View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

1914

BUSINESS REVIEW is produced in the Department of Research. Jack C. Rothwell was primarily responsible for
the article, “Aiming at a Moving Target," and Kathryn Kalmbach for “The Current Business Expansion: Where from Here?"
The authors will be glad to receive comments on their articles.
Requests for additional copies should be addressed to Bank and Public Relations, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101.




AIMING
AT A MOVING TARGET
Environment and the Goals of Federal Reserve Policy
The German philosopher Arthur Schopenhaur

SOCIAL GOALS IN THE U.S.A.

had some interesting thoughts on the goals

This environment of intellectual and material

of human society. He thought we would all be

progress was the backdrop against which the

better off if we ceased to reproduce and let the

early social goals of the United States were

race die out. The reason for this dire prescrip­

formulated. The ideas of the Declaration of Inde­

tion: life is a struggle; defeat and anguish are

pendence are rooted here— that all men are

inevitable; so why bother.

created equal and have inalienable rights such

Fortunately, Schopenhaur’s views failed to

as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The

capture the enthusiasm of his contemporaries.

Constitution drew upon this broad movemenUin

But his views do illustrate an important point

stating such objectives of union as that of pro­

in any discussion of social objectives: such ob­

moting the general welfare.

jectives are the peculiar products of their times.

The subsequent evolution of economic objec­

Take Schopenhaur’s case, for example. The

tives in the United States has amounted, in large

Napoleonic Wars had just ended. Europe was
perished,

measure, to a searching refinement of the “ gen­
eral welfare” goal. Given the background herit­

wretched poverty stalked the land. Moreover,

age that progress was possible (and given the

ravaged,

millions

of

persons

had

the hopes of the French Revolution— liberty,

stated objective that Government should pro­

equality, and fraternity— were little more than

mote that progress) this nation constantly has

mocking echoes. Things seemed so bad that the

been involved in a revision of the idea of

famed German poet, Goethe, was moved to an­

progress. What was good enough became not

nounce, “ I thank God I am not so young in so

enough.

thoroughly a finished world.”

In this article we take a look at shifting ideas

But of course times changed. In fact, the

of the goal of progress with emphasis upon the

pessimism of the early nineteenth century was,

character of the times which generated these

in retrospect, no more than a ripple on the broad

shifts. Our focus is upon money and the Federal

tidal wave of hope unleashed by the Renaissance

Reserve System, how the System reacted to and

and the Age of Enlightment. Among other things,

was stimulated by the changing times and how

this hope sprang from development of the scien­

it altered its goals better to coincide with the

tific method and the rapid accumulation of tech­

evolving idea of progress.

nical know-how. It suggested that man, by exer­
fulfilling his unique human potential and satisfy­

THE SHIFTING IDEA OF PROGRESS AND THE
EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL RESERVE GOALS

ing his wants.

In the Employment Act of 1946, Congress di­

cising his reason, could march ever upward in




3

business review

rected the Federal Government to coordinate all

us go back in history and trace the factors

its activities toward the end of “ promoting maxi­

motivating change.

mum employment, production, and purchasing
power” and to do so “ in a manner calculated to

BIRTH OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

foster and promote free competitive enterprise.”

The immediate stimuli which motivated Congress

In essence, Congress carefully defined two

to establish the Federal Reserve System were the

broad sets of economic goals, (a) what might be

severe money panics of the nineteenth and early

called “ performance goals” (maximum employ­

twentieth centuries.1 The influence of the panics

ment, etc.) and (b) what could be termed “ en­
vironment goals” (free competitive enterprise).

is clearly evident in the Federal Reserve Act,
which defines the performance objectives of the

These two broad classifications of goals, in

new System in such terms as furnishing an elas­

fact, have characterized the objectives of the

tic currency and affording a means to rediscount

Federal Reserve System since its very early days.

commercial paper.

Both explicitly and implicitly, the System has
sought to maintain economic stability within the

Economic performance

framework of a free enterprise system. This is

In effect, the System was to provide funds to

a thread

member banks which needed additional resources

of

continuity

that

binds

past to

to meet the currency demands of their depositors

present.
Yet as conditions changed through time— as

or to pay balances due other banks. The funds

we experienced wars, inflations, and recessions

could be obtained by a banker through a sim­

— subtle changes occurred both within and be­

ple process: going through the notes owed him,

tween these two broad sets of goals.

selecting one or more deemed eligible, present­

The performance objective changed in the di­

ing them to a Federal Reserve Bank for discount.

rection of greater dynamism; from avoiding

If banks had enough eligible notes, they would

money panics to mitigating the boom-recession

always be able to get funds from the System and

phase of the business cycle; from meeting the

thus could avoid any panic on the part of cus­

needs of commerce and industry to actively

tomers who might fear that currency would not

stimulating commerce and industry, and pro­

be forthcoming on demand.
But the framers of the Federal Reserve Act

moting real growth.
The

environment

objective

also

shifted.

had more in mind than preventing panics. The

Though the Fed still sought a free-enterprise

System was also to accommodate the “ legitimate”

environment in pursuing its performance goals,

credit needs of a growing economy through its

it found that its own functioning could not be

discount function— through provision of funds

guided solely by the forces of free enterprise. It

and by setting the rate of discount— and prevent

could not be so integral a part of the free enter­

“ ill-advised” credit expansion.

prise system that its actions were limited by this

To meet credit needs, the Act authorized the

system. It could not, for example, be stimulated

Reserve Banks to “ discount notes, drafts and

to action solely by such free-market phenomena

bills of exchange [for member banks] issued or

as “ gold flows” and “ productive credit.”

i For a discussion of the character and mechanics of
panics, see Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Phila­
delphia, “Who Changed the Rules of the Game,” October
1963, p. 4.

So much for the direction of movement. Let

4




business review

drawn for agricultural, industrial or commercial

2. International Trade. But nineteenth century,

purposes, or the proceeds of which have been

laissez-faire ideas encompassed more than domes­

used, for such purposes. . .

