FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK REVIEW

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We will not achieve full employment and security by wishful thinking alone. Nor is inflation avoided just because we don't like it.

The task ahead of us is unmistakable: we must boost production and jobs as fast as possible, and we must hold the line against run-away inflation until the necessary balance of production and consumption removes the threat.

Cooperative action is required to accomplish these purposes. The interests of the Government, of industry, the banker and the businessman, the employed worker and the farmer, are bound up together and are inseparable. Special interests are narrow interests. But as each group has a real interest at stake, so each has a real responsibility.

John W. Snyder

Director
War Mobilization and Reconversion

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REVIEW

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POSTWAR HOUSING PROBLEMS IN PERSPECTIVE

Faced again with a tremendous housing problem in reconverting to peace, what can be learned from past experience? This article, without attempting to draw too close analogies, reviews the last postwar period as a guide to current thought and action.

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■ IN the past few months we have come to grips with the stern realities of conversion from war to peace. In the field of international relations we are beginning to sense that total wars do not end in the kind of victory that permits armies simply to go home or peoples to pick up where they had left off when the fighting started. War leaves deep scars and irritations which it takes years of patient effort to heal. On the domestic scene, the beautiful long-range projections of boundless prosperity do not seem to jell with the front page news which impresses us with the aches and frictions of readjustment.

A Short-Run Emergency Ahead

There is perhaps no sector of our economy in which the temporary aches and frictions are as pronounced as in housing. At the same time, there is perhaps no field which holds as great and real a promise of prosperity in the long pull. A realistic appraisal of the short-run prospects, however, points toward staggering problems the solution of which will require wise stewardship of all elements of the building and home financing industries as well as of Government. We are confronted with the uncomfortable fact that, for some time to come, the housing supply will be lagging behind an impatient *effective* demand. One of the controlling elements in this picture is the rapid demobilization of our armed forces, which is returning hundreds of thousands of married veterans who have either given up their homes or had never established households of their own and will be in the market for living quarters, plus single veterans who are early candidates for marriage.

Such a situation can touch off sound capacity operation of the building and home financing industries over a number of years. It can also be the basis for an explosive short-run boom similar to that experienced after World War I, with price excesses in new as well as existing property, over-extension of home purchasers, narrowing of the market, and a subsequent collapse. For even under the most favorable circumstances it will take time for the building industry to inject into the market the only sure antidote to inflation: more production at prices within consumers' capacity to pay.

Parallels in War Experience

These problems are not entirely novel. We faced a similar set of circumstances only a generation ago, after the end of World War I. The story of this experience is told in a document issued by the National Housing Agency in its series of bulletins and entitled *Housing After World War I.*[1] The report warns that analogies should not be pushed too far but it adds that study of this experience "may well serve to sharpen up both our understanding of current problems and the judgments of business, consumers and government in the crucial period ahead of us."

The pattern of our national economy during World War II paralleled in many respects that of World War I. During the 19 months of the first war, nine million workers were drawn into war occupations and four million more into the armed services—over 30 percent of the 1914 labor force. At the peak of the war effort about 25 percent of our production was for war purposes. The recent global conflict, however, lasted 45 months, required about one-half of all the gainfully employed in either the armed forces or in war production, and diverted almost 45 percent of the national production from peacetime uses. More noteworthy by contrast is the history of price changes. During all previous major wars in American history there has been a sharp increase in wholesale commodity prices, followed by a drastic decline some time after the war. During World War I wholesale commodity prices increased 100 percent over the 1914 level, the cost of living index went up about 60 percent, and the national income increased about 70 percent—while physical production volume averaged but 25–30 percent higher. Prices in World War II have been controlled much more effectively. Wholesale commodity prices rose 37 percent from 1939, and the cost of living index increased about

[1] National Housing Bulletin 4, *Housing After World War I, Will History Repeat Itself?* Office of the Administrator, National Housing Agency, Washington 25, D. C., October 15, 1945.

30 percent. But national income bounded to $160 billion, roughly 125 percent higher than prewar, and industrial production increased to more than double the 1939 volume.

Construction activity was rather high throughout the first World War, sustained in 1917 and 1918 by large expenditures for military purposes. Residential building, however, was in a downswing when hostilities began in 1914, and dropped sharply to a level of 174,000 new units in 1918—almost a 60-percent reduction from 1914. Twenty-five years later, when war again broke out in Europe, residential construction was in an upswing and reached a peak of 715,000 nonfarm units in 1941. Thereafter activity dropped rapidly despite the substantial volume of war housing built in 1942 and 1943. By 1944 only 169,000 nonfarm dwelling units (private and public combined) were started—a decline of about two-thirds from the 1939 level. When VJ Day came in 1945 the entire construction industry was operating at low levels, having completed the bulk of industrial, public and military building in earlier years of the war; but by Armistice Day in 1918, construction for war purposes was far from completed, and the industry was in rather high gear.

Controls on building and ceilings on prices of construction materials did not appear in World War I until March 1918, nearly a year after we entered the conflict, and they were less direct and drastic than in World War II. There was no Federal control of rents.

Construction costs—materials and labor—rose 50–75 percent during the first World War. Wholesale building material prices increased 93 percent, only slightly less than the rise in the all-commodity wholesale price index; union wage scales were up 23 percent. In World War II both labor and building material costs advanced about one-third.



Postwar Uncertainty and Boom

Here the parallels and contrasts that can be drawn between the two periods must end until history of the post World War II era unfolds. The first few months after the Armistice in November 1918 presented a deceptive picture. There was no immediate burst of peacetime business activity.

This period (from November 1918 to spring 1919) was characterized by the shock of sudden peace, contract cancellations, some labor surpluses, uncertainty and hand-to-mouth buying. Prices and production declined slowly while buyers waited and manufacturers proceeded with reconversion. Despite a housing shortage estimated at over a million units, new construction did not mushroom immediately. Peace had come in the "off-season," and materials were scarce. There was no warning of the impending boom. On the record of these few months, the removal of wartime controls seemed justified. Within three weeks after November 11, all construction controls had been taken off, and in less than three months all major wartime controls had been eliminated.

When, in the spring of 1919, domestic and foreign demand reached unprecedented volume, the industrial and distributive machinery was not ready to respond. The result was an explosion of the price structure. Wholesale prices started up in March 1919, first slowly and then in accelerating tempo. Efforts to build up rapidly dwindling inventories, uncertain deliveries due to strikes and transportation difficulties, duplicate orders and liberal bank credit, all combined to engender a buyers' panic at successively higher price levels. By May 1920 all-commodity wholesale prices were 23 percent above the wartime high and 145 percent above the 1914 level.

During this period (from spring 1919 to spring 1920) there was a veritable deluge of construction contracts and building permits. Residential construction awards reached a peak in mid-year 1919 at a point almost six times the January 1919 volume. The competition for available building materials and labor was keen. Commercial and industrial builders were in a stronger position to bid for the limited supply of materials and labor at the expense of residential builders. This shortage, together with rapidly rising costs and prices and a reported scarcity of mortgage funds, brought an early end to the residential building boom, while other types of construc-



tion continued at high levels for a little longer. Wholesale building material prices rose 72 percent from April 1919 to April 1920, three times as much as the all-commodity price index, and union wage scales in the building industry advanced 35 percent over a similar period. Total construction costs rose over 40 percent in this short boom on top of a wartime increase of 50–75 percent. In June 1920 rents were 29 percent above the prewar level, having advanced 23 percent after the end of the war. Many localities introduced more or less effective municipal controls on rents. Rent strikes were common and mass protests attempted to stop wholesale evictions and "rent profiteering."

The Collapse of 1921

By mid-summer of 1921, the inventory accumulation had spent its force, Federal Reserve Banks raised discount rates and urged restriction of credit, buyers' strikes developed in protest against exorbitant prices, and exports began to decline. In the wake of the boom followed a period of sharp price drops, loss of income and production, increasing business failures and bank crashes and considerable unemployment. Industrial production dropped to about one-third, manufacturing employment 30 percent, manufacturing payrolls 45 percent; wholesale prices dropped to 45 percent below the 1920 peak. Construction went into a similar tailspin. Residential building contracts declined 67 percent from the peak in July 1919 to December 1920. Only 247,000 nonfarm units were started in 1920 as against 405,000 in 1919. And yet there was a strong effective demand for housing throughout this period. The BLS rental index increased 43 percent from the end of 1918 to summer of 1921, right through the recession—evidence of a mounting housing shortage which was aggravated by the needs of returning veterans. Building costs sagged in this recession but it is noteworthy that the decline of wholesale building material prices—about 40 percent from April 1920 to April 1921—paralleled the drop in the all-commodity price index whereas they had previously risen about three times as much.

This recession lasted over a year—a little longer than the preceding boom. It was more than two years after the end of the war, and after the price confusion of 1919–1921 gave way to a degree of stability, that the sustained upward movement of building began, culminating in the large volume of the middle twenties.

Conclusions

The NHA study does not attempt to answer the question whether this course of events was inevitable and might repeat itself in the months and years ahead. However, a number of conclusions from the experience after World War I may be indicated:

1. The greatest impact of the current housing shortage may not be felt for several months. After World War I the shortage was even more of a problem late in 1919 than immediately following Armistice Day. The principal reasons were: returning veterans, continued migration from farm to cities, increase in marriage rates, and the rapid pick-up in business activity.

2. In the past experience, the big general increases in rents came after the war, although rents did rise in many war centers before peace came. In the absence of Federal rent control either during or after the war, numerous local measures were enacted in the first few years of peace. Although they were moderately effective in curbing speculation and in preventing wholesale evictions, they failed to keep rents from rising rapidly. Rent strikes were common and there was much public resentment of "rent profiteering."

3. Twenty-five years ago housing demand proved to be quite sensitive to price excesses, in spite of housing shortages and a basically favorable demand situation. After rapid expansion in the first half of 1919, residential building declined sharply while other types of construction continued to increase for months. Today again, we have an acute shortage and an effective demand backed by cash balances and war bond savings. But how many potential buyers will follow a rising market up to substantially

(Continued on p. 73)

CLOSING THE BOOKS ON WARTIME OPERATIONS OF INSURED ASSOCIATIONS

It has been recognized that the asset structure of savings and loan associations has been undergoing extensive changes during the war. A final report on the greatly altered position in selected balance sheet items of insured associations is presented in this study.

■ THE course of wartime trends among savings and loan associations has been closely followed by management throughout the industry. Now that VJ Day is a matter of history, data compiled by the Division of Operating Statistics permit a summary analysis of developments among insured savings and loan associations during the entire war period. Because their assets during the years under consideration have comprised slightly over half of those of all operating associations, and on the basis of previous studies, it is reasonable to assume that their experience is *generally* indicative of that of the entire industry. However, it must be borne in mind, in this connection, that because of the factor of insurance of accounts, these associations tend to show higher-than-average assets, private capital and liquidity. Also, the increases indicated were influenced by the net addition of 146 insured associations during the period of this survey.

Although it was not possible to use the day of the "cease fire" order as the cut-off date for this study, a comparison between the close of September 1941 and the same time in 1945 provides an accurate "before and after" picture. Just what the recent years have meant in terms of asset trends, share capital, mortgage holdings and liquid items is analyzed in this article.



Assets and Private Capital

On September 30, 1941, associations insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation totaled 2,330 and reported assets of $3,223,510,000, an average of $1,383,000. Four years later there were 2,476 insured associations with average assets of $2,313,000. Total assets on the latter date amounted to $5,725,962,000—an increase of 78 percent over the period. This gain was general throughout the country and was not confined solely to states in which the number of such institutions increased or whose population and income were expanded by wartime activities.

Asset gains ranged from 126 percent in Pittsburgh to 27 percent in the Little Rock District. On a state basis, Arizona led with assets on September 30, 1945 almost three times those on the same 1941 date. Louisiana reported only a 14-percent gain.

Private repurchasable capital of insured associations doubled during this period, rising from $2,487,146,000 at the end of September 1941 to $4,981,869,000 at the same time this year. This represented a rise from $1,067,000 to $2,012,000 in average capital held by each association. In this respect, too, the gain was universal. Because of the relationship between assets and private capital, the same Districts and states were top and bottom in the range. In addition to Pittsburgh, which reported an increase of 169 percent, six other Districts at least doubled their private capital accounts. The state pattern was also largely the same as that shown in total assets.

