



# Monthly Review

Atlanta, Georgia

November • 1964

## *From Panic to Prosperity*

### The South's Economy and the Federal Reserve

The opening of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta on November 16, 1914, unlike the inauguration of most other banking ventures at that time, was attended by a great deal of publicity, both in Atlanta and throughout the region. This institution, representing an entirely new concept of banking in the United States, brought new hope to southern farmers, businessmen, and bankers who suffered from the frequent financial panics that had become characteristic of the American economy.

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#### **Recurring Panics Gripped the Nation**

The success or failure of a bank in rural Alabama in the opening years of the twentieth century might very well have depended upon what the citizens of New York thought of a copper mine in Montana. Such a relationship may seem a bit far-fetched in the present era in which few banks fail and usually those that do are the victims of poor management or drastic changes in local economic conditions. Back in the 1800's and in the early years of this century, however, large numbers of banks might suspend operations at one time, often as the result of events hundreds of miles away and completely beyond local control.

The nature of the American financial system as it had evolved under the National Banking Act of 1864 was largely responsible for these conditions. The Act required all Federally chartered country banks to maintain a 15-percent cash reserve against deposits, but it permitted them to keep up to three-fifths of this amount at banks in certain designated reserve cities. Banks located in the forty-seven reserve cities had to keep a 25-percent cash reserve, half of which could be deposited in banks in the three central reserve cities. Most state banking laws also permitted state chartered banks to keep some portion of their reserves in large city banks. As financial resources became more and more concentrated, the proportion of business transactions that took place in these cities increased substantially. Accordingly, banks throughout the country found it necessary to keep more of their deposits as reserves in the large city banks to accommodate the needs of their customers who dealt with businesses in these cities. By 1907, half the reserves of national banks were deposited in reserve city banks, and almost one-third of this amount was held by New York City banks alone. This arrangement was profitable for the country banks, for it allowed them to discharge a large portion of their check clearing obligations without frequent, costly currency shipments; at the same time, it satisfied part of their reserve requirements. The reserve city banks also gained, for they were provided with additional funds with which to make loans and investments.

Such a system was also a source of trouble. The southern banks, for example, had widely fluctuating currency needs, depending largely upon the time of year in which crops were planted, harvested, and marketed. Thus, each fall they would draw down their balances at the northern reserve city banks to help finance the cotton crop, forcing

*Federal  
Reserve  
Bank of  
Atlanta*

### Then . . .

*The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta was the smallest of the twelve regional reserve banks opened in the fall of 1914. On December 31 of that year, it held the following proportions of the Federal Reserve System's assets and liabilities:*

- 1.4% of the gold.**
- 2.1% of total cash assets.**
- 2.4% of the reserves of member banks.**
- 11.5% of the Federal Reserve notes issued.**
- 2.7% of total resources.**

*At the same time, the national banks in the six states served by the Atlanta Reserve Bank accounted for:*

- 4.1% of the loans and**
- 3.3% of the deposits of all national banks.**



**The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta opened in offices on the second floor of this building, the largest in the South in 1914.**

those banks to liquidate some of their earning assets. In addition to these seasonal drains, any event that affected the confidence of a number of people could cause a run on banks in various parts of the country, which would quickly lead to withdrawals from the central reserve city banks. The latter then might be forced to suspend currency payments to maintain their own cash reserves. The resulting withdrawal of currency from circulation could bring a halt to trade and a general economic breakdown. Recurring crises or panics of this nature became a characteristic feature of the American scene. Especially sharp contractions occurred in 1873, 1884, 1893, and 1907.

The 1907 panic is particularly interesting because it occurred in the midst of a period of relative prosperity, thus illustrating the vulnerability of the banking system and the entire economy to what would today appear to be a very minor disturbance. The New York banks held cash reserves well above the minimum required by law, although somewhat below the level proved to be necessary in times of crisis. At the same time, however, they had become reserve depositories for many state banks and trust companies, both of which maintained cash reserves below what was considered a prudent level. Thus, the cash needs of the reserve city banks were substantially greater than they had been in the past.

The events leading to the crisis were certainly insignificant enough. A brother of two men involved in speculation in Montana copper properties became president of a small New York bank. Many depositors withdrew their funds from the bank, forcing it to reorganize under new management. Meanwhile, the activities of one of the bank's directors, who also had interests in a number of other banks, came under suspicion. The banks in his chain suffered heavy deposit withdrawals, as did a large trust company whose president was an associate of the man in question. The New York Clearing House failed to come to the aid of any of the state chartered associations involved, and the crisis quickly spread throughout the country as depositors became frightened and country bankers no longer felt that their funds were safe in the New York banks. Currency payments were halted at most major clearing houses, and bank holidays were declared in several states. In Atlanta, for example, the clearing house issued loan certificates in lieu of cash from October 31, 1907, to January 16, 1908, and the banks limited cash withdrawals of customers to \$100 a week.

