The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.
February 25, 1977 Towards Unbundling Like other businesses, banks prosper or fail depending on the spread between the prices they obtain for their products and the prices they pay for their various inputs. Yet unlike other businesses, banks are able to obtain one major Tnput-namely, money-at belowmarket prices becauseof regu latory ceilings on deposit interest rates. (For example, the explicit rate ceiling is zero on demand deposits.) Banks in turn are able to offer many services at below-market prices as a means of improving their own competitive standing. This complicated situation has gradually begun to unravel, especially during the past decade of inflation and high interest rates. Economically rational corporations and households have found ways of improving the return on deposits; particularly by reducing their Jtfhza'f16n of demand deposits. Banks have responded to these moves by taking steps to improve their own rates of return. J The situation logically would seem to demand a movement towards ilunbundling"-that is, the explicit pricing of each bank charge and each bank service at market prices. The securities industry has been going through just such a process during the past year or so, under pressure from the Securities and Exchange Commission. But many banks and thrift institutions, seeing only one side of the equation, fear unbundling for the impact it may have on their own earnings, and they forcefully remind Congress of their preference whenever legislation is proposed to change the situation-for example, the proposal to lift the Depression-era prohibition against payment of interest on demand deposits. Financial innovations o Major changes in financial markets, reflecting the post-Depression, post-World War II rise in the price of money, have served to reduce reliance on non interest-bearing deposits for handling monetary transactions. As far back as the early 1950's, rising interest rates led some large corporations to begin investing spare cash in Treasury bills. Subsequently, more and more firms developed better systems of cash management, and then individuals began to emulate these business practices by shifting idle funds into liquid market securities or savings deposits. In the early 1960's, the innovational process picked up speed as large commercial banks began to bid aggressively for loanable funds. In particular, they worked hard to attract corporations' highly interest-sensitive funds by selling large-denomination certificates of deposit. Later, as interest rates soared in the early 1970's, the financial community developed an array (continued on page 2) ®mlit IF JB@Iilllk §@illl IF Opinions expressed in this newsletter do not necessarily reflect the views of the rnanagernent of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, nor of the Board of Covernors of the Fecierzli Reserve System. of new financial instrumentsand practicesto meet the public's de,.. mand for waysto minimize hold,.. ings of noninterest-bearingassets. Today,the public's transactionsbalancesare increasing1yheld in interest-bearingform. NOW accounts-negotiable orders of withdrawal-have grown steadily in the New Englandstates,serving effectively aschecking accountsfor many individuals. Under newly granted authority, smaller businessesand state-and-Iocalgovernments hold a significant part of their cashbalancesin the form of commercial-banksavingsaccounts. Many individuals utilize savingsaccounts for transactionspurposesby making paymentsthrough thirdparty transfer arrangements,or by telephonic transfersof funds from savingsto demand depositsto cover newly written checks.Others accomplishthe samepurpose through overdraft arrangements with banks,or through ing onfunds kept with mQDeymarket mutual funds. Moreover, those uHHzingnoninterest-bearing checking accountsfrequently receive an implicit return in the form of free or below-cost services,such as checksand safedeposit_boxes. Cost of unbundling Againstthis background,the Federal ReserveBoard of Governors this month releaseda major staff study, The Impact of the Payment of Inter- 2 est on Demand Deposits, which considersthe variousconsequences of Congress'removing or modifying its 44-year-old ban on deposit interest. The staff arguesthat if banks begin to pay explicit intere,st on such deposits,they undoubtedly would also move to price checking and other servicesmore nearly in line with costs.On the plus side, this would tend to curtail uneconomic use of certain--bankservices and would encouragean allocation of resourcesto usesmore highly vaiued by the public. However,the payment of explicit interest would temporarily reduce bank earnings-perhaps by as much as5 to 20 percent of 1975 pretax earningsduring the worst year of the The largesttransitional impact vvould be felt if interest were paid on all demand deposits and,if thrift institutions were also empowered to offer such deposits. The hardest hit would be those bankswith both relatively low earnings and a relatively large amount of deposits newly