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FRBSF

WEEKLY LETTER

August 2, 1985

Thrift Deregulation and the Mortgage Market
Over the past several years, savings and loan associations have diversified their asset portfolios by
increasing the share of nonmortgage investments.
This greater diversific:ation isnot surprising given
that deregulation and other forces have blurred
the boundaries marking financial institutions' traditional turf. However, it has raised concerns that the
more aggressive pursuit of nonmortgage activities
by savings institutions will reduce the flow of
funds available to finance housing. This Letter
examines the reasons for the increased portfolio
diversification and its implications for mortgage
credit.

Asset diversification
Historically, regulations have limited the options
for savings and loans to invest directly in nonmortgage assets. The regulatory restrictions were
strongly reinforced by the tax code. By holding 60
percent of its assets in residential mortgages and
certain other qualifying assets, a savings and loan is
able to defer taxes on a portion of its income. To
protect the maximum proportion of income possible (40 percent), a thrift must hold at least 82 percent of its assets in the qualifying assets.
With these regulatory restrictions and taxincentives, savings and loans entered the 1980s holding
over 85 percent of their assets in mortgage loans
and mortgage-backed securities. Over the past
several years, however, the asset mix has changed
dramatically. Mortgages and mortgage-backed
securities combined fell from 851f2 percent of
assets at FSLlC-insured savings institutions at the
end of 1979 to a little over 73 percent in December 1984.
Changes in the regulations governing the investment powers of savings and loans provide a
natural starting point for explaining this marked
portfolio shift. In 1980, the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (MCA)
expanded asset powers for federally chartered
savings and loans. Among other things, the Act
provided more latitude for thrifts to extend consumer loans and to invest in commercial paper and
other corporate securities.

As important as these regulatory changes may
have been, they were not sufficient to cause the
dramatic decline seen in the ratio of mortgage
holdings to assets at thrift institutions. In fact, long
before MCA, state-chartered savings and loans in a
number of states had fairly broad authority to
engage in nonmortgage lending. Yet most of these
institutions chose not to exercise their asset
powers mainly because of the tax advantages associated with residential mortgage lending.
In recent years, the poor performance of earnings
among thrifts has diluted the appeal of these tax
incentives. In the latter part of 1981 and during the
first part of 1982, over three-quarters of all
federally insured savings and loans reported negative net income. With the subsequent decline in
interest rates, the earnings situation at savings and
loans began to improve. In 1983 and 1984, the
savings and loan industry as a whole posted positive net earnings following two years of losses.
Nevertheless, by mid-1984 one-fourth of all
federally insured savings institutions still were reporting losses.
The relaxed regulatory constraints on asset diversification, combined with the blunting of tax
incentives, seem sufficient to explain the change
we saw in the asset composition of savings and
loans. However, further analysis suggests that
these factors were not as important as a first
glance would indicate.
First, as shown in Chart 1, nonmortgage loans
account for only a small portion of the rise in the
ratio of nonmortgage assets to total assets in
recent years. Second, special factors account for
the changes in "other assets," shown in Chart 1.
For example, included in "other assets" is "goodwill and other intangible assets." The value of this
asset category was boosted considerably through
the purchase accounting procedures used in savings and loan mergers. The rise in the ratio of
"other assets" to total assets also reflected savings
and loans' investments in their service corporation
subsidiaries, a power they already held before
MCA.

FRBSF
Increased liquidity
The growth in "cash and securities" over the past
several years also points to factors other than the
relaxation of asset "restrictions" in influencing the
asset mix at thrifts. The bulk of cash and securities
are federal government or federally sponsored
agency securities, bank CDs and federal funds,
which savings and loans were empowered to hold
before MCA. The increase in their holdings could
reflect factors affecting small-denomination (core)
deposits at thrift institutions. A possible connection is that savings and loans accumulated "cash
and securities" in the face of deposit interest rate
deregulation which stimulated strong core deposit
flows relative to the demand for mortgages at
these thrift institutions.
However, the simultaneous buildup of managed
liabilities at savings and loans following deposit
rate deregulation conflicts with the notion that
these institutions were reacting to an increase in
the supply of core deposits relative to the demand
for mortgages. From 1979 to 1984, managed
liabilities at savings and loans (large-denomination
CDs, Federal Home Loan Bank advances, RPs,
mortgage-backed bonds, and other borrowings)
rose from about 141/2 percent of total liabilities and
net worth to 26 percent. This greater reliance on
managed liabilities suggests that the increase in
liquid assets at savings and loans probably
reflected a higher demand for liquidity by thrifts,
rather than only strong flows of core deposits.
The volatility in interest rates through most of the
1979-1984 period may have provoked the thrifts'
heightened demand for liquidity. In addition, a
byproduct of deregulation has been a shortening
in the overall maturity of core deposits. As a result,
savings and loans could have been attempting to
increase holdings of short-term assets such as
those in "cash and securities."

