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THE TREASURY AND ITS DEFICIT.

For several years past the financial documents appended to the President's Message have attracted too little attention. There are several reasons for this: First the admirable system of publicity which has been established throughout Gen. Grant's administration makes the condition of the Treasury fully known to the people beforehand, and to the certainty that the Secretary of the Treasury and the Heads of his Bureaus were thoroughly honest and free from the taint of suspicion, we have added the fact of an overflowing Treasury. Secondly, the recommendations of the Secretary of the Treasury and of other officials in their reports have so seldom guided the deliberations of Congress that the documents of the Department, though so elaborate and valuable, have offered but little indication of what Congress would do. Our Secretary of the Treasury has in this respect a position much inferior to that of the corresponding officer in the British Cabinet. That functionary is the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He has a seat in the House of Commons. As the acknowledged leader of the government majority he is virtually omnipotent in that House, and his annual speech on the Budget, which is the counterpart of the annual report of our Secretary of the Treasury, affords an accurate and detailed view of the fiscal legislation which, having been decided on by the Cabinet, has to be ratified by Parliament. Failing this ratification a resignation of the Cabinet would be inevitable with the formidable chances of a general election—a contingency which would cost some members their seats and all of them a great deal of money.

The apathy with which the Treasury reports have been received by the public seems this year to have given place to an eager anxiety, to meet which we enlarge our space to admit these documents; excepting the Internal Revenue Report, which we published in sufficient detail two weeks since. The reasons for the increasing interest of the public in these papers is not founded on the growing disposition of Congress to listen to their suggestions, for probably there is scarcely a single recommendation, except the very valuable one touching elasticity, which will stand much chance of favorable action during this year.

The truth is that in the hearts of our people a vague dread has been for some time lurking, lest an unknown financial crisis may be drawing near, and lest the tidal wave of our national prosperity is about to recede. Something of this undertone of apprehension, not intermingled with hope and confidence, find an echo in the President's message, as he speaks of the deficit in the revenue, the disasters of the panic, the duty of preventing the recurrence of a worse catastrophe, and of the possibility of converting that calamity into a blessing in disguise.

Be the reason, however, what it may, the Treasury reports are anxiously scanned, and their inevitable defects are drawn consequently into the more conspicuous notice. As a matter of business what the people want to get from these documents, is an answer to such questions as these:—How can we best contrive to make up the ugly deficit which confronts us in the National Revenue? What is the cost of the funding operations so far, and shall we continue them? What shall we do to avoid the dreadful peril which hangs over the country in connection with the issue of legal tenders, now going on for the first time in the lifetime of this government, as a means of supplying defective revenue in time of profound peace?

The people have a right to look for a plain answer to each of these questions in the papers before us. Let us see what sort of replies Mr. Richardson gives. He says the surplus in the revenue last year was \$43,392,959. This large sum was not used to strengthen the balances of the Treasury. On the contrary, 50 millions of debt have been paid off and 7 millions of the money in hand were used up for this purpose. Hence the Treasury balance was weakened. By this process and by the panic of last September, the money in the Treasury was so reduced and depleted that there were not funds enough to meet disbursements. To conquer this difficulty several millions of greenbacks were taken from the so-called "reserve" of 44 millions. In other words the Treasury has made a loan of several millions of dollars without the special authority of Congress, and has borrowed this money in the most objectionable way in which money has ever been borrowed by the most needy, bankrupt, governments in their worst calamities. The extent of the loan which has already been made, or is to be made, by this new issue Mr. Richardson does not tell us. But from the debt statement for 1st December, which we publish on another page, the amount appears to be \$10,922,018, as the aggregate of greenbacks is now almost 367 millions, instead of 356 millions, their legal aggregate.

Hence we see that the amount of the deficit thus supplied in the revenue is now 11 millions, and as the whole deficit for the year is estimated at \$13,530,000, two millions more

of greenbacks will have to be issued according to the estimate of the Secretary. He seems to be perfectly satisfied that this method of meeting the difficulty will be satisfactory to the people, though he offers to Congress the suggestive warning that the deficit may become greater than is now anticipated. "Should there not be a revival of business and an increase of revenue, new taxes may be required," he says, "rather than resort to borrowing money and increasing the public debt." As the Treasury has for months been a borrower, and is even now increasing the public debt by the issue of greenbacks, it not easy to see the precise meaning of this illogical warning to Congress. What is certain is that the Treasury has already issued 11 millions of the 13½ millions of greenbacks which were believed needful to make up the deficient revenue of the current year. As the revenue comes in hereafter, the intention is, we presume, to withdraw the over-issue of greenbacks *pari passu* with the influx of the new income into the Treasury. Meanwhile the Secretary asks Congress to give the Treasury the power to meet any future need for greenbacks by similar issues within the prescribed limits of 44 millions.

As to the important questions touching the Syndicate and the refunding of the debt, there is absolutely no information except that 300 millions of new fives have been negotiated in exchange chiefly for sixes, and that three millions a year have thus far been saved in interest alone. Now it is reported that the negotiation cost the extravagant sum of 3½ millions of dollars. Whether this be so or not, the people wish to be informed; and Congress, we trust, will ascertain precisely how much was the aggregate sum which this new loan cost the Government. We believe the Syndicate contract closed with the first of this month, and in the present state of the Treasury, it should not be renewed on any such costly terms.

THE CURRENCY AND CONGRESS.

Mr. Kelley, of Pennsylvania, the well-known leader of the party of Currency Inflation in the House has begun the campaign by the introduction of his long promised bill. It is entitled "An Act for the Improvement of the Currency and the Reduction of the Interest on the funded debt of the United States." In view of the pressure of the public burdens, the latter of these two objects commands quite as much attention as the first. Let us see by what novel expedient of statesmanship both these objects are reached and brought within the firm grasp of one broad comprehensive measure of reform. Subjoined is the text of Mr. Kelley's bill.

Be it enacted, &c., That the amount of United States notes in circulation be limited, except as hereinafter provided, to \$400,000,000, and that any holder of said notes presenting any sum not less than \$50 or some multiple thereof to the Treasurer of the United States, or any of the Assistant Treasurers, shall receive in exchange therefor an equal amount of bonds of the United States, coupon or registered, as may by said holder be desired, bearing interest at the rate of 3 65-100 per cent per annum, payable semi-annually, with the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized to prepare and furnish for that purpose; and that when any person shall demand of the Treasurer of the United States, or any Assistant Treasurer, redemption of said bonds, it shall be the duty of said Treasurer, or Assistant Treasurer, to pay in United States notes the principal of such bond or bonds, with the accrued interest, and cancel and forward the bonds thus redeemed to the Treasurer of the United States forthwith, in such manner as the Secretary may prescribe.

SEC. 2. That the Secretary of the Treasury shall cause to be prepared United States notes of the several denominations now in use to the amount of \$50,000,000, which shall be held as a reserve or redemption fund for the purpose of securing prompt payment of said bonds when demanded; and the United States notes so held in reserve shall be used only when needed for the payment of said bonds on their presentation, and shall be withdrawn and placed again in reserve out of any United States notes not otherwise appropriated, received by the Treasury Department thereafter, and the amount of United States notes received by the Treasury Department in exchange for said bonds, bearing 3 65-100 per cent interest, should be appropriated and applied by the Secretary of the Treasury as rapidly as practicable, to the

purchase or redemption of any bonds of the United States outstanding at the passage of this act.

SEC. 3. That the national banks are hereby authorized to hold said bonds, bearing 3 65-100 per cent interest, instead of the reserve of United States notes now required by law.

Here, then, we have the whole mystery. Such is the statesmanship, such the far-reaching sagacity of our inflationist friends in Congress. The substance of their new plan is summed up in the old exploded cry of "more paper money." The inflationists boast that they are practical men. They know, as everyone knows, that where a man fails it is for want of money, and that plenty of money always gets him out of his troubles. Just so it must be with a great nation. Would you make its finances flourish? There is an easy method. Create greenbacks! Our philanthropists imagine the thing has never yet been tried. You have only to set the press in motion. You can fill the public Treasury with money in endless profusion. Since money is what business needs let us make money that business may flourish! Why should the country languish when money, the great regenerator of its commerce and trade, can so easily be created?

How many sober members of either House hold this extreme view, it is difficult to say. Some time ago you could count them on your fingers. In 1866, when the sound policy of currency contraction was in the ascendant, these expansionists were mute. They were shrewd enough to work in the dark, and were content with getting the Treasury to operate the machinery of contraction in such a way as to make it feared, unpopular, and obnoxious. In the summer, when contraction was safe and wholesome, Mr. McCulloch was induced to refrain from it, and in the fall and winter, when it was the worst time in the world to contract the currency, they induced Mr. McCulloch to contract it with such force and vehemence that in February, 1868, his power over the contraction of the currency was summarily taken away, and all efforts at contraction have been ever since suspended. Since that victory the expansionists have been steadily gaining ground, and we shall soon see how much power they can muster on a division. The general impression is that they will be much too weak to pass any inflation bill during the session.

As to the bill before us, it is unsatisfactory to both parties. The expansionists, who think paper-money so good a thing that we cannot have too much of it, find fault with Mr. Kelley for limiting his proposed "relief" to 450 millions. They say, with much show of reason, that the rigid limit of 94 millions of new greenbacks will soon be as intolerable as the present limit of 356 millions. What they want is elasticity. By this they mean elasticity in one direction—namely, in expansion. The greenback aggregate they would have unfettered by any legal limit. They well know that if the law impose no limit, there is no other power in existence with force enough to do so.

As to the opponents of expansion, they are not at issue with Mr. Kelley on mere matters of detail. Their question is not how much more or less of new paper money Congress shall give the country. They boldly challenge the right to ask Congress for a single dollar. Under the Constitution of the United States, Congress has no power, they say, to emit legal tender money except in time of war. Hence, if Mr. Kelley's measure should pass in its present form, the enactment would be unconstitutional; inasmuch as the sole power which Congress holds, or has ever claimed, over the greenback currency is either to redeem it, or else to bring it to par with gold. Some persons will even push these views further, and contend that the obligation of the greenbacks is of such a primary urgency that the Treasury ought to devote all its surplus

revenue to the redemption of greenbacks, and that the payment of the five-twenties in preference during the last four years is a violation of law as well as a breach of the national faith.

It is well known to the readers of the CHRONICLE that we have not gone so far as this, although we heartily espouse the cause of reforming the currency, and have always contended against expansion. We have not hitherto ventured to insist that every dollar of the 368 millions of surplus which have been used since 1869 in prepaying the gold bonds of the United States should have been devoted to the redemption and retiring of its greenbacks. That a part of this prodigious surplus could with advantage have been so disposed of; and that it would have been of service as a stepping stone to specie payments, we do, however, firmly believe. Nobody will doubt that if the surplus had been so used, and if the resumption of coin payments had come, the benefits conferred on the nation by this consummation would have far transcended in value all the advantages which have come to us from the much-vaunted reduction of the public debt.

On the whole we conclude that Mr. Kelley's bill, like all similar measures heretofore, will find foes in abundance. The inflationists will quarrel with it because it does not go far enough in creating paper money. Moreover, some of them want more bank notes, and they have a salutary fear that they cannot get both greenbacks and bank notes. As to the contractionists they will of course give a solid vote against the measure, and their example will be followed by a growing number of intelligent Congressmen who have studied the subject in the light of history, and have taken the trouble to form an independent opinion. Such at least is the general belief among those best informed and shrewdest in such forecasts. If they be accurate the prospect of inflation of the currency, on which the Stock Exchange has been advancing its prices 10 to 20 per cent, will be disappointed, and the country will for some time at least steer clear of the Maelstrom of bankruptcy into which its paper money men have been so industriously guiding it.

RAILROADS IN DEFAULT.

In THE CHRONICLE of Nov. 15 was published an extended list of railroads which had failed to pay the interest on their bonds at any time within several years past, and whose affairs still remained unsettled. It was stated at the same time that the list was not perfectly complete, as from the nature of the case, it was impossible to ascertain the exact status of so many railroads within a short time.

To-day the list is brought forward after being thoroughly revised and corrected, and with the addition of the names of several other roads, concerning which information has since been obtained, and five roads which have for the first time passed their interest since November 1, 1873.

Brief remarks were made at that time upon the financial condition and prospects of each company embraced in the table, and it is only necessary now to comment upon the affairs of those which have since been added to the table, or to give further information concerning the others wherever additional points have been obtained.

It is necessary that the character of this compilation should be clearly understood, and that it is not intended to embrace those railroads which have been sold out under foreclosure and their affairs closed up, nor those which have completed negotiations for funding their interest, and are therefore not now in default.

The Atlantic & Great Western Railway does not belong among companies in default, as the interest on its first and second mortgages is promptly paid, and the obligation to pay interest on the third mortgage is distinctly expressed to be conditioned upon the earning of such interest over

and above all prior liens and charges; a reference to the full report of the road, published in THE CHRONICLE, October 18, and in the *Railway Monitor* of November 15, will therefore give light on the subject.

TABLE SHOWING RAILROADS IN THE UNITED STATES NOW IN DEFAULT FOR NON-PAYMENT OF INTEREST ON THEIR BONDED DEBT.

NAME AND DESCRIPTION.	Length in miles	Principal of bonds outstan'g	Rate per cent.	Interest periods	Where payable.	Date of first default.
1. Ala. Cent. (Selma & Mer.) 1st mortgage	81	1,600,000	8	J. & J.	New York	Jan., 1872
2. Alabama & Chattanooga—1st M. gold, guar. by Ala. 2d M., not guar.	296 298	5,220,000 2,673,000	8 g. 8	J. & J. J. & J.	New York New York	July, 1872 Jan., 1871
3. Atchison & Nebraska—1st mortgage	150	3,750,000	8	M. & S.	Boston.	Sep., 1873
4. Boston, Hartford & Erie—Burdell M., \$5,000,000 guar.	139	20,000,000	7	J. & J.	New York	July, 1869
5. Bur., Cedar R. & Minn.—1st M. gold sinking fund.	229	5,400,000	7 g.	M. & N.	New York	Nov. 1873
6. Burlington & So'west.—1st M., coup. or reg.	105	2,100,000	8	M. & N.	Boston.	Nov. 1873
7. Cairo & St. Louis—1st mortgage	150	2,500,000	7	A. & O.	Oct., 1873
8. Central of Iowa—1st mort. gold coupon... 2d mort. gold	231 231	3,700,000 925,000	7 g. 7 g.	J. & J. A. & O.	New York New York	July, 1873 April, 1873
9. Chesapeake & Ohio—1st M. sinking fund, gold.	427	15,000,000	6 g.	M. & N.	New York	Nov. 1873
10. Chester & Tamaroa (Ill.)—1st mortgage, gold.	41	660,000	7 g.	M. & N.
11. Chicago & Canada S.—1st M. gold, for \$8,000,000.	...	2,000,000	7 g.	A. & O.	New York	Oct., 1873
12. Chic., Clinton & Dub.—1st mortgage	60	1,500,000	8	J. & D.	Boston.	Dec., 1873
13. Chic., Danv. & Vinc.—1st mort., main line... do Ind. exten.	114 32	2,500,000 592,000	7 g. 7 g.	A. & O. A. & O.	New York New York	Oct., 1873 Oct., 1873
14. Chic., Dubuq. & Minn.—1st mortgage	131	4,350,000	8	J. & D.	Boston.	Dec., 1873
15. Chic. & Mich. Lake Sh.—1st mort., " " " " " "	195 185 52	3,500,000 1,350,000 1,300,000	8 8 8	J. & J. M. & N. M. & S.	Boston. Boston. Boston.	July, 1873 Nov. 1873 Sep., 1873
16. Chicago & Southwest.—1st mort., gold, not guar.	50	1,000,000	7 g.	J. & D.	New York	June 1873
17. Des Moines Valley—1st M., Keokuk to Des M. 1st M. on 85m. and 466,000 acres & 2d M. on 162 m.	162 85	2,310,000 4,690,000	8 8	A. & O. A. & O.	New York New York	Oct., 1871 Oct., 1871
18. Det., Hillsdale & Ind.—1st mortgage... 2d mortgage	65 65	1,170,000 300,000	8 8	J. & D. J. & J.	New York New York	June 1873 July, 1873
19. Detroit & Milwaukee—1st mortgage... 2d mortgage... 2d mort., funded coupons... Oakl. & Ottawa, sterl. loan... do dollar loan	190 190	2,500,000 1,000,000 377,000 155,000 51,300	7 8 7 6 g. 7	M. & N. M. & N. M. & N. M. & N. M. & N.	New York New York New York N. Y. & L. New York	Nov., 1873 Nov., 1873 Nov., 1873 Nov., 1873 Nov., 1873
20. Duchess & Columbia—1st mortgage	58	2,500,000	7	J. & J.	New York	July, 1871
21. Florida Railroad—1st mortgage, gold, conv.	...	350,000	7 g.	J. & J.	N. Y. & L.	July, 1873
22. F. Wayne—Muncie & Cin.—1st mortgage, gold... 2d mortgage	109 109	1,800,000 500,000	7 8	A. & O. A. & O.	Boston. Boston.	Oct., 1872 Oct., 1872
23. Greenville & Columbia—1st M., guar. by State... Bonds not guaranteed	143 ...	1,426,545 376,766	7 ...	J. & J. J. & J.	Jan., 1872 Jan., 1872
24. Jacksonv., Pen. & Mob.—1st mortgage to the State	250	4,000,000	8	J. & J.	New York	July, 1873
25. Jersey City & Albany—1st mort., Rockl. Central... 1st mort., Ridgefield Park	12 12	250,000 250,000	7 7	M. & N.	New York	Nov., 1873
26. Kan. C., St. Jo. & C. B.—St. Jo. & C. B. RR. 1st M. do conv. K. C., St. J. & C. B. Con. M. New consol. mortgage	78 78 262 265	1,400,000 525,000 687,500 1,000,000	10 8 8 ...	M. & S. J. & D. M. & S. F. & A.	N. Y. & Bos. N. Y. & Bos. New York Boston.	Sep., 1873 Dec., 1873 Sep., 1873 Aug., 1873
27. Kansas Pacific—1st M., land g. 3,000,000 acres 1st M., from 140 miles... 1st M., coup (Leaven Br.)	245 253 34	6,455,000 4,063,000 600,000	7 g. ... 7	M. & N. J. & D. M. & N.	New York N. Y. & St. L. N. Y. & St. L.	Nov. 1873 Dec., 1873 Nov. 1873
28. Leaven., Lawr. & Gal.—1st M. land grant conv. K. C. & S. Fe 1st M. guar Southern Kansas, 1st M.	145 33 ...	5,000,000 720,000 160,000	10 10 8 s.	J. & J. M. & N. J. & D.	New York Boston. Boston.	July, 1873 Nov. 1873 ?
29. Little Rock & F. Smith—1st mort. gold... Land grant sink. f. bonds	150 ...	3,500,000 3,750,000	6 g. 7	J. & J. A. & O.	Boston. Boston.
30. Little R'k, Pine B. & N. O.—1st mortgage	70	750,000	7 g.	A. & O.	New York
31. Logan sp., Crawford, & C.—1st M. gold	92	1,500,000	8 g.	Quar'ly	New York	Nov. 1873
32. Louisv., New Alb. & St. Louis Air Line—1st mortgage	30	780,000	7 g.	New York
33. Macon & Brunswick—1st M. State end. bonds... 2d mortgage... Equipment bonds	197 1/2 197 1/2 ...	2,550,000 1,100,000 150,000	7 7 7	Various A. & O. A. & O.	New York New York New York	1873 Oct., 1871 Oct., 1871
34. Maysville & Lexington—1st mortgage	50	500,000	7	J. & J.	New York	July, 1873
35. Memphis & Little R'k—1st mortgage land grant... 2d mortgage	131 ...	1,300,000 1,000,000	8 ...	M. & N.	New York New York	Nov. 1873
36. Michigan Lake Shore—1st mortgage	56	830,000	8	J. & J.	New York	Jan., 1873
37. Miss., O'chita & Red R.—1st mortgage, gold	35	500,000	7 g.	J. & J.	New York
38. Mobile & Montgomery—1st M., gold, end. by Ala. 2d M., not endorsed	186 186	2,500,000 1,000,000	8 g. 8	M. & N.	New York New York	May, 1873
39. Montclair of N. Jersey—1st M., gold, guar... 2d mortgage... Income bonds 7	1,800,000 1,500,000 888,000 500,000	7 g. 7 7 g.	M. & S. Quar'ly	New York New York New York	Sept. 1873 April, 1873
40. Monticello & Port Jervis
41. Montgomery & Eufaula—1st mort., end. by Ala... 1st mort., not endorsed	80 80	1,040,000 330,000	8 g. 8	M. & S. J. & D.	New York New York	Mar., 1873 Jan., 1873
42. Mo., Kansas & Texas—1st M., gold, Tebo & Neo	100	396,000	7 g.	J. & D.	New York	Dec., 1873
43. Mo. Riv., Ft. Scott & G.—2d mortgage, gold	161	2,000,000	10	M. & N.	Boston.	Oct., 1873

NAME AND DESCRIPTION.	Length in miles	Principal of bond-outstanding	Rate per cent.	Interest periods	Where payable.	Date of first default.
44. N. H., Middle'n & W.— 1st mortgage.....	52	3,000,000	7 f	M. & N.	New York	Nov. 1872
2d mortgage.....		880,000	7	J. & J.	New York	Jan., 1873
45. New Jersey Southern— 1st mortgage.....	78	2,120,000	7	M. & N.	New York	Nov. 1873
2d mortgage.....		1,000,000	7	M. & S.	New York	Sep., 1873
Maryland & Del. 1st M....	54	850,000	6	M. & N.	New York	May 1872
46. N. O., Mobile & T. xas— 1st mortgage bonds.....	327	?	8	J. & J.	New York	Jan., 1873
47. New York & Oswego M. 2d mortgage.....	225	4,000,000	7	M. & N.	New York	Nov. 1873
3d mort. or equip. b nds.		3,800,000	7	M. & N.	New York	Nov. 1873
48. Oreg n & California— 1st mortgage.....	200	10,500,000	7 g.	A. & O.	New York	Oct., 1873
49. Pittsb., Wash. & Balt— 2d mort. to Baltimore city	149	2,937,000	6 g.	J. & J.	New York	July, 1873
50. Port Huron & Lake Mich (now Chic. & Lake H.)— 1st mort., traffic guar.....	90	1,800,000	7	M. & N.	New York	Nov., 1873
51. Port Royal— 1st mort., not guaranteed.	112	1,500,000	7 g.	M. & N.	New York	Nov. 1873
52. Poughkeepsie & East.— 1st mortgage.....	42	500,000	7	Jan., 1873
53. Rockf. Rock I. & St. L. 1st mortgage, gold.....	281	9,000,000	7 g.	F. & A.	London.	Feb., 1872
54. St. Jo. & D. nv. C.... 1st M., gold, Eastern div.	112	1,500,000	8 g.	F. & A.	N.Y.,L&F.	Feb., 1873
1st M., W. div., land grant	170	5,500,000	8 g.	F. & A.	N.Y.,L&F.	Feb., 1873
55. St. Louis, Lawrence & D. 1st mortgage, gold.....		1,020,000	6 g.	A. & O.	New York	April, 1873
56. St. Louis & Southeast.— 1st-M., gold convertible..	210	3,250,000	7 g.	M. & N.	New York	Nov., 1873
57. St. Louis & St. Joseph— 1st mortgage, gold.....	72	1,000,000	6 g.	M. & N.	New York	May, 1873
58. St. Paul & Pacific— 1st M. West. or main line.	150	3,000,000	7 g.	M. & N.	London.	Nov., 1873
2d do do land gr.	207	6,000,000	7 g.	M. & N.	London.	Nov., 1873
2d mortgage & land grant.	80	1,200,000	7	J. & D.	New York	Dec., 1873
59. Selma & Gulf.— 1st mort. (guar. by Ala.)	40	640,000	8	A. & O.	New York	April 1872
60. Selma, Marion & Mem.— 1st M., end. by Ala.	50	800,000	8	M. & S.	New York	Mar., 1872
61. Selma, Rome & Dalton— 1st mortgage.....	100	835,500	7	J. & J.	New York
2d M. (Ala. & Tenn. Riv.)	100	241,000	8	J. & J.	New York
General mortgage.....		3,000,000	7	A. & O.	New York	Oct., 1870
62. Sheboygan & Fon-du-lac 1st mortgage.....	45	750,000	7	J. & D.	New York	June, 1873
1st mortgage, extension..	40	694,000	8	A. & O.	New York	April, 1873
63. South Side of Long I.— 3d M. and 1st on extension	34	1,000,000	7	A. & O.	New York	Oct., 1873
64. Springfield & Ill., S. E.— 1st mortgage, gold.....	228	3,400,000	7 g.	F. & A.	New York	Aug. 1873
2d do do.....	228	1,000,000	7 g.	F. & D.	New York	Aug. 1873
5. Southern Minnesota— 1st M. } land grant	170	3,340,000	8	A. & O.	New York	April 1872
2d M. } 1,792,000 acres.	170	1,252,000	7	J. & J.	New York	July, 1872
66. Sullivan & Erie— 1st mortgage convertible.	29	1,000,000	7	M. & N.	New York	May, 1873
67. Sunbury & Lewiston....	45½	1,200,000	7	A. & O.	Philade.	Oct., 1872
68. Toledo, Peoria & War.— 1st mort., Eastern divis'n.	111	1,600,000	7	J. & D.	New York	Dec., 1873
69. Union Pacific, cen. br.— 1st mortgage gold.....	100	1,600,000	6 g.	M. & N.	New York	Nov., 1873
70. Vermont Central— 1st mortgage.....		3,000,000	7	M. & N.	Boston.	Nov., 1872
2d mortgage.....		1,500,000	7	J. & D.	Boston.	June 1868
71. Western Alabama— Bonds not guaranteed....	168	1,350,000	8	A. & O.	New York	April, 1873
72. Wilm'g'n & West'n (Del).	20	500,000	7	A. & O.	New York	Oct., 1887

3. ATCHISON & NEBRASKA.—This company borrowed money to pay its interest on March, 1873, and relied upon selling certain county bonds to repay the loan, which was prevented by the stringency of the money market, and the September interest was passed. The road earned net in the first five months of this year \$47,910. The proposition made in the Treasurer's circular to bondholders was to simply hold back their coupons for two years till September 1, 1875, and not present them for payment.

5. BURLINGTON, CEDAR RAPIDS AND MINNESOTA.—This company's circular dated November 1, 1873, states:

"The effects of the great panic—its resulting suspensions, and failures to realize money—make it necessary for the company to request the bondholders to extend the payment of coupons maturing November 1, 1873, May 1, and November 1, 1874, until the first day of March, 1877.

"The three coupons from this series of bonds to be deposited with the Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, of New York City, and gold scrip payable in 1877, as above indicated, drawing interest at seven per cent per annum, payable semi-annually in gold, to be given for said coupons, interest to be adjusted. The coupons to remain with the Trustee, upon the condition that if the Burlington, Cedar Rapids and Minnesota Railway Company fail to pay the interest coupons and principal of said scrip at maturity, then the holders thereof shall have their coupons returned to them, with all their rights to proceed against the company.

"The company will at any time receive said scrip at par and accrued interest, with premium on gold added, in payment of its first mortgage bonds at 90 per cent and accrued interest; or in payment of stock at forty dollars per share of one hundred dollars.

"Up to the present time, owing to the limited sale of bonds, a large proportion of the net earnings during the present year have gone into construction and equipment. Over seventy-five miles of road have been completed during the present season, chiefly on the Milwaukee division. The company felt justified in appropriating the earnings in the manner above stated, believing that under the then existing circumstances they would have no difficulty in realizing funds from their unsold bonds for the payment of their November coupons."

9. CHESAPEAKE & OHIO.—The first proposition to bondholders for funding has been modified as follows:

"1st. The coupons to be surrendered, and the assignments of registered interest shall be placed in the custody of some bank-

ing or trust company, acceptable to the majority in interest, to be held in escrow for the period of five years, from January 1, 1874."

"2d. If, during the said period, there shall occur a foreclosure of either of the mortgages on the road, then the coupons and interest assigned, that are secured by that mortgage shall be entitled to the priorities established by its mortgage, after deducting whatever may have been paid as interest on the income bonds.

"3d. Interest paid at any time on the income bonds to the then holders, shall cancel an equal amount of the coupons and assignments held in escrow."

These terms are much more favorable to bondholders. By the opening of the Church Hill Tunnel in Richmond, December 1, the trains of the Chesapeake & Ohio are admitted to the new dock on the James River, and a considerable traffic in Western freights is expected immediately. Through bills of lading are issued from Louisville and Cincinnati for New York, Boston & Providence, and also to European ports.

12. CHICAGO, CLINTON AND DUBUQUE.—The failure to complete connections and obtain business which had been confidently counted upon is given as the cause for this road's default, which were also the causes for the difficulties of the Chicago, Dubuque, and Minnesota. Mr. Graves is the president of both and similar action will probably be taken in each case.

13. CHICAGO, DANVILLE AND VINCENNES.—The first proposition to bondholders has already been referred to, and in a circular dated November 20, the company makes a second proposition as follows:

"The four coupons to be deposited with the trustee, and the company to issue "Certificates of Indebtedness" for a like amount, payable in five years from February 1, 1874, bearing interest at seven per cent per annum, payable February 1 and August 1, in each year, both principal and interest payable in United States gold coin; and in case of default in the payment of interest or principal when due, the coupons to be returned to the owners, with all their rights to proceed against the company."

Either proposition remains open for acceptance. The total bonded debt is stated at \$3,780,000; floating debt, \$806,000; total cost of property, \$7,507,800.

14. CHICAGO, DUBUQUE, AND MINNESOTA.—This company first defaults in December. In a circular to bondholders it is stated that the road from Dubuque to La Crescent, 117 miles, is completed and equipped, and in good running order; the branch up Turkey River to Elkport, 14 miles, is finished and doing a good business, the remainder of the branch, 47 miles, is nearly ready for the rails. Mr. J. K. Graves, the President, states that the managers are the largest bondholders, and they will soon prepare a plan for temporary relief, and submit it for approval.

17. DES MOINES VALLEY.—The motion at Des Moines, Nov. 20, to set aside the sale of the road and the removal of Smythe, the receiver, was withdrawn, on agreement of parties that the Keokuk & Northwestern Railroad transfer its bid to trustees in trust for the second mortgage bondholders. The bonds of the purchasers were transferred to the first mortgage bondholders, and the road turned over to John E. Henry, as the manager.

19. DETROIT & MILWAUKEE.—Concerning the financial prospects of this road, which failed to meet the coupons on its bonds due Nov. 15, it is stated that last winter was an unusually bad one for the road, owing to a vast amount of ice on Lake Michigan, and it became absolutely necessary to make improvements in order to retain any business, hence steel rails have been put down at a heavy cost, and other changes have been made which have consumed the means of the road very largely. The result was a default in meeting its coupons. The matter is already actively considered by the officers and shareholders of the Great Western Railway of Canada, by which the Detroit & Milwaukee is owned, and a committee of that corporation is to investigate affairs and mature a definite plan of action.

23. GREENVILLE & COLUMBIA.—The Greenville & Columbia (S. C.) Railroad has been in default since January 1, 1872, but this road is now operated by the South Carolina Railroad, and W. J. Magrath is president of both.

A proposition was made by circular, dated August 11, 1873, to the bondholders, inviting them to fund the past due coupons of January and July, 1872-73 (14 per cent), into a new bond, bearing 7 per cent interest, to be endorsed by the South Carolina Railroad, and interest to be resumed on the coupons maturing Jan. 1, 1874. This proposition is said to be satisfactory to the bondholders, and they have all, or nearly all, accepted it.

27. KANSAS PACIFIC.—This month the Kansas Pacific passes its interest on \$4,063,000 of its bonds, which are secured by mortgage on 253 miles of road, beginning at the 140th mile post west. After the failure to pay in November this was of course expected, but the question as to the company's relations to the United States Government is of some interest, as the first mortgage bonds now default, and the question arises, how does this affect the United States, which holds the second mortgage, in exchange for its subsidy? It is claimed on behalf of the Kansas Pacific that the interest was fully earned, but expended in construction of eighty-eight miles of new road; the securities based upon which new construction are unsold. The President of the Company sailed for Europe recently, to lay before bondholders in Frankfort and elsewhere the condition of his company, but it appears that the building of new road, with money that was due for interest on first mortgage bonds, may be considered prejudicial to the rights of the United States.

28. LEAVENWORTH, LAWRENCE & GALVESTON.—We have seen a copy of the proposed indenture made by this company, dated

August 1, 1873, providing for the surrender to trustees of the coupons maturing up to and including Jan. 1, 1877, and the issue therefor of certificates of preferred stock to bear 10 per cent per annum, payable out of net earnings, if made. No information is at hand as to the number of bondholders who have yet assented.

32. LOUISVILLE, NEW ALBANY & ST. LOUIS AIR LINE.—This company has been proceeded against in bankruptcy on its floating debt, and the following official statements are made by the president, Mr. Augustus Bradley: "Very inconsiderable amount of work will place the first eighty miles of the road, leading out of New Albany west, in a condition to receive the superstructure. Some three miles of iron is already laid upon the portion of the work adjacent to New Albany. Further west, from Princeton, Indiana, to Albion, Illinois, a distance of about twenty eight miles, the iron is also down, and upon which the company are running daily trains and doing considerable traffic in freight and passengers. Between these two points is the bridge over the Wabash river, a substantial structure, fully completed for the crossing of trains, of the Howe truss pattern, and over 1,300 feet in length.

"The floating debt of the company, which is owing almost exclusively to banking institutions, and is secured to them by the hypothecation of 329 of the company's first mortgage bonds, amounts to the sum of \$184,516 71; that the bonded debt of the company, for bonds paid to contractors for building the road (very few of the bonds having been sold by the company), amounts to the sum of \$780,000, which makes the total obligations of the road amount to the sum of \$964,516 71.

"From the showing of the report of Mr. Lyman, secretary, we have these conclusions, to wit:

Value of work done on road.....	\$2,539,676 84
Amount of indebtedness of road.....	964,516 71

Value of work done above indebtedness.....	\$1,575,160 13
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It then requires to complete the road, according to the estimate of Mr. Dukes, the sum of \$2,591,221 22. And to meet that expenditure the company has of the—

First mortgage bonds undisposed of amounting to.....	\$3,745,000 00
Of uncollected and conditional stock subscribed.....	243,677 39

Making a total of.....	\$3,988,677 39
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Which would be a sufficient sum, if money was easy and confidence restored, to fully complete the road.

"In ordinary times, there would be no difficulty in making sale of the company's bonds, but our bonds have been in the market for some months past, and have actively and energetically been discussed and pressed for sale by able and influential parties, both in this and in countries in Europe, but without any immediate success. A communication received from a party looking after the company's interest abroad, states that the American panic will prevent the sale of bonds for the present, and that the contemplated trip to this country for the purpose of examining our line of road will be deferred by him for a short time."

39. MONTCLAIR.—The late President, Mr. J. H. Pratt, makes the following statements in a published letter, as to the actual cost by reference to the books and accounts, he says:

"There is invested in the main road and branches as follows:

Land taken for right of way.....	\$590,673 98
Construction, engineering, legal and general expenses.....	2,809,751 31

Total.....	\$3,400,425 29
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Deduct cost of Morristown branch.....	\$305,142 22
Deduct cost of Orange branch.....	26,450 77—
	331,592 99

Total cost of main line, Jersey City to Ringwood, 39 miles....	\$3,068,832 30
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"This is about \$80,000 per mile. This may seem large to some, but only to those who are ignorant of the fact that the average cost of the principal New Jersey railroads, as evidenced by their stock and bonds, is \$217,000 per mile.

"The debt is represented by first mortgage bonds, \$1,800,000; costing present owners about 90—\$1,620,000. Second mortgage bonds, \$780,000, not sold, but forfeited as collateral, costing present owners about \$400,000.

"There is due general creditors unsecured, exclusive of New York and Oswego Midland Railroad Company, less than \$175,000. The income bonds are held mainly by the townships benefitted by the road, or by the early friends and directors of the road who paid their money for them at par. The stock of the company is also held to the extent of three-fourths of the whole issue by the original managers of the enterprise.

"The first mortgage bondholders, the only real representatives of the public in this matter, have in their hands a valuable security. It can hardly be doubted that the trustees of the first mortgage have the ability and disposition to protect the interests of those they represent, and to secure a purchaser of this valuable property when the proper time shall arrive, at a price which shall save the first mortgage bondholders from any loss."

