

# BANK AND QUOTATION RECORD

REG. U. S. PAT. OFFICE

- New York Stock Exchange
- New York Curb Exchange
- Baltimore Stock Exchange
- New York Produce Exchange
- Cleveland Stock Exchange
- Chicago Stock Exchange
- Pittsburgh Stock Exchange
- Philadelphia Stock Exchange
- Los Angeles Stock Exchange
- Boston Stock Exchange
- San Francisco Stock Exchange
- Detroit Stock Exchange

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# July 7, 1933

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Entered as Second Class Matter, March 9 1928, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3 1879.

VOL 6.

NEW YORK, JULY 7 1933.

NO. 7.

## BANK AND QUOTATION RECORD

The Bank and Quotation Record is one of the publications of the Commercial & Financial Chronicle and is issued monthly.

Terms for the Chronicle are \$10 per annum within Continental United States, except Alaska; \$11.50 in Canada, and \$13.50 in other foreign countries and United States Possessions and Territories.

The subscription price to the Bank and Quotation Record is \$6.00 a year. Foreign postage outside of United States and Canada, 50 cents extra. Single copies are sold at 75 cents per copy.

CHICAGO OFFICE—208 South La Salle Street.

LONDON OFFICE—Edwards & Smith, 1 Drapers' Gardens, E.C.

WILLIAM B. DANA COMPANY, Publishers,  
William Street corner Spruce Street, New York.

### REVIEW OF JUNE—COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL EVENTS.

The adjournment of Congress in the early morning hours of June 16 with the largest program of new legislation to its credit ever devised or carried through in peace times (all at the instance and under the immediate direction of President Roosevelt), and the convening of the World Monetary and Economic Conference at London on June 12 were the events of overshadowing importance during the month of June. In the meantime business activity grew apace, recovery and revival in all lines of trade and industry proceeding on a scale that for magnitude and all-embracing character it is safe to say has never had a parallel in the history of this country and very likely not in that of any other country. Rising prices and schemes for inflation, most of them of a very radical character, were the one topic everywhere. While there was unquestionably genuine improvement in trade, built on the sure foundation of low inventories and exhausted stocks of goods in primary and secondary channels—in wholesale and retail trade alike—there can be no doubt that the movement was helped along by the knowledge that it was the purpose of the Administration at Washington to bring about a higher level of commodity values through the depreciation of the foreign exchange value of the American dollar, and by other means directed to the same end.

Virtually everybody, as far as the general public is concerned, believed in higher prices, everybody foresaw higher prices and, this being so, everybody thought it safe to be prepared for the event and accordingly buying proceeded with the greatest confidence on the theory that no risk would be incurred by so doing in any event. And confidence begat confidence. As the advance in prices proceeded—and the advance was of no mean proportions—and permeated virtually all lines of trade, commerce and industry, confirmation was apparently being given the belief that the country had entered on an enduring basis of rising values as designed by the occupant of the Presidential Chair at Washington, and accordingly the whole community became imbued with the idea that the United States had been definitely launched upon a new era where the tendency would henceforth be uninterruptedly upward, and the long period of declining prices and of business prostration and business paralysis would be succeeded by expanding activity and growing prosperity. Hardly anyone gave much attention to the means chosen to attain the object sought—that in the last degree it rested on the debasement and degradation of the American unit of value which was to be made less valuable by decreasing its purchasing power either directly or indirectly or both. The object in view was the main thing in the eyes of the generality of people and nothing else mattered much. In a word the business world was inflamed with the thought of higher prices. In such a state of things hardly anyone doubted the success of the movement and the stock market reflected the fact in staging a bull movement of gigantic size in an atmosphere of great boyancy.

Mr. Roosevelt was able to carry through, almost without a hitch, his extensive program of legislation in which were embodied all the numerous schemes for raising prices. The only obstacle of any consequence which he encountered came at the very end of the session, delaying adjournment for a couple of days, and concerned the question of modifying the program for veterans' pensions in the Independent Offices' Appropriation Bill where the Senate held out for a larger increase in the allowances than the President deemed adequate and proper, but where the Senate at the end was induced to yield to the views of the President. The most important piece of legislation of the month was no doubt the National Industrial Recovery Act, which the President signed on June 16, and which provides for Federal control of private business for the revival of industry and also for a \$3,300,000,000 program for expenditures on public works. The President in signing the measure termed it "the most important and far reaching legislation ever enacted by the American Congress" and it certainly forms a fit companion piece to the Farm Relief Bill enacted the previous month with its inflationary rider. In a formal statement, issued at the time, the President remarked, that it represented "A supreme effort to stabilize for all time the many factors which make for the prosperity of the nation and the preservation of American standards." The President's statement follows:

History probably will record the National Industrial Recovery Act as the most important and far-reaching legislation ever enacted by the American Congress.

It represents a supreme effort to stabilize for all time the many factors which make for the prosperity of the nation, and the preservation of American standards.

Its goal is the assurance of a reasonable profit to industry and living wages for labor with the elimination of the tyrannical methods and practices which have not only harrassed honest business but also contributed to the ills of labor.

While we are engaged in the establishment of new foundations for business which ultimately should open the return to work for large numbers of men, it is our hope through the so-called public works section of the law to speedily initiate a program of public construction that should early re-employ additional hundreds of thousands of men.

Obviously, if this project is to succeed it demands the whole-hearted co-operation of industry, labor and every citizen of the nation.

But there was much other new legislation not less important in character. We outline the features of the chief new acts further below and will mention here in passing merely the Glass-Steagall Bank Act radically amending the Federal Reserve and National Banking laws and providing among other things for the insurance of bank deposits and the Home Owners' Mortgage Relief Act making \$2,000,000,000 available for the re-financing of mortgages of small home owners. This latter provides for the establishment of a quasi-Federal agency to be known as the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, with a capital of \$200,000,000 subscribed in full by the Treasury, and authorized to issue up to \$2,000,000,000 in 4% bonds guaranteed by the Government as to interest but not as to principal.

The London Monetary and Economic Conference did not have smooth sailing. Trouble developed almost at the start. The opening proceedings were harmonious enough. All the different delegates professed to be animated by a truly co-operative spirit and indicated a desire to engage in conciliatory efforts to solve the world's great monetary and economic problems. But as soon as the Conference got to work, difficulties developed and differences of views cropped out which it quickly became apparent would render common action difficult if not impossible. One obstacle at the start was the fact that the American delegates appeared to be not altogether certain as to their own position. They seemed to lack definite instructions or definite understanding. Many of the Americans appeared to be very anxious to air their own views and often it seemed as if they were working at cross purposes without a definite leader. A sketch of the proceedings is furnished below and we will only say here that the troubles finally crystallized on the one commanding point, namely as to the time when stabilization of the different monetary units was to be undertaken. The United States definitely took the stand that there should be no immediate stabilization, but that stabilization should be deferred until the plans for the raising of price levels had been given greater chance to assert their influence. This at once

created a wide chasm between the representatives of the leading countries contemplating the matter from angles far apart. The deepest kind of friction developed between France and the other countries of the so-called gold bloc, namely Holland, Switzerland, Belgium and Italy on the one side, and the United States on the other side with the position of Great Britain uncertain, the British authorities being apparently not altogether clear as to what would be the best course for them to pursue in the circumstances. The French wanted stabilization of the different currency units to precede everything else. The American Government wanted the whole question kept open. The British Government appeared to side with the French, but apparently did not want to take a position antagonistic to the United States. It should be added that the United States was very slow in declaring its own position and for a period of 10 days the American delegates appeared to be more or less at sea concerning even the question of stabilization. The Conference convened on June 12, but it was not until June 22 that the American delegation issued a statement regarding the attitude of the United States towards stabilization. In this statement the delegation said that "undue emphasis" had been placed upon consideration of a plan for temporary de facto stabilization of currencies and that the "American Government at Washington finds that measures for temporary stabilization now would be untimely." Raising of prices, the statement continued, was the immediate interest of the American Government. The text of the American delegation's statement on stabilization was as follows:

Undue emphasis has been placed upon consideration of a plan proposed for temporary de facto stabilization of currencies.

The fact is this never was an affair of the delegation. It was considered by representatives of the Treasuries and Central banks of the United States, Great Britain and France, Oliver M. W. Sprague having been especially sent to represent the United States Treasury for this purpose. The American Government at Washington finds that measures for temporary stabilization now would be untimely.

The reason why it is considered untimely is because the American Government feels that its efforts to raise prices are the most important contribution it can make and that anything that would interfere with those efforts and possibly cause a violent price recession would harm the Conference more than the lack of an immediate agreement for temporary stabilization.

As to the ultimate objective, the American delegation has already introduced a resolution designed for ultimate world-wide stabilization of unstable currencies, and is devoting itself to the support of measures for the establishment of a co-ordinated monetary and fiscal policy to be pursued by the various nations in co-operation with the others for the purpose of stimulating economic activity and improving prices.

The effect of this statement was to cause a renewed slump in the foreign exchange value of the American dollar, far surpassing the previous depreciation, but this did not disconcert the American delegation or the Administration at Washington and the stock market engaged in a renewed rise and commodity prices also spurted still higher—all of this being accepted as additional evidence going to show the determination of the American Government to proceed vigorously in the carrying out of its scheme of inflation. Towards the close of the month a compromise proposition on the question of stabilization was presented on behalf of the gold standard countries and then Mr. Roosevelt, who had been enjoying a well-needed vacation in the Bay of Fundy took a hand in the matter himself and early in July (Monday, July 3) issued a statement which made it clear beyond per adventure that the United States was not to be swerved from its purpose—and he disregarded diplomatic language, too, and really delivered what must be considered a lecture to those taking a position antagonistic to the United States on the question of stabilization.

#### *Details of the London Monetary and Economic Conference.*

The long-awaited and much-heralded World Monetary and Economic Conference began its sessions at London, June 12, with delegations from 66 countries in attendance, out of the 67 that were invited by the League of Nations. It is no secret that this Conference was not preceded by the usual understandings between leading governments regarding aims and achievements, even the greatly publicized series of preliminary conversations with 11 countries at Washington having been of no avail in this respect. Formal conferences, however, usually proclaim mainly the understandings previously reached. The London gathering thus opened with an insufficient background, and the course of the meeting reflected to the full the divergencies inherent in the unco-ordinated viewpoints of 66 nations on the various aspects of the parlous situation in which the world finds itself. The Conference was marked by a series of "crises" on the question of stabilization of currencies, the gold standard countries of France, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland and Italy insisting upon immediate stabilization by those off the gold standard, while the United States, as the leading country which has departed

from the gold standard, insisted with equal emphasis that it would not stabilize the dollar because such action might interfere with the upward swing of prices here. This impasse remained unbroken at the end of June.

When the Conference opened the question of the intergovernmental debts overshadowed it rather ominously, and the bad start made then was corrected subsequently. Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, in his capacity as President of the Conference, made the initial address after a few remarks by King George, in which the delegates were welcomed to the British capital. Although the debts were specifically excluded from the agenda, the Prime Minister deemed it incumbent to refer to them as one of the matters that "must be dealt with before every obstacle to general recovery has been removed." Lausanne has to be completed, he said, and this vexed question settled once for all in the light of present world conditions. "This Conference," he continued, "is a sequel to the work done at Lausanne last year when, by a conditional agreement on how to deal with war debts and reparations, the world was saved from immediate financial collapse. It will be remembered that having finished its own immediate work at Lausanne, the Conference reported that for the clearance of the world crisis a wider conference should be called and that the League of Nations should be invited to take that in hand without delay."

In the four days that followed the formal opening, leaders of the 66 delegations followed one another in rapid succession with general statements of their particular views and aims at the gathering. The first of these delegation statements was to have been made by Secretary of State Cordell Hull in behalf of the United States, but a delay was occasioned for reasons which have never been cleared up entirely, and the honor of making the first address of this kind fell to Premier Edouard Daladier of France. The French leader dwelt upon the current disorganization of trade and finance and the abrupt fall of agricultural prices during the depression. He urged an end to monetary warfare and currency instability, so that exchanges and commerce could have the indispensable guarantee of monetary security. Finance Minister Jung of Italy followed with a recommendation that the international flow of capital be stimulated from countries with surplus funds to those that desire to borrow. Baron von Neurath presented the German view that payment of international indebtedness must be permitted in goods and services. Viscount Ishii declared that Japan is ready to co-operate in restoring the gold standard and removing trade barriers.

Secretary of State Cordell Hull presented the views of the United States Government in a long address on June 14. "The success or failure of this Conference will mean the success or failure of statesmanship everywhere, and a failure at this crucial time would long be conspicuous in history," Mr. Hull declared at the outset. He described the effects of the depression rather vividly and appealed in general terms for an end of economic nationalism, but made no specific proposals. "Has not the time come for nations to cease erecting tariff barriers, with their excesses, rank discriminations, and hate-breeding reprisals and retaliations?" Secretary Hull asked. "This Conference should proclaim that economic nationalism is a discredited policy," he added. Vigorous international co-operation at the Conference will be the first step toward recovery, Mr. Hull proclaimed, and he expressed the opinion that plans and methods will readily take form if the nations are determined to that end. Immediate adherence by all countries to the tariff truce arrangement was suggested. The Conference must face the problems of currency stabilization and the removal of restrictions on foreign exchange dealings, Mr. Hull remarked.

Chancellor of the Exchequer Neville Chamberlain, as the leader of the British delegation, made an even longer speech, but in this address some specific proposals were mentioned. Mr. Chamberlain spoke in great detail on the successive steps which the British Government considers necessary for overcoming the depression. Wholesale prices must be increased, and for this purpose money must be kept cheap, he declared. Central banks should co-operate in extending credit and business men should see to it that the cheap credit is used, he added. Settlement of the war debts and reparations problems also were viewed by Mr. Chamberlain as essentials to recovery. "Adjustment of the factors which caused the breakdown of the gold standard in the past and which, if not corrected, would inevitably lead to a repetition of the process in the future," was among the proposals of the British leader. The gold standard must be so administered in the future, he continued, that wide fluctuations in the purchasing power of gold, in so far as they arise from monetary causes, will be to the greatest possible extent prevented. Excessive tariffs must be reduced and not merely held at present levels, it was maintained.

Maxim Litvinoff, Foreign Commissar of the Soviet Union, delivered an address the same day, June 14, which was remarkable in some ways. He made a deep impression by contrasting the Soviet readiness to buy goods of other nations, with the high tariff and import quota policies of many other countries. The Russian Minister urged the Conference to study the stabilization of tariffs and the granting of equal trade treatment, regardless of political prejudices. The import program of the Soviet Union might be enlarged if credits were available, he added, and Russia might buy up to \$1,000,000,000 of goods from other countries. He drove this point home by stating that surpluses of various kinds of goods

might easily be absorbed entirely by Russia, in that event. In the opening addresses of leaders of the smaller countries, it was mostly maintained that the leadership in stabilization, tariff reduction and other items must be taken by the larger countries. As the initial declarations were concluded, the Steering Committee of the Conference met and appointed two general Commissions to study monetary and economic aspects of the present world situation. James M. Cox of the United States was named as head of the Monetary Commission, while Premier Hendryx Colijn of Holland was named to preside over the meetings of the Economic Commission.

As the nations began to air their views in more detailed manner in the two Commissions, a series of confusing developments began which indicated that the American representatives were less well prepared for the Conference than they might have been. In the Monetary Commission the delegates of France, Holland, Switzerland and Belgium began to press for immediate action on stabilization of currencies that have no gold anchor. This problem was considered by banking representatives even before the World Conference started, and it was reported that Governor Montagu Norman of the Bank of England, Governor Clement Moret of the Bank of France, and Governor George L. Harrison of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York had elaborated a plan for prompt stabilization by England and the United States. Secretary Hull insisted in London that the discussions by the banking experts were not binding upon the American delegation, but these denials were not generally accepted in Europe. Attempts were made in Washington to stem the rising tide of rumors that America would agree to prompt stabilization of the dollar at some definite ratio to gold, but these also were insufficient. Secretary of the Treasury Woodin issued a vigorous denial in Washington that the United States Government contemplated immediate action. On June 17 Acting Secretary of the Treasury Acheson followed with a statement that the whole discussion of stabilization was not one which the United States Government had initiated. "We have not arrived at a point where we can pick out a particular point where stabilization should take place," he said.

Even this statement did not stifle the series of rumors that American stabilization was imminent, and the matter was not definitely settled until June 22, when the American delegation in London gave out a most emphatic statement on the subject, which has already been quoted in the earlier portion of this article. In regard to the broad question of tariffs, also, the United States delegation was placed in an unfortunate light. Premier Colijn, as head of the Economic Commission, suggested at the start of the meetings by this group that the nations present suggestions for study, and the United States delegation promptly urged consideration of a 10% multilateral reduction of trade barriers. This was immediately accepted as a statement of formal policy by the United States, despite the well known fact that Congress alone has the power to make agreements of this sweeping kind. Senator Key Pittman found it necessary, on June 18, to issue a formal statement that no such definite plan could be attributed to the American group at London. This left the Conference as a whole quite bewildered as to the precise attitude of the United States.

Such matters were rapidly overshadowed, however, by the series of "crises" on stabilization which quickly developed. France continued to insist, inside and outside of the Conference, that immediate stabilization by the countries off the gold standard was the sine qua non for the success of the gathering, and a gold bloc was formed which pushed its views on this point with great determination. The first crisis on this matter was overcome when the formal statement on stabilization was issued in London, but a second developed promptly. The gold standard group was augmented by Italy, on June 28, and the efforts to force immediate American stabilization were redoubled. Other questions at the Conference were gradually subordinated entirely to the problem of stabilization of currencies. The representatives of the gold standard group of nations held special meetings of their own, and every endeavor was made to persuade Great Britain to join in the demands for prompt action by the United States. Under-Secretary of State Raymond Moley, acting as liaison officer between the London delegation and the Administration in Washington, reached the British capital on June 28, and he conferred on stabilization with representatives of the gold bloc and with British officials. A series of meetings developed, centered around this question, in which delegates from the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Holland, Belgium, Poland, Germany and Switzerland participated. The outcome was that a statement was drafted and sent to President Roosevelt for his approval, which called for agreement on the need for ultimate stabilization, while reserving the right of all countries to act in their own interests in the meantime. The intent of this declaration was that central banks and banks of issue would be authorized in the meantime to curb speculative movements of wide scope in currencies. But President Roosevelt indicated, after the close of the month, that he would not sign this declaration, although previously it was reported that he had no objection to action by banking authorities aimed at curbing speculative movements of currencies without a gold anchor.

While the stabilization struggle was in progress, half-hearted attempts were made by the delegates at London to reach understandings of some of the outstanding problems facing the world. Chancellor of the Exchequer Chamberlain

introduced a resolution in behalf of Great Britain, June 20, calling for a program of price recovery through Central bank action for making credit cheap and plentiful. Senator Key Pittman introduced a resolution calling for eventual restoration of gold as the general monetary medium, but urging withdrawal of the metal from circulation. He suggested that the metal coverage of note issues be reduced to 25%, and that 80% of the cover should be gold while 20% might be optional in silver. A committee detailed to study this resolution decided in favor of the proposals that gold be withdrawn from circulation and the metal cover of note issues reduced to 25%, but the portion calling for possible admixture of silver with gold as the currency base met difficulties and remained under discussion.

In the Economic Commission much attention was paid to the possibility of curtailment of production of wheat, sugar and other commodities of a like nature. The wheat discussions made considerable progress, representatives of the United States, Canada and the Argentine deciding in favor of such plans, but Australian adherence was not so easy to obtain. It was indicated that the Prime Ministers of the Australian States would consider the proposal carefully in a gathering at Sydney.

#### *The Failure of the Disarmament Conference.*

Efforts for a reduction of the heavy armaments of the world again attained some prominence in June, but in a purely negative sense. The recent desperate efforts to reach an agreement on disarmament having been completely unsuccessful, leading countries decided at a Geneva meeting, June 29, to postpone further sessions of the General Disarmament Conference until Oct. 16. In the meantime, Arthur Henderson, as President of the Conference, will confer privately with representatives of all heavily armed countries in an endeavor to find a basis for an agreement. Count Rudolph Nadolny, of Germany, objected vehemently to the plan for adjournment. It would be interpreted, he warned, as "the beginning of the abandonment of our task, or, in other words, as a first-class funeral for the Conference." The vote for adjournment nevertheless was overwhelming, only Germany and Hungary refraining. Norman H. Davis, chief American delegate at the fruitless disarmament discussions, returned to the United States on June 24 and voiced the usual "pronounced optimism" regarding disarmament negotiations.

#### *Great Britain and Soviet Russia Settle Their Differences.*

An extraneous development at London of great interest was a series of conversations between Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon of Great Britain and Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinoff of the Soviet Union, regarding the embargoes which each country placed upon the products of the other after the trial of several British engineers who were accused and convicted of sabotage on Russian engineering projects. After four or five lengthy discussions, it was finally announced on July 1 that the embargoes had been mutually lifted. Part of the adjustment obviously concerned the British engineers, who were released from prison immediately after the embargoes were terminated.

#### *The Question of Inter-Allied Debts.*

Among international problems which arose last month one of the most perplexing and disconcerting was that of the war debt payments due from 13 European nations on June 15. This question gave rise to an immense amount of unofficial conjecture in advance of the payment date, and it was evident that it formed an important part of the Washington discussions preliminary to the London Monetary and Economic Conference, but no official intimation was given as to the probable course of action by the European debtor States or by the United States Government. Payments in full by Great Britain, Italy and Czechoslovakia on Dec. 15 last, with the reservation that the sums were to be considered as capital payments in any final settlement of the war debt problem, together with defaults on the same date by France, Belgium and several other countries, left the matter of the June 15 payments wide open. Requests were made by the debtor countries late last year for reviews of the debt settlements, and the United States Government then took the stand that it was willing to consider any proposal made by the debtors. With each side waiting for the other to make the first move no formal steps actually were taken for rearrangement of the debt settlements, and the approach of June 15 thus occasioned an exceedingly delicate international situation.

When the payment date for the instalments of \$143,605,294 finally arrived, various expedients were resorted to by the debtor nations, with full payment made only by one country, Finland. The course adopted by Great Britain, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Latvia was to make what these countries called "token payments" of various small percentages, with silver tendered and accepted in every case at a rate of 50c. an ounce, under the authority granted the President by Congress to accept payment of the instalment in that form. Other debtors, including France, Belgium, Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, Estonia and Jugoslavia, defaulted entirely. All in all, the United States Government received 22,317,385 ounces of silver, appraised officially at \$11,158,692, against the sum of \$143,605,294 actually due. The official valuation was fictitious, however, as the market valuation of silver on the payment date was 36 $\frac{1}{4}$ c. an ounce. The course of the debtor States with regard to future payments is apparently to be determined by further negotiations, as

the hope was again expressed in most of the notes of the foreign governments that the United States will be prepared to enter upon formal negotiations for revision of the debts.

The countries which were not clearly determined to default again on June 15 awaited action by Great Britain in order to guide their own steps, and all attention thus was centered upon the decision of the London Government. Although Chancellor of the Exchequer Chamberlain was interpellated several times on the subject in the British House of Commons, no formal indication of the debt action by Great Britain was made available until notes on the matter between London and Washington were published on June 15. In an extended communication, through Ambassador Sir Ronald Lindsay, in Washington, the Chancellor of the Exchequer recalled the circumstances attending the debt payment of last December and the subsequent negotiations. Emphasis was placed in the note upon an alleged connection between war debts and falling commodity prices, and the conclusion was added that the June payment "could not be made at this juncture without gravely imperiling the success of the World Monetary and Economic Conference, and involving widespread political consequences of a most serious character." The British Government therefore "proposed an immediate payment of \$10,000,000 as an acknowledgment of the debt pending a final settlement." The sum due from Great Britain was \$75,950,000. It was announced at the same time that the payment would be made in silver bullion at the rate of 50c. an ounce, as permitted under the Thomas amendment to the Agricultural Relief Act. The British Government again expressed the hope that the United States would be prepared to enter upon formal negotiations for an ultimate settlement of the whole debt question, and asked to be informed of the time and place for the negotiations to begin.

