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## THE GOLD QUESTION.*

## DEPRECIATION OF GOLD AND SILVER.

The money question is again the order of the day; it was raised sometime after the discovery of the placers of California and Australia, when the amount of specie was greatly increased by the supply of gold. F ir several years in fact these placers yielded for each country 300 or 400 ml lion francs, say 700 millions for the two [about 140 million dollars?. The greater part of this gold was exported and reached the great commercial centres-the United States, England and France. There had been nothing like it for centuries-since the discovery of the famous silver mines of Mexico and Peru. Before 1848 the production of the precious metals in the entire world was probably from 400 to 450 million francs [ 80 to 90 million dollars], and yet it had nearly doubled since the commencement of the century from the working of the new silver mines of

[^0]Russia. But with a sudden bound, in a few years, we pass from 450 mil. lion francs to 1100 or 1200 millions. It is natural that some anxiety should have been felt at this state of things, and that its consequences upon political economy should have been studied. It was asked especially if gold, which was becoming so abundant, would not lose its value, and if it was not wise to devise means of avoiding as much as possible the effects of depreciation. This precaution seemed to be demanded by those States which had either the silver standard or the double standard [silver and gold]. Those which had the silver standard adhered to it more rigorously than ever, and those which had both were induced to proscribe gold as legal coin, reserving its use simply for commercial purposes. It was under the influence of this prejudice that in 1849 Holland withdrew its gold from circulation, and that some years after, the example was followed by Belgium. In France there were also some very clever men who urged our country to follow the example of Belgium and Holland and return to the exclusive use of silver, which they considered the true monetary standard of France, by virtue of the law of Germinal in the year XI. Our Government was not induced to do this, preferring to remain in statu quo; and some years after, public opinion underwent some change, At first it was rather pleasant to see gold substituted gradually for silver, which bore a premium, and, consequently, disap. peared from circulation. It was found that the new coin was more convenient and easier of transport, and finally as people became convinced that this gold, although supplied in abundance, was needed for circulation, and did not even fully supply the demand, they ceased to be alarmed at the annual production of seven or eight hundred millions in America. In fact, in 1856, when the mines had already furnished to the world six or seven thousand millions of francs, the precious metals became very scarce, discount reached six or seven per cent in England and France, and the principal financial establishments of these two countries, which, in 1852 and 1853 had had a cash reserve of five or six hundred millions, were straightened to maintain it at two hundred millions. It will be remembered that the Bank of France made oonsiderable sacrifices to supply itself with coin ; it purchased, from 1855 to the end of 1857 , one thousand three hundred and serenty-eight millions, for which it paid in premiums the sum of $15,883,000$ francs. The same thing occurred in 1863 and 1864 ; silver became very dear, and the eash reserve of the Bank of France and the Bank of England sank below two hundred millions; it was efen urged upon our principal financial institution to sell its stock in order to obtain the precious metals. After this experience several times repeated, of the dearness of gold, notwithstanding the production of the mines, no one concerned himself longer with the question of specie.

But things change rapidly in this world, and, among the rest, the phenomena of political economy. Three years had not elapsed after the crisis of 1854 before things appeared in an entirely different aspect. The specie reserve of the banks, instead of decreasing at intervals as formerly, continued to increase, that of France in particular. In the middle of 1865, the 6th of July, it had reached five hundred and twenty-one millions; in 1866, seven hundred and eightyone millions; in 1867 it attained to the famous one thousand millions; and finally, the present year, it oscillates between twelve and thirteen hundred millions, which nothing seems to diminish materially; neither the stock of cereals which we have been obliged to purchase to meet the deficiency in the harvest, nor the acquisition of raw material for our manufactures, nor even the expense occasioned by our preparations for war. In view of this fact, which has exercised, and still does exercise all minds, the attention is recalled to the question of the currency; it is again asked if we have not reached the time when the production of the mines, after having filled all the channels, and satisfied all demands, is about to overflow and cause a serious depreciation of specie. One recalls what took place after the discovery of America. From 1492 to 1530 , in spite of the relative abundance of the precious metals, which was experienced from the first discovery of the New World, there was no appriciable change in the price of things-money preserved its full value -but, commencing with 1530 , depreciation made rapid progress, and in the course of a century, according to some, three-quarters of a century, according to others, the revolution was accomplished; the value of the precious metals was thre or four times less, that is, merchandise which was exchanged in 1492 and again, in 1530, for a certain weight of gold, brought triple and quadruple the amount in 1620 or 1630. Can we now be, as in 1530 , on the eve of a new monetary revolution, and have we just traversed the intermediary stage when the precious metals, abundant as they are, still find a demand? Does the production commence to be largely in excess, and is it to this that we must attribute all the specie reserve of the principal financial institutions? These are the questions which are proposed to-day, and which we wish to examine without pretending to give them a practical solution, for it is very evident that if the depreciation of the piecious metals were found to be real, it would be im. possible to prevent it. In any event it would be well to know it, in order to know how to regard certain facts in political economy, which we observe without inquiry into their causes.

We shall astonish many persons perhaps in saying that the money question is still an obscure subject in political economy. Yet its use has been known for a very long time; it would be necessary to go back to
the infancy of society, to the barbarous epochs even, in order to find exchanges made otherwise than with a metallic medium. The Greeks, the Romans, and before them the Assyrians employed it : it was of bronze, silver or gold, according to the resources of the country and the state of civilization, but it existed everywhere, and it was in that form that riches were particularly sought. It is a long time that men have been called to meditate upon the use of a metallic currency and upon the influence which it can exert in the political economy of a people; but as nothing is simple in the phenomena of political economy, depending as they do upon a thousand things which cause them to vary with times and circumstances, it often happens that in studjing these phenomena at different epochs, we arrive at very different conclusions. That which is certain, and we think it can be demonstrated, is that there are great errors disseminated upon the subject of the use of a metallic currency, and, I repeat, it is one of the points of political economy upon which science is the least employed. In speaking thus we have no reference to the opinions of those who imagine that a metallic currency is a useless expense which society imposes upon itself, that we should gain by ridding ourselves of it, and that it would be easy to carry on all tran sactions with some other instrument of exchange. some conventional thing of no intrinsic value, such as paper for example, We have several times seen this system in operation; we see it yet unfortunately every day ; we know what it produces, and no reflecting mind can view it with favor; but there is another much more serious school which has combatted successfully the extravagance of the mercantile system, but has found riches in nothing but metallic currency, and has sought to acquire the greatest possible amount of it; this school has committed another extravagance in refusing to give to specie that peculiar import. ance which it deserves. Hence the erroneous conclusions derived from what has taken place.

Upon the utility of money there is a figure in an American author strikingly appropriate. "Tbe precious metals," says Mr. Carey, " are to the social body what the atmosphere is to the physical world; both furnish the means of circulation, and the dissolution of the physical body into its elements, when deprived of the one, is not more certain than the dissolution of society when deprived of the other." This is substantially the character of a metallic currency: it is an instrument of circulation, par excellence, that which extends the use and gives value to the more substantial things. In order that an article of merchandise may have great stability in value, there is need of two things: first, that it have an extensive market, and secondly, that it can be kept a long time. If it has only a limited market and is perishable, however useful it may be, it cannot escape the immediate effects of the law of supply and demand which
operates upon it in the market where it is sent. Take wheat for example. That article of food is undoubtedly very useful, it can have a very extensive market; but it is not convenient and easy of transport, and cannot be sent far; besides, it is subject to rapid deterioration. If, then, wheat is produced in a much greater quantity than is needed for immediate consumption within the limits of its market, it must fall in price and it wil decline so much the more, for the reason that it can hardly be kept in store to wait for the equilibrium to be better established in supply and demand. It will be the same with any other article of merchandise which is less perishable and more convenient of transport, provided it is not so useful. If it exists in a greater quantity than is needed for the almost immediate use for which it is destined, it will necessarily depreciate, for the fashion may change and with it the use of the article may cease. The precious metals, on the other hand, unite a universal utility with a durability which exceeds that of any other product; they are, besides, convenient and easy of transport, are not subject to the caprices of fashion, and consequently everything is in their favor. Suppose the consumption of cereals in France to be 120 millions hectolitres*; if a good harvest furnishes 140 millions, and the markets surrounding have nearly what they need, this seventh part which is in excess of the ordinary consumption can cause a decrease in price of one quarter and perhaps a third-we have seen it many times. On the other hand, in years of scarcity, oftentimes a deficit of 10 or 12 millions of hectolitres is sufficient to send the price up in the same proportion. Not only has metallic currency a very extensive market and one always open, which renders a surplus more difficult, but its market has no appreciable limit, it can expand indefinitely. To day the commercial relations are maintained with 30,000 millions of money, to-morrow it will take perhaps 40,000 millions, and subsequently more in proportion as the commercial relations are extended. There is another fact, and it is one which has escaped certain writers upon political economy. The precious metals have of themseives developed business which eventually absorbed them, and thus have acted at the same time both as cause and effect. It is often said that man's ability to produce is unlimited like his ability to consume; it depends only upon the supply of necessary instruments, and the first in importance of these instruments is certainly that which extends his relations with Lis fellow-man. This is the service which a metallic currency performs. Like railroads, it brings the products to the consumers, and this ready supply increases the number of consumers and consequently the quantity consumed. You have

[^1]wine, woolen fabrics, manufactured products of any kind, with which you wish to purchase wheat, cotton, sugar and colonial commodities; but it may be that the people who have these commodities may not need at this time your wine and your fabrics. They will not take them in exchange, or if they take them it will only be on conditions unfavorable to you; you will abstain then from buying, and the holders of these commodities will not sell them till they have found a person who has the products which they wish in exchange. In the meantime see how the industrial pursuits are checked in their development, because the people are not furnished with a medium of exchange adapted to their wants. The precious metal presents itself and a medium is furnished.

Every one purchases the products he needs without taking the trouble to inquire whether the merchandise which he has is suited or not to those who sell to him; he is certain of a means of payment which wilh not be refused. In this manner products are distributed, production is increased, and with it the public wealth. A very conscientious and very competent author, who has written the best things upon the influence exercised by the abundance of the gold mines, M. Newmarch, has endeavored to explain this. "The discovery of the gold mines," he says, "has had the effect to increase wages and riches in the countries where they are found, and to attract there ia large population, which, being enriched by the mines, has consumed a much larger quantity of the manufactured products of other countries with which they have been connected. These countries, in their turn realizing profits from their exportations, have also become consumers to a much greater extent, of the products of other countries; and thus, in consequence of the remunerative employment derived from the opening of the gold mines at one point on the globe, the industrial pursuits and commerce have become active everywhere." This explanation has unquestionably its value, but touches only the smallest side of the question. It is as if it were held that railroads have only been useful for the employment they have furrished in their construction and what they still furnish in their operation. On this supposition, if instead of gold mines, iron and copper mines had been worked, which had yielded the same profits, the result would have been the same, since it would equally have furnished markets for the manufactured articles of other countries. One can understand perfectly that such would not have been the case, and that gold mines have had an effect beyond furnishing a field for remunerative labor ; they have, like railroads, put in mens' hands the most effective lever for developing public wealth.

Many things have been invented since the beginning of the worid which have aided the progress of civilization, but, aside from printing,
there is nothing which has had the influence of railroads and the precious metals, and, we may also add, the electric telegrapb. Railroads not only furnish means of distributing the products along their lines, but they also have the merit of making more products; we have proof of this every day before our eyes. A railroad is constructed in a country which was destitute of them and had not the means of easy communication; the first year the transportation is very limited, the second year it increases, and, after a short time, the rolling stock is insufficient, its capacity is overtaxed. What has happened to bring about such a result? It has been simply the fact that new branches of industry have been created along the line, that those which existed have been developed, and this has happened because the people have had at their command convenient, rapid and cheop means of communication. It is the same with the precious metals. A discovery like that of the placers of California and Australia, by furnishing to the world a great quantity of the instrument of exchange, acted necessarily upon business, and gave it a greater development, a result inconsistent with the reasoning of those who hold that the working of mines is an improductive labor, because it only helps increase the weight of money; it also shows the insufficiency of M . Newmarch's explanation that there is no source of riches in the new mines except in so far as they have furnished employment for the laborer, M. Hume has said, in speaking of specie, that it was not one of the wheels of commerce, that it was only the oil which makes the movement easier and more agreeable. We think he is mistaken, and that money is precisely one of the wheels of commerce, and one of the most essential ; but following out his illustration, we still find that the more abundant the oil, the more means we have to give activity to the wheels, and, therefore. the more is accomplished. The gold mines have of themselves aided the commercial movement which has resulted in absorbing them.
I.

According to this school, in time of a crisis, when the metallic currency becomes scarce and leaves the country, there is no occasion to feel concerned. Products are exchanged for products and it matters very little whether we export specie or anything else. We do not export for nothing; it is a traffic analagous to that of exchanging wine for iron or silk. It is only necessary to let things take their course and the equilibrium will establish itself naturally. It is thus they reason who see in the precious metals only an article of merchandise like anything else. Nevertheless experience teaches us that in a time of crisis when silver goes out of circulation and becomes scarce, society is otherwise effected than by the extraordinary exportation of wine or any other product. If
we export more wine than the local demand will admit of, and it becomes dear, the consumption of the country will be perhaps a little disturbed, and the people will drink less wine than ordinarily; but the producers of that supply will be enricked; they will become consumers upon a greater scale, of the products of other industry, and on the whole the country will have gained by it more than it will have lost. The inconvenience will be partial and the advantage will be general. It is not the same in respect to money; a crisis comes for some reason or another; we are debtors abroad beyond what we are able to pay by the regular course of commercial exchange, we must pay the differences in money, and these demands encroach upon the stock which is needed in the country. The specie reserve in the banks diminishes, gold and silver are in demand and become very dear. What is the result? Is there a point where the evil may be stopped - Not at all. Commerce and all branches of industry are at once affected everywhere. There is no one who does not suffer from the difficulty in obtaining silver and from the high price it commands. A metallic currency is the base which sustains all transactions, the pivot upon which they all turn. It is possible by a skillful arrangements in using credit to increase the circle of these transactions, but it is not possible to do away with the base nor weaken it sensibly without damage and great damage to society.

It is to be remarked here that a metallic currency becomes the more necessary when there is a crisis. Credit then fails and everyone seeks that which affords the greatest security in business, that is specie. If then at these times, trusting to the general maxim that after all products are exchanged for products, there were no especial attention paid to arrest the exportation of money by effective means such as may be used to advantage, for example, a sudden advance in the price of discount, we should soon be thrown into the greatest embarrassments, no industry would escape the effects of it, and we should see our commerce declining, as in the countries where paper money rules. A metallic currency is still more than the base of commercial operations, it is the main spring which sets in motion the active operations of a country. We have no need to cite examples in support of this proposition; they are furnished by every crisis; it suffices to recall what took place in 1857 in Europe, and particularly in England. We can also remember the complaints in our country, when, during two years in succession, 1863 and 1864, the Bank reserve did not exceed 200 millions, and it was necessary to raise the rate of discount to 7 and 8 per cent. It was plainly seen then that the metallic currency was not an article of merchandise like anything else, and that it demanded more circumspect treatment than ordinary products. Now, it is the same point of departure which causes the errors respecting the influence exerted by an abundance of gold mines.

It is imagined that gold, being an article of merchandise like any other, cannot become suddenly abundant, much more abundant than it was, without undergoing a certain depreciation. "The abundant supply of precious metals," says Hume in his essay upon money, "is a cause of loss to a nation in its foreign commerce, because it raises the price of labor and merchandise, and obliges every one to pay out a greater number of the little white and jellow pieces." Bastial, even, who had seen the commencement of the production of the California mines, said, in speaking of the countries producing gold and silver, "The more you send us of precious metals the better it is for us, for this permits us to have more gold and silver for making spoons, forks and knives; but it is so much the worse for you, for we do not send you more cloth and iron for the increased amount than we send you to-day for the lesser quantity."

In this estimate there were two errors: first, in supposing that the superfluity of gold and silver was destined principally, if not exclusively, for the manufacture of spoons and knives and, we will add, even jewelry; secondly, in admitting that the depreciation of the precious metals is in proportion to the increase in quantity. We might cite other authors who have gone further and who have even considered the working of the California and Australia mines in the light of a misfortune and a loss, for the reason that it has diverted from agriculture and industrial pursuits much cinew and capital which have been devoted to unprofitable work, that of increasing the medium of exchange to an extent that will render it more inconvenient, because it will require more of it for the same transactions. These opinions appear really very extravagant to-day, after the experience we have had since 1848; but it is not easy to explain how so many hundreds of millions turned out every year by the mines have entered into the circulation without having more effect upon it. It is a point which requires elucidation. We are twenty years removed from the commencement of the working of the California mines and seventeen from that of the Australian mines. The gold furnished by these mines, exclusive of other sources of production, may be estimated at 15 or 16 thousand millions [about $\$ 3,000,000,000$ ]. We have then under our eyes a field of observation sufficiently large, and if we cannot judge pos. itively, by what has occurred during these twenty years, of what will take place in future, on account of the intricacy of the monetary phenomena and their disturbance by circumstances, we can at least make some useful deductions. According to some authors, the value attached to what are called the precious metals, arising from their use for manufacturing purposes, ornaments for example. It is admitted that they also derive a value from their use as money, but this is considered subordinate to the other, and when we compare particularly the intrinsic value of the pre-
cious metals with other conventional substances which are proposed as a circulating medium, paper for instance, we are very quick to note the advantage which the metals possess, of being adapted to manufacturing purposes, and it seems to be thought that from this quality only they have been adopted as a standard of value. Nothing is more false. The industrial pursuits for their various uses do not employ a tenth of the precious metals which are produced according to the estimates made by all competent judges who have examined the subject. Consequently, out of the 40 and odd thousand millions which have been taken from the mines during three centuries added to the 18 or 20 thousand millions which have been extracted since 1848 , if we subtract one-quarter for loss and only consider its uses for industrial purposes, there will remain about 40 thousand millions, with no foundation for its value. It has a foundation for its value, however, which is its use as money, by the side of which its use for industrial purposes is nothing, and it is precisely because it has this foundation which is of the most substantial kind, that people have entertained the idea of using gold and silver for ornaments; otherwise, no one would have thought of it sooner than they would have thought of making jewelry and ornaments of iron or copper. The truth is, then, just the contrary of what has been held : it is its value as a monetary standard which has given to it its value as a material for ornaments. It has sometimes been said that it was in consequence of a conventional arrangement that these metals became monetary standards, that any other might have been adopted. This is a great mistake. The metals which are called precious have not been conventionally adopted; they have forced themselves into use by reason of their peculiar qualities which no other material possesses. Wheaten bread and wine are certainly very useful in the world, yet they have not a use as general as specie. We find people who do not eat bread nor drink wine, but have substitutes in rice, potatoes, beer and other fomented drinks. Even wool, which serves to clothe us, is not used everywhere; it is replaced by cotton or other tissues. It is not the same with a metallic currency. When a people does not possess it, and their commercial relations are conducted by means of barter, that is to say, an exchange in kind, it is in a primitive and barbarous state, and only commences to emerge from that condition when it adopts the precious metals as a medium of exchange. It is also seen what results to civilized ptople why, after having abused their resources, are compelled to dispense with metallic currency and to perform their exchanges by means of that conventional medium styled paper money. They are checked in their industrial and commercial developments and grow poorer year after year.

Now to what extent have they done this? Have the products which they have furnished been only proportional to the activity in business which they have produced? Have they been greater? This is the new question which we purpose to examine, a question of fact rather than of theory upon which authors are divided, and one which it is very difficult to settle authoritatively.

## II.

The greatest monetary revolution which has taken place in the world, dates, we have said, from the discovery of America. At that epoch, 1492, in the opinion of most writers upon the subject, there was in Europe and in the civilized countries with which Europe had commercial relations about one thousand millions of coin- 300 millions in gold and 700 millions in silver. The rest of the production anterior to that time had been buried during the barbarous period or destroyed. They did not at first find in America that richness in precious metals which was subsequently discovered. Nevertheless, from the first, much gold was exported which went to enrich Spain. One will recall the famous galleons which were the admiration of the world; a little later, from 1520 to 1530 , when Ferdinand Cortez took possession of Mexico, and Pizarro of Peru, the yield increased perceptibly ; but it was not at its height until the discovery by chance-as almost always happens-of the famous mines of Potosi. Then the working of the mines commenced upon a larger scale, and Europe was soon inundated with the metals which were obtained. M. Jacob estimates that in the course of the 16 th century the supply of precious metals was about 3,615 millions. There is a difference of opinion as to what was the ratio of the specie in existence at the time of the discovery of America, to the amount in existence at the time of the opering of the California and Australian mines. Some calculate as 1 to 11 , others as 1 to 7 or 8 , and still others as 1 to 6 . This last estimate is that of M. Newmarch, in his History of Prices; it is also that of Leber in his History of Private Wealth in the Middle Ages; it appears to be the most accredited. In 1492 then it required but one sixth of the amount of specie which was required in 1848 to make the same purchases. This applies, it will be understood, to articles for which the value has maintained a certain constancy for centuries, and such articles are more rare than one may imagine. It cannot be gainsaid, indeed, that in spite of the depreciation of spesie, there are to-day-owing to the progress of the industrial pursuits-many products which are cheaper than in the 15 th century-for example, all which relate to clothing and to the comforts of life. One is clothed at less expense than at the close of the 15 th century, one travels at less expense and much easier, and when it is
said, relying upon this depreciation, that it would require an income five or six times greater for a nobleman to live now as one lived then, it is a great mistake; he could live much better, he could procure a vanity of enjoyments which did not exist then, or which were accessible only to a few.

In adopting the price of wheat as a standard of comparison, it is generally admitted that the value of specie does not commence to diminish before the second quarter of the sixteenth century; calling it 4 in the second quarter, it fe!l to 3 in the third quarter, and finally in the last year of the century, and even up to 1620 , it continued to fall, and reached 2 , where it remained fixed up to the revolution in 1789. Some persons deny that any serious change was produced before 1560. According to them, the depreciation did not commence till that epoch and continued to 1620 or 1630 ; but whatever may be the difference of opinion as to the amount of depreciation and the time when it commenced, every one agrees that the great monetary revolution was accomplished near the close of the first third of the 17th century, about one hundred and forty years after the discovery of America, and that there was no serious change besides, up to a time very near the present.

Now, we are anxious to determine what has been the production of precious metals during the epoch in which the revolution was accomplished, and what it has been since that time. M. Jacob, we have said, estimates at 3,615 millions the entire production of the sixteenth century; he extends to 1,000 millions that of the seventeenth century, and sup. posing that a third of this belongs to the first thirty years of the century, we have a production of 6,000 millions to be added to the 1,000 millions which is thought to bave existed before the time when the great change in the value of precious metals commenced. The increase in quantity would have been 600 per cent, and the depreciation only 200 per cent. It results, therefore, from this, that the depreciation of specie is not necessarily proportionate to the increase ; but what has a greater significance still is the production which succeeds the monetary revolution.

The seventeenth century, according to M. Jacob, furnished 10,000 millions, which would be 7,000 millions subsequent to 1630 . The eighteenth century produced, according to the most probable valuation, 20,000 , in all 27,000 millions, which must be added to 7,000 , millions supposed to have been in existence about 1630, that is to say, an increase nearly quadruple, and yet in spite of this increase no one has observed up to the middle of the eighteenth century any further important depreciation of the precious metals. It is supposed that a new change took place about 1789 , and that the value of silver, which we found reduced from 2 to 1 ir 1630 , went up again to 2, that is to say, the value which
it had in 1848. Still there are other authors who deny this and who think that the last change occurred in the first half of the nineteenth century. However, the difference of opinion is of no importance, because supposing the depreciation the most considerable, we still find that from 1630 to 1789 , it has only been 100 per cent, while the increase in quantity of the precious metals was 400 per cent. The same phenomenon continued during the first half of the nineteenth century. It is asserted that the production of that century, up to the discovery of the California mines, was about 12,000 millions, of which 8,000 at least were imported into Europe, and these 8,000 millions have been added to a stock of metals which, in 1800, amounted to about 26 or 27,000 millions. This is an increase of near one-fourth, and the increase has produced scarcely any effect. If the price of things has advanced since that, it is from causes foreign to the value of the precious metals. This is recognized by every one; there is only a difference of opinion as to what has occurred since.

We have said that some years after the opening of the California and Australian mines, the yield of precious metals had increased from 450 to 11 or 1200 millions per year; but it is necessary to deduct what was produced by countries with which the civilized world had little intercourse, such as Asia and Africa, which kept nearly all they furnished. There remains the production of the civilized world which is all that we need take into account. M. Michel Chevalier, whose remarkable labors in this field have won for him great distinction, estimates it in 1865 at 14000 millions. Let us add to this 3000 millions for the three years which have elapsed since, and we have 17000 millions for which it is necessary to deduct still what has been exported in gold and silver to those partially civilized countries which return but little of what is sent them of precious metals, such as India and Japan. M. Michel set this amount in 1865 at 3311 millions. It is necessary to deduct, in the second place, what has been lost by wear and accidents, such as shipwrecks and burying, which amounts to a considerable sum upon the whole stock of metals. The estimates for this can only be hypothetical and, therefore, vary a great deal.

According to some, the loss is about $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent per annum for silver, and about $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent for gold; others set it higher, and make it amount to 1 per cent altogether. We shall not inquire which is the most probable. Precision in this point is of secondary importance in reference to the question which we are now discussing. It suffices to have an approximate figure, and if we set the loss for wear and accidents of every kind at $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent for the whole, it amounts to 200 millions per annum and 4000 millions for twenty years, which is not far from the truth. We
shall have then about 7500 millions to deduct from the I7000 millions furnished directly from the working of the mines. There remains 9500 or 10000 millions for the increase of precious metals since 1848. M. Newmarch, whose calculations we readily accept, has found that in 1848, after deducting for all loss, there were probably in the civilized countries, Europe and America, 34000 millions of precious metals (in round numbers), of which 20,000 millions were in silver and 14,000 millions in gold. The 9 or 10000 millions just alluded to, or near that amount, constitute, upon the whole metallic stock, an increase of 25 to 30 per cent in 20 years, which is $1 \frac{1}{4}$ to $1 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent per annum.

Is this an increase sufficient to have brought about a depreciation of the precious metals? Some persons have thought so, and have even calculated the amount of that depreciation at different epochs in the period of twenty years, which separates us from the discovery of the California mines. Some have set it at 9 , others at 15 , and still others at 20 per cent. In order to make the calculation, they have obtained the price of certain commodities at the different epochs they wished to compare, and according to the variations in price which they have observed, they have estimated the depreciation. We understand this to be the proper course to take to estimate the variation in the price of things at different epochs ; but to proceed with any security and to be at all certain that we do not deceive ourselves in the cause to which the variations are attributable, it is necessary to go over a long space of time in order to avoid accidental disturbances; if we have before us only a very short period, these accidental influences are in operation and aid in bringing about the results upon which our calculation is based. Here is unfortunately the error of the calculations to which we have alluded; they have been calculated for a period of ten or fifteen years. Now, for this period, what a variety of circumstances besides that of the production of specie may have modified the price! We have had, first, the extraordinary impulse given to business after the coup d'etat of 1851 , then the influence of the Crimean war in 1854 and 1855. If we adopt wheat as the standard of comparison, it is necessary to take into account three consecutive gears of searcity, from 1854 to 1856 . In 1857 occurred a formidable crisis, the result of excessive speculation. If we extend the comparison to our time, 1868, we find still in 1859 a new war, that of Italy, with all its consequences upon the political future of Europe. In 1863 and 1864 there were new financial embarrassments, having nearly the same causes as in 1857. In 1866 came on the German war which disturbed the equilibrium of States, and, finally, since that time, for reasons well known to every one, Europe finds itself plunged into apprehensions of war, and lives in the greatest disquietude. Hence a
prolonged stagnation in business, which is not without its influence upon the price of things, and yet is not a normal condition. What conclusions can be derived from a period so full of incidents, and so darkened with storms that there is hardly a vista of clear sky during the time? Certainly no definite conclusions as to the value of the precious metals.

It is evident that the price of certain things has not materially advanced since 1848. The price of meat, vegetables, wine and provisions general. ly is higher to-day than at that time, so also are luxuries and certain materials of the first importance in manufactures. The price of handwork and salaries have proportionately advanced. It will be recollected, on the other hand, that all products have not undergone this advance. There are some which have to-day the same price as in 1848. If we take wheat, for example, and select, from the period of twenty years which have just elapsed, the years of scarcity, we shall find the mean price to be about 18 or 20 francs a hectolitre. It fell even to 15 and 16 franes in 1864 and 1865, when agriculture made such bitter complaints and asked for an inquiry into its grievances. The same stagnation applied to wool and other commodities. Sugar is cheaper than in 1848, and as to the larger part of colonial commodities such as coffee, chocolate, tea, although the consumption has increased very considerably, the price has advanced but little. In fact, the price of manufactured articles in general has rather diminished than increased. Iron is materially below its value in years preceding 1848, and one can be clothed at less ex. pense now than twenty years ago. What is the inference from this? That the high price of certain things depends upon some other cause than the depreciation of specie. It depends upon the development of public wealth, which has changed every one's condition and increased the general consumption. Where the production has kept pace with the consumption prices have varied but little; they have not advanced except where the production has been much in arrears. They have varied but little for wheat, because, owing to the progress of agriculture, nearly enough has always been raised to meet all demands, and besides, the consumption of this article of provisions is not unlimited. One does not eat more bread because he is richer. Wool, also, on account of its importation from abroad, and particularly from Australia, has remained very nearly at the level of demand. Hence the stagnation in price. As to sugar, there bas been much progress in home manufactures, which has naturally brought about a diminution in the net cost. It is the same with all manufactured articles; a much greater quantity is consumed now than twenty years ago, but the results of scientific appliances are such that the increased consumption is provided for, and still the articles are sold cheaper. Production never falls behind the demand; it out-
runs it even, which in some cases brings on crisis and a fall in prices, like that of which the iron manufacturers are complaining at this time. As to colonial commodities the prices have not advanced sensibly, because, owing to the extent of the markets which furnish us and to the means of transport, which have become more economical and more numerous, these commodities arrive in as great quantities as we desire. The things which have advanced in price are those, I repeat, of which the quantity can not be increased at the will of the consumers. There is certainly more wine produced to day than there was twenty years ago, and our frontiers are open for the introduction of cattle, yet the consumption has so increased by the development of riches that the demand is still greater than the supply. Different from the case of wheat, this latter article of food is a kind which is consumed in greater or less quantities, according to the facility of obtaining it ; and it is not necessary to enter into details to show that a very much greater use is made of it to-day than before 1848. It is the same with vegetables, with wine, and also with raw materials for manufactures. The progress in manufactures makes a demand for raw material and the price is raised because it is not so easy to increase the quantity as to work it up. It is the triumph of the genius of man to have succeeded, by means of economical appliances, in realizing this phenomenon, in appearance paradoxical, dearness of the raw material and cheapness of the manufactured products. It is the same cause which has raised the price of hand work; labor has been more employed, the demand for it has increased, and naturally we have had to pay higher for it; but the dedrness of all these articles has nothing to do with the depreciation of the precious metals. Otherwise it would have affected as well those products which have remained at the level of consumption, for certainly, the equilibrium which has been sustained in these would have been broken as far as specie is concerned, the moment it became more abundant, and it would have taken more of it to make the same purchases, according to the natural law of supply and demand. This is what happened after the discovery of America. As soon as the depreciation took place, it was perceived with wheat as with all other merchanḑize, and wheat was even taken as a standard to measure that depreciation.

