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1977

ANNUAL REPORT
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Cover:
Detail from bronze doorway, main
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

entrance,

Table of

contents

"Letter to stockholders"

4

The source of Federal
Reserve earnings

6

Reserve Bank profits and
the management challenge

8

The challenge and the
strategy

8

Managing for the 70s
and beyond

10

Summary of operations

11

Statement of condition

12

Statement of earnings

13

1977 directors

14

1977 officers

15

ANNUAL REPORT
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

To our stockholders:
Current earnings for 1977 climbed to
$1,085,843,394, an increase of 7.3 percent
over the previous year. The increase
resulted from renewed demand for loans from
the bank, growth in the bank's securities
portfolio, and a modest rise in market
interest rates.
Income after current expenses was
$1,006,473,635, an increase of 7.7 percent.
Thus, current net earnings in 1977 amounted
to 92.7 percent of total revenues, up slightly
from 92.4 percent in 1976.
This improvement in the bank's performance
was achieved primarily through continued
vigorous efforts on the part of management to
control costs and improve productivity.
Consequently, even though volume increased in
most of the bank's major activities, operating
expenses for 1977 were up only 2 percent from
the previous year.
Primarily as a result of unfavorable
developments in foreign exchange markets, the
rise in net earnings after all additions and
deductions was somewhat less than the rise in
current earnings — about 4.5 percent. Nonetheless,
with net earnings of $971,509,141 for
1977, the bank was able to pay its stockholders
a dividend for the 62nd consecutive year, or,
in other words, in every year since the
second full year of the bank's operation.
The earnings outlook for the coming year
is, as always, dependent largely upon development
in the U.S. economy. Stockholders can
rest assured, however, that bank management
will continue to seek opportunities to improve.

Wouldn't any bank be proud to send its stockholders a
letter describing such extraordinary performance?
Operating expenses total only 7.3 percent of operating
income compared with an 87.6 percent ratio for all insured commercial banks in the United States for 1976!
Net earnings amount to almost 90 percent of total
current earnings versusa12.4 percent profit margin for
all banks! That kind of earnings performance means
remarkable rates of return as well. All banks in 1976
earned (before taxes) about 1 percent on assets and 14
percent on capital. The figures reported in that letter
represent a 4.6 percent return on assets and an incredible 619 percent return on capital!
Could such performance be possible? The figures
cited are real. They are derived directly from the 1977
condition and earnings statements of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago (pages 12 and 13 of this
report). Year after year Chicago Fed financial
statements indicate "performance" ratios that would
be the envy of any "for-profit" enterprise.
But while the figures are authentic they are not a
true indication of this institution's performance. Profits
are only incidental to, not an objective of, Reserve Bank
operations.
Unfortunately, however, the average citizen finds it
difficult to regard "profits" which for the Chicago Fed
approach the billion dollar level as incidental, unimportant or insignificant. As a result, Reserve Bank
profitability is a source of confusion for many and,
quite frankly, a source of irritation for a few.
This confusion is especially unfortunate today in
light of current debate concerning the structure and
operation of the Federal Reserve System. Of particular
significance in this regard are questions being raised
concerning: (1) the central bank's independence,
which in large part rests on its ability to finance
operations from its own earnings, and (2) the use of
such earnings to pay interest on member bank
reserves.
Obviously, misunderstanding concerning Reserve
Bank profits inhibits constructive debate of such
questions. Therefore, Federal Reserve profitability has
been chosen as the focus of this year's annual report of
the Federal Reserve Bankof Chicago. In particular,two
questions underlie the discussion: first, what is the
source of Reserve Bank earnings, and second, if profits
are not a managerial objective, what are the determining factors of management decisions?

