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The attached document represents the most complete and accurate version available
based on original files from the FOMC Secretariat at the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
Please note that some material may have been redacted from this document if that
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Content last modified 05/27/2010.

Confidential (FR) Class II FOMC

Part 1

June 23, 2004

CURRENT ECONOMIC
AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS
Summary and Outlook

Prepared for the Federal Open Market Committee
by the staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Confidential (FR) Class II FOMC

June 23, 2004

Summary and Outlook

Prepared for the Federal Open Market Committee
by the staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Domestic Developments
Incoming data have confirmed our view that the economic expansion is on a
solid footing. Although consumer spending in the current quarter has fallen
short of our expectations, housing demand has been stronger than we had
anticipated, and business fixed investment has remained on track for a
considerable gain. In addition, hiring has been robust this spring, and
manufacturing production advanced strongly in April and May. We estimate
that real GDP increased at an annual rate of 4-3/4 percent in the second quarter,
about the same pace as in the first quarter.
Looking ahead, the contour of our projection for economic activity over the next
year and a half is little changed from the last Greenbook. Continued strength in
final demand and an upswing in inventory accumulation should foster a sizable
advance in output in the second half of the year. We expect that growth will
slow in 2005 to a rate of 3-1/2 percent, as a result of fiscal policy that will be
slightly restrictive after providing substantial stimulus for several years and
monetary policy that will be less accommodative than in the past few years.
Indeed, our forecast is predicated on a marked increase in the federal funds rate
over the next year and a half, albeit a smaller one than anticipated by financial
market participants.
Actual output is about 1-1/4 percent below potential in the second quarter
according to our latest estimate, which incorporates a downward adjustment to
potential that includes the effect of higher energy prices on structural
productivity as well as a reassessment of the trend in hours worked. With actual
output rising more rapidly than potential in our forecast, the output gap shrinks
appreciably by the end of 2005, and the unemployment rate falls to
5-1/4 percent—just above our estimate of the NAIRU.
Core CPI inflation has come in higher than we had projected in the last
Greenbook, and we have marked up our projection of inflation going forward.
However, we still think that recent increases in core prices have been
exacerbated by transitory factors, such as the pass-through of large increases in
energy prices and non-energy import prices. The diminishing influence of these
transitory factors and continued slack in resource utilization should lead to some
moderation in core inflation next year. Our forecast calls for core PCE prices to
rise at an annual rate of 1.7 percent in the second half of 2004 and 1.5 percent in
2005. Overall inflation should slow more sharply next year, primarily because
of the direct effect of declining energy prices.

I-2

Part 1: Summary and Outlook, June 23, 2004

Key Background Factors
Financial market participants have reacted to stronger-than-expected economic
data, particularly regarding employment, by shifting up the path anticipated for
the federal funds rate. Futures quotes imply that market participants expect the
funds rate to rise fairly steeply, reaching 3-1/2 percent by the fourth quarter of
2005. Our forecast also incorporates a higher path for the funds rate than it did
in April, including an earlier onset of policy tightening, but our projected path
continues to lie below the one expected by the market. We have assumed that
the federal funds rate will be raised to 1-3/4 percent by the end of this year and
to 3 percent by the end of 2005.
Yields on nominal long-term Treasuries and private debt have moved up about
1/4 percentage point since the end of April. Yields on inflation-indexed
securities have risen by less; together with other indicators of inflation
expectations, this differential suggests that the increase in nominal yields has
been partly in real yields and partly in inflation compensation. We anticipate
that market participants will gradually come to share our expectation of a lesssteep trajectory for the funds rate, roughly offsetting the rise in long-term rates
that would otherwise accompany a tightening of policy. Therefore, our forecast
is conditioned on rates on long-term Treasuries holding about steady at their
current levels for the rest of this year and through 2005.
Broad indexes of equity prices are down about 1 percent, on balance, since the
April Greenbook. The negative effect on equity prices of the run-up in interest
rates was apparently counterbalanced by growing confidence in the strength of
the economic expansion and the accompanying implications for corporate
earnings. We had expected some upward drift in equity values over the past two
months, so we have lowered the projected path of stock prices a bit less than
2 percent. As in our previous forecast, we assume that equity prices will rise at
an annual rate of 6-1/2 percent over the forecast period, roughly maintaining
risk-adjusted parity with the projected yield on long-term Treasury securities.
As in the last Greenbook, we expect that federal fiscal policy will provide
considerable stimulus to economic activity through the end of this year before
turning slightly restrictive in 2005 owing to the expiration of the partial-

Domestic Developments

I-3

expensing allowances for business investment.1 Because individual income tax
refunds came in somewhat weaker this spring than we had projected and final
tax payments a little stronger, we have boosted slightly our forecast of the
effective tax rate (roughly speaking, the ratio of taxes to NIPA personal
income). Developments on the spending side are proceeding about as we had
expected. Although the House and the Senate have not agreed on a budget
resolution for fiscal 2005, the appropriations committees in both houses are
working with allocations for discretionary spending totaling about $820 billion
(excluding Iraq-related outlays), an amount that is about consistent with our
previous projection. In May the Administration requested $25 billion of budget
authority for military and reconstruction activities in Iraq, and it has announced
its intention to seek substantial additional funds for this purpose; this outlook is
also quite close to our earlier assumption. All told, we expect the federal budget
deficit to be $428 billion in fiscal 2004, $21 billion below our April forecast,
and $344 billion in fiscal 2005, $14 billion below our previous forecast.
The budget pressures faced by state and local governments are easing
somewhat, primarily because of the strengthening of economic activity and the
resulting pickup in tax receipts. Therefore, we continue to expect less spending
restraint than has been the case over the past couple of years.
Since the April Greenbook, we have shifted up the projected path of the real
trade-weighted exchange rate about 1 percent in the second half of 2004. In
addition, with the faster tightening of monetary policy in this forecast, we have
reduced the assumed depreciation of the dollar during 2005. Our outlook for
foreign GDP growth is very close to that in the last Greenbook; we anticipate
that real trade-weighted foreign growth will be just short of 4 percent this year
and about 3-1/2 percent next year.
The spot price of West Texas intermediate (WTI) crude oil moved above
$40 per barrel in May but has since fallen back to around $38 per barrel, about
$1 per barrel above its level at the end of April. Rising global demand and
intensifying worries about terrorism and political instability in major exporting
countries seem to have been the key factors provoking this increase. These
same factors have also driven up futures prices—by about $3 per barrel, on net,
1. We continue to assume that the major changes in the individual income tax enacted in
2003 (the child tax credit, marriage penalty relief, and expanded 10 percent bracket) will be
extended for next year and beyond, although progress toward that end is not yet evident.
Recently the House and the Senate have passed bills repealing the corporate tax exclusion for
extraterritorial income; that exclusion had been declared in violation of WTO rules. The bills
differ in many of their provisions, and the timing of conference action is unclear. In any event,
neither bill would likely have a large effect on the budget outlook or a material effect on business
investment over our projection interval.

I-4

Part 1: Summary and Outlook, June 23, 2004

over the entire forecast period. However, futures quotes still imply a gradual
decline in prices over the coming year and a half, as global production increases
and oil inventories rise. In line with these quotes, we project that the price per
barrel of WTI will edge down to roughly $37 by the fourth quarter of 2004 and
roughly $34 by the fourth quarter of 2005.
Recent Developments and the Near-Term Outlook
We estimate that real GDP rose at an annual rate of 4-3/4 percent in the second
quarter, quite close to our projection in the April Greenbook. Real final demand
appears to have advanced more than 5 percent this quarter, but a swing to
inventory liquidation in the motor vehicle sector has provided some offset.
Payroll employment has surged for three months in a row, and we are looking
for further increases in the neighborhood of 300,000 jobs in each of the next
several months. The recent strength in hiring should draw more people back
into the labor force, nudging up the participation rate; even so, we anticipate that
the unemployment rate will inch down in coming months.
Manufacturing production climbed 0.7 percent in April and 0.9 percent in May.
For the second quarter as a whole, we estimate that factory output excluding
motor vehicles and parts increased at an annual rate of about 10 percent.
However, motor vehicle assemblies declined, as firms trimmed outsized
inventory positions. Capacity utilization in manufacturing has rebounded nearly
4 percentage points from its trough last spring but, at 76.4 percent in May,
remains about 3-1/2 percentage points below its 1972-2003 average.
On the spending side, we now project that real consumer outlays rose at an
annual rate of roughly 3-1/2 percent in the second quarter, about
1-3/4 percentage points less than we had anticipated in the April Greenbook.
Purchases of goods excluding motor vehicles were disappointing in April and, to
a lesser extent, in May. However, real disposable income is poised to register a
sizable gain this quarter despite the run-up in energy prices, and consumer
confidence remains at a favorable level. Based on these fundamentals, our
projection is that overall consumer spending will quickly resume its solid
uptrend.
Single-family housing starts have edged above their rapid first-quarter pace,
averaging 1.63 million units (annual rate) in April and May. We estimate that
real residential investment shot up at an annual rate of nearly 20 percent in the
second quarter, driven by the strong pace of starts, a spurt in real estate
commissions stemming from the extraordinary level of home sales, and a rise in
spending on home improvements that is likely to be brisk.

I-5

Domestic Developments

Summary of the Near-Term Outlook
(Percent change at annual rate except as noted)
2004:Q1
Measure
Real GDP
Private domestic final purchases
Personal consumption expenditures
Residential investment
Business fixed investment
Government outlays for consumption
and investment

2004:Q2

Apr.
GB

June
GB

Apr.
GB

June
GB

5.2
4.3
4.0
3.8
6.9

4.4
4.4
4.0
4.5
6.7

4.6
6.4
5.1
8.4
14.2

4.7
5.6
3.4
18.8
14.2

3.6

3.5

1.9

3.0

Contribution to growth
(percentage points)
Inventory investment
Net exports

1.0
-.2

.8
-.7

-.8
-.4

-.6
-.1

We project that real business purchases of equipment and software climbed at an
annual rate of more than 15 percent this quarter. Outlays for motor vehicles and
aircraft appear to have increased sharply, and the data on orders and shipments
of durable goods through April point to a substantial increase in outlays for
nontransportation equipment as well. The strength in purchases of
nontransportation equipment has been broadly based, with notable gains over
the past few months in all the major categories.
Construction of nonresidential structures moved up in March and April, pointing
to an increase in the second quarter that may reverse the first-quarter decline.
Viewed over a longer period, activity in this sector has yet to break out of the
low range seen over the past year and a half.
Real federal defense spending increased modestly this quarter following a
sizable jump last quarter, and nondefense spending appears to have been about
unchanged. Real spending by state and local governments is estimated to have
increased at an annual rate of 3 percent in the second quarter on the basis of a
step-up in construction of roads and bridges.
We estimate that net exports have been a roughly neutral influence on real GDP
growth in the second quarter after arithmetically deducting nearly
3/4 percentage point from growth in the first quarter. The release of
international trade data for April included the annual historical revisions and

I-6

Part 1: Summary and Outlook, June 23, 2004

incorporated a new seasonal adjustment procedure for oil imports that has
noticeably altered the recent quarterly pattern. We now estimate that real
imports climbed at an annual rate of about 10 percent in the first quarter, well
above our previous projection; imports are on track for a gain about half as large
in the current quarter, with that slowdown attributable almost entirely to a
decline in oil imports on a seasonally adjusted basis. We project that real
exports rose about 7-1/2 percent in the first quarter and will repeat that
performance in the second quarter.
Core consumer price inflation, as measured by the CPI, came in above our
expectations for April and May but was more moderate than in March. After a
0.2 percent increase in the core CPI last month, our forecast calls for similarsized increases in each of the next few months. The BEA’s estimate of core
consumer prices that are not based on market transactions fell in March and
April, holding down the increase in PCE prices. Altogether, we estimate that
core PCE prices rose at an annual rate of 1.6 percent in the second quarter, in
line with our April projection. Overall consumer prices this quarter have been
boosted further by a surge in energy prices and a sizable rise in food prices;
based on survey measures and futures markets quotes, we project that consumer
energy prices will be about flat in June and then turn down in subsequent
months. We estimate that overall PCE inflation will be 3.0 percent in the
second quarter.
The Longer-Term Outlook for the Economy
We expect output, supported by its recent momentum and strong fundamentals,
to increase at an annual rate of around 5 percent in the second half of 2004. In
2005, less-accommodative financial conditions and a turn in fiscal policy from
stimulative to restrictive should cause growth to slow to about 3-1/2 percent.
Our outlook for the next year and a half is little changed since the last
Greenbook, with the damping effects of the revisions to interest rates and other
background factors partly offset by our assessment that, in a sustained economic
expansion, households and firms will have the wherewithal and inclination to
undertake somewhat more spending than we previously thought.
Household spending. Our forecast calls for real consumer spending to pick up
to a 4-1/2 percent pace in the second half of the year. An improving labor
market and smaller increases in consumer prices should generate a sharp
acceleration in real pre-tax income that will more than offset a waning of the
stimulus from last year’s tax cuts. In 2005, disposable income growth is likely
to slow; in addition, the rise in interest rates will tend to hold the growth of
consumption below that of income, causing the personal saving rate to move up.
Still, we project that real consumer spending will rise 3-3/4 percent next year.

