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MONTHLY REVIEW
Of Credit and Business Conditions

FEDERAL
V o lu m e

34

RESERVE

BANK

OF

NEW

YORK

APRIL1952

No. 4

M O N E Y M A R K E T IN M A R C H
Money market conditions ranged from moderate tightness
to extreme ease during the tax-payment month of March.
The heavy demands on the market that some observers had
expected to result from preparations for corporation tax pay­
ments on March 15 failed to materialize, although Federal
Reserve discount facilities were used rather extensively by
member banks on several days during the first half of the
month to obtain needed reserves. Reserve positions of member
banks in New York City and throughout the country eased
sharply around the middle of the month as the result of a large
increase in float and of Treasury cash outlays substantially in
excess of cash receipts (financed in part by special short-term
certificates of indebtedness sold directly to the Federal Reserve
Banks). The excess reserves of the banks rose to unusually
high levels, but collections of tax checks, supplemented by
large Treasury withdrawals from its deposit accounts in the
banks, along with the usual month-end contraction of float,
reduced member bank reserves to near customary levels by the
end of the month.
After ten days of movement in a narrow range around the
February closing levels, the Government security market re­
sponded to a change in investors’ anticipations, and to the
developing ease in the money market, and firmed markedly
over most of the remainder of the month. Prices on all inter­
mediate and long-term securities at the close of March were
above the end-of-February quotations. Short-term yields
tended to increase in the closing days of the month as gradu­
ally tightening bank reserve positions reduced commercial
bank activity in the market.
Commercial bank business loans, after increasing slowly
in February, expanded somewhat more rapidly through March
19. As in the first two months of the year, loan increases were
largely for defense and defense-supporting activities, although
nondefense borrowing in March recovered somewhat after the
substantial declines in January and February. There was little
evidence of large-scale borrowing by corporations to meet their
March 15 tax liabilities.




M ember Ba n k R eserves

The tightness in the availability of funds that had developed
in late February continued to characterize bank reserve posi­
tions in the first two statement weeks of March. Although
not shown by the week-to-week changes in the following table,
relatively large changes in the amount of borrowing from the
Federal Reserve Banks occurred on several days during this
period. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York provided a
small amount of funds to the market in the second statement
week, mainly through repurchase agreements negotiated with
Government security dealers, but over the month as a whole
Federal Reserve open market operations were nominal in
volume.
Reserves available to the banking system increased sharply
in the third statement week, primarily as the result of
Treasury operations. Cash outlays for interest payments, for
redemption of unexchanged bonds maturing on the 15 th, and
for redemption of tax anticipation bills not presented in pay­
ment of taxes were substantially greater than the flow into
Treasury balances at the Reserve Banks from cash tax pay­
ments and calls on Tax and Loan Accounts held by member
banks. A tendency for cash tax collections to lag behind
previous rates of collection and the Treasury procedure of
crediting large tax checks to special Treasury " X ” balances
in the commercial banks, along with the very high Treasury
cash outlays, account for the magnitude of the spread between

CONTENTS
Money Market in March ....... *......................................... 45
Earnings and Expenses of the
Second District Member Banks...................................... 48
Survey of Ownership of Business and
Personal Demand Deposits ........................................... 50
Life Insurance Companies and the Security Markets.... 52
Preliminary Retail Credit Survey Results ....................... 56
Department Store Trade ..................................................... 57

46

M ONTHLY REVIEW, APRIL 1952
W e e k ly Changes in F actors Tending to Increase or D ecrease
M em ber B ank R eserves, M arch 1 952
(In m illions of d o lla rs; ( + ) denotes increase,
(— ) decrease in excess reserves)

Statement weeks ended
Factor

March
26

Four
weeks
ended
March
26

+
4
-5 5 0
+ 32
+
1
+
3

+ 740
- 58
+ 61
+ 159
- 53

+ 1,193

-5 0 9

+ 845

+16
-2 6

+
-

295
231

-2 9 7
+ 44

- 27
—252

March
5

March
12

Operating transactions
Treasury operations*.................
Federal Reserve float.................
Currency in circulation.............
Gold and foreign a ccou n t.........
Other deposits, e t c .....................

+ 58
+213
- 74
+103
-1 4 0

+31
-9 5
+ 12
+35
+ 22

+
+
+
+
+

T ota l.............................

+ 157

+ 4

-

41
39

-

80

Direct Federal Reserve credit trans­
actions
Government securities...............
Discounts and advances...........
T ota l.............................

March
19
617
374
91
20
62

-1 0

+

64

-2 5 3

-2 7 9

Total reserves...................
Effect of change in required reserves

+ 77
+ 29

- 6
+ 18

+ 1 ,2 5 7
376

-7 6 2
+101

+ 566
-2 2 8

Excess reserves..................................

+106

+12

+

-6 6 1

+ 338

881

N ote: Because of rounding, figures do not necessarily add to totals.
* Includes changes in Treasury currency and cash.

cash outlays and cash receipts around the middle of March.
Part of the funds for the net Treasury outlays was provided by
the sale of special short-term certificates of indebtedness to the
Federal Reserve System in anticipation of tax receipts; this
appears in the accompanying table as a System purchase of
Government securities. In all, Treasury operations provided
close to one billion dollars to the banking system in the week
ended March 19. The net Treasury outlays, in turn, were
primarily responsible for the expansion of deposits at member
banks and the resulting increase in required reserves. A large
increase in float during that week almost exactly offset the
increase in required reserves, and reserves acquired from other
operating sources offset the larger part of the reserves used in
the reduction of borrowings from the Federal Reserve Banks,
so that member bank excess reserves increased by almost 900
million dollars for the week.
Net Treasury receipts from cash tax collections and large
calls on Treasury balances with depositary banks in the week
ended March 26 were utilized to redeem most of the special
certificates of indebtedness still outstanding with the Federal
Reserve Banks and to meet regular Treasury disbursements.
The net drain on banking reserves was supplemented by a
large reduction in float and only partially offset by gains from
other factors, so that member bank excess reserves were re­
duced substantially in this week. Lower required reserves, as
Treasury deposits in the banks were reduced, were the most
important offset to the reduction in bank reserves. Over the
remaining days of the month, Treasury operations (including
full repayment of the special certificates) continued to absorb
funds, and member bank borrowing from the Federal Reserve
Banks increased moderately as reserve positions tightened.
The New York money market reflected the effects of the
large March 15 Treasury disbursements for most of the two
following weeks. Excess reserves of New York City banks




at the close of the statement week ended March 19 were above
400 million dollars, the highest level since January 1943.
Rates on Federal funds, which had remained close to the
Federal Reserve discount rate prior to the middle of the month,
fell to low levels for most of the two weeks ended March 26,
and even at these lower rates very little demand developed.
Many of the Federal funds transactions completed during
March involved out-of-town borrowers, since New York City
banks, except for a brief period in the second statement week,
were generally in possession of more than adequate reserve
balances. The developing tightness in the rest of the country
toward the close of the month was not immediately trans­
mitted to the New York City banks despite relatively large
transfers of funds out of the City through regular channels
and large Treasury calls on ‘'X ” balances. Since a dispropor­
tionately large part of the bigger tax checks are received in
New York, the City banks tend to hold a substantial share of
the "X ” balances to which the Treasury credits single checks
of over 10,000 dollars, and they subsequently suffer the greatest
loss of funds when pro rata calls are made on such balances.
Federal funds returned to well above 1 per cent by the
end of the month, a reflection of the reduced availability of
bank reserves, and short-term Government security yields rose.
T he G overnment Security M arket

The Government security market in March was more
notable for what did not happen than for what actually
occurred. Late in February there was some belief that the
large tax payments due on March 15 would create very tight
money market conditions, accompanied by generally higher
yields on Government securities. There also was some concern
as to the effects of the heavy volume of private financing
scheduled for March. Thus, through the first ten days of
March a tone of general uncertainty prevailed in the Govern­
ment security market as investors waited for the expected
appearance of corporation selling for tax purposes. Most inter­
mediate and longer-term prices remained approximately con­
stant in an inactive market during this period, while yields on
bills and the shorter certificates tended to edge upward. The
average discount on the Treasury bill dated March 6 (1.656
per cent) was somewhat above expectations and tended to
confirm the belief that the market was tightening.
However, the anticipated corporate selling failed to develop
in volume, and a re-evaluation of market prospects for the
month was indicated. The turning point in the market seems
to have been reached on March 10 with announcement of the
results of the bidding on the Treasury bill dated March 13.
Tenders received for this offering were in larger volume than
the market had anticipated, and the average issue rate of 1.784
per cent, while the highest since the January 3 issue, was well
below what many investors had expected. With this indication
that no serious oversupply of securities was in prospect, a firmer
tone developed at all maturities and some investors who had