Besides, at the time when the authors of whom we speak made their calculations to prove the depreciation, the most of them about 1857, the commodities which they took for a standard had undergone an exceptional rise, due to the operation of excessive speculation which had taken place previously. We were encountering one of the greatest commercial crisis which had been known for a long time. Prices experienced a sensible iall later, and to-day, after ten years, they are generally below what they
were in 1857. The Economist gives a very explicit statement of them. It takes twenty of the most common kind of merchandize, coffee, sugar, tea, meat, indigo, oil, lumber, tallow, leather, iron, lead, tin, cotton, flax and hemp, silk; tobacco, and ordinary cotton stuffs. Only four of them were on the 1st of January, 1868, above the price of the first of January, 1857; these are butchers meat about 7 per cent; isdigo, about 27 per cent; oil, about 2, and tobacco about 5 . All the others are lower-coffee about 6 per cent, sugar about 40 per cent, tea about 32 per cent, lumber about 9 per cent, tallow about 30 per cent, leather about 40 per cent, iron about 30 per cent, lead about 26 per cent, tin about 34 per cent, cotton about 17 per cent, silk about 25 per cent, wool about 23 per cent. With the close relations which exist to day between the principal markets, we may conclude that what has taken place in England has equally been the case in France. It results from this statement, that aside from the years 1863 and 1864, when prices nearly reached the level of 1857 , resulting from enormous speculation, they remained generally below that level. This goes far to show that the exceptional advance in prices which the most part of these commodities underwent from 1852 to 1857 did not proceed from a depreciation of the precious metals; otherwise it would have continued, since the products of the mines have been more abundant than ever. Since 1857 California and Australia alone have furnished at least 7000 millions of gold. It has only continued upon certain commodities and in particular upon articles of food. The reason of this is, that in spite of the check given to many kinds of business, people continued to consume more, owing to increasing riches and the force of habit, and the production did not keep pace with the consumption. There would have been depreciation, if we had had less means than in the 16th century for employing the 25 per cent increase in the precious metals, which we have shown to be the increase since 1848; and the contrary has been the case. Without speaking of other inventions which have multiplied commercial transactions by increasing production, we may characterize the difference between the present and former condition by two things: railroads and the electric telegraph. At the time when these two important inventions were first applied in a very limited way, there was a stimulant for the development of business such as we have never before known at any epoch, and what is remarkable, is the coincidence of these two inventions with the discovery of the gold mines of California and Australia. Without these mines we should certainly have made the railroads-they had been already commenced-but they would have been made much more slowly, and we would not have been able to devote to them 400 millions per annum, as we have done in France for more than fifteen years. And then
what a difference in the results! Business would not have received the development which we see if it had not found a solid basis in the increase of the precious metals. The gold mines came just in time to give to railroads and the electric telegraph their full development in results. On the other hand, if gold, in the quantities which were furnishel at once, had come alone, unaccompanied by the greater facilities of communication and transport, it would not have been absorbed so easily-it would have been depreciated-and would not have produced the effect upon business which it did. The gold of California and Australia has served to extend the railroads and they, in turn, by the influence they have exerted upon commerce, have furnished channels for gold. It is thus that improvements are connected one with another, and that humanity advances through discoveries towards an ideal civilization beyond our knowledge.

Let us see now by figures how we can account for the increased quantity of specie since 1851. Every one knows that business has been much more extended, commencing from that epoch; but it is not generally known in what proportions, and this is a very important point to be presented. In 1851, at the time when the working of the mines of Australia commenced, on the eve of a considerable political change which took place in France, the foreign and domestic commerce of our country, exports and imports united, aside from the movement of the precious metals, was less than 200 millions ( 1,923 millions). It was more than 6,000 millions in 1867 , which was a bad year, and it attained to 7,500 millions, including the precious metals.

The amount of the operations of the Bank of France was raised from 1,592 millions in 1851 to 7,372 millions in 1867, after having reached 8,292 millions in 1866. These figures are significant, and furnish the measure of the development of business, which has more than tripled since 1851. Supposing that we have had a proportional share with the rest of the world in the increase of precious metals furnished by the mines-that our metallic stock in particular has been increased 25 per cent, 40 per cent even, if you please, this 40 per cent increase of the precious metals has not been sufficient to meet the demands of the triple or quadruple amount of business. The same progress has taken place in England; the foreign commerce of less than 5,000 millions in 1851 exceeds to-day 15,000 millions. I know that it is necessary to take into account the great rapidity with which the precious metals circulate at present, the facilities which have been furnished in this respect by railroads and the substitution even of gold for silver; that is to say, a metal having greater value for one having less. It is necessary to take into account also all the means of credit which have been much expanded within fifteen years, the expansion keeping pace with that of business;
but there is a wide margin between 40 per cent more of specie and 3 or 400 per cent more of business; and whatever allowance may be made for these circumstances we shall still find enough to absorb largely the increase of precious metals furnished by the mines.

Proof that the precious metals have not been too abundant-more abundant than business has required, is found in the fact that several times in this period of twenty years there has been an insufficiency of gold and silver. Never before has such a price been paid for specie. If it is otherwise to-day, and if our principal financial institution is overflowing with specie for which it has no use, it is a condition entirely exceptional, for which we have pointed out the reason in a former article* and does not in the least degree indicate to what extent our country is capable of employing the precious metals in ordinary times. If instead of 1,300 millions cash balance which the Bank of France has to-day, it had only two-third as much which could not be received into the circulation, that would suffice to bring about a depreciation. Gold would be worth less at home than elsewhere; it would leave the country and we should pay much more dearly for everything we purchase. Now the contrary of this is the case. As raw material tends towards that country which can use it to the best advantage, and which consequently can pay the most for it, so the precious metals in general go to the country where their purchasing power is greatest. Consequently if we see them abound with us, it is because they have not diminished in value. Let us examine the average prices of grain, and we shall see that in England, with the exception of articles of food and certain objects of luxury, which the in crease in comforts has rendered necessary, most articles of merchandise, especially those which are thought to have been affected by the depreci:tion of gold, are to-day below the market value of 1857, 1863 and 1864. They are affected by the stagnation in business as formerly they were affected by the opposite condition of things. The increase in the price of articles of food and luxury is so intimately connected with the increase of public wealth, that they are everywhere inseparable, and these articles become dearer as public wealth increases. Before 1848 they had become very dear in England and Holland, dearer than with us, for the simple reason that there was more wealth there. Since 1852 France is certainly the country which, owing to various causes, has made the most progress in the industrial pursuits and in commeree, that in which there has been the greatest comparative increase in wealth. So it is the country where articles of food and luxuries have the greatest demand. They are to day at nearly the same level as in England and Holland. Besides, if a more

[^2]decisive proof were needed, it would only be necessary to cite the example of the United States. In that country for a long time, even before the discovery of the new mines, articles of food and luxuries were higher than anywhere in Europe. Why? Because the development of riches was greater, there were more consumers for the same articles, and the production was largely deficient.

If it is meant that the precious metals have no longer, with respect to merchandise, the same power of acquisition as formerly, that it is necessary to give more for things, and that this is the effect of the influence of the gold mines upon the development of public wealth, we have no difficulty in assenting to it ; but there is a great difference between this and a depreciation of specie. If articles of food are dearer it is because there is more wealth to pay for them. The level of riches has risen nearly the same for every class; for some because they have increasing revenues; for others because they are producers and sellers of all which has advanced in price. The wages of workmen even have not remained long below what they should be as participants in this advance, and to-day, generally, in spite of the dearness of commodities necessary for life, the condition of the working class is better than it was twenty years ago. It is especially better in the country, where the spirit of economy rules more than in the cities. There is no serious difficulty except for those who have fixed salaries and settled revenues. Still, as regards the fixed salaries they can be raised up to the level of public riches, and they are raised in fact constantly. As to settled revenues, which are after all an exception, they are subject to the law of humanity, which wills that nothing shall be immutable. If those who possess them do not find them sufficient they must resort to labor for what is wanting.

Now from the fact that the precious metals have not yet undergone a serious depreciation, which can be plainly shown, does it follow that it will always be so in future? The gold deposits are far from being exhauste 1 . In California they extend, it is said, over a surface 1,250 kilometres* in length, by 115 in breadth, along the chain of mountains which border the Pacific. In Australia, which is a country greater than Europe, they extend over nearly the whole surface. Russia is constantly furnishing new mines in the mountains which separate it from Asia, in the Ural, the Altai, and even on the plataux inhabited by the Kirghis. As to the silver mines here is what was said of them forty years ago by M. de Humboldt: "The abundance of silver is such in the chain of the Andes, that in reflecting upon the number of deposits which have not been touched, or which have been only superficially worked, one would be tempted to believe that the

[^3]Huropeans have but just commenced upon an inexhaustible store of wealth such as the New World possesses." Without seeking to make an estimate which would be impossible, it may be said, without fear of exageration, that there has not been taken from the mines already discoveredthose recently discovered especially-a tenth of the wealth they hold. And now that their working has become more regularthat it is done with capital, with machines, and in a scientific manner, we may expect for a long time an excessive yield; perhaps we shall succeed in doubling the present metallic stock. Will the effect be always the same; shall we be able still to absorb the additional supply of precious metals? This is a question which pertains to the future, and one we are not able to determine. All we can say is, that this prodigious increase-if it takes place-will be comparatively slow. Supposing that the mines which are worked to-day continue to furnish 1,000 millions per year, and that three quarters of it goes to the civilized world-deduction being made for loss and exportation, and this calculation is evidently very liberal-it will take more than sixty years for the present metallic stock to be doubled, and eighty years for it to reach 100,000 millions. At the end of that time, according to what took place following the discovery of America, the depreciation of precious metals would be 50 per cent; but in the mean time what are the elements tending to diminish that result: First, the progress of the industrial pursuits is much more rapid to-day than formerly. They progress, if I may be allowed the expression, by steam ; and as the wants of man may extend indefinitely, there is an immense field in which to employ the precious metals.

The English Economist, in presenting a tabular statement of the increase of business in England, during twenty-two years, from 1843 to 1865, fixed the consumption per head in 1865 at 41 l 10 lbs . sugar, $33 \cdot 10 \mathrm{lbs}$. tea, $36-10 \mathrm{lbs}$. rice, against $165-10 \mathrm{lbs}$. sugar, $15-10 \mathrm{lbs}$. tea, and 1 lb . rice in 1843 , that is to say, the consumption had almost tripled. The increase of foreign commerce per head, in like manner was represented by 108 against 38 ; and as it nas necessary to take into account the increase of population, which, according to the average in England, was about one ${ }^{-}$ third for the same space of time, it resulted that the positive progress in twenty-two years was represented by an increase of products of 400 per. cent. Let us app.y this calculation to the future with a great deduction Suppose that during the sixty years which will have transpired before we have doubled our metallic stock, the advance is only what it has been in England in twenty-two years; if we add to this the amount necessary for the increase of population, which we will estimate at 50 per centalthough the average period for doubling the population is, for Europe and America, at least 80 years-we have an amount of business 450 per
cent greater than it is at present, and we shall have, to meet this, double the amount of specie. The industrial pursuits, and the arts also, by reason of the increase of wealth, will employ more; they can take 200 millions, for example, instead of 100 millions, which they employ to-day.

These figures show that we shall be under the necessity of resorting more than ever to means of credit; yet, in admitting that we may by this means be able to make up in a measure for the insufficiency of specie, we do not go so far as to suppose, like certain enthusiasts, that we can some day do without it. We think, on the contrary, that more of it will be needed in proportion to the increase of business. It is like a pyramid which may be raised in height or proportion to the breadth of base. We may grieve at present to see 1,300 millions of specie inactive in the vaults of the Bank of France, but we may felicitate ourselves upon it in the future; when the political distrust shall have ceased and the spirit of enterprise shall have been renewed, we shall find in this the means of greater activity. Finally, in considering the use to which these precious metals may be put in future, we must not forget besides, that there are to-day in America and Europe great States by our side, which have about 10,000 millions of paper money, and that they will not always remain in that condition. They will suppress their paper money and recall a metallic currency. We find still another channel for their use, not less important, in the relations becoming more and more active, which we are forming with the East. Those countries are very eager for precious metals; they are far from having all that they are able to useall that they will be able to use one day-when they become richer. Consequently, if there is no assignable limit to the production of the precious metals, there is also none to their consumption, and we may hope that the two forces brought in contact will succeed in neutralizing each other-that specie will maintain nearly its present value, and that there will result from it only a very great stimulus to the increase of public wealth.

If, however, depreciation happens in spite of all, it will be no cause for regret, and we ought to refrain from thinking that it can cause serious trouble to our well-being. In the first place, it would be slow and gradual, and we should have time to prepare for it and to arrange our business accordingly. This is what happened in the 16 th century. When the monetary revolution was accomplished every one conformed to the new order (f things, and society was richer than ever. Another consequence yet of depreciation and a fortunate one, is the importance which labor assumes in respect to acquired wealth. The one gains in value, the other loses, and, by this means, equality is produced among the different classes of society. One of our distinguished contributors,
M. de Laverleye, has said in this Revue ( ${ }^{*}$ ) that in the 16th century the abundance of the precious metals had contributed to the elevation of the common people, and that, in the 19th century, the abundance of gold would contribute to the emancipation of the people; nothing is more correct, and we prefer this kind of emancipation to that which the laborers dream of in their social Congress. It has the merit of being conformable to the laws of political economy, and of tending to no violent disorder.

Victor Bonnet.

## CIESAPEAKE AND OHIO RALLROAD.

One of the chief projects of the State of Virginia has for many years been the construction of a railroad which should connect the waters of Chesapeake Bay with those of the Ohio River, the distance between Richmond, Va., and the mouth of Big Sandy River, the terminal points, being upwards of 400 miles.

The Virginia Central Railroad, including the Blue Ridge Railroad constructed by the State, covers a little more than one-half of this line, and together have cost nearly $\$ 6,000,000$. The Covington and Ohio Railroad, the construction of which was undertaken by the State of Virginia alone, has to date cost about $\$ 3,250,000$. Since the erection of the State of West Virginia nearly the whole of the unfinished line isincluded within its limits.

The important ends to be gained by the completion of the Covington and Ohio Railroad led to identical action on the part of the two States most interested, and under acts passed by the Legislatures of each in 1867 commissioners were appointed whose duty it was to contract with any party which could give satisfactory assurances of being able to complete the road between Covington, Va., and the confluence of the Big Sandy with the Obio River. The acts specially referred to the Virginia Central Railroad Company, and provided that in case that Company should take the contract, they should acquire all righte, interests, \&c., in the work now held by the States aforesaid and under the general title of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company become owners of the line.

The Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad, as thus organized, will begin at Richmond and run west through the Alleghany Mountains and West Virginia to the Ohio River, a distance of 405 miles. A branch line will also be built from a point 14 miles west of Charleston, W. Va., to Point

[^4]Pleasant, thereby making two termini on the Ohio River and connections with the network of railroads already completed or now being constructed in the Northwest, West and Southwest. At Richmond direct connection is made with West Point on the deep waters of York River and also with Norfolk. A line is also projected to counect with Newport News, together giving the road three termini on the tide-waters of the Atlantic ocean.

On the 31st of August, 1868, the commissioners appointed under the acts aforesaid and the Virginia Central Railroad Company signed a contract giving to the latter the authority necessary to construct the line from Covington, together with all the franchises, \&c., conferred by said acts, and from that date the Company assumed the title of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company.

The amount of money required to complete the roads is about $\$ 13$,000,000 . Of this about $\$ 5,000,000$ has been secured by stock subscriptions and the remainder by the issue of bonds secured by a fresh mortgage on all present and future property of the Company. For this purpose a mortgage for $\$ 10,000,000$ was executed on the first day of October, 1868 , the trustees being Philo C. Calhoun, William Butler Duncan and William Orton of New York, and Mathew F. Maury of Virginia. The bonds issued under this mortgage have thirty years to run from October 1st, 1868 , and are made payable, principal and interest in gold, either in New York city or London. They bear seven per cent interest free from United States Government tax, payable in gold or sterling, at the option of the holders. The mortgage deed also provides for an accumulative sinking fund, to commence one year after the completion of the road. Of the total issue authorized, $\$ 2,000,000$ are to be set apart in trust for the payment of the bonded and floating debt of the Virginia Central Railroad Company, to whose property, rights, branches, \&c., the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company succeeds. By special acts of Virginia and West Virginia all the property of the Company is exempt from State taxation until 10 per cent dividends are declared from net earnings upon the capital stock.

The Chesapeake and Olio Railroad will pass through a country abounding in natural resources-iron, coal and salt being among its principal products. It will connect the Western waters and those of the Atlantic by the shortest line, and at its ocean termini find harbors capable of receiving the largest class of ships. Norfolk has 28 feet, Newport News 22 feet and West Point 21 feet water. The distance from Richmond to the Big Sandy is 405 and to Point Pleasant 398 miles. From Richmond to Cincinnati, by the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad, the distance is 545 miles, to Louisville 621 miles, to Chicago 792 miles, and to St. Louis 885 miles. The shortest existing lines from Cincinnati to New

York is 756 miles, from Chicago to New York 911 miles, and from Louisville to New York 862 miles. It is thus apparent that the distances from the Ohio River to tide-water are much shorter by this route than any now existing, and also that it must, in the order of things, become a strong competitor for the commerce originating in the great interior and aggregating in the Atlantic seaboard ports. The establishment of steamship lines from Norfolk to the principal freight ports is a part of the programme.

If we were to measure the ultimate success of the whole road by the success of a part which has been in operation for years, we should fall short of what promises to be the actual result. The existing portion of the line has no western connections, and its terminus is in the midst of a wild and bnt partially improved country. Yet in the year 1867-68, the gross earnings amounted to $\$ 599,35406$, and the net earnings, after paying all expenses on account of operations, amounted to $\$ 162,70557$, enough to pay 7 per cent on the whole outstanding debt and liabilities of the company and leave a considerable surplus for the stockholders. As the road is extended to the Ohio, it will then have changed its local characteristics and assumed those of a great trunk line, and with this change must come far more favorable results.

## EVANSIILLE AND CRAWFORDSVILLE RILROAD.

As now existing, the Evansville and Crawfordsville Railroad expands in a north and south direction between Terre Haute and Evansville, Ind., a distance of 109 miles, with an extension northeast from the first-named city to Rockville, 23 miles in length. By July, 1869, Evansville, the southern terminus of the road, will be connected by the Evansville, Henderson and Nashville Railroad, now in rapid progress with Nashville, and thence with lines diverging southeast, south and southwest to the Atlantic, Gulf and Mississippi River. At Vincennes it will be intersected by the line now being constructed between Indianapolis and Cairo, and at Terre Haute by the line between Indianapolis and St. Loujs. Terre Haute will also be the southern terminus of the Chicago, Danville and Terre Haute Railroad, which will afford a very direct line to Chicago, a few miles north of Terre Haute, the line now under construction between Indianapolis and Paris, and at Rockville the line between Indianapolis and Paris (the Indianapolis and St. Louis) will cross it. The further extension of the road to Crawfordsville, a distance of less than 20 miles, will connect it with the northern division of the Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railroad, and also with the Toledo, Wabash and Western Railroad, and
other lines pointing north, northeast and east. Thus a line which has hitherto been almost isolated from the commercial world, is to become, at an early date, a link in one of the great central north and south lines from the Lakes at many points to the Gulf of Mexico, with connections which will give it outlets on the South Atlantic coast at Charleston and Savannab, atid on the Mississippi at Memphis and New Orleans.

The rolling stock on the road is ample for its present business demands, At the close of the last fiscal year (August 31, 1868), this consisted of 15 locomotives and 216 revenue cars, viz. : 11 passenger, 1 paymaster's, 4 baggage, mail and express, 81 local and 37 compromise box freight, 28 platform, 31 coal, 10 stock and 10 construction cars; also 27 hand and 17 push cars. The number of miles run by trains in 1866-7) was 272,310 , and in 1867-68, 254,192.
The gross earnings, expenses and profits for the last two years are compared in the following statement:

| Passencer | 186e-67. | 1867-68. | Increase. $\$ 3.405$ | Decr'se. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Freight... | 289,44754 | 230,481 70 |  | $59,465 \dddot{81}$ |
| Expre | 16,56? 30 | 19,011 36 | 2,449 06 |  |
| Mail | 9,400 00 | 9,40010 |  |  |
| Rents | 30725 | 31200 | 475 |  |
| Gross earnings | \$517,792 32 | \$453,186 34 |  | \$54.605 98 |
| Operating expenses | 344,444 40 | 335,266 25 |  | 9,178 15 |
| Earnings over expen | \$163 34792 \$ | \$117,920 09 |  | \$45,429 |

The following, compiled from the annual reports of the ccmpany, shows the progressive development of business on the road from 1858 to 1868 :


The income account for $1867-68$ shows the receipts from all sources, including balance from previous year, $\$ 32,42797$, at $\$ 486,76818$, and the expenditures on all accounts at $\$ 510,393 \quad 57$-balance against income $\$ 23,625$ 39. The expenditures were: Expenses as aiove, $\$ 335,26625$; interests $\$ 96,08390$; internal revenue taxes $\$ 6,10898$; State, county and municipal taxes $\$ 7,75410$; construction $\$ 46,02871$; equipment (new freight cars) $\$ 14,05682$; and increase of supplies $\$ 6,095$ 51-total, $\$ 510,39357$. No dividends were ever paid on the company's common stock since 1856, when a serip distribution was made.

The financial condition of the company, as exbibited on the general balance steet of August 31,1868 , is shown in the following summary:


The funded debt is described as follows:
First mortgage (main line) 7 p . cent bonds of 1 1552, due January $1,1869 \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots . .{ }_{\text {,4 }} \$ 350,000$
" (Rockville extension) 7 p . c. bonds, due Feb. $1,1881 \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots . .$.
The first mortgage (main line) bonds, due in 1869, are being exchanged into new sinking fund bonds having twenty years to run.

## aggregite resources and hablitites of the national baniing Assoclations froii oct., 1863, T0 OcT., 1868.

We give below the official returns, showing the aggregate resources and liabilities of the National Banking Associations, from October 1863, the date of their first return, to October, 1868 , the date of their last return. It will be seen that the total number of banks at the former date was sixty-six, with a capital of $\$ 7,188,393$; while now there are 1,645 banks, with a capital of $\$ 420,634,511$. Since October, 1866 , however, both the amount of capital and the number of the banks have remained about the same, varying slightly from year to year. The National bank circulation now outstanding is $\$ 295,769,489$, while the State bank circulation is reduced below $\$ 3,000,000$. Some of the main items of the returns show the following progress from year to year:

|  | No. |  | Lo | United States bonds. | Bank notes circulation. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1863, Oc | 66 | 87,188,393 | \$5,466,088 | \$5,662,600 |  |
| 1864, | 139 | 14,740,522 | 10,666,095 | 15,112,250 | 55 |
| 1864, Gct | 507 | 86 782,802 | 93,2 8,657 | 108,064,496 | 45,260,504 |
| 1865, J | 643 | 135,618,874 | 166,448,718 | 176,578,750 | 66.769,375 |
| 1865, O | 1,513 | 893,157,206 | 487,170,136 | 427,731,3 | 171, 21,903 |
| 1866, Jan | 1,579 | 403,357,346 | 500,650,103 | 440,379,350 | 213239,540 |
| 1866, Oct | 1,643 | 415,27 ,969 | $63,247,503$ | 426,657,350 | 280,129,558 |
| 1867, Ja | 1,644 | 419,779,739 | 60S,411,901 | 428,120,700 | : 9 ',093,29 |
| 1867, Oc | 1,643 | 420,073,415 | 609,675,214 | 418,963,050 | 293,887,941 |
| 1868, Ј | 1,642 | 420,230,7 90 | 616,603,479 | 420,544,450 | $24.377,890$ |
| 1868, Oct | 1,645 | 420,654,511 | 657,658,847 | 414,664,80J | 295,769,489 |

Besides the foregoing national securities the banks have held, as will be seen, compound interest notes to a large amount, and at the last return held $\$ 59,080,000$ of the Three Per Cent Certificates.

Aggregate resources and liabilities of
1863.

1864.

|  | 139 banks. | 309 banks. | 473 banks. | 507 banks. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Loans and discounts | \$10, 666, 09560 | \$31, 593, 94343 | \$70, 746, 51333 | \$93, 238, 65792 |
| U. S. bonds and securities. | 15, 112, 25000 | 41, 175, 150 | 92, 530, 50000 | 108, 064, 49600 |
| Other items. | 74,57148 | 432, 05995 | 842, 01773 | 1, 434, 64376 |
| Due from national banks...... |  | 4,699,479 56 | 15, 935, 73013 | 19,965,720 47 |
| Due from other b'ks and bankers | *4, 786, 12458 | 8,537, 90894 | 17, 337, 55866 | 14, 051, 39631 |
| Real estate, furniture, \&c...... | 381, 14400 | 755,696 41 | 1, 694, 04946 | 2, 202,318 20 |
| Current expenses ............... | 118,854 43 | 352, 72077 | 502,341 31 | 1, 021,569 02 |
| Checks and other cash items... | 577, 50792 | 2,651,916 96 | 5, 057, 12290 | 7, 640,169 14 |
| Bills of national and other banks. | 805,521 00 | 1,660,000 00 | 5, 344, 17200 | 4,687, 72700 |
| Specie and other lawful money. | 5, 018,622 57 | 22,961,411 64 | 42, 283, 79823 | 44, 801, 49748 |
| Total | 37, 630,691 58 | 114,820, 28766 | 252, 273,803 75 | 297, 108, 19530 |

1865. 

|  | 643 banks. | 907 banks. | 1,295 banks. | 1,513 banks. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Loans and discounts. | \$166, 448, 71800 | \$252. 404, 20807 | \$362, 442, 74308 | \$487, 170, 13629 |
| U. S. bonds and secur | 176, 578, 75000 | 277, 619,900 00 | 391, 744, 85000 | 427, 731, 30000 |
| Other items. | 3,294, 88327 | 4, 275, 76951 | 12,569, 12038 | 19, 048, 51315 |
| Due from national banks ...... | 30, 820, 15544 | 40, 963, 24347 | 76, 977, 53959 | 89, 978, 98055 |
| Duefrom other b'ksand bankers | 19, 836, 07283 | 22, 554, 63657 | 26, 078,02801 | 17, 393, 23225 |
| Real estate, furniture, \&c. | 4, 083, 22612 | 6, 525, 11880 | 11, 231, 25728 | 14, 703, 221 77 |
| Current expenses. | 1, 053, 72534 | 2,298, 02565 | 2,388, 77556 | 4,539, 52511 |
| Premiums. | 1,323,023 56 | 1,823, 29184 | 2, 243, 21031 | (5) $2,585,50106$ |
| Cheeks and other cash items... | 17, 837, 49677 | 29,681, 39413 | 41,314, 90450 | 72, 309,854 44 |
| Bills of national and other banks. | 14, 275, 15300 | 13,710, 370 00 | 21,651,826 00 | 16,247, 24100 |
| Speeie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 4,481,937 68 | 6, 659, 66047 | 9, 437, 06040 | $14,966,14422$ |
| Legal tender and fract'l cur'ney. | $72,535,50467$ | 112, 999,320 59 | 168, 426, 16655 | 193, 064, 36465 |
| (6) Total | 512, 568,666 68 | 771, 514, 93910 | 1,126, 455, 48166 | 1,359, 768, 67449 |

## the National Banking Associations.

1863. 


