The 1989 Drought: A Risk to Texas Farmers

In 1988, insufficient rainfall crippled agricultural production across much of the United States. Throughout the nation, soil moisture conditions have improved, but drought remains severe and extreme in many areas of the country. Early reports indicate that much of the winter wheat crop shows signs of moisture stress.

In Texas, soil moisture conditions have worsened since last summer. Current dry conditions raise concern for the upcoming crop year. Some South Texas farmers fear that there will be inadequate moisture for their spring crops, which they began planting in February.

In comparison to last year, insufficient rainfall in 1989 would mean more serious problems for Texas crop farmers and livestock producers. Last year, farmers with damaged crops maintained their income by selling from inventory at high prices. Their action restrained last year's rise in grain prices, and held down losses for livestock producers. Grain inventories are now reduced. Poor grain yields in 1989 could mean lower net cash income for some area grain producers and higher grain prices. Higher grain prices would further reduce livestock margins.

Although well-timed rains could bring bumper crops to Texas farmers in 1989, dry soil increases the risk associated with inadequate rainfall. This suggests two issues facing the Texas farming community. What risks do current soil moisture conditions present for 1989 operations? And what measures can farmers take to reduce their financial exposure to the risk associated with drought?

Soil Moisture Conditions

Drought is dry soil resulting from a prolonged period of inadequate rainfall. Despite improving soil moisture conditions across much of the country, the 1988 drought is still with us. Portions of the United States are still in extreme drought. Texas soil moisture conditions have deteriorated.

Map 1
Palmer Drought Severity Index
July 30, 1988

[Map showing drought severity with legend: Moderate, Severe, Extreme]
Southwest soils remained in relatively good shape at the peak of the drought. Map 1 shows the Palmer Drought Severity Index by climatic division for July 30, 1988, when last summer's drought was at its worst. The Palmer index measures long-term soil moisture. Drought conditions are described in terms of increasing intensity: moderate, severe, and extreme. The map shows that, while the drought was widespread and intense in July, the Southwest was suffering less than much of the rest of the United States.

Map 2, the last Palmer map of the 1988 growing season, shows soil conditions as of December 10, 1988. As the map shows, the drought has lessened in severity throughout much of the United States since July. Still, areas of the country remain in extreme drought. And in Texas, the drought has intensified and become more widespread.

### Rains Unlikely to Help Texas Drought Significantly

Rains are unlikely to end the Texas drought before July. If a drought area receives only normal amounts of rain or snow, the soil-moisture deficit remains. Normal precipitation simply prevents the drought from getting worse. Above-normal rainfall is required to end drought conditions.

Given historical rainfall, the Texas drought is unlikely to end, or lessen from a severe drought to a moderate drought by mid-April (See Map 3). In the drought-afflicted areas of the state, the probability of the drought ending ranges from 0.1 to 13.3 percent. That is, for one severe drought area of the state, scientists have estimated that sufficient rain to end the drought by mid-April occurs only once every thousand years. For some other areas of the state, scientists have estimated that sufficient rain to end the drought occurs once every seven years. In the severe drought areas of the state, the probability of drought conditions improving to moderate ranges from 11.6 to 17.5 percent.

Though the odds are somewhat better, the Texas drought is unlikely to end, or lessen from a severe drought to a moderate drought by mid-July (See Map 4). In the drought-afflicted areas of the state, the probability of the drought ending ranges from 5.5 to 25.9 percent. In the severe drought areas of the state, the probability of drought conditions improving to moderate ranges from 21.6 to 34.5 percent.

### Texas Crops at Risk

Dry soil conditions do not guarantee a poor crop year, but dry soil puts Texas crop production at risk. With odds against adequate rainfall ending the drought before the middle of the growing season, well-timed rains will be essential for good crop yields.

Historical evidence for Texas and other states shows that reduced crop yields are likely in drought years. Nonetheless, good production is still possible during drought years. Well-timed rains have produced good crop yields during periods of dry soil.

If production remains low in other parts of the state or country, Texas farmers with irrigated fields will benefit. Less than 10 percent of U.S. cropland is irrigated, but irrigation is used on more than 20 percent of Texas cropland. Prolonged drought, however, will increase the demand for irrigation, limit the availability of water, and increase costs.

