Full text of Review (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas) : March 1976
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Rlderal Reserve Bank of DalJas Business Review - 1 ~o • ifJ?-- ,:J ~ 'y \ ~ 0 I > ~ • March 1976 District BankingNew Edge Offices Participate In Expanding International Banking Market Review 011975 Treasury Cash BalancesNew Policy Prompts Increased Defensive Operations by Federal Reserve This publication was digitized and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas' Historical Library (FedHistory@dal.frb.org) District Banking- New Edge Offices Participate In Expanding International Banking Market Since early 1972, six of the country's eight largest banks-headquartered in New York, Chicago, or San Francisco-have opened Edge Act corporation offices in Houston. And the other two have plans to do so. Together with the mounting presence of foreign banks in Houston and the sharp expansion of international departments in local banks there, the Edge movement attests to the increasing importance in world commerce of the economy of the Eleventh Federal Reserve District. And it retlects the emergence of Houston as a center for international bank credit and services. Legal framework The origins of Edge Act corporations go back 60 years to when Congress sought to stimulate U.S. foreign trade by enabling domestic banks to playa larger role in international finance. In 1916, Congress amended Section 25 of the Federal Reserve Act to permit national banks to fonn corporations principally engaged in international or foreign banking. Under this amendment, owner banks are required to have at least $1 million in capital and surplus, with no more than 10 percent of that total invested in the stock of such corporations. And before any stock can be purchased, the organizers have to have an agreement with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System as to the conditions under which the corporation will operate. Corporations organized under Section 25, therefore, are called Agreement corporations. There are no Agreement corporations active in the Eleventh District at this time. But on January 26 this year, the Board of Governors approved an application by the Bank of Tokyo, a Japanese bank that is a registered bank holding company in the United States, to operate one in Houston. Because the 1916 amendment did not provide a means for federal charters to be granted, all Agreement corporations have state charters. But in 1919, Congress added Section 25(a), which empowers the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to charter corporations for the purpose of engaging in international or foreign banking or other financial operations. These corporations are called Edge corporations after Senator Walter Edge, sponsor of the legislation. Section 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act permits out~of state banks to operate Edge Act subsidiaries in Texas, provided their activities are clearly related to international or foreign business. Because of their special purpose, Edge corporations operate under somewhat different restrictions than commercial banks. For example, existing provisions of state and federal law prohibit banks from having branch offices in Texas. But Section 25(a) permits out-oI-state banks to operate Edge Act subsidiaries in Texas, provided their activities are clearly related to international or foreign business. Edge Act corporations can receive demand and time EDGE ACT CORPORATIONS IN ELEVENTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT, DECEMBER 31, 1975 Name Republic International Company' . FIrst Dallas InternaUonal Banking Corporation' .. First National CIty Bank (International-Houston) Bank of America International of Texas ... First City International Corporation of Texas' .... Morgan Guaranty International Bank of Houston. Continental Bank International (Texas) ... . . ..... . Bankers Trust International (Southwest) Corporation .. . Chase Bank International-Houston .. . ............ . Commenced Loe"lIon ApproWld by Board 01 Governors Dallas Dallas Houston Houston Houston Houston Houston Houston Houston May 29, 1968 January 9. 1969 February 7, 1972 February 3, 1972 January 5, 1973 January 21. 1974 January 21, 1974 June 7,1974 May 10, 1974 May 31,1968 February 3, 1969 March 1, 1972 March 24, 1972 July 27, 1973 April 10, 1974 April 15, 1974 June 10. 1974 September 26. 1974 b~.lnen 1. NOI engaged In banking u defined by Federal R..",,,,,, Regu l.llon K Business Review I March 1976 l deposits, but not passbook savings deposits, so long as the deposits are incidental to international or foreign transactions. Reserves against such deposits cannot total less than 10 percent. A corporation having aggregate demand deposits and acceptance liabilities in excess of its capital and surplu.s-<:alled a banking Edge-must limit the amount of credit granted to any customer to 10 percent of its capital and surplus. Otherwise, a corporation is an investment Edge and can lend a single customer as much as 50 percent of its capital and surplus. At mid-1975, 113 corporations organized under Section 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act were operating in the United States. By contrast, there were only four Agreement corporations. The six non-Texas banks with Edge offices in Houston had 23 other Edge subsidiaries in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Miami, San Francisco, and Portland. Three banks in the Eleventh District-two in Dallas and one in Houston-own nonbanking Edge subsidiaries for holding their overseas investments. Although two of the three preceded the Edge banks having out·of-state owners, the combined assets of 10caUy owned Edges amount to only 5 percent of total assets held by nil Edges in the District. climbed from over 6 percent to almost 10 percent. The sharp run·up in global petroleum prices over the past two years has put heavy demands on the Texas Gulf Coast for petrolewn products and oil production technology and know-how and has been a particularly important factor leading to an increase in the demand for credit and services integral to international transactions. Recognizing the strong profit opportunities developing around Houston, the country's largest multinational banks have set up Edge Act offices there. They were particularly encouraged to do so because many of their major customers with southwestern subsidiaries had expanded operations or relocated corporate headquarters in the Houston area. Scope of Edge activities Edge corporations found new business from the many small but rapidly growing companies-especially petroleum-related firmslocated in the booming Houston area. Thrust into the world of international trade, many of these companies did not know how to collect or transmit funds overseas or lacked expertise about letters of credit. Others needed advice on submitting complex bids for contracts overseas or help in checking on the creditworthiness of foreign customers and the stability of foreign currencies. By using the parent bank's extensive network of foreign branch olfices, an Edge bank in Houston can collect or transfer funds around the world and can provide on-site representation and information for its client. The new Edge offices offered the resources to serve the needs of companies entering international markets. By using the parent bank's extensive network of foreign branch offices, an Edge bank in Houston could easily collect or transfer funds around the world and could provide on-site representation and information for its client. And each Edge bank could also rely on the home office for financial and economic expertise in analyzing complex overseas transactions and for the overline on any credit that exceeded the Edge bank's limit. The Edge banks have also achieved some success in attract- GROWTH IN FOREIGN ACTIVITIES OF COMMERCIAL BANKS IN HOUSTON Establishment of Edge offices In recent years, the economy of the Eleventh District has rapidly expanded into world markets. For example, from 1969 to 1974, the value of exports and imports for the Houston customs region-an area composed of Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Colorado, and a small part of Louisiana-rose from $4.7 billion to $19.3 billion, or 311 percent. And the share of total U.S. foreign trade accounted for by the Houston customs region 2 l1t1m Total claims on fore igners ............ • ..•..... Loans PrIvate nonbank foreigners ........ • ..• ..... Foreign commerci al banks ... ............. . Foreign acceptances ....................... . Collections outstanding . . .. ... ............ . . Total liabilitles to foreigners .................. . Time deposits of private nonbank foreigners .. . Demand deposits Private nonbank foreigners .. .... .......... . Foreign commercial banks . . . .. . .. ..... . 180% 244% 233 185 75 717 NOTE : Calculat&!! 110m data reported 10 Ille U.S. TII.IUry Department 75 . 338 48 13 81 137 60 143 233 383 52 ing the business of older, more established finns. Collections are made faster by the small Houston offices than by the large interna· tiona! departments at home offices. Where letters of credit were previously routed to the main bank and then cleared (at a fee) through a Houston correspondent, they can now be written or cleared in Houston. Clearing times have dropped from a week or more to a day or two, and the incidence of lost documents has declined. Some of the Edge banks in Houston have sizable foreign deposits. The parent banks of these offices have strong branch networks in Mexico and Latin America, and depositors from those countries find it is now easier to go to Houston than to the home office. But most of the Edge banks in Houston do not have a large foreign deposit business. Foreign exchange trading in Houston is limited. No Edge bank-or, for that matter, local commercial bank-has a foreign exchange trader or makes a mar· ket in foreign currencies. Hous· ton's international bankers trade in the New York foreign exchange market for their customers. Competitive impact of Edges The est3.blishment of Edge banks in Houston has increased com· petitive pressures on local com· mercia! banks. Parent banks of Edge Act corporations usually have more extensive global repre· Activity of foreign banks in Houston The presence of many representative offices of foreign banks in Houston attests to the area's increasing importance in international banking. At least 13 foreign commercial and merchant banking institutions had representative offices there in late 1975. These offices-forbidden by Texas law from engaging in banking-are in Houston to oversee the interests of their parent banks. And many aggressively market ser· vices and credit that can be booked at their home offices or at branch affiliates in New York, Chicago, or San Francisco. While some make calls only in the Southwest, others take in the entire United States, or even North America, as trade territories. Canadian banks came to Houston as early as 1958. Beginning with a strong base in petroleum and allied industries, they now have customers in all lines of commerce. Transactions need not be tied to Canada. The banks will extend loans for profitable projects in the United States or anywhere else around the world-consorlium loans for North Sea oil exploration, for example. A large percentage of the loans Canadian banks arrange are participated out to Hous· ton banks. They have also been somewhat active in marketing large--denomination cer· tificates of deposit. Most other representative offices in Houston were established after 1973. Two Japanese offices followed major Japanese trad- Business Review I March 1976 ing companies to the Southwest. Although Japan's economic interests in the Southwest have traditionally centered around cotton, its representative offices are most heavily involved in financing iron and steel imports from Japan. Heavy manufacturing in Houston and the Southwest is increasingly de· pendent on Japanese iron and steel, and about a third of all such U.S. imports from Japan enter through Houston. The Japanese representatives are also ac· tive in financing refinery construction and other needs of major U.S. oil companies. not only in the United States and Japan but also in Iran, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. And they have invested in many other sectors of U.S. industry. Scottish offices and one Italian office are primarily service·oriented, helping homebased customers operate in the United States and encouraging U.S. firms to invest in their countries. But they also maintain close relationships with Houston's multinational corporations. And the Scots have a special interest in developing North Sea oil reserves. The other foreign bank offices in Hous· ton are trying to keep close ties with oil· related companies in the Southwest, including their domestic financing needs and their investments abroad. Otherwise, activi· ties of these offices are too diverse for generalization. 3 sentation and more international expertise than local Houston banks. At mid-1975, for example, First National City Bank of New York had 243 branches in 58 countries, Edge offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Miami, and San Francisco, and additional international banking subsidiaries in 16 countries. That dwarfed the seven branch offices in three countries that five Houston banks controlled. The large multinational banks maintain specialized staffs that analyze such developments as movements in foreign exchange rates, differences in money market rates around the world, and policy changes by foreign governments. And the Edge subsidiaries can pass along this valuable information to southwestern companies dealing overseas. The smaller Houston conunercial banks do not have large staffs of foreign specialists and often must buy such infonnation from correspondent banks in U.S. money centers. Also, even the largest Houston banks sometimes find their legal lending limits insufficient to handle outsized overseas loan packages. Because of their modest capitalization, Edge banks have small lending limits, both for individual customers and in aggregate. But as subsidiaries, they have access to the vast resources of their home offices. Currently, Edge banks in Houston participate out about $2 for every $1 of loans carried on their books, with 80percent participation in some instances. Even though some clients have shifted to the Edge banks, Houston commercial banks are handling more inter~ national business than ever. Even though some clients have shifted to the Edge banks, Houston conunercial banks are handling more international business than ever. The six largest Houston banks have experienced rapid growth in their international departments (the staff at one bank has tripled in the past three years). And growth of both claims on foreigners and liabilities to them has actually accelerated at Houston banks since the arrival of Edge offices. Last year, Edge offices had 18 percent of the total claims on SHARES OF SELECTED FOREIGN CLAIMS AND LIABILITIES OF COMMERCIAL BANKS AND EDGE CORPORATIONS IN HOUSTON Pereent 01 Hou ston total. D&eembor 3t. 1975 Bankt Edge. Total claims on foreigners loans Private nonbank foreigners ................ . Foreign commercial banks ...... . ...... • ... Foreign acceptances . .. . . .. .... . . Collections outstanding .. . ....... . Total liabilities to foreigners ............. . Time deposits 01 private nonbank foreigners Demand deposits Private nonbank foreigners . . .. . .... . .. ........ . Foreign commercial banks . ......... . Foreign official institutions .. . 82% 18% 80 95 93 72 64 5 20 60 98 100 5 7 28 36 95 40 2 0 NOTE' Catc",l ated from data reported to tile U.S. TrU SYry Departm ent and the Federal Reserve System 4 foreigners held by all banking organizations in Houston. And their share among all District banks was only 7 percent, although this probably understates their share considering participations with home offices. Obviously, local conunercial banks still have something to offer customers dealing in international trade. Where Edge banks are restricted to international and foreign business, conunercial banks can offer a full line of credit and services, including domestic loans, payroll management, stock registration and transfer, and pension fund and other trust services. As a typical industry practice, these are sold as packages partly in exchange for deposit balances. As a further return, customers of long standing receive tacit priority for loanable bank funds during tight credit conditions. An Edge bank offers international credit and services on better teons. But in buying them, a corporate client may forgo the full value of its conunercial bank bal~ ances. And by splitting its business, it could jeopardize its preferential status with the local bank. In this light, loyalty of many southwestern companies to fullservice local banks may amount to good economic reasoning. Potential for continued expansion International banking in Houston is rapidly undergoing both growth and change. The Edge movement has brought an increased amount and variety of credit and services to the area. It has injected new expertise there, tying Houston into global branch networks of multinational banks. And even though they are without banking powers, representative offices of foreign banks are drawing foreign direct investment to the Southwest and arranging for financing of greater international trade. As a center for world energy technology and know-how, Houston has an excellent potential for also becoming a center for international finance. It already has a significant concentration of international banking, but future progress will depend, in part, on the number and variety of new international banking outlets allowed. As a center for world energy technology and know-how, Houston has an excellent potential for also becoming a center for international finance. The role of foreign banks in Texas has been limited because the state's constitution denies them banking privileges. And during the 1974 Texas Constitutional Convention, an effort to open the state to foreign-owned banks proved unsuccessful. As a longtime unit-banking state, Texas seemed unprepared for legal recognition of branching, even if confined to foreign banks. But some Texas bankers now favor the entry of foreign-owned banks into the state. They believe that foreign competitors would broaden the state's banking industry and bring profitable spillover business through increased foreign trade and investment. A constitutional change would also increase the opportunities for Texas banks to branch overseas. Frequently, a foreign government will not pennit Texas banks to have branches in its country without a reciprocal agreement. With extensive branch networks, Texas banks could achieve economies of scale in foreign operations and compete more effectively against money market multinationals, both here and abroad. At this time, however, questions about the state's statutory authority over foreign banks may be moot. Late in 1974, the Board of Governors sent Congress proposed legislation for regulating foreign banking in the United States. Now called the Foreign Bank Act of 1975, it would standardize the status of many foreign banks in the United States by placing them under the same basic rules and procedures that domestic national banks must observe. In particular, two provisions of the Foreign Bank Act would have direct bearing on the growth of international banking in Texas. One would permit foreign banks to own Edge corporations. The other would allow some degree of foreign ownership in national banks and would empower the Comptroller of the Currency to license branches of a foreign bank in any state. If these provisions become law, foreign banks could engage in domestic and international banking in Texas despite state constitutional prohibition. In the near tenn, the direction of international banking in Houston will come from policies of the Board of Governors as it exercises its authority under Sections 25 and 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act. Early this year, the Board approved an application by the Bank of Tokyo to establish an Agreement corporation in Houston. By forming this corporation, the Bank of Tokyo had responded to objections made by the Board in denying an earlier application, last May, which proposed creating an international banking subsidiary in Houston under provisions of Section 4(c)(9) of the Bank Holding Company Act to avoid some of the restrictions in Regulation K. Texas banking authorities may well challenge whether a foreignowned Agreement corporation can engage in banlting with a state charter and still be in compliance with state law. But if the position of the Board of Governors that state law is not violated is upheld, other foreign banks would likely enter the Texas market by means of Agreement corporations. Naw member bank First National Bank of West University Place, West University Place, Texas, a newly organized institution located in the territory served by the Houston Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, opened for business February 19, 1976, as a member of the Federal Reserve System. The new member bank opened with capita) of $400,000, surplus of $400,000, and undivided profits of $200,000. The officers are: Joseph S. Bracewell, President; W. Otto Frosch, Executive Vice President; Joan Evans, Cashier; and Mary Lou Farrar, Director of Customer Relations. BUSU1eM Review I March 1976 5 REVIEW OF 1975 The nation's economy was marked by recovery from the most severe recession of the postwar period, significant moderation of inflation from double-digit levels, and a decline of most interest rates from record highs. 1,240 BILLIONS OF 1972 O O L L A R S - - - - - - - REAL GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 20 BILLION DOLLARS - - - - - - - - - - - '0 0 ~L-~~~~~~~e.r--__- -- 1,190 -10 -20 1,140 r'---"C'9::7:C.:---T--:-'::9~7:;5---' Output fellG.6 percent from a peak in 1973 to the trough in the first quarter of 1975. It then advanced at somewhat less than the average pace for postwar recoveries. ,... '0 " 5 , , " ," ,' '-"., 0 --, - ,,~, CONSUMER PRtCE INDex ,~, " ~ " "'< . ,,~> \ " 1914 Fluctuations in economic activity were dominated by an exceptionally sharp inventory cycle. A large and mostly involuntary accumulation of inventories in 1974 gave way to massive liquidation in the first half 01 1975. w ~ ,~ " '''' ,~ '-'-~ '~" ,', " , " ,'''' ",~~, " u ~." '"" '" ~<u REAL PER CAPIT A DISPOS ABLE INCOME '\H~ " = ,'<<-< "U ,~s~ 3 ,900 'u 1975 The rate of inflation declined from double-digit levels to 6.4 percent by the end of the year. But that was still more than double the average inflation rate of the 1960's. 10 PERCENT - - - - - - - - - - 8 • • r,--'-.