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A Florida Case Study: Performance of Holding Company Banks

By Stuart G. Hoffman

This article summarizes a staff analysis authored by Dr. Hoffman, entitled "The Impact of Holding Company Affiliation on Bank Performance: A Case Study of Two Florida Multibank Holding Companies." The complete study is available as the first in a series of Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Papers. Single copies are available upon request to the Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Georgia 30303.

The Board of Governors, in approving or denying specific holding company acquisitions, has been influenced in part by results from several recent studies of the impact of holding company affiliation on bank performance. An implicit assumption underlying these studies is that all holding companies affect the performance of their respective subsidiary banks similarly. If this is the case, the Board's reliance on the conclusions of these studies is legitimate and useful. However, if average performance tendencies mask offsetting differences in the impact on performance of affiliation with individual holding companies, the results may be misleading if employed in analysis of specific acquisitions.

The assumption that the performances of banks acquired by different multibank holding companies are, nevertheless, similarly affected needed testing. Two large Florida holding companies—HC-1 and HC-2—offered to be good subjects for such a test. A sample of 13 paired affiliated and independent banks for each subject holding company is used to analyze the effects of affiliation on 29 measures of bank performance. (See box on Statistical Methodology.) The major conclusions are that the acquired banks tended to (1) restructure their asset portfolios in favor of loans and state and local government securities and away from cash, due from balances, and U. S. Government securities, (2) alter their loan portfolios in favor of increased holdings of

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¹See for example, Robert J. Lawrence, **The Performance of Bank Holding Companies** (Washington, D.C.: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, June 1967); Joe W. McLeary, "Bank Holding Companies: Their Growth and Performance," **Monthly Review**, Federal Reserve Bank of At'anta, October 1968; Samuel H. Talley, "The Effect of Holding Company Activity on Bank Performance," Staff Economic Studies No. 69 (Washington, D. C.: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1972); Robert F. Ware, "Performance of Banks Acquired by Multibank Holding Companies in Ohio," **Economic Review**, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, March-April 1973.

consumer loans, and (3) have offsetting increases in total operating revenue and expenses. These findings are very similar to those found in previous holding company performance studies. While there were differences in the impact on performance of affiliation with HC-1 relative to HC-2, the differences were more of degree than kind, with only one exception. Banks acquired by HC-1 achieved significantly greater operating efficiency and, thereby, relatively greater before-tax profitability than those banks acquired by HC-2. The results of this analysis support the general findings of the previous holding company performance studies and do not contradict their applicability to individual acquisitions.

Empirical Results

The findings of the study are summarized below under the headings of the general performance categories listed in Table 1. This table presents the mean changes for all 29 performance variables for each subject holding company compared to the independent banks and the direct comparison of HC-1's subsidiaries to those of HC-2.

Bank Asset Structure

Affiliation with HC-1 or HC-2 tended, on average, to increase the acquired banks' total loans/total assets and state and local government securities/ total assets ratios. Looking at the composition of the increased loan portfolio, subsidiaries of HC-1 made more consumer loans to individuals; HC-2 affiliates increased loans to farmers. To the extent that there is a local market for these types of loans, this result suggests that the acquired banks made more credit available to their respective communities after affiliation. In contrast, banks acquired by each holding company tended to reduce their cash and due from balances/total assets and U. S. Government securities/total assets ratios, on average.

Prices of Bank Services

Holding company affiliation had no significant effect on prices the acquired banks charged for services. Subsidiaries of each holding company tended to reduce the service charges/total IPC demand deposits ratio and to increase the interest paid on time and savings deposits/total time and savings deposits ratio, relative to the paired independent banks. While the mean change for the interest and fees on loans/total loans ratio was positive for both HC-1 and HC-2, it was considerably larger for the former holding company. This is consistent with the finding that HC-1's subsidiaries concentrated their increased loans in the consumer category.

Bank Earnings, Expenses, and Profitability

Affiliation with HC-2 increased all four performance variables related to bank earnings,

Statistical Methodology

This study focuses on banks acquired by two Florida multibank holding companies between 1965 and 1973. Data obtained on 29 measures of bank performance for a sample of 13 paired affiliated and independent banks were used to analyze the effects of affiliation on the performance of the acquired banks. To isolate those effects on performance due solely to holding company affiliation, acquired banks were paired with similar sized independent banks located in the same banking market.

The differences between the acquired banks and the independent banks for each performance variable were computed in both the before-acquisition years and in the final year of the study-1974. From this information, the mean changes in the differences (the difference in 1974 minus the corresponding difference before acquisition) were calculated. For a given performance ratio, its mean change is the estimated average effect that affiliation with the subject holding company had on that performance aspect of the acquired banks in the sample. Finally, each mean change was divided by its standard error to test for statistical significance (t-test). This series of computations was performed separately to the acquired and paired independent banks for each of the two subject holding companies. A t-value in excess of ± 2.17 signaled rejection of the hypothesis of no change in average bank performance after affiliation with the relevant holding company.

although none significantly so. HC-1 subsidiaries significantly raised their total operating income/total assets ratio and decreased their trust department income/total assets ratio.

Subsidiaries of each holding company earned a lower average rate of return on their U. S. Government securities portfolios, both before acquisition and in 1974, though data indicate that the negative average yield differential was reduced (in absolute value) after affiliation. Also, HC-1 and HC-2's affiliates earned a higher rate of return on their state and local government securities portfolio in 1974 than their paired independent banks. These improvements in investment yields are consistent with statements made by each holding company to that effect in its applications to acquire the sample banks.

Banks acquired by HC-2 increased their average ratio of total operating expenses to total assets, compared to the independent banks. This increase may be attributed to a significant rise in the acquired banks' other operating expenses/total assets ratio. Affiliation with HC-1 brought a significantly greater improvement in operating