Factors other than the concentration of bank reserves contributed to this crisis, as well as others, of course. The majority of the banks were too small to provide the sole source of income for management, and officers and directors usually had other interests. At times, these activities interfered with the normal operations of some of the banks and, occasionally, these banks would be called on to finance questionable ventures of their owners. Recurring failures brought on by injudicious management and currency crises resulted in a general lack of public confidence in the banking system.

The crisis of 1907, which probably could have been averted with a little cooperation among bankers, intensified an already vocal demand for reform. Congress launched a five-year study of the entire banking system

that culminated in the passage of the Federal Reserve Act in late 1913. Among other things, this legislation provided for a regional pooling of bank reserves at designated Federal Reserve cities, as well as inter-regional flows of such reserves. Under the then existing system, the cash resources of the reserve city banks had proved inadequate in times of crisis since they had to provide for their own liquidity. One of the purposes of the new Reserve System, therefore, was to provide a last resort source of funds for individual banks in times of special need. At the same time, the Act permitted the nation's currency to fluctuate with the normal seasonal needs of business throughout the country. Removing the need to depend upon the great financial centers, it was hoped, would lead to a more balanced development of the entire United States.

Several southern cities competed vigorously for the regional bank, and the Federal Reserve Organizational Committee held meetings and hearings in a number of them. Atlanta was finally chosen as the site of the Federal Reserve Bank for the deep South because of its central location, superior transportation facilities, and its position as regional headquarters for many national concerns. Atlantans, of course, were pleased to obtain the Bank, but the entire region expected to profit from the facilities provided by the institution. The six states that were located entirely or partly in the newly created Sixth Federal Reserve District—Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee—constituted one of the most economically backward areas of the United States. An arrangement that promised to provide an elastic currency and, at the same time, free funds for investment was bound to be of tremendous benefit.

### **The South Was Underdeveloped**

What was this part of the South like fifty years ago? First and foremost, a major part of the population lived on farms and in small towns. Despite a 50-percent increase during the previous decade in the number of those living in towns with over 2,500 people, only 20 percent of the population was classified as urban in 1910, compared with a 50-percent ratio for the rest of the nation. New Orleans, with a third of a million people, was by far the largest city in the six-state area. Atlanta, Memphis, and Birmingham all had less than half as many people as New Orleans, and Nashville, the only other large city, was about a third as big. Key West was the only city with over 6,000 people south of Tampa.

The population, then, was widely scattered. Social and economic activity was centered in the 495 county seats, each of which contained an average population of a little over twenty thousand. Although the area was served by a good network of railroads, communication between these towns was limited. There were thirty-four telephones for each thousand inhabitants—about one-third the national average—and these were installed only in the larger towns. Residents of the six states had fifty-two thousand registered motor vehicles, but most of them had no place to go. Improved roads were a thing of the future, and total state expenditures for roads in the region were less than \$400,000 in 1914. Lack of good communications

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### **. . . Now**

*By 1964, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta was the sixth largest in the System. On June 30, its holdings of the Federal Reserve System's assets and liabilities had changed to the following proportions:*

- 5.6% of the gold certificates.**
- 5.4% of U. S. Government securities.**
- 5.4% of member bank reserve accounts.**
- 5.7% of the outstanding Federal Reserve notes.**
- 5.9% of total resources.**

*At the same time, member banks in the six District states accounted for:*

- 5.9% of the loans and**
  - 6.5% of the deposits of all member banks.**
- 



**In 1964, the Bank moved into its new quarters, which occupy almost an entire block in downtown Atlanta.**

## Then . . .

*When the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta opened in 1914, the six-state region it served contained the following proportions of the economic assets and liabilities of the United States:*

- 12.1% of total population.**
- 5.3% of the city dwellers.**
- 14.1% of school-age population, but only**
- 11.9% of those attending school, and**
- 30.5% of the nation's illiterates.**
- 31.6% of the persons employed on farms,**  
**who worked on**
- 19.6% of the farms, which accounted for only**
- 5.9% of the value of farm lands and equipment,**
- 13.7% of the value of crops produced,**
- 3.7% of the receipts from sales of animals, and**
- 3.2% of the value of livestock products.**
- 7.5% of the nation's manufacturing establishments.**
- 6.6% of the factory workers, who earned**
- 4.8% of wages and created**
- 4.7% of the value added by manufacture.**

facilities, both a cause and effect of low incomes, precluded cooperative effort to hasten economic development. It also prevented the quick and accurate transmission of information necessary for the smooth functioning of the economy.

The location of the population was reflected in the occupational structure of the six-state area. Out of a work force of almost five million people, over 60 percent were engaged directly in farming and forestry, while less than 13 percent worked in factories. This contrasted sharply with the remainder of the nation, where each of these categories employed about 30 percent of the labor force.