42. MISSOURI, KANSAS & TEXAS.—This company has passed its December interest on the bonds of the Tebo & Neosho Railroad, of which there is but a small amount outstanding. No circular has yet been issued to the bondholders.

46. NEW ORLEANS, MOBILE & TEXAS.—This road was sold out under the second mortgage, both east and west divisions, and bought in by second mortgage bondholders. Two companies were organized—one for east of Mississippi River, and one for west, each being subject to their respective first mortgages. The affairs of the company are still unsettled, and they do not wish to furnish information to the public.

50. PENINSULAR.—We have been informed that the Peninsular Railroad (now Chicago & Lake Huron) has effected arrangements for funding its coupons up to 1878, and we are therefore glad to

be able to omit it from the list. It is stated that the Port Huron and Lake Michigan also has a good prospect of funding its coupons within a short time on terms somewhat similar to those of the Peninsular.

54. ST. JOSEPH & DENVER CITY.—The President Mr. Bond has published a full report of the affairs of this company, dated Oct. 28, 1873, which gives some details not contained in the report published in THE CHRONICLE, August 23, on page 250, and we may extract from his pamphlet more fully hereafter. In conclusion, Mr. Bond says:

"I recommend the immediate foreclosure of the mortgages, both on the Eastern and Western Division, and thereupon a reorganization in favor of all the existing creditors, based upon equitable ownership. In my opinion it is essential that all the debt now bearing interest should be cancelled, and that other evidences of interest or ownership in the property, such as land scrip, income bonds, preferred stock, or common stock, calling for revenue only when it can be obtained from sales of land or surplus earnings, should be issued in place of such debt. The scrip or income bonds could be secured upon the property by first mortgage lien, if the bondholders should so decide upon reorganization. This can be accomplished only by means of a foreclosure and reorganization. As no one in interest, so far as I am advised, objects to a foreclosure by the bondholders, the legal proceedings necessary to accomplish this result can and should be attained with speed and economy."

58. ST. PAUL AND PACIFIC.—In view of the fact that nearly all the bonds of this road are held abroad, and that those who purchased them were induced to do so in reliance upon the company's land grant, it seems very desirable and only just that Congress should extend the time for the completion of the road in order to secure the original land grant. An article at much length on this subject has been published in the Holland papers, and we quote the following:

"During the last few years upwards of sixty different kinds of American railway securities have been introduced into that little country (Holland) alone. Until lately American railway bonds were the favorite investment in the greater part of Germany and Holland. The news of the various spoliation of the rights of the St. Paul and Pacific bondholders gave rise to a general distrust in all American railway securities; and later, when a crisis was brought about at New York, the panic in Europe became universal."

After referring to the appointment of a receiver by Judge Dillon, the writer says: "But the director-construction agent of the Northern Pacific had taken care that the lines should not be half completed, that not a single mile of land grant had been obtained. To complete the line millions would still be required, and the credit of American railways in Europe was totally gone. Was it surprising, under these circumstances, that the loan of \$5,000,000, ordered by the receiver, failed in Europe, where the most conflicting representations found credence? The unfortunate bondholders of the St. Paul & Pacific, however, did not remain quiescent. They were desirous to give a proof of their intention to proceed with the construction and to put up with sacrifices so as to attain that object, if Congress would only consent to prolong the term of the land grant for the period of one year. An amount was collected by them, to be placed at the disposal of a New York banking house, for the purpose of proceeding with the work as soon as the season should permit.

"The great question now is: How will Congress decide? Will it protect foreigners, who furnished their money in aid of American enterprise, against violation of good faith and deceit?"

66. SULLIVAN & ERIE.—The corporation was established in 1865. Its property was then stated to be above five thousand acres of coal fields and timber lands in Dunshee, Sullivan county, Pennsylvania, with a railroad of twenty-nine miles thence to Tonawanda, on the Erie Railroad. On the 1st of November, 1866, the stockholders placed \$1,000,000 in bonds on the market. These bonds had twenty years to run (until November 1, 1886); and \$700,000 worth was taken in Albany, Providence and Boston. From some cause or other, however, no coupons have been paid since May, 1872, and a meeting of bondholders was held on the 18th of June last to survey the situation. At this meeting Mr. Parsons, of Malden, was appointed to visit Pennsylvania and see what could be done. At the stockholders' meeting, lately held in Boston, Mr. Parsons read letters which stated that the property of the company had been attached at the instance of a farmer for \$1,800, he claiming the same as land damages, and that it was advertised to be sold at auction by the sheriff. After some remarks the meeting appointed a committee of three with power to employ assistance, whose duty it will be to protect the interests of the bondholders in such manner as may seem to them best. The committee is composed of E. S. Wheelan of Philadelphia, Charles Cushman of Cambridge, Matthew Bartlett of Boston.

67. SUNBURY & LEWISTON.—The terms of the lease of this road were that the Pennsylvania Railroad should operate the Sunbury & Lewiston Railroad for two-thirds of the gross earnings. The interest on the bonds and all other payments to come out of the remaining one third. The Pennsylvania Railroad claims that the cost of operating the road more than exceeded the gross receipts, and moreover that they (the Penn. R. R.) only loaned the S. & L. road the money to pay the April, '73, coupons. A committee of the bondholders have taken steps to foreclose the mortgage, and expect to sell the road sometime in the early part of 1874.

68. TOLEDO, PEORIA & WARSAW.—A committee of stockholders of this road, which defaulted on its December interest, have gone out over the line to decide as to the best measures for its relief. The financial embarrassments are alleged to have been caused by the difficulty in finding an Eastern outlet to their business. They connect at the Illinois State line with the Pennsylvania Central Railroad, but that road has not moved their freight as it accumulated, and they have thus been unable to do the business which naturally belongs to them.

Department Reports.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, D. C., December 1, 1873.

SIR: In compliance with the the provisions of law, I have the honor to submit to Congress the following report:

RECEIPTS, &C., FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1873.

The moneys received and covered into the Treasury during the fiscal year ended June 30, 1873, were—

From customs.....	\$188,089,522 70
From internal revenue.....	113,729,314 14
From sales of public lands.....	2,882,312 38
From tax on circulation and deposits of national banks.....	6,830,037 67
From repayment of interest by Pacific Railway Companies.....	514,206 04
From customs' fines, penalties, &c.; labor, drayage, storage, &c.....	1,966,469 36
From sales of Indian trust lands.....	818,246 58
From fees, (consular,) letters patent, homestead, &c.....	1,877,221 67
From proceeds of sales of Government property.....	1,637,283 15
From marine-hospital tax.....	333,003 03
From steamboat fees.....	259,092 56
From direct tax.....	315,254 51
From profits on coinage.....	489,134 62
From tax on seal skins.....	252,181 12
From miscellaneous sources.....	2,184,394 25
Total ordinary receipts.....	\$322,177,673 78
Premium on sales of coin.....	11,560,530 89

Total net receipts.....	\$333,738,204 67
Balance in Treasury June 30, 1872, including \$3,047 80 received from "unavailable".....	106,567,404 74

Total available cash..... \$440,305,609 41

The net expenditures by warrants during the same period were—

For civil expenses.....	\$19,348,521 01
For foreign intercourse.....	1,571,362 85
For Indians.....	7,951,704 88
For pensions.....	29,359,426 86
For military establishment, including fortifications, river and harbor improvements, and arsenals.....	46,323,138 31
For naval establishment, including vessels and machinery, and improvements at navy yards.....	23,526,256 79
For miscellaneous, civil, including public buildings, light-houses, and collecting the revenue.....	52,408,226 20
For interest on the public debt.....	104,750,688 44
For premium on bonds purchased.....	5,105,919 99

Total, exclusive of the public debt.....	\$290,345,245 33
Redemption of the principal of the debt, exclusive of the certificates of deposit issued under act of June 8, 1872, for the redemption, of which a like amount of United States notes was set apart and held as a special deposit.....	\$50,498,335 58
Outstanding certificates of deposit mentioned above, added to the principal of the debt and to the cash balance in the Treasury.....	31,730,000 00

Leaving net disbursements on account of loans..... 18,768,335 58

Balance in the Treasury June 30, 1873.....	\$99,462,028 50
To which add special deposit of legal tender notes for redemption of certificates of deposit, added above.....	31,730,000 00

Total cash balance July 1, 1873..... 131,192,028 50

Total.....	440,305,609 41
By the foregoing statement it will be seen that the net revenues for the fiscal year were.....	\$333,738,204 67
And the ordinary expenses.....	290,345,245 33

Leaving a surplus revenue of..... \$43,392,959 34

Which has been applied to the reduction of the debt, as follows:

Reduction of principal account, exclusive of certificates of deposit.....	\$50,498,335 58
Decrease of cash in the Treasury, exclusive of special deposit of United States notes for redemption of certificates of deposit, as compared with June 30, 1872.....	7,105,376 24
Reduction in debt.....	\$43,392,959 34

This statement treats solely of the principal of the debt. By the monthly debt statement of the public debt, into which enter the accrued interest, interest due and unpaid, and the cash in the Treasury, as ascertained on the day of publication, as well as the principal of the debt, the reduction of the debt during the past year amounted to \$43,667, 630 05; and the total reduction from March 1, 1869, to Nov. 1, 1873, has been \$383,629,783 39, the annual saving of interest resulting therefrom being \$27,432, 932 04.

RECEIPTS, &C., FOR FIRST QUARTER OF FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1874.

The receipts during the first quarter of the current fiscal year were:

From customs.....	\$49,195,403 68
From sales of public lands.....	573,768 07
From internal revenue.....	25,640,454 41
From tax on circulation, &c., of national banks.....	3,499,743 66
From repayment of interest by Pacific Railways.....	198,970 56
From customs' fines, &c.....	438,514 21
From consular, patent, and other fees.....	503,941 12
From proceeds of Government property.....	303,765 32
From miscellaneous sources.....	1,507,931 21

Net ordinary receipts.....	81,853,492 24
From premium on sales of coin.....	2,350,818 24
From Government of Great Britain—payment of the award of the tribunal of arbitration at Geneva.....	15,500,000 00

Total receipts..... \$99,704,310 58

Balance in Treasury June 30, 1873..... 131,192,028 50

Total available..... \$230,896,339 08

The expenditures during the same period were as follows:

For civil and miscellaneous expenses, including public buildings, light-houses, and collecting the revenues.....	\$17,372,293 60
For Indians.....	2,008,715 19
For pensions.....	8,698,156 58
For military establishment, including fortifications, river and harbor improvements and arsenals.....	13,795,053 48
For naval establishment, including vessels and machinery and improvements at navy yards.....	9,792,451 57
For interest on the public debt, including Pacific Railway bonds.....	37,051,907 79

Total, exclusive of the principal and premium on public debt..... \$88,718,578 21

Premium on purchased bonds.....	\$1,301,946 78
Award by Geneva tribunal, investment account.....	15,500,000 00
Net redemption of the public debt.....	32,986,828 91

49,788,775 69

Total net expenditures..... \$138,507,353 90

Balance in Treasury September 30, 1873..... 92,388,985 18

Total..... \$230,896,339 08

Owing to the large proportion of the interest on the public debt maturing July 1, the amount paid out on that account during the first quarter of the year is more than half as much as will be required for the next nine months, and although it enters into the expenses of this quarter, it is properly chargeable to a longer period of time. Many other expenditures are greater also during the first than any subsequent quarter, by reason of the necessity of supplying disbursing officers with money under new appropriations which became available on the first of July.

For the remaining three-quarters of the current fiscal year it is estimated that the receipts will be:

From customs.....	\$111,000,000 00
From sales of public lands.....	1,500,000 00
From internal revenue.....	66,000,000 00
From tax on national banks.....	3,200,000 00
From Pacific railways.....	300,000 00
From customs' fines, &c.....	800,000 00
From consular, patent and other fees.....	1,300,000 00
From sales of public property.....	1,000,000 00
From miscellaneous sources.....	2,000,000 00

Total..... \$187,100,000 00

For the same period it is estimated that the expenditures will be:

For civil expenses.....	\$15,250,000 00
For foreign intercourse.....	1,100,000 00
For Indians.....	6,500,000 00
For pensions.....	21,780,000 00
For military establishment.....	34,000,000 00
For naval establishment.....	18,000,000 00
For miscellaneous, civil, including public buildings.....	34,000,000 00
For interest on the public debt.....	70,000,000 00

Total..... \$200,630,000 00

This will leave a deficiency in the revenues of \$13,530,000.

ESTIMATES FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1875.

It is estimated that the receipts for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1875, will be:—

From customs.....	\$180,000,000 00
From sales of public lands.....	2,500,000 00
From internal revenue.....	108,000,000 00
From tax on national banks.....	6,200,000 00
From Pacific railways.....	500,000 00
From customs' fines, &c.....	1,500,000 00
From consular, patent, and other fees.....	1,500,000 00
From sales of public property.....	1,500,000 00
From miscellaneous sources.....	4,000,000 00

Total..... \$305,700,000 00

It is estimated that the expenditures for the same period will be:—

For civil expenses.....	\$19,500,000 00
For foreign intercourse.....	3,350,000 00
For Indians.....	7,000,000 00
For pensions.....	30,480,000 00
For military establishment, including fortifications, river and harbor improvements, and arsenals.....	50,000,000 00
For naval establishment, including vessels and machinery and improvements at navy yards.....	23,000,000 00
For miscellaneous, civil, including public buildings, light-houses, and collecting the revenues.....	54,067,144 00
For interest on the public debt.....	98,000,000 00
For interest on Pacific Railway bonds.....	3,875,000 00
For sinking fund.....	29,918,856 00

Total..... \$319,191,000 00

The estimates received from the several Executive Departments are as follows:

Legislative.....	\$3,961,405 62
Executive.....	17,895,674 90
Judicial.....	3,409,750 00
Foreign intercourse.....	2,347,304 00
Military.....	34,881,618 10
Naval.....	19,251,935 86
Indians.....	6,765,779 61
Pensions.....	30,480,000 00
Public works.....	33,163,287 10
Postal service.....	6,811,363 00
Miscellaneous.....	10,704,381 42
Permanent.....	16,926,890 49
Interest on public debt.....	97,798,080 00
Interest on Pacific Railway bonds.....	3,877,410 72
Sinking fund.....	29,918,856 00

Total..... \$319,198,736 82

The book of estimates, now ready to be laid before Congress, thoroughly prepared under the immediate supervision of Mr. C. F. Conant, chief of the warrant division of the Secretary's office, whose watchful care, industry and judgment have made it a work of great accuracy, will prove to be of the utmost convenience to committees and members.

The several tables which form part of this report furnish details of the accounts of the Department.

THE REVENUES AND ESTIMATES.

On account of the alterations in the tariff laws, effected by the acts of May 1 and June 6, 1872, adding tea and coffee and other articles to the free list, and the reduction of duties on other merchandise, as well as by the removal of a considerable amount of internal revenue taxation, the receipts have fallen off for the year ending June 30, 1873, much below those of previous years, as was anticipated.

Since the close of that year the recent severe financial and commercial crisis has caused an additional and unexpected diminution in the revenues during part of September and the whole of October and November.

But it is gratifying to find that, in this period of the greatest commercial embarrassment, the receipts in coin from customs have been greater than the proportionate amount required for the same period to meet the interest on the public debt and all other expenditures which are payable in coin.

For the remainder of the year the currency payments will be much larger than the ordinary currency receipts without the sale of gold. The revenues have already fallen off sufficiently to make it important and necessary to exercise the greatest economy in appropriations and expenditures for the future. And should there not be a revival of business at an early day, and an increase in the receipts over those of the past two and a half months, additional means will be required to meet expenses. Should such be the case, I recommend additional taxation, judiciously laid, so as to be the least burdensome upon the people and the business of the country, rather than a resort to borrowing money and increasing the public debt.

In the estimates for the next nine months, as well as for the next fiscal year, the probable effect of the financial and business derangement has been somewhat taken into account; but, as it is yet too early to determine its full effect upon the future revenues, or to estimate when and to what extent they will be restored to their former amounts, these estimates are subject to future contingencies, which, during the next few months, Congress will be better able to take into account and to judge of than it is possible to do at this time.

In any event, I earnestly commend every reduction in the appropriations which may be found possible, to the end that the economy which the people, suffering under the present embarrassment in business, are everywhere disposed to make, may be shared and encouraged by the Government through their public servants.

REFUNDING THE PUBLIC DEBT.

Under arrangements made by my immediate predecessor in January last the refunding of the public debt has been successfully continued, and is still progressing in precisely the same manner as previous negotiations were conducted. Subscriptions have been made to the new five per cent funded loan to the extent of eighty-four and a half million dollars, and the proceeds are applied, as fast as subscriptions mature, to the redemption of an equal amount of five-twenty bonds bearing six per cent interest.

In addition to that amount, the fifteen and a half million dollars received from Great Britain in payment of the Geneva award, under the first article of the Treaty of Washington, have been used to redeem so far the outstanding public debt bearing six per cent interest, and an amount equal to the debt so redeemed has been invested in five per cent bonds of the funded loan, and a registered bond therefor has been issued to the Secretary of State, in trust, to be held subject to the future disposition of Congress, according to the provisions of the act of March 3, 1873.

When the subscriptions above mentioned shall have matured there will have been thus effected since January last a conversion of the debt bearing six per cent interest into the new five per cent loan, one hundred million dollars, making an annual saving of interest to the amount of one million dollars. And the whole amount converted into this loan since the passage of the refunding act will be three hundred million dollars, reducing the annual interest charge three million dollars.

The credit of the United States has not stood higher since the close of the rebellion than it does at the present time, and it is believed that the refunding of the six per cent debt at a lower rate of interest can be still further continued.

LOAN OF 1858.

Under the provisions of the act of June 14, 1858, as amended by the act of March 3, 1859 (chap. 82, sec. 6), the then Secretary of the Treasury contracted a loan of twenty million dollars, for part of which registered bonds were issued "redeemable at the pleasure of the United States at any time after the expiration of fifteen years after the 1st of January, 1859;" and for the balance, and much larger part, coupon bonds were issued, "payable at any time after the 1st day of January, 1874, on presentation and surrender of the certificate at the Treasury of the United States."

It will be perceived that the two classes of bonds differ materially in phraseology as to the option of payment after January 1, 1874, but I am unable to discover, either from the act itself or from the records of the Department, that any difference in the contracts was intended, and it is presumed that the variation in language of the two classes of bonds was wholly accidental. Since the passage of the act of June 30, 1864, authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to issue registered bonds of any loan in exchange for coupon bonds of the same loan, the coupon bonds of this loan to the amount of \$4,000,000 have been exchanged into the registered bonds, and the amount of each class now outstanding is \$6,255,000 registered and \$13,745,000 coupon.

It is understood that some holders of the coupon bonds have regarded them as payable on the 1st of January next or at any time after that date, at their option. Applications have been made to the Department for the privilege of exchanging coupon bonds for

five per cent bonds of the funded loan, which exchange the Secretary of the Treasury has now no authority to permit.

No appropriation has been made, either in the act authorizing the loan or in any subsequent act, for the payment of the principal, and no provision of law exists for determining the pleasure of the United States as to the time of payment of either class of bonds.

The attention of Congress is thus called to this loan with the recommendation that such action in relation thereto may be taken, before the 1st day of January next, as Congress may deem wise and just.

THE BANKS, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, AND THE CURRENCY.

The prevailing practice, not only of national banks, but of State banks and private bankers, of paying interest on deposits attracts currency from all parts of the country to the large cities, and especially to New York, the great financial centre. At seasons of the year when there is comparatively little use for currency elsewhere, immense balances accumulate in New York, where, not being required by the demands of legitimate and ordinary business, they are loaned on call at a higher rate of interest than that paid to depositors and are used in speculation.

Every year, at the season when the demand sets in from the West and South for currency to be used in payment for and transportation of their agricultural products, there occurs a stringency in the money market arising from the calling in of such loans to meet this demand.

Until this year, though annually creating some embarrassment, this demand has been met without serious difficulty.

During the past summer, anticipating the usual autumn stringency, the Treasury Department sold gold while the market price was high, currency abundant, and bonds for sale in the market were scarce, and while there was a surplus of gold in the Treasury, and thereby accumulated about fourteen million dollars of currency with the view of using the same or such part thereof as might be necessary in the purchase of bonds for the sinking fund at times during the autumn and winter when they could be bought at a price not above par in gold, or in meeting demands upon the Treasury, as circumstances should require.

This year there was a great demand for currency to pay for the heavy crops of a bountiful harvest, for which the European countries offered a ready market. The suspension of certain large banking houses, the first of which occurred on the 18th day of September, alarmed the people as to the safety of banks and banking institutions in general. Suddenly there began a rapid calling in of demand loans and a very general run on the banks for the withdrawal of deposits. Entire confidence was manifested in United States notes and even in national bank notes, and they were drawn wherever they could be obtained and were largely hoarded with as much avidity as coin was ever hoarded in times of financial distress when that was the circulating medium of the country. The banks found themselves unable to meet the demands upon them, currency in circulation became exceedingly scarce, and the business of the country became greatly embarrassed.

In this condition of things, great pressure was brought to bear upon the Treasury Department to afford relief by the issue of United States notes. The first application came from a number of gentlemen in New York, suggesting that no measure of relief would be adequate that did not place at the service of the banks of that city twenty millions of dollars in United States notes, and asking that the Assistant Treasurer of New York should be authorized to issue to those banks that amount of notes as a loan upon a pledge of clearing house certificates secured by ample collaterals, and for which certificates all the banks were to be jointly and severally responsible. This proposition was declined, it being clearly not within the duty or the authority of the Treasury Department, under any provisions of law, thus to employ the public money.

Exchange on Europe having fallen to unusually low rates, and indeed having become almost unsalable in the market to the embarrassment of our foreign and domestic trade, application was made to the Secretary of the Treasury to use the money in the Treasury in the purchase of exchange. The Treasury Department having no occasion to do this for its own use, and no necessity for transferring funds to Europe, was compelled to decline this proposition, which, if accepted, would have put the department in the position of becoming a dealer in exchange, a position clearly inconsistent with its duties.

Subsequently the New York Produce Exchange made a proposition to accomplish the same result in a different form, and also requested, as others had before, that the Secretary should pay at once the twenty million loan of 1858, to which the following reply was made:

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, Sept. 30, 1873.

SIR: Your letter of the 29th inst., covering two resolutions of the New York Produce Exchange, has been received and the subject-matter fully considered.

The resolutions are as follows:

"Whereas the critical condition of the commercial interests of the country requires immediate relief by the removal of the block in negotiating foreign exchange; therefore be it

Resolved, That we respectfully suggest to the Secretary of the Treasury the following plans for relief in this extraordinary emergency:

"First. That currency be immediately issued to banks or bankers, upon satisfactory evidence that gold has been placed upon special deposit in the Bank of England, by their correspondents in London, to the credit of the United States, to be used solely in purchasing commercial bills of exchange.

"Second. That the President of the United States and the Secretary of the Treasury are respectfully requested to order the immediate prepayment of the outstanding loan of the United States due January 1, 1874."

While the Government is desirous of doing all in its power to

relieve the present unsettled condition of business affairs—as has already been announced by the President—it is [constrained, in all its acts, to keep within the letter and spirit of the laws, which the officers of the Government are sworn to support, and they cannot go beyond the authority which Congress has conferred upon them. Your first resolution presents difficulties which cannot be overcome. It is not supposed that you desire to exchange coin in England for United States notes in New York at par. If your proposition is for the Government to purchase gold in England, to be paid for in United States notes at the current market rate in New York, it would involve the Government in the business of importing and speculating in gold, since the Treasury has no use for coin beyond its ordinary receipts, and would be obliged to sell the coin so purchased at a price greater or less than was paid for it. If your object is to induce the Treasury Department to loan United States notes to banks in New York upon the pledge and deposit in London of gold, it is asking the Secretary of the Treasury to loan the money of the United States upon collateral security for which there is no authority in law. If the Secretary of the Treasury can loan notes upon a pledge of coin he can loan them upon a pledge of other property in his discretion, as he has recently been requested to do, which would be an extraordinary power as well as a most dangerous business to engage in, and which my judgment would deter me from undertaking, as the Secretary of the Treasury, even if by any stretch of construction I might not find it absolutely prohibited by law. The objections already mentioned to your first resolution are so insuperable and conclusive that it is unnecessary for me to refer to the many practical difficulties which would arise if an attempt should be made to comply with your request. Your second resolution calls for the payment at once of the loan of 1858, or the bonds commonly called "Fives of 1874." Upon a thorough investigation I am of opinion that Congress has not conferred upon the Secretary of the Treasury power to comply with your request in that particular, and in this opinion the law officers of the Government concur. Under these circumstances you will perceive that, while I have great respect for the gentlemen comprising the New York Produce Exchange, I am compelled, by my views of the law and of my duty, to respectfully decline to adopt the measure which your resolutions propose. I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

WM. A. RICHARDSON,
Secretary of the Treasury.

The Chamber of Commerce of Charleston, South Carolina, petitioned for the transfer of currency to that city, and the purchase with it, at that point, of exchange on New York, to aid those engaged in forwarding the cotton crop to the market. The following letter was sent in answer to this petition:

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, }
October 3, 1873. }

SAMUEL Y. TUPPER, Esq.,

President Chamber Commerce, Charleston, S. C. :

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the memorial of the Charleston, South Carolina, Chamber of Commerce, addressed to the President of the United States, and referred to this Department, which, after reciting the present stringency in the money market and the difficulty of obtaining currency, requests "that the sum of five hundred thousand dollars be placed and maintained on deposit with the assistant treasurer at Charleston, to be used by him in the purchase of New York exchange from the banks."

To comply with the request it would be necessary for the Treasury Department to send currency by express to Charleston from time to time, and to buy with it exchange on New York in competition with private bankers.

Should this request be granted a hundred other places in the country might, with equal propriety, ask for the same relief, and if all such requests were impartially granted, the Department would find itself engaged in an extensive exchange business, fixing and regulating the rate of exchange between different places in the country, and the public money, raised by taxation only for the purpose of carrying on the Government, would be employed to a very large amount in a business which Congress has not given the Secretary of the Treasury any authority to engage in.

With a due regard to the proper management of the Treasury Department, within the provisions of law, I have felt it to be my duty to decline all similar propositions from other places, and your request must, therefore, receive the same response. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, yours,

WM. A. RICHARDSON,
Secretary of the Treasury.

The Executive Department of the Government was anxious to do everything in its power, under the law, and with due regard to the protection of the Treasury and the maintenance of public credit, to allay the panic and to prevent disaster to the legitimate commercial and industrial interests of the country; but it was found impossible to afford the relief in any of the many forms in which that relief was asked. It was decided, therefore, to adopt the only practicable course which seemed to be open to it, the purchase of bonds for the sinking fund to such an extent as the condition of the Treasury would allow, and thus release a considerable amount of currency from its vaults. Purchases of bonds were commenced on the morning of the 20th of September, and were continued until the 24th, when it became evident that the amount offering for purchase was increasing to an extent beyond the power of the Treasury to accept, and the purchasing was closed after bonds to the amount of about thirteen million dollars had been bought, and without the use of any part of the forty-four millions of United States notes, generally known as the reserve.

It should be stated that in the excitement there were many persons in the city of New York who insisted with great earnestness that it was the duty of the Executive to disregard any and all laws which stood in the way of affording the relief suggested by them—a proposition which indicates the state of feeling and the excitement under which applications were made to the Secretary of the Treasury to use the public money, and which, it is scarcely necessary to add, could not be entertained by the officers of the Government to whom it was addressed.

These facts are recited in order to lay before Congress, and place on record in a concise form, exactly what the Treasury Department was asked to do, and what it did, in the late financial crisis.

The currency paid out of the Treasury for bonds did much to strengthen many savings banks, and to prevent a panic among their numerous depositors, who began to be alarmed, and had there developed an extended run upon those useful institutions, it would inevitably have caused widespread disaster and distress. It also fortified other banks, and checked the general alarm to some extent. But the loss of confidence in the value of a great amount of corporate property which immediately followed the failure of banking houses connected with largely indebted corporations, the distrust of the solvency of many other institutions, the doubt as to the credit of firms and individuals whose business was supposed to be greatly extended, and the legitimate effect thereof in disturbing the business of the country, could not be avoided by any amount of currency which might be added to the circulation already existing.

Confidence was to be entirely restored only by the slow and cautious process of gaining a better knowledge of true values and making investments accordingly, and by conducting business on a firmer basis, with less inflation and more regard to real soundness and intrinsic values.

There can be no doubt that the practice by banks of allowing interest on deposits payable on demand is pernicious, and fraught with danger and embarrassment to borrower and lender, as well as to the general business interests.

Deposits payable on demand should be limited to that surplus which individuals require over and above their investments, and no part of that from which they expect an income. Such deposits are comparatively stable in average amount, and constitute a healthy basis for banking purposes within proper limits, which prudent bankers know how to determine.

But if deposit accounts are employed as temporary investments, the interest attracts a large amount of money to those cities where such interest is paid, and where speculation is most active, at seasons when as much profit thereon cannot be secured elsewhere. With the first return of activity in legitimate business these temporary investments are called in, and jeopardize in their sudden withdrawal the whole business of the banks, both affecting the legitimate depositors on the one hand by excitement and distrust, and on the other creating a condition of things in which the borrowers on call are also unable to respond. The banks have borrowed their money of depositors on call. They have loaned it on call to speculators, who by its use have contributed to inflate the prices of the stocks or merchandise which have been the subject of their speculations. The speculator wants it to carry the stocks till he can dispose of them without a loss. This he is unable to do in a stringent money market. The banks, their depositors and the borrowers, all want it at the same time, and of course a stringency is developed which spreads distress throughout the country.

The system creates immense amount of debts payable on demand, all of which thus suddenly and unexpectedly mature at the first shock of financial or commercial embarrassment in the country, and at the very time when most needed by debtors and when they are least able to respond.

There is no safety for corporations or individuals whose capital employed is wholly or mostly borrowed on call. Many savings banks were protected from ruin in the recent financial excitement by availing themselves of provisions in their rules requiring sixty days or other periods of notice before paying depositors, thus making all their deposits payable on time. Every cautious and well-managed savings institution has such a rule among its by-laws.

Without attributing the stringency in the money market, which is experienced every autumn and occasionally at other seasons of the year, solely to this practice of paying interest upon deposits in the large cities, it is evident that, when money is less needed in legitimate business, the practice encourages overtrading and speculation, always detrimental to the best interests of the country, and the bad effects of which upon those interests become more apparent, and the disaster more widespread, when the necessary contraction begins to be felt.

I recommend that national banks be prevented from paying interest on deposits, or that they be restricted and limited therein, either by direct prohibition, by discriminating taxation, or otherwise.

While legislation by Congress cannot prevent State banks and private bankers from continuing the practice, it can prevent national banks from becoming involved in, and instrumental in producing, the embarrassments and difficulties to which it necessarily leads.

The national banks, organized by law of Congress and having relations with the Government in the issue of circulating notes, ought to be the most cautious and safe banking institutions of the country, and should be kept aloof from all hazardous business which it is not possible to prevent sanguine, venturesome, and speculative individuals from engaging in, at the risk of their capital and their credit.

With a fixed amount of circulation of bank notes and of United States legal-tender notes not redeemable in coin, and with

gold above par in currency, there must be each year times of redundancy and times of scarcity of currency, depending wholly on the demand, no method existing for increasing the supply.

With a circulating medium redeemable in coin, a redundancy is corrected by the export, and a scarcity by the import of specie from other countries.

There is a prevailing sentiment that more elasticity should be given to the volume of the currency, so that the amount in circulation might increase and diminish according to the necessities of the business of the country. But the difference of opinion on this subject is so great, and the real difficulties attending its solution are so numerous, that, without discussing any of the multitude of plans which have been presented to the public through the press and otherwise, I earnestly commend to the wisdom of Congress a careful and thorough consideration of this important subject, rendered more obviously important by the present embarrassed condition of large business interests which have suffered by the recent financial crisis; and that, in such inquiry, avoiding further inflation of the issue of irredeemable legal-tender notes, the most desirable of all financial results to be attained, namely, a permanent return to the sound basis of specie payments, and a gold standard to which all our paper issues shall be made of equal value, shall be the aim.

To allow national banks to use part of their reserves at seasons of the greatest pressure, under proper restrictions and regulations would afford some flexibility.

Rigid statute laws applied to all banks, at all seasons, and in all places alike, often prove an embarrassment and injury when they conflict with economic principles and the laws of trade and business, which are stronger than legislative enactments, and cannot be overthrown thereby. Associated banks at the several redemption cities named in the banking law, which are the great controlling centres of business, might do much to give steadiness and safety, if they were authorized, through properly constituted boards or committees of their own officers, to exercise a large discretion in the use of their reserves, in the rate of interest to be charged at different seasons and under different circumstances, and in other matters, within limits prescribed by law.

Should it be deemed necessary or expedient to temporarily enlarge the paper-money circulation in cases of great emergency, provision may be made to permit the national banks, under certain circumstances to a limited extent, to increase their note circulation by a pledge of United States bonds, bearing no interest while so pledged, or subjecting the banks to special taxation upon the circulating notes obtained thereon, or upon such other terms that it would be for their interest to recall the notes and redeem the bonds at the earliest possible day after the pressure and their necessities should have ceased.

But any large augmentation of the issue of United States legal-tender notes in time of peace would not only be a departure from that "declaration of public policy and pledge of the public faith to the national creditors," made in the act of June 30, 1864, that the total amount of such notes shall never exceed four hundred millions dollars, as well as from that more solemn pledge contained in the first act of the Forty-first Congress, "to make provisions at the earliest practicable period for the redemption of United States notes in coin," but would postpone the day of specie payments and render it more difficult to attain in the distant future, unsettle confidence in our national finances and be a serious detriment to public credit at home and abroad.

There can be no doubt that during the eight years since the rebellion there has been a growing desire among the people to restore the paper circulation to a specie standard, and that any steps taken to accomplish that object will be received with general favor.

It is not possible to resume and maintain specie payments with so large an amount of notes in circulation and so small an amount of gold in the country. The volume of currency must be reduced or that of coin greatly increased. Should the national banks be prohibited from selling the coin received by them as interest upon bonds pledged to secure circulation, retaining the same in whole or in part in reserve, or loaning it in the discount of bills and notes payable in coin, as Congress might prescribe, there would be a gradual accumulation of gold in the banks, which would do something towards preparing for resumption. This, with a constant increase of coin in the Treasury, undertaken with the approval of Congress, would ere long lead to the desired result, when other conditions required for the maintenance of specie payments should become favorable.

The acts of Congress of February 25, 1862, July 11, 1862, and March 3, 1863, together authorize the issue of four hundred million dollars of United States notes, in addition to fifty million dollars of such notes reserved for the purpose of securing prompt payment of temporary-loan deposits, and the act of June 30, 1864, contains these words: "nor shall the total amount of United States notes issued, or to be issued, ever exceed four hundred millions of dollars, and such additional sum not exceeding fifty millions of dollars, as may be temporarily required for the redemption of temporary loan."

The temporary loans referred to in the foregoing acts having been redeemed, the maximum amount of United States notes which, under existing laws, can now or hereafter be issued, is four hundred million dollars.

Between the 31st of August, 1865, when the amount of United States notes outstanding was at its highest point, and the 4th of February, 1868, there was a gradual contraction of the amount in actual circulation, limited by the act of February 12, 1866, to not more than ten million dollars within the then next six months, and thereafter not more than four million dollars in any one month. On the 4th of February, 1868, Congress passed an act suspending further reduction of the currency, when the amount outstanding was three hundred and fifty-six million dollars, and

that sum is now the minimum limit of issue. But the law authorizing the issue of the maximum of four hundred million dollars has never been repealed, and has uniformly been held by the Treasury Department and the law officers thereof to be in full force. In view of the uncertainty which exists in public sentiment as to the right of the Secretary of the Treasury to issue United States notes in excess of the minimum, and the conflict of opinion as to the policy of doing so, conceding that he has that right under the law, I respectfully recommend that Congress shall set these questions at rest by a distinct enactment.

Until that is done, whenever there is a stringency in the money market there will continue to be a pressure upon the Treasury Department, by those who favor a policy of expansion, to increase the issue of notes to the maximum, by the purchase of bonds or otherwise; while, on the other hand, those who conceive that the public interests will be better served thereby will bring equal pressure to keep the issue down to the minimum.