Net Mortgage Holdings

Two factors characteristic of the economy during total war have been instrumental in keeping the rise in the net volume of mortgage holdings far below those shown in these other balance sheet items. The restricted mortgage market, on the one hand, and heavy repayments, on the other, resulted in a gain of 34 percent. The dollar increase amounted to $899,138,000—from $2,673,826,000 to $3,572,964,000—an advance in the average institutional holdings from $1,148,000 to $1,443,000. This, of itself, was



a substantial increment, based almost entirely on home purchase loans.

Again, the same two regions, Pittsburgh and Little Rock, were top and bottom in rank on the basis of gains of 96 and 5 percent, respectively. However, the state picture did not show either the universal increase or the same geographical pattern.

The greatest gains were registered in Rhode Island, New Jersey and Pennsylvania—all reporting a more-than-doubled volume. However, Rhode Island had only one insured association and the other two states reported large increases in the number of insured institutions. More significant, perhaps, would be the situation in Georgia and Maryland, for instance, where the same number of insured institutions reported increases of 60 and 44 percent, respectively, in net mortgage holdings. Comparatively large gains were not confined entirely to the eastern states, however. California, with the largest number of insured associations in any state west of the Mississippi (136, of which 5 were added during the period under consideration), reported a 44-percent increase in mortgage holdings. Missouri and Kansas, which lost five associations each, showed gains of 32 and 26 percent, respectively.

Five widely scattered states reported a declining volume of net mortgages held. New Hampshire, South Carolina, Louisiana, South Dakota and Montana showed decreases ranging between 2 and 9 percent. Another interesting variation was to be found in Washington, a state with a large increase in population and industrial concentration. One less association was reported on September 30, 1945 than on the same date in 1941; assets and private capital more than doubled, but net mortgage holdings increased only 4 percent.

Liquid Assets

All of the foregoing advances were completely dwarfed by the tremendous gain registered in cash and Government bonds. The increase in the average liquidity of all insured associations was from $78,000 to $772,000. From a pre-Pearl Harbor total of $182,673,000, liquid assets skyrocketed to $1,911,039,000. The fact that this increase was 946 percent for the entire group, and that no region showed liquid assets less than seven times those of September 30, 1941, indicates the futility of talking in terms of percentage changes.

Liquidity-Asset Ratio

A much surer way to show the vast change that has taken place in the liquidity factor in this "before and after" comparison, is to relate the volume of cash and Government bonds held by these insured associations to their total assets and to their private share capital. Such a comparison eliminates the factor of the changing number of these institutions.

On the selected prewar date, the liquid assets of all insured associations were equal to 5.7 percent of the group's total assets. At approximately the end of the war, this ratio stood at 33.4 percent. This is obviously a direct effect of investment funds greatly in excess of regular investment opportunities, coupled with the patriotic motive of supporting the war financing program. Just what the optimum postwar ratio will be must necessarily be determined by individual associations on the basis of their own local operating conditions. It seems unlikely that this relationship will be maintained.

In September 1941, the lowest ratio shown by any region was 3.7 percent in Winston-Salem, while the highest was 9.1 in Cincinnati. By the same month this year, the proportion of liquid to total



assets had advanced to the point that 23.6 percent, recorded in Pittsburgh, was the lowest ratio. The highest, shown in Portland, was 48.4 percent.

In spite of the much higher liquidity-to-asset ratio in each Bank District, in only five regions was the pattern of wartime activities sufficient to cause much fluctuation in their *relative* positions. The Winston-Salem and Des Moines Districts, which had stood comparatively low in the 1941 ranking, rose to fourth and sixth places, respectively, this year. On the other hand, Chicago, Topeka, and Pittsburgh, all among the upper half on the original date of this study, dropped to ninth, tenth, and twelth places, respectively, in 1945.

Every state, except Rhode Island, which had only one insured institution on both dates of this study, showed an increase in the proportion of liquid to total assets. Delaware with 15.7 and Arkansas—19. 8 percent—were the only other states to report ratios of less than 20 percent on September 30, 1945.

At the other end of the scale, Arizona, with three insured associations, stood in first place after showing the greatest gain—from 4.5 percent in 1941 to 53.2 this year. Washington and Idaho, although both in the same District, were subject to different population and income trends during the war but both showed liquidity-to-asset ratios in excess of 50 percent, as did North Dakota. Nine other states (five of them in the Portland District) reported ratios of 40 percent or more. The other states in this upper bracket represented such widely scattered locations as Florida, North Carolina, Ohio and Minnesota.

The situation at the end of September 1941 was quite different, both quantitatively and geographically. At that time, liquidity-to-asset ratios (excluding Nevada which had only one insured association) varied from 2 percent in Maryland to 10 percent in Ohio; only 21 states had a ratio of 5 percent or over.

Liquidity-Capital Ratio

Even greater gains were evident when the volume of cash and Government bonds was related to private repurchasable capital. For every $100 of private capital held by insured institutions on September 30, 1941, they had $7.30 in liquid assets. By the same time in 1945 the ratio had risen to $38.40 per $100 of private funds. This, again, is probably a higher ratio than will be found practical or possible as peacetime operations become established. Even so, it may conceivably be continued, on a somewhat modified scale, as a permanent goal.

Liquid assets of insured associations

[Dollar amounts are shown in thousands]

State and District	Change in number of associations	Cash and Government obligations		As a percent of			
				Assets		Share capital	
		Sept. 30, 1945	Sept. 30, 1941	1945	1941	1945	1941
UNITED STATES	+146	$1,911,039	$182,673	33.4	5.7	38.4	7.3
Boston	+6	91,978	7,943	30.8	4.6	35.9	5.7
Connecticut	+6	24,086	1,075	28.4	3.3	31.5	4.4
Maine	0	870	38	28.8	2.9	31.3	3.9
Massachusetts	0	58,679	6,210	31.9	5.1	38.1	6.2
New Hampshire	0	5,688	318	38.1	3.2	44.0	3.7
Rhode Island	0	264	109	5.8	6.0	6.5	8.4
Vermont	0	2,391	193	34.5	4.3	41.5	4.9
New York	+58	220,483	18,611	31.6	5.7	35.7	7.4
New Jersey	+39	68,590	5,314	32.1	6.5	36.9	9.1
New York	+19	151,893	13,297	31.4	5.4	35.2	6.9
Pittsburgh	+45	86,913	7,323	23.6	4.5	26.7	6.0
Delaware	0	85	10	15.7	3.2	16.3	3.8
Pennsylvania	+45	78,978	6,314	23.3	4.5	26.3	6.0
West Virginia	0	7,850	999	27.4	4.5	31.3	6.6
Winston-Salem	+14	204,969	12,591	33.5	3.7	38.7	4.9
Alabama	+1	7,230	1,184	28.7	7.9	31.5	9.8
District of Columbia	0	14,551	1,394	21.3	3.4	24.0	4.1
Florida	+1	68,091	3,908	45.2	5.2	55.5	7.1
Georgia	0	24,218	1,185	29.6	3.2	33.2	4.0
Maryland	0	27,677	1,125	27.3	2.0	31.6	3.0
North Carolina	+9	31,070	1,669	40.0	3.9	44.7	5.1
South Carolina	+2	15,798	1,107	37.2	3.6	41.1	4.2
Virginia	+1	16,334	1,019	25.6	2.5	29.8	3.2
Cincinnati	+4	433,774	57,395	41.2	9.1	46.9	11.3
Kentucky	0	36,408	5,069	37.0	7.4	40.9	8.8
Ohio	+7	376,238	50,884	42.0	9.6	48.0	11.9
Tennessee	−3	21,128	1,442	36.2	4.3	41.0	6.1
Indianapolis	+7	146,124	14,776	37.8	6.5	42.5	8.0
Indiana	+6	90,332	9,697	37.8	6.7	42.4	8.4
Michigan	+1	55,792	5,079	37.8	6.0	42.6	7.4
Chicago	+21	180,670	17,646	29.1	5.1	34.2	7.0
Illinois	+17	147,566	14,798	30.3	5.9	35.5	8.0
Wisconsin	+4	33,104	2,848	25.0	3.1	29.7	4.4
Des Moines	−6	100,563	7,227	31.5	3.8	34.8	5.1
Iowa	0	13,403	1,172	27.1	4.3	29.3	5.2
Minnesota	0	53,802	1,897	42.1	2.8	46.6	4.0
Missouri	−5	25,176	3,426	20.0	4.0	22.3	5.2
North Dakota	0	6,639	536	52.7	8.1	58.8	10.7
South Dakota	−1	1,543	196	38.9	6.9	42.0	9.8
Little Rock	−4	72,935	9,537	23.9	4.0	27.9	5.0
Arkansas	0	4,336	614	19.8	3.5	23.4	4.5
Louisiana	−1	25,818	2,996	22.6	3.0	26.9	3.9
Mississippi	0	2,779	389	21.8	4.6	24.3	5.4
New Mexico	0	2,485	352	27.9	5.8	31.4	6.8
Texas	−3	37,517	5,186	25.4	4.8	29.4	5.9
Topeka	−5	59,682	7,044	27.2	4.6	31.1	6.0
Colorado	+1	15,644	2,144	32.7	6.7	38.4	9.0
Kansas	−5	18,334	1,523	27.5	3.1	31.1	4.5
Nebraska	0	5,201	290	33.1	2.7	37.8	3.6
Oklahoma	−1	20,503	3,087	22.9	5.0	26.0	5.9
Portland	+1	134,637	10,500	48.4	7.4	54.1	10.3
Idaho	0	8,806	659	51.0	7.7	56.4	11.5
Montana	+2	6,777	962	43.9	9.2	48.7	10.7
Oregon	0	13,884	866	40.7	4.4	44.9	6.7
Utah	0	15,724	913	42.6	4.9	50.9	8.3
Washington	−1	85,767	6,842	51.7	8.5	57.4	11.4
Wyoming	0	3,276	244	42.7	5.6	46.1	7.7
Alaska	0	403	14	42.4	2.8	45.2	4.4
Los Angeles	+5	178,311	12,080	31.3	4.1	38.3	5.5
Arizona	0	8,701	254	53.2	4.5	65.2	6.9
California	+5	166,903	11,622	30.6	4.1	37.5	5.5
Nevada	0	545	8	38.7	1.0	42.5	1.2
Hawaii	0	2,162	196	35.0	5.0	38.8	5.8

On a regional basis, 1941 liquidity-capital ratios varied from 4.9 percent in Winston-Salem to 11.3 in Cincinnati. Four years later the range was between 26.7 in Pittsburgh and 54.1 percent in Portland. It will be noted that these are the same regions that shared those relative positions in liquidity-asset ratios.

Some conception of the increase on a statewide basis can be gained from the fact that, whereas on the selected date in 1941, only five states had liquidity-capital ratios of 10 percent or more, at the same time this year only two states (with one insured association each) were below 20 percent. Six showed liquid assets equal to 50 percent or more of the amount of their private share capital.

Future Prospects

This final roundup of wartime data confirms the fact that insured associations, which may well be considered a barometer of the industry, have finished the war in a strong position to meet the tests and opportunities of peacetime operation. However, the emergence of peacetime competition—both in savings and financing—will present a different set of problems. The extent to which the current situation is used as a foundation for long-term expansion will, from now on, depend to an increasing degree upon individual management policies and action.

Liberalized FHA Policy

■ RECENTLY the Federal Housing Administration announced its new policy of issuing firm commitments on loans to builders as a means of "stimulating production for the middle market." Supplementing the present conditional commitment, the new policy is "designed to provide more advantageous credit facilities to the home construction industry," according to FHA.

The firm commitment will constitute a dual commitment. It will provide that in the event the property is sold to an owner occupant, acceptable under FHA Regulations, for a longer term and higher ratio loan, such a loan may be insured without the necessity and cost of preparing and recording a new mortgage instrument.

Field offices have been notified to start issuing firm commitments to approved lending institutions to insure 80 percent up to $6,000 in valuation of homes produced by operative builders and 60 percent on the value in excess of $6,000 up to $10,000 in valuation. The builder in all such cases would be the mortgagor.

This operation differs from the procedure followed in issuing conditional commitments. In that case FHA agrees to insure the mortgage on a house built to its standards when the builder secures a satisfactory purchaser.

New Construction Program Announced

■ ON December 12 President Truman announced a series of new moves intended to break the bottleneck in moderate-priced new home construction. To supplement the program established in September, measures have been taken to speed the release of surplus housing and building materials held by the Government, to re-establish a priority control on building materials to assure adequate construction in the price range of $10,000 or less and use all the powers granted the Executive to arrest inflation in selling prices of new and existing homes. To coordinate this program, the President appointed Wilson Wyatt, former Mayor of Louisville, Kentucky, as Housing Expediter.