Banks could then

tic production and trade. The System envisaged

use the proceeds of the discounts to make loans

a free international market place in which the

to their customers. Thus the process of discount­

businessmen of each nation would (a) specialize

ing was the way both to prevent panics and pro­

in producing those goods they could make at

vide funds for legitimate business growth.

lowest comparative cost and then (b) trade with

The Annual Report for 1914 summed up the

each other across international boundaries, rela­

Board’s idea of its objectives when it mentioned

tively unencumbered by tariffs and the like. It

the:

was thought that such a system would provide

promise of being able to protect business against

the most goods at the lowest prices. The system

the harmful stimulus and consequences of ill-

also envisaged the free movement of capital

advised expansions of credit on the one hand,

funds— an important invisible raw material of

or against the menace of unnatural restrictions

the production process.

and unnecessary contractions on the other, with

3. The Role of Money. Yet the system might

exorbitant rates of interest and artificial strin­

need new money and credit if it were to grow

gencies.2

healthily. Rich resources were available for ex­

These, then, might be termed the early “ per­

ploitation. New undertakings could be estab­

formance” objectives of the System. But how

lished and new production set going if money

were the “ environmental” objectives expressed?

and credit were available. Sufficient funds, how­

Economic environment

ever, might not be forthcoming out of savings.
What was needed was new money and credit to

There was no explicit mention in the Federal

create a new circuit of production and then to

Reserve Act of a free market environment. Yet

circulate an ever-expanding volume of trade.

much was implied and much more was taken

This was to be provided through banks.

for granted. To understand the environment

4. Self-Regulating Nature of the Laissez-faire

which the Federal Reserve hoped to foster, it is

System. But what was to make the system run

necessary to understand the economic thinking

smoothly? Businessmen might produce too much

inherited by the System.

of the wrong kind of goods and not be able to

1.
Free Enterprise. Nineteenth century, laissez- sell them (thus creating unemployment of work­
ers as goods stacked u p). Moreover, too much
faire liberalism was the legacy of the Federal
or too little new money might be created thus
Reserve System. Free enterprise was the byword
— businessmen should be allowed to compete in

causing inflation on the one hand (too much

the production and sale of goods with a bare

money pursuing goods) or inhibiting expansion

minimum of interference by Government. It was

on the other (not enough money to take advan­

thought that this system would assure maximum

tage of productive opportunities). Finally, since

output at lowest cost and hence provide the

the system included international trade, might

greatest possible satisfaction of economic wants.

we spend too much abroad and thus lose gold?
The answer to these questions— or so it was

2 Federal Reserve Board, Annual Report, 1914, p. 17.




thought— was that the system was self-regulating,

5

business review

that the system itself generated forces that would

vesting too much) and hence losing gold? Again,

maintain

the system generated self-stabilizing forces, or

its

own

equilibrium

and

its

own

so it seemed.

stability.
of markets, for example, was

A nation would buy too much abroad, it was

widely accepted: supply creates its own demand

thought, because prices were lower abroad. It

— the process of production places income in

would invest too much because interest rates

the hands of the producers which is used to pur­

were higher.

“ Say’s law”

chase the fruits of production. Thus the system

Increased purchases and investments abroad

tended toward operation at full capacity and full
employment. Flexible wages, prices, and profits

would mean a flow of domestic currency (and
bank deposits) to foreign lands and quite pos­

were supposed to assure the timely movement of

sibly, an outflow of gold. This was where the

capital and labor from industries where demand

self-corrective force became manifest.

was falling to those experiencing rising demand.

Since gold was the basis of a nation’s money

And what of money? As it did in the produc­

and banking system in the classical model, (cur­

tion and distribution spheres, the laissez-faire

rency and bank deposits were supposed to be

system was supposed to generate its own equili­

backed by gold and interchangeable for gold)

brating forces. If commercial bankers and cen­

the outflow of gold was supposed to inhibit fur­

tral bankers would only recognize these forces,

ther creation of money and credit. Commercial

then it was thought that the equilibrium of the

bankers, seeing their gold reserves shrink, would

system would not be endangered by financial

be more reluctant to make new loans and

excesses. There would tend to be just the right

create new demands against their diminishing

amount of new money and credit to assure high-

gold reserves. Central bankers, aware of the

level production at stable prices.

outflow of gold, would raise their discount rates

On the home front, the mechanism was the

thus

discouraging

banks

from

rediscounting

“ real bills doctrine.” The Federal Reserve should

their paper and obtaining the wherewithal to

create new money (via the discount mechanism)

create new money and credit.

only on the collateral of productive loans made

The result? Less money and credit would be

by banks to finance current production and dis­

available. With less money and credit pursuing

tribution— goods in process. Thus it was argued

domestic goods, prices would tend to fall. With

that each new creation of money and credit

less money available to borrowers, interest rates

would match the needs of the production process.

would tend to rise. Domestic prices and interest

If production grew, so would money and credit.

rates

The free-enterprise system generated the demand

foreign counterparts and domestic citizens would

would

become

competitive

with

their

for productive loans and this demand was the

cease spending too much abroad.3 The laissez-

very force that would maintain financial equilib­

faire system generated forces from within that

rium. All the central banker need do was recog­

maintained international as well as national

nize it and adjust his discount administration

equilibrium. We could have the benefits of free

and rates accordingly.

enterprise and free trade together with the bene­

Finally, how about the problem of interna­
tional trade, of buying too much abroad (or in­

6



3 The reverse of this process was supposed to take place
in the countries gaining gold.

business review

fits of money creation to set in motion new cir­

things didn’t work out. For times were changing.

cuits of production and trade. In short, we could

Events were to test both the laissez-faire system

have a growing supply of low-cost goods to

of goals and the prevalent idea of progress on

satisfy our wants with a minimum of disturbing

which those goals were based. The test was busi­

business fluctuations.

ness depression— 1920-1921 and the dark years

One might look at the laissez-faire system as

of the thirties.

a “ package deal.” Theoretically, the buyer got
all the free-market and output advantages with­
out need to make agonizing discretionary deci­

THE MURKY ERA OF THE TWENTIES
AND THE THIRTIES

sions on how to maintain the stability of the

The tests didn’t come for a while. The Fed was

system. All he had to do was recognize the

busy with organizational problems during its

stabilizing forces and play by the rules of the

early days. Then World War I came along and

game, just act appropriately with regard to gold

all objectives became secondary to a successful

flows and “ real bills.”