A reply to the British notes was made by Acting Secretary of State William Phillips, in behalf of President Roosevelt. The British payment was noted "as an acknowledgment of the debt," but it was added that the President "by no means concedes some of the statements concerning the world-wide economic cause and effect" contained in the British note. It was pointed out that it is not within the discretion of the President to reduce or cancel the existing debt owed to the United States, nor within his power to alter the schedule of debt payments. "Such power rests with Congress," the note stated. The proposal of further representations regarding the entire debt question was met with the suggestion that such representations be made at Washington as soon as convenient. "Any results of such a discussion of the debt question," the reply concluded, "can be submitted for the information or the consideration of the Congress when it next meets."

In a public statement by President Roosevelt accompanying the announcement of these exchanges, it was explained that the President had "noted" the British representations in "a spirit of co-operation." In view of those representations, the statement continued, "I have no personal hesitation in saying that I do not characterize the resultant situation as a default." The sole right of Congress to alter the amount and method of payment was specifically stressed, and the Congressional resolution of December 1931, declaring that the debts should not be canceled or reduced, was cited. On the other hand, the statement claimed for the President the right, constitutionally and in accordance with the terms of the policy which he had set forth, to entertain representations regarding the entire debt settlements. It was noted again that the debt question was not included in the agenda of the World Monetary and Economic Conference which had started at London three days earlier, and the President added that the American delegates at London had been instructed not to discuss the debts with any foreign Government. "This is in accordance with the further principle, that I have felt important, that the debts be considered on their merits and separate from other international economic questions," the statement concluded.

Formal notes exchanged with other countries, both the defaulting and the other ones, were published in the days immediately following the payment date. The French Government disclaimed, in its communication, any intention of breaking unilaterally engagements freely entered into, but found it necessary to postpone the payment of \$40,738,568 due on the same basis that default was occasioned last December. The reply of the State Department was unexpectedly brusque. Noting the attitude of the French Government and its complete default, the United States Government remarked that it must, in all frankness, call attention to the problems raised by the failure of the French Government to meet the payment due on Dec. 15 1932, which have not yet been solved or even discussed between the two Governments. The note from the Italian Government pointed out that the Fascist Grand Council had decided upon a payment of \$1,000,000 on June 15, in order to show the good will of the Italian Government and at the same time the limitations imposed upon it by the existing situation. The payment due from Italy was \$13,545,438. The reply of the State Department to the Italian Government was to the effect that the United States Government would not be entirely candid if it did not express its thought that a payment of \$1,000,000 against the sum due "may be regarded in the United States as unsubstantial and may occasion disappointment on the part of Congress and the people of the United States."

The exchange of notes with the Government of Finland was considered quite significant, as it appeared to open the

way for immediate review of the debt problem with this Government. The Finnish Minister in Washington, L. Astrom, remarked in his communication that the full payment of \$148,592 due on June 15 would be made in silver, on the understanding that payment in this form would be acceptable to the United States. In its reply, the State Department acknowledged receipt of the payment and added that the Government of Finland, by this action, "has justified the high regard in which it has always been held by the people of the United States." Readiness to discuss the entire debt question at the pleasure of the Government of Finland was expressed in the note. It was stated in Washington dispatches, however, that Minister L. Astrom preferred to postpone the discussions until next autumn.

The notes exchanged with the States making "token payments" and with those that defaulted entirely fall into two categories, the paying group being invited to state its case, while the defaulters were met with chilly reserve. Belgium defaulted on its payment of \$6,325,000; Czechoslovakia paid \$180,000 against the sum of \$1,500,000 due; Estonia defaulted on the sum of \$284,322; Hungary defaulted on \$28,260; Latvia paid \$6,000 on the instalment of \$118,961; Lithuania defaulted on \$132,091; Poland defaulted on \$3,559,062; Rumania paid \$29,100 on the instalment of \$1,000,000 due; Jugoslavia defaulted on \$275,000. These developments have not so far been followed by any further indications of review of the debt settlements.

#### *Germany's Moratorium on External Debt.*

A partial transfer moratorium on the external debt service of German borrowers in the international capital markets was announced June 8 by Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank. This action was expected, as Dr. Schacht had issued warnings in May that the measure was under contemplation to protect the Reichsbank from further losses of gold and foreign exchange reserves. After repayment of several Reichsbank credits, the Bank would have only about 300,000,000 marks in gold and foreign exchange, or about 8% cover for the note issues of the institution, he made clear. In line with this announcement, an emergency decree was issued by Chancellor Adolf Hitler on June 9, whereunder German borrowers are compelled to place the debt service due on external loans in a newly organized conversion bank. Administration of the funds thus deposited in blocked mark accounts was placed in charge of the Reichsbank.

This moratorium was substantially modified in discussions at London, during June, between Dr. Schacht and representatives of both short-term and long-term creditors of Reich borrowers. A meeting was held June 13 to consider the problem of the Reichsbank and the application of the moratorium, and agreement was quickly reached for exempting the short-term credits from the moratorium, so far as interest payments are concerned. Certain payments of principal guaranteed by the Gold Discount Bank of Germany are to be postponed under the short-term credit arrangement until Feb. 28 1934. Interest paid on the short credits will be reduced an average of  $\frac{1}{2}\%$  from the average of  $4\frac{3}{4}\%$  previously in effect. At the same meeting the discussion with the long-term creditors resulted in recommendations that the German Government 7% loan of 1924 be exempted entirely from the moratorium, both as to interest and amortization payments, while the German Government international  $5\frac{1}{2}\%$  loan of 1930 should be exempted as to interest, it was maintained. These suggestions Dr. Schacht took under consideration. At a further London meeting between Dr. Schacht and the long-term creditor representatives, on June 27, it was formally agreed that the two Government loans be treated as above, with the question of amortization transfers on the  $5\frac{1}{2}\%$  loan to be discussed with the B.I.S., which is trustee for the loan. After returning to Berlin, on June 30, Dr. Schacht announced a further modification in the sense that 50% of all interest and dividend payments on other external obligations will be transferred in the period from July 1 to Dec. 31 this year, provided the foreign exchange becoming available to the Reichsbank in the period is sufficient for the purpose. The hope was expressed, moreover, that German export trade will improve sufficiently to make possible a full resumption of debt service beginning next year.

#### *National Industrial Recovery Bill Passes Congress and Is Signed by President—House and Senate Approve Conference Report—Measure Provides Federal Control for Revival of Industry and \$3,300,000,000 Program of Public Works—Provision Affecting Tax Exempt Securities Dropped—New Tax Features of Measure.*

The final stamp of Congressional approval was placed on the Administration's National Industrial Recovery Bill on June 13, when the Senate, by a vote of 46 to 39, approved a conference report on the measure. The same report had been approved by the House on June 10. The bill in its completed form was immediately signed by Vice-President Garner and Speaker Rainey and was sent to the President, who affixed his signature to the measure on June 16. The National Industrial Recovery Bill, providing Federal control for the revival of industry and a Government-sponsored public works program costing \$3,300,000,000, was introduced in Congress on May 17, following a special message from President Roosevelt. It was passed by the House of Representatives on May 26 by a vote of 323 to 76. On June 9 the Senate by a vote of 57 to 24 passed the bill after making several drastic changes, including a radical alteration

of the tax provisions. The bill then went to conference, where an agreement was reached, and final passage of both House and Senate followed. Under date of June 13 Associated Press advices from Washington, stating that the new legislation is intended to provide jobs for thousands of idle men and inject new life into sluggish industry, cited the following as the main features of the measure:

Gives President Roosevelt and his administrators wide power to promote self-regulation of industry under Federal supervision as a means of curtailing overproduction, improving wages, shortening hours and thus increasing prices and employment.

Authorizes a \$3,300,000,000 bond issue to finance construction of Federal, State, local and public-benefiting private projects to create new employment.

Invests the President with authority to work out codes of fair competition to be accepted by industry voluntarily, with additional power for the Chief Executive to compel adoption of the codes and subject violators to a \$500 fine.

Provides the President with power to license an industry so as to force unwilling minorities into line.

The bond issue will require \$220,000,000 annually for financing. To meet this cost, the following new taxes are provided:

#### *New Taxation.*

A tax of 1-10 of 1% on corporation net worth, with a 5% additional assessment on earnings above 12½%; a 5% tax on corporation dividends to be deducted at the source; an increase of ½c. in the present gasoline tax; three-year extension of corporation consolidation return authority with increase of 1% in income tax rate on consolidated returns, instead of the present three-quarters of 1%.

Extends for one year, also, all special excise taxes voted by last Congress and makes administrative changes in the tax law to prevent carrying over into subsequent years stock and bond losses which exceed the gains in the year in which they occur. These apply to both corporations and individuals.

Provides for publicity for income tax returns under regulations to be drawn by the President.

The public works program, as finally agreed upon, includes, among other general work, the following:

Construction, repair and improvement of public highways and parkways, public buildings, conservation and development of natural resources, prevention of soil or coastal erosion, development of water power and transmission of electrical energy, river and harbor improvements and flood control.

Low-cost housing and slum-clearance projects, dry docks, naval vessels permitted under the London Treaty, heavier-than-air craft and technical construction for the Army Air Corps.

The Public Works Administrator, the Senate amendment for a board of three having been eliminated, would be empowered to make grants to States and municipalities for construction and improvement projects up to 30% of the cost of labor and materials.

The President is authorized to institute proceedings before the Tariff Commission and to embargo or limit imports where they interfere with the purposes of the Act in raising wages and prices.

It also authorizes \$100,000,000 for distribution by the farm relief administrators.

Shortly after signing the National Industrial Recovery Act on June 16, President Roosevelt issued a statement in which he explained the purposes of the measure, and outlined in general terms the machinery that will be employed to place the legislation in operation. In his statement the President also announced the appointment of General Hugh Johnson as Administrator, under the industry control section of the Act, and said that it was his "hope that the 10 major industries which control the bulk of industrial employment can submit their simple basic codes at once and that the country can look forward to the month of July as the beginning of our great national movement back to work." The President added that "the Act proposes to our industry a great spontaneous co-operation to put millions of men back to their regular jobs this summer." He stressed the fact that the legislation is a challenge to industry, which has long insisted that, given the right to act in unison, it could do much for the general good which has heretofore been unlawful. It is a challenge also to labor, he declared, for the workers are given a new charter of rights long sought and hitherto denied, and they will be expected to co-operate with their employers.

**Congress Passes and President Roosevelt Signs Glass-Steagall Bank Bill as Agreed on in Conference—New Legislation Amends Federal Reserve and National Bank Acts—Deposit Insurance Plan Carried in Measure—Passage Followed Administration's Action in Yielding to Compromise Measure—Contains Branch Banking Provisions—Divorces Bank Affiliates—Creates Federal Open Market Committee—Payment of Franchise Tax by Federal Reserve Banks No Longer Required, Double Liability Against Bank Stockholders Removed Against Future Issues.**

The Glass-Steagall bank bill, with a guaranty of bank deposits as its most conspicuous feature was signed June 16 by President Roosevelt. According to Associated Press accounts from Washington, members of the Senate and House banking committees who worked for months on this legislation surrounded Mr. Roosevelt as he penned his name, despite protests that had been received against the bill. The bill, which would have died for lack of agreement on details between the two houses had Congress adjourned the previous Saturday night (June 10), went through both houses on June 13 in quick time, and without even a record vote in the Senate. It was stated in a Washington dispatch June 13 to the New York "Times" that assurance of the President's approval of the measure was given when he telephoned his congratulations to Senator Glass. The "Times" dispatch of June 13 added:

He told the Virginian the bill was the best banking law since the Federal Reserve System was created, and invited him to be present to receive the pen used in the signing. . . .

According to the Washington account June 13 to the "Herald Tribune" the virtually unanimous approval of the bill, presumed to have been sidetracked not more than 24 hours before, surprised and mellowed the Senate. The same account said:

The bill places general restrictions upon the operating policy of the Federal Reserve banks with the intent to limit them to the extension of credit for ordinary business purposes, and to make plain that their resources are not to be used to support speculation. The Reserve Board is given power to oversee and direct such use of the resources of the banks.

It provides for the creation of a Federal open-market committee of the twelve member banks to supervise open-market operations of the Federal Reserve banks and the relation of the Federal Reserve System with foreign banks in accordance with regulations adopted by the Federal Reserve Board. This, in effect, legalizes and gives official recognition to the present open-market committee. The Act also gives the Federal Reserve Board power to supervise all relations and transactions of any kind entered into by Federal Reserve banks with foreign banks and bankers.

To control bank affiliates, the legislation is aimed at the following objectives:

(1) To separate as far as possible National and member banks from affiliates of all kinds.

(2) To limit the amount of advances or loans which can be obtained by affiliates from the parent institutions with which they are connected.

(3) To install a satisfactory examination of affiliates, working simultaneously with the present system of examination applicable to the parent banks.

The bill undertakes to broaden the National banking laws by giving National banks all powers possessed by State banks of deposit and discount organized in the States in which such National banks are located, except in so far as they may be prohibited by Federal legislation.

National banks are to be permitted to purchase and sell investment securities for their customers to the same extent as heretofore, but hereafter they are to be authorized to purchase and sell such securities for their own account only under such limitations and restrictions as the Comptroller of the Currency may prescribe, subject to certain definite maximum limits as to amount. The limitations as to dealing in investment securities are not to take effect until two years after the approval of the Act.

Authorization is given for the establishment of branch banking by National banks in States with statutory provisions expressly permitting branch banking by State institutions.

**From the June 13 account from Washington to the New York "Journal of Commerce" we take the following:**

Other features of the bill as it goes to the President are as follows:

The requirement of the payment of a franchise tax to the United States by Federal Reserve banks is eliminated as of July 1 last.

Morris Plan banks and other incorporated banking institutions of like character and mutual savings banks are made eligible to membership in the System.

State member banks are made subject to the same limitations and conditions with respect to purchasing, selling, underwriting and holding of investment securities and stock as are applicable in the case of National banks.

Federal Reserve Board is empowered to fix the percentage of individual member bank capital and surplus which may be represented by loans secured by stock or bond collateral.

Prohibits member banks from acting as the medium or agent of any non-banking corporation, partnership, association, business trust, or individual, in making loans on stocks, bonds and other investment securities to brokers or dealers therein.

Member bank officers are prohibited from securing loans from their own institutions and limitations upon loans or extensions of credit by member banks to their affiliates are imposed.

In a statement made before the Senate on June 13 Senator Glass referred to a provision in the bill relating to double liability of stockholders in banks, as to which Senator Glass said, "we have written into the bill a provision which does not undertake to interfere with existing liability, but which obviates the double liability for future issues of stock."

**President Roosevelt Signs Home Owners' Mortgage Relief Bill—Creates Home Owners' Loan Corporation—Limit of Homes to Be Aided \$20,000 in Value—Statement Issued by President Roosevelt.**

Final Congressional action on the Administration's Home Owners' Loan bill, making \$2,000,000,000 available for the refinancing of mortgages of small home owners, was taken on June 9 when both the Senate and House approved the conference report on the measure. President Roosevelt signed the bill on June 13. A statement issued by the President in affixing his signature to the new legislation said that "the Act extends the same principle of relief to home owners as we have already extended to farm owners." The following outline of the principal features of the new legislation was contained in Associated Press dispatches of June 9 from Washington:

Promising aid to all owners of homes worth \$20,000 or less and housing four families or less, the bill establishes a quasi Federal agency to be known as the Home Owners' Loan Corporation. This corporation may have a capital of \$200,000,000 subscribed in full by the Treasury.

Then the Corporation may issue up to \$2,000,000,000 in 4% bonds, guaranteed by the Government as to interest, but not as to principal.

When an individual homeowner discovers he no longer can carry his home under his existing mortgage, he may ask aid of the Corporation during three years after the bill becomes law. The Corporation will ask the mortgage holder to reduce the size of the mortgage and, then, trade him 4% bonds for the mortgage.

This mortgage will be replaced with a new one held by the Corporation and bearing 5% interest. Interest and principal may be paid in monthly, quarterly, semi-annual or annual instalments on a mortgage extending not more than 15 years.

In no case may the Corporation accept a mortgage for more than 80% of the value of the home, or for more than \$14,000. Should the homeowner be in extreme difficulty, the Corporation may grant him a three-year moratorium on principal payments. Extension of time for payments of both principal and interest may be granted if the Corporation finds that circumstances justify.

Cash advances up to 50% of the value may be made on any home against which there is no other indebtedness. This, however, will carry 6% interest against the 5% on outright mortgages.

**President Signs Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, After Winning Battle with Congress on Cuts in Veterans' Compensation—Senate and House Both Accepted Administration's Compromise Proposal Enhancing Prospects of Balanced Federal Budget.**

After a struggle of almost two weeks between President Roosevelt and an opposing faction in Congress in the matter of the Federal economy program as it related to cuts in veterans' compensation payments, the President won a decisive victory when early in the morning of June 16 the Senate accepted the President's compromise plan by a vote of 45 to 36, and thus passed the Independent Offices Appropriation Bill. The House previously had rejected a vote of 208 to 177 a substitute plan sponsored by Senators Steiwer and Cutting which would have dealt much more liberally with slashes in presumptive disability cases than did the Administration proposal. The Independent Offices Appropriation Bill, after its approval by both branches of Congress, immediately went to the President, and he signed it on June 16, thereby enacting into law one of the most bitterly contested measures considered by Congress during its special session, and assuring the likelihood of a balanced budget. The Senate on June 2 passed the Independent Offices Bill, but included in the measure approximately \$170,000,000 more for veterans' payments than had originally been planned by the Administration, and this was the point of controversy.

**President Roosevelt Signs Wagner Employment System Bill—New System to Co-Ordinate Federal and State Services.**

The Wagner Bill, establishing a national employment system under the Department of Labor, was signed by President Roosevelt on June 6. The bill passed the Senate without a record vote on May 29 and the House passed the bill on June 1. The Act provides for a co-ordinated system between the Federal Government and the States for the establishment of employment agencies and authorizes an appropriation of \$1,500,000 for the next fiscal year and \$4,000,000 annually thereafter.

**President Roosevelt Signs Railroad Relief Bill, Providing for Federal Co-Ordinator to Reorganize Transportation System and Effect Certain Carrier Consolidations—Measure Received Final Congressional Approval on June 9.**

The Administration's Railroad Relief Bill (the bill "to relieve the existing national emergency in relation to inter-State railroad transportation"), creating a Co-ordinator to bring about consolidations and effect economies in carrier operation, became a law on June 16, when President Roosevelt affixed his signature to the measure. It received the final approval of Congress on June 9, when both the House and Senate adopted a conference report. The bill was approved in virtually the same form as originally introduced into Congress early in May, after the conference committee on June 8 had eliminated a House amendment which would have authorized telegraph company mergers with the approval of the Inter-State Commerce Commission. This amendment was said to have been rejected for two reasons: first, because of opposition likely to arise in Congress at a proposal to consolidate the two competitive telegraph systems in the United States (Western Union and Postal), and second, the fact that no hearings were held on the question of telegraph mergers, and the conferees believed that the topic was too important to be passed upon hastily. An abstract of the principal features of the legislation, as contained in Washington advices to the New York "Times" on June 9, said:

The measure provides for the establishment of a comparatively simple system of railroad control, headed by a Federal Co-ordinator of Transportation, who will work in co-operation with the roads themselves and with labor to effect economies, but not at the expense of wage earners.

The Co-ordinator will be, in effect, a dictator of transportation, named by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, but appeal from his decisions may be taken to the Inter-State Commerce Commission. Unless revoked by the Commission, the orders of the Co-ordinator will have all the force and effect of orders by the Commission.

**Three Co-ordinating Bodies.**

The bill provides that, operating with the Co-ordinator, there shall be three co-ordinating committees, one each in the Eastern, Southern and Western groups of railroads, each group to be designated by the Co-ordinator.

Each of these committees will contain seven members, five representing the major roads, one representing steam railroads with operating revenues in 1932 less than \$1,000,000 and another representing electrical systems not connected with steam railways.

The votes of railroads through these committees will be on the basis of mileage, but "no railroad system shall have more than one representative on any such committee." Railroads will be assessed \$1.50 a mile to cover the expenses of this set-up.

Joseph B. Eastman, member of the Inter-State Commerce Commission since 1919, was appointed Federal Co-ordinator of Transportation by President Roosevelt on June 16, immediately after the President had signed the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act. Mr. Eastman's appointment had been generally anticipated.

**Proposed Rail Wage Reduction Put Off Eight Months—Agreement of Roads and Labor Announced by Joseph B. Eastman, Co-Ordinator of Transportation—Present 10% Cut Is Continued.**

An agreement between railroads and railway labor suspending their wage reduction controversy until June 30 1934, out of deference to President Roosevelt's recovery program, was announced June 21 by Joseph B. Eastman, the new Co-ordinator of Transportation. Under the terms of the agreement, which Mr. Eastman said was arrived at through a commendable spirit of co-operation between the disputants, the existing temporary 10% pay cut was extended eight months from Nov. 1 and the rail managements' notice of a further 12½% reduction effective Nov. 1 was canceled.

Mr. Eastman emphasized in his announcement that neither side had relinquished its views regarding what railway wages should be. But both appreciated, he said, that it would be difficult to deal wisely now with the matter "and that the active prosecution of such a controversy at the present time might have a most disturbing and unsettling effect."

**Adjournment of First Session of Seventy-Third Congress—Session Marked by Enactment of History-Making Legislation—President Roosevelt Expresses Thanks to Congress.**

The first session of the Seventy-third Congress called by President Roosevelt on March 5 to convene March 9 to deal with the monetary crisis, adjourned in the early morning hours of June 16. The Senate adjourned sine die at 1:12 a. m. Eastern standard time, the House having voted to adjourn without a roll call at 12:40 a. m. The conclusion of the session came after the Senate had finally yielded on the controverted program for veterans' pensions in the Independent Offices Appropriation Bill. The session accomplished what is described as "a history-making record of legislation," passing (we quote the Associated Press) every vital bill submitted by the President and starting the Government on new enterprises. Indicating the legislation enacted, the Associated Press on June 16 said:

It took Congress only a day or two after it assembled to vote President Roosevelt power to reopen the nation's banks virtually on his own terms. That measure also suspended domestic gold payments for the time and continued the embargo on gold shipments abroad. As it turned out, this was the prelude for the definite departure from the gold standard, the abrogation of the gold payment clause in contracts and the inflation measure itself.

Almost any of the measures already signed or awaiting signature would have required of an ordinary session of Congress months of arguments before reaching a decision.

Outstanding enactments of the special session include:

Economy authorizations providing for reduction of approximately \$350,000,000 in veterans' compensation and \$125,000,000 in the pay of government employees.

Beer and wine bill, legalizing beverages with an alcoholic content of 3.2%.

Gigantic three-in-one measure authorizing inflation; giving the Secretary of Agriculture unprecedented power to raise farm prices and providing \$2,000,000,000 to refinance farm mortgages.

Tennessee valley authority, ending the twelve-year controversy over Muscle Shoals.

Civilian Conservation Corps bill to put 275,000 unemployed to work in the national forests.

Industrial control bill to allow industry, through government suasion, if necessary, to enter agreement limiting production, raising wages and reducing working hours.

Glass-Steagall banking reform measure, looking toward a unified national banking system.

Wagner-Peyser bill, setting up a Federal-State employment system.

Railroad measure to rehabilitate the carriers under the direction of a Federal co-ordinator.

Home Mortgage bill, providing \$2,000,000,000 for refinancing mortgages on small homes.

Resolution abrogating the gold-payment clauses in existing or future contracts.

Securities Act, requiring registration of securities offered for sale.

Measures putting Federal agricultural credit institutions under the Farm Credit Administration.

The \$3,300,000,000 public works program, passed as a part of the Industrial Control bill.

Measure voting \$500,000,000 for direct relief grants to States.

The \$3,500,000,000 deficiency bill which provided the funds for many of the ventures previously decided upon.

