

Administrative Highlights of the WRA Program



United States Department of the Interior

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The major goal in the administration of the War Relocation Authority was twofold: (1) the adequate management of temporary living facilities for persons of Japanese ancestry evacuated from the Pacific Coast, and (2) the complete relocation of these people into normal private life. The Authority was responsible for the management of the relocation centers as temporary homes, and for returning these people to civilian life with a maximum of speed and individual consideration, yet with a minimum of social disruption and economic dislocation. The administration of the Authority set its policies and goals, and attained them within time limits calculated as necessary. Probably no governmental agency has ever before worked as hard as did WRA to get itself liquidated and out of business.

There were five basic characteristics of the administrative management of the War Relocation Authority which were in some respects unique:

1. From the very beginning of the program, the Agency attempted to recruit people with Government experience for its principal positions.
2. Administrative management was always recognized as an equal to all of the operational phases of the program, and was adequately represented at the top of the organization. Nearly all planning activities were a joint function, with administrative management participating to an equal extent with the operating divisions.
3. Procedures and organization were kept flexible and current. This meant cooperation among the several divisions of the Agency at all levels, and a persistent effort to keep all units advised as to what was going on in the various divisions and at various locations.
4. Administrative management was constantly growing. It did more than the normal "housekeeping" functions. In

Note: This report prepared by Malcolm E. Pitts, Assistant Director, in charge of administrative management.

some respects, it was as much an operational division as any other in the Authority.

5. There was a constant necessity on the part of all in the Authority to act decisively, and not quibble at every turn of events. There was the ever present problem of thousands of persons who must be fed, housed, and taken care of in all respects 24 hours a day, and 365 days a year.

Some of the functions and operations which came under the purview of administrative management in the War Relocation Authority were unusual or possibly unique. Other administrative management functions and operations of the Authority have not been appreciably different from those same functions in other Government agencies or large organizations. No attempt will be made here to chronicle in detail the minute operations of the administration of the War Relocation Authority, or to describe extensively its routine procedures. Rather, the intent here will be to give only such background as appears essential to understanding the administrative management problems of the Authority, and to present examples of some unusual, unique, or extremely difficult administrative management problems encountered.

CHAPTER II

THE PLACE OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE PROGRAM

The story of the administration of the War Relocation Authority is a story of pressures; and the policies, functions, techniques and organization developed to handle these pressures. There were pressures from without—public, governmental and private; there were pressures from the evacuees from within; there were pressures from top levels within the Authority and also from levels in the field. Frequently, pressures came from several different directions at once on the same issue, but each demanding different solutions. There were pressures to get the War Relocation Authority established and receive 112,000 people in the newly created, isolated cities; pressures of a war-hysterical public to maintain these people in self-maintained establishments in complete isolation and continued detention; pressures from labor-short, war-producing agricultural and industrial groups for cheap labor—or just labor at any price—from this apparent labor pool; pressures on center management to establish and set in motion an adequate administration of center facilities and functions along lines enunciated nationally to care for the needs of the 112,000 center residents, from the cradle to the grave, for living, eating, education, recreation, medical and hospital care, fire protection, internal security, fuel, essential maintenance and sanitation; pressures to set in motion an orderly program of relocation—places to go from the centers with jobs and housing; pressures regarding loyalty determinations and mass segregation; pressures of resistance by the evacuees to relocation, and objections to curtailing center facilities; pressures against the closing of relocation centers and relocation offices; and even pressures to stop the War Relocation Authority from liquidating its functions and going out of business.

As a counterpart to these sundry pressures, there were developed policies and procedures to handle each major problem, and all of the details attendant to that problem. Many of these had to grow, initially, from emergency situations; and then, as rapidly as possible, they were made uniform on a national basis. Policies were worked out on agency organization, seasonal leave for evacuees, and center management operations. The latter included a gamut of operations equivalent to all of the functions and duties which a large city and all of its residents perform together as a group, or as individuals, with the additional requirements of governmental regulations and "red tape" added on. Policies were developed in line with wartime requirements along security lines, and the segregation of those who believed the United States was not the place in which they desired to live.

For a time it was contemplated within WRA that the entire group evacuated from the Pacific Coast might have to remain in WRA centers for the major part of the war period. On this basis, a policy for an extensive center work program was developed. Later, the policy was changed to one of individual relocation to any point within the United States where the individual was eligible to travel. This relocation policy necessitated the adjustment of the center work program to a marked degree, leaving only a program of those functions which materially contributed to center living and maintenance operations.

With the revocation of the Exclusion Orders, when the termination of the war was in prospect, policies were developed regarding the final relocation of all persons still resident in the centers, and the orderly liquidation and closing of the relocation centers, relocation offices, and the entire work of the Authority.

Because of foresight and extensive previous experience, WRA officials very early developed a method of advance planning which was a reality, conditioned against possible future changes in the program, or possible emergencies which would require quick changes or modifications in existing policies and procedures, or the expeditious enactment of new ones.

For all policies on whatever subject, carefully worked out procedures had to be developed. In nearly all of these procedures, administrative management principles and practices were involved, since every operation in some way or another involved compliance with legal and governmental requirements in regard to civil-service appointive personnel, evacuee employment, finances, Government property, mess operations, or transportation. Administrative management officials of the WRA at all times shared an equal position with others in the Authority in advance planning, and in the enactment of policies and procedures, or any changes made thereto.

A very important aspect of the administration of the War Relocation Authority was the excellent esprit de corps which was developed in the staff at all levels. The very implications raised by the fact of physical evacuation of the persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific Coast immediately created an impression among the public at large that the evacuees were a dangerous, untrustworthy people, un-American in thought and desire. The appointive staff of the Authority very soon learned that such was not the case; in fact, quite the opposite was true. These were peace-loving people, two-thirds of them American by birthright, and they thought in American ways and wanted to live American lives. And although these implications, which were a part of the evacuation, continued to be prevalent in many areas for a considerable period of time, they were eventually dispelled in almost every area through public relations work.

One normally thinks of public relations as being a function of a specified division or section of an organization, but in the War Relocation Authority the entire staff was engaged in public relations in its true sense. Every staff member who traveled from his official station on business or pleasure, who paid a bill or tried to buy something, or who attended a business, recreational or church gathering was immediately besieged with questions which represented the rumors, mostly false, that were rife. The procurement officers, the teachers, the accountants and the stewards were engaged in public relations work of a constructive sort—even though this was not a part of their prescribed functions—just as truly as were the project directors, the reports officers and the relocation officers whose duties explicitly included public relations activity. This situation, together with the fact that the channels of communication for getting factual information regarding the program to the field had been quite well established, brought about in each employee's mind a better understanding of what had happened, and what the true facts were. Each employee had an understanding of the program, and believed in it, or he would not stay with it. The *raison d'etre* in the War Relocation Authority was probably better understood by its employees than in nearly any other Government agency. The objectives of the program tended to attract high-type personnel for employment and this again contributed to the good working relationships and excellent spirit.

CHAPTER III

GRADUAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT FUNCTION

The War Relocation Authority was created by Executive order on March 18, 1942. It will complete all of its work, with the exception of a small amount of fiscal and record liquidation, by June 30, 1946. The headquarters office was located in Washington, D. C. However, the major portion of the Agency's work initially was at the opposite side of the country, extending first from all of California, western parts of Oregon and Washington, and the southern part of Arizona, where the evacuation took place, into the States of California, Idaho, Utah, Arizona, Wyoming, Colorado, and Arkansas where the 10 relocation centers, to which the evacuees were taken, were located.

In order to provide adequate field supervision in the establishment of the centers and provide for the staffing and supplying functions at these centers in a very quick manner, regional offices were established during 1942 in San Francisco, Denver, and Little Rock. The regional offices, although only short-lived, performed very essential and useful functions in the initial stages of the program in expediting the establishment of centers and handling public relations activities. Since the War Relocation Authority was considered a war agency, it was originally arranged to have its service functions performed almost entirely by the Office for Emergency Management, or as it was known later, Central Administrative Services. Initially, then, the scope of the administrative management activities at the Washington, regional, and center levels in the War Relocation Authority was to be that of control primarily, with Central Administrative Services keeping all of the accounts, effecting nearly all procurement upon requisition (except subsistence), handling all personnel transactions and payrolls, and discharging the other multitudinous details usually considered as management "housekeeping" functions.

The 10 relocation centers were located in isolated localities where all transactions had to be handled by mail through second and third intermediaries, the regional offices and the Central Administrative Services. The tempo of operations necessary at the centers at that time could not be maintained on the basis of the slowness with which mail deliveries took place. Further, the scope and experience of the procurement officers of CAS was not extensive enough to handle the very large variety of supplies necessary for all the evacuees in the situation given. The problem of breaking the bottleneck in these operations was just becoming acute, when, in the fall of 1942, as the relocation centers were really just getting established, the Authority for a number of reasons decided to discontinue the operation of regional offices. The Authority at that time established its own administrative

functions at the centers for the centers themselves. CAS continued to handle only the functions for the central office and the few WRA offices and warehouses that were located in metropolitan areas. This led to a complete decentralization of management functions to the centers with the exception of controls which were maintained at the Washington level. The elimination of the regional office operation was certainly a milestone in WRA's administrative job, and made a more clean-cut operation for the rest of the program, although the regional offices had definitely been a help during the initial stages.

As a part of the heritage of the program of evacuation, the War Relocation Authority had turned over to it, for custody and handling, a large amount of personal property belonging to the evacuees which had been deposited with the Government for safekeeping by the evacuees at the time of departure from their homes. This property was originally received by the Federal Reserve Bank which had that responsibility as a participating agency in the Wartime Civil Control Administration, the over-all agency charged with the responsibility of conducting the evacuation. The property was located in warehouses at various points up and down the West Coast. After the property was turned over to the War Relocation Authority by the Federal Reserve Bank, it was consolidated into 10 large warehouses. The Authority continued a service function for the evacuees upon requests in regard to matters pertaining to their personal property during its entire existence.

As time went on, up to the closing of the Authority in 1946, the relocation program developed, and offices were opened and operated as an assistance to the evacuees with their relocation plans, problems and travel. At the peak, 58 such offices were in operation in major cities throughout the country. These offices are contrasted to the 10 relocation centers in respect to administrative management services, in that a highly centralized administration process was used for these offices as compared with the decentralization method of organization used at the relocation centers.

Three field procurement offices were established at Chicago, Denver and Los Angeles, under the direction of the national office, but to act in a service capacity to the centers and later to the relocation offices. The material and supply requirements of the 10 relocation centers were at all times very large, and a major portion of the budget requirements of the Authority were for materials and supplies for carrying on center operations. Probably a much larger portion of WRA money and energy went into procurement requirements and supplies than any other governmental agency outside of the armed forces. Certain types of materials and supplies seemed to have a greater concentration at some points than others. Because of the isolation of the centers, it proved expedient and efficient to establish these field procurement offices at these strategic locations. By law, the Authority was exempt

from some requirements applicable to Government purchasing. By agreement, nearly all of the procurement facilities of the Army were available to the Authority, and very extensive use was made of these facilities, particularly for items of subsistence. The field procurement offices performed a very useful liaison function for the centers with the Army Quartermaster facilities, which were usually located at the same places as the procurement offices.

Central Administrative Services continued to handle, through its appropriate office for a given district, the administrative management functions for all offices of the Authority, with the exception of the centers, until June 30, 1944. On July 1, 1944, the Authority took over the complete responsibility for handling all of its own management functions for these offices. This change followed the placing of the War Relocation Authority in the Department of the Interior in February 1944. The operation of CAS was liquidated shortly after July 1, 1944.

In the summer of 1944, the War Relocation Authority acquired another operation at Fort Ontario, Oswego, N. Y., where an emergency shelter was established for nearly 1,000 refugees from war-torn Europe. From a management point of view, this operation was handled by a combination of the methods used for other phases of the program. The accounting was handled on a centralized basis at the Washington office, whereas all other administrative management processes and responsibility were handled on a decentralized basis at the refugee shelter. Because of the nature of the problems involved and the fact that a different source of funds was used, the policies and administration at the shelter differed in many respects from those at the relocation centers.

Although nearly all of the relocation centers had a similarity in appearance, there was no typical center, as each differed in local respects brought about by physical lay-out, climate, availability of land and water for agricultural purposes, and similar considerations. But for a better understanding of the facilities that were being operated, a brief description is given of one of the relocation centers.

The Gila River Relocation Center was located approximately 45 miles southeast of Phoenix, Ariz., on desert land leased from the Pima Indian Tribe. At its peak in residence, the Gila center had over 14,000 evacuees. The center area covered approximately 17,000 acres. The community was divided into two camps, one approximately twice the size of the other. The total of the two camps approximated 67 blocks of buildings for evacuee residence with 20 buildings in each block. Each block had a messhall where all persons in that block ate. In addition, there were areas for administrative personnel housing, military guard barracks, warehouses, administration buildings, and buildings for various operations.

In all, there were approximately 1,400 buildings in the center. Water was provided by deep wells with storage tanks and standpipes. A sewage system and disposal beds were in operation. The system was connected with the latrines and wash-houses located in the center of each block of evacuee residence, and with other appropriate buildings, but not with each barrack or evacuee living quarters. All buildings were serviced with electricity. There were no individual water connections or cooking facilities in the rooms and apartments in the evacuee block area. The fuel used at Gila River, Colorado River and Manzanar for heating purposes was oil, whereas at the other centers coal was used. The buildings at all centers were one story, frame, theatre-of-operations-type of construction, built by the Army Engineers. The Gila River Relocation Center used plaster board as outside sheathing, whereas most other centers used wood sheathing covered with tarpaper. The Gila and Colorado River centers were distinctive in that they had double roofs as a protection from the hot sun in summer time. The barracks in the northern centers were lined on the inside. There were approximately 4,100 individual stoves in the barracks at Gila for heating purposes. The estimated cost of the Gila River Relocation Center for its fixed plant was \$7,300,000.

At the peak of center operations, the Gila center farmed approximately 7,000 acres, with almost 3,000 of this in intensive cultivation of vegetable crops. Because of the early and long growing season, several crops a year were raised, and vegetables were shipped from Gila to other relocation centers to reduce feeding costs and reduce purchasing requirements from an already overburdened market. There were over 2,000 head of cattle at Gila, raised for beef purposes and center consumption. Between 2,500 and 3,000 head of hogs were constantly in the pens, fed principally from the garbage disposal from the messhalls. This added materially to the meat supply. A total of 25,000 chickens and 110 dairy cows completed the livestock program at Gila. Although none of the other centers had quite as extensive an agricultural program as Gila, all of the centers had as adequate a farming and livestock program as local circumstances and climate would permit.

The relative size of these cities, the relocation centers, in respect to other communities in the region, is interesting. The Colorado River center, with a peak population of over 18,000, was the third largest city in the State of Arizona; and the Gila River Relocation Center, with a peak population of over 14,000, was the fourth largest city in that State. The Heart Mountain Relocation Center, with over 11,000 evacuees, was the third largest city in the State of Wyoming. The Central Utah Relocation Center, with 8,600 evacuees, was fifth in the State of Utah; and the Minidoka Center, with over 9,000 evacuees, was seventh in the State of Idaho.

Although each of the centers differed in many respects, all of them had in common the fact that they were isolated. In many instances, evacuees, personnel, mail, materials and supplies would arrive at railheads some distance away from the installation. In the case of the Colorado River and the Central Utah centers, all mail, people, equipment, materials and supplies had to be transported nearly 20 miles from railhead to the installation, or the reverse. At the Gila center, there were about 350 vehicles of all kinds, over 225 of them trucks.

The entire fixed plant of the Authority in the 10 relocation centers was valued at approximately \$65,000,000. The major portion of all the construction of the installations was done by the Army Engineers under contract, from funds made available from the President's Emergency Fund of 1942. The centers had movable property in the form of equipment, materials and supplies to the amount of approximately \$35,000,000. This represented approximately 10,000 different kinds of items at each center.

CHAPTER IV

PROGRAM DEVELOPMENTS THAT AFFECTED ADMINISTRATION

There were seven major events which very definitely affected the main policies, procedures and organization of the War Relocation Authority. These events made themselves evident in all branches of the organization, and colored much of the planning and operations after each took place. These events were:

1. Within 10 days after the creation of the War Relocation Authority by Executive order on March 18, 1942, the Bureau of the Budget requested a detailed budget for the next year's operations. Although prepared in a short time, a great amount of thought and good planning went into it. There were set forth in that budget the basic policies and goals of the Authority, and it was some time before adequate policy statements and procedures could be developed that covered the same scope as that budget. The material contained in the budget served as the criteria upon which WRA relationships with the Congress, the Budget Bureau and the public took form, and the functions and operations at the centers took place. The budget for the War Relocation Authority henceforth was an active device for advance planning, and a strong tool for administration, operation and control.

2. The change in the policy of relocation in the summer of 1942 decidedly changed the objective of relocation center operation and materially changed the organizational structure of the Authority at all levels. This change in policy eliminated plans and programs already underway for large factory-type operations at the centers. It radically changed the emphasis and type of supply program required, and altered completely the problem of evacuee employment at the centers. It foreshadowed the day that some time in the future there would be a labor scarcity in the centers, and the centers would be closed.

3. In the summer of 1943, there was instituted a program of segregation of those persons believed to be disloyal to the United States, or who had expressed a desire to repatriate to Japan. The Tule Lake Center in California was designated as the center where the segregees would be in residence. First there was

a large program of interviews and screening and then, with the cooperation of the Army for guarding facilities and equipment, a rather extensive program of transportation in and out of Tule Lake to and from all centers took place. Approximately 23,000 persons were moved in a month. This was the first in a series of War Relocation Authority experiences in the transportation of masses of people and their household effects; and experience which proved very helpful in the closing days of the program. The segregation work also taught the Authority, particularly at the centers, how to organize and mobilize its resources and personnel to get a given job done that had many details and ramifications, and do it on a time schedule.