	TABLI IEAN CHANGES I	LE 1		
MEAN	CHANGES	IN THE	1974 AND	

BEFORE-A	CQUISITION DIFFERENCES		
Performance Variable	Independent Banks	HC-1 Affiliates Compared with HC-2 ¹ Affiliates	
Bank Asset Structure			
Cash + Due from Banks Total Assets			-1.67 (2.15)
U. S. Government Securities Total Assets Total Assets	-3.08	-3.19	-2.29 (71)
State and Local Government Securities Total Assets		(1.05)	1.83 (1.00)
Real Estate Loans Total Assets	(.27)	(.34)	.20 (.10)
<u>Consumer Loans to Individuals</u> Total Assets	(2.02)	(1.18)	3.70 (1. 84)
<u>Commercial and Industrial Loans</u> Total Assets	(.31)	(1.14)	87 (42)
<u>Loans to Farmers</u> Total Assets	(.29)	(2.09)	81 (-1.87)
Total Loans Total Assets			.24 (.08)
Average Price of Bank Services			
Service Charges Total IPC Demand Deposits			15 (1.11)
Interest and Fees on Loans	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		.94
Gross Loans			(1. 4 0) .37
Interest on Time and Savings Deposits Total Time and Savings Deposits			(1.04)
Bank Earnings			4-
<u>Total Operating Income</u> Total Assets			.45 (1.99)
Trust Department Income			03 (1.56)
Total Assets Interest on U. S. Government Securities	, ,		(-1.56) 10
Total U. S. Government Securities Interest on State and Local Gov't. Securities Total State and Local Gov't. Securities	(.58) .19	(.47) .32	(21) .23 (1.09)
	(., 1)	(1.47)	(1.03)
Bank Expenses Total Operating Expenses	.42	87	42
Total Assets	(1.36)	(1.97)	(-1.00)
Interest on Time and Savings Deposits Total Assets	(.29)	(18)	.0 4 (.17)
Salaries and Wages Total Assets	(.26)	(1.39)	− .09 (−.82)
Other Operating Expenses Total Assets	(1.24)	(2.38)	58 (-1.27)
<u>Total Operating Expenses</u> Total Operating Income			−11.7 1* (−2.20)
Bank Profitability			
Net Income Total Assets			.43 (1.70)
Income Before Tax and Security Gains (Losses) Total Assets	.27	55	.87
Net Income			(2.15) 4.96
Total Equity Capital + All Reserves	(1.74)	(.54)	(1.49)
Capital Structure	4		
Total Capital Accounts + Reserves Total Assets			.32 (.72)
<u>Total Capital Accounts + Reserves</u> Total Deposits			.53 (.91)
Other Ratios			
<u>Total Time and Savings Deposits</u> Total Deposits			-3.02 (-1.40)
Total Loans		· ·	2.70
Total Deposits		(1.55)	(.75)
Cash Dividends Paid Net Income			2.82 (.17)
<u>Total Deposits</u> Total Market Deposits			.53 (1.35)
Total Market Deposits	(.+3)	(.57,	(1.00)

In seven cases, HC-1's subsidiary was acquired in an earlier year than the subsidiary of HC-2 with which it was paired.
 In these instances, the before-acquisition comparison was made in the year prior to HC-1's subsidiary's acquisition, the earlier of the two years.
 Statistically significant at the 5-percent level
 Statistically significant at the 1-percent level
 NOTE: t-statistics of the mean differences given in parentheses

efficiency (as measured by the operating expenses/ operating income ratio) compared to affiliation with HC-2.

Before acquisition, affiliates of HC-1 had lower average net income per dollar of assets or per dollar of capital and lower average income before taxes and security gains (losses) per dollar of assets than the paired independent banks; in 1974, all three ratios had risen.

Subsidiaries of HC-2 had lower average net income per dollar of assets or per dollar of capital, but higher average income before taxes and security gains (losses) per dollar of assets than their paired banks before acquisition. In 1974, net income per dollar of assets was still lower, but less so; net income per dollar of capital was actually higher; however, income before taxes and security gains (losses) per dollar of assets had dropped.

Capital Structure

Neither holding company improved the capital position of its acquired banks. Before acquisition, HC-2 subsidiaries had higher capital accounts plus reserves per dollar of assets or per dollar of deposits

than paired independent banks, on average. In 1974, these ratios had dropped below those of the paired banks, though not significantly so.

Subsidiaries of HC-1 had lower average ratios of capital accounts plus reserves per dollar of assets or per dollar of deposits than paired independent banks, both before acquisition and in 1974. However, the negative differential was much larger (in absolute value) in 1974.

Other Performance Variables

The only performance variable with a mean change significant at the 5-percent level for both holding companies was the cash dividend paid/net income ratio. This may partially explain lower capital plus reserves/total assets or total deposits ratios.

In 1974, both holding companies' affiliates had a significantly higher total loans/total deposits ratio than their paired independent banks, on average. Finally, holding company affiliation had no significant effect, on average, on the ratio of total time and savings deposits to total deposits or the market share of the acquired banks.

"The Impact of Holding Company Affiliation on Bank Performance: A Case Study of Two Florida Multibank Holding Companies" by Stuart G. Hoffman is the first paper circulated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in our new Working Paper Series. The purpose of this series is to make available to an audience somewhat more specialized than our Monthly Review readership the full text of some of our Bank economists' research efforts. Some papers will represent tentative findings of authors who plan to use this series as a way of getting further critical comment; others will probably be reprinted with few, if any, changes in yet another series of Bank publications. We also plan to publish in our Monthly Review summaries in varying detail of each study in the Working Paper Series.

One copy of each working paper will be sent without charge upon request. In addition, those interested may have their name placed on a subscription list for future studies in the Series. Such requests should include name, street address or post office box number, city, state, and ZIP code and should be sent to the Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Atlanta, Georgia 30303.

Harry Brandt Vice President and Director of Research

The Impact of Discount Activity on Federal Funds Borrowings

by John M. Godfrey

Banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System may use the discount window for a variety of reasons—short-term adjustment credit, seasonal borrowing, and emergency credit. When a bank uses the discount window, the bank's balance sheet may change in one or more ways. Loans and securities might increase; that is, banks might extend additional credit as a result of receiving accommodations at the discount window. Or banks might turn to the discount window to offset deposit losses or to replace other types of borrowed funds such as Fed funds (interbank borrowings).

To better understand the balance sheet adjustments that accompany discount activity, all Sixth District member bank borrowing at the discount window during 1974 was examined. The initial assumption was that unless a bank's deposits drop or credit demands increase, discount activity is most likely to serve as a substitute for other types of borrowed funds.

To test the significance of this hypothesis, the weekly average dollar changes in discount window borrowing of individual member banks were compared with the weekly average dollar changes in those banks' net Fed funds purchases (gross purchases less sales). If a bank uses the discount window as a substitute for Fed funds, then there should be a high negative relationship between changes in discount activity and net purchases of Fed funds. An increase in discount window borrowings would bring a significant drop in net Fed funds purchases, while a decrease would be accompanied by more net Fed funds purchases.

During 1974, banks faced generally strong loan demands, and deposit inflows were weak. As a result, many banks made heavy use of borrowed funds such as money market CD's and Fed funds. Interest rates were high throughout the year. In particular, the Fed funds rate exceeded the discount

rate during the entire year and, at mid-1974, was more than 500 basis points above it.

Banks had considerable incentive, then, to use the discount window and reduce their use of the more expensive Fed funds. To some extent, the interest rate differential in favor of the discount window during the period may bias results in favor of the hypothesis. There is no question that banks use the discount window more when the spread is wide, and one need only examine periods of negative rate spread to see this. The dollar level of discount borrowing moves directly with the spread of interest rates. But we are investigating to what extent these borrowings serve as a substitute for Fed funds at individual banks, not explaining the amount of total borrowings in the District or System.