The region's farms, which provided the major source of income in each of the six states, were, on an average, much poorer than those in the rest of the country. The typical farm property, including land, buildings, machinery, and livestock, was worth less than \$2,000 in 1909, or about one-fourth that of the rest of the nation and one-third of the value achieved in this area in 1860. The receipts from the sale of animals and livestock products plus the value of all crops produced averaged \$670 per farm, compared with \$1,370 in the remaining states. Such sharp differences resulted from a number of factors: The farms in this area were about 60 percent as large as those in the rest of the nation; a smaller proportion of the land on each farm was improved; less of the improved land was planted in crops; and the income from sales of animals and livestock products was only a small portion of the total, while it amounted to half the value of crops in the rest of the country.

The plight of the factory worker in the deep South was probably no better than that of his agrarian cousins. Most production workers averaged close to sixty hours a week on the job, or five to ten hours longer than workers in the North and West. Despite more time spent at work, however, the typical southern wage earner made only \$380 per year, compared with \$530 elsewhere in the nation. The value of the products he turned out was less than two-thirds that of the remainder of the country. Children constituted a larger part of the work force and women a smaller proportion than in other parts of the United States.

This part of the South, then, found itself in a sort of vicious circle of underdevelopment. Incomes were low; consequently, savings were low. The highly seasonal nature of production meant that funds needed for investment had to remain idle to accommodate currency needs in the fall and spring, while the low market potential and the lack of an educated labor force in the region discouraged the inflow of funds from other areas.

Such were the broad economic characteristics of the states to be served by the new Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. During the summer of 1914, some of the more undesirable aspects of these qualities were brought to the fore. Over six and a half million bales of cotton had been produced in the six-state region, a substantial increase over 1913's yield, which was a near record. At the same time, war had broken out in Europe, the cotton industry's principal market, and naval blockades halted shipments to many countries. The fiber began to pile up,



Courtesy of Atlanta Historical Society.

**The South was predominantly rural, and most of the cities looked more like overgrown towns than future metropolitan centers.**

and the price dropped steadily from around thirteen cents to a little over five cents a pound. Farmers were unable to repay their bank loans, bankers were unable to obtain funds to finance other business, and trade in general was paralyzed.

### **Federal Reserve Promised Relief**

The cotton crisis was one of the reasons the Federal Reserve Board decided to open the regional banks in late 1914, rather than at a later date as was originally intended. The Board was instrumental in the creation and successful implementation of the cotton loan fund, whereby banks in New York and other clearing house cities outside the cotton-producing areas pledged \$100 million for long-term loans on cotton. This action, coupled with the opening of the Federal Reserve Banks, which released millions of dollars worth of reserves to back up new short-term loans, went a long way toward restoring confidence and averting a more serious crisis.

The apparent need for a Federal Reserve Bank in the South was illustrated quite vividly during the Bank's first year of operation. In the thirteen and one-half months ending on December 31, 1915, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, which held less than 3 percent of the resources of the entire System, discounted over \$35 million worth of commercial paper for member banks, or almost 20 percent of the total for all Federal Reserve Banks. As many as half the member banks were accommodated at one time. And, as early as October 1915, the Atlanta Bank was able to report in the *Federal Reserve Bulletin* that:

The bright outlook in the cotton market, marked by the rapid and continued advance in the price of cotton, is the most important factor in the business situation in the Sixth District. The knowledge that the Federal Reserve System is now thoroughly organized and in position to render efficient aid to the agricultural, commercial and industrial life of this section has had a marked effect in restoring confidence.

The Federal Reserve System, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, and the region that it serves have undergone important changes during the past fifty years. The original assumption underlying the rediscount mechanism, that credit flows would be automatically regulated by prices and international gold movements, was abandoned in the light of experience. The Reserve System thus moved from a position of passively rediscounting commercial paper to one of actively striving through open market operations and other techniques to influence the volume of available credit. In addition to its original goal of providing an elastic currency, the System has also sought to provide a financial climate conducive to prosperity and high employment of the nation's resources. At the same time, its original function as a lender of last resort in times of great need remains intact, although it is seldom called upon for this purpose.

As the functions of the Reserve System changed and its duties expanded, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta increased its range of responsibility. Branches were established in New Orleans in 1915, in Jacksonville and Birmingham in 1918, and in Nashville in 1919. From a

. . . **Now**

*Fifty years later, the states in this region had increased their share of almost all the important economic variables:*

- 11.8% of total population.**
- 9.9% of the urban population.**
- 12.7% of the school-age population.**
- 12.3% of those attending school.**
- 16.2% of the nation's farm employment.**
- 17.2% of the farms, which accounted for**
  - 8.7% of the value of land and buildings.**
  - 10.2% of the value of farm products.**
  - 8.7% of the manufacturing establishments.**
  - 8.6% of the production workers, who earned**
    - 6.8% of factory wages and created**
      - 7.0% of the value added by manufacture.**



Courtesy of Atlanta Chamber of Commerce.  
**Skyscrapers dot the southern landscape in 1964, as an increasingly greater part of the population is drawn to the economic opportunities provided by the urban centers.**

single office employing fourteen persons primarily concerned with rediscounting the commercial paper of member banks, the Atlanta Bank has grown to a five-office operation with over 1,350 employees engaged in check clearing, maintaining U. S. Treasury accounts, issuing and redeeming U. S. Government securities, bank supervision and examination, economic research, supplying currency and coin, and many other tasks that contribute to the smooth functioning of the region's economy. The operations of this and the eleven other Federal Reserve Banks and the safeguards inherent in the decentralized process of monetary policy formulation have justified the controversial concept of a regional central reserve banking system.