4. In January of 1944, Selective Service for persons of Japanese ancestry was reinstated. Although this event did not change the material aspects of the program, except to reduce the available supply of able workers, it definitely changed the psychological aspects and removed one of the biggest blocks from the path of eventual liquidation of the centers. The relationships of the evacuees and the staff at the centers, and the relationships of the evacuees and the Authority with the public, were very definitely strengthened by this action.

5. In the spring of 1944, the gradual process of relocation for a year and a half had reduced the populations of the relocation centers whereby it appeared desirable and efficient to close one of the centers and transfer the remaining residents at that center to others. The action of Selective Service, and the fact that it was the younger group from the ages of 18 to 40 that had taken advantage of the relocation opportunities and left the centers, had actually created a shortage of capable full-time workers at the various centers. Accordingly, the Jerome Relocation Center in Arkansas was scheduled for closing by June 30, 1944. Although the great majority of the residents at Jerome transferred to other centers, the closing of the Jerome center gave the Authority a preview of the activity that it was to accomplish a year and a half later at all of the centers. Individual plans had to be made with each family, and detailed arrangements as to their transportation, household goods and baggage, problems of medical care, and other intimate family problems. The

Authority also had its first experience in actually shutting down an installation and in the disposal of Government property that was surplus to its needs, through the appropriate channels. The lessons learned here were utilized to great advantage at a later date.

6. The revocation of the Exclusion Orders on January 2, 1945, by the War Department removed all cause for the continued maintenance and operation of relocation centers, after a reasonable time had been allowed for each evacuee to formulate and complete his final relocation plans. This reasonable time was determined to be not more than a year, and possibly less. As a result of this announcement, center facilities and operations were reduced to a bare minimum. All work other than that absolutely necessary for day to day living, such as eating, care of the utilities and protective maintenance, was stopped. Since it was during the off-crop season, the farm programs were quickly stopped (except at the Arizona centers), and the purchasing of food was handled in such a way that virtually all livestock and stocks of food on hand were consumed gradually. Purchasing of all kinds was virtually discontinued. Advance announcements were made regarding the closing of the schools, and drastic reductions were made in such facilities as medical care and hospitalization. The relocation program was expanded at the centers and throughout the Nation, and the emphasis of administration was shifted to finding locations suitable to the evacuees any place in the United States, going through the mechanics of checking the evacuees out of the centers, arranging for transportation of evacuees and their household goods from the centers and the warehouses on the West Coast, and the adjustment of the evacuees in normal civilian life in their old homes or a new community.

7. As of July 1, 1945, an announcement was made definitely establishing the dates that all relocation centers would close for evacuee residence. Although met with some resistance at first, the program went ahead, and all centers closed on or before schedule. The decision to close the centers by given dates posed a very important administrative problem in coordinating the activities of the relocation centers in sending the evacuees out of the centers, and the activities of the relocation

offices on the receiving end in the areas where the evacuees had decided they wanted to go. The principal problems for the relocation workers were adequate housing, welfare situations, and medical assistance. The closing of the centers developed an administrative management program of transportation, property accountability, closing of accounts and records, surplusing of property, and, as the work became complete, aid to appointive personnel for other employment. All of these proceeded at an accelerated rate. All of the lessons and techniques learned in previous operations were utilized, and some new situations were surmounted satisfactorily. The greater portion of the evacuees did not leave the centers when the Exclusion Orders were revoked. They waited for the school terms to be completed, and, for a number of other reasons, did not really start to move out of the centers in large numbers until August 1945. Between that time and November 30, over 45,000 evacuees left the centers. As high as 1,200 left one center in one week; and nearly 4,000 left all centers in an equal period. Because of the peculiar circumstances surrounding the persons at the Fort Ontario Emergency Refugee Shelter, and the Tule Lake Center, liquidation of these two establishments had to be handled quite apart from the relocation centers. They did not close until a later date—the refugee shelter on February 6, 1946, and the Tule Lake Center on March 20, 1946. In all, about 60,000 persons left the installations operated by the War Relocation Authority in a period of approximately 9 months, and approximately 50,000,000 pounds of personal effects of the residents at the installations were shipped to them at their chosen destinations.

CHAPTER V

THE ORGANIZATIONAL PATTERN

In any organization, the structure of the organizational plan is a very important tool in administration. Frequently, minor shifts of function and responsibility will iron out many problems, both large and small, which at first do not appear to be connected with organization pattern at all. The War Relocation Authority, like all organizations starting out anew, had its growing pains. Although initially the operations of the regional offices and cooperation of Central Administrative Services figured prominently in the organizational pattern and the work to be done, it must be acknowledged that the detailed breakdown and size of the organization planned was too modest. The general structure and pointing of the organization remained very much the same during the Authority's lifetime, but many minor shifts of function were effected from time to time, and provision was made for handling additional detail before the organization was shaped into its final form. As the pattern of organization was shaped in the final 2 years of operation, it was found to be very workable from the top and at all levels.

There are set out below summaries of organization of the War Relocation Authority for the Washington office and for the relocation centers. A comparison is given for the organizations for the years 1942-43 and 1945-46. A casual review of the comparisons will show some of the organization adjustments found necessary. It should be pointed out, of course, that circumstances at the Washington level were considerably different in 1945-46 than they were in 1942-43. For this reason, the number of positions occupied in the Washington office have been given.

Summary of Organization and Personnel Requirements

Washington Office

<u>1942-43</u>		<u>1945-46</u>	
<u>Unit of Organization</u>	<u>No. of Positions</u>	<u>Unit of Organization</u>	<u>No. of Positions</u>
Office of Director	5	Office of Director	3
Office of Solicitor	18	Office of Solicitor	14

1942-431945-46

<u>Unit of Organization</u>	<u>No. of Positions</u>	<u>Unit of Organization</u>	<u>No. of Positions</u>
Office of Information	8	Reports Division	28
Publication & Reports Section		Publications Section	
Press & Radio Section		Current Information Section	
Visual Information Section		Photographic Section	
		Intra-Agency Liaison Section	
Office of Relocation Planning	2	Relocation Planning Division	40
		Alien Liaison Section	
		Statistics Section	
		Operating Statistics Unit	
		Analysis Unit	
		Master File Unit	
		Evacuee Records Unit	
Office of Finance & Personnel	17	Administrative Management Division	156
Budget & Finance Section.		Finance & Supply Section	
Accounts Unit		Finance Branch	
Procedures Unit		Accounts Unit	
Personnel Management Section		Cost Accounting Unit	
Office Services Section		Audit & Scheduling Unit	
		Supply Branch	
		Property & Claims Unit	
		Procurement Unit	
		Priorities Unit	
		Office Services Unit	
		Budget Branch	
		Personnel Management Section	
		Classification & Organization Planning Unit	
		Placement Unit	
		Personnel Operations Unit	
		Evacuee Employment Unit	
		Records Management Section	
		Distribution Unit	
		Mail & Files Unit	
		Procedures and Administrative Analysis Section	
		Mess Operations Section	

1942-43

1945-46

<u>Unit of Organization</u>	<u>No. of Positions</u>	<u>Unit of Organization</u>	<u>No. of Positions</u>
		Administrative Management Division (contd)	
		Field Examinations & Investigations Section	
		Clearance Review Section (Discontinued 2/1/45)	
Community Management Division	12	Community Management Division	40
Education Section		Education Section	
Health Section		Health Section	
Community Enterprises Section		Business Enterprises Section	
Project Government Organization Section		Community Organization & Activities Section	
Women's Affairs Section		Welfare Section	
		Internal Security Section	
		Community Analysis Section	
Reemployment Division	4	Relocation Division	20
		Field Supervision Section	
		Center Liaison Section	
		Evacuee Property Section	
Manufacturing Division	6	Operations Division	15
		Engineering Section	
Agricultural Division	8	Agriculture Section	
		Motor Transport & Maintenance Section	
		Fire Protection Section	
		War Refugee Division	3
	<hr/> 80		<hr/> 319

* * * * *

In the summary of organization for the relocation centers which is set forth below, no indication is given of the personnel requirements, since they varied from center to center depending upon the population and the peculiarities of that center, such as size of schools, size of agricultural program, maintenance problems, and other details. The size of the appointive staffs at the regular relocation centers varied from 135 to 275, with the Tule Lake Center employing at peak about 350. The average total number of appointive personnel at the centers except during the closing period was about 1,750.

Summary of Organization

Relocation Centers

1942-43

1945-46

Office of Project Director

Office of Project Director

Project Reports Division

Reports Division

Project Attorney

Legal Division

Relocation Division

Evacuee Property Section

Community Service Division

Community Welfare Section

Education Section

Health Section

Community Management Division

(Assistant Project Director)

Welfare Section

Evacuee Quarters Unit

Education Section

Internal Security Section

Business Enterprises Section

Community Analysis Section

Community Government Section

Public Works Division

Construction Section

Design Section

Highway Section

Irrigation & Conservation
Section

Operations Division

(Assistant Project Director)

Engineering Section

Irrigation, Drainage, &
Roads Unit

Construction & Maintenance
Unit

Agricultural Section

Motor Transport & Maintenance
Section

Fire Protection Section

Industry Section

War Works Division

Agriculture Production Section

Manufacturing Section

Processing & Marketing Section

Office of Assistant Project Director

Administrative Management Division

(Assistant Project Director)

Administrative Division

Budget & Finance Section

Cost Accounting Unit

Fiscal Accounting Unit

Audit Unit

Personnel Records Section

Office Services Section

Procurement Section

Budget & Finance Section

Expenditure Analysis Unit

Accounts Unit

Examination Unit

Personnel Management Section

Appointive Personnel Unit

Evacuee Employment Unit

1942-43

Office of Assistant Project Director
Administrative Division (contd)
Property Control Section

Transportation & Supply Division
Mess Management Section
Warehousing Section
Motor Pool Section

Maintenance & Operations Division
Buildings & Grounds Maintenance and Repair Section
Garage Section

Employment & Housing Division
Occupational Coding & Records Section
Placement Section
Quarters Section

1945-46

Administrative Management Division (contd)
Office Services Section
Supply Section
Procurement Unit
Property Control & Warehousing Unit
Postal Service Unit
Mess Operations Section
Statistics Section

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As an item of historical interest, there is given below a summary of organization and personnel requirements for the San Francisco regional office when it was in operation in 1942. This was the largest of the three regional offices, but the pattern used in Denver and Little Rock was the same except for a smaller number of personnel. In the early stages of the program of the Authority, the San Francisco regional office served as the location for many of the operations nationally, and many of the officials of the Washington office conducted operations from the San Francisco office for some period of time.

Summary of Organization San Francisco Regional Office, 1942

<u>Unit of Organization</u>	<u>No. of Positions</u>
Office of Regional Director.....	4
Office of Regional Attorney.....	4
Information Division.....	14
Administrative Division.....	57
Service of Supply Division.....	15
Reemployment Division.....	11
Office of Assistant Regional Director.....	3
Lands Division.....	7
Public Works Division.....	15
Agricultural Production & Marketing Division.....	10
Industrial Management Division.....	9
Office of Assistant Regional Director.....	3
Education & Recreation Division.....	3
Community Organization Division.....	3
Health Division.....	3
Community Enterprise Division.....	2
	165

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After the closing of the regional offices in the late fall of 1942, a skeleton organization was maintained at San Francisco, Denver and Little Rock under a Field Assistant Director and a small staff, which acted as field arms of the Director's staff taking action principally in public relations and liaison activities with public and private agencies. The San Francisco office took over the administration of the warehouses where the property of the evacuees was stored which were transferred from the Federal Reserve Bank. The Denver and Little Rock offices concentrated on supply activities and preliminary work on relocation possibilities. The Denver and Little Rock offices of the Field Assistant Director were abolished in the summer of 1944.

As has been pointed out, as the need grew for assistance at points away from the centers for evacuees who were relocating, relocation offices were established at various points throughout the country. The initial relocation program had been set in motion in the fall of 1942 to provide seasonal workers for agricultural work. At first this

was principally for the sugar-beet work in the Rocky Mountain area. The same pattern that had been used in the rest of the country outside of the exclusion zone was adopted for the former exclusion zone when the Exclusion Orders were rescinded, with the added responsibility of shipping to the evacuees, upon request, the property belonging to them that was in the warehouses of the Authority on the West Coast. In total there were 58 relocation offices and 10 large warehouses in operation at the same time, although many other offices that had formerly been opened for seasonal agricultural work in prior years had been closed. The pattern of administration of the relocation work was a division of the country into nine areas with principal offices at New York, Cleveland, Chicago, New Orleans, Denver, Salt Lake City, Seattle, San Francisco and Los Angeles, and various district offices in other cities under the administration of the area offices. These offices varied in personnel from 2 in small district offices, to 75 in a large area which had considerable property under its jurisdiction. In total, approximately 600 persons were employed in the relocation offices. A large part of these, however, worked only during the last year of operation.

The organizational structure at the relocation centers provided only for a supervisory staff of appointive personnel, employed under civil-service war service regulations. By far the greatest number of workers at the centers came from the ranks of the evacuees. The largest number of appointive personnel on WRA rolls was about 3,300, in December of 1945 after the evacuees had left all centers. Nearly 800 of this total were laborers to assist in the handling of property to be declared surplus. Whereas at the peak of the center operations there were a total of approximately 2,300 appointive employees on the WRA rolls, 1,750 of them at the centers, the total number of employees of the War Relocation Authority at that time approximated 33,000. Over 30,000 evacuees were employed at the centers in all manner of work. They were not paid civil-service rates; rather, the scale of wages was set in money return at \$12, \$16, and \$19 per month, plus a clothing allowance that averaged \$3.50 per person per month for each member of the family of the worker. The wages were initially set at these rates to make some differentiation between the skills of an employee and the type of work to be performed, and also to be below what was then the prevailing rate of entrance salary in the armed forces—i.e. \$21 a month. Of course, all living facilities, food, medical care, nearly all items for recreation, education, and other needs to normal life were furnished to center residents by the Government. At a center such as Gila River, there were approximately 210 appointive employees, and about 4,000 evacuee employees. Nearly half of the appointive employees were engaged in educational work, for nearly 25 percent of the population was of school age and attended the accredited schools provided from the first through the twelfth grades. Mess operations kept from 1,500 to 1,800 employees occupied, and during the farming seasons, a large number of workers were engaged in agricultural work. Until the final stages of the closing, nearly all

of the routine clerical, stenographic, semisupervisory and laboring work was done by the evacuees. A system of hours of employment, sick and annual leave, and other requisites to employment was devised for the evacuees that very closely paralleled the rules, regulations, rights and privileges of the appointive employees under Federal civil-service rules. By and large, the arrangements worked very well but involved a tremendous amount of record-keeping. The initial concept of relocation center organization involving key appointive staff members with good Government experience for the directional and supervisory positions, with the bulk of the work performed by the evacuees after receiving training on the job, proved to be efficient and workable. From this work at the centers, there were developed a rather large number of employees among the evacuees who were later employed by the Authority in its offices outside the centers in stenographic, clerical, and semiprofessional jobs under civil-service regulations. At the centers, a large part of the professional work, such as medical and dental services, some legal services, and translation and interpretation work, was carried on by the evacuees.

The same general pattern of organization and approach to the problem of employment was used at the Fort Ontario Emergency Refugee Shelter. It was not as successful, however, due principally to the older average age of the group, a more difficult linguistic problem, and a lack of general familiarity with the American methods of doing things.

There was some unorthodox structure in the final organizational plan used by the Authority, but it functioned and was effective. Because of the particular background and experience of certain personnel, the direction of the finance activities and the supply activities was combined into the Finance and Supply Section at the Washington level, whereas, at the centers, the finance section and the supply section were separate and parallel. The activities in each case, however, were under the direction of the Administrative Management Division.

In the Washington office, the Relocation Planning Division had the responsibility for all statistical work of the Authority, as well as many other planning phases of work peculiar to the operation of a central office. The Relocation Planning Division had no need for a field arm, except for the current gathering of statistics. So the statistics section at the centers was placed under the direction of the assistant project director in charge of administrative management. By careful advance clearance at the Washington level between the Chief of the Relocation Planning Division and the Assistant Director in charge of Administrative Management on all matters of importance, this particular crossing of organization lines between the Washington and center levels did not generate any difficulties. In fact, it worked quite well.

CHAPTER VI

THE WRA MANUAL

The process of communication of administrative procedures and regulations in a large organization is always difficult. It is necessary that communications, rules and regulations be uniform and interpreted, wherever possible, in exactly the same manner. The technique used by the War Relocation Authority for this requirement started out initially as a series of numbered administrative instructions. The first administrative instruction was issued from the San Francisco regional office within the first week after the creation of the Authority, and within a 6-weeks' period the Washington office had taken over the responsibility of evaluating and issuing policies and procedures on a national scale. The necessity for grouping instructions according to subject rendered the initial efforts of the numbered administrative instructions series obsolete. A manual system was devised to replace the numbered instructions, and was set in operation. The manual was a comprehensive statement of all policies and procedures of the Authority. However, for extremely detailed instructions regarding the operations of given phases or functions of the Authority, a series of handbooks, setting forth the policies and procedures in minute detail, were developed for those functions as supplements to the manual of instructions.

Administrative material was prepared in three ways for communication to the field:

1. "Administrative notices" and "emergency instructions," for the dissemination of emergency material or spot announcements. Frequently, these confirmed material already informally sent out by teletype. They were prepared by mimeograph process, and advance copies distributed by air mail. The material contained in these notices was later incorporated into the WRA manual at the proper place.
2. "Manual of administrative instructions," which set forth in a comprehensive manner the elements of policy and procedure for all activities of the Agency. It was prepared in multilith form and maintained in loose-leaf binders.
3. A system of detailed "handbooks." Each handbook related to a specific subject which facilitated its distribution to the workers engaged in that specific activity. The policy and instructions for that specific subject were covered in minute detail.