The new priority regulations establish preference for single or multiple dwelling units costing $10,000 or less per unit. This is expected to channel approximately 50 percent of all materials into this type of construction. The balance will remain available for commercial, industrial, higher priced residential and all other types of building. The regulation also provides that preferences shall be granted veterans for the purchase or rental of such housing.

Rent and Price Control

The report by the Director of OWMR, upon which this action was based, contained the following with respect to rent and price control:

"The Office of Price Administration is placing local dollar-and-cent ceilings on the construction materials themselves and many services . . .

"Rent controls have been very successful and their coverage of some 14 million family units constitutes one of our strongest safeguards against housing inflation.

"Legislation has been introduced and is now pending before the House Banking and Currency Committee which would provide for ceiling prices on the sale of old and new housing. Such authority is essential if we are to avert further sky-rocketing of home prices . . ."

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NEW RESIDENTIAL GROWTH IN URBAN AREAS

Ever since the development of rapid transportation extended the potential area of urbanization, special attention has been given the subject of decentralized building. In view of the anticipated large volume of postwar construction, the location of new building will be of importance to local governments as well as to financing institutions, real estate interests and potential home buyers.[1]

■ THE end of the war signalized the resumption of a host of peacetime activities. In the forefront, as attention shifts from military requirements, is housing, generally acknowledged to be one of the country's greatest needs. Intense interest and effort are already focused on the need to make immediate inroads in the huge backlog of postponed demand. The return of veterans from overseas, the search for productive avenues of investment and employment, the already stringent supply of housing, all point unerringly toward a large volume of residential building for some years to come.

Of almost equal importance to the public, to city governments, savings and loan associations, real estate interests and others is the question of where the new houses will be built. Based upon movements preceding the war, the events of the war years, and factors in the current situation, what will be the probable location of a large part of his residential building?

Straws in the Wind

Between 1920 and 1930 three-fourths of the new nonfarm dwellings in the United States were erected *within* the boundaries of urban places, one-fourth outside of these boundaries.[2] From 1930 to 1940, however, more than 50 percent of nonfarm dwelling construction took place *outside* the boundaries of urban places. This development represented a significant shift in the locational tendency of new construction.

During the war years many industrial plants were constructed in areas close to large cities but beyond present suburban limits. Some of these plants no doubt will be successfully converted to peacetime needs and will stimulate homebuilding in adjacent communities and unincorporated areas.

The plans of builders and prospective home owners, as expressed in numerous polls of opinion, also indicate that the great bulk of the new homes will be built in outlying areas. While the preferences of returned veterans are difficult to estimate at the present time, it is reasonable to assume that the needs of their predominantly young and growing families point toward a suburban or outlying location for the long-awaited new home.

Recent developments in transportation and technology make such a choice possible. During the war, Congress has passed legislation designed to aid states and communities in improving highways in and around urban areas. Action is already under way on this program. Access to outlying areas will thus be made easier and more convenient for the prospective home purchaser. The extension of electric power lines, the production of bottled gas and the improvement of the septic tank, all add to the physical feasibility of a home in and beyond the outer fringe of the city. The lower cost of outlying and unsubdivided land and its comparatively unencumbered status is an additional factor tending to encourage such growth.

Fringe Growth Studies

Much has been written of the supposed causes of the movement of people to the outer reaches of urban areas. One recent study,[3] by means of detailed inquiry and investigation of the movements of approximately 1,000 families, examined the fringe growth surrounding two Wisconsin cities. The conditions leading to the outward move, the way in which the family acquired a home in the fringe, and the living conditions in the new area were subjected to close study and analysis. The findings of the project showed the complex nature of the problem and the variety of forces responsible for the movement. Strong economic pressures within the city (such as seasonal lay-offs in industry), the desire to obtain lower rents and taxes, the attractions of the semi-rural environment, inducements of relatives or

[1] This article, prepared by Victor H. Bringe of the Urban Development Division, National Housing Agency, is the sixth in a series on the general subject of urban planning.

[2] *Housing-Special Reports*, Series H-44, No. 3, Bureau of the Census, U. S. Department of Commerce, 1944.

[3] Richard B. Andrews. "Urban Fringe Studies of Two Wisconsin Cities; A Summary," *Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics*, November 1945.

friends, local business interests, a desire for home ownership which could not be satisfied inexpensively within the city, the wish to conserve failing health or indulge hobbies—all of these motives played a part in influencing the move in addition to the noise, smoke, traffic, lack of vegetation and crowding in the central city.

However, the study also revealed the inadequacies of fringe living as solutions for the desires and needs of those who settled there. The increased cost of transportation and utilities more than offset the saving over city living costs for many families. Utilities, schools and urban services of all kinds were inadequate. The lack of building code enforcement and zoning regulations permitted unsound construction and blighted "shacktowns" little removed from city slums. As population presses outward, the goals achieved by the move may give way to a repetition of the very conditions which were found to be undesirable in the central city. Much additional investigation of the causes, costs and suitable corrective measures for unsatisfactory fringe growth is required before full knowledge of the problem will be available; it is apparent, however, that the much heralded "flight from the city" has grave disadvantages and cannot be viewed as a cure-all for problems of urban living.

Booms and Busts in Building Lots

Estimates of the total number of vacant subdivided lots in outlying areas of cities in the United States range from fifteen to thirty million at the present time—enough to provide for most of the existing population of the country. It is questionable whether this staggering figure represents an excess of desirable building lots—it may rather represent merely an excess of poorly laid out subdivisions. The traditional pattern of events during past real estate booms included a flood of poorly planned subdivisions and the production of lots far in excess of any reasonable demand. After the boom subsided, the locality was left with heavy obligations for improvements extended in advance of need, and large areas of badly platted urban land—areas which lay idle for the most part for many years afterward. Many of these lots were sold to individuals who held them for speculative purposes; a few scattered homes may have been constructed. In subsequent years much of this land became tax delinquent, titles became clouded, and holdings were dispersed among widely scattered ownerships.

The next cycle of subdivision development tended to ignore such "frozen" lands in favor of untouched raw land farther out. The latter could more easily be designed to meet modern needs in residential development.

Even if a private developer should wish to acquire an already subdivided area and replat it to meet current needs and desires, he is faced with insuperable obstacles—many individual ownerships and accumulated tax delinquency exceeding the present valve of the land. The local government too is unable, under its existing powers, to assemble individual holdings for sale to redevelopers at a price which will conform to the intended use of the area and will compete with the price of raw land.

Consequently, the local government is faced with stalemate. Many families move from within city



Chicago Plan Commission.



Chicago Plan Commission.

boundaries and taxing jurisdictions while land suitable for sound residential growth remains locked in obsolete plats and tax and ownership complications.

The Plan Commission of the City of Chicago made a careful study of land uses within the city which disclosed that extensive areas of land which are suitable for residential building are vacant.[1] Approximately eighteen square miles of land is available within the city limits in this category, twelve square miles subdivided and six in acreage plots. For the purpose of reclaiming such areas for use as attractive and desirable neighborhoods, the Plan Commission recommended that enabling legislation be adopted by the state to extend to municipalities the power to assemble such vacant land by tax foreclosure, purchase, trade, gift and by eminent domain in order to redevelop such areas in conformity with good planning practice and to utilize them for private and public uses in the best civic interest.

The studies of the Commission indicate that these undeveloped areas can be redesigned to yield all the values of urban living and, in addition, provide the attractiveness of a suburban environment. The improved design may provide for a number of distinct neighborhoods, each of them served by an elementary school and playground. Streets are more economically laid out to provide better circulation and less hazard to children. More adequate parking facilities are outlined. Housing is planned to meet the needs of families of many sizes and requirements. Commercial centers, public buildings, schools and parks are strategically placed to serve the whole area conveniently and economically. The end product is an attractive community, efficiently equipped for adequate municipal services, at less cost to the developer and the home owner or rental occupant. The Commission believes that such a community will result in greater economic and social stability and become a lasting asset to the city of Chicago.

[1] *Building New Neighborhoods.* The Chicago Plan Commission, June 1943.

The Attack on Dead Subdivisions

Some 20 states have passed enabling legislation since 1941 to permit the assembly of land in urban areas and its redevelopment for public and private uses. Although the primary emphasis of these laws is on slum clearance, many of them apply to obsolete and poorly designed subdivisions as well. These statutes are of two general sorts. The earlier kind empowers private corporations to assemble the land and rebuild the area, while the more recent type empowers the locality or its agency to assemble the land and prepare it for re-use. Under this second type, the rebuilding will be done by private developers, except for such public uses as may be needed in the area.

A number of bills introduced in the current as well as recent sessions of Congress indicate a growing interest in this subject by the Federal Government. Most of these propose to extend Federal financial

aid to localities to assist in the acquisition of deteriorated areas and make it possible to assemble and dispose of the land at a price consistent with its suitable re-use.

The concurrent interest expressed by local, state and Federal governments may result in comprehensive action on the problem of obsolete or poorly designed urban areas in the near future. The fact that such action would require advance preparation, acquisition of land and perhaps clearance of structures before new building could proceed, seems to indicate that the major portion of residential construction in the next few years may conform to existing locational trends. A sustained redevelopment program, continued over a period of years, however, would make possible a major shift to residential building within the urban boundaries.

Factors in Location and Design

The large volume of housing construction anticipated for the coming years raises basic questions of location and design of importance to all those who live in cities. The attractiveness and quality of the environment of homes is dependent upon sound physical design and layout. The cost of city government will be influenced by the extent to which residential areas can be provided with improvements and services in the most economical manner.

Research and demonstration are needed to throw light on such questions as the proper amount of open space, parks and playgrounds to be provided, consistent with economy, in residential developments. The most desirable treatment of traffic to achieve efficiency and safety, accurate methods of estimating the probable demand for housing in a community, the optimum number and placement of commercial and shopping facilities to be provided and a host of other problems must also be considered.

Control of additional lot production and its quality is equally important if the locality is to achieve an orderly utilization of its physical land area. Many states authorize cities to exercise subdivision control beyond their boundaries. Control by the county government is the practice in others. A variety of tools may be employed—the requirement for the installation of improvements by the developer, the limitation of water and utility extensions, cooperative zoning, land use and building controls by all of the governmental units in the affected urban area. Techniques and procedures to accomplish the most desirable use of urban land have received increasing attention in recent years and are recognized as occupying a key position in achieving sound community growth and development.

A repetition of the haphazard and scattered residential growth which occurred in former boom periods is almost sure to result in inadequate physical surroundings for homes, heavy tax burdens and an insufficient number and quality of urban governmental services. Only by careful advance planning can such disadvantages be avoided.

Amendment to Rules and Regulations

FHLBA

Bulletin No. 46

AMENDMENT TO THE RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN SYSTEM RELATING TO THE DISPOSITION OF AN ASSOCIATION OPERATING UNDER A CONSERVATOR. (Approved and effective November 14, 1945.)

Paragraph 207.4 of the Rules and Regulations for the Federal Savings and Loan System has been amended by the repeal of the first two sentences thereof. The deleted portion reads as follows:

> 207.4 Disposition. Unless the Federal Home Loan Bank Administration shall otherwise order, the Governor of the Federal Home Loan Bank System shall within twenty days of the appointment of the conservator recommend to the Federal Home Loan Bank Administration a plan for the reorganization, consolidation, merger, liquidation or other disposition of the association. If such plan shall provide for the ultimate restoration of the association to normal operations without an involuntary write-down in the association's share capital, the Federal Home Loan Bank Administration may order the conservator to carry such plan into effect.

This minor and procedural amendment became effective upon its adoption and filing with *The Federal Register* on November 14, 1945.

Postwar Housing Problems

(Continued from p. 65)

higher levels rather than wait for a readjustment to ideas of "normal" or "fair" value?

4. In the post World War I period, material shortages and price confusion retarded the expansion of residential construction by at least one and possibly two years. It was not until the fourth year after hostilities ceased—1922—that the residential construction average for the twenties was reached.

5. The inflation of construction costs in 1919–1920 was only incompletely corrected in the subsequent price collapse. This left us with an unbalanced relationship between construction costs and the general price level that was felt throughout the housing boom of the middle and late twenties.

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

HIGHLIGHTS

I. Home building in October—all privately financed—more than one-third greater than in September.
A. October volume of privately financed building three times that of like 1944 month.
B. Privately financed home construction in first 10 months 35 percent above same 1944 period.

