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74580

Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 238 / Tuesday, December 12, 2006 / Notices

Written comments should be
received on or before January 11, 2007
to be assured of consideration.

DATES:

Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade
Bureau (TTB)
OMB Number: 1513–0107.
Type of Review: Revision.
Title: Monthly Report—Tobacco
Products Importer.
Form: TTB 5220.6.
Description: Reports of the
importation and disposition of tobacco
products are necessary to determine
whether those issued the permits
required by 26 U.S.C. 5713 should be
allowed to continue their operations or
renew their permits. This report is used
to accomplish this goal, which protects
the revenue.
Respondents: Business and other for
profits.
Estimated Total Burden Hours: 7,258
hours.
Clearance Officer: Frank Foote, (202)
927–9347, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax
and Trade Bureau, Room 200 East, 1310
G. Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005.
OMB Reviewer: Alexander T. Hunt,
(202) 395–7316, Office of Management
and Budget, Room 10235, New
Executive Office Building, Washington,
DC 20503.
Michael A. Robinson,
Treasury PRA Clearance Officer.
[FR Doc. E6–21112 Filed 12–11–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810–31–P

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency
[Docket No. 06–14]

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
[Docket No. OP–1248]

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION
Concentrations in Commercial Real
Estate Lending, Sound Risk
Management Practices
Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, Treasury (OCC); Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (Board); and Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
ACTION: Final guidance.
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AGENCIES:

SUMMARY: The OCC, Board, and FDIC
(the Agencies) are issuing final joint
Guidance on Concentrations in
Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound
Risk Management Practices (Guidance).
This Guidance has been developed to

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reinforce sound risk management
practices for institutions with high and
increasing concentrations of commercial
real estate loans on their balance sheets.
This Guidance applies to national banks
and state chartered banks (institutions).
Further, the Board believes that the
Guidance is broadly applicable to bank
holding companies.
DATES: Effective Date: The final
Guidance is effective December 12,
2006.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
OCC: Dena G. Patel, Credit Risk
Specialist, (202) 874–5170; or Vance
Price, National Bank Examiner, (202)
874–5170.
Board: Denise Dittrich, Supervisory
Financial Analyst, (202) 452–2783;
Virginia Gibbs, Senior Supervisory
Financial Analyst, (202) 452–2521; or
Sabeth I. Siddique, Assistant Director,
(202) 452–3861, Division of Banking
Supervision and Regulation; or Mark
Van Der Weide, Senior Counsel, Legal
Division, (202) 452–2263. For users of
Telecommunications Device for the Deaf
(‘‘TDD’’) only, contact (202) 263–4869.
FDIC: Patricia A. Colohan, Senior
Examination Specialist, (202) 898–7283;
or Serena L. Owens, Chief, Planning and
Program Development, (202) 898–8996,
Division of Supervision and Consumer
Protection; or Benjamin W. McDonough,
Attorney, Legal Division, (202) 898–
7411.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
The Agencies have observed that
commercial real estate (CRE)
concentrations have been rising over the
past several years and have reached
levels that could create safety and
soundness concerns in the event of a
significant economic downturn. To
some extent, the level of CRE lending
reflects changes in the demand for
credit within certain geographic areas
and the movement by many financial
institutions to specialize in a lending
sector that is perceived to offer
enhanced earnings. In particular, small
to mid-size institutions have shown the
most significant increase in CRE
concentrations over the last decade. CRE
concentration levels 1 at commercial and
savings banks with assets between $100
million and $1 billion have doubled
from approximately 156 percent of total
risk-based capital in 1993 to 318 percent
in third quarter 2006. This same trend
has been observed at commercial and
1 CRE concentration levels for loans secured by
real estate for (a) construction, land development,
and other land loans; (b) multifamily residential
properties; and (c) nonfarm nonresidential
properties.

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savings banks with assets of $1 billion
to $10 billion with concentration levels
rising from approximately 127 percent
in 1993 to approximately 300 percent in
third quarter 2006.
While current CRE market
fundamentals remain generally strong,
and supply and demand are generally in
balance, past history has demonstrated
that commercial real estate markets can
experience fairly rapid changes. For
institutions with significant
concentrations, the ability to withstand
difficult market conditions will depend
heavily on the adequacy of their risk
management practices and capital
levels. In recent examinations, the
Agencies’ examiners have observed that
some institutions have relaxed their
underwriting standards as a result of
strong competition for business.
Further, examiners also have identified
a number of institutions with high CRE
concentrations that lack appropriate
policies and procedures to manage the
associated risk arising from a CRE
concentration. For these reasons, the
Agencies are concerned with
institutions’ CRE concentrations and the
risks arising from such concentrations.
To address these concerns, the
Agencies published for comment
proposed Interagency Guidance on
Concentrations in Commercial Real
Estate Lending, Sound Risk
Management Practices, 71 FR 2302
(January 13,2006). The proposal set
forth thresholds to identify institutions
with CRE loan concentrations that
would be subject to greater supervisory
scrutiny. As provided in the proposal,
an institution exceeding these
thresholds would be deemed to have a
CRE concentration and expected to have
appropriate risk management practices
as described in the proposed guidance.
After reviewing the public comment
letters 2 on the proposal, the Agencies
are now issuing final Guidance to
remind institutions that there are
substantial risks posed by CRE
concentrations and that these risks
should be recognized and appropriately
addressed. The final Guidance describes
sound risk management practices that
are important for an institution that has
strategically decided to concentrate in
CRE lending. These risk management
practices build upon existing real estate
lending regulations and guidelines. The
Agencies also have clarified that they
are not establishing a limit on the
amount of commercial real estate
lending that an institution may conduct.
2 The Agencies did receive a number of comment
letters requesting a 30-day extension of the
comment period, which the Agencies granted. See
71 FR 13215 (March 14, 2006).

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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 238 / Tuesday, December 12, 2006 / Notices
In addition, the final Guidance includes
supervisory criteria to help the
Agencies’ supervisory staff identify
institutions that may have significant
CRE concentration risk.