The six-state area served by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta has not yet achieved a level of income equal to the average of the rest of the nation. In 1914, the gap was widening, and the prospects for future growth appeared to be quite dim. In 1964, however, the differences were narrowing, and the region was recognized as one of the major growth areas in the United States. Many factors have been responsible for these changes, but it is doubtful that they would have occurred in the absence of the monetary stability provided by the Federal Reserve System.

ROBERT M. YOUNG

## Bank Announcements

On October 8, the FIRST STATE BANK OF STOCKBRIDGE, Stockbridge, Georgia, a newly organized nonmember bank, opened for business and began to remit at par for checks drawn on it when received from the Federal Reserve Bank. Officers are J. T. Mays, President; Virlyn Slaton, Chairman of the Board; and Paul B. Christenbury, Executive Vice President and Cashier. Capital is \$100,000, and surplus and undivided profits, \$100,000.

The BALDWIN NATIONAL BANK OF ROBERTSDALE, Robertsdale, Alabama, a conversion of the Central Baldwin Bank, a nonmember State bank, opened for business on October 13 as a national bank. Officers include M. W. Baldwin, President; Robert I. Gullledge, Executive Vice President; James W. Cooper, Vice President and Cashier; and T. W. Mitchell, Vice President. Capital is \$100,000, and surplus and undivided profits, \$297,916, as reported by the Comptroller of Currency at the time of the conversion.

On October 26, the UNITED NATIONAL BANK, Miami, Florida, a newly organized member bank, opened for business and began to remit at par. Officers are Frank Smathers, Jr., President; Frank E. Peuser, Senior Vice President; Robert Van Westerborg, Vice President and Cashier; Herbert H. Hellmann, Vice President; and Dennis P. Clum, Vice President and Trust Officer. Capital is \$2,000,000, and surplus and other capital funds, \$1,000,000, as reported by the Comptroller of Currency at the time the charter was granted.

The PEOPLES NATIONAL BANK OF BAY HARBOR ISLANDS, Bay Harbor Islands, Florida, a newly organized member bank, opened for business on October 28 and began to remit at par. Officers include Leonard Usina, Chairman of the Board; Frank H. Willer, Vice Chairman; Morris N. Broad, President; Carl E. Bowdre, Executive Vice President; and Roland M. Stafford, Vice President and Cashier. Capital is \$260,000, and surplus and other capital funds, \$160,000, as reported by the Comptroller of Currency at the time the charter was granted.

## Debits to Demand Deposit Accounts Insured Commercial Banks in the Sixth District

(In Thousands of Dollars)