II. October building costs 2.1 percent over corresponding month of last year as both materials and labor show gains.

III. Mortgage recordings gain sharply to reach new peak since twenties. Average loan size also rising.

IV. Third quarter foreclosures reach lowest level for any quarter since beginning of series in 1926.

V. Lending by savings and loan associations reaches new post-depression peak in monthly volume.
A. Construction loans show greatest relative gain.
B. Home purchase lending increases 20 percent.

VI. Balance of FHL Bank advances outstanding hits second lowest figure for any October since 1933.

VII. Both industrial production and wages show continued decline, despite increase in non-agricultural employment.

☆ ☆ ☆

BUSINESS CONDITIONS—Production, pay rolls down

Industrial production, except in nondurable goods, declined somewhat further in October although not so steeply as did the total output in the months following VE Day. In October the seasonally adjusted index of the Federal Reserve Board showed 164 percent of the 1935–1939 average—down 7 points from September. Recent decreases had amounted to 16, 23 and 10 points in September, August and July, respectively.

This index stood at the same point in October 1945 as it had in mid-1941. However, in the first half of November, output in a number of basic industries was above the previous month's level.

Although employment in munitions industries and Federal war agencies declined during October, there was a general increase in non-agricultural employment. Data compiled by the Bureau of the Census showed 42,990,000 non-agricultural employees in that month—a gain of 610,000 over September and only 380,000 less than in October last year.

The decline in wage-earner payrolls has been abrupt during the third quarter of 1945. According to the Department of Labor, this index stood at 215.7 percent of the 1939 average compared with 257.1 in September and 333.8 in October 1944.

Money in circulation totaled $27,970,000,000 for the week ending October 27, according to the U. S. Treasury. This was $201,000,000 more than in the final week of September and $3,720,000,000 above the figure for the last week during October 1944. Later reports show that it is continuing to rise and in the week ending November 17 stood at $28,158,000,000.

Federal Reserve bank credit, which was reported at $23,790,000,000 in the last week in October, represented a decline of $102,000,000 from the corresponding period of the previous month. It was, however, $5,891,000,000 more than during the week ending October 28, 1944.

Department store sales, as measured by the Federal Reserve Board's seasonally adjusted index (1935–1939=100) rose to 213 in October compared with 199 in September. In October last year it was 193 percent of the average.

Wholesale commodity prices, which reached a postwar low in mid-September, advanced to 131.2 percent of the 1935–1939 average (converted from 1926) by the end of October, according to the Department of Labor. By mid-November, they had climbed to 131.9 percent of the index, marking the highest point which this series has reached since January 1921.

[1935-1939=100]

Type of index	Oct. 1945	Sept. 1945	Percent change	Oct. 1944	Percent change
Home construction (private)[1]	123.8	95.5	+29.6	42.8	+189.3
Foreclosures (nonfarm)[1]		8.5			
Rental index (BLS)	108.3	108.3	0.0	108.2	+0.1
Building material prices	132.1	131.8	+0.2	129.9	+1.7
Savings and loan lending [1]	271.0	228.6	+18.5	186.6	+45.2
Industrial production [1]	164.0	r 171.0	−4.1	232.0	−29.3
Manufacturing employment [1]	121.4	r 122.8	−1.1	163.8	−25.9
Income payments [1]	232.3	r 229.0	+1.4	235.5	−1.4

r Revised.
[1] Adjusted for normal seasonal variation.

BUILDING ACTIVITY—All privately financed again

Home building activity in urban areas rose contraseasonally during October, the 19,480 family dwelling units for which permits were issued representing an increase of 36 percent over the total of 14,315 in the previous month. As in September, all residential construction was privately financed. Permits were issued for 17,423 one- and two-family units, or 31 percent more than in September, while the number of multi-family units (2,057) was more than twice the September figure. Due to the lifting of cost ceiling controls, the average permit valuation in October was 14 percent higher than in September.

The number of family dwelling units provided by private funds during October 1945 was almost three times as great as in the same month last year. Then permits were issued for 6,884 private units, while publicly financed construction accounted for 585 dwellings.

During the first 10 months of 1945, the 110,564 privately financed units for which permits were issued amounted to 92 percent of total urban residential construction, an increase of 35 percent over the like 1944 period. In the same comparison, public construction declined 45 percent, dropping from 17 to 8 percent of the total number of units provided. [TABLES 1 and 2.]

BUILDING COSTS—Labor unchanged, materials up

Preliminary computation of the FHLBA index of construction costs for the standard house indicated a slight rise during October from the revised September figure. The index of labor charges remained unchanged, but increased building material costs advanced the total index to 136.7 (1935–1939=100). Since October of last year, the total cost index has risen 2.1 percent, the result of a 2.4-percent increase in labor charges and a 1.9-percent rise in the cost of building materials.

The Department of Labor's composite index of wholesale building material prices also moved upward from September, advancing fractionally to 132.1 percent of the 1935–1939 base period. During the year ended in October, the wholesale index of all building materials rose 1.7 percent, reflecting increases in all components except structural steel which was unchanged. The major increase was in the price index of brick and tile, up 10 percent. [TABLES 3, 4 and 5.]

Construction costs for the standard house

[Average month of 1935–1939=100]

Element of cost	Oct. 1945	Sept. 1945	Percent change	Oct. 1944	Percent change
Material	p 133.8	133.3	+0.4	131.3	+1.9
Labor	p 142.4	142.4	0.0	139.1	+2.4
Total	p 136.7	r136.3	+0.3	133.9	+2.1

p Preliminary. r Revised.

MORTGAGE LENDING—New post-depression peak reached

New mortgage lending by savings and loan associations increased sharply throughout the country in October. The estimated $196,400,000 of new loans made during the month represented an increase of 21 percent over the preceding month and exceeded by 45 percent the volume of loans made during October 1944. The current volume of new loans also represented a new monthly record for these institutions, being $22,700,000, or 13 percent, greater than the previous record for the late twenties reached only two months earlier.

Loans in all purpose categories increased from September to October. Although accounting for only a small portion of the month's total (12 percent), construction loans showed by far the largest relative increase during October, 47 percent, followed by reconditioning loans with an increase of 22 percent and home purchase loans with an advance of 20 percent. Loans for the latter purpose, which aggregated more than $135,000,000 in October, accounted for 69 percent of total loans made during the month.

The increased demand for home mortgage credit was evident in all parts of the United States. Among the Federal Home Loan Bank Districts, increases in savings and loan lending activity over the preced-

New mortgage loans distributed by purpose

[Dollar amounts are shown in thousands]

Purpose	Oct. 1945	Sept. 1945	Percent change	Oct. 1944	Percent change
Construction	$23,985	$16,375	+46.5	$6,095	+293.5
Home purchase	135,224	113,103	+19.6	101,461	+33.3
Refinancing	18,751	16,786	+11.7	15,253	+22.9
Reconditioning	4,857	3,980	+22.0	2,699	+80.0
Other purposes	13,562	12,189	+11.3	9,720	+39.5
Total	196,379	162,433	+20.9	135,228	+45.2



ing month ranged from 12 percent in the Pittsburgh region to 40 percent in the Los Angeles area. In eight of the twelve Districts these percentage gains varied from 18 to 28 percent.

During the first 10 months of 1945, savings and loan associations made more than $1,500,000,000 of new mortgage loans, an amount 25 percent greater than that made during the same 1944 interval and $148,000,000, or 11 percent, larger than the total of new loans made by these institutions during the entire year 1941. [TABLES 6 and 7.]

MORTGAGE RECORDINGS—At highest level in over a decade

After showing the usual seasonal decline in September, the first full month following VJ Day, real estate financing activity throughout the country zoomed upward during October to the highest level in well over a decade. From relatively high volumes ranging from $456,000,000 to $489,000,000 in the preceding six months, nonfarm mortgage recordings of $20,000 or less jumped to $556,000,000 during October. This represented an increase of 20 percent over the September volume, was 31 percent higher than the October 1944 total and exceeded the peak prewar month (October 1941) by $108,000,000, or 24 percent.

The number of mortgages recorded exceeded by 20 percent the number in October 1944 and was higher than the previous record month (October 1941) by about 5 percent. A comparison of these percentage rises with those in the corresponding *amounts* of recordings indicates the large part played by the increasing average size of loans in boosting home financing activity to the present high level. The average mortgage recorded during October amounted to $3,482 as against an average of $2,944 in the same 1941 month, an increase of $538, or 18 percent. Almost three-fifths of this 4-year rise occurred during the last 12 months, the average recording in October last year amounting to $3,168, or $314 less than in the same 1945 month.

All types of mortgage lenders shared in the September-to-October rise in mortgage financing. Mutual savings banks, with a 28-percent gain in dollar volume, reported the greatest relative increase, followed by banks and trust companies and savings and loan associations, with advances of 20 percent each. Gains reported by insurance companies, individuals and miscellaneous lenders followed very closely with percentages of 17, 18 and 19 percent, respectively.

It is also significant that the upward trend in amount of mortgages recorded was evident in all parts of the country. With very few exceptions, the volume of mortgages recorded in every state during October was greater than in the preceding month or in the same month of last year. By Federal Home Loan Bank Districts, increases from September ranged from 9 to 24 percent, and in 10 of the Districts gains were in excess of 19 percent.

Mortgage recordings by type of mortgagee

[Dollar amounts are shown in thousands]

Type of lender	Percent change from Sept. 1945	Percent of Oct. 1945 amount	Cumulative recordings (10 months)	Percent of total recordings
Savings and loan associations	+20.0	37.2	$1,610,167	35.5
Insurance companies	+17.4	4.0	199,259	4.4
Banks, trust companies	+20.5	19.9	865,797	19.1
Mutual savings banks	+28.4	4.3	168,408	3.7
Individuals	+18.1	23.7	1,153,734	25.4
Others	+19.1	10.9	538,221	11.9
Total	+19.8	100.0	4,535,586	100.0

The increase over October of last year was even more uniform throughout the country, percentage gains ranging from 27 percent in Little Rock to 36 percent in Pittsburgh.

All types of mortgagees experienced an increase in recordings over October of last year. The largest gains in this comparison were reported by commercial banks (45 percent), mutual savings banks (43 percent), and savings and loan associations (40 percent). [TABLES 8 and 9.]

FHLB SYSTEM—Advances outstanding dropped sharply

On October 31, 1945 the total balance of advances outstanding throughout the FHLB System was reported at $86,598,000. Except for the October 1944 figure of $80,513,000, this was the smallest volume for that month since 1933. It represented a decline of $13,171,000 from the outstanding balance of $99,769,000 on September 30 of this year. Eleven of the twelve Banks showed smaller amounts of unpaid advances at the end of October while one—Portland—received repayments equivalent to advances made during the month.

In contrast to the situation which prevailed in the past two years, when advances made by the Banks during September exceeded those for October, in 1945 the October total was larger than in September. Advances in October of this year amounted to $6,577,000—higher by $2,058,000 than the $4,519,000 reported for September. The 1945 figure stood $2,396,000 above the $4,181,000 advanced by all the Banks during October 1944. This increase is probably traceable in part to the opening of the Victory Loan in October and in part to more active home financing operations following the end of the war and the removal of building restrictions.

The aggregate rise in advances during October was concentrated in seven of the twelve FHLB Districts. Of the other five regions, the Topeka Bank made no advances at all during the month, while the volume in the Chicago, Winston-Salem, Pittsburgh and New York Districts dropped below the September activity.

Registering the highest October receipts since the System was established in 1932, the twelve Banks recorded combined repayments of $19,748,000 during October 1945. This was $879,000 more than the $18,869,000 repaid to the Banks during the like period of 1944. Likewise, the October repayments this year exceeded by $2,548,000 the September total of $17,200,000. This increase, however, was shared by only four of the twelve Bank Districts, namely, Boston, Pittsburgh, Winston-Salem and Los Angeles.

The Bank System showed aggregate assets of $341,445,000 as of October 31, 1945. This compared favorably with $302,157,000 under this item on September 30 and with the October 1944 holdings of $281,673,000. [TABLE 12.]

FLOW OF PRIVATE REPURCHASABLE CAPITAL

Private savings invested in all savings and loan associations during October increased 24 percent over the like month of last year, aggregating $202,800,000, but repurchases gained 59 percent, totaling $119,800,000. The resulting net increase of $87,952,000 in private capital was 12 percent less than that noted in September and was 5 percent below the net gain in October 1944. The repurchase ratios which were relatively high in October were 56.0 percent among insured associations, 67.9 percent in uninsured members and 80.2 percent in nonmember institutions.

