first half of 1964 of $1.4
billion, but on a cash payments basis the law resulted in
a temporary increase in tax payments of $0.6 billion for
the period, due to a speedup in the payments schedule
(both figures given at seasonally adjusted annual rates).
Similarly, the Budget Bureau has estimated that the dif­
ference between corporate tax accruals and corporate tax
payments for fiscal 1966 will amount to $2.9 billion.
These differences have, of course, substantive implica­
tions for a measure of the effect of budgetary changes on
the economy as of the time when that impact is ini­
tially felt. More particularly, accuracy on the tax side
requires some knowledge of whether the relevant impact
upon corporations occurs as they incur the tax liabilities
or as they actually make the tax payments. There is little
empirical evidence on this issue. Therefore, the analysis
presented here is based on a compromise. The estimates
shown are a simple arithmetic average of corporate tax
changes on an accrual basis and on a payments basis. No
such averaging procedure appears to be necessary in the
case of personal income tax changes. There is fairly gen­
eral agreement that individuals react to their tax pay­
ments rather than their tax liabilities.
The remainder of this Appendix summarizes the esti­
mate of the initial effects of individual and corporate
after-tax incomes stemming from recent tax law changes.
In each case, the effect is measured in terms of the
change in taxes at the level of income prevailing in the
previous period rather than as the simple period-toperiod change in tax receipts.
Changes in individual tax rates. Social security taxes
and personal income taxes have undergone major
changes since 1960. Social security rates were increased
three times during the 1960-64 period. The Social Se­
curity Administration has estimated the amounts of these
increases at annual rates of $2.1 billion in 1960, $0.5
billion in 1962, and $2.3 billion in 1963. Each of these

10 Until 1964, large corporations were not required to make any
actual tax payments on income earned during a given calendar year
9 The formula (A -j- 2B -f C)
4, in which A represents the until September of that year. Indeed, the largest portion of their
previous period, B the current period, and C the succeeding period,
tax bill was not paid until the following March and June. (The
has been used to obtain a “seasonally adjusted” figure for period B. somewhat different schedule for fiscal-year corporations does not
The half-yearly totals are converted to annual rates by multiplying materially affect this point.) In the national income accounts budget,
by 2.
however, taxes for any period are listed as the liability is accrued.




MONTHLY REVIEW, JULY 1965

148

rate changes became effective on January 1 of the year
indicated. Thus, the impact of the changes is listed in
Table III for the first half of these three years. Although
each tax rate change remained permanently in effect,
there was no additional curtailment of incomes sub­
sequent to the initial introduction of the increase, and
therefore no tax change is listed in Table III for the suc­
ceeding half-year period or for later periods.
The Revenue Act of 1964, of course, provided for a
substantial cut in personal income tax rates. To imple­
ment the cut, the basic withholding rate was reduced from
18 per cent to 14 per cent, effective in early March of
1964. At the level of personal income prevailing in cal­
endar 1963, and given the amount of income taxes ac­
tually withheld at that income level, this reduction in the
withholding rate would have provided individuals with
an additional $8.9 billion (annual rate) in after-tax in­
come. Because the effective date of the withholding rate
cut occurred in March 1964, or roughly two months after
the first half of the year had begun, the amount of the
tax cut for that half year is listed in Table III at an an­
nual rate of only $5.6 billion. In the second half of the
year, however, the lower withholding rate covered the
entire period. Hence the table lists an additional stimulus
for the second half, which reflects the difference between
the application of the lower rates to six months as
against only about four months.
The net effects of the changes in social security and
personal income taxes are shown in the last column of

Table III
CHANGES IN INDIVIDUAL TAXES
Seasonally adjusted at annual rates; in billions of dollars
Calendar
years by
half years

1960:

1

................................

Social
security

Revenue A ct
of 1 9 6 4

+ 2 .1

T otal

+ 2 .1

2 .........................................
1961:

1

................................

2 .........................................
1962:

1

..............................

+ 0 .5

+ 0 .5

+ 2 .3

+ 2 .3

2 ..........................................
19 6 3 :

1

................................

2 ..........................................
1964:

1

...............................

2 ..........................................

__

— 5 .6

— 5 .6

- 3 .3

- 3 .3

Note: A minus sign denotes a reduction in taxes, a positive sign an increase
in taxes.
Source: Estimates released by the United States Treasury Department and the
Social Security Administration, or based upon the Treasury’s estimates.




