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October 15, 1993

eCONOMIG
COMMeNTORY
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

The Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993: A Summary Report
by David Altig and Jagadeesh Gokhale

o.

"n August 5, the U.S. Senate cleared
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993 (OBRA93), one day after the
House of Representatives had done likewise. President Clinton signed the bill
into law on August 10, formalizing its
role as the central fiscal blueprint for the
nation's economy over the next five years.
Passage of OBRA93 followed an extended period of vigorous debate instigated by the administration's publication
of A Vision of Change for America
(henceforth referred to as Vision) and the
President's State of the Union address in
February. In an earlier Economic Commentary, we published an overview of
the administration's proposals.1 Our primary conclusions were as follows:
•

The majority of proposed deficit cuts,
in dollar terms, would be deferred to
the later years of the plan, with 70 percent of the total being realized in fiscal years (FY) 1997-98.

•

Through FY 1995, planned revenue
increases would actually exceed
deficit cuts and would cumulatively
account for 75 percent of the total
dollar reduction in deficits over the
entire six-year horizon.

•

The plan would shift resources, via
both expenditure and tax policy, toward nondefense discretionary
spending.

•

ISSN 0428-1276

The plan would reduce the net payment burden of future generations.

Although OBRA93 retained much of
the President's original plan, some of
our conclusions are indeed altered by
the provisions in the final budget bill.
In this article, we summarize those differences and outline the legislation's
revenue, spending, and deficit details.
Using recently published data by the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO),
we conclude that:
•

Compared to the Clinton plan,
OBRA93 provides more deficit reduction over its first three years, in
both absolute terms and as a percentage of the FY 1994-98 total.
However, it remains true that the
majority of cuts in dollar terms (60
percent) is deferred to FY1997 and
FY1998.

•

Revenue increases are still the largest
source of deficit reduction, but account for only 56 percent of the total
in OBRA93, as opposed to more than
70 percent in the administration's
original proposal. Furthermore, unlike the Clinton plan, in no year does
the bill entail revenue increases that
exceed that year's dollar amount of
deficit reduction.

•

OBRA93, like the Clinton plan, does
provide for a rise in total nondefense discretionary spending.

•

Although reduced health benefits, taxation of Social Security benefits, and
higher income taxes raise the net tax
burdens of all living generations, over
the immediate horizon the increases
are larger for older generations.2

The final budget bill that was enacted
this past summer contains some significant differences from the administration's original proposals. These
involve the scope and timing of deficit
reductions and the amount and distribution of revenue increases. Here, the
authors use new data from both the
Congressional Budget Office and the
Office of Management and Budget to
assess changes in lifetime tax burdens
created by the new legislation and to
explore prospects for real deficit reduction in the budget bill.

• The Bottom Line
The analysis here and in the following
two sections relies largely on numbers
produced by the CBO. These estimates
differ from the administration's, which
are produced by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), for a variety
of technical reasons. The most important of these for our purposes is the
exclusion of spending reductions mandated by prior legislation. Specifically,
the CBO does not allocate to OBRA93
spending cuts that are required by the
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990—a
position that we find appropriate. 3
The CBO calculates that from FY1994
through FY1998, the budget bill is
projected to reduce deficits by a cumulative total of $433 billion below what

FIGURE 1 DEFICIT REDUCTION IN OBRA93 AND
IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL
Billions of dollars
160
140
120

60 percent of the total reductions is deferred to FY1997 and FY1998.
A Closer Look at the Revenue Side
Increased revenues account for nearly
56 percent of the $433 billion deficit reduction total. This is substantially lower
than the 70 percent share proposed by
the administration, because OBRA93
reflects both larger spending cuts and
lower revenue collections. The most
significant element of the latter arises
from a scaling back of the President's
initial energy tax proposals.

I OBRA93
I Administration's
proposal

100
80
60
40
20
0

1994

1995

1996
Fiscal year

1997

1998

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

TABLE 1

EFFECTS OF OBRA93 TAX CHANGES
BY INCOME GROUP

Average Change in Taxes, FY1994-98
Family Income

Less than $10,000
$10,000-$20,000
$20,000-$30,000
$30,000-$40,000
$40,000-$50,000
$50,000-$75,000
$75,000-$100,000
$100,000-$200,000
$200,000 or more

Dollar!