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II. Proposed Guidance
The proposed guidance described the
Agencies’ expectations for heightened
risk management practices for an
institution with a concentration in CRE
loans. Further, the proposal set forth
two thresholds to identify institutions
with CRE loan concentrations that
would be subject to greater supervisory
scrutiny. The proposal provided that
such institutions should have in place
the heightened risk management
practices and capital levels set forth in
the proposal.
The first proposed threshold stated
that if loans for construction, land
development, and other land were 100
percent or more of total capital, the
institution would be considered to have
a CRE concentration and should have
heightened risk management practices.
Secondly, if loans for construction, land
development, and other land and loans
secured by multifamily and nonfarm
nonresidential property (excluding
loans secured by owner-occupied
properties) were 300 percent or more of
total capital, the institution would also
be considered to have a CRE
concentration and should employ
heightened risk management practices.
The proposal described the key risk
management elements for an
institution’s CRE lending activity with
an emphasis on those components of the
risk management process that are
particularly applicable to an institution
with a CRE concentration, including:
board and management oversight,
strategic planning, underwriting, risk
assessment and monitoring of CRE
loans, portfolio risk management,
management information systems,
market analysis, and stress testing. The
proposal also reminded institutions
with CRE concentrations that they
should hold capital exceeding
regulatory minimums and
commensurate with the level of risk in
their CRE lending portfolios.
III. Overview of Public Comments
Collectively, the Agencies received
over 4,400 comment letters on the
proposed guidance. The OCC received
approximately 1,700 comment letters,
the Board had approximately 1,700
letters, and the FDIC had approximately
1,000 letters. The majority of comment
letters were from regulated financial
institutions and their trade groups.
Among the trade or other groups
submitting comments were seven

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nationwide banking trade associations,
26 state banking trade associations, the
Conference of State Bank Supervisors,
three state financial institution
regulatory agencies, the Appraisal
Institute, the National Association of
Home Builders, National Association of
REITs, and Real Estate Roundtable.
Additionally, during the comment
period, the Agencies met with several
industry groups.
The vast majority of commenters
expressed strong opposition to the
proposed guidance and believe that the
Agencies should address the issue of
CRE concentration risk on a case-bycase basis as part of the examination
process. Many commenters contended
that existing regulations and guidance
are sufficient to address the Agencies’
concerns regarding CRE concentration
risk and the adequacy of an institution’s
risk management practices and capital.
Several commenters asserted that
today’s lending environment is
significantly different than that of the
late 1980s and early 1990s when
regulated financial institutions suffered
losses from their real estate lending
activities due to weak underwriting
standards and risk management
practices. These commenters contended
that regulated financial institutions
learned their lessons from past
economic cycles and that underwriting
practices are now stronger.
Many community-based institutions,
particularly Florida-based and
Massachusetts-based institutions,
opposed the proposed guidance and
contended that the proposal would
discourage community-based
institutions from CRE lending and
serving the needs of their communities.
If community-based institutions were
forced to reduce their CRE lending
activity, these commenters asserted that
there was the potential for a downturn
in the economy, creating systemic
problems beyond the risks in CRE loans.
While smaller institutions
acknowledged that many community
banks do concentrate in commercial real
estate loans, they contended that there
are few other lending opportunities in
which community-based institutions
can successfully compete against larger
financial institutions. Community-based
institutions commented that secured
real estate lending has been their ‘‘bread
and butter’’ business and, if required to
reduce their commercial real estate
lending activity, they would have to
look to other types of lending, which
have been historically more risky.
Moreover, these commenters noted that
community-based institutions are
actively involved in their local
communities and markets, which

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affords them a significant advantage
when competing for CRE loan business.
Community-based institutions also
noted that their lending opportunities
have dwindled as a result of
competition from other types of
financial institutions, such as finance
companies, Farm Credit banks, and
credit unions.
IV. Overview of Final Guidance
After carefully reviewing the
comments on the proposed guidance,
the Agencies have made significant
changes to the proposal to clarify the
purpose and scope of the Guidance. The
Agencies continue to believe that it is
important for institutions with CRE
credit concentrations to assess the risk
posed by the concentration and to
maintain sound risk management
practices and an adequate level of
capital to address the risk. Therefore,
while the final Guidance continues to
emphasize these principles, the
Agencies have revised the proposal to
clarify that financial institutions play a
vital role in providing credit for
commercial real estate activity and to
make clear that the Guidance does not
establish a limit on an institution’s CRE
lending activity.
A discussion of the changes in the
final Guidance from the proposal, major
comments on the proposal, and the
Agencies’ responses follows.
A. Purpose
The final Guidance reminds
institutions that sound risk management
practices and appropriate capital levels
are important when an institution has a
CRE concentration. Like the proposal,
the final Guidance reinforces and builds
upon the Agencies’ existing regulations
and guidelines for real estate lending
and loan portfolio management.
Commenters expressed concern that
the proposal placed additional burden
on institutions that already have sound
practices in place to manage their CRE
lending activity. Further, commenters
contended that the Agencies have
sufficient existing authority to address
their concerns with an institution’s CRE
lending activity and that the Agencies’
examination process affords the
Agencies with ample opportunity to
address weaknesses in an institution’s
lending practices.
The Agencies are issuing the final
Guidance to remind institutions of the
substantial potential risks posed by
credit concentrations, especially in
sectors such as CRE, which history has
shown to have cycles that can, at much
lower concentration levels, inflict large
losses upon institutions. While most
institutions are practicing sound credit

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risk management on a transaction basis,
the Agencies believe this Guidance is
necessary to emphasize the importance
of portfolio risk management practices
to address CRE concentration risk.
B. Scope
The final Guidance, like the proposal,
focuses on CRE loans that have risk
profiles sensitive to the condition of the
general CRE market. This includes loans
for land development and construction
(including 1- to 4-family residential and
commercial properties), other land
loans, and loans secured by multifamily
and nonfarm nonresidential properties
(where the primary source of repayment
is cash flows from the real estate
collateral). Loans to REITs and
unsecured loans to developers also are
considered CRE loans for purposes of
this Guidance if their performance is
closely linked to the performance of the
general CRE market.
Commenters noted that the
identification of CRE loans in the
current Consolidated Reports of
Condition and Income (Call Report) did
not correspond to the proposed
guidance’s CRE definition and did not
constitute an accurate measurement of
the volume of an institution’s CRE loans
that would be vulnerable to cyclical
CRE markets. Commenters did
acknowledge that the revisions to the
Call Reports, effective in 2007, would
address this inconsistency.
In response to these comments, the
Agencies have clarified that the focus of
the Guidance is on those CRE loans
where the cash flow from the real estate
collateral is the primary source of
repayment rather than on loans to a
borrower where real estate is a
secondary source of repayment or is
taken as collateral through an
abundance of caution. This is consistent
with the 2007 revisions to the Call
Report.
Many commenters found the
proposal’s definition of CRE loans
overly broad and failed to recognize
unique risks posed by loans with
different risk characteristics. Further,
commenters asked for clarification as to
the types of properties included in the
scope of the Guidance, such as loans
secured by motels, hotels, mini-storage
warehouse facilities, and apartment
complexes where the primary source of
repayment is rental or lease income. A
number of commenters contended that
loans on certain types of CRE properties
should not be considered CRE loans,
including: Presold 1- to 4-family
residential construction loans,
multifamily loans, and loans to REITs.
Commenters recommended that the
proposal should not cover residential