The scope of the manual of instructions is shown in its table of contents given below. It is to be noted that the design of the manual follows the organizational pattern of the Authority.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Administrative Manual — Table of Contents

Organization	Chapter 10
Basic Legislation and Orders	10.1
Statement of Policy	10.2
Organization of the WRA	10.3
Function of Administrative Units	10.4
Lines of Administration	10.5
Administrative Policies (Authority-wide)	Chapter 20
Personnel Management	20.1
Budget	20.2
Accounting	20.3
Property Control	20.4
Travel	20.5
Procurement	20.6
Priorities	20.7
Office Services	20.8
Procedures	20.9
Information and Reports	20.10
Bonding of Employees	20.11
Supply	20.12
Operation of Motor Vehicles	20.20
Identification Cards	20.21
Damage Claims against WRA	20.22
Purchase of War Bonds	20.23
Community Management on Relocation Centers	Chapter 30
Internal Security	30.1
Health	30.2
Education	30.3
Welfare	30.4
Community Activities	30.5
Community Government	30.6
Business Enterprises	30.7
Community Analysis	30.8

Operations on Relocation Centers **Chapter 40**

Agriculture	40.1
Industry	40.2
Engineering	40.3
Fire Protection	40.4
Motor Transport and Maintenance	40.5

Relocation Center Management **Chapter 50**

General Administration	50.1
Regulations Affecting Administrative Personnel	50.2
Regulations Affecting Evacuees	50.3
Legal Services	50.4
Project Employment	50.5
Mass Operations	50.6
Postal Service	50.7
Statistics	50.8
Information Useful to Evacuees	50.9
Rationing	50.10

Issuance of Leave **Chapter 60**

Introduction	60.1
Short-Term Leave	60.2
Seasonal Work Leave	60.3
Indefinite Leave	60.4
Student Relocation	60.5
Leave Clearance	60.6
Application by Evacuees on Seasonal Work Leave for Other Leave	60.7
Leave Records	60.8
Forms	60.9
Investigation for Leave Clearance in Doubtful Cases	60.10
Appeals Procedure (from Tule Lake)	60.11
Indefinite Leave (Trial Period)	60.12
Leave Assistance Grants	60.13
Leave for Persons Hospitalized in Evacuated Area.	60.14

International Relationships **Chapter 70**

Repatriation and Expatriation	70.1
Geneva Convention	70.2
Protecting Power for Japanese Interests	70.3

Relations with Internment Camps	Chapter 80
War Department	80.1
Justice Department	80.2
Individual Exclusion	Chapter 90
Provisions of Exclusion Program	90.1
WRA Organization for Exclusion	90.2
WRA Assistance to Excluees	90.3
Other Agencies Part in Exclusion	90.4
Evacuee Property (at all levels)	Chapter 100
WRA Organizations for Evacuee Property	100.1
Management and Disposition of Property	100.2
Storage and Transportation of Property	100.3
Segregation	Chapter 110
Segregation Policy	110.1
Segregation Center	110.2
Persons to be Placed in Tule Lake Center	110.3
Priorities of Movement to Tule Lake Center	110.4
Preparation for Transfers to Tule Lake Center	110.5
Preparation for Transfers from Tule Lake Center	110.6
Transportation of Property of Transferees	110.7
Responsibilities in Connection with Movement	110.8
Departures from Tule Lake Center	110.9
Persons Institutionalized in the Evacuated Area	Chapter 120
Introduction	120.1
Payment for Hospital Care	120.2
Mental Patients	120.3
Grants for Necessary Expenses	120.4
Burials	120.5
Transfers to Centers	120.6
Relocation	Chapter 130
Relocation Program	130.1
Relocation Divisions	130.2
Group Relocation	130.3
Relocation Information Procedures	130.4
Community Adjustment	130.5
Relocation Committees	130.6

Policy on Closing Centers	140.1
Responsibilities in Connection with the Movement of Transferees	140.2
Plans and Arrangements for Closing a Center	140.3
Transfer of Evacuees	140.4
Movement of Evacuee Property	140.5
Curtailment of Center Activities	140.6
Designation of Evacuee Post-Contingent	140.7
Disposition of Equipment and Supplies	140.8
Disposition of Appointed Personnel	140.9
Final Report of a Closing Center	140.10

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The detailed handbooks prepared and in use were as follows:

Accounting	Agriculture
Personnel Management	Fire Protection
Property Control	Motor Transport and Maintenance
Procurement	Project Employment
Supply	Statistics
Procedures	Mess Operations
Welfare	Relocation
Education	Leave
Community Government	Center Closure and Transfer Operations
Health	

The procedure material was a reflection of an attitude throughout the entire Authority and not just a management aid. All parts of the organization had a hand in its development. As a result, the administrative and procedural material issued was generally accepted throughout the Authority as being accurate and wise, and was followed rather closely.

An active procedure program was developed. No procedure was released unless it had been reviewed by representatives of all divisions. Yet procedures were not delayed, and were circulated throughout the Agency as rapidly as possible. Only by advance planning, complete follow-up, and timing was the procedural material kept accurate, current and usable. There was ever present in the thinking of both the persons planning and the persons on the operating end, the necessity of getting the work done, yet having a way of doing it that was as nearly uniform as possible, and having adequate documentation for the proper method of operation.

The dissemination of administrative material other than procedures—particularly facts, figures and information relating to some particular situation that was making newspaper headlines in some other part of the country—was handled from the national level in much the same way. Accurate current informational material proved to be the most important public relations tool of the Authority. Although the relatively small size of the organization helped to make the distribution of this information in a quick and accurate manner a little easier than it might have been in some other organizations, all personnel in the Agency, regardless of location or job, were alert to the need for accurate information to be transmitted through channels quickly to the national headquarters where it was made available to all employees and evacuees at the centers throughout the country.

An additional problem arose at the center level, that of language difference. The problem of language difference was handled principally by two techniques: (1) the preparation of summaries of information or other material in written form in the Japanese or other language, and distributing this material in mimeographed form; and (2) the extensive use of group meetings where discussion was held in English and was interpreted by qualified interpreters in one or more languages. At the emergency refugee shelter, all information was at first put out in six languages, and later in four.

A concerted effort was made by the Authority whereby appropriate key members of the staff of the Washington office at various times made frequent trips to the relocation centers and other field offices. Likewise, key members of the field and center staffs travelled to Washington or other locations for conferences or special assignments. This action developed a more uniform interpretation of policies and instructions, and kept all divisions and levels of the organization more alert to the progress of the Agency as a whole. It aided immeasurably in planning for future activities. Opinions and points of view of the personnel outside of Washington were always given a great deal of weight and consideration in the problems and planning of the Authority.

CHAPTER VII

THE BUDGET-MAKING PROCESS

The budget presentations of the War Relocation Authority to the Bureau of the Budget and to the Congress were constantly used by the Authority as a device for advance planning, and later, after approval, as a guide for operation. A great deal of time and energy were spent by the Authority in developing applicable and correct appropriation language, and in preparing the budget as briefly as possible, at the same time making it a factual presentation of the intended scope of operations for the coming year. Every attempt possible was made to prepare the budget documents with clarity (considering the wide diversity of operations to be covered), and to indicate the plans for the future that were later to become operations.

The War Relocation Authority enjoyed a good reputation, generally, with the Budget Bureau and the Congress for accurate, honest and well prepared requests for appropriations. The Authority believes this was due primarily to the frank, clear and earnest manner in which the proposals set forth in the budget requests were described and discussed by the Director, and occasionally his assistants, with the officials of the Bureau of the Budget, and the members of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. The explanations and hearings before the committees of Congress and the Bureau of the Budget were not always easy nor was all the material readily accepted until a thorough understanding of the proposals and the intended operations was reached. However, the Authority experienced very little "tailoring" in its budgets. As a result, when the appropriation was approved, the plan of action of the Authority was not in question.

When the budget was finally approved for the coming fiscal year and the appropriation made available, copies of the budget document were distributed to the main offices of the Authority to serve as a basis of administrative guidance for the program and a copy of the plan of the operations the current appropriations was to cover.

The War Relocation Authority attempted to expend its appropriation conservatively and wisely, and to effect savings wherever possible. Appropriated funds were not spent merely because they were available. They were spent only as needed. As a result, some savings in appropriations were effected each year. As the savings became apparent, the Authority readily cooperated with the Budget Bureau or the Congress, as the case might be, in the impounding of the savings, or a rescission in a part of the appropriation.

There is set forth below a resume of the funds made available to the War Relocation Authority in its 4 1/3 years of operation:

FUNDS FOR THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

<u>Year</u>	<u>Original Appropriation</u>	<u>Transfer By Warrant</u>	<u>Rescissions</u>	<u>Savings</u>	<u>Net Amount Of Appropriation Expended</u>
1942	\$8,000,000*	—	\$1,700,000	—	\$6,300,000
1943	70,000,000	—	—	\$15,272,147	54,727,853
1944	48,170,000	—	—	5,577,142	42,592,858
1945	39,000,000	\$225,000	1,500,000	2,563,296	34,711,704
1946	<u>25,000,000</u>	<u>1,400,000**</u>	<u>2,500,000</u>	<u>1,020,358***</u>	<u>20,079,615***</u>
TOTAL	\$190,170,000	\$1,625,000	\$5,700,000	\$24,432,970	\$158,412,030

*From the President's Emergency Fund of 1942, \$4,500,000 of which was transferred to the War Department, for equipment and materials for WRA centers bought by the Army, and therefore is included in the expenditures. \$525,000 of this amount was returned and was part of the \$667,075 used in fiscal year 1945 for the emergency refugee shelter, the remaining \$142,075 was the WRA unencumbered balance of this source of funds.

** Transferred to Federal Security Agency, Social Security Board, for temporary aid to enemy aliens. These funds were used to take care of welfare situations of evacuees which occurred after leaving relocation centers. They were administered by local, State, and county welfare boards, as needed, through regularly established channels of the Social Security Board.

*** Estimated.

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At times representatives of the Authority appeared before various appropriation subcommittees to assist cooperating Federal agencies with part of their appropriation hearings that related to work in which the War Relocation Authority was interested. Appearances were made several times, for example, in behalf of the Federal Security Agency.

The relationships between the War Relocation Authority and the Bureau of the Budget were at all times excellent. Because of the frankness with which each agency dealt with the other, the Budget Bureau was kept informed at interim periods between budget hearings and reviews as

to the progress of the work of the Authority, and in turn the Budget Bureau offered many valuable and acceptable suggestions regarding WRA's work.

The War Relocation Authority required five budget presentations a year from each of its offices—one annual estimate 6 months in advance of a fiscal year, and four quarterly budgets for immediate operations, due 30 days before each quarter began. The annual budgets helped in the preparation of the national budget presentation. The quarterly budgets were carefully reviewed by operating and budget officials, and allotments of funds for the quarter's operation were made upon the basis of the final approvals of these quarterly budgets. The proposals contained therein were carefully checked against over-all plans, progress reports of work under way, cost reports and fiscal information gleaned from representatives recently returned from field trips, personnel ceilings for appointive employees and for evacuee employment, mileage and vehicular operation reports, contracts of one kind or another that were in force, and other sources. At the close of a quarter, all unencumbered funds were withdrawn, so that only the funds approved for the current quarter were available for expenditure. Periodically, all encumbered allotments not disbursed were reviewed, and the obligations reduced to actual outstanding commitments. Detailed reports of these reviews were submitted to the Washington office.

In the budget reviews for the operation of the relocation centers, the War Relocation Authority found the cost of \$1.20 per day per evacuee to be the approximate over-all average for all center operations including food, medical care, nominal welfare and grants, wages to evacuees for essential center functions and administrative costs. While this average could not be applied to all centers at all stages of operation due to varying size of population, status of the relocation program, size of center agricultural and construction operations, and similar factors, the average did serve as a rule-of-thumb check on budget requests. Further, it is believed that the figure provided a good index of a conservative policy for operation of the centers.

CHAPTER VIII

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Some of the problems of personnel management encountered by the War Relocation Authority were unique, it is believed, in the history of Federal service. Never before have so many persons been paid for work by the Federal Government and yet had no real employment status. The greatest part of the work at the relocation centers was performed by the evacuees at wage rates of \$12, \$16 and \$19 a month, plus cash clothing allowances for the worker and his family. The low wages paid the evacuees were believed to be adequate when it was considered that all expenses for eating, medical care, and everything except incidentals, were provided without charge by the Government.

The organization for handling the requirements for evacuee labor was initially established under the Employment Division, which was to have the dual function of handling employment of the evacuees at the centers, and the relocation of evacuees to employment in normal civilian life outside the centers. At a very early date, a reorganization of these responsibilities was necessary. The problems of evacuee employment at the centers were made a part of the regular personnel management program, and the relocation operations were taken over by the Relocation Division.

The evacuee employment program was launched under the usually approved management principles for employment. There were interviews for the determination of skills and availability of assignment. Requisitions for workers were submitted and assignments made. As time progressed, the Authority established a sick and annual leave arrangement in a manner which was roughly comparable to that enjoyed by the appointive personnel under civil-service regulations. An attempt was made to establish at each center an evacuee employees' fair practices committee to arbitrate disputes or other problems among the evacuees, or between the evacuees and the appointed staff.

With the employment of 2,500 to 3,000 evacuees at each center, and more at the larger centers, there soon developed a very large problem of record keeping. After assignments were made, there was the daily time reporting of all evacuee workers, made by evacuee timekeepers, as to whether the workers were on the job or on official leave; and if absent and not on leave, appropriate deductions had to be made from the very small amount of pay.

In the early period of center operations, there was a great deal of construction work to do, and every attempt was made to keep as many evacuees employed as possible. Of necessity, it was believed that many of the evacuees could assume positions of responsibility and direction.

With a small appointive administrative staff of 160 people, for example, which was the number of appointive personnel at the Granada Relocation Center, it was impossible to give complete appointive supervision to all activities and work done. Moreover, about one half of the members of the appointive staff were school teachers, and were not available for directional or supervisory work to any great extent. The small difference between the rates of wages paid to evacuees was believed to be adequate to form a basis for compensation to beginners, average workers, and exceptional workers. And it was surprising how much competition was developed between the groups paid the three different wages and how much prestige was attached to the higher wages. Yet, in spite of the competition, it was extremely difficult in many divisions of labor to get the evacuees to assume the responsibility of foremanship or directional work. The answer to this problem seemed to lie in the lack of a sufficiently wide spread in the wages paid to attract leadership that could withstand the pressures of center life if it were necessary to criticize fellow residents. Many wanted the \$19 per month but not the responsibilities that went with it.

It should be pointed out that even though there was no difference in the approach of laying out any of the work at the centers, in the minds of many of the evacuees there was a definite distinction between the work which could be easily seen was of direct benefit to the evacuees, and that work in which the administration was interested. For the work that was of direct benefit to the evacuees, there was little problem in getting it done rather quickly and well. Nearly all of the work-completion labor problems that arose at the centers came on work projects in which the administration was interested directly, and the evacuees only indirectly or not at all. For instance, there was little difficulty in getting the messhalls staffed and meals served or building facilities erected for evacuee recreation. But there was considerable difficulty at times in getting work done on lining a big irrigation canal so that farming activities might start, or on the building of staff personnel living quarters, or on clearing and leveling of raw land, the benefit of which would go to someone else after the center was closed. Yet from the over-all operation of the center, it was necessary that the items that the administration was interested in be completed.

Personalities of many of the appointed staff, and their previous experience in handling people, made a great deal of difference as to whether the evacuees assumed responsibility for work. At one center, a farm superintendent could get all of the workers he could use, and organize them effectively under evacuee foremen. And at the same time he was not lax with the evacuees in their work. At another center, the farm superintendent would have a very hard time in completing his farm program because of insufficient help and no one to whom he could delegate responsibility, no matter how tactfully he tried to approach his employment problem.

An attempt was made to classify all the jobs performed by the evacuees at the \$12, \$16 and \$19 rates. This was an arduous task and faithfully completed. It was thought that by classifying the jobs, the problems of evacuee employment and the press for payment at the higher rates would be eliminated by clarifying the job status. Of necessity, the duties of each job at the beginning were fuzzy and indefinite. Evacuees relocated or changed center jobs frequently, and made the labor force in any given division unsteady. Frequently, personalities of the supervisors or conditions of work were sufficient to induce job changes. Actually, the classification work did help a great deal in clarifying organization lines and outlining the specific job. It stabilized some workers. But in other instances, it made the malcontents a little more unruly in that they could point to a specific job sheet and advise that they were hired for that job, and would not willingly cooperate in a shift of work, or perform special duties in an emergency.

One receives in most instances just about what one pays for; and although 7 or 8 hours may have been spent on the job by each evacuee, and reported as such, it is fair to say that in the majority of instances, only a good 2 or 3 hours of work per day were actually derived from the average evacuee.

Should the problem arise again of handling a large number of people under similar circumstances, it is not recommended that the employment of the people be handled exactly as it was at the relocation centers. Detailed planning and job classification should have been instituted at an earlier date. In some areas, additional appointed staff would have been desirable. More adequate procedures and supervision should have been provided at the national level early in the program. The scope of the problem, as it was, was too large for the resources of the appointed personnel at the relocation centers to handle. And although all the larger objectives of center management were accomplished, the detailed results were far from gratifying when viewed from an administrative point of view.

With the resources available, it was not possible to administer a program of employment of such proportions at the low wages paid and still accord the workers all the possible privileges and considerations due workers, when full value in work was not obtained. The provisions regarding annual and sick leave were highly desirable, in principle, but the requirements for record keeping far outbalanced the benefits. In the case of the arbitration committees, the principle involved was very democratic and commendable, but the final issue would always have to be settled in the project director's office, and whatever his ruling was, it had to be accepted by all parties concerned. Evacuees, of course, could not leave the premises except under certain conditions, on the one hand, and appointive personnel could not force the evacuee to work, on the other.

There were many workers, however, among the evacuees who performed in an outstanding manner. It made little difference whether they were paid any wages whatsoever, except for the need of an occasional tooth brush or pack of cigarettes; they would have performed their work in the same creditable manner under any circumstances because they were interested in helping the evacuees, as a group, and the administration, and viewed their particular job as a means to that end.