The source of
Federal Reserve earnings
At first glance Federal Reserve
financial statements are strikingly
similar to those of a private commercial
bank. Although one would have to admit
to some major disparities in relative
proportions (such as capital to assets,
loans to deposits and investment income to total income), most asset,
liability and income items are thesame.
For both commercial and Federal
Reserve Banks, their principal assets
are loans and securities. The liability
side of their balance sheets both show
"customer" deposits—member bank
reserve accounts in the case of the Fed.
And earnings statements for both show
that income is derived primarily from interest on security holdings and loans.
Given this overall similarity it is easy
to assume that Federal Reserve profits
are generated in the same way as commercial bank earnings. But the truth of
the matter is that the processes are exactly opposite.
A commercial bank uses its deposit
liabilities to acquire assets. By lending
or investing its customers' funds, a bank
generates income. But to assume that
the Federal Reserve uses member bank
deposits to make loans or buy U.S.
Government securities which in turn
generate its income carries the parallel
too far. Whereas from the commercial
bank's point of view an increase in its
assets results from an increase in its
liabilities, Federal Reserve liabilities
arise from increases in its assets. And
whereas a commercial bank goal is to

increase assets in order to increase
earnings, the Fed at times deliberately
takes action to decrease its assets.
The process through which the acquisition of assets by a Federal Reserve
Bank creates its liabilities is illustrated
by T-accounts depicting a Reserve
Bank loan to a member bank. Reserve
Bank assets increase by the amount of
the loan, and the proceeds of the loan
are simply added, or credited, to the
member bank's reserve deposit account. (See Illustration 1.) Clearly, the
asset increase—a loan—gives rise to an
increase in reserve deposits—a liability.
The purchase of securities by the
Fed from a securities dealer has the
same effect although the process is less
direct. The Fed "pays" for the security
by simply crediting the reserve account
of the dealer's bank, and the bank in turn
credits the demand deposit account of
its customer, the securities dealer. (See
Illustration 2.)
For the receiving commercial bank
a deposit received as a result of this
transaction is no different from any
other net increase in its deposits: it now
has additional funds to lend or invest.
But for the commercial banking system
as a whole, the transaction is quite distinctive. Had one party to the securities
purchase not been the central bank, the
increase in deposits at the seller's bank
would have been precisely offset by a
decrease in deposits at the buyer's
bank.

Illustration 1
When a member bank borrows $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 from the Fed
Federal Reserve Bank

6

Loans to
member banks

+ 100

Member bank
reserves
+ 100

Member bank
Reserve balance
at F.R. Bank
+ 100

Loan payable
to F.R. Bank

+ 100

A c l o s e r l o o k at R e s e r v e B a n k e a r n i n g s :
t h e 1 9 7 7 f i n a n c i a l s t a t e m e n t s of t h e
F e d e r a l R e s e r v e B a n k of C h i c a g o
Year-to-year changes in the major asset, liability
and income items on Reserve Bank financial
statements reflect developments in the economy and
actions undertaken in support of System monetary objectives. By purchasing securities and making loans to
member banks, the Reserve Banks increase member
bank reserve deposits and provide a base for expansion
in the public's holdings of currency and commercial
bank deposits, in accord with the economy's growth
needs.
During 1977 this Bank's loans to member banks
increased by $34.5 million and its share of securities held
in the System Open Market Account increased by $1.4
billion, as System monetary policy actions continued to
be aimed at providing reserves to the banking system
sufficient to finance moderate expansion in the nation's
economy with a minimum of inflation. The increase in
Reserve Bank credit outstanding was almost entirely
absorbed, however, by the payout of currency (Federal
Reserve notes outstanding) in response to public
demands. Although District member bank deposits increased last year, member bank reserves declined
because of a reduction in reserve requirements and
shifts of deposits to banks and deposit classes with
lower reserve requirements.
Increased interest income from this larger portfolio
of loans and securities as well as somewhat higher
market interest rates more than offset this Bank's share
of losses on sales of securities and foreign exchange
losses entailed in currency stabilization operations. Net
earnings rose by almost $42 million, producing a record
payment to the U.S. Treasury.

