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EARLY FRUITS OF
VICTORY

Thirty-second Annual Report
of the

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
OF PHILADELPHIA

1946
Third Federal Reserve District




EARLY FRUITS OF
VICTORY

Thirty-second Annual Report
of the

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
OF PHILADELPHIA

1946
Third Federal Reserve District

CONTENTS

Page

Introduction .....................................................................................

1

Conferences with bankers.........................................................

2

Business conditions in 1946 ........................................................

4

The clash over wages...............................................................

5

The clash over prices ...............................................................

6

Jobs for all................................................................................... 10
A year of shortages..................................

11

What the consumer really got................................................ 12
Banking developments...................................................................

14

Banking in wartime ................................................................. 14
Banking policy in peacetime..........................

15

Earnings and profits .................................................................

18

Sharing the responsibility......................................................... 18
The Federal Reserve........................................................................ 19
Federal Reserve credit............................................................... 20

General operations...................................................................... 21

Directors and officers................................................................. 22
Appendix ......................................................................................... 25
(Contains tables listed on page 25)




FEDERAL RESERVE BANK

OF PHILADELPHIA

April 30, 1947.

To the Member Ban\s in the
Third Federal Reserve District:

This Thirty'second Annual Report of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia reviews
developments in business and banking during
the post'war period. Entitled the “Early
Fruits of Victory,” it deals particularly with
the diverse problems of the period and the
manner in which they are being met.




Alfred H. Williams
President.

EARLY FRUITS OF VICTORY

For more than a year since VJ Day the American economy
has shown conflicting movements that on balance emphasize
inflationary pressures. Diversity of action as well as confusion of
counsel in many quarters has tended to obscure the meaning of
the victory that has been achieved at such heavy cost. But if we
sink our shafts of thought below the surface, these appearances
acquire a constructive significance of fundamental importance. We
need only remember earlier periods of war and reconstruction to
recall that apparent impairment of the unity of purpose and effort
that made victory possible is an immediate consequence of military
defeat of a powerful foe. Developments since the end of the Second
World War show just about the usual manifestations that accorm
pany the complex transition of the economy from wartime to
peacetime activities.

It need occasion no surprise that conflict seems to be the order
of the day in this country. Cleavages of objectives and desires are
inherent in every human society. A fundamental distinction
between democracy and dictatorship is the attitude toward such
differences in aims, purposes and desires. Democratic societies foster
and encourage personal and independent views. Each member is
free to enter his ideas in competition with those of his fellows.
The only requirements are that in political life he submit to the
decision of the majority and that in economic life he yield to the
decision of the market place operating under democratically estab'
lished rules of conduct. An immediate decision, of course, may be
wrong; but when the majority so decides, they may change it.
Variety of ideas gives strength, resilience, and adaptability to
democratic institutions as well as significance, color and zest to the
lives of democratic citizens. Differences of opinion are the basis
for progress and are the very tissue of democratic society.
In a dictatorship, on the other hand, differences of opinion are
not tolerated. The State alone determines both the goals of society




1

Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Banl{ of Philadelphia
and the means of achieving them. Those suspected of disagreement
are “liquidated.” In an attempt to promote the notion that the
State is omniscient and thus is infallible, programs may be con'
tinued even after it becomes obvious that they are based on error
in conception and judgment.

The apparent unity of dictatorships and the apparent disunity
of democracies are often misinterpreted as demonstrations of
strength and weakness. Twice within a generation dictators have
made this mistake. Both instances have proved that the citizens of
democracy are after all united on a basic principle. They agree
on the right of each member to his own opinion, on the right to
disagree. They will defend that right with their lives and fortunes.
They even submerge actual disagreements on important but obviously lesser matters in defense of this basic principle. Democracies
are strong in war because each citizen is defending for himself
what all citizens of a dictatorship are defending only for the State.
When war is in progress, rights tend to be submerged and
duties emphasized. It is understandable that citizens of a democracy want to make sure after defeat of an external enemy that they
have indeed won the victory. They want to know with certainty
that they can exercise the fundamental right to disagree. The final
test, of course, is to disagree in fact. The first full year of peace
has brought conclusive evidence in this respect that victory has
been real. The present ferment, therefore, may well presage greater
strides of democratic progress, just as it did after the Civil War.

Our future is neither assured nor determined. During the war
we demonstrated our ability to discharge responsibilities. Since the
end of the war we have been busily reasserting our rights. In the
long run, however, continued progress depends on achieving and
maintaining proper balance between rights and duties.
Informed discussion is always an essential ingredient
of
democratic process. Exchanges of views are
particularly important in periods of fundamental changes and con­
sequent readjustment to new conditions. Conscious of its respon­
sibility as well as opportunity for service in this district, this
Bank has developed a program of conferences with the bankers in
the field in an attempt not only to discuss current problems of
2
Conferences
with bankers




Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Ban\ of Philadelphia

mutual interest but also to seek solutions to these problems through
cooperative efforts.

The first step in the program was to intensify the work of the
Federal Reserve Relations Committee. This Committee had been
formed originally some twenty years ago primarily to discuss
technical aspects of the relation between the Federal Reserve Bank
and the commercial banks of the district. The Committee was
revitalized in 1945 to discuss broader aspects of business, banking,
and credit developments.
Two all'day meetings were held at this Bank in 1946: one on
May 17 and the other on October 18. Participants included twenty'
six members elected or appointed by bank groups and state asso*
dations representing some 900 banks in this district. Also present
were the principal officers of state bankers’ assodations and officers
of this Bank.

Agenda were carefully planned and outlined. Included in the
discussion were such subjects as developments in lending and
investment; bank operating problems, with particular emphasis on
sources of earnings and factors of cost; and developments in corn
trolling inflationary pressures, with spedal reference to the debt
retirement program of the Treasury, private credit expansion, and
credit control proposals as outlined in the Board of Governors’
Annual Report for 1945. The results of these discussions were
printed in booklets, copies of which were sent to all banks in the
district. Over the years these records should provide valuable
history of contemporary thinking on banking and credit in this
district.
The second step in the program has been the development of
field conferences for the interchange of ideas with small groups of
executive bank officers, one from each bank. These groups range
in size from ten to thirty, with an average of about twenty bankers.
About forty such conferences have been held, covering all counties
in the district. Where counties were relatively small, two or more
were combined into one group.