~7-.--.----'9-7-5---, 6 -30r-------------~--~~------_, 1974 1975 ',000 ,-, n" ~ .. 4,100 BILLIONS OF 1972 DOLLARS - - - - - - - - 15 PERCENT CHANGE _v, INVENTORY CHANGE 3,800 .,----'-.-7-.---.-----'-.-7-.----, And large gains were made in real per capita disposable income, partly because of the Tax Reduction Act of 1975. Tax rebates contributed to an especially sharp gain in the second quarter. But because of continued growth in the labor force and rising labor productivity, the recovery translated into only modest reductions in the unemployment rate during the year. 230 BILLION DOLLARS - - - - - - - - - - - - 8 210 190 170 ,• GROSS PRIV ATE DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 2 o I.orl--------_r--------, 120 BILLION D O L L A R S - - - - - - - - - - - - 80 - 10 PERCENT CHANGE MONEY STOCK (M, ) - " ".., -. r-- h '4PERCENT--------------------------- 12 FEDERAL FUNDS RATE 10 FEDER AL BUDGET DEFICIT 8 '0 • , "-----1"."7"'"'------'------:1"97=.:------, o ...-~--,=-- 1974 As the deficit in the federal government's budget rose, private spending on investment goods fell about as much. But since most interest rates were not rising, it was a case of weakness in private spending causing the deficit rather than the deficit crowding out investment spending. Monetary policy was aimed at slowing inflation and achieving sustainable economic growth. Ml expanded at less than 5 percent for the second consecutive year, compared with advances in excess of 6 percent in the preceding four years. 10 P E R C E N T - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2.0 MILLION U N I T S - - - - - - - - PERCENT 10 9 1.5 CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGE RATE An CORPORATE BONOS 8 1.0 • 9 7 • GOVERNMENT BONOS HOUSING STARTS o 8 Reduced credit demands and large savings inflows into thrift institutions helped sustain relatively low mortgage rates. But a large stock of unsold homes and sharp increases in new home prices dampened the housing recovery. Business Review I March 1976 5r'----I"•.,.7~'----r----1~9.,.7.,..----, Corporate bond yields remained high, mainly because inflationary expectations persisted and businesses lengthened the maturity of their debt. Yields on state and local government bonds actually rose as a consequence of the financial difficulties of New York City. 7 Treasury Cash Balances- New Policy Prompts Increased Defensive Operations by Federal Reserve In recent years, the amount of money in circulation has gained importance as a target and indicator of monetary policy. But even as more attention has been focused on the money stock, a recent change in the U.S. Treasury's management of its cash balances has increased the potential of Treasury balances to cause short-term fluctuations in money. In response, the Federal Reserve System has stepped up defensive open market operations and, through these operations, has successfully offset the potential increase in the variability of the money stock. The Treasury's new cash management policy has not, therefore, significantly interfered with the Federal Reserve's ability to hit its desired monetary targets. Treasury cash balances Almost all the Treasury's cash disbursements, such as Social Security payments and Government payrolls, are made by drawing down Treasury checking accounts at the 12 Federal Reserve banks and their branches. These transactions inject funds into private demand deposits at commercial banks and, at the same time and by an equal amount, increase the reserves available to the commercial banking system. Because banks are required to hold only a fractional amount of reserves against deposits and other liabilities, an injection of new reserves into the commercial banking system from Treasury cash disbursements can result in a multiple expansion in the money stock and bank credit and exert downward pressure on money market yields. 8 By contrast, Treasury cash receipts that are paid into accounts at Federal Reserve banks-tax collections or proceeds from security sales, for example-can produce the opposite effects since they drain reserves from commercial banks. The Treasury's new cash management policy has not significantly interfered with the Federal Reserve's ability to hit its desired monetary targets. To minimize disruptions in the money market resulting from large and irregular flows of funds between the Government and private sectors of the economy, the Treasury began using, as early as 1917, a specialized system of deposits--called tax and loan accounts-in the management of its cash balances. Tax and loan accoWlts are Treasury-owned demand deposits at about 12,700 commercial banks that qualify as special depositaries. Banks can qualify by applying through a Federal Reserve bank and posting collateral, in the form of various government securities, to cover funds in the accounts. Initially, Congress authorized the use of tax and loan accounts for the deposit of proceeds from sales of new Treasury securities, which helped induce commercial banks to distribute new issues at no direct commission costs to the Government. Later, after World War II, Congress broadened the use of these special accounts to include deposits of payroll taxes, income taxes, and certain excise taxes. And today, balances in tax and loan accounts come mostly from tax collections. When payments to the Treasury are made by crediting tax and loan accounts at banks, no reserves are drained from commercial banks. Instead, ownership of a given quantity of demand deposits is simply transferred from a private account to a tax and loan account of the Treasury. The Treasury can leave the funds in the commercial banking system until they are needed for expenditures. At that time, funds are transferred to deposits at Federal Reserve banks for disbursement, which returns them to commercial banks. Acting in consultation with officials at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Treasury transfers funds from tax and loan accounts to deposits at Federal Reserve banks through the use of calls on commercial banks, or scheduled withdrawals. Before 1971, the Treasury generally sought to minimize the impact of calls on bank reserves by attempting to keep its deposits at Federal Reserve banks at a minimal level. Day-to-day experience revealed the amount of deposits needed to conduct Treasury operations efficiently. And forecasts of expenditures and receipts enabled Treasury officials to schedule calls so as to restore deposits at Federal Reserve banks to efficient operating levels. Receipts in excess of immediate disbursement needs were allowed to accumulate in tax and loan accounts at commercial banks. And the Treasury quickly redeposited in tax and Treasury Demand Deposits 12 BILLION DOLLARS (EN[).()F·MONTH BALANCES) 10- TAX AND LOAN ACCOUNTS AT COMMERCIAL BANKS 8- 6- 4- 2- DEPOSITS AT FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS O-r---.--~r---~---r---.