T h u s , a l t h o u g h it c e r t a i n l y appears
o t h e r w i s e , t h e Fed d o e s not earn its
p r o f i t s b y u s i n g t h e f u n d s of c o m m e r c i a l
b a n k s to b u y s e c u r i t i e s a n d m a k e
loans. 1 T o a c q u i r e assets—to p u r c h a s e
s e c u r i t i e s or o t h e r w i s e e x t e n d c r e d i t —

t h e Federal Reserve d o e s
n o t n e e d to have a s i n g l e
p e n n y of d e p o s i t s . T h e very
essence of c e n t r a l b a n k i n g
is that increases in c e n t r a l
bank assets p r o v i d e new
f u n d s to t h e b a n k i n g s y s t e m ;
the
increases
create
reserves w h i c h in t u r n s u p p o r t g r o w t h in c o m m e r c i a l
bank d e p o s i t s and c r e d i t .
A n d this is p r e c i s e l y t h e p u r pose for w h i c h t h e Federal
Reserve
increases—or
d e c r e a s e s — i t s assets: n o t to
p r o d u c e Reserve Bank inc o m e b u t rather to affect the
f l o w of m o n e y a n d c r e d i t
through the nation's banking s y s t e m . Reserve Bank
profits, a l t h o u g h s u b s t a n tial, are i n c i d e n t a l . Assets
are a c q u i r e d by t h e Federal
Reserve w i t h o u t regard to
the i m p a c t t h e a c t i o n w i l l
have o n its p r o f i t a n d loss
s t a t e m e n t but rather w i t h an
eye o n l y to t h e i m p a c t t h e
a c t i o n w i l l have o n t h e c o m m e r c i a l b a n k i n g system a n d
t h r o u g h it t h e U.S. e c o n o m y
at
large—ultimately
on
growth,
production,
e m p l o y m e n t , a n d t h e value
of t h e d o l l a r .

'The mistaken notion that the Federal
Reserve uses the funds member banks are
legally required to deposit with it to earn
huge profits underlies some arguments
that the Fed should use its profits to pay interest on member
bank reserve accounts. While the above points out that this
line of reasoning is not correct, the aim here is not to suggest
that the payment of interest on reserves is inappropriate or
unwarranted. The payment of interest on reserves would
tend to compensate for the fact that the legal requirement,
and therefore, the burden of membership, does not fall
equitably on all banks.

Illustration 2
W h e n t h e Fed b u y s $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 of U.S. G o v e r n m e n t s e c u r i t i e s
Federal Reserve Bank
U.S. Government
securities
+100

Member bank
reserves
+100

Member bank
Reserve balance
at F.R. Bank
+100

Securities dealer's
deposit account

+100

7

Reserve Bank profits and
the management
challenge
To say that Reserve Banks face any
kind of management challenge may
sound strange. After all, what could be
simpler than managing a very profitable
not-for-profit institution?
Since profits are not an objective,
management is not expected to maximize them. And management hardly
has to worry about financial resources
since Reserve Bank revenues far exceed
needs in terms of the cost of operations.
Consider, for example, that current
earnings of the Chicago Fed for 1977
exceeded $1 billion while current expenses were less than $80 million. In
other words, during 1977 the Chicago
Fed used only about $1 out of every $14
of its income to cover the cost of
operations, and it has been many
decades since management has had to
worry whether revenues would fall short
of expenses.
Furthermore, no precise legal constraints apply to how much or how little
a Reserve Bank can spend on
operations. Current law and regulations
place only two specific fiscal requirements on a Reserve Bank: it must

pay an annual dividend to member bank
stockholders (by statute equal to 6 percent of paid-in capital), and it must set
aside an amount sufficient to equalize
its capital surplus account with its paidin capital account. Whatever remains of
Reserve Bank earnings after these small
payments and after expenses is turned
over to the U.S. Treasury each year,
technically as interest on Federal
Reserve notes.
With no challenge to maximize
profits, no fears that earnings will not
cover expenses, and no precise legal
restrictions on spending, Reserve Bank
management would appear to have little
need or incentive to apply management
methods similar to those that are
successful in private business.
But, in reality, the absence of a
profit discipline does not mean that the
Fed has no "bottom line," that there are
no constraints. Clearly, Reserve Bank
m a n a g e m e n t is a c c o u n t a b l e — r e sponsible for completing the tasks
assigned the central bank in the most
effective and most efficient manner
possible.