financing of the war effort. For several months

Thus the Fed, at its inception, was committed

following the war, the Fed felt compelled to de­

to an environment goal of free markets. But the

vote its efforts and resources to aiding the Treas­

environment goal was a package in which the

ury with the large war debt

Fed also accepted the inherent forces which

making credit readily available and keeping in­

would stabilize the system. In short, the Fed

terest rates low ). Then, in 1919, conditions

took on a responsibility to propagate the whole

seemed ripe once more to bring the objective of
economic stability to the fore.

system, to gain the benefits and maintain the

(which meant

viability of the classical model by playing its
rules.
And the environment goal seemed in perfect
harmony with the performance goal. Perform­
ance

was

directed

at

stability— at

avoiding

panics and preventing “ ill-advised expansions or
unnatural restrictions of credit.” The environ­
ment objective seemed to promise just that— to
provide both the natural forces and the auto­
matic guides to action which would maintain
stability.
The Fed’s commitment to the laissez-faire sys­
tem was implicit in the Federal Reserve Act
which prescribed the nature of bills which could
be discounted and required that Federal Reserve
notes be backed by gold. The commitment was
also evident in System statements and publica­
tions.
A neat package it would seem. But the fact is,




The twenties
In the year or more preceding 1920, fundamental
economic developments as viewed by the Fed
were deteriorating to the extent that economic
goals seemed in imminent danger. Credit was
being used for “ speculative” purposes, which
seemed to threaten economic stability and un­
dermine

both

performance

and

environment

goals. Moreover, gold was flowing out. The sit­
uation was described as:
characterized by an unprecedented orgy of ex­
travagance,

a

mania

for

speculation,

over­

extended business in nearly all lines and in
every section of the country, and general de­
moralization of the agencies of production and
distribution.4
4

Federal Reserve Board, Annual Report, 1920, p. 1.

7

business review

Given these conditions, the Fed raised dis­

ber bank when it rediscounts with a Federal

count rates both at the close of 1919 and again

Reserve Bank may disclose the purpose for

in May, 1920. The Reserve authorities felt that

which the loan evidenced by that paper was

credit should do its part in bringing about re­

made, but it does not disclose what use is to

adjustment, that borrowing should be made

be made of the proceeds of the rediscount. A

sufficiently expensive to exert pressure and dis­

farmer’s note may be offered for rediscount by

courage unproductive and unnecessary uses of

a member bank when in fact the need for redis­

credit. But the movement should be gradual and

counting has arisen because of extensions of
credit by the member bank for speculative use.5

orderly; sudden credit or price deflation might

Moreover, the Board pointed out:

lead to disaster.
Was the Fed successful? Unfortunately, no.

By what means may it be known whether the

There followed in 1920-21 the sharpest price

volume of credit provided by the Federal Re­

break in history and a severe business recession.

serve Banks is in any given set of circumstances

This untoward train of events set the stage

adequate, excessive, or deficient? The problem

for a fundamental reexamination of Federal

in good administration under the Federal Re­

Reserve policy. Many members of Congress,

serve System is not only that of limiting the field

Federal Reserve officials, and others felt that

of uses of Federal Reserve credit to productive

the

and necessary.

purposes, but also of limiting the volume of

Others, however, felt that Fed goals had not

credit within the field of its appropriate uses

recession

was

inevitable

been attained and asked why.
This interrogative attitude was expressed suc­
cinctly in the Federal Reserve Board’s Annual

to such amount as may be economically justified
— that is, justified by a commensurate increase
in the nation s productivity.6

Report for 1923. In this document the classical

The question of the international gold stand­

laissez-faire model— the proud construction of

ard also came up for review. The Board con­

the nineteenth century— came in for quite a

cluded that it was desirable to return to the

humbling review. First to feel the swordpoint of

standard but:

analysis was the “ real bills doctrine.” The Re­

Under the present conditions, with gold em­

serve Board pointed out that the theory was

bargoes in force in most foreign countries and

erroneous, that concentrating on the quality of

the United States practically the only free gold

credit would not automatically assure that (a)

market of the world, the movement of gold to

credit would be used for nonspeculative pur­

this country does not reflect the relative posi­

poses or that (b) the over-all quantity of credit

tion of the money markets nor does the move­

would be just sufficient to meet the needs of

ment give rise to corrective influences, working

trade.

through exchanges, money rates, and price levels,

There are no automatic devices or detectors for

which tend to reverse the flow. The significance

determining, when credit is granted by a Fed­

which movements in the reserve ratios formerly

eral Reserve Bank in response to a rediscount

possessed rested upon the fact that they were

demand, whether the occasion of the rediscount

the visible indicators of the operation of the

was an extension of credit by the member bank
for non-productive use. Paper offered by a mem­

8



Federal Reserve Board, Annual Report, 1923, p. 35.
e Ibid., p. 33.
5

business review

nicely adjusted mechanism of international fi­

serious and protracted period of unemployment

nance. With this mechanism now inoperative,

in the nation’s history. In 1933, for example,

the ratios have lost much of their value as

one out of four persons in the labor force could

administrative guides.7

not find a job. This compares to about one out

To sum up the reevaluation prompted by the
inflation-deflation cycle of the early twenties,

of eighteen today, and even now we think of
unemployment as a serious problem.

the idea of progress could still be interpreted

The early thirties were also years of financial

broadly within the old context: an environment

crisis, when banks failed by the score and

goal of free enterprise, a performance goal of

stock prices plunged. And the depression was

economic stability. Yet important shifts within

not confined to this country. All of the indus­

and between the goals had occurred.

trial nations of the world suffered, and each at­

With regard to performance, panics no longer

tempted to protect itself, even through pushing

appeared to be a problem; concentration now

this suffering onto the other with beggar-my-

was even more strongly on cyclical fluctuation

neighbor policies of tariffs, exchange controls,

in business.

and the like.