1864.

|  | 139 banks. | 309 banks. | 473 banks. | 507 banks. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Capital stock....................... | \$14,740,522 00 | \$42, 204, 47400 | \$75, 213, 94500 | \$86, 782, 80200 |
| Surplus fund..................... |  |  | 1,129,910 22 | 2, 010, 28610 |
| Undivided profits................ | 432, 82781 | 1,625, 65687 | 3, 094, 33011 | 5,982, 39222 |
| Nat'l bank notes outstanding... | 30, 15500 | 9, 797, 97500 | 25, 825, 66500 | 45, 260,50400 |
| Due to nat'l and other banks*.. | 2,153, 77938 | 6,814,930 40 | 119, $27,332,06637$ | $122,166,536$ $34,862,38481$ |
| Other items ....................... | 2,822, 91486 | 3,102,337 38 | 27, 213, 70802 | -43,289 77 |
| Total | 37,630,691 58 | 114, 820, 28766 | 252, 273, 80375 | 297, 108, 19530 |

1865. 

|  | 643 banks. | 907 banks. | 1,295 banks. | 1,513 banks. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Capital stock. | \$135, 618, 87400 | \$215, 326, 02300 | \$325, 834, 55800 | \$393, 157, 20600 |
| Surplus fund..................... | 8,663,311 22 | 17, 318, 94265 | 31, 303, 56564 | 38,713,380 79 |
| Undivided profits................ | 12, 283, 81265 | 17, 809, 30714 | $23,159,40817$ | $32,350,27819$ |
| Nat'l bank notes outstanding... | $66,769,37500$ | 98, 896, 48800 | 131, 452, 15800 | 171,321,903 c0 |
| Individual and other deposits .- | $183,478,63698$ | $262,961,47313$ | $398,357,55959$ | $500,910,87322$ |
| United States deposits . . . . . . . . | 37, 764, 72977 | $57,630,14101$ | $58,032,72067$ | $48,170,38131$ |
| Dre to national banks.......... | 30, 619, 17557 | $41,301,03116$ | $78,261,04564$ |  |
| Due to nat'l and other banks*.. | $37,104,13062$ | 59, 692,581 64 | $79,591,59493$ | $84,155,16127$ |
| Other iter | 265,620 87 | 3 7 578,95137 | 462,871 02 | (7) 944,053 70 |
| 4 Total | 512,568, 66668 | $771,514,93910$ | 1,126, 455,48166 | 1,359, 768, 07449 |

1866. 

| Resources. | Jandary. | APRIL. | JULY. | OCTOBER. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1,579 banks. | (3) 1,612 banks. | 1,633 baaks. | 1,643 banks. |
| Inans and discounts. | \$500, 650, 10919 | \$528, 080, 52670 | \$550, 327, 44417 | \$603, 247, 50358 |
| U.S. bonds dep'd to secture circ'n. | 298, 376, 55000 | 315, 850, 30000 | 326, 383, 35000 | 331, 733, 20000 |
| Other U. S. bondsandseeurities. | 142, 013,500 60 | 125, 625, 75900 | 121, 152,950 00 | $\cdots 94,924,15000$ |
| Oth'rstocks, bonds, and mortg's. | 17, 483, 75318 | 17, 379, 73892 | 17, 565, 91146 | -6 15, 887, 49066 |
| Due from national banks. | $93,254,55102$ | 87, 564, 32971 | 96, 692, 43323 | 107, 597,858 41 |
| Due from other b'ks and D'kers. | 14,658, $2 \times 987$ | 13, 682, 34512 | 13, 982, 22706 | 12, 136,549 87 |
| Real estate, furniture, \&c. . . . | 15,436, 29616 | $15,895,56446$ | 16,728,533 45 | 17, 122, 11701 |
| Cusrent expenses. | 3, 193,717 78 | 4,927, 59979 | 3, 030, 43901 | 5, 298,375 86 |
| Premiums | 2, 423,918 02 | 2, 233, 51631 | 2, 398, 86226 | 2,490,891 81 |
| Cheeks and other cash items | 89, 837,684 50 | 105, 490,619 36 | 96, 077, 13453 | 103,676,647 55 |
| Bills of national and otherbanks. | 20, 406, 442 00 | 18,279, 81600 | 17, 866, 72200 | 17, 437, 69900 |
| Specie | 16, 909, 36380 | 13,854, $881 \cdot 66$ | 12, 627, 01652 | 8,170,835 97 |
| Legal tendersandfract'lcur'ncy. | 187, 846,548 82 | 193, 542, 74928 | 201, 408, 85358 | 205, 770,641 38 |
| Tota | 1, 42, 480, 96434 | 1,442, 407, 73731 | 1,476, 241, 87727 | 1,525, 493,960 50 |

$186 \%$.

|  | 1,644 banks. | 1,639 banks. | 1,633 banks. | 1,643 banks. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Loans and discount | \$608, 411, 90158 | \$597, 124, 69866 | \$588, 100,70362 | \$609, 675, 21461 |
| U.S. bouds dep'd to seeure cire'n. | 339, 180, 70000 | 338, 388,65000 | 337, 355, 25000 | 338,640, 15000 |
| U.S.bonds dep'd to sec're dep'ts. | $36,015,95000$ | $38,405,80000$ | 38,302, 750 00 | 37, 862, 10000 |
| U.S.bonds and sec'ties on hand. | 52, 924,050 00 | 46,629, 40000 | 45, 629, 30000 | 42, 460,800 00 |
| Oth'r stocks, bonds, and mortg's. | 15, 072, 73745 | 20,194, 87521 | 21, 452, 04043 | 21, 507,881 42 |
| Due from national banks | 92, 492, 44595 | 94, 035, 40585 | 92, 287, 90639 | 95, 217,610 14 |
| Due from other b'ks and b'kers. | 12, 981, 44540 | 10,720, 27139 | $9,603,44212$ | 8, 400, 72647 |
| Real estate, furniture, \&ce | 18, 861,137 63 | 19, 537, 89838 | 19, 755, 02370 | 20,639, 70823 |
| Current expen | 2, 795,322 36 | 5, 665, 42997 | 3, 217, 74770 | 5, 297, 49413 |
| Premiums | 2, 852,945 23 | 3,402, 629 76 | 3, 331,247 11 | 2, 764, 18635 |
| Checks and other eash i | 101, 3330,984 35 | 87,876,535 84 | 128, 255,674 49 | 134, 591,731 51 |
| Bills of national bank | 19, 205, 58409 | 12, 868, 18900 | 16, 120, 89800 | 11, 841, 10400 |
| Bills of other b | 1.176, 14200 | 852, 74800 | 531, 26400 | 333, 20900 |
| Specie | 16,634,972 10 | 10, 335, 49233 | 9, 602, 07297 | 10, 2556, 13030 |
| Legal tendersand fractl curacy | 104, 586, 82723 | $92,661,37761$ | 102, 431, 34696 | 100550,84991 |
| Compound interest notes ....... | $81,925,10000$ | $84,029,69500$ | $75,456,91500$ | $56,888,25000$ |
| Total | 1,506, 448,245 28 | 1,462, 727, 89700 | 1, 491, 433, 58249 | 1,496, 927, 14607 |

## 1863.

|  | 1,642 banks. | 1,643 banks. | 1,640 banks. | 1,645 banks. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Loans and discounts | \$616,603. 47989 | \$628, 029, 347765 | \$655, 729, 54642 | \$657, 668, 84783 |
| U. S. bonds dep'd toseeure circ'n. | 339, 004, 20000 | 339, 686, 65000 | 339, 569, 10000 | 340, 487, 05000 |
| U.S. bonds dep 'd to sec're dep'ts. | $37,315,75000$ | 37, 446, 00000 | 37, 853, 15000 | 37, 369, 15000 |
| U. S. bonds and secties on hand. | $44,16 \pm, 50000$ | 45,958, 55000 | 43, 068, 35000 | 36, 817,60000 |
| Oth'r stocks, bouds, and mortg's. | 19,365,864 77- | 19,874,384 33 | 20,007, 327 42 | 20, 693, 40640 |
| Due from national banks | 99, 311, 44660 | $95,900,60635$ | 114, 433, 97943 | 102, 278,54777 |
| Wuelromotherb'ksand bank'rs. | 8, 480, 19974 | 7, 074, 29744 | 8, 642,574 72 | 7,848,822 24 |
| dees estate, furniture, © C...... | 21, 125, 66568 | 22, 082,570 25 | 22, 699, 82970 | 22, 747, 87518 |
| Currasc expenses | 2,986, 89386 | 5, 428,460 25 | $2,938,51904$ | 5, 278, 91122 |
| Premitu | 2, 464,536 96 | 2, 660, 10609 | 2,432,074 37 | 1, 819,815 50 |
| Checks and other | 109, 390, 26637 | 114,996, 03623 | 124, 076, 29771 | $143,241,39499$ |
| liills of national | $16,655,57200$ | $12,573,51400$ | 13,210,179 00 | 11, 842,974 00 |
| Bills | 261, 269 00 | 196, 10600 | 342,550 00 | 229, 66800 |
| Specie | 18, 163, 980, 49 | 15,379, 65453 | 20,755, 91904 | 11, 749, 442 14 |
| Lezaltendersand fract T curncy | 116,234, 34778 | 86, 215, 85916 | 102, 029, 45891 | 94, 716,266 97 |
| Compound interest notes. | 39.997, 03000 | \%. $38,917,490 \mathrm{CO}$ | 19,473, 22000 | 4,513,730 00 |
| Three per cent. certitica | 8, 245,000 60 | ~24, 255, 600 00 | 44,905, 00000 | ¢ $59,080,00000$ |
| (3) T | 1,499,770,023 14 | 1,496, 674,632 28 | 1,572, 167, $076 \sim 6$ | 1,558, 367, 50224 |

1866. 

| (4) Liabilities. | sandart. | APRIL. | july. | october. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1,579 bauks. | 1,612 banks. | 1,633 banks. | 1,643 banks, |
| Crapital stock. | \$403, 357, 34600 | \$403, 273, 53400 | \$114, 170, 49300 | \$415, 278,96900 |
| Surplus fund.... Undivided profits | $\begin{aligned} & 43,000,37078 \\ & 28,972,49370 \end{aligned}$ | 44, 687, 81054 30,964, 422 73 | $59,151,991 \quad 77$ $29,295,526 \quad 03$ | 53, 359, 27764 $32,583,328 \quad 33$ |
| National bank notes outstanding. State bank notes outstanding... | $\begin{array}{r} 213,239,53000 \\ 45,449,15500 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 248,886,28200 \\ 33,800,86500 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 267,753,67800 \\ 19,992,03800 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 280,129,55800 \\ 9,748,02500 \end{array}$ |
| Individual deposits $\qquad$ <br> T. S. deposits <br> Dep'ts of U.S.disbursing offic'rs. | $\begin{gathered} 520,21,17433 \\ 29,747,23615 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 534,734,95033 \\ 29,150,72982 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 533,330,75981 \\ 36,038,18503 \\ 3,666,89222 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 563,510,57079 \\ 31,420,819 \quad 80 \\ 2,970,95577 \end{array}$ |
| Due to national banks ......... Due to other banks and bankers. | $\begin{aligned} & 94,709,07415 \\ & 23,793,58424 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 89,067,50154 \\ & 21,84,1,64135 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 96,496,72642 \\ & \stackrel{5}{2}, 945,58699 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 110,531,195731 \\ 26,951,498 \\ 815 \end{gathered}$ |
| Total | $\overline{1,402,480,96434}$ | 1, 442, 407, 737 31 | $\overline{1,476,241,877 ~ 27}$ | 1,525, 493,960 50 |

186\%.

|  | 1,644 banks. | 1,639 banks. | 1,633 banks. | 1,643 banks. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Capital stock: | \$419, 779, 73900 | \$418, 844, 48400 | \$418, 123, 14800 | \$120, 073, 41500 |
| Surplus fund.... <br> Undivided profits | $\begin{aligned} & 59,967,2 \geqslant 214 \\ & 26,887,323 \quad 35 \end{aligned}$ | 60,193, 22358 31, C68, 30593 | 63, 229, 585 fi2 <br> 30, 586,670 86 | $\begin{aligned} & 66,695,58701 \\ & 33,751,41621 \end{aligned}$ |
| National bank notes outstanding. State bank notes outstanding... | $\begin{array}{r} 291,093,29400 \\ 6,961,49900 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 291,880,10200 \\ 5,955,14700 \end{array}$ | 291,491, 038 c0 <br> 4,522,505 60 | $\begin{array}{r} 293,887,94100 \\ 4,692,15360 \end{array}$ |
| Individual deposits <br> U. S. deposits..................... Dep'tsof U.S.disbursing officrs. | 555, 179, 94445 <br> 27,225, 66360 <br> 2, 275, 38479 | 510, 593, 098 63 27, 396, 47789 2,582,015 44 | $\begin{array}{r} 537,882,950 \quad 49 \\ 29,674,089 \\ 3,407,608 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 537,976,83402 \\ 23,580,7 \pi 3168 \\ 4,412,82558 \end{array}$ |
| Due to national banks $\qquad$ <br> Due to other banks and bankers. | $92,755,56088$ $24,322,61407$ | $\begin{aligned} & 91,159,253 \\ & 23,062,729 \\ & 95 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 89,817,13274 \\ & 22,6 \cup 8,95458 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 93,111,24089 \\ & 19,641,940 \stackrel{20}{2} \end{aligned}$ |
| Total | $\overline{1,506,448,24528}$ | $\overline{1,462,727,897} 0$ | 1,491, 433, 58249 | 1,400, 027, 14607 |

1869. 

|  | 1,642 banks. | 1,643 banks. | 1,640 banks. | 1,645 banks. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Capital stock. | \$420, 260, 79000 | \$420, 676, 21000 | \$ $420,105,01100$ | \$420, 634, 51100 |
| Surplins fund.... Undivided profits | $\begin{aligned} & 70,586,19570 \\ & 31,399,87757 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 72,349,110 \mathrm{Co} \\ & 32,861,597<8 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 75,840,11894 \\ & 33,543,22335 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 77,995,76140 \\ & 36,095,88398 \end{aligned}$ |
| Nationalbank notes outstanding. State bank notes ontstanding.- | $\begin{array}{r} 294,377,390 ~ n 0 \\ 3,792,01300 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 295,336,04400 \\ 3,310,17700 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 294,908,26400 \\ 3,163,77100 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 295,769,48900 \\ 2,906,35200 \end{array}$ |
| Individual deposits <br> U.S. deposits. <br> Dep'ts of U.S.disbursing offic'rs. | $\begin{array}{r} 521,827, \text {, } 18804 \\ 24,305,638 \\ 3,298,783 \\ 02 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 529,017,19167 \\ 29,750,3427 \\ 4,976,682 \\ 41 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 575,842,07012 \\ 24,603,67696 \\ 3,499,38999 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 579,686,54960 \\ 17,573,25064 \\ 4,570,47816 \end{array}$ |
| Due to national banks .......... Due to other banks and bankers. | $98,144,66961$ $21,867,64817$ | $\begin{aligned} & 94,073,63125 \\ & 21,323,65660 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 113,306,34634 \\ 27,355,20456 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 99,414,39728 \\ & 23,720,8 \div 918 \end{aligned}$ |
| Tot | 1,499,770,023 14 | 1,496, 674, 63228 | 1,572, 167,076 26 | 1,558,367,502 24 |

## WHAT BASIS HAVE WE FOR RESUMPTION :

Whatever may be the features of the plan ultimately adopted for restoring the specie basis, to be successful it must include a reserve of coin adequate to sustain the note circulation. It is not our present object to inquire what may be deemed an adequate reserve, but rather to ascertain, as nearly as data may permit, what amount of gold and silver we have in the country, leaving it for after consideration, under what conditions that supply is a basis broad enough for the resumption of specie payments.

There is much vagueness in the public mind upon this very essential point; and we fear that to this indefiniteness the recent able speech of Senator Morton may have added positive misapprebension. While the country owes much to the Senator's clear elucidation of many questions affecting resumption, and while his plan will, by many, be conceded to be the most consistent and feasible of any yet introduced into Congress; yet it does appear to us that when he comes to the very important question as to the existing supply of coin, he handles figures with a prodigality which bespeaks enthusiasm rather than cautious research. We pre sent the Senator's own language :

There is now in the treasury a surplus of not less than $\$ 70,000,000$, and the accruing surplus under the present tariff for the next two years cannot be less than $\$ 100,000,000$, which will, together, make $\$ 170,000,000$. It is very difficult to form an esimate of the amount of gold in the country. The Director of the Mint in Philadelphia, in 1861, estimated the smount (f gold in the country at that time to be $\$ 275,000,000$, which, I bave no doubt, was much short of the antual amount. The Comptroler of the Currency (Mr. Hulburd), is his report last year, estimated the gold product from our mines, from the 30 th of June, 1860, to the 30 th of June 1867, at $\$ 411,320,000$. The imports of gold from abroad during the seme period were $\$ 78,938,587$. The products of the mines during the year en ing June 30,1868 , are estimated at $\$ 75,000,000$, making in the aggregate $\$ 840,253,557$, to which may be added the gold circulation in California, and other gold producing. States, not included in the above calculation (estimated at $\$ 50,000,000$ ), making in a $\$ 890,253$,587. Deducting the amount of gold exported during the same period ( $\$ 177,740,908$ ), leaves a balance of $\$ 412,512,679$. There is also another large import of gold into the country from Europe, of which there is no official record, the a mount of which can only be gueseed at. I mean that which is brought in small sums by emigrants, who come to our country at the rate of half a million a year. I have heard various conjectures as to the amount thus brought to the country, and nose have put it lower than $\$ 20,000,000$ per annum for the eight or ten years, making the sum of $\$ 160,000,000$, which, added to the above, makes a total sum of $\$ 572,512,679$. But, to make allowance for mistakes and emaggerations, I estimate the gold and silver coin in the country at $\$ 400,000,000$. The products of the mines ending June 30,1869 , may be safely estimated at $\$ 75,000,060$, and after that at $\$ 100,000,000$ per annum.
Mr. Morton's balance sheet may be thas summarised :
(1) Gold in the Atlantic States in $1861 \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots 275,00,00$
(2) Product of mines for 7 years ending June 0,1867 . 411,32 , , 000
(3) Product of mines past year.................... $75,000,000$
(4) Imports for 7 y 'rs ending June $30,1567 \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots$. $7 c, 933,00$
(5) Circulation in Pacific States. $\ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots . .550,000,000$
(6) Brought by emigrants last 8 years ............... $1<0,0 \cdot 0,000$

Total supply July 1, 1860 , to June 30, 1868.
\$1,0 $00,253,000$
(7) Exported within same period.

477,740,000
Stoct of gold July 1st, 1863............................ \$ $572,513,000$

The Senator appears to have been incredulous of the result of his own statistics, and therefore, "to make allowance for mistakes and exaggerations," he throws off the very liberal amount of $\$ 172,513,000$, and lumps his estimate at $\$ 400,000,000$. Let us see how near this singularly generous method of handling figures brings us to the truth, taking the items seriatim.

The Director of the Mint, in 1861, estimated the stock of coin then in the country at $\$ 275,000,000$; Mr. Morton accepts that estimate, at the same time having no doubt it was "much short" of the actual amount, Mr . Chase, in his annual report of 1862, gave it as his opinion that $\$ 210,000,000$ covered the whole supply. These figures, we understand, to include the circulation of the Pacific States, which, taken at $\$ 40,000,000$ at that period, would leave $\$ 170,000,000$ as the supply in all the other States; an estimate which probably is not at all under the truth. For the two fiscal years, 1859-60 and 1860-61, the specie in the banks averaged $\$ 85,000,000$. What amount there was in the hands of the people can only be vaguely estimated. Considering the preference given to bank notes for their greater convenience in handling, and especially in large amounts, it may perhaps be very safely assumed that the amount of bank circulation, in the hands of the people, was double that of coin so circulating. The official reports show that, for the three years next preceding the war, the amount of bank notes in the hands of the people, this side the Rocky Mountains, averaged $\$ 163,000,000$; from which it would follow, adopting the ratio of one dollar in specie to two of notes, that the specie circulating from hand to hand outside the banks was about $\$ 80,000,000$. This we are disposed to regard as a very liberal estimate; and adding thereto the $\$ 85,000,000$ in the banks, we should have a stock of $\$ 165$,000,000 , exclusive of the Paciic circulation. If our estimate be correct. Mr. Morton must deduct from the first item of supply about $\$ 110,000,000$.
To the second iten, there seems to be reason to demur rather on account of its being an under estimate than as an "exaggeration." Our own statistics (see the Magazine of January, 1868) would lead us to place the domestic production for the iseven years at about $\$ 40,000,000$ over these figures ; as 1 is possible, however, that we may have estimated too liberally the amounts conveyed from the mines to market by the miners, we are willing for present purposes to accept the estimate of Comptroller Hulburd, as given by Mr. Morton.
The fourth item, imports of specie for the seven years ending June 30 , 1867, contains an important error. The corrected returns of the Bureau of Statistics give the total receipts of treasure from abroad tor those years at $\$ 128,200,000$, or $\$ 49,300,000$ more than Mr. Morton's figures; which, we presume, leaves no room for question that the Senator is in error to
that extent. The fifth item, the circulation in the Pacific States, cannot probably be brought into the calculation. In that section, there has never been any suspension of specie payments; and, in the event of the other States resuming, the present coin circulation of the Pacific coast would be required there, as at present, and would in no way facili. tate the effort made here to recover the normal condition of affairs. For practical purposes, therefore, it would be as legitimate to count in the supply of Great Britain or any other foreign country as that of California and the adjoining territory. The sixth item, the amount of coin brought in by foreign emigrants within the last eight years, it appears to us, should be classed among the Senator's "exaggerations." The number of emigrants is here estimated at 500,000 yearly, which exceeds the truth by fully one-third, as appears from the official returns since 1860. The amount of gold brought by the emigrants is averaged by Mr. Morton at $\$ 40$ per head; which, again, considering the large proportion who come depending upon finding immediate employment or upon receiving help from their friends, and the large number of children, must appear to be an extravagant over estimate. It would probably be a much closer approximation to the truth to take the arrivals at 350,000 , and the average amount of coin brought by each emigrant at $\$ 25$, which would give a total supply from this source of $\$ 70,000,000$ for the eignt years, which is $\$ 90,000,000$ below Mr. Morton's estimate. One very important offset against this supply has escaped the Senator's attention. From thirty to forty thousand of our people every year make a tour to Europe, taking with them, in the form of coin, not less than $\$ 150$ per head, which, within the eight years, would take nearly $\$ 40,000,000$ of gold out of the country. Indeed, were we to accept the opinions of local dealers in foreign coin, we should place the estimate much above this figure. Upon the whole, these movements of influx and efflux may be regarded as so nearly balancing each other that they need scarcely be taken into the account.

The seventh item, the exports of specie for the last eight years, fails to agree with the official records. Mr. Morton states the shipments at \$477,740,000 . The revised returns of our foreign commerce recently issued by the Director of the Bureau of Statistics, give the following as the exports of specie for each of the last eight years :

|  | Domestic. | Foreign. | Total specie |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1861 | \$23, 00,000 | \$6,000,0*0 | \$29,800,000 |
| 1862. | . $31,000,000$ | 5,800,000 | 36,800,000 |
| 1863. | - 60,0c0,000 | 8,100,000 | 68,100,000 |
| 1864. | . 100,300,000 | 4,900,000 | 105,200,009 |
| 1865. | 64,600,0)0 | 8,000,000 | 67,600,000 |
| 1866. | 82,600,000 | 3,400,000 | 86,000,000 |
| 1867. | 55,100,000 | 5,800,900 | 60,900,000 |
| 1868. | $83,700,000$ | $1(1,000,000$ | 93,700,000 |
| *Total | \$501,100,100 | \$47,000,000 | \$548,100,000 |

[^5]It thus appears that the exports of foreign and domestic specie, for the eight years, reach the real total of $\$ 548,100,000$, or $\$ 70,360,000$ above Mr. Morton's figures. There is one item of export of which we have no record, viz., the amount of specie sent out of the Southern States during the war. It is a well-known fact that the exports of cotton did not suffice to pay for all the imports made into that section; but the amount of the balance which had to be liquidated in gold we can but vaguely guess. According to the official returns, the banks of the seceding States held at the outbreak of hostilities about $\$ 25,000,000$ of specie. It would perhaps be quite safe to conclude that not over $\$ 10,000,000$ reo mained in the South at the close of the war, the balance having been sent out of the country. As an improvement upon $\mathrm{Mr}_{0}$ Morton's figures, we submit the following statement of the course of supply and loss for the last eight years, omitting, for reasons above stated, the circulation on the Pacific Coast and the receipts by emigrants and loss by travelers :


It would thus appear that the present stock of the precious metals in the Atlantic States is close upon $\$ 230,000,000$. It is not to be supposed, however, that all this exists in the form of coin, nor even of coin and bars. A certain portion of the supply of gold and silver has been taken for commercial purposes. That form of consumption has been largely increased within late years, under the high duties on jewelry and plate, and perhaps could not be safely estimated at less than $\$ 10,000,000$ per annum. Assuming this to be a full estimate, and deducting only $\$ 70$,000,000 from the foregoing balance, we should have about $\$ 160,000,000$ as the present stock of coin and bullion in the Atlantic States. It is true, this result makes a poor show against Mr. Morton's $\$ 572,000,000$, or even compared with his more modest estimate of $\$ 400,000,000$; but we do not see how its substantial accurac can be impugned. It is not easy to concerve where the whole of even this amount is held. The amount in the United States Treasury averages about $\$ 100,000,000$, including the public deposits; the banks, national and state, hold perhaps $\$ 20,000$, 000 more, exclusive of coin certificates; beside this, there is in the hands of dealers and in circulation in some of the Southern States say $\$ 15,000$,

000 more, and hoarded by timid people say $\$ 5,000,000$; making a total of $\$ 140,000,000$ of coin, to which must be added about $\$ 5,000,000$ for bullion; which would give a total of the precious metals, in all forms, of $\$ 145,000,000$. A vulgar idea prevails that there is somewhere a large amount of gold secretly hoarded; but when it is remembered that all such hoards lose interest and afford no reasonable prospect of ultimate gain, it would be doing an injustice to the common sense of an acute and business-minded population to suppose that these secretions exist to anything beyond a nominal extent; beside, the supposition finds no confinmation in common observation or experience. Upon the whole, then it results that wo have, in the States where resumption has to take effect, about $\$ 150,000,000$ of coin as the basis of gold payments. We may hereafter inquire how far this fact comports with the practicability of Senator Morton's plan of resumption.

## THE HURON AND ONTARIO CANAL.

The Oswego Commercial Advertiser and Times, in referring to our article in the last number of the Magazine on the Lake Simcoe canal, states that our doubts of the success of the measure, based upon the lack of means in Canada for the purpose, arrive from a misapprebension. The canal, the Advertiser and Times says, is to be constructed by a company "which does not ask a cent from the treasury of Canada, directly or indirectly. The surveys and estimates have all been made, and the feasibility of the project has been pronounced upon by the best civil engineers, not only of this country, but of England also. The money t. pay for the work has been pledged, half in this country, and half in England, depending upon the grant of land by the Ontario Parliament. That grant, therefore, is all that now stands in the way of the early commencement of the work. How soon that grant will be made, it is im. possible to say. The measure has met with opposition in the Provincial Legislature, which for the present has blocked its progress. But the people of the Province are beginning to understand the advantages of the measure to the Province, and it seems probable that all local opposition will eventually be compelled to give way before the pressure of public opinion. Instead of being a drain upon the wealth of the Province, it would not take a dollar from the treasury, but would lead to the expenditure of $\$ 40,000,000$ of the capital of outsiders within the Province, and stimulate enterprise, invite permanent settlement, and in every respect promote the material prosperity of the country. The ten million acres of land granted would be opened to settlement, and in this regard the increase of population and prosperity of the Province would be promoted. We regard it as certain that the good sense of the people of Ontario will ultimately prevail. The opposition so far is not more formidable than should have been expected, from experience, to a work of this magnitude-is not so great as that which DeWitt Clinton encountered for years before success crowned his efforts; and the effects of this
work upon the prosperity of the Province of Ontario may be measured somewhat by the effect the construction of the Erie Canal has had upon the State of New York, raising it suddenly to the proud position of the Empire State of the Union."

## PRICES OP MERCHANDISE.

In the table which follows, a comparison is made of the prices of the principal articles of commerce in the New York market about the first of January in the past eight years. This comparison is extremely interesting, as it shows the course of priees at the several periods, from the commencement of the war to the period of greatest inflation and thence down to the present time. As the peculiar value of this statement is seen at a glance, any extended comment upon it is unnecessary.

| Ashes, pots........ ${ }^{\text {a }}$ ( ${ }^{\text {Pearls........ }}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1862 . \\ \$ \mathrm{c} \\ 625 \\ 625 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1863 . \\ & \$ \mathrm{c} \\ & 825 \\ & 825 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1804 . \\ & \$ \mathrm{c} \\ & 850 \\ & 975 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1865 . \\ & \$ \mathrm{c} \\ & 1175 \\ & 1300 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1866 . \\ \$ \mathrm{c} \\ 900 \\ 1100 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1867 . \\ \$ \mathrm{c} \\ 825 \\ 1200 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1868 . \\ \$ \mathrm{c} \\ 837 \\ 1050 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1869 . \\ & \$ c_{0} . \\ & 78 \% \frac{1}{2} \\ & 925 \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Breadstuffs- |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Wheat flour, State Ex. | 550 | 605 | 700 | 1000 | 825 | 1100 | 1000 | 700 |
| do ex-West. \& St.L | 750 | 875 | 1100 | 1500 | 1400 | 1700 | 1600 | 1200 |
| Rye flour. Genese | $387 \%$ | 445 | 665 | 900 | 610 | 785 | 875 | 700 |
| Corn meal, Jerse | 300 | 400 | 565 | 880 | 425 | 500 | 615 | 500 |
| Wheat, white M | 150 | 153 | 183 | 270 | 275 | 305 | 320 | 230 |
| Chicago, Spring No | 130 | 133 | 148 | 222 | 185 | 245 | 245 | 170 |
| Rye, Western.... .b | 83 | 96 | 130 | 175 | 105 | 125 | 175 | 151 |
| Oats, State. | 42 | 71 | 93 | : 06 | 62 | 69 | 87 | 78 |
| Oats, Wes | 42 | 69 | 93 | 109 | 62 | 64 | 84 | 77 |
| Corn, West | 64 | 82 | 130 | 190 | 95 | 112 | 141 | 110 |
| Cotton, mid. upland | 351/8 | 681/2 | 82 | 120 | 52 | 84 | 16 | 27 |
| Mid. New Orl | 36 | 681/2 |  | 121 | 53 | 85 | 161/2 | 27 \% |
| Fish, dry cod | 350 | 450 | 670 | 900 | 983 | 650 | 550 | 680 |
| Frait, layer | 320 | 350 | 420 | 625 | 450 | 385 | 480 | 356 |
| Currants . . . . . . . . . db | 9 | 13 | 15 | 21 | 15 | 13 | 121/4 | $10 \frac{2}{3}$ |
| Hay, shipping.... 100 lbs | $771 / 2$ | 85 | 145 | 155 | 75 | 125 | 120 | 90 |
| Hops ... ............. | 20 | 23 | 33 | 50 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 20 |
| Iron-Scotch p | 2300 | 3350 | 4500 | 6300 | 5290 | 5000 | 3600 | 4100 |
| Eng ish bars | 5700 | 6500 | 9000 i | 19000 | 1300011 | $150)$ | 8500 | 8700 |
| American pig |  |  |  | 59 | 51 | 49 | 39 | 4100 |
| Laths .... | 185 | 145 | 150 | 240 | 500 | 325 | 300 | $312 \frac{1}{4}$ |
| Lead-Span | 7 CO | 800 | 1050 | 1500 | 638 | 700 | 650 | $637 \frac{1}{6}$ |
| Galena... | $7121 / 2$ | 801 | 1056 | 1600 |  |  |  |  |
| Leather-hemlock, sole II | 20\% | 27 | 30 | 42 | 36 | 32 | 251/2 | 29 |
| Uak ...... .......... do | 28 | 33 | 42 | 52 | 31 | 37 | 38 | 40 |
| Lime, com. Rockland. bbl | 65 | 85 | 135 | 115 | 170 | 170 | 150 | 160 |
| Liquors, brandy, cog'c.ga | 460 | 525 | 610 | 1500 | 600 | 600 | 650 | 800 |
| 1 omestic whiskey. | 203/2 | 39 | 94 | 224 | $2271 / 2$ | 238 | 235 | 97 |
| Molasses, N . Orleans | 53 | 55 | 70 | 143 | 115 | 90 | 85 | 76 |
| Naval stores . |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Crude turpentine....bbl | 000 |  |  |  | 900 | 600 | 375 | 388 |
| Spirits tur entine ...g | $1471 / 2$ | 260 | 295 | 210 | 105 | 67 | 50 | 50 |
| Common rosin | 600 | 1300 | 3200 | 2300 | 650 | 500 | 300 | 245 |
| Oils-Crude whale | 48 | 81 | 110 | 148 | 160 | 130 | 70 | 195 |
| Crude, sper | 140 | 175 | 160 | 213 | 250 | 260 | 215 | 175 |
| Linseed | 86 | 125 | 147 | 150 | 145 | 134 | 103 | 98 |
| Petroleum, crude |  | 25 | 811/2 | 1 51 | 40 | 18 | 163/8 |  |
| Refined in b'd, S.W..g |  | 471/2 | $461 / 2$ |  | 62 | 30 | 24 |  |
| Provisions-- |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Pork, old mess | 1200 | 1450 | 1950 | 4300 | 2850 | 1925 | 2115 | 2725 |
| Pork, prime | 850 | 1250 | 1450 | 3625 | 2350 | 1725 | 1850 | 2300 |
| Beef, prime mess | 550 | 1300 | 1200 |  |  |  | 1600 | 1400 |
| Beef, extra mess | 1100 | 2000 | 2300 | 2300 | 2400 | 2100 | 2100 | 1950 |
| Beef hams, ext | 1450 | 1500 | 1830 | 2700 | 3500 | 3500 | 3250 | 3200 |
| Kams, pickled | 6 | ? | 11 | 20 | 161/2 | 121/4 | 13 | 16 |
| shoulder, pick | $43 / 4$ | $53 / 4$ |  | \% 18 | 14 | 10 | 812 | - 112 |
| Lard, Western | 83\% | 10 | 13 | - 23 | 19 | 13 | 123/2 | - $17 \frac{1}{6}$ |
| Butter, prime Western | 15 | $2 \cdot$ | 24 | 45 | 35 | $\because 0$ | 38 | $40^{\circ}$ |
| Butter, prime state. | 19 | 24 | 29 | 55 | 43 | 41 | 45 |  |
| Cheese, prime factory |  | 12 | 151/2 | \% 24 | 181/2 | 171/2 | - 16 | $19 \frac{1}{3}$ |
| Rice, prime . . . . 100 lbs | 700 | 875 | 1000 | 1300 | 1250 | 925 | 875 | 925 |
| Salt,Liverpool, ground..sk | 86 | 125 | 185 | 247 | 250 | 200 | 200 | 210 |
| Live pool, fine, Ashtons. | 170 | 215 | 280 | 475 | 410 | 370 | 390 | 385 |
| Seeds, clover.... ....... tb | 714 | - $103 / 4$ | -121/2 | \% 27 | 14 | 14 | 121/2 |  |
| Sugar, Cubs, good | $8 \frac{1}{4}$ | ( 10 | 12 |  | 12 | 10 | 117/8 |  |
| Sugar refined, hards | 105/4 | 1314. | 467/8 | 7/8 281 | $1 / 218$ | -15 | 63/6 |  |
| Tallow.. |  | 103/8 | \% 12 | 18 | 14 | 11 | 101/2 | / 118 |
| Wool. Ohio fleece, do' | 59 | 60 | 80 | 95 | 70 | 60 | 60 |  |
| American gold.. | - Par | 1331/2 | -152 | 227 | 1441/3 | \% 133 | 1331/2 | / 1351 |