--~r---~---r---.----r---~ 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 SOURCE: U.S. Tr •••ury Department loan accounts any surplus funds in operating balances. to exceed the value of services rendered by banks handling them.' New Treasury policy After 1971, the size of Treasury deposits at Federal Reserve banks increased substantially, as did their fluctuations, because the Treasury changed its policy and began keeping minimal balances in tax and loan accounts. Because they are demand deposits, tax and loan accounts cannot earn interest under present federal legislation. Yet, banks can realize a return with the funds obtained from these accounts. In the past, the Treasury viewed these returns as fair compensation to banks for their services in handling tax and loan accounts. However, in a 1974 study, the Treasury reported that, partly because of higher interest rates, bank earnings on these accounts had come Congress is considering several bills that would authorize permanent changes in the Treasury 's cash management practices and permit interest to be earned on idle Government funds. On the basis of this report, Con- gress is considering several bills that would authorize pennanent changes in the Treasury's cash management practices and pencit interest to be earned on idle Government funds. Pending the adoption of one of these bills, the Treasury has reduced its balances in tax and loan accounts and shifted funds into deposits at Federal Reserve banks. In response to this shift and to prevent a deficiency in the reserves of commercial banks, the Federal Reserve System has purchased an appropriate amount of Government securities in the open market. The Treasury's revenues have been enhanced since the higher net income from the Federal Reserve's larger holdings of Government securities accrues to the Treasury. But the shift of funds to Federal Reserve banks has also complicated the task of monetary management because the minimization of tax and loan accounts has caused Treasury balances at Federal Reserve banks to become more volatile. Effect on the money stock Fluctuations in Treasury deposits at Federal Reserve banks, if not offset by System open market operations, can cause variations 1. Report on a Study of Tax and Loan Accounts, Treasury Department, June 1974 Busineu Review I March 1976 9 Potential Changes in the Money Stock Due to Changes in Treasury Deposits at Federal Reserve Banks 6O PERCENT -----------------------------------------------------------40- 20- 0 -········· .. -20- -40- 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 NOTE; E,Umaled .. -m _ 1 I1TOFRIM •• pr....d alan annual ral., "".r.I1TOFR I, Ih. ehang.ln ...rag. monthl, balane., 01 TN..ury depo,l" al Fed.ral A...1"'I'. banb, M I, ttMo narrowl, d.flned mone, ,Iodl, and m_\ I, Its mulllpll.r 101' the preeeding month. in the stock of money because changes in these deposits create changes in base money. Base money consists of the net monetary liabilities of the Federal Reserve System and the Treasury that are held by commercial banks and the nonbank public. It is equal to member bank deposits at Federal Reserve banks, vault cash held by banks, and currency held by the public. ~ Currently. about $2.5 in money-defined as currency plus demand deposits other than those of domestic banks and the Treasury- is supported by each $1 of base money. Since the Treasury adopted the new policy, changes in its deposits at Federal Reserve banks have become a dominant source of potential short-term fluctuations in base money. In the four years ended June 1971, the standard deviation about the mean for monthly changes in the Treasury's deposits was not substantially larger than for most other sources of changes in the base. But in the following four years, the standard deviation of these changes ranked second in size only to that of changes in Federal Reserve securities and was three times larger than that of the next most volatile source of change. 2. Base money has several sources. Increases in securities, loans, and other assets held by Federal Reserve banks-aa well as increases in Federal Reserve fioat-add to the base because these items are paid for with monetary liabilities of the Federal Reserve. Acquisitions of gold or Special Drawing Rights by the Treasury and increases in the amount of its currency outstanding over and above its own holdings of currency also add to the base. But increases in deposits at Federal Reserve banks other than those of member banks reduce the base. These include increases in foreign·owned deposits and Treasury deposits. For a more detailed description of the monetary base, see Leonall C. Andersen and Jerry L. Jordan, "The Monetary Base-Eltplanation and Analytical Use," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, August 1968. 10 Changes in Federal Reserve Holdings of Securities And in Treasury Deposits at Federal Reserve Banks 5 BILLION DOLLARS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , - (FROM MONTHLY AVERAGES) 43FEDERAL RESERVE SECURITIES 21 - 0-·· -1 -2- TREASURY DEPOSITS -3-4- -5-r---r---r---r---r---r---r---r--~--~--~~_,_ 1965 SOURCE: Board of 1967 GO'IlIfnOfS. 1969 1971 1973 1975 F.d ..... 1 RIIS."'II SYlillm The potential effect of changes in Treasury deposits at Federal Reserve banks on the stock of money can be estimated by multi· plying the current ratio of the money stock to the base by the actual changes. Before June 1971, the Treasury's policy of maintain· ing low and stable balances at Federal Reserve banks limited potential monthly changes in money arising from their move· ments to a relatively narrow range of minus 7.6 percent to plus 8.6 percent, at annual rates. But after June 1971, the range of potential changes in money from this source increased to minus 52.7 percent to plus 52.6 percent. Both before and after the Trea· sury changed its cash management policy, however, open market operations of the Federal Reserve almost completely offset the potential impact of these cbanges on the money stock. Thus, for the four years ended June 1971, statistical regression analysis shows that a $1 change in Treasury deposits at Reserve banks induced the Federal Reserve System to change its holdings of Government securities in the same direction by $1.18, on average. And in the next four years, a $1 change in Treasury deposits at Federal Reserve banks caused the System to change its holdings of Government securities by only 90 cents. The difference in measured response between these two periods, however, is not statistically signi6cant.' A further indication of how successfully the Federal Reserve System's defensive open market operations have offset the effects of the increased volatility of Treasury deposits can be obtained from 3. In this analysis. the regression equations wereJuly 1967·June 1971: tJ'RS = 393 + 1.18.6TDFR July 1971-June 1975: tJ'RS = (4.84) (3.47) 454 + .OOflTDFR (4.78) (11.6) where flFRS is the monthly change in Federal Reserve holdings of securities and tlTDFR is tbe monthly change in Treasury deposits at Federal Reserve banks, with the changes in millions of dollars. The figures in parentheses are t statistics of the regression coefficients. The Chow Test failed to detect a statistically significant difference between the coefficients of changes in Treasury deposits at Federal Reserve banks for the two periods at the 9O-percent confidence level. Business Review I March 1976 11 STANDARD DEVIATION OF MONTHLY CHANGES IN BASE MONEY AND ITS COMPONENTS (Chngu In ner.ge monthly leYela. MitUona of dotta rs) Pallocl July 1967-June 1971 July 1971-June 1975 '.N ,,. $60. $619 1,278 mon.y 93. TOFR >CR MiSe $35 $238 1,224 $23 79 $258 7. 