These field conferences were organized largely on the basis of
the discussions at the meetings of the Federal Reserve Relations




3

Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Ban\ of Philadelphia
Committee but with particular emphasis on local conditions. At
least four officers of this Bank participated in each of these con*
ferences. A senior officer acted as moderator and kept the discus'
sion within the general framework outlined in advance. All
officers of this Bank have participated and staff members have
attended most of the meetings. Under a cooperative arrangement
with the Pennsylvania State College, county farm agents, and
frequently the director of agricultural extension or his assistants
also participated.

The underlying idea of these field conferences and that of meet'
ings of the Federal Reserve Relations Committee has been to
provide an opportunity for intimate discussion of banking and
credit problems by a limited number of executive bank officers. The
primary objective of these conferences has been to stimulate dis'
cussions and factual analyses as essential steps in searching for
solutions of the problems in the light of changing conditions in
the economy. In developing ea,ch discussion an attempt was made
to bring out the experiences and views of each participant both
on difficulties common to the group and on broader problems affect'
ing banking and credit.

The initial response to these conferences has been beyond
expectation. It shows that the broadened program of bank and
public relations fills a void that has apparently been growing over
the years. Requests for continuing the field meetings are most
encouraging particularly as they indicate that the program is both
well conceived and workable. This outcome is gratifying, and at
the same time it imposes heavy responsibilities upon the officers
of this Bank to encourage and carry on free discussion and inter'
change of ideas in mutual confidence.

Business Conditions in 1946
The clash of interests and opinions was reflected in all segments
of the economy. Production, prices, and income felt their impact.
Opposing groups sought to make their influences felt by both poli'
tical and economic means, and the progress of transition was




4

Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
retarded by a welter of conflicting arguments and opposing sets of
“facts.” By comparison, the physical problems of reconversion —
the redesigning of products and the assembly of tools — were easy.
For most industries reconversion was accomplished by the first
quarter of the year. The controversies over wages and prices,
however, continued bitter and voluminous.

The industrial disputes of early 1946 had their origin
jn
events which transpired immediately after V-J
Day. The curtailment of munitions production had caused gross
weekly earnings in manufacturing industries to drop from an aver'
age of $47.50 at the beginning of 1945 to $40.87 in September.
Labor wanted to maintain its “take home” pay; management, faced
with reconversion difficulties of an unpredictable nature, held that
wages could not be raised without raising prices.
The clash
over wages

The decision to free wages from Government control and the
abolition of the War Labor Board almost immediately after V-J
Day precipitated a long series of industrial disputes which resulted
in what was later known as the “first round” of wage increases.
It began with the work stoppage in the oil refineries which led to
their seizure by the Government.
It was the General Motors strike which began late in November
1945 that set the pattern for wage negotiations early in 1946. The
fact-finding board appointed by the President investigated the
dispute and recommended a 17^2 Per cent wage boost. There was
no settlement at that time, however, and late in January the workers
in the steel, electrical manufacturing, meat packing, and farm
equipment industries went on strike. One and one-half million
workers were directly involved in these disputes, and many more
were indirectly affected by the stoppage of parts and material flow
through the industrial machine. Production in the Third Federal
Reserve District, which seemed to be making a recovery from the
low point reached in October, dropped nearly 20 percent in Feb­
ruary owing to a sharp decline in durable goods output. The pro­
duction of consumers’ goods was not affected by the strikes, and
production in those lines hit a record high in February.

The crisis in production resulted in the issuance of Executive
Order 9697 — the Wage-Price Stabilization Plan of February 14.




5

Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Ban\ of Philadelphia
Additional Government controls were established over wages,
but increases in pay were to be permitted in accordance with the
numerous precedents which had been set throughout industry in
the previous months. Price increases were to be permitted to the
extent necessary to offset increased labor costs. The steel dispute
was immediately settled on the basis of this plan, and this, together
with other recommendations of a fact-finding board, became the
basis for the settlement of scores of strikes. It was hoped that the
realignment of wages and prices on a slightly higher level would
correct inequalities and distortions which had developed and would
make it possible to stave off a wage-price spiral until production
could be increased sufficiently to meet existing demands.

Industrial production recovered somewhat in March but the
bituminous coal strike, which lasted for almost two months, sent it
down again in April and May. An anthracite strike of seven days’
duration took place in June, but by the end of that month the
“first round” of industrial disputes had been about completed and
durable goods production moved upward. In July, factory employ­
ment in Pennsylvania rose to its highest point since the beginning
of the year, though it remained considerably below the average
for 1945.
During the first half of 1946 there was increasing
controversy over price control. Its proponents said it
was necessary to continue it in order to keep the gap between
money supply and goods from causing a runaway inflation. Its
opponents pointed to distortions in the structure of prices and to
the need for encouraging production by price increases. Both sides
wanted to do away with price control as soon as possible. Every­
one agreed that its retention would be incompatible with the free
peacetime economy which we were trying to reestablish. But there
was considerable disagreement as to the timing of its discontinu­
ance. Price revisions permissible under the existing regulation
allowed wholesale prices to advance 5 percent from January to
June, and the consumers’ price index for Philadelphia rose from
129 to 133 percent of the 1935-1939 average.

The clash
oyer pnces

The controversy culminated in the lapse of price control after
the President’s veto of a modified extension bill late in June. Dur-




6

Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Banh of Philadelphia




BUSINESS CONDITIONS

7

Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Ban\ of Philadelphia
ing the three-week price holiday that ensued, prices rose rapidly.
They were not effectively harnessed by the compromise price con­
trol extension bill that was passed in July. Lifting of controls on
meat and acceleration of the removal of ceilings on other products
in October presaged an early end to all price regulation. It came
on November 9—seven months before the statutory limit. Sugar,
rice, and rents were the only items over which the Government
retained control. By the end of the year, wholesale prices had
attained a level of 175 or one-third above the previous year. The
cost of living in Philadelphia had risen to 153 per cent of the
1935-1939 average.
Remaining wage controls, since they were closely connected
to prices, were also abandoned. Faced with a sharp rise in the cost
of living, organized labor indicated its intention of asking for more.
While the interim between July and November was relatively free
of strikes, the coal dispute which started in the latter month was
especially significant because it was apparently the beginning of
a “second round” of major wage increase demands. With many
other union contracts subject to early renegotiation, the coal settle­
ment could have been a very important precedent. After legal
action had been started against the coal miners, the strike was
called off and its settlement postponed. Negotiations for adjust­
ments of wage demands in other industries proceeded smoothly,
and the month of December had the lowest level of strikes since
the end of the war. Production in this district, at 142 per cent
of the 1935-1939 average, exceeded the 1941 level for the first
time since V-J Day. The rate of recovery in industrial production
for the district was somewhat behind that for the rest of the
country because of a marked decline in wartime shipbuilding.