COURSE OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHINGE FOR 1866.
The following is the Course of Prices at the New York Stock Exehange Board, each month, for 1866:
Satement showing the Lowest and Highest Sale-Prices of Shares at the Nero York Stock Exchange Board in each month:

| stocks. | Januuary. | February. | March. | April. | May. | June. | July. | August. | Sept. | October. | November. | December. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Ri3. shares, viz. : |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Buff. N. Y. \& Erie.. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $85-85$ |  |  |
| Buff. \& State Line.. | $195-195$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Catawissa | 57-59 |  |  |  | $80-80 \%$ | 79 | 79-79x | $79-80$ |  |  |  |  |
| Central of N | $114-119$ | $113-114$ | $104-1071 / 2$ | 1.6s-110 | $110-117$ | 115 $1 / 4-117$ | $116-120$ | 120-1281/ | $127-129$ | 1271/2-130 | $128-1321 / 2$ | $124-127$ |
| Chicago \& Alton | 103 $105-1051 / 2$ | $\begin{array}{ll}102 & -119 \\ 103 & -120\end{array}$ | 83 $9416-11218$ | $84-901 / 8$ $93-98$ | 91 91 100 | 95-99 | 983/-1051/2 | 1021/2-109 | $105-1133 / 8$ | 1101/2-1131/4 | $106-113$ | $108-1101 / 4$ |
| Chic. B. \& Quincy | 105 $1091 / 4$ | $\begin{array}{ll}103 & -120 \\ 112 & -112\end{array}$ | (9436-118 | 115 $\begin{aligned} & 93-98 \\ & 1171 / 3\end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{ll}100 & -101 \\ 113 & -117\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{ll}102 & -102 \\ 116 & -121\end{array}$ | 1043/2-106 | $\begin{array}{ll}105 & -1091 / 2 \\ 129 & -130\end{array}$ | 1063/4-1131/3 | $\left\lvert\, \begin{aligned} & 113-1131 / 2 \\ & 1321 / 4-137 \end{aligned}\right.$ | $\begin{aligned} & 10916-1316 \\ & 131-1331 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 110 \mathrm{~s} /-111 \\ & 130-134 \end{aligned}$ |
| Chic. \& Great Eas |  |  |  | 401/3-42 | 48-44 |  |  | $45-45$ | 45-50 | 497/8-5218 | $30-45$ | $130-134$ $333 / 45$ |
| Clic. \& Milwaukee. | 60-67\% |  |  | $58-60$ | $63-63$ |  |  | 70-70 |  | $70-70$ | $79-79$ | 68 - 68 |
| Chic. \& N'western.. | $27-361 /$ $5316-627$ | 2648-29 | $25-27 \%$ | $24-301 / 8$ $5216-595$ | 261/2-29y/8 | 281/4-31药 | $30-37$ | 351/4-373/4 | $34-371 / 2$ | 38-6076 | 373/4-621/2 | 42-551\% |
| Chic. \& R'k Island.. |  | 58 ${ }^{5} / 8$ | $52-573 / 8$ $1047 / 31185 / 8$ | $521 / 2-595 / 8$ $107-1231 / 4$ | 5518-613/4 | $58-61 / 4$ $91-951 / 6$ |  | 1021通-1101/8 | (653/8-721/4 | $721 / 2-813 / 4$ $1051 / 3-111 / 8$ | $100-112 \frac{1}{4}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 651 / 2-845 / 4 \\ & 102-105 \% \end{aligned}$ |
| Cinn., H. \& D'ton Cleve., Col. \& Cin. | $110-123$ | $114-115$ | $111-115$ | $100-100$ $1143 / 2-115$ | 114-115 | $116-1181 /$ | $110-113$ | $110-1111 / 6$ | 1114 -115 | $\begin{array}{cc}85 & -85 \\ 113 & -115\end{array}$ | 1113/2-113/4 | $109-112$ |
| Cleveland \& Pitts | $741 / 2-87$ | $76-821 / 6$ | 751/4-82 | 761/2-841/2 | 803/4-99 | 80-87\% | 79\%-88 | 85\%/-883/4 | 853/6-90 | 877/z-943/4 | 841/2-941/2 | 881/2-981/6 |
| Cleveland \& Toledo | $103-113 / 6$ | $105-1081 / 2$ | $107-113$ | 991/4-10514 | $103-1055 / 8$ | 10414-107 | 1061/2-116x | 1151\%-117 | 1141/2-128 | 1187/8-1235/8 | 1113/3-1213/ |  |
| Del., Lac. \& Wert | $149-158$ | $140-145$ | $124-1253 / 6$ | $130-130$ | $135-140$ | $144-147$ | $142-150$ | $160-1621 / 2$ | $150-155$ | $150-152$ | $150-150$ | 1441/2-14413 |
| Erie | $801 / 2-93$ 81 | $76-8516$ $80-823$ | 747/4-87 | 713/6-797/8 | $551 / 2-75$ 74 | $571 / 2-653 / 4$ 78 | $62-77 \%$ <br> 7216 <br> 7876 | $665 / 78-74 / 4$ $723 / 4$ | $681 / 8-801 / 4$ $75-814$ | $811 / 2-95$ 793 | 701/2-861/2 | $65 \%-743 / 2$ $82-86$ |
| Han. \& St. Jos. |  |  |  |  | 80-31 | 32-35 | 30 | $35 \%-361 / 6$ | 363/4-363/4 | 38-51 | 54-60 | 56-59 |
| do do pref.. |  | 523/2- |  |  |  | $50-52$ |  |  | 52 | 4 | 65 - | 63 |
| Hart. \& N. Haven.. Hudson River | $\left\|\begin{array}{cc} 170 & -170 \\ 981 / 2109 \end{array}\right\|$ | $99-1041 /$ | 1021/2-1091/4 | 1025/3-1105/8 | $108-113$ / | $110-1183$ | 1121/6-1201/ | 175-175 | $119 \times-125$ | $118-1283 / 4$ | 118 -1261/2 | i18 |
| Illinois Central. | $115-1313 / 4$ | 1121/4-1161/4 | 1141/2-1191/2 | $114-124$ | $115-1223 / 4$ | $117-124$ | 1153/8-123\% | 1211/4241/2 | $121-123 \%$ | 1231/2-129 | $116-1263 / 4$ | $1151 / 2-120$ |
| Indianapo. \& Cin |  | $70-70$ | $55^{2}-55^{\prime}$ |  | $70-76$ | 60-70 | 172-72 | $73-74$ | 75-76 | $80^{-}-84$ | 84-93 | 87-88 |

New York Central N. Y. \& Harlem.. N. Y. \& N. Haven N. Y. \& N. Haven. Panama
Phila. \& Reading. Pitts., F.W. \& Chic. Rome \& Waterto'n St. Louis, A.\& T.H. Sixth-av., N. Yref. Ston. (N.Y., P. \&B) Warren
Coal Shares, viz.: American
Ashburto Central
Consolidated (Md.) Cumberland
Del. \& Hud, Canal.
Lehigh \& Sus'hanna
Maryland Ant'racite
Pennsylvani
Spring Mountain.

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| 60-60 |  |
|  | - $393 \%-42$ |
|  | 193/4-201/2 |
|  | $110 \%$-1151/3 |
|  | 823/8-88/2 |
|  | 941 1 -100 |
| 14 |  |
| \% | $85-87$ |
|  | 511/2-55 |
|  | 651/2-75 |
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| $\cdots \ldots$ <br> $\because 55$ <br> 40 <br> 40 <br> 193 <br> 13 <br> 87 <br> 87 <br> $\cdots$ <br> 99 <br> 85 <br> 54 <br> 72 |
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| $55-60$ |
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| $\begin{gathered} 40-441 / 2 \\ 193 / 4-22 \\ 113-1173 / \\ 873-93 \end{gathered}$ |
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80

$\overline{7}^{8}:$
$111 / 8$
99
119
110 99
-115
-115 $1151 / 2-118$
$115-115$
$265 \quad .270$
1105 $\qquad$ $25 . .-265$ $1 / 41143$ $143 / 2-1181 / 2$
$106-111 / 4$
3830.50101
$72 \%-78$
$\cdots \cdots \ldots .$.

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| $38-53$ |  |
| 67-78 |  |
| $105-105$ |  |
| 40-547/6 | 4012-45x |
| $72-751 / 2$ | -1...... |
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| $67 \quad 73$ | 60-63 |
| $13-17$ | 101/2-101/2 |
| 191/2-211/2 | $17-201 /$ |
| $54-57$ | 50 |
| 35-35 |  |
| $\begin{array}{rr}64 & -71 \\ 155 & -160\end{array}$ |  |
| $4-41 / 2$ |  |
| $150-150$ |  |
|  |  |


| stocks. | Ja | Feb | Mar | AD | Ma | June. |  | Au | Sep |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Spruce Hill |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Wilkesbar |  | $60-60$ $9915-963$ | $50-50$ | 48-48 | 48-52 | $53-55$ | $53-55$ | 54\%-54\% | $52-57^{\prime 2}$ | $58-711 / 2$ | $63^{-2}-75$ | 55-63\% |
| Wolf Creek Wyoming | 50 | $921 / 2-963 / 4$ 49 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Wyoming Valley... Gas shares, viz.: | 50 | 49-521/2 | 44 |  | 38 |  | 371/8 | 40 | 40 - | 36 - | 36-37 |  |
| Citizens.. | 118 -118 |  |  | $105-105$ |  |  |  |  |  | $125-125$ | $125-125$ |  |
| Manhattan Mining sha |  |  |  |  | $150-150$ |  |  | $135-135$ | $138-138$ |  | $150-150$ |  |
| Copake Iron | 01/2-01/6 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mariposa Gold | 123/4-15 | 10 | 1114.1242 | 113/2-1312 | 11-1312 | 10\%-12\% | 101/2-123/4 | $11-12 \%$ | i1 - $15 \%$ | 131/4-14\% | $12-15 \%$ | 12-13 |
| do $\mathbf{P}$ | $16-19 \frac{1 / 2}{}$ | $15-173 / 4$ | 163/4-183/4 | 173\%-251/4 | 193/6-26\% | $21-26 \frac{1}{4}$ | $22-2712$ | 261/2-281/4 | 2713-3514 | 27\%-321/4 | 241/2-31 | 27\% 2 - $321 / 8$ |
| Minnesota Coppe Quartz Hill Gold |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 17\%-17\% |  |  |  |
| Quicksilv | 363/4-443/4 |  | 40-4312 | 40 | $49-563 \%$ | 48 - | 47\% 720 | 471/2-513/2 | 4932-54\% | 54-56\%/8 | $44-56$ | $3 / 4$ |
| Fiutland Marbl | 121/4-17\%/2 |  |  |  |  |  |  | $16-233 / 4$ | 233/4-32\% | $29-331 / 8$ | $23-29312$ |  |
| Smith \& Parm, Gold |  |  |  |  |  | 91/8-97\% | 81 |  | 91/8- $17 / 3$ | 117/6-141/2 | 71/4-121/8 | $81 / 6-81 / 4$ |
| Improv't shares, viz. <br> Boston Water Pow, |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Brunsw'k City Lan | 8-8 |  |  |  |  |  | $8-91$ |  |  |  | $7{ }^{1 / 8}-93$ |  |
| Canton | 42-451/2 | $43-443 / 4$ | 4312-483/4 | $47^{\prime 2}-571 / 2$ |  |  | $51-55 \%$ | 513/4-513/4 | 52-561/2 | 531/3-57\% | $44-571 / 2$ | $44^{4}-501 / 2$ |
| Cary ...... |  |  |  | 14 | 12-14\% |  | 51 -50.8 | $14-143 / 8$ | $14-14$ | 53/2-51/2 | $14-143 / 4$ | $44-50 / 2$ |
| Te'ph shares, viz.: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| West. Union. . 7 . do do (Rus. Ext.) | 441/2 | 54-70 | $108^{-2}-109$ |  | $\begin{array}{rr} 57 & -64 \\ 107 & -108 \end{array}$ | $\left\|\begin{array}{c} 493 / 4-62 \\ 105-1071 / 3 \end{array}\right\|$ | $\left\|\begin{array}{cc} 51 & -571 / 2 \\ 10 & -110 \end{array}\right\|$ | $\left\|\begin{array}{rr} 55 & -591 / 2 \\ 102 & -103 \end{array}\right\|$ | $\begin{aligned} & 541 / 4-581 / 8 \\ & 90 \\ & 90 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 511 / 6-561 / 2 \\ & 97-98 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 44-53 \\ & 96 \frac{1}{4}-97 / 6 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 43-50 \\ & 953 / 4-971 / \end{aligned}$ |
| St'ms'p shares, viz. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Atlantic | $108-135$ | $102-136$ | $128-1331 / 2$ | 1211/2-133 | 1221/-1321/4 | $124-130$ | $\begin{array}{ll}111 & -125\end{array}$ | 112 | $110-1171 / 2$ | 1083/2-116 | 94 | $103-113$ |
| Pacific* | $180-210$ | $185-212$ | $205-215$ | - 215 -227 | 225 -225 | $210-2121 / 2$ | $208-216$ | 213-222 | 219-222 | $215-284$ | $205-246$ | 160 |
| South Am. Nav | 160-203 | 165-200 | 190-200 | $190-209$ | 216 -218 |  |  |  |  |  | $109-111$ | 1101. 1131 |
| Union Navigati | $100-100$ | $100-100 \%$ | $100{ }^{-105}$ | $105-106 \%$ | 1001/3-106\%/4 |  |  |  | $104-108$ | 108\%/2-1043/4 | 118 -114 | 101 -107\% |
| Express shares, |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Adams... <br> American |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{array}{ll}85 & -104 \\ 99 & -105\end{array}$ | 18 |  |
| United States |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 80-80 | 70-78 |
| Miscel's shares, viz : |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Central Am. Transit | $15-28$ | $22-22$ | 18-18 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 20-20 |  | $23-23$ |
| New York Guano... | 22-12 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ........... |
| Union Tr |  |  | 90-921/2 |  | 95-95 |  | $97-97$ | $100-100$ | $105-105$ | $105-105$ |  |  |

* After November 20 the Pacific Mail Steamship Rhares wero sold, ex-dividend 5 per cent,s, and stock distribution $38 \%$ per cent, from which date to the end of the month the sales ranged from $170 @ 190$.


## COURSE OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE BOARD FOR $18 j 7$.

Statement showing the Lowest and Highest Sale Prices of Shares at the New York Stock Exchange Board, in each month

| Stocks. | January. | February. | March. | April. | May. | June. | July. | August. | September | October. | November. | Decemi r . |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1-Railr'd Share List Boston, Hart, \& Erie |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cent. of New Jersey. | $124-1$ | $120-123$ |  | 113 | 15 | 18 -1 | 21-122 | $1121 / 12$ | $122-123$ | 150/2-17 | $\begin{aligned} 15 & -16 \\ 119 & -120\end{aligned}$ | ${ }^{101 / 2-113 / 2}$ |
| Chicago \& Alton.. | 105 -1103/4 | $106-111$ | 1051/4-1081/2 | $1{ }^{105}$ | $107-108$ | 109 -114\% | $114{ }^{-115}$ | ${ }_{111}^{12}-117^{-1 / 4}$ | $117-125$ | ${ }_{123} \begin{aligned} & 125\end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{lll}120 & 122\end{array}$ |  |
| Pr | 109 -112 | $112-116$ | $106-109$ |  | 1111/2-1111/2 | 1111/2-116\% |  | $114-120$ |  | 125 | 1250 | $125{ }^{-130}$ |
| Ch'c, Bur. \& Qnincy | $\begin{array}{ll}129 & -132\end{array}$ | $127-1301 / 2$ | 1293/4-132 | 130 -135 <br> 8 -10 | 1300 -13 -15 | 132-142 | $\begin{array}{ll}141 & -150 \\ 10 & -10\end{array}$ | $148-150$ | $124-1261 / 4$ | 1261/2-137 | $r^{133}-10$ | $\begin{array}{lll}136 & -137\end{array}$ |
| Chicago \& Gt. East.. Chicago \& Milwan. | 80 - $0^{\circ}{ }^{\circ}$ |  |  | 8-10 | $11-15$ |  | 10-10 |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 15-18 \\ & 61-61 \end{aligned}$ | $20-$ |  |
| Chicago \& Northw wh | 32-4612 | $35 \%$ | $32 \%-363$ | 3j | 3i $1.7-363 \%$ |  | $43-513$ | $413 / 2-50$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & 411 / 2-61 \\ & 413 / 3 \end{aligned}$ | $461 / 4-585 / 8$ |  |
| Chic, R I \& Paprific.: | \| ${ }^{571 / 2-831 / 5} 9$ | $\begin{aligned} & 633 / 695 / 8 \\ & 95-1003 / 4 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 5914-65 \% \\ & 921 / 2-98 \% \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 5634-65 \% \\ & 8516-9314 \\ & \hline 164 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 563 /-6 e 5 / \\ & 867 / 8-927 / 8 \\ & 80 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 58-651 / 2 \\ & 87 / 8-953 / 4 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 647 / 7-731 / 4 \\ & 95 / 2-104 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 67 \%-717 / 8 \\ & 99 \% / 4-1037 / 8 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 63-713 \\ & 99 \\ & 93 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 653 / 70 \\ & 94-104 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 623 / 8-673 \\ & 94 / 2 / 277 / 8 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 66-413 \\ & 901 / 2-5: 58 \end{aligned}$ |
| Cin, Hamil \& Dayt'n |  |  |  |  | $80-80$ |  |  |  |  |  | 75-75 |  |
| Cleve, Col \& Cine'ti. <br> Cleveland, P \& bsh. | $105-111$ | ${ }^{100}-105$ | 99-100 | 97-99 | 981/2-100 | 981/2-101/2/ | $98-100$ | 100-101 | $100-1014$ | 97-99\%/ | 104 |  |
| Cleveland \& Pittsb'g | 751/6-913/4 | 79-85\%/3 | 781/2-83 | 65重-7934 | 713/4-75\%/8 | 75/2-861/4 | $84-95$ | $911 / 8-96$ | 7512-89/2 |  | 81 104 | \% |
| Cleveland \& Toledo | $117{ }^{-126 \%}$ | $117-121$ | $116-122$ | 1093/4-115 | 1121/4-114 | 113\%/6-1221/2 | 119/4/2-126 | 1213/4-127\%/6 | 125 $\frac{1}{4}-131$ \{ |  | $100-1043 / 4$ | $97-104$ |
| Delaware, Lack \& |  |  | $120-120$ | 112 -112 | $120-125$ | $125-130$ | $130-130$ | $118-121$ | $118-123$ <br> $113-118$ | $1093 / 113$ | $\left\lvert\, \begin{array}{ll} 113 & -114 \\ 110 \end{array}\right.$ | $1111 / 2-114$ |
| Dub'e \& Sci. C. pref. |  |  |  | $5 \dddot{5}-50$ | $59-60$ |  |  |  |  | 70-70 |  |  |
| Erie |  | $\begin{aligned} & 55 \%-6113 \\ & 70-75 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 52-613 / 4 \\ & 69-73 \end{aligned}$ | $53-64$ $6915-72$ | 58\%-65\% | 58\%/8-67 |  | $\begin{gathered} 667 / 763 / 8 \\ 76-79 \end{gathered}$ | $59-711 / 3$ 74 | $635 / 8-761 / 2$ $75-80$ | $\begin{aligned} & 635 / 8-743 / 2 \\ & 76-80 \end{aligned}$ | 71 79 79 |
| Hannib. \& St. Josep ${ }_{\text {b }}$ | 69-79 57 | 52-52 | 69-73 | $6914-72$ $45-53$ |  |  |  |  |  | ${ }_{50}^{75}$ |  | $79-81$ $50-50$ |
| rtford \& N. |  |  | $51-56$ |  | 55-55 | $53-64$ | 63-63 | 63-63 | $63-6$ | 61-63 | 621/2-62 | 61-63 |
| dson | 119 -1 | $128-1351$ |  | 1 | 103 |  |  |  | 1243/1391/2 |  | 1231/1261/ | $124-133 \%$ |
| Illinois Central | $111-1171 / 8$ | $114-117$ | $114-116$ | 1111/2-116 | 1131/2-116 | $117-122$ | 116 | [177/8-12 | $120-122$ | 1243/4-12 | $124-1341 / 2$ | 1291/2-135 |
| Indianap. \& Cin | S4-87 | 84-84 | 85-85 |  |  |  | 80 | 81 - 81 |  |  | 68 - |  |
| Lehigh Valley |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 93-95 | $\left\|\begin{array}{cc} 302 & -1021 / 2 \end{array}\right\|$ | 101 $102 \%$ |
| Little Miami |  | 100 - -100 | $1050-105$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 硣 | 60-60 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | $3 \mathrm{x}-38$ | 25 | 24-3 -26 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 17-18 | $16-17$ | i5. -1.1 |
|  | 35-38 | 25 | 24-26 | $25-25$ |  |  | 20-24x | \% | $17-228$ | 17 -18 | 16 - 17 | 15-16 |

Stocks Michigan Central... Michigan Sontral.... ichigan Southern. January. | Febraary. 1 March. | April. I May. I June. | July. | August. I Sept. | October. |November.|December. Milwau. \& P. duch. Milwau. \& St. Praul. Morris \& Essex.... New Jersey New York Central New York \& Harlem
N. York \& N. Have
Norwich \& Worces. Norwich \& Wolces.Panama..............

Pittsb., Ft. W. \& Ch Rome, W. \& Ogdensb St. L., A. \& T. Haute
Second Avenue ${ }^{\text {pr }}$ Sixth Avenne (N. Y..... B B Third Avenue. ..... Toledo, W. \& West.
Troy, s, \& Rutland
 American...... .....
American...
Ashburt
Central
Cumberiand .............
Delaware \& Hudzon
Maryland.
Schuylkill
Spring Mountain
United States...
Wilkesbarre........

| $\left\|\begin{array}{rl} 10-2 & -1 \\ 66 & -83 \% \end{array}\right\|$ | $\begin{gathered} 107-107 \% \\ 70 \%-75 \% \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| $\dddot{90}$ - 100 | $90-90$ |
| 90-90 |  |
| $33-47$ | 35\% 5 -4) |
| 521/2-701/2 | 56 |
|  |  |
| $96-113$ | 941/4-1033/8 |
|  | $90-90$ |
| $114-116$ | $115-118$ |
| 231\%-241\% | 2118 - $26 \%$ |
| $87-89$ |  |
| $260-2601 / 8$ | $260-2$ |
| 995/6-1051/2 | 1031/2-1061/4 |
| 422/2-1053/4 | 94\% $/ 8.993 / 4$ |
| $95-95$ |  |
| $31-351 / 2$ |  |
| $60-67$ $60-60$ | 62 |
| $\ddot{96}-98$ |  |
| $39-45 \%$ |  |
|  | 66 |
| $9 \mathrm{i}^{\prime}-9 \mathrm{y}$ | $100-10$ |
| 56-70 | 57-61 |
| 11-11 |  |
| $10-2012$ |  |
| $10-121 / 2$ |  |
| $3{ }^{35}$ - 94. | $43-47$ $33-86$ |
| $139-156$ | $145-147$ |
| $71 / 2-83 / 2$ | 145 |
|  |  |
| $70-75$ | $65-65$ |
| $40 \cdots-59$ | $36 \cdots \cdots$ |



|  | $1081 / 2-110$ <br> $651 / 2-701 / 4$ <br> 37.92 |
| :---: | :---: |
|  |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & 25-36 \\ & 47 / 2-563 / 4 \end{aligned}$ | $3311 / 27$ $53 / 4 / 571 / 2$ |
|  | $\begin{array}{cl}67 & -67 \\ 140 & -1401 / 2\end{array}$ |
| 953/-105\% | $97-993 / 4$ |
|  | $93-95$ |
| $85-85$ | 98-93 |
| 1191/2-123 | 11512-117 |
| $22-271$ | $\begin{aligned} & 95-95 \\ & 20 \%-25 \% / 3 \end{aligned}$ |
| 254....... |  |
| $254-258$ | $254-260$ |
| $971 / 2104$ $891 / 4-95 / 4$ | 1021/2-1041/2 |
| 893/4-953/4 | 95 |
| $31-35$ | 353/4-40\% |
| $60-61$ | $56-7012$ |
|  | $55-55$ |
|  | 116-116 |
| $80-80$ |  |
| $36-393 \%$ | 38 - $\quad 33$ |
| 6114-65 | 587/8-67 |
| 96-96 | 97-97 |
| 45-46 | $45-45$ |
|  |  |
|  |  |
| 26-84 | $29314-32$ |
| $143-146$ | 1471/2-155 |
| 150 -150. | $130-10$ |
|  | 541/4-551/3 |
| 45-45 | . ........... |
| $25-36$ | $35 \cdots 3$ |




| 3－Gas Share List |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Citizens ${ }^{\text {a }}$（Biooklyn） |  |  |  |  | 126－ 30 | －130 |  | －1271／2 |  |  |  |  | $\infty$ |
| Marlem．tin．．．．．． | 145 | $145 \cdots-160$ | $170 \cdot-176$ | 167／2－167／2 |  |  | $140 \cdot 0$ | 156 | 135－ 10. | $155-155$ | $160-160$ | $163{ }^{-164}{ }^{-16}$ |  |
| Metropolitan |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $130-130$ |  |
| New York． |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $280-280$ |  |  |  |  |
| 4－Minin，Sh．Lish <br> Consoli＇d Greg＇y g＇ld |  | 10\％－14 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mariposa gold | 9－14 | $9-101 / 6$ | 8－93／4 | 6188－87／2 | $63 / 8$－ 8 | 63／4－834 | 9 | $97 / 8-11$ | $9-10 \%$ | $73 / 4.93 / 2$ | s－－ 918 |  |  |
| arw | $18-325$ | 21／4－24 | $20-23 / 2$ | $18^{18}-22^{1 / 2}$ | $16 \%$－ 21 | 17／\％－2414 | 221／2－25 | 18 －23／2 | 17－20\％ | $18-17 \%$ | $13-14 \%$ | $13^{12}-15 / 4$ |  |
| New Jersey zinc．．．． <br> New York gold．．．．．．． |  | $100-100$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Quicksilver．．．．．．．． |  |  | 12 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 9 |
|  | $35-45 \frac{1}{2}$ | 381／4－41\％ | 301／2－38／4／ | $253 / 4$ | $22-301 / 4$ | $24-32 \%$ | 31\％－361／4 | 27－33\％／2 | 24／2／2－29 | $17-261 / 2$ | $15-151 / 2$ | $15-221 / 2$ | a |
| Boston Water Power <br> Brunswick Land | $\begin{array}{r} 233 / 4-30 \\ 8 \end{array}$ |  | $243 / 2-271 / 4$ $6-8$ | 241／6－32\％／6 | $261 / 2-331 / 4 \mid$ | 23－24\％ | ${ }_{5}^{21 \% / 8-243 / 4}$ | 19－223／4 | $16-201 / 6$ | 151／6－20 | 16／4－181／2 | 171／2－19\％／ | 鿬 |
| Canton improvement | 411／2－49 $\mathrm{c}_{6}$ | 43／2／2－48 | $44-501 / 2$ | $41 \% 2-46$ | 411／2－443／4 | 42\％－483／6 | 467／2－531／2 | 46－51\％ | $43 \cdots-50$ | $423 \%-453$ | 42－46\％ | 441／2－57 |  |
| Cary impfovement． <br> 6－elegranh $S h ' s$ ． | 11－11\％ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | － |
| Westera Union． <br> （Rus’n） | $\begin{aligned} & 421 / 2-471 / 6 \\ & 95-97 \end{aligned}$ | 40－451／4 | 40\％／2－42\％ | $3518-42$ | $40-46$ | 40\％－45\％ | 44\％／8－503／8 | 42－471／2 | 363／3－44\％ | 33－38 | 3012－343／4 | 881／4－32 | 右 |
| Atlantic Mail． | （150 $\begin{array}{ll}95 & -110 \\ 150 & -173\end{array}$ | $793 / 85$ 122 120 -160 | 178－913／8 | 76 118 | $\left\lvert\, \begin{gathered} 901 / 2-10116 \\ 1243 /-130 \end{gathered}\right.$ | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} 102 \\ 1287 /-1433 / 4 \end{array}$ |  | $\left\lvert\, \begin{aligned} & 111 \\ & 1413 /-1463 / 4 \end{aligned}\right.$ | $\left\lvert\, \begin{aligned} & 109 \\ & 1851 / 2-144 \% / 8 \end{aligned}\right.$ | $\begin{aligned} & 112-1818 \\ & 1391 / 6-150 \end{aligned}$ | 114  <br> 117 -145 | $\begin{aligned} & 115-121 \\ & 108 / 61 / 130 / 4 \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Union Navigat on． | $106-1083 / 4$ | $109-109$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| S．Am．Nav．\＆M．R | 1131／4－17\％ | $\begin{array}{ll}115 & -118\end{array}$ | 115 －116 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ．．．．．．．． |  |  |
| Adams | $63-75$ |  | $55-611 / 6$ |  | 583／4－661／2 | $62-80$ | $66-74 \times 5$ | 72－764\％ | $53-751 / 2$ | 55－673／4 | $661 / 2-811 / 4$ | 77－ $841 / 3$ |  |
| mer can． | $70-50$ | 543／4－60 | $55-61$ | 55－59 | ${ }^{61}-711 / 8$ | $611 / 2-76$ | 64－743／2 | $71-771 / 4$ | 57－73 | $55-673 / 4$ | $66-78 \%$ | $7414.8823 / 4$ |  |
|  |  |  |  | 16－17 | 13－19 |  | $101 / 2-12$ $15-21$ | 16－19 | 13－15 |  |  |  |  |
| ＂${ }^{\prime \prime}{ }^{\text {U }} 35$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 231／2－243／2 | 22\％－30 | $28-41 \%$ | 363\％－42\％ | \％ |
| United States．．．．．． | 653－72 | $94 \not 3 \times 67$ | $54-60$ | 54－62 | $62-75$ | $62-77$ |  | $72 \%-78$ | $55-76$ | $58-69$ |  | $77^{1 / 8}-54 \%$ | ， |
| Wells，Fargo \＆Co． 9－1rust，ins \＆c Sh＇s | 67－70 | 54－70 | 54－671／4 | 65－70 | 64－68 | $64-68$ | $64-70 y$ | $65 \not / 2-68$ | $54-66$ |  |  |  | 옹 |
| Central Am．Transit． |  |  |  | 17． 17 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Home Insurance．．．． |  |  |  |  | $121-121$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| United States |  |  | 110 －110 | 111 |  | $10 \mathrm{~S}-108$ | 160－1 |  |  | 112 －12 |  |  | $\infty$ |

COURSE OF TIIE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE BOARD FOR 1863.