The results confirm the hypothesis that District banks use adjustment credit from the Federal Reserve as a substitute for Fed funds. The change in such borrowings of Sixth District banks explains 40 percent of the change in net Fed funds purchases (NFF). And the relationship further indicates that a \$10-million increase (decrease) in Federal Reserve borrowings would be associated with a \$7.7-million decrease (increase) in net Fed funds purchases. The relationships are highly significant.

Statistically, there is, however, considerable variation in the impact of borrowing when these banks are analyzed by size. The larger ones would expectably have more ability to adjust their. alternative sources of funds; this is supported by the data. At large banks, the change in borrowings explains 42 percent of the change in NFF (with a regression coefficient of 0.78). This drops to 18 percent (and a regression coefficient of 0.60) at the medium banks and to 5 percent at the small banks (with a regression coefficient of 0.34).

The large banks engage in a massive window dressing the last week of the year, reducing both borrowings and net Fed funds purchases in order to show a "cleaner" balance sheet. In addition to statistical reasons for not using data from the last week in 1974 (see box), then, there are also institutional reasons. This atypical behavior during one week has a disproportionately large impact on the results obtained from the remaining 51 weeks. For these reasons, the last week of the year was deleted.

Expectably, there was little relationship between seasonal borrowings and NFF. Seasonal borrowings are supposed to involve extensions of credit to banks without alternative sources of funds. (The regression results showed very small coefficients [0.06] and R²'s [0.0004]—the proportion of total variation in net Fed funds attributed to the variation in F. R. borrowing—with no significant results.) Banks that borrow for seasonal purposes do not, apparently, use those borrowings as a substitute for NFF. This supports seasonal

This study includes all 184 Sixth District member banks that borrowed at the discount window during 1974. These included 14 large banks (deposits in excess of \$400 million), 32 medium banks (deposits of less than \$400 million but over \$100 million), and 138 small banks (deposits of less than \$100 million). These categories are arbitrary and constrained by the need to have a sufficient number of observations in each group. Perhaps \$100 million in deposits is too much for a bank to be considered small, but results indicated that there would not be any benefits from subdividing that category into two or more additional groups.


These 184 banks made nearly 2,400 changes in their borrowings during 1974. The large banks made 289 changes, the medium banks, 572, and the small banks, 1,529.

Data are drawn from the first 51 weeks of 1974; including the last week in 1974 would give significantly different results than those reported above. The results for 52 weeks, although still significant, explain less about the relationship between borrowings and Fed funds purchases than do those for 51 weeks. The regression coefficient for 51 weeks is 0.707 and negative while the coefficient for the last week in the year is 3.728 and positive. The Chow test clearly indicates that these two coefficients are from significantly different populations and should be removed from the first 51 weeks of the year.

borrowings' basic purpose as credit for banks without access to the Fed funds market.

There is a significant negative correlation between changes in borrowings for adjustment credit and changes in net Fed funds purchases, but these results are very different when a bank's changes in borrowing are positive and when they are negative. When borrowings increase, 44 percent of the decrease in NFF is explained (and the regression coefficient is — 0.91); but when borrowings decrease, only 31 percent of the rise in NFF (with a regression coefficient of -0.67) is explained. This asymmetrical pattern suggests that banks use the time that they are in the discount window to make portfolio adjustments that reduce their need for NFF. This behavior is consistent with the discount window's function of allowing banks the time to make orderly adjustments.

The pattern described above varies, however, with bank size. Larger banks seem to reduce their NFF more when increasing borrowings from the Federal Reserve than when reducing them, but the difference is not significant. Still, the change in borrowings does explain more of the change in NFF for large banks than for medium and small



banks. The results indicate that large banks use the discount window as just another source of funds and not to make other portfolio adjustments. This is consistent with the idea that these banks are thought to depend heavily upon liability management.

At medium and small banks, the change in borrowings explains much less of the change in NFF, but the difference between increases and decreases in borrowings is significant. At the medium banks, only about 15 percent of the changes in NFF is explained by the change in borrowings. At the small banks, more of the change in NFF is explained when borrowings decline than when they increase.

The use of the discount window, of course, varies directly with the difference between the discount rate and alternative borrowing costs. During 1974, the discount rate was always at least 100 basis points below the weekly average Fed funds rate; in July, it was over 500 basis points lower. To test the influence of this rate spread, the year 1974 was separated into two periods. From the week ended May 29 to the week ended September 4, the discount rate was 300 or more basis points under the Fed funds rate; the spread was smaller in all the remaining weeks.

For the large banks, we find a surprising result. When the rate spread was less than 300 basis points, the large banks were most apt to substitute Reserve Bank borrowings for the NFF than when it was wider. How is it that the aggressive liability management banks do not substitute cheaper discount window accommodations for the more expensive Fed funds? The answer may lay in the financial pressure which developed in the summer of 1974. The large banks did not substitute reserve bank borrowings for Fed funds because they needed both. The former were a complement, not a substitute. Because the demand for credit was strong last summer, many large banks that borrowed may have made use of all borrowed funds sources.

When the interest rate spread is large, the large banks clearly show different behavior patterns. Discount window borrowings explain much less of the change in NFF-only 26 percent when the spread is wide compared to 54 percent when the spread is narrow. The difference may reflect the intense pressure banks were under, or it may reflect closer administration of the discount window. While there was no statistically significant difference between increases and decreases in borrowings when the spread was wide, the relationship between borrowings and NFF appeared to be much weaker when banks reduced their Federal Reserve borrowings. Then the change explains only 4 percent of the change in NFF. (Examining the 42 reductions in FRB borrowings when the spread was wide, we find some atypical behavior. On 12 of the 42 occasions, banks also reduced NFF. This behavior is contrary to our hypothesis that banks will increase NFF when borrowing decreases but may be explained if banks used the discount

window to acquire excess reserves to carry over into the next reserve week.)

At medium and small banks, it is apparent that the wider the spread between the discount and Fed funds rates, the more the change in FRB borrowings explains the change in NFF. The difference is not significant for medium banks; it is for the small banks. (At medium banks, the

change in borrowings explains 29 percent of NFF [with a regression coefficient of 0.73] when the spread is wide and 13 percent [with a regression coefficient of 0.5] when narrow. For small banks, 12 percent is explained during wide spreads and 2 percent when narrow.) Small and medium banks tend to substitute discount activity for NFF more when the spread is over 300 basis points. ■

This study will be available in early 1976, with complete statistical methodology and data, as one in the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's Working Paper Series. Single copies will be available upon request to the Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Atlanta, Georgia 30303.

1975 Crop Production: Outstanding in Both the Nation and District

by Gene D. Sullivan

The 1975 District crop production forecasts are for record highs in corn, soybeans, tobacco, grain sorghum, sugar cane, and rice. Only cotton production will decline substantially from year-ago levels because farmers sharply reduced planted acreage in response to 1974's plunging cotton prices. Unlike last year, crop production in District states closely resembled output trends for the U. S. as a whole.