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construction loans where a house has
been sold to a qualified borrower prior
to the start of the construction. These
commenters argued that presold 1- to 4family residential construction loans
carry far less risk than speculative home
construction loans because the future
homeowners are known and
contractually obligated to purchase the
home, and have passed a credit review
prior to the commencement of
construction. Commenters noted that
their rationale for excluding presold 1to 4-family residential construction is
consistent with the proposal’s exclusion
of CRE loans on owner-occupied
properties.
Further, commenters recommended
that multifamily construction loans with
firm takeouts or loans on completed
multifamily properties with established
rent rolls be excluded from the scope of
the guidance. Commenters contended
that multifamily residential loans have
much less risk than CRE loans that have
no firm takeout or established cash flow
history.3 One commenter noted that
over the last 20 years, institutions have
incurred minimal losses on multifamily
loans and attributed this performance to
strong underwriting and stability in
rental properties.
The Agencies note that because the
Guidance does not impose lending
limits, its scope is purposely broad so
that it includes those CRE loans,
including multifamily loans, with risk
profiles sensitive to the condition of the
general CRE markets, such as market
demand, changes in capitalization rates,
vacancy rates, and rents. However, the
Agencies believe that institutions are in
the best position to segment their CRE
portfolios and group credit exposures by
common risk characteristics or
sensitivities to economic, financial, or
business developments. As explained in
the final Guidance, institutions should
be able to identify potential
concentrations in their CRE portfolios
by common risk characteristics, which
will differ by property type. The final
Guidance notes that factors, such as
portfolio diversification, geographic
dispersion, levels of underwriting
3 Another commenter, representing REITs, sought
clarification as to whether the proposed guidance
would apply to both secured and unsecured loans
to REITs. This commenter asserted that unsecured
loans to REITs should not be considered a CRE loan
for purposes of the proposed guidance as the
commenter believes that the risk of an unsecured
loan to a REIT is mitigated by well-diversified cash
flow comprising the sources of repayment. The final
Guidance, like the proposal, applies to both secured
and unsecured loans to REITs where repayment
capacity is sensitive to conditions of the general
CRE market. The Agencies note that the structure
of such loans would be considered a mitigating
factor when an institution analyzes the risk posed
by such a concentration.

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standards, level of presold buildings,
and portfolio liquidity, would be
considered in evaluating whether an
institution has mitigated the risk posed
by a concentration. Further, the
Agencies acknowledge in the final
guidance that consideration should be
given to the lower risk profiles and
historically superior performance of
certain types of CRE such as wellstructured multifamily housing loans,
when compared to others, such as
speculative office construction.
C. CRE Concentration Assessment
The final Guidance contains a new
section referred to as ‘‘CRE
Concentration Assessment’’ that
provides that institutions should
perform their own assessment of
concentration risk in their CRE loan
portfolios. While the final Guidance
does not establish a CRE concentration
limit, the Agencies have retained highlevel indicators to assist examiners in
identifying institutions potentially
exposed to CRE concentration risk.
These are described in section IV.E of
this preamble.
Many commenters noted that the
proposal did not recognize the different
segments in an institution’s CRE
portfolio and treated all CRE loans as
having equal risk. A commenter noted
that a concentration test cannot reflect
the distinct risk profile within an
institution’s loan portfolio and that the
risk profile is a function of many factors,
including the institution’s risk
tolerance, portfolio diversification, the
prevalence of guarantees and secondary
collateral, and the condition of the
regional economy.
In response to such comments, the
Agencies have added a section on CRE
Concentration Assessments to the final
Guidance. The Agencies recognize that
risk characteristics vary by different
property types of CRE loans and that
institutions are in the best position to
identify potential concentrations by
stratifying their CRE portfolios into
segments with common risk
characteristics. The Agencies believe an
institution’s board of directors and
management should identify and
monitor credit concentrations and
establish internal concentration limits.
The final Guidance clarifies that an
institution actively involved in CRE
lending should be able to identify
concentrations in its CRE portfolio and
to monitor concentration risk on an
ongoing basis.
Commenters raised concern that the
proposed thresholds would be
perceived by examiners as de facto
limits on an institution’s CRE lending
activity. The Agencies believe that the

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final Guidance addresses the concerns
of commenters by placing the emphasis
on the institution’s own assessment of
its CRE concentration risk rather than
on the proposed concentration
thresholds. In the final Guidance, the
Agencies have responded to these
concerns by specifically stating that the
Guidance does not establish any specific
limits on institutions’ CRE lending
activity. Moreover, in implementing the
Guidance, the Agencies will take the
necessary steps to communicate the
purpose of the Guidance to their
supervisory staffs to prevent any
unintended consequences.
The final Guidance does incorporate
the proposed concentration thresholds
as part of the Agencies’ supervisory
oversight criteria for examiners to use as
a starting point for identifying
institutions that are potentially exposed
to significant CRE concentration risk.
The Agencies believe that these
numerical supervisory screens will
serve to promote consistent application
of this Guidance across the Agencies as
well as within an agency. The
supervisory oversight and evaluation of
an institution’s CRE concentration risk
are discussed in more detail in section
IV.E. of the preamble.
D. Risk Management
The final Guidance, like the proposal,
builds upon the Agencies’ existing
regulations and guidance for real estate
lending and loan portfolio management,
emphasizing those risk management
practices that will enable an institution
to pursue CRE lending in a safe and
sound manner.
Many commenters acknowledged that
the risk management principles
described in the proposal should be
viewed as prudent industry standards
for an institution engaged in CRE
lending. However, some commenters
alleged that the proposed guidance
would create additional regulatory
burden at a time when institutions are
already faced with other compliance
responsibilities. Further, commenters
noted that the Agencies needed to
consider an institution’s size and
complexity in assessing the adequacy of
risk management practices. This
particular concern was raised with
regard to the expectations for
management information systems and
portfolio stress testing that commenters
found to be burdensome for smaller
institutions.
In response to these comments, the
Agencies have revised the final
Guidance’s risk management section to
make the discussion more principlebased and to focus on those aspects of
existing regulations and guidelines that

