Formerly a Section of the Commercial \& Financial Chronicle

# BANK QUOTATION RECORD 

New York Stock Exchange<br>New York Curb Exchange<br>Chicago Stock Exchange<br>Philadelphia Stock Exchange<br>Los Angelès Stock Exchange San Francisco Stock Exchange

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## REVIEW OF OCTOBER-COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL EVENTS.

The overshadowing event in October was, of course, the panic on the Stock Exchange and the incidents and occurrences connected with it. It was unquestionably the worst panic in Stock Exchange history and may, in fact, be termed the greatest stock market catastrophe of all the ages. All previous stock market convulsions and collapses in ralue pale into insignificance alongside the overwhelming destruction in market prices which occurred on this occasion, not even excepting the havoc wrought to security values by the sudden outbreak of the World War in August 1914, when the Stock Exchange had to be closed for several months, trading not being resumed until the following December. The situation, however, on this preceding occasion of utter collapse in prices was vastly different than that now encountered. No speculative orgie prevailed in 1914, and there was no overtrading. Prices had not been carried to dizzy heights and, indeed, inflation was entirely absent. As a matter of fact, the stock market then had been weak and declining. It was the period of the first Wilson administration, when the country's industries were experiencing a state of depression and the Stock Exchange reflected that fact. The bottom dropped out of the stock market at that time because of the destruction that was seen to be impending as the result of this, the greatest military conflict of all time, and which was to involve such an immense sacrifice of life and property and also because it was seen that the first and immediate effect, as far as the United States ras concerned, would be the dumping of American securities held by the billions in Europe upon the American market.
In contradistinction, the October 1929 panic marked the culmination of the greatest stock market debauch of which history furnishes any record. Fed by Federal Reserve credit, which was ever on tap, and especially stimulated by the easy money policy inaugurated by the Federal Reserve authorities in the Summer of 1927 for the supposed benefit of Europe, but which in the end proved more damaging to Europe than to any other part of the world, a speculation developed which quickly got beyond control and raised money rates eventually to such high levels that New York became a magnet drawing all available supplies of investment and banking funds from every quarter of the habitable globe and finally produced a situation where only a few days before the opening of the month of October-that is, on Sept. 261029 the Bank of England was obliged to raise its rate of discount from $51 / 2$ to $6 \frac{1}{2} \%$ after having the previous Feb. 7 moved the rate up from $4 \frac{1}{2}$ to $51 / 2 \%$. As a result of an this, prices in the stock market were raised
higher and still higher, in response to speculative manipulation which cannot be said to have had any parallel in the past but which thrived and flourished since as a necessary corollary it found public support on a scale and of a character and magnitude which likewise has never previously had a parallel.
As was pointed out in the columns of the "Financial Chronicle," never before has the country fallen prey to such an unbridled speculation; never before did a speculative craze have such a prolonged period of existence during which it kept expanding and ever widening in character; never before did such a speculation obtain such a firm grip on the entire world, abroad as well as at home, and never before was there a speculation which so fired the popular imagination everywhere, nor one so far-reaching in its effects, the final result being that all trade and all the ordinary activities of business to the farthest corners of the earth fell under complete subjection to it.
As prices, under speculative manipulation, rose higher and still higher, as fortunes were made through the prodigous appreciation in market values, old reckonings were cast aside, all reason abandoned, and it seemed as if all economic law had been suspended and a new era had opened up in which success and prosperity could be attained without any aid or endeavor except speculation on the Stock Exchange. Everyone became seized with the idea that it was possible to get rich overnight by simply taking flyers in the stock market. Accordingly, everyone became fascinated by the fluctuations on the Stock Exchange, and everyone a participant therein. Scrubwomen, porters, elevator boys, typists, bootblacks, soda fountain attendants, clerks, statisticians, actors and actresses, business executives - in fact, all classes of the population from the highest to the lowest, the humblest as well as those most exalted, one and all became a prey to the consuming speculative craze. Some put only a little at stake, others their all.
Plainly such a rampant speculation and such an untamed speculative spirit could not continue forever, and, to careful observers, even if not to the general public, the end had long seemed inevitable. The outcome, in any event, was never in doubt, and it is unnecessary to make any inquiry as to the cause or causes of the ultimate collapse. The simple fact is that the market dropped of its own weight, and the decline was in proportion to the antecedent rise, which was of such dimensions as really to stagger the imagination and to impeach the judgment of the sober minded. A diagram was published in the "Monthly Review" of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for Nov. 1 which indicates that there was an almost uninterrupted rise in stock prices from the Autumn of 1923 to September 1929, a period of six years, and it is pointed out that the swing upward was the largest in the 30 years covered by the diagram and that the October break was the most severe on record for so brief a period (it having extended over only about five and six weeks, even if the decline which occurred the latter part of September is taken into consideration), measured by the average price declines and one of the most severe in the percentage decrease in prices. Careful examination of this diagram, however, makes it plain that the rise, while extending aver so long a period, with only minor deviations in the upward course, kept within moderate bounds until the Federal Reserve System entered upon its easy money policy in 1927. At the date mentioned Stock Exchange speculation was dormant, even
though the stock market was not experiencing actual reverse, and it appeared no easy matter to revive the drooping speculative spirit. This was because the country's industries were for the time being showing moderate recessions. The member banks were borrowing very little and could not be induced to extend their use of the facilities of the Reserve System, even, when the rediscount rate of the Federal Reserve Banks was marked down to the inordinately low figure of $3 \frac{1}{2} \%$, and, accordingly, the Reserve Banks were obliged to engage in huge purchases of United States Government securities in order to put extra amounts of Reserve credit into use. This led to a new era of speculation which then passed entirely beyond control, leaving the Reserve authorities themselves helpless and impotent when, too late, they realized what was happening and sought to undo the mischief which they had so unwittingly created. The speculation kept steadily gaining momentum and widening and spreading until the crash came in October. The higher priced stocks, mainly industrial and public utility issues, representing properties of undoubted merit and of high earning capacity, such as United States Steel, General Motors, General Electric and American Tel. \& Tel became prime favorites and were used as leaders in carrying prices forward and ever upward, and served excellently well for the purpose. With these as a basis, group after group of stocks was raised to new high levels, many entirely devoid of the merits possessed by the leaders, and these leaders themselves were in the end raised so high that future prospects appeared discounted on a basis far beyond reasonable probabilities. The final result was that prices were raised to a level where the return measured either by current dividends or even full current earnings, not distributed, was in numerous instances not more than 3 or 4\%, and even less. And this was done with borrowed money in the shape of brokers' loans on which the borrowers had to pay $8 \%$ or $10 \%$ or $12 \%$ interest, and in some instances and on some occasions (as in the previous March) even $15 \%$ and $20 \%$-from which the abnormal character of the speculative craze becomes readily apparent.
As to the extent of the rise in prices during the last two years and the decline which came with such suddenness in October, the New York "Times" has been keeping records for many years of the changes in prices from day to day and from week to week and from month to month of 50 special stocks of a high order, 25 of these being industrial stocks and 25 railroad issues. The 25 industrial shares rose from an average of 171.49 Jan. 251927 to 469.49 on Sept. 19 1929, and then tumbled to 247.56 Oct. 29, the low point in the downward movement, and in the upward rebound in the last two days of the month recovered to 327.12. The speculation in the railroad list was much more subdued and more rational, though even a few prime favorites among these enjoyed very sharp advances, and if these are taken into account the combined average for the 50 stocks shows a rise from 135.82 on Jan. 271927 to 311.90 Sept. 19 1929, from which there was a drop to 183.50 Oct. 29 , with a recovery in the upward rebound on Oct. 30 and Oct. 31 to 230. Taking a more comprehensive list of stocks such as contained in compilations kept by the Standard Statistics Co. in which are embraced 90 stocks altogether, consisting of 50 industrial shares, 20 railroad shares and 20 public utilities, consideration being given to the volume of stock outstanding, the same violent fluctuations are disclosed, only a little less wide, and these 90 stocks advanced from 104.7 Jan. 271927 to 253.5 Sept. 30 , and in the break on Oct. 29 got as low as 162.2, from which there was a rebound to 192.2 at the close on Oct. 31.

What precipitated the eventual crash was that the market kept steadily weakening, beginning the latter part of September, and that the cumulative losses reached such proportions that stop loss orders without number were encountered and that the movement then was aided by the calling of loans on the part of investment trusts and other large outside lenders on such a scale as completely to undermine the price structure, which then fell into general ruin. One important fact, however, that should not be overlooked is that tension in the money market had nothing to do with the ultimate breakdown. There was, in fact, no money tension when the panic actually developed. It had completely disappeared. It will ever remain a characteristic of this panic that no money tension preceded it and none
followed. This is the more noteworthy as brokers' loans kept steadily expanding and reached new high figures the first half of October, the amount on Oct. 16 falling only $\$ 3,000,000$ below the new high record attained in all time two weeks before, on Oct. 2 , the tremendous shrinkage in these loans which eventually did come not occurring until after the panic. In face of all this, money rates precipitately declined, and, moreover, the ease extended to all branches, of the money market-call loans, time loans and bankers' acceptances as narrated at length in our review of the money market further along in this article. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York had in August advanced its rediscount rate from $5 \%$ to $6 \%$, presumably with a view to preventing any further diverting of bank credit into speculative channels, but failed to accomplish anything along that line, as was made evident by the further expansion in brokers' loans. It had, at the same time, resumed the purchase of bankers' acceptances and lowered its buying rate for acceptances from $51 / 4 \%$ to $51 / 8 \%$ (and in October to $5 \%$ ) with a view to assisting the mercantile community and make feasible its policy of acquiring large lines of acceptances, and had actually been heavily increasing its holdings of acceptances, week after week, but as this was attended by a diminution of member bank borrowing at the Reserve institutions and by the selling by the Reserve Banks of considerable amounts of their United States Government securities, no increase in the amount of Reserve credit outstanding occurred-in fact, some small decrease resulted-barring, of course, the final week of October, when the panic made a change necessary. All the particulars in this respect are set out at length in our review of the money market, and it is intended here simply to note the fact that whatever the cause or explanation there was growing ease in the money market in the period immediately preceding the great convulsion on the Stock Exchange and that the panic which ensued cannot be ascribed in any degree, near or remote, to money tension, even though money tension was a disturbing influence at various other times during 1929.
As already stated, the stock market was weak during much of the month of September and experienced numerous sinking spells during that month. The weakness extended into the early part of October, after which for a few days the tone of the market seemed to improve, aided by extensive covering of outstanding short contracts. After the 11th and 12th of October, however, it suffered one bad turn after another, and prices declined day by day with alarming rapidity. The crisis came on Thursday, Oct. 24 , when the bottom almost completely dropped out of the market. The selling now proved overwhelming. It is not the purpose here to go into the details of what then happened on the Stock Exchange, since that is covered in the proper place in our narrative of the course of the stock market, under a separate heading, on subsequent pages. It is intended here simply to note the larger outlines of the panic because of their bearing on the general situation. At the noon hour on Thursday, Oct. 24, the stock market was in such a state of convulsion that a gathering of leading bank executives took place at the office of J. P. Morgan \& Co.-an impromptu gathering, as it were-all, however, moved by a common sense of danger. Among those attending were Charles E. Mitchell of the National City Bank, Albert $H$. Wiggin of the Chase National Bank, W. C. Potter of the Guaranty Trust Co., and Seward Prosser, head of the Bankers' Trust Co. Subsequently, George F. Baker, Jr., also participated in the conferences, which continued day by day thereafter as the situation became increasingly grave. Thomas W. Lamont of J. P. Morgan \& Co. became spokesman at the conferences in which several of the other partners of the Morgan firm also participated, Mr. Morgan himself being in Europe. The action of the bankers, which was directed towards insuring orderly marketing conditions, had a reassuring effect, though it did not suffice to check the deluge of selling. The aggregate of the sales on the Stock Exchange on the day mentioned reached $12,894,650$ shares, to which the sales on the Curb Exchange contributed a further $6,337,400$ shares, making the combined total for that single day $19,232,050$ shares-both, of course, records never previously even closely approached. The next day, Oct. 25, the market enjoyed a sharp rally, largely because it was supposed that the bankers' consortium had obtained
control of the situation, but that, unfortunately, proved not to be the case. The followling Monday, Oct. 28, the trouble broke out afresh. Selling on a very extensive scale was resumed, and finally became so overwhelming as to sweep everything before it. The banking consortium heroically sought to check the outpour, with attending destruction in values, but was able to accomplish little or nothing in that direction. The turnover on the New York Stock Exchange on Monday, Oct. 28, reached $9,212,800$ shares, and that on the New York Curb Exchange 4,152,900 shares, making $13,365,700$ shares for the two exchanges combined, but it remained for the next day, Oct. 29, to demonstrate the full magnitude of the selling movement, the transactions on the New York Stock Exchange alone on that day reaching the astonishing total of $16,410,030$ shares and the dealings on the Curb Exchange $7,096,300$ shares more, making an aggregate for the two exchanges together of over $231 / 2$ million shares. It was estimated that the further decline on these two days alone, counting all the securities dealt in on the two exchanges, represented a depreciation of between $\$ 15,000,000,000$ and $\$ 18,000,000,000$.

The renewed collapse, after it had been supposed that the crash of the previous Thursday had marked the end of the disturbance, has been referred to in various quarters as a reflection of "mob psychology," representing frantic selling on the part of the whole community, all at once seized with the idea that stocks were worthless and must be got rid of. The statement of brokers' loans, however, issued by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for the week ending Oct. 30 appears to make it plain that the flood of stock which came on the market in a perfect torrent was due to the calling of loans on a scale which itself spelled disaster. This calling of loans was entirely by outside lenders whose operations have long been looked upon as a positive bane. The figures referred to show that the loans "for account of others" representing funds loaned out by the banks for account of large depositors, corporate and individual, and against which no reserves are maintained, fell during the week referred to in the tremendous sum of $\$ 1,380,000,000$ while in addition the loans for account of out-of-town banks, also consisting very largely of money loaned out for the benefit of large depositors, underwent a diminution in the further sum of $\$ 707,000,000$. In other words, there was a shrinkage in these two divisions of loaning in amount of over two billion dollars or, to be precise, in amount of $\$ 2,087,000,000$. That this represented the calling of loans rather than liquidation as the result of voluntary selling, appears from the fact that while this prodigious reduction in the two classes of loaning referred to occurred, the loans made by the reporting member banks on their own account actually increased in the amount of almost a full billion dollars, the aggregate of such direct loaning having risen during the week from $\$ 1,077,000,000$ Oct. 23 to $\$ 2,069,000,000$ Oct. 30 -that is nearly doubled. What happened appears to be perfectly plain. The outside lenders either because they got scared or because they wanted to make purchases of stocks at the low figures to which the market had dropped, called loans on the perfectly prodigious scale just shown, and the banks thereupon were obliged to jump into the breach and save the situation, by taking over a portion of these loans themselves in order to prevent the stock market from going altogether to pieces. This also shows with what a Herculean task the banking interests of the City were confronted and likewise the consummate skill with which they handled the problem.
Following the panic and complete breakdown which occurred on Oct. 29 the market on Oct. 30 and Oct. 31 enjoyed an upward rebound almost as pronounced as the new decline which it had suffered. And fortunate indeed thiswas, as the downward movement of prices had proceeded so far that it could not have gone much further without having involved the banks themselves in ruin and destruction. The rebound followed chiefly from the fact that a belief gained ground that the swing of the pendulum had been too far in the opposite direction and that stocks could now be considered a safe purchase. The immediate effect was to attract a horde of buyers who only appear on such occasions, that is, when prices are at bargain levels. Mr. Rockefeller, too moved by a desire to allay growing apprehension, had no hesitation in abandoning his customary policy of silence and openly proclaiming that the present was a good time to make purchases and that both he and his son had already entered the market. Many other large moneyed individuals, and innumerable small ones, adopted a similar course. Thus all of a sudden the market became flooded with buying orders.

One large capitalist is understood to have disposed of $\$ 15$, 000,000 in bonds and to have invested the proceeds in the purchase of stocks.
Then on Tuesday, Oct. 29, both the United States Stee Corp. and the American Can Co. declared extra dividends and the Steel Corp. submitted one of those strikingly favorable quarterly income returns for which it has become famous this time for the September quarter. Several other dividend increases by one company or another were subsequently an nounced. Under the influence of all this the stock market on Wednesday (Oct. 30) staged a recovery quite as remarkable as the phenomenal break of Oct. 28 and Oct. 29. An untoward development at this time was the announcement that the New York City bond sale of $\$ 60,000,000 \quad 41 / 2 \mathrm{~s}$ scheduled for Oct. 30 had at the suggestion of banking interests been indefinitely postponed. But this was obviously a wise move, in keeping with the demands of the situation. The banks had their hands full in taking care of a stock market situation of extraordinary peril, and were not in position to take on any additional burdens that could well be postponed for the time being. On Thursday (Oct. 31) the Bank of England, quite unexpectedly, reduced its discount rate from $61 / 2 \%$ to $6 \%$, evidently recognizing that this step could safely be taken now that money rates at New York had declined and no longer acted as a magnet for drawing funds from the outside world. After the close of business the same day, news came that the New York Reserve Bank had marked its rate down from $6 \%$ to $5 \%$, bringing it once more to the same level as that of the eleven other Reserve banks.
What no doubt also helped the rally was the action of the Exchange authorities in announcing on Wednesday, Oct. 30, that the Exchange would not open on Thursday, Oct. 31, until noontime instead of the customary hour of 10 o'clock and that it would remain entirely closed on Friday, Nov. 1, and Saturday, Nov. 2, this being with a view to enabling the brokers to straighten out their accounts and the clerical forces to recruit their strength and recuperate after the strain imposed upon them by the enormous volume of work that they were called upon to perform.

As far as general trade is concerned, the stock market panic came too late in the month to count as an influence or to gauge its possible effects. However, there were the same indications of a slowing down in certain industries as in previous months. Thus the "Iron Age" in its issue of Oct. 24, in summing up the developments in the iron and steel markets for the week, said that the week's news had accentuated the contrast between the reduced steel requirements of the automobile industry and the sustained demand from other sources. The outlook in the automobile industry, it was pointed out, remained uncertain. Rail orders, however had added 563,000 tons to mill books and ship building contracts accounted for 105,000 tons more, and the view was gaining ground that production had struck bottom. The price situation was less satisfactory. The "Age" said that with the steel industry adjusting itself to the slump in automotive requirements, the price situation gave signs of clarifying. At least changes for the week under review had not been significant, "being limited to recognition of recen concessions or to the readjustment of quotations on certain products to bring them into line with others," In its isule Oct. 31 the "Age" said that stock market liquidation had not materially disturbed sentiment in the iron and steel trade Feeling secure in the knowledge that it had been free from inflation, in sharp contrast with the securities market, th industry shared the confidence of its leaders, Messrs. Schwab and Farrell, in the fundamentally sound condition of business. Although aware that steel demand might be affected by Wall Street losses, the trade was not disposed to exaggerat that possibility. In the same calm spirit the situation was being carefully surveyed with an eye to favorable result that might ensue with particular attention to the release of construction work of the type that had been held back by high money rates. The "Iron Age's" composite price for finished steel declined to 2.362 c . a lb., a new low mark for the year, comparing with 2.369 c . the previous week and the same figure a year before. This was the first time in 1929 tha the composite price had been below its level on the same date in 1928. Pig iron was unchanged at $\$ 18.38$ a gross ton compared with $\$ 18.29$ a month earlier and with $\$ 18.25$ a the corresponding date in 1928. The peared to be operating at a shade over $82 \%$ of capacity against a fraction under $83 \%$ the previous week, and $82 \%$ two weeks before. At the same date in 1928, the Steel Corp was running at $86 \%$, while in the case of the independent steel producers the comparison was between $77 \%$, the current year, and $87 \%$ in 1928. In the case of the non-ferrous metals the price of copper remained unchanged throughout the month at $181 / 8 \mathrm{c}$. for Lake copper, and at $173 / 4 \mathrm{c}$. for electro ytic. The price of lead, however, at New York, was marked down Oct. 29 from 6.99c. to 6.75c. and on Oct. 31 to 6.50 c Tin displayed renewed weakness and the price at New York dropped from $441 / 4 \mathrm{c}$. Oct. 1 to $401 / 4 \mathrm{c}$. Oct. 21 with the price Oct. 3141.75 c .
In the oil market an important development was a drastio cut in crude oil on Oct. 21 by the Standard Oil Co. of California which was subsequently met by the General Petro leum Co., Shell, the Texas Co., Richfield Oil and the Union Oil Co. The reductions in the prices paid by the Standard for crude in the Santa Fe Springs, Seal Beach and Signal Fill fields ran from 40 c. a barrel to $\$ 1.05$ a barrel. A state-
ment by President K. R. Kingsbury of the Standard Oil Co. of California pointed out that the economic conditions justified the drastic cuts and reviewed the general situation in California resulting from over production, emphasizing the fact that "there has been continued opposition to the State conservation law on the part of those controlling a small percentage of production in the fields affected, which opposition continues to delay the operation of the law, thereby prolonging the indefensible waste of great quantities of natural gas and resulting in an overproduction of crude oil in the fields in question." Mr. Kingsbury pointed out that co-operative effort in California to control flush pools had failed and concluded by saying "it is an established policy of this company to currently offer producers such prices for crude oil as conditions warrant. Present conditions do not justify offering of prices which will encourage continued overproduction." This action, however, had good effect and the indications at the end of the month were that the California crude situation would adjust itself in the near future through a voluntary reduction of output on the part of operators who previously had blocked all efforts of the larger units to meet the requirements of the new State conservation law. A plan to curtail production of oil in Oklahoma for the rest of 1929 was approved by flush pool operators of the State at a meeting on Oct. 8 . At the very beginning of the month, that is on Oct. 1, the South Penn Oil Co. announced a reduction of 25 c . a barrel on all grades of Pennsylvania crude oil. This made the new price range from $\$ 2.70$ a barrel for Pennsylvania crude in Buckeye Pipe Line $\$ 2.70$ a barrel for $\$ 3.05$ for Bradford District oil run July 1 and Co. lines to $\$ 3.05$ for Bradford District oil run July 1 and after. The new cut in Pennsylvania followed a general re-
duction on Aug. 16 of 25 c. a barrel; oil in the Buckeye Pipe Line Co. lines then was cut 30c. and the latest drop brought Pennsylvania Oil to the lowest quotation of the year. On Oct. 2 the Ohio Oil Co. reduced the price of Western Kentucky crude oil 15c. a barrel, making the new price $\$ 1.68$ a barrel. In gasoline the feature was the reduction in tank wagon gasoline announced on Oct. 10 by the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey. The cut was 1c. per gallon throughout Now Jersey and at southern refinery and terminal points. At all other points in the territory of the Standard of New Jersey the price remained unchanged at 16c. per gallon tank wagon and 18c. per gallon service station exclusive of State tax. The new prices were met the same day by the Atlantic Refining Co. throughout New Jersey and in Delaware.
In the textile trades cotton goods prices were firmly maintained except in the fine goods division, notwithstanding a decline in the price of raw cotton. Middling Upland spot cotton in New York after being marked up from 18.75c., Sept. 30 to 19.15 c ., Oct. 1 declined and by Oct. 17 was Sept. 30 to 19.15 c, , Oct. 1 dechined and by Oct.
down to 18 c . A recovery to 18.50 c . Oct. 22 followed, but thereafter the tendency was again downward and the quotation Oct. 31 was 18.10 c . In print cloths there was no change during the month, 28 in . $64 \times 60$ remaining at $51 / 2 \mathrm{c}$. The renewed decline in the staple the latter part of the month was largely due to the speculative collapse on the Stock Exchange. The drop earlier in the month grew largely out of the fact that the Agricultural Bureau in its report on the growing crop estimated the probable yield at 14,915,000 bales of 500 pounds, as against $14,825,000$ bales, the estimate a month earlier, and comparing with an actual production of $14,478,000$ bales in 1928 . The new estimate was nearly 200,000 bales higher than the average of private estimates. U. S. Census figures of cotton consumption issued on Oct. 15 showed that cotton consumption in the United States was being maintained at high figures, the amount consumed for September 1929 being reported at 545,649 bales of lint and 82,022 bales of linters, against 558,113 bales of lint and 83,570 bales of linters in August and comparing with 492,307 bales of lint and 70,917 bales of linters in September 1928. The statistics made public Oct. 9 by the Association of Cotton Textile Merchants of New York were also again of a favorable character. Sales during September were put at $371,485,000$ yards or $138.3 \%$ of production and shipments at $287,628,000$ equivalent to $107.1 \%$ of production. Stocks on hand at the end of the month amounted to $345,043,000$ yards, being a decrease as compared with the preceding month of $5.2 \%$. Unfilled orders on Sept. 30 were 438,952,000 yards, representing an increase of $23.6 \%$ during the month. Raw silk was in rather light demand and prices moved lower again: Japanese double demand and prices moved lower again: Japanese double extra 13-15 deniers were quoted Oct. 31 at $\$ 4.90 @ \$ 4.95$,
against $\$ 5.10 @ \$ 5.15$ on Sept. 30 and on Aug. 31, and comagainst $\$ 5.10 @ \$ 5.15$ on Sept. 30 and on Aug. $\$ 1$, and com-
paring with $\$ 4.90 @ \$ 4.95$ July 31 ; $\$ 4.85 @ \$ 5$, June 29 ; \$4.75@\$4.80, May 31; \$5.15@\$5.30, April 30; \$5.05, Mar. 31 and \$5.10@\$5.15, Feb. 28. In the 20-22 deniers Japanese crack double extra were down to $\$ 4.75 @ \$ 4.80$, Oct. 31 , against $\$ 4.95 @ \$ 5$, Sept. 30; $\$ 4.90 @ \$ 4.95$, Aug. 31; $\$ 4.80$, July 31 ;; $\$ 4.75 @ \$ 4.80$, June 29 and the same May 31 ; $\$ 5.15 @ \$ 5.20$ April 30 ; $\$ 5 @ \$ 5.05$, March 31, and $\$ 5.15$ $@ \$ 5.20$ on Feb. 28. Crude rubber continued depressed and ribbed smoked sheets for spot delivery in New and ribbed smoked sheets for spot delivery in New
York were quoted at $181 / 2 @ 183 / 4 \mathrm{c}$., Oct. 31, against York were quoted at $181 / 2 @ 183 / 4$ c., Oct. 31 , against July $31 ; 203 / 8 @ 205 / 8$ c., June $29 ; 213 / 8 @ 213 / 8 \mathrm{c}$., May 31 ; $195 / 8193 / 4$ c., April 30 ; $227 / 8 @ 231 / 8$, March 30 ; 261/4@261/2, Feb. 28; 221/8@223/8, Jan. 31, and 18@181/4c. on Dec. 31 1928. Tire prices were advanced by tire manufacturers about the middle of the month. The Goodyear Tire \& Rubber Co. in its new price list to dealers made an upward
revision, averaging $1 \%$ and less than $2 \%$, effective Oct. 15 while the advance by other companies selling to consumers ran as high as $10 \%$ and above.

Grain prices sagged still lower and tumbled badly during the state of panic on the Stock Exchange. The Agricultural Bureau report issued Oct. 9 put the estimate of the wheat crop at $791,768,000$ bushels or $6,000,000$ bushels higher than the previous month and comparing with the actual harvest of $902,000,000$ bushels in 1928 . The falling off was almost entirely in the yield of spring wheat. The winter wheat estimate was kept unchanged at $568,000,000$ bushels as compared with the crop of $578,000,000$ bushels harvested in 1928. The crop of durum wheat was estimated at 52,000,000 bushels against $53,000,000$ bushels on Sept. 1 and comparing with an actual production of $93,000,000$ bushels in 1928. The crop of other spring wheat was estimated a $172,000,000$ bushels against $164,000,000$ on Sept. 1 and comparing with the crop of $231,000,000$ bushels harvested in 1928. The estimate of the corn crop was raised from 2,456,000,000 bushels Sept. 1 to 2,528,000,000 bushels Oct. 1 at which figure comparison is with $2,836,000,000$ bushels the rop in 1028. The crop raised in 1928.0 . he estmate the oats crop was increased from $1,205.000,000$ bushels Sept. 1 to $1,227,000,000$ bushels Oct. 1 at which figure comparison is with the crop
of $1,449,000,000$ bushels harvested in 1928 . The chief depressing influence, aside from the stock market panic the latter part of the month, was the enormous stocks of wheat and large visible supply chiefly in this country. The reports of a heavy reduction in the new wheat crop of Canada and that of Argentine were fully confirmed. The Decembe option for wheat in Chicago declined from $\$ 1.361 /$, Oct. ption 17 . o $\$ 1.24 / 8$, Oct. 23 and the next day, when panic raged on the Stock Exchange, touched $\$ 1.13 / 4$. A recovery to $\$ 1.281 / 2$ on Oct. 28 followed, but in the new convulsion on again tumbled to $\$ 1.203 / 4$. The close Oct. 31 was $\$ 1.277 / 8 \mathrm{c}$ The March wheat option in Chicago touched $\$ 1.211 / 4,0 \mathrm{ct} .24$ as against $\$ 1.44 \frac{1}{4}$ on Oct. 9 ; it closed Oct. 31 at $\$ 1.351 / 8$ December corn at Chicago on Oct. 24 sank to 88 c . as agains $981 / 8 \mathrm{c}$. on Oct. 2 with the close Oct. 31 at $921 / 8 \mathrm{c}$. and the March corn option touched $951 / 8 \mathrm{c}$., Oct. 24, against $\$ 1.025 / 8 \mathrm{c}$. Oct. 2 , with the close Oct. $31,973 / 4 \mathrm{c}$. December oats at Chicago touched $477 / 8 \mathrm{c}$. Oct. 24 , which compares with $541 / 8 \mathrm{e}$ Oct. 1; the close Oct. 31 was 50c. March oats at Chicago got down to $503 / 8 \mathrm{c}$., Oct. 24 , as against $567 / 8 \mathrm{c}$. Oct. 1 and closed at $527 / 8$ c. on Oct. 31. Sugar prices also again took a turn downward. Cuban raw sugar uncontrolled by the Cuban Export Agency fell from $25-16$ to $21-16 \mathrm{c}$., and on Nov. 1 sold down to 2c. The wholesale price of refined sugar by the leading refiners at New York was reduced Oct. 30 to 5.25 c. with the Spreckels Sugar Corporation quoting a range of 5.25 .5 .30 c .; at the end of September the prevailing price was 5.50 c . with the Spreckels Sugar Corp quoting a range of $5.50 @ 5.55 \mathrm{c}$. The coffee market became utterly demoralized owing to all sorts of rumors regarding financial troubles in Brazil and fast growing fears that Brazil would be unable to finance any further purchases of coffee. Several of the coffee exchanges in Brazil were closed the latter part of the month. No. 7 Rio for spot delivery in this market was quoted on Oct. 31 at only $12 @$ 121/4c., against 151/2@155/8c., Sept. 30, 161/4@161/2c., Aug. 31 and $181 / 4 @ 181 / 2$ c. back at Feb. 28. Coffee futures on Oct. 30 sold at the lowest levels since 1923 on the New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange.