This year's crop production has drawn unusual attention because of short supplies of several important commodities. Relatively brisk worldwide demand in the face of 1974's severe drought in the Midwest stimulated unusually intense interest in 1975's feed crop, particularly corn. Observers have anxiously awaited each successive U.S.D.A. forecast for new indications of crop production in 1975.

Corn: The initial August estimate of the District's corn production was about 9 percent above last year's level, which was in turn nearly one-fifth larger than the 1973 crop. In November, the crop was still estimated at a record high, though it had declined slightly since the initial August forecast. Georgia and Tennessee, in that order, account for most District corn production.

District states' 1975 corn production amounts to an insignificant 3.6 percent of the total U. S. crop. U. S. corn production is projected to be up by one-fourth from 1974's drought-reduced level.

Sugar Cane: The unprecedentedly high sugar prices in 1974 stimulated District sugar cane growers to increase production. The first 1975 forecast released in August showed an estimated increase of 14 percent over 1974's level. Favorable weather and ideal circumstances for cane production have raised subsequent

¹The data reported in this article refer to the entire areas of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee, states which are either partially or totally included within the Sixth District.

projections so that November's forecast is up another 4 percent. The entire District sugar cane crop is produced in Florida and Louisiana.

The U. S. crop is also projected to increase in 1975 in approximately the same proportion as in the District. This District usually accounts for well over half of U. S. sugar cane production.

Rice: Rice has shared in the sharp grain price increases over the past two or three years, stimulating District farmers to increase acreage. In 1974, output was up one-fifth from 1973, and the August projection of 1975's crop was up 6 percent from 1974. November's projection declined slightly, but output is still projected to reach a record level.


The U. S. rice crop has also increased rapidly since 1973. And 1975's August projection was up approximately 10 percent from last year; subsequent projections remain unchanged. District states' rice production in Louisiana and Mississippi usually makes up about one-fourth of the U. S. total.


Cotton: One of the most drastic changes in District crops in 1975 was the reduction in estimated cotton production. In response to plunging cotton prices received by farmers in 1974, District acreage was sharply reduced. In August, projected production was down by more than a fourth from 1974's level. The cotton crop declined further with succeeding forecasts, so that November's estimate was only two-thirds of last year's level and nearly 40 percent below 1973's crop. Mississippi accounts for over one-half of this year's expected cotton output in District states.

U. S. production is also down for the second year in succession. August's forecast was nearly 20 percent below the 1974 total, and by November expected production was only 70 percent of 1973's level. Declining September and October crop forecasts reflected damage to the crop in Texas and Mississippi. Sixth District states provide one-fourth of 1975's projected U. S. total cotton crop.

Tobacco: Tobacco production in District states jumped by more than one-third in 1974. The expected crop in 1975 was estimated fairly near the 1974 crop in August, and succeeding forecasts have shown little change. Georgia produces most of the District's tobacco crop; Tennessee is the second largest producer.

U. S. tobacco production increased again rather sharply in 1975, reflecting the increase in planted





acreage. August's crop estimate was over 10 percent above the 1974 output. Production has declined only slightly with succeeding forecasts, making 1975 another year of record tobacco output. The District accounts for about 15 percent of the total crop.

Grain Sorghum: Although grain sorghum is a minor crop in District states, its production has increased sharply for the past three years. The 1974 output was up approximately 14 percent from 1973; August's estimate for the 1975 crop rose again by 18 percent. Mississippi, Georgia, and Tennessee continued to be the major contributors to the District crop output.

U. S. output of grain sorghum dropped sharply in 1974, following a severe drought in the plains states. The August 1975 forecast showed a recovery of nearly 30 percent from last year; however, this still did not return production to 1973's level. Subsequent monthly projections of the total U. S. crop declined with November's estimate, falling 5 percent below the initial August forecast. The District's portion of total grain sorghum output (1.0 percent) is perhaps least of all the nation's crops considered in this analysis.

Soybeans: In response to 1974's extremely high prices, the soybean acreage in District states increased sharply this year. Initial estimates in August showed an expected increase in production of 20 percent. Subsequent monthly forecasts had remained fairly stable until November's upward revison. In the District states, Mississippi accounts for most of this year's expected increase; Tennessee and Louisiana also grow significant portions of the crop.

U. S. production is up from 1974's drought-reduced level, but the crop is not record large as in the District. In August, estimated production was about equal to the 1973 crop, and November's forecast has been increased by 4 percent from that level. District states' soybean production accounts for 15 percent of the total U. S. crop. Though still a relatively minor portion of the total, the District's soybean production is much more significant to the U. S. total than its corn production.

Oranges: Almost all of the District's orange crop is grown in Florida. Production reached another record high in 1974, and the initial forecast of 1975's production shows only a slight decline

from last year. So, barring unfavorable weather, Florida is expected to harvest another near-record orange crop.


Florida usually accounts for more than three-fourths of the nation's orange crop, so U. S. production tends to follow the state's trend. Total U. S. output is expected to decline slightly this year from 1974's high; it may well be the second largest crop on record, however.

Pecans: Pecans are not usually thought of as a major crop in this area, but they are important, particularly in Georgia which accounts for nearly half of District states' production. The pecan crop usually fluctuates sharply from year to year, reflecting weather variations that especially influence the yields of wild varieties. Production fell sharply in 1974. It is expected to recover somewhat this year, though it will not reach the large 1973 crop. The October forecast of 1975 production was revised downward from September's level, largely because of hurricane damage in Alabama and Georgia.


District states produce well over half of the U. S. crop. Thus, total U. S. production fell sharply in 1974, even though the crop outside this area shrank very little from 1973's level. The forecast of the 1975 crop is up, partly because production has improved in states outside the Sixth District. However, the U. S. crop will apparently not reach the 1973 level.

The Effect on Income

Although production of most crops in the District will be even better than in 1974, it probably will not result in higher gross incomes. In October, crop prices averaged 14 percent below 1974 levels. Thus, price declines have more than offset production gains for most crops. This is particularly true for soybean producers, whose one-fifth larger crop faces a market price reduction of more than one-third from the fall of 1974. Oranges are the major exception to the pattern, since recent prices have averaged 16 percent higher than a year ago, even though production is expected to be unchanged. On balance, crop farmers' incomes will still be unusually high by historical standards. Net income of crop producers has been squeezed by both rising costs and falling prices, but in this region at least, it is likely to remain above levels experienced in all years prior to 1974.