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deserve greater attention when an
institution has a CRE concentration or is
pursuing a CRE lending strategy leading
to a concentration. As a result, the risk
management section in the final
Guidance sets forth the key elements of
an institution’s risk management
framework for managing concentration
risk. Further, the final Guidance
recognizes the sophistication of an
institution’s risk management processes
will depend upon the size of the CRE
portfolio and the level and nature of its
CRE concentration risk.
The final Guidance describes the key
elements that an institution should
address in board and management
oversight, portfolio management,
management information systems,
market analysis, credit underwriting
standards, portfolio stress testing and
sensitivity analysis, and credit risk
review function. In general, an
institution with a CRE concentration
should manage not only the risk of the
individual loans but also the portfolio
risk. Recognizing that an institution’s
board of directors has ultimate
responsibility for the level of risk
assumed by the institution, the Agencies
believe that appropriate board oversight
should address the rationale for an
institution’s CRE lending levels in
relation to its growth objectives,
financial targets, and capital plan.
The Agencies believe that the final
Guidance’s discussion of management
information systems (MIS), market
analysis, and portfolio stress testing
addresses the concerns of smaller
institutions regarding regulatory burden.
The Agencies recognize that the level of
sophistication of an institution’s MIS,
market analysis and stress testing will
depend upon the size and complexity of
the institution. Therefore, the focus of
the final Guidance is on the ability of
the institution to provide its
management and board of directors with
the necessary information to assess its
CRE lending strategy and policies in
light of changes in CRE market
conditions. Regardless of its size, an
institution should be able to identify
and monitor CRE concentrations and the
potential effect that changes in market
conditions may have on the institution.
Some commenters requested
clarification on the Agencies’
expectations for stress testing. These
commenters expressed concern that, as
a result of the proposal, management’s
time would be diverted to creating
reports and statistics with not much
value. These commenters represented
that an institution’s focus should be on
a loan review program, portfolio
monitoring procedures, and loan loss
reserves.

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The Agencies agree with these
comments and have revised the
discussion on market analysis and stress
testing. The final Guidance
acknowledges that an institution’s
market analysis will vary by its market
share and exposure levels as well as the
availability of market data. Further, the
final Guidance notes that portfolio stress
testing does not require the use of
sophisticated portfolio models.
Depending on the institution, stress
testing may be as simple as analyzing
the potential effect of stressed loss rates
on the institution’s CRE portfolio,
capital, and earnings. The important
objective is that an institution should
have the information necessary to assess
the potential effect of market changes on
its CRE portfolio and lending strategy.
Commenters questioned the proposed
guidance’s suggestion that institutions
should compare their underwriting
standards to those of the secondary
commercial mortgage market.
Commenters noted that there is not a
ready secondary market for CRE loans
made by smaller institutions as the
loans are smaller in dollar size and have
characteristics that make them
unsuitable for securitization.
The Agencies recognize that smaller
institutions do not have ready access to
the secondary market and had not
intended that the proposal be viewed in
this way. Therefore, in the final
Guidance, the Agencies have clarified
the situations when an institution
should conduct secondary market
comparisons. If an institution’s portfolio
management strategy includes selling or
securitizing CRE loans as a contingency
plan for managing concentration levels,
an institution should evaluate its ability
to do so and compare its underwriting
standards to those of the secondary
market.
E. Supervisory Oversight
In the final Guidance, the Agencies
have retained the concept of
concentration thresholds as a
supervisory tool for examiners to screen
institutions for potential CRE
concentration risk. The intent of these
indicators is to encourage a dialogue
between the Agency supervisory staff
and an institution’s management about
the level and nature of CRE
concentration risk. While the final
Guidance is effective immediately upon
publication in the Federal Register, the
Agencies will provide institutions with
CRE concentrations a reasonable
timeframe over which to demonstrate
that their risk management practices are
appropriate for the level and nature of
the concentration risk.

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Commenters encouraged the Agencies
to evaluate institutions’ CRE
concentrations on a bank-by-bank basis
and not to take a ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’
approach to evaluating concentrations.
Commenters asserted that an assessment
of concentration risk based on the
Agencies’ proposed thresholds did not
consider the differing risk
characteristics of the subcategories of
CRE loans. Further, commenters noted
that the proposed thresholds did not
consider whether or not an institution
had an established history of managing
a high CRE concentration.
In the final Guidance, the Agencies
addressed the commenters’ concerns by
stating that numeric indicators do not
constitute limits; rather they will be
used as a supervisory monitoring tool.
These indicators will assist examiners
in identifying institutions with CRE
concentrations. These indicators will
function similarly to other analytical
screens that the Agencies use to
evaluate an institution. By including
these indicators in the final Guidance,
institutions will have an understanding
of the Agencies’ supervisory monitoring
criteria. The Agencies also have tried to
strike a balanced tone in the final
Guidance to promote an appropriate and
consistent application of these
indicators by their supervisory staffs.
As explained in the final Guidance,
an institution that has experienced
rapid growth in CRE lending, has
notable exposure to a specific type of
CRE, or is approaching or exceeds the
following supervisory criteria may be
identified for further supervisory
analysis of the level and nature of its
CRE concentration risk. The supervisory
criteria are:
(1) Total reported loans for
construction, land development, and
other land 4 represent 100 percent or
more of the institution’s total capital; 5
or
(2) Total commercial real estate loans
as defined in the Guidance 6 represent
300 percent or more of the institution’s
total capital and the outstanding balance
of the institution’s CRE loan portfolio
has increased 50 percent or more during
the prior 36 months.
While the criteria will serve as a
screen for identifying institutions with
potential CRE concentration risk, the
4 For commercial banks, this total is reported in
the Call Report FFIEC 031 and 041 schedule RC–
C item 1a.
5 For purposes of this Guidance, the term ‘‘total
capital’’ means the total risk-based capital as
reported for commercial banks in the Call Report
FFIEC 031 and 041 schedule RC–R—Regulatory
Capital, line 21.
6 For commercial banks, this total is reported in
the Call Report FFIEC 031 and 041 schedule RC–
C items 1a, 1d, 1e, and Memorandum Item #3.