On the basis of a broad outline prepared at the national level, several of the relocation centers, at the behest of the national office, inaugurated general training programs for the evacuees. The appointive personnel responsible for inaugurating these training programs worked hard and diligently. Different approaches to the problem were tried, some through the schools, some through the personnel management section, some through the project director's office, and other administrative channels. Yet, generally speaking, the training program was not successful among the evacuees.

On an individual basis, however, the War Relocation Authority probably has done more training of employees for the Federal Government than any other Federal agency in the same period of time. The younger generation of the evacuees were particularly adaptable to stenographic, typing, clerical, accounting, nurse's aide, mechanical and other types of positions which were badly needed by each of the centers. On the basis of the individual training that these young people received at the centers, many qualified for civil-service employment by the War Relocation Authority in its other offices as time went on. At one time, nearly 20 percent of the Washington office staff were evacuees who had received their original training at the centers. Now hundreds of them are employed by a large number of Federal agencies throughout the Nation. Just as the relocation centers contributed an outstanding unit to the United States Army in the 442nd Combat Team, so also the relocation centers have contributed a good group of well-trained civilian workers for work in the Federal service. Upon leaving the relocation centers, the evacuees were employed under regular civil-service regulations and at standard rates of pay.

Although most of the unusual situations in employment at the centers were connected with the evacuees, the appointive personnel staff presented some important problems also. One of the most important of these was in keeping the relocation centers staffed. The Authority pursued the policy of attempting to recruit for its key positions, in so far as possible, personnel with good Government experience. The recruiting of teachers, nurses, doctors and some classes of administrative personnel became increasingly difficult as the war went on. Initially the Civil Service district offices assisted a great deal in helping recruit staff for the centers. The recruiting situation, however, went from this pleasant arrangement to the opposite extreme. The tightest

employment situation encountered by the Authority was in the Salt Lake area where there were a great many large and important war activities. The Central Utah Relocation Center, which would normally draw a number of its personnel from this area, was informed by the War Manpower Commission office controlling employment quotas that, due to the shortage of workers in the area, no allotment of workers or personnel of any kind was available to the War Relocation Authority from that area. The Civil Service district office, under the direction of the War Manpower Commission, would refer no eligibles even when requested to do so.

Some persons who were qualified and available to work at the centers refused to go to the "Jap camps" because they did not like the evacuees, or rather the idea of working with the evacuees. Others were unwilling to put up with some of the deprivations and lack of facilities in the isolated areas where the centers were located. Because of gas rationing, travel to and from the centers was somewhat limited. Movies were available at times at the centers, but many other advantages of urban life were lacking; and probably most important, one worked with, played with, and lived next door to the same people 24 hours a day. Several of the centers were located where it was extremely hot in the summer, and several were where the climate was quite cold in the winter. The Government quarters in which the staff lived at the centers were rented at reasonable rates and were somewhat better than the accommodations provided for the evacuees, but not outstandingly so. The main difference was that cooking and sanitary facilities were available in each apartment. Because of the inconveniences and for other reasons, a person who was not directly connected with the War Relocation Authority and interested in it had a hard time in carrying on a conscientious and successful recruiting job for it.

So, very early in the operation of the centers, the War Relocation Authority had to take on virtually all of the recruiting of teachers, doctors, nurses and many other jobs as they became harder to fill. Representatives of the Authority made recruiting trips throughout the country from time to time, and it is surprising how many people from Pennsylvania, New York, New England, and the north central part of the United States were interested, and did go to the deserts of California, Arizona, Utah and Wyoming. Some of these people went because they wished to participate in a war agency program; others were attracted by the possibility of traveling west for the first time. Others were attracted by the simple life at the centers which provided an excellent chance to save some money. There were quite a large number, moreover, who were genuinely interested in the WRA program and in helping to alleviate the hardships to which the Japanese Americans had been submitted because of evacuation. The Authority followed the policy of employing men and their wives, if both were qualified for the work that was to be done. This again was an item of attraction to a family.

There were a few persons who arrived on the job, took one look and left, or left the next day. The majority of the recruits, however, were willing to accept the situation as it was, and after becoming acquainted with the program and the people, stayed and worked with an interest in seeing the job through to its completion. Occasionally, the effects of living too close together in a semi-isolated community were as apparent among the appointive staff as among the evacuees. But these were rare instances. By and large, the appointive personnel at the centers enjoyed cordial personal relations and had a very enjoyable time of it.

The recruiting that representatives of the Authority carried on was painstaking and diligent. Well qualified personnel was sought and generally found. Factual representation of the life and work at the centers was given; prospective employees were not promised a honeymoon cottage with roses around the door and a retinue of hand maids and doemastics, nor a job that was easy. Quite the contrary was the case. Living facilities were explained truthfully, and in almost every case the job described was a challenge to the abilities of the individual who was to cope with it. The most appealing recruitment argument was that it was work for and with people, and for people who should be helped. The recruiting job was a tough one, but one which provided satisfaction when successfully carried out.

The Authority pursued a progressive policy in regard to the classification of the positions of the appointive staff. At the inception of the organization, the policy decided upon for the establishment of the grades and salaries of the Authority at all levels was to follow the Classification Act as closely as possible. The jobs at all levels, both departmental and field, were classified at rates which, after careful study by technicians in position-classification work, were believed to be equitable and fair for the work done. Some sources believed that the salary rates for some positions in the Authority were too high. For example, based on a 12-months' period of employment for teachers, the Authority did not believe that the rate of CAF-3, \$1620 per annum, was out of line for good qualified teachers. Some sources did. Although not required by law or regulation to do so for the field, the War Relocation Authority conscientiously checked all of its position classifications for field positions as well as for departmental positions with the Civil Service Commission, and obtained their informal concurrence in the grades and rates established for all positions in the field. Events during the postwar period would seem to indicate that the progressive policy which the Authority followed in position classification was correct and in harmony with the current trend in wages and salaries.

When the closing of the centers and other offices of the Authority came into prospect, the War Relocation Authority felt a certain amount of responsibility for trying to assist loyal employees to obtain

other employment. Center employees were isolated and without chance of employment contacts. Further, the Authority needed personnel to finish its work. A program of delayed placement with other agencies and employers was instituted. Under a plan worked out with the Civil Service Commission, four representatives of the Commission were detailed to work with the personnel representatives of the Authority. The representatives of the Commission were given abstracts of the employment histories of all employees who indicated a desire for help in locating other employment when the work of WRA was complete. The country was divided into four areas, and one Commission representative made contacts with the Civil Service offices and the regional offices of the various Federal agencies in that territory. The facts were made known to the agencies that the War Relocation Authority would be liquidating; the work of the Authority was described; and the availability of its personnel at different times as different parts of the Agency closed was indicated. Some direct placements were made as a result of these visits, but these visits served to be more important in gathering information as to where possible expansion might take place, what jobs would be available, the type of work done and the proper person and location for contact. This information was sent to the Washington office of the Authority, and at least once a week, it was consolidated and forwarded to all of the offices of the Agency where it was made available to all employees in order that they might make direct contacts if they were interested.

Along with the work of the Civil Service representatives away from the centers and offices, personnel representatives of the War Relocation Authority interviewed each employee at each WRA office and provided them all with counsel in making plans for the future. Additional contacts were made by these personnel representatives with field offices of agencies that were known to be expanding and in need of qualified personnel. Quite a large number of placements in Federal and other governmental agencies, and some private employment as well, were effected in this manner. But the most successful means found was to provide the individual employee with as much information as possible about employment opportunities, and then have him make his contacts direct. The end of the war and the sudden easing of the manpower situation, together with the quick curtailment of many Federal and war-connected activities, changed the employment picture drastically almost overnight. Employing officials almost immediately reasserted their former practices of preemployment personal interviews, and the consideration of a multiple number of candidates for each available position.

Between October 1, 1945, and June 1, 1946, approximately 3,000 employees left the War Relocation Authority rolls. Of this group, information available as this report is written indicates that over 2,200 had definitely secured other employment, about 60 percent of which was with other Federal agencies. On many of the remaining individuals,

there is a lack of definite information as to placement rather than a definite indication that no job was secured.

Although it is impossible in most instances to determine the source of the contact that led to the placement of these employees, it is fair to state that the program initiated and carried forward jointly between WRA personnel and the representatives of the Civil Service Commission contributed greatly to the success of post-WRA placements. The cooperation of the Department of the Interior personnel office was also very helpful. Frequently, the early contacts were made by the Commission representatives, and the WRA personnel paved the way for consideration of applications and later employment at a date long after the initial contact.

The program bolstered the morale of the WRA employees, and assisted the Authority in keeping competent personnel on the job to complete the work of the Agency. From various points of view, the placement program is considered a success, and a possible contribution to future employment policies of the Federal Government.

The War Relocation Authority, like every other Federal agency under current regulations, had management problems with personnel ceilings. It is a paradoxical situation under which an agency must operate. Each year a great deal of careful thought and planning goes into the preparation of a detailed budget which is presented to the Bureau of the Budget and the Appropriation Committees of the Congress. In that budget is a very detailed statement of positions needed by the agency to perform the work proposed in the budget, and the period of time each position is expected to be occupied. The man-years of occupancy is always less than the number of positions because of expected personnel turn-over or completion of work. The budget in due course is approved and an appropriation made available. But the number of positions and the man-years in the approved budget can not be used to govern the number of persons that may be employed with the total money approved and appropriated.

A separate request must be made to the Bureau of the Budget for an agency personnel ceiling. Detailed justifications are prepared and hearings held regarding the number of personnel needed. The personnel ceiling for total employees granted to an agency by the Budget Bureau is nearly always less than that approved in the budget and for which an appropriation has already been made. The experience of the War Relocation Authority, until its final period of liquidation, was that the budget would be approved for from 3,300 to 3,600 positions, yet the Agency personnel ceilings granted ranged from 2,000 to 2,350.

Then, in the management of a multiple number of offices, any one of which might have an emergency and need immediately additional

employees, a small reserve of positions must be withheld as a contingency.

So the net result when the personnel ceiling is apportioned to all activities and offices, is that the number of actual employees is only from 50 to 75 percent of those approved in the budget.

Such a situation makes it extremely hard to carry out a conscientious personnel management or administrative program. It creates a tri-pronged personnel ceiling of different lengths—the approved budget, the approved agency ceiling from the Bureau of the Budget, and the individual office ceilings administratively determined by the agency.

To insure sufficient operating personnel, there is a tendency to do one of two things: (1) balloon the requests for personnel in the budget and to the Budget Bureau beyond the honest needs of the agency, to cushion the expected percentage cut, or (2) over-allot ceilings to individual offices beyond the agency's approved ceiling, depending on the fact that normal personnel turn-over will always keep some positions vacant, and the maximum agency ceiling allowed will, consequently, always be full. Both ways are poor administration and a serious gamble. The War Relocation Authority did neither of these, and always presented as honest and factual a budget as possible. As a consequence, however, it suffered severely at times because of lack of sufficient appointive personnel. Employment and the carrying out of operations take time and require stability of organization. Personnel ceilings can not be shifted about indiscriminately and without proper notice, and still attain the work objective.

CHAPTER IX

FISCAL MANAGEMENT

In fiscal operations, the War Relocation Authority enjoyed a smooth-working system that functioned efficiently for its allotments, obligations, expenditures, budget control and financial reports. All financial operations were in accordance with established Government regulations. But the experience was not enjoyed at first in respect to the cost accounting work attempted.

In the original establishment of the cost accounting system for the Authority, it was envisioned that eventually the Authority would attempt to render a cost accounting report on an individual family basis. With this as a basis, the many diverse operations of the Authority were woven into a very intricate system that was theoretically correct, but was too complex to administer under the conditions present in the centers. There was a need for considering absolutely every function and activity that went on at the centers—maintenance and sanitation, recreation, center-produced agricultural products and livestock that were consumed in center feeding operations, construction of some things and demolition of others, the handling of losses, breakage, and deterioration of equipment and supplies, off-project hospital costs, welfare assistance, grants for relocation, and many others. There was almost no end to the complexity of accounts it was found necessary to establish to reflect the cost data believed essential for gauges of given operations, on the one hand, and the combinations of the data from the various accounts for statistical purposes on a population or family basis, on the other.

A good cost accounting system presupposes that every transaction of purchase, material issuance, usage or return, and all labor and other items will be promptly and completely reported exactly as used, prorating and coding to the various accounts. It presupposes reliable inventory reports as a source to check against, and to reconcile differences. Above all, it presupposes that all data required will arrive currently.

The cost accounting system initially installed at the relocation centers failed for a number of reasons. It was too complex to administer. Because of the large number of personnel, appointive and evacuee, connected with the various operations, the necessary reports of time, material and labor were not submitted promptly, or were not accurately prepared to give the extremely detailed breakdown required. The turnover in evacuee workers, upon whom most of this reporting depended, was such that in very few instances was there a continuity of handling of the reporting for any great period of time. An additional important reason for the failure of the cost accounting system was the inadequate warehousing system that was initially in effect at the centers. The

receiving and inspection reports and the material issuance tickets were chronically prepared late, and their tardy arrival constantly changed the cost data for periods several months back.

So, until the last year and a half of operation of the War Relocation Authority, the cost data used by the Authority were really obtained from analyses made of the allotment and fiscal accounts, and coordinated with the monthly progress reports of the divisions and sections, as the occasion for particular cost information arose.

After the warehousing system had been thoroughly revamped, the cost accounting system was revised, eliminating approximately 75 percent of the detail required by the first system. Thereafter the system functioned in a satisfactory manner, and, for the period maintained, the expenditure analysis was good. But it was rather like locking the barn door after the horse was stolen, because the data of earlier periods could not be recaptured. Thanks to a very good system of allotment and fiscal accounts, and a good system of statistical progress reports, nearly any necessary information could be reconstructed—but it had to be done the hard way.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that in the establishment of any new organization, a clear, easy, workable system must be developed so that there is a coordinated and established flow of documents for requisition, administrative approval, purchasing, receiving and inspection, warehousing, issuance for use, and vouchering for payment. Otherwise, hours and hours of fruitless labor and search will be expended which result in frustration, and the expenditure of much more work to accomplish the result than in the original method devised is simple, direct, understandable to everyone, and workable.

The War Relocation Authority used the services of agent cashiers very extensively in its work. At each of the centers, and at some of the other offices, there were from one to six agent cashiers, with a total of cash available from \$2,500 to \$150,000. They were usually staff members who performed as agent cashiers as a secondary function. The use of agent cashiers was mainly for emergency grants and relocation assistance, although at some stages of operation at all of the centers, evacuee payrolls were also handled by the agent cashiers.

During the closing months at the relocation centers, the agent cashiers were extremely busy with relocation grants. Each evacuee relocating and in need of assistance was provided with a \$25 cash relocation grant plus subsistence for the period en route to his destination at the rate of \$3 per day, and a Government transportation request for the purchase of his railroad or bus ticket. During the heavy periods of relocation, this took a lot of cash. The availability of cash was dependent upon the amount of the bond of the agent cashier, and the

proper submission of reimbursement vouchers to the regional disbursing office of the Treasury Department by mail, the return of checks by mail, and arrangements made with local banks to have sufficient cash on hand to handle the checks. The availability of cash in the isolated areas where the centers were located brought about some peculiar situations occasionally when the amount of funds needed for the operations of a given period was insufficient. Several times it was necessary for personnel at the centers to go on a Saturday afternoon to the nearest town or towns and borrow temporarily as much cash as each of the local merchants could make available. This, of course, was returned at the beginning of the following week when the reimbursement voucher had been processed and the funds were made available to the agent cashier. Frequently personnel drove hundreds of miles over night to submit the reimbursement vouchers direct to the disbursing office for payment, and drove back again over the same road in the same hurry, to repay the merchants, or take care of another several hundred people waiting to depart from the center.

The use of the agent cashiers to disburse evacuee payrolls was discontinued in all centers as a regular measure because of difficulties of keeping enough cash on hand, and the fact that a payroll document had to be completely prepared as well. On payday, payment in cash necessitated long queues of people and tedious waiting. And it was found that the regular submission of the payrolls to the regional disbursing office of the Treasury where the checks were made out and mailed individually to the evacuees was the most satisfactory method of handling such a large volume of workers. It also spread the demand for cash within the center, as the checks were not all cashed at once.

The process at the end of each month of preparing payrolls for all of the evacuees who had worked that month was quite a chore. Because of the rapid turn-over of evacuees in the various jobs, and the large number of evacuees who were employed, there were difficulties at first in obtaining currently accurate timekeeping data. At the peak of operation there were 2,500 and more names on the first payroll each month for services performed, based upon computations from the time reports, leave records, and similar documents. Then a second payroll was prepared each month for clothing allowances which included the family members of a worker as well as the worker himself, and made it larger in number of names than the first payroll. The amount of money due each individual was small, but it was just as much work as if the amounts were considerably larger. And until one had worked with this particular situation for some time, the spelling of Japanese names was a slow and tedious process. The typists at the regional disbursing offices of the Treasury Department must have been relieved when the relocation centers closed, and the last payroll of Japanese names was completed. Nevertheless, the cooperation and service which the regional disbursing offices gave to the Authority throughout its entire operation was outstanding.

Because of the isolation of the centers, the cashing of so many small checks created a problem for a time. Different arrangements for this service were worked out at each of the centers at different times, but the best arrangement finally reached at each center was for the business enterprises (the cooperative stores operated by the evacuees at the centers for notions, drugs and incidentals) to cash the checks for a small charge, or at a time when purchases were being made.

The fiscal requirements for the relocation offices throughout the country were operated on a centralized basis, as was the emergency refugee shelter, with only memorandum accounts maintained at the operating offices, and all official accounts and payment of bills being done at the Washington office. On the other hand, until the closing of the relocation centers, their fiscal and finance functions were completely decentralized.

With the liquidation of the Authority, the handling of the accounts and obligations from the relocation and other field offices was no particular problem. At the centers, however, there had to be a carefully executed plan to cut off fiscal operations at the centers, including the notification to vendors on unpaid bills, the balancing of accounts with the regional disbursing offices, a closing of the center books, and then a complete transfer of all books of account, records, and other items to the Washington office for consolidation into the Washington accounts and records.