47

FEDERAL RESERVE BAN K OF NEW YO R K

withheld funds in expectation of market stringency were
encouraged to move back into the market. Further buoyancy
was imparted to the market after the middle of the month as
bank reserve positions eased, releasing a substantial volume of
bank funds for short-period investment, and short-term yields
settled steadily to lower levels through the third and fourth
statement weeks. The bill issues dated March 20 and 27 were
allotted at average discounts of 1.601 and 1.592 per cent,
respectively. In the last few days of the month, a mild tighten­
ing in the New York money market resulted in some increase
in market yields on the shortest-maturity instruments, along
with a generally higher level of short-term yields, and at the
close of March yields in this area were approximately in line
with the pattern that has prevailed over the past several months.
Price changes in intermediate and long-term Treasury bonds
were moderately to sharply upward over the last half of March.
The longer-term, bank-eligible issues and the bonds that
become eligible for bank purchase in 1952 displayed particular
strength, registering gains of Y s to 1 1/ a of a point from their
February closing bid prices. Lengthening of bank portfolio
maturities and the generally improved anticipations of a variety
of investors were responsible for the activity in this sector of
the market. Many banks had maintained liquid portfolios in
expectation of heavy demands for bank credit over the March
15 tax date, and when this demand did not materialize in
expected volume, bank funds became available for security
investment. The buying interest in the eligible and soon-to-be
eligible bonds, moreover, may indicate that banks and other
investors believe that part of the funds currently available to
banks will not be needed to meet other demands for credit
in the immediate future. The longer, partially tax-exempt
bonds were generally up as much as Vi of a point, and the
extension of buying interest to the later-maturity, bankrestricted issues toward the close of the month resulted in
price increases of V a of a point in this sector of the market.
M e m b e r B a n k C r e d it

Business loan totals reported by member banks in 94 lead­
ing cities increased by 312 million dollars in the three state­
ment weeks ended March 19, in contrast with a decline of
3 million dollars over the four weeks in February and a decline
of 432 million dollars for the five weeks ended January 30.
Part of the increase in March may represent borrowing to pay
taxes. However, whatever volume of tax borrowing might be
included would appear to be small, and such loans certainly
did not reach the volume in March that had been expected in
some quarters. The pattern for the country as a whole thus
far in 1952 (as indicated by the special reports on larger loans
of the weekly reporting member banks, inaugurated last year
under the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program) has been one
of continuing increases in commercial loans to defense and
defense-supporting industries and moderate contraction of
nondefense loans. Borrowing by nondefense industries, accord­
ing to these special reports, showed a tendency to recover in




Chart I

Commercial and Industrial Loans in the Second District
by Purpose, June 1951-March 1952
(Cumulative weekly changes since May 30, 1951)

March after a total decline of about 670 million dollars in
January and February, and loans in this category for the three
weeks ended March 19 increased by 106 million dollars, while
defense and defense-supporting loans increased by 182 million
dollars.
Business lending by New York City banks also recorded a
net increase during March, and the 7,967 million dollars of
such loans on March 19 represents the highest level on record.
Nevertheless, the net increase to that date since the beginning
of the year amounted to only 34 million dollars, and this
increase was wiped out by a decline of 39 million dollars in
the week ended March 26. This compares with an increase of
531 million in the corresponding period last year. Chart I
illustrates the course of business lending by member banks in
the Second District, as reported by those banks which submit
weekly data on changes in their commercial and industrial
loan totals by purpose of the loan and business of the bor­
rower.1 In general outline, the Second District experience cor­
responds closely with that for the entire country. Defenserelated loans increased steadily during the last half of 1951
and through the first quarter of 1952. Nondefense borrow­
ing, after a seasonal lull in the summer of 1951, increased
during the fall and winter months, reaching a peak in late
December. It then contracted through January 1952, and
leveled off in February and March.
The pattern of lending by Second District banks to those
industries that have displayed the most marked changes in
credit needs is illustrated in Chart II. Loans to the metal and
metal products industries have expanded steadily through 1951
1 It should be noted that these data contain an upward bias since
they include only individual loans and repayments larger than a
certain minimum size, with the result that a loan repaid in instalments
might be included when it is made but not deducted when it is repaid.

48

MONTHLY REVIEW, APRIL 1952
Chart II

Commercial and Industrial Loans in the Second District
by Type of Borrower, June 1951-March 1952
(Cumulative weekly changes since May 30, 1951)

and thus far in 1952, largely reflecting the steady expansion
of defense-related credit. Loans to public utilities which, to
a lesser degree, also fall in the defense-related category, indi-

cate a smaller magnitude of change with a slight downward
drift since December. Among the loans primarily for non­
defense purposes, on the other hand, those to food-processing
industries and commodity dealers expanded rapidly in the latter
part of 1951 in conformity with the usual seasonal pattern and
then receded unevenly in the early months of 1952. Other busi­
ness categories that have reduced bank credit in the first quarter
of 1952, not shown on the chart, are the wholesale and retail
distributors and the sales finance companies. In both instances,
the reductions were related to lagging consumer sales and
attempts of businessmen to bring inventories into line with
the level of sales. Loans by Second District reporting banks
to borrowers in the textile and apparel industry have followed
the national pattern for this category. They declined at a
decreasing rate from the middle of 1951 through January of
this year and, in February and March, displayed a tendency to
level off or recover slightly.
The loan record for the first quarter of 1952, both for the
Second District and for the country as a whole, is in sharp
contrast with that for the same quarter of 1951 when a very
sharp loan expansion occurred. If the second quarter of this
year follows the usual seasonal pattern, still further reductions
in total business lending by banks may take place despite
expanding bank credit to satisfy defense needs.

EARNINGS AND EXPENSES OF THE SECOND DISTRICT MEMBER BANKS
Net profits of the Second District member banks after all
charges but before payment of dividends declined 10.0 million
dollars, or 5.0 per cent, in 1951 to 191.2 million dollars.1 In
the aggregate, larger allowances for income taxes, increased
reserves for loan losses, and a reduced level of security profits
and recoveries drew down net profits more than they were
increased by higher net current operating earnings. Among
the different size-groups of banks, however, the influence of
the various factors affecting net profits was very uneven. In
the central reserve New York City banks, the impact of heavier
taxation was especially severe but net profits declined the least
of any group (3.3 per cent) because these banks realized the
largest increase in net current operating earnings. In the banks
outside the City, on the other hand, the principal factor draw­
ing down net profits was the transition from net security profits
and recoveries in 1950 to net security losses in 1951, and the
reductions in net profits ranged from 3.6 per cent in the
smallest-sized banks to 14.1 per cent in the largest banks.
Among these groups, increased net current operating income
partially offset security losses in the largest-sized institutions,
1 Earnings and expense ratios and the ratios of net profits to capital
for the member banks in this District have been summarized in Cir­
cular No. 3832, entitled "Operating Ratios of Member Banks in the
Second Federal Reserve District for the Year 1951”. Copies of this
circular are available upon request from the Financial Statistics Divi­
sion, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York 45, N. Y.




whereas in the smaller banks net operating income declined
and accentuated the drop in net profits.
Total current operating earnings of the Second District
member banks increased 121.1 million dollars, or 15.4 per
cent, to a record peak of 908.8 million dollars. The bulk of
the rise stemmed from an increase of 116.0 million dollars,
or 32.5 per cent, in interest and discount earned on loans. All
groups of banks showed an increase in income from loans, but
the greatest gain (43.4 per cent) was recorded by the central
reserve New York City banks in which the effect of an above
average expansion in commercial loan volume was accentuated
by higher rates of interest and the reduced proportion of rela­
tively low-rate security loans. In the banks outside New York,
the rates of interest on loans are customarily higher than in
the City banks, to a considerable extent because of differences
in the types of loan business. Except to a minor extent, there­
fore, these banks were unable to follow the upward trend of
rates in the City. Consequently, the increases in their loan
income, which ranged from 15.2 per cent in the largest banks
to only 2.6 per cent in the smallest institutions, principally
reflected increases in loan volumes.
Interest received on United States Government obligations
declined by 9.2 per cent in the District as a whole, as the
member banks reduced their holdings to provide funds for
loan expansion and for the higher reserve requirements that