NEW SECURITY ISSUES AND DIVIDENDS IN OCTOBER.
Foreign government securities offered in the domestic market during the month of October were on a somewhat larger scale. Canadian National Ry. $5 \%$ guar. 40 -year gold bonds at $981 / 2$ and int. in the amount of $\$ 30,000,000$ led the list.
$\$ 30,000,000$


Domestic offerings in October were far less conspicuous than in other recent months. The outstanding issue was the offering of $\$ 100,000,000$ Texas Corp. conv. sinking fund gold $5 \%$ debs, at $981 / 2$ and int., with the $\$ 60,000,000$ Marine Midland Corp. issue of common stock at $\$ 60$ per share next One other issue of size was the Firestone Tire \& Rubber Co. consisting of $\$ 60,000,0006 \%$ cum. pref. stock, series A (with stock purchase warrants) at 99 and div. The month's financing, classified as to the nature of business and size of
issues, is shown below, the table including only issues of $\$ 5,000,000$ and abore

## rail road finanoing

$\$ 13,500,000$ Baltimore \& Ohio RR. $-41 / 2 \%$ equip. trust certificates,
 maturit' Isiond Isued under the Philadelphid plan. By Bankers
Co of Niver York, Continental Illinois Co., Inc., and Evans
stillman \& Cor
10,200,000 New York Central RR.- $43 / 2 \%$ equip, trust gold certificates
at prices to yleld from 5.15 to $6 \%$. The certificates issued under the Phila dilohia plan, complete a total authorized amount of $\$ 16,500,000$, of which $\$ 6,300,000$ already were
Issued under the agreement dated April 151929 . Due serially Prom April 151930 to April 15 1944. By Chase Securities
Corp., and Freeman \& Co
pUBLIO UTILITY FINANCING.
$\$ 32,000,000$ Southern Bell Telephone \& Telegraph Co.-1st mtge. Southern Bell. Telephone \& Telegraph Co. - 1 st mtge.
sinking fund gold 5 bonds at 100 and int, due.
This completes the total amount of $\$ 50,000,000$ authorized to
 Co.; Frist National Bank; he National..ity Cor, Bankers Coo
of New York; Guaranty Co of Now York; Harris, Forbes \& Co., and Lee, Higginson \& Co.
11,000,000 Gatineau Power Co. -1st mtge. gold bonds $5 \%$ series of
1956 at 93 and int. to yield about $5 / 3 \%$ due June 1956 .
By Chase Securities Corp. Bankers. By Chase Securtiles Corp.; Bankers Co. of New York Harris,
Forbes \& Co. Lee Higginson \& Co.; Bancamerica-Blair Corp.; Halsey, Stuart \& © Co..Inc.:O Id Coiony Corp.; Otis \& Co., and
The First National Corp. of Boston.
100,000 shs. $8,000,000$ par value) at $\$ 99$ per share and div. 1 st pref. stock $\$ 6$ series (no gold bonds, series A, at Light Co. 974 and int \& \& ref. mtge $51 / \%$
 \& Co; Bancamer
Estabrook \& Co.
$\$ 7,250,000$ General Water Works \& Electric Corp.-15-year $6 \%$ conv
 and stroud \& Co. E. H. Rollins \& Sons, Central-Illinois Co
INDUSTRIAL AND MISCELLANEOUS FINANCING
$\$ 100,000,000$ (The) Texas Corp-Conv. sinking fund gold $5 \%$ debs. a
$983 / 2$ and int., to Yield over $51 / 8$ and due Oct. 1 1944. Th issue has been oversubscribed. Offered by Continental III.
CO. Inc., Chase Securities Corp.; Guaranty Co York; Bankers Co. of New Yorp.; thuaranty Co or New

$1,000,000$ shs Marine Midland Corp.-Common stock at $\$ 60$ per share.
By Stone \& Webster and Blodget, Inc.; White, Weld \& Co.; Marine Union Investors, Inc, and schoellkopf, Hutton \&
$\$ 60,000,000$ Firestone Tire \& Rubber Co. $-6 \%$ cum. pref. stock, serie A (with stock purchase warrants) at 99 and div. stock, series
Co., Cleveland Trust Co., and National City Co. By Otis \& Corporation Securities Co. of Chica
700,000 shs. Corporation Securities Co. of Chicago.- Allotment ctfs.
1929 sing or 700 . 00 ohbs. of no par value optional pref. stock,

400,000 shs. Commercial Investment Trust Corp.-Conv. pref. stock
optional series 1929, at 100 and (cash) div. Of the offering 250,000 shs. were placed privately. By Dillon, Read \& Co Lehman Brothers; A. G. Becker \& Co.: E. H. Rollins \& Sons
Shields \& Co., Inc. and Chemical National Co In
$1,500,000$ shs. Railroad Shares Corp.-Common tol
$\$ 12$ per share. By Lorenzo E. Anderson \& ${ }^{\circ} \mathrm{Co}$... $\mathrm{St}$. . Louis Central-Illinois Securities Corp.-Units consisting of 1 sh
of $\$ 1.50$ conv. pref. stock and 1 sh of common stock at $\$ 31.50$ per unit. . The stock and are ished of in the form of allot
ment certificates. By the Central-1lininois Co
\$11,000,000 Hotel Wader
Hotel Waldorf-Astoria Corp. (Waldorf-Astoria).-1st of no par common stock for each $\$ 1,000$ bond $)$ atr 103 and int
Due Sept. 1 1954. By Hallgarten \& Co. He Hed Due Sept. 1 1954. By Hallgarten \& Co.: Havden, Stone \&
Co.; Kissel. Kinnicutt \& Co.; Hornblower \& Weeks; Green-
baum sons Securities Corp., and Cassat
 Boston, and spencer Trask \& Co
$\$ 9,900,000$ Goddard Securities Corp- $1,000,000$ shs. of full voting common stock of no par value at $\$ 11$ per share, of which
100,000 shs. were purchased by the bankers for their
16,934 shs. May Department Stores, Inc.-Common stock (par \$25) of 170 a share to common holders of record Oct. 25 in ratio of 1 new share for each 10 shares held. Rights will explire
on Nov. 15 . By Goldman, Sachs \& C 0 ., and Lehman Bros.
100,000 shs. Folds Buck Financial Corp.-Capital stock (no par) at

## MUNIOIPAL FINANCING.

$\$ 30,000,000$ Port of Now York Authority, N. Y. $41 / 5 \%$ bridge conNational Cilty Co of New York, at 92.857 , a net by the cost of 4.896\% T. The bonds, which mature annually on Nov. 1 trom 1939 to 1953 , incl. were. re-offered for public subscription at a price of 95 and interest for all maturities, yieldine
5.15 to $4.86 \%$.
5,200,000 Allegheny Co., Pa. $414 \%$ bonds, comprising seven issues maturing in 25 and 30 years, sold to a group managed by $4.4 \%$ Syndicate reorfered bonds at prices to yield 4.25 to
$4.125 \%$, according to maturity.
$5,000,000$ State of North Carolina $57 \% \%$ permanent improvement notes, average maturity of 1 , ysears privately sovemen to a
syndicate headed by the First Nationa Bank of New York. Re-offered for public subseript.
$5.50 \%$, according to maturity.
Changes in dividend declarations for October were quite numerous. The following table, divided into two sections namely "Favorable Changes" and "Unfavorable Changes," gives the more important of the changes:

FAVORABLE DIVIDEND CHANGES.
Abbott Laboratories-Extra div. of 50 c . per share on the common stock. Agricultural Insurance Co.-Extra cash div. of 25c. a share, a $25 \%$ stock
div. and the reg. quar. cash div. of $\$ 1$ per sh. on the capital stock. American Art Works, Inc.-Extra div. of $\$ 2$ per sh. on the common stock. American Bank Note Co-- $10 \%$ stock div, and extra cash div. of $\$ 1$ a
share on the common stock. share on the common stock.
American Can Co.-Extra div. of $\$ 1$ per sh. on the common stock in addition to a quar. div. of $\$ 1$ per sh. par sabie on the common stock in ad-
of 75 c . a share is payable on Nov. 15 next.
American enain Co., ne.--Quar. divs. on the common stock resumed
by payment of 75 c , a share. American Equitable Assurance Co.-Extra cash div. of 50c. per share
on the common stock.
 American Multigraph Co.- Hxtra div. of $121 / \mathrm{C}$. per share on the comAmerican To
American
mon
B
T (The) Angus Co .
Atlas Stores Co.-initial div. of 15 c . a share on the common stock. (N.) Bawlf Grain Co $10 \%$ stock div. on the capital stock.

Boss Manufacturing Co. Initial div. of 50 c . a sh. on the common stock. mon stock.
Brillo Mfg. Co.-Initial div. of 30 c . a sh. on the common stock. British Type Investors, Inc.- Bi-monthly div. of 8c. a sh. on the class
A" stock. Prior to split-up on a 2 -for-1 basis, 15c. a sh. was paid on the old stock.
Budd Wheel Co.-Initial quar. div. of 25 c . a sh on the new common
stock following the distribution of a $300 \%$ stack div Bulova Watch Co., Inc.-Initial quar. div. of 75 c . a share on the comCam stock.
Camden Fire Insurance Co., Phila.-Extra div. of 20 c . a share on the
capital stock.
Canada Gypsum \& Alabastine, Ltd.-Quar. div. of $371 / 2 \mathrm{c}$ a share on the capital stock, Prior to the spitt-up on a 4 -for- 1 basis. 75 c . a a share was
paid on the old capital Carrier Engineering Corp.-Initial divs. of 25 c . per share on the class Chile Cop
Chile Copper Co.-Extra div. of $\$ 1.50$ per share on the capital stock. Cincinnati Advertising Products Co.- $10 \%$ stock div. and an extra
cash div. of $\$ 1$ per share on the capital stock Claude Neon Electrical Products Corp., Ltd.-Quar. cash div. increased from 20c. to 25ctan a shale on commonp., Litd.- Quar. cash div. increased
to distribute a $6 \%$ stock div. payable $3 \%$ each on Jan. 1 and July 1 . Consolidated Gas Co. of New York. - Quar. div. on common stock
increased from
Counsellors Securities Trust.- $2 \%$ stock div. on the capital stock.
Diamond Electrical Mfg. Co.-Initial semi-annual stock div, of $2 \%$ on
the common stock. Dictaphone Corp.
Domestic \& Oyers
on the common stock investing Co., Ltd.-Extra div. of 10c. per share
Dominion Bridge Co., Ltd.-Quar. div. on common stock increased
from 75c. a share to 0 oc, a share Dow Chemical Co.-Initial div. of 50 c . a share on the new common stock. Durant Motor Co. of Calif.-Initial div. of 20c, per share on the common
Edison Electric Illuminating Co. of Boston.-Quar. div. on capital stock increased from $\$ 3$ to $\$ 3.40$ per share
Empire American Securities Corp.-15\% stock div. on the common
stock. This is the first dividend declared by this corporation which irons Securities Corp.
Famous Players Canadian Corp., Ltd.-Initial div. of 50c. a share
Fenton-
Fenton-United Cleaning \& Dyeing Co., Cincinnati.-Extra div. of \$1
Follansbee Bros. Co.-Quar div on com. increased from 50 c . a sh. to
75c.a sh. Formerly 50 c. reg. and 25 c . extra was paid quarterly.
General Refractories Co.-Quar. div. on com. increased from 75 c . a
sh. to $\$ 1.00$ a sh. in addition to an extra div. of 25 c a share Gleaner Combine H rieter Cons
Gleaner Combine Harvester Corp.- $300 \%$ stock div, on com. stock
through the split- of this stock on a 4 -for Globe Insurance Co. of America.- $66 \mathbf{2 - 3 \%}$ stock div. in addition to a special cash div. of 50 c . a sh. on the capital stock to be presently out-
standin. (F \& $\mathbf{W}$ ).
(F. \& W.) Grand 5-10-25 Cent Stores, Inc. - $5 \%$ stock div. on the (W. T.) Grant C

Co. (Del.). $-100 \%$ stock div. on the com. stock.
Harbison-Walker Refractories Co.-Extra div. of 25c. a sh. on the Harrisburg (Pa.) Rys.-Semi-annual div. increased from $2 \%$ to $3 \%$ on the 6\% cumulative preferred stock.
Hawaiian Pineapple Co., Ltd.-Extra cash div. of 50 c . a sh. and a
$20 \%$ stock div. on the capital stock. Her
Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co.-Extra div. of $33 / 4 \%$ on the common
Home Title Insurance Co., Brooklyn, N. Y.-Initial div. of 75 c . per share on the new capital stock.
Hudson \& Manhattan RR.-Semi-annual div, on com. increased from Inerell-
Ingersoll-Rand Co.-Extra div. of \$1 per share on the common stock.
Knickerbocker Insurance Co.-Extra div. of 50 c . a sh. on the com. stk. McFadden Publications, Inc.-Initial div. of 50c. a sh. on the new Mengel Co., Lou
stock resumed Metropolitan Title Guaranty Co.-Initial div. of \$1 per sh. on the
capital stock. Missouri Portla
Missouri Portland Cement Co.-Extra div. of 50c. a sh. on the com. stk. Mohawk Mining Co.-Div. of $\$ 3$ per share compared with $\$ 2$ per share
paid previously on the common stock. Montgomery Ward \& Co. Chicago.-Quar. div. on common increased Moody's Investors Service, N. Y. City.-Extra divs. of 75c. per share on the common and partic. pref. stocks.
Moore Drop Forging Co.-Extra div. of $\$ 1.50$ per share on the class A stk Morse Twist Drill \& Machine Co.-Extra div. of $\$ 5$ per share on the
common stock. National Public

Service Corp.-Initial div. of 75 c . per sh. on the class B
National Securities Corp. of Calif.- $10 \%$ stock div. on the capital stock Nehi Corp.-Quar. div. of $321 / \mathrm{c}$ c. a sh. on the common stock compared dideviousy
New Yersey Zinc Co.-Extra div. of $\$ 1$ per sh. on the common stock.
Norfork Fire Insurance Co.-Extra div. of 30c. a sh. on the com. stock div of Western Ry.-Extra div. of $4 \%$ in addition to regular quar North American Investment Corp. (of Calif.).-Quar. div. on common Otis Co., Boston.-Extra div. of \$4 a share and a quar. div. of \$1 a share on the common stock. Pennsylvania Investing Co.-Initial semi-annual div. of 50 c . a share on
the class B stock.

(Louis) Philippe, Inc.-Quar. div. on the class B stock increased from
25c. per share to 40 c . per share. Pilot Radio \& Tube Corp.-Initial div. of $\$ 1.50$ per share on the com. stk Procter \& Camble Co--Quar. div. of 50 c . a share on the new common
stock. Prior to split-up on a 5 -for-1 basis divs. of $\$ 2$ were pald quarterly stock. Prior to split-up
on the old common stock.
Public Investing Co.-Extra div. of $12 \frac{1}{2} \mathrm{c}$. per sh. on the common stock Rich's, Inc., Atlanta, Ga.-Initlal quar. div. of 30 c . per share on the
Schlage Lock Co. $-10 \%$ stock dividend on the common stock.
Sherwin-Williams Co., Cleveland.-Extra div. of $123 / 2 \mathrm{c}$. a share on
the common stock. Simmommon stock.
Simmons Co. $-13 / 2 \%$ stock div. on the common stock.

Sparta Foundry Co.-Extra div. of 50c. a share on the common stock. Springfield Fire \& Marine Insurance Co-Quarterly dividend-on caplal stock increased from $\$ 1$ a share to $\$ 1.13$ a share.
Standard Oil Co, of Indiana.-Extra dividend of 25 c . a share on the common stock.
A.) Stein \& Co.-Initial div, of 40 c . per share on the common stock

Stouffer Corp. Quar, div. on the class B common stock increased from
Sun Oil Co, $9 \%$ stock dividend on the common stock and the regular quarterly cash dividend of 25 c . per share.
Superheater Co.-Extra dividend of $\$ 1$ per share on the common stock.
Sylvania Insurance Co., Philadelphia.-Extra dividend of 60 c .
share share on the capital stock
Telautograph Corp.-Extra div, of 5 c , a share on the common stock.
Thermoid Co.-Initial quar. div. of 50 c . a share on the common stock.
hird Nail Corestors Corp.-Initial div. of \$1 a sh. on com, stock.
Union Oil Co. of California.-Extra quarterly dividend of $1 \%$ in common
stock on the common stock.
Union Stricet Ry., New Bedford,-Quarterly dividend resumed by
payment of $\$ 1$ per share on the capital stock.
United Biscuit Co, of America.-Quarterly dividend on common increased Carbon Co. 50c. a share.
United Carbon Co.-Initial div. of 50c. a share on the common stock. United-Carr Fa
common stock
United Engineeri
United Engineering \& Foundry Co.-Extra div. of 35c. per share on
the common stock compared with an extra of 20 c . a share on Aug. 9 last.
United Gas Improvement Co.-New common stock placed on a $\$ 1$ annual Uited Gas improvement Co.-New common stock placed on a $\$ 1$ annual stock which was split up on a basis of $\$ 1.5$ new common shares and $1 / 8$ of a
preferred share for each old share held.
United States Dairy Products Corp.-Quar. div. on the class A
common stock increased from $\$ 1$ to $\$ 1.25$ per share.
United States Playing Card Co.-Extra div. of 75 c . per share on the common stock.
United States Steel Corp.-Extra div. of $\$ 1$ a share on the common stock. Narner Bros. Pictures, Inc.- Quar. div, of $\$ 1$ per share on the common stock compared with a regular quarterly of 75 c . a share and an extra White Me.
as against 25 c . a share paid previously. 50 c . a share on the capital stock Will \& Baumer Candle Co., Inc.-Extra dividend of 10 c . a share on the common stock.
Yale \& Towne Mfg. Co.-Special div. of $\$ 1$ per share on the com. stock. Zonite Products Corp.-Quar. div. on common increased from 25 c . a
share to 40 c . a share.

## UNFAVORABLE DIVIDEND OHANGES

Borax Consolidated, Ltd.-Interim div, of $£ 1$ on the ordinary shares
was omitted. was omitted.
Capital Securities Co., Inc.-Quar. div. of 15 c . a share on the common stock was omitted
Grace Securities Corp.-Quar. div. of 50c. a share on the capital stock
omitted.
Hydraulic
Hydraulic Press
per share to $1 \%$ per share. Quar. div. on pref. reduced from $11 / 2 \%$ International Combustion Engineering Corp.-Quar. div. of 50 c .
a share on the common stock a share on the common stock omitted.
Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co.-Div. of 1-40th of a share on common
as against 1-30th of a share paid previously.
Samson Tire \& Rubber Corp.-Div. on common stock omitted. In
the previous quarter an initial div. of 3114 c. was declared. cioto Valley Ry \& Power Co-Div of $1 \mathrm{M} \%$ on the
scioto Valley Ry, \& Power Co.-Div. of $11 / 4 \%$ on the 1st pref. stock
was omitted. Tobacco Products Corp.-Quar. div. of $13 / 4 \%$ on the $7 \%$ non-cum.
class $A$ stock omitted. class " $A$ " stock omitted.
United Cigar Stores Co. of America-Quar, div. of $11 / 2 \%$ on the $6 \%$
cum. pref. stock omitted. United Crescent Dry Clea
United Crescent Dry Cleaning Corp.-Quar. div. of $18 / 4 \%$ on the
$7 \%$ cum. pref. stock omitted. Universal Cooler Corp - Quar.
Universal Cooler Corp.
common stock omitted.
Wayagamack Pulp \& Paper Co., Ltd.-Quar, div. on the common stock
stock reduced from 75 c , a share stock reduced from 75c. a share to 69c. a share.
West American Finance Co.-Quar. div. of 20 c. per share on the $8 \%$
cum. pref. stock omitted.

## THE COURSE OF THE STOCK MARKET DURING OCTOBER 1929.

The stock market during October passed through what may accurately be described as the greatest crisis in Stock Exchange history. In the closing days of the month a panic swept over the Stock Exchange the like of which has never been witnessed before. In the utter rout inflicted upon the bull forces, who had been almost uninterruptedly in control for a period of six years-in the magnitude and overwhelming character of the sales and the complete collapse of market values-nothing even closely approaching the great convulsion which now occurred can be found in any of the records of the past. The decline in prices was in proportion to the previous phenomenal rise, and that means that it was of staggering proportions and involved losses and ruin and disaster to the unfortunate masses operating in the market of such appalling magnitude as to put the catastrophe in a class all by itself. In considering the month's fluctuations and seeking the more immediate causes of the collapse, it is necessary to go back two months to the early part of August. After the close of business on August 8 there came the wholly unexpected announcement that the Federal Reserve Board at Washington, after having for six months or more objected to an advance in the rediscount rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York from 5\% to $6 \%$, had now, to the utter surprise of everyone, not excepting the officials of the New York Reserve Bank itself, all at once withdrawn its objections and sanctioned the increase. The immediate effect was to precipitate a break in the stock market the following day of gigantic proportions. But the collapse lasted only for that single day. The very next day (Saturday, Aug. 10) the market sharply rallied and a new upward movement in prices was inaugurated which was destined to dwarf all the preceding ones. Acting on first impulse, the speculative fraternity had overlooked the fact that the Reserve Board, while sanctioning an increase in the rediscount rate, had at the same time sanctioned a reduction in the buying rate of bankers' acceptances from
$51 / 4 \%$ to $51 / 8 \%$, this being done with the dea of cheapening bank credit for the benefit of mercantile borrowers and as part of the Reserve Board's policy of again enlarging its. holdings of acceptances. This put a wholly different aspect upon the move. Previously the buying rate for acceptances had been $1 / 4$ of $1 \%$ above the rediscount rate; now it was $7 / 8$ of $1 \%$ below the rediscount rate. There was no question therefore that the Reserve Banks would be able to acquire acceptances in large and growing volume and to the full extent desired. This meant the putting out of new Reserve credit and that, in turn, meant inflationand inflation, too, at the hands of the Reserve System itself. The public was quick to realize what the result would be, and speculation on the stock market was started afresh with greater confidence than before. And this confidence increased as it appeared week after week that the Reserve Banks were adding to their acceptance holdings. On July 10 these acceptance holdings had been down to $\$ 65,976,000$, the low figure of the year, and even on Aug. 7, the day before the bill buying rate was marked down, were no higher than $\$ 79,158,000$. But the very next week there was an increase to $\$ 117,885,000$; on Aug. 21 a further increase to $\$ 132,137,000$; on Aug. 28 to $\$ 156,514,000$; on Sept. 4 to $\$ 182,916,000$; on Sept. 11 to $\$ 222,229,000$, and so week by week the total grew larger all through September and October, until on Oct. 23 it stood at $\$ 379,383,000$.
Here, therefore, there was an addition to the Reserve credit in use in that way of $\$ 313,000,000$. The stock market sensed what that meant. One of the immediate effects was to enable the member banks to cancel a corresponding amount of their indebtedness to the Reserve Banks and, accordingly, the discount holdings of the Reserve Banks on Oct. 23 stood at only $\$ 796,358,000$ as against $\$ 1,153$, 041,000 July 10. This did not change the total amount of Reserve credit outstanding, but it did change the form of this credit so as to make it appear that the member banks had improved their condition, and hence were in better position to finance a new stock speculation. The performances of those engaged in the new speculation proceeded with correspondingly greater freedom from restraint. Brokers' loans, already the occasion for the gravest anxiety, mounted still higher, the climax of such expansion not being reached until the middle of October, just before the panic broke in full fury. On the face of the figures, this further expansion in brokers' loans did not operate to impair the position of the banks, since the further growth was wholly in the outside loans, which consist of deposits against which no cash reserves are maintained and which do not form part of the ordinary deposits of the banks.
During August the speculative craze on the Stock Exchange, given a new lease of life, continued unabated and the upward movement extended into the early part of September, at which time a great mass of stocks (though not those not subject to manipulation) attained their highest figures of the year and the highest in all time. Then, however, something happened; many large holders thought it prudent to lighten their loads or to dispose of them altogether, reckoning that the autumnal demand for currency with which to move the crops might impose a severe strain upon the money market notwithstanding the freedom with which the Reserve Banks were purchasing acceptances. This selling somehow did not cease, but kept up, weakening the market during September by its cumulative force. The result was that the market became very depressed as the month advanced, and finally fell into a state of almost complete collapse, prices crumbling away on the last day of the month (Monday, Sept. 30) in a perfectly startling manner, as noted in our review of the stock market for that month.
This was the state of things when the month of October opened on the Stock Exchange. Extreme weakness marked the initial dealings of the month, and this weakness continued with only one important interruption, during the second week of the month, when the market for the time being manifested decided rallying tendencies, only to be plunged into new weakness which then became progressive, and in the end eventuated in the panic with all its disastrous consequences. On Tuesday, Oct. 1, the call loan rate on the Stock Exchange touched 10\%, just as it did the day before (Sept. 30), which, of course, did not tend to improve sentiment, but the market still remained weak on Wednesday, Oct. 2, when the call loan rate in the afternoon fell to $7 \%$, and was weakest of all on Thursday, Oct. 3 , when the rate dropped to $6 \%$ after renewals had been effected at $7 \frac{1}{2} \%$. On this last mentioned day a new depressing influence was the Stock Exchange statement of brokers' loans, showing a further increase of $\$ 667,764,553$ for the month of September on top of increases of $\$ 100$,000,000 a month in each of the three preceding months, and bringing the grand total of Stock Exchange borrowings up to over $8 \frac{1}{2}$ billion dollars -in exaet figures, $\$ 8,549,383,979$. On Friday, Oct. 4, the call loan rate again touched $6 \%$ without benefit to the market. It was impossible to stop the a avalanche of selling, and the further Increase in brokers' loans of $\$ 33,000,000$ shown in the weekly statement of the

New York Reserve Bank for the week ending Wednesday, Oct 2, proved additionally disturbing. There was an upward reaction the milddle of the day, but renewed weakness In the closing hour. Liquidation proved perfectly overwhelming, with all support lacking, though brokers claimed that they had extensive orders to fill for their customers as prices moved down-orders given some time previously, in expectation of just such a break as actually occurred. As a result an almost unparalleled list of new lows for the year were recorded.
For a few days now the market regained tone and showed revived strength, as a result of which a considerable portion of the early losses were recovered. One reason for the improvement and recovery was the decided easing of the money situation. Call loans on the Stock Exchange tended downward. On Monday, Oct. 7, they were no higher than $61 / 2 \%$, and on Thursday and Friday, Oct. 10 and Oct. 11, some loaning was done at $5 \%$. Another strengthening influence was the improved accounts regarding the steel trade, some of these indicating that the recession in that trade, which had been in evidence in more recent weeks, had about reached its end. Moreover, the monthly report of the United States Steel Corp., relating to the unfilled orders on the books of the subsidiary corporations, issued on Oct. 10, quite to the general surprise, showed an increase in amount of 244,370 tons, whereas it had been believed there would again be a decrease. Another favoring circumstance was the offering to the stockholders of the New York Central RR. of rights to subscribe to new stock at par ( $\$ 100$ per share) on the basis of 1 share for each 13 shares held. The tobacco stocks were features of strength at one time on the announcement that cigarette prices were to be advanced. On Thursday, Oct. 10, the upward movement was very pronounced as a result of the report, already referred to, of the U. S. Steel Corp. showing a substantial increase in the unfilled orders of the subsidiary companies of the United States Steel. Evidently those who had sold these shares short were caught napping, and they were, as a consequence, obliged to cover their outstanding short contracts at a loss. A great upward splurge now occurred in the entire stock market. This carried all the other steel stocks along and the general market as well. On Oct. 11 the statement of the Federal Reserve Bank, issued the previous evening and showing a reduction in brokers' loans, in amount of $\$ 91,000,000$ for the week, had the effect of stimulating the market anew and of causing a further advance in prices all along the line, though this brought sales to realize profit, and the advances made earlier in the day were in large part lost.
The recovery, it now quickly appeared, was destined to be only temporary, and renewed weakness set in, which thereafter was never arrested and eventuated in the panic. This was in face of growing ease in the money market, demonstrating once again that the course of the money market did not control the course of the stock market. The chief depressing influences were the indications of a further recession in the steel trade, which naturally affected adversely U. S. Steel and the other steel shares, and a decision by the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities announced on Saturday, Oct. 12, disapproving the plan of the Edison Electric Illuminating Co. of Boston to split its stock and denying the company's petition for permission to change the par value of its shares from $\$ 100$ to $\$ 25$. The decision was construed as having wide bearing and significance. The decision was very sweeping and averred that the market value of the shares was far in excess of the real intrinsic values, and said that the rates charged by the Edison Electric did not compare favorably with those of other companies which in the past had made more adequate provision for depreciation and declared "that the investor in the petitioner's stock has no assurance that the company will be able to increase its rate of dividends in the near future, or, in fact, that it will be able to maintain the increased rate of dividends recently voted."
As a result of this decision public utility shares nearly all became weak, especially the high-priced ones, and many of these suffered severe declines. The drop in these and in the steel stocks carried the whole market down. Entirely apart from this, however, stocks nearly all through the list appeared to lack support and to yield easily to selling pressure, though there were the usual exceptions in the case of special stocks which were the subject of manipulation, and as a result of such manipulation moved higher. The Stock Exchange was closed on Saturday, Oct. 12, on account of the Columbus Day holiday. On Monday and Tuesday, Oct. 14 and Oct. 15, the course of prices was irregular, with the market more or less unsettled. On Oct. 16 there was a general collanse in values, with blg breaks in special stocks and the whole list in a state of depression. On Oct. 17, after a further sharp fall in the morning, there was a brisk recovery, as a result of which a part of the losses of the previous day was recovered. On Friday, Oct. 18, a further break occurred, the renewed increase in brokers' loans shown in the Federal Reserve statement issued the previous evening being used with telling effect against
the market. International Combustion Engineering Corp: was one of the stocks that suffered most violent fluctuations, this being due to the suspension of dividends on the common stock, which had been on a $\$ 2$ annual basis. The stock, with a high for the year of $1081 / 2$ in February, closed on Oct. 18 at 26, a new low for the year, and later in the month got as low as 8.
Things were now rapidly shaping for the panic which was to come on Thursday, Oct. 24 . At the half-day session on Saturday, Oct. 19, the market was so weak as to furnish occasion for the gravest anxiety; prices tumbled in startling fashion. The drop ran all the way from five to 40 points, and the aggregate depreciation in values was estimated at $\$ 1,000,000,000$ or more. The sales for the half-day closely approached $31 / 2$ million shares, and the ticker was so far behind that the last of the sales did not appear on the tape until an hour and twenty-three minutes after the closing hour of 12 o'clock. J. I. Case Threshing Machine suffered a shrinkage of 40 points, Auburn Auto of 25 points, Columbian Carbon of 21 points, Westinghouse Electric \& Manufacturing of $181 / 4$ points, Eastman Kodak of 125 points, General Electric of $91 / 4$ points, American Can of 11 points, Simmons Co. of $10 \%$ points, while losses on the Curb Exchange were equally pronounced.
Monday, Oct. 21, proved another exceedingly weak day, with distress selling on a huge scale. Many traders were wiped out. Auburn Auto suffered a further drop of 40 points, and Commercial Solvents old stock (befort the split in the shares on the basis of 10 for 1) 145 points, Stone \& Webster 16 points, and so on through the whole list. Sales on the Stock Exchange aggregated $6,091,870$ shares, while on the Curb Exchange they reached $3,715,400$ shares, the total for the two exchanges combined thus falling but little short of $10,000,000$ shares. The sales on the Curb established a new high record for a full day's business, the previous high record having been $3,584,700$ shares, on July 28 1929. No less than 920 separate issues were dealt in on the Stock Exchange, against the previous record of 890 shares set on Oct. 4. At the close of the day the Stock Exchange ticker was 1 hour and 41 minutes late, and the Curb ticker 1 hour and 23 minutes late. On Tuesday, Oct. 22, the market rallied and assumed a more composed appearance; sales on the Stock Exchange fell to $4,129,820$ shares, and on the Curb Exchange to $1,945,300$ shares. An interview with Charles E. Mitchell, Chairman of the National City Bank, on his return from Europe, in which he declared that conditions were sound and intimated that the break in the market had gone beyond reasonable limits and spoke of the possibility of a reduction in the rediscount rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York helped to impart strength to the market and caused an upward rebound of from one to 30 points. However, the recovery was not fully maintained, and renewed weakness developed in the closing hour. This weakness extended into the trading on Wednesday, Oct. 23, on which day selling pressure again proved overwhelming and brought about a new break in prices more severe than any previously recorded. Sales for the day again exceeded $\mathbf{6 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0}$ shares, reaching $6,374,960$ shares. Public utilities and other high-priced issues suffered the severest fall of all, the declines running all the way up to 96 points, this last being in the case of Adams Express. Commercial Solvents (old stock) again distinguished itself and suffered a break of 70 points, while Auburn Auto dropped 77 points; American \& Foreign Power 23 114 points, Western Union Telegraph 33 points, Westinghouse Electric 25 points, \&c., \&c. There were also bad breaks on the Curb, Amer. Gas \& Electric falling $14 \frac{1}{2}$ points, Commonwealth Edison $201 / 2$ points, Electric Bond \& Share $141 / 4$ points, \&c., \&c. The New York "Times" average of fifty representative stocks showed a decline for the day of 18.24 , marking the largest drop since the start of the compilation of these records in 1911. This, it was estimated, represented a depreciation of $\$ 4,000,000,000$. The Stock Exchange ticker was 1 hour and 44 minutes behind in recording the closing transactions.
It remained, however, for dealings on Thursday, Oct. 24, to show how completely confidence in values had been undermined, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say how universal the selling pressure was becoming. Liquidation now proceeded on a scale that it is safe to say has never previously been witnessed. Orders to sell came from every quarter and proved of overwhelming volume. The market drifted into a state of panic that threatened to become alarming. At the noon hour such was the situation that a gathering of leading bank executives at the office of $\mathrm{J} . \mathrm{P}$. Morgan \& Co. too place, as noted in the earlier part of this article. No formal statement was given out as a result of the meeting, but Thomas W. Lamont, of J. P. Morgan \& Co. (Mr. Morgan being in Europe), told newspaper men that as there appeared to be much distress selling on the Stock Exchange a meeting of the heads of several institutions had taken place to discuss the situation. Since rumors of impending failures had gained currency, Mr. Lamont took occasion to say that so far as could be ascertained no houses were in difficulty, while reports from brakerage concerns indicated that the margin position was satisfactory. Mr,

Lamont added that it was the consensus of opinion among those at the conference that many of the prices reached in the break did not set forth the situation fairly, because of the numerous "air pockets" which sellers found in many stocks, in which bids were utterly lacking. "We consider the situation," Mr. Lamont said, "which arose on the floor late on Wednesday and to-day more in the nature of a techlate on Wednesday and to-day more in the nature of a techan assuring effect, and more or less support was extended to the market, with the result that an appreciable upward rebound in prices occurred. The recovery, however, was not fully maintained, and later in the day another sharp downward plunge occurred, after which, however, the tone improved and in the closing half hour a rally occurred all around, so that the close showed more or less recovery from the extreme low figures of the day, though leaving prices heavily reduced from the close on Wednesday, which itself had suffered such a great shrinkage, as already stated.
Among the net losses of Thursday, Oct. 24, were $141 / 2$ points by American \& Foreign Power; Air Reduction, 35/8; American Tel. \& Tel., 3 ; Int. Tel. \& Tel., $43 / 4$; Auburn Auto, 25; Baldwin Locomotive (new stock), 2; Burroughs Adding Machine, $191 / 4$; Commercial Solvents (old stock), 25; Consolidated Gas of N. Y., 3; General Electric, 6; Houston Oil, $81 / 2 ;$ Johns-Manville, 10; Ludium Steel, $75 / 8$; People's Gas of Chicago, 13; Public Service of N. J., $21 / 8$; Standard Gas \& Elec., 27; Westinghouse Electric, 5. The Curb Exchange suffered as badly as the Stock Exchange, and one spectacular feature on that exchange was the opening transaction of a block of 150,000 shares of Cities Service com. at $553 / 4$, down $43 / 4$ points from the previous close; the stock sold down to 45 during the day, as against a high the previous Saturday, Oct. 19, of $671 / 2$, and closed at $511 / 2$. Electric Bond \& Shares was also very erratic in its fluctuations on large trading. It sold down to 91 , but closed at $1071 / 2$ against a high of $1361 / 3$ the previous Saturday. Aluminum Co. of Amer. was conspicuous for a net loss of $741 / 2$ points. The Stock Exchange ticker was 4 hours and $81 / 2$ minutes behind in recording the closing transactions, and the Curb ticker 2 hours and 48 minutes behind. All records for a day's transactions were left far behind, both on the Stock Exchange and on the Curb Exchange, the sales on the Stock Exchange reaching the huge total of 12,894,650 shares, and those on the Curb Exchange 6,337,400 shares, making the combined total, it will be seen, $19,232,050$ shares. On Friday, Oct. 25, the market displayed very pronounced rallying tendencies, both because of the reduction of $\$ 167,000,000$ in the total of brokers' loans in the statement of the Federal Reserve Bank, issued the previous evening, and because the low figures to which prices had dropped induced investment buying on an extensive scale.

