Title:

Measuring CEO Compensation, No. 16-03

PREVIOUS | NEXT

Measuring CEO Compensation, No. 16-03

DATE: March 2016

PART OF: AUTHORS: CONTRIBUTING AUTHOR:

ABSTRACT: Compensation packages for CEOs of large public companies often include grants of restricted stock and stock options, the value of which to the CEO depends on the future performance of the firm, as well as on the terms of the grants. This value, which is key to evaluating the CEO's incentives, can be estimated in a number of ways. The authors use measures based on the expected values and the realized values of pay to compare the compensation of CEOs in a sample of large public U.S. firms and a subset of financial firms before and after the 2007-08 financial crisis.

Download (pdf) View Full Text

Share this page:


Diversity is critical to the Federal Reserve, and we are firmly committed to fostering a diverse and inclusive culture throughout the Federal Reserve System. Collections within FRASER contain historical language, content, and descriptions that reflect the time period within which they were created and the views of their creators. Certain collections contain objectionable content—for example, discriminatory or biased language used to refer to racial, ethnic, and cultural groups. These viewpoints and attitudes are inconsistent with our values, but the original descriptions are retained to ensure that they are not erased from the historical record.
Save & Share
less

Jarque, Arantxa , Price, David A. and Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. "Measuring CEO Compensation, No. 16-03," Economic Brief (March 2016). https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/6034/item/583946, accessed on May 27, 2022.

More Information
less

THEMES:

Metadata (XML)
Metadata (JSON)