49

FEDERAL RESERVE B AN K OF NEW YO R K

payments were smaller and averaged between 4.3 per cent and
5.5 per cent in the various size-groups of banks. Interest pay­
ments on time and savings deposits increased 4.4 million dol­
lars, or 10.7 per cent, in the District as a whole, with the bulk
of the rise occurring in the largest banks and reflecting both
a larger volume of time deposits and higher effective rates of
interest. The larger banks serving the larger centers have had
to raise the effective rate of payment in order to meet the com­
petition of other depositary institutions; in the smaller com­
munities served by smaller commercial banks, competition
with other institutions is less severe and the effective rates of
payment have remained fairly steady. Other current expenses,
consisting principally of the expense of occupancy and main­
tenance of banking quarters, increased moderately in all groups
of banks, reflecting the higher prices for goods and services
that prevailed during the year. The increases in aggregate
current operating expenses were more than covered by larger
operating income in the New York City banks and in the larg­
est banks outside the City, but in the remaining groups, the
higher expenses were only partly met by larger income and
their net current operating earnings before income taxes
declined.
For the first time in the past decade, net losses or write­
downs on security holdings were a major factor reducing net

became effective in January and February 1951. However, the
percentage decline in income was less than the reduction in
average holdings, owing to the higher yields obtainable on the
short-term refunding issues offered in 1951, and to a modest
lengthening in the average maturity of the banks’ portfolios.
Interest and dividends received from "other securities” in­
creased by a substantial 16.0 per cent, entirely as a result of
larger investments in tax-exempt State and municipal obliga­
tions. Member bank purchases of such issues were undoubtedly
influenced by the increased value of the tax-exemption feature
during a period of rising income taxes and also by the higher
yields available on municipal obligations after the second
quarter of the year when the entire money rate structure had
moved upward. Receipts from service charges on deposit
accounts continued to increase in all groups of banks, rising
7.3 per cent in the District as a whole, but the District rise in
trust department income (9.3 per cent) was confined to the
central reserve New York City banks.
Salaries and wages— the principal item of operating expenses
— increased generally throughout the District. The rise of
15.5 per cent in the central reserve New York City banks,
however, was by far the heaviest in the District and closely
followed the record gain of 18.8 per cent in their total cur­
rent operating income. Outside the City, the increases in salary

Earnings and Expenses of Second District Member Banks for the Year 1951 and the Percentage Change from the Year 1950
(Dollar amounts in thousands)
Reserve city and country banks
Deposit size
Central reserve banks
New York City
(22 banks)

$5,000,000 to
$20 ,000,000
(264 banks)

Over $20,000,000
(93 banks)

$2 , 000,000 to
$5,000,000
(225 banks)

Item
Dollar
volume
1951
Interest on United States Government obligations.
Interest and dividends on other securities.............
Interest and discount on loans..............................
Service charges on deposit accounts......................
Trust department income......................................
Other current income.............................................

127,006
37,348
308,498
17,639
63,522
54,620

Dollar
volume
1951

Percentage
change*
1950 to
1951

Dollar
volume
1951

Percentage
change*
1950 to
1951

8.3
+ 2.2
+ 15.2
+ 3.6
5.4
+ 0.7

21,321
5,085
43,517
6,849
1,228
4,129

6.5
+ 9.7
+ 5.2
+ 1.2
- 11.3
+ 10.6

6,207
1,581
13,652
1,689

10.5
15.4

41,438
10,426
104,067
11,964
7,300
12,611

Percentage
change
1950 to
1951
+
+
+
+
+

12.2

19.5
43.4
8.1

Dollar
volume
1951

Percentage
change*
1950 to
1951

Dollar
volume
1951
1,482
401
3,571
367

Percentage
change*
1950 to
1951

Dollar
volume
1951

Pecentage
change
1950 to
1951

197,455
54,840
473,305
38,508
72,160
72,514

- 9.2
+ 16.0
+32.5
+ 7.3
+ 9.3
+13.8

+
+
+

5.5
2.9
4.8
1.4

-

2.3

181

- 5.0
+10.7
+ 2.6
+ 3.7
—
+ 7.7

110

973

All member banka
in Second District
(735 banks)

Under $2,000,000
(131 banks)

1

—

Total current operating earnings................

608,633

+ 18.8

187,806

+

5.8

82,129

+

1.8

24,212

+

1.3

6,003

+ 1.3

908,782

+15.4

Salaries and wages—officers and employees..........
Interest on time and savings deposits....................
All other current expenses.....................................

196,126
12,024
126,427

+ 15.5
+ 24.1
+ 6.7

61,528
18,795
48,062

+
+
+

5.5
4.9

25,372
10,835
20,281

+
+
+

4.5
1.5
1.9

7,523
3,394
5,608

+
+

5.4

+ 4.3

2.0
1.2

1,897
784
1,398

+ 3.9

292,445
45,832
201,776

+ 13.8
+10.7
+ 6.7

Total current operating expenses...................
Net current operating earnings, before income
taxes........................................................

334,577

+ 12.3

128,385

+

3.9

56,488

+

2.9

16,525

+

2.4

4,079

+ 3.3

540,053

+ 10.8

274,056

+ 27.9

59,421

+ 10.0

25,641

-

0.7

7,687

-

0.9

1,924

-

368,729

+ 22.8

5,221
6,845
5,159

-8 0 .9
(a)
+17.7

Security profits and recoveries (+ ) or chargeo f f s e t .............................................................
Net recoveries(-f) or charge-offs(—) on loans........
All other net recoveries(+) or charge-offs(—) . . . .
Net additions to(—) or deductions from(+) loan
valuation reserves J.............................................

58.9
(a)
13.7

-

1,728
1,386
1,361

(a)
+115.9
+175.5

-

1,181
726
424

33,435

+134.3

-

8,295

-

8.4

-

Taxes on net income..............................................

114,335

+ 66.6

16,566

+

9.1

Net profits.............................................................
Dividends paid...............................................
Retained earnings...........................................

140,686
93,225
47,461

3.3
+ 4.3
- 15.4

30,085
13,996
16,089

- 14.1
+ 2.0
- 24.4

14,038
5,529
8,509

+
+
-

8,405
9,224
3,229

-

-

1.6

-

(a)
+ 200.0
- 20.0

-

2,171

-

27.4

-

7,101

+

3.1

- 12.6
+ 1.0
- 19.7

4,958
1,685
3,273

266
218
142

(a)
+ 11.1
(a)

-

295

-

45.9

-

1,808

+

5.3

- 10.6
+ 1.4
- 15.2

1,391
465
926

0

2.6

9
49
3

(a)
-5 0 .0
(a)

+
+
-

73

+ 20.0

-

44,268

+67.9

399

0

140,209

+52.7

- 3.6
+ 2.9
- 6.6

191,204
114,900
76,258

- 5.0
+ 4.8
-1 6 .8

Note: The plus or minus signs affixed to dollar amounts represent the effect of those amounts as net additions to( + ) or deductions from( —) net current operating earnings. The plus or minus
signs attached to the yearly percentage changes indicate whether the 1951 item is a larger amount than( + ) or a smaller amount than( —) the 1950 item.
* The percentage changes in these categories have not been computed directly from the aggregate dollar amounts but from averages obtained by dividing these aggregates by the number of
banks within each category in the two^ years. The number of banks in each group pertains to the year 1951.
t Also includes transfers to or from valuation reserves for losses on securities,
j Includes transfers to or from both bad debt and other valuation reserves for loan losses.
(a) Percentage changes have not been shown either because the dollar change occurred from a negligible base amount, or because the dollar amount shifted from a negative to a positive amount
or vice versa.




M ONTHLY REVIEW, APRIL 1952

50

profits of banks in this District. Each of the size-groups of
banks outside New York City sustained such losses or chargeoffs. Although the City banks realized enough security profits
and recoveries to outweigh the losses of the other member
banks, net profits from this source were the smallest since 1942.
The fall in this source of income arose from the decline in
security prices following the Treasury-Federal Reserve accord
of last March.
Actual net losses and charge-offs on loans were confined in
the aggregate to the groups of banks outside New York City.
For these banks as a whole, loan losses increased to 2.4 million
dollars from 1.1 million in 1950; relative to the record volume
of loans outstanding, however, losses still were negligible,
averaging one tenth of one per cent of the average annual
loan volume.
Net additions to valuation reserves for loan losses, which
consist principally of tax-deductible reserves for bad debt losses
on loans, were a factor reducing final net profits of all groups
of banks. The increased normal and surtax rates that became
effective April 1 made such deductions from current income
more valuable, and wherever possible bankers availed them-

selves of the opportunity of adding to such reserves in order
to reduce taxable income. Taxes on net income in the New
York City banks reached an all-time high of 114.3 million
dollars, 45.7 million dollars or 67 per cent above the 1950
level. The severity of the increase arose principally from the
combination of higher normal and surtax rates and a larger
volume of taxable income. Outside the City, income taxes also
increased to new high levels but the increases over 1950 were
smaller because the effect of the higher corporate rates was
offset in part by reductions in the amounts subject to taxation.
Dividend payments continued the gradual uptrend that has
been in effect continuously since 1944 and increased moder­
ately in all groups of banks. In this eight-year period, aggre­
gate dividend payments in the District have increased from
76 million dollars to 115 million dollars, annually, or by slightly
more than 50 per cent. This steady growth in dividend pay­
ments, however, has had the effect of reducing the volume of
earnings retained and added to capital funds. The 1951 reten­
tion of 76 million dollars was the smallest in the entire period,
except for 63 million dollars in 1949 when the net profits of
the member banks reached their postwar low.

