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Systemic Risk Regulation and the "Too Big to Fail" Problem, No. 09-07

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Systemic Risk Regulation and the "Too Big to Fail" Problem, No. 09-07

DATE: July 2009

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ABSTRACT: A single regulator tasked with preventing threats to systemic stability would need to have considerable power and discretion. But creating such a powerful entity could reinforce the moral hazard problem resulting from the idea that some firms are too big to fail.

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Grochulski, Borys , Slivinski, Stephen and Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. "Systemic Risk Regulation and the "Too Big to Fail" Problem, No. 09-07," Economic Brief (July 2009). https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/6034/item/583866, accessed on April 24, 2024.

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