	Sept. 1964	Aug. 1964	Percent Change			
			Year-to-date 9 Months		1964	
			Sept. 1964	Aug. 1964	Sept. 1963	from 1963
<b>STANDARD METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS†</b>						
Birmingham . . . . .	1,171,211	1,156,865	1,009,280	+1	+16	+11
Gadsden . . . . .	57,460	58,615	52,032	-2	+10	+10
Huntsville . . . . .	150,966	140,020	128,221	+8	+18	+20
Mobile . . . . .	395,025	382,801	365,002	+3	+8	+8
Montgomery . . . . .	256,148	257,416	226,733	-1	+13	+6
Tuscaloosa . . . . .	76,359	70,256	66,051	+9	+16	+9
<b>Ft. Lauderdale-</b>						
Hollywood . . . . .	372,235	344,432	326,393	+8	+14	+12
Jacksonville . . . . .	1,091,668	1,110,151	995,542	-2	+10	+14
Miami . . . . .	1,561,667	1,412,151	1,383,282	+11	+13	+7
Orlando . . . . .	395,235	404,379	380,747	-2	+4	+10
Pensacola . . . . .	162,893	152,815	129,015	+7	+26	+14
<b>Tampa-</b>						
St. Petersburg . . . . .	966,134	919,406	860,206	+5	+12	+9
W. Palm Beach . . . . .	265,979	250,866	241,391	+6	+10	+10
<b>Albany</b>						
Atlanta . . . . .	80,230	64,478	66,512	+24	+21	+11
Atlanta . . . . .	3,499,002	3,271,513	3,209,169	+7	+9	+6
Augusta* . . . . .	155,258	163,019	139,571	-5	+11	+9
Columbus . . . . .	191,284	182,961	155,202	+5	+23	+19
Macon . . . . .	181,296	170,180r	163,532	+7	+11	+9
Savannah . . . . .	204,922	200,493	191,402	+2	+7	+10
<b>Baton Rouge</b>						
Lafayette . . . . .	371,512	349,877	342,097	+6	+9	+6
Lafayette . . . . .	82,898	84,050	72,557	-1	+14	+9
Lake Charles . . . . .	97,143	98,370	93,689	+9	+4	+3
New Orleans . . . . .	1,873,596	1,754,823	1,587,034	+7	+18	+11
<b>Jackson</b>						
Jackson . . . . .	448,330	426,483	398,105	+5	+13	+12
<b>Chattanooga</b>						
Chattanooga . . . . .	425,798	408,006	388,560	+4	+10	+9
Knoxville . . . . .	362,027	356,719	345,950	+2	+5	+7
Nashville . . . . .	1,085,339	1,060,660	1,028,540	+2	+6	+12
<b>OTHER CENTERS</b>						
Anniston . . . . .	53,606	49,799	49,099	+8	+9	+6
Dothan . . . . .	52,255	43,888	48,698	+19	+7	+7
Selma . . . . .	37,096	31,946	34,551	+16	+7	+12
<b>Bartow</b>						
Bartow . . . . .	25,183	20,993	20,554	+20	+23	+13
Bradenton . . . . .	40,650	40,398	39,962	+1	+2	+4
Brevard County . . . . .	148,519	152,193	133,391	-2	+11	+26
Daytona Beach . . . . .	63,232	65,952	67,149	-4	-6	+6
<b>Ft. Myers</b>						
N. Ft. Myers . . . . .	52,116	48,999	48,599	+6	+7	+7
Gainesville . . . . .	65,130	59,958	56,710	+9	+15	+14
Key West . . . . .	18,042	17,829	16,601	+1	+9	+10
Lakeland . . . . .	90,724	81,340	78,628	+12	+15	+5
Ocala . . . . .	42,905	41,433	39,904	+4	+8	+5
St. Augustine . . . . .	14,750	15,590	14,360	-5	+3	+4
St. Petersburg . . . . .	233,460	222,870	210,068	+5	+11	+8
Sarasota . . . . .	73,477	69,046	72,883	+6	+1	+4
Tallahassee . . . . .	87,977	88,466	76,136	-1	+16	+12
Tampa . . . . .	506,533	489,604	452,402	+3	+12	+9
Winter Haven . . . . .	44,164	43,556	41,534	+1	+6	+14
<b>Athens</b>						
Athens . . . . .	53,776	51,234	46,122	+5	+17	+11
Brunswick . . . . .	37,183	36,908	32,918	+1	+13	+9
Dalton . . . . .	79,472	71,323	71,629	+11	+11	+20
Elberton . . . . .	11,934	10,567	9,613	+13	+24	+12
Gainesville . . . . .	61,617	60,761	56,577	+1	+9	+7
Griffin . . . . .	26,727	25,112	23,437	+6	+14	+10
LaGrange . . . . .	18,547	17,615	16,542	+5	+12	+12
Newnan . . . . .	25,913	23,050	20,374	+12	+27	+10
Rome . . . . .	57,555	55,079	55,560	+4	+4	+11
Valdosta . . . . .	43,090	47,543	37,349	-9	+15	+12
<b>Abbeville</b>						
Abbeville . . . . .	10,779	7,560	9,110	+43	+18	+7
Alexandria . . . . .	96,524	97,894	84,587	-1	+14	+11
Bunkie . . . . .	5,273	4,535	5,287	+16	-0	+2
Hammond . . . . .	28,128	25,314	22,590	+11	+25	+9
New Iberia . . . . .	28,918	27,148	26,734	+7	+8	+17
Plaquemine . . . . .	7,399	7,853	6,831	+6	+8	+15
Thibodaux . . . . .	17,484	15,730	20,947	-11	-17	+9
<b>Biloxi-Gulfport</b>						
Biloxi-Gulfport . . . . .	70,707	70,593	70,402	+0	+0	+5
Hattiesburg . . . . .	41,268	41,955	39,555	-2	+4	+6
Laurel . . . . .	30,747	31,089	29,775	-1	+3	+8
Meridian . . . . .	53,416	53,456	53,039	-0	+1	+3
Natchez . . . . .	31,217	29,216	27,850	+7	+12	+11
<b>Pascagoula-</b>						
Moss Point . . . . .	39,054	46,675	38,369	-16	+2	+10
Vicksburg . . . . .	31,433	30,365	27,526	+4	+14	+13
Yazoo City . . . . .	20,228	43,612	19,030	-54	+6	+12
<b>Bristol</b>						
Bristol . . . . .	56,807	53,801	53,657	+6	+6	-1
Johnson City . . . . .	59,681	56,195	51,033	+6	+17	+13
Kingsport . . . . .	106,753	105,530	96,916	+1	+10	+13
<b>SIXTH DISTRICT, Total</b>						
Alabama† . . . . .	3,165,144	3,081,932	2,752,301	+3	+15	+11
Florida† . . . . .	6,559,777	6,265,308	5,981,904	+5	+10	+9
Georgia† . . . . .	5,788,547	5,440,364r	5,300,606	+6	+9	+7
Louisiana†** . . . . .	3,193,732	3,007,281	2,772,594	+6	+15	+10
Mississippi†** . . . . .	1,037,418	1,047,897	949,256	-1	+9	+10
Tennessee†** . . . . .	2,812,366	2,735,765	2,725,544	+3	+3	+9
U.S., 344 Cities . . . . .	340,900,000	319,400,000r	310,400,000	+7	+10	+11

\*Richmond County only.  
†Partially estimated.