It was now supposed that the worst had been seen. But this proved not to be the case. Trading at the half-day session on Saturday, Oct. 26, was quiet, the sales on the New York Stock Exchange being only $2,087,660$ shares. But on Monday and Tuesday, Oct. 28 and Oct. 29, the torrent was again loosed and panic reigned supreme. A perfect avalanche of selling overwhelmed the market, resulting in enormous declines in prices. The consortium of bankers,
referred to above, under the leadership of J. P. Morgan \& referred to above, under the leadership of J. P. Morgan \&
Co. sought to bring about order, but without much success, prices continuing to drop in a perfectly alarming fashion. On the New York Curb Exchange the situation was even worse, and the declines went to the same extremes. The sales for the day on the Stock Exchange, on Oct. 28, aggregated $9,212,800$ shares, and on the Curb Exchange 4,152,900 shares. On Tuesday, Oct. 29, the panic became still more acute, with sales on the Stock Exchange of $16,410,030$ shares, and on the Curb of $7,096,300$ shares, both outdistancing by a wide margin the high record reached the previous Thursday, and making the combined turnover on the two exchanges for this single day $23,506,330$ shares. Price
down in still more alarming fashion than on Monday.
It was supposed that the selling was due in great measure to the action of frightened holders, anxious to dispose of their shares in view of the way prices had dropped in the great crash the previous Thursday. But it appears from our analysis of brokers' loans in the early part of this article that loans were called on a prodigious scale by outside lenders in this market, making it incumbent upon the banks themselves to furnish the needful funds to fill the void thus created, and this these bankers were able to do only in part. The unfortunate owners, accordingly, had no option except to throw over a large part of their holdings at sacrifice prices.
While dealings on Monday, Oct. 28, were not of the same magnitude as on Tuesday, Oct. 29, the declines on that day were fully as large, if not actually larger. The New York "Times" averages for 25 representative railroads and 25 representative industrial shares, on Monday, showed the greatest decline for any day since the records were begun in 1911. The decline in the case of the rails was 9.31, and in the case of the industrial stocks 49.12, the combined 50 stocks dropping 29.22. On Tuesday there was a further decline in the railroad list of 6.29, and in the industrial group of 43.03. The ticker lagged far behind on both days, and,
in-fact, on every subsequent day. On Oct. 28 the $=$ Steck Exchange ticker did not record the last transaction unth $1671 / 2$ minutes after 3 o'clock, the closing time, and the Curb ticker not until 2 hours after closing. On Oct. 29 final quotations on the Stock Exchange were not recorded until 5;32 P. M., and on the Curb ticker not until 6:17 P. M. On Oct. 28 among the conspicuous losses on the Stock Exchange for the day were General Electric, $471 / 2$ points; Eastman Kodak, $41^{7 / 8}$ points; New York Central, $22 \%$ points; Union Kadak, $41 / 8$ points, 20 points. United States Steel, $171 / 2$. Carbide \& Carbon, 20 points; United Westinghouse Elec. \& Mfg., $341 / 4$; Consolidated Gas, 20 ; Columbia Gas \& Electric, 22; American Tel. \& Tel., 34, and Int. Tel. \& Tel., 15 points. On the Curb Exchange Aluminum Co. of America showed a net decline for the day of $501 / 4$; American Light \& Traction, 45 , and Cities Service, 18 $\%$. On Oct. 29, among the conspicuous losses for the day were Air Reduction, 25; Amer. Tel. \& Tel., 28; Int. Tel \& Tel.; 17; Atchison, 17; Louisville \& Tel., 28; 19. Nor. \& Tel., ican, $271 / 2$ points after a decline of $181 / 2$ the day before ; Purity Bakeries, $441 / 2$, after a drop the previous day of $171 /$; Delaware \& Hudson, $25 \frac{1}{4}$; General Electric, 28; New Haven, $181 / 8$; U. S. Steel, 12, and Westinghouse Elec+ tric \& Mfg., 19. In the Curb Exchange Aluminum Co. of America suffered a further drop of $74 \frac{1}{4}$; Midwest Utilities fell 85; American Cigar, 33; Goldman Sachs, 247/8, and Transamerica new, $235 / 8$.

On Wednesday, Oct. 30 , the market opened higher all around and continued to improve almost all day long. American Tel \& Tel recovered 36; Int Tel \& Tel 13. Gen Elec 25; U S Tel. recovered 36, Inl. Fese $181 / 2$, The Curb Exch. S. Steel, 11; Westinghouse Elec., 1812. The Curb exchange also showed recoveries all around, Aluminum Co. of America rising 15; Cities Service, $9 \frac{1 / 2}{2}$; Goldman Sachs, $223 / 4$, \&c. The Stock Exchange ticker on Oct. 30 did not record the last of the sales until $5: 52$, and the Curb not until 5:35. It was then announced that the Exchange on Thursday, Oct. 31, would not open until 12 o'clock, and would be closed altogether on Friday and Saturday, Nov 1 and Nov. 2, to enable the brokers and their employees, who were in a state of almost complete physical exhaustion, to get through with the mass of work they were called upon get through with the mas of the record-breaking volume of business brices was At the short session, some of the princinal pains being was carried still further, some of the prel 11. sain being American Tel. \& Tel., 63/4; Int. Tel. \& Tel., 11; Amercan \& Foreign Power, 175\%; Consolidated Gas, 10; General Electric, 5; U. S. Steel, 81/4; Westinghouse Elec., $153 / 4$; Union Pacific, $121 / 4$-all on top of Wednesday's huge upward rebound. In the Curb Exchange the net gain on Oct. 31 in the case of Cities Service was $51 / 2$; Middle West Utilities, $491 / 4$; Elec. Bond \& Share, $151 / 8$, and Aluminum Co. of America, $55 \frac{1}{2}$. As the easiest way to show the extent of the declines during the month, as also the upward rebound the last two days, we introduce here the following two tables:


MONTHLY REVIEW


It is needless to say, after the enumeration of the recordbreaking transactions on several of the closing days of the month, that the volume of transactions for the month in its entirety reached an aggregate of unparalleled proportions, leaving all previous monthly aggregates far in the rear. That is true of the Stock Exchange and the Curb Exchange alike. On the Stock Exchange the month's turnover was $141,668,410$ shares, which exceeds by $26,234,575$ shares the previous high record established in November 1928 , when the sales aggregated $115,433,835$ shares. On the New York Curb Exchange the sales totaled $61,836,200$ shares, which compares with $57,646,450$ shares in July 1929, the previous record for that exchange. It deserves to be stated that the bond market showed growing strength as the stock market kept developing weakness, at least in the case of nearly all the better class of bonds, but the remark does not apply in the case of bond issues with convertible features, which naturally suffered severe collapse in common with the stocks into which they are convertible. In the final days of the month, however, even the better class of bond issues, in not a few instances, weakened and moved lower, this evidently following because of sales made by holders, some of them of large calibre, who desired to invest the proceeds in the purchase of stocks at the extremely low level to which these latter had fallen.

## VOLUME OF BUSINESS ON THE STOCK EXCHANGE.

Month of October-
stock sales-No. of sh
Bond sales (par value)-
Railroad \& miscell
United Stas miscell.-
Tnited Statos Govern't
State, munle. \& foreign
Total bond sales
Jan. 1 to oct. 31 -
Stock sales- No. of shar
Bond sales (par value)
Bond sales (par value)
Railroad \& miscell

$\begin{array}{lll}\text { Tnited States Govern't } & 111,188,800 & 158,869,250 \\ \text { State, munic. \& foreign } & 529,125,150 & 640,849,925\end{array}$
Total bond soles $2,417,663,2502480709,3252735,031$

## THE MONEY MARKET DURING OCTOBER 1929.

In the money market the situation during October was one of growing ease There was not the slightest reflection of the turbulent state of things prevailing on the Stock Exchange, where prices collapsed as never before in Stock Exchange history, and where in the closing days of the month panic reigned supreme and where, on account of the tremendous liquidation in the stock market and the almost complete collapse of the price structure, even the safety of the banks and banking institutions was threatened when the panic was at its height. The absence of monetary tension at a time of great convulsion in the stock market was a wholly new development, distinguishing the stock market panic in this instance from all previous convulsions of the same nature. This freedom from monetary strain cannot be ascribed to the existence or operation of the Federal Reserve System, inasmuch as the country has had the Reserve System for fifteen years and yet has not escaped high money rates in times of crises, and even during 1929 there have been repeated huge declines on the Stock Exchange, every one of which has been attended by high money rates and stringency in the money market. As a conspicuous instance of the kind, we need mention only the violent upheaval in the stock market which occurred last March, when the stock market suffered a crash only second to that through which the country has now passed. At that time, it will be recalled, call money the latter part of
the month (March 26) on Stock Exchange collateral mounted to $20 \%$, and the tension reached such an acute stage that an actual crisis was escaped only through the intervention of the National City Bank of New York, with the announcement in the last hour of the Stock Exchange session, that is, between 2 oclock and 3 o'clock, that the bank stood ready to place an additional $\$ 25,000,000$ in the call loan market, $\$ 5,000,000$ at $16 \%$, and a like amount for each succeeding rise of $1 \%$ up to $20 \%$. Other banks then quickly followed in the footsteps of the National City, thereby breaking the crisis which had at this time developed.
No money trouble of this kind developed during the stock market collapse under review, which, of course, was of inf:nitely larger proportions than that witnessed the previous March. As far as the huge volume of brokers' loans is concerned, which played such a prominent part in the debacle in this instance, the Sept. 30 total of these loans (taking the monthly Stock Exchange compilation as a guide) actually exceeded that at the beginning of March (or, to be precise, at the close of business on Feb. 28) by no less than $\$ 1,870,838,062$, making the situation in that respect correcpondingly worse in October than the previous March.
What is still more remarkable is that the course of the money market was one of developing ease all through the month of October. Not only was there no upward splurge in money during the time of the stock market panic in the closing days of the month, nor the slightest sign or trace of any monetary tension, near or remote, but from the very beginning of the month, before anything was discernible to indicate what was to befall the stock market later on, money rates kept going lower day after day and week after week. And the statement applies to all branches of the money market-call loans representing money loaned out subject to immediate call, time loans representing money also loaned out on Stock Exchange collateral but running for fixed dates of maturity, and bankers' acceptances representing the highest type of banking accommodation on behalf of the mercantile community. Rates on all these classes of banking accommodation, of one kind or another, and the use and service of bank credit, not only tended lower, but actually moved lower long before the advent of the panic or before there was any admonition of its coming except such as had been patent to trained observers for a considerable time previously and had led to the inescapable conclusion that a crash was impending and might come at any time.
This growing ease in the money market existed, too, notwithstanding that brokers' loans, judged by the weekly figures of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, were being maintained at the highest level in Stock Exchange history and even were establishing new high records (it being a matter of general comment that brokers' loans were increasing notwithstanding the continuous liquidation on the Stock Exchange, the decline in the stock market having been uninterruptedly in progress since the early part of September), the big drop in these loans not occurring until the final week of the month, when forced liquidation on the Stock Exchange brought about a diminution of unparalleled magnitude in Stock Exchange borrowing. Nor was there any addition to the amount of Federal Reserve credit outstanding to account for the developing ease in money. It is true that the Federal Reserve Banks kept adding to their holdings of acceptances purchased in the open market, the amount of these for the 12 Reserve institutions ris ng from $\$ 322,818,000$ Oct. 2 and $\$ 263,934,000$ Sept. 25 , to $\$ 379,383,000$ Oct. 23 , but the increase here was offset in part by a reduction in the holdings of United States Government securities, which fell from $\$ 145,752,000$ Oct. 2 and $\$ 152,059,000$ Sept. 25 , to $\$ 135,704,000$ Oct. 23 , and for the remainder of the amount was more than offset by diminished borrowing at the Reserve institutions by the member banks, the increased purchases of acceptances having made this possible and the decline in call loan rates to $6 \%$ and on occasions to $5 \%$, leaving no margin of profit in borrowing, at least at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, where the $6 \%$ rate was maintained up to and including the last day of the month, the reduction to $5 \%$ announced on this last mentioned day not going into effect until the next day, Nov. 1.
Of course all this was changed after the panic came, when the Reserve Banks once again greatly enlarged their holdings of United States Government obligations and the member banks also again greatly enlarged their borrowing at the Reserve institutions, as related at length in our discussion of the statements of the Reserve Banks and of brokers' loans, in separate paragraphs further along in this article. The point which it is sought to bring out here is that ease in money became a marked characteristic of the money market before the development of the panic on the Stock Exchange, and was independent of any action or do:ngs of the Reserve authorities. Conclusive evidence of this is furnished in the fact that notwithstanding the large addition to the line of acceptances purchased
in the onen market, the total of the bill and security holdings of all kinds, which last reflects the amount of Reserve credit outstanding-the total of these holdings, owing to the reduction already referred to in the amount of United States Government securities, and still more because of diminished borrowing by the member banks (the discount holdings of the 12 Reserve institutions having declined from $\$ 930,633,000$ Oct. 2 and $\$ 944,399,000$ Sept. 25 to $\$ 796,358,000$ Oct. 23)-this total of the bill and security holdings Oct. 23, just before the great crash in the stock market on Oct. 25, was actually smaller than at the beginning of the month or during September, the amount Oct. 23 being $\$ 1,336$, 656,000 against $\$ 1,414,228,000$ Oct. 2 and $\$ 1,375,467,000$ Sept. 25. It might be added that the volume of Reserve credit outstanding at this time was also below the amount of Reserve credit out at the corresponding date in the previous year, the total of the bill and security holdings on Oct. 241928 having been $\$ 1,548,182,000$ and the amount Oct. 31 1928, $\$ 1,603,476,000$.
In any study of the course of the money market during the $h$ storic period under consideration, the above observations should be held clearly in view. As to the facts themselves which establish the developing ease in money in adrance of the panic and enormous liquidation on the Stock Exchange, these it now remains to place on record. It should, however, be noted that the ease referred to was a wholly abrupt and sudden development. There was no evidence of it during September, even up to the very close of that month, during which the long existing tension remained unrelieved, as was set out in our review of the money market conditions in that month. As far as rates for call loans are concerned, the renewal charge on Sept. 30, it may be recalled, was $9 \%$, and from that figure there was an advance to $10 \%$ in the rate for new loans. On Tuesday, Oct. 1, there was again an advance to $10 \%$ after renewals had been put through at $9 \%$. On Wednesday, Oct. 2, with the renewal charge still $9 \%$, there was a drop in the rate for new loans to $7 \%$. On Thursday, Oct. 3, the renewal rate was reduced to $7 \frac{1}{2} \%$, while the rate for new loans fell to $6 \%$. On Friday, Oct. 4, the renewal charge was down to $61 / 2 \%$, and new loans were negotiated at $6 \%$. This occurred while brokers loans kept up their record of expansion and were mounting in a perfectly appalling manner. The nionthly Stock Exchange statement was given out after the close of business on Wednesday, Oct. 2, and showed that borrowing by Stock Exchange members had now reached a total in excess of $81 / 2$ billion dollars, the exact amount as of Sept. 30 being $\$ 8,549,383.979$. For the month of September alone the increase was $\$ 667,764,553$ and for the four months from May 31 to Sept. 30 borrowing rose from $\$ 6,665,137,925$ to $\$ 8,549,383,979$, or not far from $\$ 2,000,000,000$. On top of this there appeared on Thursday evening, Oct. 3, the weekly statement of the Federal Reserve for the week ending Wednesday n:ght, Oct. 2. being two days later than the Stock Exchange compilation for Sept 30. This also showed another increase, in addition to all the other increases which had come without a solitary break week after week since Aug. 14. The further increase for this latest week was $\$ 43,000,000$, raising the total of the increases since Aug. 14 to no less than $\$ 852.000,000$.
The further expansion in Stock Exchange borrowing attracted the more attention as it occurred in face of continuous liquidation on the Stock Exchange with violent and general declines in prices, a state of things which in the past had always been attended by great contraction in Stock Exchange borrowing. Nevertheless, ease in money continued. On Monday, Oct. 7, renewals of call loans on the Stock Exchange were at $61 / 2 \%$, from which there was a decline to $6 \%$ in the rate for new loans. On Tuesday. Oct. 8 , the range was again from $61 / 2 \%$ down to $6 \%$. On Wednesday, Thursday and Friday of that week the renewal charge each day was $6 \%$, with the rate for new loans only $5 \%$. Incidentally, it may be noted that this $5 \%$ call loan rate was the lowest since Aug. 17 1928. Outside the Stock Exchange some loaning was done at $41 / 2 \%$. The Federal Reserve weekly statement regarding brokers' loans this time proved more assuring, it showing a reduction of $\$ \$ 1,000.000$. all but $\$ 3,000,000$ of which, however, was cancelled the next week, when an $\$ 88,000,000$ increase was again shown, leaving the total on Oct 16 only $\$ 3,000,000$ below the peak figure in all time reached on Oct. 2. On Monday, Oct. 14, all call loans on the Stock Exchange were at 6\%, including renewals. On Oct. 15, after renewals had been effected at $6 \%$, there was an advance in the rate for new loans to $7 \%$. On Oct. 16 all loans were at $7 \%$. On Oct. 17 the renewal rate was again $7 \%$, and from this there was a decline to $6 \%$ in the charge for new loans. On Friday, Oct. 18, the renewal rate was lowered to $6 \%$, while some new loans were negotiated at $5 \%$. From this time on to the end of the month the rate never got higher than $6 \%$, and on several days was as low as $5 \%$ for new loans, with even the renewal rate as low at $5 \%$ on one day, namely, Oct. 29. Brokers' loans, as a result of the panic in the stock market and tremendous liquidation, now at length began to show contraction. In the return for Oct. 23 the decrease in these
loans was still moderate, considering the extent of the antecedent rise, being no more than $\$ 167,000,000$, but the following week, on Oct. 30, after the panic was in full swing, the brokers' loan total was diminished in amount of over a billion dollars, the exact amount of the contraction being $\$ 1,096,000,000$.
In the time loan branch of the collateral loan market, the reduction in rates proceeded with great rapidity, and, indeed, the time loan market may be said to have been most of the month in a chaotic state by reason of this rapid decline in rates. On Oct. 1 and Oct. 2 time money continued firm at $9 @ 91 / 4 \%$ for all dates. On Oct. 3 and Oct. 4 the rate fell to $9 \%$ for all dates. This last was a Friday. The following Monday, Oct. 7, the quotation for all dates from 30 days to six months was $83 / 409 \%$. On Oct. 8 the single figure of $83 \%$ was named for all dates. On Oct. 9 the range for all dates was $81 / 2 @ 83 / 4 \%$. On Oct. 10 there was a drop to 8@8 $1 / 4 \%$ for 30 - and 60 -day money, and to $81 / 4 @ 81 / 2 \%$ for 90 days to six months; while on Oct. 11 the range was 8@8 $1 / 4 \%$ for all dates. The rates thereafter continued to drift lower and still lower. On Oct. 14 the quotation for 30 -day money was $71 / 2 \%$, for 60 days $71 / 2 @$ $73 \%$, for 90 days and four months $8 \%$, and for five and six months 73/4@8\%. On Oct. 15 the quotations were 71/4@ $71 / 2 \%$ for 30 days, $71 / 2 @ 73 / 4 \%$ for 60 days, and $73 / 4 @ 8 \%$ for 90 days to six months. On Oct. 16, 17 and 18 rates were $71 / 4 @ 71 / 2 \%$ for 30 days, $71 / 2 \%$ for 60 days, and $71 / 2 @ 7 \% \%$ for all other dates from 90 days to six months.
On Oct. 21 the rate for 30 -day money was $7 @ 71 / \%$, for 60 days $71 / 4 @ 71 / 2 \%$, for 90 days and four months $7 \%$ @ $7 / 4 \%$, and for five and six months $71 / 4 @ 71 / 2 \%$. On Oct. 22 the quotations were $7 \%$ for 30 days, $7 @ 71 / 4 \%$ for 60 days, and $71 / 4 @ 7 \frac{1}{2} \%$ for 90 days to six months. On Oct. 23 rates were $7 \%$ for 30 days and for 60 days, and $71 / 4 @ 71 / 2 \%$ for all other dates from 90 days to six months. On Oct. 24 and Oct. 25 the quotations were $61 / 2 @ 63 / 4 \%$ for 30 and 60 days, and $7 @ 71 / 4 \%$ for 90 days to six months. The panic was now raging in full fury in the stock market, but it made no difference in the course of money. Notwithstanding the upheaval in the stock market and the feeling of positive alarm that prevailed in banking circles, money became still easier and there was not even a flurry in the call loan division, as already noted. On Monday, Oct. 28, quotations were down to $6 \%$ for 30 and 60 days, and $6 @ 61 / 2 \%$ for 90 days to six months. On the remaining days of the month the rate was uniformly $6 \%$ for all dates. It will hence be seen that during the month as a whole the time loan rate dropped from $9 \%$ and above to $6 \%$. Commercial paper remained quiet throughout the month, with dealings at a minimum and with virtually no change in rates, though with slightly greater activity in the latter half of the month, before the stock market fell into a state of panic. Rates for names of choice character maturing in four to six months remained throughout at $6 @ 61 / 4 \%$, while names less well known commanded $61 / 4 @ 61 / 2 \%$.

RATES FOR MONEY AT NEW YORK.
Call Loans on Stock Exchange- Oct.5. Oct. 12. Oct. 19. Oct. 26. Nov. 2. Call Loans on Stock Exchango-
Range for weeks (mixed \& indus. coll.)
Week's average (mixed \& ind. coll.)
Time Loans, Mixed \& Indus. Collater
 Sixty days.
Ninety days...
Four months..
Five months..
Double and single names:

## Prime 4 to 6 months

Banks and bankers' acceptance strongest evidence of all of the s and the lack of tension. Rates for bankers' acceptances were reduced several times during the month. To be sure the Federal Reserve Banks furnished an increased market for acceptances through their open market purchases, but a growing market for acceptances developed independent of the purchases made by the Reserve institutions and during the latter part of the month purchases by the Reserve Banks largely ceased, inasmuch as owing to successive reductions in market rates these latter were now below the buying rate of the Federal Reserve Banks, making it more advantageous to sell in the market than to sell to the Reserve Banks. New supplies of acceptances appeared in growing volume, showing that the banks were by no means refraining from adding to the volume of acceptances afloat, but the demand for these bills appeared to be growing even faster than the supplies, and the only tenable explanation appears to be that there must have been very liberal trans fers of funds from the stock market to the bill market, no doubt by the investment trusts and other large lenders who had been employing their idle funds on the Stock Exchange. Large blocks of cotton bills came out as well as considerable supplies of other bills, but all found ready takers, a very spirited demand existing for both foreign and domestic account. Rates were reduced $1 / 8 \%$ in both the bid and the asked columns for all maturities on Oct. 23, again on Oct. 24, and a third fime on Oct. 25, and finally were reduced another $1 / 8 \%$ on Oct. 29 The buying rate of the Reserve Banks
was reduced from $51 / \%$ to $5 \%$ and was further marked down to $43 / 4 \%$ on Friday, Nov. 1, after the Federal Reserve rediscount rate at New York had the day before (Oct. 31) been lowered from $6 \%$ to $5 \%$, but effective on Nov. 1. The successive reductions in rates left the posted rates of the American Acceptance Council at the close of the month at $43 / 4 \%$ bid and $45 / 8 \%$ asked for bills running 30 days, 60 days and 90 days; $47 / 8 \%$ bid and $43 / 4 \%$ asked for 120 days, and $5 \%$ bid and $478 \%$ asked for 150 and 180 days. In this last instance the reduction for the month is $5 / 8 \%$ instead of $1 / 2 \%$, as in the case of the other maturities, due to the fact that when the first reduction was made on Oct. 23 bills running 150 days and those running 180 days were reduced $1 / 4 \%$ instead of $1 / 8 \%$, as in the case of other maturities. The Reserve Banks kept adding to their hold ngs of acceptances except in the last week of the month, when, for the reason stated, a substantial diminution in these holdings occurred. As against $\$ 322,818,000$ Oct. 2 and $\$ 263,934,000$ Sept. 25 , the acceptance holdings of the 12 Reserve institutions stood at $\$ 379,383,000$ Oct. 23 , from which there was a reduction to $\$ 339,885,000$ Oct. 30 ; the previous July 10 the acceptance holdings of the 12 Reserve Banks were $\$ 05,976,000$. These figures relate to the Reserve Banks' own holdings of acceptances. They are buyers in still larger volume for their foreign correspondents, and in this last instance there was an uninterrupted increase week by week, not excepting the last week, so that the total of the bills held for these foreign correspondents stood at $\$ 500,833,000$ Oct. 30 as against $\$ 453.908,000$ on Oct. 2.
The volume of acceptances outstanding was apparently further substantially increased during the month. On Oct. 18 the American Acceptance Council made public its usual monthly survey and reported a grand total of dollar acceptances outstanding for Sept. 30 in amount of $\$ 1,272,270,545$, or within $\$ 12,000,000$ of the highest total on record, and showing an increase of $\$ 71,734,399$ for the month of September. As compared with Sept. 301928 this was an increase of $\$ 268,104,365$, and compared with Sept. 301927 increase of $\$ 268,104,365$, and compared with Sept. 301927
an increase of $\$ 408,447,000$. Contrariwise, the volume of ordinary commercial paper outstanding remained at low levels. The "Monthly Review" of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for Nov. 1 reported that during September the amount of commercial paper outstanding through 23 firms had declined $1 \%$ to $\$ 265,000,000$. This amount was $38 \%$ less than that outstanding at the end of September of last year.

PRIME BANKERS' ACCEPTANCES.

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { April } \\ & 1929 . \end{aligned}$ | Call Loans Secured by Accepl'ces. | 30 Days Bid \& Ask | $\begin{array}{r} 60 \text { Days } \\ \text { Bid \& Ask } \end{array}$ | $\begin{gathered} 90 \text { Days } \\ \text { Bid \& Ask } \end{gathered}$ | $\left\|\begin{array}{l} 120 \text { Days } \\ \text { Bid \& Ask } \end{array}\right\|$ | 150 Days Bid \& Ask | 180 Days Bid \& Ask |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | 53/-51/8 |  | 514-53/6 | $53 / 5$ |  |  |
|  |  | 51/-51/8 | 51/4-51/8 | 514-51/6 | 533-5 |  | 5\%3-53/1/ |
|  |  | $51 / 21 / 8$ $51 /-51 / 8$ | $51 / 21 / 6$ $51 / 216$ | 514-51/6 | $5336-51 / 4$ | $558-51 / 2$ | 5\%-51/2 |
|  |  |  | 51/2-51/6 | ( $\begin{aligned} & 51 /-51 / 8 \\ & \text { Saturday }\end{aligned}$ | 53/3-51/ | $55 / 8-51 / 2$ | 5\%-51/3 |
|  |  |  |  | Sunday |  |  |  |
|  |  | 514-51/6 | 511/51/6 | 514-5\% | 53/2-51/4 | 5 \% $/ 251 / 2$ |  |
|  |  | 514-51/6 | 51/2-51/6 | $51 / 41 / 8$ 514 | 53/8-5/4 | $558-51 / 2$ | 5\%\%-5/3 |
|  |  | $51 / 4$ | 51/4-51/6 |  | / | 5 | 56-5 ${ }^{5}$ |
|  |  |  |  | Saturday |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | Sunday |  |  |  |
|  |  | 51/5-51/6 | 51 | 514-51/6 | 53/2-51/4 | 5 | 55/8-51/2 |
|  |  | - ${ }^{51 / 4}$ |  | 5314-519 | 533/53/4 |  |  |
|  |  | 51/-51/6 | 514-51/6 | 514-51/6 | 5385014 | 5\% 5 | $5 \% / 5$ $5 \%-5$ |
|  |  | 514-51/6 | 51/4-51/8 | 51/4-51/8 | 53/8-51/4 | 59\%-51/2 | 5\%\% $51 / 2$ |
|  |  |  |  | Saturday |  |  | 5\%-5/2 |
| 21. |  | 51/4-51/8 | 51/5-53/6 | 51/4-51/8 | 53/2 |  |  |
| 22 |  | 51/41/2 | 51/-51/8 | 514-51/8 | 5\%-514 | 5 $5 \%-5 \%$ | 5\%\%-51/2 |
|  |  | 5 | 5 | 51 | $51 / 21$ | 53/8-5 | 518-51/4 |
| 25. |  | 43/6-4\% | 47/6-4\% | 4 $3 / 3-4 \%$ | $5^{5 / 8}-47 / 8$ | $51 / 21 / 2 /$ $518-5$ | $51 / 23 / 8$ $51 / 8-5$ |
| 26 |  |  |  | Saturday | - -428 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | Sunday |  |  |  |
| 29 |  | 43/4\% | 43-4\% | $43-49$ | $\begin{aligned} & 57-4 / 8 \\ & 476-43 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 51 / 8-5 \\ & 5-47 / 8 \end{aligned}$ | ${ }^{51 / 8-5}$ |
|  |  | $43 / 4598$ $43 \%-45 / 8$ | $43,4 \%$ $43-49$ | 4\% $4 \%$ | 476-4\% | $5-4 \%$ | 5 5 -47 |
| 31.-. | ----7--- | 43\%-45/8 | 43-49\% | 43/45\% | 478-4\% | $5-41 / 8$ | 5-478. |

## THE RETURNS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND MEMBER OF THE FEDERAL RESERV BANKS-BROKERS' LOANS.

In analyzing the figures of brokers' loans for the month of October a sharp distinction must be made between the first three weeks of the month, before the panic in the stock market occurred, and the last two weeks, and especially the final week, when the panic raged on the Stock Exchange. The stock market was depressed even during the early part of the month, and liquidation evidently proceeded on a very large scale, but brokers' loans, nevertheless, kept expanding, and, indeed, established a new high peak in all time. And there was much discussion in the newspapers as to the reason for this anomalous state of things. The last week of the month, however, the liquidation referred to left an indelible mark in a reduction of brokers' loans of unparalleled proportions. From $\$ 6,761$,000,000 Sept. 25 , the grand total of these loans increased further to $\$ 6,804,000,000$ Oct. 2, establishing a new high record in all time. The statement for Oct. 9 showed a reduction to $\$ 6,713,000000$, but for Oct. 16 there was a rise again to $\$ 6,801,000,000$, during all of which time liquidation was proceeding on the Stock Exchange on a very extensive scale. On Oct. 23 a reduction to $\$ 6,634,000,000$ appeared, but it
was not until the actual occurrence of the panic, wíth an outpouring of stocks on a scale never before witnessed, that a reduction of truly large proportions appeared. The return for Oct. 30 showed the total down to $\$ 5,538,000,000$, a contraction of $\$ 1,096,000,000$ as compared with Oct. 28 , and of $\$ 1,263,000,000$ as compared with 0 ct .16.