Table III. As previously explained, these figures should
be adjusted to allow for the fact that some of this after­
tax income released was saved rather than spent and thus
did not have a direct impact upon aggregate output.
Therefore, these figures were multiplied by 90 per cent
before including them in the final estimate of the total
fiscal effect from taxes, shown later on in Table V. (The
reversal of signs in Table V reflects the fact that a tax cut
is stimulative, while a tax increase is restrictive.)
Corporate tax rate changes. Since 1960, there have
been several tax changes affecting corporations— the in­
vestment tax credit, effective in 1962; the liberalization
of depreciation allowances, also effective in 1962; and the
Revenue Act of 1964, which provided for a two-stage tax
cut and the acceleration of corporate tax payments.
The dollar value of the tax reduction generated by the
investment tax credit of 1962 has been estimated at an
annual rate of $1.0 billion, while the liberalization of
depreciation allowances brought about a tax reduction of
$1.2 billion (both figures based on 1962 income levels).11
These estimates of the change in tax liabilities are shown
in the first two columns of Table IV. Because both these
tax features became effective in the second half of 1962,
the timing of the reduction in cash payments largely
coincided with the reduction in tax liabilities (or accru­
als). These two reduction measures, of course, remain
in effect, but once again the logic of the “initial” impact
measure requires that these tax changes be shown as
affecting only the second half of 1962, which is done in
Table IV.
Corporate income taxes were also reduced by the Reve­
nue Act of 1964. Calculation of the effects of this reduc­
tion is somewhat more complicated than in the case of
the earlier tax measures. First, the effective date of the
cut in liabilities preceded that in tax payments. Second,
the Act also provided for some acceleration of tax pay­
ments. On the basis of 1963 profit levels, the Treasury
has calculated that the value of the over-all reduction in
corporate tax liabilities will amount to about $2.5 billion
when fully effective in 1965. A little more than half this
total, or about $1.4 billion, was estimated as applic­
able to calendar 1964, effective as of the first half of the
year. This number is shown in the third column of Table
IV, which is on a liabilities basis. Tax payments, on the
other hand, did not begin to reflect the effects of the rate

11 All figures in this section are based on official United States
Treasury estimates.

149

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

reduction until the second half of 1964. Thus, column
6 of Table IV, which shows the effects of the reduction
in rates on a payments basis, lists the $1.4 billion figure
for the second half of 1964.
The Revenue Act of 1964 also provided that corpora­
tions make two “advance” income tax payments— in
April and in June— on income earned during the same
calendar year. These two payments were in addition to
the traditional September and December advance pay­
ments. Between 1964 and 1970, the size of each of these
new payments is scheduled to increase from 1 per cent
to 25 per cent of the estimated tax liability for the given
current year. In the long run, this provision affects only
the timing of payments rather than the amount and will
result in a closer correspondence of actual tax payments
with accrued tax liabilities. But during the transition
years, payments in any given half-year period are affected
significantly. More specifically, corporate tax payments
will tend to be relatively higher in the first half of each
calendar year when corporations will make both the nor-

Table IV
CHANGES IN CORPORATE TAXES
Seasonally adjusted at annual rates; in billions of dollars
Changes in lia b ilitie s

Calendar
years by
h a lf years

Changes in cash paym ents

Invest­
Lib­
L ib­
Invest­
m ent
eralized
eralized
m ent
ta x
depreci­ Revenue
tax
d epreci­
c re d it a tio n of A ct of
atio n
cre d it
of 1 9 6 2
1962
1964
of 1 9 6 2 of 1 9 6 2
(1 )

(2 )

1 9 6 0 : 1 ................

(3 )

(4 )

Average
of lia ­
b ilitie s
and pay­
m ents
Speedup
bases

Revenue A ct
of 1 9 6 4
Rates

(5 )

(6 )

—

—

(7 )

|

(8 )

__

~~ i

2 ................
1 9 6 1 : 1 ................

—

2 ................

—

—
—

1 9 6 2 : 1 .................
2 ................

- 1 .0

1 9 6 3 : 1 .................
z

- 1 .2

—

—

—

—

—

— 1.0

- 1 .2

—

—

- 2 .2

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

+ 0 .6

- 0 .4

- 0 .6

- 1 .0

............

1 9 6 4 : 1................
2 ................

1

—

- 1 .4
—

—

—

- 1 .4

Note: A minus sign denotes a reduction in taxes, a positive sign an increase
in tax payments.
Source: Estimates released by the United States Treasury Department or based
upon the Treasury’s estimates.




Table V
DERIVATION OF FISCAL EFFECTS FROM CHANGES IN
FEDERAL TAXES
Seasonally adjusted at annual rates; in billions of dollars

Individual
ta x changes

Corporate
tax changes

Fiscal
effects of
tax changes

( 1)

(2 )

(3 )

- 1 .9

—

— 1.9

1 ..........................................

—

—

—

Calendar
years by
h alf years

1960:

1 ..........................................
n

1961:

1962:

1963:

1964:

1 ..........................................