\*\*Includes only banks in the Sixth District portion of the state.  
r Revised.

# Sixth District Statistics

## Seasonally Adjusted


(All data are indexes, 1957-59 = 100, unless indicated otherwise.)

	Latest Month (1964)	One Month Ago	Two Months Ago	One Year Ago		Latest Month (1964)	One Month Ago	Two Months Ago	One Year Ago
<b>SIXTH DISTRICT</b>					<b>GEORGIA</b>				
<b>INCOME AND SPENDING</b>					<b>INCOME AND SPENDING</b>				
Personal Income, (Mil. \$, Annual Rate)	Aug. 44,745	44,620r	43,537r	41,750	Personal Income, (Mil. \$, Annual Rate)	Aug. 8,398	8,347r	8,217r	7,956
Manufacturing Payrolls	Sept. 146	146r	144	138	Manufacturing Payrolls	Sept. 147	142r	143	136
Farm Cash Receipts	Aug. 123	115	110	128	Farm Cash Receipts	Aug. 131	102	116	126
Crops	Aug. 141	99	101	144	Department Store Sales**	Sept. 130	139	123	125
Livestock	Aug. 115	121	113	117	<b>PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT</b>				
Department Store Sales**	Oct. 139p	136	143	121	Nonfarm Employment	Sept. 118	117	118	115
Instalment Credit at Banks, *(Mil. \$)					Manufacturing	Sept. 114	111	113	110
New Loans	Sept. 178	174	191	163	Nonmanufacturing	Sept. 120	120	120	117
Repayments	Sept. 183	190	183	173	Construction	Sept. 126	129r	130	121
<b>PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT</b>					Farm Employment	Sept. 75	83	88	96
Nonfarm Employment	Sept. 117	116	116	113	Insured Unemployment, (Percent of Gov. Emp.)	Sept. 2.4	2.6	2.2	3.0
Manufacturing	Sept. 115	114	114	112	Avg. Weekly Hrs. in Mfg., (Hrs.)	Sept. 40.1	40.8r	40.3	40.0
Apparel	Sept. 136	136	136	132	<b>FINANCE AND BANKING</b>				
Chemicals	Sept. 112	111	112	109	Member Bank Loans	Sept. 183	183	182	164
Fabricated Metals	Sept. 123	120	120	115	Member Bank Deposits	Sept. 154	148	149	137
Food	Sept. 108	107	106	106	Bank Debits**	Sept. 165	163	159r	160
Lbr., Wood Prod., Furn. & Fix.	Sept. 93	92	94	93	<b>LOUISIANA</b>				
Paper	Sept. 111	109	110	108	<b>INCOME AND SPENDING</b>				
Primary Metals	Sept. 105	103	103	102	Personal Income, (Mil. \$, Annual Rate)	Aug. 6,529	6,474r	6,375r	6,156
Textiles	Sept. 95	95	96	94	Manufacturing Payrolls	Sept. 133	129	127	125
Transportation Equipment	Sept. 131	121	126	121	Farm Cash Receipts	Aug. 131	113	110	158
Nonmanufacturing	Sept. 117	117	117	114	Department Store Sales**	Sept. 115	125	118	112
Construction	Sept. 107	107	107	101	<b>PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT</b>				
Farm Employment	Sept. 75	78	85	85	Nonfarm Employment	Sept. 105	104	104	103
Insured Unemployment, (Percent of Gov. Emp.)	Sept. 2.8	2.9	2.9	3.5	Manufacturing	Sept. 102	101r	100	99
Avg. Weekly Hrs. in Mfg., (Hrs.)	Sept. 40.6	41.1	40.7	41.1	Nonmanufacturing	Sept. 106	105	105	104
Construction Contracts*	Sept. 153	129	174	145	Construction	Sept. 90	90	89	83
Residential	Sept. 146	145	173	145	Farm Employment	Sept. 80	89	88	81
All Other	Sept. 160	116	174	144	Insured Unemployment, (Percent of Gov. Emp.)	Sept. 3.0	3.3	3.4	3.8
Industrial Use of Electric Power	Aug. 119	121	126	116	Avg. Weekly Hrs. in Mfg., (Hrs.)	Sept. 42.1	41.7	41.4	42.9
Cotton Consumption**	Sept. 107	110	113	103	<b>FINANCE AND BANKING</b>				
Petrol. Prod. in Coastal La. and Miss.**	Sept. 180	174	170r	163	Member Bank Loans*	Sept. 167	162	164	145
<b>FINANCE AND BANKING</b>					Member Bank Deposits*	Sept. 134	129	127	122
Member Bank Loans*	Sept. 183	180	177	158	Bank Debits**	Sept. 139	141	133	127
All Banks	Oct. 170	170	166	154	<b>MISSISSIPPI</b>				
Leading Cities					<b>INCOME AND SPENDING</b>				
Member Bank Deposits*	Sept. 148	144	143	135	Personal Income, (Mil. \$, Annual Rate)	Aug. 3,346	3,369r	3,372r	3,122
All Banks	Oct. 136	140	136	125	Manufacturing Payrolls	Sept. 156	157	156	147
Leading Cities	Oct. 152	153r	145	146	Farm Cash Receipts	Aug. 124	121	131	132
Bank Debits**					Department Store Sales**	Sept. 96	108	93	96
<b>ALABAMA</b>					<b>PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT</b>				
<b>INCOME AND SPENDING</b>					Nonfarm Employment	Sept. 119	119	118	116