**Processing Tax of About 30 Cents on Wheat Under Agricultural Adjustment Act—Percentage of Acreage Reduction in 1934 and 1935 Not to Exceed 20%.**

On June 16 Secretary of Agriculture Wallace announced the program for processing taxes and acreage reduction, as applied to wheat, under the Farm Relief or Agricultural Adjustment Act. Secretary Wallace indicated that no general curtailment was proposed for this year's crop, but that the percentage of acreage reduction in 1934 and 1935, which may be asked, while still undetermined (pending the outcome of the London Wheat Conference); was in no case to exceed 20%. The tax was fixed at 30 cents a bushel; effective July 9, according to the regulations announced June 27 by Secretary of Agriculture Wallace, with the approval of President Roosevelt. The tax is equivalent to \$1.38 per barrel of flour. The Washington correspondent of the New York "Journal of Commerce" on June 27, in noting the action of Acting Secretary of Agriculture R. G. Tugwell in proclaiming the processing tax, said:

The maximum processing tax of 30 cents a bushel was proclaimed by Acting Secretary Tugwell despite the fact that the wheat market for the first time in several years past swept past the \$1 per bushel mark. In explanation of this action, it was declared that the maximum tax was necessary in order to close the gap between the current average farm price of wheat and the fair exchange value of wheat which is based on pre-war parity prices of wheat and industrial products purchased by the farmer.



**Continued Growth and Activity of the Iron and Steel Trades—Non-Ferrous Metals Also Manifest Continued Strength.**

Activity further increased during June in all lines of trade and business and found its strongest manifestation in the iron and steel trades as in the months immediately preceding. Steel production steadily increased week by week and the rate of expansion established will always stand as one of the most eventful in the ups and downs of the steel industry. In its issue of June 8 the "Iron Age" reported that ingot output had risen from 41% of capacity to 44%. In its issue of June 15 the "Age" reported that steel production had further increased from 44% to 47%, and stated that although control legislation (through the National Recovery Act) might have speeded up buying, and demands remained unbalanced, with little support coming from the railroads, construction, or the oil industry, there was no gainsaying that steel consumption was still increasing. June sales of automobiles were moving contrary to the usual seasonal trend, and retail deliveries might set a new high mark for the year. More steel tonnage was now being placed by makers of medium and high priced cars, and mills believed the flow of business from the automotive trade would remain at a fairly high level until at least the middle of July. Tin plate specifications were the heaviest in more than three years and production was sustained at a 90% rate. On June 22 the "Age" reported that steel production was now up to the 50% rate for the first time since April 1931. It also reported that with steel buyers increasing their specifications and pressing for shipments, mills were beginning to experience difficulty in keeping up with demand, in some cases falling behind on deliveries. These evidences of growing market tension, emphasized by the appearance of a scarcity of skilled labor in certain Eastern mills, the "Age" was prompted to remark were reminiscent of conditions which had been conspicuous by their absence since the '20s. The primary cause of the bulge in demand was the piling up of releases against low priced second quarter contracts as the June 30 dead line drew near. While all of this tonnage would not get into immediate consumption, speculative buying had been held down both by the tonnage limitations of contracts and the unsatisfactory financial standing of many buyers. In the automobile industry, at least, there had been little protective buying. The bulk of the steel placed by the motor car builders had been for immediate requirements and their main concern had been to get deliveries on time. To guard against interruptions in their production schedules they were having much of their steel rushed to their plant by motor truck. On June 29 the "Iron Age" stated that steel production had made another 3-point gain, advancing from 50% of capacity to 53%, and observed that the upward swing of output which had been uninterrupted since operations struck a low of 14% in the third week of March marked one of the sharpest recoveries in the history of the trade. The expansion of production, it was averred, had been closely paralleled by a comparable growth of consumption, especially on the part of automobile makers and other industries making consumer goods. It had been largely from tin plate, bars, sheets, strip and other light rolled products that the steel industry had obtained the tonnage which had made heavier operations possible. Business from the construction industry and from the railroads had been insignificant and it was now a question how much further steel output could increase without such support. The "Age" was inclined to think that the first phase of recovery appeared to be over and said that this view was supported by the fact that latterly at any rate many buyers had been taking steel in excess of their known requirements. Specifications against second quarter contracts had been unusually heavy.

Prices for steel products also moved higher, though there was much uncertainty as to the course of prices for the immediate future. Steel mills refrained from quoting for the third quarter of the year except with a stipulation protecting them against increased production costs incident to the carrying out of the provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act. The "Iron Age" made the composite price of finished steel June 27, 1.904c. a pound, against 1.892 a month earlier, and the price of steel scrap \$10.08 a gross ton, against \$9.75 a month earlier, but the composite price of pig iron remained unchanged at \$15.01 a gross ton.

Nearly all the non-ferrous metals sharply advanced at the beginning of June and retained their advances the rest of the month. Lake copper for delivery in Connecticut rose to 8c. a lb. "Metal and Mineral Markets" in its issue June 29 reported that, with the movement of raw materials into consumptive channels slowly increasing, and producers busy in drawing up codes of practice designed to provide for a "living wage" under the National Industrial Recovery Act operators in major metals continued to take a rather bullish view of the general situation. Active buying of zinc at higher levels was noted with the call for lead and tin also satisfactory. Interest in copper from a trading standpoint centered, it was stated, in the revival of buying in foreign markets. European buyers were impressed with the stability of prices here and by reports to the effect that something might come out of the London Monetary and Economic Conference that might bring about concerted action to support basic commodities. Prices realized in the European market toward the end of the month ranged from 7.60c. c.i.f. to 8.05c. In this country all copper sales were on the 8c. basis for delivery in Connecticut. Here in New York

electrolytic copper, after the sharp rise in April and May, further advanced on June 1 from 7.25c. to 7.75c. and remained at that figure the rest of the month. Lake copper further advanced June 1 from 7.50c. to 8.00c. which latter remained the quotation the rest of the month. Tin prices steadily advanced and the New York quotation June 30 was 44.75 against 39.25c. at the close of May. Lead at New York also continued its upward movement, and after the rise during the preceding two months, was marked up June 1 from 3.90c. to 4.10c. and further advanced June 9 to 4.20c.

**Lumber Trade Also Continues to Show Growing Activity Even Though Building and New Construction Still Lag.**

The National Lumber Manufacturers' Association in its weekly returns from regional associations, covering the operations of 648 leading soft wood and hard wood mills, presented most favorable accounts regarding conditions in the lumber industry. For the week ended June 24 lumber production, it was stated, had overtopped all records since September 1931 and lumber shipments all records since July 1931. New business, though a trifle under that for the week ended June 10, was otherwise the largest in volume since December 1930. Production totaled for the week 186,116,000 feet shipments were 225,087,000 feet and new orders 253,091,000 feet. Compared with the corresponding week of the preceding year production was 53% greater, shipments were 68% heavier and new orders 90% greater. All the different regions showed gains over 1932 in all items.

**Advance in Price of Paper Materials—Sulphite Pulp Increased 10% in 10 Days, Affecting Writing Paper and Bags—Manufacturers See Possibility of Wage Increases as Result of National Industrial Recovery Act.**

An advance of about 10% in the price of sulphite pulp used in the manufacture of paper was made in the last 10 days of June, it was indicated in the New York "Times" of June 28, which also had the following to say:

This became known yesterday at a meeting of a committee of the American Paper & Pulp Association to draw up that industry's code under the National Industrial Recovery Act.

With the advances made by importers in sulphite pulp prices sharp increases in the price of rags and old papers have been registered. In the case of old papers the increase was from \$6 to \$14 a ton, or 130%.

The advance in sulphite prices has carried up automatically the prices of writing paper, wrapping paper and paper bags.

*Reluctant on Price Change.*

Manufacturers of the finer grades of paper also were reluctant to discuss price changes in view of unsettled conditions attributed to efforts to apply the National Industrial Recovery Act. One of the leading manufacturers disclosed that sulphite pulp of prime quality was being quoted as follows:

	Old Price per Ton.	New Price per Ton.	Percentage Increase.
Bleached sulphite pulp.....	\$42.00	\$46.00	.10
Unbleached (prime strong)....	35.50	36.00	.075
No. 1 book bleached domestic....	41.00	47.50	.16
No. 1 book unbleached domestic....	32.50	36.00	.11

There has been an advance of about \$5 a ton on bleached soda pulp. The bleached and soda pulps go into the manufacture of the finer grades of papers used for books and magazines and writing papers. The unbleached sulphite pulp goes into newsprint, wrapping paper and other heavier grades.

The material advances in writing paper, wrapping paper and paper bags were described by members of the trade as spot prices. It was said that contracts were not likely to be quoted before fall, by which time it is expected that the situation with reference to the National Industrial Recovery Act will be understood.

Wrapping paper has advanced to as much as 2½ and 3 cents a pound. A 10% increase in paper bags was fixed by a committee of the industry in Chicago last week. A committee of the wrapping paper industry was in conference here yesterday and will confer again to-day with reference to a contemplated price increase. The committee is considering the prospective increase, it is understood, in connection with a projected wage increase. From one source it was reported that the wage increase under consideration was 33 1-3%.

*Supports Spot Price Theory.*

The assertion that the price advances put into effect recently by the sulphite importers were spot prices was supported to some extent by one manufacturer who supplied a set of quotations slightly different from the others. He said that bleached sulphite pulp had been quoted to him at \$53 a ton as against \$43 about 10 days ago, and that unbleached sulphite had been priced him at \$38 a ton as against \$33 before the price rise began.

The manufacturer who gave the latter figures forecast that the increase in prices of materials used in papermaking were bound to result in increases all along the line for paper.

He pointed out that there had been increases in the price of sulphur from Texas which is used in the manufacture of chemical pulp. He cited rising prices for pulpwood.

This manufacturer foresaw that wages were bound to go up as a result of the move to shorten hours, increase the spread and fix minimum scales. He pointed to increased prices being asked for coal used for steam drying and power. He also mentioned that higher prices were being asked for felts and wires and mill supplies used in paper making.

**Textile Markets Develop Further Activity, in Many Cases to the Best Figures in Many Years—Raw Cotton Enjoys a Further Spurt Upward—Wool, Silk, Rayons and Rubber All Share in Phenomenal Recovery.**

In the textile trades the revival went to really sensational lengths and all divisions of the industry shared in the improvement. The cotton industry was reported as more active than at any time since the stock market crash in October 1929. The U. S. Census figures, made public for the month of May under date of June 14, showed that cotton consumption in the United States during the month had comprised 620,909 bales of lint and 76,084 bales of linters, or nearly double the consumption in the corresponding month of the preceding year, when the consumption was only

332,372 bales of lint and 50,941 bales of linters. The Census figures of mill activity, issued on June 21, showed that, based on an activity of 8.96 hours per day, the average of spindles operated during May 1933 had been 34,778,658, or at 112.3% capacity on a single-shift basis. This percentage compared with 95.7% for April and with only 63.3% for May 1932. At the same time the price of raw cotton spurted still higher with great rapidity in the general upward movement of all commodity values, influenced very largely by the spectacular slump of the American dollar as expressed in the terms of foreign currency units, and particularly the pound sterling and the French franc, this shrinkage in the dollar value abroad being looked upon as part of the general scheme of inflation by which the Administration at Washington was undertaking to establish a permanently higher level of values in this country. The latter part of the month the spot price for cotton in New York ruled above 10c. a lb., and on certain days when the depreciation of the dollar became especially pronounced, the upward flight of the staple reached spectacular proportions. One such occasion was Monday, June 26, at a time when the American dollar suffered an especially bad break and when wheat prices shot up in a phenomenal fashion on bad news regarding the growing wheat crop in this country and in the Dominion of Canada. On that day (June 26) spot cotton on the New York Cotton Exchange was marked up to 10.45c., as against 9.60c. the previous Saturday. It will be observed that this was an advance of \$4.25 a bale. On June 30 the New York spot price was 10.15c., as against 9.35c. on May 31 and as compared with less than 6c. a lb. on several days the preceding February. Prices of cotton cloth moved upward in corresponding fashion. Print cloths at Fall River for 28-in. 64x60 were marked up from 4 $\frac{1}{4}$ c. to 4 $\frac{3}{8}$ c. on June 14 and to 4 $\frac{5}{8}$ c. on June 26. This compares with only 2 $\frac{3}{8}$ c. early in April. The price of 27-in. cloths 60x64 June 30 was 4 $\frac{5}{8}$ c., against 4c. May 31 and 2 $\frac{1}{4}$ c. at the beginning of April; 30-in. 40x30 7-oz. Osnaburgs were quoted at 9c. June 30 against 7 $\frac{5}{8}$ c. May 31 and 5c. at the beginning of April. Another element in the rise in the price of goods was the National Industrial Recovery Act. The codes to be put into operation under this Act were submitted by the leaders in the industry and their main provisions had reference to the fixing of minimum wages and maximum hours per man and by machine, both adding materially to the cost of producing the goods.

An uncertain feature in this situation is the application of the Farm Relief Act to raw cotton. This is discussed as follows in the New England letter of the First National Bank of Boston: "The Government, under the provisions of that law, has offered to cotton growers cash payments averaging \$8 to \$9 per acre for acreage which they contract to remove from production, and in addition an option to buy Government held cotton at 6c. per pound, the cash payment per acre and the amount of cotton optioned to each producer being based on the yield ordinarily obtained from the land in question. If the grower does not desire an option on Government cotton he will receive a higher cash payment. If a sufficient reduction in acreage is effected, perhaps around 10,000,000 acres, the Secretary of Agriculture will declare the plan operative and impose a tax on the first processing of cotton to make the cash payments, thus increasing the cost of the raw material to the domestic industry. While there is a large surplus of cotton depressing the market, the amount is no greater than the cumulative reduction in consumption that has occurred during the depression and could easily be absorbed under restored conditions of trade, provided, of course, that domestic output were kept within reasonable bounds."

The woolen industry showed the greatest activity experienced in years. According to the New York "Wool Topie Exchange Service," advance business on women's wear wool goods was the heaviest in four years, despite the fact that forward buying was restricted chiefly to jobbers and a few of the more important garment manufacturers. Several mills opened their lines only to close their books several days later, having accepted all of the business that they could handle for the next few months. The Exchange Service continued as follows under date of June 2 (and the same conditions prevailed the rest of the month):

Most of the woolen and worsted mills are operating close to capacity. Thousands have returned to work at increased wages at Lawrence, Mass., and in other manufacturing centers. Unable to obtain the wool they need in domestic markets, a number of mills have been forced to draw on foreign supplies. Clothing factories in Rochester, New York, Chicago and Philadelphia have stepped up operations, having booked heavy initial business from retailers.

The raw wool market also continued strong with quotations 10% to 15% above the previous month and with the advance since early in April put at from 50% to 75% on the various grades, with medium wool showing the largest gains. The silk industry also worked into a better state, influenced by sharp advances in the prices of raw silk. Japanese double extra 13-15 deniers closed June 30 at \$2.17 $\frac{1}{2}$ @\$2.22 $\frac{1}{2}$  on June 30 and on June 28 sold as high as \$2.30. This compares with \$1.65@1.70 on May 31; \$1.47 $\frac{1}{2}$ @\$1.52 $\frac{1}{2}$  April 29; \$1.15@1.20 March 31; \$1.17 $\frac{1}{2}$ @\$1.22 $\frac{1}{2}$  Feb. 28; \$1.15@1.20 Jan. 31; \$1.47 $\frac{1}{2}$ @\$1.52 $\frac{1}{2}$  Dec. 31 1932; \$1.42 $\frac{1}{2}$ @1.47 $\frac{1}{2}$  Nov. 30; \$1.55@1.60 Oct. 31; \$1.75@1.80 Sept. 30; \$2@2.05 Aug. 31; \$1.40@1.45 July 30; \$1.12 $\frac{1}{2}$ @1.17 $\frac{1}{2}$  June 30; \$1.10@1.15 May 31; \$1.35@1.40 April 30; \$1.50@1.55 March 31; \$1.67 $\frac{1}{2}$ @1.70 Feb. 29;

\$1.87 $\frac{1}{2}$ @\$1.90 Jan. 30, all in 1932; \$1.85@1.90 Dec. 31 1931; \$2.20@2.25 on Nov. 30 and also on Oct. 31 1931, and comparing with \$4.70@4.75 on Jan. 31 1930. In the case of the 20-22 deniers Japanese crack double extra were quoted at \$2.22 $\frac{1}{2}$ @\$2.27 $\frac{1}{2}$  June 30 against \$1.70@1.75 May 31; \$1.52 $\frac{1}{2}$ @1.57 $\frac{1}{2}$  April 29; \$1.10@1.15 March 31; \$1.15@1.20 Feb. 28; \$1.12 $\frac{1}{2}$ @1.17 $\frac{1}{2}$  Jan. 31; \$1.47 $\frac{1}{2}$ @1.52 $\frac{1}{2}$  Dec. 31 1932; \$1.42 $\frac{1}{2}$ @1.47 $\frac{1}{2}$  Nov. 30; \$1.45@1.50 Oct. 31; \$1.60@1.65 Sept. 30; \$2@2.05 Aug. 31; \$1.45@1.50 July 30; \$1.17 $\frac{1}{2}$ @1.22 $\frac{1}{2}$  June 30; \$1.10@1.15 May 31; \$1.32 $\frac{1}{2}$ @1.37 $\frac{1}{2}$  April 30; \$1.42 $\frac{1}{2}$ @1.47 $\frac{1}{2}$  March 31; \$1.70@1.80 Feb. 29; \$1.95@2 Jan. 30, all in 1932; \$1.85@1.90 Dec. 31 1931; \$2.30@2.32 $\frac{1}{2}$  Nov. 30 \$2.10@2.15 Oct. 31 1931, and comparing with \$4.60@4.65 on Jan. 31 1930.

Crude rubber after decided weakness the early part of the month showed recovery again the latter part. Ribbed smoked sheets for spot delivery was quoted at only 5 $\frac{5}{8}$ c. asked on June 15 and for several days thereafter; this was on a report published in a London paper that Great Britain had abandoned all ideas of restriction and that Colonial Secretary Cunliffe-Lister was convinced of the futility of the policy. The report was later denied, but not until prices had yielded considerably. The trade understanding was that Great Britain would not take the initiative on International restriction, but would consider such a proposal from the Dutch provided it embodied a practical scheme for control of Dutch native outputs. On June 30 ribbed smoked sheets for spot delivery were quoted at 6 $\frac{3}{8}$ c. asked against 6 $\frac{1}{4}$ c. asked May 31; 4 5-16c. asked on April 29 and 2 $\frac{7}{8}$ c. bid and 3c. asked March 31; 2 15-16c. asked Feb. 28; 2 $\frac{7}{8}$ c. bid and 2 15-16c. asked Jan. 31; 3 3-16c. bid and 3 $\frac{1}{4}$ c. asked Dec. 31 1932; 3 $\frac{1}{4}$ c. bid and 3 $\frac{3}{8}$ c. asked on Nov. 30; 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ c. asked on Oct. 31; 3 $\frac{3}{8}$ c. bid and 3 11-16c. asked Sept. 30; 4 $\frac{3}{8}$ c. Aug. 31; 3 3-16c. asked July 30; 2 9-16c. bid and 2 11-16c. asked June 30; 2 11-16c. bid and 2 $\frac{3}{4}$ c. asked May 31; 3 1-16c. asked April 30; 3 1-16c. bid and 3 3-16c. asked March 31; 3 $\frac{5}{8}$ @3 11-16c. Feb. 29; 4 5-16@4 7-16c. Jan. 30; 4 13-16@4 15-16c. Dec. 31 1931; 4 5-16@4 $\frac{3}{8}$ c. on Nov. 30; 4 9-16@4 $\frac{5}{8}$ c. Oct. 31; 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ @4 $\frac{3}{8}$ c. Sept. 30; 5@5 $\frac{1}{8}$ c. Aug. 31; 5 $\frac{5}{8}$ @5 $\frac{1}{4}$ c. July 31; 6 13-16@6 15-16c. June 30; 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ c. bid May 29; 5 $\frac{7}{8}$ @6c. April 30; 6 $\frac{3}{8}$ @7c. March 31; 7 $\frac{3}{8}$ @7 $\frac{1}{4}$ c. Feb. 28; 7 $\frac{3}{4}$ @8c. Jan. 31; 8 $\frac{3}{8}$ @8 $\frac{1}{2}$ c. Dec. 31 1930, and 15 $\frac{3}{4}$ @15 $\frac{3}{8}$ c. Feb. 28 1930.

#### Tube and Tire Prices Advanced by Leading Companies—Tires Up 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ to 10%.

Prices of tires were advanced 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ % to 10% and inner tubes 14% on June 6. This was the second general increase in prices in five weeks, they having been raised 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ % to 7% on May 1. The New York "Journal of Commerce" of June 7, with regard to the latest increase, said:

The second and greater boost in tire lists may still be followed by further upward revisions, said one of the large rubber firms in making the announcement. Instead of diminishing, as is customary at this period of the tire selling season, sales are holding at a high level for the industry and in some instances showed further gains at the start of June.

The advance in tire lists, effective 8 a.m. June 7, was participated in by the United States, Goodyear, Goodrich, Pennsylvania, General, Seiberling and Kelly-Springfield companies.

J. D. Tew, President of the B. F. Goodrich Co., in announcing advances of 8 to 9%, said the revisions would apply to the entire Goodrich line, making the second of the year and following an increase of about 5% by that company on May 1, which was the first tire price boost "in nearly eight years."

Advices from Akron, Ohio, June 7, to the paper previously quoted, said that the advances in tire prices named by leading manufacturers on June 6 were followed by the Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. and other rubber companies on June 7. The advices contained the following statement issued by John W. Thomas, President of the Firestone company in regard to the increase in prices:

The increase just announced is fully justified in view of the recent advances of over 100% in cost of rubber and over 50% in cost of cotton. The increase does not yet bring tire prices up to the Jan. 1 level. We are issuing new price lists and feel that another advance in tire prices will surely follow if the cost of rubber and cotton continues to advance.

#### British Indian Import Duties Increased on Non-British Cotton Piece Goods.

The Department of Commerce at Washington stated on June 10 that effective June 7 British Indian import duties had been increased on non-British cotton piece goods (other than fents of not more than nine yards in length) to 75% ad valorem from the previous rate of 50% ad valorem, with plain gray now subject to a specific minimum duty of 6 $\frac{3}{4}$  annas per pound as against the former specific alternative of 5 $\frac{1}{4}$  annas per pound, according to a cablegram from Trade Commissioner George C. Howard, Calcutta. It is added that the anna at present exchange equals approximately 1.9 cents.

#### Japanese Adopt India Cotton Ban — Spinners' Federation Approves Boycott as Retailatory Measure.

The New York "Evening Post" in a dispatch from Osaka (Japan), June 13, reported:

The Cotton Spinners' Federation to-day unanimously approved a boycott against Indian raw cotton.

This action was in retaliation against a recent 50% increase in duties levied by India against non-British cotton cloths.

It follows by a few days a statement by a Foreign Office spokesman that the Japanese Government was considering methods of effectively checking "the British Empire's aggressive tariff and general commercial policies against Japan."

It has been predicted that as a result of the differences between Japan and India, American raw cotton may replace Indian goods in the Japanese market, in which it once held primacy.

Newspapers have reflected a wave of anti-British feeling among Japanese industrial and commercial interests as a result of the increase in the cotton cloth tariffs of India. The Japanese view is that these increases mean the death of the Indian textile trade.

**Hides, Leather and Footwear Continue to Share in the General Recovery.**

Shoe factories remained unusually busy for the season of the year and orders kept coming in in good volume. The business was partly in summer wear and partly represented advance orders for the autumn season, and reflected not only better retail demand, but also the replenishment of depleted stocks in distributing channels. The First National Bank of Boston observes that some uncertainty prevailed as to the extent of adjustments that must be made in the retail price of shoes as a result of higher material prices and other manufacturing costs, present and prospective, and the manner in which the consumer is likely to react to such advances appeared to be causing some uneasiness as to the hide and leather markets, the same authority remarked, adding:

A lull in new business but a confident outlook characterizes the hide and leather markets at the present time. The prevailing dullness is generally considered desirable, in view of the large volume of business at rapid advances in price which has taken place since March. Light native cowhides sold recently at 12½ cents per pound, compared with the year's low, in February, of 4½ cents. Very little business has been done at this level, however, and a slight recession may be necessary to attract buying. After advances ranging from 50 to 100% on the various types of leather, buying is not as active as it was for a time, but prices remain very firm.