eligible for interest, especiallyhousehold demand deposits.Roughly 370, or 2V2percent, of all commercial banksmostly very small banks-fall into such a category. The impact-on depository institutions could be limited jf interest paymentswere paid only on consumers' NOW-type accountsinsteadof on all demand deposits. The volume of demand deposits that could be converted to NOWs probably amounts to about $80 billion, as opposed to the roughly $320 billion found in all checking accounts. .Thestaff study argues that if explicit interest were paid on demand deposits, banks and other institutions would probably raise charges for checks and other bank services now offered free or below cost. This would tend to equalize ratesof return for all depositors, provided that they all received the same interest rate and that serviceswere priced more in line with costs.But it would be difficult to judge who would gain or lose the most from payment of explicit interest and from a probable increasein the cost of checks and other services.Some small depositors who write a large number of checks might be worse off than they are now, unless they economized on their check writing. The largest gainers would appear to be those depositors with large and relatively inactive accounts. interest on reserves? In th'e Fed staff's view, cost pressures resulting from demanddeposit interest payments could be partially.offset by the payment of interest on member-bank reserve balancesheld at Federal Reserve Banks. Such interest payments would tend to promote competitive balance between member banks and other depository institutions, since the latter are now permitted to maintain the bulk of their reservesin interest-bearing form. 3 Interest on reserve balancesalso would provide a compensating adjustment for the lossin revenue that nonmember institutions would . experience if they were required to hold reservesagainsttransactional balancesat the Federal Reserve.As the central bank has argued on earlier occasions," From a monetary policy viewpoint, it would be desirable to require all institutions offering transactional accounts to hold reservesagainstsuch deposits either in vault cash or as balancesat the Federal Reserve,and to set such requirement on a uniform basis." ! Summing up, the staff study said, lilf explicit interest were paid on demand deposits, the most significant potential problem would lie in the transitional adjustments of banks and other institutions to the new competitive environment. Adjustment difficulties could be mitigated by payment of interest on reserve balances; by a gradual phase-in through regulatory actions, such as use of alow, and perhaps gradually rising, ceiling rate; and by a delay in the effective date for interest on demand deposits following enabling legislation so as to permit banks to plan effectively for the new competitive environment." No one knows how Congress,the financial community and the general public will react to this study and the Board of Governors' forthcoming recommendations, but the long-term movement towards unbundling seemsunmistakable. William Burke U Ol8u!4SB M' 4Bln • uo8aJO • BpBi\aN .04BPI !!BMBH e B!UJOmB:) .. BUOZPV • B>ISBIV j}(Q) 'me::>'O:lspueJ:lues lS.l. 'ON .ll W1 Hd al Vd 's'n llVW 55Vl:) .lSlJl:lI BANKING D ATA-TWE L F TH fE DER AL RESERVEOBSTRUCT SelectedAssetsand liabilities large Commercial Banks Amount Outstanding 2/09/77 2/02/77 - Loans ("5ross,adjusted) and investments* Loam (gross, adjusted)-total Security loans Commercial and industrial Real estate Consumer instalment U.S.Treasury securities Other securities Deposits (less items)-total* Demand deposits (adjusted) U.S. Government deposits Time deposits-total* Statesand political subdivisions Savingsdeposits Other time deposits:j: Large negotiable CD's 92,271 70,236 1,344 22,891 21,808 12,368 8,833 13,202 91,985 26,375 251 64,137 5,846 30,939 25,370 9,040 Weekly Averages of Daily figures Week ended Member Bank ReservePosition ExcessReserves(+)/Deficiency H Borrowings Net free(+)/Net borrowed H federal Funds-Seven large Banks Interbank Federal fund transactions Net purchases (+)/Net sales H with U.S. security dealers Net loans (+)/Net borrowings H Change from 630 - 1,276 - 189 65 + 63 9 + 322 + 324 + 254 + 415 48 + 75 - 122 + 102 + 93 + 31 Change from year ago Dollar Percent Week ended 2/09/77 2/02/77 + + + 62 2 60 + 921 + 146 + Comparable year-ago period 1 1 0 95 + + 5.11 + 7.98 + 67.16 - 2.15 + 11.30 + 15.50 - 12.44 + 4.35. + 5.15 + 10.37 - 22.53 + 3.53 - 16.14 + 26.48 - 8.88 - 29.61 + 4,483 + 5,188 + 540 - 502 + 2,214 + 1,660 - 1,255 + 550 + 4,502 + 2,479 73 + 2,188 - 1,125 + 6,477 - 2,471 - 3,802 135 + + 53 14 39 + 1,592 + 224 *Includes items not shown separately. :j:lndividuals, partnerships and corporations. Editorial comments may be addressedto the editor (William Burke) or to the author. . . . Information on this and other publications tan be obtained by calling or writing the Public Information Section, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,P.O. Box 7702, San francisco 94120. Phone (415) 544-2184.