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April 1995

Volume 1 Number 1

The Electronic Purse
John Wenninger and David Laster

The electronic purse, a new payments instrument offering advantages to both consumers and
merchants, may soon replace currency in many routine transactions. Widespread use of the
electronic purse could, however, raise concerns about consumer protection and the safety
and soundness of the instrument.

Today a U.S. consumer making a purchase can choose
from as many as five principal means of payment:
check, cash, credit card, debit card, or automated clearing house (ACH) debit. In recent months, several major
financial institutions have announced plans to develop
yet another payments instrument—the electronic purse,
or stored value card. The electronic purse is a multipurpose prepaid card the size of a credit card. If successful, it might fundamentally alter the way in which
people spend money, much as automated teller
machines (ATMs) have changed the way that individuals conduct business with banks.
This edition of Current Issues explores how an electronic purse system might work, why such a system
should prove attractive to consumers, merchants, and
issuers, and what difficulties it might present. The article also reviews several interesting policy issues raised
by the introduction of the electronic purse in the marketplace.
How an Electronic Purse Works
For more than a decade, prepaid cards have been used
in the United States in a variety of single-purpose and
limited-purpose applications. The mass transit systems
of New York, San Francisco, and Washington all use
prepaid cards. Prepaid cards are common on college
campuses, where students use them for copying
machines and at cafeteria checkout lines. Many

regional telephone companies have begun selling prepaid calling cards. Applications such as these, which
offer only one or a few possible uses, are known as
“closed systems.” An “open system,” by contrast,
allows consumers to use a single card in a variety of
locations for a broad range of purchases. When used in
an open system, a prepaid card is commonly known as
either an electronic purse or a stored value card.
An electronic purse system might work as follows.
A bank issues stored value cards to its customers, who
then transfer value from their accounts to the cards at
an ATM, a personal computer, or a specially equipped
telephone. The electronic purse card might also function as an ATM card or a credit card. When making
purchases, customers pass their cards through a vendor’s point of sale terminal. No credit check or signature is needed; validation, when required, is by personal identification number. Funds are deducted
directly from the cards and transferred to the vendor’s
terminal. Merchants can transfer the value of accumulated transactions to their bank accounts by telephone
as frequently as they choose. When the value on a card
is spent, consumers can load additional funds from
their accounts to the card.
Although no electronic purse system currently exists
in the United States, several such programs are under
way in other countries. Denmark’s DANMONT card is
now used in vending machines, phones, trains, buses,

CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE

and parking meters. Finland’s Avant card, in operation
in some cities for two years, is being phased in to cover
the entire country.

because consumers would always have “exact change.”
The electronic purse would also be more convenient
than checks or debit cards for smaller transactions.
Because it functions independently of a bank account,
the electronic purse would afford users both greater
privacy and freedom from the need to record expenditures in a checkbook. The electronic purse could even
promote budgeting because a user can spend only the
amount on the card.

Because of their modest data processing requirements, closed systems can generally operate using a
magnetic stripe card such as those now used for credit
cards and ATM cards. An open system is different. To
provide sufficient flexibility and protection against
fraud, open systems will probably need to employ

Electronic purses also offer advantages to recipients
of government benefits. Several local government
agencies have begun using electronic transfers (direct
deposit) to issue benefits, and many others are exploring the possibility. To assist recipients without bank
accounts, an agency could set up a master account at a
bank with subaccounts for its beneficiaries. Smart
cards issued to the beneficiaries would serve as both
account access devices and electronic purses. Rather
than cash a check for the full amount of their benefits
once a month at a check cashing establishment, often
for a high fee, beneficiaries could use their cards to
withdraw funds as needed. This would reduce their
exposure to loss or theft of benefits. In providing a safe
and convenient store of value and medium of
exchange, electronic purses could also help benefit
recipients in other ways. Specially programmed ATMs
could eventually offer these cardholders new payment
options, such as low-cost money orders and the payment of routine bills by ACH.