While the issue of still higher wages was debated vigorously
both in the press and on the platform, organized labor in leading
industries did not press for a second round of wage increases.
Attitudes of labor leaders were undoubtedly tempered by the
prospect of unfavorable Congressional action and the danger of a
business recession. A slump in business activity had been widely
forecast in a series of predictions from many sources since the stock
market slump in September. Management on its part, perhaps
tempered by rising profits, was conciliatory.




8

Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

CONSUMER PRICES IN PHILADELPHIA

Whatever the reasoning behind it, at the end of the year both
sides had apparently come to the realization that a continuation of
the wage-price spiral of the spring and summer and repeated inter­
ruptions of production would have unfavorable consequences for
all. The possibility of serious strikes remained, but we learned a
great deal from our experience during 1946. The first fruits of
victory in labor-management relations may well have been in the
form of a lesson in making democracy work.

Developments in the first quarter of 1947 bore out this hope.
Unlike the early months of 1946, when at one time lpi million
workers were out on strike, few strikes of more than local impor­
tance occurred. Labor-management relations were marked by
increasing moderation and restraint, and major issues were resolved
without work stoppages.
An entirely different business climate prevailed early in 1947.
Business had became reaccustomed to operation without Govem-




9

Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Ban\ of Philadelphia
ment controls and the public had been reacclimated to the exercise
of choice in free markets. Negotiations with respect to price
changes were not necessary. Problems of physical reconversion
were passe. A smoother flow of production, growing efficiency,
and an increased ability on the part of management to plan ahead
allowed for greater leeway in wage negotiations. Aided by favor*
able tax revisions, over-all earnings in trade and industry were
relatively high. As it became generally apparent that earnings,
with few exceptions, had been substantially higher in 1946 than the
preceding year, management was inclined to grant wage concessions.

Although a second round of wage increases began during the
first quarter of 1947, wage rates were already high as measured by
past standards. Consumption had not declined noticeably, and the
dearth of purchasing power which some feared might cause a
recession was not clearly in sight. Labor was therefore inclined to
moderate its demands. In a statement to the press, however, the
President emphasized the need for higher wages if rising prices
continued to cut into purchasing power. On the other hand, many
business men still held to the view that any wage increase would
necessitate proportionate increases in prices. Rapidly rising prices
rekindled the conflict.
But the most important factor of all in the situation, which
made for a smoother running economy at the outset of 1947, was
the fact that the experience of the previous year was well
remembered. People remained conscious of the danger involved
in continuing the wage-price spiral, and no one wanted to repeat
the production losses which occurred in the first half of 1946. In
this atmosphere collective bargaining seemed to take an encourag­
ing turn in the process of settling industrial disputes. Production
of goods and services was maintained at high levels.

In the first full year of peace practically all of our
human and material resources were being used, and
cash registers rang up a new retail trade record. National income
consisting of money payments to labor and capital employed in
production amounted to $165 billion, which surpassed that of 1945.
As a nation we produced and consumed more goods and services
than in any previous year of peace; nevertheless, consumers had

fobs

for all




10

Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Bank, of Philadelphia
to go without many things they wanted because goods were in
greater demand than our capacity to produce.

The year began with 53 million in the civilian labor force
and 6 million in the armed forces; it ended with the latter reduced
to 2 million and the civilian labor force expanded to more than
58 million. Nevertheless, thousands of establishments still had their
“help wanted” shingles hanging outside. In almost every line
unfilled orders were piled up to die ceiling — demands for housing,
household appliances, automobiles, and clothing appeared to be
insatiable. Business eagerly employed returning veterans but in
many lines of activity jobs went begging. At the end of 1946
more people were employed in manufacturing, mining, construc­
tion, trade, and transportation than at the beginning of the year,
and unemployment was negligible.
One of the outstanding changes in the labor market was a
continuation in the liquidation of jobs in war industries and the
expansion of jobs in peacetime industries. In the Philadelphia
area, employment decreased in the manufacture of aircraft, ord­
nance, and shipbuilding, but new jobs opened up in all other lines
resulting in a net gain in employment. Although unemployment
was one of the least of our worries in 1946, Congress debated
whether private enterprise or the Federal Government should
assume responsibility for maintaining sufficiently high levels of
employment to assure prosperity. The influence of the issue was
reflected in the Employment Act of 1946 which recognized the
interest of the Government in maintaining conditions favorable to
a high level of employment. The real significance and implications
of this Act will be frilly realized only with the passage of time and
the state of the economy over the years.

The persistence of shortages of many though a diminishing number of items throughout the year served to
remind us that supply lines in peace, like those in war, are long.
From the farmer or the miner to the retailer is a long road, as most
of us learned in our efforts to restock pantry shelves and linen
closets. Fortified with an abundance of buying power derived
from both past savings and current earnings, consumers competed
vigorously with each other for everything that appeared in the

A year of
shortages




11

Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Ban\ of Philadelphia

market; and producers at every stage, from the retailer back to
suppliers of raw materials, likewise had to fight for supplies, equip*
ment, and labor.

Throughout the year industrial production as measured by the
Federal Reserve Board’s seasonally adjusted index expanded from
160 to 182 per cent of the 1935*39 average. This is more indica*
tive of total productive activity than of output of finished goods,
because many of the materials and hours of work that went into
the productive machine did not emerge in the form of end products
for consumption in 1946.
Many customers were perplexed by the persistent scarcity of
goods in the face of expanding production. The explanation lies
not only in the fact that a substantial part of the output consisted
of machines, materials, and supplies for producers, but also in the
fact that inventories had to be replenished all along the line. It
is estimated that inventories increased by $10 billion throughout
the year. Probably as much as one*third of that was price increase,
but shelves and stock piles were generously replenished.