More significant than the reduction itself was the ehange in the distribution of the loans in the three different divisions of loaning, namely, (1) the loans made by the reporting member banks in New York City on their own account; (2) the loans made by these reporting member banks for account of out-of-town banks, and (3) the loans for "account of others." Under these last two headings reduction appeared far in excess of that in the grand total, the loans for account of others showing a contraction in the huge sum of $\$ 1,380,000,000$, and those for account of the out-of-town banks a reduction of $\$ 707,000,000$, making a shrinkage under these two heads combined of bo less than $\$ 2,087,000,000$. On the other hand, in the case of the loans made by the reporting member banks for their own aeeount, a tremendous increase occurred, the amount under that head expanding almost a full billion dollars, the amount, In fact, almost doubling, the total rising from $\$ 1,077,000,000$ Oct. 23 to $\$ 2,069,000,000$ Oct. 30 . These figures furnish some interesting revelations regarding the occurrences connected with the panic and throw much light upen the panic itself and the cause or causes of it, or at least the acute stage which it reached. Evidently what happened was that these outside lenders-and the loans for account of the out-of-town banks are very largely of the same elass and character as the loans "for account of others," neither being protected by any cash reserves-undertook to call in their loans and thus forced the banks to take over the loans at least in part themselves, so as to prevent the stock market, already in a state of great panic, from going altogether to pieces, in which event the banks themselves would have gone down in ruin and destruction. These outside lenders did this either because they became apprehensive of the safety of their loans, in view of the great decline in prices which had continued almost without interruption stnce the early part of September, or because they now wanted to buy stocks, the latter appearing cheap after the great shrinkage in their market values, and probably for both reasons.
At all events, the facts themselves are clear and ineontrovertible. The outside loans, as we have seen, were drawn down in amount of $\$ 2.087,000,000$, while the loans eredited to the banks themselves concurrently underwent expansion in the sum of $\$ 902,000,000$. It would also seem that the great further break in prices which accurred on Monday, Oct. 28, and Tuesday, Oct. 29, following the tremendoas smash the previous Thursday, was not due, as claimed in certain quarters, to "mob psychology," that is, to frantie selling induced by a complete loss of confidence in values, but rather was due to the calling of loans on a gigantic scale by these outside lenders, forcing the borrowers to obtain loans elsewhere, which was possible only to the extent that the banks could extend the loaning on their own account, and this obviously they could not do to the full amount of the withdrawals by the outside lenders. In these circumstancese no alternative was left to the nofortunate borrowers except to throw their holdings apon the market-a market already weakened, almost beyond calculation, by the long antecedent period of liquidation continued without interruption since the early part of September.
The changes in the Federal Reserve statements must be studied in the light of what has just been sald and the part played by the panic itself in obliging resort to unasual measures. But first it should be noted that the monthly statement of borrowing prepared by the Stock Wxehange itself brings out in even stronger reltef than the weekly Federal Reserve figures the story of what happened in the matter of the shrinkage in brokers' loans and borrowing on Stock Exchange account. The Stock Exchange compilation always deals with larger figures than the Federal Reserve statements, being cast on more comprehensive lines. It was noted further above that on Sept. 30 the Stock Exchange total of borrowng had run in excess of $81 / 2$ billion dollars, it standing at $\$ 8,549,383,979$. It now appears that during October the total fell to $\$ 6,108,824,868$, this being the aggregate for Oct. 31. In other words, there was a shrink-age-a forced shrinkage-in Stock Exchange borrowing during the month in the tremendous sum of $\$ 2,440,509,111$, thereby cancelling all of the huge expansion which took place in the months preceding, and bringing the total down to a level lower than that shown in any monthly return since Oct. 31 1928. It would seem plain that this shrinkage in Stock Exchange borrowing of close to $2 \frac{1}{2}$ billion dellars in a single month does not represent voluntary selling in the stock market by holders who, moved by mob psychology, got rattled all of a sudden and threw their holdings overboard, regardless of market price, without other cause or reason. A much more reasonable explanation is that the holdings came unon the market because the outside lenders withdrew their funds on the gigantic scale already noted, thereby
forcing the borrowers to reduce their holdings, or to get rid of them altogether, since no other way existed of obtaining the banking accommodation of which they stood in such sore need.
Taking up now some of the other Federal Reserve figures and which have already been partly outlined in the comment above, it is found that the Federal Reserve Banks continued their policy of enlarging their holdings of bankers' accentances until the last week of the month, when the decline in the market rate for acceptances left the Reserve Banks no longer a profitable receptacle for the same, and that as a result the acceptance holding of the 12 Reserve institutions increased from $\$ 322,818,000$ Oct. 2 to $\$ 379$,383,000 Oct. 23 , and then fell to $\$ 339,885,000$ Oct. 30 . It is also found that while bill buying thus proceeded member bank borrowing was reduced, the discount holdings of the 12 Reserve Banks falling from $\$ 930,633,000$ Oct. 2 to $\$ 796$,358,000 Oct. 23, and then jumping to $\$ 991,038,000$ Oct. 30 under the necessity imposed by the panic in the stock market and the tremendous withdrawal of outside funds. It should be added that the whole of the $\$ 2,087,000,000$ of outside funds withdrawn from the Stock Exchange in the last week of the month, as shown by the weekly returns of the Federal Reserve Banks, represented deposits against which no cash reserves of any kind were carried. The Federal Reserve statement also shows that while the Reserve Banks were adding to their accentances they kent reducing their holdings of United States Government securities, but that in the last week of the month, because of the development of the stock market panic, this nolicy was abandoned and very extensive purchases of United States Government securities made. In exact figures, holdings of Government securities fell from $\$ 145,752,000$ Oct. 2 to $\$ 135,704,000$ Oct. 23 , and then at one bound were increased to $\$ 292,688,000$ Oct. 30. The net result of these different changes was that total bill and security holdings on Oct. 23 stood at only $\$ 1,336,656,000$, against $\$ 1,414,228,000$ Oct. 2 , but on Oct. 30 rose to $\$ 1,648,742,000$. It accordingly appears that the list week of the month $\$ 312,086,000$ of Reserve credit was used directly and indirectly in relief of the situation. It should be added that of this $\$ 312,086,000$ of new Reserve credit obtained through the 12 Reserve Banks $\$ 256,813,000$ was obtained here at New York, where, of course, it was especially needed, through the New York Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

One outgrowth of the situation was that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on the last day of the month lowered its rate of discount from $6 \%$ to $5 \%$, after having raised it the previous Aug. 8 from 5 to $6 \%$. The rise became effective on Nov. 1, and on this latter day the buying rate for bankers' acceptances by the Reserve institutions was reduced from $5 \%$ to $43 / 4 \%$. This brought the rediscount rate of the New York Federal Reserve Bank back to the same figure as that obtaining at the other 11 Reserve Banks, making it uniform throughout the whole Reserve System at $5 \%$.

## COURSE OF STERLING EXCHANGE DURING OCTOBER.

All the foreign exchanges at New York were under the influence of the growing ease in the money market here, -which ease, as noted in our review of the money market further above, was a feature that continued uninterruptedly from the very beginning of the month. With lower money rates at this center, New York ceased to be a magnet for drawing funds from all parts of the earth, and as a consequence foreign exchange rates on all of the leading countries of Europe kept steadily rising and at some points approached very close to the figures where gold exports from the United States could be made at a profit. This was a complete reversal of the situation in previous months, when the flow of the metal was strongly in this direction and when it was a question of gold imports into the United States instead of gold exports from this country. The improvement in the exchange situation in the particulars mentioned was of a special advantage to Great Britain and led the Bank of England on the last day of the month (Oct. 31) to lower its discount rate from $61 / 2$ to $6 \%$, after having raised it on Sept. 26, five weeks before, from $51 / 2$ to $61 / 2 \%$. The lowering of the Bank of England rate no doubt also played some part, along with the panic in the stock market, in inducing a reduction again from $6 \%$ to $5 \%$ in the rediscount rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York This lowering of the Bank of England rate on Oct. 31 was followed the same day by a reduction also in the discount rate of the Bank of the Netherlands at Amsterdam from $51 / 2 \%$, the rate in effect since March 25 1929, to $5 \%$. On Nov. 1 the Irish Free State cut its rate from $7 \%$ to $6 \frac{1}{2} \%$, and on Nov. 2 the Bank of Germany reduced its rate from $71 / 2 \%$ to $7 \%$. Thus the easing of the money market at New York, with the rise in foreign exchange rates, exerted world-wide influence.

There were no special features in the sterling exchange market during October aside from what has just been mentioned. The higher Bank of England rate put in effect on Sept. 26, while playing its part in inducing the withdrawal of British funds from this center, did not serve
to stop the flow of gold from London to Paris. The rise in the rate did operate to strengthen sterling exchange here at the beginning of the month; later in the month growing ease in money at this center proved a much more effective agency in strengthening sterling exchange rates here on London. The repeated cuts in the rates here for bankers' acceptances was perhaps the strongest manifestation of the ease in money at this center, and the most powerful factor in advancing the price of sterling bills. The rise in sterling may be said to have been continuous throughout the whole of October. The extent of the advance appears from the fact that cable transfers on London were at their lowest on Oct. 4 at $\$ 4.857 / 32$, and at their highest on Oct. 24, when $\$ 4.881 / 8$ was touched and with no very appreciable decline the rest of the month, the range Oct. 31 being $\$ 4.875$ @\$4.88. The Bank of England, nevertheless, was unable greatly to enlarge its gold holdings, mainly, however, because of the further withdrawals of the metal for shipment to Paris, which the New York Federal Reserve Bank estimates at, roughly, $\$ 30,000,000$ between Sept. 26 and Oct. 30. After the large loss of $£ 2,868,977$ gold shown in the Bank of England statement for the week ending Oct. 2, the return for the week ending Oct. 9 disclosed a gain of $£ 1,653,546$, and this was followed by a further increase of $£ 935,755$ in the week ending Oct. 16. In the return for Oct. 23, however, the gain was only $£ 88,155$, and for the week ending Oct. 30 a loss in the very considerable amount of $£ 879,221$ was disclosed. The governors of the Bank, nevertheless, felt safe on Oct. 31 in lowering the discount rate from $6 \frac{1}{2} \%$ to $6 \%$, in view of easy money at New York and the collapse of the stock speculation in this country.

As to the gold movement at New York during October, the New York Federal Reserve Bank, in its "Monthly Review," puts the month's arrivals from Argentina at $\$ 6$, 575,000 , and from Colombia at $\$ 2,500,000$, with $\$ 1,000,000$ more from England. Exports from this country are put at $\$ 3,700,000$, of which $\$ 3,000,000$ was for shipment to France. As there was an increase of $\$ 4,500,000$ in the gold ear-marked here for foreign account, the net gain in the metal for the month to this country was, roughly, only $\$ 2,000,000$, the smallest gain, it is stated, since February. No gold arrived here from Canada, notwithstanding that the Canadian dollar the latter part of the month was at a discount at one time as high at $21 / 2 \%$. The fact is, a virtual embargo upon exports of gold exists in the Dominion, the banks having refrained from shipping gold on the verbal request of the Canadian Minister of Finance.


## THE CONTINENTAL AND OTHER FOREIGN EXCHANGES.

The Continental exchanges moved up sharply in the wake of sterling and as a result of the same set of factors, chief of which were the lower money rates in New York and the consequent return flow of funds to Europe. French francs were exceptionally strong and advanced to figures well above dollar parity. Cable transfers on Paris rose from 3.92 Oct. 2 to $3.941 / \mathrm{s}$ Oct. 24, a new high for the year, with the range Oct. 31 at $3.933 / 4 @ 3.94$ 1/16c. The Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York, as noted above, reported a shipment of $\$ 3,000,000$ gold from New York to Paris. While French francs moved higher with respect to dollars, this appears not to have been the case with respect to the pound sterling, and the latter part of the month withdrawals of gold from London for shipment to Paris were resumed on a considerable scale. As stated above, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York figured out that from the date of the advance in the Bank of England rate on Sept. 26 to the close of October, when the English Bank rate was lowered to $6 \%$, France took, roughly, $\$ 30,000,000$ of gold in London, and of this approximately $\$ 12,000,000$ was taken between Oct. 22 and Oct. 30. Advices from the other side made it appear that the gold withdrawals for French account were made mainly by French private banks, over which the Bank of France exercises no control. French balances abroad, largely in London, but also in New York City, continued heavy. Gold holdings of the Bank of France showed a large increase in the return for the week ending Oct. 5, namely, $373,346,935$ francs. In the week ending Oct. 12, and in that ending Oct. 19, decreases of $7,682,913$ francs and $5,512,241$ francs, respectively, appeared. This was followed by an increase of $\mathbf{7 2 , 4 5 6 , 8 0 3}$ francs in the week ending Oct. 26 and an increase of $207,000,000$ francs in the week ending Nov. 2.

German marks were also firm and in greater demand. The easier money situation in New York resulted in the offering of more American funds to the German market, with a corresponding lowering of money rates in Berlin. The easier money situation in Berlin was ascribed as due in some measure to the strong position of the Reichsbank and to the suspension of short-term borrowing by municipalities. Cable advices stated that the German Government had decided to prolong the existence of the Loans Advisory Board, which has power to veto or sanction State and municipal foreign loans. It was also stated that the Government was likewise preparing a bill to prolong the temporary law of 1920 which legalized mortgage issues in foreign currencies. The extension of the application of this law was expected to facilitate long-term German borrowing abroad. The Bank of Germany in its return for the first week of October showed a decrease in gold holdings of

84,000 marks and in the return for the second week a decrease of 141,000 marks, but in the third week of the month there was an increase of $7,134,000$, and in the fourth week an increase of $\mathbf{1 0 , 1 7 0 , 0 0 0}$ marks. The Bank's note circulation, as usual, registered heavy decreases the first three weeks of the month, namely $227,475,000$ marks, $337,268,000$ marks, and $239,063,000$ marks, respectively, with the customary large expansion in the final week of the month, this time $722,534,000$ marks. Cable transfers on Berlin, after touching $23.82 \%$ c. Oct. 3 , moved up to 23.94 c . Oct. 29, with the range Oct. $31,23.92 @ 23.931 / 2 \mathrm{c}$. After the reduction in the Bank of England rate on Oct. 31 from $61 / 2 \%$ to $6 \%$, the Bank of Germany followed on Nov. 2 by a reduction in its rate from $71 / 2$ to $7 \%$. Italian lire and the minor Continental exchanges displayed firmness in common with the major Continental exchanges. The rate of the lira, however, was altered very little, cable transfers being $5.233 / 4 @ 5.23 \% / /$ Oct. 31 against 5.235/8 @5.23 11/16 Oct. 1. The Greek drachma on cable transfers was 1.30 Oct. 31 against $1.291 / 2$ Oct. 1.
The exchanges on the Continental countries neutral during the war moved upward along with the rest of the European exchanges. Dutch guilders were exceptionally strong, and considerable withdrawals of Dutch funds from the New York market for transfer to London and Amsterdam were reported. Checks on Amsterdam advanced from 40.11 Oct. 1 to 40.35 Oct. 31, and cable transfers from 40.15 Oct. 1 to 40.36 Oct. 31 . The dollar parity is 40.20 . The Bank of the Netherlands on Oct. 31, the day on which the Bank of England rate was marked down, followed with a reduction in its rate from $51 / 2 \%$, the figure in effect since March 25 1929 , to $5 \%$. Swiss francs also sharply advanced, cable transfers rising from 19.30@19.31 Oct. 1 to 19.39 Oct. 24, and being 19.37@19.38 Oct. 31. The Scandinavian exchanges likewise all moved higher. This was particularly true regarding the Norwegian crown, which, as against 26.70 for cable transfers on Oct. 1 , touched 26.81 Oct. 30 and was 26.79@26.801/2 Oct. 31. The Danish crown moved up in the same brisk manner, the rate for cable transfers rising from 26.70 Oct. 1 to 26.81 Oct. 29, and being 26.79@26.801/2 Oct. 31. The Swedish crown moved up more slowly, but moved up, nevertheless. After a decline from 26.84 Oct. 1

RATES OF EXCHANGE ON CONTINENTAL CENTRES.


|  | Denmark Kroner |  | Sweden Kroner |  | Norway <br> Kroner |  | Berlin Reichsmarks |  | Vienna Schilling |  | Spanish |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | hecks | Cables | Bankers' |  | Bankers' |  | Bankers' |  | Bankers' |  | Bankers' |  |
|  | 26.6 |  |  | $26.83 a 26$ | 26.69a26.691/2 | 26.70 |  |  | 14.07 |  |  |  |
|  | 26.68a26.70 | ${ }_{26}^{26.70 a 26.71}$ | $26.82 a .833 / 3$ | $26.83 a 26.84$ | 26.68a26.70 | $26.70 a 26.71$ | $23.821 / 2 a 23$ | $23.831 / 2.841 / 2$ | 14.07 | 14.08a.14/4/ | 14.821/2a14.85 |  |
|  | 26.68a26.69 | ${ }^{26.70 a 26.71}$ | 26.80aa.813/2 | 26.82a26.84 | 26.68a26.70 | ${ }^{26.69 a 26.71}$ |  | 23.825 5 \% $7.841 / 2$ | 14.07 | $14.08 a .1414$ | $14.83 a 14.8431 / 2$ | $14.84 a 14$ |
|  | 26.68a.691/2 | 26.7 | $26.81 a .821 / 2$ |  | $26.68 a 26.691 / 2$ | 26.70 26.70 | 23.81/2a23.83 | 23.831/2 | $\begin{aligned} & 14.08 \\ & 14.08 \end{aligned}$ | 14.09a.141/4 | $14.83 a 14.85$ $14.83 a 14.85$ | ${ }_{14.84 a 14.85}^{14.84 a 14.85}$ |
|  | SUN | DAY | SUN | DAY | SUN | DAY | SUN | DAY | 14.08 | 14.09 | $14.85$ <br> SUN | $14.84 a 14.85$ |
|  | . 69 | $26.693 / 51.71$ | 26.81a.81//2 | $26.82 a 26.83$ | 26.69a26.701/2 | 26.71 | 23.813/423.84 | 23.83 3 a 4 | 14.07 | 14.08a.141/4 | 14.83 14.85 | DAY |
|  | 26.69a.691/2 | 26.70a26.71 | . $801 / 50.811 / 2$ | $26.82 a .8$ | 26.69a26.691/2 | 0a26.71 | $23.801 / 2 a .831 / 2$ | $23.83 \%$ a.83 | 14.071/2 | . $081 / 1 / 2.141 / 4$ | $14.821 / 314.85$ | ${ }^{14.84 a 14.85}$ |
|  | $23.69 a 26.70$ | ${ }_{26}^{26.70132 .717}$ | 26.80026 .81 | 26.811/2a.82 | ${ }^{26.69 a 26.70}$ | $26.701 / 226.71$ | $23.803 / 4 \mathrm{a} .831 / 2$ | 23.83 \%a.84 | 14.07 | 14.08a.141/4 | $14.82 a 14.85$ | 14.83314 .85 |
|  | 26.70a.711/2 | ${ }_{26.72}^{26.71 a 26.72}$ | $\|26.81 a .811 / 2\|$ | 26.82a26.83 | ${ }_{26.70 a 26.711 / 2}^{26}$ | 26.711/2a26.72 | $23.84 a 23.85$ | 23.85a23.851/2 | 14.07 | $14.08 a .1414$ | $14.83 a 14.85$ | 14.8 |
|  | HOLI | DAY | HOLI | ${ }^{\text {DAY }}$ | ${ }_{\text {26.70a2 }}^{\text {HOLI }}$ | 26.72a26.721/2 |  | 23.831/2a.851/2 | 14.07 | 14.08a.141/6 | 14.84a14.86 |  |
|  | SUN | DAY |  | DAY |  | DAY |  | DAY |  |  |  |  |
|  | 28.72 a26.73 | $26.731 / 2 a .74$ | 26.82a26.83 | 26.831/2a.8 | 26.72a26.73 | $26.731 / 3 a 26.74$ | 831/4223.86 | D3.85 | 14.07 | 14.08a.141/4 |  | DA |
|  | 26.72a.731/2 |  | 26.82a.831/2 | 26.84 | $26.72 a 26.741 / 2$ | $26.74 a 26.75$ | 23.85423 .86 | 23.854 | 14.07 | 14.08a.1414/4 | $14.321 / 2$ a14.47 |  |
|  | $26.72 a 26.73$ | 26.731/2a.74 | 26.82a26.83 | $26.831 / 2 a .84$ | 26.72a26.73 | $26.731 / 2 a 26.74$ | $23.85023 .851 / 2$ | 23 | 14.07 | 14.08 a.144/4 | 14.04a14.45 | 14.331/20 |
|  | 73132.731/2 | 26.74a.741/2 | 26.821/2a.84 | $26.841 / 2$ | $26.721 / 12.731 / 2$ | $26.74 a 26.741 / 2$ | $23.85 a 23.861 / 2$ | $23.86 a 23.87$ | 14.07 | 14.08a.144/4 | $14.33 a 14.37$ | 14.34114 |
|  | .731/2a.741/2 | 26.75a.751/2 | $26.831 / 2 a .84$ |  |  | 26.75a26.751/2 | $23.86 a 23.88$ | $23.861 / 2 \mathrm{a}$. | 14.07 | $14.08 a .144$ | 14.16a14.341/2 | $14.15 a 14.351 / 2$ |
|  | 26.75a.761/2 |  | $\left\|\begin{array}{r} 26.84 a .861 / 2 \\ \text { SUN } \end{array}\right\|$ | ${ }^{26.86 a 26.87}{ }^{\text {DAY }}$ | 26.75a26.761/2 | $26.77$ | $23.861 / 2 a 23.89$ | 23.8923. | ${ }^{14.07}$ SUN | ${ }^{14.08 a .144 / 4}$ | 14.19a14.311/2 | 14.20a14.321/2 |
|  | 26.75a.771/2 | $26.77 a 26.78$ | 26:84a26.86 | 26.86a.861/2 | 26.751/a. $771 / 2$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $22$ | 26.771/2a.78 | .781/2a.791/2 | .851/2a.861/2 | 26.87 | $26.771 / 2 a 26.78$ | 26.781/2.791/2 | ${ }_{23}^{23.86 a 23.92}$ | 23.89a23.91 | 14.07 | 14.08a.141/4 | 14.33a14.48 | 14.32414 .38 |
|  | 26.77a26.78 | 26.781/2a.79 | .851/2a.8 | 26.87 | 26.77a26.78 | 26.7815a26.79 | $23.881 / 2 a 23.90$ | $23.90 a 23.91{ }^{\text {a }}$ | 14.07 | 14.08 a. 1414 | $14.34 a 14.41$ $14.27 a 14.37$ | $\begin{aligned} & 14.35 a 14.41 \\ & 14.28 a 14.35 \end{aligned}$ |
|  | 26.77 1. 1.78 | 26.79a.791/2 | 26.851/2 4.86 | . 8.8 | 26.771/5a26.78 | 26.79a26.791/2 | 23.881/2a23.91 | $23.911 / 5$ | 14.07 | 14.08 .1414 | $14.2413 / 2.37$ | $14.28 a 14.35$ |
|  | 26.7734.78 | 26.781/4a.80 | 26.85a.863/4 | 26.87a.8714 | 26.773/426.78 | 26.781/426.80 | 23.89a23.91 | $23.911 / 2 a 23.92$ | 14.07 | 14.08a.141/4 | $14.26 a 14.31$ |  |
|  | 26.773/2 | 26.78a.791/2 | .851/2 | 26.86a.871/2 | 71/2 | $26.78326 .791 / 2$ | $23.881 / 2 a .911 / 2$ | $23.911 / 1323.92$ | 14.07 | 14.08a.141/4 | 14.28a14.36 | ${ }_{14.29414 .32}^{14.27 a 14.32}$ |
| $27$ | 26.781 20.80 | DA | N | $\mathrm{T}_{26}$ |  | DAY | SUN | DAY | SUN | DAY | SUN | ${ }^{14.299}$ |
|  |  | 2.80 .8 |  |  | 27.781/3a26.80 | $26.80 a 26.801 / 2$ | $23.891 / 20.92^{\text {Let }}$ |  |  | $14.08 a .1$ |  |  |
|  | $28.77 a 26.79$ | ${ }_{26.79 a 26.81}^{26.80 a 26.81}$ |  |  | ${ }_{26}^{26 .}$ |  | $23.913 / 4.93{ }^{1 / 4}$ | 23 | 14 | 14.08a.141/4 | 4.26a14.35 | 14.3014 .3 |
| (1) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

to 20.81 - Ct, 4, cable transfers on Sweden touched 26.88 tina to New York and London, because of this -

0 ct. 29 , and were $26.841 / 2 @ 26.861 / 2$ Oct. 31 . Spanish pesetas went through some spectacular gyrations, and the position of 'this currency appeared to be very confused. As against 14.861/2 for cable transfers on Friday, Oct. 11 (Saturday, Oct. 12 being Columbus Day and a holiday in New York), there was a sudden drop the following Monday, Oct. 14, to 13.93, and rumor then had it that the Spanish Finance Minister had announced the abandonment of attempts to control peweta exchange, the new policy becoming effective on Saturday, Oct. 12. But a quick recovery followed, and the text of the Finance Minister's statement showed that he Iald:stress on the satisfactory budgetary and economic situation of spain and recalled that the Exchange Committee stlll had powerful resources and important foreign credits at the disposal. There was a recovery to 14.45 the next day, Oct. 15, but the trend subsequently was again lower, and the range for cable transfers Oct. 31 was 14.22@ 14:27.
The primeipal South American exchanges were weak and depressed. The Brazilian milreis the latter part of the month suffered a sharp decline on the development of financial disturbances in Brazil and the difficulties attending the con inued valorization of coffee (the coffee exchangen in Brasil being closed, as noted in the earlier part of this article, on account of the collapse in the market price of coffee), while exchange on Argentina slumped, notwithstanding the large shipments of gold from Argen-
reduced wheat yield in Argentina and the unsatisfactory labor situation in that country. The Brazilian milreis on cable transfer was quoted at $11.90 @ 11.93$ on Oct. 23 against 11.87@11.90 on Oct. 1, but on the development of the troubles referred to a sharp break occurred and the rate Oct. 31 was down to 11.80@11.85. The Argentine peso on cable trans fers was $40.89 @ 413 / 4$ Oct. 31 against $42.00 @ 42.05$ on Oct. 2. In the Far Eastern exchanges the Japanese yen continued to move higher on the improved trade position of Japan and the growing conff dence in its financial administration, while the Chinese exchanges were weaker on the decline in silver and the unsettled political conditions in China, the military uprisings against the Nationalist Government assuming formidable dimensions. Yen checks were $483 / 16$ Oct. 31 against 47 11/16@48 1/16 Oct. 1. The dollar on Hong Kong was only $433 / 84313 / 16$ Oct. 31 against $475 / 848$ Oct. 1 , and tael on Shanghai 547/8@55 3/16 Oct. 31 against 55\% @ $557 / 16$ Oct. 1 . The price of silver in London fell to $227 / 8 \mathrm{~d}$. per ounce Oct. 30, and was 23 d . Oct. 31 against $235 / 16 \mathrm{~d}$. Oct. 1. Fresh elements of uncertainty were injected into the silver market early in the month by the news that arrangements had been made to deliver Indian Government refined silver in Bombay against Bazaar purchases made in London for shipment, thereby effecting, it was claimed, a double saving of freight. Consequent expectation of fresh sales of Ind an Government silver served to augment the weakness of the silver market.

RATES OF EXCHANGE ON OTHER CENTRES.


[^0]
## New York Stock Exchange

## RANGE OF BOND PRICES DURING OCTOBER 1929.

| Bond Sales. | $\begin{aligned} & 1929 . \\ & \$ 347,225,300 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1928 \text {. } \\ & \$ 231,259,000 \end{aligned}$ | Octobertock Sales. | Shares $\$ 141,668,410$ | $1928 .$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Jan. | 2,417,663,250 | 2,480,709,325 | Jan. 1 to 0 | - $968,674,420$ | $\$ 98,831,435$ $\mathbf{7 1 1 , 4 6 4 , 4 0 0}$ |

The tables on pages 15 to 36 furnish a complete record of the transactions on the New York Stock Exchange during October and the range sincel'January 1. They need no extended introduction, as they are self-explanatory. The tablee embrace every security dealt in on the Exchange. We give bonds first, using the classification adopted in the official list. The black-faced letters in the column headed "Interest Period" indicate in each case the month when the bonds mature.

In accordance with the rule adopted by the New York Stock Exchange in 1909, all quotations for interest-paying bonds are at a price to which accrued interest must be addel. The exceptions to the rule are income bonds and bonds on which interest is in default. A few other bonds, like the H)lland-American Line 6s, for spesial reasons, are also quoted "flat,' but where this is the case the quotation "flat" will be found against the name of the issue. This method of quoting bonds became effective Jan. 21909.

For footnotes to tables see last page of bonds and last page of stocks.








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93
93
98 983
1043
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J \& 88 <br>
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105 <br>
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97 <br>
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97
98
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$981 / 2$
$921 / 2$ $\begin{array}{ll}100 & 1001 \\ 104\end{array}$ $\begin{array}{cc}1 \mathrm{i}^{-2} & \text { Sale } \\ 114 & \text { Sale }\end{array}$

| 88 | Sale- |
| :--- | :--- |
| $103 \%$ | Sale |

$\begin{array}{cc}941 / 2 & 80-1 \\ 941 / 2 & 961 / 6\end{array}$
$871 / 2$
$981 / 2$
89
$983 / 8$
Sale
112
sale
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-9
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Oct.

| ER. |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| . | Heghest. |
| , | Sale Pri |
| . 1 | $92 \%$ Oct. 25 |
|  | 93\% Oct. 19 |











# New York Stock Exchange 

## MONTHLY AND YEARLY RECORD

RANGE OF STOCK PRICES DURING OCTOBER 1929.
October Stock Sales.
1929.

| 1928. |  |
| ---: | ---: |
| $\$ 98,831,435$ | October |

Bond Sales.
1929.
$711,464,400$ Jan. 1 to Oct. 31 ........................ $2,417,663,250$



| Octo |
| ---: |
| sha |
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| 1,0 |



RANGE SINCE JAN. 1.
> ${ }_{5}^{5}$

## SAL 30

${ }^{230,100}$

SALES TO NOV. 1
Price ——PRICES IN OCTOBER.


[^1]

## New York Curb Exchange

RANGE OF PRICES ON NEW YORK CURB EXCHANGE


| AGGREGATE SALES. | NEW YORK |
| :---: | :---: |
| Oto | Since |
| October. | CURB RXCHANGE |


| Price <br> Jan.2 |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1929. | Oct. 1. | Oct. 31. | Lowest. | Highest. |



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AGGREGATE SALES

## Price $\quad$ PRICES IN OCTOBER.



RANGE SINCE JAN. 1.

| Lowest. | Highest. |
| :---: | :---: |
|  |  |



## 10,500 3,800 1200 3800 1

$\frac{\text { AGGR }}{\text { In }}$

| 2,700 | 32 |
| ---: | ---: |
| 3,400 | 132 |
| 1,300 | 13 |
| 53,100 | 125 |
| ---- | 12 | A1.

 1300
13,500
74,000
46,300
142,650
20,600
3,800
3,500
32,100
132,500

|  |  |
| :---: | :---: |
|  |  |
|  |  |



[^2]

For footnotes see page 54.


[^3]

For footnotes see page 54.

NEW YORK CURB EXCHANGE


For footnotes see paxe 54.