I-7

Domestic Developments

Projections of Real GDP
(Percent change at annual rate from end of
preceding period except as noted)
Measure
Real GDP
Previous

2004
H1

H2

2005

4.6
4.9

5.0
5.1

3.6
3.8

4.5
4.8

4.3
4.7

3.6
3.6

3.7
4.5

4.5
4.3

3.8
4.0

Residential investment
Previous

11.4
6.1

-4.9
-2.9

-1.8
-1.2

BFI

10.4
10.5

15.6
16.6

9.0
7.8

Government purchases
Previous

3.2
2.7

1.9
1.7

2.2
2.1

Exports
Previous

7.4
6.9

10.2
11.7

8.0
9.1

Imports

7.9
6.8

10.8
9.2

8.1
8.6

Final sales
Previous
PCE
Previous

Previous

Previous

Contribution to growth
(percentage points)
Inventory change
Previous
Net exports
Previous

.1
.1

.7
.4

.0
.2

-.4
-.3

-.6
-.2

-.4
-.3

The factors bolstering future consumer spending should also support the
demand for housing, but the considerable increase in mortgage rates this spring
will provide an unfavorable overlay. We anticipate that the balance of these
forces will leave single-family starts on a modest downward trajectory that
averages 1.49 million units in 2005—a strong pace by historical standards,
although below this year’s expected rate of 1.57 million units. Multifamily
construction has been quite resilient during the past several quarters despite high
vacancy rates, and we are forecasting that multifamily starts will stay around

I-8

Part 1: Summary and Outlook, June 23, 2004

350,000 units through the end of 2005. Taking these pieces together, real
residential investment is projected to fall at an annual rate of 5 percent in the
second half of this year and then to slip a further 2 percent next year.
Business spending. Supported by sustained increases in the demand for
business output, strong profits, and a cost of capital that is held down by low
interest rates and the partial-expensing tax provisions, business outlays for
equipment and software should rise at a solid pace through the end of the year.
The impending expiration of partial expensing will provide an additional boost
to investment late in the year as firms pull investment forward; however, the
payback for that extra boost will reduce investment next year. This effect
should be most pronounced for non-high-tech equipment, which has a longer
average service life and therefore benefits to a greater extent from the partialexpensing provisions. All told, we are looking for real business investment in
equipment and software to jump at an annual rate of 19 percent in the second
half of 2004 and then to rise nearly 10 percent in 2005.
We have written down a moderate increase in business construction spending
over the next year and a half. After holding roughly flat since the end of 2002,
real investment in nonresidential buildings is expected to move up in coming
quarters because of the further recovery in business activity and hiring. The
high level of energy prices should support spending in the drilling and mining
sector during the forecast period.
The ratio of business inventories to sales appears to be below its downward
trend, and we anticipate that firms will gradually increase inventory investment
in order to bring that ratio back in line with the trend. The resultant faster pace
of inventory accumulation provides a small positive contribution to output
growth in our forecast.
Government spending. We project that real federal outlays will rise at a pace
close to 2 percent over the next year and a half. After increasing rapidly in the
past several years, defense spending appears likely to move up more slowly in
the period ahead. Nondefense spending is also on track for moderate gains.
With many state and local governments experiencing improving budget
situations, we anticipate that real outlays in this sector will increase at an annual
rate of 1-1/2 percent in the second half of 2004 and 2-1/2 percent in 2005.
Net exports. Supported by solid growth abroad and the effects of past dollar
depreciation, real exports are expected to climb at an annual rate of 10 percent
in the second half of this year and 8 percent next year. We project that real
imports, spurred by rising domestic demand, will increase at roughly the same

Domestic Developments

I-9

pace as exports. Nonetheless, because imports are considerably larger than
exports, net exports should arithmetically deduct about 1/2 percentage point
from real GDP growth in the second half of 2004 and a bit less in 2005. (The
International Developments section provides more detail on the outlook for the
external sector.)
Aggregate Supply, the Labor Market, and Inflation
We now estimate that the gap between actual output and potential output—for
both the recent past and the forecast period—is somewhat narrower than in the
April Greenbook. The revision reflects primarily a downward adjustment to
potential output stemming from two changes: We reduced trend hours growth
from 2001 through 2005 based on a reassessment of recent population trends,
and we trimmed multifactor productivity growth from 2003 through 2005 to
incorporate the effect of higher actual and expected energy prices on capital
obsolescence.2 Actual output now appears to be about 1-1/4 percent below our
revised estimate of potential output in the current quarter, and above-trend
growth in real GDP during the next year and a half eliminates much of this gap
by the end of 2005.
We have boosted our projection of inflation, especially in the near-term.
However, we continue to expect that the diminishing influence of some forces
that have temporarily pushed up inflation, as well as the remaining slack in
resource utilization, will keep inflation reasonably well contained over the
forecast period.
Productivity and the labor market. Private payrolls have jumped by nearly
1 million workers in the past three months. We expect further hefty gains in
payrolls over the next several quarters and then a gradual moderation in the rate
of increase in employment. Despite a rise in labor force participation induced
by these improving labor market conditions, our forecast calls for the
unemployment rate to decline to 5-1/4 percent by the end of 2005.
The pickup in employment has been associated with an easing of labor
productivity growth. Following a 5-1/2 percent surge last year, output per hour
in the nonfarm business sector appears to have increased at an annual rate of
3 percent in the first half of 2004. We project that the average growth rate of

2. The Census Bureau recently published updated extrapolations of population growth
beyond the Census year that are slightly below the estimated rates of increase in population
reported in the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the past three years. The population growth
rates published so far this year in the CPS are consistent with the new, lower projections, and we
have reduced our estimate of trend population growth for the period after 2000 to a rate in line
with the updated Census projections.

I-10

Part 1: Summary and Outlook, June 23, 2004

Decomposition of Structural Labor Productivity
(Percent change, Q4 to Q4, except as noted)
Measure
Structural labor productivity
Previous
Contributions1
Capital deepening
Previous
Multifactor productivity
Previous
Labor composition
MEMO
Potential GDP
Previous

1974- 19962002
95
2001

2003

2004

2005

1.5
1.5

2.7
2.7

3.3
3.3

3.8
3.8

3.2
3.2

3.0
3.0

.7
.7
.5
.5
.3

1.4
1.4
1.1
1.1
.3

.7
.6
2.4
2.4
.3

.7
.7
2.8
2.9
.3

.9
.9
2.0
2.1
.3

1.1
1.1
1.6
1.7
.3

3.0
3.0

3.4
3.4

3.5
3.6

3.9
4.1

3.5
3.6

3.5
3.6

NOTE. Components may not sum to totals because of rounding. For multiyear
periods, the percent change is the annual average from Q4 of the year preceding the first
year shown to Q4 of the last shown.
1. Percentage points.

The Outlook for the Labor Market
(Percent change, Q4 to Q4, except as noted)
Measure
Output per hour, nonfarm business
Previous
Nonfarm private payroll employment
Previous
Household survey employment
Previous
Labor force participation rate1
Previous
Civilian unemployment rate1
Previous
MEMO
GDP gap2
Previous

2002

2003

2004

2005

4.3
4.3
-.9
-.9
.3
.3
66.5
66.5
5.9
5.9

5.4
5.4
-.2
-.2
1.2
1.2
66.1
66.1
5.9
5.9

2.2
2.7
2.8
2.3
1.7
1.7
66.2
66.4
5.3
5.4

2.0
1.6
2.0
2.5
1.7
1.9
66.5
66.6
5.2
5.2

2.1
2.4

1.7
2.2

.5
.9

.5
.7

1. Percent, average for the fourth quarter.
2. Percent difference between potential and actual GDP in the fourth quarter of the
year indicated. A positive number indicates that the economy is operating below
potential.

I-11

Domestic Developments

Inflation Projections
(Percent change, Q4 to Q4, except as noted)
Measure

2002

2003

2004

2005

1.8
1.8

1.5
1.5

2.1
1.5

1.2
1.1

Food and beverages
Previous

1.4
1.4

2.6
2.6

2.9
1.8

2.0
1.6

Energy
Previous

7.9
7.9

7.8
7.8

7.6
1.7

-4.6
-2.7

Excluding food and energy
Previous

1.6
1.6

1.0
1.0

1.7
1.4

1.5
1.2

2.2
2.2

1.9
1.9

2.8
1.8

1.5
1.3

Excluding food and energy
Previous

2.0
2.0

1.2
1.2

2.3
1.7

2.0
1.6

GDP chain-weighted price index
Previous

1.4
1.4

1.6
1.6

1.8
1.3

1.4
1.3

ECI for compensation of private
industry workers1
Previous

3.2
3.2

4.0
4.0

4.0
3.7

4.2
3.9

NFB compensation per hour
Previous

1.8
1.8

4.5
4.0

4.3
3.6

4.1
3.8

Prices of core non-oil
merchandise imports
Previous

.5
.5

1.8
1.8

4.4
4.5

.7
.4

PCE chain-weighted price index
Previous

Consumer price index
Previous

1. December to December.

productivity over the next six quarters will slow to around 2 percent, well below
our estimate of its underlying structural pace.
Prices and labor costs. Recent data on prices and wages point to a somewhat
higher underlying rate of inflation than we had been assuming. In addition to
the unexpectedly high readings on the core CPI, we have been surprised by the
size of the increases in energy prices and core intermediate materials prices,
both of which will likely be passed through to some degree into core consumer
prices. Labor compensation has also risen more rapidly than we had
anticipated, judging from the employment cost index for the first quarter and

I-12

Part 1: Summary and Outlook, June 23, 2004

compensation per hour in the nonfarm business sector for the past couple of
quarters.
All told, these data have led us to mark up the projected core inflation rate in the
second half of this year by nearly 1/2 percentage point, to 1.7 percent, and we
expect some of that faster inflation to carry forward into next year. Still, we
expect the rise in core prices to moderate in 2005 to 1.5 percent, as the impetus
to inflation from recent increases in energy prices and non-energy import prices
wanes. The decline in energy prices and a moderation in food prices should
hold the rate of increase in overall PCE prices to an annual rate of 1.3 percent in
the second half of this year and 1.2 percent next year.
Our forecast calls for the employment cost index to rise about 4 percent both
this year and next—supported by the accumulated productivity gains of recent
years and the tightening of the labor market. Benefit costs were boosted in the
first quarter by a jump in contributions to retirement plans, but the rate of
increase should ease somewhat going forward; wages and salaries are likely to
pick up over time.
Financial Flows and Conditions
Domestic nonfinancial debt is anticipated to increase 7-3/4 percent this year—a
bit slower than last year’s pace—and to slow to 6-3/4 percent next year. We
expect a slowdown in government and household borrowing next year to more
than offset a pickup in the rate of business borrowing.
Household debt growth is projected to slow from last year’s pace of
10-1/2 percent to 9-1/4 percent this year and 7-1/4 percent next year. This
pattern reflects a deceleration in home mortgage debt, which is held back by the
damping effect of smaller increases in house prices and the rise in mortgage
rates relative to last year. In contrast, the growth rate of consumer credit is
expected to pick up from last year’s pace of 5 percent, to 6-1/2 percent next
year, because of a step-up in household spending on big-ticket items as well as a
reduced reliance on mortgage debt for the financing of household purchases.
We anticipate that borrowing by nonfinancial businesses will move up this year
and next, as capital expenditures rise and the expiration of the partial-expensing
provisions at year-end 2004 lowers the volume of internal funds available to
finance those expenditures. With inventory investment projected to step up over
the forecast period, we expect some shift back toward shorter-term financing
after the sharp runoffs in commercial paper and bank loans in recent years. This
year’s projected increase in debt is smaller than that in the last Greenbook:
Current-quarter data for nonfinancial bond issuance and C&I loans have been
quite weak, and borrowing costs have been revised up a bit.

Domestic Developments

I-13

Federal sector debt is expected to increase 10-3/4 percent this year—roughly the
same as last year’s pace—and then to increase 7-1/4 percent in 2005. This
pattern tracks the expected path of the deficit, which has been revised down
since the last Greenbook. Borrowing by state and local governments is
expected to slow this year and next as a result of the brightening fiscal outlook
and the damping effect of higher interest rates on advance-refunding activity.
Because of the increase in the funds rate anticipated this year, M2 growth is
expected to slow significantly in coming quarters and to move up about
5 percent for the year as a whole, less than the rate of increase in nominal
income. In 2005, tightening monetary policy raises the opportunity cost of
holding M2 and pulls its growth rate down to about 2-1/2 percent for the year.
Alternative Simulations
In this section we evaluate several risks to the staff forecast using simulations of
the FRB/US model. The first two scenarios examine the possibility that we
have overestimated the restraint on prices from economic slack and from the
stability of long-run inflation expectations. The next simulation explores the
risk that inflation may slow markedly if competitive pressures substantially
erode the markup of prices over unit labor costs. We then consider three
aggregate demand scenarios. In the first, the personal saving rate rises more
markedly than in the baseline. In the second, we reinterpret the likely sources of
the recent strength in equipment spending and attribute less importance to tax
incentives. The third demand scenario assumes that monetary policy is
providing more stimulus to aggregate demand than in the baseline. In all these
simulations, the federal funds rate is held at baseline. The final scenario
assumes that the funds rate follows a path consistent with current readings from
the futures market.
Less room to grow. In the baseline outlook, real activity expands briskly
without putting much upward pressure on inflation, in part because slack in
labor and product markets is still available to be taken up. In this scenario, we
take a less optimistic view of supply-side conditions and assume that the
NAIRU has been for some time and will continue to be 5-3/4 percent rather than
5 percent; we also assume that the rebound in labor force participation will be
only half as great as in the baseline. The downward revision to the level of
potential output (and therefore permanent income and corporate earnings)
implies that the economy’s equilibrium real interest rate has been and will be
higher than in the baseline. As a result, the baseline path for the funds rate
delivers more stimulus, which roughly offsets the implied downward revision in
permanent income and earnings; thus, real aggregate spending is largely
unaffected. However, with the labor force growing more slowly, the

I-14

Part 1: Summary and Outlook, June 23, 2004

unemployment rate falls to 4-3/4 percent by the end of next year. Tighter labor
and product market conditions boost core inflation to almost 2 percent in 2005.
Alternative Scenarios
(Percent change, annual rate, from end of preceding period, except as noted)
Measure

2003:
H2

2004
H1

H2

2005

Real GDP
Baseline
Less room to grow
Higher inflation expectations
Lower markup
Higher saving rate
Stronger investment
Surging demand
Market-based funds rate

6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2

4.6
4.6
4.6
4.6
4.6
4.6
4.6
4.6

5.0
5.0
5.0
5.2
4.6
5.0
5.9
5.0

3.6
3.7
3.8
3.6
2.4
4.3
4.5
3.3

Civilian unemployment rate1
Baseline
Less room to grow
Higher inflation expectations
Lower markup
Higher saving rate
Stronger investment
Surging demand
Market-based funds rate

5.9
5.9
5.9
5.9
5.9
5.9
5.9
5.9

5.6
5.6
5.6
5.6
5.6
5.6
5.6
5.6

5.3
5.0
5.0
5.3
5.4
5.3
5.1
5.3

5.2
4.7
4.6
5.1
5.9
4.9
4.5
5.3

PCE prices excluding food and energy
Baseline
Less room to grow
Higher inflation expectations
Lower markup
Higher saving rate
Stronger investment
Surging demand
Market-based funds rate

1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1

1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7

1.7
1.9
1.9
1.1
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7

1.5
1.9
2.4
.7
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.4

1. Average for the final quarter of the period.

Higher inflation expectations. In the previous simulation, long-term inflation
expectations were assumed to remain reasonably well anchored despite the
combination of accelerating prices and a very accommodative stance of

Domestic Developments

I-15

monetary policy. In this scenario, these same conditions are accompanied by a
gradual rise of 1 percentage point in long-term inflation expectations. As a
result, the upward pressure on wages and prices is more intense, and core PCE
inflation reaches 2-1/2 percent in 2005. Although nominal bond yields also rise
in response to the shift in long-run inflation expectations, the increase is not
enough—given the fixed funds-rate trajectory—to prevent a modest decline in
real long-term interest rates over time. This decline provides a small stimulus to
real activity late in 2005 and would provide more in the longer term unless
offset by a tightening of monetary policy. If policymakers responded to these
events by gradually raising the federal funds rate to 3-3/4 percent by late next
year—a tightening roughly in line with the prescriptions of a Taylor rule under
these circumstances and similar to market expectations—real GDP would
increase 3-1/4 percent in 2005, and core PCE prices would rise 2-1/4 percent.
Lower markup. The markup of prices over unit labor costs in the nonfarm
business sector is currently well above its long-run average. We believe that
firms will be able to maintain an elevated level of profitability for at least a year
or two, in part because we anticipate that future gains in compensation per hour
will be moderate. However, there are risks that firms may bid up wages more
than we have assumed in an effort to boost production and that competitive
pressures may prevent firms from passing on increases in their costs to the
extent that we project in the baseline. In this scenario, both developments
occur: Nominal wages rise 3/4 percentage point faster than in the baseline, but
competitive pressures are sufficiently strong to more than offset the faster
growth in firms’ unit labor costs, pushing core inflation down to only
3/4 percent in 2005. These developments boost the level of real labor income
more than 2 percent relative to baseline by the end of next year. However,
because of the accompanying reduction in corporate earnings and increase in
real interest rates, real output is only slightly strengthened.
Higher saving rate. The personal saving rate is presently quite low by
historical standards, and although we project it to move up modestly through the
end of next year, we believe that this rise is just the beginning of a morepronounced and longer-term adjustment. But in light of the recent softness in
consumer spending, we may have misjudged the speed at which this adjustment
will occur. In this scenario, the pace of overall consumer spending is about
1 percentage point slower than in the baseline through the second half of this
year and in 2005. Because weaker spending leads to slower income growth, the
personal saving rate rises to almost 4 percent by late next year, 1 percentage
point above baseline. Under these conditions, real GDP increases only
2-1/2 percent in 2005, and the unemployment rate stands at just under 6 percent
in late 2005. The resultant increase in slack causes inflation to be a bit lower.