Assuming that it is the settled policy of Congress, as declared in the act of June 30, 1864, above cited, that the total amount of United States notes, issued and to be issued, shall never exceed four hundred million dollars, I am of opinion that it would be unwise to require the amount in actual circulation to be kept up to the maximum, or to any amount above the present minimum. The Treasury, depending principally upon the receipts from customs and internal taxation, without the power of borrowing or otherwise increasing its resources, with liabilities created by congressional appropriations which must be met in currency to the extent of nearly two hundred million dollars a year, ought always to have a large reserve upon which it can draw to meet the ordinary demands upon it in case of emergencies, when the revenues suddenly and unexpectedly diminish by reason of a national calamity or financial derangement, which from time to time are liable to occur in all nations.

Such a reserve is also rendered necessary by the fact that the fractional currency authorized to be issued to the amount of fifty million dollars, now in actual circulation to the extent of more than forty million dollars, is redeemable in United States notes at the option of the holders.

In order that there may be no misunderstanding as to the circumstances under which the amount between the minimum and the maximum may be issued, and that it may not be issued for the purpose of inflating the paper currency of the country, I recommend that it be declared a reserve to be issued temporarily when the ordinary demands upon the Treasury shall require it, and in payment of such demands and for the redemption of fractional currency, the amount so issued to be returned to the reserve as soon as the condition of the Treasury shall warrant it, and that the purchase of bonds shall be forbidden so long as the outstanding United States notes shall exceed the minimum fixed by the act of February 4, 1868.

I believe that such a reserve, so restricted, would be a proper and reasonable protection against any contingencies whereby the revenues of the country might temporarily be diminished, and would give no reasonable cause to fear permanent inflation. As it ought not to be the business of the Treasury Department to increase and diminish the amount of legal tender notes from time to time, according to the condition of the money market, and for the sole purpose of affecting that market, I think it would be unwise to authorize the reserve to be issued except for the purposes and in the manner which I have suggested.

NATIONAL BANK NOTES.

In the general appropriation act for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1874, the following special appropriation is made, in addition to the usual annual appropriation for making and issuing the national currency:

"For replacing the worn and mutilated circulating notes of national banking associations, and for engraving and preparing, in such manner and on such paper and of such form and design as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe, new circulating notes for such associations to replace notes of a design and denomination now successfully counterfeited, six hundred thousand dollars: *Provided*, That each of said national banking associations shall reimburse the Treasury the costs of the circulating notes furnished under this provision."

The operation of this clause must be very limited without further legislation. The making of new plates and replacing notes seem to be restricted to those of denominations which have been successfully counterfeited, and it is found that the only one that can be thus considered is the ten dollar note, although the two and the twenty dollar notes have been counterfeited to some extent. A plate has been made for the ten dollar note, but as the proviso in this clause requires banking associations to reimburse the Treasury for the cost thereof, few banks are inclined to order them while they can continue to have notes of other denominations printed from the old plates without cost to themselves, under the provisions of the general banking law.

I recommend that the proviso in the clause above cited be repealed, or that banks be required to pay for all new notes furnished them, whether printed from new or old plates.

The soiled and mutilated condition of the circulating notes of national banks now in use makes it a matter of necessity that something should be done to redeem the same and to supply their places with new currency, to the end that all the notes which the people are obliged to take and use as money may be clean and whole. Several methods to accomplish this result have been carefully considered, but no plan seems to be feasible without the active co-operation of the banks themselves, assisted by such congressional enactments, as may be required for that purpose, which are earnestly recommended.

EXPORTS AND IMPORTS.

During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1873, the value of mer-

merchandise imported into the United States was \$642,029,539, as against \$626,595,077 for the previous year.

An analysis shows an increase in the imports of merchandise admitted duty free, in raw materials and in some articles of necessity, while in some articles of luxury there was a reduction.

The increase in the importation of coffee was \$6,164,339, and in tea, \$1,522,519, in addition to the amounts in bond July 1, 1872, and which were withdrawn therefrom during the year. Coffee was so withdrawn for consumption to the value of \$16,901,126, and tea to the value of \$18,024,217. There was an increase, also, in the importation of copper and copper manufactures of \$1,818,488; soda and salts, \$1,719,408; tin in plates, \$2,681,222; hides and skins, \$1,427,784; fur skins, \$188,170; melado, \$2,656,138; wood and manufactures thereof, \$2,141,766; earthenware, \$745,140; manufactures of cotton, \$9,893,870.

There was a decrease in silk goods, \$5,723,582; precious stones, \$182,905; fruits, \$713,203; fancy goods, \$278,577; fine linen, laces, and other manufactures of flax, \$1,054,115; as well as in some articles of a different class, such as barley, \$440,626; opium and extracts thereof, \$128,839; leather and leather goods, \$1,829,917; wool, \$8105,114.

The gold value of the exports of merchandise from the United States was \$522,478,892, as against \$444,177,586 for the previous year.

There was an increase in certain articles exported as follows, the value being stated in currency:

Cotton, \$47,201,672; wheat, \$12,537,194; wheat flour, \$1,425,980; bacon and hams, \$13,895,545; pork, \$884,727; lard \$1,068,198; cheese, \$2,745,092; oils, \$7,256,514; wood and manufactures thereof, \$3,878,930; manufactures of iron, \$2,372,725; coal, \$952,449; drugs and chemicals, \$575,050; hides and skins, \$2,159,845; fur and fur skins, \$382,545; leather and leather goods, \$1,621,465; in live animals, \$259,731.

The export of gold and silver in excess of the imports was \$63,127,637, as against \$66,133,845 for the previous year.

The balance of trade in merchandise has been largely against the United States for many years, and the country has exported during the twenty years ending with the last fiscal year gold and silver to the extent of more than a thousand million dollars over and above the amount imported.

For some months past, and especially in the months of October and November, the export trade in merchandise has greatly increased, and, owing to the disturbance of financial affairs and other causes, the importation of goods has largely diminished, so that the balance of trade is at present in favor of the United States; and gold and silver have flowed into the country during the past two months at a rate more rapid than ever before, except in the year 1861, when, for the whole year, the excess of imports over exports was \$16,548,531; and for the past twenty years there has been no other single year in which there has been an excess of imports of gold and silver over the exports.

The condition of the carrying trade with foreign countries, though exhibiting a large adverse balance, shows some slight gains, with prospects of still further improvement. Of the exports and imports during the past year, twenty-seven per cent were carried in United States vessels—a gain of three per cent over the previous year.

The increase in ship building in the country is decided. Official numbers were awarded by the Bureau of Statistics to 1,699 vessels of the aggregate tonnage of 313,743 tons, while, during the year preceding, the addition to our mercantile marine was only 38,621 tons. Since the close of the fiscal year still greater activity has prevailed in the ship yards on the Atlantic seaboard. From the 1st of July to the 1st of November documents have been issued to 1,288 completed vessels of 181,000 tons in all; while such returns as have been received, incomplete as they are, indicate that there were building in October last 386 vessels of the tonnage of 177,529 tons; including 69 steamers with a tonnage of 67,007 tons, of which 18 iron steamers with an aggregate of 38,492 tons are in course of construction on the Delaware.

In view of the high price of iron and coal and the recent advance in the cost of labor in Europe, together with the superior tensile strength of American ship plates, as proved by actual experiments, there is reasonable encouragement to expect that this branch of industry will make rapid strides of progress, to the great advantage of the commerce, trade and financial strength of the country.

The following table shows the amount of merchandise imported or taken out of bond at the places therein named since the passage of the act of June 6, 1872, authorizing the importation free of duty of certain articles actually used for ship building:

Port.	Value.	Duties remitted.	Duties estimated.	Duties to be collected.	Vessels built.	rep'd.
New York.....	\$173,626 00	\$36,992 00	2	..
Boston.....	139,246 00	37,546 86	\$10,347 06	\$1,306 13	4	47
Philadelphia.....	2,768 00	894 48	*
Portland.....	15,403 00	4,687 67	*	5	1
Bath.....	56,665 00	4,743 92	*	17	2
Total.....	\$387,709 00	\$84,864 93	\$10,347 06	\$1,306 13	28	50
Duties estimated.	10,347 06
		\$95,211 99				

* Duties remitted, but vessel engaged in coasting trade more than three months in one year, hence duties accrued.

Nothing, except a sound financial system, is more important to the welfare of the country than that of turning and retaining the balance of trade in favor of the United States, by a healthy stimulation of the agricultural and manufacturing industry of the country, the reduction in the cost of production at home, and of the transportation of merchandise from the interior to the seaboard, and the building of ships and vessels to do the carrying trade, now mostly in the hands of the people of other countries;

and no legislation should be neglected which may assist the industrious people of our country in attaining those most desirable results.

With the balance of trade in favor of the United States a return to specie payments may be easily reached, and, when reached, may be maintained if such wise financial measures are adopted as will prevent overtrading, extravagance and speculation, and encourage economy, industry, thrift, and only well directed and prudent enterprises—conditions as essential to the prosperity of nations as to individuals.

CUSTOMS, COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION.

The attention of Congress is invited to the necessity of a revision and codification of existing tariff laws. Duties on imports are now imposed under fourteen principal statutes relating to classification and rates, besides twenty other acts or resolutions modifying or affecting tariff acts, all passed between March 1, 1861, and March 4, 1873, to which must be added the very numerous customs revenue laws enacted prior to March, 1861, and remaining either wholly or partially in force.

Under these various enactments, questions relating to the proper assessment of duties constantly arise. There is often a direct conflict between different statutes, and occasionally between two or more provisions of the same statute, while single provisions are frequently held to embrace different meanings. These differences can be settled only by arbitrary interpretations or by adjudications in court. As a necessary consequence, protests against the payment of duties exacted by collectors of customs and appeals to this department, based on such protests, are of daily occurrence, while suits brought by the Government to collect unpaid duties, or by individuals to recover back duties paid, crowd the calendars of our courts.

The number of statutory appeals to the Secretary of the Treasury on tariff questions during the last fiscal year was four thousand seven hundred and thirty-one, exclusive of miscellaneous cases or applications for relief, numbering five thousand and sixty-five.

The onerous duties imposed upon the Department, the vexatious delays to individuals, and the expense of litigation to all concerned, resulting from this state of affairs are obvious. The following remedies are suggested for adoption, in a general revision of the tariff laws:

First. The abandonment of distinctions based upon commercial usage. In other words, the material of which an article is composed instead of its commercial designation, where a particular material forms the sole or chief element of value, should control its classification, and the rate of duty consequently imposed, whether ad valorem or specific.

Second. The abandonment of "charges and commissions" as an element of dutiable value. The revenue from this source, while uncertain and comparatively trifling in amount, is a fruitful source of embarrassment and complaint in the liquidation of duties. Its continued exaction is therefore not desirable.

Third. The repeal of all provisions of law for what are commonly known as "damaged allowances," or proportionate abatements of duties on merchandise injured during the voyage of importation. These vary at different ports, exceeding at some by ten or fifteen per cent those made at others in like cases. In many instances the extent of damage can be only approximately determined, while in others there is room to suspect fraudulent practices, and, in all, the operation of the system is unfavorable to the honest importer as well as to the Government. I therefore recommend its entire abolition—a measure which would place all importers on an equality in this respect, while there would result to them only the extra expense of insurance on the duties, in addition to that upon the foreign cost of the goods.

Many articles upon which duties are now levied, and which do not come in competition with those of the manufacture or production of this country, are imported in such small quantities that the duties collected thereon are insignificant and do not compensate for the cost of collection. I suggest that all such articles be added to the free list.

The fees prescribed by law for services upon the northern frontier connected with the execution of the laws relating to navigation and the collection of the revenue from customs are different from those upon the coast, and it is questionable whether such difference does not constitute a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the giving of a preference by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another; and a revision and equalization of such fees are recommended.

A tonnage tax is now levied on all American sailing vessels engaged in the foreign trade, and on all sailing vessels of other nationalities. It is not imposed upon American vessels engaged in the coasting trade. Steamships of foreign nationality, in some cases, are subject to the tonnage tax; in others they are exempt by old treaty stipulations only recently carried into effect. But all American steam vessels arriving from foreign countries are subject to the tax. In consideration of the fact that this tax was entirely abolished on all vessels for more than thirty years and only resorted to as a war measure in 1862, and that those engaged in the coasting trade were again relieved from this burden by recent enactments, I recommend that this tax be wholly abolished.

The Department has found difficulty in the administration of the act of February 18, 1793, relating to the enrolment and license of vessels, with reference to its application to canal boats and similar craft designed to be chiefly employed on the internal waters of States. From a period immediately subsequent to the passage of the act down to a comparatively recent date, the Department uniformly held that such boats, exceeding five tons burden, were liable to be enrolled and licensed. During the term of my immediate predecessor the question was thorough

considered, and the liability to enrolment and license was held to attach to this class of vessels only when they emerged from the internal waters of a State into the navigable waters of the United States. But even this modified view of their liability has been contested on the ground that such boats are not included in the provisions of the enrolment act. The growth of inland commerce and the necessities of trade have, of late years, led not only to a large increase in the number of canal boats, but also to their more frequent egress into navigable waters. Hence it becomes more and more for the interest of the numerous owners of this species of property to claim entire exemption from the burdens imposed by the coasting laws, or incidental to an enforcement thereof, while the Department has no option but to administer the law. It is, therefore, important that the status of this class of vessels should be definitely fixed by such legislation as the case requires.

Rivers and harbors which have been dredged by the Government at great expense are often made the receptacle of ballast thrown from vessels, by which the channels become filled and navigation impeded. There is much necessity for a law to prevent this practice, making it a penal offence to deposit, in such channels or harbors, ballast or other matter by which their value as such is lessened.

The general regulations of this Department, issued in 1857, and partially revised in 1868-'69, having become to some extent obsolete, and in many respects deficient, have been completely revised and adapted to existing laws, special pains being taken to make the arrangements of topics convenient, and the text of the regulations simple, comprehensive and concise. It is believed that this revision, an edition of which will be issued at an early date, will materially aid customs and other officers in the performance of their duties.

REORGANIZATION OF CUSTOMS DISTRICTS.

I invite the attention of Congress to the propriety of reorganizing the customs collections districts on the Atlantic coast, seventy-nine in number.

The establishment of many of these districts dates back to a period when the conditions determining their importance, relative to the commerce of the country, were entirely different from those existing at the present time. In some, the expenses of collecting the revenue exceed the amount collected, and the consolidation of such districts with others may be advisable. At the same time, it must be remembered, that the effective administration of the revenue system often requires the services of customs officers at points where few or no duties are collected. The judicious disposition of a force for the prevention of smuggling is indispensable to the collection of the revenue from imports, especially where the extent of coast affords opportunities for the clandestine introduction of dutiable merchandise. I would therefore suggest such action as may lead to a reduction of the number of districts, and a consequent reduction of expenses, without affecting the convenience of importers or the safety of the revenue.

INTERNAL REVENUE.

The following statement shows the increase and decrease from each general source of internal revenue for the fiscal years ended June 30, 1872, and June 30, 1873, as appears from the report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

	Increase.	Decrease.
Spirits.....	\$2,623,855 42
Tobacco.....	650,132 57
Fermented liquors.....	1,066,439 38
Penalties.....	19,447 94
Banks and bankers.....	\$857,197 68
Adhesive stamps.....	8,474,943 75
Articles and occupations formerly taxed but now exempt.....	12,723,224 53
Total.....	\$4,359,875 31	\$22,055,365 96

It will be seen that there has been an increase in the receipts for taxes on spirits, tobacco, fermented liquors, and from penalties.

The decrease in the receipts from banks and bankers is due principally to that provision in the act of June 6, 1872, which raises the exemption of all sums deposited in savings banks, &c., in the name of one person, from \$500 to \$2,000.

The repeal of all stamp taxes imposed under Schedule B, act of June 30, 1864, except that of two cents on bank checks, drafts or orders, took effect October 1, 1872, and has caused a falling off from that source.

The class of articles and occupations formerly taxed but now entirely exempt includes incomes, gas and other sources of taxation on lists repealed prior to the act of June 6, 1872, and the receipts from these sources constantly and rapidly diminish.

In accordance with the provisions of the act of December 24, 1872, the offices of assessors and assistant assessors of internal revenue have been abolished, and all their final accounts approved by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and referred to the accounting officers. The number of these offices varied according to the exigencies of the service, being greatest in 1868, when there were three thousand and forty-three, of which two hundred and forty-one were assessors; since which time the number had, up to the taking effect of the act above referred to, been reduced about one-half.

The system of collecting taxes by stamps, and without assessments, has been found to give general satisfaction. Since its application to special taxes they have been collected more promptly and thoroughly, and a more gratifying and healthy increase in the receipts therefrom is apparent.

The old assessment lists have been disposed of in a large number of the collection districts, and the aggregate amount held as collectible thereon does not exceed \$450,000.

REVENUE MARINE AND LIFE-SAVING SERVICE.

A marked improvement has been made during the past year in the Revenue Marine Service. The number of vessels boarded

and examined, and the number of those reported for violation of revenue laws, and of those assisted in distress, as well as the number of lives saved through the agency of the revenue cutters, is largely in excess of like service performed during any previous year. The character of the service has been elevated by rigid professional examinations. Ten old vessels have been thoroughly repaired and three new ones have been built. There are now employed twenty-eight steamers and six sailing vessels, and these are better adapted to the service required of them than were the vessels formerly in use. Three new steam vessels are constructing, and will go into commission next spring. With the addition of a new steamer for the Columbia River and vicinity, it is believed that this branch of the service will be in a condition to answer the demands upon it, economically and efficiently, for many years to come.

I desire to renew the recommendations heretofore submitted to Congress that the navy pension laws be made applicable to the officers and seamen of the Revenue Marine, and that provision be made for a retired list of officers. These measures are demanded to aid in promoting efficiency, and in justice to meritorious officers and seamen whose lives are spent in the performance of hazardous public service.

From the appropriation of \$100,000 "for the establishment of new life-saving stations on the coast of the United States," twenty-one new stations are in process of erection upon the coasts of Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Virginia, and North Carolina. Of these, ten will be ready for occupancy by the first of February next, and the others at a later period in the season. Arrangements are also being made for the establishment of two other stations. No provision of law exists for the two additional superintendents which these new stations render necessary, nor for keepers and crews for the same. It is recommended that early authority be given for the employment of such persons.

Although during the past year marine disasters have been unusually numerous, it is gratifying to be able to state that upon the coasts provided with life-saving stations, which are the most dangerous upon the seaboard, the loss of life and property has been exceedingly slight.

The wreck reports from the various stations show that since the last annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury, thirty-two vessels have been driven ashore upon these coasts by stress of weather, valued, with their cargoes, at \$832,230, on which the loss was only about \$220,000.

The number of lives imperilled was two hundred and thirty-five, of which number but a single life was lost.

In accordance with the directions of the act of March 3, 1873, measures have been taken to ascertain "at what points on the sea and lake coasts of the United States the establishment of life-saving stations would best subserve the interests of commerce and humanity," and a report on the subject will be transmitted to Congress during the session.

For the purpose of recognizing and encouraging the services of the keepers and crews of the stations, in the performance of the perilous duties they are frequently called upon to undertake in rescuing the shipwrecked, it is recommended that a system of rewards be adopted in the shape of medals of honor, to be distributed to such of them as may particularly distinguish themselves by special or notable acts of gallantry or daring, resulting in the rescue of persons from imminent danger. Such rewards might be properly extended even beyond the life-saving service, and bestowed upon any others who may have made extraordinary exertions, at their own peril, in saving life in marine disasters. Similar rewards are bestowed in foreign countries where life-saving institutions exist, and are considered prizes worth the most adventurous efforts.

THE COAST SURVEY.

The important service of the Coast Survey under this Department has been prosecuted with vigor and usefulness. The changeable character of many of our harbors and most frequented coastwise passages calls for constant watchfulness, to maintain the charts and aids to navigation as correct indicators of the actual channels. Work has been prosecuted on portions of the coast heretofore surveyed, and examinations and resurveys have also been made at New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, San Francisco and many other harbors, as well as in the great thoroughfare between Nantucket and Monomoy. Twenty-five new charts are reported as published during the year. The publication of a "Coast Pilot," or printed sailing directions for harbors and coastwise navigation, has been commenced, which, with the annual predictions of tides, will complete and digest for ready use the information laid down on the charts. Much interest has been manifested in the extension of the great triangulation lines across the continent; and the system, steadily pursued, will in time, at a small annual expense, supply the framework for an accurate map of the whole country.

LIGHT HOUSES.

I have frequently attended the meetings of the Light House Board, and have been much impressed with the importance of the work under its control, and the efficiency with which it has been conducted.

Our Light House Establishment is now larger than that of any other country in the world, extending with its lights and beacons over more than ten thousand miles of coast and shore, maintaining, at the close of the last fiscal year, 521 light houses, 85 powerful signals, operated by engines driven by steam or hot air, 21 light ships, 364 day or unlighted beacons, and 2,838 buoys.

During the past summer the board, with my approval, directed its Engineer Secretary, Major Elliott, of the Corps of Engineers of the Army, to make an inspection of the light house systems of Europe, with a view of improving our own by the introduction

of such modifications as have been found useful there. His report has been made, and the practices in other countries which differ from our own will be duly considered by the board, with a view to the adoption of such as will render still more efficient the light house system under its control.

At some of the most important points on the French and English coasts, electric and gas light houses have been placed, and I recommend that the Treasury Department be authorized to make experiments in the same direction, by applying to two of our most important stations, on towers already constructed, one electric and one gas light, of most powerful character.

MINTS

The Mint Bureau, established by the act of February 12, 1873, was organized on the 1st of April, when the coinage act became operative. Doctor H. R. Linderman was appointed director; and, under his able and energetic management, the operations of the mints and assay offices have been officially conducted, and a more speedy and systematic rendition of the bullion accounts effected. At the request of the Department, he has obtained valuable information on various technical and scientific points connected with the coinage, by which the transaction of business has been greatly facilitated.

The coinage during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1873, was as follows:

Gold coinage.....	\$35,249,337 50
Silver coinage.....	2,945,795 50
Minor coinage.....	494,050 00
Total.....	\$38,689,183 00

During the same period, the value of bars manufactured was as follows:

Fine gold.....	\$7,439,843 78
Unparted gold.....	8,485,602 35
Total gold.....	\$15,925,446 13
Fine silver.....	3,149,372 64
Unparted silver.....	8,442,711 84
Total silver.....	\$11,592,084 48
Total gold and silver bars.....	\$27,517,530 61

The reduction of the coinage charge from one-half to one-fifth of one per cent has been followed by an increased coinage, and prevented, to a considerable extent, the export of gold bullion—its value for coinage in this country having thereby been brought nearly to its mint value in London, where it is coined without charge. Some further advantages would no doubt follow the adoption by this country of the free coinage system as to gold. I recommend the repeal of the charge for coining gold, and also the charge imposed for copper used for alloy, as being an inconvenient item in estimating the coinage value of gold.

With the view to prevent the export of gold coins, authority should be given for keeping in the Treasury, when its condition will admit of the same, a supply of fine gold bars bearing the mint stamp of fineness, weight and value, and for exchanging such bars for coin. They would always be preferred to coin for export, and gold coins of full weight would be retained in the country, instead of being selected for export.

The repeal or modification of that part of the coinage act which requires gold coins to be excluded from the benefit of the half per cent abrasion limit, unless they have been in circulation for certain prescribed periods, is recommended, on the ground that in the daily transactions of the custom houses it cannot be carried into effect.

The subsidiary silver coins being manufactured by the Government on its own account, and the seigniorage or difference between the bullion and nominal value of such coin realized by it, provision should be made for redeeming in kind such pieces as have become unduly worn from long circulation. This is done in other countries which, like ours, have adopted the gold standard and demonetized silver.

The recent fall in the price of gold, together with the depreciation in the market value of silver, as compared with gold, which has been going on for sometime, has enabled the Director to coin silver, to be paid out instead of United States notes to advantage. Availing himself of this opportunity, the Director caused to be purchased as much silver bullion as could be conveniently used in giving employment to the mints, when not engaged in the more important business of coining gold, and the same was so coined and paid out.

During the last few years, our subsidiary silver coins have been sent in considerable amounts to Central and South America, where it is understood they circulate as full valued coins. It would be better for us to manufacture coin according to standards and values legally prescribed by those countries, than to encourage the export of our subsidiary coin, which is intended for home circulation.

In connection with this subject, it should be stated, that applications have been received from some of the South American governments to supply them with coins of their own standards. These applications could not be granted for want of lawful authority. As an act of comity to friendly States who have no facilities for coinage, and for commercial reasons, it is recommended that authority be granted for the execution of coinage of other countries, when it can be done at our mints without interfering with home demands for coin.

No coinage has been executed at the New Orleans Mint since the year 1861, but the machinery, with inconsiderable exceptions, is still there, and reported to be in good condition. As that section of the country will, at no distant period, require a large supply of coin, estimates for the amount required, to place the mint in condition for coining operations, and for its support during the

next fiscal year, have been submitted, and, it is hoped, will receive the favorable consideration of Congress.

Under the provisions of the coinage act, depositors receive in stamped bars from assay offices, where refining is not done, the identical bullion deposited by them, and are subjected to heavy discounts in converting the bars into coin or currency. These interior assay offices would become much more useful to the mining interests, if authority were given to the Secretary of the Treasury to issue coin certificates for the net value of such bars. (We omit the remarks of the Secretary respecting Public Buildings, &c.)

LOUISVILLE AND PORTLAND CANAL.

In the "act making appropriations for the repair, preservation, and completion of certain public works on rivers and harbors, and for other purposes," approved March 3, 1873, the following appropriations and provisions are made:

"For completing the Louisville and Portland canal, one hundred thousand dollars; and the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to assume, on behalf of the United States, the control and management of the said canal, in conformity with the terms of the joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of Kentucky, approved March 28, 1872, at such time and in such manner as in his judgment the interests of the United States, and the commerce thereof, may require; and the sum of money necessary to enable the Secretary of the Treasury to carry this provision into effect is hereby appropriated: *Provided*, That after the United States shall assume control of said canal, the tolls thereon on vessels propelled by steam shall be reduced to twenty-five cents per ton, and on all other vessels in proportion."

The resolution of the State of Kentucky recites the facts that all the stock of the canal company belongs to the United States except five shares owned by the directors, that the property of the company is subject to a mortgage to secure bonds therein mentioned, and that the company may owe other debts, and directs the Louisville and Portland Canal Company to surrender the canal and all the property connected therewith to the government of the United States upon the terms and conditions therein specified, the sixth and last of which is "that the government of the United States shall before such surrender discharge said mortgage and pay all debts due by said canal company, and purchase the stock of said directors."

The United States, by repeated acts, have manifested the intention of taking possession of this canal and maintaining it for the benefit and improvement of the navigation of the Ohio river, and the importance of consummating that intention at as early a day as possible is apparent. As long ago as 1855 the United States had become the owners of all the shares in the company except the five shares held at the request of the then Secretary of the Treasury by the directors, to enable them to retain their offices and keep up the corporate organization and the management of the business of the company. Since that time Congress has at different times made appropriations and expenditures for enlarging and improving the canal to the amount of more than a million dollars, for which the Treasury has never been reimbursed.

Recognizing the great benefit which would accrue to the commerce of the country bordering on the Ohio river, by the United States taking possession of the canal and reducing the tolls thereon, steps were taken to ascertain the debts of the company, and to devise a plan for carrying into effect the provisions of the appropriation act above cited.

It is found that the unsecured floating debt of the company, after deducting cash on hand, is not large, and may be easily ascertained and paid, and that the five shares of stock may be obtained of the directors by paying therefor one hundred dollars per share, with interest from February 9, 1864.

In addition to these debts, there are outstanding eleven hundred and seventy-two bonds of the company, of \$1,000 each, with coupons attached, bearing six per cent interest, payable semi-annually. Of these bonds, \$373,000 will mature January 1, 1876; \$399,000 will mature January 1, 1881, and \$400,000 will mature January 1, 1886.

While the resolutions of the State of Kentucky require that these bonds shall all be paid, and the mortgage discharged before the surrender of the canal to the United States, and the bonds do not all mature until the year 1886, and are supposed to be distributed among a great number of unknown holders, the difficulty of carrying into effect the provision of Congress may be readily seen.

If Congress would authorize the Secretary of the Treasury, with the consent of the State of Kentucky, to take possession of the canal upon paying the floating debts of the company, purchasing the five shares of stock, and assuming the payment of the bonds secured by the mortgage when matured, with authority to purchase them at any time previously, as circumstances would warrant, one great obstacle in the way of accomplishing this most desirable result would be removed, and the cost thereof might be distributed over a period of several years.

While this subject was under consideration a communication was received from the president of the company, under date of July 9, 1873, informing the Department that "the Louisville and Portland Canal Company has been sued in the Louisville Chancery Court, by the devisees of Colonel John Campbell, for nearly all the land owned by the company."

This suit, which is now pending, and is understood to involve the title to all or nearly all the land through which the canal runs, has so changed the aspect of affairs, that I deemed it the part of prudence, within the discretion intrusted to my judgment, to expend no money towards paying the debts of the company

until these facts should be laid before Congress for its consideration and action thereon.

REPORTS OF BUREAU OFFICERS.

The several reports of the different bureau officers to accompany this report, to wit: those of the First and Second Comptrollers, Commissioner of Customs; the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Auditors; Treasurer, Register, Director of the Mint, Chief of the Bureau of Statistics, Solicitor of the Treasury, Superintendent of the Coast Survey, the Light-house Board, Supervising Architect, and Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with that of the Comptroller of the Currency, are respectfully commended to the consideration of Congress, as showing the extent and condition of the business of the Department in all its numerous branches, and the faithfulness, industry and integrity with which the same has been conducted during the past year by all persons employed in the service.

WILLIAM A. RICHARDSON,
Secretary of the Treasury.

Hon. SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
WASHINGTON, November 28, 1873.

SIR: I have the honor to submit for the consideration of Congress, in compliance with section sixty-one of the National Currency act, the following report:

The first national bank, under the act of February 25, 1863, was organized in Philadelphia June 20, 1863,* and the first circulating notes were issued December 21 of the same year. Since that time 2,129 national banks have been organized, 32 of which have failed, and 117 gone into voluntary liquidation by a vote of two-thirds of the shareholders, under section forty-two of the act. During the last year 68 banks have been organized, 11 have failed, and 21 have gone into voluntary liquidation, leaving 1,980 in existence on November 1, 1873.

The following table will exhibit the resources and liabilities of the national banks at the close of business September 12, the date of their last regular report—the returns from New York City, from other redemption cities, and from the remaining banks, being given separately;

	N. Y. City. 48 banks.	Other redemption cities* 181 banks.	Country banks. 1,747 banks.	Aggregate. 1,976 banks.
Resources.				
Loans and discounts.....	199,162,887 79	262,523,070 82	478,549,315 61	940,235,273 22
Overdrafts.....	182,459 64	591,439 05	3,209,914 03	3,983,812 72
U. S. bonds to secure circulation	33,870,100 00	89,591,050 00	264,869,250 00	388,330,400 00
U. S. bonds to secure deposits.....	550,000 00	3,026,000 00	11,129,000 00	14,895,000 00
U. S. bonds & securities on hand	5,332,400 00	1,707,400 00	3,785,050 00	8,824,850 00
Other stocks, bds & mortgages	4,552,797 40	4,736,037 68	14,420,199 45	23,709,034 53
Due from redem. agts and reserve agents.....		\$2,279,436 51	63,854,684 15	96,134,120 66
Due from other national banks	15,740,765 99	10,976,896 48	14,696,017 59	41,413,680 06
Due from other banks & bankers	2,077,286 04	3,335,728 30	6,609,859 07	12,022,872 41
Real estate, furniture & fixtures	8,469,984 33	8,601,528 75	17,590,310 13	34,661,823 21
Current expenses.....	905,622 11	2,304,410 80	3,699,404 68	6,905,436 59
Premiums.....	766,179 69	1,629,890 56	5,356,473 62	7,752,543 87
Checks and other cash items.....	2,055,769 53	1,908,812 89	7,466,300 80	11,430,883 22
Exchanges for clearing house.....	67,597,740 69	21,028,262 84	88,926,003 53	176,551,007 06
Bills of other national banks.....	2,615,533 00	4,935,579 00	8,502,644 00	16,076,866 00
Bills of State banks.....		11,211 00	15,826 00	27,037 00
Fractional currency.....	333,394 22	535,538 90	1,428,841 04	2,302,774 26
Specie.....	14,585,810 55	3,210,970 07	2,071,683 83	19,868,464 45
Legal tender notes.....	21,461,530 00	23,599,405 00	42,279,718 00	92,341,663 00
U. S. certificates of deposit.....	10,310,000 00	7,550,000 00	2,250,000 00	20,610,000 00
Clearing house certificates.....		175,000 00		175,000 00
Totals.....	389,486,310 48	439,356,698 65	951,784,836 40	1,830,627,845 53
Liabilities.				
Capital stock.....	70,235,000 00	127,164,935 00	293,672,631 00	491,072,616 00
Surplus fund.....	21,923,211 45	32,470,516 75	65,207,771 00	120,314,499 20
Undivided profits.....	11,210,470 03	12,764,472 21	30,540,199 52	54,515,131 76
National bank notes outstanding	27,432,342 00	77,900,560 00	233,798,897 00	339,081,799 00
State bank notes outstanding.....	146,525 00	207,127 00	833,201 00	1,186,853 00
Dividends unpaid.....	205,979 60	320,700 00	875,868 26	1,402,547 89
Individual deposits.....	167,512,632 74	172,015,102 29	283,107,793 26	622,635,528 29
U. S. deposits.....	296,877 89	1,498,332 71	6,036,117 63	7,829,327 23
Deposits of U. S. disb'g officers.....	49,297 13	1,326,753 51	6,731,509 49	8,088,560 13
Due to national banks.....	72,257,769 25	43,649,018 01	17,765,945 63	133,672,732 94
Due to other banks & bankers.....	18,113,050 50	15,469,278 28	5,715,819 86	39,298,148 64
Notes and bills rediscounted.....		1,349,073 57	4,633,158 78	5,987,512 36
Bills payable.....	62,125 39	3,272,799 28	2,145,729 42	5,480,554 09
Totals.....	389,486,310 48	439,356,698 65	951,784,836 40	1,830,627,845 53

* The redemption cities, in addition to New York, are: Boston, Albany, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, Washington, New Orleans, Louisville, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Chicago, Detroit, Milwaukee, St. Louis and San Francisco.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE CURRENCY.

The act of February 25, 1863, and the subsequent acts of June

* The first proceedings in the Congress of the United States in reference to the establishment of a bank were June 21, 1780, at which time a committee of three was appointed to confer with the inspectors and directors of the proposed bank, which committee, on June 22, 1780, reported as follows:

"Whereas, A number of patriotic citizens of Pennsylvania have communicated to Congress a liberal offer, on their own credit, and by their own exertions, to supply and transport 3,000,000 rations and 300 hogsheads of rum, for the use of the army, and have established a bank for the sole purpose of obtaining and transporting the said supplies with the greater facility and dispatch; and whereas, on the one hand the associators, animated to this laudable exertion by a desire to relieve the public necessities, mean not to derive from it the least pecuniary advantage, so, on the other, it is just and reasonable that they should be fully reimbursed and indemnified: Therefore,

"Resolved, *unanimously*, That Congress entertain a high sense of the liberal offer of the said associators to raise and transport the beforementioned supplies for the army, and do accept the same as a distinguished proof of their patriotism.

"Resolved, That the faith of the United States be, and the same hereby is, pledged to the subscribers to the said bank for their effectual reimbursement in the premises."

The proposed bank of 1780 was completed by the act of incorporation of 1781 of the Bank of North America. This bank was converted from a State bank to a national bank December 8, 1864.

3, 1864, and March 3, 1865, authorize the issue of three hundred millions of circulating notes to national banks to be organized under the provisions of those acts, one hundred and fifty millions of which were required to be "apportioned to associations in the States, in the District of Columbia and the Territories, according to representative population, and the remainder among associations formed in the several States, the District of Columbia and the Territories, having due regard to the existing capital, the resource and business of each State, District and Territory."

The whole amount of currency authorized by these acts was issued to national banks during the four years following.