To succeed, an electronic purse system will
need to offer enough features of value to its
three constituencies —consumers, merchants,
and issuers— to induce them to bear its costs.
smart card technology. A smart card is a plastic card,
with or without magnetic stripe coding, that has one or
more computer chips embedded in it. Capable of storing, retrieving, and manipulating data, smart cards are
used in a variety of applications such as health care and
security systems.
It is not yet clear what standards fledgling electronic
purse systems will adopt. System designers must
choose, for example, between two distinct types of
smart card representing incompatible technologies:
contact cards, which touch a card reader when registering a transaction, and contactless cards, which need
only come in proximity to a card reader. Another issue
under discussion is whether electronic purse transactions should be traceable. Keeping a record of each
transaction would help law enforcement officials track
down fraudulent or black market uses of electronic
purses. Some maintain, however, that the record keeping would be unduly burdensome and expensive, and
could represent an invasion of privacy. They argue that
for an electronic purse to be an attractive alternative to
currency, it must mimic currency’s main attributes—
ease of use and anonymity.

The electronic purse should also prove attractive to
merchants. It saves time and money in the handling of
cash. Prepaid cards will likely have lower transaction
fees than on-line debit cards and, unlike checks, offer
assured payment. In addition, the electronic purse can
reduce theft, open new markets (for example, pay-perview television or vending machines selling $4.98
items), facilitate the collection of market data, and
serve as the backbone of customer affinity programs
such as frequent flier miles.
Issuers of electronic purses can reduce cash handling costs and combat fraud, save on-line network
charges, and gain new sources of fee income from merchants and consumers. Of potentially greater significance, issuers can collect “float,” the right to invest and
earn interest on the balances their customers hold on
electronic purses. As the uses for electronic purses and
the number of cards issued multiply, so too will the
aggregate balances that consumers carry on the card.
The income from float could therefore be substantial.

What the Electronic Purse Offers
To succeed, an electronic purse system will need to
offer enough features of value to its three constituencies—consumers, merchants, and issuers—to induce
them to bear its costs.
In several market studies, consumers have expressed
enthusiasm for the electronic purse concept and a general willingness to pay either a per transaction fee of 2
to 5 cents or annual user fees. The major attraction for
consumers is convenience: using the card for smallticket purchases such as newspapers, coffee, and various vending machine items would reduce the need to
carry loose change and would speed transactions

FRBNY

Float is effectively paid by consumers and the U.S.
government. To the extent that the balance on an electronic purse substitutes for demand deposits, cardholders forgo interest on their checking accounts. To the

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extent that the balance replaces currency, the float
comes at the expense of the U.S. Treasury. The reason
is that the Federal Reserve holds U.S. government
securities corresponding to the dollar value of currency
in circulation and returns the interest income to the
Treasury (more on this later). Over time, however,
competitive forces in the banking industry may reduce
the value of float to banks as banks lower fees or
expand service to attract consumers and merchants to
their prepaid card programs.

(demand deposits) by an equal amount. Because the
reduction in vault cash constitutes a dollar-for-dollar
reduction in reserves, and the lower level of demand
deposits reduces required reserves by just 10 percent
(the current reserve ratio), the bank will need to acquire
additional reserves. A withdrawal of funds into an electronic purse, by contrast, merely substitutes one liability for another—an electronic purse liability for a
demand deposit liability. Thus, the transaction will
have no effect on the bank’s reserve management operations provided that both liabilities are subject to the
same reserve requirements.

Some Drawbacks
As with any new technology, potential pitfalls abound.
The cards or the terminals could malfunction, inconveniencing consumers and merchants. Customers might
balk at having to tie up funds and pay fees in order to
spend their own money. The treatment of lost and
stolen cards could be another point of contention.
Finally, the market might fragment, creating a hodgepodge of incompatible systems requiring consumers to
carry several different cards.

From the consumer’s perspective as well, the two
types of withdrawal differ conceptually. In both cases,
the value withdrawn leaves a government-insured
demand deposit. With the currency withdrawal, however, the consumer receives legal tender issued by the
Federal Reserve and backed by its holdings of U.S.
government securities. The value on an electronic
purse, by contrast, is not legal tender for all transactions. It is backed not by securities, but by the promise
of the issuer to honor its value. If balances held on
bank-issued electronic purses were covered by deposit
insurance, however, they would be more equivalent to
cash because their value would ultimately be backed by
the U.S. government.