While hides have had a greater relative advance than any other commodity, the statistical position of the former has been unusually strong. One of the principal reasons for this strong position has been the fact that coincident with the decrease in leather consumption the supply of hides also declined, because of a smaller demand for meat and reduced slaughter. Recent data, however, indicate a sharp rise in cattle slaughter. Federal inspected slaughter in May totaled 717,000 head of cattle, as compared with 616,000 in April and about the same number in May a year ago. Less inclusive but fairly representative weekly figures covering a part of the current month show a definite continuation of this rising trend of supply.

**Grain Markets Soar and Position of Agricultural Classes Greatly Improved—Wheat Sells Above a Dollar a Bushel on Future Options at Chicago—Sugar Prices Well Maintained—Copper Weaker.**

The jump in grain prices was one of the most striking events of the month of June. Speculation in grains reached gigantic proportions, recalling the old days when the speculation at the Chicago Board of Trade commanded large outside support. The rise in prices may be said to have continued throughout almost the entire month but proceeded by leaps and bounds the latter part of the month. On Monday, June 26 and Tuesday, June 27, the rise each day ran as high as 6@7c. a bushel. This was on bad news regarding the growing wheat crop, both in the United States and in Canada, and the movement was helped along by the concurrent great further depreciation of the American dollar in the foreign exchanges. The Agricultural Bureau report early in June had confirmed the Department's estimate of a tremendous shortage in the growing winter wheat crop of this country.

The Department estimated the crop only a little larger than the previous month, namely at 341,017,000 bushels as against 337,485,000 bushels, and comparing with 462,151,000 bushels harvested in 1932 and 787,465,000 bushels harvested in 1931. But now came news that the spring wheat crop of the United States was also being badly damaged by the prolonged drouth and intensely hot weather in large areas of Minnesota, North and South Dakota, and the adjacent States. Not only that, but the Northwestern provinces of Canada were suffering from the same adverse condition and were threatened with even more serious cuts in yield since the wheat crop of Canada, consisting almost entirely of spring wheat, in 1932 aggregated 428,514,000 bushels. Under the influence of these adverse factors, wheat prices now advanced, as already stated, by leaps and bounds. The July option for wheat in Chicago touched a high of 96¾c. on June 27 and closed June 30 at 90½c. as against the opening price of 72¾c. on June 1. The September wheat option in Chicago touched 98¾c. June 27 and closed June 30 at 93½c. against the opening price on June 1 of 74½c. December wheat at Chicago touched \$1.01 7/8 June 27 and closed June 30 at 96c. as against 77c., the opening price on June 1. The May 1934 option for wheat at Chicago sold as high as \$1.06 3/8 on June 27. At Winnipeg prices also moved briskly upward, though in much more moderate fashion and at a lower level of values. July wheat at Winnipeg touched 80¾c. on June 27 and closed June 30 at 72¼c.; on June 7 the same option sold at 62c. Prices of other grains also shot upward with great rapidity. July corn at Chicago touched 57¾c. June 27 and closed June 30 at 52c. as against the opening price on June 1 of 44c. The September corn option at Chicago touched 60¾c. June 27 and closed June 30 at 57c. as against the opening price on June 1 of 47c. July oats at Chicago touched 45c. June 27 and closed June 30 at 43¾c. which compares with the opening price on June 1 of 24½c. September oats at Chicago advanced to 46¾c. June 27 and closed June 30 at 45¼c. against an opening price on June 1 of 25½c. The conclusion of arrangements for a credit of \$50,000,000 to China to facilitate the purchase by that country of American cotton and American wheat was announced by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation on June 4.

Sugar prices were well maintained at the sharp advances of previous months, though occasional sales at reduced figures were noted. Cuban raw sugar sold at 1.50@1.46c. June 28 as against 1.48@1.49c. on May 31. The wholesale price of refined sugar at New York was advanced June 8 from 4.50c. to 4.60c. by all the leading refineries.

Coffee prices weakened somewhat. The Farm Credit Administration, successor to the Federal Farm Board, announced on June 28 that the New York coffee office of the Grain Stabilization Corporation had on that day sold the customary monthly quota of 62,500 bags of Santos coffee at prices ranging from 8.55c. to 9.15c. per lb. At the May sale the range of prices was from 9.26c. to 9.36c. per lb. The Brazilian Government on June 25 announced that it would pay coffee growers 30 milreis (\$2.40) a bag for this year's "sacrifice quota" of the coming crop in an effort to lower production and boost prices. The previous year the Government paid approximately \$2.65 a bag "sacrifice quota" for all coffee burnt or otherwise destroyed to eliminate over-production. No. 7 Rio for spot delivery in the New York market was quoted at 7¼c. June 30 against 7¾c. on May 31 and also 7¾c. Apr. 29 and on Mar. 31, and comparing with 8@8½c. Feb. 28; 8½c. Jan. 31; 8¼c. Dec. 31 1932; 8½c. Nov. 30; 8¼c. Oct. 31, and the nominal price of 10c. bid on Sept. 28. This last compares with 8¾c. bid Aug. 31; 8¼c. July 30; 7¾c. on June 30; 8½c. May 31; 7¾c. @7¾c. Apr. 30; 7¼c. Mar. 31; 7¼c. Feb. 29; 7½c. Jan. 30; also with 7@7¼c. Dec. 31 1931; 6½@6½c. Nov. 30; 5¾@6c. Oct. 31; 5½c. Sept. 30; 5½@5¾c. Aug. 31; 5½@6c. July 31; 6½@7c. June 30; 6½c. May 29; 6½@6¾c. Apr. 30; 5½c. Mar. 31; 5½@5½c. Feb. 28; 6¾c. Jan. 31, all in the year 1931, and with 7¼@7½c. Dec. 31 1930.

No. 7 Santos June 30 was quoted 7¾@8c. June 30 against 8@8¼c. on May 31 and the same on Apr. 29 and on Mar. 31, and against 8¼@8½c. Feb. 28; 8¾c. Jan. 31; 9c. Dec. 31 1932; 9½c. Nov. 30 and 10¼c. Oct. 31. There was no quotation Sept. 30 1932 for this grade, but earlier in Sept. the price was 14c. bid. This compares with 12½c. Aug. 31; 10¼c. July 30; 9½@9½c. June 30; 9¾@10c. May 31; 9c. Apr. 30; 8½c. Mar. 31; 8½c. Feb. 29; 8½c. Jan. 30. It also compares with 8@8¼c. Dec. 31 1931; 7¼@7½c. Nov. 30; 7¼c. bid Oct. 31; 6½@7c. Sept. 30; 6½@6¾c. Aug. 31; 7½@7¾c. July 31; 8½@9c. June 30; 8½@8¾c. May 29, and the same figures for Apr. 30; 7¾@8c. Mar. 31; 7¾@8c. Feb. 28; 8¾@9c. Jan. 31, all in the year 1931, and with 8¾@9¼c. Dec. 31 1930 and 11¼c. Oct. 31 1930.

**Petroleum and Its Products—General Advances in Prices the Feature.**

General advances in prices, both in the case of crude petroleum and the refined products were the distinctive feature of the petroleum industry during the month of June. A proposal permitting the President of the United States to fix maximum and minimum petroleum prices was adopted by representatives of more than 40 crude oil producing companies which supply 95% of the country's output. At a meeting in Chicago on June 17 the proposal was included in a code drafted by independent and large oil producers under the division of the National Industrial Recovery Act. On the same day delegates representing 33 independent producers' associations and the American Petroleum Institute, also meeting at Chicago, agreed upon an allotment plan for the industry under which production would be limited and drilling of new wells would be prohibited except with permission from the President. The Texas Railroad Commission on June 13 authorized a reduction of 1-3 in the East Texas oil field production allowable according to Associated Press advices from Austin, Tex., June 13, which said that for several weeks the production had been approximately 820,000 barrels daily. The new allowable was estimated to be from 550,000 to 575,000 barrels daily. The new order became effective at midnight June 13. On the other hand the Oklahoma Corporation Commission on June 20 voted 2 to 1 to increase the oil allowable of three flush areas in Oklahoma 77,091 barrels daily for the remainder of June. The increase was permitted, it was said, as a result of improved demand caused by higher crude prices. On June 28 the Oklahoma Corporation Commission ordered the allowable petroleum production for July fixed at 594,384 barrels daily, compared with 525,747 barrels in June. This represented a further daily increase of 68,637 barrels. In the following we show all the principal price changes of the month both in the case of crude oil and the refined product.

**Crude Oil.**

June 15—Bell Oil & Gas Co. advances Oklahoma crude price 25c. a barrel to new price of 50c., and also posts 15c. advance in Panhandle Texas crude.

June 15—Tide Water Oil Co. posts 10c. advance in Conroe crude.

June 16—Danciger Oil & Gas Co. posts 10c. advance for East Texas crude, the new price being 35c.

June 17—Effective at 7 a. m. to-day, the White Eagle Oil Corp., subsidiary of Socony-Vacuum, will pay 52c. for Kansas crude of 40 gravity and above, this being a 27c. increase and restores prices to level in effect Jan. 10 1933.

June 17—In addition to meeting advance of Sinclair-Prairie in mid-continent, East Texas and Panhandle, Texas, the Magnolia Petroleum Co., subsidiary of Socony-Vacuum Corp., also advances West Texas crude 10c. a barrel, new price 30c.; Darst Creek 12c. and Mirando 10c., new price on both being 35c.; Luling and Corsicana heavy 10c., to 30c. a barrel; Lyton Springs 20c. advance, new price 45c.

June 17—Continental Oil Co. meets Sinclair-Prairie advance.

June 17—Ohio Oil Co. advances Wyoming and Montana crudes. Elk Basin and Grass Creek light crudes are increased 27c. to new price of 63c.; Big Muddy 20c., to 45c.; Rock Creek 6c., to 52c.; Sunburst 15c., to new price of 80c.

June 17—South Penn Oil Co. advances Corning grade crude 10c. a barrel, new price 60c.

June 17—All grades of Pennsylvania crude advanced 10c. a barrel with exception of that in Buckeye Pipe Line Co. lines, which was advanced 7c. New prices: Bradford-Allegheny crude \$1.47 a barrel; Pennsylvania grade in South West Pennsylvania Pipe Line Co. lines \$1.17; in Eureka lines \$1.12; in Buckeye lines, 97c.

June 17—Ohio Oil Co. advances central western crudes 20c. a barrel. New prices: Illinois and Princeton 67c.; Lima 75c.; Indiana 45c.; Western Kentucky 62c.

June 19—East Texas Refining Co. meets price of 50c. a barrel for East Texas crude.

June 20—Humble Oil & Refining Posts East Texas at 50c. flat. Other light crudes in Texas were topped at 52c., being restored to the gravity basis; Gray County posted from 34c. to 36c.; Carson County 29c. to 41c.; West Texas and New Mexico crudes 30c. flat; Refugio 45c.; Miranda 40c.; Pettus 55c.; Darst Creek and Salt Flat 40c.; Conroe crude 35 to 35.9 gravity advanced to 59c. with 2c. advance on each degree, with 40 gravity topped at 69c.

June 20—Gulf Oil Corp. meets new price lists in mid-continent and Texas fields.

June 20—Effective as of June 19, 7 a. m., Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana posts new crude prices in Louisiana and Arkansas as follows: Caddo, below 29 gravity 26c.; 40 and above, 50c. Homer, below 29 gravity 32c.; 40 and above, 56c. Haynesville, below 29 gravity, 29c.; 40 and above, 53c. Sabine and De Soto, below 29 gravity, 35c.; 40 and above, 59c. Eldorado, below 29 gravity, 37c.; 40 and above, 61c. Sarepta and Cartersville, below 29 gravity, 35c.; 40 and above, 59c. All with differential of 2c. per degree. Former price for all was flat basis of 25c. per barrel. Smackover crude, formerly 20c. a barrel, is now priced at 30c.

June 21—Ashland Refining Co. advances eastern Kentucky crude price to 65c. a barrel, an increase of 15c. and the first price advance in this field in several years.

June 21—Sinclair-Prairie Oil Marketing Co. meets Humble's prices for crude in Texas Panhandle.

June 21—In meeting advances of other companies, Shell Petroleum also posted the new field in Polk County, Texas, at flat price of 50c.

June 22—Texas Co. meets Humble Oil's postings in Gray, Carson and Hutchinson Counties, Texas Panhandle, and in Conroe and Darst fields, which were slightly higher than the Texas Company's earlier postings.

June 26.—Effective at 7 a. m., Standard Oil Co. of California posts advances in California crude ranging from 2c. to 15c. a barrel, according to gravity, leading a general increase by all majors on the west coast.

June 26.—Tide Water Pipe Line Co. posts 10c. advance in Bradford-Allegheny crude, making new price \$1.57.

June 26.—South Penn Oil Co. advances all Pennsylvania crudes 10c. a barrel, new prices being: \$1.27 for oil in lines of South West Pennsylvania Pipe Lines Co. lines; \$1.22 for oil in lines of Eureka Pipe Line Co., and \$1.07 for oil in lines of Buckeye Pipe Line Co.

June 26.—Stoll Oil Refining Co. advances Kentucky crude oil 15c. a barrel, making new price 85c. a barrel.

June 28.—South Penn Oil Co. advances Corning crude 10c. a barrel, new price being 70c.

*Gasoline and Kerosene.*

June 1.—Standard Oil Co. of Nebraska, Sinclair Refining Co., and Phillips Petroleum Co. reduce Omaha gasoline prices 2c. a gallon. Adjustment of statewide basis expected to follow.

June 1.—Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey advances tank car gasoline prices ¼c. to 5c. a gallon at Bayonne; ¼c. to 4¼c. at Baltimore and Philadelphia.

June 2.—Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey advances service station gasoline prices in New Jersey, posting advances ranging up to 3 5c. a gallon in territories where "price wars" have been conducted. The new price at Newark, N. J., will be 14.5c. a gallon, cash, at service stations, including 4c. tax.

June 3.—Standard Oil Co. of New York advances tank-car gasoline ¼c., new price being 5.10c., Long Island. Also posts advance of 3-10c. a gallon in service station prices throughout New York and New England. New York City service station price now 14.5c., including tax of 4c.

June 5.—Principal refiners in Pittsburgh area eliminate 2c. cash discount on gasoline sales, thus, in effect, advancing service station prices 2c. to new price of 14.5c., including 4c. tax.

June 5.—Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey advances tank car gasoline prices ¼c. a gallon at Baltimore and Norfolk.

June 5.—Gasoline prices in Richmond, Va., area advanced by leading companies to new price of 12.8c., with 2c. cash discount. Premium motor fuels are 3c. additional, all plus 6c. in State and Federal taxes.

June 14.—New price basis adopted by Standard of Ohio result in increase of ¼c. in two leading grades, and ½c. on low grade. Actual advances at service stations are 2¼c. to 2½c., but 2c. discount is allowed on cash sales.

June 16.—Standard Oil Co. of Indiana advances tank wagon and service station gasoline prices ½c. a gallon on all grades throughout its territory.

June 17.—Standard Oil Companies of New York, New Jersey and Indiana, advance gasoline 1c. per gallon.

June 17.—Standard of Ohio advances gasoline ¼c. per gallon.

June 19.—Hartol Products Co. posts ¼c. advance in tank car gasoline prices.

June 20.—All leading marketers in Oklahoma follow lead of Magnolia Petroleum Co. and post further gasoline advances, bringing total rise to 1½c. a gallon.

June 20.—Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana advances tank wagon and service station gasoline prices ½c. a gallon in Louisiana, Arkansas and Tennessee.

June 22.—All majors in Philadelphia post 2c. cash discount in metropolitan area.

June 26.—Standard Oil Co. of New York will post 5¼c. price for tank car gasoline.

June 26.—Standard Oil Co. of California advances all grades of gasoline 1c. a gallon in the Pacific Coast territory.

June 26.—Chicago reports furnace oils advanced ½c. a gallon, making new prices as follows: No. 2 at 6¼c., No. 3 at 5¼c., No. 4 at 4¼c., No. 5 at 4¼c. No. 1 oil was previously advanced (June 21), and is now quoted at 6¼c.

June 27.—Socony-Vacuum advances gasoline prices ½c. a gallon throughout its territory.

June 27.—Advance of ¼c. a gallon posted for Pennsylvania bright stock, 25 pour test, new price being 22c. Cylinder stocks advanced ¼c.

June 27.—Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey advances gasoline prices from ½ to 6.10c. throughout entire territory, with exception of Delaware and Pennsylvania, but including Louisiana, Arkansas and Tennessee. In New York and New England tank car, tank wagon and service station prices were advanced ½c. per gallon; in northern New Jersey, tank car, tank wagon and service station prices were advanced 6.10c. a gallon, effective June 28.

June 28.—Richfield Oil Corp. of New York posts 6c. per gallon price for tank car gasoline.

June 29.—Hartol Refining and Republic Oil post 6c. price for tank car gasoline.

June 29.—Socony-Vacuum Corp. advances tank car gasoline ¼c. a gallon throughout its territory, bringing high-octane price at Long Island City to 6.15c. a gallon, equivalent to the 6c. posting generally observed in New York harbor.

June 29.—Service station gasoline prices advanced 1c. throughout the state of Texas.

June 29.—Pennsylvania bright stocks advanced 1c. a gallon for 25 pour test, new price being 23c., and the second advance within a few days.

#### THE JUNE FINANCING OF THE U. S. TREASURY.

The large-scale financing of the United States Treasury during June proved an unqualified success, notwithstanding that in some leading particulars it was conducted under radically different conditions from those of other recent periods. The special occasion for concern in this instance was not alone the fact that the United States Treasury was likely to appear as a borrower on a large scale for a long time to come, owing to the various activities into which the Federal Government was being injected, through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the requirements of the National Industry Recovery Bill, the Farm Credit Bill, and to carry through various other measures of relief, but more particularly the circumstance that the new obligations were to be put out without any specific pledge of repayment in gold such as had been the distinctive characteristic of all previous issues of Government obligations, but instead they were now made payable in ordinary lawful money. It is proper to state, however, that on that point the Secretary of the Treasury, when announcing his financial plan, had results before him, made in a sale of Treasury bills a day or two earlier, that served as a test to show that in the sale of that class of obligations at least the absence of the gold clause had not acted to impair the marketability of bills, though candor compels the statement that these Treasury bills (sold on a discount basis) do not really belong in the same category with the other forms of Government obligations, inasmuch as such bills run for only 91 days, whereas the certificates of indebtedness included in the Treasury program of June financing ran for nine months and the Treasury notes for a full term of five years. Secretary Woodin announced his June program on Tuesday night, June 6, and the sale of Treasury bills referred to occurred on Monday, June 5, and it was with the result of that sale before him that Mr. Woodin invited subscriptions to the securities included in his June financing program. The details of this sale of bills are related further below, and, as stated, it showed that the absence of the promise of repayment in gold was not working in any way to the detriment of financing of that description except possibly that the tenders for the bills were somewhat reduced in the aggregate.

As already indicated, the new financing was announced in the morning papers, Wednesday, June 7. The Treasury Department offered \$500,000,000, "or thereabouts," of 2⅞% Treasury notes ranging for five years and \$400,000,000 of certificates of indebtedness running for nine months and bearing only ¾ of 1% interest, making \$900,000,000 altogether. As a matter of fact, the combined offering was certain to exceed greatly the nominal \$900,000,000, as the Secretary expressly reserved the right to increase the total offering "by an amount sufficient to allot in full all subscriptions for amounts up to and including \$10,000," the purpose having been expressed to keep the subscription books open several days for the receipt of small subscriptions of that class. Furthermore, subscriptions for which payment was to be tendered in Treasury certificates of indebtedness maturing June 15 1933, and of which \$374,000,000 were reported as outstanding, were to be allotted in full, the same as in the case of cash subscriptions for amounts up to and including \$10,000.

What attracted particular attention in this program of Treasury financing was the low rate of interest offered in both instances. At the large piece of financing on April 23 1933 the Secretary disposed of an aggregate of \$572,419,200 of three-year Treasury notes carrying 2⅞% interest, or the same rate as in the current five-year offering of Treasury notes. The previous January, under the Hoover Administration, the Government disposed of \$277,516,000 of five-year Treasury notes bearing only 2½% interest, the lowest rate at which any issue of Treasury notes has ever been put out. As to the certificates of indebtedness, the ¾% rate fixed in the current nine months' offering was precisely the same as the rate fixed the previous December in issuing one-year certificates, when the Treasury, under the Secretaryship of Ogden L. Mills, set up a new post-war record for this class of borrowing at such a low rate as ¾ of 1%. The Treasury officials then stated that they knew of no lower rate at any time for one-year certificates. The program at that time also included an offering of Treasury notes running for four years, with the rate of interest 2¾%, as against the present rate of 2⅞% for a five-year issue of notes, while in August 1932 a note issue bearing only 2¼% interest was put out, but

these latter were notes running only two years. All this, however, was before any question as to the repayment of any Government obligations in gold had arisen, and when not even a remote possibility of anything of the kind existed, while now the Government had actually repudiated its obligation to make payment in gold and taken special pains to make it plain that these new offerings of both Treasury notes and certificates of indebtedness would *not* be payable in gold. Previously the language in that respect was that "The principal and interest of the notes (or certificates, as the case might be) will be payable in United States gold coin of the present standard of value," whereas now not only was this provision of payment in gold eliminated, but no reference whatever was made to the kind of money in which repayment was to be made, the inference being that payment would be in current funds, embracing all forms of legal tender.

In face of the absence of the gold clause, subscriptions for the new issues poured in in overwhelming amounts, and with great alacrity, too. As already stated, subscription books were opened on Wednesday, June 7, and they were promptly closed at the close of business on the same day, the Federal Reserve Bank reporting that "in accordance with instructions from the Treasury Department the subscription books (for the two classes of obligations) had closed at the close of business on that day except for the receipt of subscriptions for amounts up to and including \$10,000." A further notice came the very next day, saying that books for the receipt of subscriptions for amounts up to and including \$10,000 would be closed at the close of business on that day (Thursday, June 8). When the figures were finally tabulated it was found that the subscriptions had aggregated the huge sum of \$5,659,599,900, and that of these \$1,083,540,800 had been allotted—an amount considerably in excess of the nominal offering of \$900,000,000. The subscriptions for the five-year 2½% Treasury notes reached \$3,306,415,900, and the amount allotted was \$623,441,800, this last including \$179,018,000 exchange subscriptions, which were allotted in full. The bids for the ¾% nine months' certificates of indebtedness totaled \$2,353,184,000, and the allotments were \$460,099,000, including \$152,673,000 exchange subscriptions, which were allotted in full. It should be added that the new issues were immediately quoted at substantial premiums in the market. Allotments on cash subscriptions exceeding \$10,000 were made on a graduated scale.

But there was one feature of the offering of these Government obligations which had not been changed in the slightest degree, and which in itself, under prevailing conditions, acted to insure a wide market for Government obligations, and especially those having, like the new Treasury notes, a fairly long period to run—in this instance five years. We refer to the complete exemption from Federal income taxes with which both the Treasury notes and the certificates of indebtedness are endowed. The provision in that respect was the same as before. If the Treasury officials were careful to omit the provision regarding repayment in gold, they were equally careful to continue unchanged the provision regarding tax exemption, and to state it in its broadest terms. The Treasury circular offering the new obligations, both in the case of the Treasury notes and in the case of the certificates of indebtedness, expressly said that "The notes (and also the certificates) shall be exempt both as to principal and interest, from all taxation (except estate or inheritance taxes) now or hereafter imposed by the United States, any State, or any of the possessions of the United States, or by any local taxing authority." The sweeping and all-embracing provision of this tax exemption feature should not escape attention. Thus the new obligations (as was the case with past offerings) were made specifically exempt not only from the ordinary normal income taxes but also the Federal surtaxes and likewise from local taxes of every character and description—a feature certain to ensure a wide market in advance for United States obligations, especially as both the normal Federal income and the Federal surtaxes have been raised to such very high figures.