By type of association, the net increase in private capital during October was $72,000,000 in insured associations, $8,500,000 in uninsured members and $2,500,000 in nonmember institutions. In the like month of 1944 the corresponding figures were $75,200,000; $7,600,000 and $4,800,000.

Share investments and repurchases, October 1945

[Dollar amounts are shown in thousands]

Item and period	All associations	All insured associations	Uninsured members	Nonmembers
Share investments:				
1st 10 mos. 1945	$1,929,627	$1,549,595	$232,530	$147,502
1st 10 mos. 1944	$1,567,823	$1,227,121	$206,163	$134,539
Percent change	+23	+26	+13	+10
October 1945	$202,777	$163,628	$26,449	$12,700
October 1944	$163,194	$129,938	$20,313	$12,943
Percent change	+24	+26	+30	−2
Repurchases:				
1st 10 mos. 1945	$1,083,102	$841,292	$151,847	$89,963
1st 10 mos. 1944	$880,823	$656,566	$135,335	$88,922
Percent change	+23	+28	+12	+1
October 1945	$119,821	$91,668	$17,970	$10,183
October 1944	$75,511	$54,719	$12,678	$8,114
Percent change	+59	+68	+42	+25
Repurchase ratio: (percent):				
1st 10 mos. 1945	56.1	54.3	65.3	61.0
1st 10 mos. 1944	56.2	53.5	65.6	66.1
October 1945	59.1	56.0	67.9	80.2
October 1944	46.3	42.1	62.4	62.7

INSURED ASSOCIATIONS—New lending showed marked increase

The 2,476 insured savings and loan associations had total resources amounting to $5,797,000,000 at the close of October, a gain of $71,000,000 for the month. New loans made during the month aggregated $150,000,000, or 49 percent more than the $101,000,000 extended during the same month in 1944, and a 23-percent rise above the $122,000,000 loaned in September of this year. The private capital balance rose $73,000,000, or 1.5 percent, during October to pass the $5,000,000,000 mark. For each $100 invested during the month, $56 was withdrawn compared with $53 in September and $42 during October 1944. [TABLE 13.]

FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS

Federals had resources of $3,676,000,000 on October 31. Of the 1,466 associations, 630 new Federals reported $1,268,000,000 and 836 converted Federals, $2,408,000,000. New mortgage lending for the month was approximately $95,800,000, or 24 percent above the $77,300,000 loaned during the previous month and 55 percent over lending in October 1944. Private capital grew by $49,000,000 in October 1945 to total $3,231,000,000. In October, $55 was repurchased for each $100 invested by the public.

Progress in number and assets of Federals

[Dollar amounts are shown in thousands]

Class of association	Number		Approximate assets	
	Oct. 31, 1945	Sept. 30, 1945	Oct. 31, 1945	Sept. 30, 1945
New	630	631	$1, 267, 752	$1, 252, 668
Converted	836	836	2, 408, 649	2, 379, 529
Total	1, 466	1, 467	3, 676, 401	3, 632, 197

FORECLOSURES—Lowest quarterly figure shown

Nonfarm real estate foreclosures during the third quarter dropped to the lowest number for any three-month period since the beginning of the series in 1926. From July through September such actions totaled 3,349, about 18 percent under the number estimated for the corresponding period last year and 13 percent lower than the second quarter total in 1945. As a result, the seasonally adjusted index (average month of 1935–1939=100), after dropping to a new low of 8.3 percent in July, stood at 8.5 percent at the close of September.

The annual rate of foreclosures per 1,000 structures was 0.6 for the third quarter of 1945, compared with 0.7 for the three-month period immediately preceding. Greater numbers of foreclosures were reported in 15 states, although only 2 FHLB Districts (Winston-Salem and Topeka) showed increases.

In the first nine months of 1945, an estimated 11,134 distress actions were completed, 16 percent below the same 1944 period. Four Districts reported increases ranging from 3 percent for Portland to 65 percent in Indianapolis. Reductions varied from 35 percent in Des Moines to 8 percent in Little Rock. [Table 15.]

DIRECTORY CHANGES

OCTOBER 16—NOVEMBER 15, 1945

Key to Changes

*Admission to Membership in Bank System
**Termination of Membership in Bank System
#Federal Charter Granted
##Federal Charter Canceled
ØInsurance Certificate Granted
ØØInsurance Certificate Canceled

DISTRICT NO. 2

NEW YORK:
Utica:
*Home Savings and Loan Association, 1209 Park Avenue.

DISTRICT NO. 3

PENNSYLVANIA:
Philadelphia:
**St. Agatha's Building and Loan Association, 4001 Haverford Avenue.

DISTRICT NO. 4

SOUTH CAROLINA:
Lancaster:
*ØStandard Building and Loan Association of Lancaster, South Carolina, 105 Gay Street (Lancaster Bank Building).

DISTRICT NO. 5

OHIO:
Cincinnati:
**Sampson Savings and Loan Company, 2616 Vine Street.

DISTRICT NO. 8

IOWA:
Storm Lake:
**Storm Lake Savings and Loan Association.

DISTRICT NO. 12

CALIFORNIA:
East Los Angeles:
#First Federal Savings and Loan Association of East Los Angeles, 4628 Wilshire Boulevard.

NATIONAL HOUSING AGENCY
John B. Blandford, Jr., Administrator

FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK ADMINISTRATION
John H. Fahey, Commissioner

Table 1.—**BUILDING ACTIVITY**—Estimated number and valuation of new family dwelling units provided in all urban areas in October 1945, by Federal Home Loan Bank District and by State

[Source: U. S. Department of Labor]

[Dollar amounts are shown in thousands]

Federal Home Loan Bank District and State	All residential structures				All private 1- and 2-family structures			
	Number of family dwelling units		Permit valuation		Number of family dwelling units		Permit valuation	
	October 1945	October 1944	October 1945	October 1944	October 1945	October 1944	October 1945	October 1944
UNITED STATES	19,480	7,469	$90,996	$21,305	17,423	6,023	$82,627	$17,108
No. 1—Boston	589	24	3,226	64	577	24	3,181	66
Connecticut	114	8	657	23	102	8	612	23
Maine	31	1	144	1	31	1	144	1
Massachusetts	314	13	1,766	39	314	13	1,766	40
New Hampshire	25	2	167	1	25	2	167	2
Rhode Island	88		444		88		444	
Vermont	17		48		17		48	
No. 2—New York	1,547	199	10,100	598	984	39	6,183	163
New Jersey	300	180	1,712	553	281	20	1,632	118
New York	1,247	19	8,388	45	703	19	4,551	45
No. 3—Pittsburgh	887	82	4,592	236	833	69	4,421	212
Delaware	22		112		19		97	
Pennsylvania	748	50	4,164	177	701	37	4,013	153
West Virginia	117	32	316	59	113	32	311	59
No. 4—Winston-Salem	3,135	946	14,110	1,956	2,899	715	13,384	1,353
Alabama	409	193	784	532	405	193	775	532
District of Columbia	186	287	841	836	140	75	727	291
Florida	1,083	204	5,869	346	948	185	5,400	288
Georgia	305	207	942	146	305	207	942	146
Maryland	385	3	1,971	8	377	3	1,953	8
North Carolina	271	24	1,671	41	252	24	1,640	41
South Carolina	104	9	203	9	104	9	203	9
Virginia	392	19	1,829	38	368	19	1,744	38
No. 5—Cincinnati	1,396	658	7,074	2,582	1,316	637	6,784	2,491
Kentucky	97	47	327	136	93	47	326	136
Ohio	893	429	5,554	2,010	821	411	5,268	1,920
Tennessee	406	182	1,193	436	402	179	1,190	435
No. 6—Indianapolis	1,397	758	7,572	2,399	1,368	275	7,448	1,057
Indiana	353	117	1,484	397	349	113	1,477	390
Michigan	1,044	641	6,088	2,002	1,019	162	5,971	667
No. 7—Chicago	1,503	951	8,971	4,164	1,356	609	8,336	2,885
Illinois	979	812	6,101	3,472	867	470	5,600	2,193
Wisconsin	524	139	2,870	692	489	139	2,736	692
No. 8—Des Moines	1,147	181	5,185	510	1,080	177	5,050	508
Iowa	229	35	972	105	225	31	954	103
Minnesota	541	101	2,850	336	541	101	2,850	336
Missouri	235	34	972	54	215	34	925	54
North Dakota	93	3	219	6	50	3	149	6
South Dakota	49	8	172	9	49	8	172	9
No. 9—Little Rock	2,598	1,519	6,660	2,454	2,499	1,515	6,376	2,445
Arkansas	168	46	393	16	149	46	343	16
Louisiana	217	534	510	1,220	211	534	500	1,220
Mississippi	250	99	362	63	246	99	349	63
New Mexico	73	42	154	107	73	42	154	107
Texas	1,890	798	5,241	1,048	1,820	794	5,030	1,039
No. 10—Topeka	728	237	2,582	655	680	221	2,479	632
Colorado	272	26	1,175	37	239	22	1,111	29
Kansas	150	98	410	311	140	90	404	299
Nebraska	83	28	360	127	78	28	327	127
Oklahoma	223	85	637	180	223	81	637	177
No. 11—Portland	648	387	2,934	1,410	616	387	2,806	1,410
Idaho	35	18	136	19	35	18	136	19
Montana	27	45	80	101	27	45	80	101
Oregon	214	91	916	291	185	91	793	291
Utah	102	25	495	75	102	25	495	75
Washington	245	207	1,248	922	242	207	1,243	922
Wyoming	25	1	59	2	25	1	59	2
No. 12—Los Angeles	3,905	1,527	17,990	4,277	3,215	1,355	16,179	3,886
Arizona	205	41	960	114	173	41	865	114
California	3,671	1,476	16,894	4,150	3,018	1,304	15,198	3,757
Nevada	29	10	136	13	24	10	116	15

Table 2.—**BUILDING ACTIVITY**—Estimated number and valuation of new family dwelling units provided in all urban areas of the United States

[Source: U. S. Department of Labor]

[Dollar amounts are shown in thousands]

Type of construction	Number of family dwelling units					Permit valuation				
	Monthly totals			January–October totals		Monthly totals			January–October totals	
	Oct. 1945	Sept. 1945	Oct. 1944	1945	1944	Oct. 1945	Sept. 1945	Oct. 1944	1945	1944
Private construction	19,480	14,315	6,884	110,564	81,862	$90,996	$58,318	$19,712	$429,526	$255,784
1-family dwellings	16,568	12,459	5,288	92,323	62,465	79,099	51,871	15,243	369,741	195,351
2-family dwellings [1]	855	839	735	6,910	8,728	3,528	3,173	1,865	24,147	29,015
3- and-more family dwellings [2]	2,057	1,017	861	11,331	10,669	8,369	3,274	2,604	35,638	31,418
Public construction			585	9,013	16,448			1,593	18,899	40,774
Total urban construction	19,480	14,315	7,469	119,577	98,310	90,996	58,318	21,305	448,425	296,558

[1] Includes 1- and 2-family dwellings combined with stores.
[2] Includes multi-family dwellings combined with stores.