Percent

-68
-86
-41
50
105
192
312
649
23,521

-14.9
-5.0
-1.0
0.7
1.1
1.3
1.4
1.9
17.4

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

they otherwise would have been. Figure
1 provides a first sense of how deficit
reduction in OBRA93 compares to the
administration's original proposals. As
illustrated, the CBO foresees deeper
cuts from the final legislation than it
projected under the President's plan
when it was announced in February, a
feature that is true both cumulatively
and in each of the relevant fiscal years.
Although some of the difference is due
to changes in economic and technical
conditions since March (the date of the

CBO's analysis of the Clinton plan),
most is the result of shifts in policy.
Changes in the relative timing of deficit reduction are also apparent from figure 1. In particular, a larger fraction of
the OBRA93 deficit cuts is to be realized in the early years of the legislation
than was the case in the administration's proposal. Nonetheless, the bill
still postpones the majority of cuts to
the outlying years of the budget: A full

The distribution of total revenue increases in the new legislation is illustrated in figure 2. Approximately 58
percent of the total is associated with
taxes aimed at high-income individuals, including both higher income-tax
rates and Medicare payroll taxes. However, as shown in table 1, the CBO calculates that the majority of taxpayers
(starting with a family income of
$30,000) will face somewhat greater
tax burdens than before. In addition,
the tax changes have long-run distributional effects that are not adequately
captured by simply looking at the pointin-time impact across income levels, a
subject we will discuss later.
A Closer Look at the Outlay Side
Like the Clinton plan before it, OBRA93
seeks simultaneously to reduce total federal outlays and to shift spending priorities (see figure 3). Assuming that planned
defense cuts follow the proposals in
Vision, total outlays for nondefense discretionary spending will, relative to the
old status quo, be higher in all years but
FY1998. However, over five years, the
legislation calls for a nearly $70 billion
decline in overall discretionary expenditures, a total guaranteed by legislated
spending caps that are binding unless specifically abrogated by acts of Congress.
The balance of OBRA93's $192 billion
spending reductions stems from a decline in planned mandatory and interest
expenditures. These changes — particularly in mandatory spending — have a
significant impact on the generational
burden of the plan, an issue to which
we now turn.

FIGURE 2

DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE INCREASES
BY SOURCE IN OBRA93, FY1994-98

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

• OBRA93 from a Generational
Accounting Perspective
As noted, OBRA93 aims to achieve its
five-year, $433 billion deficit reduction
through a mixture of tax increases and
spending cuts. Although the foregoing
discussion provides some insight into
the law's distributional effects, it does
not address the long-run impact on different generations of taxpayers and
benefit recipients. In particular, we
would like to understand the likely impact of the bill's measures on the net
tax burdens — tax payments less transfer receipts (such as Social Security
and Medicare benefits) — of individuals in different age groups.
Our approach is to estimate the present
value of changes in prospective net tax
payments for different generations under the assumption that the policies embodied in the legislation will be in
force permanently. This type of analysis reveals the stance of budgetary
measures with regard to intergenerational wealth redistribution.
We presented the results of such an exercise, based on the budget proposals
contained in Vision, in our earlier Economic Commentary. In fact, from the
perspective of generational accounting,

OBRA93 differs little from the original
administration proposals, and we reach
essentially the same conclusions that
we did before: OBRA93, if sustained
over time, will increase the prospective
net tax burdens on living generations
and reduce the lifetime tax burdens on
future generations. However, the measures in the new legislation do not go as
far as necessary to redress the imbalance in current fiscal policy, whereby
future generations face lifetime tax burdens that are considerably higher than
those faced by today's newborns.
Here, we supplement the results of the
earlier study by offering two alternative
ways of viewing the effects of OBRA93
on living and future generations. First,
we present lifetime tax rates — the present value of taxes less transfers relative to
lifetime income — faced by selected generations. Our experiments compare these
rates in the baseline, or status quo, case
involving no policy change to those implied by the assumption that OBRA93
policies will be in force permanently.
Second, we relax the assumption that the
OBRA93 policies are permanent, and
trace the changes in tax and transfer
flows on individuals of different ages over
the five years of the budget plan only.