SURYEY OF OWNERSHIP OF BUSINESS AND PERSONAL DEMAND DEPOSITS
The annual survey of the ownership of demand deposits of
individuals, partnerships, and corporations in the Second Fed­
eral Reserve District reveals that most ownership groups in­
creased their demand deposit balances to new high levels in
the year ended January 31, 1952. Based upon reports from
114 banks that submitted detailed summaries of their larger
accounts, the past years expansion appears to have been the
largest annual increase to occur since World War II. It totaled
1.5 billion dollars or 7.0 per cent, compared with 1.0 billion
or 5.0 per cent in 1950, and brought the aggregate checking
balances maintained in this District by businesses and indi­
viduals to an estimated volume of 23.5 billion dollars.
Businesses needed an increased volume of cash on hand in
1951 for a number of reasons, among which the more impor­
tant were: (1) the necessity for heavier outlays for wages
and materials to purchase and distribute a greater volume of
goods and services at higher prices, while, at the same time,
making substantial additions to plant facilities for meeting the
needs of the national defense program; (2) enlarged pay­
ments for interest and amortization on the increased volume
of bank loans and bond indebtedness outstanding; (3) and
last, but possibly most important, the larger liabilities for pay­
ments to the Federal Government for income and excess profits
tax levies at the higher rates in effect during 1951. Moreover,
corporate accumulations of deposits or other liquid assets for
use in making tax payments were also affected by the require­
ment that a higher proportion of the total tax due must be paid
on March 15 and June 15 of this year than was payable in
1951. Last year, 30 per cent of the total tax bill for most cor-




porations was due on each of these dates; in 1952, 35 per cent
is due; next year it will be 40 per cent, and in 1955, 50 per cent.
Thus some year-to-year growth in corporate cash balances held
for tax purposes was to be expected.
As in the preceding year, the need for funds by business
concerns was greater than the amounts they derived from depre­
ciation and depletion reserves, from the retention of profits, or
from the sale of new issues in the capital markets, and this
deficiency was met by a further expansion of bank loans. This
expansion, however, was about half of that occurring last
year. The larger growth of deposits this year was due to the
fact that the commercial banks in this District sold a relatively
small amount of Government securities in comparison with the
preceding year when such sales (considerable amounts of which
were purchased by nonbank investors— chiefly corporations)
were substantial and, in effect, offset a major part of the
influence of the greater loan expansion on deposits.
As the accompanying table indicates, all deposit-ownership
classifications except foreign accounts and trust accounts of
banks showed increases in demand deposits during the past
year. The greatest relative gain was 11.5 per cent by non­
profit organizations. The large demand deposit accumulations
by tax-free organizations of this sort may reflect partial defer­
ment of building programs and other expenditures because of
the material scarcities for nondefense activities. Accounts of
'all other nonfinancial businesses” (which include most of the
purely service industries such as theatres, amusements, laun­
dries, garages, etc.) in which business and personal funds are
frequently intermingled, increased 10.0 per cent. Balances of

51

FEDERAL RESERVE BAN K OF NEW YO RK
Estimated Ownership of Demand Deposits of Individuals, Partnerships,
and Corporations in All Commercial Banks in the
Second Federal Reserve District
(D olla r am ounts in m illion s)
Julj' 1945 to
January 1952

January 1951 to
January 1952
Type of owner

Dollar
balance
J a n .1952

Dollar
change

Per cent
change

Dollar
change

+ 3 .8

Manufacturing and mining,
Public utilities, transporta­
tion, and communications
Retail and wholesale trade
and dealers in commodities
All other nonfinancial busi­
ness, including construc­
tion and services...........

7,668

+

588

+ 8 .3

+

1,446

+

44

+ 3.1

-

3,546

+

300

+ 9 .2

+

923

+ 3 5 .2

1,556

+

141

+10.0

+

522

+ 5 0 .5

Total nonfinancial...

14,216

+ 1,692

+ 1 3 .5

Insurance com panies. . . .
Trust funds of banks. . . .
All other financial business*

1,143
489
1,678

T otal financial.

3,310

Nonprofit organizations.. . .
Personal (including farmers)
Foreign accounts...................

640
4,777
583

T otal demand deposits of
individuals, partnerships,
23,526
and corporations...........

+ 1 ,0 7 3

282

Per cent
change

35

-

2 .4

+

324

122

-20.0

+

472

+ 3 9 .1

+ 1.2

+

674

+ 2 5 .6

383
27

+ 1 1 .5
+ 8 .7
- 4 .4

+
203
+ 1,292
138

+ 4 6 .5
+ 3 7 .1
-1 9 .1

+ 1 ,5 3 3

+ 7 .0

+ 3 ,7 2 3

+ 1 8 .8

+
+

56
80
62

+

66

+
-

+ 5 .2
-1 4 .1
+ 3 .8

-

+ 3 9 .6

* Includes investment, finance, real estate concerns, insurance agencies, etc.

retail and wholesale trade and dealers in commodities increased
9.2 per cent and were probably bolstered to some extent by
the recent liquidation of inventories. Although trade inven­
tories remained moderately higher than a year ago, it is possi­
ble that a portion of the funds released by the recent reductions
have resulted, at least temporarily, in additions to deposit bal­
ances. Personal accounts (including those of farmers) and
manufacturing and mining accounts, the two most important
ownership groups in absolute dollar terms, increased 8.7 and
8.3 per cent, respectively. Accounts of farmers, which are
only reported separately by the smaller banks, increased 11.3
per cent.
At the other extreme, trust funds of banks showed a rather
sizable decline of 14.1 per cent, reflecting the rapid rate of
investment of the increasing volume of available funds.
Demand deposits of foreigners, which include all institutions
and individuals domiciled outside the United States and cer­
tain possessions, were drawn down 4.4 per cent to meet their
pressing need for dollars.
Estimates of deposits owned by individuals, partnerships,
and corporations in the different size-groups of banks indicate
that, while banks of all sizes shared in the past year’s increase,
the gains in the different groups varied substantially, ranging
from a low of 2.5 per cent in banks with deposits of 10 to 100
million dollars to 13.5 per cent in banks with deposits of 1 to
10 million. Generally, the over-all deposit increase for each
group varied directly with the relative gains in deposits of
manufacturing and mining concerns, retail and wholesale trade,
and personal accounts.

accounts that are currently below record levels are those of
public utilities, trust funds of banks, insurance companies, and
foreign depositors. Public utility balances were temporarily
at a substantially higher level in July 1946, as funds were
accumulated at that time to resume the normal plant expan­
sion that was deferred during wartime. The lower levels of
deposits for trust funds of banks and insurance companies
merely indicate the greater availability of attractive investment
outlets. Balances of foreigners in the postwar period have
gradually been drawn down to meet the needs for dollars, the
only upswing of any magnitude occurring in 1950 when dollar
receipts increased substantially.
During the period since World War II, that portion of this
District’s money supply that is represented by business and
personal demand deposits rose from 19.8 billion dollars to 23.5
billion, or by 18.8 per cent, a large part of the increase taking
place since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. Among the
individual ownership groups, the greatest relative gains— rang­
ing from 50.5 per cent to 35.2 per cent— were shown by "all
other nonfinancial business”, nonprofit organizations, insur­
ance companies, "all other financial business”, personal check­
ing balances (including farmers), and retail and wholesale
trade. On the other hand, the ownership group with the larg­
est deposit balances, manufacturing and mining, gained only
3.8 per cent, while demand deposits of public utilities, trust
funds of banks, and foreign accounts declined by proportions
ranging from 2.4 to 20.0 per cent.
Estimated Ownership of Business and Personal Demand
Deposits at All Commercial Banks in the Second
Federal Reserve District*
Billions
of dollars

Billions
of (dollars

~1 N O N FIN A N C IA L I
BUSINESS ACCOUNTS

> /
Manufacturing
& mining

R e ta il &
wholesale tra d e




Personal
(incl. farm ers)

■ Foreign accounts ■

N o nprofit o rgan izations
’47 ’48 *49 ’ 50 *51 ’ 52

The accompanying chart shows the fluctuations that have
occurred in the balances of the various depositor groups since
these surveys were first undertaken in July 1943. The only

I F IN A N C IA L I
I
B U S IN E S S ACCOUNTS

1943 '44 ’45 '46 '47 ’48 *49 ’50 ’51 ’52

Figures are semiannual from July 1943 to February 1947 and annual as of
each January thereafter.

52

M ONTHLY REVIEW, APRIL 1952

LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES AND THE SECURITY MARKETS
This is the second of two articles dealing with the impact
of the growth of life insurance investments on the security
markets. The first article, which appeared in the Monthly
Review for March 1952, traced the effects of the growth of the
life insurance companies’ investment operations on their own
investment practices, treating specifically the marked increase
in the companies’ holdings of corporate debt obligations over
a long period of time and the growth and development of
the direct placement of securities as a financing technique.
This second article will deal with the impact of the growth
of life insurance company investments on other investors
and investing institutions, and on the functioning of the
security markets and the traditional investment banking
machinery.