Table 3.—**BUILDING COSTS**—Index of building costs for the standard house in representative cities in specific months [1]

[Average month of 1935–1939=100]

Federal Home Loan Bank District and City	1945				1944	1943	1942	1941	1940	1939
	Nov.	Aug.	May	Feb.	Nov.	Nov.	Nov.	Nov.	Nov.	Nov.
No. 3—Pittsburgh:										
Wilmington, Del.	136.7	136.2	135.4	134.9	134.9	130.8	129.7	122.8	106.5	97.0
Philadelphia, Pa.	161.1	158.3	151.9	151.4	151.1	148.3	138.3	127.9	112.4	105.6
Charleston, W. Va.	136.1	135.4	134.1	134.2	134.2	121.6	121.3	115.5	106.8	r 101.6
No. 5—Cincinnati:										
Louisville, Ky.	138.4	135.7	136.3	135.2	134.7	126.2	118.4	112.1	107.0	104.0
Cleveland, Ohio	149.2	148.1	147.5	147.9	147.8	142.3	128.1	124.7	110.0	107.6
Memphis, Tenn.	139.6	137.7	136.9	136.0	135.6	133.7	118.9	113.0	107.5	104.0
No. 9—Little Rock:										
Little Rock, Ark.	140.9	138.8	139.0	138.4	138.5	135.4	135.0	125.0	109.9	r 103.2
New Orleans, La.	142.6	141.9	141.9	141.9	141.7	138.4	131.9	126.9	119.3	105.3
Jackson, Miss.	141.1	139.2	139.0	137.2	137.2	129.2	122.7	121.1	109.6	105.1
Albuquerque, N. Mex.	132.5	132.3	132.0	134.7	132.0	130.9	117.5	113.1	104.9	r 104.8
Houston, Texas	128.6	126.8	126.8	126.4	126.8	121.5	116.6	118.1	104.9	99.9
No. 12—Los Angeles:										
Phoenix, Ariz.	121.9	122.3	122.4	122.3	122.0	112.5	111.8	109.1	101.2	99.4
Los Angeles, Calif.	150.6	151.9	151.4	150.9	151.3	141.6	129.9	109.2	100.8	96.3
Reno, Nev.	133.5	133.1	133.0	133.0	132.9	119.9	119.9	117.2	108.6	104.3

[1] Indexes of November 1940 and thereafter have been revised in order to use retail material prices collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

This index is designed to measure the changes in the costs of constructing a standard frame house and to provide a basis for the study of the trend of costs within an individual community or in different cities. The various units of materials and labor are selected in accordance with their contribution to the total cost of the completed dwelling.

Material costs are based on prices for a limited bill of the more important items. Current prices are furnished by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and are based on information from a group of dealers in each city who report on prices for material delivered to job site, in average quantities, for residential construction. Because of wartime conditions, some of the regular items are not available at times and, therefore, substitutions must be made of similar products which are being sold in the current market.

Labor costs are based on prevailing rates for residential construction and reflect total earnings, including overtime and bonus pay. Either union or nonunion rates are used according to which prevails in the majority of cases within the community.

Figures presented in this table include all revisions up to the present time. Revisions are unavoidable, however, as more complete information if obtained and becomes available for inclusion in this table.

Cities in FHLB Districts 2, 6, 8, and 11 report in January, April, July, and October of each year; those in Districts 3, 5, 9 and 12 report in February, May, August and November; and those in Districts 1, 4, 7 and 10 report in March, June, September and December.

r Revised.

Table 4.—**BUILDING COSTS**—Index of building costs for the standard house

[Average month of 1935–1939=100]

Element of cost	Oct. 1945	Sept. 1945	Aug. 1945	Jul. 1945	June 1945	May 1945	Apr. 1945	Mar. 1945	Feb. 1945	Jan. 1945	Dec. 1944	Nov. 1944	Oct. 1944
Material	p 133.8	133.3	r 133.1	133.0	132.7	132.5	132.4	132.3	131.9	131.7	131.5	131.5	131.3
Labor	p 142.4	142.4	140.9	140.6	140.5	140.4	140.5	140.4	140.1	140.1	140.0	139.9	139.1
Total	p 136.7	r 136.3	r 135.7	r 135.5	135.3	135.1	135.1	135.0	134.7	134.5	134.4	134.4	133.9

p Preliminary.
r Revised.

Table 5.—**BUILDING COSTS**—Index of wholesale prices of building materials in the United States

[Source: U. S. Department of Labor]

1935–1939=100; converted from 1926 base]

Period	All building materials	Brick and tile	Cement	Lumber	Paint and paint materials	Plumbing and heating	Structural steel	Other
1943: October	125.8	109.0	102.7	163.3	126.4	118.5	103.5	110.5
1944: October	129.9	115.3	107.0	171.3	130.3	121.4	103.5	111.7
November	130.0	115.6	107.2	171.3	130.7	121.4	103.5	111.7
December	130.0	115.9	107.0	171.3	130.7	121.4	103.5	111.7
1945: January	130.4	121.5	106.9	171.3	130.7	121.4	103.5	111.9
February	130.6	121.6	108.7	171.4	130.8	121.4	103.5	112.0
March	130.8	121.8	109.1	171.3	130.7	121.4	103.5	112.3
April	130.8	121.7	109.1	171.4	130.7	121.4	103.5	112.3
May	131.0	121.8	109.1	171.9	130.8	121.4	103.5	112.6
June	131.1	122.1	109.1	172.5	130.7	121.7	103.5	112.8
July	131.2	122.9	109.1	172.7	130.4	121.7	103.5	112.8
August	131.5	122.8	109.1	172.9	131.9	122.7	103.5	112.8
September	131.8	123.7	109.3	172.6	132.3	124.8	103.5	113.0
October	132.1	126.8	109.6	172.8	132.3	124.8	103.5	113.1
Percent change:								
October 1945–September 1945	+0.2	+2.5	+0.3	+0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	+0.1
October 1945–October 1944	+1.7	+10.0	+2.4	+0.9	+1.5	+2.8	0.0	+1.3

Table 6.—**MORTGAGE LENDING**—Estimated volume of new home mortgage loans by all savings and loan associations, by purpose and class of association

[Thousands of dollars]

Period	Purpose of loans					Total loans	Class of association		
	Construction	Home purchase	Refinancing	Reconditioning	Loans for all other purposes		Federals	State members	Nonmembers
1943	$106,497	$802,371	$167,254	$30,441	$77,398	$1,183,961	$511,757	$539,299	$132,905
January–October	88,665	664,662	141,937	25,513	62,556	983,333	423,306	448,219	111,808
October	7,452	83,259	14,025	2,874	7,540	115,150	50,576	52,026	12,548
1944	95,243	1,064,017	163,813	30,751	100,228	1,454,052	669,433	648,670	135,949
January–October	85,364	892,327	136,993	26,117	83,739	1,224,540	562,869	546,508	115,163
October	6,095	101,461	15,253	2,699	9,720	135,228	61,965	60,945	12,318
November	4,635	90,182	13,265	2,507	7,785	118,374	54,978	52,241	11,155
December	5,244	81,508	13,555	2,127	8,704	111,138	51,586	49,921	9,631
1945									
January–October	133,147	1,092,313	158,752	32,291	110,306	1,526,809	724,042	669,179	133,588
January	3,772	76,495	12,167	1,868	7,999	102,301	46,439	46,452	9,410
February	3,081	78,140	12,524	1,994	10,270	106,009	49,900	46,575	9,534
March	7,406	105,307	15,922	2,559	10,287	141,481	69,430	60,688	11,363
April	9,541	113,684	16,800	2,951	10,778	153,754	71,375	67,955	14,424
May	13,032	120,244	15,887	3,396	10,520	163,079	75,607	71,921	15,551
June	17,567	116,798	17,147	3,364	12,435	167,311	79,603	74,219	13,489
July	17,658	112,761	15,622	3,351	11,007	160,399	76,355	70,264	13,780
August	20,730	120,557	17,146	3,971	11,259	173,663	82,197	75,644	15,822
September	16,375	113,103	16,786	3,980	12,189	162,433	77,321	70,642	14,470
October	23,985	135,224	18,751	4,857	13,562	196,379	95,815	84,819	15,745

Table 7.—**LENDING**—Estimated volume of new loans by savings and loan associations

Dollar amounts are shown in thousands]

Federal Home Loan Bank District and class of association	New loans			Cumulative new loans (10 months)		
	October 1945	September 1945	October 1944	1945	1944	Percent change
UNITED STATES	$196,379	$162,433	$135,228	$1,526,809	$1,224,540	+24.7
Federal	95,815	77,321	61,965	724,042	562,869	+28.6
State Member	84,819	70,642	60,945	669,179	546,508	+22.4
Nonmember	15,745	14,470	12,318	133,588	115,163	+16.0
Boston	12,671	11,149	10,356	102,590	89,506	+14.6
Federal	5,636	5,514	4,302	43,587	33,929	+28.5
State Member	5,919	4,375	4,844	46,892	44,436	+5.5
Nonmember	1,116	1,260	1,210	12,111	11,141	+8.7
New York	19,346	16,899	13,948	150,314	109,546	+37.2
Federal	7,521	5,813	5,095	53,522	34,829	+53.7
State Member	9,215	8,406	6,756	72,387	56,438	+28.3
Nonmember	2,610	2,680	2,097	24,405	18,279	+33.5
Pittsburgh	15,261	13,621	10,997	125,891	101,928	+23.5
Federal	7,324	6,550	5,116	59,847	46,526	+28.6
State Member	5,354	4,521	3,867	43,342	34,741	+24.8
Nonmember	2,583	2,550	2,014	22,702	20,661	+9.9
Winston-Salem	25,723	20,798	15,142	191,034	143,154	+33.4
Federal	13,238	11,139	7,526	101,020	75,232	+34.3
State Member	10,512	7,992	6,695	77,815	59,231	+31.4
Nonmember	1,973	1,667	921	12,199	8,691	+40.4
Cincinnati	31,352	26,322	24,371	251,888	212,483	+18.5
Federal	13,570	10,826	10,346	107,785	88,916	+21.2
State Member	15,647	13,712	12,275	126,532	106,460	+18.9
Nonmember	2,135	1,784	1,750	17,571	17,107	+2.7
Indianapolis	11,529	8,976	7,622	85,177	68,296	+24.7
Federal	6,301	5,012	3,937	46,019	33,625	+36.9
State Member	4,746	3,585	3,361	35,390	31,453	+12.5
Nonmember	482	379	324	3,768	3,218	+17.1
Chicago	21,779	18,504	15,718	172,932	138,878	+24.5
Federal	9,438	8,093	6,291	73,754	57,951	+27.3
State Member	10,753	9,116	8,066	86,234	69,493	+24.1
Nonmember	1,588	1,295	1,361	12,944	11,434	+13.2
Des Moines	12,117	10,296	8,775	92,280	77,385	+19.2
Federal	6,597	5,346	4,662	47,794	40,397	+18.3
State Member	4,004	3,560	2,974	32,383	27,114	+19.4
Nonmember	1,516	1,390	1,139	12,103	9,874	+22.6
Little Rock	9,311	7,730	6,317	72,344	64,356	+12.4
Federal	4,690	3,741	3,081	35,807	27,638	+29.6
State Member	4,479	3,880	3,131	35,545	35,951	−1.1
Nonmember	142	109	105	992	767	+29.3
Topeka	9,898	7,948	6,295	76,986	59,144	+30.2
Federal	5,656	4,572	3,573	42,281	31,131	+35.8
State Member	2,827	2,176	1,541	22,098	16,406	+34.7
Nonmember	1,415	1,200	1,181	12,607	11,607	+8.6
Portland	6,622	5,403	4,385	52,032	39,685	+31.1
Federal	4,514	3,281	2,604	32,214	25,743	+25.1
State Member	2,053	2,057	1,675	18,564	12,493	+48.6
Nonmember	55	65	106	1,254	1,449	−13.5
Los Angeles	20,770	14,787	11,302	153,341	120,179	+27.6
Federal	11,330	7,434	5,432	80,412	66,952	+20.1
State Member	9,310	7,262	5,760	71,997	52,292	+37.7
Nonmember	130	91	110	932	935	−0.3

Table 8.—**RECORDINGS**—Estimated nonfarm mortgage recordings, $20,000 and under

OCTOBER 1945

[Thousands of dollars]