That the Administration officials were not unaware of what a drawing card this provision regarding tax exemption constituted, in inducing subscriptions, appeared when they intervened to prevent Congress from amending existing law so as to preclude further issues of wholly tax-exempt United States securities. On Friday, June 9, the United States Senate adopted an amendment to the National Industrial Recovery Act providing that income from all Governmental securities should be taxable. At that time the Treasury had just received the huge subscriptions in response to its June program of financing. The new securities, however, were not deliverable until June 15, and, according to Treasury officials, subscribers could not be compelled to accept them with the tax exemption clause abrogated. High officials accordingly got busy on the telephone and long but emphatic discussions with House and Senate leaders ensued, according to news dispatches from Washington. As a result, the amendment was eliminated on Saturday, June 10, by the Conference Committee. Legislative leaders, we are told, were understood to have planned to exert considerable pressure for elimination of the clause anyway, but Treasury activity added to the stimulus.

As on previous occasions, qualified depositaries were permitted to make payment by credit for certificates and Treasury notes allotted to them for themselves and their customers up to any amount for which they should be qualified or might qualify. And it appears that the Government deposits

growing out of the disposal of the \$1,083,540,800 of new issues aggregated \$626,901,000, of which \$300,872,800 represented Government deposits in the New York Federal Reserve District. It deserves to be noted also that under the provisions of the Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933, the depository banks were completely relieved of the obligation to pay any interest on these Government deposits, as related in detail in our discussion of the Money Market in subsequent columns.

The United States Treasury also disposed of several issues of Treasury bills on a discount basis. The first of these took place on Monday, June 5, and it was this sale that offered a test, as noted further above, of the effect of the absence of the clause for specific repayment in gold on the marketability of Government issues in the new conditions under which Treasury financing was now to be carried on. Notice of this offering had been given May 31, and it consisted of \$75,000,000 of 91-day bills dated June 7 1933 and maturing Sept. 6, the proceeds to be used to retire an issue of \$75,266,000 maturing on June 7. Tenders were invited up to Monday, June 5, and the bids aggregated \$197,947,000, of which \$75,529,000 were accepted. The average price realized by the Treasury was 99.932, this being equivalent to an average rate of 0.27% on a bank discount basis. At the last previous sale of Treasury bills, which was made on Friday, May 26, and which consisted of \$100,000,000, the bids aggregated no less than \$407,553,000 (of which \$100,352,000 was accepted), and the average price obtained was 99.919, or an average rate on a bank discount basis of about 0.32% per annum. This showed that if the absence of the gold clause had any effect at all it was to diminish the total of the applications for bills, while leaving the price slightly lower, though at abnormally low figures in both instances—namely, 0.32% at the last sale in May and at 0.27% at the June sale. The fact should not be overlooked, however, that these Treasury bills possess the same advantage that the Treasury notes and the certificates of indebtedness enjoy, that is, complete tax exemption, and while this cannot be held to be as great an advantage in the case of bills running for only 91 days, as in the case of the five-year Treasury notes and the nine months' certificates of indebtedness, it was evidently considered by the purchasers of the bills as a complete offset to the absence of the provision for repayment in gold. It should be noted that the bill for the repeal of the gold clause by statutory enactment of Congress did not become a law until Monday, June 5 (the date on which tenders for the new bills were received), when the President attached his signature to the same, but in view of the certainty that that measure would receive Congressional endorsement and become a law the Treasury Department eliminated the gold clause in the offerings of bills scheduled for that day.

It deserves to be pointed out that prior to Oct. 16 1931 no specific stipulation as to the method of repayment was made in inviting tenders for the purchase of bills sold on a discount basis. In Section (2), however, of the circular issued on that date a statement to the following effect was included: "Treasury bills are payable at maturity in United States gold coin of the present standard of value, upon presentation to the Treasurer of the United States in Washington or to any Federal Reserve bank." And this was the rule and practice until the new offering now made. The change was to have the sentence rewritten so as to read: "Treasury bills are payable at maturity upon presentation to the Treasurer of the United States in Washington or to any Federal Reserve bank." In other words, the stipulation as to payment in gold was eliminated.

On June 14 Secretary of the Treasury William H. Woodin invited tenders for another offering of 91-day Treasury bills. This was for amount of \$100,000,000, and tenders were received up to 2 p. m. Eastern Standard time on Monday, June 19. These bills were dated June 21 1933 and will mature Sept. 20 1933. The proceeds went to meet an issue of maturing bills for \$100,569,000 maturing June 21. The tenders aggregated \$240,273,000, and \$100,361,000 of the amount was accepted. The average price realized was 99.939, being an average rate on a bank discount basis of 0.24% per annum. On June 21 the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, Dean G. Acheson, announced an offering of 91-day Treasury bills in the amount of \$75,000,000, "or thereabouts." Tenders to this offering were received on Monday, June 26. These bills were dated June 28 1933 and will mature on Sept. 27 1933. The tenders aggregated \$209,956,000, of which \$75,697,000 were accepted. The average price of the bills disposed of was 99.931, being an average rate on a bank discount basis of 0.27%. On June 27 Acting Secretary of the Treasury Dean G. Acheson asked for tenders to an offering of bills to amount of \$100,000,000. These were 91-day bills dated July 5 and maturing Oct. 4. The proceeds were to be used to meet an issue of \$100,096,000 maturing July 5. Bids were received up to and including June 30. The tenders amounted to \$242,687,000, of which \$100,010,000 were accepted. The average price of the bills disposed of was 99.929, equivalent to an average rate on a bank discount basis of about 0.28%.

#### NEW SECURITY ISSUES AND DIVIDENDS IN JUNE.

The absence of foreign financing in the domestic market over a long period was broken with the placing of the \$60,000,000 Government of the Dominion of Canada offering of 15-month 4% notes here in the United States. This issue was the outstanding feature of the month as to size and far surpassed all domestic issues placed on the market during June.



**Birmingham Electric Co.**—Quar. divs. of 88c. a share and 75c. a share on both the \$7 and \$6 cum. pref. stocks omitted.

**Bridgeport Machine Co.**—Quar. div. of 1¼% on the 7% cum. pref. stock due July 1 1933 deferred.

**Bucyrus-Monighan Co.**—Dividend on the \$1.80 cum. class A stock of no par value, decreased from 45c. a share to 22½c. a share.

**Buffalo Niagara & Eastern Power Corp.**—No action taken on the quar. divs. ordinarily payable about June 30 on the common and class A stocks of no par value. Quar. divs. of 33c. a share were paid on March 31 last on both of these issues.

**(F. N.) Burt Co., Ltd.**—Quar. div. on the common stock reduced from 50c. a share to 25c. a share.

**Canada Bread Co., Ltd.**—Dividend on the 7% non-cum. 1st pref. stock reduced from \$1 a share to 75c. a share.

**Canadian General Electric Co., Ltd.**—Quarterly dividend on the common stock reduced from \$1 a share to 75c.

**Canadian General Investments, Ltd.**—Quarterly dividend of 7½c. a share on the registered stock, no par and on the no par coupon shares, both payable July 15 1933. This compares with 10c. a share paid each quarter from July 2 1932 to and incl. April 1 1933.

**Charlottesville Woolen Mills Co.**—A semi-annual dividend of \$1.75 per share has been declared on the common stock and on the 7% cum. partic. pref. stock, payable July 1 1933. A semi-annual dividend of \$2 per share on the common and a semi-annual dividend of \$1.75 per share and an extra of 25c. per share on the pref. stock, were paid on Jan. 1 last and on July 1 1932. Previously, both issues received \$6 per share each six months.

**City Investing Co.**—Dividend on the common stock reduced from 1½% a share to 1% a share.

**Coca-Cola Bottling Co., St. Louis.**—Quarterly dividend of 33c. a share on the common stock, due about July 20, deferred.

**Commerce Investments, Inc.**—Quarterly dividend on the investment management shares of no par value reduced from 10c. a share to 9c. a share.

**Commonwealth Edison Co.**—Quarterly dividend on the capital stock reduced from \$1.25 a share to \$1 a share.

**Connecticut Gas & Coke Securities Co.**—Quarterly dividend on the no par common stock reduced from 20c. a share to 10c. a share.

**Consolidated Laundries Corp.**—Quarterly dividend of \$1.87½ a share, due Aug. 1 1933 on the \$7½ cum. pref. stock, deferred.

**Continental Gas & Electric Corp.**—Dividend on the no par common stock reduced from \$1.25 a share to 42c. a share.

**Ecuadorian Corp., Ltd.**—Semi-annual dividend of 2% on the 7% pref. stock. Previously, the company made regular semi-annual distributions of 3½% on this issue.

**Electric Auto-Lite Co.**—Dividend on the common stock of 30c. a share omitted.

**Fourth National Investors Corp.**—Dividend on the common stock decreased from 55c. a share to 40c. a share.

**General Baking Co.**—Quarterly dividend on the common stock decreased from 50c. a share to 25c. a share.

**Harriman Investors Fund, Inc.**—Quarterly dividend on the no par capital stock reduced from 50c. a share to 40c. a share.

**Harrisburg (Pa.) Hotel Co.**—Dividend payable July 1 1933 on the common stock omitted. On Jan. 2 last a distribution of 50c. a share was made on this issue.

**Illinois Power & Light Corp.**—Quarterly dividends of \$1.50 a share on both the 6% cum. pref. stock and on the \$6 cum. pref. stock, deferred.

**Incorporated Investors.**—Semi-annual dividend of 25c. a share payable July 15 1933. Previously regular quarterly distributions of 25c. a share were made on this issue.

**Intercolonial Coal Co., Ltd.**—Semi-annual dividend on the common stock reduced from \$1 a share to 50c. a share.

**Kansas City Southern Ry.**—Quarterly dividend of 50c. a share on the 4% non-cum. pref. stock stock omitted.

**Kansas Gas & Electric Co.**—Quarterly dividend of 25c. a share on the no par common stock omitted.

**Manchester (N. H.) Gas Co.**—Quarterly dividend payable July 1 1933 on the common stock decreased from \$1 a share to 50c. a share.

**Manufacturers Finance Co., Baltimore.**—Dividend on the 7% cum. pref. stock decreased from 43¼c. a share to 21¼c. a share.

**Marine Midland Corp.**—Quarterly dividend on the common stock reduced from 20c. a share to 10c. a share.

**Massachusetts Investors Trust.**—Quarterly dividend reduced from 20c. a share to 19c. a share, payable June 30 1933.

**Minnesota Power & Light Co.**—Quarterly dividends on the 7% cum. pref. stock reduced from \$1.75 a share to 87½c. a share and on the 6% cum. pref. stock from \$1.50 a share to 75c. a share.

**Noranda Mines, Ltd.**—Interim dividend of 50c. a share payable in New York funds. This compares with 60c. a share paid on Dec. 21 1932.

**Northern States Power Co. of Wis.**—Quarterly dividend of 1¼% a share on the 7% cum. pref. stock omitted.

**Nova Scotia Light & Power Co., Ltd.**—Quarterly dividend on the no par common stock reduced from \$1 a share to 75c. a share.

**Ohio Associated Telephone Co.**—Quarterly dividend of 35c. a share on the 7% cum. pref. stock omitted.

**Oilstocks, Ltd.**—Dividend on the common stock reduced from 20c. a share to 10c. a share.

**Package Machinery Co.**—Quarterly dividend on the common stock reduced from 75c. a share to 50c. a share.

**Pan American Life Insurance Co.**—Semi-annual dividend of 60c. a share payable July 1 on the capital stock omitted.

**Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.**—Quarterly dividend on the capital stock decreased from \$1.25 a share to \$1 a share.

**Petroleum Exploration.**—Quarterly dividend on the capital stock reduced from 25c. a share to 12½c. a share.

**Providence Gas Co.**—Quarterly dividend on the no par common stock reduced from 30c. a share to 25c. a share.

**Public Service Co. of Northern Illinois.**—The directors on June 23 declared a dividend of 60c. per share on the common stock, no par value, and on the common stock, par \$100, payable Aug. 1 1933. Quarterly distributions of 75c. per share were made on these issues from Aug. 1 1932 to and incl. May 1 1933, as against \$2 per share each quarter from Aug. 1 1925 to and incl. May 2 1932.

**Sieloff Packing Co.**—Quarterly dividend of 30c. a share on the no par common stock omitted.

**Southeastern Express Co.**—Semi-annual dividend on the common stock decreased from \$3.50 to \$2.50 a share.

**Southern Weaving Co.**—Semi-annual dividend on the no par common stock decreased from 35c. a share to 20c. a share.

**Southwestern Light & Power Co.**—Semi-annual dividend of 3% on the 6% cum. class A common stock omitted. On June 30 1933 a dividend of 75c. a share was declared on the \$6 cum. pref. stock of no par value. This distribution represents a reduction of 50% from the normal rate.

**Spencer Trask Fund, Inc.**—Quarterly dividend on the no par capital stock reduced from 25c. a share to 12½c. a share.

**Standard Chemical Co., Ltd.**—Annual dividend of 50c. a share due about June 27 1933 on the no par capital stock omitted.

**Standard Gas Light Co. of the City of New York.**—The directors have decided to defer the semi-annual dividend ordinarily payable June 30 on the common stock, par \$100. On June 30 1927 to Dec. 31 1932 semi-annual distributions of 2% each were made on this issue.

**Stecher-Traung Lithograph Corp.**—Quar. div. of \$1.87½ a share on the 7½% pref. stock due June 30 1933 omitted.

**Texon Oil & Land Co.**—Dividend on the capital stock reduced from 25c. a share to 15c. a share.

**Third National Investors Corp.**—Dividend on common stock reduced from 45c. a share to 40c. a share.

**Thirteenth & Fifteenth Streets Passenger Ry.**—Semi-annual dividend on the capital stock cut from \$6 a share to \$3 a share.

**Title Guarantee & Trust Co.**—Quarterly dividend on the capital stock decreased from 40c. a share to 20c. a share.

**Vortex Cup Co.**—Quarterly dividend on the no par common stock reduced from 25c. a share to 12½c. a share.

**Whitaker Paper Co.**—Quarterly dividend of 1¼% a share on the 7% cum. pref. stock, due July 1 1933, deferred.

**Wisconsin Bankshares Corp.**—Semi-annual dividend of 2c. a share on the common stock omitted

**THE COURSE OF THE STOCK MARKET DURING JUNE 1933.**

Great buoyancy and the utmost enthusiasm characterized the speculation on the Stock Exchange during the month of June, with a further large rise in prices, thus repeating and extending the experience of April and May. The upward swing of prices may be said to have continued throughout the entire month except for a downward reaction around the tenth of the month and which lasted about a week. The reaction was due mainly to extensive sales to realize profits and to a feeling that the pace was getting too fast and that accordingly it was time to let up for a while. After this temporary reaction the market the latter half of the month resumed its upward course with greater vim and vigor than before and with further sensational rises in prices, though with some of the speculative leaders inclined to lag at times, with which exception the best prices of the month as a rule were recorded on the closing day—June 30. Taking the averages of the 50 stocks kept by the New York "Times" the low figure of the month was 78.46 June 16 and the high figure 90.43 on June 28 with the close June 30 at 88.57. In the case of the 25 railroad stocks (forming part of the 50) the low figure of the month was 31.88 June 16 and the high 39.49 June 30, with the close on that day at 39.25. In the case of the 25 industrial shares included in the total, the low was 125.05 June 16 and the high 141.75 June 27 with the close June 30 at 137.89. Great activity prevailed and aggregate sales for the month reached 125,619,530 shares, which was larger even than for the month of May when the dealings footed up 104,213,954 shares. In June 1932 the sales were only 23,000,594 shares; in June 1931 they were 58,643,847 shares; in June 1930 76,593,250 shares and in June 1929 69,546,040 shares. There were five separate days when the sales each day ran in excess of 6,000,000 shares. On the New York Curb Exchange speculation was also exceedingly active and on that exchange the sales for the month reached 22,545,649 shares, which compares with only 2,720,768 shares in June 1932; 9,972,998 shares in June 1931; 28,128,750 shares in June 1930 and 44,837,500 shares in June 1929. Of the stocks dealt in on the New York Stock Exchange no less than 1,005 attained new high records for the year during the month, and on the Curb Exchange 618 stocks were distinguished in the same way.

The influences responsible for the speculative revival and buoyancy were the same as in the months preceding. They consisted of multiplying indications of recovery in trade and industry as illustrated by such well known and accepted indices as carloadings and the consumption of electricity, both of which ran appreciably in excess of the figures for the corresponding weeks of the preceding year, and also as reflected in the great increase in the production of steel, the steel mills of the country being reported as engaged to 53% of capacity at the end of June as against 41% at the beginning of the month and comparing with only 14% during the period of the bank suspensions in March. Another stimulating factor was the great rise in commodity prices and especially in grain and cotton. The spot price for cotton here in New York rose to above 10c. a pound, with the quotation June 26 10.45c. per pound and with the price June 30 at 10.15c. against 9.25c. on June 1 and less than 6c. a pound in February. In the case of grain, wheat at Chicago for some of the future options (the December option for one instance) rose to above a dollar a bushel with the September option closing June 30 at 93½c. (after having sold at 98½c. June 27) against an opening price on June 1 of 74½c. There were some days when the gains ran as high as 6 and 7c. a bushel, notably on Monday June 26 and Tuesday June 27. The rise in wheat was based on bad crop news from the spring wheat region of the northwest in the United States as well as from the Western provinces of Canada, in both of which much damage was being done by prolonged drought and extremely high temperatures. The growing winter wheat crop in the United States was known to be exceedingly poor, the smallest in a generation, and now there was to be added a reduced spring wheat yield, not only in the United States, but also in the Dominion of Canada, whose crop in 1932 was 428,514,000 bushels, mostly of the spring wheat variety.

The biggest stimulus of all however was furnished by the depreciation of the American dollar as expressed in terms of foreign currency units, and especially the pound sterling and the French franc. The American dollar slumped badly on numerous occasions during the month and each further break in its value furnished fresh occasion for starting a new bull demonstration in securities on the Stock Exchange. The stock market at such times fairly boiled and prices spurted upward with dazzling rapidity. This was on the theory that depreciation of the dollar foreshadowed the success of the Washington program for raising prices to permanently higher levels. Monday June 26 and Tuesday June 27 were conspicuous instances of the kind and the stock market responded the more readily on those occasions as grain and cotton also spurted up with sensational rapidity, partly in response to the same influence, the break in the dollar. The advance in wheat prices carried other grains with it and July corn at Chicago closed June 30 at 52c.

against 44c. the opening price June 1 and July oats at Chicago June 30 closed at 43 3/4c. as against 25c. on June 1. The railroad share list displayed special strength most of the time for the double reason that current reports of carloadings showed large increases over the corresponding periods of the preceding year and that many roads in their return for the month of May recorded strikingly large gains in net earnings because of a drastic reduction in expenses, net earnings often recording marked improvement in net in face of lower gross revenues. The railroad list at one time appeared to be a little under a cloud because of fears that the notice given by the railroads of intention to make a further reduction in wages on top of the 10% decrease already in effect would lead to a strike, but it soon appeared that Mr. Eastman, the railroad co-ordinator, had prevailed upon the railroads to withdraw the proposal.

A few illustrations will serve to show the extent of the rise in prices in the case of individual stocks. As far as the railroads are concerned New York Central sold up from 32 1/4 June 8 to 43 3/4 June 28 and closed June 30 at 43. Delaware & Hudson advanced from 70 June 16 to 82 June 30. Union Pacific rose from 106 June 8 to 120 1/4 June 28 and closed June 30 at 117 3/4; Southern Pacific advanced from 21 June 15 to 31 1/8 June 28, with the close June 30 at 31 1/2; Baltimore & Ohio advanced from 17 1/2 June 16 to 27 1/4 June 30; Southern Railway from 18 1/4 June 16 to 26 June 28, with the close June 30 at 25 3/8; Chesapeake & Ohio moved up from 36 5/8 June 1 to 42 7/8 June 28 with the close June 30 at 41 5/8 and Illinois Central from 25 1/2 June 16 to 33 1/2 June 28, with the close June 30 at 32 3/4. In the industrial and miscellaneous group United States Steel advanced from 51 June 16 to 60 June 28 with the close June 30 at 58, and the preferred from 91 June 16 to 98 June 28, with the close June 30 at 97 1/2; American Tel. & Tel. rose from 116 1/4 June 1 to 132 June 13 and closed June 30 at 127 3/4; J. I. Case Threshing Machine advanced from 70 June 1 to 94 1/2 June 27 with the close June 30 at 88 1/2; General Electric from 20 1/4 June 16 to 25 1/4 June 26, and closed June 30 ex div. at 24; Consolidated Gas of N. Y. advanced from 54 1/2 June 1 to 64 1/2 June 13 and closed June 30 at 57; Allied Chemical & Dye jumped from 101 1/2 June 1 to 122 3/8 June 13, but closed June 30 at 115 1/4; Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. moved up from 41 June 16 to 49 1/4 June 13 and closed June 30 at 46 1/4.

The bond market was as strong as the stock market, and, as a matter of fact, in the case of many low priced issues pursued a faster pace than the share list. U. S. Government bond issues were firm and many foreign issues moved upward with the domestic issues. In the following table we indicate, as usual, the fluctuations for the month in the different issues of United States obligations, and also in a large list of railroad and industrial bonds, and a considerable number likewise of foreign bond issues.

Table with 5 columns: Railroad and Industrial Bonds, Opening Price June 1 1933, Range for June 1933 (Lowest, Highest), and Closing Price June 30 1933. Includes various bond issues like Atch Topeka & S Fe gen 4s, Baltimore & Ohio 1st gold 4s, etc.

Table: Government Bonds. Columns: Bond Name, First Sale June 1, Range During June 1933 (Lowest, Highest), Last Sale June 30. Includes First Liberty Loan, Fourth Liberty Loan, Treasury 4 1/2s, etc.

Table: VOLUME OF BUSINESS ON THE STOCK EXCHANGE. Columns: Month of June, 1933, 1932, 1931, 1930. Rows: Stock sales, Bond sales, Total bond sales, etc.

Table: VOLUME OF BUSINESS ON THE CURB EXCHANGE. Columns: Month of June, 1933, 1932, 1931, 1930. Rows: Stock sales, Bond sales, Total bond sales, etc.

THE MONEY MARKET DURING JUNE 1933.

Unabated ease continued the dominant feature of all branches of the money market during the month of June, although there were some developments which might have served in some slight degree to modify the extreme ease if congestion of idle funds had been less pronounced. As it was, the developments referred to caused not the slightest ripple on the surface of affairs. Doubtless the most important of the new developments was the passage of the Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933, which, among other things, prohibits the payment of interest by member banks on demand deposits. The Act was approved by President Roosevelt on June 16. As the New York Clearing House institutions, owing to the great accumulation of unemployed funds, had been steadily cutting down the rate of interest allowed on deposits until it was only 1/4 of 1% per annum for deposits subject to call, the change, after all, was not a matter of great consequence at the present juncture. But it appeared that the United States Treasury construed the provision also as prohibiting the payment by the banks of interest on Government deposits growing out of the sale of certificates of indebtedness and Treasury notes, and the like. On Monday, June 19, a notice came from the Treasury Department at Washington that beginning with June 15 special depositaries would not be required to pay interest any longer on balances of war loan deposit accounts. These special depositaries on numerous occasions have held enormous amounts of Government deposits growing out of the subscriptions to different war loans, and, as a matter of fact, the Government deposits growing out of the June program of financing just completed, by means of which the Treasury succeeded in marketing \$1,083,540,800 of Treasury notes and certificates of indebtedness, aggregated \$626,901,000, as already stated above. The custom of the Treasury has been to let the depositary banks hold these deposits until they were needed by the Treasury, exacting payment of interest while the banks held possession of them. Under the Reserve Bank's easy money policy, however, the rate had been rapidly reduced during the two or three years preceding. The rate formerly was 2% per annum. This was reduced to 1 1/2% on Dec. 1 1930. On Feb. 16 1931 the rate was further marked down from 1 1/2% to 1%. On June 1 1931 there was another reduction, this time to 1/2 of 1% per annum. As it happened, early in the month under review, the Treasury had given notice of still another reduction, this time to only 1/4 of 1% per annum. But the passage of the Banking Act of 1933 relieved the depositary banks from the necessity of paying any interest at all on Government deposits and obliged the Treasury to rescind its order prescribing the rate at 1/4 of 1%. It was Department circular dated June 2 1933 that gave notice that on June 15 1933 the rate would be cut to 1/4 of 1%, while the Department circular dated June 14 changed this and stated that in view of the provisions of Section 11 (b) of the Banking Act of



1933 the Department circular of June 2 fixing the rate at  $\frac{1}{4}$  of 1% per annum had been eliminated, and that beginning with June 15 1933 special depositories would not be required to pay any interest on deposits of war loan accounts. It was explained that under the new Banking Act, deposits of public funds of the United States were not exempt from the provision that no interest shall be paid by the depository banks on demand deposits, and accordingly, the Treasury had amended its Circular No. 92 so as not to require payment of interest on balances in war loan deposit accounts.