C o m p e t i t i o n B e t w e e n L if e I n s u r a n c e C o m p a n i e s
a n d O t h e r In v e s t o r s

The substantial growth of direct placements of corporate
debt securities with the larger life insurance companies, prin­
cipally in obligations suitable for the investment of fiduciary
or near-fiduciary funds, has tended over the years to limit
increases in the supply of desirable industrial bond issues
available to the smaller life insurance companies and other
investors.1 Competition among investors for publicly offered
corporate bonds of the higher grades, therefore, has been
particularly keen, and has been an important influence con­
tributing to lower yields on such issues, wholly apart from
the depressing effects upon interest rates of supply-demand
relationships in the investment market during a large part of
the past two decades. Moreover, the larger insurance companies
have also been important competitors for the publicly offered
securities that have been issued, which have consisted princi­
pally of public utility and to a lesser extent railroad obligations.
Thus, available data show that a group of major companies
acquired the equivalent of 36 per cent of all publicly offered
corporate bonds in 1948 and that purchases of the 22 largest
companies amounted to 38 per cent of total new corporate debt
issues offered in the public market in 1949.
Other investors may, therefore, find somewhat greater diffi­
culty in achieving the broad diversification of industries and
risks which is considered desirable in the management of

investment funds. For example, as of October 31, 1951 the
business security holdings of 17 life insurance companies with
assets of less than 200 million dollars consisted of one sixth
each of railroad and industrial holdings and two thirds of
public utility obligations. In contrast, almost half the cor­
porate security holdings of the 13 life insurance companies
with assets of one billion dollars or more were industrial
corporation obligations, while public utility and railroad issues
comprised 40 and 10 per cent of total assets, respectively.
The corporate bond holdings of the New York State mutual
savings banks at the end of 1951 were almost entirely devoted
to railroad and public utility issues (50 and 45 per cent,
respectively) with less than 5 per cent in industrial issues. It
should be noted, however, that the savings banks have charac­
teristically been relatively moderate investors in corporate
bonds.
Data on the industrial composition and method of sale of
new corporate obligations issued during the past four years
are shown in the accompanying table. These figures shed
further light on the problem of obtaining diversification
through purchase of the corporate debt securities available to
the public market. Publicly offered issues sold between 1948
and 1951 (inclusive) amounted to slightly less than half the
total of private and public offerings. The proportion of ‘ pub­
lic” issues represented less than 20 per cent of total offerings,
however, for manufacturing, real estate and financial, com­
mercial and miscellaneous, and transportation (other than
railroad) enterprises. On the other hand, approximately 65
and 90 per cent of the new bond issues of electric, gas, and
water companies and communications corporations, respec­
tively, were floated in the public market. A very large part
of the railroad debt issues (consisting principally of equip­
ment trust obligations) were likewise publicly sold. A large
part of the utility issues and most of the railroad issues, of
course, are required by regulatory authorities to be offered
through competitive bidding, and for that reason only a
limited amount of financing in these fields can be done through
direct negotiations with large lenders.
Direct and Public Offerings of New Corporate Bond Issues
(T ota ls fo r years 1 9 4 8 -1 9 5 1 ; in m illions o f d olla rs)

Total di­

1
See Wilde, Frazar B., "The Pros and Cons of Direct Placement”,
rect and
Industry
public
a speech before the American Life Convention, October 6, 1950.
The argument has also been made that one of the factors keeping Manufacturing..................................
6 ,1 1 2
1,419
smaller life insurance companies out of the direct-placement field Commercial and miscellaneous. . .
1,747
has been the fact that the number of participants in a new offering Real estate and financial................
1,960
must be limited in order to keep an issue in the private-placement Electric, gas, and w ater.................
7,128
2,282
Comm
unications...............................
category and thereby exempt it from registration with the Securities
and Exchange Commission. The evidence requires further analysis, Transportation (other than
850
however, to determine whether the provisions of the Securities Act
21,498
T
o
ta
l.......................................
are entirely responsible for the infrequency of participations by smaller
companies in the larger placements, or whether the convenience of
the borrowing principal (and perhaps that of the originating lender)
N ote: Figures may not add to totals because of
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission.
may be partly responsible.




Direct

Public

5,028
1,314
1,458
23
2,429
232

1,084
105
289
1,937
4,699
2,050

Public as
a per cent
of total
17.7
7 .4
16.5
9 8.8
65.9
89.8

769

81

9 .5

11,253

10,245

47.7

rounding.

53

FEDERAL RESERVE B AN K OF NEW YO R K

Nevertheless, the larger life insurance companies have been
large purchasers, in the market, of utility and other publicly
offered securities. In 1948, for example, a group of major
companies purchased the equivalent of over two fifths of the
publicly offered utility debt securities (including issues of
electric, gas, water, and communications corporations), one
fifth of the publicly offered railroad obligations, and 30 per
cent of the market flotations of industrial debt issues (includ­
ing those of manufacturing, real estate and financial, and
commercial and miscellaneous enterprises). Corresponding
proportions for the 1949 public acquisitions of the 22 largest
life insurance companies came to two fifths, one fifth, and
over three fifths, respectively, of new publicly offered utility,
railroad, and industrial and miscellaneous debt security
flotations.

developed, including long-term loans secured by oil and gas
leases in proved and producing fields, the purchase of sub­
ordinated debentures (securities subordinate to bank loans)
of sales and personal finance companies, and the financing of
natural gas and oil pipe lines. Most of these have involved
an extension of the private-placement technique involving
direct negotiation of loans between life insurance companies
and borrowers. In addition, new outlets for funds have, to a
limited extent, taken the form of "ownership” investments,
involving institutional and fiduciary types of investors in the
ownership of urban real estate (including housing projects
and other income-producing properties), railroad cars and
locomotives, and fleets of automobiles and trucks leased to rail­
roads and industrial corporations, respectively. There has also
been a limited growth in the ownership of common stocks.2

Thus, the large life insurance companies have come to
acquire a very large part (although not all) of the direct
placements of corporate bond issues, and a sizable proportion
of those offered in the public market as well. The volume of
new corporate debt securities taken by the smaller life insur­
ance companies and other institutional investors has been
relatively smaller and has to some extent lacked as balanced
a representation of borrowing industries. The effects of these
latter developments on the earning power and the composi­
tion of the investment portfolios of the smaller life insurance
companies and other institutions are not clear-cut in view of
the substantial volume of new higher-yielding mortgage loans
(including those secured by commercial and industrial prop­
erties) that became available in the postwar years. Thus, the
mortgage holdings of 17 life insurance companies with assets
of 200 million dollars or less came to over 40 per cent of their
total assets at the end of October 1951; the proportion for
those companies with assets of one billion dollars or more was
less than 25 per cent.

To the extent that competitive pressures among institutional
investors to invest funds have resulted in investment in owner­
ship assets, concepts formerly governing the investment prac­
tices of public savings institutions have been altered. More
and more, the prudent-man rule of investment of the public’s
funds has been enacted into State laws, and in 1951, New York
passed a law permitting limited investment in common stocks
by life insurance companies in that State.3 ( It is reported that
the latter law has as yet resulted in only small purchases of
common stock by New York life insurance companies.) It
should be noted, however, that many of the investments made
by the life insurance companies and some others involving
ownership have been very conservative transactions and that
the change from creditor to owner status has been principally a
change in the form of asset acquired rather than in substance
and risk; and as far as life insurance companies are concerned,
the aggregate amounts placed in such assets have been small
in relation to total assets.

The particularly large volume of privately placed bond
issues in the past few years, furthermore, may be attributable
to an acceleration of the commitment practice, which is pecu­
liarly suitable to the private-placement technique, and which
cannot practicably be provided for in the case of corporate
borrowing in the public market. Should there be any sub­
sidence of this trend toward advance commitments, some
expansion in the relative proportion of public corporation
bond flotations could result.
The competition among investors for corporate obligations
was particularly keen during the thirties when the supply of
new corporate bond issues as well as new mortgage loans fell
below the potential demand, and led investors to seek new
outlets for funds. During the war, most investors’ funds were
placed in Government securities. However, the search for
new investment media has been resumed in the postwar years
in spite of the fact that since 1946 new corporate bond offer­
ings and other types of long-term financing have been very
heavy. In part, new forms of corporate financing have been




C h a n g i n g St r u c t u r e

of the

C o r p o r a te Bo n d M a r k e t

The fact that corporate debt instruments have come to be
held principally by life insurance companies and other institu­
tional investors has apparently narrowed the breadth of the
corporate bond market over the years. Turnover in the market
for outstanding bonds, particularly industrial bonds, has been
reduced not only as a consequence of the decline in the number
of important buyers (including those who, being subject to
heavy taxation, have shifted into "municipals”), but also as a
result of the growing volume of private placements of bonds
which initially by-pass the market altogether and rarely are
traded after issuance. Except for a spurt during the war years,
the volume of trading has declined sharply, as indicated by
2 Another factor in the purchase of common stock has been the
desire of some institutions to acquire equities in order to share in
industry’s growth and as a partial hedge against inflation.
3 A bill permitting New York mutual savings banks to purchase
limited amounts of common stock was approved by the State legisla­
ture in March of this year.