BANKING STATISTICS



**Daily average figures.

SIXTH DISTRICT BANKING NOTES

Real Estate Lending Increases

REAL ESTATE LOANS SIXTH DISTRICT COMMERCIAL BANKS

100	une 1970 Amount million \$)	June 1975 Amount (million \$)	% Change June 1975 From June 1970		June 1970 Amount (million \$)	June 1975 Amount (million \$)	% Change June 1975 From June 1970
DISTRICT	. 4,717	11,869	+ 152	GEORGIA		2,455 1,477	+ 131 + 158
ALABAMA	. 529	1,186	+ 124	Augusta		141	+ 76
Anniston-Gadsden		111	+ 113	Columbus		122	+ 110
Birmingham	100	493	+ 148	Macon		260	+ 110
Dothan		121	+ 98	Savannah		213	+ 111
Mobile		230	+ 135	South Georgia .		242	+ 92
Montgomery		231	+ 94		7-7		
FLORIDA		4,418	+ 177	LOUISIANA* Alexandria-	. 668	1,622	+ 143
Jacksonville		429	+ 170	Lake Charles .	. 75	124	+ 65
Miami Orlando	165	1,798 461	+ 172 + 179	Baton Rouge Lafayette-Iberia-	. 153	366	+ 139
Pensacola	. 71	175	+ 146	Houma	. 136	311	+ 129
Tampa-St. Petersburg	. 540	1,555	+ 188	New Orleans	. 304	821	+ 170
MISSISSIPPI*		484	+ 101	TENNESSEE*	. 621	1,704	+ 174
Jackson	149	343	+ 130	Chattanooga Knoxville		380 381	+ 209 + 147
Meridian	73	104	+ 42	Nashville		836	+ 184
Natchez		37	+ 95	Tri-Cities		107	+ 114

NOTE: Figures shown are for trade and banking areas, which include several counties surrounding central cities. Boundaries of some areas include counties in two states. Some data are partly estimated.

*Represents that portion of the state in the Sixth District.

Bank lending grew faster at commercial banks in the Southeast than in the nation as a whole from mid-1970 to mid-1975, and a major reason was the increase in real estate mortgage lending. Over these five years, total loans in the District increased from \$20.0 billion to \$39.5 billion, up 98 percent. Nationally, bank loans rose only 74 percent.


One reason District loans increased more rapidly is that banks here expanded real estate mortgage loans at nearly *twice* the rate as in the nation as a whole. In the Southeast, bank real estate loans rose \$7.2 billion, up over 150 percent; nationally, they were up slightly less than 90 percent.

While such an increase in real estate loans is not unexpected for a rapidly developing area such as the Southeast, it has brought about a relative shift in real estate loans at Southeastern banks, compared to the nation. In mid-1970, all types of real estate loans comprised 24.7 percent of banks' total loans in the U. S., but only 23.5 percent of District bank loans. By mid-1975, however, real estate loan growth in the Southeast had reversed this relationship. District banks had 30.1 percent of their loans secured by real estate in contrast to 26.4 percent in the U. S.

The shift in emphasis to real estate loans came at a time when banks were receiving strong consumer time deposit inflows. Much of these deposit gains came in the form of the longer maturity but more expensive deposits. These deposits allowed banks to seek the higher yields available on real estate lending. To obtain higher returns, banks increased their financing of short-term, but highrisk construction loans and long-term real estate mortgage loans. Now, some real estate loans have fallen into a reduced or noninterest-accruing category. The expected stable and high return from real estate credit has proved elusive.

All types of real estate loans in the District have grown rapidly during the last five years. Strong growth has come from traditional forms of real estate loans, such as single family housing, which increased nearly 160 percent. Nearly one-half of the District's growth occurred at banks in the Miami, Atlanta, and the Tampa-St. Petersburg areas. Residential home mortgages have probably given banks the stable yield that they were seeking. Defaults from home mortgages do not seem to have been unusually excessive during the last two years.

Most of the banks' problems have been in multifamily and commercial real estate loans, such as those for business properties, office buildings, hotels and motels, other commercial income-producing properties, and undeveloped land. These loans accounted for nearly one-half of the growth in real estate loans during the last five years. District banks extended mortgage credit to those types of properties that are now the most overbuilt and that are causing most of the defaults and interruptions in loan repayments.



Within the District, real estate loan growth has varied much more than that of total bank loans. In Florida and Tennessee, for example, real estate loans rose 175 percent; in Mississippi they advanced 100 percent. Total loans varied much less. In Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, and Tennessee, they were up slightly more than 100 percent; in Mississippi, they rose 80 percent.

Multifamily real estate loans varied most among the states. In Florida and Tennessee, these loans rose about 200 percent in sharp contrast to an average of less than half that rate in the rest of the District. Florida banks led the District in growth of total residential mortgage loans, while Tennessee banks had by far the most rapid growth in commercial real estate loans.

The rapid growth of bank loans for permanent financing of real estate has undoubtably contributed to overbuilding in many parts of the Southeast. Loans that banks were eager to make in previous years reflected a general optimism about this region's future. If the Southeast had lived up to those expectations, banks would have had many sound real estate loans on their books. Now, however, the region's growth has slowed, causing many developers to default on interest and loan principal payments. And nowhere have more problem real estate loans surfaced than where loan growth was previously strongest.

JOHN M. GODFREY

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Sixth District Statistics

Seasonally Adjusted

(All data are indexes, unless indicated otherwise.)