[^4]$\mid$

| $\begin{gathered} \text { Price } \\ \text { Jan }_{2} \\ 1929 . \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: |
| $\begin{gathered} B_{2 i d} \text { Ask. } \\ 27 j 2 \text { Sale } \end{gathered}$ |
| $\left\|\begin{array}{cc} -59 \overline{7} 7 & \text { Sale } \\ 104 \% / 8 & \text { Sale } \end{array}\right\|$ |
|  |
| ${ }^{\text {a }}$ - ${ }^{-1}$ |


| PRICES IN OCTOBER |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Oct. 1. | Oct. 31. | Lowest. | Highest. |
| $\begin{array}{cc} \text { Bid. Ask } \\ 26 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Bid } \\ & 257 / 8 \\ & \text { Asale. } \end{aligned}$ | Sale Prices. $243 / 4$ Oct. 24 | Sale Pric |
| $-32 \overline{7}$ Sale <br> 90 $953 /$ <br> 105 106 <br> 93 95 <br> 63 67 <br> 33 39 |  |  |  |
| $2 \overline{2}^{-\cdots}$ | is - Sale |  |  |
|  | $10 \overline{0}^{-7}$ Sale |  | 100 |
| $\begin{aligned} & 933 \\ & 501 / 2 \\ & 5 a l e \end{aligned}$ | ${ }_{45}^{963 / 2}$ Sale ${ }^{\text {Sale }}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 105 \text { Oct. } \\ & 81 \\ & 25 \text { Oct. } \\ & 29 \end{aligned}$ | $53$ |
| $\begin{array}{cc}79 & \text { Sale } \\ 119 & \text { Sale }\end{array}$ |  | 830 Oct. | $120^{28} \mathrm{Oc}$ |
| 15--197\% |  |  |  |
|  |  | 30- Oct. $\overline{14}$ |  |
| ele | $\overline{9} \overline{1} / 2$ Sale |  |  |
| ${ }^{-1} 0^{---1 i} 1 / 2$ | $15 \cdots$ |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| 32102SalaSaleSaleSale |  |  |  |
|  | 26- Sale |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| 2asiz Sale 24\% Sale | $\begin{aligned} & \text { and sale } \\ & 24 \\ & 241 / 8 \text { Sale } \\ & \text { Sale } \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| $\overline{s o}^{-1}$ Sale |  |  |  |
| 281/2 Sale | 25 Sale |  |  |
| ī12 $\overline{1} / \mathrm{S}$ Sale |  | 50 Oct. 30 118 oct. 10 |  |
|  |  |  |  |
|  | 49\%\% Sale |  |  |
| $\left\lvert\, \begin{array}{ccc} 11 \\ 151 / 2 & \text { Sale } \\ 15018 \end{array}\right.$ |  | 115, Oct. $30117 /{ }^{\text {a }}$ |  |
| 107\% 110 |  |  |  |
| $\\|_{1 i 55-} \text { sale }$ | 1075/2 Sale |  |  |
|  | 92\% Sale |  |  |
| 9818 <br> 10488 | 62/8 Sale |  |  |
| ${ }^{-1-}$ Sale |  | $\begin{array}{llll}1007 & \text { Oct. } \\ 105 & \text { Oct. } & 22 & 110 \\ 110 & \text { Oct. } \\ 11\end{array}$ |  |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  | ...... |  |
| $\stackrel{\square}{0}$ | $3 \overline{0}^{-\cdots}{ }^{-\cdots}$ |  |  |
| 13/4 Sale | 167\% Sale |  |  |
|  | 16/8 sale |  |  |
| $46 \frac{18}{3}$ Sale <br> 5314 Sale <br>  |  |  |  |
|  | 771/8 Sale |  |  |
| 1ī6i/8 Sale | 100 Sale | ${ }_{90} 0^{-10 c t} 2$ | 119 - |
| -10-- $\overline{2}_{0}$ | $10 \quad 20$ |  |  |
| - | $\begin{array}{cc} -2 \overline{0}{ }^{-1} & \text { Sale } \\ 59 & \text { Sale } \end{array}$ |  |  |
| ${ }^{-7}$ Sale |  | \%\% Oct. | Oct. 1 |



| Lowest. | Htohest. |
| :---: | :---: |
| Sale Prices. | Sale Prices |

 O-M Mo July
Juñ:
Jan:
Jan
act:
oct
on
2e


AGGREGATE
12



\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{AGGREGATE SALES．} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{NEW YORK CURB EXCHANGE} \& \multirow[b]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{gathered}
\text { Price } \\
\text { Jan } \\
\hline 1929 . \\
\hline
\end{gathered}
\]} \& \multicolumn{4}{|c|}{PRICESIN OCTOBER．} \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{RANGE SINCE JAN． 1.} \\
\hline \(\mathrm{In}^{1}\) \& － \& \& \& Oct． 1. \& Oct． 31. \& Lowest． \& Hiohest． \& Lowest． \& Highest． \\
\hline clob \& \multirow[t]{8}{*}{} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{OTHER OIL STOCKS} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{Bid．Ask．Bid} \& \& Bid．Ask． \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{Sale Prices．} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{Sale Prices．} \& ale Prices \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\begin{tabular}{l}
Sale Prices． \\
\begin{tabular}{l}
75 c \\
72 c \\
Apr. \\
26 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{tabular}} \\
\hline Shares S \& \& \& \& Bid．Ask．Sid \& \& \& \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} \& \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
\& 33,9,90 \\
\& 38,500 \\
\& 38,5
\end{aligned}
\] \& \& \begin{tabular}{l}
\(\square\) \\
Am American
\(\qquad\) Fiē̈s．－．
\end{tabular} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} \& 3／4 Sale \&  \&  \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{1383 Oct． 10} \& \&  \\
\hline  \& \&  \& \& \({ }^{15} 50{ }^{21 / 4}\) \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\({ }^{15} / 2\) Sale} \&  \& \&  \& \\
\hline \& \&  \& \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\({ }^{22}\) \％ 3 sale} \& \& \({ }_{4}^{61 / 2}\) Oct．\({ }^{\text {Oct．}} 398\) \& \({ }^{23} 10\) Oct．\({ }^{\text {ct．}} 8\) \&  \& \\
\hline 9，600 \& \&  \& \& \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{1／81／4 \({ }^{1 / 8}\)} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\(\begin{array}{llll}4 \& \text { Oct．} \& 30 \\ 1 \& \text { Oct．} \\ 1 \& 3 \\ 1 \& \text { ctt．} \& 3\end{array}\)} \& \(81 / 2\) \& \[
\begin{array}{l|l|l|} 
\& 61 / 2 \& \text { Oct. } \\
\& 29 \& 2 \\
4 \& \text { Oct. } \& \\
1 \& \text { Sept. } 30 \& \\
\hline
\end{array}
\] \& \\
\hline 6，600 \& \& tlantic Lobos Oil com Preferred． \& 21／6 sale \&  \& \& \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
\& 45 \\
\& \\
\& \\
\& \\
\& \\
\& \hline 13
\end{aligned}
\]} \& \\
\hline \& \&  \& －－7．－： \&  \&  \& \(11 / 2\) Oct． 29 \& \& \& \({ }^{70} 808\) Sept． 7 \\
\hline \& 183,000
184,900
Coi \& Carib Syndicate com ．－．．．．．： 1 \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{array}{|c}
41 \% \text { saie } \\
81 \% \text { Sale } \\
818 \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]} \& \& \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\(\begin{array}{rl}21 / 2 \& \text { Oct．} \\ 55 \& 30 \\ \text { Oct．} \\ 29\end{array}\)} \& \&  \& 5 Jan． 4 \\
\hline 4 \& 100，400 Con \& Consol Royalty Oil．－．－．．．－1 \({ }^{\text {Cosden }} \mathbf{1}\) \& \& － 94 \&  \& \&  \&  \& 11 \\
\hline \& \({ }^{4}\) ，900 \({ }^{\text {P }}\) \& Preferred \& \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{－81／8 sale} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{gathered}
\text { 雍 sale } \\
\text { sale }
\end{gathered}
\]} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\left|\begin{array}{rlr}
751 \& \text { Oct. } \& 7 \\
558 \& \text { Oct. } \& 30 \\
3 / 4 \& \text { Oct. } \& 5 \\
4 \& \text { Oct. } \& 7
\end{array}\right|
\]} \& \& \& \(11313{ }^{3} \mathrm{Jan} .2\) \\
\hline \& \(\begin{array}{r}986,000 \\ 98 \\ \hline \text { Cro }\end{array}\) \& Grown Cent Petroi Corp．．．．－＊ \& 113／4 Sale \& \& \& \& \(\begin{array}{llll}1 \& \text { Oct．} \& 14 \\ 4 \& \text { Oct．} \& 7\end{array}\) \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} \& \({ }^{2} \frac{13}{3} \mathrm{Apr} \mathrm{Ma}^{18}\) \\
\hline \& \& Crystal Oll \& \multirow[b]{2}{*}{} \& \multirow[t]{3}{*}{} \&  \&  \&  \& \& 511／8 \\
\hline ŌO \& 162,600 \& Darby \& \& \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\left|\begin{array}{rrr}
73 \& \text { Oct. } \\
40 \\
17 \\
17 \& \text { Oct. } \\
\text { Oct. } \& 29 \\
\hline
\end{array}\right|
\]} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\(\begin{array}{ll}81 / 2 \& \text { Oct．} \\ 33 \\ \text { Oct．} \& 28\end{array}\)} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{17} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} \\
\hline \& \& Derby \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \\
\hline 0 \& 82， 8 ，900 \(\mathbf{~ D e v}\) \&  \& \& 190］－Sale－ \&  \&  \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} \& \(211 / 8 \mathrm{Oc}\) \& \\
\hline 11，400 \& 156，900 \&  \& 150／2 Sale \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{193\％\({ }^{\text {a }}\) Saie \({ }^{\text {a }}\)} \& \& \& \& 38 \& 38.5 Feb． 25 \\
\hline 21,5000 \& 166，200 \({ }^{\text {Ho }}\) \& Houston Guit Gas \&  \& \&  \& 6 oct． 29 \& \[
\mid 203 / 8 \text { Oct. } \mathrm{in} \mid
\] \& 95 \& \({ }^{22}{ }^{2 / / 8 \mathrm{Feb} .14}\) \\
\hline \(188 . \overline{7} \overline{7}^{\square} \bar{n}\) \& 188.7000 \& Indinn Terr Milum \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\(\overline{2} \overline{4}\) Sale} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\left|\begin{array}{cc}
1 / 2 \\
27 \text { saie } \\
2 \text { sale }
\end{array}\right|
\]} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{array}{ll}
25 \& \text { Saile } \\
23 \text { Sale } \\
\text { sale }
\end{array}
\]} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{array}{rll}
5 \& \text { Oct. } \& 29 \\
15 \& \text { Oct. } \& \text { Oct. } \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{array}{rl}
491 / 0 c t \& 18 \\
13 \\
291 / 8 \& \text { Oct. } \\
911
\end{array}
\]} \& \(5 \mathrm{~s} / \mathrm{Occ} \mathrm{O}^{\text {Oct．}} 21\) \& \({ }^{49} 10\) Oct． 18 \\
\hline \[
\begin{array}{r}
63,600 \\
203,600
\end{array}
\] \& 1，004，600， ln \& Intercontinental Petroi．．．10 \& \& \& \& \& \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} \& 29\％／3 Appr． 16 \\
\hline \& 147.500 Ki \&  \& \multirow[t]{3}{*}{\[
\left\lvert\, \begin{array}{rll}
-1 i v \& \text { Sale } \\
5 \& \text { Sale } \\
33 \& \text { Sale }
\end{array}\right.
\]} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} \& \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{－1140ct． 29 oct．} \& \&  \\
\hline \& 1420，200 \&  \& \& \& －\({ }_{\text {2 }}\) \& \({ }_{18}^{2} \begin{array}{cc}\text { Oct．} \\ 18 \& \text { Oct．} \\ 24 \\ \text { O4，}\end{array}\) \&  \& 18 Octer \({ }^{2}\) \& \(38{ }^{7}\) \\
\hline 38，600 \& \& Lone Star Gas．－－．－．－．．．－：－ \& \& \[
\begin{array}{ll}
29 \\
643 / 4 \\
\text { sale }
\end{array}
\] \& 407\％Sale \& 28 Oct． 29 \& \(1 / 2\) Oct． 2 \& \({ }_{41}{ }^{28}\) June \(19{ }^{\text {a }}\) \& 67／1／Sept． 26 \\
\hline \(\bigcirc{ }_{9}, \overline{6} 000\) \& 100 M \& MacMillan
Mastalena Str
Snd \& \(\left.{ }_{6} \overline{4}\right]^{-}\)sale \& \[
\begin{aligned}
\& 19 \sqrt[3]{8} \text { Sajale } \\
\& \text { Sale }
\end{aligned}
\] \& \[
151 / 2
\] \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\[
\begin{array}{ll|ll}
16^{1 / 4} \text { Oct. } \& 29 \& 19 / 2 \& \text { Oct. } \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]} \&  \& 18.3 Jan． 23 \\
\hline \& \& \& \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{} \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\multirow[t]{3}{*}{}} \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{} \\
\hline \& \& Mexican－Ohio Oll \({ }^{\text {co．．．．．．．－＊}}\) \& 4- sale- \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{} \& \& \& 8 Oct． 29 \& \\
\hline 66,7
6,7 \& \& Mo－Kansas \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\({ }_{21}^{13 / 9}\) Sale} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
11^{1 / 8} \text { sale }
\]} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
88
\]} \& \& \& \(7^{3 / 4}\) Oct．\({ }^{\text {Oct．}} 23\) \&  \\
\hline 38， \& 229，400 M \& Mountain Producer \& \& \& \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\multirow[t]{2}{*}{}} \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\multirow[t]{4}{*}{}} \\
\hline \& 61，100 \& Natem Bradford Oill \& \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { Sale } \\
\hline
\end{gathered}
\] \& \& \& \& \& \& \\
\hline \& \& \& \& \& \& 1 \& －181／80ct． 5 \& \& \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
\& 10, \\
\& 10,2
\end{aligned}
\] \& \(115,000 \mathrm{~N}\)
\(102,000 \mathrm{~N}\) \& N Y P \& \multirow[b]{2}{*}{\(2 \overline{2} \overline{3}\) Sale} \&  \& 1938 sale \& 914 Oct． 30 \& 12140 \& \& \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
\& 10, \\
\& 22, \\
\& 32,
\end{aligned}
\] \&  \& Northic \& \& \({ }_{23-16}{ }^{2}\) Sale \& \& 12／8 Oct． \& \& \(3{ }^{3} \mathrm{Occt}\) \& 8ep． 11 \\
\hline 32,800
31,400 \& 231，500 \& Pandepec Oil \& 10\％Sale \& 4\％／Sale \& \& \& \& 37c Mar． 16 \& \({ }^{2}\) \\
\hline \& 100 P \& \({ }_{\text {Paragon Refir }}^{\text {B voting tr }}\) \& \& \& \& \& \& 22.15 June 12 \& 行 May 14 \\
\hline \& \& Penno \& \(63 / 1 / 8.80\) \& \& \& \& \& 2415 \& \\
\hline \& 1390,300
241,000 \& Petroteum C \& \& \&  \&  \& 28 Oct． 14 \& \({ }_{22}^{18}\) Oct．\({ }^{\text {July }}\) a \({ }^{30}\) \& \({ }^{28} 3 / 8\) Oct． 14 \\
\hline \& \({ }_{1} 112.100\) \& Plymouth Oil
Rei Bank 011 \& 疗 \& \& \& \({ }^{235} 950\) \& \(15 \%\) Oct 22 \&  \&  \\
\hline 19，300 \& \[
\begin{aligned}
\& 15,600 \\
\& 181,300
\end{aligned}
\] \& Reiter－Foster Of \& sale \& 3\％\％\％Sale \& \(\overline{3}\) Sale \& Oct． 29 \& \(4{ }^{4}\) Oct． 5 \& 11／8 Oct． 29 \& Fe \\
\hline 400 \& R \& Richfield oll of \& \& \& \& 223／4 Oct \& 247／3 Oct． 14 \& \({ }_{\text {ic }}^{223 / 4}\) Feb． 2 \& 253／4 Apr．\({ }^{20}\) \\
\hline 4，6no \& 4，600 \& Rootrefinin \& \& \& 180 \& \(1 i^{1}\)
20 \& arcter
29 \& \({ }_{20}^{18} \mathrm{Oc}\) \& \({ }_{29}^{26}\) Oct．\({ }^{\text {Apr．}} 29\) \\
\hline \& \& Royal Can Oil \& \& \& \& \& \& Oct． 29 \& \\
\hline \& \(77.260{ }^{\text {R }}\) \& Ryan Consol \& \& \& \& \& \& \({ }_{9}^{2} 1\) Aug．\({ }^{8}\) \& \\
\hline \({ }^{40}\) \& \&  \& 5 25－sale \& \& \& \({ }^{9} 916\) Oct．\({ }^{\text {a }}\) O 9 \& \(131 / 8 / 8\) \& \(9-16 \mathrm{Oc}\) \& 2 2\％June 18 \\
\hline \& \& Shreveport R1 n Ora \& \& \& \& \& \& 12 Oct \& Mar． 12 \\
\hline \[
\begin{array}{r}
18,800 \\
2,400
\end{array}
\] \& \[
\begin{array}{r}
190,900 \\
20,300 \\
S
\end{array}
\] \& Southland Roy \& \& \& \& \& \& \(200 \%\) \& 1250 Feb． 7 \\
\hline \& \& Superior Oil \({ }^{\text {Suprer }}\) \& \& \& 121／2 \& \(71 / 80\) \& \& 2013 Oc \& Ju \\
\hline 21，500 \& 212，000 \({ }_{21}\) \& Texon Oh \＆Land Co \& \& \& \& \& \&  \& \({ }^{\text {A }}\) \\
\hline \& \&  \& \(0^{89}{ }^{-1}\) \& \& \& \& \& A \& \begin{tabular}{l} 
Aly． \\
Oct． \\
\hline 16
\end{tabular} \\
\hline \& \[
\begin{aligned}
\& 4.70 \\
\& 5,40
\end{aligned}
\] \& Union Oil \& \& \& \& 75 Oct． 31 \& \({ }^{1} 75\) \& \({ }^{66}\) 1／Feb． \& 11.6 \\
\hline 31，700 \& 240，100 \& （enezuelan Petroleum．．．－5 \({ }^{5}\) \& \& \& \& \& \& 18\％July 11 \& \\
\hline \& \& White Star Refining
Woodiey Petroleum \& 63／4 Sale \& \& \({ }^{4}\) Sale \& \& \& \(\xrightarrow{\text { Oct．}}\) \& M \\
\hline 1，200 \& \&  \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \\
\hline \& \& \begin{tabular}{l}
MINING STOCKS \\
0 Amer Commander M\＆M－－ 1
\end{tabular} \& 1 4c Sale \& \& \& \& \& \[
\begin{array}{lr}
3 \mathrm{c} \& \text { Jan. } \\
13 / 4 \& 8 \mathrm{cct} . \\
1
\end{array}
\] \& c \(\begin{gathered}\text { Jan } \\ \text { Mar } \\ \text { 22 }\end{gathered}\) \\
\hline \({ }^{33.400}\) \& \[
\begin{array}{r}
1,900 \\
2,094,400
\end{array}
\] \&  \& 10 \& ale \& \& \& \&  \& 47e Jan． 25 \\
\hline 33 \& \begin{tabular}{|l|l} 
\\
\hline 10700
\end{tabular} \&  \& \& \& \& \(00^{-\cdots}\) oct． 2 \& 35 oct． \& 100 Oct． \& 165 Mar， 22 \\
\hline \& \& \％0 Swana M＇kubwa Cos \& \& \& 1e \& \(51 / 2 \mathrm{Oct}\). \& \(977 / 8 \mathrm{Oct}\) ． \& \(5{ }^{51 / 2}\) Oct．\({ }^{\text {Oct．}} 29\) \& 27 \\
\hline \& 162,500
38.400 \&  \& \& \& \& \(11 / 2\) ct． 25 \& 1516 Oc． \& \({ }^{1} 11 / 2 \mathrm{Oct}\). \& 15 \\
\hline \& 385
31500 \& （eat \&  \& 13－16 Sale \&  \& \(13 / 20 c t\).
4

Oct．

29 \& ${ }_{9}^{15-16} \mathrm{Oct}$. \& 50c Mar．${ }^{\text {a }}$ \& ${ }^{21 / 8}$ Jan． $1{ }^{\text {ar }} 18$ <br>
\hline \& － 718,200 \& Consol Copper Mines－ \& \& \& \& 71／8 Oct． 28 \& $81031 / 8$ Oct． \& ${ }^{880} 808 \mathrm{Oct}$ \& ${ }^{15} 15$ June 78 <br>
\hline \& \& Consol Min 8 S Smelt of Can 25 \& \& \& \& － \& \& 14. \& 24 c <br>
\hline \&  \& Coppes Range Co．－．－．－－25 \& 27.8 \& \& \& ${ }_{1-16}^{14}$ Oct． 29 \& 2 1／8 Oct． \& 1－16 Aug． 15 \& 37 c Feb． <br>

\hline | 18,900 |
| :--- |
| 97 |
| 800 | \& 0 201，000 \& 0 Cresson Conso \&  \& \& ${ }^{1 / 2}$ Sale \&  \&  \& $2 \%$ \& 18 Oc <br>

\hline \& 288，0 \& Oivide Extensi \& ic Sale
87 c
Sale \& \& ${ }^{\text {\％／8 }}$ Sale \& \& 3 － \& ${ }_{1-16}^{4 \mathrm{c}}$ Oct．Jan． 23 \& 22c $11 / 4 \mathrm{Man}$ Mar．${ }_{2}$ <br>
\hline 59，500 \& $0 \quad 118$ \& （1）${ }^{\text {Oolores Esperanza Corp．．－}{ }^{2}}$ \& 20 27 87c Sale \& \& ，18 Sale \& 16 Oct． 23 \& ${ }^{10}$ \& $177 / 15$ \& 23.10 <br>
\hline \& ${ }_{4}^{1.200}$ \&  \& 10 － 4 sale \& \& \& \& \& $21 / 2$ July \& <br>
\hline \& \& Engin \& \& Sale \& 113 \& Oct． 22
Oct． 29 \& 22917 17\％Oct． 1 \& $\begin{array}{lll}1 & \text { Oct．} & 22 \\ 9 & \text { Oct．} & 29\end{array}$ \& <br>
\hline 23，000 \& － 463.800 \& 00 Evans，Watio \& 153／Sale \& \& \& \& \& 70 July 16 \& diar． <br>
\hline 121.1000 \& － 3,350 \& （en Prefred \& 10c．Sale \& ${ }^{-1 / 4}$ Sale ${ }^{-1}$ \& \％／6s Sale \& 23 \& \& 10c Jan． \& 24 <br>
\hline \& \& First National Co \& \& \& \& \& \& 30 c Ja \& 8 <br>

\hline 00 \& |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| 180 |
| 18,70 | \& （Gotd Coin Min \& 9 $\mathrm{T}_{2}$ Sale \& －${ }^{-}$7\％S Sale \& $6^{1 / 4}$ Sale \& 4\％\％Oct． 31 \& 1018 \& 4／3 Aug． 14 \& 12.12 <br>

\hline 900 \& \& 00 Gooden Cyclo M sc Reduct－ 1 \& \& \& \& ${ }_{616}$ Oct． 29 \& 29 7／8 Oct． 18 \& 16c Ja \& 1 <br>
\hline 71,900
12,100
7 \& 0－825，400 \& 00 Goldield Consol Mines．．．． $\mathrm{is}^{1}$ \& $25_{5}^{1}{ }^{1}$ i6 Sale \& － $17{ }^{\text {ard }}$ Sale \& 1413 Sale \& $10^{016}$ \& ${ }^{9}{ }^{17}{ }^{7} \mathrm{O}$ \& ${ }^{10}$ \& 237 Mar． 19 <br>
\hline 7,1600
149,300 \& 00 52，100 \& 00 Houln \&  \& ${ }_{e}^{e}$－${ }^{53 / 3}$ Sale \& 1314 Sale \& ${ }^{31 / 4}$ Oct．${ }^{\text {Oct．}}$ \& 24.1738 \& $1{ }^{1} 10$ Oct． 24 \& 6 <br>
\hline 149,300
7,700 \&  \& 00 Hud Bay Min \％Smelt．．．．－i \& －10 ${ }^{*}{ }^{\text {a }}$ \& － $31 / 23{ }^{\text {a }}$ \& $3421 / 2$ Sale \& Oct． 29 \& $2933 \%$ Oct \& $7{ }^{1} 1.0 \mathrm{Oc}$ \& $9{ }^{93 / 6 \mathrm{Mar} .12}$ <br>
\hline \& \& Iste Royale Copper N J．．．－．${ }^{25}$ \& \& \& \& Oc． \& \& ${ }^{3} 16$ Jun \& $1{ }^{69 \mathrm{c}}$ Feb． 14 <br>

\hline $$
\begin{aligned}
& 1,100 \\
& 1,400
\end{aligned}
$$ \&  \&  \& ale \& \& \&  \&  \&  \& 3 <br>

\hline 1，400 \& | 00 |
| :--- | \& 边 00 Kirkland La \& \& \& \& \& \& 243／2 Mar． \& $271 / 3 \mathrm{Apr} .29$ <br>

\hline \& \& \& \& \& \& \& 15 314 Oct． 15 \& \& 57 Mar． 28 <br>
\hline \& \& \& \&  \& \& \& \& \& <br>
\hline \& \& （enter \& ．5 41／8 Sale \& de |l-59- sale \&  \& 58 \％Oct． \& ${ }_{29}^{29} 82{ }^{4}$ Oct． \& $50{ }^{1 / 8}$ Apr． 10 \& ${ }_{0} 64$ Sept． 4 <br>
\hline
\end{tabular}

Forfootnotes see page 54


[^5]

For footnotes see page 54.





Oct. 22,6 at 113 .
 at 79.

## Chicago Stock Exchange

## RANGE OF PRICES ON CHICAGO STOCK EXCHANGE

October
, 13,558,000
1928.
$6,426,00$

28,170,516

Bond Sales.
Jan. 1 to Oct. 31
1928. $\$ 275,000$ $\mathbf{6 2 7 8 1}, 600$


[^6]

[^7]$\frac{\text { AGGREGATE SALES. }}{\text { In CHICAGO }}$
aE Price $\quad$ PRICES IN OCTOBER.



| PRICES IN OCTOBER. |
| :---: |
| oct. 1. |
| Oct 31. |

## RANGE SINCE JAN. 1.



[^8]| AGGREC |
| ---: |
| In |
| October |
| Shares |
| 6,6 |
| 38,7 |
| 3,4 |
| 27,3 |
| 17,8 |
| 2,70 |
| 3,20 |




| Prico |
| :---: |
| Jann |
| 1928. |


| PRTCES IN OCTOBER. |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| oct. 1. | Oct. 31 |  |  |



- No par value. Ex-dividend.


## Boston Stock Exchange

MONTHLY AND YEARLY RECORD

RANGE OF PRICES ON BOSTON STOCK EXCHANGE




## Cleveland Stock Exchange <br> MONTHLY AND YEARLY RECORD

## RANGE OF PRICES ON CLEVELAND STOCK EXCHANGE




## Baltimore Stock Exchange

## RANGE OF PRICES ON BALTIMORE STOCK EXCHANGE



| AGGREGATE SALES. |  | STOCKEXCORENGE BONDS |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\begin{gathered} \text { Since } \\ \text { Jan. } \end{gathered}$ |  |
| $84.000$ $28,000$ |  |  |
|  |  |  |
| 101,000 |  | Wash |
|  |  | ${ }_{\text {Wash }}^{\text {Wah }}$ Coiv |
| 4,000 | 32, |  |


|  | PRICES IN OCTOBER. |  |  |  | RANGE SINCIA JAN. 1. |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Jan. | Oct. 1. | Oct. 31. | Lowest. | Hiohest. | Lowest. | Hiohest. |
| Bid. Ask. <br>  | $\left\|\begin{array}{\|cc} \hline \text { id. } & \text { Ask. } \\ 97 & \text { sale } \\ 661 / 2 & \text { Sale } \end{array}\right\|$ | Bid. ${ }^{\text {a }}$ As |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Sale Prices } \\ & 98.17 \\ & \text { Oct. } \\ & \text { O8\% Oct. } 17 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Sale Prices. } \\ & 90 \quad \text { Jan. } 28 \\ & 61 \quad \text { Oct. } 28 \end{aligned}$ |  |
| (100 Sale |  | 70 Sale | $70^{-} \mathrm{Oct} \mathrm{c}^{2}$ |  | Ju |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | -1-----1 |  | 9 |


| Shares. | Shares: | STOCKS Am States Pub Sery pra...... |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |



| -13 |
| :--- |
| -3 |
| 42 |
| 180 |
| - |
| - |

- 

$\underset{\substack{\text { Sanaie } \\ \text { gan } \\ \cdots-1}}{ }$


起据

## - 




$95, \mathrm{Feb}$.
$121 / 2$
Oct x



 Gavoww tio

# Philadelphia St'k Exchange MONTHLY AND YEARLY RECORD 

RANGE OF PRICES ON PHILADELPHIA STOCK EXCHANGE



## Pittsburgh Stock Exchange MONTHLY AND YEARLY RECORD

RANGE OF PRICES ON PITTSBURGH STOCK EXCHANGE



[^9]
# Detroit Stock Exchange 

RANGE OF PRICES ON DETROIT STOCK EXCHANGE


\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{AGGREGATE SALES.} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{DETROIT stock exchange STOCKS} \& \multirow[b]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
\& \text { Price } \\
\& \text { Jan.2. } \\
\& 1229 .
\end{aligned}
\]} \& \multicolumn{4}{|c|}{RICES IN OCTOBER} \& SI \& C JAN. 1. \\
\hline  \& \& \& \& Oct. 1. \& ct. 31. \& owes \& ohe \& Lowest \& lighest. \\
\hline \[
\begin{array}{r}
2,900 \\
6,350
\end{array}
\] \& \multirow[t]{5}{*}{} \& \begin{tabular}{l}
Airparts \& Tool Corp units-
Class B.
Arway Hiec ADDDiance com- \\
Preferred
\end{tabular} \& \[
\left\lvert\, \begin{array}{ll}
-\overline{4} \overline{0} \bar{j} \& \bar{s} \operatorname{saie}^{-1} \\
100 \& -\ldots--
\end{array}\right.
\] \&  \& \[
\left|\begin{array}{cc}
B i d . \& \text { Ask. } \\
223 / \\
143 / 2 \& \text { Sale }
\end{array}\right|
\] \&  \& \[
\begin{array}{cc}
\text { Sale Prices. } \\
261 / 2 \\
\text { Oct. } \& 2 \\
173 / 8 \text { Oct. } \& 9
\end{array}
\] \& 11 \& \[
\begin{aligned}
\& 6 \\
\& { }^{6} \\
\& 15 \\
\& 17 \\
\& 23
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline \& \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\begin{tabular}{l}
1 class A \\
Class \(B\)
\end{tabular}} \& 100 -:--- \&  \& \& \(\begin{array}{ll}11 \\ 12 \& \text { Oct. } \\ 12 \\ \text { Oct } \\ \text { 22 }\end{array}\) \& \(133 / 2\) Oct. \({ }^{16}\) \&  \& \[
\begin{aligned}
\& 17 \\
\& 23 \\
\& 27
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline \& \& \& \& 14/2
30
Sale
Sale \& -351/2- \(\overline{5}\) \&  \& \[
\begin{array}{llll}
133 \& \text { Oct. } \& 16 \\
35 \& \text { Oct } \& 16 \\
7 \& \text { Oct. } \& 1
\end{array}
\] \&  \& 2 \\
\hline \& \& \begin{tabular}{l}
Class B \\
mer Ind Auto Fan \&c Bearing com
\end{tabular} \& 147\% Sale \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
\& 18,181 / 2 \\
\& 71 / 4 / \text { sale } \\
\& 1138 \text { Sale }
\end{aligned}
\]} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
12
\]} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{array}{ll}
181 / 2 \mathrm{Oct} \& 4 \\
71 / 2 \mathrm{Oct} \& 1
\end{array}
\]} \& \(\begin{array}{ll}81 / 2 \& \text { Oct. } 28 \\ 3 \& \text { Mar. } 18\end{array}\) \& \\
\hline \(\begin{array}{r}2,100 \\ 18,156 \\ \hline\end{array}\) \& \& \begin{tabular}{l}
Auto Fan \&r Bearing com Baldwin Rubber units Class B \\
Bower Roller Bearing
\end{tabular} \&  \& \& \& \& \& 7 Oct. 30 \& 221/2 Feb. 13 \\
\hline \& \& British Amer Brew Ltd \& ---- 17 \& \& \(93 / 4\) Sale \& \[
\begin{array}{lll}
7 \& \text { Oct. } \& 30 \\
71 / 2 \& \text { Oct. } \& 4
\end{array}
\] \& \[
\left|\begin{array}{rrr}
13 \& \text { Oct. } \& 8 \\
8 \& \text { Oct. } \& 4
\end{array}\right|
\] \& \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} \\
\hline 180 \& \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} \& --.-.-.-.-- \& \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{} \& \[
\begin{aligned}
\& 5 / 5 \text { July } 10 \\
\& 19 \% \text { Jot. } 126 \\
\& 19.2 \\
\& \text { Sept. } 6
\end{aligned}
\] \& \\
\hline \& \& \& \& \multirow[t]{3}{*}{\[
\left|\begin{array}{cc}
-0 \& 19 \\
\hdashline 28 \& \text { sale } \\
11 \% \& 19 \\
13 \% \& 19
\end{array}\right|
\]} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{} \& \[
\begin{array}{cc}
191 / 2 \& \text { Sept. } 6 \\
\text { Oct. } \\
6
\end{array}
\] \& \\
\hline \& 151,25 \& \({ }_{\text {corer }}^{\text {Burkart }}\) \& 30 \& \& \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\(6{ }^{6}\) Oct. 88 oct. 8} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} \& \\
\hline \& \& \& -183亥 \(=-\) \& \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\(16^{\frac{1}{2}} 1019\)} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} \& \& \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} \\
\hline \& \& \& -\%:--:- \& \(17 \% 19\) \& \& \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\(101 / 2\) Oct. 23} \& \(101 / 4 \mathrm{Oct}{ }^{1}\) \& \\
\hline \& \& \& \& \& \multirow[b]{2}{*}{-} \& \[
\begin{aligned}
\& 5810 \text { oct. } 22 \\
\& 101 / 40 \mathrm{Oct} .31
\end{aligned}
\] \& \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{161/2 Apr. 122} \& 971/ Feb. 2 \\
\hline \& \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} \& -- \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{--:------:-} \& \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{array}{rlr}
21 / \begin{array}{ll}
\text { Oct. } \\
36 \& \text { Oct. } \\
36 \& \text { Oct. }
\end{array} 0_{0}
\end{array}
\]} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\left\lvert\, \begin{array}{ccc}
23 \& 0-1 \& -1 \\
21 / 2 \& \text { Oct. } \& 8 \\
44 \& \text { Oct. } \& 23
\end{array}\right.
\]} \& \& \(203 / 3\) Feb. 25 \\
\hline \& \& \&  \& \&  \& \& \&  \& \({ }_{3}^{5}\) \\
\hline \& \& \begin{tabular}{l}
Crowley-Milner \& Co com.Davega Inc com \\
Deisel Wemmer Gilibert com
\end{tabular} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{-15\%} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\left|\begin{array}{cc}
-2 \overline{5} \frac{1}{2} \& \text { saie } \\
15 \& 151 / 4
\end{array}\right|
\]} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\left|\begin{array}{rl}
20 \& \text { Oct. } \\
1334 \& \text { Oct. } \\
31
\end{array}\right|
\]} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\multirow[t]{3}{*}{}} \\
\hline \& \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{Detroit \& Clevel Nar com.- 10 Detroit Greamery com} \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \\
\hline \& \& \& \& \& \[
\begin{array}{ll}
14 \& \text { Sale } \\
\hline
\end{array}
\] \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{} \& \& \\
\hline \& \& \& \& \& 91/2 \({ }^{\text {Sa }}\) \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\multirow[t]{2}{*}{}} \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{} \\
\hline \& \& \& xiz \& \& \(9 \overline{4} 4\) \& \& 15 \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\(193 / 3\)} \\
\hline \& \& Det \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} \&  \& \(\begin{array}{llll}2731 / 2 \& \text { Oct. } \\ 14 \\ \text { Oct. }\end{array}\) \& \(\begin{array}{ll}321 / 2 \& \text { Oct. } \\ 15 \\ \text { Oct. } \\ 1\end{array}\) \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{4 4 Supt. \(191161 / 18\) Aug. 14} \\
\hline 6,3 \& \({ }_{6}^{25}\) \& Detroit \& \& \& 6348 \& \(4 \%\) Oct. \& \(73 / 8\)
7
Oct.
Oct.