Somewhat in excess of $10 billion worth of new construction
was put in place in 1946. This was more than double the activity
of the preceding year. Despite the very substantial increase, the
output of finished structures ready for use fell behind both plans
and expectations, owing largely to insufficient materials and labor.
In the case of residential construction, for example, the Veterans’
Emergency Housing Program early in the year called for initiating
construction of 1,200,000 dwellings. Actually only one million
were started and not quite half a million were completed. In this
district, contract awards of all types amounted to $400 million but,
as elsewhere, rising costs discouraged some new ventures and com*
pletions were delayed for want of skilled craftsmen, or hardware,
or millwork, or nails.

After paying their 1946 taxes, individuals had $146
billion left for their own use. Of that amount they
rea y got
saved $19 billion and spent $127 billion. Spending
and saving reverted to about the pre*war pattern — people spent
more and saved less than during the war years. In addition to the
obvious fact that they had more money, people spent more than
What the
consumer




12

Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Ban\ of Philadelphia

the year before for two reasons. Goods were more plentiful, and
they cost more.
People had to spend more money for food than in 1945. Food
stores did almost $25 billion worth of business — oneffifth above
the previous year. Price increases, however, accounted for a sub'
stantial part of the expansion in dollar volume; in December food
prices averaged about 30 per cent above those at mid'year. Dollar'
wise, the country’s farmers produced a record output but physical
quantities were below the previous year and less than the 1944
peak. Gross farm income in the three states represented in the
Third District was only fractionally above that of 1945. Dairy
and poultry farmers, so prominent in this area, were handicapped
by the tight feed situation.
Unable to obtain all the durables they wanted, people spent
heavily on nondurables such as apparel, food and drink, but
throughout the year more and more durables became available.
Automobile manufacturers overcame the handicaps of material
shortages sufficiently to turn out two million cars. Though con'
sumer needs were by no means satisfied, they bought increasing
quantities of radios, refrigerators, washing machines, and related
household requirements.

The changing pattern of consumption is revealed by department
store sales. Stores in this district sold more goods of practically
every kind in 1946 than in 1945, but the greatest increases took
place in such lines as household appliances, furniture, and floor
coverings. Toward the end of the year consumer buying reflected
increasing resistance to rising prices.

Most restraints imposed on our economy during the war were
removed in 1946. Differences of opinion over wages were settled
democratically, and all resources were turned to the production of
goods for civilian markets. Though tremendous energy was
exerted, complete fulfillment of all requirements was not attained
owing to large accumulation of consumer needs backed up by heavy
spending power and by reason of supply difficulties. In the overall
view, despite some shortcomings and failures, the unrestricted play
of conflicting opinions and ideas was paying off. Free men working
together in a free nation had again proved a powerful combination.




13

Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Ban\ of Philadelphia

Banking Developments
With the transition from war to peace, the evolution of sound
banking policy and program has not been simple. Faced with an
excessive accumulation of spending power in the hands of the
public and aware of many distortions in the economy, commercial
banks have had none too easy a task in developing policies that
mitigate rather than contribute to the distortions. In most
instances safety of deposits and maintenance of income have proved
far less a problem than the correct evaluation of “service to the
community” — one of the three objectives usually regarded as basic
in commercial bank operations.
During the war, bankers as well as industrialists
adapted their operations to the requirements of the
time. Helping to sell bonds for the Treasury, restricting credits
where the public welfare would not be served and extending credit
where war aims would be furthered — these were part of their
operations. The prime mover in these activities was a sense of
patriotic responsibility rather than compulsions.
Banking
tn wartime

Banks came out of the war with assets and liabilities altered
both in volume and nature far beyond any expectations that might
have been held when we stood on its threshold. True enough, at
the close of the 1930’s the volume of United States Government
securities in bank portfolios was much larger than it had been in
the 1920’s — a result of the deficit financing of the depression
and post-depression years. But in the six years ended December
194? member bank holdings of Governments in this district were
multiplied five and one-half times. This reflected the failure of
taxes and absorption of securities by nonbank investors alone to
supply the funds necessary to finance a war in which expenditures
for one year alone were about three times as large as total costs
of World War I.
Loans to support the purchase or carrying of Treasury securities
increased. Accommodation for business purposes in this district,
following a rise through 1941, declined by June 194? to a point
substantially lower than in pre-war 1939. Advance Government
payments on contracts, progress payments, and accumulation of
internal resources enabled many business concerns in war lines to




14

Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Ban\ of Philadelphia
run at top speed without much help from the usual credit sources.
Consumer credit also contracted materially.

The changed pattern of bank earning assets is illustrated in the
following percentage breakdown:
United States

Member Banks
(End of year)

Loans ...........................................
U. S. Gov’t obligations ...........
Other securities ...................

Total ........................ ..

Third Federal
Reserve District

1939

1945

1946

1939

1945

1946

41%
42
17

21%
73
6

28%
65
7

41%
33
26

16%
75
9

24%
66
10

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

In the discharge of its wartime responsibilities, the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in participation with other Reserve
banks also purchased very large amounts of Government securities
after 1941. The Reserve banks stood squarely behind the Govern­
ment’s financial program, enabling banks to meet a greatly expanded
demand for currency and to obtain the reserves needed to carry
growing deposit structures. Largely on the basis of increased
holdings of Governments by the banking system, member bank
deposits in this district increased from $3^ billion in 1939 to
$6% billion in 1945 and the Federal Reserve notes of this Bank
expanded from $349 million to $1,635 million.