Under the Glass-Steagall Act, while the rate of interest which banks are permitted to pay on demand deposits is forbidden, the rate to be allowed on time deposits is left to the Federal Reserve Board to determine. The law stipulates that the Federal Reserve Board "shall from time to time limit by regulation the rate of interest which may be paid by member banks on time deposits." In the absence of any action along this line by the Reserve Board, the New York Clearing House Committee took it upon itself to fix the time loan rates. The old rate on time deposits was  $\frac{1}{2}$  of 1% per annum. The rate was now reduced to  $\frac{1}{4}$  of 1%, the new rate becoming effective Thursday, June 22. In distinguishing between demand deposits and time deposits, anything under 60 days in a certificate of deposit or 60 days' notice was now prescribed as a demand deposit instead of the former 90 days. It was stated that the Clearing House institutions felt it necessary to reduce the time deposit rate because of the way in which customers had been trying to have deposits converted from the demand to the time deposit classification, to take advantage of the higher interest paid on the latter. The Federal Reserve Board at the same time issued a statement saying that member banks might continue to pay interest on time deposits in accordance with their usual practice, or existing bona fide contracts, until the Federal Reserve Board prescribed regulations on the subject. Preparation of such regulations, it was pointed out, required investigation, study and careful consideration of practical and economic effects, and such regulations would be promulgated as soon as practicable. It was also stated that views of all Federal Reserve banks on the subject had been requested, and would be given consideration before regulations were promulgated.

One effect of the prohibition against further interest payments on demand deposits was to cause a withdrawal from the New York banks of deposits held here by out-of-town banks. The "Monthly Review" of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, under date of July 1, discusses the whole subject at length, as follows:

"The provision of the Banking Act of 1933 which had the most immediate effect on New York City banks was that which prohibits the payment of interest on demand deposits. The enactment of this provision was followed by a considerable shifting of funds by owners of demand deposits. In the week ended June 21, the week in which the Banking Act was signed, the net demand deposits of the principal New York banks declined nearly \$350,000,000, and in the following week there was a further decline of nearly \$100,000,000. A large part of this reduction was in the New York balances of out-of-town banks, but there was some reduction also in other demand deposits. Income tax collections and other Treasury operations during the quarterly tax period undoubtedly caused some decline in demand deposits, but the magnitude of the reduction was too great to be attributed to that cause alone. Coincident with the reduction in demand deposits in the week ended June 21, there was a moderate increase in the time deposits of the New York banks, which during the past few months had tended to decline gradually. This transfer of funds from demand to time deposits appears to have been checked in the following week, however, by a reduction in the rate of interest on time deposits payable in less than six months from  $\frac{1}{2}$  to  $\frac{1}{4}$ %, which became effective on June 22.

"Some indication of the employment of funds which previously had been carried in demand deposit accounts was given by the changes in Government security holdings of the New York banks. For the week ended June 21 these holdings increased only \$86,000,000, whereas allotments of new Treasury securities to the New York banks on June 15 were about \$300,000,000 in excess of maturing securities held by these banks; this would appear to indicate that more than \$200,000,000 of the new securities allotted to the New York banks were resold almost immediately to depositors. In addition, large corporations were reported to be purchasers of bankers' acceptances which previously had been held in the portfolios of the New York banks or carried by bill dealers on loans from the banks. Thus, one effect of the elimination of interest on demand deposits was to transfer some of the earning assets of the New York banks to depositors and at the same time to reduce the deposit liability of the banks.

"To the extent that funds withdrawn from demand deposit accounts in the New York banks were invested in the New York market, no movement of funds away from New York resulted. There were, however, substantial withdrawals of funds from New York during the latter half of June. On June 15 and the few days immediately following, a part of this movement undoubtedly was related to income tax collections and Government financing operations. The withdrawal of funds from banks throughout the country by the Treasury through tax collections and cash sales of new securities was accompanied as usual by the withdrawal by out-of-town banks of a part of their New York balances, and there was some additional movement of funds from New York to other

districts on account of purchases by New York dealers of new Government securities which had been allotted to banks in other localities. The outflow of funds from New York continued, however, beyond the period in which these transactions occurred, with no apparent cause other than the withdrawal of deposits which had ceased to produce any income.

"In their effect on bank reserves these losses of funds by New York banks during the last half of the month were offset in part by a reduction in reserve requirements which accompanied the drop in deposits, and near the end of the month by the gradual disbursement of the large balances which were accumulated in the Reserve banks by the Treasury during the tax period. In addition, purchases of Government securities by the Reserve banks were continued, and there was also some further return flow of currency to the banks. In the four weeks ended June 28 the Reserve banks purchased an aggregate of \$86,000,000 of Government securities, largely in the New York market. The return flow of currency in the same period amounted to \$137,000,000 for the country as a whole, and to perhaps \$40,000,000 in the New York district alone. This represents a somewhat smaller return flow than in the previous month, but the diminished rate may have been due at least in part to an increase in the requirements for currency incident to the expansion of industrial payrolls and the rise in commodity prices.

"Funds received from the open market operations of the Reserve banks and the return flow of currency were used by member banks to effect a further reduction of \$111,000,000 in their borrowings from the Reserve banks during the four weeks ended June 28. Most of the bankers' acceptances in the Reserve banks' portfolios were also retired upon maturity. As a result, the total volume of Federal Reserve credit outstanding showed a small reduction during the four weeks. Excess reserves of member banks outside of New York City showed a large increase, however, and notwithstanding some reduction in New York, there was an increase of at least \$100,000,000 in the total excess reserves of all member banks."

It might be pointed out that the New York Clearing House, in its weekly statements, showed the average of the demand deposits for the week ending July 1 at \$5,892,781,000 as compared with \$6,284,028,000 for the week ending June 17, and the average of the time deposits for the week ending July 1 at \$722,051,000 as against \$655,716,000 the average for the week ending June 17.

Whatever changes occurred during the month of June in the rates for any class of loans was in a downward direction. On the Stock Exchange the call loan rate ruled unchanged throughout the whole month at 1% per annum, this being the charge for new loans as well as the charge for renewals of existing loans. Outside the Stock Exchange call money was available all through the month at  $\frac{3}{4}$  of 1% per annum, and occasionally at only  $\frac{5}{8}$  of 1% per annum. Time loan rates may be said to have remained virtually unchanged, only an occasional time loan being made, and quoted rates being largely nominal.

DAILY RECORD OF TIME LOAN RATES.

June 1933.	Rates on Mixed Collateral.					
	30 Days.	60 Days.	90 Days.	4 Months.	5 Months.	6 Months.
1	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{3}{4}$ @1	$\frac{3}{4}$ @1	1 @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 @1 $\frac{1}{2}$
2	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{3}{4}$ @1	$\frac{3}{4}$ @1	1 @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 @1 $\frac{1}{2}$
3						
4			Saturday			
5			Sunday			
6	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{3}{4}$ @1	$\frac{3}{4}$ @1	1 @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 @1 $\frac{1}{2}$
7	$\frac{3}{4}$ @1	$\frac{3}{4}$ @1	$\frac{3}{4}$ @1	1 @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 @1 $\frac{1}{2}$
8	$\frac{3}{4}$ @1	$\frac{3}{4}$ @1	$\frac{3}{4}$ @1	1 @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 @1 $\frac{1}{2}$
9	$\frac{3}{4}$ @1	$\frac{3}{4}$ @1	$\frac{3}{4}$ @1	1 @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 @1 $\frac{1}{2}$
10			Saturday			
11			Sunday			
12	1	1	1 @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
13	1	1	1 @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
14	1	1	1 @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
15	1	1	1 @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
16	1	1	1 @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
17			Saturday			
18			Sunday			
19	1	1	1 @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ @1 $\frac{1}{2}$
20	1	1	1 @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ @1 $\frac{1}{2}$
21	$\frac{3}{4}$ @1	$\frac{3}{4}$ @1	1 @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ @1 $\frac{1}{2}$
22	$\frac{3}{4}$ @1	$\frac{3}{4}$ @1	$\frac{3}{4}$ @1	1 @1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
23	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{3}{4}$	1	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
24			Saturday			
25			Sunday			
26	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{3}{4}$	1	1	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
27	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{3}{4}$	1	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
28	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{3}{4}$	1	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
29	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{3}{4}$	1	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
30	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{3}{4}$	1	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$

CALL LOANS ON THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE.

June.	Low.	High.	Renewal.	June.	Low.	High.	Renewal.
1		1	1	16	1	1	1
2	1	1	1	17		Saturday	
3		Saturday		18		Sunday	
4		Sunday		19	1	1	1
5	1	1	1	20	1	1	1
6	1	1	1	21	1	1	1
7	1	1	1	22	1	1	1
8	1	1	1	23	1	1	1
9	1	1	1	24		Saturday	
10		Saturday		25		Sunday	
11		Sunday		26	1	1	1
12	1	1	1	27	1	1	1
13	1	1	1	28	1	1	1
14	1	1	1	29	1	1	1
15	1	1	1	30	1	1	1

Commercial paper and bankers' acceptances remained in good demand throughout the month, the supply of both bills and acceptances being at all times insufficient to meet the current demand. Rates for commercial paper at the end of

June ruled at 1½% for extra choice names running from 4 to 6 months and 1¾% for names less well known. Under date of June 23 the New York Federal Reserve Bank issued its customary monthly release, saying that reports received by the Bank from commercial paper dealers showed a total of \$60,100,000 of open market commercial paper outstanding on May 31 1933. This compared with \$64,000,000 April 30, \$71,900,000 March 31, and with \$111,100,000 on May 31 of the previous year.

Rates for bankers' acceptances were further reduced ½% of 1% on the very first day of June in both the bid and the asked column for all dates of maturity, leaving the quotations at ½% bid and ¾% asked for bills running 30, 60 and 90 days; ¾% bid and 1% asked for 120 days, and 1% bid and 1½% asked for 150 and 180 days, and these continued the quotations the remainder of the month. The report of the American Acceptance Council, made public on June 16, showed a drop in the volume of acceptances outstanding for the month ending May 31 in amount of \$28,002,029, and Robert H. Bean, Executive Secretary of the Council, remarked that this reduction more than wiped out the gain shown for the previous month and left the grand total at \$668,811,328 as compared with \$787,414,750 twelve months before, on May 31 1932. He observed, however, that May and June are normally periods of contracting volume, and pointed out that practically the entire reduction in May occurred in the volume of bills outstanding against goods in domestic warehouses plus a drop of over \$9,000,000 in the volume of bills based on goods stored in or shipped between foreign countries. It appeared that during May the accepting banks and bankers increased their holdings of their own bills and of others in the further amount of \$102,000,000, raising the grand total of such holdings to \$505,000,000, or 76% of the grand total of \$668,811,328 of acceptances outstanding on May 31 1933. Commenting on this feature, Mr. Bean observed that not in many months had the accepting banks held such a large volume of their own bills, which normally find their way immediately upon acceptance into the discount market. These banks, he stated, now made practically the whole market, as the Federal Reserve total of bills for their own account at the last report had reached the unprecedentedly low figure of \$11,000,000, while the volume of bills held for foreign account was only slightly in excess of \$40,000,000. Of the total of \$504,000,000 in bills held by accepting banks, \$400,000,000 were held by New York City banks, bankers and agencies of foreign banks. The New York Federal Reserve Bank described the course of the acceptance market during the month of June as follows:

"The market was very quiet in the first half of June, but as the New York banks held moderate excess reserves, dealers' sales of bills exceeded their purchases and portfolios showed a progressive decline. At mid-month, the passing of the Banking Act of 1933 prohibiting the payment of interest on demand deposits in member banks was followed by a substantial increase in the volume of bill market operations. An active demand for bills from non-banking corporations and out-of-town banks developed, and, as offerings of bills in the discount market were rather scattering, dealers' portfolios underwent a further decline. Subsequently there were intermittent offerings of bills by a few city banks, reflecting the elimination of excess reserves in most of the banks during the second half of the month, but the demand by other investors continued to absorb the bills which became available until the closing days of the month.

"At the month-end increased offerings of bills in the discount market resulted in a rise in the supply of bills in the hands of dealers who sold a moderate amount to the Reserve Bank under repurchase agreement. At that time, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York reduced its buying rate for 90-day bills from 2 to 1%."

PRIME BANKERS' ACCEPTANCES.

June.	Call Loans Secured by Acceptances	30 Days Bid & Ask	60 Days Bid & Ask	90 Days Bid & Ask	120 Days Bid & Ask	150 Days Bid & Ask	180 Days Bid & Ask
1	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
2	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
3	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
4	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
5	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
6	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
7	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
8	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
9	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
10	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
11	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
12	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
13	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
14	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
15	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
16	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
17	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
18	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
19	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
20	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
21	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
22	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
23	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
24	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
25	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
26	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
27	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
28	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
29	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾
30	-----	1½-¾	1½-¾	1½-¾	¾-¾	1-¾	1-¾

It remains to be added that the New York Federal Reserve Bank towards the close of June reduced its buying rate for bills running up to 90 days from 2% to 1%, having failed to secure any supply of the bills at the old rate. As a matter of fact, the acceptance holdings of the 12 Reserve institutions

after the sharp reduction in previous months declined further from \$19,862,000 May 31 to \$8,186,000 June 28, and this last consisted almost entirely of foreign bills of the frozen type. The holdings of bills for account of foreign central banks did not vary a great deal during the month from \$36,000,000.

After the reduction in the rediscount rate of several of the Federal Reserve banks towards the close of May there were reductions also in the rediscount rates of several of the other Reserve institutions. The New York Federal Reserve Bank had reduced its rate from 3% to 2½%, effective Friday, May 26, and the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago reduced from 3½% to 3%, effective Saturday, May 27. On May 31 the Boston Federal Reserve Bank reduced from 3½% to 3%, effective June 1, and the San Francisco Reserve Bank made a similar reduction from 3½% to 3%, effective June 2. On June 7 notice came that the Philadelphia Reserve Bank, the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, and the Cleveland Federal Reserve Bank likewise had lowered their rates from 3½% to 3%, the first two effective June 8, and that of the Cleveland Reserve Bank effective June 10. This still left the Richmond Reserve Bank, the Atlanta Reserve Bank, the Minneapolis Reserve Bank, the Kansas City Reserve Bank, and the Dallas Reserve Bank quoting the 3½% rate.

RATES FOR MONEY AT NEW YORK.

	Week Ended—			
	June 10.	June 17.	June 24.	July 1.
Call loans on Stock Exchange—				
Range for wk. (mixed & ind. coll.)	1-1	1-1	1-1	1-1
Week's ave. (mixed & ind. coll.)	1	1	1	1
Time loans (mixed & ind. coll.)—				
Thirty days	¾@1	1	¾@1	¾
Sixty days	¾@1	1	¾@1	¾
Ninety days	¾@1	1 @ 1½	¾@1½	¾
Four months	¾@1½	1¼@1½	1 @ 1½	1
Five months	1 @ 1½	1½	1¼@1½	1½
Six months	1 @ 1½	1½	1¼@1½	1½
Commercial paper—				
Double and single names—				
Prime 4 to 6 months	1¾	1¾	1½@1¾	1¾
Good 4 to 6 months	2	2	1¾@2	1¾

THE RETURNS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS—BROKERS' LOANS IN NEW YORK CITY.

A distinctive feature of the Federal Reserve condition statements during the month of June was the further acquisition of U. S. securities in pursuance of the policy entered upon the previous month and on this there was a repetition of the experience of the previous month in showing that the amount of Federal Reserve credit outstanding was actually reduced somewhat in face of these additional purchases of U. S. securities instead of being increased. The explanation is found in the fact that the proceeds of the purchases of Government securities by the Reserve Banks enabled the member banks to re-enforce their reserves and thus to reduce their borrowings at the Federal Reserve institutions. During the last two weeks of May the holdings of U. S. securities by the twelve Reserve Banks were increased from \$1,836,598,000 May 17 to \$1,889,578,000 May 31. During June there was a further increase in these holdings from \$1,889,578,000 May 31 to \$1,975,212,000 June 28. Contrariwise the discount holdings of the Reserve institutions, reflecting member bank borrowing, were reduced from \$301,974,000 May 31 to \$190,981,000 June 28. At the same time the holdings of acceptances purchased in the open market fell from \$19,862,000 May 31 to \$8,186,000 June 28. The shrinkage in these two items more than offset the expansion growing out of the purchase of additional U. S. securities and accordingly the total of the bill and security holdings of the twelve Reserve Banks, which constitute a measure of the volume of Reserve credit outstanding was reduced from \$2,216,237,000 May 31 to \$2,177,227,000 June 28.

There was also a further contraction in the amount of Federal Reserve notes in circulation. This was in continuation of the contraction in April and May that followed the huge expansion in the amount of Federal Reserve notes put out during the period of the banking troubles in March. The amount of these Federal Reserve notes in circulation further declined during the month of June from \$3,203,102,000 May 31 to \$3,061,324,000 on June 28. As partial offset there was an increase in the amount of Federal Reserve bank notes outstanding from \$96,280,000 May 31 to \$120,081,000 June 28. As against these bank notes no cash reserves are required. Gold holdings were further added to, rising from \$3,519,898,000 May 31 to \$3,543,765,000 June 28. With gold holdings larger and the liability against Federal Reserve notes reduced, because of the contraction in the amount of these Reserve notes outstanding, reserve ratios naturally increased. On the other hand, however, the liability on account of deposits increased inasmuch as these deposits rose from \$2,393,773,000 May 31 to \$2,509,783,000 June 28. The growth in the deposit line follows entirely from the increase in member bank reserves, which constitute the main item in the deposits and which rose from \$2,166,721,000 May 31 to \$2,286,207,000 June 28, these member bank reserves having been reinforced as already stated out of the proceeds of the purchases of U. S. securities by the Federal Reserve Banks. Allowing for the greater liability on the deposits the ratio of total gold reserves and other cash to deposit and Federal Reserve note liabilities combined moved up from 68.0% May 31 to 68.8% June 28.

As for brokers' loans, these increased moderately as a result of the revival of speculative activity on the Stock Ex-

change. As tabulated by the New York Federal Reserve Bank for the reporting member banks in New York City, the increase was only from \$635,000,000 May 31 to \$764,000,000 June 28. In the case, however, of the New York Stock Exchange's own statement, the expansion is found to have been larger, though still moderate. Just as was the case during the preceding month. The Stock Exchange compilation is prepared only once a month and according to the figures for the latest period borrowing by Stock Exchange members on collateral, contracted for and carried in New York, after having increased from \$322,492,188 April 29 to \$528,509,438 May 31, further increased to \$780,386,120, on June 30.

#### COURSE OF STERLING EXCHANGE DURING JUNE.

The course of sterling exchange during June, and, as a matter of fact, the course of all the European exchanges, was controlled almost entirely by the proceedings of the London Monetary and Economic Conference, and by the interpretation placed upon the sayings and utterances of the American delegates, which often were conflicting and most of the time confusing. It will be recalled that toward the close of May all the foreign exchanges became badly demoralized and nervous as a result of the introduction in Congress on Friday, May 26, at the instance of President Roosevelt, of the bill taking the country off the gold basis by statutory enactment. The result altogether was that cable transfers on May 31 sold up to 4.02%. During June the tendency of sterling was steadily upward, but violent further advances did not occur until the London Conference was about to open. Funds kept flowing to London from all parts of the world for safety and security. These came, not alone from Paris and from Holland and Switzerland, but it was even asserted that American exporters were leaving the proceeds of their sales on the other side, and that there was some flow of American capital also to the other side so far as the disturbed state of the foreign exchanges permitted such a course. Likewise, New York banks doing business with Latin America reported the receipt of instructions to convert dollar deposits into sterling—movements, of course, which have the effect of decreasing the foreign deposits in New York and increasing them in London, and of stimulating a rise in sterling. In this state of things the tendency of the pound sterling was naturally upward, and surface indications appeared to show that the British Equalization Fund often intervened to hold the rising tendency in check. At the beginning of the month the effort, too, appeared to be measurably successful, and during the first six days of June cable transfers on London did not sell above \$4.05. On June 7, however, there was a rise to \$4.08%, and on June 8 the rate touched \$4.14, while on Saturday, June 10, there was a rise to \$4.16%. On June 12, the day when the London Conference convened, the range for cable transfers was \$4.14% @ \$4.19%. For a few days now the tendency of rates was downward as a favorable view of the outcome of the London Conference was taken.

But beginning with Monday, June 19, the course of sterling was again upward, and very strongly so, as the attitude of the United States in opposition to early stabilization became more clearly defined. On June 22, when the American delegation issued its statement definitely defining its position, cable transfers sold up to \$4.24¼; for a few days now a further rise was held in check, then the rate moved violently upward as their came a realization that the whole Conference was in danger of being wrecked as the "gold bloc" countries took a most determined stand against the position of the United States, and there were even suggestions that these countries might ask for an adjournment of the Conference or withdraw from it altogether. In this state of things cable transfers on June 27 touched \$4.30%, and on June 28 advanced to \$4.43%. The range on June 30 was somewhat lower at \$4.26 @ \$4.30%, as it appeared that a compromise proposition had been devised which might be found acceptable to the United States. As it happened, these hopes, too, were doomed to disappointment, and on Monday, July 3, the sterling rate again bounded upward in more violent fashion than before, and the American dollar suffered the worst slump of the whole series. During the whole month speculative influences were at work, and to such an extent that the British authorities, according to report, asked the London banks and the Stock Exchange Committee to discourage such transactions and to limit exchange to commercial purchases. The Bank of England continued to add heavily to its gold holdings, and once more appeared as a purchaser of gold in the open market. For the week ended June 7 the Bank showed a gain in gold in amount of £334,771, raising the total of the holdings to the largest amount ever held, and each week thereafter a further increase occurred to a new high record in all time. For the week ending June 14 the further increase was £508,912; for the week ending June 21, £1,030,239, and for the week ending June 28, £1,307,426, raising the total of the holdings to £190,584,121. Twelve months before, on June 29 1932, the aggregate of the holdings was only £136,953,579. Gold kept flowing into London from all parts of the world, and not a little of this was taken for Continental account when offered in the open market, though allowed to remain in London, nevertheless.

The gold movement to and from the United States during June was of moderate proportions, necessarily so because of the gold embargo on the metal. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York reports that there was an increase of about \$3,000,000 in the monetary gold stock of the United States during June, due principally to receipts of bullion from do-

mestic sources. Imports, it is stated, were negligible, and exports of \$1,400,000 to Germany and \$2,100,000 to England represented the release and shipments of gold previously earmarked, which had no effect on the gold stock of the United States.

The Canadian dollar continued to be quoted at a discount, but this discount was reduced as the American dollar itself became more and more depreciated. On June 30 the discount on the Canadian dollar was only 8% @ 8¼c. as against 11% @ 11½ on June 1.