The method used for this consolidation was simple. A transfer unit was established in the Washington office which received the material as it was sent in. At the same time, one or two of the center's finance section employees went to Washington and checked in each obligation and record. Since the timing of center closures was spaced over a period, the first center was about completed by the time the second was ready to check in. And so each center, in order, was checked into the transfer unit, and one set of accounts for all of the centers was compiled. At that point, the complete set of accounts for all centers were checked into the accounts and records of the Washington office, appropriately subdivided by center and obligation phase, and the complete accounting activity of the Authority was made into one set of accounts that might be handled by a fiscal liquidating agency.

The War Relocation Authority probably used more Government transportation requests and Government bills of lading than any other agency of its size in the same period of time. To effect the relocation of the evacuees from the centers, approximately 100,000 Government transportation requests and 50,000 Government bills of lading were issued, 60,000 of the transportation requests in a period of 4 months, and 35,000 bills of lading in a period of 6 months. Hence, the number of individual items requiring financial handling for obligation and payment was extremely heavy during the closing period of the centers and the Authority.

CHAPTER X

SUPPLY OPERATIONS

Ten large cities housing a total of 100,000 persons require a lot of supplies, materials and equipment to carry on their day-to-day operations. The centers were constructed by the United States Army Engineers, and the major facilities were installed at that time with the exception of schools and staff housing. At the request of the War Relocation Authority, the Army also ordered for delivery the initial stock of essential equipment, such as cots, blankets, mattresses, kitchen equipment, heating stoves, hospital equipment and supplies, and a 10-day supply of Army B rations. Most of the supplies and equipment arrived at about the same time as the evacuees began to come to the centers in trainloads of 500 per day. It was a rather acute problem to take care of all the material and at the same time to get the evacuees quartered when the staff was small and inadequate. Many times the staff at the centers in the early weeks of operation worked as much as 18 to 20 hours a day to handle the shipments of people and materials. But within a rather brief time, the problems of housing evacuees, receiving the initial equipment, and distributing it to the barracks and other buildings were overcome.

Few, if any of the personnel, realized in the beginning the quantities of supplies, particularly food, that would be required to take care of the needs of the evacuees. They had a great deal to learn about the usual diet of Japanese Americans. There were many community problems that had to be handled quickly, such as schools for the children, establishment of hog farms to take care of the garbage, and getting work programs under way to keep the evacuees occupied. All of these activities required that some material items be bought so that the activity could go forward. The procurement of necessary supplies and equipment became and remained a very important function in the operation of the centers.

By memorandum of understanding with the War Department, the procurement facilities of the Army were made available to the War Relocation Authority very early in the program. The Army sources of supply for food and other quartermaster items, such as cots and blankets, for medical items, and for such ordnance items as autos, trucks and auto parts and accessories, were a big factor in the successful administration of the relocation centers. The facilities of the Army Engineers as a procurement avenue were not found to be as adequate or as expeditious as those of the Authority, however, for building material, construction items or miscellaneous articles. At first the Authority tried the system of having Army officers detailed to the Authority to work on its supply problems, but this was abandoned because it was found that

civilian relationships between the WRA employees and the War Department worked more smoothly. The Army handled the requisitions of the Authority just as if they were Army requisitions. One important difference was present in regard to food items: the Authority followed a rationing program comparable to the civilian rationing program, and it delivered ration points for all purchases where required; and it did not participate in the "set aside" program of the Army for overseas shipments. Requisitions were placed 50 days in advance. Within certain administrative limitations made by the Authority, the Army was at liberty to make substitutions if the items requisitioned were not available.

At the beginning, a concerted effort was made to gather up surplus Government property from Federal agencies that were closing, and from other Federal agencies. Through the Army, trucks, autos and other equipment were acquired that had been in use in the Civilian Conservation Corps. A large amount of other equipment was obtained from the National Youth Administration and the Work Projects Administration at their closing. Because of a "take it all or none" basis on which this surplus was obtained, some items of equipment, such as wheelbarrows and land tools, were acquired in numbers far greater than needed.

But in spite of these sources of equipment and supplies, there were many thousands of items to be bought before schools could be built and equipped, recreation and leisure time could be organized and appropriately directed, care given to the new born, the sick and the aged, and a very extensive farm program could be put into gear. There were two steps involved in buying anything during the war period: (1) obtain the necessary priority with which to buy the item needed, and (2) find a dealer with the item to sell after the priority was obtained.

The War Production Board and the Office of Price Administration were responsible for the wartime control, use, sale and price of important materials and equipment for war and civilian use. If a vendor wished to replace his stock of a strategic item, he required a priority of a certain class before he would effect a sale. Before any extensive procurement program could be undertaken by the Authority, its position had to be made clear to the two controlling agencies. The initial reception at the War Production Board was a hearing for priorities for the building of schools and administrative staff housing at the centers. It was quite unfavorable; and it took a good deal of careful explaining before the program was thoroughly understood. However, once the genesis and scope of the WRA program were understood, and its plans made clear, the relationships with the War Production Board were quite satisfactory. It was necessary, of course, for the Authority to justify adequately any requests for priorities, but they were granted if properly presented and the need justifiable. The Authority exercised a great deal of administrative control in screening priority requests from the field before submitting them to the WPB for consideration. The rapid dissemination

to the field of information relating to priorities became an important operation.

Based upon experience with the War Production Board, the original approach to the Office of Price Administration was made in quite another manner, but the point at issue was quite different. The OPA and the WRA believed that the program of the Authority should be under civilian ration rules as an institutional user, and ration banking followed. The Army objected to this procedure and set forth the thesis that the evacuees came under the provisions of the Geneva Convention as prisoners of war. The legal point was finally established that the evacuees were not prisoners of war, and that the Geneva Convention was not therefore applicable in this situation. So the War Relocation Authority became an institutional user under the civilian rationing program.

Because of the wartime situation surrounding the operation of the centers, the War Relocation Authority was exempt from certain regulations and requirements which normally relate to Federal procurement. The Agency was exempt by appropriation language from Statute No. 3709, and by permit from the "prison-made and blind-made industries" requirements. To a certain extent, these exemptions led to a modest overstocking of critical items at the centers. But the volume of this type of material was not great, in comparison with the total purchases, and the materials were carefully stored and cared for, and have been made available through surplus action for postwar use in a time when the items are possibly more critical and more needed than they were during the war. These exemptions were essential, nevertheless, to carry on a supply program of the necessary proportions.

The problems of purchasing large quantities of goods and supplies for a large number of people in isolated areas at any time are difficult, and under wartime restrictions they were frustrating and disappointing, but all the more challenging for those reasons to the supply or procurement officer. Where to find enough lumber to buy to build boxes so that 12,000 persons could pack their personal belongings in them for relocation? Where to find tractors, farm equipment, feed, seed, and livestock? How to arrange for regular and sure deliveries of 50,000 tons of coal, and have it unloaded and distributed before demurrage started? How to handle ice deliveries from railroad cars at railheads 20 miles away when it was 120 degrees in the shade? These were typical supply problems which the Authority faced at various centers during the program.

Occasionally, when a small plumbing store, tin shop, or lumber yard was going out of business, the entire stock was purchased. Strained foods for babies were hard to get, and many of the Agency's procurement officers searched long and hard before they found a sufficient quantity of disposable diapers which were needed whenever there was a mass shifting of the evacuees from center to center by train.

Not all the problems of procurement and supply lay in finding the desired items and in securing the necessary priority if required. There were administrative problems as well. Many of the employees at the centers, particularly in the professional fields, had never worked for the Government or for large organizations, and were "brand" or "make" conscious. As many of the new doctors, dentists, nurses, teachers and motor maintenance men, in particular, came to assume their duties at the centers, they immediately wanted to order an entirely new set of equipment and supplies of their favorite "brand", and no other kind, whether as good, or even better, would do. But by painstaking diligence on the part of procurement and supply personnel, and their cooperation with the principal administrative officials, the merits of each case were carefully considered and discussed with the person desiring to order the material or equipment, and a great amount of duplication of equipment and pyramiding of supplies was avoided.

The procurement functions performed both at the centers and by the field procurement offices for the centers were one of the outstanding planks in the foundation of planning and performance by which the Authority moved ahead with its varied program. The performance of the procurement and supply personnel was consistently good.

The War Relocation Authority went through a period of adjustment in its procurement and supply problems as practically any other large agency starting out anew must do. The methods used at first for property control and receiving of property purchased were based upon a divisional system. Each major division maintained its own property control, and received and warehoused the materials and supplies purchased for it. This divisional system of warehousing did not lend itself to centralized control; under the system it was not possible at any one time to know just what was available on the center, and what was not. The system also tended, with persons who had never before worked for the Government or a large organization, to encourage the practice of division heads or persons at their direction making purchases locally, without going through the channels to establish a proper financial obligation for payment and requisition for purchase. One section would be looking for a couple of pounds of nails which were desperately needed and lacking in its warehouse, while other sections had several kegs of the required size of nails available and not in use. And the section with the immediate need would eventually buy a few pounds of the nails.

This situation was cleared up promptly and satisfactorily in two ways: (1) a central system of warehousing was established and put under the direction of one unit, the supply section, where all incoming deliveries were checked against copies of requisitions, and a central set of records of materials on hand and property accountability records were kept; and (2) the quarterly budget requests from the centers were used as a planning and control device as to what was to be done, what was on

hand, and what needed to be bought. Detailed lists of materials needed and on hand accompanied the budgets. The organization very soon learned to anticipate its requirements by as much as 3 months, and the estimates proved to be quite accurate. A system of reserves, or earmarking for specific work to be done, was tried, but the most satisfactory method developed was to have the supply officer consolidate all of the anticipated requirements, gauge them against stocks on hand and on order, and determine the amounts that should be purchased, after going over his results with appropriate administrative officials. It was found that supply requirements could be anticipated fairly closely, and advance buying in large quantities without waste, with sufficient delivery time allowed, could be accomplished. The full extent of all operations planned must, however, be known.

The materials and supplies purchased by the War Relocation Authority represented nearly 45 percent of its total expenditures. In the 4 1/3 years of operation, a total of \$69,843,788 was expended for supplies and equipment, out of total expenditures of \$158,412,030.

One interesting adjunct to the supply program was the necessity to supervise the operation of post offices and mail distribution to all the persons in the centers. With the cooperation of the Post Office Department and the nearest sizable post office, branch post offices were established at the centers. The volume of mail and parcel post was heavy. The problems of maintaining current center addresses for the 7 to 18 thousand evacuees at a given center were constant, and the handling of so many unusual names at first was somewhat difficult. Once the postal unit was organized, and evacuees, who were familiar with Japanese names, were employed to handle the routine work, it functioned smoothly.

Based on the experience of receiving considerable quantities of surplus property in bad or very poor condition, the Authority made attempts to keep its stock of equipment and materials in good condition, and to eliminate from its records, by approved survey action, the loss, destruction, deterioration, or wearing out of items of equipment or supplies. Many interesting problems were solved as a result of this action. Some might think that, with so many people around, loss of minor articles might reach a high figure. This was not the case; the loss figure for WRA equipment is very low. Many items, however, did disappear and did not reappear until the evacuees and other personnel were leaving the centers to relocate, and their property accountability was checked.

The Authority participated in all drives for wartime conservation, particularly those for scrap iron, waste paper, tin cans and used fats, although the results were somewhat disappointing. On some of these, organizations within the centers, such as the Boy Scouts with the paper

drives, assumed the responsibility for the work connected with the activity. In the case of the scrap iron and tin can drives, the materials were carefully saved and large volumes accumulated, but the experience with these was much the same as with the waste paper. The distances between the centers and the localities where these items could be processed made dealers reluctant to take the articles after they had been assembled. The salvage of used fats was the most successful of any of these conservation campaigns at the centers.

In the summer and fall of 1944, the Authority had a very satisfactory experience in a "trial run" in surplus work in closing out the Jerome Relocation Center in Arkansas. It was found at that time that it was a tremendous task to collect all the property from all over the center which the evacuees had been using, warehouse it correctly with all like items together, inventory it carefully, and prepare the paper work necessary to declare the property as surplus to the appropriate disposal agency in accordance with existing regulations relating to surplus property. Yet it was a small operation compared with the one that was to come in 1945 and 1946.

When the closing of the centers was definitely announced, steps were taken immediately leading toward the disposal of equipment and supplies surplus to the needs of then current center operations. All farming equipment and agricultural supplies were declared surplus in January and February of 1945, and were disposed of almost immediately by the Procurement Division of the Treasury Department and made available for private use in the coming crop season. Treasury Procurement, as the disposal agency at that time for that equipment, held "spot sales" at each of the centers to dispose of the equipment and supplies then declared surplus. It is interesting to note that at the Rohwer Relocation Center in Arkansas, when 14 farm and general purpose tractors had been declared surplus, and put up for sale, 150 dealers from 12 States came to the center to bid on the 14 tractors.

Throughout 1945 up to the time when the last evacuee left each center, the centers individually tried currently to declare surplus such materials and equipment as were no longer needed. Although this procedure is correct in theory, and was motivated by a genuine desire to get the surpluses available to the general public as soon as possible, the same practice would not be followed by the Authority if it had its whole job to do over again. This procedure led to a comingling of property that was declared as surplus and that which was not declared, when more property of the same item became available as surplus. Additional confusion was added when, because of limited warehouse space, it was necessary to warehouse the declared and nondeclared items together. By far the better method from an operations point of view would be to collect all of the items and properly warehouse them with like items together, and then make the count and inventories and prepare the surplus

documents. An anxious buying public, however, makes such a procedure extremely difficult to follow.

When the last evacuee had left each center, the supply program of surplusing property really went into high gear. Many of the items could not be touched until all operations for the evacuees were entirely complete. There were approximately 10,000 different kinds of items in each of the relocation centers, varying in quantity in accordance with the population that had been there at the peak of residence and the types of work or other programs which had been in action.

All declarations of surplus property were made in accordance with the regulations established by the Surplus Property Board and its successors under the Surplus Property Act of 1944. A thick catalog gave a list of almost all known commodities, and placed them into various commodity classifications. All declarations of surplus movable property had to be prepared on appropriate forms in accordance with the commodity classifications, one classification to a declaration. The paper work to declare 10,000 different kinds of items--with some partial declarations, some corrections of classification, and some rewrites for condition, grade or quantity--is a tremendous job. The number of copies of each declaration required for administrative and distribution purposes made it necessary, in almost every case, to use a duplication process, after the first typing, to obtain enough copies.

An additional problem which slowed the declaration process at first was that all agencies within a given Department of the Government have first priority on the property surplus in an agency in that Department. Since the War Relocation Authority was a part of the Department of the Interior, this meant that before the Authority could declare its property surplus to the appropriate disposal agency, all of the bureaus of the Department of the Interior had to be advised of the availability of the property before it could be declared to the disposal agency. At first the attempt was made to physically circulate copies of the proposed declarations to all of the bureaus of the Department, but this was soon abandoned in favor of a general announcement that the War Relocation Authority was liquidating and representatives of all bureaus and their offices were invited, up to a given date, to visit all of the centers and earmark the property they wanted and could pay for, with the assurance that the Authority would ship it to them as soon as it became available.

The constant changing of organization of the disposal agencies was also a confusing factor in declaring property as surplus. There are generally three classes of property: (1) real estate and buildings, (2) consumer goods, and (3) capital goods. The general distinction between class 2 and class 3 is that consumer goods are items ready to use, and capital goods are items which are used to make something. When the

Authority first started declaring property surplus, class 1 went to the Surplus Property Board, class 2 went to Treasury Procurement, and class 3 went to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Later, class 2 went to the Consumers Division of the Commerce Department, and class 3 went to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Still later, class 1 went to the Surplus Property Administration; class 2 went to the Consumers Branch of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation; and class 3 went to the Capital Goods Branch of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Still later, class 2 went to the Consumer Goods Division of the War Assets Corporation and class 3 went to the Capital Goods Division of the War Assets Corporation. And, finally, class 1 went to the Real Property Disposal Division of the War Assets Administration; class 2 and class 3 to the Acquisition and Inspection Division of the War Assets Administration. All of these changes were within a year and a half. All real property declarations were at the Washington level, and all movable property declarations were at the field level. The regional boundaries were in no case quite the same for any of the organizational arrangements pointed out above.

Yet in spite of many obstacles both within the Authority and outside, it took only an average of 90 days at each of the centers to handle all of the surplus property problems and declare surplus to the disposal agencies approximately \$35,000,000 worth of movable property. It is believed that all the property was handled in accordance with appropriate laws and regulations. The Authority found it difficult to accomplish the rapid disposal of large quantities of property under the surplus property regulations; but the job was rapidly done.

CHAPTER XI

MESS OPERATIONS

In the field of mess operations, the War Relocation Authority had experiences which will probably never be duplicated. It is certain that there were no prototypes to follow. The largest single expense to the Authority for any item was for food; and the largest number of evacuee workers engaged in any single activity at the centers were employed in mess operations. The feeding of a large number of people is always a problem. But, when wartime restrictions such as rationing and short supplies are present, isolation and long-distance transportation of large quantities of food and fuel are added, and it is all topped off with administrative restrictions, the problem of feeding a large group of people takes on a very dark outlook. Yet, when the organizational aspects of operating the large number of block messhalls were completed, the public relations problems regarding the amounts and kinds of foods needed at the centers were taken care of, and the flow of supplies to handle normal operations had been correctly regulated, the feeding operations at the centers which were of tremendous dimensions slipped into the background and functioned smoothly throughout the remainder of the program.