8 \& $47 / 8$ \& $11 \frac{1}{3}$ Mar. 8 <br>

\hline \& \& \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{${ }_{4} \mathbf{5}^{-1}{ }^{\text {Sale }}$} \& \multirow[b]{2}{*}{${ }^{4} \overline{3}^{-7}$ Sale} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{$\begin{array}{ll}88 & \text { Oct. } \\ 40 \\ 42 & \text { Oct. } \\ 15 & \text { Oct. } 24\end{array}$} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{$$
\left(\begin{array}{lll}
8 & \text { Oct. } 30 \\
461 / 2 & \text { Oct. } \\
17 \\
\text { Oct. } & 16
\end{array}\right.
$$} \& \& $211 / 5$ Jan. 30 <br>

\hline \& \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{Detrolt Paper Products Detroit Steel Prod com Dolphin Paint \& Varn cl A Class B} \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} <br>
\hline \& \& \& \& \& \& \&  \&  \& <br>

\hline \& \&  \&  \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{cle} \& \multirow[t]{3}{*}{$$
\begin{aligned}
& 29 / \text { sale } \\
& 9121 / 211 \\
& 451 / 2 \text { sale }
\end{aligned}
$$} \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{} \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\multirow[t]{2}{*}{}} <br>

\hline \& \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{Federal Screw Works com Federated Publica'ns pref. Foote Burt com} \& \& \& \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\multirow[t]{2}{*}{$361 / 2$ Oct. 30}} \& \& <br>
\hline \& \& \& ${ }^{\text {a }} 231 / 2$ \& \& \& \& \&  \& <br>

\hline \& \& | Ford Motor of Canada ci-i.-. |
| :--- |
| Class B | \& \& ${ }^{-1} 9^{-}$ \& -30-- ${ }^{-12 l e}$ \& 25 oct. 30 \& 41 Oct. 15 \& \& $3 / 4 \mathrm{Jan} .7541 / \mathrm{Feb} 27$ <br>

\hline \& \& \multirow[b]{4}{*}{Fourth Nat Invest com Frost Gear \& Forge com...Gemmer Mfg class $A$. Gen Fdy \& Machine units} \& \& \multirow[t]{3}{*}{} \& \multirow[t]{3}{*}{- 4 4i14 Sale} \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{} \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{} <br>

\hline \& \& \& \multirow[t]{3}{*}{$$
\left|\begin{array}{cc}
x_{2} 2 \\
\hdashline 41 & \text { sal } \\
321 / 2 & \text { sale }
\end{array}\right|
$$} \& \& \& \& \multirow{2}{*}{1} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{21936 Aug. 23} \& \multirow[t]{3}{*}{} <br>

\hline \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& <br>
\hline \& 1, \& \& \& -..- $\quad 40$ \& \& \& 29 oct. 19 \& \& <br>
\hline \& \& Gen Fdy \& MachIne unita.:- \& \& \& \& \& \& 72 y Ju \& <br>
\hline \& \& \& \& \& $\mathrm{i}^{-7-}$ Sale \& \& \& /2 M \& <br>

\hline \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& | 9 | Oct. |
| :--- | :--- |
| 5 | Mar | \& <br>

\hline --500 \& \& \& 533 \& \& \& \& 16 \& \& <br>
\hline \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& <br>
\hline \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& $8{ }^{8}$ Oct. 29 \& <br>
\hline \& \& Hall \& \& \& 16\% Sale \& $121 / 2$ Oct \& \& \& <br>

\hline \& \& $$
5 \left\lvert\, \begin{array}{c|c|}
\hline \text { Harar } \\
5
\end{array}\right.
$$ \& \& \& \& \& \& \& <br>

\hline \& \&  \& \& \& \& \&  \& \& 28 Sept. 17 <br>
\hline \& \& Hosk \& 185/3 8ale \& 50 Sale \& 46 49 \& 411 \& \& ${ }_{35}{ }^{\text {M }}$ \& 4 <br>
\hline 1,950 \& 22 \& \& \& \& \& ${ }_{27}^{41 / 8}$ Oct. ${ }^{\text {Oct. }} 24$ \& $44 / 8$ \& \& <br>
\hline \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& <br>
\hline \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& <br>
\hline \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& <br>
\hline 39,439 \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& <br>
\hline 10,33 \& 210, \& \& \& 18 sale \& 113/8 Sale \& 101/8 Oct. 30 \& 19 \& \& <br>
\hline \& \& Ka \& \& \& \& \& \& \& <br>
\hline \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& <br>
\hline \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& <br>
\hline \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& <br>
\hline \& \& \& \& \& \& \& 26 Oct. \& $\begin{array}{ll}25 & \text { Oct. } \\ 25 & \text { June }\end{array}$ \& 32 Jan. 30 <br>
\hline \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& <br>

\hline 375 \& \& \& 70c Sale \& $$
{ }_{11}^{76 c}
$$ \& 60c. 65 \& ${ }_{10}^{50 \mathrm{c} .0 \mathrm{Oct}} \mathrm{Oct}{ }^{\text {a }}$ \& \[

\underset{1}{2}

\] \& \[

$$
\begin{array}{lll}
50 \mathrm{c} & \text { Oct. } & 15 \\
10 & \text { Oct. } & 4
\end{array}
$$

\] \& \[

15^{1 / 4}{ }^{Feb.}{ }_{10}^{25}
\] <br>

\hline
\end{tabular}

[^10]

- No par value. $x$ Efx-dividend. Y Ex-rights


## Los Angeles Stock Exch.

RANGE OF PRICES ON THE LOS ANGELES STOCK EXCHANGE

*Formerly John Bean Mig. Oorp.; name changed to Food Machinery Corp. July 241929.


## San Francisco Stock Exch. <br> MONTHLY AND YEARLY RECORD

## RANGE OF PRICES ON THE SAN FRANCISCO STOCK EXCHANGE


dNo par value.


* No par value.


# General Quotations <br> OF BONDS AND STOCKS 

In the earlier part of this publication complete records of the dealings on the leading stock exchanges of the country, for the latest month and for the calendar year to date, are furnished. In this department of Goneral Quotations we combine in one comprehensive whole, securities of all classes and descriptions, not only those dealt in on the exchanges but also leading unlisted and inactive securities. The following is an index to the different classes of securities quoteds

| Page | ge | P Pag |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Steam Railroad Bonds_....................... 78 | Public Utility Bonds.......................... 85 | Insurance Stocks and Scrip |
| Steam Railroad Stocks........................ 82 | Public Utility Stocks...........-.............. 90 | Real Estate Trust and Land Stoc |
| Joint Stock Land Bank Bonds............... 84 | Industrial \& Miscellaneous Bonds.......... 93 | Title Guarantee and Safe Deposit Stocks |
| Joint Stock Land Bank Stocks.............. 84 | Industrial \& Miscellaneous Stocks........ 96 | United States and Municipal Bonds....--101 |
| Fedoral Land Bank Bonds................. 103 |  | Canadian Municipal Bonds...............- 10 |
| Real Estate Bonds..........-................... 95 | Textile Manufacturing Stocks................ 96 | Foreign Government Bonds................. 10 |
| Investmont Trust Stocks and Bonds...... 101 |  |  |

Quotations from all Stock Exchanges are as near as possible for the closing day of the month preceding the date of issue. As the Now York Stock Exchange began with Jan. 21909 to quote all bond prices "and interest;" we have adopted the same method and no longer employ a dealgnating mark to indicate the fact except where there is a deviation from this rule. The reader will understand, therefore, that unless the letter "f" is prefixed a the price he must pay accrued interest in addition to the price. This, however, does not apply to income bonds or bonds in default, in which casee the pricc includes the interest, should there be any.

The letter " $f$ " prefixed to bond prices denotes that the quotation is a flat price-that is, that the accrued interest forms part of the price, and ands in default, the price is always "flat." and no designating mark is employed to indicate the fact

Quotations for guaranteed stocks are "and dividend"; that is, the accrued dividend must be pald in addition to the price. Stock prices marked hua (d) are per share. All others are per cent except bank stock prices, which are quoted per share unless otherwise stated

It should be borne in mind in the use of these tables that the quotations for many inactive and unlisted secirities are merely nominal, but in all cases the figures are obtained from sources which are considered reliable.

The following abbreviations are often used, viz.: "M" for mortgage, " $g$ " for gold, "gu" for guaranteed, "end" for endorsed, "cons" for consolldated conv" for convertible, "s $\boldsymbol{f}$ " for sinking fund, " 1 g " for land grant. "op" for optional.

The black-faced type in the letters showing the interest period indicates the month when the bonds mature.
NOTICE.-All bond prices are "and interest" excopt whore marked " $f$ " and income and dofaulted bonds.

| Bond | Bid. |  | Bonds | Ba. | Ask. | Bond | Bid | Ask. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & 93 \\ & 86 \\ & 98 \\ & 95 \\ & 94 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1000 \\ 999^{1 / 2} \end{gathered}$ | Atlantic Coast Line RR (Conct) <br>  | $\begin{aligned} & b \\ & b \end{aligned} 5.75$ | 5.20\% |  | 100 100 | --.. |
| Oa |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Gen |  |  | Atlantic Coast Line of S O-J J J Gen 1st g 4s July 1948. <br> A |  |  |  | ${ }_{95}^{96}$ |  |
| Gen |  |  |  | $871 / 6$6253 | $\begin{aligned} & 89 \\ & 68 \\ & 61 \end{aligned}$ |  | ${ }_{93}^{94} 14$ |  |
|  |  | ${ }_{9} 3^{-}$ |  |  |  |  | 78396189 |  |
| ba |  |  | Ati \& Yad 1st gu g $481949-$ A 80 | 79931/2 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 96 \\ & 96 \\ & 94 \end{aligned}$ | Aus \&erm 1st 58 \& 1941 .-A J\&JJAususta Union Stat 481953 J\&J | 97312 | 888 | Bost |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | 821/2 |  |  |  |
|  |  | 7536 |  | 98 |  |  | 198 | ** |
|  | 71 31 |  |  |  |  |  | 101 |  |
| abama ${ }^{\text {a }}$ Vickab |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| lbany |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| (con | $88^{81 / 6}$ | 85 | 1st M 5 July 11948 Conv 41/5s 1933 red 1923 -M\&S Ref \& gen 5 s 1995 series A_J\&D | $10^{90}$ |  | ${ }^{103} 95$ | 5s Jan 1943-:-.......:- | ${ }_{101}^{101}$ | 963/3 |
| Alleghany Corr |  |  |  | $1001 / 4$ | 101 | 5 tm |  |  |  |
| Ooll | 100 | 10036 |  |  |  |  | 5.60 | 8.20\% |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ner |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 5 \% \\ & 5 \% \\ & 5 \% \\ & 5 \% \end{aligned}$ |  | 868284838 | ${ }^{\mathbf{8} 7^{-7}}$ |  |
|  |  | 100 ${ }^{73}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | Eq tr $6830-35$ (yT) - jaj 15 |  | 5.30\% |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 5181930-19 |  | 8 |  |
| Restook | 85 | 9898 |  <br>  | $\begin{aligned} & 91 \\ & 101 \\ & 81 \frac{13}{4} \end{aligned}$ | ${ }_{82}^{102}$ |  Boston Rev Beach \& | ${ }_{7} 5$ |  |  |
| herill |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| diso |  |  |  |  | $\begin{array}{r} 104 \\ 83 \end{array}$ |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 913/2/ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Juatment |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }^{\square}$ |  | 89 |  Van Bur Ext 5 s g Jan ${ }^{43}$ _A\& | ${ }^{955} 5$ | $\begin{aligned} & 98 \\ & 98 \\ & 98 \\ & 98 \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | 9593 |  | Bluff Point Land © Impö- Soe In d |  |  |  |
|  |  | 154\% | Washburn Ext $18 t 58{ }^{\circ} 39$. FsA <br> Bat Oreek $88818 t$ gu g $3 \mathrm{~S}^{\circ} .89 \mathrm{~J} \mathrm{\& D}$ |  |  | General $58 \mathrm{~g} 1937 \ldots . . .-\mathrm{M}_{1} 8$ | 801/2 | $\begin{aligned} & 10076 \% \\ & 8.30 \% \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Tran |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 96919 \\ & 97 \\ & 90 \end{aligned}$ |  | ${ }^{9} 96$ | $10^{-1}$ | Buffalo \&\% Southwestern- |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Athens |  | 80 | Beoch Ork Ext 33/ 1951 I-A\&O | 7714 |  | Buff 2 f Susqueha |  |  |  |
| 1 1st g 59 1937 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 983/4 | ${ }_{61 / 2}$ |  |
|  |  | 103 |  | 85 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Consol mold 4 s 2002 | 10 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Oon |  |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 88^{0} \\ 85 \\ \text { scell. } \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 70 \\ & 87 \end{aligned}$ |  |  | Oambria \& Indiana- |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Atlantic Ooast Line Oo |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} \cdots- \\ \cdots--- \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 95 | 100 |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{array}{r} 911 / 2 \\ 99 / 3 \\ 913 \\ 5.1 \\ 5.20 \% \end{array}$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4ser ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Bads. f This price inclades accrued interent. $k$ Last aale. ZLendon. $n$ Nominal. s Sale price.

| Bonds | आ. | Ask. | Bonds | Brd. | Ask. | Bonds. | Bid. | Ask. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| anadian Northern- <br> 1st con deb 4s 1930 gu__J\&D30 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & 858 \\ & 458 \end{aligned}$ | ${ }^{110} 15$ | Gen M 31/2s g 1987.....M\&N | $\begin{aligned} & 73 \\ & 87 \\ & 87 \end{aligned}$ | $8{ }^{-7}$ | $7 \%$ sec g bonds 1930 $\qquad$ $15-\mathrm{yr}$ g 51/3 May $1{ }^{\circ} 37$ _M\&N | 1003 | 先 |
|  |  |  | Stmpd non-pay Fed inc tax | 87\% | 07 |  |  |  |
| Winnipes ferm 4s 1939 - JkJ | 9 9 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| nadian Pacifios | 91 |  | Slinking fund deb 5s 1933.M\&N | 1003/4 | 1001\% |  | ${ }^{9} 5^{-}$ |  |
| ns deben 4a perpetual. J\&J | $831 / 8$ | ${ }^{84}$ | 15-year ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | 1063/2 | 107 \% |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1st \& ref | 103 |  |  | 8 |  |
| 41/23 Dec 15 1944.-.J\&D | 10 |  |  | b.40 |  | Ref \& impt 58 | 6\% |  |
| J\&D | b $\begin{array}{r}10058 \\ 5.40\end{array}$ | 5.15\% |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | - 5.70 | 5.20\% |  | b $\begin{aligned} & \text { b } \\ & b\end{aligned}$ | $5.15 \%$ $5.20 \%$ |  | ${ }_{91}^{903}$ | ${ }_{92}^{921 / 3}$ |
|  |  | $\mathrm{So}^{-7}$ |  | 5.65 <br> 50 |  |  |  |  |
| ro Clinch \& Ohlo 58 |  | 80 |  |  | \% | 18t | 8 | 99 62 |
|  | ${ }_{6} 107$ | 50773 | General |  | 90 |  | ${ }_{30}^{58}$ |  |
| 1933 s -a-a--J8D ${ }^{\text {d }}$ | 5.60 |  |  | 92 |  | D |  | 37 ${ }^{1 / 2}$ |
| $\mathrm{Oart}_{\text {Et }}^{\text {tr }}$ |  |  | Eq 6s Jan 15 | ${ }^{6} \quad 5.70$ | $5.30 \%$ | D |  |  |
| Oart A Adr |  |  |  | 5.5 | 5.10\% | Mer R Tuage gold 48 1995 | 96 | 69 88 |
|  | 77 | ${ }_{78}^{92}$ |  | 5.50 | 5.10\% | Detr |  | 88 |
| Oentral of Georgla |  |  | Oong 5 s June 15 '51-J\&D 15 | 1001/2 | 103 | ${ }_{\text {Detroit }}$ | 94 | 98 |
|  | 103 |  |  |  |  | 1 st gold guar $4 \mathrm{~s} 1953{ }^{\text {a }}$ |  | 86 |
| Oons gold 5 s 1945 .....M\&iN | 988i4 | $10^{-7}$ | Ohic St L\& Pita 1 st 5 s g 1932A\&O | $100^{8 / 2}$ |  | Dulut Range 18t 581937 -A\&O |  |  |
| Reef Remen $51 / 58$ | $1023 / 4$ | 1041/2 |  |  | 100 |  | 100\% |  |
| Rep \& gen 58.1959 ser O , A\& OO |  |  | Cons 6 s red to 31/88 1930 -J8D | 973 | 100 | lit gold 5s 1937. |  | 75 |
| $\mathrm{Eg} \operatorname{tr} 418{ }^{8} \cdot 30-40 \operatorname{ser} \mathrm{P}(\mathrm{yr}) \mathrm{M} \& \mathrm{~N}$ |  | 5. | Deb gold 5 s Mar 11930 _m\& ${ }^{\text {c }}$ |  | $993 / 4$ | Dul Union Dep 58.1930 - - A A O |  |  |
| $\mathrm{ERatr}^{\text {ORat }}$ |  | 5.30\% | d | \% | $5.50 \%$ | \|lastern |  |  |
| Macon 4 Nor ${ }^{58} 519$ |  | $10 \overline{7}$ |  | 6\% |  | No |  |  |
| Mid Ga \& At1 19t 5 s 1997..J8J | 95 | 99 | 1 st \& | 89 | 3 | Consol 1st g 5 | 1011 |  |
| Oconee Div Istg 581945 |  |  |  | 57/8 | 88 | Elgin Jol \& East 5s 1941_-.MrN | 88\% | 99 |
| Ocean 88 10t $581943 \ldots$ |  |  |  | 9318 |  | 1st 681910 extat $4 \% 1950$ J 8 J |  |  |
| Oent Now Eng 1st qu $4196191 \mathrm{~J} \mathrm{\& J}$ | 76 | 81 | 1 lst | 1121/6 | 114 | Income 5 s 2862 |  |  |
| GenM (now lit) g 5 sa | 1071/2 | 108 | Guar god 581944 . ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |  | 1023/2 | El Paso \& R I I st |  |  |
|  | O 5.80 |  | Gen gold 6s Dec 1 Oonsol gold guer | 1001/3 |  | 1st \& ref 581965 .......A\&O | 101 |  |
| Eq tr $41581930-41$ (yr) -- F\&A ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | b 5.40 | \% | Oons | $1021 / 3$ | 103 |  |  | 101 |
| Reors |  |  | Thoc \& Memph 58 1949--.-JtJ | 96 |  |  |  |  |
| entral Pactifo- |  |  | Oonsol | 99 | 100 | Conv | 79 |  |
|  | 883 | $\begin{aligned} & 91,16 \end{aligned}$ | Oincinnati Hamilton \& |  |  | Seriea B 1953 . | 79 |  |
| Guars 5 1960..... ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | 100 | 100 |  | ${ }_{92} 9$ | 971 1/2 | Rer | 82 |  |
|  |  | ${ }_{9} 7$ | Olnc In |  |  |  | 5.7 |  |
| ent R2 \& Bkg 58 1937 |  |  | lat pold guar 481953 | ${ }^{9}$ |  | Eq 4 |  |  |
|  |  |  | Cln Ind \& Weest 1 st | $3 / 3$ | $\overline{8} 8$ |  | 13 |  |
| Eq tr 58 Apr 261932 s -a..A\&O) |  | 5.50\% | Cin | 8732 | 93 | Er |  |  |
| arl \& Woar lat 5 E 1946, A\&O |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ateaugay Ore \& |  |  |  |  | 5.20\% | Gen | 85\%/3 |  |
| hattahoochee \&\% |  |  | Of | 82 | 5.20\% | Est RR of |  |  |
| hat R \& South g | 80 |  | Cle Bltum Coal-See Ind |  |  | External if $781954 \ldots \ldots$ - M\&N | 1025/3 | 03 |
| hattanooga Sta 49 1957 |  |  |  | 98 |  | European \& N |  | 96 |
| 55 May $151947 \ldots \ldots . . . M^{2} \times 15$ | 96 | 63/4 | 1st C , hn gusi g 4 s 1940 ...F\&A | 89 |  | Fitchburg 58.15 Jan |  |  |
| 1at cons \& 5 s 1939......MAN |  |  | Clev Cinc Ohte \& 8 Sto |  |  | Florida Central ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |  |  |
|  | 102 |  |  | 1/2 | 86\% $3 /$ | st lien g ext 5a gold 1930_J J \% |  |  |
| Conve 43/38 1930 Opt $191515 \mathrm{~F} \mathrm{\& A}$ |  | 98 |  | 近 | 9833 | st cons 58 g go | 8 |  |
| Ref tampt 4 |  |  |  | 103 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | Reof \& imp M 58.63 ser D-J ${ }^{\text {d }}$ | 10001 | $102{ }^{1} \frac{1}{6}$ |  |  | .75\% |
| Eqtr $51 / 38$; $30 \cdot 37$ ( |  | 5.25\% | ${ }_{\text {Caf }}$ | 924 |  |  | 50\% | 5.75\% |
| Eq tr $681930 \cdot 35$ ( yrly)-j\&J |  |  |  | 80 |  | Flor |  | $\overline{8} 0$ |
| Eq $61 / 8 \mathrm{~s} 1929.35$ |  | 5.75\% | $8 t \mathrm{~L}$ Div 1st coltrg 4 | $803 / 4$ | 82 | Fonda Johns |  |  |
| Prate Oroek |  | $\overline{8} 8$ | ${ }_{\text {Spr \% Ool Div }}$ | 91 | 92 | 1st cons ref g 41/81947...J*J | 75 | 85 |
|  |  |  | Clev Colum Clin sc Ind |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | ${ }_{94}$ | 85 878 | Gen cons gold 6s | 1007/8 | 103 |  | $291 / 2$ | 31 |
|  |  |  | Cleveland Lorain se wheeing |  |  | Fort Dodge De | 22 |  |
| Weat Poc Corr 1 lat $41 / 3 \mathrm{~s}^{4} 45 \mathrm{~F}$ F A A |  |  | Gén M 581936 |  |  | Ft Smith |  | 29 |
| 1st M 5 1945 19. | 97 |  | C | 99 |  | , | 93\% |  |
|  |  |  | Clev \& Marietta $41 / 381935$ |  |  | Worth ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |  |  |
|  |  | ${ }^{6631 / 2}$ | Oleveland \& Pitts burg |  |  | Frem Elk ${ }^{\text {c }}$ Mo V 6s 1933-A\&O | $10 \overline{1}^{-\cdots}$ | 101 |
|  | 653/2 | 68 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Certificates of deposit- |  |  | Int red to 31/30 | 83 |  |  | 98 | 99 |
|  |  | 67 | Ser O $31 / 58$ gen gtd |  |  | Galv Houston \& Hender |  |  |
| (Vearly ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | 6.25 | 5.75\% | Cleve Short L 4 | ${ }_{961 / 8}$ |  |  | 7 | 951/2 |
|  |  |  | Cleveland Terminal |  |  | Genes |  | iii |
|  | $951 / 8$ | $961 / 2$ | 1st 4 s gold guar 199 Cleveland Union Term | 80 | 82 | Ga \& Ala 5s Oct 1945 | 86 | 95 |
| 1st \% ref p 581987 | 1023 | 10376 | 1 lt | 106 | $1063 / 2$ | Ga |  |  |
|  | 88 |  |  | 1025/8 |  |  |  | 100 |
|  |  |  | 181 |  | 96 | Georgia \& Hlorida |  |  |
| Gen M 5 S May 1951 | 76 | 77 | Colo |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | Natms | ${ }^{961 / 4}$ |  | Georgla $\mathrm{Fla} \& \mathrm{Ala}^{\text {R }}$ R |  |  |
|  | 1013 | 104 |  | 5.7 | 5.35\% | 1st M \& ref 68 | 85 |  |
|  | ${ }^{6} 37$ | $64^{--}$ | 18t 5 R 1930 ctis dop unstpd.J\&J |  |  | Ga RR \& Bkg ref 68195 | 107 | 110 |
| Ohicago Indiana \& Southern Ry |  |  |  | 91 | 93 |  | 80 |  |
|  | 851/8 | 90 | Ool \& Hock Val ext 48.1948 A\& |  |  | Deb 5 s 1952 |  |  |
| Ref M 6 6s 1947 seriea ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |  |  | Col \& Tol 1st g 4s 1955---F\&A |  |  | Eq $\operatorname{tr} 41 / 3 \mathrm{~s} 1930-1939 \mathrm{~m}-\mathrm{a}-\mathrm{M} \& \mathrm{~N}$ (b | 5.50 | 5\% |
| Ref M 5 S |  | 101 | Conn River | 83 | 87 | Gouv \& Osw |  |  |
|  |  |  | Connecting |  |  | Gr 2 d 4 s 1936 | 8 | 96/3/3 |
|  |  | 102 |  | 85 |  |  | 81 |  |
|  |  | 5. $35 \%$ | ${ }_{\text {Cont }}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 52 | 55 | Ouban Northern $\mathbf{R}$ |  |  |  | ${ }^{65}$ |  |
| Ohlcago Lake Shore Eastern |  |  |  |  | $23 / 2$ |  | 86 | 89 |
| Hit M 4 4/9 1969 opt 1919-J8D | 93 |  |  | $8931 / 8$ | 100 | Gen 48 | 8 |  |
| alc Momp \& Gulf 58 1940.JdJ |  |  | lst $1 \&$ ref 6 s 1936 ser B_-J $\&$ D | $911 / 2$ | 923 | ${ }^{\text {Pra }}$ | 73 |  |
|  |  |  | Imp | 65 | 70 | Lak | 4 |  |
| Oorvadj ${ }^{\text {Gen }}$ 4s ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |  |  | Dars \%aco 18t gu 5s 1940-M\&N | 78 |  | Grand |  |  |
|  |  | $821 / 8$ | Dayton \& Michigan 1st 58.1911. | 8 |  | ${ }_{\text {Sink }}$ | 109 | -110 |
|  |  |  | Extt at 4\% \% to '31 op'17.-J\& | $97^{1 / 2}$ | $991 / 2$ | Grand | 73 |  |
|  |  |  | Dayton Unfon 481949 deale | 82 |  |  | 82 | $8{ }^{1}$ |
| , |  |  | Dawnon Ry \& Coal 581951. J8J ${ }^{\text {del }}$ |  |  | Grays Pt Term g 5s 1947.-.J\&D Great Northern- | 96 |  |
| $43 / 8 \mathrm{~s} 30-41 \mathrm{G} \pm \mathrm{H}$ (yr |  |  |  |  |  | Gen M 781936 series A._J\&J |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 97 |  |
|  |  | 5.20\% | 1st \& ref gold 4s 1943 ...-M\&N | 91 | $917 / 8$ | G | 1077/6 | 10 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 103 | 10 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Gen 43/31977 ser E....-Jd | 40 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 5881930-1 | 5.40 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Eq tr 5s 1930-1938 (yr) _-M\&s ${ }^{\text {b }}$ |  | 5.10\% |


$b$ Basis. $f$ This price includes accrued interest. $h$ Dollars per 1,000 franc bond. $k$ Last sale. $l$ In London. $n$ Nominal, $x$ Sale price.

NOTICE.-All bond prices are "and interest' except where marked "q" and income and defaulted bonds.

$b$ Basis, $f$ This price includes accrued interest. $h$ Dollars per 1,000 -franc bond. $k$ Last sale. $l$ In London. $n$ Nominal. $s$ Sale price.

NOTICE.-All bond prices are "and interest" except where marked "f" and income and defaulted bonist


Banle. TThis price facludee mocrued interest. $k$ Latit sale. $\boldsymbol{l}$ In London. $n$ Nominal. $\boldsymbol{s}$ Sale price. y Fix-righte. t No par value.

RALLROAD STOCKS-INVEST. TRUST STOCKS AND BONDS
NOTICE.- All bond prices are "and interest" oxcept where marked "i" and income and defaulted bonds.

| Stocks. Par. | Bid. | Ask. | Stocks. Par | Bid. | Ask. | Stocks Par | Bid. | Ask. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| St Louis Pridge 1st | 111 | 115 | Southwestern of Ga (guar) ---100 | 93 | 102 | Virgini |  |  |
|  | ${ }^{54} 11 / 2$ | $1{ }^{57}$ |  | 133 | 100 105 |  | 48 | 52 |
| st Lour pref Southwestern--.-100 | ${ }_{91}{ }^{1}$ | -92 | Texas \& Pacifich | 130 10 | 140 65 | Preferred A.-...-...-.-.-100 | 88 | 8 |
| ${ }^{\text {Pt }}$ Preferred ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | 88 | 88 | Troy Gribush ${ }^{\text {Tha }}$ | ${ }^{1} 11$ | 115 |  | 21 | ${ }^{65}$ |
| Saratoga \& Schenectady (gu) 100 Seaboard Air Line common) | 105 | 1110 | Union Pacific-Common.-.--100 <br> Preferred | 242 | 243 | Western Maryland Ry com_100 | $223 / 2$ | 23 |
| Seaboard Air Line common... 100 | 10 | 14 35 | ( Preferred ${ }^{\text {U }}$ | 208 | $212{ }^{81 / 2}$ | ${ }_{20}^{1 s t}$ preferred | ${ }^{2} \overline{5}^{-}$ | 12 |
|  | ${ }^{\text {d }} 46$ | 55 1333 | Unted ${ }^{\text {Unen }}$ | 20 110 30 | $\begin{array}{r}12 \\ 115 \\ 45 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | Western Pacific RE Oorp-o-100 |  | 30 54 |
| Southern Ry common........-100 | 1411/2 | 142\% | Valley RR (N Y) (guar) ..... 100 | 98 | 103 | West Jorsey \& | 50 | 120 |
|  | ${ }_{85}^{97}$ | -98 98 | Vermont \& Mass (guar) <br> Vicksb Shrevep \& Pac com.-. <br> Pro | $\begin{gathered} 116 \\ 90 \\ 90 \end{gathered}$ | ${ }_{95}{ }^{-1}$ | Wheeling \& Lake Erie Ry .... 100 Prior lien stock | ${ }^{100} 0^{-1}$ | ${ }_{150}^{150}$ |


Investment Trust Stocks and Bonds

| Stocks and Bonds. Par. | Bid. | Ask. | Stocks and Bonds. Pa | Bid. | Ask. | Stocks and Bonds. Par. | Bid. | Ask. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Per } \\ & 13 \end{aligned}$ | $\frac{\text { nare. }}{15}$ |  | Per <br> 17 | $21$ |
| ${ }^{\text {dred In }}$ | 108 |  | Eastern Bankers Corp com...- | 241/2 | 7 | Leaders | 47 |  |
| Alliance Inves |  |  |  | 5 | 145 | Leaders | 918 | 8 |
| Allied Int Investing Corp |  | 161/2 |  |  |  | Metal \& Mining Shares com.-( $\dagger$ ) |  |  |
| Amer Alliance Investing al |  |  | Deb 5 |  | ${ }^{85}$ | Mutual Invest |  |  |
| ${ }_{\text {American }}^{\text {American Briti }}$ |  | ${ }_{14}^{303 / 4}$ |  |  | 89 | New Bedford Invest |  |  |
| $\stackrel{\$ 6}{ }{ }^{\text {a }}$ referred | 75 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 83 units | 4 | 48 | ${ }^{\text {Equitabie }}$ |  | 6 | North \& South A | 271/2 |  |
| ${ }_{\text {Amer }}$ | 20 |  | Equitable |  |  | ${ }^{\text {s }}$ B |  | 07 |
| Class | 241/8 | 27 |  | 8 |  | North American Utility Securities |  | 8 |
| American |  |  |  |  | 80 | Preferr |  |  |
| American \& Contic | 30 43 | 35 44 | Federated Capital Corp com... 10 | 75 | 85 | Oil | 56 20 20 | 25 |
| Amer Finan H |  |  | Financial Investing Coold comio |  |  |  | 82 |  |
| Amer \& For Shares Cor | 85 | $\begin{aligned} & 90 \\ & 50 \end{aligned}$ | First Holding \& Trading Ltd.-(t) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Con ertible d |  | 98 | Fixe |  |  | Ist serial trust shares--(t) | 46 | 50 |
| Amer pref ${ }^{\text {rrred }}$. | 101 |  | nd | 10 |  | ${ }^{\text {Pa }}$ |  |  |
| $7 \%$ pre | 46 |  | Now | $\overline{35}$ |  |  | 77 |  |
| Oont | 71 | 76 c . | Found |  |  | Warrants | $\begin{aligned} & 63 \\ & 11 \end{aligned}$ | 17 |
| American \& Gene |  |  | Pref |  |  | Public Utility | 2 |  |
| Common class | ${ }^{25}$ |  | Founder | $t 16$ |  | Reliance Inter |  |  |
| \$3 preferred | 29 | 30 | Deb | 80 |  | Royalties Manag |  |  |
| Amer Int |  |  | General America | 20 | $231 / 2$ | $6 \%$ preferred units |  |  |
| ${ }_{\text {Amer railw }}$ | 173/4 | ${ }_{329} 181 / 2$ | General Equitie | 24 40 40 | 42 | eaboard-Con | $\begin{array}{r} 30 \\ 5 \end{array}$ |  |
| Astor Financlal cla |  |  | $\$ 6$ first preferred | 90 | 95 | Second F |  |  |
| Atlantic |  |  | General Trust |  |  | Second Found |  | 25 |
| Prefor |  |  | Cowateral | 90 |  | Second Int Sec C |  |  |
| Units |  |  | German Credit \& Inv $25 \%$ pd- ${ }^{\text {Globe }}$ Underwriters Exchange- |  |  | 6 |  |  |
| Atlantic S | $\overline{3} 2$ | $\overline{35}$ | $\underset{\text { Greenway Cor }}{ }$ |  |  | Second Nat Inv Corp unit ctifis $(t)$ |  | 1097 |
| Aviation Sec | ${ }_{7}$ |  | Ex-warra |  |  | Preferred |  |  |
| ${ }_{\text {Bancomit }}^{\text {New }}$ Co |  | 9 | Guardian | 36 |  | Allotment certificates $75 \%$ pald |  |  |
| Bankers Financial |  | ${ }_{31}^{50}$ | Guardian In | 12 |  | Shawmu |  | 21 |
| Bankers Investm't T | 3438 | 37 | \$6 units | 38 |  | Shawn |  | 40 |
| Bankers Nat Investi |  |  | ${ }_{5} 7$ |  | ${ }_{90}$ |  |  |  |
| Bankers S |  |  | Debentur |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bankinstock Bankshares | ${ }_{16}^{16}$ | 3/4 | Incorpo |  |  | ${ }_{\text {Shenand }}^{\text {Sonv }}$ | ${ }_{34}^{1634}$ |  |
| Class B |  |  | Industrial Coll | 1 |  | Southern Bond |  |  |
| Bankstocks |  |  | Indus \& | 24 |  | Comm |  |  |
| Prete | $2 \overline{0}$ | 30 | Insuranshares of Delaware--(- $\dagger$ ) | 58 | 173/4 | \$3 preferred |  |  |
| British Type | 16 | 20 | Insura |  |  |  | 1438 | 159 |
| Canadian | 40 |  | Serie | 25 29 29 |  | Standard Holding |  |  |
| Class B |  |  | eries H19 |  |  | \$5.50 |  |  |
| $6 \%$ cum pref $\operatorname{ser}$ A 5 s series B 1953 with warrants_ |  |  | Insull Utility | 66 85 |  | Stand | 1038 | 115 |
| Without | $\begin{array}{r}75 \\ 5 \\ \hline\end{array}$ |  | Debs 5 s |  |  | State Bankers F |  |  |
| Class B | $\begin{array}{r}59 \\ 28 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | 63 31 | Intercontio |  | 180 | Stone ${ }^{\text {ster Webs }}$ | $10 \overline{8}$ |  |
| Colonial Investor | 24 60 | 72434 | Int Sec | $\begin{array}{r}50 \\ 95 \\ \hline\end{array}$ |  | Trustee Stan |  | 121/4 |
| Community State Corp class A- |  |  | $7 \%$ | $\begin{array}{r}95 \\ 25 \\ \hline\end{array}$ |  | U S Shares cla |  |  |
| Continenta |  |  | ${ }^{6} 5$ | 77 |  | Cla |  | 141/8 |
| Preferred | 70 | 80 | Ailo | 115 |  | Class C | ${ }_{32}$ |  |
| Debenture |  |  | Inte | 60 | 70 | Clas |  | 27\% |
| Continenta |  |  | Int |  |  | Cla | 20 |  |
| Convertible preferr | $80$ | $85$ | 7\% preferre | 93 | 100 | 䢒 | 123/8 | 13 |
| Corporate Dapital |  |  |  |  |  | - Class |  |  |
| Corporate Trust sha | 97\% | 105\% | Investment Trust of | 1156 | ${ }^{12} 3$ | Preferred |  |  |
| Cradit Alliance clas |  | 29 98 | Invest Trus | 45 30 |  | U S S Electri | 4531/ |  |
| Preferred. | 98 | 100 | Debe |  |  | U \& Foreign secur |  |  |
| Depos Bank Shares Service N Y Y - | 16 | 171/6 | Debe | 76 | 77 | 1st | $881 / 2$ |  |
| Diversified İnve |  |  | Joint |  |  | Utility Equities Corp aliot ctis--- |  |  |
| Diversified Trus B shares | 221/8 |  | Convertible preferred.-.---100 | 100 |  | Common. | 18 | 18 |