	Latest 19		One Month Ago	Two Months Ago	One Year Ago		Lat e st 19		One Month Ago	Two Months Ago	One Yea Ago
SIXTH DISTRICT						Unemployment Rate (Percent of Work Force)***	. Oct.	8.8	9.1	9.2	5.9
INCOME AND SPENDING						Avg. Weekly Hrs. in Mfg. (Hrs.)		40.2	40.1	40.1	40.2
Manufacturing Payrolls	. Oct.	190.0	186.4		170.0	FINANCE AND BANKING					
Farm Cash Receipts	. Sept.	137 145	177 152	268 418	172 167	Member Bank Loans	. Oct.	269	267	264	264
Livestock	. Sept.	179	185	205	177	Member Bank Deposits	. Oct.	226 296	224 293	225 282	210 259
New Loans	. Oct.	677.7	672.4r	632.0	569.9	FLORIDA					
Repayments	. Uet.	620.3	669.9r	646.2	596.6	INCOME					
EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTION						Manufacturing Payrolls	Oct	192.2	186.4	186.0	188.3
Nonfarm Employment		130.6	130.2	129.7	134.4	Farm Cash Receipts		106	148	411	241
Nondurable Goods	. Oct.	111.6 112.4	110.8 110.8	109.6 109.7	117.3 115.0	EMPLOYMENT					
Food	. Oct.	103,4 106.5	101.4 105.1	100.5 103.4	104.4 109.7	Nonfarm Employment	. Oct.	147.0	147.2	148.3	156.4
Apparel	. Oct.	113.7	111.9	110.0	114.7	Manufacturing		119.2 152.4	117.2 152.9	117.4 154.3	126. 162.
Paper	. Oct.	107.6 124.0	106.6 123.5	105.8 122.7	113.7 129.8	Construction	Oct.	133.3	134.7	133.4	194.9
Chemicals	. Oct.	108.8	107.3	107.1	113.7	Farm Employment	. Sept.	100.1	99.7	107.8	93.5
Lbr., Wood Prods., Furn. & Fix.	Oct.	110.5 99.1	110.6 98.7	109.3 97.3	120.3 105.1	(Percent of Work Force)***	Oct.	11.8	11.6	11.5	7.3
Stone, Clay, and Glass Primary Metals	Oct.	115.5 101.3	116.0 102.1	115.7 101.8	128.6 115.9	Avg. Weekly Hrs. in Mfg. (Hrs.)	. Uct.	40.3	39.8	39.8	40.0
Fabricated Metals	Oct.	121.6	121.1	120.3	132.1	FINANCE AND BANKING					
Machinery		144,8 103.6	144.8 104.8	143.0 103.2	164.6 105.1	Member Bank Loans		285 247	285	285 249	314
Nonmanufacturing	. Oct.	137.3	137.0	136.8	140.4	Bank Debits**	Oct. Oct.	324	249 322	318	245 309
Construction	Oct.	123,2 120.9	122.5 120.1	121.4 121.6	148.8 126.5						
Trade	- Oct.	134.4 150.0	134.7 149.4	134.7 149.2	139.2	GEORGIA					
Services	· Oct.	156.8	155.7	154.7	154.2 155.9	INCOME					
Federal Government	Oct.	107.6 143.5	108.0 143.6	107.4 145.0	105.6 138.9	Manufacturing Payrells		181.0	173.5	170.1 229	168.6 186
Farm Employment	Sept	90.5	91.7	95.6	83.1	Farm Cash Receipts	Sept.	237	112	229	100
Unemployment Rate (Percent of Work Force)	Oct.	9.5	9.5	9.8	6.2	EMPLOYMENT					
Insured Unemployment (Percent of Cov. Emp.)						Nonfarm Employment		126.3 104.8	1.25.6 103.7	124.4 101.9	130.1
Avg. Weekly Hrs. in Mfg. (Hrs.)	. Oct.	4.8 40.2	5.0 40.1	5.0 39.8	2.9 39.7	Nonmanufacturing	Oct.	136.2	136.0	134.7	139.8
Construction Contracts*	Oct.	193 145	167 150	150 125	20 2 149	Construction	Oct. Sent	118.8 102.3	117.7 112.2	116.1 109.3	140. 97.
All other	. Oct.	240	184	175	254	Unemployment Rate					
Cotton Consumption**	. July . Oct.	73.5 93.7	64.4 91.4	61.4 91.8	92.1 100.8	(Percent of Work Force) Avg. Weekly Hrs. in Mfg. (Hrs.) .	Oct. Oct.	8.8 40.4	8.8 40.1	9.2 39.2	5.: 39.
Manufacturing Production	Sept.	146.0	144.0	142.4	152.7	FINANCE AND BANKING					
Nondurable Goods	. Sept.	147.3 128.4	145.6 126.5	144.1 128.0	152.5 134.1	Member Bank Loans	Oct	240	242	244	26:
Textiles	. Sept.	145.3 129.6	142.4 128.1	140.3 124.5	146.6 135.4	Member Bank Deposits	Oct.	193	194	192	190
Paper,	. Sept.	140.5	138.0	134.2	138.8	Bank Debits**	Oct.	366	403	354	32
Printing and Publishing	. Sept.	128.9 161.8	127.8 161.8	127.8 160.2	133.8 173.8	LOUISIANA					
Durable Goods	. Sept.	144.3 150.3	141.5 146.4	140.0 142.9	152.6 154.0	INCOME					
Furniture and Fixtures	. Sept.	138.2	132.6	127.3	149.2	Manufacturing Payrolls		174.5	177.9	171.7	164.2
Stone, Clay, and Glass Primary Metals	. Sept.	145.3 102.5	144.3 101.2	141.4 100.0	156.1 110.8	Farm Cash Receipts	Sept.	128	352	259	16
Fabricated Metals	. Sept.	113.3 145.5	112.1 145.6	111.4 147.1	120.8 157.6	Nonfarm Employment	Oct	119.6	119.0	117.5	118.8
Electrical Machinery	. Sept.	231.9	227.7	227.1	258.3	Manufacturing	. Oct.	104.4.	104.1	103.9	105.9
Transportation Equipment .	. Sept.	140.1	134.9	133.7	137.3	Nonmanufacturing	. Oct.	122.8 100.2	122.0 99.1	120.4 97.1	121.5 99.1
FINANCE AND BANKING						Farm Employment	. Sept.	71.4	75.4	80.9	87.7
Loans*						Unemployment Rate (Percent of Work Force)***	. Oct.	8.7	8,2	8.9	7.3
All Member Banks		263 240	263 239	264 242	278 265	Avg. Weekly Hrs. in Mfg. (Hrs.) .		38.8	39.7	39.1	40.0
Deposits*		223	222	223		FINANCE AND BANKING					
All Member Banks	. Oct.	191	192	194	215 188	Member Bank Loans*		241 207	243 202	244 205	25 7
Bank Debits*/**	. Oct.	314	322	307	289	Bank Debits*/**		279	279	280	24
ALABAMA						MISSISSIPPI					
INCOME						INCOME					
Manufacturing Payrolls	. Oct.	197.9	195.8	201.0	190.4	Manufacturing Payrolls	. Oct.	223.2	218.2	210.1	199.
Farm Cash Receipts	. Sept.	187	219	286	162	Farm Cash Receipts	Sept.	70	201	279	15
						EMPLOYMENT					
EMPLOYMENT											
Nonfarm Employment		121.7	120.9	121.7	122.6 117.0	Nonfarm Employment		129.0 126.2	128.1	127.3	
	. Oct.	121.7 111.2 126.5 136.9	120.9 110.9 125.6 136.7	121.7 109.9 127.1 134.7	122.6 117.0 125.2 139.4	Nonfarm Employment Manufacturing Nonmanufacturing Construction	Oct.	129.0 126.2 130.2 116.2	128.1 125.4 129.3 110.0	127.3 122.8 129.3 103.2	131.2 130.5 131.5 138.2

La	test Month	One Month Ago	Two Months Ago	One Year Ago	L -	test Month 1975	One Month Ago	Two Months Ago	One Year Ago
Unemployment Rate					EMPLOYMENT				
(Percent of Work Force)*** O		7.8	8.2	4.6	Nonfarm Employment	ct. 127.4	126.4	125.4	130.0
Avg. Weekly Hrs. in Mfg. (Hrs.) O	et. 39.9	39.8	39.7	39.0	Manufacturing		110.0	109.0	119.2
					Nonmanufacturing		136.6	134.5	136.1
FINANCE AND BANKING					Construction		130.9	130.7	145.€
Member Bank Loans*		256	261	258	Farm Employment		97.1	96.7	93.4
Member Bank Deposits* O	ct. 225	223	226	214	Unemployment Rate				
Bank Debits*/**	at. 267	281	267	264	(Percent of Work Force) (ct. 8.9	9.1	9.3	5.8
					Avg. Weekly Hrs. in Mfg. (Hrs.) (40.5	40.3	39.7
TENNESSEE									
					FINANCE AND BANKING				
INCOME					Member Bank Loans*	ct. 271	267	272	271
Manufacturing Payrolls O	ct. 188.0	186.0	181.6	182.4	Member Bank Deposits*		217	218	206
Farm Cash Receipts		163	167	148	Bank Debits*/**		268	267	269

^{*}For Sixth District area only; other totals for entire six states
***Seasonally adjusted data supplied by state agencies.