The feeding arrangements in the centers were based upon one messhall for each block. Each block normally housed from 250 to 300 people, and all persons resident in that block ate at the messhall in that block. The number of blocks per center varied from about 35 to almost 100, depending upon the size of the center. The chef and his crew of messhall workers were evacuees, mainly from the block that the messhall served. Most of the workers had not had any particular experience in feeding operations outside of the cooking that one normally does in his own home. Because of this fact, the efficiency of the mess workers and the quality of the meals, which improved as time went on, often differed radically between messhalls. Yet the basic instructions and supplies made available to each messhall were exactly the same. There were normally five appointed employees in the mess section, a project steward, assistant steward, clerk, storekeeper and head warehouseman. The total number of evacuee mess workers varied with the size of the center from about 1,200 to 4,000, at the peak of center operations.

The initial stock of food for the relocation centers was a 10-days' supply of Army B rations. The War Relocation Authority learned its first lesson regarding the feeding of persons of Japanese ancestry at that point. A very important part of the planned menu of Army B rations is navy or pinto beans which the majority of evacuees did not like, and would not eat.

In the course of the first few weeks of center operations, a great deal was learned about the diet desired by the evacuees. It is not the same diet that one would normally set forth on menus in large institutions for the rank and file of people in the United States. Although many of the basic ingredients used by the evacuees were the same as those used by all other people in the United States, the quantities and the way they were used were quite different. The seasonings and combinations of spices and flavorings differ; many vegetables used extensively by the evacuees were rarely used by others; and of course there was a desire for large amounts of rice and certain kinds of fish. At one time, the Authority was buying and consuming nearly 40 percent of the rice crop of the United States.

After some experimentation in organization, it was found that 35 to 40 people were necessary for the operation of each messhall for three meals a day, 7 days a week. This number was reduced as relocation progressed. The pantry stocks of the messhalls were kept to a bare minimum, and all food was received, stored and issued from central warehouses. Large refrigerated warehouses permitted the storage of sizable shipments of meat, milk and vegetables. Accurate population records by block were maintained, and the issuance of all foods was based upon the weekly population figure for each block. Several evacuees who had extensive experience in feeding operations were responsible at each center for preparing menus 60 days in advance. On the basis of these menus, requisitions for staples were placed with the Army Quartermaster depots 50 days in advance; and requisitions for perishables were placed with the Army Quartermaster Markets Centers 15 to 30 days in advance. An attempt was made to maintain a warehouse stock of staples for approximately 60 to 90 days usage. Deliveries on many commodities were sometimes slow. The issuance of food at the warehouses was worked out from the menus, the proper quantities placed in containers marked for the appropriate messhalls, and deliveries were made to the messhalls every day or every other day. Meats were cut in a central butcher shop before delivery, and milk was apportioned according to administrative determinations. Each messhall had a copy of the menu for the day, but was not required to cook the material exactly as the menu had it listed. The basic ingredients, however, were exactly the same for all messhalls. If a chef was issued loins of pork and raw potatoes, he might serve pork chops and mashed potatoes or roast pork and boiled potatoes. Or he might make sukiyaki. It was entirely his decision.

Although the Authority obtained from Army sources nearly all of the subsistence supplies it purchased, it elected to follow civilian rationing, and succeeded in complying rather fully with the rationing requirements. The armed forces were not required to comply with rationing requirements. There were many times when it was necessary to make careful and detailed explanations to the evacuees why such and such foods could not be purchased or served. But by and large, the evacuees

accepted the rationing program just as did the civilian public, even though the war seemed very remote from the relocation centers.

As an institutional user under rationing, WRA was issued by the Office of Price Administration, in a period of about 4 years, a total of 124,138,987 points for processed food, 270,900,951 points for meat, fats, and oils, and 8,870,396 pounds of sugar. In total, over the same period, the Authority was able to save from these allotments a total of 38,630,133 points for processed foods, 43,955,991 points for meats, fats and oils, and 1,948,764 pounds of sugar. The Authority and the evacuees took considerable pride in the saving in the ration allotments, and thereby contributed directly to the conservation program, and indirectly to the needs of the armed services. At each center there were two meatless days a week; yet full and nourishing menus were provided at all times.

During most of the period of the feeding operations at the centers, a very tight control was maintained at the Washington level over stocks of food on hand, and over the use of ration points. Detailed inventories of stocks on hand were required monthly; copies of all menus and all purchase orders for subsistence items were also submitted. These were checked very closely each month, and frequently directions were given to cancel some orders, or to effect substitutions. On the basis of these rechecks, ration checks for the coming month's operations were issued to the centers by the Washington office from the master ration banking account.

Planning 50 days in advance under a system of rationing is not an easy thing to do. Frequently when purchases of foodstuffs were made, the value of the rationed items was one figure, and when they were actually ready to be consumed, their value was greater. In effect, the Authority had to carry on two sets of ration computations, one for purchase in advance, and one for consumption. The ration values were recomputed each week for the menus to be served that week, and if out of line, the menus were revised to come within the current ration quotas. This sometimes meant that some items like canned fruits, catsup and juices could not be used immediately after they had been purchased, because of the change in ration values. And it took a lot of careful planning and some time to fit those items into the already ration-tight menus.

The messhall at the hospital (the hospital was normally one of 250 beds) had, of necessity, to be operated on a different basis from the other messhalls. All types of dietary problems were encountered and handled according to competent medical direction.

The problem of handling infant feeding, with block messhall eating for the other people was at first perplexing. The final arrange-

ment was an organization known as "block mothers" who operated block feeding stations. The station was a corner in the block messhall equipped with a refrigerator where milk and perishables were kept. Besides, there was a small stock of other necessities. Upon written orders from the doctors, the station issued strained vegetables, milk, Pablum, oranges, dextri maltose, and other baby foods to parents with small children. These feeding stations were under the joint direction of the hospital and the mess operations staff.

A very important part of the work at the centers was directed toward food production. At several of the centers there were herds of cattle raised for center consumption. One center might raise some beef for several centers and ship it to other centers after slaughtering. All centers maintained hog farms, first as a means of disposal of wet garbage, and second as a source of meat. Yet a careful accounting was kept of all center-grown and slaughtered meat, and ration point were surrendered for this meat in accordance with regulations. All of the centers had vegetable farms of considerable extent, and were quite successful in vegetable production. Centers with surpluses of certain vegetables would ship to other centers that did not have a full supply of that particular vegetable. Storage houses and root cellars were constructed to store vegetables that would keep until they were consumed. A careful accounting was kept of the consumption of all center-grown foods and figured into the computations of food costs. The basis of 85 percent of market cost was used to determine the value of the food produced.

All of the centers established one or more processing plants for preserving center-grown foods, or preparing foods that the evacuees particularly liked. Tofu processing plants were established at all centers. Tofu is a sponge-like white cake made from soy beans and was a particular favorite with the evacuees. There were pickling plants for daikon (a long, large, white radish), rutabagas and turnips, and other vegetables. At the Tule Lake center, all bread and pastry used at the center was baked in a center-operated bakery. The Manzanar center made all the shoyu sauce it used.

The total amount of money expended for the purchase of food was slightly over \$48,000,000. The basis of the budget presentation for funds in the appropriation requests to the Congress for feeding operations was 45 cents per person per day. Over the approximate 4-year period, the average cost of feeding operations at all centers was 43.2 cents per day per person. This included center-produced food. At the height of the center agricultural operations, cash expenditures for food were about 31 cents per person per day, and the farms produced approximately 14 cents per person per day. This may be compared with a reputed cost of roughly 55 cents per person per day for members of the armed services.

When most of us think in terms of food, we think in terms of the amount of food needed for our own families, and what we have in our own kitchens. Few of us realize offhand the tremendous quantities of food required to feed several thousands of people. It was out of this psychological fact, plus the implications raised regarding the loyalties of the evacuees by the mere fact of the physical evacuation of these people, that some of the sharpest public criticism of the Authority arose. A rumor which resulted in a public relations problem relating to food might start somewhat as follows. A billing clerk for a meat vendor might be with a circle of acquaintances and mention that he had billed a carload of beef that day for shipment to the "Jap camp"; or a freight switchman would make an offhand remark that he switched a car that day that had beef in it for the "Jap camp." And then the ball would begin to roll. It made little difference at first whether it was beef or bacon or what it was; there was much talk about it. The reverberations might reach Congressmen and Senators, and lead to newspaper headlines 3 inches tall, and a group of reporters would rush out to a relocation center to get more of the story. Of course, carloads of beef and other meats were shipped to the centers, but few if any of those who raised their voices had stopped to think just how long a carload of 35,000 pounds of beef would feed 7,500 to 18,000 persons. This might well be a 2-week or a month's supply of meat for the center. One year, the Granada Relocation Center in Colorado served turkey for one meal on Christmas Day. Nearly all of the turkeys served were produced on the center; and the area where the center was located was a turkey producing area. That one meal served Christmas Day at Granada made the newspapers in New York and San Francisco, and the administrative officer received several hundred critical letters regarding it.

Problems of this nature led to a number of administrative restrictions, unreasonable as they may seem, being placed by the Authority on its feeding operations. No ham, bacon, butter or select foods could be bought, even for special occasions. The centers never did use butter; margarine or jams and jellies were used as spreads for bread. Special permission from the Washington office was necessary in order to serve ice cream, because of the public relations aspects of the sugar and butterfat shortages in spite of the fact that vendors had the ice cream to sell, and were anxious to sell it. Milk was administratively limited to 1 pint per day for children 12 years and under, and adults over 65. Infants and pregnant or nursing mothers were allotted milk in accordance with doctors' directions. All of these restrictions were self-imposed by the Agency to avoid continual public repercussions.

It took a great deal of careful public relations work to bring before the public the fact that relocation centers were normal civilian communities, and that the residents in the centers were entitled to the

same consideration and treatment as the rest of the civilian population, no more, no less.

Because of frequent changes in Army personnel at the various depots and market centers, it became necessary at intervals to reiterate the civilian ration policy of the Authority, and get them to accept ration points for goods purchased. Because WRA centers were listed with the Army as equal to regular Army installations for purposes of purchasing, the Army started to use WRA center warehouses as temporary storage places for seasonal surplus stocks of food, just as it did with Army installations. It was necessary to stop this practice. In one instance, such action in part contributed materially to the basis for a week-long tirade by a western newspaper about "hoarding food for the Japs." The Army cooperated, of course, very quickly in helping disperse the food stored, but the public had little opportunity to know the real story in the case.

In electing to follow civilian rationing, the Authority also elected to use more fresh vegetables, as against processed foods, with the thought in mind that it would be able to refrain from the purchase of foods that were rationed, and thus avoid cutting into the supply available to the public. With the exception of the seasons and times when the Authority was producing most of its own vegetables, this policy was probably incorrect. Should a similar situation occur again, it is believed that processed foods should be purchased, rather than purchasing fresh vegetables whenever possible. This is the only possible manner in which the feeding operations of the Authority might have overburdened any market; yet, ironically, no one objected to it.

The relocation centers and the people within them did not change the national population nor the over-all rationing picture. However, where the relocation centers were established in isolated sections, and in States with small populations, the first prorationing of goods and commodities made by the Office of Price Administration did not take into consideration the shifts in the population distribution that had been made by the movements of this large group of people into these sparsely settled areas. These adjustments were, however, made later.

At the time of closing the centers, the mess operations were very carefully watched and gauged so as to have on hand as small an amount of food as possible. At the close of all the centers, there was a total of approximately \$80,000 worth of staples in stock at all of the 10 centers together. This represented approximately 0.2 percent of all the food purchased, and is considered extremely low. Most of the remaining food consisted of broken lots collected from the messhall pantries, some formerly high-ration-value items whose value changed after purchase and could not be worked into the ration allowance for the menu, and some

items peculiar to the preparation of Japanese-type foods. At one center, some of the navy beans originally sent in by the Army at opening were still on hand. Under the direction of the appropriate disposal agency, these surplus foods were placed in the hands of the public within 45 days after the centers closed.

As the number of evacuees in the centers dwindled, messhalls were closed according to a pattern laid out for each center. The evacuees continued to take care of their own feeding arrangements up to the last meal for the last evacuees on the last day. In spite of the many trials and tribulations present in the early days of the centers before the organization was set and the flow of supplies was regulated, the mess operations of the War Relocation Authority were, on the whole, satisfactorily handled. There could have been many more problems than there were.

CHAPTER XII

RECORDS MANAGEMENT

Records management is believed by some to be a rather unimportant part of the activities of an organization. Yet in some types of operations, the performance and efficiency of the agency is greatly influenced by the performance of the files and records organization upon which the operation must depend. Records and files were very important in the War Relocation Authority program.

The files and records of the War Relocation Authority divided roughly into two groups: (1) general files normally found in any governmental agency; and (2) the individual evacuee files.

The general files of the Authority, like those of most governmental agencies, included correspondence, agreements, informational material, procedural documents, and other similar papers maintained mostly in central file locations at each office. Material peculiar to a particular operation, such as personnel records or obligation documents and vouchers, were maintained in the divisions or sections primarily concerned. Moreover, copies of many documents which should have been maintained in central files were also retained by the divisions and sections, thus complicating the records management problem.

The evacuee files were made up of all material pertaining to a particular evacuee—information regarding property that he had asked the WRA to store or handle, welfare and family information, health and school records, material on interviews about relocation, loyalty hearings or other intelligence information. This information in various forms on the same individual was frequently located in various offices throughout the country either at the point of relocation or at the place where the evacuee had property that the Authority handled for him. At the centers, during their period of operation, the elements of the individual evacuee file were spread over several divisions—the hospital having the health records; the schools having the education records; the welfare and relocation sections having some family information; the statistics section having other family information; and so on.

The files in the War Relocation Authority grew rapidly. Because of certain personnel changes early in the life of the Authority, no set and rigid classification outline for the maintenance of central files was established for all offices and centers. Later, an advisory outline was sent out, but it was not made mandatory. The only change that might be made in a similar operation in the future, should it occur, would be to inaugurate a good classification outline for general correspondence filing at the very beginning of operations.

Nevertheless, the records operations functioned quite well for all locations during the period of operations. It was only when it came to the closing of the centers and the offices that any real problems arose. The principal problems at that time were the consolidation of the material, particularly on the individual evacuees, and the transportation of it to one central place.

Crews of workers trained at the Washington office went to each of the centers and area relocation offices as each was closing, and assisted the personnel at those locations in consolidating and packing of essential records, and in the disposal of nonrecord material.

With careful planning in advance, and the close cooperation of the National Archives and each division in the Washington office, detailed schedules of all forms, correspondence types, memoranda, and other records were carefully listed in detail as to just what was to be preserved and what was not. This information was issued generally to all locations before the tremendous job was started.

At the centers, the statistics section was made the local assembly point for all the individual evacuee files. Manila envelopes were prepared for each individual evacuee who had ever lived in that particular center. The name was placed on the front of the envelope and then the hundreds and thousands of envelopes started the trek from one division to another until the rounds of the center had been completed. The material from each division for each evacuee was put into the envelope with his name on it. The filing in different sections differed. The welfare section at one center had the material filed numerically under the family number; the hospital at one center had the records broken down into seven alphabetical arrangements according to seven hospital functions of in-patient, out-patient, dental, surgical, pharmacy, obstetrical, and X-ray (there might have been a record for the same person in one or more of these); the school records at one center were filed alphabetically by school grades and classes; and so on.

Suffice it to say that it was a large job to gather together all of the material on the individual evacuees at each of the centers in less than 3 months, along with all the other work that was necessary in the closing operation. There were individual records of some 120,000 evacuees, some of whom had lived at as many as four different centers.

The central file material was also consolidated, and prepared for shipment, but presented little difficulty compared with the evacuee individual records.

When the files and records at all the centers and offices had been relieved of all nonrecord material and consolidated, they were

packed and shipped to the Washington office for further consolidation.

Arrangements were made with the United States Office of Education to handle the transcripts of official credits of all persons attending the schools at the relocation centers. The transcript records were sent to the Washington office separately, consolidated by the staff members of the Education Section, and then transferred to the Office of Education where they will be maintained.

In the Washington office, the individual evacuee files had originally been developed by the Clearance Review Section in processing requests for leave clearance in the early days of the Authority, and contained principally material relating to leave requests, loyalty hearings, family information, and intelligence information. When the Exclusion Orders were revoked, the Clearance Review Section was disbanded, and the individual evacuee files (about 120,000) were transferred to the Statistics Section of the Relocation Planning Division.

When the boxes of files shipped from all offices arrived in Washington, the individual evacuee file material was turned over to the Statistics Section to be filed in the individual evacuee folders. Again, a review for duplication of material was made, and some material disposed of.

In all, a total of approximately 1,000 boxes arrived in Washington from the centers and field offices containing individual evacuee file material. The boxes varied in size from what would be in one file cabinet drawer to the equivalent of four drawers. When the consolidation job was completed—and it required 3 months time—approximately 450 filing cases of four drawers each were needed to store the individual evacuee file material. When the liquidating agency for the War Relocation Authority has no further requirement for this material, it will be prepared in accordance with specifications, and transmitted to the National Archives.

The individual evacuee file work was done under the general direction of the Records Management Section, but performed by the Statistics Section. However, the general files from all centers and offices were handled by representatives of the Records Management Section, and represented approximately 90 file cabinets, 60 from the field, and 30 in the Washington office. In addition, there were 10 cabinets of appointive personnel material, and approximately 100 cabinets of finance material, mostly paid vouchers, 75 of which came from the centers. Much of the relocation center material has already been transferred to the National Archives, and the balance will be sent there when it is no longer needed by the War Relocation Authority or its fiscal liquidating agency.

The War Relocation Authority had considerably more record material than most governmental agencies, primarily because of the individual evacuee records and a large supply program. It was a task of large proportions for a small staff to handle in such a brief time. The key to the success of the operation in the field was the small staff of specially trained employees who went to each major office and worked with the employees of that office on its record problems. This staff was in the field almost continuously for 9 months, and tackled the job with diligence, interest, and lack of personal consideration. Responsible center and other office personnel connected with the record work cooperated and worked in a very creditable manner, and the Statistics Section in the Washington office completed a gruelling and monotonous task in a surprisingly short time with a very moderate force. The business of closing out the files of a liquidating agency is truly a nightmare for file clerks or record analysts.