I-16

Part 1: Summary and Outlook, June 23, 2004

Stronger investment. Expenditures on equipment and software have been
rising at an average annual rate of about 15 percent in recent quarters. In the
staff forecast, we attribute some of this strength to the partial-expensing
provisions of the tax code and therefore expect that investment spending will
weaken noticeably in 2005 after the provisions expire. However, gauging the
effect of tax incentives on business investment is quite difficult, and in this
scenario we assume that more of the recent pace of spending reflects a stronger
underlying trend. This alternative interpretation implies both a smaller current
contribution from partial expensing and a less-pronounced “pothole” in
equipment spending next year. In total, real E&S outlays rise at about the same
pace this year and 5 percentage points faster in 2005, boosting the increase in
real GDP to 4-1/4 percent next year. With output growing more rapidly, the
unemployment rate falls below 5 percent in 2005. Inflation is the same as in the
baseline, in part because more-rapid investment spending boosts potential
output.
Surging demand. The Greenbook baseline projects the level of real activity to
be nearly 1/2 percent below potential late in 2005, even though the real funds
rate over the projection period averages more than 2 percentage points below its
mean of the past forty years. One way to characterize this outlook is that the
stimulus to spending from a low funds rate is being muted by an equilibrium
real rate of interest (a summary measure of the net effect of the medium-term
forces influencing aggregate demand) that also has been, and will be for a while,
low by historical standards. In this scenario, which repeats an exercise that we
included in the last Greenbook, we instead assume that the restraining forces
that have been holding down the equilibrium real rate fade away rapidly;
accordingly, the magnitude of monetary stimulus is greater than in the baseline.
Consistent with this assumption, real GDP advances at a rate of 6 percent in the
second half of this year and 4-1/2 percent next year. By the end of 2005, this
faster output growth is sufficient to bring the unemployment rate down to
4-1/2 percent and to cause inflation to be slightly higher than in the baseline.
Market-based funds rate. Quotes from futures markets are consistent with a
federal funds rate that begins to rise at the forthcoming FOMC meeting and
reaches 3-1/2 percent by the fourth quarter of 2005. Relative to baseline,
adopting the market-based path for the funds rate limits the increase of real
GDP in 2005 to 3-1/4 percent. The unemployment rate is a touch higher as a
result, and inflation is a bit lower.

I-17

Domestic Developments

Selected Greenbook Projections and 70 Percent Confidence Intervals
Derived from FRB/US Simulations and Historical Forecast Errors
Measure
Real GDP (percent change, Q4 to Q4)
Projection
Confidence interval
Greenbook forecast errors1
FRB/US stochastic simulations
Civilian unemployment rate (percent, Q4)
Projection
Confidence interval
Greenbook forecast errors1
FRB/US stochastic simulations
PCE prices excluding food and energy
(percent change, Q4 to Q4)
Projection
Confidence interval
Greenbook forecast errors2
FRB/US stochastic simulations

2004

2005

4.8

3.6

3.4–6.2
3.8–5.8

1.6–5.6
2.0–5.1

5.3

5.2

4.8–5.8
4.8–5.7

4.4–6.0
4.2–6.1

1.7

1.5

1.2–2.1
1.3–2.0

.6–2.3
.7–2.2

NOTE. Shocks underlying stochastic simulations are randomly drawn from the 19782003 set of model equation residuals.
1. 1978–2003.
2. 1981–2003.

I-18

Forecast Confidence Intervals and Alternative Scenarios
Confidence Intervals Based on FRB/US Stochastic Simulations
Greenbook baseline
Less room to grow
Higher inflation expectations
Lower markup

Higher saving rate
Stronger investment
Surging demand
Market-based funds rate

Real GDP
4-quarter percent change
7

7

90 percent interval
6

6

5

5

4

4

3

3

2

2

70 percent interval

1

1

0

0

-1

-1
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Unemployment Rate
Percent
7.0

7.0

6.5

6.5

6.0

6.0

5.5

5.5

5.0

5.0

4.5

4.5

4.0

4.0

3.5

3.5
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

PCE Prices excluding Food and Energy
4-quarter percent change
3.0

3.0

2.5

2.5

2.0

2.0

1.5

1.5

1.0

1.0

0.5

0.5

0.0

0.0
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

I-19

Strictly Confidential <FR>
Class II FOMC

June 23, 2004

STAFF PROJECTIONS OF CHANGES IN GDP, PRICES, AND UNEMPLOYMENT
(Percent, annual rate)

Nominal GDP
Interval

GDP chain-weighted
price index

Real GDP

Consumer
price index1

Unemployment
rate2

04/28/04

06/23/04

04/28/04

06/23/04

04/28/04

06/23/04

04/28/04

06/23/04

04/28/04

06/23/04

2.9
3.8
4.8
6.7
5.4

2.9
3.8
4.8
6.9
5.5

0.5
2.2
3.1
5.1
4.3

0.5
2.2
3.1
4.9
4.1

2.4
1.5
1.7
1.5
1.1

2.4
1.5
1.7
1.9
1.3

2.8
1.6
2.3
1.9
1.2

2.8
1.6
2.3
2.5
1.6

4.7
5.8
6.0
5.5
5.3

4.7
5.8
6.0
5.5
5.2

ANNUAL
______
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
QUARTERLY
_________
2002

Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4

5.4
3.9
4.4
3.1

5.4
3.9
4.4
3.1

4.7
1.9
3.4
1.3

4.7
1.9
3.4
1.3

1.1
1.5
1.5
1.7

1.1
1.5
1.5
1.7

1.4
3.4
2.2
2.0

1.4
3.4
2.2
2.0

5.7
5.8
5.7
5.9

5.7
5.8
5.7
5.9

2003

Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4

4.3
4.2
10.0
5.7

4.3
4.2
10.0
5.7

2.0
3.1
8.2
4.1

2.0
3.1
8.2
4.1

2.3
1.1
1.6
1.5

2.3
1.1
1.6
1.5

3.8
0.7
2.4
0.7

3.8
0.7
2.4
0.7

5.8
6.1
6.1
5.9

5.8
6.1
6.1
5.9

2004

Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4

7.6
6.2
5.7
5.8

7.2
7.4
6.3
5.7

5.2
4.6
5.1
5.1

4.4
4.7
5.2
4.9

2.3
1.6
0.6
0.7

2.7
2.6
1.1
0.8

3.5
2.2
0.6
0.9

3.5
4.5
2.0
1.0

5.6
5.6
5.5
5.4

5.6
5.6
5.4
5.3

2005

Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4

5.5
5.1
4.9
4.9

5.3
4.9
4.9
4.8

4.0
3.8
3.7
3.6

3.7
3.6
3.6
3.5

1.4
1.2
1.2
1.2

1.5
1.3
1.3
1.3

1.2
1.3
1.4
1.4

1.3
1.5
1.7
1.7

5.3
5.3
5.2
5.2

5.2
5.2
5.2
5.2

TWO-QUARTER3
___________
2002

Q2
Q4

4.7
3.8

4.7
3.8

3.3
2.3

3.3
2.3

1.3
1.6

1.3
1.6

2.4
2.1

2.4
2.1

0.2
0.1

0.2
0.1

2003

Q2
Q4

4.2
7.8

4.2
7.8

2.5
6.2

2.5
6.2

1.7
1.6

1.7
1.6

2.2
1.5

2.2
1.5

0.2
-0.2

0.2
-0.2

2004

Q2
Q4

6.9
5.7

7.3
6.0

4.9
5.1

4.6
5.0

1.9
0.6

2.6
1.0

2.9
0.8

4.0
1.5

-0.3
-0.2

-0.3
-0.3

2005

Q2
Q4

5.3
4.9

5.1
4.9

3.9
3.6

3.7
3.5

1.3
1.2

1.4
1.3

1.3
1.4

1.4
1.7

-0.1
-0.1

-0.1
0.0

2.4
4.2
6.0
6.3
5.1

2.4
4.2
6.0
6.7
5.0

-0.0
2.8
4.3
5.0
3.8

-0.0
2.8
4.3
4.8
3.6

2.4
1.4
1.6
1.3
1.3

2.4
1.4
1.6
1.8
1.4

1.8
2.2
1.9
1.8
1.3

1.8
2.2
1.9
2.8
1.5

1.7
0.3
0.0
-0.5
-0.2

1.7
0.3
0.0
-0.6
-0.1

FOUR-QUARTER4
____________
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

1.
2.
3.
4.

Q4
Q4
Q4
Q4
Q4

For all urban consumers.
Level, except as noted.
Percent change from two quarters earlier; for unemployment rate, change in percentage points.
Percent change from four quarters earlier; for unemployment rate, change in percentage points.

I-20
Strictly Confidential <FR>
Class II FOMC

June 23, 2004
REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND RELATED ITEMS, ANNUAL VALUES
(Seasonally adjusted annual rate)

- - Projected - Units1

Item

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

8304.3
8703.5

8747.0
9066.9

9268.4
9470.3

9817.0
9817.0

10100.8
9866.6

10480.8
10083.0

10987.9
10398.0

11746.4
10909.6

12391.0
11358.5

4.3
5.1
3.7
5.2

4.5
5.5
4.8
6.4

4.7
5.5
4.2
5.3

2.2
3.0
2.9
4.3

-0.0
0.1
1.1
0.8

2.8
3.6
1.8
2.3

4.3
4.2
4.4
4.7

4.8
5.0
4.4
5.1

3.6
3.8
3.6
4.1

4.3
9.9
2.5
4.0

5.4
14.4
4.7
3.8

4.9
7.3
4.9
4.4

4.1
4.7
3.0
4.5

2.7
9.4
1.7
1.8

2.7
1.8
2.8
2.9

4.0
11.1
4.9
2.2

4.1
4.9
4.5
3.8

3.8
7.3
4.8
2.7

Business fixed investment
Equipment & Software
Nonres. structures
Residential structures

11.4
13.8
4.6
3.1

10.9
13.5
4.0
10.3

7.7
10.8
-0.9
3.6

7.8
7.5
8.8
-1.8

-10.2
-9.4
-12.4
1.7

-2.8
1.6
-14.9
7.1

7.4
10.0
-0.9
9.5

13.0
16.4
1.6
2.9

9.0
9.6
6.5
-1.8

Exports
Imports

8.3
14.3

2.6
11.0

5.6
12.1

6.5
11.2

-11.5
-7.4

3.3
9.4

6.4
4.5

8.8
9.3

8.0
8.1

Gov’t. cons. & investment
Federal
Defense
State & local

1.2
-0.5
-1.5
2.2

3.3
0.1
-1.2
5.1

4.2
4.2
4.3
4.2

0.4
-2.2
-3.5
1.7

3.6
6.3
6.6
2.3

4.5
10.1
10.9
1.6

2.1
5.9
8.0
0.1

2.6
4.2
4.9
1.6

2.2
1.7
1.4
2.5

71.2
68.5
-104.6

72.6
71.2
-203.8

68.9
71.5
-296.2

56.5
57.8
-379.5

-36.0
-36.3
-398.1

5.7
9.3
-470.6

-0.8
0.5
-509.1

30.3
31.7
-547.7

64.5
63.4
-594.6

Expenditures
____________
Nominal GDP
Real GDP

Bill. $
Bill. Ch. $

Real GDP
Gross domestic purchases
Final sales
Priv. dom. final purchases

% change

Personal cons. expenditures
Durables
Nondurables
Services

Change in bus. inventories
Nonfarm
Net exports

Bill. Ch. $

Nominal GDP
GDP Gap2

% change
%

5.9
-0.9

5.7
-1.6

6.3
-2.4

4.6
-2.4

2.4
0.4

4.2
1.6

6.0
2.2

6.7
1.0

5.0
0.5

Nonfarm payroll employment
Unemployment rate

Millions
%

122.8
4.9

125.9
4.5

129.0
4.2

131.8
4.0

131.8
4.7

130.3
5.8

129.9
6.0

131.7
5.5

134.7
5.2

Industrial prod. index
Capacity util. rate - mfg.

% change
%

8.1
82.6

4.4
82.0

4.9
81.4

2.3
81.1

-5.2
75.4

1.3
73.9

1.5
73.4

7.1
76.9

4.3
79.7

Housing starts
Light motor vehicle sales
North Amer. produced
Other

Millions

1.47
15.13
13.19
1.95

1.62
15.52
13.48
2.03

1.64
16.90
14.41
2.49

1.57
17.36
14.48
2.87

1.60
17.12
14.04
3.08

1.70
16.79
13.50
3.30

1.85
16.65
13.34
3.31

1.92
16.97
13.57
3.40

1.84
17.59
14.09
3.50

Nominal GNP
Nominal GNP
Nominal personal income
Real disposable income
Personal saving rate

Bill. $
% change

8337.3
5.8
6.4
4.3
3.6

8768.3
5.5
7.0
5.6
4.3

9302.2
6.5
5.5
2.8
2.4

9855.9
4.7
7.1
4.4
2.3

10135.9
2.6
2.4
1.3
1.7

10502.3
3.8
2.4
3.5
2.3

11031.6
6.3
4.5
3.8
2.1

11804.7
6.4
6.8
4.6
2.4

12409.4
4.6
5.9
4.2
2.7

Corp. profits, IVA & CCAdj.
Profit share of GNP
Excluding FR Banks

% change
%

9.1
10.4
10.1

-10.0
9.1
8.9

9.6
9.2
8.9

-8.6
8.3
8.0

8.7
7.6
7.3

8.3
8.6
8.4

29.0
9.7
9.5

5.0
10.6
10.5

-3.5
10.0
9.8

Federal surpl./deficit
State & local surpl./def.
Ex. social ins. funds

Bill. $

-55.8
39.1
38.0

38.8
52.0
50.3

103.6
50.4
48.7

189.5
50.0
47.9

50.5
17.3
14.0

-240.0
-3.2
-6.6

-413.1
-0.6
-4.0

-403.4
6.9
3.3

-270.5
12.1
8.4

Gross natl. saving rate
Net natl. saving rate

%

17.5
6.6

18.2
7.4

18.0
6.9

18.0
6.7

16.4
4.4

14.7
2.7

13.5
1.8

14.6
3.4

14.8
3.6

Employment and Production
_________________________

Income and Saving
_________________

%

Prices and Costs
________________
GDP chn.-wt. price index
Gross Domestic Purchases
chn.-wt. price index
PCE chn.-wt. price index
Ex. food and energy

% change

1.5

1.1

1.6

2.2

2.4

1.4

1.6

1.8

1.4

1.0
1.3
1.4

0.7
0.9
1.4

2.0
2.1
1.6

2.4
2.3
1.5

1.6
1.6
2.1

1.7
1.8
1.6

1.7
1.5
1.0

2.1
2.1
1.7

1.2
1.2
1.5

CPI
Ex. food and energy

1.9
2.2

1.5
2.3

2.6
2.0

3.4
2.6

1.8
2.7

2.2
2.0

1.9
1.2

2.8
2.3

1.5
2.0

ECI, hourly compensation3
Nonfarm business sector
Output per hour
Compensation per Hour
Unit labor cost

3.4

3.5

3.4

4.4

4.2

3.2

4.0

4.0

4.2

2.0
4.0
2.0

2.8
5.7
2.7

3.2
4.9
1.6

2.1
6.5
4.3

2.9
3.8
0.8

4.3
1.8
-2.4

5.4
4.5
-0.9

2.2
4.3
2.0

2.0
4.1
2.0

1. Changes are from fourth quarter to fourth quarter.
2. Percent difference between potential and actual. A positive number indicates that the economy is operating below potential.
3. Private-industry workers.