In the last half of 1945 there was an overlapping of
war finance and the financing of peacetime activities.
yhe jag^. great war |oan dr£ve was held in December of
that year, but in this district loans to finance civilian industry were
already pointing upward. Consumer credit, which had fallen
sharply from the peak in 1941, was gaining momentum. Other
loans also were reviving.
Banking
poltcytn
peacettme

The decisions facing bankers at this point were crucial. Were
they to stay in the risldess market and depend upon their greatly
expanded holdings of Government securities to assure safety of
deposits and provide earnings? Or were they to revert to their
earlier function and give credit service to their communities and




15

Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Ban\ of Philadelphia

asstime the risks always to be found in this role? Opportunities
for expanding loans were plentiful in most communities. While
many businesses had abundant liquid assets, others needed funds
for reconversion, building up inventories and to carry receivables.
Consumers were ready to borrow to help finance their purchases.
And a real estate boom was under way, calling for large amounts
of mortgage money.
The record for 1946 indicates that bankers generally chose
to enter the loan field, most of them quite actively. Credit to
carry Government securities declined with the absorption of these
bonds, but the total loans of member banks in the Third District
increased by $329 million or 35 per cent. A further increase of
$90 million occurred in the first quarter of 1947, indicating no
abatement in the demand for loans. By the close of 1946 the
proportion of loans to total earning assets had risen to 24 per cent
and by March 1947 to 26 per cent, as against 16 per cent in the
middle of 1945. It was, of course, still far short of the 40 per cent
at the close of 1939 and 69 per cent in 1929, when total earning
assets were much lower.

Failure to even, approximate ratios in the earlier years cannot
be taken as evidence that bankers were not adequately serving
their communities. The whole background of banking had shifted
in two important respects — the war heritage of huge quantities
of Government securities in bank portfolios and a tremendous accu'
mulation of liquid assets in the hands of many business concerns
and individuals.
United States
Third Federal Reserve District
Member Bank
Loans
(Millions $) Dec. 1939 June 1945 Dec. 1946 Dec. 1939 June 1945 Dec. 1946

Business* ...
Security........
Real estate ..
Consumer ... j
All other ....

Total........

6,570
1,491
2,957
2,944 j

13,962

8,221
6,496
3,248
1,688
934

14,038
2,973
5,358
3,308
1,020

363
87
245
} 250

20,588

26,696

94S

* Including agricultural loans.




16

{

299
139
229
172
51

561
67
344
250
40

890

1,262

Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Bank, of Philadelphia
Analysis of the loan figures in the foregoing table shows that
in the period of approximately one and a half years to the end of
1946 all major types other than those made to carry securities
increased considerably.

In the post-war period there also was an accumulation of securi­
ties other than issues of the Federal Government. Holdings in this
district rose from $437 million in June 1945 to $564 million at
the close of 1946, and maintained this level in the first quarter
of 1947.
Management of their portfolios of United States Government
obligations was an important aspect of policy for banks. But in
this instance fiscal policy also played a considerable part. Many
short-term securities were retired from bank holdings by the Treas­
ury’s redemption program. The decline in Treasury issues was
much more marked at the city banks than at the country banks in
this district, as the latter group experienced gains in private
deposits sufficient to offset the heavy withdrawals from war loan
accounts. But whether the decline in short-term Governments was
due to redemptions or sales to meet deposit losses, the effect in
either case was to lengthen the average maturity of securities
remaining in the portfolios. This tendency was furthered slightly
by moderate purchases of medium-term issues, but was offset in
part by the shortening of maturities with the passage of time.
Reports from two-thirds of the commercial banks in this district
show the following changes during 1946:
Investment in
Governments
(Millions $)

Philadelphia banks

Banks outside Philadelphia

Dec. 1945 Dec. 1946 Change Dec. 1945 Dec. 1946 Change

Bills, notes,
certificates .............
Bonds callable—
1946-1950 ...............
1951-1955 ...............
1956-1960 ...............
After 1960 .............
Nonmarketable issues

783

296

—487

893

605

—288

434
696
121
61
6

333
560
144
63
6

—101
—136
+ 23
+ 2

484
856
168
242
97

497
868
220
238
95

+
+
+
—
—

Total ....................

2,101

1,402

—699

2,740

2,523

Number of reporting
banks ......................

37

35

559

556




17

13
12
52
4
2

—217

Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Ban\ of Philadelphia

The decline in deposits resulting from the retirement of securities was in inactive war loan balances, part of which were trans­
ferred by the redemption process to the potentially more active
private deposits. These deposits also were expanded by bank loans
and bank purchases of securities other than obligations of the
Federal Government. It is the active means of payment that are
most important. The record of 1946 and early 1947 shows com­
modity prices up sharply after the removal of controls, inventories
up considerably, distortions in the economy, and other factors that
warrant careful examination of the reasons back of the credit
growth and that which may lie ahead.
Developments during the war years resulted in larger
profits for banks. Yields on securities and on loans
declined materially between 1939 and 1945, but this trend was
more than countered by the expansion in Government security
holdings, which for member banks in this district became the
largest single source of earnings.
Earnings
and profits

A substantial rise in total earnings was more than sufficient to
meet growing expenses and income taxes. Noncurrent receipts
from recoveries and profits on sales of securities also ran consider­
ably ahead of amounts charged off in 1945 and stayed ahead in
1946. The result was a racord level of profits in 1945 — nearly
$55 million as against $21 million in 1939. In 1946 current earn­
ings and expenses expanded further and two-thirds of the banks
reported larger net profits than in 1945, but the aggregate of such
profits declined to approximately $521/2 million.
Banks have paid out only about a third of their profits in the
last two years. The resulting additions to the capital structure will
be helpful in facing the risks to be assumed in credit granting over
the years to come.

The exercise of freedom of choice in personal and
business activities within rather broad limits — one
of the keystones of a democracy — implidfe a willingness to recog­
nize and assume correlative responsibilities. This is particularly so
in the case of bankers, whose actions may affect the volume of
money and the stability of monetary values. All of the broad
powers lodged in the hands of fiscal, credit and supervisory agen­
Sharing the
responsibility




ts

Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Ban\ of Philadelphia

cies, and such additional powers as they may be given cannot
displace the need for sound judgment on the part of individual
bankers. At a time such as this, when the volume of spending
power already in existence is so large, everyone who extends credit
has exceptional responsibilities.
It is actions of individuals — in banking, in industry, and in
trade — that will determine the extent to which we achieve the
full benefits of democracy. Errors will be made, but by the inter­
play of many minds the processes of business and finance can give
rise to a maximum of spiritual and material well-being.

The Federal Reserve
The central banking organisation, composed of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Reserve
Banks, has been directed to exercise its broad powers of credit
control in the public interest. Its general objective is to contribute
as much as possible to the smooth and sustained functioning of the
economy at a high level of activity.