The challenge and the strategy

8

The Reserve Bank management
task is actually complicated by the fact
that objectives cannot be stated in terms
such as profit targets, growth rates,
sales or returns on investments. Were
such objectives relevant, management
would be provided with explicit guides
for both allocating resources and
measuring performance.

Since profits, investment return and
similar measures cannot be applied to a
Reserve Bank, what factors can be used
to answer the questions that face
management of any organization? How
should resources be allocated? How
much should be spent on one Reserve
Bank operation versus another? Should
m o r e — o r less—be spent on all

simultaneously? Is a significant capital
investment warranted—such as would
be entailed in automating an activity or
establishing regional offices to process
checks? What level of service should the
Fed provide in any of its various
activities—that is, in providing a facility
for check collection, in issuing currency
and coin, in serving as the government's
bank, in supervising and regulating
commercial bank activities, and so
forth?
To an extent, answers to such
questions may be obvious, even though
based more often on subjective
judgments than objective measures.
Take service levels within the Fed's cash
issuing function, for example.
The Federal Reserve has responsibility for assuring that the public has at
all times enough currency and coin to
conduct its business free of interruptions caused by shortages of cash.
Reserve Banks, therefore, transport
cash to member banks in whatever
a m o u n t s and denominations they
request.
But many levels of service are
possible—especially from the standpoint of the Federal Reserve's capacity
to "foot the bill." Comparable service
could be provided to nonmember
banks. Deliveries could be made to any
banking office, including all branches,
or only to selected offices. Currency
shipments could be scheduled on demand or on a restricted basis, such as
weekly or monthly. Coin could be
provided in wrappers or in bulk form. A
cash dispensing service could even be
provided directly to the general public.
What level of service is appropriate for
the Federal Reserve to provide within its
cash issuing function? In each of the
Fed's various areas of responsibility,

how much of the public's resources
should be spent by the Fed in providing
service to the public?
An examination of current Reserve
Bank activities would reveal that a
general principle that guides management in answering this question has
evolved. Within each major function that
Congress has assigned the Federal
Reserve, sufficient resources should be
spent to provide that level of service
which is essential to assure the smooth
operation of the financial system. On
the other hand, it is unnecessary, and
therefore unwarranted, for the Federal
Reserve to commit resources to services
which are adequately provided by the
private sector. The Federal Reserve was
not chartered to compete in the private
m a r k e t p l a c e . So l o n g as t h e
marketplace provides service on an
equitable and efficient basis to all
potential users, the Fed should not interfere in its operation. To put it more
simply, each Federal Reserve Bank
should do and should spend no more—
but certainly no less—than it takes to accomplish the major objectives of the
Federal Reserve Act within its District.
This general principle, although difficult to quantify and apply, represents
for Reserve Bank management what
profits are for managers of private enterprises: namely, a standard for both
allocating resources and measuring
performance. Once the general principle has been applied in the decisionmaking process, Reserve Bank management can then look to more precise
tools, comparable to those employed by
p r i v a t e enterprises, to increase
operational effectiveness and efficiency. This sequence provides a Reserve
Bank with a means and with a strategy
for meeting its management challenge.

9

Managing for
the 70s and beyond
A few examples of Chicago Reserve
Bank operational developments and
management programs might help to illustrate how this management process
works.
During the 1970s major resource
commitments have been necessary in
order for the Chicago Fed to meet increased public demands in a number of
areas of the Bank's activity. In the
payments mechanism area, for example, the establishment of regional check
processing centers and increased
automation of operations have been
necessary to process a continuously expanding volume of work and to maintain
timeliness. Similarly, in the area of
s u p e r v i s i o n and r e g u l a t i o n , new
programs, requiring additional staff,
have had to be developed and implemented, not only to carry out new
legislated responsibilities in the areas of
consumer credit protection and bank
holding company regulation, but to
provide adequate supervision of an
increasingly
complicated
and
s o p h i s t i c a t e d commercial banking
system as well.
Once the need for such resource
commitments has been recognized,
however, these and other areas of
operation can be scrutinized for opportunities to maximize effectiveness and
efficiency. To accomplish this a number
of management programs and techniques have been employed during
recent years.

