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Home / Publications / Research / Economic Brief / 2021

Economic Brief
September 2021, No. 21-28

How Do Employers Recruit New Workers?
Article by: Steven J Davis, Claudia Macaluso and Sonya Ravindranath Waddell

While data on the number of job openings and hires are readily available, data on
how hires happen are less so. The Richmond Fed surveyed employers around the
Fifth Federal Reserve District to shed light on how employers recruit new
workers. We find that recruiting for many jobs starts well before the 30-day
window defined by the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) for
active vacancies, meaning those job openings may not be counted by JOLTS. We
also note that referrals and recommendations are among the most popular
methods for finding job candidates and explore why.
Standard sources of statistical information about U.S. labor markets report the number of
hires and job openings but say little about how hiring happens. This leaves several
important questions:
What methods do employers use to recruit prospective employees?
How do recruiting methods differ by employer size and industry?
When do employers start recruiting to fill an open job position?
A few studies have shown that recruiting intensity per job opening matters greatly for the
pace of hiring, but these studies also say little about how employers actually recruit
workers.1
A better understanding of recruiting methods and the hiring process would be useful for
several reasons. For one, methods that rely heavily on personal contacts and referral
networks could disadvantage job seekers who are not tied into the relevant networks. For
another, if initial job interviews now take place mostly online, job seekers who lack ready
access to high-quality internet service could be disadvantaged. These concerns have
become more acute, because the pandemic brought especially high rates of job loss for
minorities, less-educated workers and those with low earnings.

Surveying Employers on Recruiting Methods
To throw new light on recruiting methods and the hiring process, the Federal Reserve Bank
of Richmond sampled 308 employers across three survey waves:
The February 2020 wave, which ran Jan. 31-Feb. 19 and asked respondents about
recruiting efforts for the position their firm most recently filled or sought to fill in the
prior 12 months
The June 2020 wave, which ran May 28-June 17, covered the same topics as the
February 2020 wave and also asked about the most recent position over the previous
three months
The March 2021 wave, which ran March 17-31 and asked about recruiting efforts for
the typical open position in the last 12 months
We oversampled mid-size firms with 51-500 employees, undersampled smaller firms and
oversampled manufacturing firms, as seen in Table 1.

Enlarge
Active Recruitment Often Begins Early
Many employers start recruiting for open positions long before they intend for someone to
begin work. As shown in Table 2, 43 percent of employers in our sample began recruiting at
least six weeks in advance of the desired start date, and 13 percent began recruiting 12 or
more weeks in advance.

Enlarge
Thus, for many job openings, the cycle from inception of recruitment efforts to the start of
work stretches over many weeks or months. This result aligns with evidence in earlier
studies on the often-long spell between vacancy posting and the start of work by a new
hire.2
This finding has important implications for the measurement of job vacancies. In its Job
Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), the Bureau of Labor Statistics defines an
active vacancy as one for which "work could start within 30 days." Our results in Table 2
suggest that this concept is overly restrictive and may lead to an undercount of open job
positions.
Consider a firm that starts recruiting 12 weeks in advance of when it would like a new
employee to begin work. Suppose the firm finds someone to fill the position six weeks after
it starts recruiting (and, hence, six weeks before the new recruit actually starts to work). In
these circumstances, the job opening is never counted in JOLTS.
Indeed, careful analysis of JOLTS data reveals that many hires are not mediated through
vacancies that fit the JOLTS definition, as noted in the 2013 Quarterly Journal of Economics
paper "The Establishment-Level Behavior of Vacancies and Hiring" by Steven Davis, Jason
Faberman and John Haltiwanger.

Employers Rely Heavily on Recommendations and
Referrals
Employers use a variety of recruiting methods to attract candidates to their open jobs, as
seen in Figures 1a and 1b.

Enlarge

Enlarge
Also, 80 percent of respondents use at least two recruiting methods per open job, as seen
in Table 3.

Enlarge
We found that larger employers tend to use more recruiting methods than smaller
employers: The median number of methods used by employers with less than 50
employees was two, while the median for employers with more than 500 employees was
five.

Some common recruiting methods receive little or no attention in leading economic models
of how employers match with workers. For example, employers rely heavily on
recommendations and referrals from their own employees and from people outside the
firm. In addition, respondents engage in partnerships with educational and training
institutions, headhunters and staffing firms, echoing evidence from the 2020 working paper
"Application Flows (PDF)" by Steven Davis and Brenda Samaniego de la Parra. These
network-based recruiting channels are especially important for hiring in professional
services. They are also important in other sectors. For example, even in manufacturing,
which had the lowest share, 45 percent of manufacturers rely on employee referrals to
attract applicants. Smaller firms rely less on network-based recruiting methods (especially
partnerships and professional intermediaries) and more on social media advertisements,
newspapers, radio and job boards.
Forty-three percent of respondents say they are accepting applications and screening
candidates, even when they have no immediate vacancy to fill. This result suggests that
firms sometimes recruit new workers in an opportunistic manner, creating a position and
hiring someone to fill it when a sufficiently attractive candidate becomes available. This type
of behavior also leads to hires that are not mediated through vacancies, as the concept is
defined in JOLTS.