54

M ONTHLY REVIEW, APRIL 1952

the figures for all corporate bond transactions on the New
York Stock Exchange, which fell from a prewar peak amount
of about 3 billion dollars in 1936 to a low of 725 million in
1949. While far more corporate bonds are traded over the
counter than on the Exchange, the declining activity on the
latter may, in absence of other comprehensive data, serve as
an indicator of what has happened in the over-all market.
Lower trading volume has markedly reduced the frequency
of transactions in outstanding bonds, and amounts bid for or
offered have, more frequently than not, been small. The num­
ber of buyers and sellers has declined significantly since the
twenties. With smaller numbers of investors in the market
in recent years, sizable blocks of bonds have often had to be
exchanged at prices substantially different from the quoted
prices in order to effect transfers of ownership. However, the
growing importance of pension funds as investors, the impetus
which the new liability for income taxes and the higher
interest-dividend rates to depositors have given the savings
banks to increase their earnings, and a gradual return by the
commercial banks to the interest in marketable corporate bonds
which they had before 1933 may, in combination with the
high level of corporate demand for long-term funds, be cur­
rently producing some revival in the activity and diversity of
participation in the market for publicly offered corporate bond
issues.
To a large extent, of course, whatever reduction in liquidity
(marketability) has occurred mainly reflects the lesser needs
for liquidity in the corporate security holdings of some of the
institutional investors. Life insurance companies are long-term
holders of securities, as long as the rates of return are satis­
factory, since their liabilities consist principally of long-term
contractual obligations to policyholders. Therefore, liquidity
or ready marketability may not be vitally important. Moreover,
the current flow of income from premium receipts and from
amortization, sinking fund redemptions, retirements, and pre­
payments of past investments is large enough that the life
insurance companies can usually meet any sudden demands for
cash from their policyholders (seeking loans or surrendering
their policies) merely by reducing temporarily the rate of
purchasing new investments. In addition, their Government
security holdings afford a measure of liquidity, although
not as large a measure as they did prior to the unpegging
of Government bond prices in the spring of 1951. The com­
bined effect of all these factors has apparently been to lessen
the liquidity needed in corporate bonds and other assets.
Similarly, the need of most other institutional investors for
assured marketability is probably much less pressing than for
individuals.4

R e p e r c u s s io n s

on

I n v e s t m e n t Se c u r it y M a c h i n e r y

The evolution of life insurance companies to the position of
the largest single group investor in corporate bonds has had
marked effects upon the arrangements for financing corporate
long-term capital needs that existed in the twenties and prior
years. Of course, the most pronounced decline in the invest­
ment security machinery came as a result of the 1929 stock
market crash and the subsequent sharp decline in common stock
trading and in all other phases of the securities business. In the
revival of security prices and trading beginning in 1932-33,
however, the recovery in corporate long-term financing through
investment bankers and security dealers (principally for re­
funding purposes) was retarded by the growth of direct nego­
tiation of new issues between industrial corporations and life
insurance companies and other large investors. Thus, the scope
of the "public” market for corporate bonds has been greatly
reduced with the result that over the years the income and
numbers of investment banking houses and of security dealers
in that market has likewise been reduced. However, the neces­
sary adjustments have probably been softened somewhat
through a shifting of emphasis by brokers and dealers to other
types of securities, including tax-exempt securities, common
stocks, and issues of mutual funds, and to expanding their
services as investment counselors.
Furthermore, the decline in the marketing of new corporate
bond issues caused liquidation and consolidation of investment
underwriting firms and substantial reductions in sales forces.
These developments reflect partly the fact that, because of the
increasingly institutional character of the market, widespread
distribution of new publicly offered securities is no longer
called for in order to sell a new issue.
In connection with privately placed securities, the investment
banker has in a large number of transactions become an inter­
mediary between corporate borrower and life insurance com­
pany lender, or a consultant to the borrower concerning his
general financial problems as well as the terms of any particular
private issue under negotiation. At times, of course, investment
bankers assume more active roles in the negotiations, and they
perform the strategic function of advising their clients whether
better terms are available through a public or a private offering,
thus acting as a balance wheel between the public and private
market.
In this latter connection, the investment banker’s intimate
knowledge of the markets for both public and private issues
serves to maintain a healthy competition between the direct
placement of new issues and public offerings. This knowledge,
of course, is obtained from actual experience with public flo­
tations and with direct placements. With respect to the latter,
investment bankers are constantly in contact with lending

4
It has been claimed that the change in the composition of the
purchasers of corporate bonds has had the further result of curtailing available by the National Bureau of Economic Research from its
the volume of corporate financing with risk-type, high-yielding bonds
extensive records of corporate bond issues, it has been estimated that
rated below Baa or Ba. Comprehensive information is lacking but
the volume of corporate risk bond issues (Ba or lesser grades) floated
whatever figures do exist indicate that the volume of this type of
since the turn of the century amounted roughly to one-half billion
financing could not have been large. Thus, on the basis of data made
dollars.




55

FEDERAL RESERVE BAN K OF NEW YO R K

officials and are thus well posted on the current investment
policy and current availability of funds of life insurance com­
panies and other large investors. This fund of information is
of great value to a corporation seeking to approach the insur­
ance companies for long-term funds. As a result, the corporate
issuer’s choice of financing outlets is widened, and its bargain­
ing power strengthened.

Fees of bankers for these services are usually considerably
below those earned on publicly offered issues which under­
writers usually purchase outright from the issuers. However,
all the fees earned on a direct placement are frequently earned
by the one firm instead of being shared with many firms parti­
cipating in the larger aggregate commission of a public issue.
In addition, operating expenses are considerably lower.

Investment bankers have in many instances enabled borrow­
ing corporations to obtain more favorable terms from direct
lenders than they might otherwise have been able to secure.
They have also on occasion advised private placement when
for one reason or another conditions in the public market were
less favorable. In performing their function as corporate
agents in private-placement negotiations, furthermore, invest­
ment bankers have often been instrumental in closing the gap
between a borrowers needs and the investment requirements of
the lender ( as determined by legal and policy considerations).
In other words, much of the "tailoring” of individual directplacement transactions to borrower’s and lenders needs is
facilitated if not effected by investment bankers.

Private placements have also produced another development
in the investment banking field. They have been instrumental
in reducing the borrowers cost for distribution of publicly
offered new issues by contributing to a narrowing of invest­
ment banking "spreads” (the difference between the price at
which bankers acquire an issue and the offering price to the
public). Because of the limited supply of public issues, the
competition for them is keen; it would undoubtedly be some­
what less aggressive were it not for the large volume of finan­
cing which by-passes the market. This, of course, has been a
further factor in the contraction of the security distribution
machinery. Investment bankers retain the full range of their
former functions only in such areas as the marketing of

Business Indicators

1952
Item

Percentage change

1951

Unit
February

January

December

February

Latest month Latest month
from previous from year
month
earlier

U N IT E D STATES
Production and trade
Industrial production*......................................................................
Electric power output*.....................................................................
Ton-miles of railway freight*..........................................................
Manufacturers’ sales*........................................................................
Manufacturers’ inventories*............................................................
Manufacturers’ new orders, to ta l...................................................
Manufacturers’ new orders, durable good s..................................
Retail s a le s * tf....................................................................................
Residential construction contracts*..............................................
Nonresidential construction contracts*........................................
Prices, wages, and employment
Basic com m odity p ricesf..................................................................
Wholesale prices!**...........................................................................
Consumers’ p ricesf............................................................................
Personal income* (annual rate)......................................................
Composite index of wages and salaries*.......................................
Nonagricultural em ploym ent*........................................................
Manufacturing em ploym ent*..........................................................
Average hours worked per week, m anufacturingf.....................
Unemployment...................................................................................
Banking and finance
Total investments of all commercial banks.................................
Total loans of all commercial banks..............................................
Total demand deposits adjusted.....................................................
Currency outside the Treasury and Federal Reserve B an k s*..
Bank debits* (U. S. outside New York C ity ).............................
Velocity of demand deposits* (U. S. outside New York C it y ).
Consumer instalment credit outstandingf...................................
United States Government finance (other than borrowing)
Cash incom e........................................................................................
Cash ou tg o...........................................................................................
National defense expenditures........................................................