N.A. Not available

Note: All indexes: 1967=100.

Sources: Manufacturing production estimated by this Bank; nonfarm, mfg. and nonmfg. emp., mfg. payrolls and hours, and unemp., U.S. Dept. of Labor and cooperating state agencies; cotton consumption, U.S. Bureau of Census; construction contracts, F. W. Dodge Div., McGraw-Hill Information Systems Co.; pet. prod., U.S. Bureau of Mines; farm cash receipts and farm emp., U.S.D.A. Other indexes based on data collected by this Bank. All indexes calculated by this Bank.

Data benchmarked to June 1971 Report of Condition.

NOTE: All employment data have been revised to reflect updated seasonal factors.

Debits to Demand Deposit Accounts

Insured Commercial Banks in the Sixth District

(In Thousand of Dollars)

Gadsden Huntsville Mobile 1. Montgomery 1 Tuscaloosa Bartow-Lakeland Winter Haven Daytona Beach Ft. Lauderdale Hollywood 2 Ft. Myers Gainesville Jacksonville 5. Melbourne- Titusville-Cocoa Miami 7	5,295,585 118,183 463,7 2 0	Sept. 1975 4,995,976 115,521 459,642 1,284,278 864,557	Oct. 1974 4.676.193 112.189 431,139	19 fr Sept.	oct. 975 om Oct. 1974	Year to date 10 mos. 1975 from 1974	Dothan	Oct. 1975 248,959	Sept. 1975 230,446	Oct. 1974 219,423	19 fro Sept. 1975	opt. 975 om Oct. 1974	19
Birmingham 5. Gadsden 5. Huntsville 6. Mobile 1. Montgomery 7. Tuscaloosa 8. Bartow-Lakeland- Winter Haven 0. Daytona Beach 6. Ft. Lauderdale- Hollywood 2. Ft. Myers 6. Gainesville 3. Melbourne 5. Melbourne 7. Titusville-Cocoa 6.	1975 5,295,585 118,183 463,720 1,420,435 950,575	1975 4,995,976 115,521 459,642 1,284,278	1974 4.676.193 112.189	1975		from		1975	1975	1974	1975	1974	fre 19
Birmingham 5. Gadsden 5. Huntsville 6. Mobile 1. Montgomery 7. Tuscaloosa 8. Bartow-Lakeland- Winter Haven 0. Daytona Beach 6. Ft. Lauderdale- Hollywood 2. Ft. Myers 6. Gainesville 3. Melbourne 5. Melbourne 7. Titusville-Cocoa 6.	5,295,585 118,183 463,720 1,420,435 950,575	115.521 459.642 1,284,278	112.189					248.959	230 446	219 423	+ 8	+13	+
Gadsden Huntsville Mobile 1. Montgomery Tuscaloosa Bartow-Lakeland- Winter Haven Daytona Beach Ft. Lauderdale- Hollywood 2 Ft. Myers Gainesville 5 Melbourne- Titusville-Cocoa Miami 7	118,183 463,720 1,420,435 950,575	115.521 459.642 1,284,278	112.189				Selma	94,763	97,062	87,656	- 2	+ 8	+
Gadsden Huntsville Mobile	118,183 463,720 1,420,435 950,575	115.521 459.642 1,284,278	112.189				Bradenton	191.130	177,566	222,091	+ 8	-14	_
Huntsville Mobile 1. Montgomery 1. Mortgomery 1. Mortgomer	463,720 1,420,435 950,575	459.642 1,284,278			+13	+12	Morroe County	91.303	87,158	127,565	+ 5	-28	+
Mobile 1. Mobile 1. Montgomery 1. Tuscaloosa 1. Bartow-Lakeland- Winter Haven 1. Daytona Beach 1. Ft. Lauderdale- Hollywood 2. Ft. Myers 6. Gainesville 1. Jacksonville 5. Melbourne- Titusville-Cocoa 1. Miami 7.	1,420,435 950,575	1,284,278	431,139	+ 2	+ 5	+ 3	Ocala	223 762	205,257	203,069	+ 9	+10	+
Montgomery Tuscaloosa Bartow-Lakeland- Winter Haven Daytona Beach Ft. Lauderdale- Hollywood Ft. Myers Gainesville Jacksonville Melbourne- Titusville-Cocoa Miami 7	950,575			+ 1	+ 8	+ 9	St. Augustine	43.554	43,684	45,590	- 0	- 4	_
Bartow-Lakeland- Winter Haven Daytona Beach Ft. Lauderdale- Hollywood 2 Ft. Myers Gainesville Jacksonville 5 Melbourne- Titusville-Cocoa Miami 7		864,557	1.357,555	+11	+ 5	+15	St. Petersburg		1,018.250	1,010,335	+ 3	+ 3	
Bartow-Lakeland- Winter Haven Daytona Beach Ft. Lauderdale- Hollywood 2 Ft. Myers Gainesville 5 Melbourne- Titusville-Cocoa Miami 7	312.439		719.734	+10	+32	+21	Tampa	2.315.582	2,233,437	2.111.519	+ 4	+10	+
Winter Haven Daytona Beach Ft. Lauderdale Hollywood 2 Ft. Myers Gainesville Jacksonville 5 Melbourne Titusville-Cocoa Miami 7		293,456	257.760	+ 6	+21	+13							
Winter Haven Daylona Beach Ft. Lauderdale Hollywood 2 Ft. Myers Sainesville Jacksonville 5 Melbourne Titusville-Cocoa Miami 7							Athens	181.964	188,212	172,201	- 3	+ 6	+
Daytona Beach Ft. Lauderdale Hollywood 2 Ft. Myers Sainesville 5 Melbourne Titusville-Cocoa Miami 7							Brunswick	123,126	124,716	112,195	- 1	+10	÷
Ft. Lauderdale- Hollywood . 2 Ft. Myers Sainesville Jacksonville Melbourne- Titusville-Cocoa	885,125	818,853	849,265	+ 8	+ 4	+ 6	Dalton	204.466	202,036	193.589	+ 1	+ 6	
Hollywood 2	486,643	429,589	469,361	+13	+ 4	+ 5	Elberton	34,665	31,624	24,602	+10	+41	+
Hollywood							Gainesville	194,471	182,161	178,782	+ 7	+ 9	4
Sainesville	2.006,199	1,743,354	2.075,812	+15	- 3	- 5	Griffin	75.603	77.225	86,494	- 2	-13	_
acksonville 5. Melbourne- Titusville-Cocoa . Miami	415,288	378,481	370.739	+10	+12	+ 8	LaGrange	45.690	41.136	38.027	+11	+20	_
acksonville 5. Melbourne- Titusville-Cocoa . Mami	291,178	257,860	286,960	+13	+ 1	- 3	Newnan	51.468	46.566	52,606	+11	- 2	_
Melbourne- Titusville-Cocoa Miami	5,507,199	5,332,250	4,973,441	+ 3	+11	+ 1	Rome	222,581	196,603	147.285	+13	+51	4
Titusville-Cocoa . Miami							Valdesta	134.590	107,751	125,023	+25	+ 8	4
Miami 7	419.751	393,296	403.203	+ 7	+ 4	- 2	valuesia	134.390	107,731	123,023	123	1 0	
	7,693,450	7,206,281	7.796.720	+ 7	- 1	2							
Orlando 1		1.602.485	1.557.454	+ 8	+11	+ 4	Abbeville	20.682	20,524	18,700	+ 1	+11	+
	754.454	643,580r	542,219	+17	+39	+13	Bunkie	25.801	16.997	24.814	+52	+ 4	+
	541,839	497,869	563,274	+ 9	4	- 3	Hammond	86,846	101,146	106.891	-14	-19	
Tallahassee 1		970,446	958,476	+42	+43	+13	New Iberia	91,511	82,505	67.700	+11	+35	
	4,381,173	4.208.882	4.118.052	+ 4	+ 6	+ 3	Plaquemine	29,202	29,046	27,793	+ 1	+ 5	
W. Palm Beach 1		1,006,333	1,244,638	+ 8	-13	- 8	Thibodaux	68,529	60,698	42,851	+13	+60	4
Albany	220,528	199.836	220,940	+10	- 0	. 3	Hattiesburg	172.893	158.239	138.051	+ 9	+25	
Atlanta	2.968.416	23.670.979	19.591.189	- 3	+17	+11	Laurel	93,346	96,140	85,703	- 3	- 9	
Augusta	612,865	614,000	772,234	- 0	- 21	3	Meridian	148,180	139,689	142,965	+ 6	+ 4	
	501,686	501,419	512,454	+ 0	- 2	+10	Natchez	70,733	63.065	68.117	+12	+ 4	-
Macon	911,181	957,127	835,890	- 5	+ 9	÷ 9	Pascagoula-						
Savannah 1	1,104,940	1,096,493	764,447	+ 1	+45	+ 62	Moss Point	160,272	163,817	161,500	- 2	- 1	+
							Vicksburg	110.520	79,970	132,093	+38	-16	
Alexandria	331,883	331,649	302,190	+ 0	+10	+11	Yazoo City	63,585	97,253	58.343	- 35	+ 9	+
Baton Rouge 2		2.218.900	1.992.298	+ 6	+ 18	119							
		430,706	378,350	+ 7	+21	+29	Bristol	140,124	136.067	161,102	+ 3	-13	_
	313,878	306,196	311,736	+ 3	+ 1	+10	Johnson City	201.883	190.942	167,032	+ 6	+21	+
	5,962,506	5,820,305	5,391,182	+ 2	+11	+13		389.390	347,325	343,657	+12	+13	
Biloxi-Gulfport	328,026	294,872	285,162	+11	+15	+13	Kingsport	309,390	347,323	343,037	1 12	7 13	
Biloxi-Guitport		1,840,565	1,889,777	+ 11	- 2	+ 13 + 2		00 700 555	05 005 0	01 005 07:			
Jackson 1	1,849,055	1,840,565	1,689,777	+ 0	- z	T 2	DISTRICT TOTAL	99,793,502	95,806,815r	91,285,374	+ 4	+ 9	+
Chattanooga 1	1.333.272	1,335,369	1,343,836	- 0	- 1	- 6	Alabama	12.167,943	11,456,092	10.580,133	+ 6	+15	+
Knoxville 1		1,517,861	2,062,368	+15	- 15	17	Florida		27,676,170r		+ 9	+ 5	
	4,729,525	4,192,476	4,405,511	+13	+ 7	+ 9		30.794,901	31,424,210	27,002,607	- 2	+14	
	. ,							11,253,244	10.861.819	9,924,638	+ 4	+13	
THER CENTERS								3,943,951				+ 2	
Anniston		130,913	126,451				Mississippi	3.943.971	3,912,731	3,861,107	+ 1		