Federal Home Loan Bank District and State	Savings and loan associations	Insurance companies	Banks and trust companies	Mutual savings banks	Individuals	Other mortgagees	Total
UNITED STATES	$207,006	$22,229	$110,429	$23,711	$131,590	$60,928	$555,893
Boston	16,126	562	5,910	12,204	7,445	3,407	45,654
Connecticut	1,794	349	2,460	2,023	2,611	1,113	10,350
Maine	698	22	315	793	465	75	2,368
Massachusetts	11,472	180	2,124	7,614	3,127	1,724	26,241
New Hampshire	495	11	211	795	325	40	1,877
Rhode Island	1,397		695	563	696	439	3,790
Vermont	720		105	416	221	16	1,028
New York	16,954	1,590	9,913	9,008	20,921	6,980	65,366
New Jersey	4,826	689	3,872	922	4,858	1,933	17,100
New York	12,128	901	6,041	8,086	16,063	5,047	48,266
Pittsburgh	15,990	2,006	10,835	565	8,813	3,445	41,654
Delaware	234	149	226	94	342	99	1,144
Pennsylvania	14,509	1,498	9,007	471	7,559	3,155	36,199
West Virginia	1,247	359	1,602		912	191	4,311
Winston-Salem	19,792	3,436	7,388	330	17,316	4,769	53,031
Alabama	876	339	484		1,066	465	3,230
District of Columbia	3,167	406	848		1,582	499	6,502
Florida	3,152	882	1,349		7,207	1,309	13,899
Georgia	1,832	281	1,273		1,396	631	5,413
Maryland	4,661	186	1,129	330	1,678	260	8,244
North Carolina	2,619	711	602		1,375	589	5,896
South Carolina	467	266	503		743	327	2,306
Virginia	3,018	365	1,200		2,269	689	7,541
Cincinnati	39,979	1,984	14,749	649	8,187	4,778	70,326
Kentucky	3,335	420	1,561		530	210	6,056
Ohio	35,562	784	11,317	649	6,896	1,687	56,895
Tennessee	1,082	780	1,871		761	2,881	7,375
Indianapolis	12,211	2,626	10,854	29	4,349	2,267	32,336
Indiana	7,585	1,169	2,966	29	1,457	1,018	14,224
Michigan	4,626	1,457	7,888		2,892	1,249	18,112
Chicago	24,909	1,125	8,411	39	8,989	9,748	53,221
Illinois	19,768	772	4,809		5,066	8,987	39,402
Wisconsin	5,141	353	3,602	39	3,923	761	13,819
Des Moines	12,713	1,992	8,346	244	6,293	4,968	34,556
Iowa	3,508	286	2,034		1,025	495	7,348
Minnesota	5,252	401	2,369	244	2,037	1,767	12,070
Missouri	3,190	1,248	3,492		2,835	2,635	13,400
North Dakota	533	34	237		175	53	1,032
South Dakota	230	23	214		221	18	706
Little Rock	11,704	2,727	2,760		8,331	3,514	29,036
Arkansas	975	120	464		488	54	2,101
Louisiana	2,760	221	236		1,972	694	5,883
Mississippi	542	154	318		522	174	1,710
New Mexico	205		112		264	12	593
Texas	7,222	2,232	1,630		5,085	2,580	18,749
Topeka	10,454	1,090	3,221		6,555	2,171	23,491
Colorado	1,820	114	734		3,480	775	6,923
Kansas	3,017	169	988		753	289	5,216
Nebraska	1,328	415	503		565	177	2,988
Oklahoma	4,289	392	996		1,757	930	8,364
Portland	6,326	610	5,369	643	5,106	1,930	19,984
Idaho	522	46	201		507	65	1,341
Montana	499	52	266		520	54	1,391
Oregon	1,721	191	661	139	2,283	338	5,333
Utah	593	204	709		272	155	1,933
Washington	2,761	117	3,194	504	1,195	1,297	9,068
Wyoming	230		338		329	21	918
Los Angeles	19,848	2,481	22,673		29,285	12,951	87,238
Arizona	550	48	412		1,396	53	2,459
California	19,177	2,421	22,160		27,548	12,880	84,186
Nevada	121	12	101		341	18	593

Table 9.—MORTGAGE RECORDINGS—Estimated volume of nonfarm mortgages recorded

[Dollar amounts are shown in thousands]

Period	Savings and loan associations		Insurance companies		Banks and trust companies		Mutual savings banks		Individuals		Other mortgagees		All mortgagees	
	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent
1944	$1,563,678	33.9	$256,173	5.6	$877,762	19.0	$165,054	3.6	$1,134,054	24.6	$613,908	13.3	$4,610,629	100.0
January–October	1,308,751	33.9	216,448	5.6	741,203	19.2	136,216	3.5	934,973	24.3	519,172	13.5	3,856,763	100.0
October	148,131	35.0	20,985	5.0	76,181	18.0	16,552	3.9	109,767	26.0	51,223	12.1	422,839	100.0
November	134,359	34.1	20,543	5.2	71,752	18.2	15,176	3.9	103,513	26.3	48,296	12.3	393,639	100.0
December	120,568	33.5	19,182	5.3	64,807	18.0	13,662	3.8	95,568	26.5	46,440	12.9	360,227	100.0
1945														
January–October	1,610,167	35.5	199,259	4.4	865,797	19.1	168,408	3.7	1,153,734	25.4	538,221	11.9	4,535,586	100.0
January	111,480	31.4	17,882	5.0	65,109	18.4	12,500	3.5	99,200	28.0	48,407	13.7	354,578	100.0
February	111,176	32.8	16,034	4.7	63,933	18.9	10,343	3.1	93,248	27.5	43,963	13.0	338,697	100.0
March	151,361	34.9	20,669	4.8	80,000	18.5	13,599	3.1	114,971	26.5	52,737	12.2	433,337	100.0
April	157,181	34.5	19,718	4.3	88,749	19.5	15,680	3.4	118,713	26.1	55,749	12.2	455,790	100.0
May	172,421	35.4	21,459	4.4	91,023	18.7	18,981	3.9	125,849	25.8	57,702	11.8	487,435	100.0
June	176,051	36.1	21,801	4.5	91,336	18.8	18,572	3.8	121,800	25.0	57,481	11.8	487,041	100.0
July	169,784	36.2	20,173	4.3	90,199	19.2	18,062	3.9	116,964	24.9	54,087	11.5	469,269	100.0
August	181,156	37.0	20,359	4.2	93,358	19.1	18,488	3.8	120,015	24.5	56,013	11.4	489,389	100.0
September	172,551	37.2	18,935	4.1	91,661	19.7	18,472	4.0	111,384	24.0	51,154	11.0	464,157	100.0
October	207,006	37.2	22,229	4.0	110,429	19.9	23,711	4.3	131,590	23.7	60,928	10.9	555,893	100.0

Table 10.—SAVINGS—Sales of war bonds [1]

[Thousands of dollars]

Period	Series E	Series F	Series G	Total	Redemptions
1944	$12,379,891	$772,767	$2,891,427	$16,044,085	$3,263,168
October	598,570	13,653	82,871	695,094	394,846
November	806,817	42,680	173,858	1,023,355	376,053
December	1,855,300	124,669	405,880	2,385,849	358,572
1945					
January	803,819	42,034	228,327	1,074,180	333,443
February	653,222	30,695	164,073	847,990	317,083
March	712,133	26,487	150,456	889,076	437,892
April	684,424	23,112	130,100	837,636	381,198
May	1,194,712	62,940	282,437	1,540,089	404,209
June	1,467,673	178,003	532,379	2,178,055	382,536
July	1,031,778	47,409	215,288	1,294,475	406,103
August	571,286	21,629	106,825	699,740	515,161
September	420,058	17,760	76,296	514,114	514,382
October	509,706	7,922	106,842	624,470	595,663

[1] U. S. Treasury War Savings Staff. Actual deposits made to the credit of the U. S. Treasury.

Table 11.—FHA—Home mortgages insured [1]

[Premium paying; thousands of dollars]

Period	Title II [2]		Title VI (603)	Total insured at end of period
	New	Existing		
1944: October	$40	$21,941	$43,354	$5,909,934
November	54	21,646	38,053	5,969,687
December	31	18,269	36,573	6,024,560
1945: January	67	19,006	38,640	6,082,273
February	27	14,085	31,417	6,127,802
March	37	16,480	29,886	6,174,205
April	63	14,813	26,885	6,215,966
May	80	22,272	23,707	6,262,025
June	374	18,841	20,413	6,301,653
July	347	18,207	19,056	6,339,263
August	666	17,286	14,992	6,372,207
September	968	15,165	12,634	6,400,974
October	1,228	18,606	15,253	6,436,061

[1] Figures represent gross insurance written during the period and do not take account of principal repayments on previously insured loans.
[2] Figures for October 1945 are estimated.

Table 12.—FHL BANKS—Lending operations and principal assets and liabilities

[Thousands of dollars]

Federal Home Loan Bank	Lending operations, October 1945		Principal assets, October 31, 1945			Capital and principal liabilities, October 31, 1945			Total assets October 31, 1945 [1]
	Advances	Repayments	Advances outstanding	Cash [1]	Government securities	Capital [2]	Debentures	Member deposits	
Boston	$825	$1,219	$8,368	$1,671	$13,028	$20,302	$2,000	$840	$23,145
New York	160	734	4,902	2,934	37,195	28,324	3,000	13,844	45,184
Pittsburgh	356	1,915	6,935	2,506	15,915	17,348	6,000	2,093	25,449
Winston-Salem	828	6,797	7,057	766	15,637	18,669	2,500	366	23,541
Cincinnati	355	1,297	5,956	1,943	39,107	28,771	5,000	13,508	47,309
Indianapolis	350	608	5,720	800	20,173	15,589	4,000	7,164	26,775
Chicago	668	2,680	17,146	5,045	19,826	24,154	12,500	5,449	42,138
Des Moines	750	994	6,122	559	17,134	14,415	8,500	981	23,901
Little Rock	180	288	3,443	858	9,634	12,746	1,000	253	14,001
Topeka	0	95	2,740	2,070	8,224	10,938	1,000	1,141	13,081
Portland	520	520	715	747	11,354	8,809	3,000	1,065	12,876
Los Angeles	1,585	2,601	17,494	1,018	25,399	16,983	20,000	7,045	44,045
October 1945 (Combined total)	6,577	19,748	86,598	20,917	232,626	217,048	68,500	53,749	341,445
September 1945	4,519	17,200	99,769	20,671	180,808	216,319	32,000	51,163	302,157
October 1944	4,181	18,869	80,513	27,944	172,172	205,576	44,000	31,885	281,673

[1] Includes interbank deposits.
[2] Capital stock, surplus, and undivided profits.

Table 13.—INSURED ASSOCIATIONS—Progress of institutions insured by the FSLIC [1]

[Dollar amounts are shown in thousands]

Period and class of association	Number of associations	Total assets	Operations			
			New mortgage loans	New private investments	Private repurchases	Repurchase ratio
ALL INSURED						
1944: October	2,462	$4,774,160	$100,642	$129,938	$54,719	42.1
November	2,462	4,867,068	88,227	115,008	52,378	45.5
December	2,466	5,012,662	83,408	142,291	45,985	32.3
1945: January	2,466	5,035,626	76,215	195,077	123,943	63.5
February	2,463	5,076,554	79,479	125,769	63,089	50.2
March	2,465	5,136,903	110,287	138,709	71,488	51.5
April	2,469	5,204,641	113,296	133,651	65,701	49.2
May	2,469	5,292,169	121,808	130,182	62,980	48.4
June	2,471	5,549,563	126,824	163,156	56,279	34.5
July	2,473	5,594,461	121,572	196,944	144,932	73.6
August	2,475	5,666,351	131,239	156,189	83,357	53.4
September	2,476	5,725,962	122,098	146,290	77,855	53.2
October	2,476	5,797,238	150,000	163,628	91,668	56.0
FEDERAL						
1944: October	1,465	3,000,365	61,965	85,297	33,746	39.6
November	1,464	3,059,556	54,978	75,372	32,665	43.3
December	1,464	3,168,731	51,586	93,400	26,049	27.9
1945: January	1,464	3,178,132	46,439	129,640	84,624	65.3
February	1,464	3,200,324	49,900	82,862	41,374	49.9
March	1,465	3,237,942	69,430	91,627	46,574	50.8
April	1,465	3,280,506	71,375	88,356	41,856	47.4
May	1,466	3,337,648	75,607	85,977	40,063	46.6
June	1,465	3,528,027	79,603	106,770	33,601	31.5
July	1,467	3,552,154	76,355	129,958	100,301	77.2
August	1,469	3,595,087	82,197	102,190	55,016	53.8
September	1,467	3,632,197	77,321	96,180	51,428	53.5
October	1,466	3,676,401	95,815	108,252	59,925	55.4
STATE						
1944: October	997	1,773,795	38,677	44,641	20,973	47.0
November	998	1,807,512	33,249	39,636	19,713	49.7
December	1,002	1,843,931	31,822	48,891	19,936	40.8
1945: January	1,002	1,857,494	29,776	65,437	39,319	60.1
February	999	1,876,230	29,579	42,907	21,715	50.6
March	1,000	1,898,961	40,857	47,082	24,914	52.9
April	1,004	1,924,135	41,921	45,295	23,845	52.6
May	1,003	1,954,521	46,201	44,205	22,917	51.8
June	1,006	2,021,536	47,221	56,386	22,678	40.2
July	1,006	2,042,307	45,217	66,986	44,631	66.6
August	1,006	2,071,264	49,042	53,999	28,341	52.5
September	1,009	2,093,765	44,777	50,110	26,427	52.7
October	1,010	2,120,837	54,185	55,376	31,743	57.3

[1] Balance-sheet items, formerly shown each month, now appear only in the February, May, August and November issues of the REVIEW as does Table 14.