As for environment, the nineteenth century

Given these conditions, the idea of progress

laissez-faire model viewed as an integral whole

shifted from maintaining stability to regaining

had received some hard knocks. Fed officials had,

it— putting people back to work, reflating prices,

in effect, adjudged it incompatible with the per­

reestablishing confidence in banks and the fi­

formance goal. Though a return to the gold

nancial system. Arthur Hersey of the Board’s

standard was hoped for, the “ real bills doctrine”

staff summarized the change in the following

was logically debunked as a technique to insure

manner:

the economy against speculation and assure the

After 1929 the dislocation of normal economic

proper over-all quantity of money and credit.

processes and the depressed level o f business

This is not to say that “ real bills” ideas were

activity and national income made it necessary

completely dead. Such sharp breaks with the

to reinterpret the twofold objective of maintain­

past are rare indeed. But, metaphorically speak­

ing prosperity and of maintaining sound credit

ing, the doctrine stood with hat in hands and

conditions. It was no longer a question merely

head bent in humility. The Fed was moving

o f smoothing out fluctuations in a generally

away from the automatic formulae of laissez-

stable economy. During the years 1930-1933

faire toward discretionary money management.

the immediate need was to restore the stability

Yet equally significant changes were still to

and adaptability o f the banking system . . .

come, both in the idea of progress and in the

“ Soundness” of “ credit conditions” . . . now

goals of policy to implement changing ideas.

involved the ultimate issue of public confidence

Next in line as a social catalyst: the Great De­

in the banks and the basic ability of the banks

pression of the 1930’s.

to function effectively. The banking crisis of

The thirties

was not to be cured simply by providing the
banks with facilities for borrowing . . . From

those years, unlike the money panic of 1907,
The decade o f the thirties marked the most
7

ibid., p. 30.




(Continued on Page 12)

9

THE CURRENT BUSINESS EXPANSION:
The current expansion in business, which has been going on for over three years, has now become the longest
since World War II (not counting the one from 1949-53 which was stretched out by the Korean action). The ques­
tion now is what the tax cut will do to the course of the expansion. No one knows for sure, but part of the answer
may lie in the nature of the growth we have had so far. These charts compare the growth in this period with those
of other expansion periods in the postwar years, starting with the bottom of the recession as 100.
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
INDEX (Trough == 100)

UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

FROM HERE?
NEW CONSTRUCTION OUTLAYS

Construction outlays also have shown less vigor; until
the most recent month, the rate of advance had about
come to a halt.

INDEX (Trough =

100)

PER CENT

GOVERNMENT PURCHASES OF GOODS AND SERVICES
INDEX (Trough =

100)

It is Government purchases of goods and services
which have given the really impressive support to
the economy over the past three years, increasing
relatively more than in any of the other periods except
during the Korea episode.

If two words can characterize the period, they are “slow” and “ inadequate.” This has been a relatively slow and
gradual expansion. The course of industrial production during the current expansion has been quite similar to
that after the 1954 recession, but generally at a lower level. In recent months, output has been relatively steady.
And the pace has been too slow to take up unused resources. The unemployment rate, despite a high level of
output, has been running considerably above the percentages of the comparative recoveries and hasn't shown
any direction for many months. Much the same is true of the rate of idle manufacturing capacity.
One big reason the expansion has been relatively slow and
inadequate is that this has not been a capital boom. Plant and
equipment expenditures are scheduled to pick up steam after a
lack-lustre first quarter, but their rate of increase is expected
still to lag considerably behind the pace of the other recovery
periods.

PLANT AND EQUIPMENT EXPENDITURES
INDEX (Trough = 100)

WHOLESALE PRICES

And because of all this the
Federal Reserve has pur­
sued an easy money policy
which has promoted a much
more rapid growth in bank
credit than during earlier
periods.

INDEX (Trough =

100)

BUSINESS INVENTORIES
INDEX (Trough = 100)

TOTAL BANK CREDIT (Loans and Investments)
INDEX (Trough = 100)

Businessmen also have been prudent about spending for in­
ventories, increasing stocks more modestly than in earlier
expansions.
RETAIL SALES

Perhaps not quite so conservative as businessmen, consumers
nevertheless have not been indulging in a spending spree.
Although setting new record highs for three successive months,
retail sales still have not risen so much as after the 1949 and
1954 recessions. Construction outlays also have shown less
vigor; until the most recent month, the rate of advance had
about come to a halt.




INDEX (Trough — 100)

MONTHS AFTER TROUGH

Perhaps characterizing the
moderate nature of the per­
iod better than any other has
been the stability of prices.
Although consumer prices
have risen at about the same
pace as in earlier expansions
(except
during
Korea),
wholesale prices have re­
mained strikingly steady.
In short, this expansion has lasted longer than the others perhaps because it has been slower. This very moder­
ateness gives rise to hopes that the upturn can continue. We shall have to wait, of course, to see how the tax-cut
experiment turns out; but the nature of the expansion so far suggests that the tax cut will help to sustain and
stimulate a somewhat lagging economy rather than put the bloom on a boom.

business review

(Continued from Page 9)

“ rules of the game” — to react automatically with

1934 to the present time [1940] the Federal

greater credit ease or restraint in response to

Reserve System

gold inflows and outflows. There was a complete

has continued to

orient its

monetary policy toward the goal of a lasting

There was also a developing reluctance to

recovery.8
But what, meanwhile, was happening to the
environment

breakdown of the classical gold standard.

objective?

In

a

sentence,

the

allow international developments to affect do­
mestic policies adversely. After 1931, gold in­

laissez-faire model was disintegrating under the

flows were the rule in the United States. The

pressure of the day. Such a model seemed more

large volume of excess reserves which resulted

and more inconsistent with the dire need to

acted as a sort of cushion. Loss of gold no

bolster the domestic economy.

longer limited freedom to pursue domestic ob­

Free trade? Legislators decided that import­

jectives.

ing goods meant exporting jobs. The answer—

The general unwillingness to let international

tariffs: the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930, for

events overshadow domestic policies was well

example, greatly increased the price of a wide

illustrated in the Board of Governor’s 1936

range of imported goods. Other countries as

Annual Report:

well instituted tariffs, and most also established

On September 25 the Governments of the United

embargoes, quotas, and exchange controls.