### Texas Livestock at Risk

In 1988, much of the pasture and range forage in the eastern half of Texas was simply burned up by the drought. When pasture and range feed conditions deteriorated, ranchers were forced to provide supplemental feed, increasing their demand for feed grains. At the same time, drought conditions across the nation shrank supplies of feed grains, boosting their prices. As Chart 1 illustrates, Texas
beef producers saw their margins shrink as grain prices rose. If range forage remains scarce and national grain production does not recover in 1989, Texas beef producers will continue to see poor margins. Ample supplies of competing meats may make it difficult for Texas cattle producers to raise their prices. Furthermore, continuing drought could delay herd rebuilding another year, reducing long-run cattle supplies.

### Agricultural Risk Management

Farmers manage their operations through many uncontrollable events. Drought is just one example of a shock that introduces price and yield variability. Insects, freezes, floods, hail, and other natural phenomena badly damage or totally destroy many acres of crops each year. Agricultural prices fluctuate with world supply and demand.

Agricultural producers can reduce their exposure to price and yield risks by using the options market or by purchasing crop insurance. But many farmers seem reluctant to use these risk-management tools.

**Agricultural options.** Farmers can use the agricultural options market to hedge against price movements. Purchasing an option allows a farmer to reduce risk by setting a floor on price declines or a ceiling on price increases. Some crop farmers purchased options last fall when prices were high, setting a floor on their 1989 crop prices. These farmers now have guaranteed that they can sell their 1989 crop at no lower than the option price. In
purchasing the option to sell, the farmers have reduced their expected income but have limited their exposure to price declines. These farmers can still reap the benefits of higher crop prices by simply allowing the option to expire.

Livestock producers can hedge against both fluctuating feed and livestock prices. Livestock producers would seek to reduce exposure to falling livestock prices by purchasing options to sell their cattle, and exposure to rising feed grain prices by purchasing options to buy. Surprisingly, only 7 percent of feeder cattle are priced ahead of sale by options, futures, or forward contracting.3

Crop insurance. Crop insurance allows agricultural producers to reduce the risk associated with variable quality and yields. Private insurers have long provided crop insurance against specific hazards like fire and hail. In the past, private insurers have found it unprofitable to provide insurance against all risks. Adverse selection and government programs are two factors inhibiting the development of private all-risk crop insurance.

Adverse selection occurs when insurance companies lack enough information to identify the risk characteristics of their customers and the customers have better information. Rates are based on average claims, yielding premiums that are above or below the expected losses for specific farmers. The low-risk farmers, who would pay premiums above their expected losses, will find the insurance unattractive, leaving only the high-risk farmers to insure.

Earlier in this century, a number of small private insurers provided all-risk crop insurance. Because they were small, they had a limited ability to spread risk across geographic regions of the country. A number of these insurers failed when they had insufficient assets to pay off widespread losses in service areas.

Widespread drought and depression in the mid-1930s encouraged the U.S. government to provide all-risk crop insurance. Although the government subsidizes its provision, crop farmers have been reluctant to participate in the federal crop insurance program. Only one-fourth of the country's eligible crop acreage is currently insured by federal crop insurance.4 Farmers have identified several reasons for their reluctance to carry crop insurance. Their most common reason is that, despite subsidies, coverage levels are too low and rates too high.

Disaster Payments Discourage Ex-Ante Risk Reduction

U.S. government disaster payments in bad years make options and crop insurance less attractive to farmers. The purchase of either of these instruments reduces a farmer's expected income. Given the government disaster programs, however, options and crop insurance may not reduce significantly the farmer's exposure to risk. For the 1988 crop year, the federal government provided more than $3.5 billion in disaster assistance to U.S. farmers.

In recent years, Congress became concerned that disaster payments threatened the viability of the federal crop insurance program. In 1981, Congress made changes in the disaster program to increase the emphasis on crop insurance. The 1988 Disaster Assistance Act includes a provision that, with certain exceptions, requires farmers to carry crop insurance in 1989 to be eligible for disaster payments based on anything greater than a 65-percent crop loss in 1988. In addition, Congress recently created a commission to determine why the crop insurance program has not developed into an effective substitute for disaster payments.