I-21
Strictly Confidential <FR>
Class II FOMC

June 23, 2004
REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND RELATED ITEMS, QUARTERLY VALUES
(Seasonally adjusted, annual rate except as noted)

2001
Q1

2001
Q2

2001
Q3

2001
Q4

2002
Q1

2002
Q2

2002
Q3

2002
Q4

2003
Q1

2003
Q2

10024.8
9882.2

10088.2
9866.3

10096.2
9834.6

10193.9
9883.6

10329.3
9997.9

10428.3
10045.1

10542.0
10128.4

10623.7
10160.8

10735.8
10210.4

10846.7
10288.3

-0.2
-0.7
1.4
-0.1

-0.6
-0.4
0.7
-0.0

-1.3
-0.8
-0.7
0.5

2.0
2.4
3.2
2.8

4.7
5.2
2.6
2.9

1.9
3.1
1.3
2.2

3.4
3.4
1.8
1.7

1.3
2.7
1.7
2.2

2.0
1.1
2.7
2.3

3.1
4.3
3.3
3.8

0.5
1.7
0.4
0.3

2.3
9.8
-1.1
2.4

1.9
0.7
2.9
1.6

6.2
27.3
4.7
2.8

4.1
1.6
6.1
3.8

2.6
0.5
0.4
4.1

2.0
5.0
0.2
2.2

2.2
0.3
4.6
1.5

2.5
0.5
5.7
1.5

3.3
17.7
1.2
1.7

Business fixed investment
Equipment & Software
Nonres. structures
Residential structures

-4.5
-4.0
-5.9
2.6

-13.6
-16.4
-5.6
3.7

-8.4
-12.2
2.2
3.1

-14.0
-4.1
-35.3
-2.5

-7.0
-0.2
-23.9
8.7

-3.0
1.2
-14.5
8.9

-1.1
3.7
-14.6
4.2

-0.1
1.7
-5.6
6.8

-0.6
0.5
-4.0
4.5

7.0
8.0
3.9
4.5

Exports
Imports

-4.5
-6.2

-13.4
-8.5

-17.7
-10.8

-9.8
-3.8

4.4
8.4

8.7
17.1

4.3
4.1

-3.7
8.2

-2.0
-6.8

-1.1
9.1

5.8
8.9
7.7
4.3

5.8
6.7
2.6
5.3

-4.1
0.0
2.4
-6.1

7.4
9.9
14.2
6.1

4.6
8.4
8.2
2.7

4.0
10.5
9.5
0.7

2.5
3.9
4.5
1.7

7.1
18.2
22.1
1.5

-0.4
-0.2
-5.6
-0.5

7.4
23.5
41.9
-0.8

4.3
-2.1
-385.9

-28.8
-26.9
-391.7

-44.0
-45.8
-401.3

-75.5
-70.3
-413.4

-23.5
-28.6
-431.2

-8.0
4.2
-467.6

32.8
36.0
-471.9

21.5
25.4
-511.5

1.6
0.3
-490.0

-4.5
-2.4
-526.0

Item

Units

Expenditures
____________
Nominal GDP
Real GDP

Bill. $
Bill. Ch. $

Real GDP
Gross domestic purchases
Final sales
Priv. dom. final purchases

% change

Personal cons. expenditures
Durables
Nondurables
Services

Gov’t. cons. & investment
Federal
Defense
State & local
Change in bus. inventories
Nonfarm
Net exports

Bill. Ch. $

Nominal GDP
GDP Gap1

% change
%

2.9
-0.9

2.6
0.0

0.3
1.2

3.9
1.5

5.4
1.2

3.9
1.6

4.4
1.6

3.1
2.1

4.3
2.6

4.2
2.8

Nonfarm payroll employment
Unemployment rate

Millions
%

132.5
4.2

132.2
4.4

131.8
4.8

130.9
5.6

130.4
5.7

130.4
5.8

130.3
5.7

130.2
5.9

130.0
5.8

129.9
6.1

Industrial prod. index
Capacity util. rate - mfg.

% change
%

-6.3
77.5

-5.0
76.0

-5.2
74.6

-4.5
73.5

1.9
73.7

4.2
74.1

1.2
74.2

-1.9
73.5

0.9
73.5

-4.0
72.7

Housing starts
Light motor vehicle sales
North Amer. produced
Other

Millions

1.61
17.07
14.17
2.90

1.63
16.70
13.65
3.06

1.60
16.18
13.20
2.98

1.57
18.54
15.15
3.39

1.72
16.47
13.17
3.30

1.68
16.52
13.24
3.28

1.70
17.56
14.22
3.34

1.74
16.62
13.36
3.27

1.74
15.96
12.60
3.36

1.75
16.37
13.06
3.31

Bill. $
% change

10052.1
1.8
4.6
-0.3
1.9

10115.5
2.5
1.2
-1.4
1.1

10107.8
-0.3
1.7
12.2
2.8

10268.3
6.5
2.0
-4.4
1.0

10351.3
3.3
1.5
10.6
2.5

10435.9
3.3
5.0
4.1
2.8

10560.5
4.9
1.4
-0.9
2.1

10661.6
3.9
1.7
0.6
1.8

10763.7
3.9
3.0
2.4
1.9

10880.0
4.4
4.4
4.9
2.3

Employment and Production
_________________________

Income and Saving
_________________
Nominal GNP
Nominal GNP
Nominal personal income
Real disposable income
Personal saving rate

%

Corp. profits, IVA & CCAdj.
Profit share of GNP
Excluding FR Banks

% change
%

-18.0
7.5
7.2

-3.8
7.4
7.1

-17.4
7.1
6.8

114.5
8.4
8.2

7.9
8.5
8.3

10.3
8.6
8.4

-0.9
8.5
8.3

16.5
8.8
8.6

-3.3
8.6
8.4

48.1
9.4
9.2

Federal surpl./deficit
State & local surpl./def.
Ex. social ins. funds

Bill. $

156.1
36.1
33.1

128.9
24.6
21.3

-80.1
11.6
8.1

-2.8
-3.0
-6.6

-188.8
-7.4
-10.8

-232.0
-11.9
-15.3

-242.9
6.8
3.4

-296.3
-0.4
-3.8

-320.4
-40.6
-44.0

-424.7
-14.7
-18.1

Gross natl. saving rate
Net natl. saving rate

%

17.1
5.6

16.3
4.4

15.9
3.3

16.1
4.4

15.3
3.5

15.1
3.2

14.4
2.5

13.8
1.8

12.9
0.9

13.2
1.4

Prices and Costs
________________
GDP chn.-wt. price index
Gross Domestic Purchases
chn.-wt. price index
PCE chn.-wt. price index
Ex. food and energy
CPI
Ex. food and energy
ECI, hourly compensation2
Nonfarm business sector
Output per hour
Compensation per hour
Unit labor cost

% change

3.2

3.2

1.6

1.6

1.1

1.5

1.5

1.7

2.3

1.1

2.6
3.2
2.8

2.3
2.5
1.9

1.0
0.5
1.3

0.5
0.4
2.5

1.0
0.7
1.0

2.4
2.9
1.9

1.6
2.0
2.0

1.7
1.7
1.5

3.4
2.8
0.9

0.4
0.5
0.8

3.7
2.9

3.2
2.6

1.1
2.8

-0.7
2.4

1.4
2.1

3.4
2.3

2.2
2.1

2.0
1.7

3.8
1.3

0.7
1.0

4.3

4.0

3.9

4.4

3.6

4.4

2.5

3.3

5.5

3.4

-0.1
5.6
5.7

3.1
2.4
-0.7

1.6
3.0
1.3

7.0
4.0
-2.8

9.8
1.2
-7.8

0.7
2.3
1.6

4.5
1.3
-3.1

2.3
2.2
-0.1

3.4
4.0
0.6

6.2
4.9
-1.3

1. Percent difference between potential and actual.
2. Private-industry workers.

A positive number indicates that the economy is operating below potential.

I-22
Strictly Confidential <FR>
Class II FOMC

June 23, 2004
REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND RELATED ITEMS, QUARTERLY VALUES
(Seasonally adjusted, annual rate except as noted)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Projected - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2003
Q3

2003
Q4

2004
Q1

2004
Q2

2004
Q3

2004
Q4

2005
Q1

2005
Q2

2005
Q3

2005
Q4

11107.0
10493.1

11262.0
10600.1

11460.7
10716.0

11666.7
10838.9

11846.2
10976.1

12012.2
11107.4

12169.1
11209.4

12316.7
11309.1

12465.1
11408.8

12613.3
11506.8

8.2
7.0
8.3
8.4

4.1
4.3
3.4
4.4

4.4
4.9
3.7
4.4

4.7
4.5
5.3
5.6

5.2
5.4
4.4
5.2

4.9
5.3
4.2
5.2

3.7
4.1
2.5
3.1

3.6
3.4
4.4
4.6

3.6
3.8
3.8
4.5

3.5
3.9
3.6
4.3

Personal cons. expenditures
Durables
Nondurables
Services

6.9
28.0
7.3
2.8

3.2
0.7
5.4
2.8

4.0
-4.0
7.0
4.2

3.4
9.1
0.7
3.7

4.6
7.4
5.0
3.9

4.5
7.7
5.2
3.5

4.1
6.9
5.1
3.1

3.9
7.6
4.9
2.8

3.7
7.5
4.7
2.5

3.6
7.2
4.6
2.4

Business fixed investment
Equipment & Software
Nonres. structures
Residential structures

12.8
17.6
-1.8
21.9

10.9
14.9
-1.4
7.9

6.7
10.2
-4.4
4.5

14.2
17.3
3.9
18.8

14.1
17.4
3.0
-2.7

17.1
20.9
4.1
-7.0

0.1
-1.1
5.0
-3.6

12.2
13.9
6.2
-1.5

11.9
13.3
6.9
-0.9

12.1
13.3
7.8
-1.4

9.9
0.8

20.5
16.4

7.4
10.2

7.4
5.6

9.7
9.8

10.8
11.7

6.8
8.2

8.3
5.5

7.9
8.3

9.0
10.3

1.8
1.2
-1.3
2.1

-0.1
0.7
3.0
-0.5

3.5
9.1
13.4
0.2

3.0
3.1
4.2
2.9

2.0
2.7
1.5
1.5

1.8
1.8
1.1
1.8

2.0
1.6
1.3
2.3

2.2
1.8
1.5
2.4

2.2
1.6
1.2
2.6

2.4
1.8
1.6
2.8

-9.1
-5.9
-505.2

9.0
10.0
-515.2

28.4
32.6
-534.9

11.7
13.4
-537.3

31.2
31.4
-550.3

50.1
49.5
-568.3

83.9
83.0
-583.5

63.0
61.9
-583.6

56.8
55.7
-596.4

54.3
53.2
-614.9

Item

Units

EXPENDITURES
____________
Nominal GDP
Real GDP

Bill. $
Bill. Ch. $

Real GDP
Gross domestic purchases
Final sales
Priv. dom. final purchases

% change

Exports
Imports
Gov’t. cons. & investment
Federal
Defense
State & local
Change in bus. inventories
Nonfarm
Net exports

Bill. Ch. $

Nominal GDP
GDP Gap1

% change
%

10.0
1.8

5.7
1.7

7.2
1.5

7.4
1.2

6.3
0.8

5.7
0.5

5.3
0.5

4.9
0.5

4.9
0.4

4.8
0.5

Nonfarm payroll employment
Unemployment rate

Millions
%

129.8
6.1

130.0
5.9

130.4
5.6

131.2
5.6

132.2
5.4

133.1
5.3

133.8
5.2

134.4
5.2

135.0
5.2

135.6
5.2

Industrial prod. index
Capacity util. rate - mfg.