The act of July 12, 1870, authorized an additional issue of fifty-four millions of dollars, and provided that such notes should be issued to banking associations organized or to be organized in those States and Territories having less than their proportion under the apportionment contemplated by the act of March 3, 1865, and that the bonds deposited with the Treasurer of the United States to secure the additional circulation should be of any description of United States bonds bearing interest in coin. It also provided that a new apportionment of the increased circulation should be made as soon as practicable, based upon the census of 1870, and for the cancellation monthly of an amount of three per cent certificates then outstanding, equal to the amount of national bank notes issued—the last of these certificates having been finally redeemed during the past year. Of this additional circulation, authorized by the act of July 12, 1870, there was issued to November 1, 1871, \$24,773,260; in the year ending November 1, 1872, \$16,220,210; in the year ending November 1, 1873, \$7,357,479; leaving, at the date of this report, still to be issued to banks already organized, and in process of organization, \$5,649,051.

The following table will exhibit the apportionment of the whole amount of circulation authorized by law (\$354,000,000) to the different States and Territories, upon the basis of population and wealth, as given in the census returns of 1870, together with the amount outstanding and authorized, and the excess and deficiency:

States and Territories.	Apportionment on population.	Apportionment on wealth.	Aggregate apportionment.	Outstanding and authorized circulation.	Excess.	Deficiency.
Maine.....	\$ 2,877,818	\$ 2,053,200	\$ 4,931,018	\$ 8,029,252	\$ 3,098,234	\$
N. Hampshire.....	1,461,138	1,486,800	2,947,938	4,624,525	1,676,587
Vermont.....	1,517,376	1,380,600	2,897,976	6,932,030	4,034,054
Massachusetts.....	6,689,889	12,549,300	19,239,189	59,523,671	40,284,482
Rhode Island.....	997,747	1,752,300	2,750,047	13,385,840	10,635,793
Connecticut.....	2,467,152	4,566,600	7,033,752	17,994,648	10,960,896
Total Eastern States.....	16,011,120	23,788,800	39,799,920	110,489,966	70,690,046
New York.....	20,118,813	38,267,400	58,386,213	60,976,006	2,589,793
New Jersey.....	4,159,382	5,540,100	9,699,482	11,026,890	1,327,408
Pennsylvania.....	16,167,317	22,425,900	38,593,217	42,055,781	3,462,564
Delaware.....	573,873	566,400	1,140,273	1,296,615	156,342
Maryland.....	3,584,651	3,787,800	7,372,451	9,252,847	1,880,396
Total Middle States.....	44,604,036	70,587,600	115,191,636	124,608,139	9,416,503
D. of Columbia.....	604,560	743,400	1,347,960	1,530,091	182,131
Virginia.....	5,624,042	2,407,200	8,031,242	3,902,342	4,128,900
West Virginia.....	2,029,041	1,115,100	3,144,141	2,360,307	783,834
N. Carolina.....	4,918,022	1,539,900	6,457,922	1,819,300	4,638,622
S. Carolina.....	3,239,045	1,221,300	4,460,345	2,319,500	2,140,845
Georgia.....	5,435,587	1,575,300	7,010,887	2,365,605	4,645,282
Florida.....	861,846	265,500	1,127,346	90,000	1,037,346
Alabama.....	4,576,646	1,185,900	5,762,546	1,541,133	4,221,413
Mississippi.....	3,800,529	1,239,000	5,039,529	5,876	5,033,653
Louisiana.....	3,336,863	1,893,900	5,230,763	3,646,870	1,583,893
Texas.....	3,757,640	938,100	4,695,740	930,960	3,764,780
Arkansas.....	2,223,936	920,400	3,144,336	192,495	2,951,841
Kentucky.....	6,064,027	3,557,700	9,621,727	7,637,900	1,983,827
Tennessee.....	5,777,118	2,938,200	8,715,318	3,341,736	5,373,582
Missouri.....	7,901,509	7,557,900	15,459,409	6,476,193	8,983,216
Total Southern & S'western States.....	60,150,411	29,098,800	89,249,211	38,160,308	182,131	51,271,034
Ohio.....	12,234,726	13,151,100	25,385,826	23,876,370	1,509,456
Indiana.....	7,714,871	7,469,400	15,184,271	14,706,415	477,856
Illinois.....	11,659,230	12,496,200	24,155,430	17,824,209	6,331,221
Michigan.....	5,435,357	4,230,300	9,665,657	7,485,043	2,180,614
Wisconsin.....	4,841,403	4,141,800	8,983,203	3,253,316	5,729,887
Iowa.....	5,481,081	4,230,300	9,711,381	5,674,385	4,036,996
Minnesota.....	2,018,445	1,345,200	3,363,645	3,330,414	33,231
Kansas.....	1,672,754	1,115,100	2,787,854	1,825,496	962,358
Nebraska.....	564,592	407,100	971,692	809,500	162,192
Total Western States.....	51,622,459	48,586,500	100,208,959	78,785,148	21,423,811
Nevada.....	195,052	177,000	372,052	11,864	360,188
Oregon.....	417,377	300,900	718,277	225,000	493,277
California.....	2,571,783	3,752,400	6,324,183	6,324,183
Colorado.....	182,993	123,900	306,893	538,995	232,102
Utah.....	398,386	88,500	486,886	419,829	67,057
Idaho.....	68,852	35,400	104,252	90,000	14,252
Montana.....	94,540	88,500	183,040	252,000	68,960
Wyoming.....	41,855	35,400	77,255	72,000	5,255
New Mexico.....	421,742	194,700	616,442	270,000	346,442
Arizona.....	44,334	17,700	62,034	62,034
Dakota.....	65,096	35,400	100,496	45,000	55,496
Washington.....	109,964	88,500	198,464	198,464
Total Pacific States and Territories.....	4,611,974	4,938,300	9,550,274	1,924,688	301,062	7,926,648
Grand total of States and Territories.....	177,000,000	177,000,000	354,000,000	353,968,249	80,589,742	80,621,493

States and Territories.	Authorized.	Outstanding.	Excess.	Deficiency.
Total Eastern States.....	110,489,966	70,690,046	39,799,920
Total Middle States.....	124,608,139	9,416,503	115,191,636
Total Southern & S'western States.....	38,160,308	182,131	89,249,211	51,271,034
Total Western States.....	78,785,148	21,423,811	100,208,959
Total Pacific States and Territories.....	1,924,688	301,062	4,611,974	7,926,648
Grand total of States and Territories.....	353,968,249	80,589,742	354,000,000	80,621,493

The following table will exhibit the number of banks organized, the number closed and closing, and the number in operation, with their capital, amount of bonds on deposit, and circulation

issued, redeemed, and outstanding, in each State and Territory on the 1st day of November, 1873:

States and Territories.	Banks organized.	Closed and closed.	In operation.	Capital paid in.	Bonds on deposit.	Circulation issued.	Circulation redeemed.	Circulation outstanding.
Maine.....	65	1	63	\$9,540,000	\$3,350,750	\$10,392,106	\$2,362,874	\$8,029,252
New Hampshire.....	43	1	42	5,185,000	5,163,000	5,967,755	1,343,230	4,624,525
Vermont.....	41	2	39	8,335,000	7,736,000	8,909,990	1,977,900	6,932,090
Massachusetts.....	220	21	199	91,312,000	67,316,750	53,956,110	24,432,389	59,523,671
Rhode Island.....	62	2	60	20,504,800	14,931,700	18,084,800	4,698,900	13,385,900
Connecticut.....	83	3	80	25,384,720	20,306,800	24,510,990	6,556,312	17,954,678
Total East. States	577	11	566	160,291,432	124,415,000	151,861,751	41,871,785	110,459,966
New York.....	321	45	276	110,654,691	69,025,470	98,508,160	37,532,174	60,976,000
New Jersey.....	63	1	62	13,958,350	12,389,650	14,597,875	3,571,98	11,026,890
Pennsylvania.....	213	11	202	5,510,210	4,746,500	5,510,690	15,454,90	42,055,781
Delaware.....	11	1	10	1,223,85	1,453,200	1,765,5	459,900	1,305,615
Maryland.....	34	1	33	13,640,200	10,391,250	12,888,40	3,577,693	9,252,847
Total Mid. States	642	58	584	138,286,669	140,706,050	185,202,780	60,594,641	124,608,139
Dist. of Columbia.....	3	4	4	1,652,000	1,670,000	2,294,100	764,009	1,530,091
Virginia.....	28	6	22	4,185,000	3,226,000	4,324,800	1,074,45	3,250,350
West Virginia.....	19	2	17	2,960,000	2,571,600	3,169,200	808,898	2,360,302
North Carolina.....	10	10	10	2,110,000	1,820,000	1,836,160	147,360	1,688,800
South Carolina.....	12	12	12	3,170,000	2,425,000	2,229,550	53,080	2,176,500
Georgia.....	15	2	13	2,750,000	2,526,100	2,649,290	373,685	2,275,605
Alabama.....	10	1	9	1,569,000	1,430,000	1,477,800	187,761	1,290,039
Mississippi.....	2	2	2	66,000	66,000	66,000	60,124	6,876
Louisiana.....	11	8	3	5,250,000	4,000,000	4,345,840	729,470	3,616,370
Texas.....	8	8	8	4,950,000	840,000	1,007,000	251,510	755,490
Arkansas.....	3	1	2	205,000	250,000	272,000	10,205	194,795
Kentucky.....	37	1	36	8,263,700	7,709,500	8,178,645	1,156,745	7,021,900
Tennessee.....	27	3	24	3,520,481	3,249,750	3,655,510	573,504	3,082,006
Missouri.....	41	5	36	9,545,300	6,868,350	9,126,050	1,907,622	6,218,428
Total Southern & S. W. States	231	30	201	45,836,751	39,242,050	43,647,160	7,902,462	35,744,718
Ohio.....	180	12	168	29,093,000	26,127,750	31,572,610	7,948,240	23,624,370
Indiana.....	97	5	92	17,611,800	16,277,300	18,949,620	4,413,645	14,536,015
Illinois.....	144	18	126	20,413,000	18,710,000	20,849,450	4,523,391	16,326,059
Michigan.....	80	3	77	9,763,000	7,963,050	8,892,570	1,675,177	7,217,393
Wisconsin.....	52	4	48	3,680,000	3,434,500	4,365,700	1,242,884	3,122,816
Iowa.....	34	9	25	6,077,000	5,504,000	7,156,995	1,751,810	5,405,185
Minnesota.....	34	2	32	4,173,700	3,509,250	3,612,290	706,376	3,144,914
Kansas.....	26	2	24	1,975,000	1,765,000	1,710,995	202,699	1,508,296
Nebraska.....	11	1	10	915,000	910,000	836,200	94,700	741,500
Total West. States	708	46	662	94,062,000	83,936,500	98,233,330	22,558,692	75,664,438
Nevada.....	1	1	1	250,000	250,000	131,700	119,836	111,864
Oregon.....	1	1	1	250,000	250,000	250,500	25,500	225,000
Colorado.....	7	7	7	625,000	560,000	562,720	86,725	475,995
Utah.....	4	1	3	450,000	450,000	554,500	134,671	419,829
Idaho.....	1	1	1	100,000	100,000	1,000,000	20,600	90,000
Montana.....	6	1	5	350,000	245,000	262,300	10,300	252,000
Wyoming.....	2	2	2	125,000	60,000	54,000	19,500	54,000
New Mexico.....	2	2	2	300,000	300,000	289,000	19,500	270,000
Dakota.....	1	1	1	50,000	50,000	45,000	5,000	45,000
Washington.....	1	1	1	50,000	50,000	45,000	5,000	45,000
Total Pac. States and Terr. lies.	25	3	22	2,250,000	2,015,000	2,261,120	417,432	1,843,688
G'd total of States and Territories.	2,123	143	1,975	195,726,832	180,314,600	210,106,161	132,545,212	118,350,949
GOLD BANKS.								
Massachusetts.....	1	1	1	120,000	120,000	120,000	120,000	120,000
California.....	5	5	5	3,200,000	2,537,500	2,074,600	44,600	2,030,000
Total	6	1	5	3,200,000	2,537,500	2,194,600	164,600	2,030,000

The act of July 12, 1870, further provides that when the fifty-four millions of additional circulation "shall have been taken up," the Comptroller of the Currency shall, as additional circulation may be required by the banks having less than their proportion, make a requisition for such an amount, commencing with the banks having a circulation exceeding one million of dollars in States having an excess of circulation, and withdrawing their circulation in excess of one million of dollars, and then proceeding *pro rata* with other banks having a circulation exceeding three hundred thousand dollars in States having the largest excess of circulation, and reducing the circulation of such banks in States having the greatest proportion in excess, leaving undisturbed any States having a smaller proportion until those in greater excess shall have been reduced to the same grade, and continuing thus to make the reduction provided for by this act until the full amount of twenty-five millions provided for shall be withdrawn; and the circulation so withdrawn shall be distributed among the States and Territories having less than their proportion, so as to equalize the same.

In accordance with the provisions of this section, it will be the duty of the Comptroller, as soon as the necessary bonds shall be deposited to secure the small amount of additional circulation not already issued or "taken up," to proceed to make requisitions upon banks organized in the States which have an excess. It will probably be the duty of the Comptroller during the next three months to make requisitions as provided for by this act upon banks already organized in States which are in excess, for an amount equal to the aggregate amount of circulation called for by the applications on file from the States which are deficient. These requisitions will be made upon the banks located in the following States and cities:

Four in the city of New York.....	\$5,018,000
Thirty-seven in the city of Boston.....	13,220,000
Twenty-one in the State of Massachusetts.....	2,659,000
Seventeen in the city of Providence.....	2,818,000
Fifteen in the State of Connecticut.....	1,185,000

This will reduce the circulation of all banks in the city of New York having an excess of \$1,000,000 to that amount, and the circulation of all banks in Massachusetts and Rhode Island to \$300,000. If these banks do not return the amount of circulation within one year after the requisition is made upon them, it is made the duty of the Comptroller of the Currency to sell at public auction, upon twenty days' notice, the bonds deposited by such associations as security for said circulation equal to the circulation to be withdrawn, and not returned in compliance with the requisition. With the proceeds of the bonds the Comptroller is required to redeem the notes of these banking associations as they come into the Treasury. The notes of these banks are so

scattered through the whole country that it will be impracticable for them to return their circulation without an expense not contemplated by the act, and it will, therefore, be for the interest of the banks to provide the Comptroller of the Currency with the requisite amount of legal tender notes with which to redeem their circulation as it comes into the Treasury. To this extent the act may be executed; but the notes to be redeemed will not come to the Treasury for redemption to any considerable amount, and therefore but a small proportion of the twenty-five millions will be placed at the disposal of the Comptroller for redistribution to the banks of the South and West. The result will be, therefore, great embarrassment to the banks to whom the currency has already been issued, without providing any relief for organizations elsewhere, as contemplated by the act. The Comptroller, therefore, repeats the recommendation contained in his previous report, that section six of the act of July 12, 1870, be repealed, and that twenty-five millions additional circulation be authorized to be issued and distributed among the States, as heretofore provided.

The Comptroller also renews his recommendation that the law be so amended that national banks may be organized without circulation, upon the deposit of \$10,000 of United States bonds with the Treasurer, instead of the deposit one-third of the capital paid up, as now required. He also recommends that banks already organized without circulation may be authorized to withdraw the bonds now on deposit in excess of \$10,000, and that banks desiring to reduce their circulation may deposit legal tender notes for that purpose and withdraw a proportionate amount of bonds.

The following comparative table will exhibit the amount of circulation issued under State laws previous to the establishment of the national banking system, and the amount authorized by Congress; the ratio of bank circulation in each State in 1862, and the amount now issued, in proportion to capital and wealth, and the per capita of circulation in 1862, and the per capita of circulation authorized by Congress:

Comparative table, exhibiting by States the bank circulation,* the per capita, the ratio of circulation to wealth and to capital previous to the organization of the national banking system, and in 1873.

States and Territories	Bank circulation.		Circulation per capita.		Ratio of circ'n to wealth.		Ratio of circ'n to capital.	
	1862.	1873.†	1862.	1873.	1862	1873	1862.	1873.‡
Maine.....	\$6,488,478	\$8,029,252	\$10 33	\$12 81	3.4	2.3	81.3	84.1
New Hampshire.....	4,192,034	4,624,535	12 86	14 53	2.6	1.8	85.3	89.0
Vermont.....	5,621,851	6,932,030	17 84	20 97	4.6	2.9	143.7	83.0
Massachusetts.....	28,957,630	59,523,671	25 52	40 84	3.5	2.8	42.8	65.2
Rhode Island.....	6,413,404	13,385,810	36 73	61 59	4.7	4.5	30.7	65.0
Connecticut.....	13,842,758	17,994,648	30 08	33 48	3.1	2.3	63.5	70.9
Total East. States..	\$65,516,155	\$110,489,966	\$20 90	\$31 68	3.5	2.7	51.7	68.9
New York.....	\$39,182,819	\$60,976,006	\$10 10	\$13 91	2.1	0.9	36.0	54.4
New Jersey.....	8,172,398	11,026,890	12 16	12 17	1.7	1.1	99.8	79.0
Pennsylvania.....	27,689,504	42,055,781	9 53	11 94	1.9	1.1	106.8	78.6
Delaware.....	678,340	1,296,615	6 04	10 37	1.5	1.3	176.2	85.1
Maryland.....	6,649,030	9,252,847	9 68	11 85	1.8	1.4	54.9	67.8
Total Mid. States.	\$82,372,091	\$124,608,139	\$9 97	\$12 82	2.0	1.0	53.1	64.0
Dist. of Columbia.....	1,530,001	1,530,001	11 62	11 62	1.2	1.0	88.6	88.6
Virginia.....	19,817,148	3,902,842	12 41	3 18	2.5	1.0	120.2	83.1
West Virginia.....	2,360,307	5 34	5 34	5 34	1.3	1.0	90.1	90.1
North Carolina.....	5,218,538	1,819,300	5 26	1 70	1.4	0.7	66.3	80.4
South Carolina.....	6,089,036	2,319,500	8 65	3 29	1.1	0.9	40.7	68.7
Georgia.....	8,311,728	2,365,605	7 86	2 00	1.3	0.9	50.2	81.5
Florida.....	116,250	90,000	83	48	0.1	0.2	27.3	0.0
Alabama.....	5,055,222	1,511,133	5 24	1 55	1.0	0.8	101.5	82.2
Mississippi.....	5,876	5,876	01	01	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Louisiana.....	8,876,519	3,646,870	12 54	5 02	1.5	1.1	51.0	68.8
Texas.....	939,960	939,960	5 14	5 14	0.6	0.6	75.1	75.1
Arkansas.....	192,495	192,495	40	40	0.1	0.1	90.0	90.0
Kentucky.....	9,035,724	7,637,900	7 82	5 78	1.3	1.3	65.5	74.4
Tennessee.....	4,540,906	3,341,736	4 09	2 66	0.9	0.7	127.4	86.9
Missouri.....	4,037,277	6,476,193	3 42	3 76	0.8	0.5	35.9	64.9
Total South. and Southw. States..	\$71,098,408	\$38,160,308	\$6 17	\$2 91	1.1	0.8	66.3	77.5
Ohio.....	\$9,057,837	\$23,876,370	\$3 87	\$8 96	0.7	1.1	159.6	80.4
Indiana.....	6,782,890	14,706,415	5 02	8 75	1.3	1.2	150.9	81.9
Illinois.....	619,286	17,824,209	36	7 02	0.1	0.9	31.4	77.4
Michigan.....	131,087	7,485,043	17	6 32	0.0	1.0	73.8	73.8
Wisconsin.....	1,643,200	3,253,316	2 12	3 08	0.6	0.5	53.8	83.7
Iowa.....	1,249,000	5,674,385	1 85	4 75	0.5	0.8	156.5	88.3
Minnesota.....	198,494	3,330,414	1 15	7 57	0.4	1.5	62.4	75.0
Kansas.....	2,770	1,825,496	03	5 01	0.0	1.0	5.3	77.8
Nebraska.....	809,500	809,500	6 58	6 58	1.2	1.2	87.5	87.5
Total West. States.	\$19,684,564	\$78,785,145	\$2 49	\$7 09	0.6	1.0	1	

FREE BANKING.

The restraining law of the State of New York (act of April 21, 1818) provided that "it shall not be lawful for any person, association of persons, or body corporate, from and after the 1st day of August next, to keep any office of deposit for the purpose of discounting promissory notes, or for carrying on any kind of banking business or operations which incorporated banks are authorized by law to carry on, or issue any bills or promissory notes, as private bankers, unless thereunto specially authorized by law."

This law placed the whole banking interest of the country in the hands of a few chartered institutions, and was, in its effects, a grievous monopoly. Most of the States of the Union organize, by special act of legislature, trust companies, savings banks and other corporations. The Bank of England, and the private and joint stock banks of England, organized prior to 1844, possess the right to issue circulation, and no such right has been granted to other organizations since that year. All such favored institutions are monopolies. But it cannot be said that the national banks of the United States are monopolies, in the same sense of the word. The organization of national banks has, from the beginning, been open to all, and until the amount of circulation authorized by Congress was exhausted, all applications with proper indorsements certifying to the means and character of the applicants for the organization of such institutions, with circulation, were considered and granted, and the aggregate of circulation for which applications are now on file in this office, the consideration of which has been postponed, does not exceed ten millions of dollars. That the banks which were first organized were profitable to their shareholders is conceded, and it is a cause of congratulation that the surplus earnings of those years are husbanded in a surplus fund of more than one hundred and twenty millions of dollars, as a protection to depositors and creditors, in anticipation of times of panic and disaster. The statistics we present show that the earnings of the banks, of late years, have not been excessive, and in many cases much less than the earnings and dividends which the shareholders of manufacturing, railroad, and other corporations realize from capital invested. If the national banking system, under which two or more national banks have been organized in almost every city and thriving village in the Union, and where the earnings of business men and the savings of the people can be deposited with a greater degree of safety than under any previous system, is in any sense a monopoly, it is not the fault of the system, but an evil which arises from the existing state of the currency; and it is believed that the national banking system is in every sense less a monopoly than any national system of banking ever before devised.

The system is considered a monopoly because it is supposed that large profits are derived from the privilege of issuing circulating notes which are limited in amount. The act of March 12, 1870, authorized an additional issue of fifty-four millions of dollars of national bank notes, but the whole amount has not yet been issued, chiefly for the reason that in the States to which the amount was assigned there is but little profit in the issue of such notes, as will be seen hereafter. But to the erroneous belief that a large profit accrues from circulation to organizations of this kind, the demand for what is termed free banking may, to a large extent, be attributed. The restraining act of the State of New York, as has been seen, prohibited individuals and associations from carrying on the business of banking without first obtaining special charters from the legislature. This law was repealed about thirty years after its passage, not without encountering bitter opposition. In the year following the repeal, the general banking system of the State of New York was authorized—a system based on the deposit of securities with redemption at a fixed rate of discount, and it is probable that the term "free banking" originated chiefly from the fact that it superseded the monopoly which preceded it. The signification of the phrase "free banking," however, as now used, is not clearly defined, for there is nothing in this country to-day more free than banking. Every individual or association of individuals throughout the country has the right to negotiate promissory notes, drafts and bills of exchange, to receive deposits, to loan money upon personal or real estate security, and to transact almost every kind of business pertaining to legitimate banking.

There is little doubt that the term "free banking" by many persons is understood to mean the unrestricted issue of bank notes to any association of persons organizing a national bank, and depositing the required amount of United States bonds as security; but there are few persons who have given any considerable attention to this subject who would be willing to advocate the unrestricted issue of national bank notes to the amount of the public debt.

It is probable that a more satisfactory definition of free banking would be, an issue of paper money which shall be promptly redeemed at the commercial centre of the country. Such a currency may be divided into three classes—(1) an unsecured circulation, redeemable at par by the bank, or its agent in some designated city; (2) a secured circulation, redeemable at its own counter at par, and at the commercial centre at a fixed rate of discount; and (3) a circulation exchangeable at par for lawful money at its own counter, and by its agent appointed for that purpose.

The currency of the New England States previous to the war is a fair example of the first class. That system was generally known as the "Suffolk system," because the Suffolk Bank, at Boston, compelled the redemption of the notes of the New England banks at its own counter at par. The system, however, was not free, but a monopoly, as banks could only be organized under special charters obtained from the legislatures of the six New England States. This circulation was not required to be

secured by any deposit pledged for that purpose, and the failure of banks in some of the New England States, which not infrequently happened, almost always resulted in great loss, not only to the creditor but to the bill-holder. The Suffolk Bank, at Boston, forced the redemption of the notes at par at its own counter, by a system of assorting and returning the notes to the place of issue, but the same notes were invariably at a discount of one-eighth per cent in New York. The notes of these banks were therefore neither safe nor exchangeable at par in coin at the chief commercial centre.

The New York State system of free banking is an example of the second class of currency, and the only system of free banking which has ever been successfully maintained; and it is probable that the more thoughtful advocates of what is termed free banking propose that circulation shall be issued and redeemed under the national currency act upon a similar plan.

Taking it for granted that the advocates of free banking base their arguments upon the success of the system authorized in that State by the act of April 18, 1838, it may be well to contrast the condition of the currency and of the public debt at the time of the inauguration of that system, at the commencement of the war and at the present time.

The currency of the State of New York first issued was secured by stocks of the different States, and by bonds and mortgages deposited by corporations with the comptroller of the State. Subsequently, by various amendments, the law was so changed as to provide for the issue of circulation based entirely upon the bonds of the United States and of the State of New York, and that was the basis at the time of the breaking out of the war. The debt of the State of New York at the time of the inauguration of the system was \$11,256,152, and the debt of the United States was \$10,434,221, and all these bonds were above par in the market. In 1860 the funded debt of the State of New York was \$34,140,238, and the funded debt of the United States \$44,794,092.* The laws authorizing the issue of circulating notes were more numerous than the States and Territories of the Union, and the rates of discount in the New York market upon the bank notes issued and in general circulation varied from one-eighth of one per cent to one and one-half per cent discount, while many bank notes that had a local circulation were quoted at from five to ten per cent discount. The notes of the New York and New England banks, only, circulated throughout the whole Union, like the national bank currency of to-day.

The funded debt of the United States is to-day more than eighty times as great as was the combined debts of the United States and of the State of New York in 1838, and it is about twenty-one times greater than was their combined debt in 1860. Then the United States issued coin only as currency. Now the national bank notes and the legal tender notes are about twenty times the amount of the circulation of the State of New York at that time, and more than three and a half times the amount of the circulation authorized at that time by all of the States of the Union.†

The amount of the funded debt and of the currency is therefore entirely changed, and it is by no means evident that what was a good thing for the State of New York in 1860 is in 1873 a good thing for the whole United States.

The New York State law authorized the issue of bank notes to all associations organized under its provisions at the face value of United States and New York State six per cent bonds deposited, and to this feature of the law the Bank of England and the national currency act are indebted for those excellent provisions which insure absolute security to the bill-holder.

But this law did not authorize an unrestricted issue of bank notes. It required that the bank notes issued should be redeemed at its own counter, and by its agent in New York, Albany, or Troy, at a discount. Practically the notes were redeemed at the agency, and not at the counters of the bank. Redemption was the cardinal principle of the law, and it was expected that this principle of redemption would prevent an issue of circulation which should exceed the requirements of business. Redemption in the New York law meant discount. It was to be a redemption in specie, and was founded upon the avowed principle that specie was worth more, and was more desirable to hold, than the circulating notes authorized. But in order that there should be no mistake, the law itself provided that the discount upon the circulating notes at the redemption agencies should be one-fourth of one per cent. If a law had been passed by Congress at that time for the redemption of the gold coin in silver coin, or for the redemption of the silver coin in copper coin, such a law would have been a dead letter (for the reason that gold coin is known to be of greater intrinsic value in the market than silver coin, and the silver of greater intrinsic value than copper), though each of these coins is a legal tender to an amount fixed by law. In order to have a system of redemption, it is necessary that the thing to be redeemed shall be known to be worth less than the thing in which it is to be redeemed; and this principle was legalized by the New York State Legislature, when it provided that the bank note should be worth, in the city of New York, one quarter of one per cent less than the gold coinage of the United States. If forty millions of dollars, therefore, were issued,† its value at the moment of issue was \$100,000 less than \$40,000,000. If the circulation were redeemed three times a year, there would be \$300,000 of loss on one side, and \$300,000 of gain on the other side. The gain was, as a general rule, divided between the banks which issued the money and the banks which redeemed the same, while the country merchant, the manufacturer and the

* In addition to the funded debt proper there were \$19,795,611 of Treasury notes outstanding.

† Circulation in 1860 was \$207,102,000.

‡ The circulation of New York State was \$39,182,819.

jobber in the great cities, experienced the loss. But the circulation of the State of New York was known to be so much safer and the discount so much less than the circulation of any other State of the Union, that the discount was hardly noticed, when the loss upon the notes of most of the other States of the Union was from four to six times as great. The result was, as might have been expected, that the notes were not fulfilling their function of a circulating medium, but being sent forward, not for the purpose of obtaining specie, but to be exchanged one for the other at the Clearing House, in order to provide a fund in New York for the redemption of other notes, and also to provide exchange at a profit of from one quarter to one and a quarter per cent. The amount of exchange thus gained by the bankers and brokers, and the amount of exchange lost by the people in these transactions, cannot be computed, but there is no doubt that it amounted annually to millions of dollars.

The average amount of specie held by the New York State banks for ten years previous to the year 1860, was \$17,565,006 10.*

1851.....	\$8,978,918	1858.....	\$33,597,211
1852.....	13,304,356	1859.....	22,207,782
1853.....	13,384,410	1860.....	24,582,219
1854.....	10,792,429		
1855.....	15,921,467		175,650,061
1856.....	18,510,835		
1857.....	14,370,434	Yearly average.....	\$17,565,006

Of this amount about one-eighth, say \$2,200,000, was held by the country banks in their vaults, and the balance, seven-eighths, say \$15,300,000, was held in New York city. If from this amount should be deducted the coin belonging to banks and persons residing outside of the State of New York, and the amount represented by checks payable in coin, it would be found that the amount of circulating notes issued in the State of New York was on an average, for ten years at least, five times the amount of specie on deposit for the purpose of redeeming their notes.

The amount of national bank notes now authorized to be issued is \$354,000,000, and the amount of legal tender notes, \$356,000,000, so that the proportion of legal-tender money in which the national bank notes are now redeemable is nearly identical, though slightly in excess. If the National Banking law were so amended as to require the redemption of the national bank notes in the legal-tender notes at one fourth of one per cent discount, as in the New York State law, instead of at par, as provided in the National Currency act, and the national banks of the whole country would agree to such a provision of the law, the prompt redemption of the national bank notes would be insured, but the redemption of this vast amount of circulating notes, if redeemed but once a year, would result in a loss to the people of the United States of \$900,000; if the notes were to be redeemed four times annually, \$3,600,000; and if redeemed six times annually, \$5,400,000. A system of redemption of this kind would also at once increase the rate of exchange from the rate of one-tenth of one per cent now existing at most periods of the year between the different cities of the Union, to from one-half per cent to one per cent, thus restoring, to a considerable degree, the condition of the exchange at the time of the inauguration of the national banking system, and causing an annual loss to the people of millions of dollars. Such a system would, however, undoubtedly result in the return of the notes of the national banks, at certain seasons of the year when they were not needed, to the vaults of the country banks, to be paid out when the demand for currency increased. Such a system would also give, what is exceedingly desirable at the present time, elasticity to the currency.

The profit upon the circulation of national banks organized in the Southern and Western States during the past year, as will be shown more fully hereafter, did not much exceed one per cent for the country banks, and was less than one-half per cent in the redemption cities. Under such a condition of things, with so small a margin of profit to be derived from the issue of circulating notes, there would be little demand for circulation, and consequently but little danger in throwing the doors wide open for the issue of circulating notes to any association properly organized that might desire such circulation; but with the reduction of the value of the bonds and the approximation of the value of the bank note to the value of specie, the profit would increase, and with the increase of profit the demand for the issue of additional bank notes would also increase, so that under such a system the issue of bank notes would have a continual tendency to lessen the value of the paper dollar, and prevent its approximation to the value of the gold dollar, so that all ideas of specie payment might forever be abandoned.

In order to insure the prompt redemption of the national bank notes the amount issued must be so much increased that the notes will be, say, at one-eighth of one per cent discount, and this would probably not be accomplished until an addition should be made to the present circulation of one hundred millions of dollars. The same result would follow from the reduction of the volume of legal tender notes simultaneously with the increase of the issues of the bank notes; but Congress has so frequently refused to diminish the amount of legal tender notes, that, in the opinion of the Comptroller, any general system of free banking, accompanied with redemption, must be postponed until the resumption of specie payment.

The Comptroller, in order to avoid any misapprehension of his views upon this subject, desires to state that he is not an advocate of any permanent system of currency usually known as an irredeemable currency. He believes, however, that the people of this country will not, and ought not to, submit to the higher rates of exchange prevailing previous to the war, and that any amendment to the National Currency act which shall result in restoring

such high rates of exchange will also result in the downfall of a system of banking which, it is believed, will yet become the most satisfactory and complete of any ever established. During the past year, so far as his observation has extended, the national bank note has been rarely at any perceptible discount for legal tender notes in the city of New York; and during the late panic no distinction was made by the people between legal tender notes of the United States and national bank notes. Both were alike hoarded as being the most desirable of all things to hold, and it is probable that when specie payments shall be resumed, the faith of the people will be so well established in the safety of the currency of the banks that no such general system of redemption will be required as was necessary for the unsafe currency issued by the different States previous to the war.

If the circulation should become redundant, as is sometimes the case with the silver coinage, and the national bank notes be at a discount for legal tender notes, it will be only necessary for the surplus to be presented to the agencies in the city of New York, where more than two-thirds of the circulation is now redeemable, in order to restore the equilibrium; for it is to be hoped that previous to the return to specie payments some system will be adopted which will give abundant elasticity to the currency without increasing the expense, and burden of general redemption, and without the loss resulting from the high rates of exchange which have always prevailed under previous systems.

RESERVE.

The advocates of a free banking law are also advocates of the repeal of the chief restrictions of the national currency act, and particularly of the provision which requires the keeping of a certain amount of money as reserve against liabilities. They claim that the directors and managers of the banks are the best judges of the amount of money to be loaned; and the amount to be held on hand for the protection of their creditors, and not the legislature which enacts the law or the officer who executes it; that the Government should be careful to protect the bill holder from loss, but the depositor or other creditor may safely be allowed to protect himself. They further maintain that such laws prevent the banks from extending accommodations to legitimate business interests, which, consequently, suffer on account of the lack of such accommodations. In some instances this may be true, but such laws are not passed so much for the benefit of those persons who conduct their business on sound principles as for that class or association of persons which has but little experience in the method of transacting a legitimate business. If the law be correct in principle, it will be found not to interfere with the rights of those persons who understand the true theory of business, but its tendency will be to prevent abuses on the part of those who would otherwise take risks which a prudent and careful man would avoid.

Any association of persons may organize a bank under the provisions of the national currency act. If private citizens wish to transact business in accordance with their own judgment, they can avail themselves of the privilege by conducting a private business. If other citizens prefer to organize corporations under an act of Congress which imposes restrictions designed for the public good, who shall object? The privilege is open to both, and each can decide without prejudice or hinderance. A private banker solicits and obtains business on the strength of his good name, and it is well understood that the funds placed in his hands are to be used at his discretion, the depositors relying upon his business sagacity and judgment; but if corporations desire to organize under the authority and seal of a great nation, care should be exercised that the authority obtained shall not be abused.

During the past few years great corporations have been organized by authority of law with the advantages of immense subsidies, but almost wholly without restrictions, the law-making power having been led to believe that the corporations authorized would contribute as much to the public good as to their own profit; but it has been found that overgrown corporations are conducted in defiance of the rights of the shareholders, and with little regard to the comfort and wants and profit of the people, but chiefly for the benefit of the few officers and directors; and the whole country is now aroused to the mistaken legislation which has placed the highways of the nation under the control of a few men without reserving such salutary restrictions as should compel the common carrier to deliver the products of the land to the market for a fair remuneration; and it is the great economical problem of the day how to correct a monstrous evil, which would have been under complete control if the proper restrictions had at first been provided and enforced.