10

To name but a few, a "management
by objectives" program was first introduced at the Chicago Fed in 1973 to
identify corporate goals and new initiatives that could be undertaken at all
levels of management. A new Federal
Reserve a c c o u n t i n g system was
developed and installed, providing unit
cost and comparative performance information for all Federal Reserve offices. The usefulness of "zero-base"
budgeting is being studied, and to this
end the Chicago Fed's Research, Bank
Relations and Public Information
departments prepared special 1978
budgets incorporating these techniques
on a test-pilot basis. Overall, as in
private i n d u s t r y , terms such as
"operations reviews," "performance
evaluations" and "cost-effectiveness
analyses" have become the bywords
and tools of Reserve Bank management.
And as in private industry, there is a
sense in which a Reserve Bank can and
ought to view itself as something akin to
a profit-maximizing firm. At the least, a
Reserve Bank must recognize its
responsibility for minimizing the cost of
providing adequate service to the
public. This is the challenge that
Reserve Bank management must face.
And so long as the Federal Reserve
identifies public needs first and then
charts the best course for meeting them,
it can meet the challenge, no matter
what new demands may be made of the
central bank in the future.

Summary of operations
Dollar amount
1977

Number

1976

1977

1976

Clearing and collection operations

Commercial bank checks collected . . . 906.4 billion
U.S. Government checks collected 1 . . . 46.8 billion
Automated payments processed
3.1 billion
Wire transfers of funds
7.1 trillion
Corporate and municipal bonds,
coupons and other noncash items
collected
1.8 billion

798.8
42.2
0.9
6.0

billion
billion
billion
trillion

1.9 billion 3

2.0
96.3
10.0
3.7

billion
million
million
million

1.8
104.2
3.2
3.4

billion
million
million
million

538.5 thous.

567.5 thous.3

894.3
302.6
1.6
226.0

890.8
271.7
1.8
244.7

C u r r e n c y a n d related o p e r a t i o n s

Currency received and counted
7.1 billion
Unfit currency withdrawn
1.2 billion
Coin received and counted
215.5 million
Food stamps received and processed . 873.1 million

6.8
1.2
229.5
938.5

billion
billion
million
million

million
million
billion
million

million
million
billion
million

Loans to m e m b e r banks

Total loans made during year
Banks accommodated

6.3 billion
—

2.6 billion
—

2,001
209

560
114

Services to U.S. Treasury

Marketable Government securities
issued, serviced and redeemed:
Definitive securities
Book entry securities
U.S. savings bonds issued,
serviced and redeemed
Federal taxes processed2

4.9 billion
734.5 billion

21.3 billion 3
626.4 billion 3

326.7 thous.
268.8 thous.

750.6 thous.3
267.3 thous.3

3.7 billion
48.6 billion

3.6 billion
41.4 billion

60.2 million
0.8 million

55.6 million
4.4 million

7.7 billion
37.6 billion 3

1.5 million

1.6 million

1.1 billion

12.4 thous.

M e m b e r bank "service" operations

Safekeeping of securities:
Definitive, balance December 31 . . . 8.2 billion
Book entry, balance December 31 . . 42.3 billion
Securities purchased and sold
for member banks
1.3 billion

—

—

11.6 thous.

'Includes postal money orders.
2

Number count for items processed changed in last quarter 1976 f r o m tax deposit forms to transmittal letters

which represent multiple deposit forms.
3

Revised.