## DALLY PRICES OF GOLD AT NEW YORK HOR SEVEN YEARS．

The tables which follow exhibit a concise review of the Gold Market at New York，from the suspension of specie payments，at the close of 1861，to the close of the year 1868，embracing a period of seven years．From January 1，1862， and including June 20，1864，the prices are based on the daily sales at the New York Stock Exchange，from June 21， 1864，to December 31，1868，on the quotations at the Gold Room．This change of the sources of information was rendered necessary by the total cessation of sales at the Stock Board immediately after the passage of the Gold Bill in Congress，and the infrequency of sales thereat up to the present day．


1862．

| month． |  | Febrar |  |  |  | ， |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Molialay | 1031／2－10：31／2 | 10：23／8－1021／8 | 101z／8－10\％ | 1021／3－1021／4 | S． | 108\％ 5 －1093 | 115\％$\%$－115 $3 / 3$ | 1161／2－117 | $122-1233 / 6$ | 129\％－131近 | 1281／2－131 ${ }^{\text {c／}}$ |
| 1． |  |  | 10．3／8 | $102^{-102 \%}$ | 102144－102\％ | 1031／8－1035／8 | 1087／－1093／8 | $115-1151 /$ | 116／2－116\％ | 1223／－123 |  | $131-131)$ |
| 8 |  | 1093／8－1031／2 | $102-1023 / 6$ | 1013／2－1017／8 | 1021／3－1023／4 | 103\％－103\％ | 1091＞－1091／6 |  | 1173／4－118 | 1223／2－122\％／ | 1301／2－1811 | $131-132$ |
| 4 |  | 10332－103\％ | 10178－102 | 101）－1017／8 |  | 103\％－103\％ | Holiday． | 1145／8－115 | 1173／4－117\％／3 | 1223－123 | 1291／6－1311／3 | $133-134$ |
| 5 | S． | 1033／8－1031／2 | 102－102 | 101\％－102 | 1031／8－1033／4 | 103\％－104 | 109\％－109\％ | 11413－1143／4 | 11814－1191／6 |  | 131\％－1321／4 | 1811／2－1323／8 |
| 6 |  | 1033／2－1031／2 | $102-1021 / 3$ |  | 1025／8－1033／3 | $104-10413$ |  | 1145\％－1143／4 | 1183\％－1191／ | 1227／2－1241／6 | 1311／2－182 |  |
| 7 |  | 1033／2－1035／8 | 102－1021／3 | 1021／8－1021／6 | 1023／3－1023／4 | $104-1043$ | $110-1101 / 4$ | 114－$-1147 / 6$ |  | 123－1237／3 | 1311／2－132 |  |
|  |  | 1031／2－103\％ | 1013／4－1017／3 | 101－1021／6 | 1023年－103 | S． | 11114－1111／3 | 1125／－114 | 1183／－119\％ | 12414－1247／8 | 132－132\％ | 1313／2－1311 |
|  |  |  |  | 1013／2－1017／3 | 1031／8－1031／4 | 1041 4 －1043／3 | 11313－116\％ | 112\％－1127／3 | 1185\％－1187／8 | 125x－126\％ | 13． | $1325 / 2-133$ |
| 10 |  | 1035／8－1037／8 | $102-102$ | 1013／4－1017／3 | 1031／4－1033／8 | 1043／1043／3 | 115s／8－117\％ |  | 1185／8－1183／6 | 127x－129 | 1321／6－1331 | 1321／6－1321／2 |
| 11 |  | 103\％－104 | 1015／8－1013／4 | 1017\％－102 |  | 1033／8－1041／ | 1143／4－116 | 1123／1133／8 | 1183／－1187／6 | $128-12816$ | $131-132 \%$ | 1321／2－1321／4 |
| 12 |  | $104-1041 / 3$ | 1015／8－1015／8 | 1013／4－102 | 1033／103 $1 / 3$ | 1043／4－105 4 | 1137／8－1141／2 | 11313－1141 | 118\％－1183／4 | S． | 1311\％－132 | 131\％－131\％ |
| 18 | － | 1041／4－1043／2 | 1013／1011\％ |  | 1031／4－1033／3 | 1051／－1051\％ | 118\％ | 1143／8－114\％ | 118－118\％ | $129-129 \%$ | 1311\％－132 | 1311／2－132 |
|  | 1023／4－1031／4 | 1043／8－1045\％ | 1013／1015／8 | 1013／4－1017／8 | 10314－10314 | 105\％－105\％ | 1151／3－1163／3 | 115 $14-115 \%$ | 118 | $131-133$ | $131-132$ |  |
|  | 10212－1023／ |  | $101 \frac{1}{2}-101$ | 1013／2－1017／8 | 1031／3－163\％ | S． | 1163／－117 | 1143\％－115\％ | 1171／2－117\％／ | $132-1323 / 4$ | 131\％－132 | $1317 / 8-13214$ |
| 16 | 10214－1021／2 |  |  | 1015／8－1015／8 | $103-1031 / 2$ | 1061／2－1063／ | 1163／1174 | 114\％$\%$－114\％ | 1161／2－1173／4 | $132-1323$ |  | $132-1327 / 8$ |
| 17 | 1017／8－102 | 1033／4－1037／8 | 1011／2－1013 | $101 \times$－1015／8 | $103-103 / 1$ | 106－106\％ | 1173／4－1187／3 |  | 116\％－117\％ | $132-1321 /$ | $132-1321 / 4$ | 13214－138 |
| 18 | 1013／4－102 | 1033／8－1033／6 | 1013／8－101\％ | 1013－1013\％ | S． | 1053／8－105\％ | $119-119 \mathrm{x}$ | 1151／8－1151／4 | 116\％$\%$－116\％ | $130-1303$ | 1313／3－132 | 1321／8－1323／4 |
|  |  | 103－10315 | 10132－101\％ | 1013／2－101\％／3 | 1031／4－108 | $106-1065$ | 1181／4－1181／ | 1143／3－1151／ | 1167／8－117 | 120 | $130-131$ | 1321／4－1323／6 |
| 20 | 1021／1－102 | 10314－1033 | 101314－1013／8 | 101． | 10313－1033／3 | 1063／8－1065\％ | 118\％ | 115－1151／ | $1163 / 41171 / 8$ | 1285／8－1291／6 | 13014－1301／ | $132-1323 / 8$ |
| 21 | 1021／4－1021／ | 1031\％－1031／ | 1014－1013 | 1015／8－1015／3 | 10313－1031／ | 1063／8－1061／2 | 1193／4－120 | 1151／4－1157／3 |  | $1281 / 41293$ | 1301／2－130\％ |  |
| 22 | 1023／－1027\％ | $103-103$ |  | 1015／8－101\％ | 1031／－1035／3 |  | 1195／8－1201／8 | 1151／2－1161／ | 1171／6－1171／2 | 133－1331／ | 1301／8－1303／4 | 13214-1325/8 |
| 23. | 1033／－1033／4 | S． |  | 1015／8－1013／4 | 1033／2－1031／2 | 1063／－108 | $1198-1191$ | 1151\％－115\％／6 | $1173 /-1183 / 4$ | 1321／2－133 |  | $13213-1324$ |
|  | 1033\％－1031／2 | $103-1031 /$ | 10114－1013／8 | 10118－101\％／8 | 103\％－103\％ | $10811-1083 / 4$ | $117-1183$ | $\mathrm{S}^{\text {S }}$ | $118 \%-119$ | $131-132$ | $13018-1303 / 4$ | $132-1321 / 8$ |
|  | $103-103 / \frac{1}{4}$ | $103-1031 / 8$ | 1011／3－1013／ | 10136－1011／2 |  | $10813-1083 / 4$ | 1141／8－1161／3 | 11514－1159／4 | $120-1203 /$ | $130-1311 / 4$ | $1897 / 8-130$ | Christmas |
|  | 103 S． | $1027 / 8-1031 / 8$ $1021 / 1021$ | 10114－1013／3 | 1011／2－101\％／3 | $\begin{array}{ll}104 & -104 \\ 104 & -1041\end{array}$ | $1087 / 2-1091$ $1093 / 1093$ | $117-117 \%$ | $1151 /-1153 / 3$ | $1201 / 4-1201 /$ | $130{ }^{\text {S }}$－1314 | 12914-1291/2 | $\begin{aligned} & 1317 /-132 \\ & 1217 \end{aligned}$ |
|  | $103-1031$ $103 / 8-1033$ | $1021 / 1021 / 4$ $1021 / 8-1021 / 4$ | $1011 / 4-1013 / 4$ $1014 / 101 / 8$ | 1015／8－10 | $104-1041 / 3$ $1037 / 204$ | $1093 / 2-1091 / 2$ 109 | 1165／8－1175／ | 1151／2－115／ | 1219 $3 / 8-1213 / 6$ | $130-1311 / 4$ $1315 / 321 / 4$ | Thanksg＇g． | $1317 / 8-132 \%$ |
|  | 03141－1033 |  | 1013／2－101\％ | 1013／4－1013／4 | 1033／4－1037／3 | S． | 1153／4－1163 | $116{ }^{-116}$ | 1213／4－1231／3 | 131 $13-131 \%$ | $129-129 \frac{1}{4}$ | 1317／8－1323／6 |
|  | 10314－1031\％ |  |  | 102－102 | 1035\％－1035\％ | 1087／8－1091／4 | 1143／8－1153／8 | 115 \％／－115\％／4 | 121\％－124 | 1301／1303\％ | S． | 1325\％－133 |
| 21 | 1011／2－103\％／8 |  | 1013／8－1013／6 |  | 1031／2－1035／3 |  | 1141／2－1153／8 | S． |  | 1291／2－130 |  | 13314－1335／8 |
|  | 0．$-1083 / 4$ | 1021\％－1043／6 | 1011／5－1021／3 | 1011／3－1021发 | 102\％－1043／6 | 1031／2－1091／3 | 1083／6－1201\％ | 1121／2－1161／4 | 1161／2－124 | $122-1331 / 3$ | $129-1331 / 4$ | 1281／2－134 |

1863. 



| Febraary. S. | March. |
| :---: | :---: |
| 1563/159 | 1711/2-1713/ |
| 1541/2-1551/3 | $171-1713 / 6$ |
| $157-1581 / 2$ | $165-168$ |
| 1565/8-158 | $157-158$ |
| 1571/-1581/2 | $150-154$ |
| $156 \% / 8-157 \%$ | $\begin{gathered} 1543 / 4-1551 / 2 \\ \text { S. } \end{gathered}$ |
| 1541/2-1561/2 | 1553/4-1571/4 |
| 1521/8-153 | $160-163$ |
| 1521/2-1533/4 | 4577/-1581/2 |
| 1541/8-1541/2 | 1581/2-1601/ |
| 155 $1 / 2-156$ | $159-1611 / 4$ |
| $155 \frac{15}{15}-156$ | $1573 / 4-158 \%$ |
| 1557/8-1571/3 | 1541/2-1551/ |
| 15814-15914 | 154 $3^{1}-15514$ |
| 1601/2-162 | 1533/3-155 |
| 1611/2-164 | 1547/8-155\%/6 |
| 1621/2-1633/4 | 1541/2-155 |
| 162 -1631/2 | $1537 / 3-1547 / 8$ |
| 1631/3-1647/ | $151-1531 / 2$ |
| 1673/4-1711/3 | 1451/2-159 |
| 1711/2-173\% | 1391/8-141\% |
| 169\%-1721/8 | $139-14014$ |
| $1692 / 8-171$ | $140-1407 / 8$ |
| 171/8-1721/3 | 14216-1431/6 |
|  | 1441/4-1471/4 |
|  | 1481/2-150 |
| 1521/2-172\% | $139-171$ |


| April. |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| -15\%\% | 1503/4-151/3 | $146-1471 / 3$ | 1443/4-145 |
| $531 / 4 / 157$ | 1497/8-1501/8 | 1463/4-1471/2 | 143 $7 / 8-1441 / 3$ |
| $53-1531$ |  | $1463 / 4-1467 / 3$ | $144-144 \%$ |
| 543/1551 | 148 | $146-146 \%$ | liday. |
|  | 1481-151 |  |  |
| $1-15$ |  | 1451/8-1 | $138-1391 / 4$ |
| - -152 |  |  |  |
| 1451/2-147 | 1541/2-154 | $143-143$ | 13 |
| 1461/4.148 | $149-1501$ | 1421/8-1423/3 | 13 |
| 1461/2-149 |  | 1401/2-1407/6 |  |
| 1501/2-152 | 1481/2-149 | 1413/4-142 |  |
|  | 1481 149 | 14 |  |
| $157-157$ |  | 1 | 13114-131\% |
| $155-155$ | 1493/-150 |  |  |
| $152-154$ | 1493/3-150 | 1441/6-146 | 128 $7 / 8-1291$ |
| $152-153 \%$ | 1493/-150 | 1473/4-1483/3 | 126-126\% |
| $153^{1 /}$ - 153 |  | 145\%-1453/ | 1253/-126 |
| 1511/-15 | 1493/ $/-150$ | $1431 / 8-144$ |  |
|  | 1481\%-149, | $143-143$ |  |
| 1483/6-150 | 1485\%-149 | 1431/2-143 | 1231/4-1253/2 |
| $146-147$ | 1483/450 |  | $126-1273 / 2$ |
| 145s/-147 | 1483/-1493 | 1433/8 143 |  |
| 1483/8-150 | 148\%-149 | 1433/8-1431 |  |
| 1511/2-159 |  | 1431/2-144 | 1261/8-1261\% |
| $\mathrm{S}^{-154}$ | 1453/4-146 | 1443/2-145 |  |
|  | 1431/2-145 | 1443/4-145 |  |
| $50-153$ | 1435\%-1443 | $145-145$ | 127 |
| 1495/8-150 | 14312-1437 | S | 127312-1273/ |
| 150-150\% | 14432-145 | 14612-1471/2 |  |
| Nat'l F'ast. | $1447 / 8-145$ | 1461/8-1463/6 | $12734$ |
|  | S. |  |  |
| 451/8-157 | 1431 |  |  |



December.
Inne







|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Month．Jannary． | February | arch． | April． |  |  |  |  |  | Octoler． | Novemb＇r． |  |
| 1．．．．Holiday． | 1401／2－－ $10 \%$ | S． | $1881 / 3-1393 / 4$ | $1893 / 8-1395 / 8$ | $1393 / 4-1397 / 8$ | 1401／8－140 | $1443 / 4-14$ | $1445 / 8-145$ | $1391 / 2-1401 /$ | S． | $135-13514$ |
| 2．．．．13334 $-1331 / 8$ |  | 1407／2－1411／4 | 1373／4－1381／ | $1393 / 8-139 \% / 8$ | 1395\％－1401／8 | 140） 4 －140\％ |  | 1443／4－1451／3 | $1391<-140 \%$ | $133-1335 / 8$ | $1347 /-135$ |
| 3．．．．1335／8－134 | 1407\％1411／2 | 1107／8－1411／4 | 1373／－1：8 | S． | 13978－1401／ | 140ヶ4－140\％ | $145-1455 / 8$ | 1437／8－1445／8 | 139\％／140\％ | 13314－1333／4 | 1347／8－1514 |
| 4．．．．1337／6－1341／2 | 141\％－1413／4 | 1403／2－141 14 | 1381／2－1351／2 | 1391／2－1391／2 | 140 $-1401 / 8$ | Holiday． | 145 5\％－146\％ | 1433\％－1441／3 |  | $13315-1333 / 4$ | 1351／2－1353／4 |
|  | 1407／6－141 | $141-141 \frac{14}{4}$ |  | 13918 －1393／8 | 1393／4－140 | S． | 147 －1441／3 | 1441／4－1443／4 | 1397／8－1403／8 | 1323／8－1323／4 | 1353／8－1363／6 |
| 6．．．．1317／6－1351／2 | 1411／2－142 | $1411 / 6-14114$ $140 \%-141 / 3$ | $1373 / 2-135$ $1373 / 13$ | 1393\％－1393\％ | 1391／2－1397／8 | 14016－14613／6 | 14813／150 |  | 13936－1401／ | $132-13214$ |  |
| 136／22－1373／3 | 1428 ${ }^{14142 / 8}$ | 140：8－141／3 | $1373 / 21383 / 8$ $1381 / 8-1883 / 8$ | $189181893 / 2$ $139126-13978$ |  | $1401 / 2-141$ $14 / 5 / 141$ | $1473 / 8-1481 / 2$ 147 $-147 \%$ | $1443 / 4$ $14418-1441 / 2$ |  | $1333 / 4-1341 / 2$ | $\begin{aligned} & 155 / 8-13614 \\ & 135 / 6-1363 / 8 \end{aligned}$ |
| 9．．．．1355／6－3161／8 |  | 1893／4－1407／8 | $13>3 / 3-1383 / 2$ | 1395／8－140 | 1393／8－1397／8 | $140 \%$ \％－140\％ | $14 \%$－141／8 | 144\％\％－144\％ | 138\％－1393／4 | 1341／4－1343／4 | 1353／8 $-135 \%$ |
| 10．．．．137 1 － $1373 / 8$ | 1117 | 1393／－1403／3 | GdFriday |  | 1393／4－1397／8 | $1405 / 8-14078$ | 1461／2－14\％3／4 | 1443／8－1445／8 | 138\％－1387\％ | 1343／8－1353／4 | 1353／4－13613 |
| 11．．．．137\％－138\％ | 14173－1425／8 | 13913－13934 | 13816－133\％ | 1393／4－1401／2 | 1397／8－140 | $140-141$ 立 | 145s／8－1463／2 | 143\％／8－1441／8 | － | 1333／4－1813／8 | 135 5／8－1361／ |
|  | 14113／1413／4 | 139 $12-140 \% 6$ |  | 13938 －1393／4 | 1397／8－1401／6 |  | 14614\％－146\％／6 | $144-$－144\％ | 1371／4－138）4 | 1333／8－1343／2 |  |
| 13．．．．1381／2－1401／8 | 1403／8－1413／4 | 1391／6－140 | 1381／8－139 | 1395／8－1397／8 | 1397／8－140 | 1401／4－1417／8 | 1471／8－147\％ |  | 1371／2－138 | 1333／8－1333／4 |  |
| 14．．．．1407／2－1421／3 | $1333 / 3 / 1403 / 8$ | $1387 / 6-1393 / 8$ | 1385\％$/ 1387 / 8$ | 1893／3－14014 |  | 141 \％$/ 1421 / 8$ | $146 \%$－148 | 14358－1441／8 | 13634－1373／8 | 13434－135 | 1351／8－1351／2 |
| 16．．．．1391／8－1401／2 |  | 138） 6 －13？ |  |  | 140 $1403 / 2-1403 / 8$ | 1417／8－1425／8 | 146\％／4－1467／8 | 1193／4－1441／8 | 1375／3／－138132 |  | $\begin{aligned} & 1351 / 8-135 \% \\ & 135-135 \% \end{aligned}$ |
| 17．．．．1381／4－139 | 1407／8－1415／8 | $139-139 \frac{3}{3}$ | 1381／4－1385／8 |  | $1401 / 3141 \frac{1}{4}$ | $142{ }^{5} / 3-1131 / \frac{1}{4}$ | 1461／4－1471／4 | 1443／8－1443／8 | 1364／4－187／3 | 1341／4－136\％ | 1341／2－1351／8 |
| 15．．．．1381／6－1383／ | $1405 / 6-1411 / 4$ | 138Y－1387／8 | 1381／2－1383／2 | 13914－12912 | $140-1401 / 4$ | 14314－144 | 1457／8－146s\％ | 144388 －1443／4 | 1304－15：／2 | 1337／8－1351／4 | $1345 / 81351 / 4$ |
| 19．．．． 8 | 119 lad 141078 | 1384，－1383／4 | 130 | $13938-189 / 4$ | 140 $1 / 2-1407 / 8$ | 1－4 | 1447\％－1451／8 | 1441／8－144\％ | 1365／8－13714 | 1313－135 | $135-135$ |
| 20．．．．138 ${ }^{7 / 3}-1393 / 4$ | $140-1401 / 2$ | 13814－1383／4 | 13858－189 | 1395／8－1397／8 | $1401 / 8-1407 / 3$ | $143-1435 / 8$ | 143 ¢ 2 － $1447 / 3$ | S． | 1367／8－1373／8 | 1341／4－13978 | S |
| $21 . . .13883 / 4-13914$. | 146\％－1413／4 | 1383／8－1393／8 | 1283／4－1391／2 | 1393／4－1397／6 | S． | 1425／6－14314 | 14378－1443／4 | 1443／4－1143／6 | 136\％－136\％ | 1343／8－1343／6 | 1345／8－1351／2 |
| 22．．．．189－1393／4 | Holiday． |  | 1．931／2－1401／8 | 1397／－140 | 1401／8－1403／4 | $143-1433 / 8$ | 1437／8－144／2 | 1425\％－1431\％ | 1351／6－1357／6 | 13 S． | $135-1351 / 6$ |
| $23 . . .1393 / 2-1401 / 2$ |  | 1395／8－139 | 1397／8－1403／8 | 189\％\％－1397／8 | 140－1435／8 | 1431／8－1433／8 |  | 1423／4－14 1／5 | $185-136$ | $134-1343 / 4$ | 1313／6－135 |
| $24 . . .{ }^{140}{ }^{-1403 / 4}$ | 111 | 1377／r－1983／8 | $139-140$ |  | 1401／2－140\％ | 14314－143\％ | 1443／8－1451／2 | 1411／8－1423／8 | 134，$/ 8-135$ | 1313／2－134 | 1845／6－1751／6 |
| $25 . . . .189 \% 3 / 144 \% 1 / 6$ | 1413／4－1423／4 | 1381\％－13834 | 1383／4－1391／8 | 1397／6－140 | 1401／3－140\％ | 1431／8－143\％／8 | 1441／2－146 | 1：13\％－142 $1 / 2$ |  | 1341／2－1351／2 | Cbristmas． |
|  | 1411\％－1415／8 | 13815－1381\％ |  | 13973－1401／6 | $140-140 \%$ | ， | $144-145$ | 142；\％－142\％ | 1883／4－1345／8 | Thanksg＇g | 135 |
| $\text { 27. } \quad 1403 / 2-141$ | 1405／8－14118 | 1381／8－1385／8 | 1383／4－1393／4 | 13933／8－1401／5 | $140-1403 / 8$ | 1431／2－144 | 1443／8－1451／4 |  | 13413－1347\％ | $135-1357 / 8$ |  |
| 29．．．．1403／4－141 |  |  | 139 | 139去－139 |  | 1433／14－14 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 30．．． $140312-141$ |  | $138-1397 / 8$ | 1391／2－1391／2 | 139x－1393／4 | 1401／8－1403／8 | 1145／8－14514． |  | 141 $1 / 2-141 \%$ \％ | 194－134\％ | 1351／8－1353／6 | 13438－134／4 |
| 31．．．．14012．1405／8 |  | 1383／2－138，／4 |  | S |  | 1445／8－145 $1 / 4$ | 14i¢\％－145 |  | 1333／4－284 |  | 1345 |
| 1 |  | 1371／8－1411／4 | 137\％－1403／8 | 13．1／8－140\％／2 |  | 1／31451／4 | 1431／2－150 | 1411／8－1451／8 | 133\％／3－1401／2 | $132-137$ | 1343／8－1363／6 |
| The above table of daily prices show the following monthly changes： |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Statement exhibiting the range of prices monthly and yearly． |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| nuary． | February． | March． | ril． |  |  |  | st．Septe | er．Octol | Nover | Decem | Year． |
| 1862．1013／4－1033／4 | 1021／8－1043／4 | 1／8－10212 101 | 12－1021／4 1021 | $8-1041 / 8103$ | 10912 1083 | $-1203 / 8112$ | 161／4 1161／2 | $24 \quad 122-1$ | $31 / 2129-133$ | $1 / 412812-134$ | 1013／4－134 |
| 1863．1535\％－1603／ 1 | $1521 / 2-1721 / 213$ | －1713／4 145 | \％－1577／8 1433 | －1543／4 1401 | $-1483 / 81231 / 4$ | $-145 \quad 1221 / 8$ | 2934 1267／8－1 | 431／8 1403\％－1 | $563 / 4143-15$ | 1481／2－1523 | 1221／8－1721／2 |
| 1864． $15113 / 2-1593 / 8$ | $1571 / 2-161$ | －1693／4 166 | 1／4－1843／4 168 | －190 193 | －250 222 | $285 \quad 2311 / 2$ | 6134 $191-2$ | 51／2 189 －22 | $73 / 4210-260$ | 2123／4－241 | 15116－285 |
| 1865．1971／4－2343／8 | 1963／3－2163／4 1 | 81／2－201 143 | －15412 128 | 2－1451／8 135 | 14758 1383／8 | －14618 1401 | 14532 14258－1 | $45 \quad 1441 / 8-14$ | 9 1451／2－148 | $33 / 41441 / 2-1481$ | 1281／2－2343／8 |
| 1866．1363／4－1443／4 | 1453／4－1495\％ 12 | $47 / 8-1361 / 2125$ | $-12912$ | \％－1411／2 137 | $1673 / 4147$ | －15534 1463 | 521／6 14312\％－1 | 471／8 1451／2－ | $43 / 81371 / 2-1$ | \％1311／4－14 | 1247／8－1673／4 |
| 1867．1321／6－1377／8 | 1351／8－1403／813 | $358-1403 / 8132$ | －14156 135 | $-1387 / 813$ | 1383／4 138 | －140\％1397 | 421／2 141 | 463／8 1401／4 | $67 / 81377 / 8-1$ | $121321 / 2$ | ／／8 13218－146\％ |
| 1868． $1331 / 4 / 1421 / 4$ | 1393／4－144 | \％－1411／4 137 | 140\％ 139 | －1401／2 130 | 411／4 1401／8 | 1451／4 1431／2 | 50 1411／6－1 | 451／6 133\％－140 | 01／2 $132-13 \%$ | ＇，1343／8－13 | －132－150 |

FLUCTUATIONS IN BANK SHARES FOR 1867.
The following summary exhibits the monthly fluctuations in the price of bank shares sold at the New York Stock Exchange Board of Brokers in the year 1867

| Banks. | January. | February. | March. | April. | y. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| America. | 135-135 | 134-134 |  | 135-185 | 1372-1374 |
| American E | $115-115$ | $115-115 \frac{1}{4}$ | 115 -115 | 116-116 | 1121-113 |
| Batchers \& D | 125-125 |  |  |  |  |
| Cen'ral. | 102-110 | $109-111$ | 110-111 | 109:-110 | $1091-111$ |
| C |  | 140-140 |  |  |  |
| Oity |  |  |  |  |  |
| Commerce. | 1104-115 | 112-114 | $113-116$ | 112-115 | 114-119 |
| Commonwe | 106-106 | 104 $\frac{1}{2}-106$ | 103-106 | 105-106 |  |
| Continental | 100-102 | 101-104 | 103-104 | 102t-103 | 1031-104 |
| Corn Exchang |  |  | 119-119 | 11-\%-119 |  |
| Croton |  |  |  |  |  |
| Fourth | $102-1051$ | 1031-104 | 104-105 | 104-105 | $100-100$ $105-107$ |
| Hanove | 1088-108 |  | $110-110$ | 112-112 | $115-117^{*}$ |
| Importer | 112-113 | 112-113 | 112-113 | 1092-110 | 110-111 |
| Irving. |  |  |  | 104-104 |  |
| Leather Man |  |  |  |  | 130-130 |
| Manhattan |  |  |  | $135-135$ | 135-135 |
| Manufacturers \& Merch |  |  |  | ........ |  |
| Mechanics; | $116-116$ | $117-117$ |  | 117-117 | 118-118 |
| Merchants Banking As | $111-111$ | $110-111$ |  | 111-111 |  |
| Merchants' | 115-115 |  | 115-116 | 1141-115 | $116-116$ |
| Mechanics' Exchang | $108-103$ | 1054-105 ${ }^{\frac{1}{3}}$ |  |  | 1073-107\% |
| Metropolitan | 123-123 | 123-1243 | $123-126$ | $124-125$ | 125 ${ }^{\text {a }}$-125 ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |
| Nassau. |  |  |  |  |  |
| New rork | 116 -116 | 117-110 | 118-118 | 106-106 | $110-111$ |
| Ninth. |  |  |  |  |  |
| North Ame | 100-107 | 100-106 |  | 105-106 | 105-107 |
| Ocean |  | 1021-103 | 101-108 | 101-102 | 101-102 |
| Orien |  |  | 130-130 |  |  |
| Park. ${ }^{\text {Phem }}$ |  |  |  | 140-148 | 140-148 |
| Phwerix | 100-107 | 104-106 | 106-108 |  | 105-106 |
| Republic St. |  |  | 114-114 | 1142-115 | $115-115$ |
| St, Nicholas |  |  |  | 1051 ${ }^{\frac{1}{2}-107 \frac{1}{2}}$ | 110-110 |
| Shoe \& Leathe | 110-112 | 112-112 | 112-112 | 1i1i-112 | $110-111 \frac{1}{4}$ |
| State of New Y | 106-108 | 106-167 | 108-109 | 109-110 | 106-111 |
| Tenth .... |  |  |  |  |  |
| Union..... | 119 -119 | $115-116$ |  | 1i7-1i\% | $\begin{aligned} & 145-145 \\ & 117-117 \end{aligned}$ |
| Shares sold. | 2,461 | 1,929 | 8,425 | 3,518 | 4,051 |