The officers and directors of stock companies which have a good reputation are too apt to forget that they are but the servants of the shareholders, and that the poorest shareholder is entitled to information in reference to its affairs. The Bank of Amsterdam is said to have been bankrupt for fifty years prior to the announcement of its failure, yet it continued business for half a century upon the strength of the name and character it had built up; and many individuals and corporations are supposed to-day to be possessed of large wealth whose affairs, if carefully scrutinized, would be found to exhibit the reverse. If banks are to be organized under the authority of law and intrusted with the earnings of the people, it is right that legislators shall require them to loan the savings of the people upon real estate security of twice the value of the loan; and if the banks are organized for commercial purposes, it is right that they should be prohibited from loaning money upon real estate, and be required to loan money chiefly to business men upon commercial paper, and depositors have a right to expect that the contract which the law provides between them and the bank shall be enforced. If the law provides for a proper security for circulation, and at the same

*Specie held by the New York State banks from 1851 to 1860. (Report of Superintendent of Banking Department of the State of New York, January 1, 1861, page 79.)

time defines the kind of security in which deposits shall be invested, it is as important to know that the contract with the depositor will be fulfilled, as well as the contract with the bill holder. It is the business of such corporations to receive the money of the people, and first of all to fulfill their legal obligations with their creditors, rather than to attempt to follow the vagaries and manipulations of the stock board, or assume to regulate the rate of interest on the street. While the law permits banking corporations to use a certain portion of the deposits of each creditor, and realize a profit therefrom, it provides also that they shall keep a certain other portion of such deposits on hand for the prompt payment of the creditor, whenever it shall be demanded. The correctness of this principle of law is evident, but the difficulty is to ascertain the exact amount necessary to keep on hand. The reckless banker or director would loan it all, and frequently not to his neighbors for the purpose of facilitating legitimate transactions, but to himself, for use in some enterprise which promises well, but results in ruin. The prudent banker invests carefully the savings of his neighbors, and studies their wants, holding an ample fund at his command for all emergencies. The law properly provides that all the assets of a bank, even including the furniture, shall first be applied to the payment of the creditors, the shareholders having a right only to the balance which may remain after the payment of every cent of indebtedness. If the law is so careful to protect the interests of the depositors, it is also just that it should provide restrictions to that end, and devise methods of ascertaining frequently whether these restrictions are strictly observed. The amount of the capital of the shareholder may be small, and the amount of the capital furnished by the depositor may be many times as great, so that the risk of the shareholder is by no means as great as that of the depositor.

The capital and surplus of the London and Westminster Bank of England belonging to the shareholders is fifteen millions of dollars, while the average capital, in the shape of deposits contributed by its creditors, is one hundred and twenty millions of dollars. Three national banks in the city of New York, with a capital and surplus belonging to the shareholders of ten millions of dollars, had, previous to the late crisis, deposits contributed by their creditors equal to fifty millions of dollars; and a late report from a savings bank in this country, on file in this office, exhibits a capital belonging to shareholders of but \$25,000, while the capital contributed by the depositors was \$1,000,000. The capital contributed by the depositors in the first instance, that of the English bank, was eight times that contributed by the shareholders; in the second instance, that of the three New York banks, five times, and in the case of the savings bank forty times. The necessity of restrictions to govern corporations holding such large proportionate amounts of credits could not be better illustrated.

The banks of England, of Scotland, and of other countries of Europe are managed by men who have had long experience in that branch of business, and their experience is handed down from generation to generation to their successors, and the organization of a corporation to conduct the business of banking by men untried in that particular profession or calling would be looked upon with disfavor, and meet with no success. But in this country, under the provisions of the act, any association of persons may organize a bank, and it is no uncommon occurrence for applications to be received for that purpose from persons who have had little or no experience in banking, but who desire to organize under the national currency act, because it is believed that an organization under that act will give to the shareholders a character and credit which they could not obtain if they should attempt to conduct a private banking business.

It is said that the restriction in reference to reserve should be removed from circulation, for the reason that the circulation is already safe, beyond a peradventure. This is undoubtedly true, for the security of the circulation rests not alone upon the bonds which are deposited, but also upon the total assets of the bank, the personal liability of the shareholders, and, finally, upon the guarantee of the government that in any event the face value of the note shall be paid. The absolute certainty of the full payment of the notes is therefore assured. But the question is not whether a reserve shall be held which shall insure the payment merely of the note, for that is unnecessary, but what amount of reserve shall be held by the banks to insure the prompt payment of all their liabilities. The percentage of reserve could be fixed relatively to the capital if the amount of the liabilities were in all cases proportionate to the amount of capital, which, as is well known, is not the case. The question is not what percentage should be held upon capital, upon deposits, or upon circulation, but what amount of reserve should be held to protect the demand liabilities of the bank, and the experience of years alone can determine that proportion.

A recent writer* on English banking, who has been extensively quoted in this country, has stated that the provision of the national currency act requiring a fixed proportion of reserve liabilities is not the proper standard for a bank reserve, for the reason that a fixed proportion "will sometimes err by excess, and sometimes by defect," and that "the near approach to the legal limit of reserve would be a sure incentive to panic." He says that "the very essence and principle in the American system is faulty;" but in the final summing up of his argument in reference to the reserve which the Bank of England should hold, he gives it as his opinion that the bank "ought never to keep less than £11,000,000 or £11,500,000 of reserve on hand, and that in order not to be below £11,500,000, the bank must begin to take precautions when the reserve is between £14,000,000 and £15,000,000, for experience shows that between £2,000,000 and

£3,000,000 may probably enough be withdrawn from the bank's store before the right rate of interest is found which will attract money from abroad, and before that rate has had time to attract it." Again he says, "I should say that at the present time the mind of the monetary world would become feverish and fearful if the reserve of the banking department of England went below £10,000,000." This proportion is equal to more than one-third of the average liabilities of the Bank of England, and is more than eight per cent in excess of the amount required by the National Currency act.

When this distinguished economist asserts that the Bank of England "ought never to keep less than £11,000,000" on hand, and that "the monetary world would become feverish and fearful if the reserve in the bank department of the Bank of England went below £10,000,000," and at the same time that the rule of reserve required by the National Currency act "will sometimes err by excess and sometimes by defect," the mind of the searcher after the truth in reference to the principles which should govern legislation upon this subject is bewildered, and will look in vain for light to the abstruse legislation and management of the Bank of England, and to the dark statistics which emanate semi-annually from the parlors of the London joint-stock banks.

The method which requires that the reserve be proportioned to the liabilities is based on the conviction that the amount of the reserve should be dependent on, or have some definite relation to, the varying amount of the liabilities; and the opposite view, to wit, that the reserve should have no such relation, but should be a fixed quantity, entirely independent of and undisturbed by changes in the amount of liabilities, appears to be in conflict with sound principles, and is at variance with the practice, when untrammelled, of the leading and safer banking institutions both of this country and of Europe.*

But it is claimed that the Bank of England is required to hold this large amount of reserve because it holds in its vaults the reserve, not for its own dealers, but also of the joint stock banks of England, whose combined deposits are three times as great as all the deposits of the Bank of England; and that, therefore, the Bank of England must at all times be ready, not only to pay the demands of its creditors, but also to extend loans to the other institutions in times of panic. The joint stock banks of England are not, however, entirely deficient in reserve, for it is found upon reference to the statistics of the London & Westminster Bank for 1867, published by the same author, that this bank, with a capital of £2,000,000 and a surplus of £1,000,000, had at that time deposits of £13,889,021; cash on hand, £2,226,441, and government securities amounting to £3,572,797. This bank, which is the largest joint stock bank in England, and second only to the Bank of England itself, therefore held at that time 6 per cent of cash and more than 25 per cent in addition in available resources, while many other of the leading joint stock banks of England continually hold in available resources a still greater amount, as may be seen from the following table:

Table of reserve, &c., of the ten principal joint stock banks of London, on June 30, 1873, compiled from the London Economist of Oct. 18, 1873 (supplement).

Banks.	Capital and surplus.	Cash deposits.	Reserve.			Proportion of reserve to liabilities.		
			Cash.	Stock investments.	Total.	June 30, 1873.	Dec. 31, 1872.	June 30, 1872.
London and Westminster Bank	£3,000,000	£28,383,425	a £3,796,639	b £3,298,851	£7,095,490	p. c. 24.99	p. c. 22.64	p. c. 22.51
London & Westm'n Joint Stock Bank	1,678,819	17,404,319	a 2,213,316	c 1,080,000	3,293,316	18.95	18.22	15.45
Union Bank	1,500,000	13,371,046	d 1,135,994	e 2,778,823	3,914,817	15.45	50.93	54.02
City Bank	750,000	3,050,436	f 621,462	g 330,527	951,989	31.54	30	31.96
Imperial Bank	710,000	2,235,587	h 717,949	i 883,746	1,601,695	25.68	24.68	25.06
Alliance Bank	940,000	1,821,583	j 65,022	k 1,166	723,184	35.70	36.24	38.48
Consolidated Bank	873,135	2,983,705	l 854,029	m 208,402	1,062,431	35.51	32.20	34.53
Central Bank	109,000	669,318	n 159,163	159,163	23.79	42.77	38.30
London and Southw'n Bank	172,650	729,479	o 179,219	179,219	24.57	23.75	22.12
London and County Bank	1,800,000	17,821,279	p 1,195,143	q 1,647,498	2,842,641	38.96	37.80	41.36
Total	11,561,654	88,471,927	19,297,444	8,991,005	28,288,449	31.97	32.55	31.40

a Cash in hand and at the Bank of England.
 b Government stock and exchequer bills.
 c Consols, new 3 per cents, and reduced at 10.
 d Embraces £1,173,516 cash in the bank, £71,292 cash in Bank of England, and £2,994,185 cash lent at call.
 e Government stock, exchequer bills, debentures, &c.
 f Cash in hand at Bank of England, and at call.
 g Exchequer bills, East India debentures, and government securities.
 h Consols, India debentures, and city bonds.
 i Investments in consols, &c.
 j New 3 per cents, and other government stocks.
 k Cash in hand and at call.
 l Cash on hand at head office and branches, and with Bank of England; cash at call and at notice, covered by securities.
 m Government and guaranteed stocks.
 n From the London Economist of March 15, 1873, page 83.

* Bank of England deposits and reserve, compiled from the London Economist.

Date.	Deposits.	Banking reserve.	Rate of discount.	Per cent. of reserve.
July 30	£ 24,403,984	£ 12,423,352	3½	50.9
August 6	23,675,965	11,996,907	50.6
August 13	23,989,301	12,713,623	52.9
August 20	24,622,147	13,287,645	3	53.9
August 27	25,691,351	13,318,865	51.8
September 3	27,591,061	12,760,233	46.2
September 10	29,080,534	13,177,780	46.9
September 17	29,416,360	13,346,843	45.3
September 24	29,456,519	13,238,507	4	44.9
October 1	29,040,400	9,954,181	5	34.2
October 8	27,584,764	9,115,152	33.0
October 15	24,747,665	7,861,036	6	31.7
October 22	22,981,415	8,109,529	7	35.2
October 29	22,590,271	8,455,447	8	37.5
November 6	22,357,428	8,071,288	9	36.1

* Lombard Street, by Walter Bagehot.

It is well known that the funds of the English government are the most readily convertible of any in the markets of the world, and that while English consols* can at all times be purchased at a moderate discount, (92,) they can also at all times be converted into a coin at a smaller loss than any other securities upon the market. The joint stock banks of England, therefore, have a final resource in which their reserves can be invested with the certainty of conversion at any moment. The Bank of England thus holds continually a reserve of about one-third of the amount of its average liabilities, while the joint stock banks of England continually hold in a available reserve a still greater proportionate amount in cash and government securities; and it is no answer to the proposition under discussion to say that the conversion of the consols held by the English joint stock banks into coin would have the effect at once to reduce the reserves of the Bank of England, for the money market of London is, as we have been taught to believe, the money market of the world, to which is attracted the capital of all nations by the simple process of raising the rate of interest.

The national currency act requires that the country banks shall hold 6 per cent, the redemption cities 12½ per cent, and the New York city banks 25 per cent of their liabilities in cash, making an aggregate of cash reserve of from 13 to 15 per cent. The remainder of the reserve required to be held by the country banks may be on deposit with the banks in the redemption cities, while that of the redemption cities may be on deposit in the city of New York.

These large accumulations in the redemption cities, and in the banks of the city of New York, are to a large extent invested in call loans, the banks in the redemption cities and in the city of New York having no resource like the joint stock banks of England into which to place their surplus of reserves, which can be readily converted in the markets of the world into coin, if occasion shall require; and it can hardly be doubted that if the surplus means of the country banks, which were invested in call loans by their city correspondents, had been invested in funds convertible into cash upon demand during the late panic, the disastrous results would have been largely avoided.

The crisis was caused in a great degree by the desire of the country banks to withdraw their balances from the city banks; first, because in the month of September the amount on deposit with the city banks was needed for the legitimate purposes of trade; and secondly, because the country banks, foreseeing and fearing the return of the experience of previous years, thought it safer to withdraw their balances at once. When the reserves of the New York city banks became alarmingly reduced by the drafts of their country correspondents, the only resource left to the city banks was to convert their call loans, amounting to some \$60,000,000; but these, if paid at all, were paid in checks upon the associated banks, and the latter found, the next morning, at the Clearing-House, that, although a portion of their liabilities had been reduced by the payment of call loans, they were in the aggregate no richer in currency than on the previous day. Suspension followed; but if the surplus of the country banks had been to a considerable extent invested in Government certificates, the drafts upon the city banks would have been proportionately less; and if the surplus fund of the city banks had likewise been held in such certificates, the avails of such certificates would have been quietly withdrawn from the Treasury, and the banks would have found themselves possessed of ready means with which to supply the demands of their dealers.

It is said that the issue of such certificates would facilitate the withdrawal of legal tender notes for speculative purposes, but the Assistant Treasurer in New York could hardly fail to be advised of the deposit of large amounts of money with himself for illegitimate purposes, and a provision of law similar to the one already in force, forfeiting the amount of money on deposit, and directing the prosecution of such offenders, would effectually prevent such transactions.

The issue of a Government certificate for the use of all the banks of the country, to be counted as a certain portion of their reserve, was recommended as follows in my last annual report:

"The reserves of the nineteen hundred national banks located elsewhere than in the city of New York are held to a great extent in that city. For most of the time during the past year an amount equal to more than one-fifth of the capital of all these national banks has been held on deposit by the national banks of the city of New York to the credit of their correspondents. In many cases these credits amount to twice the capital of the bank with which they are deposited; in other cases the amount of deposits is three, four, and even five times the capital, which amount has been attracted thither largely by the payment of interest on deposits. The failure of one of these New York city banks in a time of monetary stringency would embarrass, if not ruin, many banks in the redemption cities, and, in turn, the country correspondents of these banks would suffer from the imprudence of the New York bank, which would be responsible for wide-spread disaster. * * *

"In times of excessive stringency loans are not made by such associations to business men upon commercial paper, but to dealers in speculative securities, upon short time, at high rates of interest; and an increase of call loans beyond the proper limit is more likely to afford facilities for unwarrantable stock speculations than relief to legitimate business transactions. * * *

"The variations in the liabilities requiring reserve in the banks of the city of New York are very great. The banks outside of New York, during the dull season, send their surplus means to that city for deposit upon interest, to await the revival of busi-

ness. The banks in the city of New York, at such periods of the year, have no legitimate outlet for these funds, and are, therefore, threatened with loss. The Stock Board takes advantage of this condition of affairs, speculation is stimulated by the cheapness of money, and a market is found for the idle funds upon doubtful collaterals, and the result is seen in the increased transactions at the Clearing House, which, during the past year, exceeded thirty-two thousand millions of dollars, or an average of more than one hundred millions of dollars daily—not one half of which was the result of legitimate business; the total amount of transactions being greater than that of the Bankers' Clearing House of the city of London. The evil arises largely from the payment by the banks of interest on deposits, an old established custom which cannot easily be changed by direct legislation. A considerable portion of these deposits would remain at home if they could be used at a low rate of interest, and made available at any time upon the return of the season of active business. No sure investment of this kind is, however, open to the country banks, and the universal custom is to send forward the useless dollars, from vaults comparatively insecure, to their correspondents in the city, where they are supposed to be safer, and at the same time earning dividends for shareholders. A Government issue, bearing a low rate of interest, to be counted as a certain proportion of the reserve, and an increase of the amount which the country banks are required to keep on hand, is the proper remedy for such a state of things. Such an investment need not result in inflation, for the currency invested would be in the possession of the Government. If the currency is held, the objection is the loss of interest to the Government; but this loss would be no more than a just rebate upon the six millions of dollars of taxation annually paid by the banks to the Government, at a time when almost every kind of internal taxation has been discontinued. Such a reduction of taxation should not be grudgingly made, if the result shall be to give elasticity to the currency, to strengthen and steady the money market, to give additional security to seven hundred millions of dollars belonging to depositors by retaining in the vaults of the banks a large amount of funds for legitimate business purposes, which would otherwise be thrown upon the Stock Board to unsettle values throughout the country, and alternately increase and depress the price of every commodity."

The recommendation for the issue of these certificates to be counted as a certain portion of the reserve is renewed.

The same certificates could also be issued to a large extent as a safe investment for laboring men and others requiring a safe investment for earnings. If such certificates were issued in amounts of \$50 they would at once be recognized as the safest possible temporary investment, and the Government would soon ascertain by experience what proportions of such certificates could be safely invested in the 6 per cent bonds of the United States, thus saving the interest upon the funds in which the earnings of the laboring man were invested, and conferring a permanent benefit upon its humblest citizens.

The returns made to the Clearing-House Association of the weekly average of reserve of the national banks for each week since the first of January last, show that the provision referred to has been generally observed, and the exceptions to the rule have not been among banks of old established reputation, whose experience is entitled to great weight, but among banks more recently organized, which have been ambitious to obtain business and are willing to assume risks for that purpose.*

The rule requiring a reserve was adopted by the voluntary action of the Clearing-House Association of the city of New York, previous to the passage of the national currency act. At a meeting of bank officers, representing forty-two of the forty-six banks of the city of New York, held at the rooms of the Clearing-House Association in March, 1858, it was agreed "to keep on hand at all times an amount of coin equivalent to not less than 20 per cent of our net deposits of every kind, which shall be made to include certified checks and other liabilities, except circulating notes, deducting the daily exchanges received from the Clearing House." This resolution was adopted five years previous to the passage of the national currency act, and its phraseology is not unlike the provisions of that act in reference to reserves to be held by the national banks of New York city. The resolution did not provide for a reserve on circulation, for the reason that the circulation of

* Statement of the weekly average percentage of reserve held by the New York City Banks, as reported to the Clearing House.

Week ending—	Average percentage of national banks.	Average percentage of State banks.	Average percentage of all.	Week ending—	Average percentage of national banks.	Average percentage of State banks.	Average percentage of all.
1873.				1873.			
Jan. 4.....	26.32	18.21	25.61	May 17.....	27.53	19.57	26.85
11.....	27.25	19.98	26.61	24.....	27.03	20.00	26.43
18.....	27.60	19.31	26.85	31.....	27.61	18.50	26.82
25.....	27.46	19.00	26.71	June 7.....	29.70	21.34	29.00
Feb. 1.....	26.56	17.59	25.77	14.....	30.28	20.87	29.50
8.....	26.35	16.99	25.54	21.....	30.34	20.80	29.51
15.....	24.93	17.90	24.32	28.....	30.97	21.25	30.14
21.....	24.78	16.88	24.10	July 5.....	31.78	19.09	30.72
Mar. 1.....	25.57	16.97	24.84	12.....	31.42	20.91	30.58
8.....	25.56	17.61	24.89	19.....	30.87	21.10	30.04
15.....	25.53	16.63	24.78	26.....	30.95	21.54	30.12
22.....	25.50	17.26	24.80	Aug. 2.....	30.59	19.83	29.67
29.....	25.34	16.95	24.62	9.....	30.18	21.42	29.42
Apr. 5.....	23.83	15.97	23.16	16.....	30.39	20.24	29.48
12.....	24.42	17.38	23.82	23.....	28.28	18.52	27.43
19.....	25.02	17.69	24.39	30.....	27.94	18.84	27.15
26.....	25.17	18.93	24.65	Sept. 6.....	25.67	17.62	24.95
May 3.....	26.51	19.03	25.87	13.....	21.44	18.35	23.89
10.....	27.32	19.54	26.67	20.....	23.55	17.95	23.03

From the weekly average percentage of the State banks is excluded the weekly average percentage of the Bank of America and the Manhattan Company, the former of which was invariably and the latter usually in excess of 25 per cent.

* Since the year 1850 the English consols (three per cents) have ranged in price from 99¼ (in 1851) to 87½ (in 1866.) The average price has, however, during that period been above 92; a rate which indicates the borrowing power of the government to be about ¼ per cent per annum.

the city banks was at that time redeemable at par in coin; so that no action was necessary in respect to the reserve to be held upon circulating notes. From that time to the passage of the national currency act the resolution was generally observed, and since the passage of the act neither the New York Clearing House Association nor the Clearing House Association of any city has requested the repeal of such restrictions. On the contrary, the New York Association has repeatedly refused to modify the rule by agreeing that national bank notes, which by the law can be used in payment of debts to each other, may be so employed.

The national currency act requires that the national banks "shall at all times have on hand" the reserve required in lawful money, and the advocates of a repeal of the reserve laws insist that, under this provision, the national banks are absolutely prohibited from using these reserves at any time. The provision requiring that a reserve shall be kept on hand at all times, was intended to protect the depositor, and to keep the bank in funds for the purpose of responding to the demands of its creditors at all times. This is evident from the fact that the bank is required, when its reserves become deficient, to cease discounting and making dividends until the amount of the reserve shall be restored. The word "reserve" is used, as has been suggested, in the same sense as it is used in an army, and "the fact that a military commander cannot be definitely instructed when he may employ his reserve force, is not regarded as reason why that important portion of the army organization should be abandoned, or be reduced in number or efficiency." To claim that a bank cannot redeem its own notes upon presentation, and cannot pay the checks of its depositors on demand if the payment of such debts shall intrench upon its reserves, is equivalent to declaring that the national currency act was intended to provide for the destruction of the very institutions it had created. From the first organization of the system to the present time, the uniform decisions have been that the object of the reserve is to enable the bank at all times to pay its debts. In times of panic the depositors of a bank, and not its officers and directors, are its masters; and it is absurd to maintain that a bank, liable at such times to be called upon to pay its debts, would, if there were no reserve laws, loan upon commercial paper, at the risk of almost certain failure and disgrace, the money which belongs to its creditors.

While the Comptroller concedes that experience may hereafter justify a modification of the provisions of the act in this respect, he is clearly of the opinion, in view of the lessons to be derived from the late suspension of currency payment in New York, that he would not be warranted in recommending any change at present, except the offer of inducements, as already stated, to the banks of the country to hold a larger proportion of their reserve in their own vaults in certificates which can be readily converted into cash when the funds of the depositor are demanded.

If the certificates should, however, be issued as proposed, the reserve of the country banks and the reserve of the banks in the redemption cities (other than New York) may with propriety be reduced, the amount required to be kept on hand being largely increased; while the banks in the city of New York would still be required to keep on hand 25 per cent., (one-half in certificates, if desired,) subject to a reduction at any time by the Comptroller, with the concurrence of the Secretary, upon the recommendation of the clearing house. Upon the return to specie payments and the funding of the United States debt into bonds bearing a low rate of interest, the reserve now required may be very much reduced and perhaps altogether dispensed with.

A table in the appendix will exhibit the percentage of reserve held by the national banks of the country for the past five years, which have been compiled from the regular reports of this office, showing that the banks organized in every State, and in the principal cities of the Union, have been found, in almost every instance, to hold in the aggregate a considerable amount of reserve beyond the requirements of the law.

THE PANIC OF 1873.

The monetary crisis of 1873 may be said to have had its beginning in New York City on September 8, by the failure of the Warehouse Security Company, and of two houses which had left their regular business to embark in enterprises foreign thereto, which were followed on the 13th by the failure of a large firm of stock brokers. On the 18th and 19th two of the largest banking houses in the city, well known throughout the country, which were interested in the negotiation of large amounts of railroad securities, also failed; and on the 20th of the same month the failures of the Union Trust Company, the National Trust Company, the National Bank of the Commonwealth, and three other well known banking houses were announced. On the same day the New York Stock Exchange, for the first time in its existence, closed its doors, and they were not again opened for a period of ten days, during which period legal tender notes commanded a premium over certified checks of from one-fourth of one per cent to three per cent. An active demand for deposits commenced on the 18th, and increased rapidly during the 19th and 20th, chiefly from the country correspondents of the banks, and their drafts continued to such an extent, "calling back their deposits in a medium never before received," that the reserves of the banks were alarmingly reduced.

The "call loans" amounting to more than sixty millions of dollars, upon which the banks relied to place themselves in funds in such an emergency, were entirely unavailable, because the means of the borrowers were, to a great extent, pledged with the banks, upon the sale of which they relied to replenish their funds. These collaterals in ordinary times could have been sold, but at that moment no market could be found except at ruinous sacrifices. Had there been a market, the payments would have been made in checks upon the associated banks, which would not have added to the general supply of cash. A meeting of the Clearing House

Association was called, and on Saturday evening, September 20, the following plan for facilitating the settlement of balances at the Clearing House was unanimously adopted:

In order to enable the banks of this Association to afford such additional assistance to the business community, and also for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the exchanges between the banks, it is proposed that any bank in the Clearing House Association, may, at its option, deposit with a committee of five persons, to be appointed for that purpose, an amount of its bills receivable, or other securities to be approved by said committee, who shall be authorized to issue therefor to said depositing bank certificates of deposit, bearing interest at seven per cent. per annum, in denominations of five and ten thousand dollars, such as may be desired, to an amount not in excess of seventy-five per cent. of the securities or bills receivable so deposited.

Except when the securities deposited shall consist of either United States stocks or gold certificates, the certificates of deposit may be issued upon the par value of such securities.

These certificates may be used in settlement of balances at the Clearing House for a period not to extend beyond the first of November, proximo, and they shall be received by creditor banks during that period daily, in the same proportion as they bear to the aggregate amount of the debtor balances paid at the Clearing House.

The interest which may accrue upon these certificates shall, on the 1st day of November next, or sooner, should the certificates all be redeemed, be apportioned among the banks which shall have held them during that time.

The securities deposited with the committee, as above named, shall be held by them as a special deposit, pledged for the redemption of the certificates issued thereon.

The committee shall be authorized to exchange any portion of said securities for an equal amount of others, to be approved by them, at the request of the depositing bank, and shall have power to demand additional security, either by an exchange or an increased amount, at their discretion.

The amount of certificates which this committee may issue as above shall not exceed ten million dollars.

This arrangement shall be binding upon the clearing-house association when assented to by three-fourths of its members.

The banks shall report to the manager of the clearing-house every morning at 10 o'clock the amount of such certificates held by them.

That, in order to accomplish the purposes set forth in this arrangement, the legal tenders belonging to the associated banks shall be considered and treated as a common fund, held for mutual aid and protection, and the committee appointed shall have power to equalize the same by assessment, or otherwise, at their discretion.

For this purpose a statement shall be made to the committee of the condition of each bank on the morning of every day, before the commencement of business, which shall be sent with the exchanges to the manager of the clearing-house, specifying the following items:

- 1st. Amount of loans and discounts.
- 2d. Amount of loan certificates.
- 3d. Amount of United States certificates of deposit and legal tender notes.
- 4th. Amount of deposits, deducting therefrom the amount of special gold deposits.

The suspension of currency payments followed, and was at first confined to the banks of New York City, but afterward extended to other large cities because the New York banks could not respond to the demands of their correspondents in those cities, and these in turn could not respond to the demands of their correspondents. Exchange on New York, which would otherwise have commanded a slight premium, was at a discount, and to a considerable extent unavailable. The suspension of the banks in other leading cities, almost without exception, therefore followed, and their partial or entire suspension continued for forty days, until confidence was in a measure restored by the resumption of the New York City banks on the first day of November.

Although predictions had been made of the approach of a financial crisis, there were no apprehensions of its immediate occurrence. On the contrary there were in almost every direction evidences of prosperity. The harvest was nearly or quite completed, and the bins and granaries were full to overflowing. The manufacturing and mining interests had also been prosperous during the year, and there was good promise that the fall trade, which had opened, would be as large as during previous years. The value of the cereals, potatoes, tobacco and hay for 1872, is estimated by the Department of Agriculture at \$1,324,385,000. It is supposed that the value of these products for the present year, a large portion of which was at this time ready for sale and awaiting shipment to market, will not vary materially from the above mentioned estimate of last year. An estimate based upon the census returns of 1869 gives the probable aggregate value of the marketable products of industry for that year as \$4,036,000,000, and a similar estimate upon the same basis, and upon returns to the Agricultural Department, gives an increase of \$1,788,000,000 for 1873 over the amount for 1868.

It is not the province of the Comptroller to explain the causes which led to this suspension. In order to enter upon such an explanation it would be necessary to obtain comparative data for a series of years in reference to the imports and exports, the products of industry, the issue of currency, and of other evidences of debt, and, in fact, a general discussion of the political economy of the country. The immediate cause of the crisis is, however, more apparent. The money market had become overloaded with debt, the cost of railroad construction for five years past being estimated to have been \$1,700,000,000, or about \$340,000,000 annually; while debt based upon almost every species of property, State, city, town, manufacturing corporations, and mining companies, had been sold in the market. Such bonds and stock had been disposed of to a considerable extent in foreign markets, and as long as this continued the sale of similar securities was stimulated, and additional amounts offered. When the sales of such securities could no longer be effected abroad, the bonds of railroads and other enterprises of like nature which were in process of construction were thus forced upon the home market, until their negotiation became almost impossible. The bankers of the city of New York, who were burdened with the load, could not respond to the demands of their creditors, the numerous holders of similar securities became alarmed, and the panic soon extended throughout the country.

The present financial crisis may, in a great degree, be attributed to the intimate relations of the banks of the city of New York with the transactions of the stock-board, more than one-fourth, and in many instances nearly one-third of the bills receivable of the banks, since the late civil war, having consisted of demand loans to brokers and members of the stock-board, which transac-

tions have a tendency to impede and unsettle, instead of facilitating, the legitimate business interests of the whole country. Previous to the war the stock-board is said to have consisted of only one hundred and fifty members, and its organic principle was a strictly commission business, under a stringent and conservative constitution and by-laws. The close of the war found the membership of the stock-board increased to eleven hundred,* and composed of men from all parts of the country, many of whom had congregated in Wall street, adopting for their rule of business the apt motto of Horace, "Make money; make it honestly if you can; at all events make money."† The law of the State of New York, which had been retained on the statute-book since 1813,‡ restricting the operations of the stock board, had, unfortunately, been repealed in 1858, so that its members and manipulators were enabled to increase their operations to a gigantic scale.

The quotations of the stock board are known to be too frequently fictions of speculation, and yet these fictions control the commerce and business of a great country, and their influence is not confined to this country, but extends to other countries, and seriously impairs our credit with foreign nations. The fictitious debts of railroads and other corporations which they have bolstered up, and which have obtained quotations in London and other markets of the world, have now been reduced to a more proper valuation, or stricken from the list.

Whether the Congress of the United States or the legislature of the State of New York may not re-enact a law reviving similar restrictions with great benefit to the true business interests of all parties is respectfully submitted.

Many measures of reform are proposed in order that the lessons of the crisis may not be lost, and others be led hereafter to repeat similar errors. Unity of action among the leading banks of the great cities will do more to reform abuses than any congressional enactment; for, unless such corporations shall unite and insist upon legitimate methods of conducting business, the laws of Congress in reference thereto will be likely soon to become inoperative; such enactments being observed in their true spirit by the few, while the many evade them and thus invite a repetition of similar disasters.

If, however, the banks are disinclined to unite for such a purpose, the legislation required of Congress will be such as will induce associations outside of the city of New York to retain in their vaults such funds as are not needed at the commercial centre for purposes of legitimate business.

The following table, exhibiting the condition of the banks in New York City in the month of October for four years past, has been prepared for purposes of comparison with the statement of September 12 of the present year, which is also given:

	October 9, 1869.	October 8, 1870.	October 2, 1871.	October 3, 1872.	Sept'ber 12, 1873.
	54 banks.	54 banks.	54 banks.	50 banks.	48 banks.
Resources.					
Loans on U. S. bonds on demand.....	\$9,414,376 00	\$9,012,954 10	\$5,661,498 50	\$3,180,738 35	\$2,938,875 98
Other st'ks, b'ds, &c., on demand.....	43,650,888 51	53,809,602 90	70,185,331 18	53,409,624 68	57,916,130 34
Loans payable in gold	241,054 67	112,928 40	215,166 19	3,411,738 28	4,381,571 00
Loans, all other.....	100,237,639 30	105,146,590 54	122,806,969 10	123,183,245 55	133,924,3 0 47
Overdrafts.....	211,054 67	112,928 40	215,166 19	225,675 50	182,459 04
Bonds for circulation	41,762,450 00	40,556,550 00	38,337,600 00	34,312,100 00	33,870,100 00
Bonds for deposit.....	1,474,000 00	700,000 00	4,569,000 00	1,066,750 00	650,000 00
U. S. bonds on hand	5,011,500 00	6,569,750 00	5,694,050 00	4,310,700 00	3,332,400 00
Other stocks & b'nds	6,514,988 07	6,990,261 39	5,949,200 08	4,400,397 21	4,552,791 40
Due from nat. banks	13,952,536 46	12,617,724 05	15,342,721 82	13,225,611 01	15,740,765 99
Due from State b'ks.	1,806,730 94	2,472,529 36	3,173,841 40	3,232,205 48	2,077,286 04
Real estate furniture and fixtures.....	7,422,039 95	7,833,189 04	8,034,205 89	8,061,352 99	8,499,984 33
Current expenses.....	1,103,007 65	1,282,525 00	1,250,116 17	3,411,738 28	4,381,571 00
Premiums paid.....	805,503 82	921,615 25	1,232,601 10	804,339 19	766,179 69
Cash items.....	3,487,581 39	2,330,751 92	2,765,929 97	3,649,474 86	2,058,769 53
Clear'g house exch's.	73,555,991 12	68,527,335 53	75,558,034 12	89,971,391 35	67,597,740 69
National bank notes	1,755,316 00	2,691,513 00	1,833,474 00	2,724,791 00	2,618,538 00
Fractional currency	611,751 74	331,076 74	294,857 09	293,901 62	338,394 32
Gold	1,792,740 73	1,607,742 91	1,121,869 40	920,767 37	1,063,200 55
Gold Treasury notes	16,897,900 00	7,533,900 00	7,590,200 00	5,544,580 00	13,522,610 00
Legal tender notes.....	21,070,062 00	17,648,577 00	32,044,183 00	27,004,485 00	21,468,530 00
Three p. c. certificat's	12,050,000 00	11,140,000 00	500,000 00	575,000 00	575,000 00
U. S. cifs. of deposit..	15,945,000 00	17,015,000 00	17,895,000 00	5,855,000 00	10,810,000 00
Clearing house cifs..	15,945,000 00	17,015,000 00	17,895,000 00	5,855,000 00	5,855,000 00
Total.....	390,563,093 35	375,152,133 15	422,345,958 95	395,976,719 78	389,486,310 48
Liabilities.					
Capital stock.....	73,218,100 00	73,435,000 00	73,235,000 00	71,285,000 00	70,235,000 00
Surplus fund.....	17,768,667 71	18,857,099 19	19,468,615 29	20,878,877 81	21,923,211 45
Undivided profits.....	10,964,277 76	10,039,181 42	10,383,683 51	11,049,162 30	11,210,470 03
Nat. bank c. circulat'n	34,683,075 00	32,945,080 00	30,632,976 00	28,004,951 00	27,482,342 00
State bank circulat'n	213,974 00	235,959 00	236,479 00	189,575 00	146,525 00
Dividends unpaid.....	236,860 65	265,569 71	261,830 46	205,979 60
Individual deposits—					
Currency.....	136,660,848 70	127,991,339 01	141,091,424 39	117,749,902 19	111,463,264 01
Gold.....	6,170,566 29	12,101,731 10
Certified check.....	52,580,265 47	37,689,570 53	44,679,638 56	63,827,794 36	42,695,185 81
Cashier's checks.....	1,282,332 36	1,329,457 01	891,358 43	778,729 10	1,252,481 79
U. S. deposits.....	253,692 98	241,96 99	4,073,218 32	238,092 15	296,877 39
Depo-it. of U. S. disbursing officers.....	3,213 37	40,297 13
Due to other nat. b'ks	50,005,913 23	55,947,455 65	76,701,443 53	60,580,921 60	72,257,769 25
Due to State banks & bankers.....	12,901,946 14	16,225,168 70	20,630,052 21	14,852,279 01	18,113,050 50
No es and bills rediscounted.....	61,500 00
Bills payable.....	39,825 14	62,125 39
Total.....	390,563,093 35	375,152,133 15	422,345,958 95	395,976,719 78	389,486,310 48
Reserve, 24.4 per cent.					