States, France, and the United Kingdom issued

Real bills? The theory which had stood with

similarly worded statements in which each Gov­

hat in hands in the twenties was ushered out

ernment declared ‘ its purpose to continue the

the door in the thirties. The Glass-Steagall Act

policy which it has pursued in recent years, one

of 1932 empowered the Reserve Banks to make

constant object of which is to maintain the

advances to member banks that did not have

greatest possible equilibrium in the system of

adequate eligible and acceptable paper. Later,

international exchange and to avoid to the ut­

the Banking Act of 1935 said that “ any Federal

most extent the creation of any disturbance of

Reserve Bank . . . may make advances to any

that system’ . . . Each Government stated that it

member bank on its time or demand notes . . .

must, of course, in its policy towards interna­

which are secured to the satisfaction of each

tional monetary relations take into full account

Federal Reserve Bank.”

the requirements of internal prosperity .9 ( Em­

Gold flows? The problems of the twenties
were posed with new intensity in the thirties.
With tariffs and controls

over imports and

phasis supplied)
In summary, the desperate need to secure
performance goals— to rise from the abyss of

with exchange controls over capital flows in

depression— resulted in a rapid revision of the

many nations there was no reason to expect a

environment

quick and sure response abroad to domestic

laissez-faire model was judged inappropriate for

goal.

The

nineteenth

century

changes in prices and interest rates, hence there

the conditions of the thirties. Free multilateral

was no reason to adhere to the gold standard

trade became a distant dream from the past.
Gold-flow rules and “ real bills” were scrapped.

s Arthur Hersey, Historical Review of Objectives of Fed­
eral Reserve Policy, Federal Reserve Bulletin (Washington:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), April
1940, p. 10.

12



9 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, An­
nual Report, 1936, p. 6.

business review

And to top things off: the Fed had even been

ing to the Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce

given a direct control over credit markets! The

is likely to skid by 85 or 90 per cent, and with

Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 empow­

it will go the demand for astronomical tonnages

ered the Federal Reserve Board to prescribe

of aluminum and magnesium. The machine tool

minimum margin requirements for purchasing

industry has turned out enough equipment dur­

or carrying securities or selling them short.

ing the war, in the estimation of some manu­

A man could still go out and start a grocery

facturers, to supply the needs of the next twenty

store and compete with the fellow down the

years. And so on. How many jobs can such

street— we still wanted free markets at home.

industries safely prom ise?10

But for the time being the old environment was
done for.

Debate over postwar performance goals

End of the depression

Congress as it deliberated the course of postwar

The grim years of the Great Depression finally

economic policy. Add to this memories of the

Such haunting possibilities greatly concerned

died away. The muffled voices of men in bread

recent depression and there seemed no cause

lines, the fears of unemployment, want, poverty

for optimism. Statements such as the following

— all were stilled. Now a new force was seeth­

were included in materials prepared to aid Con­

ing in Europe. The clank of metal on metal and

gress in its deliberations on economic policy.

the sound of jackboots in the streets signaled

In the early 1930’s about one-third of our work­

the emerging threat, then the awful climax and

ers were unwanted, and all the rest shared in

culmination of World War II.

the fear of being unwanted. These injuries to

Yet at war’s end the specter of the Great De­
pression returned, its influence not yet spent. The

human dignity will not again be tolerated by
a free and self-reliant people.11*

shape of our postwar goals was to bear the in­

And other basic dimensions of this same

delible imprint of the experience of the thirties.

theme were considered. Throughout the hear­

THE EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1946

Act one is struck by the resounding concern

An article appearing in the February, 1945

over the possibility of social conflict— conflict

ings which preceded passage of the Employment

issue of Harper s expressed well the concern of

of ideology which might spring forth in either

the nation over postwar economic prospects:

peaceful or violent form if the nation should once

During less than two years of war we tripled

more be racked with depression. Concerning the

our ocean tonnage, and we will go into the peace

former, Senator Wagner was quick to comment:

with a merchant marine at least equal to that of

Recent events in other democracies convince me

all other nations combined. Obviously we will

that this fundamental economic truth [the de­

not need to build very many more ships for

sirability of full employment] is permeating the

some time to come. The huge chemical factories

minds of more and more people. Interpretations

can hardly expect stump-blowing and highway
blasting to require explosives on anything like
the scale demanded by the siege of Aachen or
the bombing of Tokyo. Plane demand, accord­




10 Stanley Lebergott, "Shall We Guarantee Full Employ­
ment?” Harper’s Magazine (Vol. 190, No. 1137, February
1945), p. 194.
11 U.S. Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency,
Assuring Full Employment in a Free Competitive Economy,
79th Congress, 1st session, staff report, September 1945,
pp. 5-6.

13

business review

of the [meaning of the] recent British elections

ployment legislation were tempered throughout

are as thick as a field of daffodils. . . . They

by a desire to avoid “ overstepping the bounds

[the British people] were not satisfied that the

of propriety” in setting and implementing na­

government in power was sufficiently resolute in

tional economic objectives for a free enterprise

its determination to achieve postwar full employ­

economy.

ment, and so they have elected another govern­
ment which is pledged to that purpose.12
But the fear of social conflict lay rooted in

It goes without saying, of course, that Con­
gressional judgments differed as to the geog­
raphy of these bounds. An outstanding feature

soil deeper than that of the ballot box. For in

of the initial legislation was the high degree of

the despair of depression many saw the seeds

emphasis placed on Government spending to

of man’s basest emotions, both as an individual

combat depressions.

and as a social animal. In the words of the Full

In both Houses the tussle over the bill resulted

Employment Subcommittee:

in a progressive de-emphasis of this specific

When there are too few jobs to go around, bitter

stabilization device in favor of a more com­

conflict develops between groups and individuals.

prehensive technique of analysis of all sources

Under these conditions, human virtues lose sig­

of instability in the economy and attack along

nificance. The ethics of society recede to the

a broad front with remedial actions of many

ethics of the jungle, where dog eats dog. Racial

sorts.

and personal hates emerge. Group is set against

The environmental metamorphosis may also

group and class against class. The forces of in­

be seen in Senator Taft’s questioning of that

tolerance and fear come forth in racial and

section of the original bill which stated that:

religious conflict.13

“ All Americans able to work and willing to

This, then, was the atmosphere in which Con­
gress debated the provisions of the Employment
Act of 1946. One basic question seemed to be

work have the right to useful, remunerative,
regular, and full-time employment. . . .”
“ What was the nature of this right?” inquired

at issue: could men endure and could this na­

Senator Taft, “ Is that a legal right, intended to

tion stand another depression like that of the

create a legal right that a man can sue on if

1930’s? It appeared that we must perform better

he doesn’t get it, or what is the nature of that?

