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FRBSF

WEEKLY LETTER

January 6, 1989

China's Choices
In December 1978, China's leaders adopted a
program of economic reform designed to stimulate production and economic growth byencouraging the development of "free" markets for
much of the country's goods and services. The
results of this reform have been very impressive.
Since 1980, China's output has increased about
10 percent a year. In 1986, incomes in the agricultural areas have doubled and urban residents'
incomes have increased 50.5 percent over 1978.
However, the transition from a planned economy,
in which virtually all prices were administratively controlled, to one in which many prices
are determined in markets has not been an easy
one. In recent years, inflation has become a serious problem, threatening to undo all that reform
has accomplished to date. Although many factors
have contributed to this problem, the fundamental weakness in the reform program has been
insufficient control of the growth of money and
credit in the economy. Thus, China is now faced
with the need to reduce aggregate inflation pressures, and, as circumstances permit, accomplish
price reform. This Letter evaluates China's options.

Four approaches
The guiding principle behind China's economic
reform program is "the state regulates markets,
and markets motivate enterprises." The market is
the link between macroeconomic goals and the
realization of those goals on the microeconomic
level. But the market cannot exist without relaxation of price controls. The question before
policymakers, thus, is how to coordinate price
reform and monetary policy in such a way that
markets are allowed to function effectively and
inflation is brought under contro!'
To help clarify China's choices, it is instructive to
examine how other countries have implemented
monetary and price policies. Historical evidence
suggests that, within the context of countries that
have socialist or at the least heavily-regulated
economies, there are four' approaches to the simultaneous control of both relative prices and

the aggregate level of prices. The first approach
might be characterized as "loose money and relaxed price contro!." The second is "loose money
and tight price control," while the third is "tight
money and tight price control." Finally, the fourth
is "tight money and relaxed price control."

loose money, relaxed price control
The combination of loose monetary control and
relaxed price control best characterizes the approach followed by Yugoslavia, particularly
between 1950 and 1964. During that period,
Yugoslavia abandoned the Soviet-style planning
apparatus, with its formal system of centralized
administrative management, and adopted a more
decentralized system that granted producers the
right to determine output levels and products.
The fixed price system was eliminated, leaving
prices to be determined by market forces. Partly
in response to this decentralization of economic
decision-making, output increased, and real income doubled between 1952 and 1959.
During the same period, however, Yugoslavia followed a monetary policy that allowed the money
supply to increase by more than 250 percent.
Moreover, short-term bank credit expanded
rapidly, doubling in volume between 1952 and
1958, and nearly tripling by 1961. This expansion
of money and credit, together with the elimination of the country's fixed price system, led to
rapid inflation. In the ten years between 1954
and 1964 the price level doubled. Inflation remains a problem today in Yugoslavia; from 1965
to 1986 inflation averaged 28 percent a year and
in 1987 the annual inflation rate reached 221
percent.
Yugoslavia's experience suggests that relaxing
price controls in an environment of loose monetary control is unwise. In fact, such a combination has led to galloping inflation, which in
recent months has increased the conflicts among
the different national republics, leading to civil
disturbances, according to a number of
Yugoslavian officials.

FRBSF
Loose money, tight price control
Between 1930 and 1937, the Soviet Union followed a policy of rapid money supply growth in
conjunction with tight control over prices. During this period, currency in circulation increased
more than 260 percent, compared to an increase
in nominal gross national product of around 200
percent. To a large extent, the rapid growth in
currency helped to finance the large increase in
defense expenditures, which increased as a proportion of total government spending from 5.6
percent in 1931 to 17.4 percent in 1937.

Ordinarily, such an increase in the money supply
could be expected to cause the price level to
rise; however, prices were rigidly controlled during this period. As a result, official statistics show
that the retail price index was stable. Nonetheless, there were widespread shortages and long
lines outside shops. Moreover, the prices of
goods on the "curb market" apparently were
nearly 3112 times higher than in the state stores.
As the Soviet Union's experience suggests, official prices can be kept from rising through
administrative controls, but alternative, unofficial
markets develop and the allocation of goods and
resources becomes distorted. Social tension also
increases.
Tight money, tight price control
In the 26 years prior to the implementation of
economic reform, China pursued policies that involved tight control over the growth in the money
supply and rigid control over the prices of goods
and services in the economy. Between 1952 and
1978, the rate of growth in China's gross social
production (gross material products produced
chiefly by industry, agriculture and building sectors) averaged 10.8 percent a year, while the
average rate of growth in its bank-money supply
(all deposits plus cash) was 10.5 percent per year.
At the same time, all prices were administratively-controlled, either at the national level or
the local level. Consumer prices, in particular, remained virtually frozen for most of this period.
However, rationing was necessary to allocate
goods among consumers.