* The stock board of Paris numbers sixty members; of London, —.
 † *Rem facias; rem, si possis, recte; Si non, quocunque modo rem.*
 ‡ "All contracts, written or verbal, for the sale or transfer of any certificate or other evidence of debt, due by or from the United States, or any separate State, or of any share or interest in the stock of any bank, or of any company incorporated under any law of the United States, or of any individual State, shall be absolutely void, unless the party contracting to sell or transfer the same shall, at the time of making such contract, be in the actual possession of the certificate or other evidence of such debt, share or interest, or be otherwise entitled in his own right, or be duly authorized by some person so entitled, to sell or transfer the said certificate of debt, share or interest so contracted for.

"All wagers concerning the price or prices, present or future, of any part of any debt due by or from the United States, or any separate State, or of any share or interest in the stock of any bank or other company incorporated

The following totals will exhibit similar data, compiled from the returns of the country banks of New England, the Middle, and the Western and Northwestern States.

States.	Items.	September 12, 1873.	October 13, 1873.	November 1, 1873.
<i>N. Engl'd States.</i>				
Maine.....	Loans.....	\$154,407,121	\$150,841,262	\$148,291,782
N. Hampshire.....	Circulation.....	82,746,627	83,154,774	83,288,566
Vermont.....	Deposits.....	61,912,935	55,830,627	52,725,598
Massachus'tts.....	Balance due to banks.....	3,230,941	2,224,089	552,117
Rhode Island.....	Due from redeem'g agts	18,969,598	13,411,621	12,425,176
Connecticut.....	Legal tenders.....	10,956,979	11,517,756	11,431,217
	Specie.....	360,786	304,187	339,634
<i>Middle States.</i>				
New York.....	Loans.....	150,157,681	142,085,003	138,273,174
New Jersey.....	Circulation.....	65,416,519	65,871,069	65,976,343
Pennsylvania.....	Deposits.....	102,671,101	89,036,682	85,907,955
Delaware.....	Balance due to banks.....	1,226,981	1,869,819
Maryland.....	Due from redeem'g agts	21,428,875	14,015,227	12,024,641
	Legal tenders.....	13,541,549	14,782,708	14,949,860
	Specie.....	430,944	301,939	357,335
<i>Western States.</i>				
Ohio.....	Loans.....	123,854,884	116,833,970	111,549,204
Indiana.....	Circulation.....	59,659,474	60,253,336	60,475,650
Illinois.....	Deposits.....	92,856,762	75,541,162	70,772,060
Michigan.....	Balance due to banks.....
Wisconsin.....	Due from redeem'g agts	17,993,614	8,029,701	7,981,507
Iowa.....	Legal tenders.....	14,085,011	16,341,748	16,199,236
Minnesota.....	Specie.....	246,003	217,680	275,521
Kansas.....				
Nebraska.....				

The Comptroller, in order to obtain statistics of the condition of the banks during the late panic, as well as just previous to its commencement, issued a circular calling upon all the national banks for reports on October 13, the day on which the banks of the city of New York held the smallest amount of legal tender notes during the late crisis, and on November 1, the day on which the banks resumed currency payments. The aggregates of these statements for each State and the redemption cities will be found on pages — to — of the appendix, and on page — is a statement exhibiting in detail the average amount of loans, circulation, deposits, specie and legal tender notes of each of the associated banks of New York City for the week ending September 20, 1873, and the aggregates for the week ending November 22, as reported to the Clearing House. From all these returns the following comparative statements have been prepared of the banks in New York city at different dates:

	Sept. 12, 1873.	Sept. 20, 1873.*	Oct. 13, 1873.	Nov. 1, 1873.	Nov. 22, 1873.*
Loans.....	\$199,160,888	\$179,135,030	\$169,164,559
Circulation.....	27,482,342	\$27,151,600	27,851,206	27,835,612	\$27,267,700
Deposits.....	99,952,097	167,184,600	89,664,948	92,563,997	138,625,300
Bal. due to banks.....	72,552,768	38,790,118	36,911,563
Legal tenders.....	32,278,530	29,607,200	6,517,250	15,668,452	25,330,600
Specie.....	14,585,811	16,119,400	10,031,470	11,499,457	14,759,300

* Averages as reported to Clearing House, for week ending at date mentioned.

Some of the special reports were not received until during the present week, and the abstracts were therefore so lately completed that the Comptroller can only refer the inquirer to these curious and interesting statistics of the condition of the banks of the country during the month of the panic, without any extended comments.*

INTEREST ON DEPOSITS.

In my last annual report I referred briefly to the evils resulting from the payment of interest upon deposits, and my predecessors have frequently referred more at length to the same subject. The difficulty has been, that the proposed legislation by Congress upon the subject would apply only to the national banks. The effect of such legislation would be to bring State banks and savings banks, organized by authority of the different States, in direct competition with the national banks in securing the accounts of correspondents and dealers; the national banks would be desirous of retaining their business, and the more unscrupulous would not hesitate to evade the law by offering to make collections throughout the country free of charge, to buy and sell stocks without commission, and to rediscount paper at low rates. The proposed action of the Clearing House in the city of New York, if adopted by the Clearing Houses of the principal cities of the Union, would do more to prevent the payment of interest on deposits than any congressional enactment. But the evils re-

under the laws of the United States, or any individual State, or of any certificate or other evidence of any such debt, or part of such debt, or of any such share or interest, shall be void.

"Every person who shall pay or deliver any money, goods or thing in action, by way of premium or difference, in pursuance of any contract or wager in the two last sections declared void, and his personal representatives may recover such money, goods, or other thing in action, of and from the party receiving the same and his personal representatives."

Passed February 25, 1813. (Page 706 revised statutes of New York, vol. 1, second edition.) Repealed laws of New York, page 251, eighty-first session, 1858.

* Since writing the above the following statement has been prepared, showing the whole amount of national bank currency, legal tender notes, and fractional currency issued up to October 12 and November 1, 1873:

	Oct. 13.	Nov. 1.
National bank currency.....	\$350,049,056	\$350,332,884
Legal tender notes.....	359,566,888	360,952,206
Fractional currency.....	46,699,191	47,876,149
Totals.....	\$756,315,135	\$759,161,239
Deduct amounts held by the Treasury and by the banks.....	116,496,997	128,140,727
Which will leave unaccounted for.....	\$639,818,138	\$631,020,512

After making due allowance for the currency held by State and savings banks, trust companies, and private bankers, these are larger amounts than can be supposed to have been in the pockets of men or the tills of small dealers. But it may be left to the ingenious in such matters to divine what portion thereof was hoarded by the timid, the ignorant, or the covetous.

sulting from the payment of interest upon deposits are by no means confined to the city banks. It may be safely said that this custom, which prevails in almost every city and village of the Union, has done more than any other to demoralize the business of banking. State banks, private bankers and associations under the guise of savings banks, everywhere, offer rates of interest upon deposits which cannot safely be paid by those engaged in legitimate business. National banks, desirous of retaining the business of their dealers, also make similar offers, and the result is, not only the increase of the rates of interest paid to business men, but, as a consequence, investments in unsecured loans, bringing ultimate loss both upon the shareholders of the bank and the depositors. The kind of legislation needed is that which shall apply to all banks and bankers alike, whether organized under the national currency act or otherwise. A law prohibiting the payment of interest on deposits by the national banks will have little effect, unless followed by similar legislation under authority of the different States, and there is little hope that such legislation can be obtained. The national currency act, which was passed during the war, provided for a tax of one-half of one per cent upon all deposits, and subsequently internal revenue legislation extended this tax to all deposits made with State banks and individual bankers. If legislation prohibiting the payment of interest on deposits shall be proposed, I recommend that this law be so amended as to repeal this tax, so far as it applies to demand deposits, and that an increased rate of taxation be imposed uniformly upon all deposits which, either directly or indirectly, are placed with banks and bankers with the offer or expectation of receiving interest. Such legislation, if rigidly enforced, would have the effect, not only of reducing the rate of interest throughout the country, but at the same time preventing the illegitimate organization of savings banks—which organizations should be allowed only upon the condition that the savings of the people shall be carefully and prudently invested, and the interest arising therefrom, after deducting reasonable expenses, distributed from time to time to the depositors, and to no other persons whatsoever.

CERTIFICATION OF CHECKS.

The act of March 3, 1869, authorizes the appointment of a receiver, "if any officer, clerk, or agent of any national bank shall certify any check drawn upon said bank, unless the person or company drawing the said check shall have on deposit in said bank at the time said check is certified an amount of money equal to the amount specified in such check."

Receivers have been appointed for the National Bank of the Commonwealth of New York and the New Orleans National Banking Association, during the past year, for violations of this act; and it is the intention of the Comptroller hereafter to rigidly enforce this act whenever he is satisfied of such violation.

PROFIT ON CIRCULATION; TAXATION, EARNINGS, AND DIVIDENDS.

It is asserted that the national banks should be subject to greater taxation than other capital because they derive large profits from the issue of their circulating notes. In general terms it is stated that if the whole amount of the issue of circulating notes is \$354,000,000, as authorized by law, the profits derived by the national banks from such circulation are between five and six per cent in gold interest upon the amount of the bonds on deposit with the Treasurer bearing that rate of interest payable in coin. Nothing could be more erroneous. The banks hold an average reserve of more than \$100,000,000 of legal tender notes, which is equivalent to a loan to the Government without interest. They also hold \$42,471,000 of United States bonds, purchased at a premium, which they are required to keep on deposit with the Treasurer of the United States as security for circulation, and from which they derive no profit except the annual interest paid to all holders of such bonds. Large amounts of United States six per cent bonds held by the banks have also from time to time been voluntarily surrendered by them to the Government and five per cent bonds taken in exchange.

The only national banks authorized to be organized under the act of July 12, 1870, were banks to be located in States which had received less than their proportion of circulation, as provided by the act. For a large portion of the past year, five per cent bonds issued by the Government have been at a premium of fifteen per cent in the market. A national bank organized in the city of Chicago deposits with the Treasurer \$100,000 of five per cent bonds, costing in the market \$115,000 of currency. Upon these bonds the bank would receive interest from the Government amounting in gold to \$5,000, which, with the premium thereon, would amount to \$5,750. Upon these bonds it receives in circulation \$90,000, and is required to keep twenty-five per cent of that amount on hand as reserve, leaving \$67,500, from which it would derive an income at ten per cent, of \$6,750; and from this must be deducted a tax of one per cent (\$900) upon the amount of circulation issued, leaving an income of \$5,850, which, if added to the interest received from the bonds, would amount to \$11,600. If the \$115,000 had been invested in bonds and mortgages bearing ten per cent interest, it would net annually \$11,500, leaving a profit of \$100 to the bank for circulation during the year, and a loss of \$15,000 premium upon the bonds at the date of their maturity. The profits of a country bank located in the West or South, with interest at ten per cent, adopting the same calculation, would be a little more than one per cent, and of a bank located in the city of New York, with interest at seven per cent, about 1-3 per cent; and of a country bank located in the East, with interest at seven per cent, less than 2½ per cent. The earnings upon capital invested in the United States bonds upon which circulation is issued, in the city of New York, would not exceed an investment returning an income of 8-1-3 per cent, and in a country bank in the East, little more than an investment earning nine per cent,

The national banks, prior to May 1, 1871, paid to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue a license or special tax of \$2 on each \$1,000 of capital, and an income tax on net earnings to Dec. 31, 1871. The special or license tax from May 1, 1864, to May 1, 1871, amounted to \$5,322,688 43; the income tax from March 1, 1869, to September 1, 1871, amounted to \$5,539,289 17. The national banks also pay the following taxes to the Treasurer of the United States: 1 per cent annually on circulation outstanding; one-half of 1 per cent annually upon deposits; and one-half of 1 per cent annually upon capital not invested in United States bonds. These taxes are payable semi-annually.

The following table will exhibit the amount of taxes collected by the Treasurer annually from the organization of the system to January 1, 1873:

Year.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Capital.	Totals.
1864.....	\$287,740 45	\$412,953 99	\$55,631 63	\$756,326 07
1865.....	1,371,170 52	2,106,480 74	316,829 01	3,794,480 27
1866.....	2,638,396 35	2,668,674 72	350,545 29	5,657,616 36
1867.....	2,934,685 63	2,518,780 65	314,899 42	5,768,365 70
1868.....	2,955,394 60	2,657,235 91	299,126 21	5,911,756 72
1869.....	2,956,168 02	2,525,571 87	349,147 97	5,830,887 86
1870.....	2,941,381 51	2,694,480 26	381,598 67	6,017,460 34
1871.....	3,092,797 56	3,027,767 58	385,247 07	6,505,812 21
1872.....	3,282,597 46	3,144,839 45	418,883 75	6,846,320 66
Total.....	\$22,460,332 00	\$21,756,785 17	\$2,871,909 02	\$47,089,026 19

The national banks are required by the act of March 3, 1869, to make returns to this office of their dividends and earnings semi-annually. From these returns the following table has been compiled, exhibiting the aggregate capital and surplus, total dividends and total earnings of the national banks, with the ratio of dividends to capital, dividends to capital and surplus, and earnings to capital and surplus for each half year, commencing March 1, 1869, and ending September 1, 1873.

Period of six months ending -	No. of banks.	Capital.	Average surplus.	Total dividends.	Total net earnings.	Ratios.		
						To capital.....	To capital and surplus.....	Earnings to capital and surplus.....
Sept. 1, 1869.	1,481	\$401,650,802	\$82,105,848	\$21,767,831	\$29,221,184	p.c. 5.42	p.c. 15.06	p.c. 6.04
Mar. 1, 1870.	1,571	4,366,991	86,118,210	21,479,095	28,996,934	5.16	4.27	5.77
Sept. 1, 1870.	1,601	425,317,104	91,630,620	21,080,323	26,813,885	4.96	4.08	5.19
Mar. 1, 1871.	1,605	428,699,165	94,672,401	22,205,150	27,243,162	5.18	4.24	5.21
Sept. 1, 1871.	1,698	445,999,264	98,286,591	22,125,279	27,315,311	4.96	4.07	5.02
Mar. 1, 1872.	1,750	450,693,706	99,431,243	22,859,826	27,502,539	5.07	4.16	5.00
Sept. 1, 1872.	1,852	465,676,023	105,181,942	23,827,289	30,572,891	5.12	4.17	5.36
Mar. 1, 1873.	1,912	475,918,683	114,257,288	24,826,061	31,926,478	5.22	4.21	5.41
Sept. 1, 1873.	1,955	488,100,951	118,113,848	24,823,029	33,122,000	5.09	4.09	5.46

This table will show that the dividends of the national banks upon an average for a series of years, have been less than ten per centum per annum, while the dividends upon capital and surplus, which is the true ratio, have been less than nine per cent.* As the law now stands, the national banks are subject to a tax of one per cent per annum upon circulation, of one-half of one per cent upon the average amount of deposits, and one half of one per cent upon the average amount of capital stock beyond the amount invested in United States bonds. The taxation on deposits was essentially a "war tax," such a duty never having been, as is believed, before imposed upon the banks of any country. While almost every other species of property and investment escapes taxation upon its full valuation, the data for the taxation of the national banks can always be obtained from their reports; so that a tax is derived from this species of investment at a much greater ratio than that derived from capital otherwise invested. The result of such excessive taxation is to increase the rate of interest which is paid by the borrower, for the same reason that an internal revenue tax upon the products of the manufacturer is paid, not by the manufacturer, but by the consumer. The Comptroller is of the opinion that justice to all parties requires the repeal of the provision imposing a tax upon deposits, unless, in

* The following statements of the ten principal joint stock banks of London, including their branches, exhibiting the capital, reserve, deposits, net profits, and dividends of each for the half year previous to July 1, 1873, have been compiled from balance-sheets of the banks published in the London Economist of October 18, 1873:

Banks.	Capital and surplus.	Total deposits and acceptances.	Net profits.	Proportion of net profits to capital.	Am't of dividends for half year.	Proportion of dividend to capital.			
						June 30, 1873.	Dec. 31, 1872.	June 30, 1872.	Dec. 31, 1871.
London and Westminster.	£ 3,000,000	£ 29,587,770	£ 241,038	24.10	£ 100,000	p. ct. 20	p. ct. 20	p. ct. 20	p. ct. 18
London Joint Stock.	1,673,849	17,401,319	139,367	23.31	130,000	20	25	20	25.56
London and County.	1,800,000	20,936,233	169,384	23.23	100,000	20	20	20	19
Union.	1,500,000	18,028,531	137,910	22.93	127,500	10	10	10	20
City.	750,000	6,154,383	49,509	16.50	30,000	10	10	10	9
Imperial.	740,000	2,919,237	46,634	13.82	27,000	8	8	8	6
London and Southwest'n.	172,680	753,314	7,101	8.54	4,985	6	5	5	5
Consolidated.	876,155	3,238,035	69,895	16.47	36,000	9	6	8	7½
Central.	109,000	669,018	5,001	16.00	4,000	8	8	8	6
Alliance.	940,000	2,336,440	34,520	8.73	28,000	7	7	6	5
Total.....	11,561,654	102,013,280	903,922	20.68	677,485	15½
Bank of England, Aug 31, 1873.....	17,580,000	29,080,534	785,221	10.80	764,032	10	10

* From the London Economist of March 15, 1873, page 84.

† Public and other deposits of September 11, 1873.

The statistics of the Bank of England and its dividends were obtained from the report of the Bank of England published in the Economist for September 13, 1873. The usual dividends of this bank are 10 per cent per annum, but the amount has varied for some years past from 8 to 13 per cent.

the judgment of Congress, interest bearing certificates shall be issued as recommended, which may be counted as a certain portion of the reserve to be kept on hand; in which event it is believed that the taxation derived from deposits will much more than liquidate the interest derived from such certificates.

INSOLVENT BANKS.

Since the last annual report, receivers have been appointed for eleven national banks (seven of which failed during the late financial crisis), as follows:

Name and location.	Appointm't of receiver.	Capital stock.	Claims proved.	Dividends.	Cash on hand.
				Per ct.	
Scandinavian, Chicago, Ill.	Dec. 12, 1872	\$250,000	\$240,810	25	\$16,300
Wallkill, Middletown, N. Y.	Dec. 31, 1872	175,000	152,588	75	15,302
Crescent City, New Orleans, La.	Mar. 18, 1873	500,000	*666,751	131,945
Atlantic, New York, N. Y.	Apr. 28, 1873	300,000	521,526	55	109,030
First of Washington, D. C.	Sept. 19, 1873	500,000	*1,655,795	30
Commonwealth, New York, N. Y.	Sept. 22, 1873	750,000	*791,036	153,300
Merchants' Petersburg, Va.	Sept. 25, 1873	400,000	*1,002,346	12,787
First of Petersburg, Va.	Sept. 25, 1873	200,000	*178,618	8,922
First of Mansfield, Ohio	Oct. 18, 1873	100,000	*177,207	9,355
New Orleans Nat'l Banking Assoc'n, New Orleans, La.	Oct. 23, 1873	600,000	*642,182	7,972
First of Carlisle, Pa.	Oct. 24, 1873	50,000	*68,960	1,814
Total		\$3,825,000	\$6,097,819		

* Estimated amount of claims.

The failure of all these banks may be attributed to the criminal mismanagement of their officers, or to the neglect or violation of the act on the part of their directors. The officers of two of these banks have been arrested; one has been convicted, and the other is undergoing trial; while the President of the first bank which failed during the year left the country on the pretext of visiting some of the foreign shareholders of the bank for the purpose of inducing them to subscribe for additional stock, but did not, of course, return upon the announcement of the failure of the bank.

The Comptroller desires to call the attention of Congress to the necessity for some legislation authorizing him to appoint receivers of national banks, for insolvency, when such insolvency shall become evident from the protest of the drafts of such associations, or otherwise, after due examination shall have been made, if the assets of the association are found not sufficient to liquidate its debts. The Comptroller also desires to call the attention of Congress to the fact that where suits are brought for the forfeiture of the charter of a bank, as provided in section 53 of the act, no provision exists for the appointment of a receiver where the charter is determined and adjudged forfeited by the United States court before whom the suit is required to be brought by the Comptroller. It is desirable that prompt measures should be taken for forcing weak banks into liquidation, under section 42 of the act, when it is believed that the officers and directors will honestly wind up the affairs of such banks, and that full authority should be given to appoint a receiver in all cases where the forfeiture of the charter is adjudged. Provision should also be made, after full payment of all the debts of the association, for placing the remaining assets in the hands of an agent appointed by the shareholders of the bank, and discharging the Comptroller and the receiver, by virtue of such legislation, from all further responsibility. Provision should also be made for the investment of the funds on deposit with the Treasurer in interest-bearing securities, where dividends are delayed by reason of protracted litigation.

[We omit the remarks of the Comptroller with regard to savings banks, trust and loan companies, and State banks organized under State laws.—ED.]

SPECIAL DEPOSITS.

The abuses arising from the receiving of what are termed "special deposits" by the national banks are growing more and more numerous. The common law classifies the duties of bailee as follows: He is bound to extraordinary diligence in those contracts for bailments where he alone receives benefit, as in the case of loans; he must observe ordinary diligence in those bailments which are beneficial to both parties; and is responsible for gross negligence in those bailments which are only for the benefit of the bailor. Special deposits which are received on deposit from the dealer of a bank are almost entirely of the latter class. Such deposits consist chiefly of bonds in packages or in tin trunks which are deposited in the vaults of the bank for safe-keeping by those persons who are accustomed to make deposits and transact other business with the bank. The bank would prefer to decline such deposits, but the custom having been long established, they dislike to refuse. In the case of the Ocean National Bank, seven different suits have arisen, each of which presents different questions, and all of which it is thought will be carried to the highest court, thus inflicting protracted litigation at the expense of the creditors or the shareholders of the bank which could easily have been avoided had the national currency act contained a specific provision in reference to such deposits. The robbery of the Ocean National Bank took place previous to its suspension, and by that robbery its own bonds as well as those of its correspondents, were stolen, and the bank therefore exercised the same prudence in caring for the deposits of its dealers as for its own. But if it can be shown that the bank did not exercise the greatest degree of diligence in the protection of its own property, a jury will in most cases find a verdict involving not only the loss of the assets of the corporation, but also the property of its dealers which has been left entirely for the convenience of the depositor, and not for the profit or benefit of the bank. Similar litigation is likely to arise in the settlement of the affairs of all insolvent national banks. In the large cities there is no necessity, since

the establishment of safe deposit companies, for the deposit of such packages with the banks, and it would relieve the banks of the cities from a burden were a law passed prohibiting the receipt by them of such deposits. Country banks cannot, however, without some provision of law, relieve themselves from the duty of receiving such deposits, and I recommend, therefore, the passage of an act which shall provide that "no national bank shall be liable to make good any deficiency which may hereafter arise in any special deposit made with any national bank, unless a receipt shall be produced by the owner of such deposit in which the liability of the bank shall be distinctly stated." Such an act can work no injustice, for the depositor will take good care at the time of leaving the deposit to obtain a receipt from the bank, which shall explicitly state the liability, and if he choose to make a special deposit without such acknowledgment, he will do so, understanding at the time that the deposit is placed in the bank solely at his own option, for his own convenience and at his own risk.

MUTILATED CURRENCY.

The following table exhibits the number and amount of national bank notes, of each denomination, which have been issued and redeemed since the organization of the system, and the number and amount outstanding November 1, 1873:

Denom-ination.	Number.			Amount.		
	Issued.	Redeem'd	Outstand-ing.	Issued.	Redeem'd.	Outstanding.
1	15,524,189	9,891,606	5,632,583	\$15,524,189 00	\$9,891,606 00	\$5,632,583 00
2	5,195,111	3,120,723	2,074,388	10,390,222 00	6,241,446 00	4,148,776 00
5	34,894,456	9,141,963	25,752,493	174,472,280 00	45,709,815 00	128,762,465 00
10	12,560,399	2,573,070	9,987,329	125,603,990 00	25,730,700 00	99,873,290 00
20	3,608,219	653,671	2,954,548	72,164,380 00	13,061,420 00	59,102,960 00
50	559,722	168,976	390,746	27,986,100 00	8,448,800 00	19,537,300 00
100	416,590	144,057	272,533	41,659,000 00	14,405,700 00	27,253,300 00
500	16,496	9,658	6,838	8,248,000 00	4,829,000 00	3,419,000 00
1000	5,148	4,530	618	5,148,000 00	4,530,000 00	618,000 00
	72,780,330	25,707,654	47,072,676	481,196,161 00	132,848,487 00	348,347,674 00
				Deduct for fragments of notes lost or destroyed.....	3,275 30
				Add for fragments of notes lost or destroyed.....		3,275 30
					132,845,211 70	348,350,949 30

NOTE.—Amount of gold notes outstanding not included in the above, \$2,030,000

From the organization of the system, in 1863, to November 1, 1873, \$132,845,211, or more than one-third of the whole amount outstanding, has been returned to the Treasury for destruction, as follows:

Previous to November 1, 1865.....	\$175,490
During the year ending October 31, 1866.....	1,050,382
During the year ending October 31, 1867.....	3,401,423
During the year ending October 31, 1868.....	4,602,825
During the year ending October 31, 1869.....	8,603,729
During the year ending October 31, 1870.....	14,305,689
During the year ending October 31, 1871.....	24,344,047
During the year ending October 31, 1872.....	30,211,720
During the year ending October 31, 1873.....	36,433,171
Additional amount of notes of banks in liquidation destroyed by the Treasurer of the United States.....	9,716,735

Total amount destroyed..... \$132,845,211

During the past year \$36,433,171 of national bank notes have been returned to the Treasury for destruction, amounting to more than one-tenth of the whole amount of circulation.

The amount of legal tender notes and the amount of national bank notes in circulation are about equal. The whole issue of the national bank notes is, however, continually in circulation, while more than one-third of the legal tender notes is held permanently by the national banks as reserve. The national bank notes are redeemable only by the banks issuing them, or at their redeeming agencies, while the legal tender notes are all redeemable at the Treasury of the United States. If the national banks are not in as good condition as the legal tender notes, the reason is evident. But if the bank notes should be carefully assorted by the different treasurers, assistant treasurers, and depositories of the United States, and transmitted to the redeeming agencies in the city of New York, where more than two-thirds of the national bank notes are redeemable, the worn and mutilated notes would soon be replaced by new notes issued from this office. Section 39 of the act provides that no association shall "pay or put in circulation the notes of any bank or banking association which shall not at any such time be receivable at par on deposit and in payment of debts by the association so paying out or circulating such notes; nor shall it knowingly pay out or put in circulation any notes issued by any bank or banking association which at the time of such paying out or putting in circulation is not redeeming its circulating notes in lawful money of the United States." I recommend that the return of such notes to the Treasury for redemption be authorized at the expense of the United States, the amount necessary for this purpose to be appropriated from the tax on circulation already paid by the banks. The effect of such an authorization will be to return to the Treasury the outstanding notes of all banks which have failed and are in liquidation, amounting to \$5,246,938, which may be issued thereafter to the States which have less than their proportion.

The Comptroller has received many letters from officers of national banks, suggesting that a division be organized in his office for the assorting and redemption of the mutilated currency of the national banks, the expense to be borne by the banks in proportion to the amount transmitted to this office for that purpose. The Comptroller will willingly undertake the work of purifying the bank currency now in circulation if the proper force shall be placed at his command, and will endeavor to reimburse to the Treasury the expense thereof by assessment upon such national banks as shall avail themselves of the privilege.

The present arrangement for burning notes to ashes, as required by section 21 of the act, is very unsatisfactory, the law having evidently contemplated that the burning should take place in the Treasury building. I recommend that an appropriation be made to test the practicability, by experts, and to authorize the purchase of suitable machinery for grinding to pieces mutilated notes, thus utilizing the paper material now lost, amounting in value to thousands of dollars annually.

NEW NATIONAL BANK NOTES.

The "act making appropriations for sundry civil expenses of Government for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1874," contained the following provision: For replacing the worn and mutilated circulating notes of national banking associations, and for engraving and preparing, in such manner and on such paper and of such form and design as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe, new circulating notes for such associations to replace notes of a design and denomination now successfully counterfeited, six hundred thousand dollars: *Provided*, That each of said national banking associations shall reimburse the Treasury the costs of the circulating notes furnished under this provision.

Section 41 of the currency act provided that the plates and special dies to be prepared by the Comptroller of the Currency for the printing of such circulating notes shall be under his control and direction, "and the expenses necessarily incurred in executing the provision of this act respecting the procuring of such notes, and all other expenses of the Bureau, shall be paid out of the proceeds of the taxes or duties now or hereafter to be assessed on the circulation, and collected from associations organized under this act." The tax to which reference is made is a semi-annual tax of one half of one per cent, required to be paid to the Treasurer of the United States, semi-annually, in the months of January and July; and, under this provision, \$22,460,392 have been collected and paid into the Treasury since the organization of the system, as provided by law. The section of the appropriation bill referred to was passed without report from any committee, and no recommendation was ever made by the Treasury Department for the authorization of a new issue of national bank notes at the expense of the national banks. The engraving of the new notes will involve an expense of more than \$1,000,000; and if new notes are to be issued in place of those already issued, the expense will amount probably to not less than \$2,000,000. The national banks maintain that the expense of the new issue should be paid out of the taxes already exacted; and they insist that there is no necessity for the issue of a new set of notes at the present time; and that if the Government shall decide upon such an issue, the expense should be defrayed, not by themselves, but from the tax already collected, as provided by sect on 41 of the act.

An additional reason why the expense of printing new notes for the banks should be borne by the Government is that the Government receives the benefit of all lost and worn-out notes not finally returned for redemption, and the amount to be finally realized from this source is estimated to be much greater than the amount required to be expended in the replacing of worn-out notes.

The following extract from a letter of a well-known Boston cashier, who has had great experience as secretary of the association of banks for the suppression of counterfeiting, expresses the sentiments of the national banks in reference to the proposed issue of new notes:

"There has been no counterfeit on any of the notes of this bank, to my knowledge; and the amount of counterfeit notes of other banks presented to this bank for redemption or examination, say for the past year, has been very small. I should not estimate it at more than \$250. In fact the amount reported from all sections of the country would not seem to warrant, in any degree, the legislation by Congress—act of March 3, 1873—authorizing new plates for national bank circulation at the expense of said institutions. So far as my knowledge extends, there is a universal feeling against a new issue of national bank circulation. My opinion is that it is a mistaken policy to engrave a new set of plates for bank notes. The present issue has been so little tampered with that only two or three plates of individual banks have been at all successfully counterfeited, and those plates are well known, and have already done all the harm they can do, as the public has become well educated as to the genuineness of the present national bank circulation.

"Now, if a new issue is made, the public have got to be educated as to the genuineness of the new issue, which will take a long time, and then keep posted on two sets of plates instead of one; and my belief still further is that the new plates will be the first to be counterfeited, because the least known, and then the policy about to be adopted would require you to immediately issue a third set of plates, and so on. As secretary of the 'Association of Banks for the Suppression of Counterfeiting,' my experience of twenty years, in causing the detection and conviction of parties for the crime of counterfeiting bank notes, would lead me to say, without any hesitation, that the best policy for the Government to pursue would be to protect the present issue to the best of its ability, in preference to making any new one.

"I hope, therefore, that Congress will repeal the act of March last." I recommend that the section in the appropriation bill referred to be repealed, or so amended as to provide that the expense of such notes shall be paid by the Government. The appropriation for the issue of new notes would not result, as is supposed, in the issue of new notes in place of the worn-out and mutilated notes now in circulation, for the reason that such notes must be returned to the Treasury by the banks themselves for destruction, and the notes would not be likely to be so returned if the expense for engraving and printing were to be borne by the banks instead of being paid out of the taxes already collected and appropriated for that purpose.

Previous to the organization of the National banking system, counterfeit bank notes of more than three thousand different designs were in circulation. These notes were retired and the national bank notes issued in their place, and during the last ten years the notes of but thirty-seven banks, located in but nine States of the Union, have been counterfeited, and only forty-three plates of the whole six thousand plates which have been engraved have been counterfeited. The correct policy is undoubtedly to prevent the counterfeiting of the notes now in circulation, instead of introducing new notes upon which the counterfeiter may practice his art; and correspondence with all the banks whose notes have been counterfeited shows that, so far from counterfeiting being on the increase during the last two or three years, the number of notes counterfeited has sensibly diminished.

A method, both simple and practicable, exists by which the issue of such counterfeited notes can be readily prevented, and that is by the withdrawal from circulation of such denominations of the genuine notes of national banks as have been counterfeited. Counterfeit two-dollar notes have appeared only upon banks, and the whole amount of genuine notes issued to these banks is but \$60,000. Counterfeit twenty-dollar notes upon only eleven different national banks have appeared, and the whole amount of genuine twenty-dollar notes issued to these banks is, say, \$500,000. It is plain that if an appropriation be made, to be paid from the tax on circulation already collected from the banks, sufficient to offer a premium of one-half of one per cent upon these notes when presented to the Treasury for redemption, most of the genuine notes would soon be retired, after which all genuine notes (except when presented to the Treasury or to the bank issuing them for redemption) would be refused along with the counterfeits. No additional notes of these denominations would thereafter be issued to the banks upon which counterfeits are known to exist. The Comptroller is confident that an appropriation of, say, \$10,000 would withdraw from circulation all the genuine issues which have been counterfeited, and that an annual appropriation of \$1,000 thereafter would be sufficient to prevent the abuse.

EXAMINATIONS.

During the recent panic the Comptroller has endeavored to obtain, as far as possible, examinations of all national banks which have been considered in a weak or insolvent condition, and he desires to return his thanks to the efficient corps of examiners who have made prompt examinations and returns to him of the condition of such banks in all parts of the country. It is not to be supposed that the short time usually spent in the examination of a national bank will be sufficient, in all cases, to detect bad management or defalcations. If the directors of national banks, to whom are confided the interests of shareholders, neglect their duties, it is not to be expected that an examiner shall, in a single day, detect and correct the abuses of a year. A number of days is required for the thorough examination of a national bank of any considerable business, and if it is expected that the reports to the office will detect and expose defalcations, and other violations of law, the means should be provided for defraying the expenses of more frequent and thorough examinations. The necessary expense can be levied and collected from the banks if they shall be found delinquent; but if, upon examination, it shall be found that the investigation was unnecessary, then the expense should be paid out of a fund to be placed at the disposal of the Comptroller for that purpose.

AMENDMENTS.

Carefully-prepared bills were in possession of the proper committees during

the last session of Congress, providing (1) for the consolidation of national banks; (2) defining the duties of receivers; (3) providing for the organization of national banks without circulation, upon the deposit of ten thousand dollars of bonds with the Treasurer of the United States instead of the deposit of one-third of the capital, as now required; (4) for the repeal of section 4 of the act of June 17, 1870, providing for the organization of savings banks in the District of Columbia; (5) for the prevention of the issue of unauthorized currency; (6) prohibiting the deposit of more than ten per cent of the capital with any private banker or any person or association other than a national banking association; (7) requiring the word "counterfeit," or "altered," or "illegal," to be stamped on all counterfeit or unauthorized issues. A recommendation was also made for the issue of Government securities, bearing a low rate of interest, to be held by the national banks as part of their reserve, and for a provision of law requiring a larger proportion of cash to be kept on hand; and the attention of Congress is specially called to the necessity of prompt legislation upon these several subjects, for the proper consideration of which it is to be regretted that the brevity of the session did not afford sufficient time.

JOHN JAY KNOX,
Comptroller of the Currency.

The SPEAKER of the House of Representatives.

Latest Monetary and Commercial English News

English Market Reports—Per Cable.

The daily closing quotations in the markets of London and Liverpool for the past week have been reported by submarine telegraph as shown in the following summary:

London Money and Stock Market.—10-40s are $\frac{1}{2}$ lower, but 67s are $\frac{1}{2}$ higher than last Friday. The Bank rate has been reduced to 5 per cent. The bullion in bank has increased £627,000 during the week.