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final Guidance notes that institutions
should not view the criteria as a ‘‘safe
harbor’’ if other risk indicators are
present, regardless of the measurements
under criteria (1) and (2). Further, the
final Guidance notes that institutions
experiencing recent, significant growth
in CRE lending will receive closer
supervisory review than other
institutions that have demonstrated a
successful track record of managing the
risks in CRE concentrations.
In response to comments that the
proposal concentration thresholds did
not consider an institution’s track
record for managing CRE
concentrations, the Agencies have
included an additional condition to the
300 percent screen. The Agencies also
will consider whether the institution’s
CRE portfolio increased by 50 percent or
more during the prior 36 months. This
additional screen acknowledges that the
Agencies will be focusing on those
institutions that have recently
experienced a significant growth in their
CRE portfolio and may not have been
subject to prior supervisory review.
While most commenters opposed the
adoption of any concentration
thresholds, several commenters did
comment on the appropriateness of the
proposed CRE concentration thresholds.
These commenters asserted that the
proposed 300 percent threshold was too
low and suggested that a benchmark
from 400 to 600 percent of capital
would be more appropriate.
As previously discussed, the Agencies
have retained the 300 percent screen
with an additional screen (that is, an
institution’s CRE portfolio increased by
50 percent or more during the prior 36
months). In developing the supervisory
criteria, the Agencies relied on
historical trends in concentration levels
over real estate cycles, the relationship
of CRE concentration levels to bank
failures, and supervisory experience.
Further, the final Guidance clarifies that
the Agencies’ supervisory staffs will
consider other factors, and not just these
indicators, in evaluating the risk posed
by an institution’s CRE concentration.
F. Assessment of Capital Adequacy
In the final Guidance, the section on
the ‘‘Assessment of Capital Adequacy’’
was significantly revised to address the
commenters’ concerns that the proposal
was too restrictive and did not take into
account the institution’s lending and
risk management practices. The
proposal stated that institutions should
hold capital commensurate with the
level and nature of their CRE
concentration risks and that an
institution with high or inordinate
levels of risk would be expected to

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operate well above minimum regulatory
capital requirements. In the final
Guidance, the discussion on the
adequacy of an institution’s capital has
been incorporated into the Supervisory
Oversight section to clarify that the
assessment of an institution’s capital
will be performed in connection with
the supervisory assessment of an
institution’s risk management.
Commenters asserted that many
institutions already hold capital at
levels above minimum standards and
should not be required to raise
additional capital simply because their
CRE concentrations exceeded a
threshold. There also was concern that
the proposal would give examiners the
ability to arbitrarily assess additional
capital requirements solely due to a
high concentration.
The Agencies agree with commenters
that the majority of institutions with
CRE concentrations presently have
capital exceeding regulatory minimums
and would generally not be expected to
increase their capital levels. However,
since an institution’s capital serves as a
buffer against unexpected losses from its
CRE concentration, an institution with a
CRE concentration and inadequate
capital should develop a plan for
reducing its concentration or
maintaining capital appropriate for the
level and nature of the concentration
risk. To the extent an institution with a
CRE concentration has effective risk
management practices or is addressing
the need for such practices, the
Agencies’ concerns regarding capital
adequacy are reduced. However, an
institution with a CRE concentration
and with no prospects of enhancing its
risk management practices should
address the need for additional capital.
Therefore, the final Guidance reminds
institutions that they should hold
capital commensurate with the level
and nature of the risks to which they are
exposed.
Commenters noted that the allowance
for loan and lease losses (ALLL) is
another means of protection for an
institution and, therefore, should be
considered in determining whether
capital is adequate for the level and
nature of concentration risk. The
Agencies agree with this comment and
have addressed ALLL within the context
of the capital adequacy section.
V. Text of the Final Joint Guidance
The text of the final joint Guidance on
Concentrations in Commercial Real
Estate Lending, Sound Risk
Management Practices follows:

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Concentrations in Commercial Real
Estate Lending, Sound Risk
Management Practices

practices and capital levels should be
commensurate with the level and nature
of their CRE concentration risk.

Purpose
The Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation
(collectively, the Agencies), are jointly
issuing this Guidance to address
institutions’ increased concentrations of
commercial real estate (CRE) loans.
Concentrations of credit exposures add
a dimension of risk that compounds the
risk inherent in individual loans.
The Guidance reminds institutions
that strong risk management practices
and appropriate levels of capital are
important elements of a sound CRE
lending program, particularly when an
institution has a concentration in CRE
loans. The Guidance reinforces and
enhances the Agencies’ existing
regulations and guidelines for real estate
lending 1 and loan portfolio
management in light of material changes
in institutions’ lending activities. The
Guidance does not establish specific
CRE lending limits; rather, it promotes
sound risk management practices and
appropriate levels of capital that will
enable institutions to continue to pursue
CRE lending in a safe and sound
manner.

Scope
In developing this guidance, the
Agencies recognized that different types
of CRE lending present different levels
of risk, and that consideration should be
given to the lower risk profiles and
historically superior performance of
certain types of CRE, such as wellstructured multifamily housing finance,
when compared to others, such as
speculative office space construction.
As discussed under ‘‘CRE Concentration
Assessments,’’ institutions are
encouraged to segment their CRE
portfolios to acknowledge these
distinctions for risk management
purposes.
This Guidance focuses on those CRE
loans for which the cash flow from the
real estate is the primary source of
repayment rather than loans to a
borrower for which real estate collateral
is taken as a secondary source of
repayment or through an abundance of
caution. Thus, for the purposes of this
Guidance, CRE loans include those
loans with risk profiles sensitive to the
condition of the general CRE market (for
example, market demand, changes in
capitalization rates, vacancy rates, or
rents). CRE loans are land development
and construction loans (including 1 - to
4-family residential and commercial
construction loans) and other land
loans.
CRE loans also include loans secured
by multifamily property, and nonfarm
nonresidential property where the
primary source of repayment is derived
from rental income associated with the
property (that is, loans for which 50
percent or more of the source of
repayment comes from third party,
nonaffiliated, rental income) or the
proceeds of the sale, refinancing, or
permanent financing of the property.
Loans to real estate investment trusts
(REITs) and unsecured loans to
developers also should be considered
CRE loans for purposes of this Guidance
if their performance is closely linked to
performance of the CRE markets.
Excluded from the scope of this
Guidance are loans secured by nonfarm
nonresidential properties where the
primary source of repayment is the cash
flow from the ongoing operations and
activities conducted by the party, or
affiliate of the party, who owns the
property.
Although the Guidance does not
define a CRE concentration, the
‘‘Supervisory Oversight’’ section
describes the criteria that the Agencies
will use as high-level indicators to

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Background
The Agencies recognize that regulated
financial institutions play a vital role in
providing credit for business and real
estate development. However,
concentrations in CRE lending coupled
with weak loan underwriting and
depressed CRE markets have
contributed to significant credit losses
in the past. While underwriting
standards are generally stronger than
during previous CRE cycles, the
Agencies have observed an increasing
trend in the number of institutions with
concentrations in CRE loans. These
concentrations may make such
institutions more vulnerable to cyclical
CRE markets. Moreover, the Agencies
have observed that some institutions’
risk management practices are not
evolving with their increasing CRE
concentrations. Therefore, institutions
with concentrations in CRE loans are
reminded that their risk management
1 Refer to the Agencies’ regualtions on real estate
lending standards and the Interagency Guidelines
for Real Estate Lending Policies: 12 CFR part 34,
subpart D and appendix A (OCC); 12 CFR part 208,
subpart E and appendix C (FRB); and 12 CFR part
365 and appendix A (FDIC). Refer to the
Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for
Safety and Soundness: 12 CFR part 30, appendix A
(OCC); 12 CFR part 208, Appendix D–1 (FRB); and
12 CFR part 364, appendix A (FDIC).