#### THE CONTINENTAL AND OTHER FOREIGN EXCHANGES.

The course of the Continental exchanges was a duplicate of that of sterling exchange. They were all badly demoralized, being often on the verge of panic, as developments regarding the attitude of the United States on the question of prescribing the value of the American dollar steadily thrust the question forward. This was particularly true with reference to the French franc. The news towards the close of May of President Roosevelt's determination to have the United States declared off the gold standard by statutory enactment had produced consternation in Paris and the feeling of apprehension and tension was not relieved during the month of June. The French Government thought it vital to its best interests to have the London Conference arrange for the immediate stabilization of the American dollar, with reference to other European currencies, evidently fearing that the depreciation of the American dollar would otherwise proceed to extreme limits and the insistence of the United States on an opposite policy provoked not only violent opposition on the part of the French, but a feeling of deep resentment, as with the advance of the month the American attitude became by degrees more clearly defined. Rumors were rife that the countries still adhering to the gold standard would be forced off the gold level, and especially France, but the suggestions were repeatedly and vehemently denied. The ultimate result was that French exchange kept steadily rising against New York, involving a corresponding slump in the American dollar, on some days more violently than on others, until on June 28 the French franc on cable transfers sold up to 5.13¼c., with the range June 30 at 4.93½ @ 5.01c., this last comparing with a range on June 1 of 4.65½ @ 4.67½. The par of the French franc is 3.92c., which gives an idea of the extent of the slump in the American unit. With the franc at 5.13¼c., the equivalent value of the American dollar was only 76½c. The Bank of France was able to enlarge its gold holdings week after week, due largely to a heavy flow of gold from Switzerland and Holland, both of which countries appeared to be under the necessity of shipping gold to Paris in order to protect the gold parity of their currencies. But while gold kept flowing to Paris from other Continental centers, there was at the same time evidence of a flight of funds from Paris to London, and this appeared to be due to a propensity to hoard on the part of the French people. In its statement for the week ending June 2, the Bank of France reported an increase in its gold holdings of 110,913,352 francs. In the week ending June 9 the increase was 44,252,954 francs; in the week ending June 16, 74,870,222 francs; in the week ending June 23, 63,644,050 francs, but in the week ending June 30, a decrease of 2,000,000 francs.

The German mark moved against the American dollar the same as the other European currency units. On June 10 Germany, as noted elsewhere, declared a partial transfer moratorium, effective July 1, on long-term and short-term debts except in the case of the standstill credits. The moratorium did not extend to the Dawes or the Young Plan bonds. Cable transfers on Berlin were quoted as high as 30.18 @ 31.15c. June 28, and were 30.05 @ 30.25 June 30, compared with 27.63 @ 27.72 on June 1. The gold position of the Bank of Germany was further greatly weakened during the month. In the first quarter of the month the Bank showed a loss in gold of 21,088,000 marks; in the second quarter a loss of 87,370,000 marks; in the third quarter a loss of 41,210,000 marks, and in the final quarter of the month a loss of 33,942,000 marks, reducing the Bank's gold holdings to only 188,719,000 marks. The note circulation of the Bank decreased 96,196,000 marks in the first quarter; 88,557,000 marks in the second quarter; 84,232,000 marks in the third quarter, with 282,019,000 marks expansion in the fourth quarter.

Italian exchange also emphasized the growing depreciation of the American dollar, and on June 28 the lire was quoted at 6.70 @ 6.86¼c., and on June 30 ranged at 6.62 @ 6.68 against 6.15% @ 6.16 on June 1. The strength of the Italian unit was due in the main to the rise of all the foreign exchanges against the American dollar, but also followed in no small part to the steady improvement in the economic position of Italy, as well as to the conservative policies pursued by the Bank of Italy, which has been adding steadily to its gold holdings while at the same time keeping note circulation within bounds.

In the case of the countries which remained neutral during the war and still adhered to the gold standard (including Holland and Switzerland), the depreciation of the dollar was very pronounced, and rumor was constantly rife that both countries would be forced off the gold standard now that the United States had departed from the standard. These rumors, however, were repudiated by the banking authorities in both countries, and as the month progressed the indications were that along with France they had joined in a common defense of their position. The Dutch guilder on







Table of N.Y. Stock Exchange Bonds, organized by category (Foreign Gov't, Railroads, etc.), with columns for Sales in June Value, Maturity Period, Price Jan. 3 1933, and Prices in June (Lowest, Highest, etc.).

\* Look under list of Matured Bonds on Page 29

N. Y. STOCK EXCHANGE—BONDS

Main table listing bonds with columns for Sales in June Value, Bonds (N. Y. Stock Exchange), Price Jan. 3 1933 (Bid, Ask), Prices in June (June 1, June 30, Lowest, Highest), and Range since Jan. 1 (Lowest, Highest). Includes entries for various issuers like Battle Creek, Chesapeake, and Chicago.

r Cash sale. g Deferred delivery.

\* Look under list of Maturesd Bonds on Page 29.





Table with columns: Sales in June Value, BONDS N. Y. STOCK EXCHANGE, Interest Period, Price Jan. 3 1933, PRICES IN JUNE (June 1, June 30, Lowest, Highest), RANGE SINCE JAN. 1. (Lowest, Highest). Contains extensive data on various bonds including Illinois Central, Standard Oil, and numerous municipal and corporate issues.

r Cash sale. a Deferred delivery.







Main table listing various bonds with columns for 'Sales in June. Value.', 'BONDS N. Y. STOCK EXCHANGE.', 'Price Jan. 3 1933.', and 'PRICES IN JUNE.' The table includes numerous entries with their respective prices and sale details.

\* Cash sale. a Deferred delivery.

\* Look under list of Matur'd Bonds on Page 29.

Table with columns: Sales in June Value, BONDS (N. Y. STOCK EXCHANGE), Interest Period, Price Jan. 3 1933 (Bid, Ask), PRICES IN JUNE (June 1, June 30, Lowest, Highest), RANGE SINCE JAN. 1. (Lowest, Highest). The table lists numerous bond issues with their respective prices and dates.

\* Look under list of Matured Bonds on Page 29.













AGGREGATE SALES.

STOCKS

Price Jan. 3 1933.

PRICES IN JUNE.

RANGE SINCE JAN. 1.

Main table containing stock listings with columns for Shares, Price Jan. 3 1933, Prices in June (June 1, June 30, Lowest, Highest), and Range since Jan. 1 (Lowest, Highest). Includes various stock names like Calumet & Hecla, General Electric, etc.

\* No par value z Ex-dividend. a Optional sale.









AGGREGATE SALES.

STOCKS

N. Y. STOCK EXCHANGE

Price Jan. 3 1933.

PRICES IN JUNE

RANGE SINCE JAN. 1.

Main table listing stocks with columns: In June, Since Jan. 1., Shares, Par, Bid., Ask., June 1., June 30., Lowest., Highest., and Range since Jan. 1. (Lowest., Highest.).

\* No par value x Ex-dividend c Cash sale. a Optional sale.

AGGREGATE SALES.

STOCKS

PRICES IN JUNE.

RANGE SINCE JAN. 1.

Main table containing stock listings with columns for 'In June', 'Since Jan. 1.', 'N. Y. STOCK EXCHANGE', 'Price Jan. 3 1933.', 'June 1.', 'June 30.', 'Lowest.', 'Highest.', and 'Range Since Jan. 1.' (Lowest, Highest). Includes various stock names like Reynolds (RJ) Tob c B, Class A, Rhine Westphalia Elec Fr, etc.

\* No par value. a Optional Sale

Table with multiple columns: AGGREGATE SALES (In June, Since Jan. 1), STOCKS (N. Y. STOCK EXCHANGE), Price Jan. 3 1933 (Bid, Ask), PRICES IN JUNE (June 1, June 30, Lowest, Highest), RANGE SINCE JAN. 1 (Lowest, Highest). Rows list various stock companies like Union Oil, United Aircraft, etc.

\* No par value. z Ex-Dividend. a Optional sale.

























AGGREGATE SALES.

NEW YORK CURB EXCHANGE

Price Jan. 3 1933.

PRICES IN JUNE.

RANGE SINCE JAN. 1.

Table with 2 columns: In June, Since Jan. 1. Lists sales figures for various bonds and stocks.

Table listing bond and stock titles with their corresponding bid and ask prices.

Table with 2 columns: Bid, Ask. Shows price differentials for various securities.

Table with 4 columns: June 1., June 30., Lowest., Highest. Shows price ranges for June.

Table with 4 columns: Lowest., Highest. Shows price ranges from January 1st.

For footnotes see page 54.

NEW YORK CURB EXCHANGE

Table with columns: AGGREGATE SALES (In June, Since Jan. 1.), NEW YORK CURB EXCHANGE (BONDS (Continued), various bond names and amounts), Price Jan. 3 1933. (Bid, Ask), PRICES IN JUNE. (June 1, June 30, Lowest, Highest), RANGE SINCE JAN. 1. (Lowest, Highest). Includes a large list of bond entries with their respective sales figures and price ranges.

\*Footnotes see page 54.





Table with columns: AGGREGATE SALES (In June, Since Jan. 1), NEW YORK CURB EXCHANGE (FOREIGN GOVERNMENT AND MUNICIPAL), Price Jan. 3 1933, PRICES IN JUNE (June 1, June 30, Lowest, Highest), and RANGE SINCE JAN. 1 (Lowest, Highest).

\* No par value. n Sold under the rule. a Deferred delivery sales. r Sold for cash. z Ex-dividend. Under the rule' sales affecting the range were made as follows in 1933: Chicago District Electric 5 1/2s 1935, \$7,000 at 95 1/2 Feb. 2. Cleveland Elec. Illum. 5s, 1939, \$1,000 at 107 1/2 June 1. Crown Central Petroleum, com., 67 at 1 April 24. Narragansett Electric 5s series B 1957, \$1,000 at 10 1/4 Jan. 17. N. Y. & Westchester Ltg. 5s 1954, \$5,000 at 106 1/2 March 27. Tennessee Public Service 5s 1970, \$1,000 at 95 1/2 Jan. 13. United States Rubber 6s 1933, \$8,000 at 100 1/2 May 19. 'Deferred delivery' sales affecting the range were made as follows in 1933: Arkansas Natural Gas, com., class A, 400 at 7 1/2 March 15. American Manufacturing, pref., 30 at 43 1/2 Feb. 7. Associated Gas & Electric 5 1/2s 1938, reg., \$5,000 at 23 1/4 Jan. 24. Associated G & E. 5s 1968, reg., \$1,000 at 13 March 29. Beneficial Industrial Loan, com., 200 at 8 April 19. Central States Electric 5s 1948, \$16,000 at 27 1/2 April 7. Cities Service, com., 100 at 1 1/4 April 13. Commonwealth Edison 5s series A 1953, \$5,000 at 91 April 24. Commonwealth Edison 4 1/2s, series C 1956, \$2,000 at 83 April 24. General Bronze Corp. 6s 1940, \$7,000 at 43 April 10. Indiana Electric 5s series C 1951, \$7,000 at 80 Feb. 1. International Petroleum, 200 at 8 1/2 Feb. 2. Jersey Central Power & Light 5 1/2% pref., 25 at 58 May 29. Niagara Hudson Power, class B option warrants, 100 at 1 1/4 March 21. Peoples Light & Power 5s 1979, \$1,000 at 1 1/4 Jan. 5; \$2,000 at 1 1/2 April 18. Prudential Investors 3/4 pref., 100 at 79, June 20. San Antonio Public Service 5s 1958, \$1,000 at 64 May 3. Syracuse Lighting 5 1/2, 1954, \$1,000 at 109 1/2 Feb. 1. Union American Investment 5s w. w. 1948, \$1,000 at 72 April 12. Western Newspaper Union 6s 1944, \$1,000 at 21 March 16.

Table Brought Forward from Page 16.

RATES OF EXCHANGE ON OTHER CENTRES.

Table with columns for various international locations: June, Canada Dollar, Czechoslovakia Krone, Bucharest Lei, Polish Zloty, Hungary Pengo, Serbia Dinar, Bulgaria Lev, Finnish Markka, Argentina Peso, Brazil Mùreis, Bolivia Bolivi-ano, Colombia Dollar, Ecuador Sucre, Uruguay Peso, Venezuela Bolivar, Chile Peso, Peru Sol, Portugal Escudo, Hong Kong Dollar, Shanghai Dollar, Yokohama Yen, Manila Peso, Singapore Dollar, Bombay Rupee, Java Guilders.

# New York Produce Exchange

## MONTHLY AND YEARLY RECORD

### RANGE OF PRICES ON SECURITIES MARKET ON THE NEW YORK PRODUCE EXCHANGE

	1933.	1932.	1933.	1932.
June	Shares 1,714,839	145,912	Bond Sales.	\$5,000
Jan. 1 to June 30	4,575,070	2,515,391	Jan. 1 to June 30	\$59,000
			Jan. 1 to June 30	40,000

AGGREGATE SALES.		NEW YORK PRODUCE EXCHANGE BONDS	Price Jan. 3 1933.		PRICES IN JUNE.				RANGE SINCE JAN. 1.	
In June.	Since Jan. 1.		Bid.	Ask.	June 1.	June 30.	Lowest.	Highest.	Lowest.	Highest.
\$	\$									
	2,000	Amer Chain 10 yr 6s c d. 1933								
	10,000	Edison El Illum 5s W I. 1936								
	20,000	International Match 5s. 1941	9 3/4	12 1/2						
	16,000	Certificates of deposit. 1941	13 3/4	15						
	6,000	Certificates of deposit. 1947	13 1/2	15						
	1,000	Tri-Contin'l new 5% conv 1953								

Shares.		STOCKS		PRICES IN JUNE.				RANGE SINCE JAN. 1.	
Shares.	Par.	Bid.	Ask.	June 1.	June 30.	Lowest.	Highest.	Lowest.	Highest.
11,200	300								
29,400	11,200								
2,400	173,400								
12,300	2,400								
3,900	12,900								
61,000	20,000								
	3,900								
	92,500								
	10								
	500								
	1,000								
1,100	7,500								
9,000	8,600								
	59,000								
	1,000								
500	1,000								
	200								
300	2,500								
40	40								
100	800								
100	200								
2,500	41,500								
	2,000								
22,900	34,500								
	100								
26,000	26,000								
16,100	27,300								
700	1,300								
500	1,200								
50	50								
12,100	12,200								
5,000	5,000								
500	1,500								
47,900	69,700								
48,700	257,700								
35,100	100								
100	300								
300	64,700								
64,700	10,600								
10,600	200								
500	3,800								
51,500	247,700								
26,000	274,800								
200	2,800								
400	7,800								
600	100								
2,400	2,400								
8,400	8,400								
400	2,450								
200	300								
100	8,700								
3,600	16,000								
1,000	28,000								
2,300	9,700								
50	300								
50	250								
66,200	1,000								
900	238,800								
800	1,000								
65,500	177,700								
	100								
	500								
	4,500								
100	300								
3,100	5,300								
47,500	408,500								
500	195								
32,100	32,100								
200	200								
1,000	2,000								
900	1,200								
200	200								
102,700	182,500								
7,100	7,100								
2,500	25,300								
1,500	1,500								
200	650								
130	220								

\* No par value. a Seller. b Cash sale.







# Philadelphia St'k Exchange

## MONTHLY AND YEARLY RECORD

### RANGE OF PRICES ON PHILADELPHIA STOCK EXCHANGE

Stock Sales. 1933. 1932. Bond Sales. 1933. 1932.  
 June Shares 1,433,277 428,777 June 1933. 1932.  
 Jan. 1 to June 30 4,245,751 3,150,081 Jan. 1 to June 30 613,988 2,860,902

AGGREGATE SALES.		PHILADELPHIA STOCK EXCHANGE BONDS	PRICES IN JUNE.								RANGE SINCE JAN. 1.	
In June.	Since Jan. 1.		Price Jan. 3 1933.		June 1.		June 30.		Lowest.	Highest.	Lowest.	Highest.
\$	\$		Bid.	Ask.	Bid.	Ask.	Bid.	Ask.	Sale Prices.	Sale Prices.	Sale Prices.	Sale Prices.
	2,000	Baltimore & O 4½ s. 1933										
	1,000	4¼ s. 1960										
	1,000	Bell Telephone 5s 1948	108	109	105½	106	106¼	107½			109½	111
	1,000	Chic R I & Pac conv 4¼ s 1960									13¾	14
	7,000	Chic & North West 4¼ s 1949									11½	11½
		Chic Milw St P & Pac Ry Adjustment 5s 2000									4	4
	2,000	Delaware Elec Pow 5¼ s 1959								78½	78½	78½
	4,000	Denver & Rio Grande 4s 1936								33	33	33
88,500	392,000	Elec & Peoples tr cts 4s 1945	20	21½	20	22	20¾	Sale 18½	June 30 23¼	June 6 15	Apr. 6 23½	June 6 17
300	14,088	Certificates of deposit									17	17
10,000	10,000	Free State of Prussia 6s 1952								30	30	30
	7,000	Georgia Power & Lt 5¼ s 1967								82	82	88
	5,000	Keystone Tel 5s 1935	69	70	60	68				68	68	70
5,000	5,000	Lehigh Nav series A 4¼ s 1954						86	June 8 86	June 8 86	June 8 86	June 8 89
5,000	5,000	Series C 4¼ s 1954						89	June 28 89	June 28 89	June 28 89	June 28 86
	1,500	Lehigh & New Eng 5s 1954									86	86
	13,000	Lehigh Power & Light 6s 1954									84½	84½
	7,300	Lehigh Valley 4¼ s 2003			48	52	101	Sale	100¼	June 29 101	June 30 35	35
	41,000	6s 2003									91¼	91¼
	16,000	General 4s 2003									30	30
	2,000	Lehigh Vall Trans A 1st 4½ s 1935									49	49
	15,000	Lukens Steel 1940									32	32
	15,000	Certificates 1955									19	19
	6,000	Nat Dairy Products 5¼ s 1948								81	81	81
	11,000	New Ori Pub Serv inc 6s 1949								30	30	30
	4,000	4¼ s 1935								43¼	43¼	44
	21,000	Penn Cent L & P 4¼ s 1977								62½	62½	62½
	1,000	Penn RR 6¼ s 1936	99	100						100	100	100
	12,000	Penna Pow & Lt 4¼ s 1981	93¼	93¼						89	89	89
	10,000	Peoples Pass tr cts 4s 1943	33	Sale	23	35				24	24	24
	13,000	Phila Elec (Pa) 1st s f 4s 1966									99¼	99¼
	12,000	1st s ref 4s 1971	99¾	Sale	93¾	93¾	96¾	96¾		105½	107½	107½
24,800	133,500	1st s ref 1966	108½	109	107	Sale	107¾				102¼	102¼
1,000	3,500	1st s ref 1966									104¼	104¼
	32,000	Phila Elec Pow Co 5¼ s 1972	106¾						107¾	June 28 107¾	June 28 107¾	June 28 107¾
	5,000	Phila Suburban Water 5s 1955									103	103
	500	Reading 4s 1937									93	93
	14,000	Standard Gas & Elec 6s 1935									43	43
	1,000	Convertible 6s 1935									60	60
	8,000	6s 1951									31	31
	1,000	6s 1966									29	29
	1,000	So East'n Pr & Lt 6s deb 1957									44	44
	1,000	Southern Pacific Co 4¼ s 1968									51	51
	1,000	4¼ s with warrants 1969									51	51
	2,000	4¼ s 1981									50¾	50¾
	2,000	Southern Ry Co 6s 1956									23½	23½
	2,000	Standard Pow & Light 6s 1957									36	36
	6,000	Strawbridge & Clothier 5s 1948									62	62
	1,000	United Light & Rys 6s 1973									40	40
	1,000	York Rys 1st 5s 1987									89½	89½

\* No par x Ex-dividend.

Table with columns: AGGREGATE SALES (In June, Since Jan. 1), PHILADELPHIA STOCK EXCHANGE STOCKS (Railroad Shares Corp., Reading RR, etc.), Price Jan. 3 1933 (Bid, Ask), PRICES IN JUNE (June 1, June 30, Lowest, Highest), and RANGE SINCE JAN. 1. (Lowest, Highest).

\* No par value. z Ex-dividend.

Boston Stock Exchange MONTHLY AND YEARLY RECORD

RANGE OF PRICES ON BOSTON STOCK EXCHANGE

Summary table showing Stock Sales (1933: 1,791,476 shares; 1932: 446,690 shares) and Bond Sales (1933: \$188,950; 1932: \$150,250).

Table with columns: AGGREGATE SALES (In June, Since Jan. 1), BOSTON STOCK EXCHANGE BONDS (Amoskeag Mfg Co 6s, Brown Co 5 1/2s, etc.), Price Jan. 3 1933 (Bid, Ask), PRICES IN JUNE (June 1, June 30, Lowest, Highest), and RANGE SINCE JAN. 1. (Lowest, Highest).

Table with columns: Shares, Stocks (Boston & Albany, Boston Elevated, etc.), Par, Price Jan. 3 1933 (Bid, Ask), PRICES IN JUNE (June 1, June 30, Lowest, Highest), and RANGE SINCE JAN. 1. (Lowest, Highest).

\* No par value. a Assessment Paid. z Ex-dividend. r Cash sale.







# Cleveland Stock Exchange

## MONTHLY AND YEARLY RECORD

### RANGE OF PRICES ON CLEVELAND STOCK EXCHANGE

<b>Stock Sales.</b> June 1933. Shares 89,544 Jan. 1 to June 30 274,100	1932. June 30,708 Jan. 1 to June 30 198,461	<b>Bond Sales.</b> June 1933. \$82,000 Jan. 1 to June 30 \$37,900
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AGGREGATE SALES.		CLEVELAND STOCK EXCHANGE BONDS	PRICES IN JUNE.								RANGE SINCE JAN. 1.		
In June.	Since Jan. 1.		Price Jan. 3 1933.		June 1.		June 30.		Lowest.	Highest.	Lowest.	Highest.	
\$	\$	57,000 Cleveland Railway 5s... 1933 25,000 Firestone of California 5s '42	Bid.	Ask.	Bid.	Ask.	Bid.	Ask.	Sale Prices.	Sale Prices.	Sale Prices.	Sale Prices.	
710	710	<b>STOCKS</b> Aetna Rubber..... 1 1/2 Allen Industries..... 1 1/2 Preferred..... 1 1/2 American Vitrified Prod..... 50 Apex Electric..... 4 3/4 Sale Prior pref..... 40 50 Brown Fence & Wire "B"..... 2 1/2 Brown A preferred..... 3 1/2 5 Byers Machine A..... 2 Canfield Oil preferred..... 100 Central United National..... 20 Chase Brass & Cop pfd..... 100 City Ice & Fuel..... 11 3/4 Sale Pref..... 47 75 Clark Fred G..... 10 Cleveland Builders Supply..... 12 3/4 Cleveland Elec Iron pref..... 62 Cleveland Cliffs III 6% pref 100 Cleveland Rys..... 41 Certificates of deposit..... 39 1/2 40 1/2 Cleveland Securities prior pf..... 117 150 Cleveland Trust..... 10 Cleveland Union Skydys..... 3 3/4 Cleveland Worsted Mills..... 5 Cliffs Corporation v t c..... 1 1/2 Columbus Auto Parts pref..... 80 Commercial Bookbinding..... 300 Corrigan McKinney voting..... 1 Non-voting..... 1 Dow Chemical..... 30 31 Preferred..... 99 1/4 Edwards (Wm) pref..... 100 Elec Controller & Mfg..... 10 20 Faultless Rubber..... 18 Federal Knitting Mills..... 30 Sale Ferry Cap & Set Screw..... 10 Firestone Tire & Rubber..... 10 Firestone T & R 6% pref..... 100 Foote Burt..... 1 7/4 Fostoria Pressed Steel Corp..... 20	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2
493	493	Gabriel Co..... 200 General Tire & Rubber..... 25 6% preferred..... 100 Geometric Stamping..... 2,175 Hidden prior pref..... 100 Goodrich (B F)..... 100 Preferred..... 100 Goodyear Tire & Rubber..... 14 14 1/2 Goodyear 1st preferred..... 80 Great Lakes Towing..... 431 Preferred..... 58 Greif Bros Cooperage..... 793 Guardian Trust..... 598 Halle Brothers..... 660 Preferred..... 176 Hanna MA \$7 pref..... 230 Harbauer..... 590 Harris-Seybold-Potter..... 60 Higbee 1st preferred..... 70 2nd preferred..... 75 India Tire & Rubber..... 20,151 Interlake SS..... 3,557 Jaeger Machine..... 4 Kaynes..... 705 Kelly Island L & T..... 2,720 Korach Company..... 462 Lamson Sessions..... 10,349 McKee B..... 845 Medusa Portland Cement..... 432 Metropolitan Paving Brick..... 323 Miller Wholesale Drug..... 100 Mohawk Rubber..... 6,610 Preferred..... 968 Murray Ohio..... 175 Myers F E & Bro..... 280 Preferred..... 100 National Acme..... 4,810 National City..... 1,605 National Carbon pfd..... 1,601 National Refining..... 5,825 Preferred..... 1,141 National Tool..... 4,676 National Tool pref..... 65 Nestle Le Mur "A"..... 4,284 Nixteen Hundred Corp "A"..... 608 Ohio Brass "B"..... 6,687 Preferred..... 97 Ohio Confection A..... 25 Otis Steel..... 250 Packard Electric stamped..... 30 Packer Corporation..... 880 Paragon Refining B 3d end..... 320 Patterson-Sargent..... 1,596 Peerless Motor..... 2,050 Richman Bros..... 6,822 River Raisin Paper..... 25 Robbins & Myers pref v t c..... 150	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2
280	280	Preferred..... 100 Harris-Seybold-Potter..... 60 Higbee 1st preferred..... 70 2nd preferred..... 75 India Tire & Rubber..... 20,151 Interlake SS..... 3,557 Jaeger Machine..... 4 Kaynes..... 705 Kelly Island L & T..... 2,720 Korach Company..... 462 Lamson Sessions..... 10,349 McKee B..... 845 Medusa Portland Cement..... 432 Metropolitan Paving Brick..... 323 Miller Wholesale Drug..... 100 Mohawk Rubber..... 6,610 Preferred..... 968 Murray Ohio..... 175 Myers F E & Bro..... 280 Preferred..... 100 National Acme..... 4,810 National City..... 1,605 National Carbon pfd..... 1,601 National Refining..... 5,825 Preferred..... 1,141 National Tool..... 4,676 National Tool pref..... 65 Nestle Le Mur "A"..... 4,284 Nixteen Hundred Corp "A"..... 608 Ohio Brass "B"..... 6,687 Preferred..... 97 Ohio Confection A..... 25 Otis Steel..... 250 Packard Electric stamped..... 30 Packer Corporation..... 880 Paragon Refining B 3d end..... 320 Patterson-Sargent..... 1,596 Peerless Motor..... 2,050 Richman Bros..... 6,822 River Raisin Paper..... 25 Robbins & Myers pref v t c..... 150	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2

\* No par value.