	Sat	Mon.	Tues.	Wed.	Thur.	Fri.
Consols for money.....	93 $\frac{3}{4}$	93 $\frac{3}{4}$	92 $\frac{1}{2}$	92	91 $\frac{3}{4}$	91 $\frac{3}{4}$
" account.....	92 $\frac{1}{2}$					
U. S. 6s (5-20s), 1865, old..	93 $\frac{3}{4}$					
" 1867.....	97	97 $\frac{1}{2}$	97 $\frac{1}{2}$	97 $\frac{1}{2}$	98 $\frac{1}{2}$	98
U. S. 10-40s.....	91 $\frac{3}{4}$					
New 5s.....	92	92	92	92	92	92

The daily quotations for United States 6s (1862) at Frankfurt were:

Frankfurt.....

Liverpool Cotton Market.—See special report of cotton.

Liverpool Breadstuffs Market.—This market closes dull at a decline in red west. wheat and corn, and an advance of 6s. in peas.

	Sat.	Mon.	Tues.	Wed.	Thur.	Fri.
Flour (Western).....	28 0	28 0	28 0	28 0	28 0	28 0
Wheat (Red W'n. spr).....	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0
" (Red Winter).....	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0
" (Cal. White club).....	13 6	13 6	13 6	13 6	13 6	13 6
Corn (West. m'd) quarter	35 6	35 6	35 6	35 6	35 6	35 6
Barley (Canadian).....	3 6	3 6	3 6	3 6	3 6	3 6
Oats (Am. & Can.).....	3 4	3 4	3 4	3 4	3 4	3 4
Peas (Canadian).....	42 6	42 6	42 6	42 6	42 6	43 0

Liverpool Provisions Market.—Beef, bacon, and cheese are each lower, while pork and lard are higher than a week ago.

	Sat.	Mon.	Tues.	Wed.	Thur.	Fri.
Beef (mess) new	91 6	91 0	90 0	90 0	89 0	87 6
Pork (Pr. mess) new	82 6	82 6	81 6	81 6	79 0	77 6
Bacon (Cum. cut) new	47 0	46 0	45 0	44 6	44 0	42 0
Lard (American).....	39 3	39 6	39 6	39 6	39 6	29 6
Cheese (Amer'n fine).....	65 0	65 0	65 0	64 6	64 6	64 6

Liverpool Produce Market.—Com. rosin and spirits turpentine are each lower than last Friday.

	Sat.	Mon.	Tues.	Wed.	Thur.	Fri.
Rosin (com. N. C.).....	8 3	8 0	8 0	8 0	8 0	8 0
" fine.....	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0
Petroleum (refined).....	1 1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 1	1 1 $\frac{1}{2}$
" spirits.....	11	11	11	11	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	11
Tallow (American).....	39 0	39 0	39 0	39 0	39 0	39 0
Cloverseed (Am. red).....	45 0	45 0	45 0	45 0	45 0	45 0
Spirits turpentine.....	32 0	31 6	31 0	31 0	31 0	31 0

London Produce and Oil Markets.—Calcutta linseed has advanced 6d. during the week.

	Sat.	Mon.	Tues.	Wed.	Thur.	Fri.
Lins'd c'ke (obl).....	10 15 0	10 15 0	10 15 0	10 15 0	10 15 0	10 15 0
Linseed (Calcutta).....	62 0	62 0	62 0	62 0	62 6	62 6
Sugar (No. 12 D'ch std)						
on spot, cwt.....	28 6	28 6	28 6	28 6	28 6	28 6
Sperm oil.....	92 0 0	92 0 0	92 0 0	92 0 0	92 0 0	92 0 0
Whale oil.....	34 0 0	34 0 0	34 0 0	34 0 0	31 0 0	31 0 0
Linseed oil.....	30 0 0	30 0 0	30 0 0	30 0 0	30 0 0	30 0 0

COMMERCIAL AND MISCELLANEOUS NEWS.

IMPORTS AND EXPORTS FOR THE WEEK.—The imports this week show a decrease in both dry goods and general merchandise. The total imports amount to \$3,889,081 this week, against \$6,226,063 last week, and \$5,762,059 the previous week. The exports are \$5,403,950 this week, against \$6,582,249 last week, and \$7,603,599 the previous week. The exports of cotton the past week were 15,844 bales, against 16,155 bales last week. The following are the imports at New York for week ending (for dry goods) Nov. 27, and for the week ending (for general merchandise) Nov. 28:

	FOREIGN IMPORTS AT NEW YORK FOR THE WEEK.		1872.	1873.
	1870.	1871.	1872.	1873.
Dry goods.....	\$1,754,120	\$1,223,810	\$1,230,030	\$857,563
General merchandise....	4,159,559	4,421,115	5,022,612	3,037,216
Total for the week..	\$5,913,679	\$5,644,926	\$6,252,642	\$3,889,081
Previously reported....	276,161,015	349,812,064	397,615,395	361,763,825
Since Jan. 1.....	\$282,108,694	\$355,456,990	\$403,860,037	\$365,652,908

In our report of the dry goods trade will be found the imports of dry goods for one week later.

The following is a statement of the exports (exclusive of specie from the port of New York to foreign ports, for the week ending Dec. 2:

	1870.	1871.	1872.	1873.
For the week.....	\$7,077,229	\$3,947,436	\$4,344,898	\$5,403,950
Previously reported..	173,091,626	220,742,387	216,659,945	271,775,095

Since Jan. 1..... \$180,168,855 \$224,689,823 \$221,003,963 \$277,179,045

The following will show the exports of specie from the port of New York for the week ending Nov. 29, 1873, and since the beginning of the year, with a comparison for the corresponding date in previous years:

Nov. 26—Steamer Cuba, Liverpool—	Silver bars.....	\$8,968
Silver bars.....	\$254,721	
Nov. 26—Str. Silesia, Hamburg—	Silver bars.....	72,968
Silver bars.....	53,272	
Nov. 29—Str. Main, London—	Silver bars.....	29,800
Total for the week.....		\$419,720
Previously reported.....		46,436,565

Total since Jan. 1, 1873..... \$46,856,295

Same time in	Same time in
1872..... \$67,561,700	1868..... \$69,123,685
1871..... 60,157,277	1867..... 45,060,999
1870..... 56,738,294	1866..... 58,564,448
1869..... 30,346,349	1865..... 27,314,593

The imports of specie at this port during the past week have been as follows:

Nov. 24—Steamer Celtic, Liverpool—	Gold.....	\$4,840
Gold.....	\$14,520	
Nov. 25—Steamer Cuba, Liverpool—	Gold.....	380
Gold.....	198,440	
Nov. 25—Str. Crescent City, Havana—	Gold.....	43,665
Silver.....	274	
Nov. 26—Str. Frisco, Southampton—	Gold.....	3,388
Gold.....	25,150	
Previously reported.....	Total for the week.....	\$302,157
		17,026,770

Total since January 1, 1873..... \$17,328,927

Same time in	Same time in
1872..... \$5,461,914	1869..... 14,876,852
1871..... 8,428,905	1868..... 6,701,115
1870..... 11,387,557	1867..... 3,032,610

The resumption of payment by the Union Trust Company on Monday last, December 1, was hailed with much satisfaction by every one in financial circles. The company owed depositors \$5,150,000. To meet these debts it had in clean cash over \$4,000,000, and in assets convertible readily into cash more than double the balance due to depositors. The capital of the company is unimpaired, its surplus before the panic having been sufficient to cover the losses by Carleton's defalcation, and also by the depreciation or loss on loans. The effect of this strong statement was to create such confidence in the company's ability to pay that there was no run upon it after the first day's business. The new officers of the company are gentlemen whose names should inspire confidence in the future management of the company. Mr. Edward King is president, Mr. James McLean is first vice-president, and Mr. Freeman Clarke second vice president. The following gentlemen compose the new executive committee: Messrs. A. A. Low, James McLean, B. H. Hutton, C. D. Wood, George G. Williams, Wm. Wainwright, Jr., E. B. Wesley and Samuel Willetts. The new secretary is Mr. James H. Ogilvie.

The City Bank of Houston, Texas, has declared a cash dividend of nine per cent from the net earnings of the bank for the six months ending 31st October, 1873. Benj. A. Botts, Esq., is President, and Mr. B. F. Weems, Cashier.

BANKING AND FINANCIAL.

THE MERCANTILE NATIONAL BANK.

MR. MEIGS'S STATEMENT.

Mr. Charles A. Meigs, the National Bank Examiner, who has been engaged during the past few days in the examination of the affairs of the Mercantile National Bank, and especially with regard to loans made by the late President, E. J. Blake, to the Domestic Sewing Machine Company, reports that but little, if any, loss will accrue to the Bank in connection with these loans and on Monday issued a card to that effect, as follows:

I have gone far enough in my investigation of the assets and liabilities of the Mercantile National Bank to be enabled to express the opinion that, in my judgment, there is nothing in their position that need give the commercial world any uneasiness whatever.

CHARLES A. MEIGS, National Bank Examiner.

P. S.—The present Directors and their families, and the families of the late Directors, own 6,262 shares, of \$100 each, of the capital stock of the Bank, or \$626,200 par value out of the \$1,000,000 capital.

CHARLES A. MEIGS, Examiner.

"THE UNION TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK."

Notice is hereby given that the Union Trust Company resumed business on MONDAY, December 1.

EDWARD KING, President.

NEW YORK CITY 7s,
due Nov. 1, 1873.
JERSEY CITY 7s, WATER BONDS,
due in 1913.

For sale cheap by

DANIEL A. MORAN,
40 Wall street.

LAPSLEY & BAZLEY,

BROKERS,

74 BROADWAY & 9 NEW STREET,
New York.

Stocks bought and sold on commission, for investment, or on margin. Privileges in Stocks and Gold negotiated. Circular explaining privileges mailed to any address.
S. W. LAPSLEY. J. E. BAZLEY.

RAILROAD BONDS.—Whether you wish to BUY or SELL, write to

HASSLER & CO.,
No. 7 Wall street, New York.

The Bankers' Gazette.

FRIDAY, December 5, 1873—6 P. M.

The Money Market and Financial Situation.—The President's message and Department reports have been the principal themes of discussion in business circles this week, and their effect upon the markets does not appear to have been unfavorable. The conclusion seems to be that if the President and Secretary of the Treasury do not positively favor inflation, they certainly do not take strong and positive ground against it, and any proposal for contraction or hasty resumption is not found among their recommendations. Amid the numerous financial measures proposed, any prediction of the laws which will finally pass this Congress, would be little more than a guess, but if any provision for increasing the currency is adopted, the most likely one seems to be the definite authorization of the issue of the famous \$44,000,000 reserve, about one-quarter of which is already outstanding. The falling off in revenue during the first five months of the present fiscal year has been considerable, and is almost certain to continue for some time in the future, and unless Congress shall impose new taxes or customs duties, it is evident that funds must be derived from the issue of bonds or paper money. Perhaps that honesty, which legislators have some reason to regard as the best policy, since the developments of the past few years in Washington and New York, may be an important element in forming an opinion of the probable financial legislation of this Congress.

In the call loan market money has been readily obtainable by the best class of borrowers at 6@7 per cent, while stock brokers have paid as high as 7 gold, and in some cases 1-32 commission; to day the outside rate was not above 7 gold, and late in the afternoon loans were made as low as 5 per cent. Commercial paper continues to improve, and the best names now pass readily at 9@12 per cent, the demand for choice paper being in advance of the supply offering.

The last statement of our banks showed a further improvement, and to-day they report \$39,180,000 legal tenders on hand, which is an increase of about \$4,000,000 in five business days.

Advices from London continue to be favorable; the bank rate was reduced from 6 per cent to 5 on Thursday, and the gain in bullion for the week was £627,000. The Bank of France reported an increase in specie of 1,000,000 francs.

The Union Trust company resumed business on Monday, Dec. 1, and continued to pay promptly every demand.

The following table shows the changes from previous week and a comparison with 1872 and 1871:

	1873.			1872.		1871.	
	Nov. 22.	Nov. 29.	Differences.	Nov. 30.	Dec. 2.	Nov. 30.	Dec. 2.
Loans and dis.	\$248,067,300	\$247,922,300	Inc. \$145,000	\$276,560,000	\$292,316,900		
Specie.....	17,568,700	19,968,700	Inc. 2,400,000	12,947,200	18,074,700		
Circulation....	27,299,800	27,238,800	Dec. 61,000	27,570,900	30,166,900		
Net deposits..	167,997,200	174,467,200	Inc. 6,500,000	201,915,300	223,514,500		
Legal tenders.	30,899,800	35,399,800	Inc. 4,500,000	47,169,500	52,408,900		

United States Bonds.—Governments have made a sharp advance during the week, which can hardly be regarded as other than a favorable comment upon the Message and documents. It appears that the loan of 1858, due on or after January 1, 1874, will not be paid at that date unless special provision is made by Congress, although the holders had expected payment, as it has been the usual custom of the Government to pay similar loans when they first fell due. The continued advance in Governments, in the face of the Cuban difficulties, and without any special influence to force them up, and also with the prospect that the Treasury purchases will probably cease for some time to come, is another evidence of the great confidence in these securities, and warrants the belief that they will soon return to ante-panic prices. The public debt in November showed an increase of about \$9,000,000.

Closing prices daily have been as follows

	Int. period.	Nov. 29.	Dec. 1.	Dec. 2.	Dec. 3.	Dec. 4.	Dec. 5.
5s, funded, 1831, ..coup....	Quarterly.	109%	*109	*109%	109%	110%	*109%
6s, 1881.....	reg. Jan. & July.	111%	x111%	112%	113	114%	114%
6s, 1881.....	coup. Jan. & July.	115%	116%	117	*117%	117%	117%
6s, 5 20's, 1862.....	coup. May & Nov.	109%	*110	*110%	112%	110%	*110%
6s, 5 20's, 1864.....	coup. May & Nov.	111	*110%	111%	111%	112	112%
6s, 5 20's, 1865.....	coup. May & Nov.	*110%	111%	*111%	112%	112%	112%
6s, 5 20's, 1865 new, coup.	Jan. & July.	113%	115%	116	114%	116	116
6s, 5 20's, 1867.....	coup. Jan. & July.	114%	115%	117%	117%	117	116%
6s, 5 20's, 1868.....	coup. Jan. & July.	115	*114%	116%	*116%	117	116%
5s, 10 40's.....	reg. Mar. & Sept.	107%	*107%	109	110	*109%	*109%
5s, 10 40's.....	coup. Mar. & Sept.	*107%	108%	109%	110%	110%	110
6s Currency.....	reg. Jan. & July.	110%	108%	*109	110%	110	109%

State and Railroad Bonds.—Business in State bonds has been limited, Alabama is not paying her November interest, though it is hoped that the Legislature will soon provide for it.

The following despatch was received this week from Raleigh, N. C.: "Special tax bondholders have gained a glorious victory. Bonds declared constitutional; repealing acts declared unconstitutional. Injunction refused only because no irreparable injury has been sustained by plaintiffs. Will undoubtedly be granted on final hearing."

Union Pacific bonds have been active and strong; the Credit Mobilier suit, brought under the statute of last session, was decided in the United States Circuit Court at Hartford last week, Judge Hunt rendering the decision.

He holds that the United States cannot be authorized by statute to recover moneys due to the Union Pacific Railroad Company, or any other corporation, and therefore gives judgment to dissolve the injunction and dismiss the bill.

It is understood that an appeal from Judge Hunt's decision will be taken to the Supreme Court at Washington.

An increased inquiry is very noticeable for bonds "under a cloud," and considerable activity in these securities is reported. Holders show decidedly more firmness in their demands, and appear to be determined not to sacrifice their bonds too hastily. A few defaults in interest were made Dec. 1.

Closing prices daily, and the range since Jan. 1, have been:

Table with columns for dates (Nov. 23, Dec. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and various bond types (62 Tenn., old, new, N. Car., old, new, etc.) with corresponding prices.

Railroad and Miscellaneous Stocks.—There has been a strong and apparently a healthy tone in the stock market during the past week, and a little more of the former speculative element is visible. In Pacific Mail there has been another change of administration; Mr. Russell Sage takes the place of president, acting in close relations with Mr. Rufus Hatch, who has been vice-president for some time past, and the stock has made an advance of about 7 per cent.

It is believed that the Grinnell bankruptcy case will be settled; and to-day the counsel for George Bird Grinnell & Co. presented a petition to Judge Blatchford, reciting that all the creditors of the firm, with the exception of a few whose claims aggregate only about \$3,000, had consented to a settlement, and asking that Register Allen investigate the facts recited, and report whether it is not proper that the bankruptcy proceedings be discontinued and the firm allowed to resume its business.

The report is made that proposals are published in London for the issue of \$22,000,000 more of the ordinary Erie shares of 35 currency, instead of issuing bonds.

Railroad earnings show the effects of the panic more decidedly of late than they have heretofore—the latest returns are given below. The market closed quite firm.

The daily highest and lowest prices have been as follows:

Table showing daily highest and lowest prices for various stocks from Saturday, Nov. 29 to Friday, Dec. 5. Includes N.Y. Cen. & H.R., Erie, Lake Shore, Wabash, etc.

The latest railroad earnings reported are as follows

Table of latest railroad earnings reported and Jan. 1 to latest date. Columns include Roads, Latest earnings reported (1873, 1872), and Jan. 1 to latest date (1873, 1872).

Table of latest earnings reported for various roads (St. Louis & Iron Mt., St. L., Alton & T. H., etc.) for 1873 and 1872, and Jan. 1 to latest date.

The Gold Market.—The price of gold has fluctuated within a moderate limit, according to the varying rumors concerning the Cuban difficulties and the prospect that Congress would sanction a policy of inflation. The message of the President and the report of Secretary Richardson are generally regarded as giving forth an "uncertain sound," and it is not known whether or not they favor the issue of additional amounts of currency.

Custom receipts of the week have been \$1,351,000.

Table of quotations for gold and currency, showing Saturday, Nov. 29 to Friday, Dec. 5, with columns for Open, Low, High, Close, Total Clearings, Gold, and Currency.

Foreign Exchange.—The tendency of exchange has been towards firmer rates, under a fair demand from importers and a moderate supply of cotton bills from the South. Bankers seem to have confidence that exchange will be likely to rule as high as the present figures during the next few weeks, and as gold is heavy to carry, some purchases of bills have been made by them with the intention of drawing against such remittances hereafter, and in the meantime they make use of their gold.

Table of foreign exchange rates for London prime bank, Paris (bankers), Antwerp, Swiss, Amsterdam, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Bremen, and Prussian thalers, with columns for 60 days, 3 days, and 3 days.

The transactions for the week at the Custom House and Sub-Treasury have been as follows:

Table of transactions for the week at the Custom House and Sub-Treasury, showing Receipts and Payments in Gold and Currency for Nov. 29 to Dec. 5.

Boston Banks.—Below we give a statement of the Boston National Banks, as returned to the Clearing House on Monday Dec. 1, 1873:

Table of Boston National Banks, listing Capital, Loans, Specie, L.T. Notes, Deposits, and Circulation for various banks like Atlantic, Blackstone, Boston, Boylston, etc.

The deviations from last week's returns are as follows: Loans, Decrease \$519,900; Deposits, Increase \$733,400; Specie, Increase 159,100; Circulation, Decrease 40,000; Legal Tenders, Increase 511,700.

QUOTATIONS OF STOCKS AND BONDS IN NEW YORK.

Government Bonds and active Railroad Stocks are quoted on a previous page and not repeated here. Prices represent the per cent value, whatever the par may be. "N. Y. Local Securities" are quoted in a separate list.

Table with columns for 'SECURITIES', 'Bid.', 'Ask.', and 'SECURITIES'. It is divided into sections: U. S. Bonds, State Bonds, Railroad Stocks, Miscellaneous Stocks, Railroad Bonds, Southern Securities, CITIES, and RAILROADS. Each section lists various financial instruments with their corresponding bid and ask prices.

The Commercial Times.

COMMERCIAL EPITOME.

FRIDAY NIGHT, Dec. 5, 1873.

The character of the President's message and the report of the Secretary of the Treasury upon the subject of national finances, and the uncertainty which prevails respecting the course of legislation with reference thereto during the present session of Congress, have baffled speculation and given a quiet tone to business circles. Some improvement would have resulted from the reduction of the rate of discount by the Bank of England to five per cent, but it was followed by a decline in gold and exchange, and thus its natural effect was neutralized. So, too, the rise in gold to-day has been attended with a fear of war with Spain, which furnishes another element of uncertainty as to the future. Hence, as a rule, business has been limited to the actual wants of buyers, which are seldom great at this season of the year.

The following is a statement of the stocks of leading articles of domestic and foreign merchandise at dates given:

	1872.			1873.		
	Dec. 1.	Dec. 1.	Nov. 1.	Dec. 1.	Dec. 1.	Nov. 1.
Beef..... tcs. and bbls.	43,054	17,310	15,438	43,054	17,310	15,438
Pork..... bbls.	7,718	29,324	36,686	7,718	29,324	36,686
Tobacco, foreign..... bales.	27,001	20,101	21,050	27,001	20,101	21,050
Tobacco, domestic..... hhds.	10,956	14,455	16,833	10,956	14,455	16,833
Coffee, Rio..... bags.	25,693	70,700	61,428	25,693	70,700	61,428
Coffee, other..... bags.	42,035	3,794	4,788	42,035	3,794	4,788
Coffee, Java, &c..... mats.	170,432	7,401	7,401	170,432	7,401	7,401
Cocoa..... bags.	3,519	4,663	6,254	3,519	4,663	6,254
Sugar..... hhds.	20,074	55,575	73,441	20,074	55,575	73,441
Sugar..... boxes.	46,225	40,946	40,946	46,225	40,946	40,946
Sugar..... bags, etc.	47,361	235,121	302,689	47,361	235,121	302,689
Melado..... hhds.	1,127	4,863	3,095	1,127	4,863	3,095
Molasses..... hhds.	4,068	6,305	5,938	4,068	6,305	5,938
Molasses..... bbls.	1,415	4,069	325	1,415	4,069	325
Hides..... No.	145,500	40,900	119,570	145,500	40,900	119,570
Cotton..... bales.	56,003	49,336	47,254	56,003	49,336	47,254
Rosin..... bbls.	52,034	71,236	63,211	52,034	71,236	63,211
Spirits Turpentine..... bbls.	6,871	4,320	4,673	6,871	4,320	4,673
Tar..... bbls.	535	1,458	2,232	535	1,458	2,232
Rice, E. I..... bags.	9,640	14,440	19,840	9,640	14,440	19,840
Rice, Carolina..... casks.	240	350	340	240	350	340
Gunny Cloth (Cal)..... bales.	25,900	16,300	13,000	25,900	16,300	13,000
Gunny Bags..... bales.	8,100	7,200	7,700	8,100	7,200	7,700
Linseed..... bags.	133,206	17,329	11,548	133,206	17,329	11,548
Saltpetre..... bags.	8,000	8,300	10,000	8,000	8,300	10,000
Jute and Jute Butts..... bales.	121,000	115,200	123,850	121,000	115,200	123,850
Manila Hemp..... bales.	41,064	48,000	35,620	41,064	48,000	35,620
Ashes..... casks.	872	867	992	872	867	992

Coffee has been active, and at the close stocks are quite reduced. The movement has been mainly in Rio (including 25,000 bags last Friday, not 2,500, as misprinted), and since the speculation set in has been little if any short of 100,000 pkgs. Quotations for cargoes have been 21½@24½ gold for Rio, and 28@29½ gold for Java; but at the close it is felt that the effect of a duty of 5c. per lb. has been fully anticipated. Rice has been less active, but steady. Molasses has recovered a portion of the late decline with more activity. The market for hard sugars has been rather quiet, but has gained strength, and an advance of ¼c. is quoted—fair refining Cuba 7½, and boxes clayed 8½ for No. 12 D. S. There has been some improvement in teas, but not much activity.

Freights have been only moderately active, and rates have experienced some irregularity, though on the whole there has been little change since the reduction noted on Friday last. The lower prices of grain have permitted some renewal of shipments. Vessels for charter have been in better demand, especially to load petroleum, at rather better rates, not only for that staple, but for grain. To-day the business embraced: To Liverpool, by sail, wheat 11½d., and cotton 7-16d.; and by steam, wheat 12½d., bacon at 60s., and cotton 4d; grain to Cork for orders, 9s.; petroleum 6s. 9d. for Antwerp, and 7s. 1½d. to Cork for orders.

Provisions have developed more irregularity, especially in hog products, closing a little weak. An exhibit of hog picking shows 1,923,702 hogs slaughtered in November, against 1,183,760 for November, 1872, and 1,423,595 for November, 1871—an increase that has checked speculation and caused buyers for shipment to operate cautiously, especially for the future. Supplies on the spot are somewhat limited, the exports during the last month having been somewhat larger than in corresponding periods of previous years. To-day, pork was quiet on the spot, but firmer and more active for future delivery; the sales of mess aggregating 2,500 bbls, closing at \$15 25 for January, \$15 50 for February and \$15 75 for March. Beef also in better demand, and the sales embraced 200 tcs Philadelphia India mess at \$26, and 100 bbls beef hams at \$22 50. Bacon, at a slight shading in favor of buyers, was quite active at 7½c for short and long clear for December, and 7¾c for January, and 7-16c for short clear next week, and 7½c for January. Cut meats decidedly more active at firm prices. Lard was also firmer, with a moderate movement for future delivery; prime Western steam 8½c on the spot, 8¾@8 7-16c for January, 8 11-16c for February, and 8 15-16c for March. Butter has been rather dull, but prime stock closes firm. Cheese has been rather quiet at 13@14c for good to choice factories.

The market has been dull and weak for Kentucky leaf tobacco. The sales for the week have been only about 400 hhds., of which 300 were for export and 100 for consumption, and quotations are reduced to 6½@7c. for lugs, and 7½@11c. for leaf. Seed leaf has been more active, but at easier prices. Sales have been: Crop of 1871, 100 cases sundries at 9@45c.; crop of 1872, 400 cases Connecticut and Massachusetts at 13@45c. for wrappers; 10@12c. for seconds, and 5@6c. for fillers; 45 cases New York on private terms; 200 cases Pennsylvania, a part at 6½c; 200 cases Ohio at 6@6½c., and 700 cases Wisconsin at 6½@7c. Spanish tobacco less active, but firm; sales of 400 bales Havana at 70@80c., and 100 do. Yara, in bond, for export, on private terms.

Imports of Leading Articles.

The following table, compiled from Custom House returns shows the foreign imports of leading articles at this port since Jan. 1, 1873, and for the same period of 1872 and 1871:

	Since Jan. 1, 1873.	Same time 1872.	Same time 1871.	Since Jan. 1, 1873.	Same time 1872.	Same time 1871.
China, Glass and Earthenware—						
China.....	18,211	20,223	17,281			
Earthenware.....	47,559	55,420	59,585			
Glass.....	4,925	64,472	538,486			
Glassware.....	33,592	44,713	44,710			
Glass plate.....	10,920	10,416	11,497			
Buttons.....	5,121	5,730	6,061			
Coal, tons.....	57,975	11,349	142,882			
Cocoa, bags.....	27,475	29,638	21,065			
Coffee, bags.....	110,670	291,339	1,022,313			
Cotton, bales.....	11,731	3,503	4,991			
Drugs, &c.—						
Bark, Peruvian.....	37,532	34,929	29,221			
Blea powders.....	29,726	29,311	25,933			
Brimstone, tons.....	22,234	19,137	40,333			
Cochineal.....	7,334	5,915	10,577			
Cream Tartar.....	1,445	2,231	2,546			
Gambier.....	11,241	43,048	13,690			
Gum, Arabic.....	5,733	5,531	5,160			
Indigo.....	3,604	6,442	6,987			
Madder.....	712	5,301	2,491			
Oils, essential.....	697	801	535			
Oli, Olive.....	33,330	41,776	38,595			
Opium.....	1,115	1,576	1,710			
Soda bi-carb.....	81,203	76,676	105,024			
Soda sal.....	61,312	15,149	57,116			
Soda, ash.....	51,419	50,077	41,681			
Flax.....	8,147	11,416	11,556			
Furs.....	6,275	6,557	6,251			
Gunny cloth.....	5,195	16,194	16,530			
Hair.....	4,074	7,823	6,259			
Hemp, bales.....	122,677	157,404	113,539			
Hides, &c.—						
Bristles.....	1,733	1,733	2,096			
Hides, dressed.....	10,916	13,715	13,371			
India rubber.....	50,614	46,945	38,584			
Wool, vory.....	2,263	3,849	5,716			
Jewelry, &c.—						
Jewelry.....	3,572	8,335	4,793			
Watches.....	1,952	1,272	1,429			
Linseed.....	577,035	553,711	877,836			
Molasses.....	103,530	121,310	147,718			
Metals, &c.—						
Cutlery.....	6,423	7,490	6,569			
Hardware.....	3,528	5,691	5,632			
Iron, RR bars.....	554,349	1,012,251	1,666,134			
Lead, pigs.....	262,133	342,674	515,320			
Spelter, lbs.....	465,229	9,300,222	8,054,241			
Steel.....	197,441	215,515	217,859			
Tin, boxes.....	959,713	960,113	914,574			
Tin slabs, lbs.....	5,211,223	6,445,329	6,101,543			
Rags.....	121,945	141,931	133,355			
Sugar, hhds., tcs & bbls.....	534,310	422,323	416,712			
Sugar, boxes & bags.....	106,929	1,183,389	971,375			
Tea.....	813,756	1,067,033	914,924			
Tobacco.....	61,785	78,413	49,120			
Waste.....	4,300	4,481	4,473			
Wines, &c.—						
Champagne, bks.....	157,536	170,563	155,092			
Wines.....	151,999	91,056	173,716			
Wool, bales.....	45,970	100,212	78,212			
Articles reported by value—						
Cigars.....	197,086	1,802,079	1,731,851			
Corks.....	12,688	108,454	85,125			
Fancy goods.....	141,732	1,710,661	1,013,633			
Fish.....	404,051	374,322	315,494			
Fruits &c.—						
Lemons.....	875,453	692,830	739,702			
Oranges.....	12,757	1,337,917	1,158,813			
Nuts.....	93,313	840,531	1,016,516			
Raisins.....	1,112,552	1,551,569	871,141			
Hides undressed.....	107,532	109,721	115,734			
Rice.....	711,020	893,952	712,104			
Spices, &c.—						
Cassia.....	239,283	526,185	394,095			
Ginger.....	97,540	102,637	88,997			
Pepper.....	193,616	505,629	262,666			
Saltpetre.....	3,642	266,207	225,397			
Woods—						
Cork.....	414,063	312,573	255,525			
Fustic.....	84,773	40,128	5,436			
Logwood.....	319,012	454,480	521,978			
Mahogany.....	122,916	126,215	92,132			

Receipts of Domestic Produce for the Week and since January 1.

	This week.	Since Jan. 1.	Same time '72.	This week.	Since Jan. 1.	Same time '72.
Ashes... pkgs.	173	6,521	6,531			
Breadstuffs—						
Flour... bbls.	69,926	3,187,104	2,778,891			
Wheat... bus.	557,233	30,965,315	15,207,277			
Corn.....	124,440	21,087,527	40,232,319			
Oats.....	103,775	10,561,869	11,935,103			
Rye.....	1,840	458,972	471,013			
Barley, &c.....	22,000	2,316,638	4,901,841			
Grass sd, bgs.....	599	79,983	101,376			
Beans, bbls.....	2,910	45,071	37,262			
Peas, bush.....	2,943	18,944	192,335			
C. meat, bbls.....	2,467	2,253	190,932			
Cotton, bales.....	21,337	865,913	677,637			
Hemp, bales.....	81	6,022	5,327			
Hides... No.....	14,668	550,514	631,216			
Hops, bales.....	271	15,931	21,071			
Leather, sides.....	23,205	2,552,653	3,029,317			
Molasses, hds.....			171			
Do, bbls.....	3,934	31,490	36,839			
Naval Stores—						
Cr. turp bbls.....	116	9,927	9,187			
Spirits turp.....	523	57,533	70,590			
Rosin.....	6,233	513,315	553,498			
Tar.....	647	35,631	28,519			
Pitch.....						
Oil cake, pkgs.....	2,120	176,349	142,190			
Oil, lard.....		1,857	5,332			
Peanuts, bags.....	770	84,852	77,573			
Provisions—						
Butter, pkgs.....	20,193	814,605	622,395			
Cheese.....	53,372	1,912,262	1,616,921			
Cutmeats.....	12,462	476,863	244,521			
Eggs.....	9,743	4				

From the foregoing statement it will be seen that, compared with the corresponding week of last season, there is an increase in the exports this week of 28,261 bales, while the stocks to-night are 517 bales less than they were at this time a year ago. The following is our usual table showing the movement of cotton at all the ports from Sept. 1 to Nov. 28, the latest mail dates.

PORTS.	RECEIPTS SINCE SEPT. 1.		EXPORTED SINCE SEPT. 1 TO—				Coast-wise Ports.	Stock.
	1873.	1872.	Great Britain.	France.	Other For'gn.	Total.		
New Orleans	236,807	315,083	53,668	39,466	22,568	115,702	33,542	127,690
Mobile	73,536	109,951	14,405	500	44	15,346	39,419	25,574
Charleston	147,255	148,128	2,514	10,786	1,405	39,705	6,014	47,084
Savannah	248,001	263,336	47,927	4,597	12,738	65,262	59,112	97,622
Texas	69,894	110,323	15,182	830	—	16,019	17,113	41,273
New York	38,251	22,481	14,703	4,535	4,883	159,181	—	50,233
Florida	8,427	4,412	—	—	—	—	8,627	—
No. Carolina	12,342	23,221	2,336	—	—	2,336	—	1,823
Virginia	134,744	135,047	—	—	—	—	131,935	7,163
Other ports	10,410	4,234	13,166	65	4,913	18,449	—	23,000
Total this year	979,934	—	324,263	60,779	46,913	432,000	393,918	456,467
Total last year	—	1,110,977	306,291	100,749	110,371	517,411	477,532	407,104

The market for spot cotton the past week has been inactive and somewhat variable. The opening was weak but without quotable reduction until Monday, when receipts at the ports being over 40,000 bales, and Liverpool reported quiet, there was a reduction of $\frac{3}{8}$ c. Exchange improved, however, and on Wednesday there was a pretty fair business for export, the market closing with no sellers at the quotations, though no advance was actually paid. Yesterday, with the rate of the Bank of England down to 5 per cent, the market was active for export as well as for consumption, with the result of $\frac{1}{8}$ c. recovery in the quotations; but the demand soon subsided, and under the decline in gold, with renewed depression in exchange, the close was dull and weak. To-day gold and exchange being again higher on account of the belligerent reports from Cuba, cotton opened firm, but the demand proved less active, and at the close part of yesterday's advance was lost, leaving an aggregate decline of $\frac{1}{8}$ c. for the week. For future delivery there was a considerable decline during Saturday and Monday, the great increase in the receipts the latter day discouraging buyers, and before the decline was arrested there was a falling off of $\frac{3}{8}$ c. from the highest figures of Friday. Tuesday there was an upward turn, and since then the market has been variable. To-day the opening was firmer, but as the day progressed the excessive receipts at the ports caused a reaction, and the close was a fraction lower than yesterday. The highest prices to-day were for December 15 19-32c., for January 15 27-32c., for February 16 $\frac{1}{2}$ c., for March 16 $\frac{3}{4}$ c., and for April 16 $\frac{3}{4}$ c. After 'Change sales were made at 15 $\frac{1}{2}$ c. for January, 15 $\frac{1}{2}$ c. for February, 16 $\frac{1}{2}$ c. for March, and 16 $\frac{1}{2}$ c. for April. The total sales of this description for the week are 122,850 bales, including — free on board. For immediate delivery the total sales foot up this week 14,143 bales, including 3,457 for export, 9,758 for consumption, 118 for speculation, and 810 in transit. Of the above 1,892 bales were to arrive. The following are the closing quotations:

	Upland and Florida.	Mobile.	New Orleans.	Texas.
Ordinary..... per lb.	14 @....	14 @....	14 @....	14 @....
Good Ordinary.....	14 $\frac{1}{2}$ @....	15 @....	15 $\frac{1}{2}$ @....	15 $\frac{1}{2}$ @....
Strict Good Ordinary.....	15 3-16	15 5-16	15 $\frac{1}{2}$ @....	15 $\frac{1}{2}$ @....
Low Middling.....	15 $\frac{1}{2}$ @....	15 $\frac{1}{2}$ @....	15 $\frac{1}{2}$ @....	15 $\frac{1}{2}$ @....
Middling.....	16 @....	16 $\frac{1}{2}$ @....	16 $\frac{1}{2}$ @....	16 $\frac{1}{2}$ @....
Good Middling.....	17 @....	17 $\frac{1}{2}$ @....	17 $\frac{1}{2}$ @....	17 $\frac{1}{2}$ @....