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identify institutions potentially exposed
to CRE concentration risk.
CRE Concentration Assessments
Institutions actively involved in CRE
lending should perform ongoing risk
assessments to identify CRE
concentrations. The risk assessment
should identify potential concentrations
by stratifying the CRE portfolio into
segments that have common risk
characteristics or sensitivities to
economic, financial or business
developments. An institution’s CRE
portfolio stratification should be
reasonable and supportable. The CRE
portfolio should not be divided into
multiple segments simply to avoid the
appearance of concentration risk.
The Agencies recognize that risk
characteristics vary among CRE loans
secured by different property types. A
manageable level of CRE concentration
risk will vary by institution depending
on the portfolio risk characteristics, the
quality of risk management processes,
and capital levels. Therefore, the
Guidance does not establish a CRE
concentration limit that applies to all
institutions. Rather, the Guidance
encourages institutions to identify and
monitor credit concentrations, establish
internal concentration limits, and report
all concentrations to management and
the board of directors on a periodic
basis. Depending on the results of the
risk assessment, the institution may
need to enhance its risk management
systems.
Risk Management
The sophistication of an institution’s
CRE risk management processes should
be appropriate to the size of the
portfolio, as well as the level and nature
of concentrations and the associated risk
to the institution. Institutions should
address the following key elements in
establishing a risk management
framework that effectively identifies,
monitors, and controls CRE
concentration risk:
• Board and management oversight.
• Portfolio management.
• Management information systems.
• Market analysis.
• Credit underwriting standards.
• Portfolio stress testing and
sensitivity analysis.
• Credit risk review function.
Board and Management Oversight. An
institution’s board of directors has
ultimate responsibility for the level of
risk assumed by the institution. If the
institution has significant CRE
concentration risk, its strategic plan
should address the rationale for its CRE
levels in relation to its overall growth
objectives, financial targets, and capital

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plan. In addition, the Agencies’ real
estate lending regulations require that
each institution adopt and maintain a
written policy that establishes
appropriate limits and standards for all
extensions of credit that are secured by
liens on or interests in real estate,
including CRE loans. Therefore, the
board of directors or a designated
committee thereof should:
• Establish policy guidelines and
approve an overall CRE lending strategy
regarding the level and nature of CRE
exposures acceptable to the institution,
including any specific commitments to
particular borrowers or property types,
such as multifamily housing.
• Ensure that management
implements procedures and controls to
effectively adhere to and monitor
compliance with the institution’s
lending policies and strategies.
• Review information that identifies
and quantifies the nature and level of
risk presented by CRE concentrations,
including reports that describe changes
in CRE market conditions in which the
institution lends.
• Periodically review and approve
CRE risk exposure limits and
appropriate sublimits (for example, by
nature of concentration) to conform to
any changes in the institution’s
strategies and to respond to changes in
market conditions.
Portfolio Management. Institutions
with CRE concentrations should manage
not only the risk of individual loans but
also portfolio risk. Even when
individual CRE loans are prudently
underwritten, concentrations of loans
that are similarly affected by cyclical
changes in the CRE market can expose
an institution to an unacceptable level
of risk if not properly managed.
Management regularly should evaluate
the degree of correlation between
related real estate sectors and establish
internal lending guidelines and
concentration limits that control the
institution’s overall risk exposure.
Management should develop
appropriate strategies for managing CRE
concentration levels, including a
contingency plan to reduce or mitigate
concentrations in the event of adverse
CRE market conditions. Loan
participations, whole loan sales, and
securitizations are a few examples of
strategies for actively managing
concentration levels without curtailing
new originations. If the contingency
plan includes selling or securitizing
CRE loans, management should assess
periodically the marketability of the
portfolio. This should include an
evaluation of the institution’s ability to
access the secondary market and a
comparison of its underwriting

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standards with those that exist in the
secondary market.
Management Information Systems. A
strong management information system
(MIS) is key to effective portfolio
management. The sophistication of MIS
will necessarily vary with the size and
complexity of the CRE portfolio and
level and nature of concentration risk.
MIS should provide management with
sufficient information to identify,
measure, monitor, and manage CRE
concentration risk. This includes
meaningful information on CRE
portfolio characteristics that is relevant
to the institution’s lending strategy,
underwriting standards, and risk
tolerances. An institution should assess
periodically the adequacy of MIS in
light of growth in CRE loans and
changes in the CRE portfolio’s size, risk
profile, and complexity.
Institutions are encouraged to stratify
the CRE portfolio by property type,
geographic market, tenant
concentrations, tenant industries,
developer concentrations, and risk
rating. Other useful stratifications may
include loan structure (for example,
fixed rate or adjustable), loan purpose
(for example, construction, short-term,
or permanent), loan-to-value limits, debt
service coverage, policy exceptions on
newly underwritten credit facilities, and
affiliated loans (for example, loans to
tenants). An institution should also be
able to identify and aggregate exposures
to a borrower, including its credit
exposure relating to derivatives.
Management reporting should be
timely and in a format that clearly
indicates changes in the portfolio’s risk
profile, including risk-rating migrations.
In addition, management reporting
should include a well-defined process
through which management reviews
and evaluates concentration and risk
management reports, as well as special
ad hoc analyses in response to potential
market events that could affect the CRE
loan portfolio.
Market Analysis. Market analysis
should provide the institution’s
management and board of directors with
information to assess whether its CRE
lending strategy and policies continue
to be appropriate in light of changes in
CRE market conditions. An institution
should perform periodic market
analyses for the various property types
and geographic markets represented in
its portfolio.
Market analysis is particularly
important as an institution considers
decisions about entering new markets,
pursuing new lending activities, or
expanding in existing markets. Market
information also may be useful for