1935-39=
1935-39=
1935-39=
billions of
billions of
billions of
billions of
billions of
1923-25=
1923-25 =

100
100
100
$
$
$
$
$
100
100

222p

220

346

346

—

—
—
—
—

1 2 . 9p
—
—

200p

23. Op
42. Op
2 2 .6p
1 1 . 3p
1 2 .6

226p
364p

219r
342
20 0
2 1.2

4 2.0
2 0 .8

10.3
12.3
240
367

221

322
189
22.3
34.7
2 5.8
13.5
13.3
311
334

Aug. 1939 = 10 0
1947-49= 100
1935-39= 100
billions of $
1939= 100
thousands
thousands
hours
thousands

313.9
1 1 2 .6p
187.9
—
—
46,528p
15,840p
4 0 .8p
2,086

323.8
113.0
189.1
2 5 7 .3p
232p
46,459
15,830
40.9
2,054

328.1
113.5
189.1
258.6
231
4 6 ,548r
15,811r
4 1.2
1,674

46,078r
1 6,009r
40.9
2,407

millions of $
millions of $
millions of $
millions of $
billions of $
1935-39= 100
millions of $

74,680p
5 7 ,560p
95,530p
28,406
93.1

75,290p
5 7 ,480p
97,760p
28,551
96.3
13,313p

75,070p
5 8 ,300p
9 8 ,120p
28,850
80.9
9 8.6
13,506

71,470
53,540
90,620
27,145
8 4 .5r
100.5
13,073

5,183
5,473
3,843

5,642
5,621
3 , 440r

4,877
3,522
1 ,920r

235
89
160
184.0
7 ,3 9 2 .5
2 , 6 4 9 .9r
44.2
3 .4
117.0

228
189
229
180.8
7 ,3 6 5 .5 r
2 ,6 6 3 . 2 r
4 3.4
3 .8
111. 97-

millions of $
millions of $
millions of $

1 0 0 .0

—

6,2 7 6 p
5 ,327p
3,556

8 8 .0

389.2
116.5
183.8
2 4 3 .3r

+

1

#
#

+ 8
#
+ 9
+ 10

+ 2
- 6
- 1
-

3
#

-

1
1

220

#
#
#
#
+ 2
-

1

+
+
-

2
1
6

#

#
+ 8
- 4
+ 2
+23
-2 0

-2 5
- 3
-2 8
+ 4

-1 9
- 3
+ 2
+ 6
+ 6
+ 1
- 1
#
-1 3
+
+
+
+
+

4
8

5
5
10

#
#

4
1

+21

+ 29
+51
+ 85

#
+ 26
+ 33
#
#
+ 9
+ 7

+ 4
-4 7
- 8
+ 1
+ 2
4
+ 16
+ 11

+11

+

-

3
7

SECON D FE D E R A L R E S E R V E D IS T R IC T
Electric power output* (New York and New Jersey).................
Residential construction contracts*...................................................
Nonresidential construction contracts*............................................
Consumers’ pricesf (New York C ity )...............................................
Nonagricultural em ploym ent* ...............................................................................................
Manufacturing em ploym ent* ..................................................................................................
Bank debits* (New York C ity )..........................................................
Bank debits* (Second District excluding N. Y . C. and A lb a n y ). .
Velocity of demand deposits* (New York C it y )............................

1935-39=
1923-25=
1923-25=
1935-39 =
thousands
thousands
billions of
billions of
1935-39=

100
100
100
100

236
—
—

183.0
—

$
$
100

2 ,6 7 0 .Op
50.4
4 .2
118.4

235
112 p
2 12 p

184.2
7,4 0 8 .4 p
2,662.1
4 6.3
3 .9
106.5

-

1

p Preliminary.
r Revised.
# Change of less than 0.5 per cent.
* Adjusted for seasonal variation.
** Revised series. Back data available from the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
t Seasonal variations believed to be minor; no adjustment made.
t t Series revised from 1940 to date.
Source: A description of these series and their sources is available from the Domestic Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, on request.




6

56

M ONTHLY REVIEW, APRIL 1952

"municipal” bonds and of stocks, where individual investors
remain important purchasers of securities.

Conclusions

The very substantial growth of life insurance investment
funds, as part of the growth in institutionalized forms of
savings over the past 30 years or more, has brought significant
changes in the methods of financing business and other capital
needs and has added many elements of financial stability in
the economy. Perhaps the most significant aspect is that more
than ever before in American economic history the functions of
lending and investing are being carried out by experts and
specialists. The further implication has been suggested that
such specialization should keep losses and defaults to a mini­
mum and so minimize their tendency to aggravate business
recessions.
The development and growth of the private-placement
technique of financing is a further source of financial and
economic stability, at least on the downside of the business
cycle, in that flexible loan agreements arranged through this
technique permit appropriate changes which, in periods of
business decline, can help stave off defaults and reduce losses.
Equally important as a stabilizing element is the fact that cor­
porations, as part of the private-placement arrangement, may
obtain advance commitments for funds— a practice which may
encourage the tendency on the part of corporate management
to engage in long-range investment planning. The knowledge,
too, that changes in loan agreements— such as the temporary
waiver of sinking fund payments— may be made in periods of
adversity without forcing a borrower into bankruptcy may also
lead to greater willingness to borrow on long term, in order to
plan business capital expenditures ahead. On the other hand,

borrowers may face the risk that adversity will subject them
to greater pressure from lending institutions for a voice in the
management.
The great financial strength of the life insurance companies
and other major institutions and the fact that they are long­
term investors enables them, however, to "ride” with and see
through a debtor’s situation which temporarily turns unsatis­
factory. A further factor of stability during future recessions
may come from the fact that such investors are likely to be less
influenced by those market price tendencies which in the past
have led to "fear” liquidation, often without regard to the fun­
damental strength of the securities or other investments liqui­
dated. Moreover, along with the growth of life insurance
company funds there has developed a choice of alternative
methods of debt financing (as contrasted with equity finan­
cing). Where a borrowing corporation had only one major
source of capital financing in the twenties— flotations of new
bond issues in the market through investment underwriters—
it now has, in many cases, the possibility of direct financing
as well. The competition between the two, furthermore, has
tended to favor the borrowers in that it enables them to obtain
the most advantageous terms and rates, and has actually (as
new lending techniques have been developed) made "loanable”
transactions that might formerly have been difficult to finance.
The direct-placement technique, permitting tailor-made loan
agreements attuned to borrower’s and lender’s requirements
and financial positions, has frequently made possible financing
by life insurance companies in such cases. Thus, by channel­
ing a growing volume of the public’s savings to corporate
borrowers, the life insurance companies have helped contribute
to the growth in industrial capacity, employment, and incomes,
and the improvement of living standards, that have occurred in
recent years.

P R E L IM IN A R Y R E T A IL C R E D IT S U R V E Y R E SULTS
Preliminary tabulations of the data gathered in the Retail
Credit Survey recently conducted by this bank are now avail­
able. Statistics on sales, receivables, and inventories for nine
principal types of credit-granting retail stores in the Second

Changes in sales volume between 1950 and 1951 were
generally moderate in the Second District, except for stores
Changes in Sales, Receivables, and Inventories of Credit-Granting
Retail Stores in the Second Federal Reserve District, 1950 to 1951*

Federal Reserve District were collected as part of a nation-wide

Percentage change, 1950 to 1951

survey (which has been made annually by the Federal Reserve
Retail sales

System since 1942, except in 1951 when data from Regulation
W registration forms were available). The response to the

T ype of creditgranting store
Total

latest survey was exceptionally large; over 2,300 Second District
firms cooperated by submitting reports, more than triple the
number in previous years. Total annual sales of the stores co­
operating in this survey were more than 2 billion dollars. The
accompanying table shows some preliminary results of the
current Retail Credit Survey; a more thorough analysis, includ­
ing the data for various localities in this District, will appear in
the May issue of this Review.




Auto tire and accessory.
W om en’s apparel...........
M en’s clothing...............
Automobile dealers. . . .
Furniture.........................
Household appliances,
radio, and television.

+
+
+
+
+
+
-

5
4
4
4
1
1
2
2

-1 2

Cash
+
+
+
+
+

4
4
5
3
6
1

5
4

-1 3

Charge
account

Instal­
ment

+
+
+
+
+
+
+

7
7
9
7
3
9
4

-

-

4

-1 3

2

+ 2
- 9
- 7
+14
- 2
+12

#
5

Total
Inven­
accounts tories (at
receiv­
retail
able
prices)
+ 5
- 5
-1 7
+ 6
- 8
+ 3

+ 1
+ 6
- 7
#
+12

+10
- 2

+ 11
+18
- 7

-

-

5

2

* Sales are based on annual totals; accounts receivable and inventories on end-ofyear data. All figures are preliminary.
# Change of less than one half of one per cent.