If required to pay transaction fees and to buy new
card readers or retrofit existing ones, merchants could be
reluctant to accept electronic purses as a mode of payment unless their use generates enough new business to
justify the costs. System malfunctions could pose additional problems. A failure to process transactions as
rapidly as promised would be especially troublesome for
businesses such as fast food chains and gas stations.
Issuers also face risks, of which fraud is the greatest.
If criminals learn how to counterfeit electronic purses,
the issuing banks might suffer heavy losses. Unlike
debit and ATM cards, whose transactions are conducted on-line, electronic purse systems are off-line,
making it difficult to detect or track stolen or forged
cards. If this problem proves widespread, it could
destroy the profitability of issuing electronic purses.
Issuers are studying sophisticated cryptographic techniques as well as the periodic recall and replacement of
cards as methods to prevent, detect, and contain fraud.
Comparison of Value Flows
The advent of the electronic purse raises the question
of how bank regulators will view the instrument. Will
the bank liabilities corresponding to the value held on
the card be reservable? Will they be subject to deposit
insurance? The accompanying figure clarifies these
issues by examining the flows of value that occur when
consumers withdraw funds from their bank accounts
either as cash or as value added to an electronic purse.
These two types of withdrawal affect a bank’s balance sheet in different ways. A cash withdrawal
reduces the bank’s assets (vault cash) and its liabilities

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CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE

Consider next the perspective of vendors. When
accepting cash payment, a merchant must take reasonable care not to accept counterfeit currency, because
the bank will refuse to accept counterfeit bills for
deposit. In contrast, the value of payments made by
electronic purse accumulates in a card reader provided
to merchants by their banks. Once a bank’s card reader
accepts a card as valid, the transferred value becomes
the bank’s liability to the merchant, and the merchant
need not worry whether the card was counterfeit.

accepted by other service providers. A more open system of this sort could arrange clearing and settlement
through an affiliated bank.
Nonbank issuance has been explored by policymakers in other countries. A May 1994 report by the
Working Group on European Payment Systems proposes
that only banks be allowed to issue electronic purses.
The report cautions that cards issued by nonbanks would
not be subject to the banking regulations, supervision,
and deposit insurance schemes that have traditionally
protected consumers. The absence of such safeguards is
important because the failure of an electronic purse
scheme could undermine public confidence in other
electronic purse schemes, possibly causing a run on
them. Another issue the report discusses is fairness:
because banks are subject to regulations that do not bind
other firms, banks might be unable to compete on an
equal footing with nonbank issuers of electronic purses.

When the merchant finally deposits cash proceeds
in the bank, the bank experiences a simultaneous
increase in assets (vault cash) and in demand deposit
liabilities. Because the bank’s required reserves rise
only by the amount of the reserve ratio multiplied by

A May 1994 report by the Working Goup
on European Payment Systems proposes
that only banks be allowed to issue electronic
purses. The report cautions that cards
issued by nonbanks would not be subject to
the banking regulations, supervision, and
deposit insurance schemes that have
traditionally protected consumers.

Consumer protection. Electronic purses also raise
the issue of consumer protection under Regulation E,
which limits consumer liability resulting from the
fraudulent use of ATM and debit cards. Would
Regulation E be applied to electronic purses? Like
ATM and debit cards, the electronic purse would serve
as an account access device when downloading value
from the checking account to the card. This use would
appear to fall under Regulation E. Less clear is whether
Regulation E would apply when routine transactions
are made: it could be argued that the bank’s liability to
the consumer has ended, leaving the consumer subject
to the same risks posed by carrying cash.

the increase in deposits, the cash deposit creates excess
reserves. When the merchant deposits electronic purse
value, however, the bank merely substitutes one liability (demand deposit) for another (electronic purse),
with no reserve management implications if both liabilities are reservable at the same rate.

Issuers of electronic purses will also need to deal
with state escheatment laws. These laws require that
the funds in inactive bank accounts revert to the state
after a period of time if the depositors or their heirs
cannot be found. Hence, banks could be required to
trace the ownership of the cards they issue and to pay
state governments the value of the funds on those cards
that are inactive for several years.