105
1
1
1
1
$\vdots$
10
11
$\vdots$
10
$\vdots$
11
11
$i 2$
1
12
10
10
10
$i 42$
10
12
10

| 136 |
| :--- |
| 118 |
| 105 |
| 1 |
| 1 |
| 1 |
| 1 | …

$115-118$ $102-105$

$122-122$ 1 127 $126-126$ | $126-126$ |
| :--- |
| 106 | $101 \frac{1}{2}-106$

$101-104$ 1427-14. $103-106$
$120-120$ 108
$1081-1$
$110-1$ 103:-1034
$\frac{1 . . . . . .}{4.784}$


Angust. S
$140-140$
$1177^{2}-118$
September.
$118-119$ $\begin{array}{lll}118 & -119 & 115 \\ 115 & -119\end{array}$

 1i5-1i8 $\quad$ 1i8 $118, \quad$ i1 $6-1 i 7 \quad$ i17 $-117 \quad 119-1100^{2} \quad$ 118 -120



## 118 <br> 105

$$
\text { i } \quad \cdots \cdots .
$$



$$
\begin{array}{lll}
i & \cdots \cdots, \ldots & 118 \\
41 & \cdots \cdots \cdots & 119
\end{array}
$$

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\dot{0} & 113 \\
\dot{0} & 130
\end{array}
$$

| Banks．January． | Februa y． | March． | Aprll． | 1868. May． | June： | July． | August． | September， | Octobe | November． | Decenber． | $\cdots$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| America ．．．．．．．．．．．．．． $136-136$ |  |  | 142－142 |  | 145－145 |  |  |  | 145－145 | 144－145 |  | 0 |
| A erican Exchange ．．．．．．．．． 114 －115 | 118－121 | 1173－120 | 116－119 | 1178－119 | 1191－121 | 1201－121 | 120－121 | $120-121 \frac{1}{4}$ | 121－121 | 111：－113 | 113－1114 |  |
| Atlantic ${ }_{\text {colchers }}$ \＆Drove | 135－135 |  |  | 135－135 |  |  | $130-130$ | 103－103 |  |  |  |  |
| Central．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．ioi ioiot | $104-106$ | 107－106\％ | $105 \cdots 3107 \frac{1}{6}$ | 107t－109 | 1093－10 | $1051-10{ }^{10}$ | $107-1087$ | 108－109 | $109-110 \frac{1}{4}$ | ic9－1i0 | i05－1ii |  |
| Chstham ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． $190.10{ }^{\text {City }}$ |  | $186-185$ |  |  |  |  |  | 145－145 |  |  |  |  |
| City．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 114 190．19． 116 | 116－120 | $186-185$ $117-119$ | 118？－120 | 120）－125 | 1299－130 | 1227－125 | 1201－123\％ | 121－124 | 122－125 | 122\％－125 | 119 － 120 |  |
| Commonweaith．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 104 －104 | 109－169 | 108－108 | 109－109 |  | 115－115 |  |  | $115-116$ |  | $115-115$ | $115-115$ | 勿 |
| Contineutal ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．1021－103 | 100－103 | $182-103$ |  | 103－104 |  | 102\％－104 | 101－103 | 102－102 |  | 102－102 | 100－102 | c |
|  | 103－1043 | $126-126$ $104 i-105$ | $124-124$ $104-105$ | 1041－108 | 1042－110 | 104－105 | $126-127$ $104-105$ | 128－130 | $135-135$ $104 \frac{1}{8}-106$ | 184 $104 \frac{135}{3}-106$ | 6 | \％ |
| Fulton |  |  | ．．．．．． | ．．．．．．．． | 160－160 | ， |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Grocers |  |  |  |  |  |  | 110－110 |  |  |  |  | － |
| Innover． | $1121-112 t$ $118-122$ |  | 116－116 |  |  | 116－116 |  | 115－115 | 115－116 |  | 117 －117 | $\stackrel{7}{0}$ |
|  | 118－122 |  | $127-127$ $106 t-10 t$ | 129－129 | 132－132 | 127\％ $127 \frac{1}{1}$ | $\begin{array}{ll}127 & -128 \\ 110 & -110\end{array}$ | 1i3－113 | ．．．．．．．．．．．． | 131 117 -131 | 135－135 | \％ |
| Leather Mannfactur rs．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． |  |  | 106－10t | $200-200$ |  | 105\％．054 | 110－110 | 12－13 |  |  |  |  |
| Manhattan ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． $136-136$ |  | 142－142 |  |  | 145－145 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 感 |
| Mannfacturers \＆Merchasts．．100－100 | 102－103 | ．．．．．．．．． | 150－150 | ．．．．．．．．．．． |  | 100－100 |  | 1001－1C1 | 101－101 | 103－103 | 10 E）$-103_{1}$ |  |
|  |  | 115－115 | 150 116 －150 |  | 150－150 |  | 150－150 |  | ．．．．．．．．．．． |  | ．．．．．．．． | \％ |
| Mechanics．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． | 121－121 | 123－123 |  | 127－127 |  | $130-130$ | $129-129$ |  | ．．．．．．．．．． | $130-130$ |  | 裴 |
| Mechanics Banking Asso．．．．． |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 117－117 |  |
| Merchunt Me．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． $113-115$ | 114 <br> 107 <br> -1117 <br> 18 | $1: 8-12)$ $110-110$ | $119-125$ $111 \frac{1}{4}-112$ | ${ }^{1194^{2}-119 \frac{1}{2}}$ | 122－122 | $118-118$ 119 $-1: 0$ | 121－121 | 122－123 | 125－125 | 124！－127 | 125－125 | \％ |
| Merchants Exchange．．．．．．．．．${ }_{\text {Metropolitan }}$ ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． $126-128 \frac{1}{3}$ | 107 130 | 110 $1133-110$ | $111 \frac{1}{2}-112$ 135 | $114-120$ $136-1361$ |  | $119-1: 0$ $135-138$ | 138－1381 | $141-141$ | 14C）－142 | $141 \frac{1}{3}-142$ | 146－146 | \％ |
| Nas au．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． $10 ¢$ |  |  | 108－108 | 107－107 | ．．．．．．．． | ．．．．．．．．． | ．．．．．．．． | 107－107 | ．．．．．．．．． | 106－106 |  | d |
| National（Gal atin）．．．．．．．．． $10 \pm$－10．3 | 108－110 |  | ．．．．．．．．． | ．．．．．．．． |  |  | ．．．．．．． |  | ．．．．．．．．． | ．．．．．．．．． |  |  |
| New York．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．133－133 |  | 185－135 |  | ．．．．．．．．．．．． | 140－140 | 136－136 | 165－165 | 140－140 | ．．．．．．．．． | ．．．．．．．．．． | 140－140 | 병 |
| Ninth | 103i－104 | 104－105 | 1074 $\frac{1}{2}-105$ | 107－110 |  | 2071－110 | 1091－1091 |  | 11093－113 | ii1－i12 | $108-113$ | 怱 |
| Nirth America．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．105 ${ }^{\text {－105 }}$ | 104－107 | 107⿺𠃊⿳亠丷厂犬 | 106－107 | 110－110 | $111-111$ | ．．．．．． | ， | 108－109 |  |  | 110－110 |  |
| North |  | $102-10 \%$ |  | 112 1 － 1138 | 118 | $10^{-1} 110$ | 1078－109 | 108 | 1 |  | $111-111$ | 9 |
| Park．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 141 －143 | 143－150 | $148-150$ | 149150 | 15C－150 | 155－155 | 152－152 | 152－15\％ | $145-150$ | 151－152 | 252－154 | $147-154$ | $\infty$ |
| Phœ⿱㇒⿴囗⿱一一 | $104-105 \frac{1}{4}$ |  | 106107 |  | 118 | $104-10{ }^{\circ} \frac{1}{3}$ | 1072－107\％ | 106－108 | 108－108 ${ }^{\frac{1}{4}}$ | 109－110 | 108－108 |  |
| Repub ic ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． $111 \frac{1}{8}-112$ |  | 113－113 | 115 ${ }^{\frac{7}{4}-115 \frac{1}{2}}$ |  | 119－120 | $120-125$ | $120-125 \frac{1}{3}$ | 118－118 |  |  | $119-121_{\frac{3}{4}}$ |  |
| St．Nicholas ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． $106{ }^{-10}$ | $102-104$ | 103－108 | 106 ${ }^{\text {d }}$－107 | 107－107 |  | ．．．．．．．．． |  |  | 112－112 |  | 111－111 ${ }^{\text { }}$ |  |
|  | 111 $110-111$ -112 | 1121－112？ | $107-107$ $116-116$ | 116－117！ | 115－115 | $120-121$ | $112-112$ 121 | 120－120 |  |  |  |  |
| state of New York．．．．．．．．．．． 106 －106 | 112－112 | 1121－1131 | 115－117 | 112－114 | 118－118 | 118－121 |  |  | 121－121 |  | 1：1－1：27 |  |
| Tenth ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 102 －102 | 100－104 | $301-101 \frac{1}{4}$ | 101－102 | 105 $-105 \frac{1}{3}$ | 98－1051 | 97－100 | 1007－101 | $99-100$ \％ | 100－100 |  | 96－10 ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |  |
| Trade ${ }^{\text {men＇s }}$ | 137－137 | $135-135$ | 137－137 | 140－140 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Union．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 116 －116 | $118-118$ | 117－117 | 115 －115 |  |  | ．．．．．．．．． | ．．．．．．．． | ．．．．．．． | ．．．．．．．．． | ．．．．．．．． | $\cdots$ |  |
| Shares rold ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 8,718 | 4，951 | 2，979 | 2，532 | 2，253 | 1，659 | 8，586 | 2，332 | 2，188 | 2，383 | 2，315 | 17，12\％ | Or |

FOREIGN EXCHANGE AT NEW YORH, ON FRIDAY WEEKLY, 1867.


| London. Date, Commercial. | -London (Bankers')- |  | $\qquad$ <br> Long. Parls. Short |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Jan, 8.. $110-1101 / 8$ | 1103/2-1101/6 | 110/2-1105/8 | 5.133/4-5 125/6 | 5.113 -5. 10 |
| " $10 . .1097 / 2-110$ |  |  | 5.11 1 1 -5.10 | 5.133/4-5.123/2 |
| " 17. . 1083/2-10936 | 109x-1095\% | 1097/8-110 | $5171 / 2-5.15$ | $5.15-5.12 \%$ |
| " $24 . .1083 / 4-169$ |  | $110-1101 / 8$ | 5.1618-5.15 | 5.133/2-5.121/2 |
| " $31 . .1083 / 4-1091 / 4$ | 1093/-1097/6 | 1101/8-1103/8 | 5.155/3-5.143/8 | 5.131/8-5.117/8 |
| Fel). $7 . .108 \%$-1097\% | 1093/4-1097/ | 1101\%-1103\% | $5.15 \frac{18}{5}-5.143 / 8$ | 5.181/2-5.117\% |
| 14.. 1083/4-1091/4 | 1093/4- | 1091/8-11034 | 5.155/8-5.143/8 | 5.181/8-5.117/8 |
| 21.. .... | 109\%-110 | 1101/8-1103/8 | $5.15-5.133 / 4$ | 5.12\%-5.11\% |
| $1628 . .1083 / 4-109$ | 1093/4-1097/8 | 1101/2-1101/4 | $5.15-5.133 / 4$ | 5.121/2-5.111/4 |
| Marchs | 109x-109\% | 1193/4-110 | 5,17¢ $-5.161 / 4$ | $5.15-5.133 / 4$ |
| 13 | 1093/2-10913 | 1073/4-1097\% | 5.167/8-5.15 \% | 5.143/8-5.131/8 |
| 20 | 1095/8-1093/4 | $110-1101 / 3$ | 5.1614-5.155/8 | 5.133/4-5 131/8 |
| 27 | 1093/8-1093/6 | 1093/4-1097/8 | 5.171/2-5.161/4 | $5.15-5.133 / 4$ |
| Apr 13. | 1095/8-1093/4 | 310-110\% | 5.1614-5.15 | 5.133/4-5.121/2 |
| 10.. | 1093/4-1697\% | 1101/-11014 | $5.15-5.121 / 2$ | 5.121/2-5.11/4 |
| 17. | 1097/2-1101/2 | 11034-1103/8 | 5.131/8-5.121/2 | 5.105/8-5.10 |
| 24 |  | 110٪-110 | 5.131/8-5.123/2 | 5 5.105/8-5.10 |
| May 1 | $110-1101 / 3$ | 1103/23101 | 5.133/4-5.123/3 | 5.111/1-5.10 |
| * | 1101/8-1101/4 | 1101/2-1105/8 | 5.121/2-.... | 5. 10 |
| 15 | 110-1101/2 | 1103/8-110\% | 5.12 | 5.10 |
| " 22. | 1097/8-1101/8 | 11034-1105/8 | 5.133/4-5.121/2 | 5.111/4-5.10 |
| 27.. 1091/2- | 11018-1101/4 | 110\% $2110 \%$ | 5.231/2-5.121/3 | 5.1114-5.10 |
| June 6.. 110\%/8-110\%/4 | 110\%-110 \% | 109/2-110 | 5.131/8-5.121/2 | 5.11 1 -5. 10 |
| 12. | $110-1101 / 8$ | 1103/2-1101 | 5.133/4-o.121/2 | 5.113/2-5.10 |
| 19. | $110-1191 / 3$ | 1103/-110 | 5.13\%/5.123/2 | 5.111/4-5.10 |
| $25 .$. | $110-1101 / 8$ | 1103/2-110 1 | 5.133/4-5.121/2 | 5.1114-5.10 |
| July 3.. 1091/2-110 | 11014-1:03/3 | 1105\%-1103/4 | 5.131/6-5.123/2 | 5.10 $/ 8 / 5.10$ |
| "10.. 10918-110 | 110 $14.4103 / 8$ | 1105\%-1103/ | 5.131/8-5 121/2 | 5.100 -5.10 |
| "17.. 109 $1 / 2$-110 | 11034-1103/8 | 1105/8-1103/4 | 5.131/8-5.121/2 | 5. $10 \% 8-5.10$ |
| 424. | $1101 /$ | 110\%8 | 5.131/2-5.123/2 | 5.105/8-... |
| 31 | 1101/6-1101/4 | 1101/2-110\%/8 | 5 131/2-5.12\% |  |
| Aug. 7.. An....... $^{\text {a }}$ | $110-11014$ | 1103/-110\%/3 | $5.15-5.133 / 4$ | 5.12\% 2 -5.1114 |
| 14.. 1087/8-109 | 1093/8-1091\% | 1093/4-1097/3 | 5.171/2-5.1614 | $5.15-5.133 / 4$ |
| " $21 . .1087 / 8109$ | 1093/2-1093/8 | 1095\%-1093/4 | $5.17182-5.161 / 4$ | $5.15-5.133 / 4$ |
| is 28.. 108\%4-08\% | 109 - | 1093/8- | 5.183/4-5.173/2 | 5.161/4-5.15 |
| Sept. 4.. 1081/4-1081/2 | 10914-109\%/5 | 1095/8-1093/4 | 5.1614-5.15 | 5.123/4-5.121/2 |
| 11.. 1081/-1083/4 | 1091/3-10914 | 10918-1095/8 | 5.183/2-5.161/8 | $5.1612-5.143 / 8$ |
| " 18.. 1081/4-1081/2 | 1087/8-109 | 1091/4-1093/8 | 5.183/4-5.171/2 | 5.161415 .15 |
| 25.. $108-1083 / 8$ | $1885 / 8-108 \%$ | 109 - 10914 | 5.20-5.183/4 | 5.171/4-5.161/2 |
| Oct. 2.. $108-1083 / 8$ | 1085\%-1087/3 | :087/8-10934 | $5.20-5.183 / 4$ | 5.171/2-5.161/ |
| " 9.. 10e3/4-109 | 10918-10934 | 1091\%-109\% | 5.183/4-5.171/2 | 5.1614-5.15 |
| 16.. 1C9 -1091/2 | 10938-1091/2 | 1093/4-110 | 5.1713-5.16) ${ }^{1}$ | $5.15-5.133 / 4$ |
| 23.. | 1095/8-1093/4 | $110-110 \times$ | 5.161/4-5.15 | 5.133/4-5.121/2 |
| 30. | 1093/8-109\%/8 | 11016-1 $03 / 3$ | $5.15-5.133 / 4$ | $5.121 / 25.1134$ |
| Nov. 6.. $109.1091 / 2$ | 1093/4-110 | 1081/2-109 | 5.183/4-5.1614 | $5.15-5.183 / 4$ |
| ${ }^{4} 13 . .1093 / 2-110$ | 1091/4-1091/2 | 1095\%-1097/8 | $5.1713-5.161 / 4$ | 5,15 $-5.133^{3 / 4}$ |
| " 20. | 1093/8-1091/2 | 1093/3-110 | 5.171/2-5.161/2 | $5.15 \quad-5.133 / 4$ |
| 427 | 1091/2-109\% | 109\% -110 | 5.171/2-5.181/4 | $5.15-5.133 / 4$ |
| Dec. | 109-1091/4 | 10912\%-1093/4 | 5.183/4-1.173/2 | 5.161/4-5.15 |
| 11. | 1091/2-1095/8 | 1103/3 | 5.161/4-5.15 | 5.133/4-5.121/ |
| 18. | 10 3/8-1091/2 | 1103/8-1103/3 | 5.171/2-5.161/4 | $5.15-5.143 / 8$ |
| 24 | 109312-1098 | 1101/4-1103/3 | 5.1716-5.161/4 | 5.133/4-5.12\% |
| 31 | 1093-1093/8 | 1101/6-110/6/ | 5.161-1..... | 5.133/1- ${ }^{\text {a }}$. |

1868. 

Antwerp Continental Markets. 5.161/工-5.18\%/ Swiss, Hamburg, Ams'rdam. Frankf't. Bremen. Berlin,


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$\begin{array}{ll} & 5.20 \\ 1 / 2 & 5.20 \\ 3 / 8 & 5.20\end{array}$5.205.2
5.2$\begin{array}{ll}1 / 2 & 5.18 \\ 1 / 4 & 5.16 \\ 3 / 4 & 5.20\end{array}$$\begin{array}{ll}3 / 4 & 5.20 \\ 3 / 4 & 5.20 \\ 3 / 4 & 5.18 \\ 3 / 4 & 5.20\end{array}$5.1
5.2边:

## RANGE OF GOVERNMENT SECURITIES, 1868.

The following table will show the monthly range of Government securities, as represented by daily sales at the New York Stock Exchange Board, during the year 1868:

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | 1082/4 | 105y | 106 | $\begin{aligned} & 14 / 2 / \\ & 104 / 8 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 104 \% / \\ & 104 \% / 8 \end{aligned}$ | .... | $\begin{aligned} & 102 \\ & 101 / 6 \end{aligned}$ | 1043/ |
| First...... ${ }^{\text {Lowest.. }} 1083$ | $1081 / 2$ $108 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Highest... 1113/2 | 111\% | 111\% | 109\% | 110 | 108\% |  |  |  |  |
| ast .. 111臬 | 1111/3 | 1111 | 108\% | 109) ${ }^{1}$ | 1075/3 |  |  |  |  |
| First ..... 111\%/ | 111\%/4 | 1111 | 10946 | 110 | 1077/6 | 108 |  | 1041/2 | 107\% |
| owest . . 1103/ | 1101 | 110 | 107 | 1083 | 1063 | 1.67/8 |  | 1041 |  |
| Highest .. 1121 | 111\% | 1111/8 | 109 | 1101 |  | 108\% |  | 105 | 108 |
| Last ...... 1103/ | 1101 | 110 | 107 | 1083 |  | 106 |  |  | 105\% |
| Marc |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| First ..... 111 | 111 | 110 | 1073 | 108 | 1063 | 107 |  | 101 | 1053/6 |
| west... 110 | 1103 | 109 | 107 | 18 | 1061 | 106 |  |  |  |
| Highest .. 1113/4 | 111 | 1103 | 1083 | 109 | 107 | 107 |  | 101 | 106 |
| Last | 1107 | 1095 | 1077 | 1981 |  |  |  |  |  |
| April- |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| First ..... 111 | 111 | 1093/3 | 1075 | 107\% | 106\% | 107 |  | 100 | 1053/ |
| -west... 111 | 111 | 1093 | 10 | 107\% | 103/2 | 106 |  |  |  |
| Highest .. 11312 | 113 | 112 | 11 | 111 | 109 | 109 |  | 102\% | 107\% |
| st...... 1131* | 113 | 112\%/2 |  | 111 | 109 | 109 |  |  |  |
| First. | 113 | 10814 | 10 | 107 | 109 | 1093/8 |  | 1031/8 |  |
| Lowes | 113 | 1073 |  | 106 | 1037 | 109 |  |  |  |
| Highest . 115 | 1151/2 | 1113 | 10 | 109 | 111\% | 112 |  | 105 | 109\% |
| Last ...... 11 | 115 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | 111\% |  | 109 | 1113/4 | 112 |  |  |  |
| (rsest.... 116 | 11 | 111 | 109 | 110 | 1121 | 112 |  |  |  |
| Highest.. 118 | 113 | 113 | 111 | 1113 | 114\% | 114 | 110 |  | 11016 |
| Last | 1131 | 1131/2 | 110\% | 1111 | 1133/4 |  |  | 107 | 110 |
| July |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Lowest... 113 |  | 112 | 110 |  | 108 |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 107 \\ & 107 \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Highest... 115\% | 115 | 1143 | 1115 | 112 | 1093/ | 109 | 109 | 108\% | 1097/3 |
| Last...... 115\% | 1153 | 11 | 111 | 112 | 108\%/8 | 1091/8 | 1091发 | 108 | 1085\% |
| Aug |  |  |  | 11 |  | 109 | 109 |  |  |
| Lowest... 113 | 113 | 1131/8 | 108 | 110 | 107\% | 1071/3 | 10714 |  |  |
| Highes | 1151 | 115 | 1113 | 112 | 1091 | 1091/8 | 1093/8 | 1091/8 |  |
| Last | 114 | 114 | $109 \%$ | 1115 | 1081/2 | 108 | 108\% | 109 |  |
| Firs | 11 | 113 |  | 11 | 108 |  |  |  |  |
| Lowest... 1123 | 1133/2 | 1125 | 1 | 109 | 107\% | 107\% | 108 | 1043 |  |
| Highest.. 114\% | 114 | 1151\% | 1103 | 111 | 1091/3 | 1093 | 109 | 105\% |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Last ..... } 1121 \\ & \text { October- } \end{aligned}$ | 113) | 112\% | 109\% | 109 | 107\% |  | 108 | 104\% |  |
| First...... 113 | 112 |  | 110 |  |  | 109 |  | 104\% |  |
| Lowest... 113 | 1123 | 1121 | 110 | 109 | 1185 | 108 | 108 | 1043 |  |
| Highest .. 116313 | 115 | 1149 | 1125/8 | 112 | 1115/ | 111 | 112 | 106\% |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Last...... } 115 \% \\ & \text { Nov- } \end{aligned}$ | 114 | 113 | 111 | 112 |  |  | 111 | 106 |  |
| First...... 115 | 112 | 1093/6 | 108 |  | 110 | 110 | 110 | 106 |  |
| Lowest... 1121 | 112 | 106\% | 106 | 105 | 118 | 118 | 103 | 104 |  |
| Highest - 115 | 115 | 1133/2 | 1083 | 1083 | 110 | 111\% | 1107/8 | 106\% |  |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { ast. } \\ \text { Dec } \end{gathered}$ | 1147/ | 111 | 107 | 107 | 110 | 110 |  | 106 |  |
| First...... 11 | 1101 | 110\% | 1071 | 107 | 110 | 110\% | 110\% | 1051/2 |  |
| Lowest... 1143 | 1083 | 110 | 10612 | 1071 | 1091/2 | 1093/4 | 110 | 105 |  |
| Highest.. 115 | $1101 /$ | 1111/4 | $107 \%$ | 108 | 110\% | 111 | 111 | 105\% |  |
| Last. | 109 | 11 | 107 | 10 | 110\% | 111 | 111 | 1023/4 |  |
| rst ..... 10856 | 108\% | 1083/ | 10512 | 106 | 194 | 10 | 109 |  |  |
| 1083/ | 108\% | 106\% | 105\% | 105\% | 10 | 104 | 1073/4 | 103\% | 10 |
| ghest .. 118 | 115\% |  | 112 | 1125/2 | 1141/8 | 111 |  | 103 |  |
| ast...... 1143/4 | 109 | 1103 | 1073/2 | 107\% | 110\% | 1111 | 1113 | 1023/4 | 108 |

## speclal report on the revenue.

The third annual report of Mr. David A. Wells, the Special Commissioner of Revenue, is a valuable docament. It deserves, and will, no doubt, receive more attention from Congress than has been practically accorded to Mr. Wells' previous reports. A large part of this statistical document on the revenue is taken up with discussions about national development, irredeemable currency, the growth of wealth, the future financial policy, the refunding of the debt, the legalizing of coin contracts and the desirableness of allowing the banks to issue more notes than the 300 millions now allowed by law. The introduction of such extraneous matters into a revenue report, either extends it to an inordinate length, or else leads, as in the present case, to the omission and crowding out of facts and evidence which are of paramount importance.

The two great topics of Mr. Wells' report-the tariff and the internal revenue system-are treated with considerable ability. As to the first he protests against any further general increase of the customs duties. He would also enlarge the free list, reduce certain duties and increase a few others, with a view to increase the revenue. He would also convert the ad valorem rates into specific duties, and he would protect home industry by lightening the duties on imported material and appliances used in our manufactures.

The general views of Mr. Wells on the tariff are worthy of examination, and not the less so because they are more or less distasteful in both the hostile camps of protection and free trade. The nation during the past few years has rapidly learned to appreciate the effect of a universal and indiscriminate system of internal taxation in the enbancement of prices and in the restriction of production; but Mr. Wells declares the inevitable tendency which the adoption of a similar system of taxation under the tariff has to produce results corresponding and analogous. He illustrates his assertion by a reference to the fact that we have ruined the ship-building trade by excessive taxation, so that now "we can neither build, buy nor sell an American vessel." We cannot but think that Mr. Wells has somewhat overdrawn his picture, but the reasons he gives for the decadence of this branch of our industrial enterprises merit careful investigation, for they affect other departments of trade besides that of ship-building. These reasons are as follows:

[^6]whose interest it is that all these branches of industry should prosper, has likewise received no benesit, but rather detriment from the suspension or diversion of labor and capital from its previous employments. The same system, moreover, of checks and balances growing out of the indiscriminate and universal taxation under the tariff which we have thus shown to exist i, ship-building, has been also so far extended to every other branch of production, that if ships available for foreign trade were to-day furnished to hand, without cost, their use must be exceedingly limited, for the reason that the high prices of all domestic commodities would effectually prevent that exchange with foreign countries which in itself constitutes commerce."

As the tariff now stands, Mr. Wells believes that it is injurious and destructive, and denies that it affords to American industry that stimulus and protection which are claimed as its chief merit. He opposes, however, the advances asked in the bills now before Congress, because in his opinion they would not only aggravate the difficulties of the country, and impair the revenues of the Government. but would even hinder the return to specie payments. In behalf of these opinions Mr. Wells appeals to the true friends of American industry for countenance and support, predicting that if unnecessary and iniquitous burdens of taxation under the tariff continue to be laid upon the people, the day is not far distant when a reaction of public sentiment will compel either a sweeping reduction of duties, or induce through agitation such an unstability in legislation as will in itself prove most injurious and destructive. It is to be regretted that Mr . Wells has not entered upon some specific details of a tariff revision, but the precise changes required in his judgment he promises to lay down in an additional report, or personally to the Finance Commit. tees of Congress. As a bill proposing a change in the existing warehouse system is now pending before Congress, some recommendations in respect to this system are given in an a $a_{1}$ pendix.

Of the internal revenue system, Mr . Wells gives a much better account. Hy shews that since the taxes began to be levied, in 1863, more than 1,100 millions of dollars have been raised, and that "so long as the war continued and the demand for manufactured products-owing to the enormous consumption of the army and the withdrawal of labor from its accustomed avocations-was fully equal to, or in excess of supply, so long taxation under the internal revenue was not regarded by the majority of producers as at all oppressive; but on the contrary, by reckoning taxation in common with labor and material as an element of cost, and profit as a per centum on the whole, it was very generally the case that the aggregate profit of the producer was actually enhanced." With the close, of the war, however, a change came. The wheel of industry were clogged and the productive machinery of the country was deranged by the tax burden which had previ ously been scarcely felt. Congress interposed. Vexations, unproductive and needless taxes were taken off, to the amount of at least 170 millions a year. We have now so perfected
our system, that, as Mr. Wells justly observes, "it approximates closely to that which the experience of more than three quarters of a century in England has shown capable of yielding the most revenue at the least sacrific of the productive forces of the people.

As to the improvements of which our internal revenue system is capable, Mr. Well's statements are as vague and general as those about the tariff. He makes the remark that but little legislation is required to still further perfect the system. It should repeal the taxes now levied upon telegraph and express companies; upon the gross receipts of railroads, steamboats, and other common carriers for the transportation of passengers; and the percentage taxes on the sales of merchandise; the gross receipts from all of which is less than one-half the annual expenditures during the last two fiscal years for the equalization of bounties. When this shall have been accomplished, he says that the entire internal revenue system will have been made wholly subordinate to the more important end of creating national wealth; and under it no direct obstacle whatever will be imposed by the Government, which can prevent the domestic producer from placing his product upon the market at the lowest possible cost.

As to the effect produced on prices ky: repealing taxation-Mr. Wells tells us that "thus far the abaiement of prices consequant upon the large annual reduction of taxes has not been what pas anticipated, or what the large amount of revenue abandoned would seem to have warranted. In the case of not a few articles, 25 pig sron, manufactured lumber and salt, the prices since the removal of taxation have actually advanced, while in other instances, as in the case of agricultural implements, sewing-machines, hoop-skirts, manufactures of silk, newpapers, and, in fact most articles which are the products of monopolies created by patents, established custom or other circumstances, the repeal of the internal tax, through the maintenance of former price, has been only equivalent to legislating a bounty into the pockets of the producer." This confirmsthe general remark which has often been made by European political economists that prices adjust themselves slowly and with difficulty to changes which taxation introduces into the cost of production, but that generally the advance of prices when a new tax is imposed is instantaneous, while the fall of prices from the repeal of the tax is slower, being forecd down by the law of demand and supply.

## the new year iv europe.

The year 1869 opens to Europe the prospect, says the London Times, of a " most precarious peace." These words from the organ of the commercial classes of Great Britain, are, to be sure, less significant than the famous phrases addressed by the Emperor of the French to the Austrian Ambassador, at the Tuilleries, on New Year's Day, in 1859. Yet they are not to be lightly received. For, though a British journal, unlike a French emperor, can neither make nor break the peace whereof it speaks, there are so many threatening features in the present aspect of European affairs, that the Times could hardly boast very loudly of its prophetic wisdom were the summer of 1869 to justify, in a " blood-red blossom of war," the fears with which it tempers the holiday rejoicings of the winter.

