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Designing Effective Auctions for Treasury Securities, Volume 3, Issue 9

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Designing Effective Auctions for Treasury Securities, Volume 3, Issue 9

DATE: July 1997

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ABSTRACT: Most discussions of treasury auction design focus on the choice between two methods for issuing securities—uniform-price or discriminatory auctions. Although auction theory and much recent research appear to favor the uniform-price method, most countries conduct their treasury auctions using the discriminatory format. What are the main issues underlying the debate over effective auction design?

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Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Research and Statistics Group. "Designing Effective Auctions for Treasury Securities, Volume 3, Issue 9," Current Issues in Economics and Finance (July 1997). https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/6879/item/627879, accessed on March 28, 2023.

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