Texas Farmers at Risk

In summary, dry soil has increased the risk to Texas agricultural production in 1989. Soil conditions are unlikely to improve before the crop year is well underway. Well-timed rains will be essential for good crop production. Poor or inadequate rain in 1989 would limit crop production on non-irrigated Texas farmland. Farmers with irrigated land would benefit from higher prices, but would face higher irrigation costs. Livestock producers would see another year of poor margins.

In short, drought puts 1989 Texas agricultural income at risk. Yet, farmers seem reluctant to reduce their exposure to the financial risks associated with drought and other perils. Government disaster programs probably contribute to their reluctance.

— Fiona Sigalla and Hilary Smith


2 The National Climatic Data Center used the Palmer index and historical precipitation data to calculate the probability of an area receiving at least the precipitation needed was calculated from the Gamma Distribution using maximum likelihood techniques. By definition, a drought is considered ended when the Palmer drought index reaches -0.5. The drought is considered ameliorated when its intensity rises to -2.0 (the lower threshold of a moderate drought). See Probabilities and Precipitation Required to End/Ameliorate Droughts, Historical Climatology Series 3-16, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Climatic Data Center, Asheville, North Carolina, June 1986.


Economic Commentary

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1989 Economic Outlook

In recent years, the national economy has outperformed the Southwest economy. In 1989, this pattern may be reversed. In much of the nation, output is straining against capacity while demand continues to grow strongly. The Southwest is one of the few areas of the country where there is some room for expansion.

National Overview

In 1988, an otherwise strong performance of the U.S. economy was obscured by the negative effects of drought. While real GNP grew by 2.7 percent in 1988, output in the non-farm sector grew by a more robust 3.3 percent.

Even a partial recovery of farm output from last year's depressed levels will boost economic growth in 1989. Such an increase in the economy's overall growth rate will mask a significant slowing in the non-farm economy, where firms are increasingly faced with capacity constraints.

Statistical indicators suggest that the national economy is operating near its limits. Capacity utilization has reached its highest level since 1978, and delivery lags are near their 1984 post-recession peak. In addition, the national unemployment rate of 5.3 percent is well below the 6-percent rate which many economists consider the lowest rate that can be sustained without inflation. The labor force participation rate is further evidence of tightness in the labor market; with sixty-two percent of the working age population now employed, the labor force participation rate is at a post-World-War-II high.

Capacity constraints, combined with a declining dollar, will add to inflationary pressures. The inflation rate generally increased in 1988 and is likely to be maintained in 1989.

Regional Overview

The Southwest economy (here comprising Louisiana, New Mexico and Texas) expanded for most of 1988. The strongest growth occurred during the latter half of the year. Despite improvement, the Southwest economy was still growing more slowly than the nation's. From November 1987 to November 1988, nonagricultural employment grew by 3.6 percent in the nation; by 0.8 percent in Louisiana; by 1.6 percent in Texas; and by 3.1 percent in New Mexico.

In 1989, growing capacity constraints in other parts of the nation should serve to stimulate economic growth in the Southwest, particularly in manufacturing and services. This optimism is tempered, however, by recent movements in the Texas index of leading economic indicators which suggest sluggish growth in Texas through the first quarter of the year.

Southwest Manufacturing

Southwest manufacturing continued to expand in 1988, but more slowly than it had in 1987 or than national manufacturing. During the second half of 1988, most of the region's growth in manufacturing employment came in the nondurable goods industries — especially paper, textiles, food, chemicals, and apparel.

Manufacturing industries in the region should continue to grow in 1989. A broad spectrum of manufacturers in the Southwest should benefit from the strained capacity and near full employment in most other areas of the country, and improving conditions in construction and energy should stabilize related industries. Together, these factors suggest stronger growth in Southwest manufacturing, even as U.S. manufacturing slows.

Southwest Services

Employment growth in services, the largest sector of the economy, accelerated during the latter half of 1988 and is likely to remain strong in 1989. Employment in the categories of business and personal services, and transportation and utilities has shown strong and consistent gains since the second quarter of 1988 and will probably continue to grow.