Lifetime Tax Rates
Table 2 presents lifetime tax rates under both baseline and OBRA93 policies. The table indicates a consistent
increase over time: Generations born in
the early 1900s faced lifetime tax rates
in the range of 20 to 25 percent of lifetime labor earnings, while generations
born in the 1990s, if treated as indicated under baseline policies, would
face rates just under 34 percent. Most
disturbing, however, is the fact that under baseline policies, generations born
after 1991 are estimated to face lifetime tax rates of more than 70 percent,
on average. This severe imbalance in
the status quo fiscal policy reflects a
surge in projected entitlement spending
by way of Social Security, Medicare,
and Medicaid, together with an increase in the number of elderly recipients of these benefits.
Table 2 also illustrates our earlier observation that the generational effects of
the proposals presented in Vision were
not changed significantly by the various
modifications that yielded OBRA93.7
Like the initial plan, the final legislation
imposes fairly modest increases in the lifetime tax rates on most living generations.
The largest increases are imposed on the
relatively younger generations. This is not
surprising, because these individuals have
the greater part of their earning and taxpaying years ahead of them and will therefore pay higher taxes for a longer period
of time. Despite the small rise in tax rates
implied by the tax and spending changes
in OBRA93, the reduction in the average
lifetime tax rate faced by future generations is a sizable 13 percent. The new lifetime tax rate of future generations is
still quite large, however, meaning that
OBRA93, like the Clinton plan before
it, represents only a small step toward
equalizing the lifetime tax burdens of
living and future generations.
Per Capita Tax and Transfer
Flows — FY1994-98
The assumption that the policies embodied in OBRA93 will be in force permanently is an extreme one, and changes
are certain to occur in the course of future policy. Consequently, it is perhaps

FIGURE 3

OUTLAY CHANGES IN OBRA93

higher taxation of Social Security beneficiaries translate into sizable increases
in the net tax burdens per capita for
older male and female generations,
while higher income taxes impose significant burdens on young and middleaged male generations.

Billions of dollars
15 _

v
—
\.
Nondefense discretionary
X.

10
5

\
\

0
-5

"**•»,

-10

Net interest

-15 -20 -

^

^

\

•

-25 -

Defense N.

-30 -

\

-35 -

•

-

•

•

Mandatory
\

-40 -45

1994

1

1995

1
1996
Fiscal year

1
1997

1998

SOURCES: Congressional Budget Office and Office of Management and Budget.

TABLE 2 LIFETIME NET TAX RATES OF CURRENT
AND FUTURE GENERATIONS
(Percent)
Generation's
Year of Birth

1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
1991
Future generations

Baseline: 1992
Estimates"

Vision
Estimates'1

OBRA93
Estimates0

21.5
24.7
26.3
28.1
29.3
30.6
32.1
33.2
33.8
33.6
33.5
71.1

21.5
24.7
26.4
28.2
29.5
31.0
32.8
34.3
35.1
35.0
35.0
58.8

21.5
24.7
26.4
28.3
29.6
31.0
32.7
34.0
34.6
34.5
34.5
58.4

SOURCES:
a. Authors' calculations based on Budget Baselines, Historical Data, and Alternatives for the Future, Office
of Management and Budget, January 1993.
b. Authors' calculations based on A Vision of Change for America, February 1993.
c. Authors' calculations based on Mid-Session Review of the 1994 Budget, Office of Management and Budget.

more instructive to consider the generational impact of OBRA93 only up to
the last year that the legislation is in
force (1998). We now shift our focus
from lifetime tax rates to estimates of
the annual per capita taxes and transfers
implied by the legislation over the next
several years.

Figures 4 and 5 depict the change in annual payments for the most important
categories of taxes and transfers for selected generations from FY1994
through FY1998.8 The data confirm
the earlier discussion that most of the
cuts are to occur in FY 1997-98. The reductions in health benefits and the

On a per capita basis, these tax and
transfer changes suggest that per capita
increases in burdens are larger for
older individuals. However, to the extent that policies under OBRA93 are continued beyond 1998—and in view of
the pressures for higher taxes that will
undoubtedly emerge as a result of the
imbalance in the nation's fiscal policies—young and middle-aged generations are likely to face future tax burdens that are much larger than those
indicated in the figures.
• Deja Vu All Over Again?
During the Bush administration. Congress passed the Omnibus Reconciliation
Act of 1990 (OBRA90), legislation that
proposed a five-year deficit reduction of
about $500 billion, raised fuel taxes by
about a nickel per gallon, increased marginal tax rates on high-income individuals, placed caps on discretionary spending, and restricted Medicare outlays,
among other things. The deficit — in
nominal terms, in real terms, and relative
to GDP — rose in each of the two fiscal
years following OBRA90's passage. The
CBO's projections as of August put the
FY 1993 deficit at about $266 billion,
nearly $40 billion higher than the
FY1990 deficit, and still a larger percentage of GDP than prevailed at the time
OBRA90 was signed into law.
Many economists and policymakers
point to extraordinary factors — presumably unrelated to the provisions of the
budget bill itself—that have unfortunately conspired against the progress toward deficit reduction for which the proponents of OBRA90 had hoped. Chief
among these are the recession that began
in the summer of 1990 and the unusually
slow recovery that followed.