The perils which overcast the immediate future of the world's peace may be divided into two great classes: the perils imminent in certain actual political crises, and the perils contingent upon certain highly possible political accidents. Of the first class, the most conspicuous where in the gpolitical.crissis through which Spain is now passing, and in the issue wheht bias attlast been boldy:taker"by tho:Turkish government with Greece. Qf the secoid class; the incosto important attach themselves to the pglitiga! sifuation infrance and in Germany. Let us consider each class in its turin ${ }^{\bullet} \cdot \cdots: \because$

The Spanish Revolution, which promised so much at its outset, has
 indeed been overthrown, and the Spanish people have been restored to a sort of centrol over their own affairs. But that control is after all imperfect; nor is there much in the history of the last two months to encourage the belief that were it as complete as it is incomplete, the Spanish people would be found capable of administering their own aftairs as judiciously or as successfully as many sanguine lovers of popular government were led by the events of last fall to anticipate. The protracted interregnum of the Provisional Government has only resulted, so far, in exasperating what began as a local rising in the most important of the Spanish colonies, into something very like a genuine revolution, and in damaging the republican cause by the opportunities it has given to violent and fanatical men of identifying the Republican party in Spain with aimless and disheartening outbreaks of popular violence. Whether this unsatisfactory state of affairs in Spain has been connived at or instigated by the Government of France, cannot be positively known. But it is certain that the Emperor Napoleon has gained by it, at least in respect to the strength of the hold which his system has
upon the French people, in virtue of the fact that it is their only real alternative from a French Republic. It is clear that Spain would long ere this have been settled upon a practicable basis of constitutional monarchy, had it not been for the difficulty of finding a satisfactory monarch. Now the French people are perfectly well aware that in this particular a revolution would leave France no better off than Spain now is. Neither the pretender of the elder French line, Henry V., commonly called the Count of Chambord, nor the Princes of the younger line of Orleans can be said to be any more popular with the people of France, than Don Cartos, Don Sebastian, Don Ferdinand, the Duke of Montpensier, or the Duke of Aosta have proved to be with the people of Spain. It may very well have seemed worth while to Napoleon III. to keep Spain for a few months in a condition of dangerous effervescence, for the purpose of impressing this lesson by example upon his own subjects. Be this as it may, however, there is a point beyond which it will neither be safe for Spain, for France nor for Europe that Spain should be allowed to go in the process of fermentation. That point, we judge, is nearly reached. And it is not by any means improbable that upon the failure of the Spanish plebiscitum (soon now to be taken) to settle the dynastic question for Spain, a system modelled upon the Napoleonic system, with General Prim at its head, may be sprung and fixed upon that country. This system might not and probably would not carry with it any guarantee of permanency for itself; but it would at least remove the Spanish question for the time from the list of the active disturbing forces in European politics. The strength of the Spanish army, and its apparent fidelity to its leaders conspires with the practical disiutegration of Spanish political parties, and the comparative weakness in Spain of those great material and social interests which are so powerful in more thoroughly modernized countries, to favor the success of any well-calculated step towards the establishment of such a system. We may theretore conclude the Spanish question to be less really and immediately dangerous to the peace of Europe than it might from a superficial observation of the state of affairs abroad be inferred to be.

The same thing, we are convinced, is true of the Eastern question, in its present shape. The Atlantic Cable has throbbed for weeks past with warlike mutterings from the Levant. The names of Syra, of Hobart Pasha, and of the Greek steamer Enosis, have been reiterated in the columns of the daily press till they have become at once as familiar to the eyes, as formidable to the fancy, and as vague of meaning to the minds of most people as once were the names of Duppel, and SchleswigHolstein, and the Duke of Augustenbourg. Once more, too, we have had the Emperor Napoleon coming forward with his political panacea of a

European conference; and these signs and wonders in the air are interpreted not unnaturally to signify the near approach of that long-dreaded grapple of the Moslem with the Christian in the East from which the politicians and the statesmen of the world have so long looked for the "beginning of the end" of the so-called "balance of power" in the Old World.

But the truth is, we think, that the decisive declaration by Turkey of her determination to exact of Greece a strict fulfilment of her international duties, even at the price of war, is more likely to abate than it is to aggravate the political dargers of the Eastern question.

Of all the greater European powers, Austria alone is just now in a condition to make the notion of a war on the Eastern question not absolutely disagreeable to her. And this not because Austria either desires war really, or feels herself equal to enduring a great war without a very serious strain upon her resources, but because Austria foresees clearly tho coming of a great collision between herself and Russia in the east of Europe, and, foreseeing this collision, may reasonably think the present as favorable a moment as she is likely in a long time to come upon, for confronting the peril. For at this moment Russia, for grave financial and social reasons, is greatly averse from war; nor can either of the other great powers be said to desire war. Prussia, upon which Russia leans as her ally, is just now in such a crisis of her German relations as would make it particularly vexatious for her to find herself dragged into a conflict in behalf of Russian aggrandizement against Austrian consolidation. England is too much intent upon strengthening her Indian frontiers towards the North, where, from her Himalayan fortresses, she descries afar off the advancing cross of St. Andrew and the green uniforms which fought at the Alma and at Inkermann, to be willing to see herself compelled to open the battle prematurely on the Levant and the Euxine also. France has the Suez canal on her hands, and the growing Prussian ascendancy to watch. Were the East to get into a blaze now, Austria might hope for something at least in the way of a reinforcement of her exposed position on the Lower Danube ; and Austria, therefore, may be reasonably supposed to have stimulated Turkey to the onergetic course which has just been taken by the Sublime Porte. But it will depend upon the other great powers whether the assertion of her rights by Turkey, backed by Austria, shall or shall not lead to a real conflict with Greece, and through that to a general European war. We have already shown why it is extremely unlikely that these other great powers, no matter what may be their feelings for or against either Turkey or Greece, should suffer such results to follow. And as such results can only be averted by a practical diplomatic defeat of the Greeks,
we may expect to see such a defeat. The aspirations of the "Hellenes" will be once more thwarted. The Cretan insurrection, extinguished in Crete, will not be suffered to be rekindled elsewhere.

If the actual political difficulties of the hour in Europe then are not so fuil of peril as the Times would have us believe them to be, can the same thing be said of the political contingencies of the year in Europe?

Hardly, we think. And this, in the first place, for the simple reason that they are contingencies. It may happen at any time that the Emperor of the French, now past his sixtieth year, sh uld cease to live. It is not very likely that while he lives he should cease to reign. But he ceasing to live, who can forecast the future of France, or of Europe? It has become fashionable of late to sneer at the political skill and genius of Napoleon III. But take him out of the way, and who will not do homage, if it be only the reluctant homage of fear and dismay, to the great qualities which have enabled him so long to master the French people and so brilliantly to illustrate the renown of France? In like manner, were Bismarck to be removed suddenly from his unfinished task of the unification of Germany nothing is more likely than that the French Government should avail itself of the opportunity to press upon and interrupt that task. This could not be done without setting Europe on fire.

Finally, then, we find in the chances upon which political confusion in Europe may supervene during the year 1869, a much more adequate ground for the justification of the alarm with which large numbers of practical people are looking forward to the coming twelvemonth, than is to be found in the actual condition either of Spain or of the Levantine countries.

## TIIE NEW YORK CENTRAL DIVIDND.

For some time past the stockholders of the New York Central Railroad Company have been promised a division of a certain large surplus of earnings said to exist in the hands of the Company. In three or four instances this promise, coming apparently from the management, has been made the occasion of extensive speculations, under which the stock has fluctuated between 115 and 135 ; and at last the dividend has come, exceeding the most sanguine expectations. Upon all outstanding stock, the holders receive a certificate equivalent to eighty per cent of the amount of their shares, and four per centin cash on the steck and on the certificates, making $\$ 720$ in cash, and eighty per cent in scrip. The dividend was made, with very singular precipitance, near midnight of Saturday last, and at the residence of one of the city directors. If we may believe all that is stated in well-informed circles, some millions of this scrip had been prepared in anticipation of the action of the Buard, and was taken by a leading director on account of himself and fricnds,
immediately upon the passage of the resolutions, to evade, it is presumed, any possible legal interruptions. Before daylight on Monday an injunction was served upon the Treasurer of the Company, restraining him from issuing the certificates; but the Treasurer is understood to have disregardea the prohibition upon the ground that the documents were being issued by the Union Trust Company, a function which we have reason to believe that Company disclaims. However this may be, the certificates have since been in process of issue from the hands of the Treasurer. An injunction was also issued a short time previous to the directors' meeting, restraining the direction from making any dividends upon the stock issued against convertible bonds; and the officers of the Company state that they intend to respect that order so far as to issue the scrip only against about $\$ 23,000,000$ of stock, until the injunction is settled. The scrip declares the holders to be entitled to the same dividends as may be paid upon the share capital, and conveys a claim to an equivalent amount of stock upon the Company obtaining authorization to issue it. In some quarters serious doubts are expressed as to the validity of this very peculiar form of scrip; the directors, we have reason to believe, however, have taken the best legal advice to assure themselves upon that point.

The scrip is said by the Board to represent surplus earlings invested in construction and real estate and the general appreciation of the property of the company. This pretense is the most marvellous feature of this extraordinary proceeding. It is very unexpected information to the public that the Central Company has had any important surplus for employment in construction or real estate; and the inquiry is very naturally made, where do these investments appear? So slight has been the surplus that money has repeatedly been borrowed for the payment of dividends, and the directors have represented to the Legislature that, without an increase of fare, they could earn nothing for the stockholders. The reports made to the State Engineer show that, after paying ordinary expenses and providing for interest and dividends, the surplus income for the last fourteen years aggregates only about $\$ 5,000,000$ which has been represented by additional issues of stock. To represent that the surplus income and the improved value of the Company's real estate warrant an increase of capital to the extent of $\$ 2,500,000$ is nothing short of anattempt to practice a bold deception upon the public. It was, however, necessary to make some show of reason for this extraordinary procedure; and this was, doubtless, deemed the one best celculated to serve the purposes of the direetors.

The real nccasion of the dividend is to be found in the speculative operations of parties associated with the management. It is a matter we 1 understood in the better informed circles of Wall street, that, some few months ago, a knot o capitalists, mostly in the direction combined for
the purchase of $\$ 7,000,000$ of the stock of the Company ; and in order to facilitate the purchase and the carrying of the stock, a loan was contracted with a Londun banking house upon the stock as collateral, the loan to run for two years, if necssary. The stock was systematically depressed previous to the purchase, and was bought at from 84 to 95 , averaging about 90 . In addition to this, a prominent director and his family have held a large amount of the stock from the inception of Mr. Vanderbilt's control ; and this clique operation served as a support to his man agement, the operators being pledged to his policy and basing their operation on a knowledge of his plan. The declaration of this dividend ia the consummation of the scheme. The clique realise about 60 per cent profit on $\$ 7,000,000$ of stock, or say $\$ 4,200,000$, and a family prominently con. nected with the road makes a still larger piofit. But how has it fared with the ordinary stockholders? At the time these gentlemen formed their magnificent scheme, the stockholders outside the "ring" were not only held in utter ignorance of the private plans of the directors, but the stock was systematically depreciated below its real value, so as to frighten them into selling to the directors and their friends.

This operation is a fair illustration of the manner in which directors speculate upon their exclusive knowledge of the affairs of corporations, to the injury of the non-official stockholders. Either the New York Central Company has had a much larger surplus income than appeared from its annual reports, and the present dividend fairly represents it, or the representations of surplus earnings are fictitious and the dividend is unwarranted. In the former case, the stockholders ought not to have had the prosperous condition of the road concealed from them, but should, in all justice, have been allowed a full knowledge of the facts necessary to properly estimate their stock; such information, however, would have prevented the stockholders from selling to the directors at low figures, and for that reason it was withheld. In the latter case, the public equally suffer from their ignorance of the affairs of the road; for they are quite likely to take from the directors and their friends the stock they have advanced to such high figures, upon the pretence of the extraordinary prosperity of the Company. While directors are permitted to monopolise information respecting the business of the roads, they are not to be expected, in the present condition of public morals, to avoid the temptation to practice upon the ignorance of the stockholders and the public. The only remedy is in the Legislature requiring each road to make a faithful return of earnings and expenses at least once a month. The New York Central company has confined itself to an annual statement; had it done justice to its stoskholders, by making a monthly return of its business, the stockholders would not have been taken by surprise with this extraordinary dividend. Unless some measures are adopted for terminating this official concealment, there is no possibility of the maintenance of public confidence in railroad securities.

The following statement of the movement of treasure at New York, showing the amounts received from California, foreign ports, and the interior, and the amounts shipped to foreign ports and to the interior monthly and yearly for the ten years ending December 31, 1868, also the amount in banks and the Sub-Treasury at the commencement and close of each month and year forms a complete history of the movement of treasure at this port for the period stated. It should be sfated, in explanation of the first and last columns, that ever since the issuing of gold certificates there has been a duplication of the treasure in banks and Sub-Treasury equal to the am unt of such certificates held by the banks, and by them accounted for as specie. The amount thus duplicated cannot be determined by their publishe returns.





## PUBLIC DEBT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Abstract statement, as appears from the books and Treasurer' returns in the Treasury Department, on the 1st of December, 1868, and 1st of January, 1869 : debt bearing coin interest.

| 5 per cent. bonds | December 1. $\$ 221,588,40000$ | January 1, '69. $\$ 221,589,30000$ | Increase. $\$ 9000$ | Decrease. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 6 " 1881.. | 283,627,300 00 | 283,677,400 00 | 10000 |  |
| $66^{(5-20 ' s)}$ | 1,602,570,400 00 | 1,602,563,650 00 |  | 1,750 00 |
| Total | 2,107,886,100 00 | 2,107,835,350 00 |  | 75000 |
| DEBT BEARING CURRENCY INTEREST. |  |  |  |  |
| 6 per ct. (RR.) bonds. | \$44,38\%,000 00 | \$50,097,000 00 | \$5,760,000 00 |  |
| 3 p . cent. certificates | 58,140,000 00 | $55,865,00000$ |  | 2,275,000 00 |
| Nayy Pen. F'd 3 p.c. | 14,010,000 00 | 14,000,000 60 |  | - |
| Total | 116,477,000 00 | 119,962,000 00 | $3,485,00000$ | \$....... |

MATURED DEBT NOT PRESENTED FOR PAYMENT.
7-30n.due Aug. 15,'67, J'e \&J'v 15, '63 $\$ 2,478,45000 \quad \$ 2,174,9 C 000$
$\$ 303,55000$
6p.c. comp. int. notes mat' d June 10,
July 15, Aug. 15 Oct. 15,Dec.1o, 1867,
May 15, A, g. 1 , sept. $1 \& 15$, and
Oct. 1 \& 16. 1868

| 4,224,920 00 | 3,878,290 00 |  | 346,630 00 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 256,000 00 | 256,0 000 |  |  |
| 149,361 64 | 148,561 64 |  | 80000 |
| 435,500 00 | 349,950 00 |  | 85,850 00 |
| 445,492 00 | 445,49200 | ... ....... |  |
| 243,160 00 | 197,310 00 | .......... | 45,850 00 |
| 13,000 00 | 13,000 00 |  |  |
| 8,245,583 64 | 7,463,503 64 |  | \$782,380 00 | DEBT BEARING NO INTERYST.


| United States notes | \$356,03!,073 00 | \$356, 021,073 00 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Fractional currency | 33,875,268 17 | 34,215,715 64 | 340,447 47 |  |
| Gold certi. of deposit | 23,255,840 00 | 27,086,020 00 | 3,780,180 00 |  |
| T | $413,152,18117$ | 417,272,808 64 | 4,120,627 47 | \$....... |
|  | RECAPITULATION. |  |  |  |
| Bearing coin interes | 2,107,836,100 00 | 2,107,835,350 00 |  | 75000 |
| Bearingcur'yinteres | 116.477,00000 | 119,962,000 00 | 3,485,000 00 |  |
| Matured debi ..... | 8,245 88364 | 7,463,503 64 |  | 782,380 00 |
| Bearing no interest | 413,152,181 17 | 417,272,808 64 | 4,120,627 47 | .... ... |
| Aggregate | 2,645,711,164 81 | 2,652,533,662 28 | 6,822,497 47 |  |
| Coin \& cur. in Treas | 106,679,820 67 | 111,826,461 03 | 5,247,140 36 | ....... .. |
| Debt less coin and currency......... $2,539,031,844142,540,707,201251,675,35711$ |  |  |  | - . |

The following statement shows the amount of coin and currency separately at the dates in the foregoing table:

COIN AND CURRENCY IN TREASURY.

The annual interest payable on the debt, as existing December 1, 1868, and January 1,1869, exclusive of interest on the compound interest notes), compares as follows:

| Coin-5 per cents. | December 1. | January 1. | Increase. $\$ 4500$ | Decrease |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | \$11.079,420 00 | \$11,079,465 00 |  | \$........ |
| " 6 1881. | 17,020,638 00 | 17,020,644 00 | 600 |  |
| " 6 " (5-20's) | 96,154,2.4 00 | 96,154,119 00 | ........... | 10500 |
| Total coin interest | \$124 254,282 00 | \$124,254,228 00 |  | \$54 00 |
| Currency - 6 per cents | \$2,660,220 00 | \$3,005,820 00 | 345,600 00 |  |
| 3 | 2,164.200 00 | 2,69, ,950 60 |  | 68,250 00 |
| Total eurrency inter't. | \$4,824,420 00 | \$5,101,770 00 | \$277,350 00 | \$. |

## SENATOR MORTON'S FINANCE BILL.

Senator Morton introduced the following important bill on finances in the Senate on the 14th instant. embodying his views with reference to the resumption of specie payments. The following is the bill in full :
A Bill to provide for the Redemption in Coin of the United States Notes and
Fractional Currency, and requiring the National Banks to Redeem their Notes in Coin Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled :
Sketion 1. That hereafter there shall be no sales of gold belonging to the Treasury of the United States, and that the surplus gold now in the Treasury, and that which may hereafter accrue, over and above the amount required to pay the interest on the public debt, and for other specific uses specified by law, shall be reserved and set a part for the redemption of United States notes and fractional currency.

Sec. 2. Be it further enacted, That on and after the 1st day of Julv, 1870, the Treasury of th United States shall pay in coin at the Ireasury of the United States, at Washington, aud at such other points as may be designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, all United States notes and fractional currency that may be presented for redemption.
Sec. 3. That no and after the 1st day of January, 1872, the national banks shall pay in coin such of their notes as may be presented for redemption, and shall, on and after the jst of July. 1870, reserve and hold in their vaults all the coin which may be received by them as interest on their stock held by the government for the redemp tion of their notes.

Sec. 4. That until the first of Jan., 1872, at which time they are required to begin the redemption of their notes, the national banks shall keep and hold in their vaults the full reserve of legal tender notes as now required by law ; and that on and after that time the reserve legal tender notes, as fast as withdrawn, shall be repla ed with coin to a like amount; and the said banks shall thereafter be required to hold their reserve in coiu to a like amount, and for the same purpose as now required by law, to be he!d in legal ten er notes ; provided that the Comptroiler of the Currency may, with the assent of the Secretary of the Treasury, allow the said banks to hald a portion of the said reserve, not exceeding two-fifths of tie said amount required by law in United States notes.

Seo. 5. That the Secretary of the Treasury may cause as many of the United Ststes notes, redeemed under the provi ions of this act, to be cancelled, as may in his ja gment be necessary to the proper liwitation of the currency ; provided, further, that all fractional currency that may be redeemed shall be cancelled.

## debt of virginia.

A statement of the public debt of Virginia, November 1, 1868, lately published by the Treasurer of Virginia, shows the following: Total old registered and coupon debt, \$32,808,032.


## COMMERCIAL CHRONICLE AND REVIEW.

Course of Monetary affairs-The Stock Market-Bonds sold at the New York Stock Exchange - Gove nmen Securities-Course of Consols and American Securities at London-Highest and Lowest Prices ot Railway and Miseellaneous Securities-General Movement of Coin ard Bullion at New York - Course of Gold at New York-Course of Foreign Exchange at New York.

The course of monetary affairs, during December, has been, in some respects, very unusual. The artificial stringency in money during November interfered with the forwarding of produce from the interior, postponing the movement to a period about a month later. The result has been that money has been flowing to Chicago, Cincinnati and other Western cities, until late in December, for moving the hog crop, while at the same time, the high price and the fair receipts of cotton bave induced a very active demand for cursency from the South, so that the slipments to that section have been much larger than at the same period of last year. Hence the city banks have been parting with large amounts of currency at a time wh n it usually begins to flow back into their vaults, and at the close of the year they held only $\$ 48,000,000$ of legal tenders, against $\$ 2,000,000$ at the same period of 1867 , and $\$ 65,000,000$ in 1868 . On the 4 th of $J$ anuary they were required to make their quarterly statement, and the preparations for that return, under the circumstances indicated, were saturally atterded with considerable calling in of loans and a momentary curtailment of loaning facilities. The result of this conjuncture of unfavorable circumstances was to make borrowers almost wholly dependent upon street lenders; who, as usual under such conditions, exacted extravagant rates of interest for several days before the close of the month, call loans ranging from 7 per cent in gold to that rate with a cemmission of $\frac{1}{8} @ \frac{1}{4}$ per cent. This condition of affairs has added another to the numerous crises growing out of the present system of periodical bank statements and the lack of elasticity in our currency system. These evils, however, have new become so chronic that their regular recurrence scarcely excites remark. The periods at which they occur are indeed welcomed by a class of speculators who make them the occasion of locking up money to promote stock ventures, or turn them to account by exacting usurious rates of interes. Needy bcrrowers have been driven to every conceivable expedient for raising money. Unab'e to obtain currency, they bave pledged ther collaterals against gold, which they bave sold, taking the risk of being able to buy it back again at the same price. Some capitalists have loaned their currency upon gold at full legal interest ard a heavy commi sion, and have again loaned the gold so received upon stocks at 7 per cent, thus making 14 per cent an I a brokerage charge of $\frac{1}{8} @ \frac{1}{4}$ per cent. Banking arrangements which tend to produce such a condition of things as this, surely call for prompt revision.

The stock market has sympathized less with the stringency of money than might have been expected. Brokers have become accustomed to these periodical crises, and provide against them in anticipation by time loans, so that the only parties to suffer are the smaller holders dependent upon marging, whose sales have comparatively little effect upon prices. The declaration of a special divi-
dend upon New York Central, putting up the price to 160, and considerations affecting favorably sone other leading stocks, have had a tendency to strengthen the whole market, and some shares have realized unusually high figures, in spite of the adverse influence of the loan market. Tle amount of ordinary transactions in stecks has been quite limited, but a considerable extent of busine $s$ has been done in the way of "turning" stocks-that is selling for immediate delivery-in order to get money, and buying them in again deliverable next day, or at the buyer's option. The total sales at both toards, for the month, were $1,093,730$ shares, against $1,76,721$ in December, 1867. The total transactions for the year at the two boards have been 19,713,402 shares, against $21,271,036$ in 1867 , showing a material falling off in this branch of speculation.


United States oonds have not exbibited the bunyancy that usually characterizes the market in December. The customary advance just previous to the maturing of the January interest has not occurred; nor has the anticipation of the large demand in January for the employment of dividends and interest had its usual effect in stimulating speculative purchaces. The stringency of money has been unfavorable to these movements, while it has prevented the banks and financial institutions from buying for the employmont of their balances during the ease which usually sets in during January. From these causes prices closed at near the opening figures of the month. The total transactions of the month, of all classes of bonds, amount to $\$ 20,060,550$, against $\$ 13,5 \varepsilon 9,050$ for the same month of 1867 ; for the whole year, the sales aggregate $\$ 245,245,240$, against $\$ 206,980,430$ in 1867.
bonds sold at the N. Y. stoce exchange board.


The daily closing prices of the principal Government securities at the New York Stock Exchange Board in the month of December, as represented by the latest saie officially reported, are shown in the following statement:
prices of government seguritibs at new york.

| Day | $\sim^{6 \prime} \mathrm{~s}, 1881 . \sim$ |  | b's, (5.20 yr |  | Coupon |  | -5's.10-4* |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| month. | Coup. Reg. | 186 | 1863 | $18 t 5$. |  | S67 | rs |  |
|  |  | 1107/8 | 10734 | 10744 | 110 | 1101/8 | 110\% | 2/2 |
|  | 1147\% 1101/8 | 1103/4 |  | 107\% | 11044 | 110\% | 111158 | \% |
|  | 1147/8 1101/8 | 11134 | 107/2 | 107\% | 1:0\% | 110\% | 111 | 10 |
|  | 115 | $1113 /$ | 107\% | 1081/8 | 1113 | 110\% |  |  |
|  |  | 111\%8 | 10\%\% |  | 1114/4 | 110\%88 |  |  |
| 8 |  | 111 |  | 108\% | 1103/8 | 110\% |  | 105\% |
|  | 1143/6 110 | 1111/8 | 107\% | 107\%/8 | 110\% | 110\% | 1103/6 | 105\% |


| Day |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| mon | Coup． | Reg． | 1862. | 1864. | 1865. | ， | － | $\square$ | C＇pn． |
|  | 1147／8 |  | 111 | 107 | 108 | 1103／8 | $1101 / 4$ | $1103 / 4$ |  |
| 11 |  |  | 1103／4 | 107 | 107\％／8 | 110\％ | 110\％ |  |  |
| 12 |  | 1095／8 | 1105／8 | 107 | 107\％ | 110 | 1101／8 | 110\％\％ |  |
| $14$ |  |  | 1103／8 | 107 | 107\％8 | 110 | 1097／8 | 1103／8 | 10514 |
| 15 | 1143／6 |  | 110\％ |  | 1073／4 |  | 110 | 110\％ | 1053／3 |
|  | 1143／4 | 1093／4 | 1103／4 | 107／6 | 1077／8 | 1101／4 | 110） |  | 1053／8 |
| 17 | 114\％／8 | 1031／2 | 11114 | 106\％ | 107／8 |  | 110 | 1103／8 | 1051／4 |
| 18 | 1141／2 |  | 11034 | 1063／2 |  | 109\％ | 109\％／4 |  |  |
| 19 | 1143／8 | 10；3／8 | 1103／8 | $2063 / 8$ | 1073／8 | 1093／4 | 1093／4 | 1101／2 | 105 |
| 21 | 1143／8 |  | 1103 | 106\％${ }^{1}$ | 107\％ |  | 110\％ |  | 1053／8 |
| 2 | 1143／8 |  | 1103／4 | 1063／4 |  | 1101／8 | 110\％ | 11034 | 1053／8 |
| 23 | 1141／8 |  | 110 | 10614 | 1071／8 | 1093／4 | 310 | 110\％ |  |
| 2 |  | 109 | 1101／8 |  | …․ | 109\％ | 1097／ | 10／8 | 1051／\％ |
|  |  |  |  |  | ristmas |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | $109{ }^{109}$ |  |  | $10{ }^{3 / 8}$ |  |  |  | 1051／6 |
| 29 | $114 \%$ |  | $1101 / 2$ | 1078 | 107\％／4 | 1103／2 | 111 ${ }^{1 / 4}$ | 1111 | 11053／8 |
| 3 | 1143年 |  | 110\％\％ |  |  | 110\％ | 1113 | 1111／8 | 105\％ |
|  |  | 109 | 1103／4 | 1073／4 |  | 110\％ | 111年 | 111\％ |  |
| Fi | 1147／8 | 1101／8 | 1107／8 | 1073／4 | 10714 | 110 | 1101／6 | 1101／2 | 1051 |
| Low | 1141／8 | 1083 | 110 | 1063／4 | 10：3／8 | 1093／4 | 1093／ |  |  |
| High | 115 | $1101 / 3$ | $1113 / 8$ |  | $1081 / 8$ |  |  |  | 578 |
|  | 1143／4 | $109^{13 / 8}$ | 110\％／4 | 13／8 | ${ }_{107}^{1 / 4}$ | $111 \%$ | 111／8 | $138$ |  |

COURSE OF CONSOLS AND AMERICAN SECURITIES AT LONDON．

| Date． | $\begin{gathered} \text { Cons } \\ \text { for } \\ \text { mon. } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Am.s } \\ & \text { U.S. } \\ & 5-20 \mathrm{~S} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { securi } \\ & \text { Ill.C. } \\ & \text { sh's. } \end{aligned}$ | Erie shis． | Date． | $\left\|\begin{array}{c} \text { Cons } \\ \text { for } \\ \text { mon. } \end{array}\right\|$ | $\begin{aligned} & A m . \\ & \text { U.S. } \\ & 5-20 \mathrm{~s} \end{aligned}$ | ill.C. |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Tu＇sday | 925／8 | 745／8 | 96 | 27 | Tuesday ．．．． 22 | 9214 | 741／8 | 951／2 | 253／4 |
| Wednesda | 923／4 | $745 / 8$ | 96 | $\because 7$ | Wednesday．．．． 23 | $923 / 8$ | 7436 | $95 \frac{12}{3}$ | 261／2 |
| Tuursday | $9<1 / 2$ | 745 | 963／4 | 263／4 | Thursday ．．．．． 24 | 921／4 | 71181 | 95年 | 26\％ |
| Friday | 92\％ | 743 \％ | 963／4 | 2634 | Friday ．．．．．． 25 |  | Chris | tmas |  |
| Saturday | $423 / 8$ | 7438 | $963 / 4$ | $25 \%$ | Saturday．．．． 26 |  |  |  |  |
| Mond y | 9：1／4 | $74 \%$ | 96 | 25 | Mondry ．．．．．．．． 28 | 9214 | 7414 | 95 | $261 / 2$ |
| Tuesday | $9: 3 / 8$ | $743 / 2$ | $961 / 4$ | $2{ }^{6}$ | Tuesday ．．．．．． 29 | 923／8 | 7456 | 95 | 26\％ |
| Wedney | 923／3 | $743 / 2$ | $961 / 4$ | 263／4 | Weduesday．．． 30 | 92\％ | 7458 | $95 \%$ | 2614 |
| Thurs | 9214 | $74 \%$ | 961／4 | 26 | Thursday ．．．． 3 | $923 / 8$ | 745\％ | 951／4 | 2614 |
| Friday． | 9：3 ${ }^{4}$ | 743／4 | 3614 | 2614 |  |  |  | －－ |  |
| ＊atu day | $2{ }^{124}$ | $713 / 8$ | 96143 | 263／4 | Lowest． | 921／8 | $741{ }^{\text {\％}}$ | 95 | 25 |
| Monday | $9.3 / 8$ | 741－1 | $953 / 4$ | $27^{\circ}$ | Highest | 923／4 | 743／4 | 963／4 | 271／2 |
| Tu sday． | 9223／3 | 74\％ | $9{ }^{6}$ | 27 | Range． | 5／8 | $\%$ | 134 | 21／2 |
| Wednesday | 923／8 | $74 \%_{2}$ | 961／4 | 2713 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Thursday | 9234 | 745 | 96 | 2714 |  | 9178 |  | 843／4 |  |
| Frray．． | 8 22 | 7458 | $961 / 4$ | 2714 |  | 961／2 | 75 |  | 501／8 |
| Saturday | 3 921／8 | 7415 | 953／4 | 26\％ | Rng | 45\％ | $47 / 8$ | $171 / 4$ | $263 / 8$ |
| Mondar | $1{ }^{1} 90$ | 74112 | 951／4 | 25\％ | Last． | $923 / 8$ | 74\％ | 951／4 | 261／4 |