Retail sales reflected a stronger overall economy. During the Christmas season, retail sales in Dallas and Houston were more than 5 percent higher than a year earlier. Along the Texas border, retail sales were up about 30 percent — strengthened by rising consumer prices in Mexico and concerns about a possible devaluation in the peso.

Southwest Energy

The rig count declined during the second half of 1988 as oilfield exploration and development was cut back in response to falling oil prices. Increased OPEC production contributed to the fall in oil prices. From mid-1987 to November 1988, OPEC boosted world oil production by nearly 10 percent. Prices dropped below $13 a barrel in October of 1988.

In November, however, OPEC agreed to restrict output. Since then, the price of West Texas Intermediate crude has increased by more than 50 percent to just over $18 a barrel. An $18 price probably is not sustainable. In 1989, the average price of oil is likely to be only slightly higher than in 1988. With oil prices near 1988 levels, recent slippage in the energy industry should come to an end.

Southwest Construction

Since late 1985, a soft market for commercial and residential real estate has kept construction in the Southwest weak. Although it looked as though construction had reached bottom by late 1987, contract values and employment continued to drop. Recent gains in contract values, however, signal an improvement in construction. Employment will probably continue to decline in 1989, but at a slower rate.

Summary

In 1989, the Southwest is likely to see stronger economic growth than it did in 1988. Manufacturing and services are likely to grow somewhat more rapidly. The energy industry can be expected to stabilize, and the rate of decline in construction is likely to slow. With slowing national growth, these factors could mean stronger growth in the Southwest than the nation for the first time since 1984.
Texas Manufacturing in Recovery

In April 1987, Texas manufacturing began to recover from its recession (See Chart 1). Manufacturing output (as measured by the Texas Industrial Production Index) grew 10 percent from March 1987 to November 1988, but the rate of growth slowed considerably in 1988.

The strongest growth has occurred in the durable goods industries (See Chart 2). Those industries in Texas showing the most strength — transportation equipment, scientific instruments, nonelectrical machinery, and electric and electronic equipment — are among those industries most helped by recent declines in the value of the dollar. The only durable goods industry in Texas still in decline is the construction-related stone, clay and glass.

Nondurable goods industries, which are helped much less by the dollar's decline, are expanding more slowly. Strong gains in apparel, paper, and food-processing industries are being counterbalanced by weaker gains or losses in printing, petroleum refining, and rubber and plastics.

Growth in overall Texas industrial production has been hindered by declines in mining, a sector comprising primarily oil and gas extraction. Mining accounts for more than 30 percent of state industrial production. In addition to its direct effects on industrial production, weakness in oil and gas extraction has spilled over to other state manufacturers — most notably those making oilfield machinery and drill pipe.

Declines in mining, combined with slower manufacturing growth, have arrested growth in Texas industrial production since May.

About the Texas Industrial Production Index

The Texas Industrial Production Index (TIP1) has been published by the Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas since 1958. TIP1 is designed to provide a recent monthly measure of the growth in real output of the industrial sector of the Texas economy — that is, the output of the state's mining, manufacturing and utilities industries. Indexes are available for each of the 2-digit Standard Industrial Classifications significantly represented in Texas industry. TIP1 is of interest for several reasons. First, industrial production accounts for a substantial portion of the Texas economy. Second, industrial production and construction account for most of the variation in output over the business cycle. Third, the industrial detail provided allows analysis of structural changes in the economy. Finally, TIP1 augments the relatively scarce regional monthly data available on a timely basis.

We recently revised TIP1 in an effort to make it less volatile and subject to smaller future revisions. TIP1 is expressed as an index with 1977 as the base year (1977 average = 100). In November 1988 TIP1 stood at 111.7, which means that Texas industrial production was 11.7 percent greater than during 1977.

Subscriptions to the monthly release of the Texas Industrial Production Index are available at no cost by contacting the Public Affairs Department. Questions concerning historical data or methodology should be addressed to the Research Department.

— Franklin D. Berger and Lea Anderson

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