# Detroit Stock Exchange

## MONTHLY AND YEARLY RECORD

### RANGE OF PRICES ON DETROIT STOCK EXCHANGE

Stock Sales. 1933. 1932.  
 June ----- Shares 893,330 142,413  
 Jan. 1 to June 30 ----- 2,056,497 1,289,574

AGGREGATE SALES.		DETROIT STOCK EXCHANGE STOCKS	Price Jan. 3 1933.	PRICES IN JUNE.								RANGE SINCE JAN. 1.			
In June.	Since Jan. 1.			June 1.		June 30.		Lowest.		Highest.		Lowest.		Highest.	
Shares	Shares			Bid.	Ask.	Bid.	Ask.	Sale Price.	Sale Price.	Sale Price.	Sale Price.	Sale Price.	Sale Price.	Sale Price.	Sale Price.
1,650	1,900	Alloy Steel class A		1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	Sale	1 1/2	Sale	35c	1 1/2	1 1/2	June 30	3	June 30

\* No par value. a Option sales. r Sold for cash. z Ex-dividend.











RAILROAD BONDS

NOTICE.—All bond prices are "and interest" except where marked "f" and income and defaulted bonds.

Table with columns: Bonds, Bid., Ask., Bonds, Bid., Ask., Bonds, Bid., Ask. It lists various railroad bonds from different companies like Canadian N.W., Chic & North Western, and Detroit & Toledo Shore Line, with their respective bid and ask prices.

b Basis. \* Negotiability impaired by maturity. This price includes accrued int. & Last sale. f In London. m Dollar per 500 francs per £20. n Nominal. r Canadian price s Sale price.

NOTICE.—All bond prices are "and interest" except where marked "f" and income and defaulted bonds.

Table with columns: Bonds, Bid., Ask., Bonds, Bid., Ask., Bonds, Bid., Ask. It lists various railroad bonds such as Holdaysburg Bedford & Cumb, Lehigh & N Y 1st 4s 1945, and Mo Pac (old)—Gen 4s 1975 M&S.

b Basis. f This price includes accrued interest. k Last sale. l In London. m Dollars per 1,000 franc bond. n Nominal. s Sale price

NOTICE.—All bond prices are "and interest except where marked " and income and defaulted bonds

Table with columns: Bonds, Bid, Ask, Bonds, Bid, Ask, Bonds, Bid, Ask. It lists various railroad bonds from different companies like New York Ontario & Western, Philippine Railway, Santa Fe Prescott & Phoenix, etc., with their respective bid and ask prices.

b Basis. f This price includes accrued interest. h Dollars per 1,000-franc bond. k Last sale. l In London. n Nominal. r Sale price. \* Negotiability impaired by maturity.

NOTICE.—All bond prices are "and interest" except where marked "f" and income and defaulted bonds.

Table with columns: Bonds and Stocks, Bid., Ask., Stocks, Par., Bid., Ask., Stocks, Par., Bid., Ask. Includes various railroad bonds and stocks such as Union Pacific, Great Southern, and others.

b Basis. d Price per share, not per cent. f This price includes accrued interest. k Last Sale. l In London. n Nominal s Sale price. y Ex-rights z Ex-dividend. † No par value.





NOTICE.—All bond prices are "and interest" except where marked "T" and income and defaulted bonds

Table with columns: Bonds, Bid., Ask., Bonds, Bid., Ask., Bonds, Bid., Ask. Lists various utility bonds from different regions like Philadelphia, Detroit, and others.

b Basis / This price includes accrued interest / Last sale. n Nominal. r Canadian price. s Sale price. \*Negotiability impaired by maturity.



NOTICE.—All bond prices are "and interest" except where marked "f" and income and defaulted bonds.

Table with columns: Bonds, Bid., Ask., Bonds, Bid., Ask., Bonds, Bid., Ask. Lists various utility bonds such as Hydraulic Power of Niagara Falls, Los Angeles Railway, and others with their respective prices.

b Basis. f This price includes accrued interest. k Last sale. n Nominal. Canadian price. s Sale price. \*Negotiability impaired by maturity

PUBLIC UTILITY BONDS

NOTICE.—All bond prices are "and interest" except where marked "f" and income and defaulted bonds.

Table with columns: Bonds, Bid, Ask, Bonds, Bid, Ask, Bonds, Bid, Ask. It lists various utility bonds such as Mobile Bay Bridge, New York Railways, and Northwest Pub Serv Co, along with their respective bid and ask prices.

B Basis f This price includes accrued interest. k Last sale. l In London. n Nominal r Quotation price. s Sale price. \* Negotiability impaired by maturity

NOTICE.—All bond prices are "and interest" except where marked "f" and income and defaulted bonds.

Table with columns: Bonds, Bid., Ask., Bonds, Bid., Ask., Bonds, Bid., Ask. It lists various utility bonds such as Peoples Gas (N J), Pub Service Co of Nor Ill, San Diego Water Supply, etc., with their respective bid and ask prices.

On Basis. f This price includes accrued interest. k Last sale in London n Nominal. r Canadian price. s Sale price. z Minimum price established on Montreal and Toronto Exchanges. \*Negotiability impaired by maturity.

NOTICE.—All bond prices are "and interest" except where marked "T" and income and defaulted bonds.

Table with columns: Bonds, Bid., Ask., Bonds, Bid., Ask., Bonds and Stocks, Bid., Ask. The table lists various utility bonds and stocks with their respective prices and terms.

\* Negotiability impaired by maturity. b Basis. d Price per share not per cent. f Flat price. k Last sale. l In London. n Nominal. r Canadian price. s Sale price. (t) No par.

NOTICE.—All bond prices are "and interest" except where marked "f" and income and defaulted bonds

Table with columns: Stocks, Par, Bid, Ask. Multiple columns listing various utility stocks and their prices.

a Purchaser also pays accrued dividend. d Price per share, not per cent. k Last sale. l In London. n Nominal. r Canadian price. s Date price. x Ex-dividend. z Minimum price established on Montreal or Toronto Exchange. † Without par value

Table with multiple columns: Stocks, Par, Bid, Ask. Lists various utility companies and their stock prices, including Memphis Natural Gas, Pacific Lighting Corp, and Second Ave RR Corp.

\* Purchaser also pays accrued dividend. d Price per share, not per cent. k Last sale. l In London. n Nominal. r Canadian price. s Sale price. z Ex-dividend. s Minimum price established on Montreal or Toronto Stock Exchange. † Without par value.



NOTION.—All bond prices are "and interest" except where marked "f" and income and defaulted bonds.

Table with columns: Bonds, Bid., Ask., Bonds, Bid., Ask., Bonds, Bid., Ask. It lists various industrial and miscellaneous bonds with their respective prices and terms.

1 Basis. f This price includes accrued interest. t Last sale n Nominal. r Canadian prices. s Sale price f Less 1. s Minimum price established Montreal and Toronto Stock Exchanges \* Negotiability impaired by maturity.



NOTICE.—All bond prices are "and interest" except where marked "f" and income and defaulted bonds.

Main table of bond listings with columns for Bonds, Bid, Ask, and multiple columns of bond descriptions and prices.

EXCHANGE SEATS.

Table listing exchange seats with columns for No., Last Sale, and various exchange names like N Y Stock Exch., N Y Produce Exch., etc.

Bottom section containing explanatory text for various symbols and abbreviations used in the bond listings.





Table with 15 columns: Stocks, Par, Bid., Ask., Stocks, Par, Bid., Ask., Stocks, Par, Bid., Ask., Stocks, Par, Bid., Ask. Lists various industrial and miscellaneous stocks with their respective prices and shares.

a Purchaser also pays accrued dividend. d Price per share, not per cent. k Last sale. n Nominal. r Canadian price. s Sale price. t New stock. u Ex-cash and stock dividend. v Ex-stock dividend. x Ex-dividend. y Ex-rights. z Minimum price established on Montreal and Toronto stock and curb exchanges. † Without par value.

Table with 16 columns: Stocks, Par., Bid., Ask., Per share. Multiple columns of stock listings including Hazelton Corp, Hearst Consol Pub, H Rubenstein, etc.

a Purchaser also pays accrued div. d Price per share, not per cent k Last sale n Nominal. r Canadian price. s Sale price. z Ex-dividend. y Ex rights. z Minimum price established on Montreal and Toronto Stock and Ourb Exchanges. 1 Without par value.

Table with 12 columns: Stocks, Bid, Ask, Stocks, Bid, Ask, Stocks, Bid, Ask, Stocks, Bid, Ask. Lists various industrial and miscellaneous stocks with their respective bid and ask prices.

a Purchaser also pays accrued div. d Price per share, not per cent. k Last sale. n Nominal. r Canadian price. s Sale price. z Ex-dividend. y Ex-rights. z Minimum price established on Montreal and Toronto stock and curb exchanges. † No par value.









Table with columns for Bonds, Yield Basis (Bid., Ask., To Net.), and various bond details. Includes sections for BERGEN, NORWAY; IDAHO; ILLINOIS; INDIANA; INDIAN TERRITORY; IOWA; CANADA; and GEORGIA.

Basis, f Flat price, k Last Sale. \* Negotiability impaired by maturity. n Nominal. o Tax-exempt, under a law approved March 9 1903, and which went into effect April 23 1903, bonds issued after that date by municipal corporations are tax-exempt and these sell on a better basis. s Sale price.



STATE AND MUNICIPAL BONDS

Table with columns for Bonds, Yield Basis (Bid, Ask, To Net), and various bond details. It is organized into sections for different states: DETROIT (concluded), NEW HAMPSHIRE, NEW JERSEY, MISSOURI, MINNESOTA, MONTANA, NEBRASKA, and MISSISSIPPI. Each entry includes bond type, date, and financial terms.

o Basis. n Now paid by N. Y. City. f Flat price. n Nominal. o Tax-exempt; under a law approved March 13 1909, and which went into effect Sept. 1 1909 bonds issued after that date by municipal corporations are tax exempt and these, accordingly, sell on a better basis.

Table of State and Municipal Bonds. Columns include Bond Name, Yield Basis (Bid., Ask., To Net), and Bond Name, Yield Basis (Bid., Ask., To Net). Rows list bonds from various municipalities including Hunterdon County, Jersey City, Newark, and New York.

b Basis. d Now part of N. Y. City. f Flat price. n Nominal.

Main table of State and Municipal Bonds with columns: Bonds, Yield Basis (Bid, Ask), To Net, and To Yield Basis (Bid, Ask). Includes sections for New York City, North Carolina, and various other municipalities.

Basis. f Flat price. n Nominal. \* Subject to taxation: By an amendment to the constitution of Ohio, adopted Sept. 3 1912, bonds issued after Jan. 1 1913 by municipalities in that state are subject to taxation. s Sale price.









National Banks Dec. 31. COLORADO State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table with columns: Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par, Bid, Ask, Nomi Per share, and various bank names like Colorado Spgs., Denver, Leadville, Pueblo.

National Banks Dec. 31. CONNECTICUT State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table with columns: Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par, Bid, Ask, Nomi Per share, and various bank names like Bridgeport, Hartford, Meriden, New Haven, Stamford, Waterbury.

National Banks Dec. 31. DELAWARE State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table with columns: Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par, Bid, Ask, Nomi Per share, and various bank names like Wilmington, Farmers' Nat Bank, Delaware Trust Co.

National Banks Dec. 31. DIST. OF COLUMBIA State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table with columns: Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par, Bid, Ask, Nomi Per share, and various bank names like Washington, Columbia Nat Bank, Federal Amer Nat'l Bank.

National Banks Dec. 31. FLORIDA State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table with columns: Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par, Bid, Ask, Nomi Per share, and various bank names like Jacksonville, Lakeland, Miami, Orlando, Pensacola, Tampa, West Palm Beach.

National Banks Dec. 31. GEORGIA State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table with columns: Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par, Bid, Ask, Nomi Per share, and various bank names like Atlanta, Augusta, Columbus, Macon, Savannah.

\* Sale price. † Branch of Savannah. ‡ Affiliates of the Hartford National Co. § Reorganized National Tradesmen's Bank & Trust Co. of New Haven, Conn. ¶ Member of the Atlantic Group in Florida. †† Member of the First National Bank of Atlanta, Ga. ‡‡ Sept. 30 1932. §§ Member of the Florida National Group. ††† Affiliated with the Barnett National Bank of Jacksonville, Fla. †††† April 7 1933. ††††† The directors of the R. F. C. have authorized the purchase of \$75,000 preferred stock in the reorganization of the Winthrop Trust Co. of New London, Conn. †††††† Last sale. ††††††† In liquidation; taken over by State Banking Dept. in March 1933. †††††††† March 31 1933. ††††††††† In process of reorganization. †††††††††† Combined statement. ††††††††††† May 31 1933. †††††††††††† Trust funds. ††††††††††††† June 30 1933. †††††††††††††† Ex-dividend.

State Institutions Dec. 31. IDAHO

Table with 7 columns: Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par., Bld., Ask. Includes Boise City—First Nat Bk of Idaho, First Security Bank, Boise Trus Co.

National Banks Dec. 31. ILLINOIS State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table with 7 columns: Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par., Bld., Ask. Includes Aurora—Aurora Nat Bank, Merchants Nat Bank, Old Second Nat Bank; Belleville—Belleville Bk & Tr Co; Chicago—Aetna State Bank, Amer Nat'l Bk & Tr, etc.

National Banks Dec. 31. ILLINOIS State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table with 7 columns: Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par., Bld., Ask. Includes Quincy—Mercantile Tr & S Bk; Rockford—Illinois Natl Bk & Tr Co; Springfield—First National Bank.

National Banks Dec. 31. INDIANA State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table with 7 columns: Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par., Bld., Ask. Includes Evansville—Citizens' Nat Bank, Citizens Tr & Sav Bk; Fort Wayne—Lincoln Nat Bk & Tr; Indianapolis—Fletcher-Am Nat Bk; South Bend—Citizens Nat Bank.

National Banks Dec. 31. IOWA State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table with 7 columns: Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par., Bld., Ask. Includes Burlington—Farmers & Merch S B; Cedar Rapids—Ced Rap SB&Tr Co; Iowa State Sav Bk.

\* Sale price.
a Placed in the hands of the State Auditor on April 28 1933.
b In process of reorganization.
c Sept. 30 1932.
d New stock
e June 30 1933.
f First National Bank of Burlington, Iowa, chartered on May 29 1933 by the Comptroller of the Currency.
g March 25 1933.
h First National Bank of Chicago, Ill., on June 9 1933 absorbed the trust business of its former affiliate the First Union Trust & Savings' Bank.



National Banks Dec. 31. MASSACHUSETTS State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table listing Massachusetts banks with columns for Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par., Bid., Ask., and Nominal share.

National Banks Dec. 31. MICHIGAN State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table listing Michigan banks with columns for Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par., Bid., Ask., and Nominal share.

National Banks Dec. 31. MINNESOTA State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table listing Minnesota banks with columns for Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par., Bid., Ask., and Nominal share.

National Banks Dec. 31. MISSISSIPPI State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table listing Mississippi banks with columns for Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par., Bid., Ask., and Nominal share.

National Banks Dec. 31. MISSOURI State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table listing Missouri banks with columns for Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par., Bid., Ask., and Nominal share.

\* Sale price. † No par. a Conservator appointed. b First National Group. c Includes savings deposits. d Sept. 30 1932. e Affiliated with the Worcester Bank & Trust Co. f Capital National Bank in Jackson, Miss., successor to the Capital National Bank and the Citizen's Saving Bank & Trust Co. both of Jackson, opened for business on June 21 1933. g Trust deposits. h See Marquette National Bank. i Member of Northwest Bancorporation. j Bay State National Bank and the Merchants' Trust Co., both of Lawrence, Mass., contemplate reopening for business under the charter of the former, about July 1 1933. k Last sale. l March 14 1933. m American National Bank of St. Paul affiliate. n Member of the First Bank Stock Corp. o In process of liquidation. p Member of the Guardian Detroit Union Group, Inc., Detroit. q March 31 1933. r Receiver appointed by Comptroller of the Currency. s June 30 1933. t Ex-dividend. u April 4 1933. v Consumption of the reorganization plan of the Worcester Bank & Trust Co. and the Worcester County National Bank became effective June 12 1933. w In process of reorganization.

National Banks Dec. 31. MISSOURI State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table listing Missouri banks with columns for Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par., Bid., Ask., and Nominal Per share.

National Banks Dec. 31. MONTANA State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table listing Montana banks with columns for Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par., Bid., Ask., and Nominal Per share.

National Banks Dec. 31. NEBRASKA State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table listing Nebraska banks with columns for Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par., Bid., Ask., and Nominal Per share.

National Banks Dec. 31. NEVADA State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table listing Nevada banks with columns for Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par., Bid., Ask., and Nominal Per share.

National Banks Dec. 31. NEW HAMPSHIRE State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table listing New Hampshire banks with columns for Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par., Bid., Ask., and Nominal Per share.

National Banks Dec. 31. NEW JERSEY State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table listing New Jersey banks with columns for Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par., Bid., Ask., and Nominal Per share.

\* Sale price.
a Affiliated with the Trust Co. of New Jersey, Jersey City.
b Includes security stock.
c Sept. 30 1932.
d March 15 1933.
e Member of Northwest Bancorporation.
f Merger of the Trust Co. of Orange, Orange, N. J., with the Savings Investment & Trust Co. of East Orange contemplated. Proposed basis of exchange is five shares of \$25 preferred stock, to be issued by the Savings Investment & Trust Co. for one share of the \$100 par stock of the Trust Co. of Orange.
g Member First Bank Stock Corp.
h On a restricted basis.
i In process of reorganization.
k Effective June 26 1933 the Hudson County National Bank of Jersey City, N. J., acquired the Journal Square National Bank of Jersey City.
l Last sale.
n June 30 1932.
o Order granted by Vice-Chancellor Lewis in Jersey City, N. J., permits the purchase of the assets of the closed Steneck Trust Co. of Hoboken, N. J., by the Seaboard Trust Co. of Hoboken, a newly-organized institution.
p Conservator appointed.
r March 31 1933.
s June 30 1933.
t New stock.
z Ex-dividend.

National Bank Dec. 31. NEW JERSEY State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table listing banks in New Jersey with columns for Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par, Bid, Ask, and Nominal share.

National Banks Dec. 31. NEW YORK State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table listing banks in New York with columns for Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par, Bid, Ask, and Nominal share.

National Banks Dec. 31. NEW YORK State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table listing banks in New York with columns for Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par, Bid, Ask, and Nominal share.

Table listing banks in New York with columns for Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par, Bid, Ask, and Nominal share.

\* Sale price. a Sept. 30 1932. b Federal conservator appointed. c Dec. 31 1932. d Withdrawals against deposits or other credits limited temporarily. e The Central Bank of Albany, New York on March 21 1933 taken over by the State Banking Department at the request of the bank's directors. f The Auburn-Cayuga National Bank & Trust Co. of Auburn, N. Y., on May 31 1933 changed its title to the National Bank of Auburn. g March 15 1933. h April 14 1933. i Controlled by Marine Midland Corp. k Closed. l Last sale. m On June 9 1933 the Bank of the Manhattan Co. of New York reduced its surplus and undivided profits from \$36,931,700 to \$31,931,700, leaving a surplus of \$25,000,000 and undivided profits of \$6,931,700. n Effective June 12 1933 the National City Co. changed its corporate name to "The City Company of New York, Inc." o April 15 1933. p March 31 1933. q In process of reorganization. r Hamilton Trust Co. of Paterson, N. J., and its Moravia and North Main Street branches reopened for unrestricted business on June 21 1933. s June 30 1933. t New stock. z Ex-dividend.

National Banks NORTH CAROLINA State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table listing banks in North Carolina with columns for Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par., Bld., and Ask. Includes entries for Asheville, Charlotte, Durham, Greensboro, Raleigh, and Wilmington.

National Banks NORTH DAKOTA State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table listing banks in North Dakota with columns for Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par., Bld., and Ask. Includes entries for Fargo, Dakota Nat Bank, and Fargo National Bank.

National Banks OHIO State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table listing banks in Ohio with columns for Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par., Bld., and Ask. Includes entries for Akron, Canton, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Toledo, and Youngstown.

National Banks OKLAHOMA State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table listing banks in Oklahoma with columns for Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par., Bld., and Ask. Includes entries for Guthrie, McAlester, Muskogee, and Tulsa.

National Banks OREGON State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table listing banks in Oregon with columns for Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par., Bld., and Ask. Includes entries for Eugene, Portland, and United States NBK.

National Banks PENNSYLVANIA State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table listing banks in Pennsylvania with columns for Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par., Bld., and Ask. Includes entries for Allentown, Erie, Harrisburg, Lancaster, Philadelphia, and York.

\* Sale price. † Central Savings Bank & Trust Co. of Canton, Ohio, has not as yet received a license from the State to reopen. a The National Bank of Tulsa, at Tulsa, Okla., formerly the Exchange National Bank, has acquired the business of the Central State Bank of Tulsa.







National Banks Dec. 31. WISCONSIN State Institutions Dec. 31.

Table with columns: Capital, Surplus & Profits, Gross Deposits, Par., Bid., Ask., and various bank names like La Crosse, Milwaukee, and Wisconsin State Bank.

Canadian Bank Statements

Returns are all of April 29 1933. Prices are per cent. not per share.

NOVA SCOTIA

Table for Nova Scotia banks: Halifax Bank of Nova Scotia with columns for Capital, Reserve Fund, Gross Deposits, Par., Bid., Ask.

ONTARIO

Table for Ontario banks: Toronto Bank of Toronto, Can Bank of Comm, Dominion Bank, Imperial Bank of Can.

QUEBEC

Table for Quebec banks: Montreal Bank of Montreal, Banque Canadienne, Barclays Bk (Canada), Provincial Bk of Can, Royal Bk of Canada.

Notes and footnotes for Canadian bank statements, including sale prices, consolidation info, and dates.

National Banks Dec. 31. WYOMING

Table for Wyoming banks: Cheyenne American Nat Bank, Stock Growers N Bk.

Real Estate Bonds

Large table of Real Estate Bonds with columns: Bonds, Bid., Ask., Bonds, Bid., Ask., Bonds, Bid., Ask. listing various properties and bond details.

f Flat price, n Nominal, s Sale price, k Last sale, \* Negotiability impaired by maturity.