Constant change in the economic picture requires that policies
be flexible — tailored to fit changing situations. During the war
the primary objective could be none other than to facilitate the
financing program of the Government. At the outset the Board
of Governors announced that “The System is prepared to use its
powers to assure that an ample supply of funds is available at
all times for financing the war effort and to exert its influence
toward maintaining conditions in the United States Government
security market that are satisfactory from the standpoint of the
Government’s requirements . . .”

This policy, bom of necessity, was faithfully carried out. In
the process, outstanding Federal Reserve credit increased tenfold
from $2.3 billion in early December 1941 to approximately $25
billion at the close of 1945. This expansion was a reflex of the
demand for huge quantities of currency and the increasing need
for larger bank reserves as deposit structures grew.




19

Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Ban\ of Philadelphia

The inflationary aspects of deposit and currency expansion
were obvious. Spending power, accumulated and currently being
made available through income payments, was out of line with the
supply of goods and might be expected to continue so for a long
time to come. Potentialities in part became actualities as controls
were eliminated and the unbalance of supply and demand was free
to exert its pervasive influence on the price structure. These
changed conditions were recognised in certain actions taken by
this Bank and other Reserve Banks during 1946. The preferential
discount rate on advances to member banks secured by short-term
Governments, established in 1942, was eliminated in the spring of
1946. And buying rates on bankers’ bills up to four months in
term were advanced somewhat.
A certain amount of pressure was exerted on bank reserves
by the Treasury’s debt redemption policy, at least to the extent
that it involved payment to the Reserve Banks of funds drawn
from commercial banks or that it increased required reserves
by shifting funds from reserve-free war loan accounts to private
deposits as nonbank security holdings were retired. The expansion
in private deposits, however, was adding to private purchasing
power and bank extension of private credit was having a like effect.
For all member banks in this district the figures show gross deposits
down one-half billion dollars in 1946, but that part of deposits
representing the balances of individuals and business concerns
increased by about the same amount.
Federal
Most of the credit extended by this Bank is reflected
credit'6
*n
participation in Government securities held in
cre **
the System Open Market Account. In this way the
Bank shares in any steps taken on a national basis to adjust the
volume of bank reserves and their availability to the money market.
An area remains, however, in which the Bank deals directly with
the district’s need for Federal Reserve credit.

Dollarwise the volume of direct borrowing from the Bank con­
tinues to be relatively minor. Nevertheless, of the approximately
650 members in the district, as many as forty were borrowing here
at one time in December and for the year as a whole the number
of members receiving such accommodation came to 113.




20

Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Ban\ of Philadelphia
A somewhat smaller number of banks — 87 — availed them'
selves of this Bank’s facilities for adjusting reserve positions through
the purchase or sale of Treasury bills. The dollar volume of bill
operations, however, exceeded that of discounts. Bills held by this
Bank under repurchase option ranged from $101 million to $254
million, and weekly purchases and sales were as high as $100 mil'
lion. Diminishing holdings by the commercial banks are narrowing
the opportunity for adjusting reserves through this medium.

Outside of the field of credit the Reserve Banks have
responsibility of contributing to the smooth flow
of business payments through check collection, currency supply,
and other functions, and of facilitating Treasury operations in
their roles as fiscal agents. Such operations, which the public has
come to take as a matter of course, require the great bulk of the
time of the stafF.
General
operations

The aggregate of issues, redemptions, and exchanges of Treas'
ury securities naturally dropped considerably in 1946, following
years of intensive activity revolving around great war loan drives
and heavy emphasis on inter'drive sales of securities. This per'
mitted a substantial reduction in the full'time staff of the Fiscal
Agency Department, elimination of part'time workers, and finally,
early in 1947, the return of the Savings Bond Division of
the Department from temporary facilities to the Bank’s regular
quarters.
The volume of Government checks handled also contracted
sharply with the reduction in war expenditures, but in other direc'
tions operations of the Bank increased substantially. In number
of pieces or transactions handled the increases over 1945 were as
follows: currency received and counted, 17 per cent; coins received
and counted, 14 per cent; ordinary checks handled, 24 per cent.
Somewhat smaller increases also were shown in noncash collections
and in transfers of funds. Securities held in custody for member
banks rose from $2.2 billion to about $2.5 billion.

In addition to the operations of more or less routine character,
the Bank administers regulations of the Board of Governors,
examines state bank members, and maintains a Department of
Research for its own needs and as a service to the banking and




21

Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Banl{ of Philadelphia
business public. Activities along research lines stepped up with
the coming of peace and reassertion of the normal forces bearing
upon banking and business. Statistical and analytical material is
made generally available through regular reports such as the
Business Review, special releases, and contributions to the data
required for meetings and investigations in banking and the business
field.

The administration of consumer credit controls under Regulation W continues to require the maintenance of an adequate staff
to keep contact with the many concerns granting such credit.
Approximately 12,000 are registered in this district. Our experience indicates that compliance with the terms of the regulation in
general has been very good.

The terms of John B. Henning as a Class A director
of
gank and James T. Buddey as a Class B director terminated at the end of 1946. In the regular election Mr.
Henning was re-elected by the banks of Group 3. Mr. Buckley was
unable to accept renomination. To succeed him the banks of Group
1 selected William J. Meinel, President and General Manager of
Heintz Manufacturing Company of Philadelphia. Warren F.
Whittier, whose term as a Class C director also expired on Decem­
ber 31, was reappointed for three years by the Board of Governors.
The Board of Governors appointed Thomas B. McCabe as Chair­
man of the Board and Federal Reserve Agent and Mr. Whittier
as Deputy Chairman in 1946 and redesignated them for service in
these capacities during 1947.
Directors
and officers

David E. Williams, President of the Com Exchange National
Bank and Trust Company of Philadelphia, represented this district
on the Federal Advisory Council during 1946 and was reappointed
by the Board of Directors of this Bank to serve during 1947.
Effective January 1, 1947, Robert N. Hilkert, formerly Assis­
tant Vice President in charge of personnel, was appointed a Vice
President. At the same time Richard G. Wilgus, Manager of the
Division of Reports and Analysis of the Bank Examination Depart­
ment, was appointed an Assistant Cashier. Early in 1946 Robert
R. Williams and James V. Vergari, Assistant Vice Presidents, were
also appointed Assistant Secretaries of the Bank.