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developing sensitivity analysis or stress
tests to assess portfolio risk.
Sources of market information may
include published research data, real
estate appraisers and agents,
information maintained by the property
taxing authority, local contractors,
builders, investors, and community
development groups. The sophistication
of an institution’s analysis will vary by
its market share and exposure, as well
as the availability of market data. While
an institution operating in
nonmetropolitan markets may have
access to fewer sources of detailed
market data than an institution
operating in large, metropolitan
markets, an institution should be able to
demonstrate that it has an
understanding of the economic and
business factors influencing its lending
markets.
Credit Underwriting Standards. An
institution’s lending policies should
reflect the level of risk that is acceptable
to its board of directors and should
provide clear and measurable
underwriting standards that enable the
institution’s lending staff to evaluate all
relevant credit factors. When an
institution has a CRE concentration, the
establishment of sound lending policies
becomes even more critical. In
establishing its policies, an institution
should consider both internal and
external factors, such as its market
position, historical experience, present
and prospective trade area, probable
future loan and funding trends, staff
capabilities, and technology resources.
Consistent with the Agencies’ real estate
lending guidelines, CRE lending
policies should address the following
underwriting standards:
• Maximum loan amount by type of
property.
• Loan terms.
• Pricing structures.
• Collateral valuation.2
• Loan-to-Value (LTV) limits by
property type.
• Requirements for feasibility studies
and sensitivity analysis or stress testing.
• Minimum requirements for initial
investment and maintenance of hard
equity by the borrower.
• Minimum standards for borrower
net worth, property cash flow, and debt
service coverage for the property.
An institution’s lending policies
should permit exceptions to
underwriting standards only on a
limited basis. When an institution does
permit an exception, it should
2 Refer to the Agencies’ appraisal regualtins: 12
CFR part 34, subpart C (OCC); 12 CFR part 208
subpart E and 12 CFR part 225, subpart G (FRB);
and 12 CFR part 323 (FDIC).

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document how the transaction does not
conform to the institution’s policy or
underwriting standards, obtain
appropriate management approvals, and
provide reports to the board of directors
or designated committee detailing the
number, nature, justifications, and
trends for exceptions. Exceptions to
both the institution’s internal lending
standards and the Agencies’ supervisory
LTV limits 3 should be monitored and
reported on a regular basis. Further,
institutions should analyze trends in
exceptions to ensure that risk remains
within the institution’s established risk
tolerance limits.
Credit analysis should reflect both the
borrower’s overall creditworthiness and
project-specific considerations as
appropriate. In addition, for
development and construction loans,
the institution should have policies and
procedures governing loan
disbursements to ensure that the
institution’s minimum borrower equity
requirements are maintained throughout
the development and construction
periods. Prudent controls should
include an inspection process,
documentation on construction
progress, tracking pre-sold units, preleasing activity, and exception
monitoring and reporting.
Portfolio Stress Testing and
Sensitivity Analysis. An institution with
CRE concentrations should perform
portfolio-level stress tests or sensitivity
analysis to quantify the impact of
changing economic conditions on asset
quality, earnings, and capital. Further,
an institution should consider the
sensitivity of portfolio segments with
common risk characteristics to potential
market conditions. The sophistication of
stress testing practices and sensitivity
analysis should be consistent with the
size, complexity, and risk characteristics
of its CRE loan portfolio. For example,
well-margined and seasoned performing
loans on multifamily housing normally
would require significantly less robust
stress testing than most acquisition,
development, and construction loans.
Portfolio stress testing and sensitivity
analysis may not necessarily require the
use of a sophisticated portfolio model.
Depending on the risk characteristics of
the CRE portfolio, stress testing may be
as simple as analyzing the potential
effect of stressed loss rates on the CRE
portfolio, capital, and earnings. The
analysis should focus on the more
vulnerable segments of an institution’s
CRE portfolio, taking into consideration
3 The Interagency Guidelines for Real Estate
Lending state that loans exceeding the supervisory
LTV guidelines should be recorded in the
institution’s records and reported to the board at
least quarterly.

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the prevailing market environment and
the institution’s business strategy.
Credit Risk Review Function. A strong
credit risk review function is critical for
an institution’s self-assessment of
emerging risks. An effective, accurate,
and timely risk-rating system provides a
foundation for the institution’s credit
risk review function to assess credit
quality and, ultimately, to identify
problem loans. Risk ratings should be
risk sensitive, objective, and appropriate
for the types of CRE loans underwritten
by the institution. Further, risk ratings
should be reviewed regularly for
appropriateness.
Supervisory Oversight
As part of their ongoing supervisory
monitoring processes, the Agencies will
use certain criteria to identify
institutions that are potentially exposed
to significant CRE concentration risk.
An institution that has experienced
rapid growth in CRE lending, has
notable exposure to a specific type of
CRE, or is approaching or exceeds the
following supervisory criteria may be
identified for further supervisory
analysis of the level and nature of its
CRE concentration risk:
(1) Total reported loans for
construction, land development, and
other land 4 represent 100 percent or
more of the institution’s total capital;5
or
(2) Total commercial real estate loans
as defined in this Guidance 6 represent
300 percent or more of the institution’s
total capital, and the outstanding
balance of the institution’s commercial
real estate loan portfolio has increased
by 50 percent or more during the prior
36 months.
The Agencies will use the criteria as
a preliminary step to identify
institutions that may have CRE
concentration risk. Because regulatory
reports capture a broad range of CRE
loans with varying risk characteristics,
the supervisory monitoring criteria do
not constitute limits on an institution’s
lending activity but rather serve as highlevel indicators to identify institutions
potentially exposed to CRE
concentration risk. Nor do the criteria
constitute a ‘‘safe harbor’’ for
institutions if other risk indicators are
present, regardless of their
measurements under (1) and (2).
4 For commercial banks as reported in the Call
Report FFIEC 031 and 041, schdule RC–C, item la.
5 For purposes of this Guidance, the term ‘‘total
capital’’ means the total risk-based capital as
reported fro commercial banks in the Call Report
FFIEC 031 and 041 schedule RC–R—Regulatory
Capital, line 21.
6 For commercial banks as reported in the Call
Report FFIEC 031 and 041 schedule RC–C, items 1a,
1d, 1e, and Memorandum Item #3.