CHAPTER XIII

OTHER FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT

It has been pointed out earlier that the responsibilities of the Administrative Management Division in the War Relocation Authority were constantly growing during the life of the Authority. Initially, the Division was called the Office of Finance and Personnel, and handled only those two functions. Additional responsibilities were added later, one by one: supply, mess operations, evacuee employment, and records management. Still later the division undertook the responsibilities for examination and investigation of routine and official operations, the clearance review of leave applications by evacuees, and, for a period of time, the handling of evacuee property. In addition, certain special assignments were performed from time to time.

The experiences of the Examination and Investigation Section were not unlike those that a similar unit would have in any other government agency. Its duties were principally the making of periodic examinations of the centers and offices to determine whether official procedures were being followed, and if not, why not. Copies of the examinations and findings were returned to the head of the office after a close administrative review in the national office, along with some administrative recommendations. In this way these field audits served as a very important tool to help check the workability of procedures, and provided a basis for change of the procedures where necessary. Because of the good caliber of many of the men in this unit, they were used as temporary or permanent replacements in key operating positions at the centers from time to time. The most interesting investigational problems came in connection with evacuee property, checking facts and rumors, such as reports of improper sales, loss vandalism, and similar situations. The agents of the section made no investigations or recommendations regarding the personnel of the Authority unless expressly directed to do so by the proper administrative officials.

The Clearance Review Section, as a part of the Administrative Management Division, was responsible for the preliminary examination of all requests by the evacuees for leave clearance, and the gathering together of all pertinent material from every possible source about the individual evacuees. The Clearance Review Section was originally a part of the Employment Division, and was transferred in the fall of 1943 when the Employment Division was reorganized into the Relocation Division, which, thereafter, was to deal only with evacuees free to leave the centers and with their problems of resettlement.

In other final reports of WRA, the genesis and thesis for granting leave to evacuees, the problems and legal complications relating to loyalty, the loyalty hearings of evacuees, rehearings and reviews, relationships with the War and Justice Departments regarding the evacuees, the functions of the Joint Board, and the basis for determinations for segregation are all rather fully presented. No attempt will be made here to reiterate any of that material. For, although the policy determinations and directions of the items mentioned above did directly influence the operations of the Clearance Review Section, the section was almost entirely a service organization for handling details to a point where administrative and legal determinations could be made.

The operations of the section represented the amassing and handling of a very large amount of confidential material, and handling it with the utmost discretion and objectivity. It required the development of a very broad background on the culture of persons of Japanese ancestry, both in this country and abroad. A rather intimate knowledge of social, economic and religious customs, organizations, operations and holdings of people of Japanese ancestry was developed. Considerable research had to be done. An exceptional alertness in interpretation of hearings, both in the questions and the answers, had to be developed. An organization system to set up and maintain individual files of confidential material on 120,000 people had to be devised and safeguarded. A very difficult problem was the handling of files with many names that are unusual, since nearly all Japanese names are difficult for the average American. Complications would sometimes arise from an Americanized version of a Japanese given name appearing, instead of the correct name.

The Clearance Review Section was discontinued in February 1945 as soon as its operations could be liquidated after the revocation of the Exclusion Orders. By the revocation action, the reason for the existence and operation of the section was removed, as no further WRA clearances were required for the evacuees to leave the centers. With the closing of the section, the individual files and records were transferred to the Statistics Section to form the nucleus for the consolidation of all the individual evacuee records and files at the time of the liquidation of the Agency.

From the time that the regional offices were discontinued and the Employment Division was reorganized into the Relocation Division, the Administrative Management Division was charged with the general responsibility for the evacuee property stored in warehouses on the Pacific Coast and the evacuee property operations at the centers. The immediate work in connection with the warehouses and other evacuee property on the Pacific Coast was under the direction of the field assistant director in San Francisco. That office also acted in an advisory capacity to the

centers on evacuee problems, and acted as agent for the evacuees in problems relating to their property located in the evacuated zone.

There were a great number of problems in connection with the consolidation of evacuee property into the 10 large warehouses after the property was turned over to the War Relocation Authority by the Federal Reserve Bank. Many clues had to be traced to properly identify property that was not adequately marked or had become detached from the main group of property of a family in the hurry and bustle of leaving home at the time of evacuation. There were many cases of vandalism, theft and usurpation of the property of the evacuees after they left which had numerous legal implications. These are covered in a separate document and will not be elaborated on here.

At the time of the revocation of the Exclusion Orders and the announcement that the centers would be closed, the evacuee property problem became not one of continual warehousing or servicing of property, but but one of disposal and return of property to the evacuees as they relocated. It was a part of the whole relocation process. And as such, the responsibility for evacuee property was transferred at that time to the Relocation Division.

CHAPTER XIV

MASS TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS

Until the summer of 1943, the War Relocation Authority had had no appreciable experience in the transportation of people; certainly it had no experience in mass movements of men, women and children. The Army had assumed all responsibility for transporting the evacuees when the relocation centers were being occupied. The War Relocation Authority received them at the gates of the centers; the Army had done all the rest.

A policy had been determined in the spring of 1943 which required the establishment of one of the relocation centers as a segregation center, and the consolidation of all people of questionable loyalty, together with their families at that center. The Tule Lake Relocation Center in northern California was selected for the segregation center because it was one of the largest centers, and for a number of other administrative reasons. As a special assignment, administrative officials were requested to prepare a plan of operation for the movement of the evacuees. Such a plan was completed and put into operation. The elements of the plan were used a good many times thereafter by all of the centers, until the last evacuee had left the last center, because transportation arrangements were just as essential to relocation as they were to segregation.

Not all of the people at the Tule Lake Relocation Center were to remain at the segregation center. So the basis of the transfer movements from the relocation centers to the segregation center was, insofar as possible, a shuttle movement back and forth between Tule Lake and the other centers. Because of the great distances involved and the large number of people to be transported, rail transportation was naturally best suited for accomplishing the transfers. A set of schedules for special trains was developed with the Tule Lake Center as the focal point. A train would leave one center with a load of approximately 500 evacuees and proceed to the Tule Lake Center. After its passengers had detrained, the train would load up with approximately 500 persons from the Tule Lake Center who were not to remain there, and the train would proceed to the original or to another relocation center. After discharging the persons whom it had carried from Tule Lake to the other center, it would reload at that center and return to Tule Lake. In these movements, during September and October of 1943, 8 trains made a total of 34 trips and carried approximately 6,000 people from the Tule Lake Center, and took nearly 9,000 people to it.

A manual of detailed instructions was prepared that covered all phases of the pretransfer work at the centers before departure, operations en route, and what had to be done after a train reached its destination. The manual also provided the instructions for the screening of

the evacuees and the basis for determining which evacuees were to be segregated. The detailed plans and schedules were carefully reviewed at a meeting of project directors in Denver, and copies of the manual of instructions were made available at all centers for their guidance in preparing for the transfer operations.

There was a great deal of preliminary work necessary in the segregation determination process. This consisted of a series of interview and hearings, based on certain repatriation requests and answers to questionnaires. Many of the evacuees had to have new interviews, or rechecks needed to be made for one reason or another, before the exact persons to be included in the segregation movements were known. A great deal of very careful record compilation was necessary so that the documentation in each case was complete. This activity at all centers required a great deal of work and planning. Each center finally ascertained those evacuees who were to be transferred and informed them of that fact. It should be pointed out that the operations at Tule Lake were the reverse of those at the other centers in plans for transfer. At Tule Lake, the persons not to be segregated were to be transferred; at all other centers, the segregees were to be transferred.

When one is changing his place of residence, every last detail must be taken care of before he leaves. This was the principle upon which the transfer operations were based. Household and personal effects had to be divided into groups for these transfer operations, just the same as for any other change of residence made by train. The personal effects were packed and loaded as luggage or checkable baggage on the train that the traveler was riding. The household and other effects were crated ahead of time and shipped as freight in carload lots to the point of destination. Because of the large number of persons coming to Tule Lake, and the fact that the rail siding was limited in size, the shipment of freight to the Tule Lake Center had to be scheduled in exactly the same manner as the passenger traffic.

Detailed arrangements were worked out in advance with each departing evacuee covering the proper time and proper train of departure. Provision had to be made for packing containers, and assistance sometimes had to be given in packing. Schedules were worked out for the pick up of household freight, checkable baggage, and finally of the people themselves. At each center all of these operations were organized and carried out with a mechanical efficiency, once the basic principles had been perfected.

Provision had to be made on the trains for mothers with infants, pregnant women, invalids and bed cases. Detailed instructions for use by the train doctor had to be prepared for each patient on the train. In fact, the medical records of all persons on a given train went with that particular train. Emergency medical supplies, strained baby foods,

baby formulas, disposable diapers, and numerous other special items had to be provided. Many of these items were the same in general character for each trip, but they had to be especially assembled to fit the specific needs for that trip.

The War Relocation Authority obtained the assistance of the Army in these transfer operations. Through the Army Transportation Corps, representatives of the War Relocation Authority and the Army met with representatives of the Association of American Railroads and made arrangements for the special trains, and set up the schedules in accordance with the WRA plan. These special trains had the same priority as troop movements. The Army provided military personnel to perform the guarding and to direct the mess operations while en route. From the time the segregation trains left a center and until they arrived at the center of destination, the military commander of the train was in charge. The Army provided one doctor and two nurses for each train.

The accommodations on the train were coach, except for sick, aged, infirm, mothers with small infants, or pregnancy cases. Pregnancies beyond the seventh month were not permitted to travel until after confinement. The exceptions noted above were provided with tourist sleeper accommodations. Usually there was only one tourist sleeper needed for each train movement. Normally there were 18 cars to each train: two baggage cars for checkable baggage, one auxiliary dining car for the preparation of special diets or infant formulas, one tourist sleeper for evacuees, seven coaches for evacuees, two tourist sleepers for military personnel, two baggage cars converted to be used as diners, and two baggage cars converted to be used as kitchen cars. The two kitchen cars were located in the middle of the train with a diner on either end of the kitchen cars; the coaches were divided equally in front and behind the kitchens and diners; the two baggage cars, the auxiliary diner and the evacuee tourist sleeper were arranged in that order behind the engine; and the two tourist sleepers for the military and WRA personnel were placed at the end of the train. Evacuee volunteers from the group being transported assisted the mess sergeants in the preparation of the food en route. By careful arrangements ahead of time, enough food was on hand at the point of departure to cover the entire trip. The longest trips, from Tule Lake to one of the two Arkansas centers, or the reverse run, required 5 days and 4 nights to complete. A War Relocation Authority employee from the center of departure accompanied each trip. The Authority reimbursed the War Department for all Army funds expended.

The planning and execution of these transfers took in every division and section, and all the employees at the centers. If the particular job of an individual did not happen to be in a division or section where there was much activity at the moment, the person was often detailed to some work in connection with the transfers. Many of the school teachers, for example, were used for interviewing or for the highly

important function of getting information to the evacuees. Motor maintenance personnel had to have trucks and autos ready according to the schedule and provided with competent drivers. Meals had to be eaten and the tables cleared, with the people and their hand luggage ready to go when the vehicles came for the loading process. At first the loadings were rather ineptly handled, but as experience was gained in the operation the techniques were improved and the whole process greatly speeded up. The Tule Lake Center developed the mechanical operation to the point where it was possible to load a 500-passenger train in 21 minutes, and unload a train of equal size in 17 minutes.

There were many details, such as casual medical inspections for definitely apparent communicable diseases such as chicken pox and measles, that had to be carried out both on departure and arrival at the different centers. Rosters of the persons who travelled on each trip had to be carefully prepared, the people name-checked against the rosters after boarding the train, and then name-checked again on detraining. All such operations cost money. Careful estimates of the cost of each operation had to be made, and proper obligations established to pay for it.

The Tule Lake transfer movements, the first WRA experience in the movement of masses of people, were a rather sizable operation. All of the movements anticipated, however, to complete the segregation were not made in the fall of 1943 due to the necessity of constructing additional barracks and facilities at the Tule Lake Center.

In February of 1944, five additional train trips including approximately 2,400 people were made from the Manzanar center to Tule Lake. In May of 1944, prior to the closing of the Jerome center, two train trips were made from the Arkansas centers to the Tule Lake Center, involving approximately 800 people.

Immediately after the completion of the two trips to Tule Lake in the spring of 1944, the Jerome center was closed by transferring the remaining evacuees to the other relocation centers in the month of June. Approximately 2,500 of the evacuees remaining at Jerome were transported by 15 trips of a motor caravan 35 miles north to the Rohwer Relocation Center, and the other 3,100 or so were transferred by rail to four of the other centers in six train trips.

Like the first movements in and out of Tule Lake, the assistance of the Army was obtained for all of these movements. The schedules used were similar, and the mechanics of operation at the centers nearly the same as before.

In the transfers of all these people, no person died on any train en route, and no births took place en route. It was necessary to stop

trains only five times in all of the transfer operations to place persons who had become seriously ill in hospitals, and three of these were on one train trip.

In all of the transfer operations, the evacuees assisted a great deal at all times. The largest share of the work was done by them with interest and expedition.

For all of these movements, a liaison representative was assigned by the War Relocation Authority to work very closely with the military personnel at the appropriate headquarters involved, with the Association of American Railroads representatives and with the appropriate railroad carriers involved in the particular movement. All plans and schedules were made available to all concerned well in advance of any movements, and details were checked very carefully at all levels from headquarters office to the local station and the centers, even including pretrip inspections of all rail equipment and necessary supplies.

The War Relocation Authority, including the personnel at relocation centers particularly, gained a great deal from these transfer trips that was beyond the immediate objective at hand. Centers learned how to mobilize all of their personnel and equipment; how to make plans with the evacuees; how to receive a plan of operation of major size and cut it up into small parts and assign responsibility for the completion of each part; how to set up a timing schedule that would put the parts all together again and in order, with the work done and no details left undone. Time schedules and deadlines were respected and maintained; observance of them from this time on became almost automatic. The centers learned how to make transportation arrangements for people, and arrange departures. The packing, handling and shipping of evacuee personal and household effects was an excellent trial experience for what was to come. Methods of checking Government property in and out were developed that were to be very helpful later on. Although it was not realized at the time, the centers were having a large-scale dress rehearsal in these early transfer operations of the main show of relocation to come in 1945 when the centers closed.

CHAPTER XV

CENTER CLOSURE

When the War Department announced that the revocation of the Exclusion Orders would take effect on January 2, 1945, the War Relocation Authority announced that the relocation centers would be closed within a period not exceeding a year. There was no basis for continued operation of the centers after the revocation. Center operations and facilities were curtailed to an essential-operation basis, and all efforts were directed toward assisting the remaining evacuees with their relocation plans. The ending of the school term in June was to be the conclusion of educational operations at the centers.

In March and April of 1945, the Authority presented to the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress a budget proposal that outlined the liquidation of the Authority, stating that all relocation centers would be closed before December 31, 1945, and that the affairs of the Authority would be wound up by June 30, 1946, the end of the fiscal year. At the time of the budget submission and the appropriations hearings on it, the war was still going on both in the European and Pacific theatres; V-E Day or V-J Day were still in the future. The budget set forth an estimate of the remaining population, what would be required to clear the centers of evacuee residents, what assistance the evacuees would require on the outside, and what the Authority must do to shut down the centers, surplus its property, and completely close down the business of the Authority.

On July 13, 1945, the Authority announced a definite time schedule for the closing of the centers, when all evacuees were to be gone from each center.

The relocation volume from January to July had been very small, due largely to the fact that families with children tended to postpone departure until the school term was ended. And it was really not until August that the volume of people relocating started to reach truly large proportions.

In the meantime, however, V-E Day had arrived, and the work of redeployment of the armed forces from the European theatre to the Pacific theatre was going ahead at full swing during the summer of 1945. Transportation facilities were strained to the utmost and WRA faced the possibility of not having available transportation with which to move 45,000 people before the middle of December. The major portion of the military traffic during the summer of 1945 was from east to west just as the relocation travel tended to be. Space was hard to get. Then V-J Day came, ending the war, and the movement of military forces back from

the Pacific started. Although for a while the traffic both east to west and west to east across the Nation was at full capacity, the trend very soon turned toward west to east in greater volume. The Office of Defense Transportation had placed a great many limitations on civilian travel in order to make equipment available for military transportation.

A possible bottleneck in transportation at this point could have disrupted the time schedule established for closing the centers. The Congress, it should be added, had appropriated only the money requested for liquidation on this time schedule. In fact, shortly after V-J Day, the Congress had rescinded 10 percent of the appropriation made available to the Authority on the liquidating budget presented, yet the volume of persons to move, and the time schedule, remained the same. If transportation could not be obtained for relocation, the ability of the Authority to do its job in accordance with the schedule set out to the Congress was somewhat in question; and there were definitely insufficient funds available to carry on, for any extended period, the operation of the relocation centers for a large number of people.

Representatives of the War Relocation Authority met with the Office of Defense Transportation and carefully outlined the problem as well as the need for transportation both by rail and by bus for evacuee passengers, and for freight transportation of evacuee properties by rail and by truck. Through the efforts of the ODT, a meeting was held by representatives of WRA with ODT and the National Association of Bus Operators. As a result of this meeting, arrangements were made whereby representatives of bus lines that served the local areas in which the various centers were located called at the centers and determined the situation at each specific center, both for tie-in transportation to the nearest rail junction for traffic both east and west, and for arrangements believed necessary to provide special busses for trips direct from the centers to the points of destination. These situations were reported back through the National Association, and at another meeting of the WRA, ODT, and the Association's representatives, arrangements were made whereby bus facilities for center-to-railhead travel would be increased, and chartered busses for center-to-destination transportation could be made available. In the following months, the Gila River, Colorado River and Manzanar centers used the chartered bus service to a very great extent for westward travel, particularly to Los Angeles. The bus companies within the Association worked out among themselves the interchange and loan of equipment so that all of these arrangements could be effective. The facilities and service provided by the bus companies were entirely adequate.