22

Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Banl{ of Philadelphia

Directors

as of January 1, 1947
Group

Term, Expires
December 31

Howard A. Loeb............................................................
Chairman, Tradesmens National Bank and Trust
Company, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

1

1947

George W. Reily............................................................
President, Harrisburg National Bank,
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

2

1948

John B. Henning..........................................................
President, Wyoming National Bank,
Tunkhannock, Pennsylvania.

3

1949

William J. Meinel..........................................................
President and General Manager, Heintz Manu­
facturing Company, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

1

1949

Charles A. Higgins........................................................
Chairman and President, Hercules Powder
Company, Wilmington, Delaware.

2

1047

Albert G. Frost..............................................................
President, The Esterbrook Pen Company,
Camden, New Jersey.

3

1948

Class A:

Class B:

Class C:
Thomas B. McCabe, Chairman and Federal Reserve
Agent ...........................................................................
President, Scott Paper Company,
Chester, Pennsylvania.

1948

Warren F. Whittier, Deputy Chairman.....................
Agricultural Consultant,
Chester Springs, Pennsylvania.

1949

C. Canby Balderston .....................................................
Dean, Wharton School of Finance and Commerce,
University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

1947




23

Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Banl{ of Philadelphia

Officers
as of January 1, 1947
Alfred H. Williams, President

W. J. Davis,

L. E. Donaldson,

First Vice President

Assistant Vice President

C. A. McIlhenny,

Robert R. Williams,

Vice President

Assistant Vice President
and Assistant Secretary

Ernest C. Hill,

Vice President

James V. Vergari,

Assistant Vice President
and Assistant Secretary

C. A. Sienkiewicz,
Vice President

Karl R. Bopp,

William G. McCreedy,

Director of Research

Vice President and Secretary

Wallace M. Catanach,

Robert N. Hilkert,

Assistant Cashier

Vice President

Richard G. Wilgus,

Philip M. Poorman,

Assistant Cashier

Cashier




Norman G. Dash, General Auditor
24

Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Ban\ of Philadelphia

APPENDIX

Statistical Tables
Page
Statement of condition............................. 26
Profit and loss account............................. 27

Volume of operations............................... 28
Changes in member bank reserves and
related items.......................................... 29

Combined statement of member banks. 29
Applications for industrial loans.............

30

Member bank reserves............................. 30




25

Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Ban\ of Philadelphia

Statement of Condition
December 31

Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
(000’s omitted in dollar figures)

1944

1945

1946

RESOURCES
Gold certificates ........................................... $ 945,229
42,799
Redemption fund—Fed. Res. notes...........
Total gold certificate reserves......... $ 988,028
17,815
Other cash .....................................................
505
Discounts and advances..............................
2,570
Industrial loans ...........................................
1,252,245
United States Government securities.......

$ 878,051
61,134
$ 939,185
15,576
4,386
1,763
1,610,468

$ 858,145
61,009
$ 919,154
19,235
15,547
523
1,645,130

Total loans and securities___ .____

$1,255,320

$1,616,617

$1,661,200

Due from foreign banks..............................
Fed. Res. notes of other F. R. Banks.......
Uncollected items.........................................
Bank premises...............................................
All other resources.......................................

12
4,042
153,977
3,457
3,278

10
7,298
139,850
3,313
4,353

8
8,181
157,813
3,170
2,912

Total resources ........................ . . . . .

$2,425,930

$2,726,202

$2,771,673

LIABILITIES
Federal Reserve notes.................................. $1,427,510

$1,635,242

$1,699,277

710,778
28,722
106,353
4.578

799,634
59,678
72,195
4.308

818,125
34,511
39,555
2,424

Total deposits .................................... $ 850,431

$ 935,815

$ 894,615

105,809
613

106,130
500

122,081
528

Total liabilities .................................. $2,384,363

$2,677,687

$2,716,501

Deposits:
Member bank reserve account...............
U. S. Treasurer—general account.........
Foreign ....... .......................................
Other deposits . . .. ...................................
Deferred availability items..........................
Other liabilities.............................................

CAPITAL ACCOUNTS
Capital paid in............................................. . $
Surplus—Section 7.......................................
Surplus—Section 13b .. . ...............................
Reserves for contingencies..........................

$

13,926
34,720
4,489
2,037

12,227
19,872
4,468
5,000

$ 13,064
28,946
4,501
2,004

Total liabilities and capital accounts. $2,425,930

$2,726,202

$2,771,673

Ratio of gold certificate reserves to de­
posit and Federal Reserve note liabili­
ties combined ...........................................

43.4%

36.5%

35.4%

Commitments to make industrial advances

$3,048

$703

$1,281




26

Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Ban\ of Philadelphia
Profit and loss account
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
(000’s omitted)

1944

1945

1946

United States Government securities...

$7,275

$ 9,929

$10,600

Other sources ...........................................

165

134

192

Total earnings...................................

$7,440

$10,063

$10,792

Operating expenses*................................

$2,827

$ 3,007

$ 3,704

Cost of Federal Reserve currency.........

524

349

373

Assessment for expenses of Board of
Governors ..............................................

211

204

187

Total net expenses ..........................

$3,563

$ 3,560

$ 4,264

Current net earnings.....................................

$3,877

$6,503

$ 6,528

Earnings from:

Expenses:

Additions to current net earnings:

Profit on sales of U. S. Government
securities ................................................

$ 263

Transfers of reserves in excess of re­
quirements .............................................

86

150

55

Other additions .......................................

41

52

34

$ 390

$

$

256

458

Deductions from current net earnings....

4

Net additions to current earnings.............

$ 386

$

Net earnings available for distribution...

$4,263

$ 6,956

$

$

227

178

5

453

138

$

48

$ 6,577

Distribution of net earnings:

Paid to Treasury of U. S., Sec. 13b....
Dividends paid to member banks...........

Transferred to surplus (Sec. 13b).........
Transferred to surplus (Sec. 7).............