Personal Income, (Mil. \$, Annual Rate)	Aug. 6,050	6,090r	5,968r	5,747	Manufacturing	Sept. 123	123	122	118
Manufacturing Payrolls	Sept. 135	133r	129	126	Nonmanufacturing	Sept. 117	117	117	116
Farm Cash Receipts	Aug. 120	132	119	133	Construction	Sept. 123	120	117	119
Department Store Sales**	Sept. 109	118	111	103	Farm Employment	Sept. 61	67	80	66
<b>PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT</b>					Insured Unemployment, (Percent of Gov. Emp.)	Sept. 3.3	3.4	3.4	4.5
Nonfarm Employment	Sept. 109	109	109	107	Avg. Weekly Hrs. in Mfg., (Hrs.)	Sept. 40.5	40.3r	40.8	40.8
Manufacturing	Sept. 105	104	105	102	<b>FINANCE AND BANKING</b>				
Nonmanufacturing	Sept. 111	111	111	109	Member Bank Loans*	Sept. 202	198	190	177
Construction	Sept. 101	102	102	100	Member Bank Deposits*	Sept. 159	156	157	147
Farm Employment	Sept. 74	69	83	82	Bank Debits**	Sept. 159	166	147	154
Insured Unemployment, (Percent of Gov. Emp.)	Sept. 2.8	3.0	3.1	4.1	<b>FLORIDA</b>				
Avg. Weekly Hrs. in Mfg., (Hrs.)	Sept. 41.2	41.5	40.2	40.8	<b>INCOME AND SPENDING</b>				
<b>FINANCE AND BANKING</b>					Personal Income, (Mil. \$, Annual Rate)	Aug. 13,196	13,104r	12,525r	12,080
Member Bank Loans	Sept. 180	176	173	157	Manufacturing Payrolls	Sept. 168	176	172	165
Member Bank Deposits	Sept. 149	145	144	134	Farm Cash Receipts	Aug. 122	113	79	118
Bank Debits**	Sept. 150	158	141	138	Department Store Sales**	Sept. 175	179	170	166
<b>PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT</b>					<b>PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT</b>				
Nonfarm Employment	Sept. 127	127	126	122	Nonfarm Employment	Sept. 117	117	117	113
Manufacturing	Sept. 130	130	130	126	Manufacturing	Sept. 119	120r	119	116
Nonmanufacturing	Sept. 127	126	125	121	Nonmanufacturing	Sept. 116	115r	116	111
Construction	Sept. 99	98	98	92	Construction	Sept. 139	139	140	130
Farm Employment	Sept. 91	82	94	98	Farm Employment	Sept. 80	83	86	93
Insured Unemployment, (Percent of Gov. Emp.)	Sept. 2.6	2.5	2.6	2.8	Insured Unemployment, (Percent of Gov. Emp.)	Sept. 3.2	3.3	3.4	4.0
Avg. Weekly Hrs. in Mfg., (Hrs.)	Sept. 40.3	41.7	41.5	41.7	Avg. Weekly Hrs. in Mfg., (Hrs.)	Sept. 40.5	40.7r	40.8	41.3
<b>FINANCE AND BANKING</b>					<b>FINANCE AND BANKING</b>				
Member Bank Loans	Sept. 189	183	183	157	Member Bank Loans*	Sept. 187	185	174	161
Member Bank Deposits	Sept. 149	146	144	138	Member Bank Deposits*	Sept. 152	148	142	135
Bank Debits**	Sept. 148	149	143	143	Bank Debits**	Sept. 156	152	145	160
<b>TENNESSEE</b>					<b>INCOME AND SPENDING</b>				
<b>INCOME AND SPENDING</b>					Personal Income, (Mil. \$, Annual Rate)	Aug. 7,226	7,236r	7,080r	6,689
Personal Income, (Mil. \$, Annual Rate)	Aug. 7,226	7,236r	7,080r	6,689	Manufacturing Payrolls	Sept. 146	146r	144	138
Manufacturing Payrolls	Sept. 146	146r	144	138	Farm Cash Receipts	Aug. 109	113	112	114
Farm Cash Receipts	Aug. 109	113	112	114	Department Store Sales**	Sept. 118	122	110	115
Department Store Sales**	Sept. 118	122	110	115	<b>PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT</b>				
<b>PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT</b>					Nonfarm Employment	Sept. 117	117	117	113
Nonfarm Employment	Sept. 117	117	117	113	Manufacturing	Sept. 119	120r	119	116
Manufacturing	Sept. 119	120r	119	116	Nonmanufacturing	Sept. 116	115r	116	111
Nonmanufacturing	Sept. 116	115r	116	111	Construction	Sept. 139	139	140	130
Construction	Sept. 139	139	140	130	Farm Employment	Sept. 80	83	86	93
Farm Employment	Sept. 80	83	86	93	Insured Unemployment, (Percent of Gov. Emp.)	Sept. 3.2	3.3	3.4	4.0
Insured Unemployment, (Percent of Gov. Emp.)	Sept. 3.2	3.3	3.4	4.0	Avg. Weekly Hrs. in Mfg., (Hrs.)	Sept. 40.5	40.7r	40.8	41.3
Avg. Weekly Hrs. in Mfg., (Hrs.)	Sept. 40.5	40.7r	40.8	41.3	<b>FINANCE AND BANKING</b>				
<b>FINANCE AND BANKING</b>					Member Bank Loans*	Sept. 187	185	174	161
Member Bank Loans*	Sept. 187	185	174	161	Member Bank Deposits*	Sept. 152	148	142	135
Member Bank Deposits*	Sept. 152	148	142	135	Bank Debits**	Sept. 156	152	145	160
Bank Debits**	Sept. 156	152	145	160					