— raise our sights or we risked grave conse­

. . . is that a right like the Bill of Rights, that

quences.

a man can enforce in court?” 14

Yet as we have seen, where performance is
debated, environment is not far behind.

It was this type of questioning and analysis
which assured that the Act as finally passed
would reflect the environment goal of free en­

The environment goal:
Maintenance of free economic institutions

terprise, even if that goal should be consider­
ably modified from the days of laissez-faire.

Despite fear of unemployment and social con­

This, then, is the heritage of the Employment

flict, the hearings and reports on postwar em-

Act of 1946, an attempt to provide economic

12
U.S. Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Bank­
ing and Currency, Full Employment Act of 1945, 79th Con­
gress, 1st session, hearings, July-September 1945, p. 2.
is U.S. Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency,
Assuring Full Employment in a Free Competitive Economy,
op. cit., pp. 4-5.

stabilization within the confines of free economic


14


14 u.S. Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Bank­
ing and Currency, Full Employment Act of 1945, op. cit.,
p. 20.

business review

institutions. Senate hearings on the Act began

competitive enterprise on the other.

on July 30, 1945. After months of exhaustive

Yet if the Act stressed the traditional ob­

study in both House and Senate, after testimony

jectives it also recognized the gradual shaping

and counter testimony, examination and cross-

and molding of these objectives.

examination a joint conference committee fi­

The Act called for free competitive enterprise

nally agreed upon the specifics of the bill.15 It

but not for the laissez-faire environment of

was passed by unanimous voice vote in the

earlier years. Controversy concerned mainly the

Senate and by a 322-84 majority in the House.

technique and degree that Government should

The President signed the bill on February 20,

intervene to maintain economic stability.

1946 and the Employment Act of 1946 became
Public Law 304.16 It read in part:

But perhaps most important, the Act expressed
an important change in the idea of progress and

The Congress hereby declares that it is the con­

in the responsibility for progress. The Act was

tinuing policy and responsibility of the Federal

legal recognition of the gradual evolution of

Government to use all practicable means con­

the performance goal— from an emphasis on

sistent with its needs and obligations and other

panics and accommodation of the needs of busi­

essential considerations of national policy, with

ness; through a rather grudging acceptance of

the assistance and cooperation of industry, agri­

responsibility for mitigating fluctuations in the

culture, labor, and State and local governments,

business cycle; to active stimulation of business;

to coordinate and utilize all its plans, functions,

and finally to active stimulation of economic ac­

and resources for the purpose of creating and

tivity aimed at achieving carefully enumerated

maintaining, in a manner calculated to foster
and promote free competitive enterprise and the

performance goals. The movement was from pas­
sive accommodation to active stimulation. And

general welfare, conditions under which there

the responsibility for progress? No longer was

will be afforded useful employment opportunities,

the Federal Reserve alone in the center of the

including self-employment, for those able, will­

ring. The experiments and experience of the

ing, and seeking to work, and to promote maxi­

thirties were now signed into law. The Federal

mum employment-, production, and purchasing

Government “ with the assistance and coopera­

power.17

tion of industry, agriculture, and labor and

This was the substance of the Employment

local governments” was to “ coordinate and uti­

Act. Once more was expressed the subtle bal­

lize all its plans, functions, and resources” to

ance of performance and environment goals—

achieve the desired economic ends. And

the dedication to employment, production and

course the Federal Reserve, as a creature of

purchasing power on the one hand and to free

Congress, was bound by the Act.

is U.S. Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Bank­
ing and Currency, Full Employment Act of 1945, 79th Con­
gress, 1st session, hearings, July-September 1945; U.S.
House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Depart­
ments, Full Employment Act of 1945, 79th Congress, 1st ses­
sion, hearings, September-November 1945.
10 For an interesting resume of the history of and con­
troversy over United States economic stabilization policy
leading finally to the passage of the Employment Act of
1946, see Edwin G. Nourse, Economics in the Public Service,
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1953), pp. 49-75
and 355-367.
it Employment Act of 1945, Public Law 304, 79th Con­
gress, 2nd session, February 1946, section 2.




of

Even with the passage of the Employment
Act, however, the evolutionary process did not
end. Time does not stand still. The framers of
the Employment Act could not anticipate all the
new problems that would arise. They could not
foresee the whole complex of forces which would
shape the postwar period. Hence, they could not

15

business review

legislate with infinite precision to provide for

and all this within an environment of free en­

all eventualities.

terprise.

The future was indeed to bring surprises. As

During the early postwar years up until the

a result, the idea of progress was to become even

“ Accord” of 1951, the Fed was restrained in its

more ambitious, and we were to call for an even

efforts to fight inflation by its policy of support­

more careful definition and delineation of our

ing the prices of Government securities in order

economic goals.

to assist the Treasury in managing the huge

Economic problems came in three waves as

debt contracted during World War II. Never­

the nation traversed the decades of the 40’s,
50’s, and 60’s. These waves were named infla­

theless, the Fed realized the dangers of inflation

tion, growth, and balance of payments.

stable prices.

and stressed the importance

of maintaining

But inflation was by no means to be our sole

THE POSTWAR PERIOD

postwar problem. The world still was changing,

Inflation

and this change was to be reflected in our eco­

First off, fears of massive unemployment and

nomic goals.

civil discord soon gave way to a grave concern

The next stimulus to change, however, was

over inflation. While yearly averages of unem­

to come more from the political than the eco­

ployment never exceeded 3.9 per cent in the

nomic sphere. For soon the cordial relationships

early postwar years, consumer prices jumped

established with the Soviet Union during World

over 25 per cent between 1945 and 1949. In

War II gave way to developing world tension.

his mid-year Economic Report for 1948, Presi­

The mental image of a kindly and benevolent

dent Truman stated:

Uncle Joe was replaced by the stark realism of

Repeatedly I have called attention to the de­

the Iron Curtain. This changing world scene

veloping inflationary conditions which endanger

was responsible in large measure for a new

both our domestic strength and our place in

emphasis on the goal of . . .