$

84
719
47

3,413f

$

84

0

766

814

32

6,074ft

—11**

5,774

* After deducting reimbursements received for certain fiscal agency and other
expenses.
** Transferred from surplus (Sec. 13b).
f $1,400,000 subsequently transferred from Surplus to Reserves for Contin­
gencies.
tt $3,000,000 also transferred to Surplus from Reserves for Contingencies.
27




Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Ban\ of Philadelphia

Volume of operations
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

1944

1945

1946

1
209,594
437,431
112,036

1
208,611
474,170
115,501

1
243,613
540,658
143,234

16,320

17,321

20,820

52,426
5,275-

70,155
5,041

34,410
832

1,299
185
63

1,373
180
65

1,400
193
69

25,479*
36

26,756*
22

17,241*
16

Pieces or transactions handled
(000’s omitted)
Discounts and advances..............................
Currency counted.........................................
Coins counted ...............................................
Ordinary checks ...........................................
Checks handled in packages by automobile
run service .................................................
U. S. Government checks (including Treas­
ury card checks first handled in 1943)..
Ration checks ............... ...............................
Collection items:
Coupons of U. S. Government and
agencies ...................................................
All other (notes, drafts and coupons)..
Transfers of funds™.............. ........................
Issues, redemptions, and exchanges by
Fiscal Agency Department:
U. S. Government direct obligations...
All other .....................................................

Dollar amounts
(000,000’s omitted)
Discounts and advances..............................
Currency counted.........................................
Coins counted ...............................................
Ordinary checks ...........................................
U. S. Government checks (including Treas­
ury card checks first handled in 1943)..
Collection items:
Coupons of U. S. Government and
agencies ...................................................
All other (notes, drafts, and coupons)..
Transfers of funds.......................................
Issues, redemptions, and exchanges by
Fiscal Agency Department:
U. S. Government direct obligations....
All other .....................................................

$ 509
1,077
41
45,548

$ 1,184
1,178
44
47,441

$ 1,065
1,428
48
56,278

8,188

8,401

5,074

103
243
8,424

131
260
9,032

152
257
10,323

9,788*
110

8,686*
110

6,902*
48

Securities held in custody for member
banks at end of year.............................. $1,921 mil.
Savings bonds in safekeeping at end of
229,000
year (number of pieces)..........................

$2,207 mil.

$2,485 mil.

303,000

345,000

* Includes savings bonds sold through other issuing agents, and redemptions
through qualified commercial banks.




28

Thirty-second Annual Report, Federal Reserve BanJ{ of Philadelphia
Changes in
member bank reserves and related items
Third Federal Reserve District
(Millions of dollars)

1944

1945

1946

Reserve Bank credit extended in district...
Interdistrict commercial transfers.................
Mint gold purchases, net..................................
Treasury operations ........................................

— 31
4-1,053
—
0
— 676

+ 39
+944
— 1
—660

— 74
+722
+ 1
—587

Total ............................................................

+ 346

+323

+ 62

Currency demand ................................... .
Member bank reserve deposits......................
“Other deposits” at Reserve Bank..........
Other Federal Reserve accounts...................

4- 281
+ 65
—
1
+
0

+
+
—
+

Total ............................................................

+ 346

+233
+ 89
— 0
+ 1
+323

Sources of funds:

Uses of funds:

All member banks
Third Federal Reserve District Dec. 31,
1946
(Millions of dollars)

Change from

+ 62

Percent
distribution

Dec. 31, June 30, Dec. 31, June 30,
1946
1945
1939
1939

Assets
Loans and discounts....;.........
U. S. Government obligations..
Other securities ........................
Cash assets.................................
Fixed assets ................................
Other assets ................................

$1,263
3,505
564
1,471
65
29

+$329 +$ 343
— 852 + 2,756
+ 57 —
63
+ 15 + 471
— 5 — 113
+
2 +
4

Total .................................

$6,897

Liabilities and capital accounts
Deposits:
Individuals, partnerships, and
corporations—
Demand ............. ..................
Time .....................................
U. S. Government...................
Bank .........................................
Other .......................................

18.3%
50.8
8.2
21.3
.9
.4

26.3%
21.4
17.9
28.6
5.1
.7

—$454

+$3,398 100.0%

100.0%

$3,670
1,740
161
394
301

+$291
+ 198
— 974
— 44
+ 32

+$2,416
+ 676
+
75
+
11
+ 102

53.2%
25.2
2.3
5.7
4.4

35.8%
30.4
2.5
10.9
5.7

—$496

+$3,281

90.9%

85.3%

Total deposits .................

$6,267

Other liabilities..........................
Capital accounts ........................

42
588

Total .................................

$6,897




43
18
2
3

29

+
+

10
32

—$454

+
+

21
96

.6
8.5

+$3,398 100.0%

.6
14.1

100.0%

Thirty'second Annual Report, Federal Reserve Ban\ of Philadelphia
Applications for industrial loans
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

1946

June 30,1934December 31,1946

Approved ...................................................
Rejected .....................................................
Withdrawn ........ ........................................
Under consideration ................................

6
0
1
0

371
457
71
0

Total number ....................................

7

899

Approved ...................................................
Rejected .....................................................
Withdrawn ........ ........................................
Under consideration ................................

$2,530,000
0
20,000
0

$64,326,426

Total amount.....................................

$2,550,000

$85,485,476

Number

Amount

Member bank reserves
Third Federal Reserve District
(Dollar figures in millions)

Actually Required
held

17,126,350

4,032,700
0

Excess

Ratio of
excess to
required

Philadelphia banks:

1943:
1944:
1945:
1946:
1947:

Jan
jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.

1-15..................................
1-15..................................
1-15..................................
1-15..................................
1-15..................................

$418
370
388
423
425

$358
357
374
411
415

$ 60
13
15
12
10

256
272
316
379
388

184
215
247
297
339

72
57
69
82
49

39
26
28
28
15

674
642
704
802
814

542
572
621
708
754

132
70
84
94
60 ,

24
12
14
13
8

17%
4
4
3
3

Country banks:
1943:
1944:
1945:
1946:
1947:

Jan.
jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.

1-15................. . ..............
1-15..................................
1-15..................................
1-15..................................
1-15..................................

All members:
1943:
1944:
1945:
1946:
1947:

Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.

1-15..................................
1-15..................................
1-15..................................
1-15..................................
1-15..................................




30