After the revocation of the Exclusion Orders, the Army was no longer concerned with the movements of evacuees, so the requirements for rail transportation were taken up directly with the Association of American Railroads, an organization which was very familiar by this time

with the WRA program and its operations. It should be pointed out that the acute transportation needs of the War Relocation Authority came at a time when the railroads and their equipment were greatly overburdened, and they were carrying the greatest volumes in their history. Yet very satisfactory arrangements were worked out with the Association and its member railroads for two types of transportation facilities: (1) special cars, and (2) special trains. The governing factors in each case were sufficient advance notice by the Authority as to when the equipment would be needed, and what type of equipment would be required. Arrangements for special cars were to be made locally, between the centers and the rail carrier. Arrangements for special trains were to be made with the Association at the national level.

Since the relocation movements out of all of the centers went in all directions of the compass, it was necessary for the centers to do a very close and accurate planning of departures with the individual evacuees, and lay their plans some period in advance, so that proper equipment could be requested. Special cars were used mostly for travel east and to the northwest, or to centrally located points for a group of people fanning out to different destinations, and then at that point, the group broke up and proceeded to destinations by regular carrier service. The travel west to California, which was about 65 percent of the travel, from the Rohwer, Granada, Heart Mountain, and Central Utah centers, was by special train. The facilities on these special trains were about the same as used for the earlier transfer operations, except that regular diner service was used, and there were no military personnel involved in the movements. WRA furnished such personnel on the trains as appeared necessary.

The Association of American Railroads did an excellent job in providing the necessary rail equipment, under the then present circumstances. There was one thing in the favor of these special train movements in that the major military movement by that time was from west to east, and a great deal of equipment was being deadheaded from the East to the West to bring military personnel to installations in the Middle West and East. With sufficient advance notice, the Association diverted equipment, which otherwise would have gone to the West Coast empty, to the relocation centers and carried a load both ways, with only a slight additional time required for the trip because of the diversion.

Transportation tickets were purchased by means of Government transportation requests. Some group ticketing was done, but the vast majority of the tickets were purchased on an individual basis with an individual transportation request. A special train, for instance, although it ran on a chartered course would make various stops en route to discharge passengers. A train from the Rohwer center in Arkansas would be routed to Los Angeles by way of Pueblo, Denver, Salt Lake City, Reno, Sacramento, and then down the San Joaquin Valley to Los Angeles.

Passengers would detrain at Pueblo, Denver, Salt Lake City, Sacramento, Lodi, Stockton, Merced, Fresno, Bakersfield, and finally, Los Angeles. The train would start out with about 12 or 14 cars, and then drop cars en route, so that only 3 or 4 cars would actually arrive with passengers in the Los Angeles terminal. Over 50,000 transportation requests were issued between August and November of 1945 on an individual basis. And this, of course, meant an individual authorization for travel and an estimate of the funds to be used on an individual basis.

Between August and the end of November, approximately 45,000 evacuees left the centers and returned to their own homes or went to new communities. When the closing of the refugee shelter and the Tule Lake Center had been completed by March of 1946, over 60,000 persons had left the WRA-operated installations.

Given below are the dates upon which the centers were scheduled for closing in the announcement by the Authority on July 1, 1945, and the actual date when the last evacuee left each center in 1945 and 1946.

<u>Center</u>	<u>Scheduled Closing Date</u>	<u>Actual Closing Date</u>
Granada (Colo.)	October 15	October 15
Minidoka (Idaho)	November 1	October 23
Central Utah (Utah)	November 1	October 31
Gila River (Ariz.)		
Canal Camp	October 1	September 28
Butte Camp	November 15	November 10
Heart Mountain (Wyo.)	November 15	November 10
Manzanar (Calif.)	December 1	November 25
Colorado River (Ariz.)		
Unit I	December 1	November 25
Unit II	October 1	September 29
Unit III	October 1	September 29
Rohwer (Ark.)	December 15	November 30
Refugee Shelter (N. Y.)	—	February 6, 1946
Tule Lake Center (Calif.)	—	March 21, 1946

Besides transportation facilities and relocation arrangements, there were many other things that had to be done before the work of the War Relocation Authority was complete at the centers and the land and buildings could be turned over to appropriate agencies for disposition. Many of these operations had to be worked along concurrently with the relocation work while the evacuees were leaving.

Very extensive preparations had to be made in order to transfer the household effects and other property which the evacuees had at the centers. The problem was exactly the same as in the transfer operations,

except on a much larger scale. Individual packing and crating, with careful marking of the owner's name and destination, had to be done for each family. Since some families were not sure what their actual street address or mail station would be, some of the goods had to be packed and crated, and then stored until the evacuee wrote back from his destination where to send the goods. Then shipment was effected. Supplies of lumber and boxes for crating materials were scarce, and extensive effort had to be made to locate such material. Boxes for shipment purposes had to be fabricated. It took, on the average, from three to five boxes per persons, plus the crating of unusual items. One family had 127 boxes, parcels and crates, but this, of course, was exceptional. At some centers, all of the freight had to be hauled as much as 20 miles before it could be turned over to the carrier at the railhead. There were papers to make out in each individual case to show what the transaction had been. Bills of lading for each shipment had to be prepared, and the funds encumbered to pay the freight charges. The amount of detail in the whole operation was prodigious.

Some grouping of freight shipments was carried out. For the San Francisco and Los Angeles areas, group freight shipments would be made in carload lots from the centers to the WRA warehouses on the West Coast. Since the WRA warehouses were, at the same time, making shipments of property belonging to evacuees from those warehouses, the operations were combined in that way, and the carloads received at the warehouses were broken down and reshipped on an individual basis to the evacuees.

A large part of the freight shipments were carried on through commercial freight and trucking companies. This usually meant door-to-door delivery. The pick-up was at the center and not at a railhead some distance from the center. Shipment of freight by truck was by far the most satisfactory method used.

All through the final period of relocation, as much work as possible was done at each center toward the closing down of that center. Yet most of it could not be done until the last evacuee was gone. As blocks became sparsely occupied or vacant, the messhalls would be shut down and the remaining people grouped for eating at a messhall as centrally located as possible. All the cots, mattresses, blankets, buckets, tools and similar items that had been in use by the evacuees in the block areas had to be picked up and trucked to warehouses where they were sorted and stored. Only then could the process of inventorying and declaration for surplus begin.

The process of closing down a center after the evacuees had left was roughly fourfold: (1) the physical clean-up on the center and the putting of the physical plant in standby condition; (2) the detailed process of declaring as surplus all the movable equipment at the centers

as well as the physical plant; (3) the cutting off of all operational activity, consolidation of records, and effecting their shipment to the Washington office; and, (4) the disbanding of the organization of personnel at the centers.

Between August and December, two specially trained crews of engineers, accountants and supply men went to each center and made a detailed inventory of all of the physical plant at each installation. The inventory covered all items at the centers relating to lands and fencing, buildings, utilities systems, roads and bridges, drainage and irrigation, and other investments such as water stock, hog and poultry plants, processing plants, and miscellaneous items of physical plant not otherwise covered. It was a very strenuous task. Each item was identified, appraised, and recorded by number and check, and reconciled against the books of account at the centers. Tracings giving all details of buildings, utilities, roads and bridges, and drainage and irrigation layouts were essential and were prepared.

These detailed inventories of physical plant and fixed assets were used at the Washington level to prepare the declarations of surplus to the Surplus Property Board and its successors. In all, the nine installations declared surplus had physical plant and fixed assets valued at approximately \$65,000,000. The refugee shelter at Fort Ontario, Oswego, N. Y., was used on a permit basis from the Army, and was returned to the Army upon the completion of the work of the Authority at that location.

As the movable property was picked up from the barracks and returned to the warehouses, organized crews at each center went systematically about cleaning up the center and putting it in a standby condition. Each barrack was cleaned of any refuse or paper and swept out, and the outside area was also cleared of litter. The amount of trash that had to be carted away and burned or buried was astonishing. One center took as many as 70 truckloads of trash out of one single block. Yet when the evacuees were in residence, by and large, the centers were quite tidy. All the stoves from the barracks were moved to central locations for storage. Windows were shut, and doors nailed tight. All water connections in the water and sewage systems and the electric systems in the vacated areas had to be turned off. In the case of two or three centers which closed early in the fall of the year, the weed problem was such as to make it necessary to run a bulldozer or motor patrol around each of the buildings in order to avoid a dangerous fire hazard. The closing down process of the centers was as difficult, if not more so, than the problems of getting them opened and ready for operation.

The problem of maintaining an adequate personnel and labor force during the final closing period at the centers was a difficult one.

Since the evacuee working force had left, labor employed from the outside was essential to get all the physical work done. Because of the isolation of the centers, and the fact that many of them had to do their closing work during harvest season, labor was very scarce in many of the areas where the centers were located. Much of what labor was obtained was of an itinerant type and did not stay long, which made the labor force all the more unstable. By constant recruiting, sufficient labor was finally obtained to complete the job satisfactorily, but not as well as it might have been.

Appointive personnel all during this period were getting uneasy concerning future employment. However, in the main, the personnel essential to complete the work stayed with the job until the last declaration of surplus was made, and the plant and property turned over to the disposal agencies. A personnel placement program was in operation all during this period and contributed considerably to the steadiness of the appointive personnel.

All financial and procurement activity had to be brought to a close, and appropriate measures taken to transfer the responsibility for accounts and payment of outstanding bills and current salaries to the Washington office. The tedious process of gathering together all of the records throughout the center had to be pushed, and their consolidation and shipment to the Washington office effected. Specially trained crews of workers from the Washington office, or from other centers that had completed their closure process, were detailed to the larger centers to assist with these problems. Plans had to be made with each member of the appointive staff regarding his termination, and provision made for materials for packing and shipping his household goods to his chosen point of destination. Considerable paper work was necessary with a dwindling staff to arrange transfers, terminations, and transcripts of leave; to complete the center's final official report of its lifetime of operation; and to prepare time reports and payrolls.

By far the biggest single job connected with the closing of the centers was the collection of movable property, warehousing it, inventoring it, checking it against property accountability records, and preparing the declarations of surplus. It takes a large group of well trained people who are familiar with the nomenclature of all types of supplies and equipment to do this job. A perfect group of such people would not be available in any agency; although WRA probably had a larger number of personnel familiar with this type of work than most agencies, due to its extensive supply program. Mistakes were made in the nomenclature of commodities, the classification of certain commodities, and in the appraisal of condition and usability. But considering the scope of the job done, such mistakes were few in comparison to the total. The sheer mechanical process of typing the large number of

declarations that WRA centers had to make was extensive and time-consuming. The preparation of many thousands of declaration forms was necessary at each center where there were over 10,000 items of different kinds. Many of the declarations covered only part of the supplies on hand, and others for the same commodity had to be made later. Then, of course, there were the corrections to be made for mistakes of one kind or another.

Special crews of workers experienced and trained in property and supply work were formed and detailed from one center to another as the closing progressed, to help with this difficult and big problem. Such an arrangement was a help, but had its disadvantages in that the members of the crews were not on home ground and familiar with the storage plan, the plant layout, and other local circumstances.

A very important part of an agency's declaration of its property surplus consists of cooperation with the disposal agency designated to receive the property. From July 1945 on to the closing of the last center, very intensive liaison activities were carried on by representatives of WRA with the various disposal agencies. The nature of the WRA program was described, and its program of liquidation carefully explained. Regional and district offices of the disposal agencies were visited by way of follow-up on the contacts made at the national level. Every possible effort was exerted to get the representatives of the disposal agencies to cooperate with the Authority on the job at the centers, and to have their representatives work along side of the WRA personnel so that each agency would be of assistance to the other in handling the surplus of the property. But such cooperation was not obtained from the disposal agencies to the extent that it was of any actual assistance to either agency. Usually, when the disposal agency's inspectors finally did arrive on the job, it was so late and they were so few in number, that their activities never caught up with the work of the personnel of the Authority and never accomplished very much in eliminating misunderstandings. At one center, one regional office of a disposal agency agreed that it would let the WRA personnel use the disposal agency procedure and would accept the results of the work. That center, Heart Mountain, is the only place where any appreciable amount of work and time were saved for the Government, although efforts were made to effect the same sort of arrangement at every other center.

The regional offices of the disposal agencies are not entirely to blame for their noncooperation at that time. During the period of surplus declaration by the War Relocation Authority, particularly during the intensive period from October 1945 to March 1946, the disposal agencies were reorganized in form and direction, and had their territories changed five different times. It was difficult for the disposal agencies to know, and for the Authority as a declaring agency to know, just what agency and what regional office should receive the declarations of

consumer items, on the one hand, and capital goods, on the other. Because of more effective liaison activity on the part of the War Relocation Authority at the national level and the Agency's system of filtering information down through channels to the centers, the relocation centers were constantly better and more currently informed regarding changes in disposal agency organization than were the regional offices of the organizations directly concerned.

Another important factor in the reluctance of the disposal agencies to assume responsibility in taking over the property that the Authority was declaring surplus, was that the Surplus Property Board's regulations provided that an owning agency would be required to retain custody and assume responsibility for any property declared surplus to a disposal agency, until the disposal agency had actually disposed of it. And then it was the owning agency's responsibility to pack and ship the items after they had been sold by the disposal agency. This meant that there was no need for hurry to assume custody of the property. The fact which the regional and national offices of the disposal agencies could not seem to realize was that the War Relocation Authority was going out of business. It was not like an established bureau that had one or more pieces of property which it had declared surplus at a location which would continue in operation for an indefinite time to come.

It took a great deal of liaison work with the disposal agencies and other places before the fact was recognized that the Authority was actually going out of business, and that the Congress and the Bureau of the Budget and others knew about it and agreed to it. Congress had appropriated only sufficient funds for operation on the assumption that the Authority would go out of business in accordance with the time schedule it had established. After these facts were established, directives went out to the regional offices of the disposal agencies regarding the necessity for them to take over the custody of the physical plant and the movable property. The agencies designated as the disposal agencies for buildings and land, if any, were in every instance different from the agencies designated for the disposal of the movable property.

There were a lot of public relations problems connected with the closing of the centers. Announcements, of course, appeared in the newspapers that a center was closing by a given date. Hundreds of people would come to the centers for a wide variety of purposes. Some desired to scavenge through the buildings and area, or appropriate items which they believed had no value. Others thought that everything was immediately for sale, and were disgusted when they could buy nothing. Veterans came to the centers in large numbers with proper credentials for purchase from a disposal agency, but, as owning agency, the WRA had no authority to sell to them, and the representatives of the disposal

agencies were usually so far behind the WRA work in their inspections and appraisals that the items were not ready for sale. Many came interested in trying to buy buildings for the material badly needed for construction work in the vicinity. Fire protection and guarding work became even more difficult than when the centers were fully occupied. Action by the Federal Public Housing Administration under Public Law 292, which gave the FPFA authority to transfer to it any surplus items which would help the veterans' housing program, frequently caused confusion because it was initiated many times after declarations had been made and the items had been advertised for sale. Congressional inquiries in the interest of some person desiring to buy property at the centers came into the national office in great volume. The public found it hard to understand that the WRA, as the owning agency, had no authority to sell, and that the disposal agencies had not finished their work and were not ready to proceed with a sale in accordance with the Surplus Property Law of 1944 and the regulations promulgated thereunder. A great deal of time of a large number of people was consumed in this closing period at all centers in answering questions, attempting to be courteous, but turning people away from the centers without anything being accomplished to the satisfaction of either party.

Based upon the amount of time required to declare the property at the Jerome center as surplus in 1944, the amount of money available for the surplus operations and certain other factors, a period of approximately 90 days from the time the last evacuee left each center was established as the time necessary to perform the closing operations, and turn the custody of the property over to the designated disposal agencies. This calendar proved to be sufficient, but activities had to go forward at a rapid pace in the final closing operations to meet it. Listed below are the dates in 1946 when the various centers were turned over to the appropriate disposal agencies, and the agencies designated for this purpose. The War Assets Administration (the successor to all of the previous disposal agencies handling consumer and capital goods) assumed custody of all movable property at all locations.

<u>Center</u>	<u>Liquidation Date</u>	<u>Designated Disposal Agency</u>
Granada (Colo.)	January 27	Farm Credit Administration, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture
Minidoka (Idaho)*	February 10	General Land Office, U. S. Dept. of the Interior
Central Utah (Utah)	February 10	Farm Credit Administration, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture
Heart Mountain (Wyo.)*	February 24	General Land Office, U. S. Dept. of the Interior
Gila River (Ariz.)	February 24	General Land Office, U. S. Dept. of the Interior

Colorado River (Ariz.)**	March 10	General Land Office, U. S. Dept. of the Interior
Rohwer (Ark.)	March 10	General Land Office, U. S. Dept. of the Interior
Manzanar (Calif.)	March 10	General Land Office, U. S. Dept. of the Interior
Refugee Shelter (N.Y.)	March 1	U. S. Army, War Department
Tule Lake (Calif.)*	May 5	General Land Office, U. S. Dept. of the Interior

* Bureau of Reclamation is acting as agent and custodian for the General Land Office.

**Office of Indian Affairs is acting as agent and custodian for the General Land Office.

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The closing of the relocation offices was relatively easy compared with that of the centers, even though there were a much larger number of individual establishments to be closed. Since most of the property at the relocation offices consisted of office equipment, and the offices were located in large metropolitan areas where there were offices of other Federal agencies, most of the equipment and supplies remaining at these offices were taken over by other bureaus of the Department of the Interior. Whatever was not taken over by these bureaus was declared as surplus to the War Assets Administration which had little difficulty in disposing of it immediately to expanding organizations such as the Federal Public Housing Administration and the Veterans Administration.

The problem of records consolidation and shipment to the Washington office was present in the relocation offices just as it was at the centers, although, except in those offices that had operated large warehouses and had a large number of records relating to the evacuee property that had been in the warehouses, the operation was not nearly so large as it was at the centers. District relocation offices closed their records and reports into the area offices where they were consolidated with the area records and reports and forwarded to Washington. At the Washington level, the area records and reports were consolidated with other material, and transmitted to the National Archives for preservation.