Conforms to SMSA definitions as of December 31, 1972.


Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

^{**}Daily average basis tPreliminary data

District portion only.

Figures for some areas differ slightly from preliminary figures published in "Bank Debits and Deposit Turnover" by Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

District Business Conditions



Moderate economic growth continues as 1975 draws to a close. Consumer spending, aided by increased instalment borrowing from banks, rose slowly. Employment expanded slightly. Falling prices dampened the gains in farm cash receipts. Construction activity increased, and deposit growth at financial institutions strengthened.

Employment rose moderately again in October, but the unemployment rate remained unchanged. Nonfarm employment gained strength from manufacturing, which showed increases in all nondurable industries. Even though construction jobs increased for the second month, some momentum was lost in Florida to this still sluggish sector. Nonmanufacturing was strengthened because an upturn in the transportation and public utilities sector offset a two-month downturn in government jobs. Both factory hours and earnings rose again this month, strengthening their upward trends.

Consumer expenditures grew more slowly during September, as the stimulus from tax rebates diminished. Registrations of new cars increased again, and department store sales expanded slightly. As of September, the gains throughout 1975 in income of manufacturing employees were greater than the increase in consumer prices, indicating growth in real income. Consumer instalment credit outstanding at banks increased sharply in October for the first time in over a year. This change primarily reflected a large gain in credit extensions for nonauto consumer goods.

October's downturn in prices received by farmers for most commodities continued into November, according to preliminary data. Bumper crop harvests and weakening export demand depressed

most crop prices, and gains in farm cash receipts were small despite increased production. Although cattle prices rose slightly, hogs and broilers have sold at sharply lower prices, reflecting consumer resistance to high retail prices. U. S. spot prices of foodstuffs were also falling rapidly in mid-November, as prices declined for both the livestock and products group and the fats and oils group. The spot market price index of foodstuffs was down over 25 percent from the year-ago level.

Construction activity expanded in October on the strength of gains in the nonresidential sector. A jump in the value of nonresidential contracts overcame a dip in residential contracts. Mortgage rates tended to stabilize after several months of gradual increase. Deposits flowed into savings and loan associations at record rates in October. Preliminary data indicate record inflows continued into November.

Member bank deposits advanced strongly during early November, following considerable weakness in October. A small part of the gain in savings deposits reflected newly opened business savings accounts. Bank lending has weakened, and some large banks had adopted a 7½-percent prime rate by late November. Holdings of U. S. Government securities posted a strong gain through midmonth.

Note: Data on which statements are based have been adjusted whenever possible to eliminate seasonal influences.