57

FEDERAL RESERVE BAN K OF NEW YO RK

in the household appliance, radio, and television group, where
sales dropped nearly one eighth. The important automobile
and furniture groups also reported slight sales declines in
1951. The majority of the lines surveyed, however, increased
their dollar volume of sales somewhat. Thus, aggregate retail
sales in the Second District probably showed very little change
in 1951 from the 1950 total. However, when the rise in the
average level of retail prices from 1950 to 1951 is taken into
account, the major types of credit-granting stores generally
appear to have experienced a decreased physical volume of
sales in 1951.
Most of the different types of stores surveyed reported an
increased proportion of credit sales in 1951. In department,
hardware, and household appliance stores the shifts from cash
to credit sales were minor, but women’s apparel and men’s
clothing stores and automobile dealers reported increases in
credit sales which wholly or partially offset a decline in cash
sales. The reverse situation prevailed at furniture and jewelry
stores, where cash sales rose but credit sales dropped. Charge
account sales consistently accounted for a greater share of
total sales in 1951 than in 1950, the sole exception being
jewelry stores. In particular, charge account sales made a better
showing than cash or instalment sales at automobile dealers

and accessory shops and in household appliance and hardware
stores. Instalment sales were generally lower in 1951; such sales
showed year-to-year declines in all lines surveyed except men’s
clothing and women’s apparel, where instalment sales are of
very minor importance, and department stores, where the gain
was less than the rise in either cash or charge account sales.
Inventories were a pressing problem for most types of stores
during 1951, and by the end of the year some lines had not yet
succeeded in adjusting the level of their stocks to desired
relationships with current sales. The sharpest rise in inventories
between the end of 1950 and 1951 occurred in men’s clothing
stores, jewelry stores, and at automobile dealers. For new car
dealers, at least, this rise probably was more apparent than
real, and reflected the low level of stocks at the end of 1950.
Reports from jewelry stores, however, indicated that aggregate
stocks had grown to the point where they equaled more than
one full year’s sales. Household appliance, radio, and television
stores reported a 12 per cent drop in sales, but stocks on hand
were nearly as great at the end of the year as at the beginning.
Inventories were lower than a year ago or showed smaller
increases than sales in auto tire and accessory shops, furniture
stores, and department stores, but in some cases inventories
had been rather high at the end of 1950.

D E P A R T M E N T STO RE T R A D E
March marked the fourth consecutive month in which con­
sumer expenditures at Second District department stores were
well below year-earlier levels. Although the year-to-year com­
parison in total sales during March was affected by calendar
irregularities (one shopping day less this year and the occur­
rence of Easter on March 25 last year), it is estimated, from
incomplete data, that average daily sales, after adjustment for
seasonal variation and the shifting date of Easter, had declined
4 per cent from the February level and about 6 per cent from
March 1951.
Weather conditions during the greater part of March were
generally unfavorable and hardly conducive to any sustained
increase in consumer buying of spring apparel. As Easter is
not until April 13, consumers apparently saw little need to
Indexes of Department Store Sales and Stocks
Second Federal Reserve District
(1947-49 average=100 per cent)
1952
Feb.

Jan.

Dec.

Feb.

82

80

179
103

90

100

100

104
107

101




114

106
115

Net sales
Locality
F e b .1952
Department stores, Second D istrict.. . .
New York C ity ......................................
Nassau C ou n ty ......................................
Northern New Jersey...........................
Westchester C ounty..............................
Fairfield C ou n ty....................................
B ridgeport...........................................
Lower Hudson River V alley...............
Poughkeepsie......................................
Upper Hudson River V alley...............

Syracuse..............................................
Northern New York State..................
Southern New Y ork State...................

Item

Stocks, unadjusted...........................................
Stocks, seasonally adjusted............................

Department and Apparel Store Sales and Stocks, Second Federal Reserve
District, Percentage Change from the Preceding Year

Schenectady........................................
Central New York S tate.....................
Mohawk River V alley.....................
1951

Sales (average daily), unadjusted.................
Sales (average daily), seasonally a d ju sted ..

hurry their purchases with the result that apparel sales during
March were not particularly encouraging to retailers. However,
the trade expects sales of spring ready-to-wear to increase
sharply after April 1.

110

Binghamton.....................................
Western New York State....................
Niagara Falls......................................
Rochester............................................

Jan. and
Feb. 1952

5

-

11

-

6
- 11
9
9
+ 5
2
2
4
8
1
8

+
-

13
14
13
13

—
—
+
-

-

+

+
+
+
+
+
+
-

7

3
1
6
3
2
2
0
3

1
6
2

1

4
4
10
12
6

14
4
11
8
1
12

24
5
6

5
5
2

Apparel stores (chiefly New York C it y ) .

-

-

13
15
12

15
15
3
10

—

10
11
10

13
11
7

-

11

5

14
17
4
2
3

4
3
8

—

5

- 10

-

2

2

-

-

9

120

124

Stocks on
hand
Feb. 29, 1952

6

MONTHLY REVIEW, MARCH 1952

58

N A T IO N A L S U M M A R Y OF BUSINESS C O N D IT IO N S
(Summarized by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, March 31, 1952)

Industrial production rose slightly in February and early
March and was at about the high level reached in the second
quarter of 1951. Wholesale prices decreased further over this
period, and consumer prices also declined. Total retail sales
increased in February, while sales at department stores declined
somewhat. Bank credit outstanding has changed little since
early February.
Industrial Production

The Boards preliminary seasonally adjusted index of indus­
trial production in February was 222 per cent of the 1935-39
average, as compared with 220 in January and 221 a year ago.
Durable goods output increased in February to a new post­
war record level, and production of nondurable goods was up
slightly from the level reached at the end of 1951.
Passenger auto assembly increased substantially in February
and March; total output for the first quarter will be close to
the authorized limit of about one million units. Production
of household goods was maintained in February at about the
January rate— one-fourth above last summer’s low but 30 per
cent under the exceptional rate of a year ago. Over-all activity
in machinery lines showed a small increase, reflecting partly
further gains in military equipment. Steel production, which
reached an annual rate of 108.7 million tons in February, con­
tinued to expand in March. Refinery output of nonferrous
metals also rose further in February, and lumber production
showed a strong seasonal rise.

peak rates in February, and stocks of gasoline rose to a new
high. A decline in chemicals output reflected mainly a sharp
further curtailment in rayon output.
Em plo ym en t

Seasonally adjusted employment in nonagricultural estab­
lishments in February was 46.5 million, about the same num­
ber as in other recent months. The average work week at
manufacturing plants at 40.8 hours was little changed from
January or from the level of a year ago; average hourly
earnings remained at $1.64. Unemployment was unchanged
at 2.1 million, the lowest for February since 1945.
Construction

Value of construction contract awards showed little change
in February as increases for most types of public construction
partly offset declines in private nonresidential awards. The
number of nonfarm housing units started rose to 77,000 from
68,000 in January and compares with 81,000 in February
1951. Expenditures for construction work put in place, allow­
ing for seasonal influences, continued unchanged from January
at 2.5 billion dollars and were as large as a year earlier.
D istribution

The slight increase in nondurable goods output in February
reflected mainly a 4 per cent rise in cotton consumption and
an unusually large volume of meat production for this seasoa
Pork production in March continued to exceed substantially
the year-ago amount. Petroleum refining was maintained at

Department store sales declined somewhat in February and
early March, after allowance for the usual seasonal change. In
the first three weeks of March, sales were 12 per cent below
the corresponding period a year ago, owing in part to the later
date of Easter this year. Preliminary estimates indicate a
moderate decline in February in value of department store
stocks after seasonal adjustment. Seasonally adjusted sales at

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION

CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AWARDED

Federal Reserve index. M onthly figures; latest figure shown is for February.

F. W . D odge Corporation data for 37 Eastern States. M onthly figures; latest
shown are for February.




59

FEDERAL RESERVE BAN K OF NEW YO RK

retail stores selling automotive goods and building materials
increased substantially in February.
Comm odity Prices

The average level of wholesale commodity prices declined
slightly further from mid-February to the fourth week of
March, reflecting chiefly decreases in industrial commodities.
Wholesale food prices changed little. While some farm prod­
ucts strengthened, hog prices decreased further.
The consumers’ price index, which had advanced 11 per
cent from June 1950 to last December, was unchanged in
January and then declined 0.6 per cent in February. The
February decline reflected chiefly decreases in retail food
prices. Since mid-February, there have been reductions in
prices of television sets, appliances, and textile products.
Ba n k Credit an d the M oney Supply

Total credit outstanding at banks in leading cities has shown
little change since early February. Bank holdings of United
States Government securities have declined somewhat, while
loans and other securities have increased moderately. The vol­

CONSUMERS* PRICES

ume of new bank loans to finance defense and defense-related
activity in such manufacturing lines as metal and metal prod­
ucts, petroleum, and chemicals has continued its steady upward
movement and exceeded further seasonal repayments of loans
by commodity dealers and food, liquor, and tobacco processors.
The total money supply has also changed only slightly since
early February, reflecting in large part the stability in out­
standing bank credit. The deposit and currency holdings of
businesses and individuals, however, declined sharply as a
result of a large seasonal transfer of funds from private to
Government accounts. Demand deposit turnover outside New
York City rose in February following a decline from Novem­
ber to January.
Security M arkets

Common stock prices rose moderately during the first three
weeks of March. Yields on short and intermediate-term Gov­
ernment securities which had risen somewhat during the early
part of March subsequently declined sharply as money market
conditions eased. Yields on long-term Treasury issues were
little changed, while yields on high-grade corporate bonds rose
slightly.

MEMBER BANKS IN LEADING CITIES

* CHANGE IN SERIES.

Bureau of L abor Statistics indexes. “ A ll items” includes fuel and housefurnishings groups not shown separately. Midm onth figures, latest shown
are for February.




W ednesday figures; latest shown are for March 12 .




V