\*For Sixth District area only. Other totals for entire six states. \*\*Daily average basis. r Revised. p Preliminary.

Sources: Personal income estimated by this Bank; nonfarm, mfg. and nonmfg. emp., mfg. payrolls and hours, and unemp., U. S. Dept. of Labor and cooperating state agencies; cotton consumption, U. S. Bureau of Census; construction contracts, F. W. Dodge Corp.; petrol. prod., U. S. Bureau of Mines; industrial use of elec. power, Fed. Power Comm.; farm cash receipts and farm emp., U.S.D.A. Other indexes based on data collected by this Bank. All indexes calculated by this Bank.

# DISTRICT BUSINESS CONDITIONS



**T**he District economy is still breezing along. Although harvesting activity has been hindered in some areas by hurricanes, the agricultural sector is generally healthy. The number of nonfarm jobs continues to increase, and insured unemployment is at a low level. Member bank deposits and loans expanded further, and the consumer is repaying his bank instalment debts faster than he is acquiring new ones. The construction industry is continuing to benefit from the vigorous growth of population and industry.

Harvesting operations were hampered by hurricanes Hilda and Isbell and by the above-average rainfall and below-average temperatures that prevailed throughout the District. Although Hilda caused widespread damage to the Louisiana sugarcane crop, losses will not be as high as preliminary reports indicated. Damage from Isbell was largely confined to the Everglades vegetable-producing area of Florida. While cool, damp weather in many areas has delayed maturity and caused a deterioration in the quality of some crops, total production of most crops will remain near or above last year's level. However, prices received by farmers for crops and livestock remain well below those of a year ago.

Additional nonmanufacturing jobs continued to boost total nonagricultural employment in all District states in September. Losses in manufacturing curbed this gain in Florida and Tennessee, however. Manufacturing payrolls were also down in these states, as well as in Mississippi. The factory workweek was shorter in all states except Louisiana and Mississippi. Primary and fabricated metal activity has been strong, and transportation equipment employment rebounded strongly from the auto model changeover (the effect of the strike at assembly plants will show up in the October data). Insured unemployment reached its lowest level since January 1948.

Member banks registered substantial gains in both loans and deposits during September. Paced by an upturn in private demand deposits, total deposits rose at a greater rate than in any previous month during the present expansion. Lending activity was brisker than at any time since last spring, with security loans and loans to nonbank financial institutions especially strong. Investments rose slightly but fell short of the June record. Reports from banks in leading cities indicate that loans continued to increase through mid-October, while deposits and investments declined slightly.

Consumer instalment credit outstanding at commercial banks declined in September for the second straight month. New extensions recently have been running at about the average rate for the year to date, but repayments in July, August, and September were well above those earlier in the year. Consumers continued to add to their savings in September, although at a slower rate than in earlier months. Personal income rose slightly in August, the latest month for which data are available. Department store sales, usually erratic, were down sharply in September but appear to be regaining ground in October. Bank debits also slipped a bit in September from the record August level.

Total volume of construction contract awards in September recovered substantially from the low mark of August. Residential awards, the most stable component of the total, continued their gradual readjustment to more realistic rates of growth following the sharp bulge at the beginning of the year. While fourth-quarter gains comparable to last year's steep climb may be difficult to achieve, prospects appear good for continued high volume. Heavy backlogs of projects in the planning stage, an uptrend in nonresidential building awards, and a strong demand for mortgages in the national market underlie the good construction outlook for the District.

NOTE: Data on which statements are based have been adjusted whenever possible to eliminate seasonal influences.