[^11]
## Joint Stock Land Bank Bonds and Stocks



## Public Utilities

(Includea street and electric rallways, gas, electric, power, water and telegraph and telephone companies.)
aOTIOE.-All bond prioos are "and Interost" excopt whore markod "r" and income and dofaultod bonda.

|  |  | Ask. | Bonds. |  | Ask. | Bond | Bu. | Ast |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | 991/2 |  | 103 | ${ }_{104}^{104}$ |  <br>  | ${ }^{89}$ |  |
|  |  | 991/2 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Alabama Power |  |  |  | -96 | $\begin{aligned} & 98 \\ & 964 / 4 \end{aligned}$ |  |  | 100 |
| leter ere 519 |  |  |  |  |  |  | $95 .$ |  |
|  |  |  |  | ${ }^{90} 9$ | ${ }_{90}^{90} 3$ |  | 983/4 |  |
| dot | 92 |  |  |  | 3 |  | 96 | 101 |
| y-seo | 104 |  |  | 891/2 |  |  |  |  |
| ghelley |  |  |  | $90$ | 100 |  | 1001/2 |  |
| On M |  | 90 | 18t ref 5s Feb 1946 |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 96 \\ & 87 \\ & \hline 98 \end{aligned}$ | 1033/2 |
|  |  |  |  | $57$ |  |  |  | 00 |
| nob | ${ }_{180}^{85}$ |  |  | 80 |  | Cont Gar |  |  |
| Conv deb 6s |  | ${ }_{115}^{18}$ |  |  | 91 | Cent in Light list \& rer $5 \mathrm{~S}^{-}{ }^{4} 3 \mathrm{BA} \& \mathrm{O}$ <br>  | ${ }_{98}^{101}$ | ${ }^{1013}$ |
|  |  | 93 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 991 / 29 \\ & 998 \\ & 989 \\ & 99 \end{aligned}$ | 101 |  | ${ }_{86}{ }^{1 / 2}$ |  |
|  |  | 80 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | 98 | $100{ }^{101 / 2}$ | Central Indiana Power Co--J\& | ${ }_{98}^{88}$ |  |
|  | 10023/3 | 10112 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 90 | ${ }^{9} 2^{-1}$ |  |  |  |  | ${ }^{\text {ano }}$ |  |
|  |  |  |  | 875 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 100 | ${ }^{99}$ |
|  | $\begin{gathered} 9292 \\ 1020 \\ 1020 \end{gathered}$ | ${ }^{103}{ }^{103 / 2}$ |  | 9 9 泣 |  | Cont Pow | ${ }_{91}^{88}$ | ${ }_{94} 91 / 2$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Cont Pubserr Corp- |  |  |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & 1006 \\ & 100^{102} \\ & 159^{2} \end{aligned}$ | (1018 ${ }^{1037}$ | $45 / 2 \mathrm{~s}$ July $119 \overline{3} 0$ $\qquad$ | ${ }_{92}^{96}$ |  | antral Ry-Soe UnyzEI (Bat) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Conv dab 5 | ${ }^{5} 88$ |  |
| $\Delta$ Deb 6 |  |  | Bridgeport Gas Lt 481952 -.J\& |  |  |  |  |  |
| Deb ga 1975 ser | $\begin{aligned} & 100 \\ & \substack{102 \pi \\ 86 \\ 92 \\ \hline \\ \hline} \end{aligned}$ | - |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | diver Power Co-. M*s |  |  |  | 94 | 96 |
|  |  |  | -yr ${ }^{\text {a }} 6$ | 8 | 101 | ${ }_{\text {ckit }}$ | 87 |  |
|  | $\begin{array}{r} 959 \\ \hline 95 \\ 1059 \end{array}$ | ${ }_{108}^{96}$ |  |  |  | Chareston Cois Ry Gaa ic Ej- |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | $8^{99}$ |  |  | 104 | 9 |
|  |  | 10072 |  |  | 6.50\% |  |  |  |
|  |  | 91 |  |  |  |  | 100 |  |
|  |  |  |  | 1091/31 | 9936 |  |  |  |
|  | ${ }^{83}$ | 95 |  |  |  | 1st 41/2s 1958 series A---M\&S Chicago Aurora \& Elgin Corp-J\&J | ---- |  |
|  | 94 |  |  | f 95 | 9712/ |  |  |  |
|  |  | 951/2 |  |  |  |  | 65 |  |
|  | ${ }^{93}$ | 95 |  |  |  | Coll |  | ${ }_{77} 71 / 2$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Oertircates. or deposit |  |  |
|  | 81 | 83 |  |  |  | list mete |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | ref |  |  |
| Conv dab $5 \%$, | 95 |  | Kinga oo | $8{ }^{1-}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Convidibu |  |  | Stamod |  |  |  |  |  |
| Conv |  |  | Nasisi |  | $\begin{aligned} & 50 \\ & 90 \end{aligned}$ | b |  |  |
| 1 tat |  |  |  |  |  |  | 28 |  |
| Assoclated Telep Util 5 ss 1944 | $110^{\circ}$ | 115 |  |  |  | caso Rapid Transit Co-May |  |  |
| $\triangle$ bsilisin |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 93/2/ | 941/2 |  |  |  | - |  |  |
| Con | 95 | 100 |  | 100 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 101 |  | Sian ref 58.1956 ser |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 95 | 99 | Burr |  |  |  |  |  |
| antic |  |  | Butat goid |  | 102 |  |  |  |
| 1 lat \& reat 5 |  | ${ }_{99}^{101}$ | Burlington (Y) |  | 100 | ${ }_{\text {lta }}$ I |  |  |
|  | 91 | ${ }^{83}$ |  | 94 | 97 | Clcero Gas gen \& re | 99 |  |
|  |  |  | to ElkP | ${ }_{98}^{90}$ | $100^{-}$ | deb |  |  |
|  | 90 |  |  |  |  | without warrant |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | 95 |  | D | 115 | 120 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 78 | 86 |  |  |  | 通 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | ${ }_{93}{ }^{9}$ | 96 | Itizens Gas (Indianap |  |  |
|  | ${ }_{97}^{98}$ | ${ }_{99}^{100}$ | T | ${ }^{9} 9{ }^{-7}$ | 1011 | ${ }^{1+18 t}$ |  | 101 |
|  | 98 |  |  | 100 | 101 |  | 983/2 | 1001/2 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }^{953}$ |  | 104 |  |  | 81 | (ty |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 97 <br> 93 <br> 8 |  |
|  | 100 | 101 |  |  |  |  |  |  |




PUBLIO UTIIITY BONDS

-Baale. $f$ This price includes accrued interest. kLast aale. n Nominal. rOanadlan price. ssaie price


$b$ Basis. $f$ This price Includes accrued intereat. kLast sale. IIn London. $n$ NomInal. r Canadian price. a Rale price

$d$ Price per share, not per cent. JFlat price. $k$ Last sale. $l$ In London, $n$ Nominal. $r$ Canadian price. $s$ Sale price. $t$ New stock.

Ask A.sk.



 Amer States Pub Serv A
Amer Superpower Oorp com $-\quad$. $\dagger$
First preferred Oonvertible preferred ---.-. Amer Teleg \& Oable guar-...
American Telep \& Toleg--.
Amer Wat Wks \& Elec com. sp 1st preferred
Appalachlan EII Pow $7 \%$ pref- 100 arimona Power
 Class A comeral Gas Corp Praferred
Arkan \& Mo Pow
Arkansas Pow pref Assoclated Gas \& EL1Oommon class A.
Debenturerightt. Common rights
 Associated Telep Ūtil-


 Baton Rouge Riec Mo
Preferred Serieg A
 B6 preferred.
 Boston Elevated RR com. Y Rys Preferred
lit preferre 2d proferred
Brazilian Tr Lt Ordinary (part. paid)
Bridgeport Hydraulic O.......-
 Broad River Power prof-Brockton Gas Lirht Oo....... 25
Brooklyn Olty RR

 | Preferred series A.-.-(no par) |
| :---: |
| Bklyn \& Queens Transit com-( $\dagger$ ) |
| Preferred |
| \| |

 Preferred

$\$ 5$ first pref | $6 \%$ cum pref |
| :---: |
| Oallfornia Ore $(7 \%)$ pref |
| $6 \%$ preferred |
| 100 | Oalf Ry \& Pow prior pref-. $6 \%$ cum 1 st pref

 Capital Trac (Wash, D 0 ) -100 a
Carolina Pow Light $7 \%$ pref ontral Ariz L \& Pow pref -- 100 Oent Arkan Pub Serv Oory prino Oentral Gas \& EL Oo $861 / 2 \mathrm{pref}$ ( $\dagger$ ) entral Ga Power com........ 100 Dent Hudson Gas \& Elec com_( $\dagger$ )
$6 \%$ preferred
(entral Illinols Light $\mathbf{6} \%$ pit-100 Oentral IIInols Lub Sigt $6 \%$ pf prof 100 Cont Indans Power $7 \%$ pref par
Oentral Maine Pow $6 \%$ pref--100 $7 \%$ preferred Oent Miss Val Elec Prop pref 100
Oent Pk N \& RR Ree NX Rys
Oentral Po \& Llght $7 \%$ pref. 100 dentral Pow \& Light 7\% pret-100 Cent \& A W U Util com.........87 prior pref
Oentral States Eilec Oorp.-.
$7 \%$ preferred $7 \%$ preferred (with war)----100
$6 \%$ cum pref
$6 \%$ cum pref (without warr) -100 Warrants-
86 conv pref
onen Central States Pow \& L $\$ 7$ pp ( $)$
Oent Vermont Pub Ser $\$ 6$ pf
Onarlestown Gas \& Ghes \& Poto Tale of Bait pref
 Ohicago Oity Ry Preferred
Prior Ilen stock Ohlcago Rys partic ctis series 100

 Voting tr ctis for com stack100
rior preferred


## - Ask.



PUBLIC UTIEITY STOGKS

| r |  |  |  | Par bid. |  |
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|  | $\begin{gathered} 13-1 \\ 108 \\ 200 \\ 105 \\ 101 \\ 350 \\ 356 \\ 20 \\ 32 \\ s \\ s \end{gathered} 1$ |  | $100$ | Slerra Pacific Elec $\mathbf{O O}$ com.... | ${ }_{91}^{49}$ |
|  |  | ed (\$6) |  |  | --.: |
|  |  |  | $17 \overline{5}$ |  |  |
|  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 140 \\ 92- \end{gathered}$ |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 10-8 \\ 861 / 2 \end{gathered}$ |
|  |  | Pawinsular Telep Oo com-..-. 100 110 <br> 10  | $\begin{array}{r} 105 \\ 77 \end{array}$ |  |  |
|  |  | Penn-Ohio Edison --------10 (t) ${ }_{\text {d }}^{\text {d }}$ d 104 |  |  | South Oallf Edison common_-. 25 d $591 / 2$ |
|  |  | 7\% prior pree |  |  |  |
|  |  | $\$ 8$ preferred $\qquad$ (t) $\begin{array}{ll}d & 947 / 8 \\ d & 10\end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 95 \\ & 70 \end{aligned}$ |  | ${ }_{99}^{28}$ |
|  |  |  | $\begin{array}{r} 107 \\ 98 \end{array}$ |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  Participating class A stoere- 88 |  | Southern Oities Utilities com_(t) ${ }^{7} \quad 80$ $7 \%$ preferred-a-r-86prior preferred $\qquad$ (t) ${ }^{d} 80$ |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | 108 |  | 27 |
|  |  |  Pennsylvania Pow \& Lit 86 preferred | $\begin{array}{r} 103 \\ 97 \end{array}$ | South \& Atlan Teleg (guar) ..-. 25 d 16 |  |
|  |  |  |  | Southern Indiana G \& Ef 6\% pf 100 |  |
| (t) d 100 |  | People's $\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{L}}$ \& O ( Ohlc ) |  |  |  |
|  |  | Phila Oo (Pittsburgh) <br>  | 200 | Southerra New Eng Telep- 100175 So Jer G EI \& Tr-See P \& Ori |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | ${ }_{99}^{115}$ |
|  |  |  |  |  | $\stackrel{99}{90}$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | Preferred-1ans |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | 62 |
|  |  |  | 26 | ${ }^{\text {d }}$ d 57 |  |
|  |  | Sub Rap Tran ${ }^{\text {St }}$ |  |  |  |
|  |  | nited Traction pref-----50 d |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Philadelphla Rapld Transit-...50 d 43 |  |  |  |
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|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| raska Power, pref.-.-.--100 |  | Green \& doates Sts (\$15 pd)_50 d |  |  |  |
|  | 102 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
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|  |  | Phila \& W Western Ry com. |  |  |  |
|  | 0 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | ${ }^{1} 1001 / 6{ }^{\text {T }}$ |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | $\left\|\begin{array}{l} 500 \\ 100 \end{array}\right\|$ |  |  |
|  |  | Portland Gas \& Coke, 7 or pt   <br>  100 105 <br> 100 107  |  |  | 8 |
|  |  | Potamac Edison Co 6\% pref 100 d 96 |  |  |  |
|  |  | nac Elec Pow 6\% pref- 1000 |  |  |  |
|  | 53 |  | $\begin{array}{r} 103 \\ 90 \end{array}$ | 238 |  |
|  |  | Power ${ }_{\text {Prerred }}$ |  |  | 85 |
|  |  |  | 191/4 |  |  |
|  |  | Second preferred |  |  | --\% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | 102 |  | ${ }^{46}$ |
| Y ork state Rys, com_- 100 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Pablic Serv Oorp of N J.- (no par) d 853 |  | United Gas \& K1 of NJ $5 \%$ pr-100 67 United Gas Co $\$ 7$ pref A |  |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & 700 \\ & 112 \end{aligned}$ |  | 148 |  | + $2521 / 4$ |
|  |  |  | 105 |  |  |
|  |  | $\$ 5$ preferred Trac of ${ }^{-1}$$\qquad$ (t) ${ }^{2} 95$ 40 Oonsolidated | 50 |  |  |
| ${ }^{\mathbf{w}}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 110 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | ererred Olas |  |
|  | $\begin{gathered} 5^{21 / 8} \\ 101 \\ 11 \end{gathered}$ | ubic service OO or Nor Mil--(t) ${ }^{\text {d }} 320$ |  |  |  |  |
| North Amer Ediso $\$ 86$ pref-(t) ${ }^{\text {d }}$ d 100 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Publl C Utill Ser V Corp $\$ 61 / 2 \mathrm{pf}-(t){ }^{d}{ }^{-1}$ |  |  |  |
| Allot ct |  | Puget. Sound Power a Light.. 100 |  | Otah Pow |  |
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| rth |  | Rap Tran St Ry-See P S Oorp ${ }^{\text {R }}$ d 20 |  |  |  |
| Or O ho |  |  |  |  |  |
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| Preferred ${ }^{\text {Prthern }}$ Statea |  |  |  |  |  |
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| Orthwest Eliectric.--------100 |  |  |  |  |  |
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| Ondo Public Serv pret A (7\%)-100 100 <br> 8.  |  |  |  |  |  |
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[^12]
## Industrial and Miscellaneous Securities

Under the heading＂Industrial and Miscellaneous Securities＂we include all issues which do not appear under the previous two headings，namely＂Railroads（Steam）＂and＂Public Utilities．＂In the case of stocks，how－ ever，we put＂Textile Manufacturing，＂＂Insurance，＂＂Mining，＂＂Real Estate and Land，＂＂Title Guarantee and Safe Deposit Companies＂under separate heads，then follow with the rest of the＂Industrial and Miscellaneous．＂ wotics．－All bond pricon are＂and interest＂oxcopt where marked＂q＂and income and defaulted bonda．

| ond | id． | Ask． | Bonds． | sid． | Ask． | Bonds． | Bid． | Ask． |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| cella | ．．．－ | $\begin{array}{rr} s & 96 \\ & 82 \end{array}$ | Batavian Petrol $41 / 2 \mathrm{~s}$ gu $1942 \mathrm{~J} \& J$ Bates Valve Baa Oorp－ <br>  |  |  | Ouyamel Fruit 1st 68 1940 ＿A\＆O | $\begin{array}{\|c\|} \hline 983 / 8 \\ n 70 \end{array}$ |  |
| otts Dairles deb 6s 19 |  |  |  |  |  | D |  |  |
|  | 81 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 traham \＆Straus | 81 |  |  | 97 | 80 |  |  | 7 |
| dram 51943 | 99 | $\begin{gathered} 100 \\ 84 \\ 77 \end{gathered}$ | Bethlehem <br> orporation <br> Oons s i 5 有s 1953 ser B | $\begin{gathered} 104 \\ 104 \\ 9914 \\ 98 \\ 98 \end{gathered}$ |  |  | 961／2 |  |
| ms Exp ce |  |  |  |  | 104 先 |  |  |  |
| Ajax rabber |  | 847／8 | Becured $5 \%$ note 1.930 ．J\＆D 15 Secured 5\％noter 1931－JtyD15Secured $5 \%$ notes 1932－J\＆D 15 |  | $\begin{gathered} 1001 / 4 \\ 100 \\ 99 \\ 99 \end{gathered}$ | Dodge Bros deb 68 1940．．．．M\＆N Dodge Mig lit 78 1942 <br> Dode Mg | 99060 | $\begin{aligned} & 9 \bar{\theta}- \\ & 70 \\ & 75 \% / 8 \end{aligned}$ |
| Alabama Cons Coal dir Iron－men | 97 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | ${ }^{1010} 1{ }^{\text {a }}$ | Dominnon ${ }^{\text {da }}$ |  |  |
|  |  |  | （eth ${ }^{\text {Beth }}$ | $1000$ |  |  | $r$ 951／2 |  |
| laska Gold Minn | 212 |  | Purch money 5 s 1936 －J\＆J Penn－Mary Steel 5 s 1937－J\＆J |  |  | 1st \＆ 168 June $21933 \ldots$ J\＆D 2 r Domin Iron \＆steel－ | －－－ |  |
| bany |  | 887／6 | Bluff PoInt Land Impt $\mathrm{Co}_{0}$－ |  |  |  | 90 | －－－ |
| Algoma steel Cor | 65 | 70 | Borden Mills 18t 8f 6s 1934－．F\＆A | $\begin{aligned} & 94 \\ & 95 \\ & 9414 \\ & 8012 \\ & 601 \\ & 93 \end{aligned}$ | ${ }_{97} 7^{--}$ |  |  | 9 |
| 1 ist \＆rof 5 |  |  |  |  |  | Dominion Textile 6s 1949．．．．．．．．． |  | 99 |
|  | ${ }^{4} 0^{-7}$ | －－－ |  |  | 62 | $1 \mathrm{st} \boldsymbol{1} \mathrm{f} 51 / 2 \mathrm{~s} 1948$ ser A．．．．F\＆A 80 |  |  |
| eb | 98\％$\%$ | 100 |  |  |  | Donner Steel 781942 A．－．．．．JA | 80 102 80 | B |
| pine Montan ste |  |  | 15 －yr f f extl 6 s 1940 | $9 \overline{3}^{-1}$ |  |  |  |  |
| lits 7881955. | 99\％／4 | 90 |  | $\begin{aligned} & 86-17 / 7 \\ & 93 \\ & 93 \end{aligned}$ |  | n Steel 581931 ctfe－FRA |  | 寿 |
| Blinking f |  |  |  |  | $100$ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 10013 \\ & 063 \end{aligned}$ |
| minum Ltd s |  |  |  | 991／2 | 100 |  |  |  |
| P | 101 | 103 | 1st M513s 11945 ser A．- M M N |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{\text {ker }}$ |  |  | Cody Lumber 61／28 $1939 \ldots$ M＊N | 93 | $988^{-1}$ |  | 88 | 91 |
| nerican A | 105 | 1051／2 |  Onada |  | $\begin{aligned} & 94 \\ & 80 \end{aligned}$ | Finish | 75 | 0 |
| 1 merrcan Beets Sugar |  | 105\％／2 |  | 949 |  | Falrbanks Morse \＆${ }^{\text {O－}}$－Fin |  |  |
| Oonv r P deb 681935 | 83 | 47／8 |  |  | 956－－ |  | 921／4 |  |
| ${ }_{\text {Deb．}}$ meld 51953 | ${ }^{75} 1 / 2$ | $8{ }^{871 / 2}$ | Canada SS L dob 5s 43－FkA15 |  |  | Famous Players Canada Corp－ |  |  |
| ner Ohain deb 6f |  |  | Candian Oar t Fidy Co，Ltd－ 109 |  |  |  |  |  |
| thout war |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| mer Oot Oill 58 |  |  |  |  |  | 94\％ | Federated Metals 8 f 7 s 39 －J JED <br> Flat if deb 7 s with war 46 －J\＆J |  |  |
| Deb 15581942 ． | 96 | 961／2 |  |  | Without warrants |  | 851／2 |  |
| Her Dock \％${ }_{\text {Etat }}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & 93 \\ & 913 / 6 \end{aligned}$ |  | 72 | 75 |  |  |  |
| er European | 89 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| er Ice $\mathrm{Co}^{\text {deh }} 5 \mathrm{~s}$ |  |  | Central Foundry May 1931－FèA 92 |  | 967／8 | Flour Mills of ammerca In－－J83 | 70 | ${ }_{72}$ |
| mer I ${ }_{\text {O Ohem }}$ | 104 | 105 |  |  | 55 |  |  |  |
| Cony deb $51 / 819$ |  |  | Oent Hud St＇boat 5 A Apr ${ }^{\prime} 33$ A |  |  |  |  | Forelign Power Secur Corp－－ |
| Oony 51／2s 1949 | 101 | 102 | Certain－teed Prod Oorp－．．．．M\＆SDeben if $51 / 5$ 1948．．．．．M\＆ | 65 | 88 | Framerican Ind \＆x Dev Oorp－7， |  |  |
|  | 90 | 94 |  |  |  | Framercan | 101 95 | ${ }_{993}^{102}$ |
| er Lambe | $103{ }^{3}$ |  | Oharcoal Iron of Am 88 ＇31－M\＆N |  |  |  |  |  |
| M | 103 |  | ua |  |  |  | 100\％ |  |
| ， |  |  | Ohic Jo | $\begin{aligned} & 86 \\ & 99 \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Sin | 95 |  |  |  |  | alena－SIgnal Oil |  |  |
| Amer Seating conv 6s 1936．－J\＆J |  |  | Deb sf $51 / 8 \mathrm{~s} 1942 \ldots \ldots . . .{ }^{\text {a }}$－ | 16 |  | Gannett $\mathrm{CO}, \mathrm{Inc}$ |  |  |
| erican |  |  | Olearfleld Bit |  |  |  |  |  |
| mer smelt |  | 987／8 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| mer Solvents \％ |  |  |  |  | 100 | else | 87 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | ， |  |  |
| Amer Sugar F | ${ }_{96}^{103}$ |  |  |  | $45$ | neral Amer |  |  |
| American |  |  |  |  |  | Equi | 75 | 5．50\％ |
| Deb 4 |  |  |  |  | \％ | Gene |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | $913 / 2$ | 18 mmtge a 5 |  |  |
|  | 103 | 103 | O | 98 | 99 | ${ }_{\text {Gen }}^{\text {Gener }}$ |  |  |
| mer | 35 |  | Comm |  |  | Ge |  |  |
| 1 lt 6 |  | 78 |  | 95 |  |  |  |  |
| ader |  |  |  |  |  | Deb |  |  |
| 1846 | 105 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 78 |
| Dio－Chilean |  | 91 | ${ }_{\text {D }}$ | 96 | 981／2 |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{\text {Datilla }}$ |  | ${ }_{5} 9$ | Comp |  |  |  | 31／4 |  |
| mour |  |  | Sin | 104 |  | $5 \%$ serial notes 1930 |  |  |
| 1 lt M $51 / \mathrm{sig} 1943$ |  | 85 |  | 93 | 95 | $5 \%$ serlal notes 1932 |  |  |
| mold | 86\％ |  |  |  |  | $5 \%$ serial notes | 9512 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | $5 \%$ serial notes 1 |  |  |
| Asbeato |  |  | Conso | 82 | 87 | 5\％Aerial notes 193 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | 70 | Gen Petrol 1 | $911 / 2$ |  |
| $3 \mathrm{Boc}$ |  | 102 |  | 9431／4 |  |  |  | 65 |
|  | $861 / 2$ | 712 |  | 72 | 75 | Gene |  |  |
| O1 Fruit \＆ 88 deb $78.34 .-\mathrm{JscD}$ |  | 12 | ${ }_{1}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 16 |  |  |  |  |  | 120 | 125 |
| Oolltr ${ }^{\text {g }} 58 \mathrm{Jan} 1$ |  |  | De |  |  | 10－5 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 t m |  | 100 |  | 100 | 85 |  |  |  |
| Allantif | 100 | 101 |  |  |  | Goo | 04 |  |
|  | 1023／ | 104 | Dr | 90 |  | Goodyear |  |  |
| las |  |  | Orew |  |  | Cody mear $\mathbf{T} \& \mathrm{R}$ |  |  |
| Balaba |  |  |  | 94 | 96 | 5153 s notes Fe |  |  |
|  | 83 |  | ${ }_{20}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 1061／2 | 1073／2 |  |  |  | Great Lakes Pap |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | 8 |  | 82 |  |
|  |  |  | Cub |  | ${ }_{99}{ }^{53} 4$ | $\xrightarrow{\text { Grou }}$ Guar |  |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { ta } 8 \text { gag? } \\ & \text { qua) } \end{aligned}$ | 90 | 93 |  |  |  |  | $53$ |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | nktund deb $51 / 1981937 \mathrm{AzO}$ |  | 105 10 |  | 959 |  |
|  |  |  | ard SS 4／28 1930 －－－．－－J\＆D |  |  |  |  |  |

[^13]INDUSTRIAL \＆MISCELLANEOUS BONDS

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\begin{array}{l\|} \hline 97 \\ 961 / 2 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|c\|} 100 \\ 981 / 2 \end{array}$ | Massey－Harris Oo，Ltd－＿A\＆O | $-$ |  | Pittsburgh Coal Oo－ Sinking fund deb 6s 1949．F\＆A | 99 | 100 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10 | $86$ |  | Mcorory Stores $53 / 8 \mathrm{~s}$ 1941－J8ED 15 | ${ }_{961 / 8}^{89}$ | S ${ }^{96} 9$ |  | ${ }_{1011 / 2}^{97}$ | 1021／2 |
|  |  |  |  |  | 961／2 |  | 1011／2 |  |
| Hartiord Times Bs | $98$ |  |  | 95 | 100 |  | 82 | 85 |
| $1 \mathrm{st} \mathrm{Mg}_{5} 5 \mathrm{NaO}$ |  | 85 |  | 89 | 92 |  |  | 115 |
| Hollan |  |  | Vichigan Steel Oorp－＿．．．．M\＆N | －973 |  | Poor \＆Oo 6s 1939－－．．．．－－－－ | $10{ }^{94 / 2}$ |  |
|  | 70 | 88 |  |  | 100 | Port Alired Pulp \＆Paper Oorp |  | 115 |
| Oonv $5 / \% \mathrm{~g}$ g notes 1936A\＆${ }^{\text {a }} 15$ |  |  |  | 1018／ | $981 / 2$ | Port Arthur ${ }^{\text {Onanal }}$ a Dock－ |  | －－－ |
|  | 90 | 95 |  |  |  |  | $100 \%$ | $10 \overline{2} \overline{\%}$ |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 95 \\ & 70 \\ & 99 / 2 / 2 \end{aligned}$ | $7 \%$ gold notes 1935 ． 45 A\＆O |  |  | Porto R1can Amer Tobacco－－ |  |  |
|  | 983i／2 |  |  |  |  | Potrero Sugar $7 \mathrm{a}-1947$ <br> Presbed Steel Car 5 F 193 B | $\begin{gathered} 9113 \\ \hline \\ \hline 31 \\ 915 \\ 08 \end{gathered}$ | $5$ |
|  |  | 83 |  | $\mathrm{Ry}^{81}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Sin |  |  |  |  |  | Procter \＆Gamble 43s 1947 －．．．－ |  | ${ }^{97}{ }^{-}$ |
| ， | 60 | 75 | With warrants <br> Without warrants $\qquad$ | 85 | $\begin{gathered} 904 \\ 776 \\ 77 \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |
|  | 95 | 979776 | 7 <br>  |  |  |  |  | … |
| nois Steel del | $931 / 2$ |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 98 \\ & 90 \\ & 971 / 2 \end{aligned}$ | ${ }^{\text {Prudential Refg }}$（st m 6s 1943 Corp－$\quad J \& D$ | 101 |  |
| Mtge 6 s 194 | $\overline{81}{ }^{-1}$ | －${ }^{818}$ |  |  |  |  |  | 75 |
| 硡 |  |  | Mount Emily Lumb 6 s 1934 Munising Paper 1st 6s 1932 |  |  |  | 析 |  |
|  |  | 102 | Munson Steamship Line－ |  | $\left\|\begin{array}{c} 95 \\ s \\ \hline 03 \\ 93 \\ \hline 1 / 8 \end{array}\right\|$ | 53\％\％i f notes＇37 ．－FAA | 16 | 98 |
| Limestone 18 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Inland |  | ${ }^{\text {a }}$ 9 $\overline{2} \overline{3}$ |  |  |  | 8 |  |  |
| Ingpiration Oon Oop $638{ }^{\text {s }}$＇ $31 \mathrm{M} \& 8$ |  |  |  |  | ${ }_{961 / 2}^{102}$ |  |  |  |
|  |  | 79 |  |  |  | S f conv deb 6s 1944 | 95 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 94 | 941 | Deb \＆ $61 / \mathrm{s} 1947$ | ｜ 28 | ${ }_{99} 2976$ |  |  |  |
| at |  |  |  |  |  | Republic Brass Corp－－ |  |  |
| at |  | 97 | National notes 1938 ． | 104\％ | $s 64$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & 1021 \\ & 1016 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1023 / 6 \\ & 102 \\ & 103 \end{aligned}$ |
|  | $91$ |  |  |  |  | Revabile Iron \＆St＇i 501940 A 80 Ref \＆gen 515 s ＇ 53 ser $\cdot \mathbf{A}$＿J\＆J |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 隹ubir Mot | 60 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Rheinelbe Union 78 1946 J\＆J |  |  |
|  |  | $7 \overline{70}^{-}$ | New Eng Oild | ${ }^{90} 0^{-7}$ | ${ }^{9} \overline{5}-$ |  | ${ }^{9} \overline{3}$ | 4 |
|  |  | $8614$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | $81$ | 747／8 | ${ }^{\text {cha }}$ | 971／2 |  |
| Investment ${ }^{\text {do }}$ |  |  | Deb $5 \%$ \％${ }^{\text {a }} 1948$ with wart |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dith |  | ${ }^{95}$ | N Y \＆Hob Hy $59 \mathrm{May}{ }^{46}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| － |  |  | ${ }^{\text {N }}$ J ${ }^{\text {ar }}$ |  |  | Roch |  |  |
|  |  | 86 | ， |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1ndlana Oi lst is |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 104 |  |  | 1011／2 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | hip |  |  | ot Glass |  |  |
|  |  |  | ， | 94 | 95 | R yerson ${ }_{\text {Sink }}$ | 92 |  |
|  |  |  | Norddeutsch ${ }^{\text {L }}$ |  |  | Joreph 8tk Ydis 4 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 80 | uip 5819 | 8.25 | 5.7 | ficate |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | 50 | 33 | 5 | ， |
| Kendall |  | 89 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| eyst |  |  | No |  |  | St M P P 6s 1947－－．．．－J\＆D |  | 831／2 |
| orl |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Inne |  |  |  |  | 89 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | 硣 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Deb g 6s 1931－1 |  |  |
|  |  | 10 | OIa | 83 | 84 | saxon |  |  |
| Deb sinic fund 5s 1959 ．．－M\＆ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| k |  | 100 | lo Steel Pr |  |  |  |  |  |
| lat |  |  | Oregon－Am |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 lit |  | 93 |  |  |  | scrippor |  |  |
| De |  |  | Ext1 deb 6s 519 s | 519／8 | 85 | Scullir |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| On | 88 | ${ }_{95}^{90}$ | Oswe |  |  |  |  |  |
| hig |  |  | Pactit |  | ${ }^{100} 8$ |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 相 |  |  |
|  |  | ${ }^{1011} 18 / 2$ |  | $9773$ | $981 / 4$ |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Deb ${ }^{\text {P }} 58$ 1947 | 933 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | $s$ | Shell |  |  |
| Oon |  |  |  |  | 88 | Debs ${ }^{\text {Pr }} 58195$ | 91 | 911／6 |
| Hoby |  | 96 |  | 941／6 | 316 | $1 \mathrm{st} \mathrm{s}^{1} 6 \mathrm{~s} 194$ |  |  |
| 1 lt |  |  | Pan Amer Petrel Oo（of Calin）－ |  | 97 | Sters Bread |  |  |
| grold |  |  |  |  | 97 | Siemans\＆Halske 10－yr |  | 1－ |
| Little | 96 |  | lat lien equit | 1020 | 105 | Sllesia | 1001／2 | 101 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | silice |  |  |
| Long | 80 |  |  |  | 93 | 5 |  |  |
| Lorilia | 106 | 10 | S |  |  | sincla |  |  |
| diu |  | 801／8 |  | 88 | 895 | 18t |  |  |
| ken | 102 |  |  |  |  | list lien |  |  |
|  |  | 100 | Pent | 83 | $863 / 2$ | Slinclair |  |  |
| ${ }_{\text {Deb }}^{\text {Dah }}$ |  | 100 |  | $80^{-7}$ | 85 | Slinclar Pipe inne |  |  |
| Deb |  | 100 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\underset{\substack{\text { Deb }}}{\text { Deb }}$ |  | 100 |  | 111 |  |  | 10， |  |
| ano |  | 100 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ajati sagar | $\overline{8} 0^{-}$ | 81 |  |  | 95 | Snider Packning Corporat |  |  |
| 781941 （with w |  |  |  | ${ }_{89} 101$ | 103 91 |  |  |  |
|  |  | 9276 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathrm{CO}_{0}$ | 82 | 85 |  | 971／6 |  |  |  |  |
| Mrir |  |  |  |  |  | （ |  |  |
| ${ }_{\text {Marlo }}$ | 43／8 | 997／8 |  | $87^{1 / 2}$ | 881／2 |  | 95 | 97 |
|  |  |  | ierce OII 89 Dec 151931 |  |  | gesf 68 | 98 | 88 |
|  |  |  | bury Flour Mills 6 s 1943 A\＆O | 101\％ | 1027／6 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | O |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ser 5\％notea Jane 15＇32 J\＆D15 | 寺 |  | Htteb $\mathbf{B r}$ |  |  |  |  |  |


 nembers have been elected makdng preaent mambership 1,320 . The purchase of four rights ontitlee holder to one full memberahip Ln the Exchango.