'OR FLOAT CloSOR COIN $170 $447 $233 '" 340 40' 296 NOTE: ease money equals FRS, BOR, FLOAT, G-SOR, and COIN I.... TOFR. FOR, and MiSe, FRS II Federal Re ..,,.. holdings 01 .. cu. iliu, BOR Is mamba. bank borrowlng l, flOAT 'I Fed era' Reaerve 80at G-SOR 's Treuury gold and Sp acia l Drawi ng Rlg~ts caM ille ate account! at Fed erll Re..rve ba n!ca, a nd COIN Is Tr"aury currency outsta nding Ius Tr.uury currency holdlngl. TOFR II Trusury d. poalla . t Federal Reserve banks, FOR I, loraign deposU ••1 Feda,al Rale rve ba nlta, and MiSe Is mlsceUaneous lIabHUilil 01 the Feder,l Reserve len ml scall_MlOUI UUIt. examining the degree of association between variations in Treasury deposits at Federal Reserve banks and changes in base money. Both before and after the Trea ~ sury changed its cash man~ agement policy, open market operations of the Federal Reserve almost completely offset the potential impact of these changes on the money stock. Before the Treasury adopted its new policy, a $1 change in Treasury deposits at Reserve banks probably generated a change in base money of 4 cents in the same direction, on average. But this estimated effect is not significantly different from zero, which means 4. The regression equations used wereJuly 1967-JW\e 1971: !J.BM = 392 (4.40) July 1971-June 1975: !J.BM that it could have been obtained purely by chance. After the policy change, the Federal Reserve continued to be successful in using defensive operations to offset movements in Treasury balances at Reserve banks despite their greater volatility. From 1971 to 1975, a $1 change in Treasury balances at Reserve banks probably caused a change in base money of only B cents in the opposite direction. But once again, the estimated effect is not significantly different from zero.· In summary, the continued tight association between changes in the Federal Reserve's holdings of Government securities and changes in Treasury deposits at Federal Reserve banks, as well as the continued lack of a significant association between changes in + these deposits and changes in base money, indicates that monthly changes in the money stock have not been affected to any substantial degree by movements in these Treasury balances, either before or after the Treasury's new policy_ Since the Federal Reserve has successfully offset the increased potential for variations in money, the greater volatility of Treasury balances at Federal Reserve banks has not significantly interfered with its ability to hit desired monetary targets_ - William R. McDonough .04!J.TDFR (.11) = 528 + -.08t:.TDFR (3.85) (.SO) where !J.BM is the monthly change in base money and !J.TDFR is the monthly change in Treasury deposits at Federal Reserve banks, with the changes in millions of dollars. The figures in parentheses are t statistics of the regression coefficients. As indicated by t tests on the coefficients of !J.TDFR, the efJect of changes in Treasury deposits at Federal Reserve banks on base money was not significantly different from zero at the 9O-percent confidence level in either period. 12 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas March 1976 Eleventh District Business Highlights Total credit at District member banks in 1975, after slowing considerably in 1974, almost regained its growth rate of recent years. An analysis of the ch anges in the major components of total credit, however, indicates 1975 was an unusual year for credit at these banks. Perhaps t.he most notable development at member banks in the District last year was a record GO-percent increase in holdings of Government securities. The sizable net acquisition followed three consecutive years of net reductions. Relatively high deposit inflows and a moderate rate of growth in total loans allowed District banks to finance a substantial volume of investments. Bankers' decisions to concentrate their investments in Government securities last year differed from their actions of other recent years. A large volume of these securities was readily available, as the federal government financed a very large budget deficit. A substantial part of the increase reflected net acquisitions of inter· mediate·term U.S. Treasury notes. Falling short·term interest rates played a part in the increase in holdings of Treasury notes. Interest rates on short·term money market instruments fell faster than on intermediate·tenn offerings, mak· ing Treasury notes a more attrac· tive investment. Acquisitions of Treasury bills also rose sharply, however, as member banks sought to improve their liquidity . In past years, member banks in the District generally increased their holdings of tax·exempt munic· ipal securities substantially during periods of weak loan demand. The net increase in holdings of these issues in 1975 was somewhat smaller than usual, possibly because of the inability of New York City to honor some of its maturing securities. State and local governments in this District avoided such fiscal difficulties and reportedly had little trouble in marketing their securities. New marketings by municipal govern· ments in Texas remained about in line with other recent years. However, the uncertainty created by the situation in New York City undoubtedly affected bank demand for other municipal obligationB of state and local governments outside the District. Most important, however, banks had less need for tax.exempt income from municipal securities in 1975 as they undertook to maximize after·tax income, because of loan charge-offs and other developments. Bank loans rose substantially less than usual during both 1974 and MEMBER BANK CREDIT 70 PERCENT CHANGE - - - - lEND Of YEAR) 50- LOANS u.s. GOVERNMENT I SECUAmES 30- 100 - 10 -- ~ ± OTHER SEClJRrTlIES ••;; , 1970-73 i AVERAGE • •;; I 197. § - I ;; 1975 1975. In 1974, interest rates reached record highs, and the economy entered its deepest recession of recent years. As a result, loans rose only 2.2 percent at District member banks in 1974. In 1975, the rate of increase in inflation slackened, short· term interest rates moved downward, and the economy resumed its upward climb in the second quarter. Nevertheless, total loans rose less than in the years before the recession. Chemical production and petro· leum refining, the two largest com· ponents of the Texas industrial production index, have led the recovery in output in the state. Since the cyclical trough in April 1975, out· put in these two industries has advanced about three times faster than the 4·percent increase in the total index. In the early months ofrecovery, increased chemical production resulted from a rebuilding of stocks by users. Since then, however, improvement in the auto industry has strengthened final demand for chemicals. The increase in auto pro· duction has especially spurred Texas chemical output, since producers in the state supply a large share of the basic ingredients ofsynthetic rubber used in the manufacturing of automobile tires. Also aiding the recovery in chemi· cal production has been the stepped·up output of textiles and the improvement in construction . In addition, production has been spurred, as chemical producers have increased their inventories of fin· ished goods in order to keep sales· inventory ratios at normal levels. Petroleum refining, part of whose output is processed by t he chemical (Con tinued on back page) CONDITION STATISTICS OF WEEKLY REPORTING COMMERCIAL BANKS Eleventh Federal Reserve District (Thou..1>11 cIoII.ro) ASSErS F _.. fundi ooId and Me"riI* IIU'Ch_ ..