% change
%

3.8
73.2

5.6
74.1

6.7
75.1

8.0
76.3

7.1
77.5

6.5
78.5

4.4
79.0

4.2
79.5

4.4
79.9

4.1
80.4

Housing starts
Light motor vehicle sales
North Amer. produced
Other

Millions

1.88
17.42
14.07
3.36

2.04
16.84
13.64
3.21

1.94
16.34
13.11
3.23

1.97
16.86
13.41
3.45

1.90
17.30
13.84
3.46

1.88
17.38
13.90
3.48

1.85
17.38
13.91
3.47

1.84
17.51
14.02
3.49

1.84
17.65
14.14
3.51

1.83
17.81
14.28
3.53

Bill. $
% change

11144.8
10.1
4.9
6.8
2.4

11337.9
7.1
5.5
1.2
1.9

11523.3
6.7
6.1
5.0
2.2

11734.7
7.5
7.3
4.1
2.4

11901.0
5.8
7.1
4.7
2.4

12060.0
5.5
6.5
4.8
2.5

12209.0
5.0
6.5
4.5
2.6

12341.1
4.4
5.7
4.1
2.7

12477.9
4.5
5.8
4.2
2.8

12609.6
4.3
5.7
4.0
2.9

46.0
10.1
9.9

32.3
10.6
10.5

7.5
10.7
10.5

10.6
10.7
10.6

1.0
10.6
10.4

1.1
10.5
10.3

-2.1
10.3
10.1

-4.2
10.1
9.9

-3.9
9.9
9.7

-3.9
9.7
9.5

-494.9
13.1
9.6

-412.2
39.9
36.4

-442.1
23.5
19.9

-419.0
-7.4
-11.0

-397.7
3.5
-0.1

-354.6
7.9
4.2

-309.5
10.5
6.8

-267.9
12.0
8.3

-251.3
11.6
7.9

-253.4
14.5
10.8

13.3
1.8

14.4
3.0

14.3
3.1

14.5
3.4

14.7
3.5

14.8
3.7

14.8
3.6

14.8
3.6

14.8
3.5

14.8
3.5

EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTION
_________________________

INCOME AND SAVING
_________________
Nominal GNP
Nominal GNP
Nominal personal income
Real disposable income
Personal saving rate

%

Corp. profits, IVA & CCAdj.
Profit share of GNP
Excluding FR Banks

% change
%

Federal surpl./deficit
State & local surpl./def.
Ex. social ins. funds

Bill. $

Gross natl. saving rate
Net natl. saving rate

%

PRICES AND COSTS
________________
GDP chn.-wt. price index
Gross Domestic Purchases
chn.-wt. price index
PCE chn.-wt. price index
Ex. food and energy

% change

1.6

1.5

2.7

2.6

1.1

0.8

1.5

1.3

1.3

1.3

1.8
1.8
1.0

1.3
1.0
1.2

3.3
3.0
1.7

2.8
3.0
1.6

1.4
1.6
1.7

1.0
1.0
1.6

1.4
1.1
1.6

1.1
1.2
1.5

1.2
1.3
1.4

1.2
1.3
1.4

CPI
Ex. food and energy

2.4
1.5

0.7
0.8

3.5
1.9

4.5
3.1

2.0
2.2

1.0
2.0

1.3
2.0

1.5
2.0

1.7
2.0

1.7
2.0

ECI, hourly compensation2
Nonfarm business sector
Output per hour
Compensation per hour
Unit labor cost

4.4

3.1

4.3

3.8

3.9

4.0

4.1

4.2

4.2

4.2

9.5
4.7
-4.3

2.5
4.2
1.7

3.7
4.6
0.9

2.4
4.4
2.0

1.4
4.0
2.6

1.5
4.0
2.5

1.6
4.0
2.3

2.2
4.1
1.9

2.2
4.1
1.9

2.2
4.1
1.9

1. Percent difference between potential and actual.
2. Private-industry workers.

A positive number indicates that the economy is operating below potential.

2001
Q3

-0.7
0.0
0.1
-0.1
-0.7

Government cons. & invest.
Federal
Defense
Nondefense
State and local
-1.2
-0.9
-0.3

1.3
0.6
0.5
0.0
0.7

-0.5
-1.0
0.5

-1.7
-0.4
-1.4
-0.1

4.2
2.1
0.9
1.2

3.2
2.4

2.0
2.5

2001
Q4

2.0
1.6
0.4

0.9
0.5
0.3
0.2
0.3

-0.7
0.4
-1.1

-0.8
-0.0
-0.8
0.4

2.9
0.1
1.2
1.6

2.7
2.5

4.7
5.4

2002
Q1

0.6
1.3
-0.6

0.7
0.6
0.4
0.3
0.1

-1.3
0.8
-2.1

-0.3
0.1
-0.4
0.4

1.8
0.0
0.1
1.7

1.3
1.9

1.9
3.2

2002
Q2

1.6
1.3
0.3

0.5
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.2

-0.2
0.4
-0.6

-0.1
0.3
-0.4
0.2

1.4
0.4
0.0
0.9

1.8
1.5

3.4
3.5

2002
Q3

-0.4
-0.4
-0.0

1.3
1.1
0.9
0.3
0.2

-1.5
-0.4
-1.1

-0.0
0.1
-0.1
0.3

1.6
0.0
0.9
0.7

1.7
1.9

1.3
2.8

2002
Q4

-0.7
-0.9
0.2

-0.1
-0.0
-0.3
0.2
-0.1

0.8
-0.2
1.0

-0.1
0.0
-0.1
0.2

1.8
0.0
1.1
0.6

2.7
1.9

2.0
1.2

2003
Q1

-0.2
-0.1
-0.1

1.4
1.5
1.6
-0.1
-0.1

-1.3
-0.1
-1.2

0.7
0.6
0.1
0.2

2.3
1.4
0.3
0.7

3.3
3.3

3.1
4.4

2003
Q2

CONTRIBUTIONS TO GROWTH IN REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND RELATED ITEMS

Note: Components may not sum to totals because of rounding.

-0.5
-0.7
0.1

-0.4
-2.0
1.6

Net exports
Exports
Imports

Change in bus. inventories
Nonfarm
Farm

-1.0
-1.1
0.1
0.1

1.3
0.1
0.6
0.6

Business fixed investment
Equipment & Software
Nonres. structures
Residential structures

Personal cons. expenditures
Durables
Nondurables
Services

-0.8
0.4

Real GDP
Gross dom. purchases

Final sales
Priv. dom. final purchases

-1.3
-0.9

Item

Strictly Confidential <FR>
Class II FOMC

-0.1
-0.1
-0.0

0.3
0.1
-0.1
0.2
0.3

0.8
0.9
-0.1

1.3
1.3
-0.0
1.1

4.9
2.2
1.5
1.2

8.3
7.2

8.2
7.4

2003
Q3

-1.2
-1.1
-0.1

0.6
0.4
0.2
0.1
0.3

-0.2
-1.3
1.1

-1.3
-0.8
-0.4
0.1

1.8
0.8
0.3
0.7

1.1
0.7

-0.0
0.1

01Q4/
00Q4

0.9
0.9
0.0

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.2

-0.9
0.3
-1.2

-0.3
0.1
-0.4
0.3

1.9
0.2
0.6
1.2

1.9
1.9

2.8
3.7

02Q4/
01Q4

-0.1
-0.1
0.1

0.4
0.4
0.3
0.0
0.0

-0.0
0.6
-0.6

0.7
0.8
-0.0
0.5

2.8
0.9
1.0
0.9

4.4
4.0

4.3
4.3

03Q4/
02Q4

June 23, 2004

I-23

-0.0
0.1
0.1
-0.1
-0.1

Government cons. & invest.
Federal
Defense
Nondefense
State and local
0.8
0.8
-0.1

0.6
0.6
0.6
0.0
0.0

-0.7
0.7
-1.4

0.7
0.8
-0.1
0.2

2.8
-0.3
1.4
1.8

3.7
3.7

4.4
5.1

2004
Q1

-0.6
-0.7
0.1

0.6
0.2
0.2
0.0
0.3

-0.1
0.7
-0.8

1.4
1.3
0.1
0.9

2.4
0.7
0.2
1.5

5.3
4.8

4.7
4.7

2004
Q2

0.7
0.6
0.1

0.4
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.2

-0.5
1.0
-1.4

1.4
1.3
0.1
-0.1

3.3
0.6
1.0
1.6

4.4
4.5

5.2
5.6

2004
Q3

0.7
0.6
0.0

0.3
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2

-0.6
1.1
-1.7

1.7
1.6
0.1
-0.4

3.1
0.6
1.0
1.5

4.2
4.5

4.9
5.5

2004
Q4

1.2
1.2
0.0

0.4
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.3

-0.5
0.7
-1.2

0.0
-0.1
0.1
-0.2

2.9
0.6
1.0
1.3

2.5
2.7

3.7
4.3

2005
Q1

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Projected

Note: Components may not sum to totals because of rounding.

0.7
0.6
0.1

-0.3
1.8
-2.1

Net exports
Exports
Imports

Change in bus. inventories
Nonfarm
Farm

1.1
1.1
-0.0
0.4

2.3
0.1
1.1
1.2

3.4
3.8

4.1
4.5

2003
Q4

-0.7
-0.7
0.0

0.4
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.3

0.0
0.8
-0.8

1.3
1.1
0.1
-0.1

2.7
0.6
1.0
1.2

4.3
3.9

3.6
3.6

2005
Q2

-0.2
-0.2
-0.0

0.4
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.3

-0.4
0.8
-1.2

1.3
1.1
0.2
-0.0

2.6
0.6
0.9
1.1

3.8
3.8

3.6
4.0

2005
Q3

-0.1
-0.1
-0.0

0.4
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.3

-0.6
0.9
-1.5

1.3
1.1
0.2
-0.1

2.5
0.6
0.9
1.0

3.6
3.7

3.5
4.1

2005
Q4

- - - - - - - - - - - - -

CONTRIBUTIONS TO GROWTH IN REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND RELATED ITEMS

Business fixed investment
Equipment & Software
Nonres. structures
Residential structures

Personal cons. expenditures
Durables
Nondurables
Services

Final sales
Priv. dom. final purchases

Real GDP
Gross dom. purchases

Item

Strictly Confidential <FR>
Class II FOMC

-0.1
-0.1
0.1

0.4
0.4
0.3
0.0
0.0

-0.0
0.6
-0.6

0.7
0.8
-0.0
0.5

2.8
0.9
1.0
0.9

4.4
4.0

4.3
4.3

03Q4/
02Q4

0.4
0.4
0.0

0.5
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.2

-0.5
0.9
-1.3

1.3
1.3
0.0
0.2

2.9
0.4
0.9
1.6

4.4
4.4

4.8
5.3

04Q4/
03Q4

0.0
0.0
0.0

0.4
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.3

-0.4
0.8
-1.2

1.0
0.8
0.1
-0.1

2.7
0.6
1.0
1.1

3.6
3.6

3.6
4.0

05Q4/
04Q4

- - Projected - -

June 23, 2004

I-24

-311
1.7
1.2

-114
1.9
1.0

0.9

0.5

-382

-428

-0.2

-0.9

-292

-307

0.1

0.1

-239

-318

1864
2184
636
409
227
1548
-320
87

0.5

0.9

-342

-430

1864
2289
669
448
221
1620
-425
96

30

106
-17
-73

528
544
-17
-91
75

0.4

0.8

-435

-501

1789
2284
672
444
229
1612
-495
97

35

108
-5
2

429
534
-105
-113
9

Q3a

0.3

-0.8

-353

-417

1887
2299
675
450
225
1625
-412
97

33

119
2
8

441
569
-129
-178
50

Q4a

21

136
12
23

410
580
-171
-193
23

Q1a

2004
Q3

43

44
-22
4

547
573
-26
-102
76

38

133
5
-36

465
567
-102
-115
14

Q4

34

125
4
8

469
607
-137
-182
45

Not seasonally adjusted

Q2

0.3

0.4

-405

-454

0.1

-0.2

-391

-430

1926
2345
711
476
235
1634
-419
104

0.1

-0.1

-379

-409

1973
2371
715
479
236
1656
-398
105

0.1

-0.3

-347

-366

2044
2399
720
482
238
1679
-355
105

-0.4

-0.4

-306

-320

2146
2455
735
491
244
1720
-310
106

30

143
4
7

451
605
-154
-195
40

Q1

0.0

-0.4

-266

-279

2200
2469
740
494
246
1729
-268
107

60

7
-30
-9

630
598
32
-51
83

Q2

45

87
15
-17

517
601
-84
-103
19

Q3

0.0

-0.2

-250

-262

2240
2491
744
497
248
1747
-252
107

2005

0.0

-0.0

-251

-264

2264
2518
750
500
250
1769
-254
108

30

83
15
9

516
623
-107
-155
49

Q4

June 23, 2004

1. OMB’s February 2004 baseline surplus estimates are -$527 billion in FY 2004 and -$393 billion in FY 2005 and surplus estimates under enactment of its proposed policies (which do not include
additional funding for Iraq) are -$521 billion and -$364 billion, respectively. CBO’s March 2004 baseline surplus estimates are -$477 billion in FY 2004 and -$363 billion in FY 2005. Budget receipts,
outlays, and surplus/deficit include corresponding social security (OASDI) categories. The OASDI surplus and the Postal Service surplus are excluded from the on-budget surplus and shown separately as
off-budget, as classified under current law.
2. Other means of financing are checks issued less checks paid, accrued items, and changes in other financial assets and liabilities.
3. Gross saving is the current account surplus plus consumption of fixed capital of the general government as well as government enterprises.
4. HEB is gross saving less gross investment (NIPA) of the federal government in current dollars, with cyclically sensitive receipts and outlays adjusted to the staff’s measure of potential output and the
NAIRU. Quarterly figures for change in HEB and FI are not at annual rates. The sign on Change in HEB, as a percent of nominal potential GDP, is reversed. FI is the weighted difference of discretionary
changes in federal spending and taxes in chained (2000) dollars, scaled by real GDP. The annual FI estimates are on a calendar year basis. Also, for FI and the change in HEB, positive values indicate
aggregate demand stimulus.
a--Actual

Fiscal indicators4
High-employment (HEB)
surplus/deficit
Change in HEB, percent
of potential GDP
Fiscal impetus (FI)
percent of GDP

-386

-165

2157
2454
735
491
244
1719
-296
106

13

64
20
62

398
543
-145
-169
24

2003
Q2a

Seasonally adjusted annual rates
1918
2335
699
468
232
1636
-418
103

45

362
-7
-11

2067
2411
-344
-531
187

Q1a

1884
2326
697
465
232
1629
-441
106

1844
2228
649
426
223
1579
-384
92

1895
2062
573
370
202
1489
-167
87

38

431
-3
-1

1863
2290
-428
-589
161

2005

Receipts
Expenditures
Consumption expenditures
Defense
Nondefense
Other spending
Current account surplus
Gross investment
Gross saving less gross
investment3

35

374
26
-24

1782
2158
-375
-536
161

2004

Fiscal year
2003a

Staff Projections of Federal Sector Accounts and Related Items
(Billions of dollars except as noted)

NIPA federal sector

61

221
-17
-46

Means of financing
Borrowing
Cash decrease
Other2

Cash operating balance,
end of period

1853
2011
-158
-317
160

2002a

Unified budget
Receipts1
Outlays1
Surplus/deficit1
On-budget
Off-budget

Item

Strictly Confidential (FR)
Class II FOMC

I-25

4.5
20.4
8.2
9.0
11.6
11.5
9.6
9.0
11.1
7.2
4.8
4.8

7.5
9.3
7.0
5.9
8.0
6.4
6.5
6.8
6.7
6.4
6.3
6.2

6.8
7.6
7.1
6.6

9.6
8.8
8.4
7.7

Total

10.8
11.7
10.2
7.3
10.9
9.2
8.5
7.6
7.3
7.0
6.9
6.7

9.7
10.4
9.3
7.2

7.9
8.2
8.8
9.0

Total

13.4
13.6
12.0
9.5
12.5
10.9
9.5
8.3
7.7
7.4
7.2
6.9

12.0
12.7
10.7
7.5

8.2
9.1
8.4
9.9

Home
mortgages

Households

4.3
6.2
6.0
2.8
6.1
4.7
6.0
6.1
6.4
6.5
6.6
6.5

4.4
4.9
5.8
6.6

7.3
7.8
10.7
8.0

Consumer
credit

Nonfederal

Change in Debt of the Domestic Nonfinancial Sectors
(Percent)

3.8
5.9
3.2
3.9
4.1
3.7
4.6
6.0
6.4
6.1
6.0
6.2

2.9
4.3
4.7
6.3

12.2
10.6
9.4
6.1

Business

5.7
12.4
6.1
7.6
9.6
2.4
3.9
5.3
4.3
3.8
3.7
3.5

11.1
8.2
5.4
3.9

6.3
3.4
1.3
8.9

State and local
governments

4.3
4.2
10.0
5.7
7.2
7.4
6.3
5.7
5.3
4.9
4.9
4.8

4.2
6.0
6.7
5.0

5.7
6.3
4.6
2.4

Memo:
Nominal
GDP

June 23, 2004

2.6.3 FOF

Note. Quarterly data are at seasonally adjusted annual rates.
1. Data after 2003:Q4 are staff projections. Changes are measured from end of the preceding period to end of period indicated except for annual nominal GDP growth, which
is calculated from Q4 to Q4.