Impact of Referrals and Recommendations on Employers
and Employees
Why do employers rely on personal recommendations and referrals, which are subjective
and possibly biased? As seen in Figure 2, 51 percent of our survey participants claim that
recommendations and referrals yield "better candidates," which suggests that they help
employers solve a screening problem in the presence of hidden information.

Enlarge
The idea here is that an employer cannot readily ascertain the true ability of a prospective
new hire or the quality of a match. Someone who knows the candidate personally or is
professionally trained to screen workers can supply valuable information.3 In fact, 31
percent of our respondents explicitly state that recommendations and referrals "save
time/resources evaluating candidate quality."4
Another theory emphasizes monitoring problems in the presence of hidden actions. The
idea is that employers cannot detect and punish all instances of bad conduct or bad
performance on the job. Referrals and recommendations alleviate this concern when
workers are responsive to potential punishments via the network. This can occur through
the disappointment or anger of a recommender or through the unwillingness of the current
employer to provide a positive recommendation to prospective future employers.5 About
30 percent of respondents declare that referrals and recommendations yield candidates
who are "less likely to perform poorly" and/or "more likely to be trustworthy." This finding
suggests that networks play an important role in encouraging strong worker performance.
Interestingly, 36 percent of respondents also indicate that network-based recruiting is
excellent for "promotion of company and positions." This provides another potential reason
for employers to participate in some recruiting activities, even when they do not have

specific job openings.

Conclusion
The Richmond Fed's Survey of Employer Recruiting Behavior (SERB) aims to deepen our
understanding of how firms recruit workers. Results thus far indicate that many employers
start recruiting much more than 30 days before the desired start date for the new hire.
SERB data also highlight the prevalence of network-based recruiting: recommendations,
referrals, partnerships with educational institutions, and intermediated hiring. Our evidence
also indicates that network-based recruiting can lower hiring costs, yield recruits of higher
quality and promote stronger employee performance.
Steven J. Davis is the William H. Abbott Distinguished Service Professor of International
Business and Economics at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. Claudia
Macaluso is an economist and Sonya Ravindranath Waddell is a vice president and
economist in the Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.

1

These studies include the 2013 Quarterly Journal of Economics paper "The Establishment-Level

Behavior of Vacancies and Hiring" by Steven Davis, Jason Faberman and John Haltiwanger; the
2018 American Economic Review paper "Aggregate Recruiting Intensity" by Alessandro Gavazza,
Simon Mongey and Giovanni Violante; and the 2020 working paper "Macro Recruiting Intensity
from Micro Data" by Mongey and Violante.
2

Examples of these studies include the 1985 Review of Economics and Statistics paper "Employer

Search: The Interviewing and Hiring of New Employees" by John Barron, John Bishop and William
Dunkelberg; the 1992 Journal of Labor Economics paper "Vacancies and the Recruitment of New
Employees" by Jan van Ours and Geert Ridder; the 1993 Oxford Bulletin of Economics and
Statistics paper "Vacancy Durations: Search or Selection?" by van Ours and Ridder; and the 2014
working paper "Job Recruitment and Vacancy Durations in Germany" by Steven Davis, Christof
Röttger, Anja Warning and Enzo Weber.
3

Studies discussing this aspect include the 2013 Review of Economic Dynamics paper "Learning
About Match Quality and the Use of Referrals" by Manolis Galenianos and the 2016 Journal of
Labor Economics paper "Social Networks, Employee Selection and Labor Market Outcomes" by
Lena Hensvik and Oskar Nordström Skans.
4

Giorgio Topa's chapter "Labor Markets and Referrals" from the 2011 Handbook of Social

Economics provides a review of research that explores the screening idea in the hiring context.
5

This is an idea long ago suggested in the 1966 American Economic Review paper "Information
Networks in Labor Markets" by Albert Rees and further developed by the 2013 Review of
Economic Dynamics paper "Learning About Match Quality and the Use of Referrals" by Manolis

Galenianos and the 2016 Journal of Labor Economics paper "Social Networks, Employee
Selection and Labor Market Outcomes" by Lena Hensvik and Oskar Nordström Skans.

This article may be photocopied or reprinted in its entirety. Please credit the authors,
source, and the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond and include the italicized statement
below.
Views expressed in this article are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.

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