Table 15.—FORECLOSURES—Estimated nonfarm real estate foreclosures, by Federal Home Loan Bank Districts

Federal Home Loan Bank District	Foreclosures				Cumulative (9 months)		
	Sept. 1945	Aug. 1945	July 1945	Sept. 1944	Jan.–Sept. 1945	Jan.–Sept. 1944	Percent change
UNITED STATES	1,125	1,142	1,082	1,487	11,134	13,272	−16.1
Boston	104	97	96	138	1,076	1,602	−32.8
New York	219	265	257	362	2,614	3,650	−28.4
Pittsburgh	236	171	166	387	1,967	2,322	−15.3
Winston-Salem	135	154	143	138	1,219	1,409	−13.5
Cincinnati	126	129	157	145	1,295	1,172	+10.5
Indianapolis	34	30	34	30	420	255	+64.7
Chicago	56	48	52	66	492	676	−27.2
Des Moines	37	49	48	65	473	731	−35.3
Little Rock	22	24	14	40	313	341	−8.2
Topeka	87	122	74	72	767	506	+51.6
Portland	13	9	7	4	92	89	+3.4
Los Angeles	56	44	34	40	406	519	−21.8

Treasury Continues Payroll Plan

■ DURING the war, the Treasury policy of financing as great a portion of wartime expenditures as possible through the sale of Government securities to individuals resulted in a record flow of long-term savings into small-denomination bonds issued for this purpose. Studies conducted by the Federal Home Loan Bank Administration indicate that the largest proportion of new long-term savings not invested in equities went into U. S. savings bonds. Treasury reports reveal that a considerable proportion of these purchases were made through the medium of the payroll deduction plan which represents what is probably the largest program for organized thrift in the history of the country.

Last month, the Treasury Department announced that it intends to continue this program indefinitely. Approval of this decision by both labor and management was virtually unanimous. The savings and loan industry will find of particular interest the results of a poll on this subject, conducted by the War Finance Division. Surveys of 500 leading business and industrial firms and 70 railroad companies showed that almost all of the 27 million workers who have participated in the payroll deduction plan would like to continue this painless saving.

In view of the inflationary forces generated during the war, this decision is particularly significant, for it is apparent that it will be many months before a reconverted industrial plant can produce adequate supplies of all consumer goods. During this interim, just as in the period of hostilities, it is important that excess purchasing power be drawn off into savings which in turn may facilitate financing war contracted obligations of the Federal Government. Contract termination, support of armies of occupation, the return and discharge of combat troops, care for disabled veterans and a number of other demands will continue to require heavy expenditures which can be met only in part through taxation.

From the general interest expressed by the broad section of the working population experienced with the operation of the payroll plan, it would seem reasonable to assume that U. S. savings bonds will continue as one of the dominant savings media throughout the postwar years. However, the future sales of these securities to individuals by no means will be dependent upon the payroll plan alone, for financial institutions throughout the country are planning to continue their support of the Treasury's program by acting as issuing agents.

Table 16.—HOLC—Mortgage loans outstanding and properties on hand

[Dollar amounts are shown in thousands]

	Due on original loans	Due on property sold	Properties owned	
			Book value	Number [1]
1940: October	$1,667,296	$310,280	$351,890	54,433
1941: October	1,449,502	358,922	282,904	40,615
1942: October	1,236,432	366,427	231,950	31,594
1943: October	997,970	370,447	129,005	17,217
1944: October	774,179	358,541	15,641	2,362
November	757,028	354,117	12,660	1,941
December	741,656	349,707	10,701	1,659
1945: January	724,306	344,311	9,157	1,446
February	709,620	339,642	8,278	1,337
March	693,190	334,092	7,342	1,207
April	678,134	328,846	6,439	1,071
May	662,020	323,046	5,194	881
June	647,024	317,592	4,144	710
July	632,598	312,329	3,522	613
August	618,121	306,982	2,966	512
September	605,742	302,233	2,524	435
October	590,747	296,405	2,001	357

[1] Includes re-acquisitions of properties previously sold.

Table 17.—GOVERNMENT SHARES—Investments in member associations [1]

[Dollar amounts are shown in thousands]

Type of operation	Treasury	Home Owners' Loan Corporation		
	Federals [2]	Federals	State members	Total
October 1935–September 1945:				
Applications:				
Number	1,862	4,710	995	5,705
Amount	$50,401	$213,701	$66,495	$280,196
Investments:				
Number	1,831	4,243	738	4,981
Amount	$49,300	$178,401	$45,456	$223,857
Repurchases	$47,318	$162,215	$40,147	$202,362
Net outstanding investments	$1,982	$16,186	$5,309	$21,495
Third quarter 1945:				
Applications:				
Number				
Amount				
Investments:				
Number				
Amount				
Repurchases	$673	$3,910	$827	$4,737

[1] Refers to number of separate investments, not to number of associations in which investments are made.
[2] Investments in Federals by the Treasury were made between December 1933 and November 1935.

Table 18.—FHLBS—Membership in the Federal Home Loan Bank System

[Dollar amounts are shown in thousands]

Type of institution	1945				1944		1943	
	September		June		September		September	
	No.	Assets	No.	Assets	No.	Assets	No.	Assets
All members	3,697	$8,144,151	3,696	$7,969,978	3,706	$6,945,108	3,764	$6,199,087
Savings and loan associations	3,658	7,192,282	3,656	7,013,906	3,666	6,101,752	3,720	5,399,517
Federal	1,467	3,632,197	1,465	3,528,027	1,464	2,961,860	1,471	2,523,737
Insured State	1,005	2,086,970	1,002	2,015,142	992	1,745,993	965	1,508,558
Uninsured State	1,186	1,473,115	1,189	1,470,737	1,210	1,393,899	1,284	1,367,222
Mutual savings banks	25	566,553	25	566,553	22	473,198	22	434,289
Insurance companies	14	385,316	15	389,519	18	370,158	22	365,281

Table 19.—WAR HOUSING—Progress of war housing construction program: H–1

Type of construction	Total number of accommodations allocated to localities			Number of accommodations under construction			Number of accommodations completed		
	As of Aug. 31, 1945 [1]	As of June 30, 1945	As of Mar. 31, 1945	As of Aug. 31, 1945 [1]	As of June 30, 1945	As of Mar. 31, 1945	As of Aug. 31, 1845 [1]	As of June 30, 1945	As of Mar. 31, 1945
Privately financed: [2]									
New construction	854,962	856,002	851,434	25,671	27,369	26,591	810,711	802,751	789,524
Conversion	201,228	201,721	203,466	816	1,371	2,234	198,290	197,640	196,506
Publicly financed: [3]									
Family units:									
New construction	555,922	555,041	549,420	18,762	20,600	16,646	[4] 535,111	[4] 529,393	[4] 522,550
Conversion units (HOLC)	[5] 49,803	[5] 49,893	[5] 50,003	6	111	384	49,370	49,355	49,126
Single-person units	170,750	170,165	169,610	1,493	2,976	2,612	168,367	166,864	165,401
Stop-gap accommodations	82,748	81,262	79,825	1,743	1,668	492	79,393	79,015	77,581

[1] Final war housing progress data are as of Aug. 31, 1945.
[2] Represents H–1 privately financed war housing built under P–55 orders, plus an estimated 302,000 new units and 175,000 converted units built without P–55 orders
[3] Data for March and June 1945 revised as of Aug. 31, 1945. Exclude suspended canceled and limited projects but include units started in projects which have been removed to other localities, sold, converted to non-residential use or placed in standby status. As of August 1945 such units numbered 104,464 (30,935 family units, 29,247 single-person units and 44,282 stop-gap accommodations); as of June 30, 1945 there were 88,989 units (22,603 family units, 25,384 single-person units, and 41,002 stop-gap accommodations); as of Mar. 31, 1945 there were 72,292 units (17,754 family units, 17,212 single-person units and 37,326 stop-gap accommodations).
[4] Includes 6,690 units converted by agencies other than HOLC as of August; 6,837 units as of July; and 7,540 accommodations as of June 1945.
[5] Includes 1,562 existing units not supported by program action as of August; 1,486 units as of July ; and 1,579 units as of June 1945.

NEWS NOTES



Converted homes back to owners

According to a recently announced policy, owners may now negotiate with FPHA for the return of private properties leased to the Government under the HOLC program of wartime home conversions. Almost 50,000 such dwelling units were made available to war workers.

Owners may recover immediate possession by purchasing unexpired lease contracts at a fair value, insofar as such transactions are consistent with the best financial interests of the Government. Should it prove impossible to agree with the owner on a fair sales price, the Government will continue to operate the property during the life of the lease to assure maximum recovery of public funds. The rights of present tenants, including OPA regulations on rent and occupancy, are considered binding on all lease cancelations.

Sixty-percent expansion forecast in construction

Provided that there is cooperation among all segments of the building industry, 1946 is expected to be a year of rapidly expanding activity in construction, according to recently revised estimates of the Department of Commerce. New construction may total as much as $7.3 billion with additional expenditures for repair and maintenance amounting to $5 billion. Thus total construction may exceed by 60 percent the current year's volume.

In announcing their estimates, the Department emphasizes that these expectations could be achieved only if manufacturers, dealers, builders, management and labor all work together to keep costs within reason. "Buyer resistance and economic uncertainties might cause a loss of as much as half a billion dollars in 1946 construction volume. This forecast assumes reasonable cost—close to present levels—and it assumes the internal cooperation of all segments of the industry as well as a minimum of material and labor bottlenecks."

Almost 75 percent of this construction volume is expected to be privately financed. A complete reversal of trends in recent years, this high proportion of private to total construction would be the greatest for any year since 1929.

Builders approve model code

Endorsed at the 23rd Annual Convention of Pacific Coast Building Officials Conference in September, the 1946 edition of its Uniform Building Code is scheduled for public distribution in January. Revisions include new chapters on masonry, chimneys and heating appliances, together with additional and renovated sections on heavy timber construction and adhesives.

The code, described as one of the most modern available, has been designed to regulate construction incorporating many of the new materials and techniques developed during the war. It will contain original information authorized by the Conference in 1943 and 1944, on administration, stairs and exits and prefabrication.

British building societies adopt 4-percent rate

In October, a number of building societies announced the adoption of a 4-percent interest rate on mortgage loans, according to *The Building Societies' Gazette*. This followed a general movement from 4½ percent during the preceding month. The lower rate, according to the *Gazette*, is considered as being in general operation.

One society with assets of less than £2,000,000 announced a reduction to 3¾ percent on loans to approved owner occupiers. This applies only when the loan amount is not in excess of 75 percent of the total property value.



NATIONAL HOUSING AGENCY

FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK SYSTEM

101 INDIANA AVENUE, N. W.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK ADMINISTRATION
FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK SYSTEM
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN INSURANCE CORPORATION
HOME OWNERS' LOAN CORPORATION
UNITED STATES HOUSING CORPORATION

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS

TO ALL MEMBER INSTITUTIONS:

The magnitude of the veterans' housing needs grows daily more apparent, and the acute problem of meeting them more urgent and difficult. Merged with the nation-wide shortage of homes and the temporary shortage of adequate building materials, it seems clear that it will be too long before new construction can afford the relief from these conditions which the veteran so richly deserves.

The interim period is of the gravest importance. It will be during this time that the bulk of our veterans will be discharged, and consequently facing their personal problems of reconversion.

Means are being studied whereby the Federal Government may make available a supply of temporary dwellings to communities in which the need is most pressing. However, it is possible that through intense local effort, a maximum utilization of the existing housing supply may materially reduce the need for such action.

During this interim period of reconversion, the home-financing institutions of the country may be of inestimable service to veterans, many of whom will be anxious to finance their new homes through these facilities when a regeneration of construction offers them a greater opportunity to build or buy. By individual or joint action in our local communities, institutional lenders, establishing or working with veterans' housing referral services, may assist them in finding temporary accommodations until such time as they may establish themselves in their permanent homes. Such action at this time will build good will, will aid the veteran when he most needs it, lift some of the pressure for long-term reorganizations to meet a temporary need, and, above all, reduce the governmental cost of reconversion.

After reconversion is accomplished and the nation's magnificent machinery of production, under our competitive economy, can get going, the needs can be adequately met in terms of quality, quantity and price. It is during the critical year ahead of us that the strains will be heaviest.

Sincerely yours

James Twohy

James Twohy
Governor

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