Below we give the sales of spot and transit cotton and price of Uplands at this market each day of the past week:

	SALES.					PRICES.			
	Exp't.	Con-sump.	Spec. ula'n	Transit.	Total.	Ord'ry.	Good Ord'ry.	Low Midl'g.	Midling.
Saturday	125	966	64	300	1,355	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	16 $\frac{1}{2}$
Monday	5 0	1,913	19	—	2,432	13 $\frac{1}{2}$	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	15 $\frac{1}{2}$
Tuesday	80	1,259	12	—	1,881	13 $\frac{1}{2}$	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	15 $\frac{1}{2}$
Wednesday	833	1,337	6	—	2,176	13 $\frac{1}{2}$	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	15 $\frac{1}{2}$
Thursday	1,394	2,913	1	—	4,388	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	15	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	16 $\frac{1}{2}$
Friday	515	1,260	16	610	2,411	14	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	16
Total	3,457	9,758	118	810	14,143	—	—	—	—

For forward delivery the sales (including — free on board, have reached during the week 122,850 bales (all low middling or on the basis of low middling), and the following is a statement of the sales and prices:

For	bales.	cts.	bales.	cts.	bales.	cts.
For December.	7,000	15 17-32	1,600	15 29-32	800	16 9-16
500 s. n.	3,300	15 17-32	300	15 15-16	200	16 19-32
200	2,900	15 9-16	1,100	15 31-32	400	16 1-32
500	2,600	15 19-32	3,200	16	700	16 1-32
100 s. n.	5,000	15 19-32	1,200	16 1-32	100	16 13-16
1,200	4,600	15 21-32	4,800	16 1-16	—	—
300	2,100	15 11-16	1,000	16 3-32	10,700	total March.
500	3,700	15 23-32	2,000	16 1-32	—	For April.
600	3,400	15 5-32	600	16 5-32	800	16 11-32
100	2,100	15 25-32	8,100	16 3-16	200	16 13-32
20 s. n.	3,900	15 3-16	600	16 7-32	100	16 7-16
1,400	1,500	15 27-32	2,000	16 1-32	1,200	16 1-32
600	1,900	15 1-32	300	16 1-32	300	16 17-32
100	1,000	15 29-32	100	16 13-32	200	16 9-16
300	900	15 15-16	200	15 7-16	100	16 19-32
2,100	100	15 31-32	—	—	1,100	16 1-32
1,300	230	16	34,400	total Feb.	400	16 11-16
500	400	15 1-32	—	For March.	1,200	16 1-32
100	200	16 1-16	1,100	16 1-16	300	16 13-16
250 s. n.	700	16 3-32	1,300	16 5-32	600	16 1-32
200	59,400	total Jan.	1,400	16 3-16	300	16 29-32
300	400	15 23-32	200	16 7-32	100	17 1-32
100	600	15 11-16	800	16 1-32	100	17 1-16
—	400	15 23-32	300	16 11-32	—	—
—	3,900	15 1-32	1,000	16 1-32	6,500	total April.
—	700	15 25-32	1,300	15 13-32	—	For May.
—	800	15 13-32	600	16 7-16	100	16 15-16
—	3,800	15 7-16	700	16 1-32	100	17
—	5,100	15 15-32	200	16 17-32	—	—

The following exchanges have been made during the week: 1-16c. pd. to exch, 100 Nov. for Dec.

The following will show the closing prices each day on the basis of low middling uplands, for the several deliveries named:

	Fri.	Sat.	Mon.	Tues.	Wed.	Thurs.	Fri.
On spot	15 $\frac{1}{2}$						
November	15 $\frac{1}{2}$						
December	15 $\frac{1}{2}$						
January	16 $\frac{1}{2}$	15 19-16	15 7-16	15 11-16	15 5-16	15 9-16	15 5-16
February	16 7-16	16 $\frac{1}{2}$	15 27-32	16 1-16	15 17-32	15 11-16	15 9-16
March	16 13-16	16 $\frac{1}{2}$	16 3-16	16 8-16	15 29-32	16 1-32	15 31-32
April	17 1-32	16 $\frac{1}{2}$	16 $\frac{1}{2}$	16 11-32	16 $\frac{1}{2}$	16 $\frac{1}{2}$	16 11-32
Sales, future	28,700	21,450	32,100	17,800	14,200	18,500	16 $\frac{1}{2}$
Sales, spot	2,531	1,355	2,432	1,381	2,173	4,388	2,411

WEATHER REPORTS BY TELEGRAPH.—In most sections of the South there has been a very considerable fall of rain the past week, though this remark will not to the same extent apply to all the cotton States. At Galveston they have had rain on two days—showers—the rainfall reaching four one-hundredths of an inch; the movement of cotton to Galveston is now commensurate with transportation facilities and with the market demand. There has been rain on two days at New Orleans, showery. At Vicksburg it has been cloudy and warm all the week, with one rainy day, attended with high wind. It has rained heavily more than half the week at Nashville, and is now threatening snow. At Memphis it has rained on two days, the rest of the week being cloudy; one inch of snow fell last night. The crop is being marketed freely. There have also been two rainy days at Mobile, with the balance of the week cloudy and damp; the planters are sending forward their cotton very rapidly. At Selma they have had three rainy days, heavy rain-storms prevailing, and it is now raining; the crop is being freely forwarded to market. There have been two rainy days at Montgomery, Macon and Columbus, our telegram from Columbus adding that the rain there was during the latter part of the week, the earlier part of the week being clear and pleasant. At Savannah it has been warm, sultry and wet during the week; the crop is being marketed freely, and is readily sold. It has rained on three days at Charleston; about all the crop in the country tributary to Charleston has been secured. At Augusta it has been warm, sultry and wet, with rain on more than half the days of the week. The thermometer has averaged 62 at Galveston, 62 at Montgomery, 56 at Macon, 60 at Mobile, 65 at Savannah.

INDIA COTTON CROP.—Our Bombay mail dates are brought down this week to the 25th of October. On the 18th of October Messrs. W. Nicol & Co. write that the "crop prospects continue all that could be desired, and from reliable information we learn that in the Southern Mahratta country, where up to this time prospects were not so good as in the other cotton districts, they have latterly improved very considerably, as plentiful rain has fallen throughout the country." Under the date of the 25th they give detailed reports of many of the districts tributary to Bombay as follows: "Broach.—The harvesting of the grain crops has commenced, and the cotton crop continues to look exceedingly well. The weather is bright, clear, and warm during the day, and cool at night. Ahmedabad.—All the crops are flourishing, and the general prospects are considered excellent. Hingunhaut.—Weather all that can be desired, and the cotton fields are making satisfactory progress. Oomrawuttee.—The weather continues dry with a clear sky; the cotton crops are maturing fast. Shegaum.—Kuppas, both from American and indigenous seed, is beginning to show itself freely in the more advanced fields. Khamgaum.—A docra or two of new cotton grown from American seed is now coming in daily, and also a little old cotton. The weather continues fine, and the cotton fields are looking remarkably well." Messrs. Finlay, Muir & Co., of the same date say that "the favorable weather, noticed in our last, continues in all districts, and it is now expected that the Oomrawuttee crop will be earlier than was anticipated, but we are still doubtful if supplies in quantity can reach us before the end of the year; the low prices ruling will not induce the ryots to commence picking and cleaning cotton till they have secured their grain crops." Sir Charles Forbes & Co., under same date, write "the reports from the districts continue to be of an exceedingly satisfactory character, and fully bear out the former promising estimates of the coming crop. Supplies of new Oomrawuttee and Khandish are expected in about three weeks, while new Hingunhaut will be available in about a month. Other descriptions of new cotton may be expected at a correspondingly early period of the season."

We thus see that so far as Bombay and its dependencies are concerned the prospects of the crop are unusually promising. With regard to the other cotton-producing districts of India, our advices are not as full, though as to Calcutta they are of a more favorable character than previous advices. Messrs. Fleming & Co., of Karachi, under date of October 24th, write that their "up-country correspondence continues to report favorably with regard to prospects, and in some quarters picking operations have already been commenced." Messrs. I. Nicol Fleming & Co., of Calcutta, in their circular of October 17th, say that they have just received from the "various districts reports on the prospects of the new crop, which are much more favorable than those received a short time ago. The Agra district is the only one in which a deficiency is looked for, and this is estimated at a $\frac{1}{2}$ less than last year. Jeyore, the Doab, Cawnpore and the Central Provinces all promise a full out-turn." We have also received from Calcutta our mail for one week later, but we do not find in it anything additional on this subject.

The conclusion from the above is irresistible that there will be, according to the present out-look, a considerably increased yield of cotton in India this year as compared with last year. The only question which remains is, at what price will it be marketed?

CROP ESTIMATES.—Within the next two weeks we shall make up our usual estimate of the cotton crop; we are now gathering the necessary information. A telegraphic summary of the November report of the Agricultural Bureau was issued on the 26th of November, by which the total crop is given at 3,700,000 bales, and the percentage of the states "in comparison with last year," as follows: North Carolina, 98; South Carolina, 92; Georgia, 97; Florida, 97; Alabama, 91; Mississippi, 85; Louisiana, 80; Texas, 112; Arkansas, 102; Tennessee, 102 per cent. The estimated total area in round numbers is 9,500,000 acres.

BOMBAY SHIPMENTS.—According to our cable dispatch received to-day, there has been 5,000 bales shipped from Bombay to Great Britain the past week and 1,000 bales to the continent, while the receipts at Bombay, during the same time have been 7,000 bales. The movement since the first of January is as follows. These are the figures of W. Nicol & Co., of Bombay, and are brought down to Thursday, Dec. 4:

	—Shipments this week to—			—Shipments since Jan. 1 to—			Week's receipts.
	Great Britain	Continent.	Total.	Great Britain.	Continent.	Total.	
1873....	11,000	1,000	12,000	719,000	206,000	925,000	11,000
1872....	1,000	1,000	2,000	656,000	251,000	907,000	6,000
1871....	5,000	3,000	8,000	752,000	330,000	1,082,000	21,000

From the foregoing it would appear that compared with last year there is an increase of 10,000 bales this year in the week's shipments from Bombay to Europe, and that the total movement since Jan. 1 shows an increase in shipments of 18,000 bales compared with the corresponding period of 1872.

Our Bombay telegram to-night states that the condition and prospects of the growing crop continue up to the present time very favorable.

VISIBLE SUPPLY OF COTTON AS MADE UP BY CABLE AND TELEGRAPH.—Below we give our table of visible supply, as made up by cable and telegraph to night. The continental stocks and afloat are the figures of last Saturday, but the totals for Great Britain are this week's returns, and consequently brought down to Thursday evening; hence to make the totals the complete figures for to night (Dec. 5), we add the item of exports from the United States, including in it the exports of Friday only for Great Britain, but for the Continent the exports of the entire week.

	1873.	1872.	1871.
Stock at Liverpool.....	487,000	352,000	445,000
Stock at London.....	183,500	222,000	144,544
Total Great Britain stock	670,500	604,000	589,544
Stock at Havre.....	83,250	243,000	118,000
Stock at Marseilles.....	10,250	13,000	16,000
Stock at Barcelona.....	18,500	27,000	53,000
Stock at Hamburg.....	17,500	34,000	17,000
Stock at Bremen.....	25,250	33,000	14,000
Stock at Amsterdam.....	86,750	56,000	32,000
Stock at Rotterdam.....	22,750	11,000	7,000
Stock at Antwerp.....	14,250	32,000	13,000
Stock at other continental ports.....	27,000	43,000	47,000
Total continental stocks	305,500	492,000	317,000
Total European stocks	976,000	1,096,000	906,544
India cotton afloat for Europe.....	160,000	129,000	326,000
American cotton afloat for Europe.....	284,000	274,000	228,000
Egypt, Brazils, &c., afloat for Europe....	81,000	75,000	85,000
Stock in United States ports.....	450,195	450,712	411,888
Stock in United States interior ports.....	99,382	78,871	66,329
United States exports this week.....	34,000	35,000	30,000
Total visible supply	2,085,077	2,138,583	2,053,761

Of the above, the totals of American and other descriptions are as follows:

<i>American—</i>			
Liverpool stock.....	96,000	48,000	41,000
Continental stocks.....	87,000	84,000	83,000
American afloat to Europe.....	284,000	274,000	228,000
United States stock.....	450,195	450,712	411,888
United States interior stocks.....	99,382	78,871	66,329
United States exports this week.....	34,000	35,000	30,000
Total Americanba.es.	1,052,077	970,583	860,217
<i>East Indian, Brazil, &c.—</i>			
Liverpool stock.....	391,000	334,000	404,000
London stock.....	183,500	222,000	144,544
Continental stocks.....	218,500	408,000	234,000
India afloat for Europe.....	160,000	129,000	326,000
Egypt, Brazil, &c., afloat ..	81,000	75,000	85,000
Total East India, &c.	1,034,000	1,168,000	1,193,544
Total American	1,052,077	970,583	860,217
Total visible supplybales.	2,086,077	2,138,583	2,053,761
Price Middling Uplands, Liverpool.....	8½d.	10d.	9¾d.

These figures indicate a decrease in the cotton in sight to night of 52,506 bales as compared with the same date of 1872 and an increase of 32,316 bales as compared with the corresponding date of 1871.

MOVEMENTS OF COTTON AT THE INTERIOR PORTS.—Below we give the movements of cotton at the interior ports—receipts and shipments for the week, and stock to-night and for the corresponding week of 1872:

	—Week ending Dec. 5, 1873—			—Week ending Dec. 6, '72—		
	Receipts.	Shipments.	Stock.	Receipts.	Shipments.	Stock.
Augusta.....	9,912	8,423	15,592	7,398	9,635	1,013
Columbus.....	3,837	2,183	10,858	2,374	2,031	8,139
Macon.....	3,727	5,088	9,339	3,058	1,870	11,413
Montgomery... ..	2,541	2,017	7,588	3,184	2,257	12,078
Selma.....	3,639	1,664	7,700	2,150	2,509	7,796
Memphis... ..	25,979	12,571	42,092	15,154	11,698	34,147
Nashville.....	5,956	4,247	6,713	2,586	2,888	4,285
	55,591	36,193	99,882	35,854	32,888	78,871

The above totals show that the interior stocks have increased during the week 19,398 bales, and are to-night 21,011 bales more than at the same period last year. The receipts have been 20,737 bales more than the same week last year.

The exports of cotton this week from New York show a decrease as compared with last week, the total reaching 15,844 bales, against 16,155 bales last week. Below we give our usual table showing the exports of cotton from New York, and their direction for each of the last four weeks; also the total exports and direction since Sept. 1, 1873; and in the last column the total for the same period of previous year.

Exports of Cotton (bales) from New York since Sept. 1, 1873

EXPORTED TO	WEEK ENDING				Total to date.	Same time prev. year.
	Nov. 12.	Nov. 19.	Nov. 26.	Dec. 3.		
Liverpool.....	17,691	22,216	14,401	14,119	163,882	137,749
Other British Ports.....	134
Total to Gt. Britain	17,691	22,216	14,401	14,119	163,882	137,883
Havre.....	1,713	246	4,127	1,849
Other French ports.....	100	303	325	733
Total French	100	1,713	554	325	4,860	1,848
Bremen and Hanover.....	789	759	500	1,400	3,798	12,394
Hamburg.....	315	300	700	1,316	4,398
Other ports.....	198
Total to N. Europe.	1,105	1,059	1,200	1,400	5,312	16,792
Spain, Oporto & Gibraltar &c
All others.....	971	971	2,607
Total Spain, &c.	971	971	2,607
Grand Total	19,867	24,988	16,155	15,844	175,025	159,130

The following are the receipts of cotton at New York, Boston, Philadelphia and Baltimore for the last week, and since Sept. 1, '73:

RECEIPTS FROM	NEW YORK.		BOSTON.		PHILADELPHIA		BALTIMORE.	
	This week.	Since Sept. 1.	This week.	Since Sept. 1.	This week.	Since Sept. 1.	This week.	Since Sept. 1.
New Orleans..	924	29,475	52	2,230
Texas.....	1,139	16,005
Savannah.....	5,374	71,574	2,507	11,712	279	3,953	5,003
Mobile.....
Florida.....
S'th Carolina.....	5,332	58,226	565	6,768	782	3,145
N'th Carolina.....	473	5,437	152	2,345	601	3,112
Virginia.....	9,493	73,937	1,327	9,950	4,134	21,629
North'n Ports	341	1,867	4,105	28,232
Tennessee, &c	5,269	42,520	1,555	6,170	601	3,728	1,740
Foreign.....	725
Total this year	28,345	299,766	10,059	62,854	1,032	12,269	5,517	34,629
Total last year	26,899	310,144	10,541	70,449	1,516	13,030	4,147	36,371

SHIPPING NEWS.—The exports of cotton from the United States the past week, as per latest mail returns, have reached 73,273 bales. So far as the Southern ports are concerned, these are the same exports reported by telegraph, and published in THE CHRONICLE last Friday, except Galveston, and the figures for that port are the exports for two weeks back. With regard to New York, we include the manifests of all vessels cleared up to Wednesday night of this week:

	Total bales.
NEW YORK —To Liverpool, per steamers City of Limerick, 2,359....	2,359
City of Brooklyn, 793.... Celtic, 1,240.... Canada, 3,188.... Nevada, 3,648.... Abyssinia, 1,100.... Pennsylvania, 603 (via Glasgow)....	14,119
per ships Strathearn, 1,139.... J. Harvey, 50....	325
To Marseilles, per brig Don Jacinto, 325....	1,400
To Bremen, per steamers Main, 575.... Bremen, 825....	2,789
NEW ORLEANS —To Liverpool, per ship Tasmanian, 2,789....	2,789
To Havre, per steamer Vandalia, 411.... per ships Montebello, 2,208....	8,570
.... Crescent City, 3,622.... La Louisiane, 2,329....	1,890
To Hamburg, per steamer Vandalia, 1,890....	4,509
To Reval, per steamer Durham, 4,509....	500
To Santander, per steamer Vandalia, 500....	8,921
MOBILE —To Liverpool, per ships City of Brooklyn, 4,598.... W. A. Campbell, 4,323....	2,241
CHARLESTON —To Liverpool, per bark J. B. Duffus, 2,214 Upland and 27 Sea Island....	623
To Havre, per brig Armand Adrien, 550 Upland and 73 Sea Island....	1,405
To Antwerp, per bark J. G. Norwood, 1,405 Upland....	9,974
SAVANNAH —To Liverpool, per steamer Ambassador, 4,742 Upland and 27 Sea Island.... per ship George Hurlbut, 3,304 Upland.... per bark Eva Carroll, 1,901 Upland....	4,064
To Reval, per steamer Winstead, 4,064 Upland....	7,159
TEXAS —To Liverpool, per barks Sabine, 2,441.... Robert Boak, 1,751.... Magna Charta, 1,510.... per schr. C. E. Gibson, 1,457....	1,786
BALTIMORE —To Liverpool, per steamer Hibernian, 603.... per bark Glenrallock, 1,183....	1,942
To Bremen, per steamer Braunschweig, 1,062.... per ship Reynard, 860....	588
BOSTON —To Liverpool, per steamer Parthia, 588....	371
PHILADELPHIA —To Liverpool, per steamer Indiana, 371....	97
SAN FRANCISCO —To Liverpool, per steamer Luang Se, 97....	73,273

The particulars of these shipments, arranged in our usual form are as follows:

	Liverpool.	Mar. Havre.	Bre. seilles.	Ham. men.	Ant. burg.	Ant. werp.	Reval.	Sant. ander.	Total.
New York	14,119		325	1,400					15,844
N. Orleans	2,789	8,570			1,890		4,509	500	18,258
Mobile	8,921								8,921
Charleston	2,241	623				1,405			4,269
Savannah	9,974						4,054		14,038
Texas	7,159								7,159
Baltimore	1,786			1,942					3,728
Boston	588								588
Philadelphia	371								371
San Francisco	97								97
Total	48,045	9,193	325	3,342	1,890	1,405	8,573	500	73,273

Below we give all news received, during the week, of disasters to vessels carrying cotton from any port of the United States:

KONIG WILHELM I. (Ger.) Gerdes, from New York, which arrived at Southampton Nov. 24, and proceeded for Bremen, ran ashore near Nieuw-Diep, on the coast of Holland 27th; passengers landed. She would probably have to discharge before she could be got afloat.

VILLE DU HAVRE (3,791 tons, late Napoleon III.), Captain Surmont, from New York Nov. 15, of and for Havre, with 1,615 bales cotton and 131 passengers, and a crew of 183 persons, collided at 2 A. M. Nov. 22, in lat. 47. lon. 38, with the ship Loch Earn (Br.), from London for New York, and sunk in 12 minutes, carrying down with her all but 87 of the passengers and crew, 33 of the former and 54 of the latter. The Loch Earn struck the steamer amidships tearing an immense hole in her side. A few minutes after the collision, the main and mizzen masts fell across two large boats, which were filled with people and ready for launching, crushing the boats and killing many of those in them. The Loch Earn launched four boats, and these with the whale boat launched from the steamer, were the means by which those rescued were saved. At 8 A. M. of the 23d the ship Trimountain, Capt. Urquhart, from New York for Bristol, hove in sight and to her were transferred the saved, excepting three.

RICHARD ROBINSON—The bottom of the ship Richard Robinson, from New York for Liverpool, at Halifax, in distress, had been examined by a diver Nov. 24, who found no signs of her having been ashore. After being tight for some days the ship commenced leaking again 23d, and the pumps had to be kept going constantly. Capt. Stetson makes the following statement relating to the abandonment of his vessel:—Oct. 27, encountered a violent gale from SSW, during which shifted the cargo and sprung a leak, which increased to such an extent that notwithstanding the exertions of the entire crew, they were unable to keep her free; the pumps were kept going continually until the morning of the 29th, when, in lat. 40. lon. 64, all hands were taken off by the Norwegian bark Admete, from New York for Hamburg, where we remained until Nov. 15, and were then transferred to the steamship Etna, Capt. Drakeford, and brought to New York. Capt. Stetson states that when he left the ship she had about six feet of water in the hold.

The steamer Bremen, which sailed from this port for Bremen, has been obliged to put back, having sprung a leak.

LIVERPOOL, December 5—5 P. M.—By CABLE FROM LIVERPOOL—The market has ruled quiet and steady to-day. Sales of the day were 12,000 bales, of which 2,000 bales were for export and speculation. Of to-day's sales 6,000 bales were American. The weekly movement is given as follows:

	Nov. 14.	Nov. 21.	Nov. 28.	Dec. 5.
Sales of the week..... bales.	72,000	74,000	95,000	93,000
of which exporters took.....	6,000	8,000	13,000	14,000
of which speculators took.....	3,000	4,000	7,000	7,000
Total stock.....	502,000	497,000	477,000	487,000
of which American.....	73,000	70,000	75,000	96,000
Total import of the week.....	42,000	62,000	62,000	83,000
of which American.....	22,000	32,000	42,000	59,000
Actual export.....	7,000	6,000	8,000	7,000
Amount float.....	270,000	295,000	299,000	323,000
of which American.....	130,000	153,000	154,000	174,000

The following table will show the daily closing prices of cotton for the week

	Sat.	Mon.	Tues.	Wed.	Thurs.	Fri.
Mid. Uplands.	8 3/4@	8 3/4@	8 3/4@	8 3/4@	8 3/4@	8 3/4@
Mid. Orleans.	9 @	9 @	8 3/4@	8 3/4@	8 3/4@	8 3/4@

BREADSTUFFS.

FRIDAY P. M., Dec. 5, 1873.

There has been more reaction against the previous advance in prices.

The demand for flour has fallen off materially for all grades. The receipts at this market have also been less liberal, but with supplies increasing at the West, the railways prepared to bring forward large quantities, and wheat having fallen 5@7c. per bush., receivers of flour have been more inclined to make concessions to effect sales. Early in the week there was some demand for choice superfine, with sales as high as \$6 40@\$6 50, but there was a quick decline to \$6 25, and yesterday sales of common extras were reported as low as \$6 40@\$6 60, though few that were desirable could be had under \$6 75. The medium and better grades have been reduced a little in order to prevent a falling off in trade. To-day the market was at easier prices a little more active, and for good lines of extra State \$6 75@\$6 90 may be quoted.

Wheat has been dull, and most of the advance of last week has been lost. The sales of wheat on the spot have latterly been so small that it has been difficult to fix quotations, but there has been a fair business for arrival by rail in this and early next month, at \$1 47@\$1 48 for No. 2 Chicago, and \$1 51@\$1 52 for No. 2 Milwaukee. Winter wheats have relapsed into inactivity, and are nominally lower. The receipts at the Western markets have been large for the season. To-day the market was dull and weak; No. 2 Milwaukee nominal, at \$1 49@\$1 51, and No. 2 Chicago sold at \$1 46.

Indian corn opened the week active and buoyant, with sales of prime mixed on Tuesday at 73@74c. in store; but during Wednesday and Thursday there was a good degree of activity, mainly for export, at 70 1/2@71 1/2 in store, and 73@74 afloat, for good to prime; some damaged sold at 60c., and kiln dried 66@68c. in

store. The receipts of corn at all points have been quite small, but the demand has been only moderate. To-day prices recovered 2c., with sales of prime mixed in store at 73@73 1/2.

Rye has been scarce, and with some demand has brought more money. Barley has been dull at the advance noted in our last, buyers having reduced their bids, but holders have remained firm until to-day, when a boat load of Canada West sold at \$1 75.

Oats have materially declined in the past few days, under a pressure to sell, with the demand only moderate. To-day the market was firmer at 53@53 1/2 for prime mixed in store.

A considerable movement in Canada peas has been reported at 98c in bond.

The very mild weather of Wednesday and Thursday released a large number of ice-bound boats in the Hudson River, and encouraged hopes that a portion at least of the boats detained in the Erie Canal would be gotten forward, but a telegram to-day said there was no prospect of moving boats.

The following are closing quotations:

FLOUR.		GRAIN.	
No. 2.....	\$4 25@ 5 15	Wheat—No. 3 spring, bush.	\$1 40@ 1 42
Superfine State and West-		No. 2 spring.....	1 45@ 1 50
ern.....	5 50@ 6 00	No. 1 spring.....	1 55@ 1 57
Extra State, &c.....	6 70@ 6 90	Red Western.....	1 55@ 1 60
Western Spring Wheat		Amber do.....	1 65@ 1 68
extras.....	6 40@ 6 75	White.....	1 65@ 1 85
do double extras.....	7 00@ 8 50	Corn—Western mixed.....	73@ 75
do winter wheat extras		White Western.....	78@ 80
and double extras.....	7 00@ 10 25	Yellow Western.....	74@ 76
City shipping extras.....	6 85@ 7 25	Southern, white.....	@
City trade and family		Rye.....	1 05@ 1 10
brands.....	9 00@ 10 25	Oats—Black.....	@
Southern bakers' and fa-		Chicago mixed.....	53@ 55 1/2
mily brands.....	9 50@ 10 50	White Western, &c.....	56@ 58
Southern shipp'g extras.....	7 50@ 8 50	Barley—Western.....	1 25@ 1 65
Rye flour, superfine.....	5 60@ 6 00	Canada West.....	1 75@ 1 77
Corn meal—Western, &c.....	3 65@ 3 90	State.....	1 40@ 1 65
Corn meal—Br'wine, &c.....	4 10@ 4 25	Peas—Canada.....	98@ 1 25

The movement in breadstuffs at this market has been as follows.

	—RECEIPTS AT NEW YORK.			—EXPORTS FROM NEW YORK.		
	1873.	Same	1872.	1873.	Same	1872.
Flour, bbls.	For the week.	Since Jan. 1.	1, 1872.	For the week.	Since Jan. 1.	For the week.
C. meal, "	68,926	3,187,104	2,773,891	55,112	1,494,251	33,030
Wheat, bus.	2,467	202,538	190,982	2,760	166,306	2,968
Corn, "	557,233	30,963,345	15,207,277	603,148	25,551,162	461,817
Rye, "	123,440	21,057,527	40,232,349	324,053	14,553,744	318,961
Barley, &c.	1,840	958,972	479,013	16,615	1,002,320
Oats.....	22,775	2,316,693	4,900,584	40,048
	108,775	10,564,269	11,935,103	1,910	38,880	200

The following tables show the Grain in sight and the movement of Breadstuffs to the latest mail dates:

RECEIPTS AT LAKE AND RIVER PORTS FOR THE WEEK ENDING NOV. 29, AND FROM AUG. 1 TO NOV. 29.

	Flour.	Wheat.	Corn.	Oats.	Barley.	Rye.
	bbls.	bush.	bush.	bush.	bush.	bush.
	(196 lbs.)	(60 lbs.)	(56 lbs.)	(32 lbs.)	(48 lbs.)	(56 lbs.)
Chicago.....	56,628	388,840	164,370	161,075	74,280	13,635
Milwaukee.....	24,293	606,715	26,006	17,950	43,165	10,470
Toledo.....	8,635	53,943	77,600	75,865	700	350
Detroit.....	4,253	41,501	5,190	21,815	5,089
Cleveland.....	*3,875	21,750	44,800	23,500	3,400	350
St. Louis.....	21,298	97,943	63,602	82,691	15,152	11,292
Duluth.....

Total.....	123,982	1,216,742	381,562	382,896	141,786	36,697
Previous week.....	121,500	1,176,149	415,640	345,710	149,322	25,830
Corresp'g week, '72.	97,456	694,652	625,036	303,242	194,719	28,191
" '71.	86,196	375,864	1,064,164	297,342	127,341	30,373
" '70.	150,375	1,228,751	932,837	327,164	104,448	32,009
" '69.	136,477	1,138,428	159,557	239,515	160,292	19,531
" '68.	119,427	560,793	468,440	219,130	42,240	25,683
Total Aug. 1 to date.....	2,164,702	36,775,297	25,045,938	10,824,413	3,134,171	866,962
Same time 1872-73.....	2,066,436	27,581,116	25,815,089	10,440,850	5,611,768	927,374
Same time 1871-72.....	2,316,419	27,587,286	20,312,996	14,178,578	4,265,205	1,829,197
Same time 1870-71.....	2,489,242	25,675,013	9,934,699	10,534,230	4,218,872	932,290

*Estimated.

SHIPMENTS of Flour and Grain from the ports of Chicago, Milwaukee Toledo, Detroit, Cleveland, St. Louis and Duluth, for the week ending Nov. 29, 1873, and from January 1 to Nov. 29:

	Flour.	Wheat.	Corn.	Oats.	Barley.	Rye.
	bbls.	bush.	bush.	bush.	bush.	bush.
Week ending—						
Nov. 29, 1873.....	134,286	922,506	264,568	157,414	123,015	4,507
Nov. 22, 1873.....	131,173	1,565,982	778,712	237,873	175,692	23,485
Corresp'g week 1872	103,327	795,308	392,378	339,234	265,329	6,806
Corresp'g week 1871	87,927	148,480	1,029,612	139,713	77,876	12,710
Corresp'g week 1870	123,834	192,877	583,251	101,760	32,825	36
Total Jan. 1 to date.....	5,843,727	53,992,803	49,112,267	20,743,897	3,858,654	1,307,860
Same time 1872.....	4,269,043	30,191,445	66,017,291	18,254,202	5,447,912	1,130,220
Same time 1871.....	4,220,416	35,809,517	48,785,304	16,523,542	3,237,498	1,361,372
Same time 1870.....	3,930,815	37,542,492	20,976,933	11,777,896	2,960,899	1,565,973

RECEIPTS OF FLOUR AND GRAIN AT SEABOARD PORTS FOR THE WEEK ENDING NOV. 29, AND FROM JAN. 1 TO NOV. 29.

	Flour.	Wheat.	Corn.	Oats.	Barley.	Rye.
	bbls.	bush.	bush.	bush.	bush.	bush.
At						
New York.....	71,492	601,736	127,690	105,200	48,100	600
Boston.....	38,895	35,310	22,788	30,724	11,801
Portland.....	1,392	14,500	2,200	600
Montreal.....	12,156	27,693	1,600	1,050
Philadelphia.....	18,918	51,000	46,400	73,400	22,500	1,413
Baltimore.....	16,436	42,000	65,600	21,350	1,300
New Orleans.....	15,205	47,753	14,010
Total.....	180,494	757,739	325,731	248,484	83,201	4,368
Previous week.....	222,705	1,247,236	1,036,990	355,548	263,553	43,707
Week Nov. 15.....	264,444	1,896,685	766,447	386,033	158,552	6,592
Week Nov. 8.....	254,528	1,476,086	1,273,575	419,470	310,256	8,775
Week Nov. 1.....	253,215	1,876,829	1,018,332	671,824	365,849	23,320
Cor. week, '72.....	211,189	1,253,947	1,601,849	225,856	496,840	41,565

Total Jan. 1 to date .. 8,736,009 45,778,616 46,239,962 20,889,134 3,141,295 1,091,162

THE VISIBLE SUPPLY OF GRAIN, including the stocks in granary at the principal points of accumulation at lake and seaboard ports, in transit on the lakes, the New York canals, and by rail, was Nov. 29, 1873:

Table with columns: Wheat, Corn, Oats, Barley. Rows include 'In store at New York', 'In store at Albany', etc., and a 'Total' row.

* Estimated.

THE DRY GOODS TRADE.

FRIDAY, P. M., Dec. 5, 1873.

As the season draws toward a close the distribution of dry goods naturally becomes less liberal, though there is still a comparatively fair business doing for this period of the year and the tone of the general market is steadily improving.

During the week there has been a pretty general adoption by the large jobbing houses of a new basis of credits, a reform that has been found to be needed by the effects of the late panic, which have shown open accounts to be of little value as assets in times like those we are just emerging from.

DOMESTIC COTTON GOODS.—The trade has been fitful since our last report and has been for the most part restricted to actual necessities or to transactions of a somewhat speculative nature, based upon the cheapness of goods.

DOMESTIC WOOLEN GOODS.—The trade in woollens is very slack, the retail tailoring trade being pretty well supplied. There have been some sales of heavy and spring weight cassimeres made to the clothing trade, but the demand from this branch has not been important.

FOREIGN GOODS.—The imports continue light and the market is being well cleared up by the current sales for consumption and to reassert broken stocks. The trade in holiday goods is unusually light and does not promise to be very satisfactory this season.

jobbing purchases are on a correspondingly light scale. The auction business has become narrowed down to assorted lots and is light.

The importations of dry goods at this port for the week ending Dec. 4, 1873, and the corresponding weeks of 1872 and 1871 have been as follows:

Table titled 'ENTERED FOR CONSUMPTION FOR THE WEEK ENDING DEC. 4, 1873.' with columns for 1871, 1872, and 1873, and rows for 'Manufactures of wool', 'Miscellaneous dry goods', etc.

We annex a few particulars of leading articles of domestic manufacture our prices quoted being those of leading jobbers:

Table titled 'Brown Sheetings and Shirtings.' with columns for Width, Price, and rows for various fabric types like 'Adriatic', 'Alabama', 'Amoskeag', etc.

Table titled 'Tickings.' with columns for fabric type and price, and rows for 'Amosk'g ACA', 'Cordis ACE', 'Omega B', etc.

Table titled 'Cotton Sail Duck.' with columns for fabric type and price, and rows for 'Woodberry, Druid Mills', 'No. 0', 'No. 1', etc.

GENERAL PRICES CURRENT.

Table listing various commodities such as Ashes, Breadstuffs, Building Materials, Butter and Cheese, Coal, Coffee, Copper, Cotton, Drugs & Dyes, Fish, Flax, Fruits, Gunnies, Hops, Iron, Lead, Leather, Molasses, Naval Stores, Nuts, Oil Cake, Oils, Petroleum, Provisions, Rice, Salt, Spirits, Steel, Sugar, Tallow, Teas, Tin, Tobacco, and Wool. Each entry includes a description, unit, and price.

Table listing various commodities such as Gunpowder, Hay, Hemp, Hides, Hops, Iron, Lead, Leather, Molasses, Naval Stores, Nuts, Oil Cake, Oils, Petroleum, Provisions, Rice, Salt, Spirits, Steel, Sugar, Tallow, Teas, Tin, Tobacco, and Wool. Each entry includes a description, unit, and price.

Table listing various commodities such as Saltpetre, Seed, Silk, Spelter, Spices, Spirits, Steel, Sugar, Tallow, Teas, Tin, Tobacco, and Wool. Each entry includes a description, unit, and price.