Other Issues
Clearing and settlement. From the perspective of the
banking system, an additional issue must be resolved—
the clearing and settlement of transactions. Cash withdrawals from ATMs require clearing and settlement
because the machine from which funds are withdrawn
often belongs to a bank different from the one at which
the cardholder has an account. Thus, banks settle daily
over networks for the net amounts they owe each other
because of the ATM transactions of their customers.
Electronic purse payments will create the same need
for clearing and settlement since merchants and their
customers often bank at different institutions.

Money laundering. Currency is used extensively in
the underground economy and in illegal activities to
evade taxes and the recording of transactions.
Participants in these activities, however, face logistical
challenges in moving bulky currency from one place to
another and depositing the funds in the banking system, where the money is safer, earns interest, and can
be used in check transactions. It was to make such
operations even more difficult that the Treasury
stopped printing currency in denominations over $100.

Issuance by nonbanks. Organizations other than
banks might also want to issue electronic purses.
Telephone companies and mass transit systems, for
example, could expand the use of the single-purpose
prepaid cards they now issue by arranging to have them

Some fear that electronic purses would undercut such
efforts and make it easier to launder money. Value on
these cards would be easier to move from one place to

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Composition of U.S. Currency Outstanding
As of December 31, 1994

another because a card could be more easily concealed
than a suitcase of currency. Nevertheless, it would still
be difficult to deposit large sums undetected if federal
laws requiring the reporting of large cash deposits could
be extended to deposits of value from electronic purses.
In that case, those involved in these activities would
only escape notice if they laundered the value through
businesses that could justify large deposits of electronic
purse value. The situation might be different, however,
for card systems that would allow person-to-person
transfer of value and transfers over specially equipped
phone lines. These features would allow holders of prepaid card value to move funds rapidly to remote locations where they could make several smaller, undetected
deposits. Under these circumstances, electronic purses
could facilitate money laundering.

Coin
$1
$2
$5
$10
$20
$50
$100
Total

Number
of Units
Percentage of
(In Billions) Total Number
N.A.
N.A.
5.8
36.8
0.5
3.1
1.4
8.7
1.3
8.3
3.8
24.2
0.8
5.3
2.2
13.7
15.8
100.0

Dollar Value Percentage of
(In Billions) Total Value
21.8
5.4
5.8
1.5
1.0
0.2
6.8
1.8
13.1
3.4
76.3
19.9
41.9
10.9
215.7
56.8
$382.5
100.0

Note: Taken together, all coins and currency in denominations of $10
and under account for more than half of units but only about 13 percent of the total dollar value.

Displacing currency. Electronic purses could eventually affect the amount of currency and coin outstanding (see table), particularly the smaller denominations
used in routine transactions. Consider an extreme case:
Were electronic purses to displace all coins and currency denominations $10 and under, they would substitute for more than half of physical currency outstanding but less than 13 percent of its dollar value, or
roughly $50 billion. As the currency was retired, the
Federal Reserve would have to sell $50 billion of government securities, thereby losing the interest income
on the securities that it normally turns over to the
Treasury. At a 7 percent rate of interest, the sale of
securities would cost the Treasury about $3.5 billion of
in-terest income each year. This loss would be offset, in
small part, by a reduction in the costs of maintaining
the stock of currency. In practice, this $3.5 billion can
best be viewed as an upper limit because electronic
purses are only likely to displace a fraction of the
smaller denomination currency and coins used in routine transactions, at least for the foreseeable future.
Hence, the impact of the electronic purse on currency

is more likely to take the form of somewhat slower
growth than an outright reduction.
Conclusion
Rapidly advancing technology is stimulating the
growth of electronic forms of payment. Observers of
retail banking refer to credit card transactions as “electronic loans” and to debit card transactions as “electronic checks.” The next year or two will likely witness the introduction of a complementary instrument,
an electronic analogue to cash known as the electronic
purse. This newsletter has described how an electronic
purse system might work, examined its advantages and
drawbacks, and explored the issues that it will raise for
policymakers. Although we cannot predict how rapidly
and widely this new technology will be accepted and
just what forms it will assume, dramatic changes are
clearly possible over the next several years in the ways
that consumers make payments.

About the Author
John Wenninger is an assistant vice president and David Laster an economist in Payments System Studies,
Research and Market Analysis Group, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.

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CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE

Current Issues in Economics and Finance is published by the Research and Market Analysis Group of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York. Dorothy Meadow Sobol is the editor of the publication.
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