-.de< aor~\s 10 . _ 0 _ _. _ <Mc ......I... g ...... Comm..: ... _ i_ .... - . Agnculhwu 10.... . .c"",lng CCC ce<lifi~ . . ol lnl ..... lo .... 10 and ClNlero lo< pu'ch.llng or cal'<ylng U.S & . ......-1 Me",,"," Oth.. MeUl_ 0ItI.. !of,ns lOt purcn.ting.OI' c"'Ylng US Go ••• n.... nl...:"""" om.. ...CUl''Lon", 10 nono.,,' N... nci.10l.blullon. 5001.. ~nanc •• _.anI! Nn.ncl. '.eIOt •. .nd Olhet IIU....... c.ect" eomp.ni" Oth.. Rul • • tale 10.", lo.n. 10 do",. ." c COmm.. elll bank. lo.n.'o loreign ban •• eo""u",, Hl. lllmen, lOan, lo .... 'o IOt"'gn gOlllm.,.nl •• ollle,,' Inllilulion •• cen" .. b.n", . • nd ",I"n,'ionll In"lilull",," OIh"lOan. Tolal in....,ment. _ro Tot.1 U 5 Go-emmenl MeW"'" T". ....., ";I~ Til""", c,"ific.'" 0 ' ,ndebII<I ..... T... _US 1lO\Iem ...... t bonG .....'unng Will'Iin 1 I \'H'105_. Aile. 5 \,U' . ~_ ot . la'" .nd politic .. '",bdMtionI T•• w ....... I1 _ _ ....... not .. _ _ feb 18. 191' J ... 21. 191' U102.Osa 10.601 .3S0 10 . 1301 . 9~ 1 10. 3oI~ . 0!I. 5.415.465 5.3911.1140 0.896.601 218,010 223.026 222.339 '" 56.601 1.100 371,209 5.023 368,.35 2,"5 399,3<1 164 .159 58 1.501 1,330 .1119 61.064 1.111.9 •• 178.693 55.2.051 1.347,519 74 .305 62.854 ,1211.192 194,7111 569,017 1.509.678 08, II I 66.'00 1.109,806 • .699 I .UU811 5,0 21 .902 0 ,716 1.332.930 5.305.576 1.302,066 0.075.712 U39.125 431 .969 , 1.826. 159 372.52. , 1.09 • •721 175,649 281 .• 69 1,061.829 163 .858 301 .615 1.006.410 1'5.550 152.l29 593,1 83 173 .560 .,- OIn .. IloO"" ••COfPQ..,.lIIocQ. ar>d ..,;uriliel . eert.tictotet .."....ming P"'Ic:~ I.. 19$.380 2.905.209 217.619 2 .9311.651 110.220 2.962.1).<1 _ .. agency 10_ All 0Ih.. (one""''"'11 corpOrlle 11OCl<1) C""ilenlf; in pr.,.,.."'~ 1'I _ _ _ .... ln F_at FleMr<e a .... k C,,"ency_coin " .037 328.151 2. 116122 910.3112 Ill .ln &63.161 202 .• 11 130512 309.565 1.64Ul09 1.235.592 132.528 .93.733 116.187 12 .OW 295.SlIS 1.111 .1/19 1 160.055 130. 156 BII.",," _ _ ... in Itw Unil~ 5tt.1eI Bllances _ bIonks In loI"11n_ .... ODI. . ."",.(inc'IId"'!! '''''HI_in~''' no\ conaolidaM<l) TOTAL ASSETS 1.271 .00. 1.111.316 9&' .690 23.32UII n.603, oH 21 ,310,O:HI '00 sa.l30 1.929.1S95 " Feb 111, LIABILITIES rooat "->",• T~ 11,210 .085 d..... no dec><*" indMd ....... p.u'tne,I/Iii)I, _ COf1)O(.toon. ~ .ubdMloons ".085 , , _ .... _ ........ ,1ona1 inll,'ution. Co"""..cllll>lnka .,c Cert<!led"'" ortic...· cneckl • Total I .... Ind .. ';ng.~t. IndMd ...... tl\I""ef't\'lis)".M CO'j)()t.hon • . s. .... ngo deposit. !lmed __ nd po"Ioel! IoUbdNi....... U.S. Gov .. n"' .... (1nc1"din9 I>OIl.I ..';nool 8f,nk. in t~. Unit.., Sill.. Fo..;gn Go ••• nm ...... o ll ~I., l n."IUI' on., centrl l ban",. Ind 1.... 'nlllontl l n .li1~t i on. eom"'.. c lll ban ... F"''''''un<ll pu'e~."" Ind Meu,IUI.lOId unde, :l!,_nllio "p.... eh ... OH, •• Ii. lilill'O' l)O'fQW'" money Olh.. l.. bMiH R..... "'.. on Io.n, R........ on ....,".ili.. Totll ClP"" .ecounll St.,... TOTAt.LIA8IL1TIES. RESERVES . ANI) CAPtT AL ACCOOHTS .. , '"" Augull s.p,.ml)e, Oe'ol)er No-e m"., Oece"'t>e' Reserve District 1976: J.n~I'Y C..,.,.. •..., ~ teH'. 8.o1.nc. . WIth ,.."... In 1M Unit..:! Sill. . a.lanea _ bank,1n countrlft. Cas" "..... in procell 01 col tion Other" ....,•• TOTALASS£TS' llA8lUTIES ANO CAPlT ..... ACCOUNTS O...... d cIe9QIIIs '" _ u OIhef dem.nd depolitt Timed_ ..,. To,. ",,,,,sill Borrowlr>gs Ot"" M. bollll.e Total c . ~,. , ac<:<I\jf\l.1 TOT"lliABILInES ANO CAPITAL ACCOUNTS' _Ellim.,ed J on 28. 1916 Dec 31 . 1915 Jan 29 1975 22M3 23.S33 ,.'" ,.,.'" 21.6 12 2. 1" 7,067 1.814 .~ ~, , .~ 2.077 1.377 I.NI ." '" ,.- ,~ " 1.1101 ,. ~ 2 .3<~ 2.397 1.625 1.136 02.2" •••190 37.a::ro 1,8110 13.1 57 18,809 2 .555 1(.139 "' .581 19.112 1 •. 324 18,337 5,600 3.604 .517 2( .052 708.800 195.329 2' .770 I.S09.9111 3.~ 1 .396 2,6 ••• 275 20.207 673,622 209.127 24.061 1.533.831 603.391 200,719 21 ,301 1"" .1180 3.9511 65 . ~5J ".' " n~.'"!1~ 21 .310.026 ..,00 IS. I09 ,.'" 12.07' 11.0 13 33.&&6 3 ,8601 1.101 2.181 36,059 3 ,sal 1.768 2.782 30.79'5 .2.2. . '.,190 31.820 ,.... ,2.795 DEMANO OEPOSITS "'dJUS''''' 10.20 7 14,106 14,3.U 14.501 10,5" ,",, 7.8 10, 725 15,072 1$ ,'18 1~ .1 36 11 .436 ,""II' '" CONDITION STATISTICS OF ALL MEMBER BANKS 3.512 11 2.006 8,620.213 1.:1<l1.106 7. " 9,'117 0,669.292 2,465.331 "' .5 10 2211.031 23.321.111 10.21& 10 .353 10.205 lO.3.g 10.572 10 .3 10 10,535 10.6ge 10,7' 5 10,808 10.752 10.947 11 .217 14,384 ,",,180 13,856 "'PlII Ott.' ...:tII;6es R _ WI'" F_.. 1 ' 1 _ 8.ank 2.977 61.614 101.31& 9 ,016.7115 1.• 36.7110 7,58(1,005 '.893.7SO 2.160.S83 11.301 .16,931 E leventh Federal Reserve District Jun. ASSETS LOIIn •• nd doscounll. g'OM U 5 <;o..~1 obIig.hOnt 2.788 82 .208 "'2.781 9. 123 ,381 1.510 .213 1.S09,166 •. 785.881 2 ,265.109 11,"5 .sa.OOl ~.31 .S03 0.,. ,,- 7.519 •• 95 U64,891 .79.9811 82.617 1.410.015 DEMAND AND TIME DEPOSITS OF MEMBER BANKS 197. J an". " 1975; Janu • .., Fe bfu.'Y Mlfeh E leven th Federal U03.92e 7.719.'" 5,595.726 '40. 100 143.131 1.368.:;50 14~.868 8f,"';" 1~' UnIt.., SIll" for.' G".. .. nmenll. OIl>CIeI inIl~"'5on •. cenU I! 20,S02 16.736.203 16.1:H1.1611 ' .001.104 5 .7)11.639 392.'15 51"" _ US ao. .."..,_ Feb 19. 11115 .Mn 21. 1976 1976 Ot~ woy".,... relf 1.652.S37 Feb 19. 1975 Other lhln I~OM 01 US Go-. 'n .... nl ~_ in Plac . . . 01 COlleCtion TIME OEPOSITS "' G_n",en' Totll s.·'''1IS '"'" '" '" ".'"'M 14.533 16,802 11.052 11.\ 11 17.196 17.303 17.270 17.315 17.05.2 17.563 17.115 19.031 16.249 18.55e ''''' ,~ . ,'N '" '" ~, ". 3.019 3,12' 3.226 3.3.25 3.3411 3 .• 10 3 .• 80 3.093 3.513 3.661 ,."" 3.689 3,817 '"' aornHlic co"""..c,aI blinks. ,.,.. elSh RESERVE POSITIONS OF MEMBER BANKS Eleventh Federal Reserve D ist rict ( ........ oIlIa;fy Total 'ese'_ 19f'" ThoUIand do....) - held W j l ~ F _.. I R...... e""" C"".ncy_eON1 R~I.ed 'eM""" E.CUI'..."''' eo'fOW,ng' F' ... ' ........ 5 week."- ..,.._t<I o .. FIC> • . 1916 Dec 31.1875 5 ..... ~I.nGe<I F.b 5. 11115 2. 121,i94 1.737,055 384.939 2.083.203 1.715.211 3n.986 2,072.0.2 20.161 0.8117 15.89. 2.062.531 1.701 ,048 381,"113 2.036,119 26.352 22.578 3 .110 i!.113.~ .~ 7,5" ,~ BANK DEBITS, END-Of- MONTH DEPOSITS, AND DEPOSIT TURNOVER SMSA's in Eleventh Federal Reserve District (00II., .",ounn in IhouuMi. "_"'!If'~) DEelTS TO DEMAND DEPOSIT ACCO\..foITS' ~ ... ... RIZON .... Tuc_ LOIJISIANA. M"",... '"- AmarillO .c a........""I·PorI Ar1I1ut.Or... B'own .... in...-t.,Unv-n-s... B'Y...-CoI.SIIII"" n"o Co'puICh'1$1l CO, .. c....' o.n •• EI P .... Fori WorI~ G,'VflIOn-h . .. Coiy I-Io.... ton KII_Templfl UI,..:JO ,.,.- MC"'llen .p~."·Ed Irtbu'g Midi."" ~- Son ..... ,onio 5I1.. ",.n~.nl"''' T........... (T......"'I<.In...) T",aI-3OcenI•• -,,• ", " "" -.-, -.-"• -,"" "" """ " "" "" ", ,,. -"• -, ",, , -, -, ",, -", ~ -" .. • $842.022.584 oIlndividu11f;. p_~ . _ . .• -,, 2.006.2~ Wlchltil F_ ~ -.,• -.""'"" • 2.511 ._ ' .4S5.S34 6.6SS.534 4.8611.742 ~ "~ 1915 -~ 11.141.!ioII6 5.518.216 8.920.561 5,815.574 4.307,'64 35.&a..384 ........... ,.te 01 Unov. tNI"9' from '975 V . &8.678 Lubboc~ ,, -"' ~cenl ~ s.29.124._ 7.909.511 16."2.416 1.597.152 5.321.50' 12.ro..l11\ 30,599.292 12,446.238 5,319.900 2.223.600 1:\.452.445 838.194 2 42,785.669 14,&36.291 46,284.032 5,345.S04 297 .934 .232 3,360.689 NEW .... E;t.co · AoIw .., TOAS Abi_ Auliin ... "" , ........... 