Statement of

condition
(in thousands

of

dollars)

As of December 31
1977
Assets
Gold certificate account
Interdistrict settlement account
Special drawing rights
certificate account
Coin

1976

1,735,954
89,375

1,704,081
570,496

198,000
24,371

190,000
36,278

41,575

7,020

1,282,151
16,166,456

1,087,925
14,935,629

Total loans and securities

17,490,182

16,030,574

Cash items in process of collection
Bank premises
Other assets

1,366,649
15,686
261,533

1,182,956
15,715
238,751

Total assets

21,181,750

19,968,851

Liabilities
Federal Reserve notes

15,427,599

13,895,922

3,591,303
704,511
41,355
90,167

3,713,914
824,742
36,062
222,489

4,427,336

4,797,207

834,240
178,509

837,098
142,708

20,867,684

19,672,935

157,033
157,033

147,958
147,958

314,066

295,916

21,181,750

19,968,851

Loans and securities:
Loans secured by U.S. Government
securities
Other loans
Federal agency securities
U.S. Government securities

Deposits:
Member bank reserves
U.S. Treasury—general account
Foreign
Other
Total deposits
Deferred availability cash items
Other liabilities
Total liabilities
Capital accounts
Capital paid in
Surplus
Total capital
Total liabilities and capital

12

Statement of earnings
(in thousands

of

dollars)
Year ending December 31
1977

Current earnings:
Interest on loans to member banks
Interest on Government securities
Interest on investments of
foreign currencies
All other

1976

2,763
1,082,419

639
1,006,357

422
239

4,320
251

1,085,843

1,011,567

79,726
7,370

78,053
6,009

Total current expenses
Less reimbursement for certain
fiscal agency and other expenses

87,096

84,062

7,726

7,291

Current net expenses

79,370

76,771

1,006,473

934,796

Total current earnings
Current expenses:
Operating expenses
Cost of Federal Reserve currency

Current net earnings
Additions to (or deductions from)
current net earnings:
Net profit (or loss) on sales
of securities
Net profit (or loss) on foreign
exchange transactions
Assessment for expenses of
Board of Governors
All other—net
Net additions (or deductions)
Net earnings before payments to
U.S. Treasury
Distribution of net earnings:
Dividends paid
Payments to U.S. Treasury (as interest
on Federal Reserve notes)
Transferred to surplus

(7,994)

5,111

(21,958)

(3,836)

(7,153)
2,141

(6,365)
154

(34,964)

(4,936)

971,509

929,860

9,144

8,661

953,290
9,075

915,095
6,104

971,509

929,860

13

1977 directors
PETER B. CLARK, Chairman
Chairman of the Board and
Evening News
Association
Detroit,
Michigan

President

JAY J. DeLAY
President
Huron Valley National
Ann Arbor,
Michigan

OSCAR G. MAYER
Chairman,
Executive
Committee
Oscar Mayer & Co.
Madison,
Wisconsin

Bank

ROBERT H. STROTZ, Deputy Chairman
President
Northwestern
University
Evanston, Illinois

PAUL V. FARVER
Vice Chairman
Rolscreen
Company
Pella, Iowa

A. ROBERT ABBOUD
Chairman of the Board
The First National Bank of
Chicago,
Illinois

JOHN T. HACKETT
Executive Vice President
Cummins Engine Company,
Columbus,
Indiana

Chicago

LEO H. SCHOENHOFEN
Chicago,
Illinois
JOHN F. SPIES
President
Iowa Trust and
Savings Bank
Emmetsburg,
Iowa

Inc.

Board of Directors, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, from left to right:
Schoenhofen;
(standing) Messrs. Farver, Hackett, Spies, Mayer, Delay,

(seated) Messrs. Strotz,
Abboud.

Federal Advisory Council Member

Auditors

EDWARD BYRON SMITH

FRED A. DONS, General

Carman
of the Board
The Northern Trust Company
Chicago, Illinois

Detroit

(reporting

to Board of

Clark,

Directors)

Auditor

RICHARD P. BUSH, Assistant General
ROBERT A. LUDWIG, Assistant General

Auditor
Auditor

branch

JORDAN B. TATTER, Chairman
President and Chief Executive
Officer
Southern Michigan Cold Storage Company
Benton Harbor,
Michigan
HERBERT H. D O W
Secretary
The Dow Chemical
Midland,
Michigan