6.9
11.3
7.2
6.4
8.6
7.3
7.1
7.2
7.5
6.6
6.0
6.0

7.6
10.9
10.8
7.2

7.0
8.2
7.8
6.7

2002
2003
2004
2005

Quarter
2003:1
2
3
4
2004:1
2
3
4
2005:1
2
3
4

-1.4
-1.9
-8.0
-0.2

6.8
6.3
4.9
6.2

Total

Federal
government

Year
1998
1999
2000
2001

Period 1

Strictly Confidential (FR)
Class II FOMC

I-26

23.1
-41.6
197.8
740.3
638.4
81.4
102.1
143.9
170.1
257.5
257.5
230.6
482.5
189.8
12.8
2.5
10.3

Borrowing sectors
Nonfinancial business
4 Financing gap 1
5 Net equity issuance
6 Credit market borrowing

Households
7 Net borrowing 2
8
Home mortgages
9
Consumer credit
10 Debt/DPI (percent) 3

State and local governments
11 Net borrowing
12 Current surplus 4

Federal government
13 Net borrowing
14 Net borrowing (n.s.a.)
15 Unified deficit (n.s.a.)

Depository institutions
16 Funds supplied

Memo (percentage of GDP)
17 Domestic nonfinancial debt 5
18 Domestic nonfinancial borrowing
19
Federal government 6
20
Nonfederal
195.1
15.3
3.6
11.7

477.1

396.0
396.0
394.7

117.6
178.6

869.5
756.1
94.8
107.5

-56.5
-57.3
302.2

1628.1
-57.3
1685.3

2003

197.2
14.8
3.7
11.1

561.2

437.5
437.5
436.1

84.4
160.2

867.6
719.7
118.6
111.2

-53.0
-109.3
347.2

1627.4
-109.3
1736.6

2004

200.4
12.9
2.6
10.4

498.4

319.9
319.9
313.7

63.8
170.6

726.9
558.7
143.0
113.7

148.2
-82.8
492.2

1520.0
-82.8
1602.8

2005

2.6.4 FOF

196.2
12.5
3.1
9.4

385.3

353.4
118.6
128.7

116.2
219.6

659.9
625.6
56.6
109.9

-78.6
-67.0
282.9

1345.4
-67.0
1412.4

Q4

196.7
16.8
4.1
12.8

1096.2

466.0
135.9
170.8

149.7
174.4

1008.2
840.2
123.4
110.3

-76.2
-104.0
303.5

1823.5
-104.0
1927.5

Q1

197.1
14.3
4.1
10.2

296.5

478.5
43.7
26.5

38.3
145.6

875.5
756.0
96.9
111.1

-100.7
-98.0
276.4

1570.6
-98.0
1668.6

Q2

Q3

197.6
13.9
3.5
10.5

446.5

410.7
132.9
101.7

62.8
157.6

827.1
677.2
126.1
111.8

-52.8
-90.0
348.6

1559.2
-90.0
1649.2

2004

198.3
14.2
3.3
10.9

405.4

394.9
125.1
137.1

86.8
163.1

759.4
605.6
128.2
112.5

17.7
-145.0
460.2

1556.2
-145.0
1701.2

Q4

199.4
14.8
4.1
10.8

591.5

495.5
143.2
154.5

70.8
166.9

738.1
575.3
136.9
113.0

99.7
-135.0
499.4

1668.8
-135.0
1803.8

Q1

200.4
13.0
2.7
10.3

442.4

332.6
7.2
-31.8

62.8
169.7

727.0
559.9
142.1
113.5

132.7
-65.0
483.9

1541.3
-65.0
1606.3

Q2

Q3

201.2
12.0
1.8
10.2

536.5

226.5
86.8
84.4

62.8
170.8

727.3
556.0
146.3
114.0

167.3
-68.0
481.1

1429.6
-68.0
1497.6

2005

201.8
11.9
1.8
10.1

423.2

225.1
82.7
106.6

58.8
175.0

715.0
543.5
146.7
114.4

193.1
-63.0
504.5

1440.4
-63.0
1503.4

Q4

June 23, 2004

4. NIPA state and local government saving plus consumption of fixed capital and net capital transfers.
5. Average debt levels in the period (computed as the average of period-end debt positions) divided by nominal GDP.
6. Excludes government-insured mortgage pool securities.
n.s.a. Not seasonally adjusted.

195.4
13.9
2.9
11.0

147.4

317.5
107.6
104.5

91.6
199.3

903.9
764.3
118.9
108.0

-99.9
-44.9
231.1

1499.3
-44.9
1544.2

Q3

2003

Flow of Funds Projections: Highlights
(Billions of dollars at seasonally adjusted annual rates except as noted)

Note. Data after 2003:Q4 are staff projections.
1. For corporations: Excess of capital expenditures over U.S. internal funds.
2. Includes change in liabilities not shown in lines 8 and 9.
3. Average debt levels in the period (computed as the average of period-end debt positions)
divided by disposable personal income.

1297.9
-41.6
1339.5

2002

Net funds raised by domestic
nonfinancial sectors
1 Total
2 Net equity issuance
3 Net debt issuance

Category

Strictly Confidential (FR)
Class II FOMC

I-27

(This page intentionally blank.)

International Developments
Strong demand from the United States and a buoyant high-tech sector continue to
underpin the robust performance abroad, and, based on incoming data, we have
marked up our estimates of average foreign growth for the first and second
quarters of this year. Going forward, foreign economic activity is expected to
decelerate, as growth in Asia, especially in China, settles to more sustainable
rates. Relative to the previous Greenbook, the overall foreign growth outlook is
about unchanged, with downward revisions to the euro area and emerging Asia
about offsetting upward revisions to Japan, Canada, and Mexico. Foreign CPI
inflation is estimated to have increased to nearly 3 percent in the second quarter,
but we expect it to move back down over the forecast period as energy prices and
non-fuel commodity prices fall.
Summary of Staff Projections
(Percent change from end of previous period, s.a.a.r.)
2003

2004

Projection

Indicator

2004

2005

H1
Foreign output
April GB
Foreign CPI
April GB

H2

Q1

Q2

H2

.9
.9

4.5
4.5

4.3
3.9

4.0
3.9

3.6
3.6

3.5
3.5

2.0
2.0

2.1
2.1

2.5
2.5

2.9
2.2

2.3
2.1

2.1
2.0

NOTE. Changes for years are measured as Q4/Q4; for half-years, Q2/Q4 or Q4/Q2.

Oil prices surged in May, as violence in Iraq and Saudi Arabia threatened supply
and as world demand for oil remained strong. Since early June, this most recent
run-up in spot oil prices has reversed substantially, following a promise by
OPEC to increase oil production. In line with futures quotes, we project that oil
prices, after peaking in the second quarter, will fall going forward, with the new
path being roughly $3 per barrel above that projected in the April Greenbook.
Prices of non-fuel primary commodities are expected to follow a similar path.
The major currencies index of the nominal value of the dollar declined
1½ percent on balance over the intermeeting period, but this was partially offset
by a dollar appreciation against several of our other important trading partners.
As a result, the broad nominal index moved down only a little. However,
primarily because of price developments in the United States and abroad, our
projected path of the broad real dollar starts out in the third quarter at a
somewhat higher level than anticipated in the April Greenbook. Going forward,
we have lessened the projected depreciation of the broad real dollar, owing to
changes in our assumptions about monetary policy, which call for relatively more
tightening by the FOMC.

I-30

Part 1: Summary and Outlook, June 23, 2004

We now estimate that real exports of goods and services rose 7½ percent and that
real imports moved up 10 percent in the first quarter, reflecting stronger March
data than we had anticipated as well as upward revisions to January and February
data. We project that growth of exports and imports will continue to be solid for
the remainder of this year and for next year. Net exports are projected to subtract
about ½ percentage point from GDP growth this year and slightly less next year.
The current account deficit is projected to widen to $740 billion by the fourth
quarter of next year, nearly 6 percent of GDP.
Oil Prices
Oil prices were particularly volatile over the intermeeting period. After
averaging $36.70 per barrel in April, the spot price of West Texas Intermediate
(WTI) surged to average more than $40 per barrel in May and reached a peak of
$42.35 per barrel on June 1. This run-up in oil prices appeared to result from a
market reaction to an upsurge in violence in Iraq and Saudi Arabia that occurred
against a backdrop of surprisingly strong world oil demand and lean inventories.
Sabotage of the oil infrastructure in Iraq has intermittently disrupted Iraqi oil
exports. Attacks on foreign workers in Saudi Arabia have intensified concerns
about the security of Saudi oil production. Additional supply concerns include
continued ethnic unrest in Nigeria, ongoing political uncertainty in Venezuela,
and a labor strike in Norway.
In response to higher oil prices, OPEC (excluding Iraq) increased crude oil
production 700,000 barrels per day in May. Within OPEC, only Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Emirates are believed to have significant spare production
capacity. Saudi Arabia, whose near-term production capacity is about 10 million
barrels per day, indicated that it would produce 9 million barrels per day in June,
an increase of about 500,000 barrels per day from May. Following these
statements of intent to boost production, spot oil prices have reversed much of
their recent run-up, with the spot price of WTI closing at about $38 per barrel on
June 22. The projected path of oil prices, in line with recent quotes from futures
markets, calls for the spot price of WTI to decline to about $37 per barrel by the
fourth quarter of 2004 and to about $34 per barrel by the fourth quarter of 2005.
This path for WTI is about $3 per barrel higher than was projected in the
previous Greenbook.
International Financial Markets
The major currencies index of the exchange value of the dollar moved up during
the first half of May in response to favorable U.S. economic data releases
(especially employment) and to a shift in market expectations concerning the
timing and pace and of Fed tightening. Subsequently, the dollar more than
reversed these gains on other U.S. data releases, including the U.S. May CPI
report (which was more benign than some market participants reportedly had

International Developments

I-31

anticipated), as well as on stronger-than-expected economic performance and
monetary policy tightening in some foreign industrial countries. On balance, the
major currencies index declined 1½ percent over the intermeeting period.
The dollar depreciated, on net, about 2½ and nearly 4 percent, respectively,
against sterling and the Swiss franc, in part because the Bank of England and the
Swiss National Bank tightened policy. It also depreciated about 1½ percent
against the euro, the yen, and the Canadian dollar.
The U.S. dollar appreciated against several Latin American currencies in early
May as investors speculated that rising interest rates could adversely affect
economic conditions in the region. The Mexican peso subsequently more than
recouped its losses against the dollar, but the Brazilian real depreciated about
5 percent on net. With some of the Asian currencies also depreciating
significantly, all told the intermeeting period saw a mild net increase of the
dollar’s trade-weighted exchange value against the currencies of our other
important trading partners.
Over the forecast period, the broad real dollar is projected to start out in the third
quarter at about 1 percent above the level we wrote down in the April Greenbook
and then to depreciate just ½ percent through the end of next year. This
represents a flatter path of the dollar relative to the last Greenbook, as the paths
for future policy rates have been revised up more for the United States than
abroad.
Foreign interest rates rose in May, in response to economic data releases and to
U.S. rates, but fell back somewhat late in the intermeeting period after the release
of the U.S. May CPI report. Long-term government bond yields rose about 35
basis points on net in Japan and Canada and about 20 basis points in the euro
area and the United Kingdom. Short-term interest rates generally rose as well,
especially in the United Kingdom, as the Bank of England twice tightened policy
25 basis points and market participants factored in further monetary policy
tightening in coming months. With short-term yen rates unchanged, the yield
curve steepened sharply in Japan.
Share price indexes in the major foreign economies slipped slightly on balance,
with concerns about higher global interest rates outweighing generally
encouraging news about economic activity. In Japan, share prices fell sharply in
early May following statements by Chinese authorities of their intent to slow
their economy, but subsequently recovered on favorable domestic economic data.

I-32

Part 1: Summary and Outlook, June 23, 2004

. The Desk did not
intervene over the period for the accounts of the System or the Treasury.
Foreign Industrial Countries
Growth in the foreign industrial countries eased to 2¾ percent in the first quarter
but was slightly higher than in the April Greenbook. We estimate that growth in
these countries edged up to a little more than 3 percent in the second quarter, as
faster growth in Canada and the United Kingdom outweighed a moderation in
Japan and the euro area. We expect growth to settle to a rate of just less than
3 percent over the remainder of the forecast period. After having picked up in
the second quarter, largely because of higher oil prices, twelve-month headline
inflation should ease back in most foreign industrial countries by next year, with
the important exception of Japan.
Japanese real GDP posted a robust gain of more than 6 percent in the first
quarter, with sizable contributions from most spending categories. The recent
strength in consumption should diminish as saving rates begin to reverse their
prior declines. Slowing in the pace of activity in emerging Asia should reduce
the very rapid growth rates of exports that Japan has recorded recently. As a
result of these factors, we project that growth will moderate over the forecast
period. Twelve-month CPI inflation is projected to become positive by the end
of this year for the first time since 1999. Nonetheless, inflationary pressures
should remain weak over the forecast period, and we expect the Bank of Japan to
maintain its quantitative easing policy.
In the euro area, real GDP grew at a faster-than-expected pace of 2¼ percent in
the first quarter. We estimate that growth in the second quarter fell to
1½ percent, as export growth slowed from its unusually strong first-quarter pace
and as domestic demand, especially in Germany, remained weak. Going
forward, a firming of private spending should push up growth to nearly 2
percent. Higher oil and administered prices contributed to an increase in euroarea inflation in the second quarter. We now project that twelve-month inflation
will remain above the ECB’s 2 percent target through the beginning of next year,
and, accordingly, the ECB will tighten policy sooner in 2005 than we previously
anticipated.
In the United Kingdom, real GDP growth is estimated to have increased to
slightly above 3 percent in the second quarter and is projected to fall back
gradually to just above 2½ percent by the end of 2005, as consumption growth
slows in response to an assumed deceleration of house prices. Weaker
consumption should be somewhat offset by stimulative fiscal policy and some
strengthening of exports. We assume that the Bank of England will continue its