world affairs . . . The policy proclaimed in the
Employment Act requires us to devise and adopt

Growth

positive measures to stop this inflation and se­

Shortly after World War II, Soviet ambitions

cure relative stabilization.18

became more and more obvious. By external

Truman interpreted the “ maximum purchas­

power and internal subversion the Soviets over­

ing power” clause of the Employment Act as a

ran Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, East

mandate to stop inflation. Others interpreted the

Germany, and many of the other satellites. Five

clause only as a requirement to maintain high

years after World War II the Soviet bloc had

effective demand. But whatever the interpreta­

expanded to include more than half of the land

tion, stable prices soon became a prime goal of

area and population of Europe. And other na­

national economic policy. We were becoming

tions were threatened: Turkey, Greece, even

more ambitious in our performance goals. We

powers such as France and Italy.

wanted maximum employment and stable prices,

This nation realized that something had to be
done. First, Soviet pressures were countered

is The Mid-year Economic Report of the President, July
30, 1948, pp. 1-2.

16



with aid to Greece and Turkey. Then came the

business review

Marshall Plan, followed by a building up of
military strength around the world. Finally, the
fighting in Korea began.

incorporated into our bag of economic objectives.
Of course competition with the Soviet Union
was not the sole reason for the emerging im­

All this took a huge commitment of men, ma­

portance of the growth goal. Generally speaking,

terials, and industrial resources— so much so

we must have a growing economy if we are to

that an important fact was driven home. If we

provide jobs for new entrants into the labor

were to maintain our position of strength in

market. As time went on, this second reason for

the cold war, yet still maintain the world’s high­

the growth goal became perhaps even more im­

est living standard, we must produce more,

portant than national defense.

improve our productivity. In a word, we had

In the sixties, for example, it is expected that

to grow at the fastest possible sustainable rate.

the net addition to the labor force will be about

President Eisenhower put it this way in his

13 million. This is more than 50 per cent

Economic Report for 1954:

greater than the addition in the fifties.

A high and sustained rate of economic growth

But just as the problem of inflation was joined

is necessary to the welfare, if not to the survival

by the problem of growth, so growth was soon

of America and any of the free world. The

to have company. The next important problem to

United States is now engaged, and must be for

affect significantly our economic goals was a se­

some time to come, in an effort to build security

vere and prolonged balance-of-payments deficit.

forces adequate to deter and to strike back at
aggression. These security-building efforts, and

Balance of payments

the parallel efforts to raise the defense potentials
and the living standards of friendly peoples in

The deficit in our balance of payments first
became a major concern in 1958. In that year

other countries, are as much dependent on our

we found ourselves paying far more to for­

industrial production as is the conduct of war

eigners for imports, investments, military and

itself. Success in them will depend in large part

economic aid than we received for our exports

on the amount by which our national output is

of goods and services and for other transactions.

increased.19

The difference came to a sizable $3.8 billion,

Thus we were not satisfied with mitigating

of which $2.3 billion was settled in gold.

swings in the business cycle, nor even with

Like the problem of growth, the payments

maintaining full employment. Indeed, full em­

deficit was related as much (and perhaps more)

ployment could be gained by using plows in­

to political than to economic developments. Our

stead of tractors. We wanted full employment

efforts to raise the defense potentials and living

with growth, with rising per capita real income,

standards of friendly peoples had paid off. Not

with ever greater output per man-hour at full

only did we develop an elaborate and costly

employment levels.

network of military installations around the

Some felt this idea was implicit in the Em­

world, but we “ aided friendly peoples” to the

ployment Act; others did not. But as before,

extent that they became our competitors as well

implicit or not, the specific goal of growth was

as our customers. We found in the latter 50’s
that our international export surplus was simply

19 Economic Report of the President, January 28, 1954,
p. 3.




not large enough to support our military and

17

business review

economic aid expenditures abroad, plus our in­

ernmental policy to counter the business cycle.

creasing private investments in foreign lands.

Yet it may be that environment goals will

The result was an alarming outflow of gold, an

become relatively more important. This possi­

economic problem

bility stems from the rather unique times in

par

excellence.

Regaining

equilibrium in our balance of payments, not a
problem since the early 30’s, became an impor­
tant objective of economic policy.

which we live.
The decades during which this nation con­
centrated on improving economic performance

In the December, 1963 edition of The Fed­

were characterized by a relative isolation from

eral Reserve System: Purposes and Functions,
the performance goals of the Federal Reserve

external

System were stated as follows:

to say that problems did not crop up from time

The function of the Federal Reserve System is

to time— just that we were relatively isolated.

to foster a flow of credit and money that will

First came World War I and its aftermath dur­

pressures— from

balance-of-payments

problems, gold flows, and the like. That is not

facilitate orderly economic growth, a stable dol­

ing which the gold standard was abandoned by

lar, and long-run balance in our international

the major industrial nations of the world. Then

payments.20

came the Great Depression and the large gold
its

flow into the United States which served as a

place as a major stated goal of Federal Reserve

sort of buffer behind which domestic policies

policy.

could be pursued with little regard for gold

The

balance

of

payments

had

found

outflows.

IN CONCLUSION

Then World War II was upon us and for

Here, for the moment at least, the evolutionary

several years thereafter, United States industrial

process rests. We have reached the present.

capacity stood virtually alone. There seemed

The story of change in our performance goals
has been characterized by a continual and ever

scant need to temper domestic policies for ex­
ternal reasons.

more ambitious shift in the idea of progress:

Then, in 1958, we realized that we had

from passive accommodation to active stimula­

emerged from external economic isolation. This

tion, from preventing panics to encouraging a

emergence

high rate of economic growth in an atmosphere

levels.
First of all, the war-devastated countries had

of price stability and payments equilibrium.

was

proceeding

on

at least two

The story of change in our environment goals,

rebuilt their productive capacity so that they

on the other hand, is characterized by a gradual

could produce goods both for domestic con­

shift away from laissez-faire. On successive oc­

sumption and for export. They became our com­

casions the old environment was found to con­

petitors in world markets.

flict with new demands for economic perform­

Second, Government policy was directed at

ance. We found, for example, that it was difficult

an international society of nations— welded to­

to maintain a reasonably stable economy with­

gether

out discretionary central bank action and gov­

strengthened by expanding markets, free trade

20 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, The
Federal Reserve System: Purposes and Functions, Fifth Ed.,
p. 1.