The closing prices of Five－T＇wenties at Frankfort in each week endi $g$ with Friday，were as follows ：
Dec． 4.
$743 / 8979$／2
Dec． 11
$753 / 4$
Dec． 18.
$783 / 4$
Dec 25.
Christmas
＇Month． 783＠791／2

The following table will how the opening，highest，lowest and closing prices of all the railway and miscellaneous securities quoted at the New Yor＇z Stock Exchange during the months of November and December，1868：


| Dabuque \& Sioux city |  | .... | .... |  | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| o do pr |  |  |  | $\cdots$ | 96 | 96 | 96 | 96 |
|  |  | 54 | 35\% | 40 | 3914 | 41 | 371/4 | 383/4 |
| do pref | 65 | 65 | 59 | 60 | 60 | 65 | $60^{-}$ | 65 |
| Harlem |  |  |  | .... | 125 | 128 | 120 | 125 |
| do pref |  |  |  |  | 1201/8 | 1201/8 | $121 / 8$ | 1201/6 |
| Hannibal \& St. Joseph | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 91 | 90 | 90 |
| do do pre | 99 | 921/2 | 86 | 92\% | $9.11 / 2$ | 931/2 | 911 | 90 |
| Hudson River | 18712 | 138 | 120 | 131 | 132 | 1351/4 | 1241/2 | 13514 |
| do do scrio | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 93 | 93 | 40 | $93{ }^{\text {a }}$ |
| Illinois Central | 144 | 144 | 141 | 1431/4 | 144 | 14412 | 140 | 140 |
| Ind. \& Cin innati |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Joliet \& hicago. | 95 | 95 | 95 | i5 |  |  |  |  |
| Long Island...... |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Lake Shore | 993/4 | 100 | 96 | 160 | 100 | 101 | 95 |  |
| Mar. \& Cincin., 1 | 25 | 25 | 25 | 25 | 25 | 25 | 221/2 | 223/3 |
| Mickigan Central | 116 | 113 | 111 | 11712 | 11812 | 129 | 115 | 116 |
| do S. \& N. Ind | 85 | 97 | 80 | 8914 | 887\% | 891/2 | 843/6 | 871/4 |
| Milwaukee \& St. Paul | 95 | $971 \frac{1}{2}$ | 61 | 703/4 | $703 / 4$ | 703/4 | 63 | 69 |
| do do pr | 961/2 | 953/4 | 76 | 881/8 | 89 | 89 | 111/2 | $861 / 2$ |
| Morris \& Essex. |  |  |  |  | 90 | 95 | 85 | 87 |
| New Jersey | 134 | 134 | 1313/2 | 133 | 13312 | 1331/2 | 1323/4 | 133 |
| do Central | 1201/2 | 121 | 116 | 116 | 115 | 117 | 1103/4 | 115 |
| New York Central. | 1251/4 | 12914. | $1: 5$ | 1291/8 | 1281/4 | 159\% | 1233/4 | 159 |
| do \& N. Hav | 143 | 143 | 140 | 141 | 140 | 140 | 140 | 140 |
| Norwich \& Worcest | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 91 | 91 | 91 |  |
| Oil Creek \& Allegha |  |  |  |  | 81 | $801 / 4$ | 80 | 80 |
| Ohio \& Mississippi | $79^{30 / 8}$ | 8913/4 | 791/2 | 311/8 | 3114 | $347 / 8$ | 291/4 | $343 / 8$ |
| Panama ...... | 330 | 330 | 330 | 330 | 330 | 340 | 3271/2 | 340 |
| Pittsb., Ft. W. \& Chi | 1121/4 | 1131/2 | 1051/8 | 1117/8 | 1111/4 | 114 | 109 | 11:3/8 |
| Reading. | 97\% | 993/4 | 92 | 99\% | 981/2 | 981/2 | 961/2 | $98{ }^{18}$ |
| Renssalaer \& Saratogo |  |  |  |  | 93 | 93 | 93 | 93 |
| Rome \& Watertown. | 114 | $1: 4$ | 114 | 114 | 113 | 115 | 113 | 115 |
| Stonington | 85 | 85 | 85 | 85 | 83 | $8: 3$ | 83 | 83 |
| Toledo, Wab. \& Wester | $611 / 3$ | 62 | 54 | 583/4 | 58 | 59 | 531/2 | 59 |
| do do do pref. Miscellaneous | 7318 | 73142 | 70 | 71 | 7016 | 701/2 | 70 | 701/2 |
| Cumberland Coal | 35 | 41 | 34 | 401/8 | 391/2 | 391/2 | 36 | 36 |
| Del. \& Hud. Canal Coa | 130 | 1831/2 | 127 | 1327/8 | $13{ }^{1 / 2}$ | 134 | 130 | 1303/4 |
| Pennsylvania Coal | 220 | 220 | 220 | 220 |  |  |  |  |
| Npring Mountain Coal |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| At antic Mail.......... |  |  |  |  | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 |
| Pacific Mail | 124\% | 12436 | 112\% | 1183/8 | 118 | 1203/8 | 1111/2 | 1185/8 |
| Boston Water Pow | 151/2 | 15\% | 147/8 | 151/2 | 15 | 143/2 | $183 / 4$ | 133\% |
| Canton | 47 | 511/2 | 45122 | 51 | 5012 | 50\% | 47\% | 4934 |
| Brunswick Cit | 12 | 12 | 11 | 11 |  |  | 4,2 | 4,4 |
| Mariposa | $6 \frac{14}{4}$ | 614 | 6 | 6 | 51/2 | $51 / 2$ | 43/68 | 5 |
| do pre | 22\% | 2216 | 181/2 | 213/4 | 21 | $211 / 8$ | 19 | 20 |
| Quicksilver. | 221/2 | 23 | 20 | 231/2 | 233/2 | 233/4 | 507/8 | 23 |
| Manhattan Gas | 225 | 225 | 225 | 225 | 20 | 230 | 230 | 230 |
| West. Unıon Telegraph | 36 | $371 / 6$ | 331/4 | 37 | $365 / 8$ | 373/4 | 33 | $31 / 4$ |
| Bankers \& Brokers As |  |  |  |  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Express- |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| American. | 46 | 49 | 41 | 48 | 45 | 46 | 42 | 45 |
| American M. Union |  | -.. |  |  | 42 | 42 | 42 | 42 |
| Adams | 4914 | 50 | 46 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 48 | 481/2 |
| United States | 48 | 50 | 441/2 | 50 | 46 | 461/2 | 45 | 46 |
| Merchant's Union | 211/2 | 21/6 | 183/4 | $215 / 8$ | 181/2 | 181\% | 141/2 | 141/3 |
| Wells, Fargo \& Co. | 281/2 | 291/2 | 25 | 27 | 26 | 26\% | 25 | 25\% |

The following formula will show the movement of coin and bullion during the month of December, 1867 and 1868, respectively :


The gold premium has been on the whole steady，the price having ranged be－ tween $134 \frac{8}{8}$ and $136 \frac{3}{2}$ ，the highest figures having been reached under the early apprenensions of trouble arising out of the Eastern complications．Daring the
 market has been decidedly strong，which alone has prevented the scarcity of money from breaking down the premium．For several days next preceding the close of the month，holders of gold have had to pay from 1－16 to $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent per day for having it carred．The exports of coin during the month have been on＇y $\$ 1,234,000$ ，agai st $\$ 6,843,000$ for the same period ff last jear，and thete is consequently a corre pondingly large supply of gold upon the market．

The following exhibits the fluctuations of the New York gold market in the month of December，1868：

| Date． |  |  |  |  | Date． | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 淢 } \\ & \text { on } \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \dot{3} \\ & \text { B } \\ & \text { zu } \\ & \text { en } \end{aligned}$ | 号 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Tuesday | 1351／6 | 135 | 1351／4 | 13516 | Wednesd9y ． 23 | 135 | 1343／4 | 135 | 3／4 |
| Wednesda | 2 135314 | 1347／6 | 1354 | 13514 | Thursday ．．． 24 | 1345／6 | 134\％ | 135\％ | $1351 / 8$ |
| Tharsday | 31135 | 1347／8 | 1351 | $1351 / 3$ | Friday ．．．．．． 25 |  | Chris | tmas |  |
| Friday． | ${ }^{4} 11351 / 6$ | 135 135 | ${ }_{1363}^{1354}$ | ［1353／8／ | Saturday ．．．．26 <br> Monday | ${ }_{135}^{134 / 4}$ | 1343／4 | 135 |  |
| Monday． | 135\％／8 | 135\％ | 1361／4 | 1364 | Tuesday ．．．．． 29 | 1343／4 | 134\％ | 1347／ | 1347／ |
| Tuesday | $81361 / 2$ | 135\％ | 126\％ | 1353／ | Wednesday．． 30 | 1844 | 1343／6 | 1347／ | 134\％ |
| Wedneday | $91351 / 2$ | 1353／3 | $1357 / 8$ | 135\％ | 1 hursday．．．． 31 | 134\％ | 1343／8 |  | 135 |
| Thursday． | 10 $133 \times 1$ | 1353／4 |  | $1{ }^{136}$ | Dec．．．． 186 | $1351 /$ | 1343／8 | 1263／4 |  |
| Saturda | $2135 \%$ | 1351／4 | 1853／4 | 135 ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | 1867．．．．． | 137\％ | $1132 \%$ | 13：7／8 |  |
| Monday． | 41353 | 135 5 | $1351 / 2$ | $1351 / 2$ | ＂1866．．．． | 14：＊ | 1313 | $141 \%$ | 1331／4 |
| Tuesday |  | $1351 / 6$ | $\left\|\begin{array}{c} 13518 \end{array}\right\|$ | 1353 | ＂1865．．．． |  | 1441／2 | 148\％ | 145 |
| Wednesday |  | ${ }_{1345}^{135}$ | $1355 /$ | 1355 | ＂${ }^{\prime}$ | 1483／2 | 2123／4 |  |  |
| Thursday． | $71343 / 4$ 81347 | $134 \%$ $134 \%$ | 13536 | 1347／21 | ＂ $1863 \ldots$ | 148\％2 | $1481 / 2$ | ${ }^{154} 15$ | ${ }_{1}^{1517}$ |
| Saturday | $91353 / 8$ | 135 | 135\％ | $135 \%$ | 1861. | 100 | 100 | 100 |  |
| Monday | 1134\％／8 | 1345／8 | 1851／2 | 135） |  |  |  |  |  |
| Tuesday | 22135\％ | 135 | 1335 \％ | 1135 | IS＇ce Jan 1， 1868 | ｜183／21 | 132 | 150 | 135 |

The following exhibits the quotations at New York for bankers 60 days bills on the principal European markets daily in the month ot December，1868：

|  | London． <br> cents for | Paris． centimes | Amsterdam． cents for | Bremen． cents for | Hamburg． cents for | Berlin． cents for |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Days． |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 1093\％1093／ | 517\％＠51631／ | $41{ }^{1}$＠41 | 783 ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |  |  |
|  | 1034＠1093／8 | 517 ${ }^{517}$ | ¢1 | 7833＠78\％ | ${ }_{36}^{36}$＠．．． |  |
|  | 109 ＠1093 |  | 41 ＠41\％ | 78\％（＠78\％／ |  | 71\％＠\％1\％ |
|  | 1093＠1033／ |  | ${ }^{41}$（641 | ${ }^{783}$（1078\％ |  | 7110611\％ |
|  |  | 517\％ 516165 | $413{ }^{\text {¢ }}$ |  | ${ }_{361 \% @}^{36}$ | ${ }_{72}{ }^{11} \times 181 \%$ |
|  | 109\％＠ | 516\％＠5163 | $413 \times 41$ | 79\％© $99 \%$ |  | ，＠© 2 \％ |
|  | 109\％＠109\％ | 51720516 | 41 ＠4176 | 787\％${ }^{\text {a }}$ |  | 713 |
|  | 109 | ${ }_{5} 516$ | 41 ＠41／ |  | ${ }^{36}$＠ |  |
| 12 | \％ | 518 | ${ }_{41} @_{411}$ | 78\％ | ${ }_{36}{ }^{3}$ | 71306713 |
|  | 109\％© $109 \%$ |  | 41 （6413\％ | 78 |  | 713 |
|  | 1033 | 5162 O515 | 41 ＠41\％ | 787\％ $\mathrm{Ta}^{78}$ | 36 ＠3 | 713\％ |
|  | 10：\％ | 517\％${ }^{\text {a }}$ 5163 | 41＠41／6 | 78\％ |  | ${ }_{713}$ |
|  | 109\％（109\％／ | 513\％＠5161／4 | 41 ＠411／ | 78\％\％©79 | ${ }^{36}$ | 713 |
|  | 109\％＠109 | ${ }^{515}$ 5150513\％ | $41.041{ }^{41}$ | － | ${ }_{36}^{36}$＠3 | 713 |
|  | 109\％（e） | 515 ＠5 | 41 ＠41\％ | 787\％${ }^{\text {c／9 }}$ |  |  |
|  | 109\％＠103\％ | 517\％＠516年 | ${ }_{\text {4．}}$ | 78\％＠${ }^{\text {a }}$ | 35 ＠361／2 | 713 ＠ $711 / 8$ |
|  | 1093（1099\％ | 5173051624 | ${ }_{41} @_{411 / 1 / 8}$ | 78\％＠79 | 36 ＠361／ | ${ }^{713} 13116$ |
|  |  | $517 \%$ ¢ ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | 41 ＠ $411 /$ | 78\％\％${ }^{\text {cor }}$ |  |  |
|  | 109\％＠199\％ | $517 \%$（0516） | 41 ＠1113 | 787／＠79 |  |  |
|  | 1099\％＠103\％ | 516）${ }_{\text {a }}^{\text {c．．．}}$ | 41 ＠ $41 / 6$ | 79 ＠ $971 / 6$ | 36\％＇＠．．．． | 71\％（1）71\％ |
|  | $109{ }^{10910939}$ | 5133¢＠5133／4 | 41 3411／ | 783＠${ }^{\text {® }}$ | ${ }^{36}$ ，＠3634 |  |
|  | 109\％（6110\％ | 517\％＠512／4 | 40\％ $611 \%$ | 78\％／（1973\％／4 | 35\％／＠36\％ | 71\％4672／4 |

## JOURNAL OF BANKING, CURRENCV, AND FINANCE.

## Returns of the New York, Philadelaphia and Boston Banks.

Below we give the returns of the Banks of the three cities since Jan. 1:

| Date. |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| January 4... | \$249,741,297 |
| January 11. | 25 3,1\%0,723 |
| January 18 | 256,033,938 |
| January 25 | 258.392,101 |
| February 1. | 266,415613 |
| February 8. | 270,555,356 |
| February 15. | 271,015,970 |
| February 21. | 267,768,643 |
| February 29 | 267,240,678 |
| March 7.... | 269,156,636 |
| March 14.... | 266,816,034 |
| March 21..... | 261,4i6,900 |
| March 28 .. | 257,378,247 |
| April 4. | 251,287,891 |
| April 11. | 252,936,725 |
| April 18.... | 254,817,936 |
| April 25. | 252,314,617 |
| May 2 | 257,623,672 |
| May d. | 265,755,883 |
| May 16. | 267,724,783 |
| May 23. | 267,381,279 |
| May 30. | 268,117,490 |
| June 6.. | 273,792,267 |
| June 13. | 275, 142,024 |
| June 20 | 274,117,608 |
| June 27. | 276,504,36 |
| July 3.. | 281,945,931 |
| July 11 | 281,147,708 |
| July 18 | 282,912,490 |
| July 25. | 280,345,255 |
| Augart 1 | 279,311,657 |
| August 8 | 279,705,786 |
| August 15 | 277,808,620 |
| August 22 | 275,345,781 |
| Allgust 29. | 271,780,726 |
| September 5 | 271,830,696 |
| September 12. | . $272,055,690$ |
| September 19. | . $271,25 ?, 096$ |
| September 26. | . $271,273,544$ |
| October 3.... | . $269,553,868$ |
| October 10.. | 265,595,582 |
| October 17. | 264,644, 035 |
| October 24.8 | 263579,133 |
| October 31.. | 262,365,569 |
| November $\%$. | 256,612,191 |
| November 14. | . 249,119,539 |
| November 21. | . $251,091,063$ |
| November 28. | . $254,386,057$ |
| December 5... | . 259,491,705 |
| December 12. . | 263,360,144 |
| Decembe 19 | 262,434,180 |
| December 26. | 261,342,530 |

NEW YORK CITY bANK RETURNS.
Specie. Circul tion. Deposits.
$\$ 12.724,614 \quad \$ 34,134,39:$ $19,222,856 \quad 34,094,137$ 25,106,800 $\quad 34,0-2,762$ $23,455,320 \quad 44,062,521$ 22,823,372 $34,096,831$ $24,192,955 \quad 34,043,296$ $22,513,987 \quad 34,100,023$ 22,091,642 34,0 6,223 $20,714,233 \quad 34,153957$ $19,744,70!\quad 34,218,381$ 17,944.308 17,323,367 17,077,299 $16,343,150$ $16,770,542$ $14,943,547$ $16,166,373$ 21286,910 20,939,142 $20,479.947$
$17,861,088$ 14,328,531 11,193,681 9,124,830 11,954,730 $19,235,318$ 20,399,031 $20,804,101$ 20,502,737 $24,784,427$ 22,953,85) 19.768,681 16,949,103 $16,815,778$ $16,150,942$ 14,665,742 $12,503,483$ $11,757,395$
$9,346,097$ 9,186,620 9,553,583 $10,620,526$ 16,446,741 16155,108 17,333,153 15,786, $\mathrm{C}^{277}$ 17,644,263 19,14,778 $18,643,584$ 17,940,805
$\$ 187,070,783$ $194,835,525$ 205,883143 210, $1,93,084$ $213.330,524$ 217,844,5:8 216,759,828 209,095,351 208,651,578 207,737,080 $\star 01,188,470$ $191,191,526$ 186,525,128 280,956,846 $179,851,880$ 18:,832,523 180,307,489 191.206, 133 199,276,568 201,31 ,305 202,507,550 201,716,964 209,084,655 210,670,765 211,484,387 214,302,207 221,050,806 $2 \cdot 4,320,141$ 228,180,749 2 $26,761,65:$ 223,101,867 $231.716,492$ 223,561, 487 216,435,405 210,334,646 207,854,341 2"5, 489,070 202,824,583 202,068,334 194,919.177 189,058,997 188,880,586 186,05, 847 181,948,547 175,556,718 175,150,589 $184,110.340$ 187,418,835 189,843,81'7 $182,337,415$ 183,077,228 $178,503,752$
L. Tend's. $\$ 62,111,201$

Ag. c'ear'gs. $\$ 433,266,304$ 553,884,525 $66,155,241$ $67,154,161 \quad 528,503.223$ $65,197,193 \quad 637,449,923$ $55,846,259 \quad 597,242,595$ $63,471, \div 62 \quad 550,521,185$ $69,868,920 \quad 452,421,592$ $58,553,607$ '705,109784 $57,017,044 \quad 619,21 ?, 598$ 54,788,866 641,277,641 $52,261,086 \quad 649,482,341$ 52,123,178 $557,843,908$ $51,709,706 \quad 567,783,138$ 51,982,669 493,371,451 ธ0, $-39,660 \quad 623,713,923$ $53,866,757$ S $2,784,154$ $57,863,599 \quad$-88,717,822 $57,541, \times 27 \quad 507,028,567$ 57,613,095 $480,186,9,48$ $62,233,002 \quad 488,733,142$ $\begin{array}{ll}62,633,964 & 602,118,24\end{array}$ $68,822,023 \quad 640,463,329$ $69,202.840 \quad$ ธ30,328,197 $72,567,588 \quad 553,9 \times 3,817$ $73,853,303 \quad 516,726,075$ $72,125,939 \quad 525,646,693$ $68,531,542 \quad 591,756,395$ $71.847,545 \quad 505,462,464$ $72,235,583 \quad 487,169,387$ $73,438,61 \quad 409,31,169$ $74.051,518 \quad 587004,381$ $72.95,481 \quad 482,533,952$ $69,757,645 \quad 610,308,551$ $67,757,376 \quad 480,785,665$ $65,933,773 \quad 470,036.175$ $63,429,337 \quad 493,19 i, 072$ $68,772,700 \quad 818,471,552$ $63,587,576 \quad 620,105,094$ $60,210,417 \quad 747,618,516$ $60, \leftarrow 05,086 \quad 657,958,155$ $\mathbf{5 8 , 6 2 6}, 857 \quad 635,516,451$ $56,711,434 \quad 850,584,443$ $51.590,98 \quad 809,452,542$ $47,167,207 \quad 876,571.604$ $51,466,693 \quad 807,806,543$ $63,599,944 \quad 865,111.990$ $62,44), 206 \quad 512,952,800$ $5: 492,476 \quad 635,183,39$ $54,015,665 \quad 585,0-8,469$ $\begin{array}{ll}54,015,665 & 585,08,469 \\ 50,796,133 & 611,108,133\end{array}$ $48,706,160 \quad 621,929,20.3$

PHILADELPHIA BANK BETURNS.

| Date. | Legal Ten |
| :---: | :---: |
| nuary | !6,78 |
| January | 16,037,995 |
| January | 16,827,423 |
| January | 16,836,937 |
| February | 17,064,181 |
| February | 17,063,716 |
| February 15 | 16,949,944 |
| February 22 | 17.573,149 |
| February 2 | 17,87 |
| March | 17,157,954 |
| March 14 | 16,662,299 |
| March 21 | 15,664,946 |
| March 28 | 14,348,391 |
| April | 13,218,625 |
| April | 14,194,385 |
| April 20 | 14,493,287 |
| April 27 | 14,951.106 |
| May | 14,990,832 |
| may 11 | 15,166,01 |

Loans.
$\$ 52,002,304$
$52,593,707$
$53,013,196$
$52,325,599$
$52,604,916$
$52,672,448$
$52,532,946$
$52,423,166$
$52,459,757$
$53,081,665$
$53,367,611$
$53,677,337$
$53,450,878$
$52,209,234$
$52,256,949$
$62,989,780$
$52,912,623$
$53,333,740$
$53,771,79$

Specie.
$\$ 235,912$
400,615
320,973
279,398
279,398
248,673
287,878
263,157
204,929
211,365 232,180 232,180 251,051 229,518 192858 215,835 2:0,240 299,299 204,699 214,366

Circulation. $\$ 10,639,000$ $10,639,096$ 10,641,752 $10,645,226$ 10,638,927 10,635'926 $10,663,328$ $10,632,495$ $10,634,484$ 10,633713 $10,631,399$ 10,643,613 10,643,606 10,642,670 $10.640,932$ $10,640,479$ $10,640,312$ $10,631,044$
$10,629,055$

Deposits \$36,621,274 37,131,830 37,457,089 37,312,540 57,922,287 37.396,653 37,010,520 $36,453,464$ 85, 798,314 34,826,861 94,523,550 $33,836,996$ 32,428,300 31,278,119 32,255,671 38,950,953 34,767,290 35,109,987 $36,017,596$


Legal Tenders 15,381,545 15,823,099 16,184,865 16,078,308 15,837, 117 15,993,145 16,414,877 16,443,153 16,664,232 16,747,440 16,855,894 17,402,177 17,792,508 17,819,300 17, 14,195 17,616,325 16,875,409 $16,310,565$ $15,857,032$ 16,038,854 15,677,539 15,082,008 14,821,796 14,546,736 13,802,798 $13,229,266$ 12570,578 12,685,583 13,016,734 13,255 601 $13,043,814$ 14,067,674 13,010,892

Specie.
$3: 3,525$
280,302
239,371
226,581
175,308
182,711
198,563
233,996
182,524
18,252
195,886
187,281
184,007
196,530
185,186
18,268
222,900
209,053
197,207
234,552
195,689
161,282
200,598
17,595
222,901
$3 \times 7,221$
335,012
298,754
24,154
243
202,092
241,043
224,043

Circulation 10,632,665 10,661,276 10,626,937 10,630 945 10,630,979
10,631,2:0 0,630,307 30,625.426 10,626,214 10,647,852 10,622,247 10,623 646 10,622,751 10,624,772 10,623.360 $10.622,581$ $10,622,316$ 10,613,974 10,620,531 10,607,940 10,008,33 10,607,413 10,610,700 10,609,359 10,612,512 10.611,086 10,609,645 10,605,975 10,6 0,099 10,597,816 10,594,691 10,596,634

Deposits. 36,030,063 36,000,297 36,574,457 42,910,499 43,016,968 43,243,562 48,936,629 $44,824,398$ $45,156,620$ 45,637,975 $45,5 \div 3,220$ 47 205,867 45, 04-718 46,636,377 $45,985,616$ 46,063,150 45, 79,109 44,730,328 43,955,531 44, 227,127 $43.525,479$ $42,713,623$ $41,698,881$ 41 107,463 $39,343,970$ 38,377,937 37,736,444 ,116, 328 38,064.037 $28,333,669$
$37,791,724$
(Capital Jan. 1, 1866, $\$ 41,900,000$.
Date.
Loans,
March
M

Specie. 633,832 867,174 918,485 798,606 685,034 731,540 873,487 805,486 577, 63 815,469
1,133,668
1,18t,881
1,018,809
766,553
631,149
561,990 476,433
436,699
1,617,638
1,198.529
1,521,393
785,641
756,254
634,963
644,695
779,1:2 $7+7.89$ 833,063
748,714
642,793
642.829

618,428
505,805
501,008
481,755
729,830
1,229,781
1,242,185
1,196,09:
1,030,427
$92,5.1$
915, 6 U
882,581
784,299

Legal

| Tenders. 16,304,846 |
| :---: |
| 15,556,696 |
| 14,582,342 |
| 13,7i2,560 |
| 13,736,032 |
| 13,004,924 |
| 12,522,035 |
| 11,905,603 |
| 12,2:8.545 |
| 12,656,190 |
| 11,962,368 |
| 12,199,422 |
| 12,848,141 |
| 14,188,806 |
| 14,:68,900 |
| 14,373,575 |
| 14,564, 614 |
| 15,195,550 |
| 15, 17,307 |
| 15,743,211 |
| 15,469,406 |
| 15,837,748 |
| 15,796,059 |
| 15,753,958 |
| 15,554,580 |
| 16,310,3\%3 |
| 15,813,796 |
| 14,975,941 |
| 13,774,330 |
| 13,466,258 |
| 1 $1,0: 2,447$ |
| 13,923,894 |
| 13.691,864 |
| 13,009,829 |
| 11,915,738 |
| 11,701,307 |
| 11,120,415 |
| 10,961,839 |
| 10,931,225 |
| 11,129, 856 |
| $10,459,113$ |
| 11,824,5 5 |
| 12,498,5:0 |
| 12,510,962 |

Deposits. 40,954,986 39,770,418 39,276,514 37,022,546 36,184,640 36, 1108,157 36,422,929 36,417,890 36,259,946 37,635,406 37,358,726 37,844,742 38,398,14: 40,811,569 41,470,376 41,738,706 42.553,871 42,506,316 $48,458,65 \frac{4}{4}$ 43,116,765 43,876,300 43,580,894 43,389,523 $44,962,268$ 43,702,501 42,360,049 41,214,607 40,891,745 40,640,820 39,712,168 39,127,659 39,215,483 38,801,454 38,686,344 37,872,697 37,740,824 37,335̄,519 34,970,223 $35,114,817$ $36,15,167$ 37,99 1,97\% 37,555,164 37,337,021 86,797,963
$\qquad$ Cional National 24,876,089 24,987,700 25,0152,418 25,094,253 24,983,417 $25,175,19$ 25,281,978 164,331 $25,203,234 \quad 160,385$ $25,225,173 \quad 145,248$ $25,234465 \quad 160,241$ $25,210,660 \quad 140,151$ 25,204,939 -5, 194, 1'4 25,190,565 25, 197,317 25,182,920 25.214 .100 25,216, 81 25,21-727 $25,215,727$
$25,254,406$ $25,016,192$ $25,197,164$ 25,182,658 25,214,5 $=6$ 25,190,091 25゙,196,084 25,183,876 25,184,048 25,150,081 25,143,5!7 25,282,982 25,267,095 $25,168,348$ 25,248 470 25,2 7,9 9 25,230,679 25,201,815 -5, $5,92,4: 3$ 25,256,402 25,229,377 25,109,513 25,152,339

167,013
State. 25,214 210,168 197,720 197.289 197.289
197,079 168,023 4,331 160,241
$1 ; 50,151$ 159,540 159,3:8 159,150 158,908
158,812 144,689 141,538 135,799 142,450 ........ ...... .......

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## OFFICE OF THE

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51 WALL STREET, cor. of William, NEW-YORK,



Six per cent interest on the outstanding certificates of profits will be paid to the holders therenf, or their legal representatives, on and after Tuesday the Fourth of February next.

Fifty p r Cen', of the outstanding certificates of the issue of 1865 , will be redeemed and paid to the holders thereof, or their legal representatives, on and after Tuesday the Fourth of February next, from which date all interest thereon will cease. The certificates to be produced at the time of payment, and cancelled to the extent paid.

A dividend of Thirty per cent is declared on the net earned premiums of the Company, for the year ending 31st December, 1867, for which certificates will be issued on and after Tuesday the 7th of April next.

By order of the Board,
J. H. CHAPMAN, Secretary.

JOHN D. JONES,
CHARLES DENNIS, W. H. H. MOORE, HENRY COIT, WM. C. PICKERSGILL, LEWIS CURTIS, CHARLESH. RUSSELL, LOWELL HOLBROOK, R. WARREN WESTON, ROYAL PHELPS, CALEB BARSTOW, A. P. PILLOT,

WILLIAM E. DODGE,

## (1) Hustees.

## MERCAMTILE LABRARY,

Clin'on Hall, Astor Place.

Branch Office 49 Libortv Stre e',

## $100,00.0 \quad$ VOLUMES.

 aOO BBCOCOCNS OPEN FROM 8 A.M. TO 9 P.M. Subsuriptions received at the Library or Branch Office, and may ecmmence at any time.
## 

## TERMMS:

To Clerks, $\$ 1$ initiation fee, and $\$ 3$ annual dues. To all others $\$ 5$ a year.


[^0]:    * Translated from the "Revue des deax Mondes" for Hant's Merchants' Magazine.

[^1]:    - A hectolitre is aboat 2.75 bushels.

[^2]:    * See the Revue of May 15, 1868

[^3]:    * A kilometre is little more than 3-5 of a mile.

[^4]:    * gee the Revue of $\Delta$ pril 1, 136\%.

[^5]:    * These figures differ somewhat from those given in an estimate of the gold movement in our issue of January, 1868; the difference having arisen from subsequent corrections in the offcial returns made by the Director of the Bureau of Statistics.

[^6]:    "While protecting the ships, we have also protected to nearly an equal degree the separate constituents that enter into the construction of ships, viz., the timber. the iron, the copper, the cordage and the canvass ; and the e two agencies have so far neutralized and countrrbalanced ea ch other that neither party, within this particular sphere of industry, has been benefited; the ships not havin' been built, or the constiiuents of their construction created or applied, while the conmunity at large,