1916 ( Sl....s.td "*roPOli...... OEMA.NO DEPOSITS' OK "~ 1916 J ... 31. 11176 m'.4'1 1975 '" '" '" ". '" '" ." 14 .2 57.5 '31.110 l!7.593 51.718 151,_ 273.327 503.450 371 .0 14 140.0&3 10,1163 348.759 45.487 3.320,10& 352,323 1.078.184 155,783 4.502 ,1 8 1 138.&62 8 1,355 254,413 187,935 248.&94 150.880 109.1 61 954.W4 88.5<11 98,251 UI3.176 171.873 18 1. 146 ~, '" '" '" 31.8 433 '" 33 .3 '" ". '" '" '" ." ". '" ." 30.5 40.2 17.9 ." '"«, ." 31 .5 .. ... '" '" ,'"'" M. '" '" '"». '" $15.101 .m corp..-. _ _ oIl1a1es_ POI,b(;.Ol~l ~. '" '" '" '" '"'" '" ". ". '" ". '" ~, 39 ,3 25.5 1975 '"'" 54 ,9 28.2 '" '" '" ~, '" ""'" §. '" 42 ,8 '" '" ." '" ". '" '"'"'" '" 285 '" ". '" '" '" '" ~."'" CONDITION Of THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK DF DALLAS (Tho...M "Oll.r.) BUILDING PERMITS Feb 25. "~ 1~ 76 T01.1 gOld Cer1~ic.t. ' ........ Lo.n. to ..... mlle< o.nk. Otn..-loan. F",,,.I ag ... cy obllOlllont US ao...ernmem lIC~'It'" TDlIl ..,nlng • ...,. M.... t.r bonk ' ... dopoai'F"'eral roM"" not" In .CI....1 cl'c .... " lon FeO 26, 1016 1915 422.062 10.270 422,062 10,000 46(,1098 12,&00 322.594 4,.59.739 4 ,79UC>3 1.125.204 322.6-63 4.383.904 4.11S.SS7 1.919.265 214,277 3.698,409 3.925.286 1.884.320 2.i33.999 2."'.m 2.615 .229 , rv. Jan 21 , V... LU ...TION (Doll., amounl,ln Ihou..ndlj , NM .,, ~~ ... tIiI_ ........., "'Ullin ... ,.. _rypo AVE SOUTt;WESTERN STATES' R"~"""Idi"9 ~n" aI build""" _ ull""'9 conltrUO;l1Oo1 UN.TEO STATES Res."n!'" -"'9 Non ... odent"IO"'I"rn~ NonOurld,"9 con,,,ue,,on I . ..,,, "'" '" '" '" '" 2.157 '''' 2,294 ~ 1975 '" '" '" '" "" ,.'" 5.431 , .~ ""'lO<1'.LOul...... , Ne... "elieo. Olo.l.hom., .nd TulS ,-Rav;M<! NOTE : Oe"IIs "'.~ nOt ' ''d to 101.,. boc ...... 01 ,,,,,,,ding SOURCE ' F. W Ood~. McG' ....·Hili. Inc 1915 '" '" m '" ,,.'" '" 5.573 ,.~ e""""5ViIIfI -. ....... ....... w_ Corpout CI1'il~ ,~ 1915< ,~ '" '" .." ,'" 5 .128 ~ 2.326 191 & ,~ LOUISIANA ........ iIk> (MilloQn CIDII.,,) J.".,.'Y J. n~ .. y 1916 ARIZONA W"''''_ 5I1,_pon TEX ... S VALUE OF CONSTRUCnON CONTRACTS Pe,cl nt c~.noe January 1916 t,om NUMBER E. PIItQ FonW...", a_on "'-, ....... '" '"'" '" '"" ,~ .. ,~ '" " '"", '" " '""" '"" ~ 1.812 Midlond PonArt~ " ,~ ... Son "no'1o Son AnIOnio 511 ... ",... T•• lrk .... • •ro Woe"'l. Fit" Totll-26c~I" '" 1079 "'" 1.179 '-'" 3.201 ,.= 11.213 2 •• 18 3 . 141 '.= 18.903 '" '" ,.'" ,.= 11.1&3 5.2M 50.151 1.318 6 .798 .....,,,"" 1.070 11 .038 '" ,1153,613 O&Cemt>e< J.nu ..... 1975 1975 - .'" -52'" -~ -" - ~ ".,, " .. '" '"'" -" -~ '" m ""• -" -" -M '" -" -" " -'" -", .'"'".." '" -" -" -" -" " "" -" ". -. ..-"" -~ ~ ,~ -" '" -'" LABOR FORCE, EMPLOYMENT, AND UNEMPLOYMENT INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND TEXAS MANUFACTURING CAPACITY UTIUZATION Five Southwestern States' (Seuonalty 8djust.,;lI""..... 1961 _ 100 101 Jl<ocIuction) (Seasonally adiuslad) Al" and type 01 I"".. TEXAS Tote! inclusl1l., Jl<oduc~on "' .... ulllClu.,"II ""- Nondu,.1)Ie ~- UliHtios Capec ify ulilizatior1 it! fNlnufllC W.itlg (1 972 _ 100) UNITEO STATES Toc.I indu.~ production "'... u' lICturi"ll OU...... Norni;.aOlf ~ .~ UlilillM ~r ell mlnary '"" 18761> ~ 197~ "~ 1915 ... ,."..... """,,,. . ." "" "" 131t 1338 105 3 , 1 2~ 127 ( 13( 0 " & 131 7 133.3 106.6 ,1076 ~. 1183 1 16 2 "" 13 10 , ~, , ~, 117( 116 ( 1078 116.5 117. '"" ,m "" 'M' . ,"", 106.0 . _ ~ I.., d SOU RCES : 60IIrd of Gov .. nOlI 01 ' ''' F- .. , R........ 5)'$' _ F""'.al Rasa .... Ban ~ 01 0 .11. . ,~ 1975 - 125 I 1281 , ~, 1271 111 2 1675 '" 1137 111 8 ,." 117 2 1010 1521 CMlian la1>Ol !orc. TOIII emplOymen' T 01I1u""mplO~ """'1 unemplOym...c tate TO,., nonag"cuttu .... "'89" and ""ary ernl)lOymerl! Manulaclu.itIg Du.a" Nond",.ble NOnmanu!ac!unng Mining Const. uction T•• nspOl,.' ..... and pU blic utili!ie. ,,- Finance Service GOVM..... en' Pe""",l Ch.ng. Jln 19761fom TllOusands of peI' tonl "" '"" 1975 "'" 19750- 9 .3&0 ( 6 .777 3 9.307.8 8.680 4 62 7.4 9.3791 8.8192 1.616.3 1.276.6 713 .1 7.666 0 1.2"90.6 728.1 19761> .. "" 7.7S1! ( 1.285.5 11(.5 571 0 6.' 70.t 273.0 5\( .2 ~, 1.861 I 42 7.7 1.32 77 1.56<1 3 ." 'M' "'" "'" '" -"" 1915 ' - .3 '",, ....," , '" , -, 'M'" " "" "" "",, ~, . 6.399 7 6. 37~ 495 8 1.836.5 (24 3 1.327 6 1. ~ !;( 1 1.6156 (205 1.301. 1.523 0 , Aritonl. LOOisi.na. Ne.. "'exico. OO.homa. and Tua. 2 " "" -'" , "' 1915 . ". - -," "" " -" -" "" '"' " 2 Ac'ual ch."9" ~- P.e!i""' .ry . _ I\ev;aed NOTE: 0 e! .11~ m.y no! add 10 totals bec..- 01 rounding SOURCES ' S !a" . :'ff,lOymen! "IIene..1 F..,.,., ......... BaIlk 01 0.1181 (seaoonll.di ....tmenl) industry, usually moves with chemical production. And this relationship has been clearly demonstrated over the past year. Since the upturn in chemical production last spring, capacity utilization at refineries on the Texas Gulf Coast has risen from 88 percent to 94 percent. Petroleum refineries have also stepped up operations to meet increased demand for gasoline. Gasoline consumption, nationwide, is running 5 percent ahead of the pace a year ago. Increased new car sales and lower prices at the gas pumps, due in large part to the suspension of the $2 a barrel import duty, have fueled demand. Production from the state's aging oil fields has not kept pace with demand for petroleum feedstocks and domestic fuel requirements. In fact, crude oil mining in the st ate has declined 4 percent since April 1975. And this has necessitated refining more imported oil to meet growing domestic demand. Other highlights: • The labor market in the five southwestern states continued to improve in January, as the unemployment rate fell to 6.4 percent from 6.7 percent in December. The jobless rate was a full percentage point below the cyclical peak in May 1975. Employment in the manufacturing sector continued to recover strongly. Much of the latest gain centered in nondurable goods production. Construction employment, seasonally adjusted, rose 5 percent in January. • The steady decrease in construction spending in T exas during the last half of 1975 is slowing. The value of building contracts in the state in January, seasonally adjusted, was virtually unchanged from a month before. That followed six consecutive months of decline. The source of last year's construction slump, nonresidentia l and nonbuilding activity, has shown few signs of improvement. But residential construction continues to increase and is now offsetting the weakness in the other sectors. For example, the value of residential contracts in January 1976 was over 50 percent higher than the level a year before. • Broiler supplies should be plentiful this spring, as higher prices and lower feed costs have stimulated broiler production since mid-1975. The number of chicks placed on feed in Texas in February was ahout a fifth higher than a year ear- lier. Total placements for the nation, on the other hand, were up only 5 percent. • The recession slowed the rate of industrial expansion in Texas in 1975. The number of new plants constructed in the state fell to 192, down from 293 in 1974. Meanwhile, the number of plant expansions fell to 287 from 330 a year earlier. By area, Dallas-Ft. Worth led the state in industrial expansion, followed by Houston, Longview, and San Antonio. By industry, nonelectrical machinery manufacturers paced the expansion. Manufacturers of fabricated metal products, chemicals and allied products, and food and kindred products also increased capacity.