International Developments

I-33

gradual tightening of monetary policy and that this will be sufficient to keep
inflation from moving above the 2 percent target rate.
Canadian real GDP grew nearly 2½ percent in the first quarter, as robust final
domestic demand overcame a large drag from inventories. We estimate that
growth rebounded to 4 percent in the second quarter, with domestic demand
remaining strong. Growth should hover around 3½ percent for the remainder of
the forecast period. The Bank of Canada is assumed to begin increasing policy
rates by the end of this year, sooner than in the April Greenbook, and Canadian
inflation is projected to remain within the 1-3 percent target range.
Other Countries
We now estimate that output in emerging Asia grew nearly 8 percent, on
average, in the first quarter. With evidence that growth is slowing in China, and
with the recent run-up in oil prices, we expect that activity in the region will
moderate more in the near term than we had previously anticipated. Growth is
projected to average a little more than 6 percent this year, about ¾ percentage
point lower than forecast in the April Greenbook. We continue to project that
growth in the region will slow next year to about 5¼ percent.
With investment growing at an unsustainable rate, Chinese authorities have
recently taken measures to rein in the economy. Their actions have led to a
deceleration in investment, imports, the money supply, and lending. Our forecast
for China is consistent with a “soft landing,” with real GDP still increasing at an
annual rate of 6¼ percent in the second half of this year and 7¼ percent next
year. However, there is some risk of a “harder landing” as described at the end
of this section. We maintain our working assumption that China will keep its
current exchange rate arrangement in place through the forecast period.
In Korea, real GDP growth slowed considerably in the first quarter, to around
3 percent, as private consumption and investment declined. Indicators from the
current quarter point to continued weakness in domestic demand, which is partly
constrained by high consumer debt burdens. Accordingly, we have revised down
somewhat the outlook for real output in Korea and now expect growth of around
5 percent over the forecast period.
In Latin America, recent economic growth has surprised on the upside. Mexican
real GDP posted a robust gain of 5½ percent in the first quarter and, in light of
continued strength of U.S. industrial output and incoming Mexican data, we have
also revised up our estimate of second-quarter growth. Mexican growth should
moderate to 4 percent next year, roughly in line with U.S. growth. The Brazilian
economy grew nearly 7 percent in the first quarter, largely because of a rise in
net exports. We project that Brazilian growth will come in at 3½ percent this

I-34

Part 1: Summary and Outlook, June 23, 2004

year, about 1 percentage point higher than forecast in the April Greenbook,
before slowing a bit next year.
Consumer price inflation is estimated to have risen in the second quarter in some
economies of emerging Asia, particularly China, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
In the case of China, increases in food prices accounted for the bulk of the rise.
We expect inflation in developing countries to climb to nearly 4 percent in the
second half of this year before falling to about 3 percent next year, largely
reflecting movements in oil and other primary commodity prices.
Prices of Internationally Traded Goods
Prices of imported core goods rose at an annual rate of 6½ percent in the first
quarter, the highest rate of increase since the fourth quarter of 1988. Based on
BLS data through May, our estimate is that prices of core goods imports rose at
an annual rate of 4½ percent in the second quarter, about 1½ percentage points
more than projected in the April Greenbook. The rise in core import prices so far
this year has largely been driven by the direct effects of higher commodity
prices, which have shown through to increased import prices of non-oil industrial
supplies and foods. Prices for other categories of imports have registered much
smaller increases. We project that core import prices will increase at an annual
rate of about 3½ percent over the remainder of 2004 as the lagged effects of the
run-up in commodity prices diminish. Next year, with subdued inflation abroad
and small declines in prices for primary commodities, core import price inflation
should moderate to less than 1 percent.
Prices of exported core goods increased at an annual rate of nearly 8 percent in
the first quarter, largely reflecting increases in prices of foods (especially
soybeans) and industrial supplies. Based on monthly data on trade prices
through May, our estimate is that prices of core goods exports continued to rise
at about the same pace in the second quarter. This estimate is about
2½ percentage points higher than the one in the April Greenbook, reflecting
higher domestic prices of intermediate materials and agricultural products. We
project that the rate of increase in core export prices over the forecast period will

I-35

International Developments

slow sharply to about ¾ percent, as commodity prices fall and prices of
intermediate materials decelerate.
Staff Projections of Selected Trade Prices
(Percent change from end of previous period except as noted; s.a.a.r.)
2003

2004

Projection

Trade category

2004

2005

H1
Exports
Core goods
Imports
Non-oil core goods
Oil (dollars per barrel)

H2

Q1

Q2

H2

3.5

3.2

7.9

7.8

0.8

0.7

2.5
26.42

1.1
27.74

6.5
30.91

4.6
34.14

3.3
33.82

0.7
31.57

NOTE. Prices for core exports and non-oil core imports, which exclude computers and
semiconductors, are on a NIPA chain-weighted basis.
The price of imported oil for multi-quarter periods is the price for the final quarter of the
period.

Trade in Goods and Services
Although not sustaining the fourth quarter’s red-hot pace of about 20 percent
(a.r.), real exports of goods and services grew a solid 7½ percent in the first
quarter of this year. The increase was more than double what we reported in the
April Greenbook, reflecting stronger-than-expected export data for March, as
well as upward revisions to previously published data for January and February.
For the current quarter, we estimate that real exports of goods and services
continued to grow at a rate of around 7½ percent. A bit more than half this
growth reflects solid gains in exports of core goods, albeit at a lower pace than in
the first quarter, supported by strong growth abroad and the effects of past dollar
depreciation. After contracting in the first quarter, exports of computers are
estimated to have increased a bit. Semiconductors, on the other hand, appear to
have grown more moderately than in the first quarter, based partly on the April
trade data. Exports of services grew at an estimated 8½ percent rate, more than
twice as fast as in the first quarter. Although second-quarter growth of real
exports of goods and services is lower than projected in the April Greenbook, our
estimate for the first half of this year as a whole is about unchanged.
Over the remainder of the forecast period, growth in real exports of goods and
services should continue to be fairly robust, with projected expansions of around
10 percent in the second half and 8 percent next year. Relative to the April
Greenbook, we have marked down the projected growth rate of core goods
exports about 1¼ percentage points on average, based largely on trade data

I-36

Part 1: Summary and Outlook, June 23, 2004

revisions that led us to re-assess the long-run level of exports implied by foreign
activity and relative prices. Nevertheless, core goods exports still expand at an
annual rate of 7 percent over the next year and a half, supported by solid foreign
growth and ongoing effects of the dollar’s earlier depreciation.
Summary of Staff Projections
for Trade in Goods and Services
(Percent change from end of previous period, s.a.a.r.)
2003

2004

Projection

Measure

2004

2005

H1

H2

Q1

Q2

H2

Real exports
April GB

-1.5
-1.5

15.1
15.1

7.4
2.7

7.4
11.2

10.2
11.7

8.0
9.1

Real imports
April GB

.9
.9

8.3
8.3

10.2
3.1

5.6
10.7

10.8
9.2

8.1
8.6

NOTE. Changes for years are measured as Q4/Q4; for half-years, Q2/Q4 or Q4/Q2.

Expansion in real imports of goods and services also stepped down from its
torrid pace of the fourth quarter; nevertheless, the 10 percent (a.r.) increase in the
first quarter was considerably greater than we projected in the April Greenbook.
As in the case of exports, imports for March generally came in higher than
expected, and January and February data were revised up significantly.
In the current quarter, real imports of goods and services are projected to grow
around 5½ percent, a pace about half that projected in the April Greenbook.
Both the revision in import growth in the second quarter and the stepdown from
the first quarter are driven by the Department of Commerce’s recently introduced
seasonal adjustment factors for oil imports, which tend to depress oil imports in
the second quarter and boost them in the fourth quarter.1 In this quarter, growth
in imported core goods, supported by robust U.S. growth, appears to have picked
up somewhat from the first quarter. We estimate that imports of services
accelerated from a sluggish first quarter, expanding at an annual rate of around
9½ percent in the second quarter.

1. Previously, oil imports were adjusted for the number of days in a quarter, which resulted
in only small differences between the seasonally and not seasonally adjusted series. The new
procedure, which applies the Census X12 algorithm to the value of oil imports, has resulted in a
series that shows greater quarter-to-quarter variation than the not seasonally adjusted series.
Despite this effect, we understand that the Bureau of Economic Analysis intends to incorporate
the new data into the National Income and Product Accounts beginning with the Final Q1 GDP
release on June 25.

International Developments

I-37

We look for real imports of goods and services to grow 11 percent in the second
half of this year but then to decelerate, with an increase of 8 percent next year.
Similarly, growth of core imports is projected to slow from 9½ percent to
8 percent over the same interval, reflecting the projected tempering of growth in
the United States. This effect is partially offset by a lessening of the drag coming
from import prices. Imports of computers and semiconductors are also expected
to decelerate in 2005, following the scheduled expiration of the partial-expensing
tax provision. Changes from the April Greenbook in the quarterly contour of the
growth path for total imports are heavily influenced by the introduction of the
new seasonal factors for oil imports.
Alternative Simulation
In our baseline forecast, we assume that the authorities in China will succeed in
achieving a “soft landing” for economic activity. However, there is some risk
that the investment boom that has been the main catalyst for the recent growth
spurt will be succeeded by an unexpectedly sharp slowdown. Accordingly, in
our alternative simulation we used the FRB/Global model to examine the effects
of a “hard landing” in China. Such a hard-landing scenario includes an
autonomous shock to Chinese demand that would depress private spending by
6 percent of baseline GDP in the absence of endogenous adjustment. The shock
is assumed to occur in 2004:Q3 and is phased in over four quarters. In addition,
this scenario includes an autonomous decline in demand of 1 percent of baseline
GDP in other developing Asian economies.
This adverse demand shock lowers Chinese growth about 11 percentage points in
the second half of 2004 and about 8 percentage points in 2005, relative to
baseline. The large multiplier effect associated with the autonomous shock
reflects the assumption that China maintains an exchange rate peg to the U.S.
dollar and does not engage in countercyclical monetary policy. The shock
depresses U.S. real net exports, lowering U.S. real GDP growth in 2005 about
0.2 percentage point relative to baseline. The shock also reduces U.S. core PCE
inflation 0.2 percentage point relative to baseline in 2005, mainly because the fall
in Chinese demand lowers worldwide energy and commodity prices.

I-38

Part 1: Summary and Outlook, June 23, 2004

Alternative Simulation:
Hard Landing in China
(Percent change from previous period, annual rate)
Indicator and simulation

2004

2005

H2

H1

H2

U.S. real GDP
Baseline
Demand shock in China

5.0
5.0

3.7
3.6

3.5
3.3

U.S. PCE prices excl. food and energy
Baseline
Demand shock in China

1.7
1.7

1.5
1.3

1.4
1.2

NOTE. H1 is Q2/Q4; H2 is Q4/Q2. In these simulations, the nominal federal
funds rate remains unchanged from baseline, and the monetary authorities in
major foreign economies adjust their policy rates according to a Taylor rule.

5.4
5.0
3.1
8.7
6.2
6.8
2.5

Developing Countries
Asia
Korea
China
Latin America
Mexico
Brazil

0.9
1.1
0.7
1.4
0.8
0.3

1.5
1.0
2.1
1.7
1.5
1.5

2.4
-1.1
1.2
1.5
1.1

1.1

6.0
8.3
11.4
4.1
4.2
5.4
3.4

5.9
0.4
3.3
3.9
3.4

4.4

5.0

3.1
-1.2
1.0
2.5
1.7

1.7

5.2
6.0
4.5
8.0
4.4
4.8
3.8

4.1
3.9
2.9
2.7
1.9

3.6

4.3

1.1
-1.3
1.0
2.1
1.5

0.9

-0.2
1.0
4.7
7.5
-1.3
-1.2
-0.8

1.4
-2.2
1.9
0.7
0.5

0.6

0.3

3.8
-0.5
1.6
2.3
1.2

2.1

3.4
5.8
7.7
8.0
1.4
1.9
3.8

3.8
1.8
1.9
1.1
0.5

2.6

2.9

1.7
-0.4
1.3
2.0
1.2

1.3

4.1
6.0
4.1
9.9
2.2
2.0
-0.1

1.7
3.5
2.7
0.7
0.1

1.7

2.7

1.8
0.1
1.3
2.1
2.1

1.5

5.3
6.1
4.6
8.8
4.7
4.9
3.5

3.4
3.9
2.9
1.8
1.2

3.0

3.9

1.7
0.3
1.8
1.9
1.6

1.5

4.4
5.2
5.0
7.3
3.8
4.1
3.0

3.5
2.4
2.7
1.9
1.5

2.8

3.5

1.
2.
3.
4.

Foreign GDP aggregates calculated using shares of U.S. exports.
Harmonized data for euro area from Eurostat.
Foreign CPI aggregates calculated using shares of U.S. non-oil imports.
CPI excluding mortgage interest payments, which is the targeted inflation rate.

Developing Countries
6.8
9.0
4.6
4.1
2.8
2.9
3.0
3.7
2.9
Asia
2.7
4.4
0.1
1.8
1.1
0.7
2.1
3.3
2.1
Korea
5.0
5.8
1.2
2.6
3.4
3.4
3.5
3.7
3.4
China
0.8
-1.2
-1.0
0.9
-0.1
-0.6
2.6
3.7
1.6
Latin America
15.5
15.4
12.5
8.4
5.3
6.5
4.9
4.4
4.1
Mexico
17.0
17.3
13.4
8.7
5.1
5.3
4.0
3.9
3.8
Brazil
4.6
2.0
8.4
6.4
7.5
10.7
11.5
6.2
5.2
___________________________________________________________________________________________________

Industrial Countries
of which:
Canada
Japan
United Kingdom (4)
Euro Area (2)
Germany

CONSUMER PRICES (3)
-------------------

4.4
-1.2
2.8
2.0
0.7

4.4
0.4
3.4
3.2
1.7
-0.3
-2.2
-5.4
9.5
1.2
2.9
-1.6

2.7

1.5

3.4

4.2

Industrial Countries
of which:
Canada
Japan
United Kingdom
Euro Area (2)
Germany

REAL GDP (1)
-----------Total foreign

Projected
Measure and country
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
___________________________________________________________________________________________________

Strictly Confidential (FR)
June 23, 2004
Class II FOMC
OUTLOOK FOR FOREIGN REAL GDP AND CONSUMER PRICES: SELECTED COUNTRIES
(Percent, Q4 to Q4)
___________________________________________________________________________________________________

I-39

0.2
3.6
-1.1
16.3
-3.6
-1.7
-4.6

Developing Countries
Asia
Korea
China
Latin America
Mexico
Brazil

7.0
8.6
11.3
7.9
6.0
5.6
5.9

3.3
7.3
3.7
1.5
1.1

3.3

4.8

6.6
7.9
3.2
15.9
5.6
5.4
6.8

2.4
6.1
2.5
2.3
1.8

2.8

4.3

5.2
5.9
5.0
6.9
4.7
5.3
2.5

4.1
3.8
3.1
1.6
0.6

3.2

4.0

4.7
5.4
5.1
6.2
4.2
4.6
2.5

3.7
3.0
3.0
1.7
0.9

3.0

3.7

4.6
5.2
5.1
6.2
4.1
4.5
2.5

3.4
2.7
3.0
1.9
1.4

2.9

3.6

4.6
5.3
5.0
7.3
4.0
4.3
3.0

3.6
2.5
2.8
1.8
1.3

2.9

3.6

4.5
5.3
5.0
7.3
3.8
4.1
3.0

3.6
2.3
2.7
1.8
1.4

2.8

3.5

4.3
5.1
5.0
7.3
3.8
4.0
3.0

3.5
2.3
2.6
1.9
1.7

2.8

3.4

4.3
5.1
5.0
7.3
3.7
3.9
3.0

3.5
2.3
2.6
1.9
1.7

2.8

3.4

1.7
2.8
-0.2
1.3
1.9
0.9

2.4
4.5
-0.3
1.5
2.3
1.1

2.1
-0.5
1.4
2.1
1.0

1.4
1.7
-0.4
1.3
2.0
1.2

1.3

0.9
-0.3
1.2
1.7
1.0

0.8

1.9
-0.3
1.6
2.4
2.2

1.5

2.0
0.0
1.5
2.2
2.1

1.5

1.8
0.1
1.3
2.1
2.1

1.5

1.7
0.1
1.3
2.2
2.2

1.5

1.6
0.2
1.4
1.8
1.5

1.4

1.7
0.3
1.6
1.9
1.6

1.4

1.7
0.3
1.8
1.9
1.6

1.5

--------------------------- Four-quarter changes --------------------------

7.6
15.3
6.7
19.6
0.9
-0.4
2.1

1.4
2.7
3.4
1.7
0.8

1.9

4.1

1.
2.
3.
4.