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Evaluation of CRE Concentrations.
The effectiveness of an institution’s risk
management practices will be a key
component of the supervisory
evaluation of the institution’s CRE
concentrations. Examiners will engage
in a dialogue with the institution’s
management to assess CRE exposure
levels and risk management practices.
Institutions that have experienced
recent, significant growth in CRE
lending will receive closer supervisory
review than those that have
demonstrated a successful track record
of managing the risks in CRE
concentrations.
In evaluating CRE concentrations, the
Agencies will consider the institution’s
own analysis of its CRE portfolio,
including consideration of factors such
as:
• Portfolio diversification across
property types.
• Geographic dispersion of CRE
loans.
• Underwriting standards.
• Level of pre-sold units or other
types of take-out commitments on
construction loans.
• Portfolio liquidity (ability to sell or
securitize exposures on the secondary
market).
While consideration of these factors
should not change the method of
identifying a credit concentration, these
factors may mitigate the risk posed by
the concentration.
Assessment of Capital Adequacy. The
Agencies’ existing capital adequacy
guidelines note that an institution
should hold capital commensurate with
the level and nature of the risks to
which it is exposed. Accordingly,
institutions with CRE concentrations are
reminded that their capital levels
should be commensurate with the risk
profile of their CRE portfolios. In
assessing the adequacy of an
institution’s capital, the Agencies will
consider the level and nature of
inherent risk in the CRE portfolio as
well as management expertise, historical
performance, underwriting standards,
risk management practices, market
conditions, and any loan loss reserves
allocated for CRE concentration risk. An
institution with inadequate capital to
serve as a buffer against unexpected
losses from a CRE concentration should
develop a plan for reducing its CRE
concentrations or for maintaining
capital appropriate to the level and
nature of its CRE concentration risk.

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Dated: December 5, 2006.
John C. Dugan,
Comptroller of the Currency.
By order of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, December 6, 2006.
Jennifer J. Johnson,
Secretary of the Board.
Dated at Washington, DC, this 6th day of
December 2006.
By order of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.
Robert E. Feldman,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 06–9630 Filed 12–11–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810–33–P, 6210–01–P, 6714–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Fiscal Service
Financial Management Service;
Proposed Collection of Information:
Claim Against the United States for the
Proceeds of a Government Check
Financial Management Service,
Fiscal Service, Treasury.
ACTION: Notice and request for
comments.

jlentini on PROD1PC65 with NOTICES

AGENCY:

SUMMARY: The Financial Management
Service, as part of its continuing effort
to reduce paperwork and respondent
burden, invites the general public and
other Federal agencies to take this
opportunity to comment on a
continuing information collection. By
this notice, the Financial Management
Service solicits comments concerning
the Form FMS–1133 ‘‘Claim Against the
United States for the Proceeds of a
Government Check.’’
DATES: Written comments should be
received on or before February 12, 2007.
ADDRESSES: Direct all written comments
to Financial Management Service,
Records and Information Management
Branch, Room 135, 3700 East West
Highway, Hyattsville, Maryland 20782.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Requests for additional information or
copies of the form(s) and instructions
should be directed to Dawn Johns,
Manager, Check Claims Branch, Room
800D, 3700 East West Highway,
Hyattsville, MD 20782, (202) 874–8445.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant
to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(A)), the Financial
Management Service solicits comments
on the collection of information
described below:
Title: Claim Against the United States
for the Proceeds of a Government Check.
OMB Number: 1510–0019.
Form Number: FMS–1133.
Abstract: This form is used to collect
information needed to process an

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individual’s claim for non-receipt of
proceeds from a government check.
Once the information is analyzed, a
determination is made and a
recommendation is submitted to the
program agency to either settle or deny
the claim.
Current Actions: Extension of
currently approved collection.
Type of Review: Regular.
Affected Public: Individuals or
households.
Estimated Number of Respondents:
53,000.
Estimated Time per Respondent: 10
minutes.
Estimated Total Annual Burden
Hours: 8,834.
Comments: Comments submitted in
response to this notice will be
summarized and/or included in the
request for Office of Management and
Budget approval. All comments will
become a matter of public record.
Comments are invited on: (a) Whether
the collection of information is
necessary for the proper performance of
the functions of the agency, including
whether the information shall have
practical utility; (b) the accuracy of the
agency’s estimate of the burden of the
collection of information; (c) ways to
enhance the quality, utility, and clarity
of the information to be collected; (d)
ways to minimize the burden of the
collection of information on
respondents, including through the use
of automated collection techniques or
other forms of information technology;
and (e) estimates of capital or start-up
costs and costs of operation,
maintenance and purchase of services to
provide information.
Dated: December 1, 2006.
Janice Lucas,
Assistant Commissioner, Financial
Operations.
[FR Doc. 06–9639 Filed 12–11–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810–35–M

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of Foreign Assets Control
Additional Designation of Individuals
Pursuant to Executive Order 13224
Office of Foreign Assets
Control, Treasury.
ACTION: Notice.
AGENCY:

SUMMARY: The Treasury Department’s
Office of Foreign Assets Control
(‘‘OFAC’’) is publishing the names of
nine newly-designated individuals and
two newly-designated entities whose
property and interests in property are
blocked pursuant to Executive Order

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13224 of September 23, 2001, ‘‘Blocking
Property and Prohibiting Transactions
With Persons Who Commit, Threaten To
Commit, or Support Terrorism.’’
DATES: The designation by the Secretary
of the Treasury of nine individuals and
two entities identified in this notice,
pursuant to Executive Order 13224, is
effective on December 6, 2006.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Assistant Director, Compliance
Outreach & Implementation, Office of
Foreign Assets Control, Department of
the Treasury, Washington, DC 20220,
tel.: 202/622–2490.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Electronic and Facsimile Availability
This document and additional
information concerning OFAC are
available from OFAC’s Web site
(http://www.treas.gov/ofac) or via
facsimile through a 24-hour fax-ondemand service, tel.: 202/622–0077.
Background
On September 23, 2001, the President
issued Executive Order 13224 (the
‘‘Order’’) pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50
U.S.C. 1701–1706, and the United
Nations Participation Act of 1945, 22
U.S.C. 287c. In the Order, the President
declared a national emergency to
address grave acts of terrorism and
threats of terrorism committed by
foreign terrorists, including the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in
New York, Pennsylvania, and at the
Pentagon. The Order imposes economic
sanctions on persons who have
committed, pose a significant risk of
committing, or support acts of terrorism.
The President identified in the Annex to
the Order, as amended by Executive
Order 13268 of July 2, 2002, 13
individuals and 16 entities as subject to
the economic sanctions. The Order was
further amended by Executive Order
13284 of January 23, 2003, to reflect the
creation of the Department of Homeland
Security.
Section 1 of the Order blocks, with
certain exceptions, all property and
interests in property that are in or
hereafter come within the United States
or the possession or control of United
States persons, of: (1) Foreign persons
listed in the Annex to the Order; (2)
foreign persons determined by the
Secretary of State, in consultation with
the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security and the Attorney
General, to have committed, or to pose
a significant risk of committing, acts of
terrorism that threaten the security of
U.S. nationals or the national security,

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