- 0 .5

—

2 ..........................................

—

+ 2 .0

+ 2 .0

1 ..........................................

- 2 .1

—

- 2 .1

1 ..........................................

4 - 5 .0

+ 0 .4

+ 5 .4

2 ..........................................

+ 3 .0

+ 0 .9

+ 3 .9

- 0 .5

Sources: Tables III and IV, with actual amounts of tax changes listed in those
tables multiplied by 90 per cent to reflect the assumed initial effects of the
changes in taxes on spending (and with signs reversed to reflect the inverse
relationship of tax changes from the budgetary point of view as against their
fiscal effects).

mal final payments on profits earned in the preceding year
and two additional payments on estimated profits for the
current year. Thus, in column 7 of Table IV, an increase
in tax payments of $0.6 billion is shown as occurring in
the first half of 1964— the result of the speedup— fol­
lowed by a reduction in payments of $0.6 billion in the
second half (to reflect the fact that higher payments in
the first half do not also remain in force for the second
half of the year).
The last column of Table IV shows the “compromise”
effect of the changes in corporate taxes over the 1960-64
period (calculated simply by taking the arithmetic average
of the effects on a liabilities basis and on a seasonally ad­
justed cash basis). Following the same procedure that
was applied to the effects of changes in individual tax
rates, these compromise figures are multiplied by 90 per
cent, the signs are reversed, and the results shown in col­
umn 2 of Table V. The last column in Table V, which
is reproduced in Table I and is also plotted in the chart,
shows the total initial effects of the changes that have oc­
curred in the individual and corporate tax laws over the
1960-64 period.

MONTHLY REVIEW, JULY 1965

Publications of the Federal R eserve Bank of N ew Y ork
The following is a selected list of publications available free (except where a charge is indicated)
from the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, N. Y. 10045.
Copies of charge publications are available at half price to educational institutions.
1.

F E D E R A L RESERVE

O P E R A T IO N S I N

THE

M ONEY

AND

G O V E R N M E N T S E C U R IT IE S M A R K E T S

(1956) by Robert V. Roosa. A 105-page booklet describing how Federal Reserve operations are con­
ducted through the Trading Desk in execution of the directions of the Federal Open Market Committee.
Discusses the interrelation of short-term technical and long-range policy factors in day-to-day operations.
Has sections on the role of the national money market, its instruments and institutions, trading procedures in
the Government securities market, what the Trading Desk does, the use of projections and the “feel” of
the market, and operating liaison with the Federal Open Market Committee.
2. t h e m o n e y s i d e o f “ t h e s t r e e t ” (1959) by Carl H. Madden. A 104-page booklet giving
a layman’s account of the workings of the New York money market and seeking to convey an under­
standing of the functions and usefulness of the short-term wholesale money market and of its role in the
operations of the Federal Reserve. 70 cents per copy.
3. d e p o s i t v e l o c i t y a n d i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e (1959) by George Garvy. An 88-page booklet dis­
cussing the behavior of deposit velocity, over the business cycle and over long periods, with emphasis on
the institutional and structural forces determining its behavior. 60 cents per copy.
4. M O N E T A R Y P O L IC Y U N D E R T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L GOLD S T A N D A R D , 1880-1914 (1959) by
Arthur I. Bloomfield. A 62-page booklet analyzing, in the light of current monetary and banking theory,
the performance and policies of central banks within the framework of the pre-1914 gold standard.
50 cents per copy.
5. o p e n m a r k e t o p e r a t i o n s (1963) by Paul Meek. A 43-page booklet describing for the inter­
ested layman or undergraduate student how open market operations in United States Government securities
are used to cope with monetary stresses and promote a healthy economy.
6. e s s a y s i n m o n e y a n d c r e d i t (1964). A 76-page booklet containing eleven essays on tech­
nical problems of monetary policy, Treasury debt and cash operations, and the Federal Reserve’s daily
work. It also contains several analyses of money and securities market instruments and of banking prob­
lems and policies. 40 cents per copy.
7. t r e a s u r y a n d f e d e r a l r e s e r v e f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e o p e r a t i o n s : m a r c h 1961 - a u g u s t
1964 (1964) by Charles A. Coombs. A 47-page consolidated reprint of five reports on the title subject
that appeared earlier in the Federal Reserve Bulletin and the Monthly Review. 50 cents per copy.
8. t h e n e w y o r k f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e m a r k e t (1965) by Alan R. Holmes and Francis H.
Schott. A 64-page booklet about the New York market for foreign exchange, and the large exchange opera­
tions in that market. 50 cents per copy.

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of New York, New York, N. Y. 10045.