18



by

mutual

self-interest

in

defense—

and free movements of capital funds— a grand
“ Atlantic Alliance.”

business review

All this and more served to raise the curtain
behind which domestic policies could be pursued

pursuing policies at home appropriate to domes­
tic conditions.

with scant attention to external pressures. In

Though a tall order, much has already been

effect, this nation was enlarging its environ­

done— the Federal Reserve swap arrangements

ment goal. Here was culminating a longer-run

are an example. Recommendations for further

movement toward free world trade which would

cooperative arrangements range all the way to

take its place beside “ free competitive enter­

the creation of a world central bank.

prise.” And when policies directed at such a

Undoubtedly experiments in international eco­

goal begin to bear fruit, then problems of bal­

nomic and financial cooperation will continue

ance of payments and gold flows once more
come to the fore.

as times change, as the future brings unantici­
pated problems to an unsuspecting world. Just

Many nations through time have met external

how fast these experiments will mature into new

difficulties with policies which tended to depress

institutions is difficult to tell. Yet as the future

domestic income and employment. Tight money,

unfolds, world policymakers would do well to

for example, might raise domestic interest rates

keep in mind the words of the philosopher.

and thus discourage capital outflows. But it also

From Aristotle comes this advice:

might discourage productive investment at home,

Let us not disregard the experience of ages; in

thereby inhibiting industrial expansion and gen­
eration of new jobs.

the multitude of years, these things [new ideas],

Today, with the lessons of the thirties behind

if they were good, would not have remained
unknown.21
Hegel has this word. He tells us that great

us, we are much less inclined to sacrifice do­
mestic goals to maintain a given international

men are, in essence, midwives of the future—

environment and to achieve equilibrium in the

that they anticipate the Zeitgeist, the spirit of

balance of payments. Yet we recognize that the

the age, and pull forth its offspring.

balance-of-payments problem must be solved and

Such individuals . . . had an insight into the

we realize the benefits of an international At­

requirements of the time— what is ripe for de­

lantic Alliance. How, then, are we to proceed

velopment. This was the very Truth for their

when national policies appropriate to one goal

age, for their world; the species next in order,

or set of goals may conflict with those appro­

so to speak, and which was already formed in

priate to another?

the womb of time.22

Today we are reaching for a new synthesis

Somewhere between the experience of Aris­

— a means through which we may achieve both

totle and the Zeitgeist of Hegel lie the realities

domestic and international goals without sacri­

which must be dealt with in this nineteenth year

ficing one to the other. This synthesis is inter­

of the nuclear era.

national cooperation— cooperation

which will

give us time to work out balance-of-payments
problems in an environment of free trade while




21 Aristotle, Politics, Book II, Chapter 5, (New York: The
Modern Library, 1943) p. 90.
22 G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, (New York:
Dover Publications, Inc., 1956) p. 30.

19

F OR THE R E C O R D . . .

Third Federal
Reserve District

United States

Per cent change

Per cent change

Department
Store

Factory*
Employ­
ment

Payrolls

Sales**

Check
Payments

Per cent
change
Feb. 1964
from

Per cent
change
Feb. 1964
from

Per cent
change
Feb. 1964
from

Per cent
change
Feb. 1964
from

SU M M ARY

mo.
ago

year
ago

2
mos.
1964
from
year
ago

mo.
ago

year
ago

2
mos.
1964
from
year
ago

+

Feb. 1964
frc m

2

+

7

+

6

6

+

2

+

2

Feb. 1964
frc m

LOCAL
CHANGES

mo.
ago

M A N U FA C T U RIN G
Electric power consumed........
Man-hours, total*..................
Employment, total...................
W a ge income*.......................

- 2
+ 5
+ 1
+ 4

+
+
+

7
1
1
3

+
-

7
4
0
1

year
ago

mo.
ago

year
ago

+

mo.
ago

+i

+10

C O N S T R U C T IO N **.................. + 18

-

4

+ 10

+ 15

Harrisburg.......

+2

+3

+

CO AL P R O D U C T IO N ................ +

+12

+12

-

2

+

+

Lancaster.........

+ 1

-1

+ 5

Philadelphia. . . .

0

-1

+

3

Reading..........

0

+2

+

3

+

9

0

+ 1

+3

+

8

+ ^

+ 10

9

TRADE***
Department store sales............. 1+ 3
B A N K IN G
(All member banks)
0
Deposits...............................
Loans................................... - 1
Investments............................ + 2
U.S. Govt, securities.............. + 3
Other................................. + 1
Check payments..................... — 16+

+

7

3

6

+ 10

•Production workers only.
••Value of contracts.
•••Adjusted for seasonal variation.




2
0

+ 6

9

+

3

+ 13

+ 17

-

6

+ 18

+ 1

+

-1 3

+ 6

+10

-

8

+ 17

+ 10

-

4

+ 14

2

5
7
4

- 3

+20
+ 8t

+ 5
+ 8
+ 2
- 6
+20

+

+ 6
+ 11
+ 1

+

+n
0
- 8 - 8

6

Scranton..........
Trenton...........

-1

+4

-

1

+ 10

-

+ 11

-3 5

+ 9

+ 18
+ 7

+ 18
+ 9

W ilkes-Barre. . .

+4

+2

+ 16

+10

+12

+

8

-1 0

+ 11

Wilmington......

+
+
+

0
+ 1
0
- 1
+ 1
-1 8

-1

+5

-

+ 12

+ 9

+20

-3 4

+ 14

+ 11

-

+

-

+ 15

PRICES
Consumer.............................

7

+ 11
+

year
ago

-1 7

+i

+24

9

mo.
ago

-

Lehigh Valley. . .

+53

+

year
ago

ot

+ n + 2t

0
0

+

0
1

+

f20 Cities
^Philadelphia

0
2

Y ork...............

+3

+3

4

+ 11

1

2

7

4

*N o t restricted to corporate limits of cities but covers areas of one or more
counties.
••Adjusted for seasonal variation.