Implications for the mortgage market
The proposition that a link exists between the
asset mix of savings and loans and the allocation of
credit to housing is a variant of the one thatties
the volume of total mortgage credit to deposit
growth at thrifts. In the latter proposition, the proportion of credit flows allocated to mortgages is
assumed to vary directly with the share of funds
channeled through thrifts. If this were true, it
follows· that if thrifts reduce their propensity to
invest in mortgage-related assets, then, all else
remaining equal, a smaller fraction of credit flows

would go to mortgages, and mortgage rates would
rise relative to other market rates.
For deposit flows at thrifts and their mix of assets
to change the allocation of credit to the mortgage
market requires that developments specific to
those institutions not be offset by other lenders. In
other words, it requires that mortgage borrowers
at thrift institutions be cut off from turning to other
existing mortgage lenders or from turning to other
sources of funds in financial markets. Some degree
of such separation might be expected in the short
run if institutional arrangements for channeling
funds in the credit market are costly to adjust and
the market disruptions are viewed only as temporary. However, it seems reasonable to expect that a
permanent change in the propensity of thrifts to
extend mortgage loans would induce adjustments
by other lenders.
There exists an additional flaw in the argument
thata lower proportion of thrift assets allocated to
mortgages translates into a reduced supply of
mortgage credit. A reduction in the ratio of
mortgages to assets at thrift institutions does not
necessarily imply a decline in their mortgage lending. The volume of mortgage loans held by savings
and loans can increase as the ratio of mortgages to
assets declines if total assets grow at a faster rate.
This last point is particularly important in light of
the impact that deposit deregulation had in causing reintermediation - that is, return flows of
small-denomination deposits to savings and loans.
In addition, the level of intermediation carried out
by savings and loans has been boosted by their
increased reliance on managed liabilities. The
effect of these two phenomena was quite evident
in 1984, a year in which assets of federally insured
saVings institutions expanded by almost 20 percent and mortgage holdings also rose by about
151/2 percent. Thus, since the changing mix of
assets was accompanied by rapid growth in assets,
the nonmortgage activities of savings and loans
complimented, rather than substituted for, their
mortgage lending.

Some evidence
If the change in the asset mix at savings and loans
had an impact on the amount of funds channeled
to mortgages, this impact should be reflected in
the behavior of mortgage interest rates. In that
case, the smaller the share of savings and loan
assets allocated to mortgages, the higher mortgage

~~r:;tag.

Chart 1
Change in Share of Total Assets
at FSLlC -Institutions
(from 1979 to 1984)

Chart 2
Share of Funds Allocated to Mortgages
(quarterly)
Percent

13

Percent

MCA

120

12

100

11

\

\/

80

10

60

9

20

7

o

6

\'
f

,

80

\

FSLlC -Institutions' ~
Mortgage Flows
as a Share of
Asset Flows

40

8

90

l\
t, A
v''''~\/''~

~J.\

60

-20

5

-40

4

50

-60

3

-80

2

40

-100

1

Ol.-__....L...<_ _:.LL---.L__:..Ld--.J__LL"----...1LLLL.L._ _
Total
Nonmortgage
Assets