Tight control over the money supply coupled
with rigid price control can guarantee a stable
price level, as China's experience shows. However, price controls do not allow for shifts in
relative prices of commodities. As a result, the al-

location of goods becomes distorted and
economic growth is stifled.
Tight money, relaxed price control
After World War II, a number of countries faced
the need to make a transition from wartime rationing and price controls to free-market
determination of relative prices without igniting
inflation. West Germany and Japan followed similar strategies in this transition. To control
expansive aggregate demand, the West German
government released broad categories of commodities from wartime price controls at the same
time that it implemented a currency conversion,
which had the effect of reducing the value of the
currency in circulation from Reichs Mark 150 billion prior to the reform to Deutsche Mark 12
billion after the reform. Such a drastic reduction
in the money supply led to stabilization in the
price level, even as prices for individual commod ities were decontrolled.

In Japan, the Reconstruction Bank and the Bank
of Japan sought to stimulate postwar production
by investing large amounts of funds in industrial
enterprises. The immediate result of this policy
was to stimulate inflation. Even after the enactment of the Emergency Financial Measures,
inflation on the black market and in the rural
areas continued to soar. In February 1949, Joseph
Dodge, the financial adviser to the Supreme
Commander of the Allied Powers, advanced the
so-called "Dodge Plan;' which called for suspending new lending by the Reconstruction
Bank, tight monetary policy, and an "overbalanced" government budget (that is, one that
generated fiscal surpluses) to redeem bonds prior
to maturity. This plan was adopted and price
controls were lifted. In time, the price level was
stabilized.
The experiences of West Germany and Japan
suggest that it is possible to decontrol prices and
at the same time stabilize the price level. This
approach, then, provides a useful economic
framework for China during its transition from
controlled prices to market-determined prices.
The current situation
Undertaking such an approach will not be easy,
however. In recent years, China has followed policies that entail rapid money supply growth and
gradual relaxation of price controls. The government's policy of gradual price reform, instituted

in the second half of 1984, has increased the proportion of retail prices determined by the market
from 2.5 percent in 1978 to 16 percent in 1984
and 50 percent in 1988.
At the same time, the government has pursued
expansionary monetary policy. Between 1984
and 1987, the growth rate of the aggregate money
supply averaged 23 percent a year, while that of
national income averaged only 10.4 percent a
year. Likewise, in the first half of 1988, industrial
output rose 17 percent over its year-earl ier level,
but the money supply shot up 30 percent.
This expansionary policy and the relaxation of
price controls over a significant proportion of
commodities have resulted in a rapid rise in the
overall price level. Retail prices rose at the rates
of 8.8 percent, 6 percent, and 7.2 percent in
1985, 1986, and 1987, respectively. In 1988, the
annual inflation rate is expected to register at
least 25 percent. This situation has become untenable, and the government has responded by
suspending further price reform for one year and
reinstating certain spending controls.

A difficult choice
A return to price controls is not a good long-run
solution to the problem of inflation because it
undermines the goals and achievements of economic reform. Instead, China might adopt a
tighter monetary policy along the lines adopted
by West Germany and Japan in the postwar transition period. But such a decision should be
made only after the costs of doing so and the
need to adapt the policy to China's special circumstances are considered.
Carrying out a tight monetary policy means that
China would have to "pay the piper:' Many
countries have had to suffer increasing unem-

ployment and declining real production while
overcoming inflation. Moreover, experience
shows that the longer the duration of the inflationary process, and the faster the rise in prices,
the more a society will suffer in overcoming inflation. For this reason, halting inflation has
become a matter of crucial importance in China
now. Short-term recession brought on by a tight
monetary policy may be a necessary sacrifice if
China is to control inflation and foster long-run
economic development.
But a policy aimed at slowing money supply
growth and decontrolling prices must take
China's own national characteristics into account. The economies of West Germany and
Japan are based on private ownership of enterprise. Once a suitable monetary environment
was created in those two countries and price
controls were relaxed, the transition occurred
relatively quickly. Because China's economic system is different, a few more steps in this
transition process may be necessary. First, China
should try to turn its banks and enterprises into
truly independent entities responsible for their
own profits and losses, even though they are not
privately owned. As a next step, then, China
could privatize much more of its economy, granting the right of private ownership in many
enterprises. These steps, pursued in the context
of appropriate monetary policy, should enable
China to join the ranks of the "Newly Industrialized Countries" before the end of this
century.

Li Yunqi
Economist
Peoples Bank of China
and
Visiting Scholar
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

Opinions expressed in this newsletter do not necessarily reflect the views of the management of the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco, or of the Board pf Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Editorial comments may be addressed to the editor (Barbara Bennett) or to the author.... Free copies of Federal Reserve
publications can be obtained from the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702,
San Francisco 94120. Phone (415) 974-2246.

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