14

H A R O L D A. ELGAS
President
Gaylord State Bank
Gaylord,
Michigan

Company

JOSEPH B. FOSTER
President
Ann Arbor Bank & Trust
Ann Arbor,
Michigan

Company

CHARLES R. M O N T G O M E R Y
President
Michigan Consolidated
Gas Company
Detroit,
Michigan

BENJAMIN H. PADDOCK III
President
City National Bank of Detroit
Detroit,
Michigan
JOHN SAGAN
Vice
President-Treasurer
Ford Motor
Company
Dearborn,
Michigan

1977 officers

WILLIAM H. GRAM, Assistant General
Assistant Secretary
CAROL P. KASPAR, Assistant Vice

ROBERT P. M A Y O , President
DANIEL M . DOYLE, First Vice

President

President

President

LARRY R. MOTE, Senior Economist
Assistant Vice

and

President

JAMES H. NASH, JR., Assistant

Counsel

RICHARD H. RAMSDELL, Assistant Vice

President

HARVEY ROSENBLUM, Senior Economist
Robert

P. Mayo

Daniel M.

Doyle

Assistant Vice

D A V I D R. STARIN, Assistant Vice
General Counsel, and

Secretary

President

HILBERT G. SWANSON, Assistant Vice

and

President

WARREN J. TAUBMAN, Assistant Vice

President

President

PATRICK J. TRACY, Assistant Chief

of Research

HARRY S. SCHULTZ, Senior Vice
BRUCE L. SMYTH, Senior Vice

RUTH F. VILONA, Assistant Vice

President

CARL C. WELKE, Assistant Vice

President

President

President
President

ROBERT W . WELLHAUSEN, Assistant Vice

President

GEORGE W . CLOOS, Economic
Vice President

Adviser

ROBERT P. CORNELISEN, Vice

and

Assistant Director

FREDERICK S. D O M I N I C K , Vice

President

PATRICIA W . WISHART, Assistant Vice President

President

FRANKLIN D. DREYER, Vice

Examiner

T H O M A S C. TUCKER, Assistant Vice

President

RICHARD D. ABRAHAMSON, Vice

and

of Research

T H O M A S L. WOLFE, Examining

Officer

President

Detroit

President

RODERICK L. HOUSENGA, Chief
JOSEPH G. KVASNICKA, Economic
Vice President

Adviser

and

RONALD L. ZILE, Vice

RICHARD A. MOFFATT, Vice

Adviser

President

ROBERT W . C O O K , Assistant Vice

President
President

Manager

President

WAYNE R. BAXTER, Assistant Vice

WILLIAM T. NEWPORT, Vice

DOROTHY M . NICHOLS, Economic

branch

WILLIAM C. C O N R A D , Vice President and

Examiner

Vice

President

ARTHUR G. STONE, Assistant Vice

KARL A. SCHELD, Senior Vice President

PAUL J. BETTINI, Vice

President

President,

JAMES R. MORRISON, Senior Vice

Director

and

President

WALTER A. SIENKO, Assistant Vice
W A R D J. LARSON, Senior Vice

and

President

DANIEL P. KINSELLA, Assistant Vice
ERICH K. KROLL, Assistant Vice

Counsel

President

ROBERT M . FITZGERALD, Assistant Vice

President

and

Des Moines office

President

WILLIAM ROONEY, Vice

President

RUDOLPH W . DYBECK, Vice

R A Y M O N D M . SCHEIDER, Vice

President

ROBY L. SLOAN, Vice President

President

and

Associate Director

of Research

T H O M A S P. KILLEEN, Assistant Vice

Indianapolis

President

office

ADOLPH J. STOJETZ, Vice

President

LOUIS J. PUROL, Vice

EUGENE J. WAGNER, Vice

President

RICHARD L. SIMMS, JR., Assistant Vice

ALLEN G. WOLKEY, Vice

President
President

President

BUDDIE J. BELFORD, Assistant Vice

President

Milwaukee

office

HARRIS C. BUELL, JR., Assistant Vice

President

CARL E. VANDER WILT, Vice

CHARLES W . FURBEE, Assistant Vice

President

RUSSELL O . LANGAN, Assistant Vice

President
President

15

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