Cash and
Securities

Nonmortgage
Loans

Other
Assets

rates should be relative to other market rates.
However, an empirical investigation of the relationship between savings and loan asset composition and mortgage interest rates did not turn up
any systematic association. For the period from
mid-1978 through 1984, the fraction of net asset
acquisitions by savings and loans allocated to
mortgages had no significant effect on the interest
rate for fixed-rate mortgages.
These results are consistent with the evidence on
the relation between the proportion of savings and
loan assets devoted to mortgages and the overall
allocation of funds to mortgages by all lenders
shown in Chart 2. The dashed line in the chart
represents the quarterly change in mortgages at
FSLlC-insured institutions as a percent of the
change in their total assets, while the solid line
shows net extensions of mortgages by all lenders,
including households, as a share of borrowing by
individuals and private nonfinancial firms in the
United States.
The shaded region in the chart sets off the period
in which the shift to nonmortgage assets at savings
and loans was most pronounced. During that
period, the ratios of mortgages to private domestic
nonfinancial borrowing varied but, on balance,
tended to rise, not fall. Rather than savings and
loan portfolio changes, the movements of the ratio
of total mortgage lending to private borrowing in
the early 1980s appear to reflect changes in
interest rates (largely through their effects on the
ability and willingness of borrowers to purchase
homes). The peak in the ratio of mortgages to pri-

-120
-140 '-----'_--'-_--'-_....l-l_...l1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

30
1982

1983

1984

vate borrowing due to distortions during the 1980
credit control period aside, the ratio of mortgages
to private borrowing fell in late 1980 and early
1981 as market interest rates rose. The ratio
remained low relative to the late 1970s until the
second half of 1982 when market rates began faIling sharply.
As net mortgage flows at FSLlC-insured institutions
(measured as a share of the change in assets)
stabilized between mid~1983 and the third quarter
of 1984, the ratio of total mortgages to the volume
of aggregate private borrowing fell. On balance, it
does not appear that there has been a consistent
positive (or negative) relation between changes in
the relative allocation of funds to mortgages by
savings institutions and the share of aggregate borrowing accounted for by mortgages.

Conclusion
New asset powers for savings and loans have contributed to a greater diversification of their assets,
although these were not the only stimuli. Poor
earnings, the use of purchase accounting in thrift
mergers, and changes affecting thrift liabilities also
have influenced the composition of savings and
loan assets.
This aggressive pursuit of nonmortgage investment by savings and loans has raised some concerns that fewer funds overall would be available
for mortgage lending. Contrary to this concern,
greater asset diversification at savings and loans
has not been detrimental to the mortgage market.

Fred Furlong and Kimya Moghadam

Opinions expressed in this newsletter do not necessarily reflect the views of the management of the Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco, or of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Editorial comments may be addressed to the editor (Gregory Tong) or to the author .... Free copies of Federal Reserve publications
can be obtained from the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco
94120. Phone (415) 974-2246.

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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)

Selected Assets and Liabilities
large Commercial Banks
loans, Leases and Investments 1 2
Loans and Leases 1 6
Commercial and Industrial
Real estate
Loans to Individuals
Leases
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities 2
Other Secu rities 2
Total Deposits
Demand Deposits
Demand Deposits Adjusted 3
Other Transaction Balances 4
Total Non-Transaction Balances 6
Money Market Deposit
Accounts-Total
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS

Two Week Averages
of Daily Figures

Amount
Outstanding

7/17/85

7/10/85

192,509
174,160
51,647
63,622
34,811

-

Change from 7/18/84
Dollar
Percent!

Change
from

5,~89

-

11,522
6,828
197,628
47,044
31,653
13,818
136,765

-

-

-

44,836
37,646
23,773

224
363
245
116
87
43
602
15
352
252
178
149
48
137

-

-

65
955

Period ended

2,648
2,704

7/1/85

55
106
51

17.6

Period ended

7/15/85

6.0
7.1
3.4
4.8
21.4
7.3
- 3.6
- 2.2
5.0
6.5
11.3
12.7
3.8

6,737

-

10,977
11,578
1,712
2,935
6,139
370
439
160
9,504
2,878
3,222
1,558
5,066

21
91
69

Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+ )/Deficiency (-)
Borrowings
Net free reserves (+ l/Net borrowed( -)

Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
Excludes trading account securities
Excludes U.s. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
s Includes borrowing via FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items not shown separately
7 Annualized percent change

1
2
3
4

~U'08

-

6.5
12.8