FIGURE 4

NET PAYMENTS FOR MALES, FY1994-98"

Dollars
000
900
800 700 -

^

600 —

75-year-old

-

"

__^~——-~
**

500
400

45-year-old
^

_

_

—

«

i—

—

~

w

m

60-year-old

^ **

m

-

300
200

30-year-old

100
0
1994

|
1995

1

1

1996

1997

1998

Fiscal year
a. Ages as of 1993.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on Mid-Session Review of the 1994 Budget. Office of Management and Budget. September 1993.

FIGURE S

NET PAYMENTS FOR FEMALES, FY1994-983

Dollars
000
900 -

•

800 700 600

_

~

^

^

" " y—•*• " H

500
400

^^0»

300

60-year-old

^» *^

200
100 , • •
n
1994

=

30-year-old
1995

1996

1

1997

Fiscal year
a. Ages as of 1993.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on Mid-Session Review of the 1994 Budget, Office of Management and Budget, September 1993.

An alternative explanation, however,
appeals to traditional supply-side criticisms of raising marginal tax rates to
combat deficits. The essence of these
arguments is that the failure of government estimates to incorporate behavioral responses to tax changes causes
official revenue projections to be
grossly overstated. For instance, economists Martin Feldstein and Daniel
Feenberg estimate that tax avoidance in
the face of OBRA93's tax rate increases will cause income tax revenues
to be about $20 billion less than the administration has claimed. Preliminary

calculations performed by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland's research
staff suggest that labor supply and saving responses could result in shortfalls
of a similar magnitude.
In fact, the post-OBRA90 period provides something of a natural experiment for these supply-side arguments,
and the evidence is not encouraging for
deficit reduction prospects. Federal tax
revenues in 1991 and 1992 were more
than $130 billion less than the CBO initially projected following passage of
that legislation, and less than 60 per-

cent of this shortfall can be directly accounted for by changing economic conditions. Given the striking similarities
between OBRA93 and OBRA90, the
prospects for real deficit reduction, as
well as increased generational equity, critically depend on whether the supply-side
or extraordinary-factor interpretation of
OBRA90's failure is correct.

1998

•

Footnotes

1. See David Altig and Jagadeesh Gokhale,
"An Overview of the Clinton Budget Plan,"
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary, March 1, 1993.
2. The generational accounting results reported here are based on Mid-Session Review
of the 1994 Budget, Office of Management
and Budget, September 1993.
3. We present a more detailed discussion of
differences in the CBO and OMB calculations in our earlier article.
4. OBRA93 specifies spending caps for total discretionary outlays, but does not indicate separate mandatory limits for defense
and nondefense components. Subject to revisions for economic and technical reasons or
mitigating legislation in Congress, defense
expenditures that are higher than those indicated here would necessarily be met by
lower nondefense outlays.
5. The baseline lifetime tax rates are taken
from Budget Baselines, Historical Data, and
Alternatives for the Future, Office of Management and Budget, January 1993.

6. The lifetime tax rates presented are the ratios of lifetime net tax payments to lifetime
labor income. Capital gains in excess of the
normal return on saving and net transfers from
other generations are not included in our calculations because of data limitations. However,
the upward bias in the reported tax rates resulting from these omissions is minimal because
these sources of income constitute only a small
fraction of lifetime resources. The lifetime tax
rates reported are population-weighted averages over male and female generations of the
same age.

David Altig is an economic advisor and
Jagadeesh Gokhale is an economist at the
Federal Resen'e Bank of Cleveland.
The views stated herein are those of the
authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Resen'e Bank of Cleveland or of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Resene
System.

7. The smaller tax hikes and greater spending reductions under OBRA93 result in lifetime tax rates that are marginally lower for
all (living and future) generations relative to
those implied by proposals in Vision.
8. Only changes in tax and transfer payments
are shown. Changes in government purchases
of goods and services are not included in the
analysis. This exercise can be viewed as an answer to the question, "What is the marginal
change in the distribution of the burden of paying for government purchases?"
9. See Martin Feldstein, "Clinton's Revenue
Mirage," Wall Street Journal, April 6, 1993.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Research Department
P.O. Box 6387
Cleveland, OH 44101

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