Foreign GDP aggregates calculated using shares of U.S. exports.
Harmonized data for euro area from Eurostat.
Foreign CPI aggregates calculated using shares of U.S. non-oil imports.
CPI excluding mortgage interest payments, which is the targeted inflation rate.

Developing Countries
3.4
3.0
2.6
3.0
3.0
3.6
4.0
3.7
3.6
3.2
3.1
2.9
Asia
1.2
1.1
1.1
2.1
2.2
3.2
3.7
3.3
3.2
2.6
2.3
2.1
Korea
4.1
3.3
3.2
3.5
3.3
3.4
4.0
3.7
3.8
4.1
3.8
3.4
China
0.4
0.7
0.9
2.6
2.8
4.3
4.6
3.7
3.4
2.2
1.8
1.6
Latin America
7.1
6.4
5.4
4.9
4.7
4.5
4.5
4.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.1
Mexico
5.5
4.7
4.1
4.0
4.3
4.3
4.0
3.9
3.7
3.8
4.0
3.8
Brazil
15.7 17.0 15.3 11.5
6.8
5.4
6.1
6.2
5.7
5.5
5.3
5.2
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Industrial Countries
of which:
Canada
Japan
United Kingdom (4)
Euro Area (2)
Germany

CONSUMER PRICES (3)
-------------------

-0.7
3.8
2.4
-0.3
-0.7

2.8
0.2
1.1
-0.0
-1.0
1.7
-2.8
-0.2
-2.9
5.8
4.6
-3.5

0.2

0.8

1.6

1.0

-------------------- Quarterly changes at an annual rate ------------------

Industrial Countries
of which:
Canada
Japan
United Kingdom
Euro Area (2)
Germany

REAL GDP (1)
-----------Total foreign

----------------- Projected --------------------2003
2004
2005
------------------------------------------------------------------Measure and country
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Strictly Confidential (FR)
June 23, 2004
Class II FOMC
OUTLOOK FOR FOREIGN REAL GDP AND CONSUMER PRICES: SELECTED COUNTRIES
(Percent changes)
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________

I-40

June 23, 2004

8.3
0.4
26.7
21.1
9.8
14.3
11.9
4.2
32.6
32.5
13.1

Exports of G&S
Services
Computers
Semiconductors
Other Goods 1/

Imports of G&S
Services
Oil
Computers
Semiconductors
Other Goods 2/

-1.0
0.6
-1.6

-0.9
0.7
-1.6

12.1
6.5
-3.4
26.0
34.2
12.9

5.6
5.3
13.4
34.6
3.3
11.2
10.7
13.3
13.9
22.8
10.5

6.5
1.8
22.7
27.6
5.9
-7.4
-4.6
0.1
-12.9
-51.3
-6.2

-11.5
-8.3
-22.8
-34.9
-9.8

-0.2
-1.3
1.1

Billions of Chained 2000 Dollars

11.0
10.4
4.2
26.4
-7.7
11.2

2.6
4.4
7.3
9.5
1.2

Percentage change, Q4/Q4

-1.1
0.3
-1.4

9.4
6.7
3.7
13.5
9.7
10.3

3.3
9.3
-0.9
9.7
0.4

-0.9
0.3
-1.2

4.5
0.1
2.2
17.1
0.4
5.1

6.4
4.8
11.3
38.8
5.0

-0.0
0.6
-0.6

9.3
6.2
1.5
26.1
43.5
9.4

8.8
6.5
9.8
28.3
8.6

-0.5
0.9
-1.3

8.1
5.0
1.2
23.8
41.2
7.8

8.0
5.9
19.2
41.2
6.2

-0.4
0.8
-1.2

17.0
72.4
-55.4

-108.2

-136.0
-1.6

8.3
65.5
-57.2

-164.9

-209.6
-2.4

18.4
78.2
-59.8

-263.3

-296.8
-3.2

25.3
94.9
-69.7

-378.4

-413.5
-4.2

28.7
115.9
-87.2

-362.7

-385.7
-3.8

12.6
100.8
-88.2

-421.7

-473.9
-4.5

38.8
118.9
-80.1

-496.5

-530.7
-4.8

52.1
152.2
-100.2

-573.2

-606.5
-5.2

12.2
164.0
-151.8

-627.0

-702.3
-5.7

1. Merchandise exports excluding computers and semiconductors.
2. Merchandise imports excluding oil, computers, and semiconductors.

Other Income & Transfers,Net
-44.8
-53.0
-52.0
-60.4
-51.7
-64.8
-72.9
-85.4
-87.5
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Investment Income, Net
Direct, Net
Portfolio, Net

Net Goods & Services (BOP)

US CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE
Current Acct as Percent of GDP

Billions of dollars

Net Goods & Services
-104.6
-203.8
-296.2
-379.5
-398.1
-470.6
-509.1
-547.7
-594.6
Exports of G&S
943.7
966.5
1008.2
1096.3
1039.0
1014.2
1034.7
1138.2
1234.8
Imports of G&S
1048.3
1170.3
1304.5
1475.8
1437.1
1484.7
1543.8
1685.9
1829.4
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

-0.8
0.9
-1.7

Percentage point contribution to GDP growth, Q4/Q4

Net Goods & Services
Exports of G&S
Imports of G&S

NIPA REAL EXPORTS and IMPORTS

Projected
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

OUTLOOK FOR U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Strictly Confidential (FR)
Class II FOMC

I-41

June 23, 2004

-1.5
0.7
-2.2

16.7
20.9
28.5
-2.2
25.0
16.4

Exports of G&S
Services
Computers
Semiconductors
Other Goods 1/

Imports of G&S
Services
Oil
Computers
Semiconductors
Other Goods 2/

-0.9
1.1
-2.0

-0.1
-0.3
0.2

0.5
-0.5
1.0

-0.2
-1.5
1.3

-0.4
-2.0
1.6

14.1
14.3
-2.6
35.4
71.1
12.2

10.7
-6.6
30.1
35.0
16.0
-1.6
-1.8
-6.4
-12.3
-26.9
1.8

-2.7
4.5
-10.7
-8.9
-4.5
-6.2
-3.2
23.3
-25.7
-43.5
-6.1

-4.5
-2.0
-7.7
-29.5
-2.7
-8.5
12.5
7.1
-20.5
-70.4
-10.0

-13.4
-0.6
-40.8
-54.1
-12.1
-10.8
-18.1
-26.8
-10.9
-55.4
-4.8

-17.7
-14.7
-20.1
-45.7
-16.6

Billions of Chained 2000 Dollars, s.a.a.r.

16.5
10.6
40.6
44.9
45.4
12.2

12.3
8.4
47.0
73.7
7.5

-0.5
-1.0
0.5

-3.8
-6.9
3.7
9.3
-24.6
-4.0

-9.8
-15.0
-18.6
2.3
-7.4

Percentage change from previous period, s.a.a.r.

-1.0
1.3
-2.3

Percentage point contribution to GDP growth

8.4
19.3
-19.3
38.4
44.5
5.9

4.4
22.9
-22.2
26.6
-2.8

-0.7
0.4
-1.1

17.1
-3.7
35.3
11.5
34.6
21.4

8.7
1.6
3.2
40.5
10.8

-1.3
0.8
-2.1

4.1
0.7
-10.9
6.5
-6.5
7.0

4.3
4.4
4.6
11.8
3.7

-0.2
0.4
-0.6

8.2
12.1
18.9
0.9
-20.3
7.5

-3.7
9.4
14.6
-27.1
-9.0

-1.5
-0.4
-1.1

22.8
88.9
-66.1

17.1
91.9
-74.8

-387.5

-428.8
-4.3

41.1
114.5
-73.4

-405.7

-439.2
-4.4

23.9
106.2
-82.3

-389.3

-426.8
-4.3

29.8
116.1
-86.3

-356.1

-390.2
-3.9

1.5
95.0
-93.5

-357.1

-367.6
-3.6

59.7
146.2
-86.6

-348.3

-358.3
-3.5

9.2
100.6
-91.4

-375.0

-440.8
-4.3

1.8
95.1
-93.2

-413.5

-471.6
-4.5

10.6
94.9
-84.3

-427.7

-476.0
-4.5

28.8
112.8
-84.0

-470.7

-507.4
-4.8

1. Merchandise exports excluding computers and semiconductors.
2. Merchandise imports excluding oil, computers, and semiconductors.

Other Inc. & Transfers, Net -53.1
-55.3
-58.4
-74.6
-61.3
-63.9
-12.0
-69.7
-75.0
-59.9
-59.0
-65.4
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

20.1
84.5
-64.4

-361.8

Net Goods & Services (BOP) -358.4

Investment Income, Net
Direct, Net
Portfolio, Net

-394.3
-4.0

-391.5
-4.1

US CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE
Current Account as % of GDP

Billions of dollars, s.a.a.r.

Net Goods & Services
-350.6 -374.5 -395.6 -397.2 -385.9 -391.7 -401.3 -413.4 -431.2 -467.6 -471.9 -511.5
Exports of G&S
1060.9 1092.0 1120.0 1112.3 1099.6 1060.9 1010.6
984.8
995.4 1016.5 1027.3 1017.5
Imports of G&S
1411.5 1466.5 1515.6 1509.5 1485.5 1452.7 1411.9 1398.2 1426.7 1484.1 1499.2 1529.0
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

6.6
1.4
32.7
24.2
5.9

Net Goods & Services
Exports of G&S
Imports of G&S

NIPA REAL EXPORTS and IMPORTS

2000
2001
2002
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

OUTLOOK FOR U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Strictly Confidential (FR)
Class II FOMC

I-42

June 23, 2004

0.8
-0.2
1.0

-6.8
-7.6
-12.7
-0.4
-0.4
-6.4

Exports of G&S
Services
Computers
Semiconductors
Other Goods 1/

Imports of G&S
Services
Oil
Computers
Semiconductors
Other Goods 2/

0.8
0.9
-0.1

-0.3
1.8
-2.1

-0.7
0.7
-1.4

-0.1
0.7
-0.8

-0.5
1.0
-1.4

0.8
13.5
-3.2
15.8
-1.5
-2.5

9.9
12.7
48.7
35.2
4.8
16.4
7.5
-17.0
36.8
0.5
22.8

20.5
18.8
25.7
46.4
19.3
10.2
1.1
41.9
12.7
42.5
8.1

7.4
3.1
-9.6
14.6
10.3
5.6
9.4
-39.0
30.9
33.8
10.3

7.4
8.4
1.2
6.2
7.4
9.8
7.4
1.2
30.9
49.3
9.3

9.7
7.6
26.0
49.3
7.4

Billions of Chained 2000 Dollars, s.a.a.r.

9.1
-10.9
55.8
18.9
3.1
9.1

-1.1
0.3
-11.2
30.1
-3.0

Percentage change from previous period, s.a.a.r.

-1.3
-0.1
-1.2

Percentage point contribution to GDP growth

11.7
7.0
21.2
30.9
49.3
9.6

10.8
7.1
26.1
49.3
9.4

-0.6
1.1
-1.7

8.2
5.5
11.8
17.0
33.6
7.2

6.8
6.5
12.6
33.6
4.8

-0.5
0.7
-1.2

5.5
4.9
-24.3
26.1
43.9
7.7

8.3
6.0
21.5
43.9
6.3

0.0
0.8
-0.8

8.3
4.9
-0.1
26.1
43.9
8.0

7.9
5.7
21.5
43.9
5.8

-0.4
0.8
-1.2

10.3
4.8
24.1
26.1
43.9
8.3

9.0
5.5
21.5
43.9
7.7

-0.6
0.9
-1.5

29.1
105.4
-76.3

34.5
114.6
-80.1

-489.0

-526.5
-4.7

70.1
154.2
-84.1

-502.0

-507.8
-4.5

56.3
142.0
-85.7

-547.7

-579.5
-5.1

61.8
156.2
-94.4

-558.3

-580.6
-5.0

48.6
152.6
-104.0

-581.5

-617.3
-5.2

41.7
158.1
-116.5

-605.3

-648.5
-5.4

33.7
162.9
-129.2

-618.6

-679.5
-5.6

18.3
162.8
-144.5

-615.9

-682.3
-5.5

6.6
165.9
-159.3

-627.7

-706.1
-5.7

-9.9
164.3
-174.2

-645.7

-741.1
-5.9

1. Merchandise exports excluding computers and semiconductors.
2. Merchandise imports excluding oil, computers, and semiconductors.

Other Inc. & Transfers, Net -72.8
-71.0
-72.0
-76.0
-88.1
-84.1
-84.4
-84.9
-94.6
-84.7
-85.1
-85.5
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

21.5
101.3
-79.8

-493.5

Net Goods & Services (BOP) -501.6

Investment Income, Net
Direct, Net
Portfolio, Net

-535.5
-4.9

-552.8
-5.1

US CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE
Current Account as % of GDP

Billions of dollars, s.a.a.r.

Net Goods & Services
-490.0 -526.0 -505.2 -515.2 -534.9 -537.3 -550.3 -568.3 -583.5 -583.6 -596.4 -614.9
Exports of G&S
1012.4 1009.6 1033.7 1083.1 1102.6 1122.6 1148.9 1178.7 1198.2 1222.2 1245.7 1272.9
Imports of G&S
1502.5 1535.7 1538.9 1598.3 1637.5 1659.9 1699.2 1747.0 1781.7 1805.8 1842.1 1887.8
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

-2.0
-10.2
-7.4
44.1
0.1

Net Goods & Services
Exports of G&S
Imports of G&S

NIPA REAL EXPORTS and IMPORTS

---------------------- Projected ------------------------2003
2004
2005
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

OUTLOOK FOR U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Strictly Confidential (FR)
Class II FOMC

I-43