## Real Estate Bonds

| Bonds. | Bid. | Ask. | Bond | bid. | Ask. | Bonds. | Bid. | Ask. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Allert |  |  | Graybar Bldg (East Offices Inc)- <br> Ser leaseh $51 / \mathrm{s}^{\prime} 299^{-134(g-a)} \mathrm{J} \& \mathrm{D}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 87 \\ 7 \% \end{array}$ | $6.90 \%$ |  | $90^{-7}$ | $95^{-7}$ |
| Allarton ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | 7 | 82 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Oonv deb 6s 192. |  |  |  |  |  | Qs May 11941 | 80 | 0 |
|  | 93 | 96 | HH1/2bridge Station |  |  |  |  | 56 |
| Blatm-Commodore 1 1st 7 s '34 M8 | ${ }_{92}{ }^{1 / 8}$ | ${ }_{9}{ }^{5}$ |  | ${ }_{97}^{94}$ | 100 100 | George Hotel |  |  |
|  |  |  | La salle Ho |  |  | Sayoy-Plaza Oorp bs 194b-Jd8D | 2 | 1/2 |
|  |  |  |  | 88 | 92 |  |  |  |
| $51 / 5 \mathrm{~s}$ July 11938 - |  |  | ${ }_{\text {Lisem }}^{\text {List }}$ | 90 | 9234 | Without com stk |  | 75 |
|  | 101 | $10{ }_{95} 1$ |  |  |  | Sevilis-Bilt Hotel ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |  | -- |
| Broadi |  |  | Loews Th | ${ }_{100}^{90}$ | ${ }^{9} 95$ |  |  | 2/8 |
| Bway Mot |  | $9731 / 2$ | Londs | 100 92 | 102 | Sixty-One | 准 |  |
| Bush Term Bidg 18 |  | 100 | Louisville |  |  | Standard Bldg | ${ }^{6}$ | 99 |
| Ohesebrough idg bs 1948 . ${ }^{\text {ata }}$ |  |  | Mack Trucks ${ }^{\text {Madison Clark Bldg, } 6 \text { Chic }}$ |  |  | (tate |  |  |
| Ohic reach Hotel 6s $1944 \ldots$ - J\&D |  |  | 1 1st mleasehold 6 a |  |  | 1st sink fund 58.19 |  |  |
| orgar f deb 5 \%/6s 1949 mer $\mathbf{A}$. |  |  | Master Printers Bldg $63 / 246$ |  |  | Stevens H | 901/6 | \%/8 |
| Olore Term Bldg 681941 |  | 90\% | 1sts f 5 Shs ${ }^{\text {1953 }}$ | 75 | 85 | Tatite | ${ }_{9} \overline{6}$ | $10^{-*}$ |
| Dept of Labor Bldg, Wash, D |  |  | Minneapoilis Parc |  |  | Transp'n Bldg (Ohic) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | 95 | 99 |  | 99 |  |
| Edgew Bch Apart 6 8 $31{ }^{-4}$ | 95 |  | Nab 6819 |  |  | 1st f $51 / \mathrm{ss} 195$ | 94 | 961/6 |
| 11 West 42 d St $61 / 5 \mathrm{~s} 1945$ | 90 |  | Nat Press Bldg 51/8 |  |  | er Blag |  |  |
|  |  |  | Neisner Bros Reaty, |  |  | ${ }_{\text {Most Offes }}$ |  |  |
| Ferry Sta P |  |  | 19th \& Walnut Sts | 98 | 36 | Vanderb | 40 |  |
| 50 B why Bldg (N M 1500 Walnut ${ }^{\text {St }}$ (Ph | ${ }^{10091 / 2}$ | 100 | Norfoik P 0 6s Mar |  |  | Varick |  | 100 |
| Fox Det Theatre 6 a | 70 | 85 | $1 \mathrm{stm} \mathrm{m}^{\text {f } 681948}$ |  |  | Wad |  |  |
| Fox New Eng Thea 6 |  | 93 | 5 t |  | ${ }_{9}^{95}$ | Re |  |  |
| ox Theare 1 st 16 | 97 | 99 | ${ }^{165}$ Broadwa |  |  | 1 st \& rep 6 | 95 | 100 |
| ox $8 t$ Lours Thea |  |  | Palace H |  |  | 1st \& ref 61/s 1 |  |  |
| Fuller Bldg (GA F Reait | 90 | 95 | ${ }_{\text {Par }}$ |  |  | ${ }^{15 t}$ lien 7 s 195 |  |  |
| st f f $51 / 8 \mathrm{~s} 1949$ |  |  | Pa |  |  | With warrant | 03 | 104 |
| on-Flatbush B1 | 70 | 80 | Park Row Bldg 68 1943 - Ander |  | 9494 | Wardman Realty | 5 | 99 |
| ant Blag (Plttsb) $78{ }^{\text {a }}$ - $47 \ldots$ F\&A |  |  | 5\%28 48M8J |  |  | Washington Bldg bs 1940.Jd |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | White Motor Realty 68 1929-40 |  | 99 |

## Industrial and Miscellaneous Stocks

| Stocks．Far | ard． | Ash． | cke．Par | Ba． | As | ！． | Bid． | Ast． | kg． | Bid． | Ask． |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 「EXTILE HTG。 | Por | share |  | Per |  | So | Per | shar |  |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { share } \\ 23 \end{gathered}$ |
| Arcadia M |  |  | amor |  | $41 / 2$ | Process co | ${ }^{24}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 23 \\ & 26 \end{aligned}$ |
| ${ }_{\text {Acushnot Mill }}^{\text {Algonguin Print }}$（ ${ }^{\text {a }}$ ） | 320 |  | （H）R）－ 10 | 84 |  | Southern Worsted pi |  |  | Wa | 50 | $50$ |
|  |  |  | Salmon Faus Mrg |  |  | Spartan M1198（SO） | 160 |  | Rhode Island．－．－－（ $\dagger$ ） | 37 | $40^{-\cdots}$ |
| American Mfg－ 100 |  | s 50 | Sharp Mfg（N） |  |  | Onlon－Buffalo | 99 |  |  |  |  |
| Androscog | 70 | s ${ }^{5} 675$ | $\left\|\begin{array}{l} \text { Ireferred.- } 100 \\ \text { Shawnt Mill } \end{array}\right\|$ |  |  | ${ }^{2} \mathbf{2 d}$ | 99 | 5 | gi |  | 30 |
| Apyieton |  |  | FR）common 100 |  |  | Victor |  | 90 |  |  | 30 |
| \％Wrigt |  |  | Preferred，${ }^{\text {Shaw }}$－${ }^{\text {a }}$ |  |  | Wallace MPg | 110 | 150 |  |  |  |
| Assoc T | 10 | 3／2 | shaw stockin Bhove Mll（ | 4 | 7 | Ware Shoals Mif | 142 | 147 | nt States | 7 | 5 |
|  | 10 |  | Skenandoah Oo | 4 |  | West Point M Mficiou | 115 | 60 120 | Oontinental Life－－ 10 Mo State L With -10 | 17 50 | 5 |
| Bracon | 125 |  | sould Mull（ NB | 88. |  | Whitney MPg（SO）＿l | $10 \overline{9}$ | 40 |  |  |  |
| Preferre |  |  | Stafford |  | 5 | Wroferred．．．．．． 100 | 109 70 | 110 |  | 225 | 240 |
| arkshire <br> Bpinning |  | s 35 |  |  | 55 |  |  |  |  | 22 | 240 |
| 7\％cum pref－ 100 |  |  |  | 29 | 31 |  | 70 |  |  |  |  |
| Biger－Harti | 1013 |  | Thorndik |  |  | Oan Cottons，Ltd． 10 | 70 |  | aen＇s Fund 100 | 105 | 70 |
| Boone（Dan |  |  | Tremont msaufolk |  |  | Preferred．${ }^{\text {Prata }}$－ 100 | $\overline{8} 2$ | 84 | Home Fire \＆Marine | 37 | 38 |
| Woolen MMs＿＿2t <br> Seesh Meg（N B） |  | 15 | Troy Cot＇n \＆Wool＇n |  |  | Preferred | 82 | $11^{-7}$ | Occidental Pacific Am |  |  |
| Preferred | 20 | 15 |  | 45 | 48 | Montreal |  | 130 | Pacific 1 |  | $10{ }^{-*}$ |
| ${ }^{\text {ati M M }}$ M 18 |  | $s 12 \overline{1}$ | Utica Kolt Oo．－． 100 | 55 | 48 | Prefarre |  | 78 |  |  |  |
| Bora Mfg co | 19 | 225 | Preferred．－－100 |  |  | Penmans， |  | 107 | We | 45 | 0 |
| Pent | 95 |  | ， |  |  | surance |  |  |  | 190 | 210 |
| Bearne Mile | 12 | $15$ | Wampanoa $\left(\mathrm{F}_{\mathrm{R}}\right)$ | 5 | 6 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathrm{O}_{\text {Onot M }}$ | ${ }_{95}$ | 100 | Wamsut | 27 | 29 | Baltimore American | 32 | $331 / 2$ |  |  |  |
| Oame |  |  | Westfield Mfg ${ }^{\text {cos }}$ |  |  | Oentr | 33 <br> 33 | 38 |  | 150 |  |
| Ohace Mill | －1 |  | Preferred． |  |  | Frdelity | 33 | 38 |  |  | 52 |
| Oior axtg ${ }^{\text {Or }}$ | 80 40 |  | Whitman ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |  |  | Fire Corp－－．－－10 | $501 / 6$ |  |  |  |  |
| Oonn M 1at pre |  |  | York M |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Oontin＇l M（Me） 100 Oernell Mills（F）R | $\begin{array}{r} 140 \\ 5 \end{array}$ | 50 | 80 | Per |  |  |  | 000 |  | er | nt． |
| Dartmouth Mig |  |  | Sbev | $\stackrel{\square}{8} 5$ | 90 |  |  |  | Atlantic Mutual－ |  |  |
| Oorp（ N | 66 88 8 |  | srcade Cotton Milie |  | 60 |  |  | 200 |  | 00 | 04 |
| Davis Mrills | 18 | 20 | Srcadia Mulls Preferred | 250 | 270 | Brooklyn－See N Y |  |  | 1929 | 00 | 105 |
| ${ }_{\text {Davol Mille }}^{\text {Dexdale }}$ | 120 |  | srikwright |  | 100 |  |  |  | Minin |  |  |
| Dexdaie Ho | 120 |  | Augusta |  |  | Camden Fire＿．－． 100 | 22 | 2412 |  |  |  |
| Draper | 64 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Ahumada Lead Co－${ }^{-1}$ | $1 / 8$ | 1／6 |
| Dwight MPE | 88 |  | $7 \%$ | 02 |  |  |  | 100 | Alaska Juneau | 3 |  |
| Esmond | 83 | $s 102$ | Balton M111 |  |  |  | 63 | 67 | mah | 䢒 | 15. |
| Everet |  | s 12 | 3ibb Mf | 132 | 135 |  |  |  | $\mathrm{Amer}_{\text {Sming }}$ |  |  |
| ${ }^{\text {Fairh Mims }}$ |  |  |  | 100 | 103 | American Life com．． |  |  | Pref |  | 0 |
| Farr Alpaca | $9{ }^{9} 9$ | $10 \overline{3}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Brand } \\ & \text { Clas } \end{aligned}$ | 80 | 65 12 | Letrolt F \＆M Michigan F \＆ $\mathrm{M}^{5} \overline{\mathrm{E}}$ | 75 | 80 | Anacondad |  | 100 |
| Frant | 37 | 37 | Prefe | 93 | 96 |  |  |  | Arizona |  |  |
|  |  |  | Oalhoun |  | 98 38 |  |  |  | Arizon |  |  |
| ${ }_{\text {Granit }}$ | 27 | 29 | Ohad | $1 / 2$ | 14 | Aetna（Fire） | ${ }^{600} 49$ | 615 | Arcadl | 0 | c |
| Granite |  |  | Ohesn |  | 270 | Eartford Frre－ 100 | 825 | 850 | Bonanza De | $\overline{50} \mathrm{c}$ |  |
| Grinnell | 3 B | 33 | Onquola M |  | ${ }^{270}$ | Eartf Steam Boil |  |  | Bunker Hil |  |  |
| Hamilt ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |  |  | Olifton Mfg | 123 | 126 | Insp \＆Ins－－100 | $80^{-1}$ | 725 | Butte Soliva |  |  |
| Hamill C （Mase |  |  | Olinton Oott | 270 | 290 | Phoenix（Flre）－－100 | 820 | 840 | Butte \＆Sup |  | 6\％ |
| Hathaway Mitg | 50 | $5 \overline{3}$ | Oonverse（ $\mathbf{D}$ | 113 | 117 | Life Inst |  |  | Oallahan Kinc－Lead |  |  |
| Kill Mfg | 17 | 20 | Oowpens Mill | 35 | 40 | Aetna Casualty \＆ 10 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Hommes |  | 15 | Dallas， |  | 79 | A etnaty Lipe－－－－－－10 | ${ }_{t 103}$ | 10 | Oalumet \＆Aris． 20 | 04\％ |  |
| Hoosac Cot | 40 | 50 | Dari＇g＇n Mrg | 60 | 65 | Oonn Gen－．－．．．－100 |  | 2350 | Oarnegie |  |  |
| Idparich $M$ |  |  | Dunean Mill | 135 | $11^{10-}$ |  | 72 | 120 | Oer | 78 |  |
| Kritererr | 50 |  | Prefer | 100 | 102 | Travelers ${ }^{\text {a }}$－－－－－100 | $162 \overline{0}^{-}$ | 1650 |  |  |  |
| King Phill $M$（ | 128 | 132 | Eagle \＆ | 65 | 75 |  |  |  | － |  |  |
| Lancas＇t M（Mase） | $1{ }^{1 / 2}$ |  | Emarer |  | 100 | Ind |  |  | $\mathrm{O}_{0}$ |  |  |
| Zaurel Lak | 10 2 | 14 | Florence ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |  | 60 |  | 800 |  | $\\|_{\text {Oress }}^{\text {Oop }}$ |  |  |
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| Lawton Mi |  |  | Gariney | 159 | 57 165 | Luberty－－－－－－－－－50 |  |  | Davis－Daly |  |  |
| Lincoln |  | 45 | Glenwoo | 115 | 120 | Minnes | Per | share | $\mathrm{D}^{\text {stameers }}$ | 4 |  |
| Lather 1 | 1021／2 |  | Gossett | 78 | 81 | Nor＇west | $t{ }^{15}$ | 0 | Dom |  |  |
| Masa Outt |  |  | Grantevil |  | 110 |  |  | 25 | Eas |  |  |
| uerch MPg（FR） | 38 |  | Greenw＇d ${ }^{\text {cm }}$ | 400 |  | Firemen＇s | 3414 | 35 | Fede | 190 |  |
| errimack |  |  | Gre |  | 50 | ， |  | share． | Preferred．－．－100 | 96 | $993 /$ |
| （Mass） | 125 | 150 | ${ }_{\text {Hamaric }}^{\text {Prefer }}$ |  | 120 | \％ | 100 | 110 | Flrst Nati |  |  |
| Preferre | 66 | 70 | Hartsvill | $1 \overline{4} 0$ | 145 | Lapayet | Per | share． | Frankilin |  | ／ |
| ohasw | 47 | $\overline{5} 0$ | Hunt |  |  | ${ }^{\text {Now }}$ | Per | are． | Golden Center－－－5 | 57／8 |  |
| Mt ${ }^{\text {V }}$ |  |  | Industrial | 40 | 97 50 | Americ |  |  | Goldfilield Oonsol ${ }^{--}$ |  |  |
| Preferred vir 100 | 15 75 |  | ［uman Mill | 135 | 140 | Amer Equit <br> Amer Reser | 78 | 85 | Granb | \％ |  |
| Preferred \％tr 100 | 75 | 78 | Preferred | 102 |  | Bankerg | 120 | 130 | Power | 6812 | 69 |
| （FR） | 5 |  | Judson Mills | 103 | 105 | Brooklyn Fire＿－－－－5 | 20 | 25 | Granite－Bi－Motailic |  |  |
| Nashawena A－ 100 | 27 | $\overline{29}$ | King（JP）Mfr（Ga）！ | 80 | 90 |  | 650 | 700 |  |  | 150 |
| ${ }_{\text {Naphua }}$ |  |  | Lancaster OM M | 270 | 9 |  | 650 | 700 700 | Greene－Cananea＿10 Guanajuato Cons | 133 17 | 150 |
| Nat Fabric \＆ \％Fin |  | 728 | Lane Cotto | 150 | 25312 | Oontinental | $743 / 2$ | 75 | Hancock Cons－－－20 | 2. | 3 |
| Naumkeag（Mass） |  |  | Liurena ${ }^{\text {U }} \mathbf{M}$ | 150 | 155 | Fidelit | 85 | 89 | Hardy Ooal－－－－1 | 5 c |  |
| Netleam | 82 | 86 | Marion M |  | 120 |  | 1200 | 1300 | Hecla Mining－－．－25C， |  |  |
| New |  |  | Mariboro | 101 | 24 | Gre | 33 | 34 | Homestake Min－100 |  |  |
| Preferred．-10 |  | $60^{-1}$ | Molloh | 100 | 103 | Guardia | ${ }^{50}$ | 55 | Howe Sound Oovt ct | $471 / 2$ |  |
| ${ }_{\text {Sew }}^{\text {Prefg Sou Corp }}$ |  |  | nonarch OM ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | 127 | $1{ }^{3}{ }^{-1}$ | Hanov | 450 65 | 70 | Hudson Bay Min |  |  |
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| No（N H） |  |  | Ninety－Six Mill | ${ }_{390}^{112}$ | 115 | Knicke | ${ }^{4}$ | 65 48／8 | Oop | 38 |  |
| Nonquit | 133／3 | 143\％ | Norrls Oot Mills |  | 45 | Linculn | 95 | 100 | Iron | 45 |  |
| Nyanza |  | 1412 |  | 75 <br> 92 | 97 | Merchants FYre Abso |  |  | Preferr | 105 | \％ |
| Oabor |  |  | Pacolet MP |  | 195 | Nat | 135 | 145 | Isle F | $17 \frac{1}{6}$ |  |
| Parker | $\overline{6}$ | 25 | Preferrad－－－100 | 102 | 104 | Nort | 115 | 130 | Keweena |  |  |
| Pemat | 23 |  | Panola Cotton Mill | 58 |  | Nor | 70 | 78 | Kennecott |  |  |
| Pemagq |  |  | pelham Mills |  | 15 | $\xrightarrow{\text { Pac }}$ | 100 | 125 | Kerr Lake＿－．．．．－－5 | ${ }^{6} 16$ |  |
| Peppere |  | 100 | Phillips Buttor | 150 | 160 | Stu | 80 | ${ }_{90}$ | Lake Sh M | 99 c | 1 |
| PLircim | 200 95 | 208 | Prckens Oot Mill | 115 | 120 | Onitad | 0 | 100 | La Rose MInes， |  |  |
| Foneme M（ ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |  |  | Pedrmont Mrs（8） | 115 | 120 | We | 60 | 65 | salle Oopper－－25 |  |  |
| Fonemah M（Prov |  |  | Wrorks com．．．．－$\dagger$ |  |  | Fire |  |  |  |  |  |
| Potomsks ${ }^{\text {M }}$－${ }^{\text {N }}$ B ） | ${ }^{80}$ |  | Preferred | 75 | 80 | Ins | 75 | 78 |  | ac |  |
| $\xrightarrow{\text { Powdrell \＆}}$ Preferred ${ }^{\text {A }}$ | 60 | 75 |  |  | 115 | Ins Oo State of Pa 100 |  |  | Mayflower Old OOOL 25 | 30 c | 50 |
| Preferred Qubssett Milis | 90 |  | 6\％preferred．－ |  | 90 | Mfrs Casualty 10 | 29 93年 |  |  |  |  |
| Quissett Milis（ NB ）${ }^{\text {a }}$ | 50 | $53^{\circ}$ |  |  | 95 | Mrrs （asualty ．－． 10 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Preferred．．．－－100｜ |  |  | 100 | 53 | 58 | － |  | 361／2 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | Outhern Bleachery |  | 88 | Reliance．．．．．．．－－ |  | $\begin{aligned} & 19 \\ & 187 / 8 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |

[^14]INDUSTRLAL \& MISCELLAANEOUS STOCKS


[^15] Stceske. Par.
Oert'n-Teed Prod
$7 \%$ preferred
Oessina Afrcraft com
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Ohapman Vave-100
Preforred
 Ohickasha Oot O- 10
Ohic Junc Rys VnSt Yd stpd-100 Ohic Pueu Tool- ( $\dagger$ )
$\$ 31 /$ \$3 Ry conv prof--
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Preferred Ohic WIlm A Erank Preferred.-.-100 Ohic Yellow Ōab.-
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 glifs Corp $\mathbf{v t c} \mathrm{c}-(t)$ love Oliffs Ironolevel'd Quarriesion Ilinchfield Voal. 100 $\begin{array}{r}\text { Preferred } \\ \text { Oluett, Peaboay }-100 \\ \hline\end{array}$
 Coca Cola Intern-( $\dagger$ oolgate-Palmolivo-
 Prine (7\%)-..-100 olo Fuel Syndicate Preferred. 100 Arma Mrg....25 Amer shares.-Oolum Uarbonvic $(\dagger)$ Oenmenercial (1redit- + $8 \%$ cum $18 t \mathrm{pr}-25$
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Pons
Oontinental Mot Oorn Prod Refg- 25 Oosg-Meeh Ooal Orane Co com.-. 25
 Orowley Radio-- ( $\dagger$ ) ${ }^{\text {d }} 37$ Crown C'k \& Seal ( $\dagger$ )
Preferred
$d$ 46 Orown-Willam Paper



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INDUSTRIAL \& MISCELLANEOUS SKUCK

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| nderino |  |  | 3hare 41.4 |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { share. } \\ & 3-51 \end{aligned}$ | Norwalk Tire \& ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | share. |
| Industrial Ra |  |  | 632 | Minneap-Honeywell ${ }^{\text {M }}$ Megulat |  | ${ }_{\text {Rubber }}$ | , |
| Ingersoll-Rand |  | Pin | - |  | 94 |  | 56 |
|  | 8 | Whis |  | S0.50r mmplemer 6 | 181/2 |  | 550 |
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| Int Agr Oor com. |  | Ust brothers |  |  | 367 | obio |  |
| Prior pref Int Business | 188 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
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|  | $1031 / 2$ |  | $8{ }^{89} 1$ | Moha Pref | 76 | Preferred |  |
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|  | $\stackrel{11}{55}$ | Loew's |  |  | 74 | - ${ }^{6 \%}$ pr pr w war | 88 |
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| Int Nickel (Oanadat $\dagger$ d 39 | 40 | ${ }^{2 d} 10{ }^{\text {d }}$ | 20-7 |  |  | ator-- 50 d |  |
| Inter Paper | 120 |  |  | ${ }_{\text {ctfs }}$ |  | - Preferred. | 120 |
| ${ }^{7 \%}$ | 0 | Loulslana Oiil | 90 | M M (ion | 8 | ${ }^{\text {Priol}}$ | 1 |
| ${ }^{\text {Pasa }}$ B | 31 |  | 167 | Motor M | 8 |  | 1083/3 |
| Class O...-...- ${ }^{\text {co }}$ d ${ }^{\text {d }}$ | 17 | Ludlum stoil |  |  | 84 |  | 60 |
|  | 89 24 24 |  | 34\% |  | 64 <br> 34 | Oxford Paper pra | $31^{\circ}$ |
|  | 53 | Preferred |  | Mount'n \& ${ }^{\text {G }}$ | 1 |  | 25 |
| Prearred (with ${ }^{\text {com war) }}$ - 100 | 95 | Mack Truckin | 112 |  | - | Pacfficrroasioio-100 | 20 |
| Inter Balt | 75 |  | $1{ }^{1641 / 2}$ |  | 18- | ${ }_{2 d}^{\text {18t }}$ preferred | 36 |
| ${ }^{\text {Prefarred }}$--..-100 ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |  | Mad sq Gar victis) dill | 16 | Mu7 conv pref-..( $\dagger$ ) ${ }^{\text {d }}$ | 68 | Pacifle 011 stubs |  |
|  | ${ }_{11}^{13}$ |  | 12 |  | $45 \frac{12}{2}$ | Pac Pr | 7 |
| Lnt Text | 19 | Preferred |  | common. | 90 | PackardM | 通 |
| Interstate | 38 130 | ${ }_{\text {Manati Sugar-.-100 }}^{\text {Prefred }}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 15 \\ & 30 \end{aligned}$ | 8\% cum pr | $108$ | Pairp | 12 |
| ${ }^{\text {Pf }}$ witho |  | Mandel | 24 | M | 25 | an ${ }^{\text {an }}$ |  |
| Intertype Iron Prod | ${ }^{2983}$ | Manbat El Sup-ct | 24 |  | 45 |  | $62 \%$ $62 \%$ |
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| Amer dep rcts-... ${ }_{\text {d }}$ a $93 / 4$ | 101/4 | Manha | 25 \% | Nat Avlation.... $\dagger$ ( ${ }^{\text {a }}$ d 15 | 15 |  |  |
|  |  | Preferred | 47 |  | 90 | Preferred |  |
| Johno-Man | 145 | Manischew |  | Nat Bellas-Hees-( + ) ${ }^{\text {P }}$ 2013 | 87 | Paragon Refg |  |
| Johreferred | 121 | ${ }_{\text {Stasi }}$ | 12 |  | -87 | Class A | 50 |
| ${ }_{\text {Jona }}$ |  |  |  | Nat Biserred-----100 | 148 | - |  |
|  | 35 |  | $1 / 2$ | Nat Breweries-.- ${ }^{\text {a }}$ - ${ }^{r}$ | 1297 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | $\mathrm{Nat}^{\text {Prefer }}$ |  | ${ }^{\text {Parke }}$ P |  |
| Jordan Motor ${ }^{\text {Oar }}+1$ d 1 | 11924 | Maple Lear | 18 | 1 1st preferred--100 $\overline{9} 5$ | 105 | Pathe Exch |  |
| K O Stir Ydi Me-100 105 <br> Preferred  | 109 |  |  |  | $13 \overline{5}$ | Peck, Stow on ${ }^{\text {Presic }} 25$ d ${ }^{\text {d }}$ | 143/8 |
|  |  |  |  | Nat Oasket com-(t) | 175 | Peerleeso-Egyptian |  |
|  | ${ }_{41}^{24}$ |  |  |  | 90 | 7\% pref | 95 |
| Keitt | 95 | MarmonM | 32 | Nat Dair | $1 / 2$ | Peerlese Mot Oar-50 d ${ }^{\text {Pr }}$ |  |
| Kelth (Geor | 95 | Martin-Parry |  | Natept intores | 2632 | Pendars ${ }^{\text {P }}$ |  |
|  | 100 | Massey-Ha | ${ }^{4}{ }^{-7}$ | ${ }^{\text {Nat Dist Prora }}$ | 35 |  | 10898/4 |
|  | 79 | Mreererredis.- $100{ }^{\text {a }} 1$ |  | Nat Enareds S̄tpg 100 d | 40 | Penney ( ${ }^{\text {Prem }}$ |  |
|  | ${ }_{5}^{7}$ |  | 47 |  | 19 25 |  | ${ }_{94}^{95}$ |
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| Kelsey Haves Wh'l ${ }^{\text {K }}$ ( ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | 29 9 |  | 681393 |  | 35 |  | 50 |
| Kendal |  | Maytag ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | 20 | Nat Fuel | 160 | ${ }^{\text {Pann }}$ Penn | $\overline{0}^{-1}$ |
|  | 87 |  |  | 7 | 140 | Penn ${ }^{\text {Penn }}$ | --- |
| Treferred |  | Mcoall |  | $6 \%$ | 120 | Penn-Max | 24. |
| ${ }_{\text {Comber }}$ |  | Mcorory |  | Nationa | s 36 |  | 19 |
|  |  |  |  | Preferred.-.-100 |  | Peoples Drug Stores ${ }^{\text {Common }}$ |  |
| Kinney | ${ }^{90}$ |  | 59 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 135 | McKesson |  |  | 135 |  | 25 50 |
| Oum pref $7 \%-100$ | ${ }_{95}^{40}$ | Preference ${ }^{\text {a }}$ - -50 | 488 |  | 185 | Phila Dairy |  |
| ${ }_{\text {Kolster Rad }}$ | 12 | McLellan S |  | Nat S | 36 | Whith warr | 9 |
| ${ }_{\text {Prateferred }}$ |  | Mead yohnson \& Cot ${ }^{\text {d }} 51$ | 53 | Nat supply ${ }^{\text {O-O}}$ | 121 | (tarn |  |
|  | 50 | Melville | 40 |  | $\begin{array}{r} 115 \\ 47 \end{array}$ | Phillip-Jones Preferred Corp |  |
| Kraege ${ }^{\text {deeme }}$ |  |  | 101 |  |  | Phillipa Pe |  |
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| Preferred | 110 |  | 90 | preferred - 100 | 28 17 | $\underset{\text { Pleck Barth com V tcl }}{\text { Prefered }}$ d ${ }^{\text {d }}$ | $103 / 2$ |
| $\mathrm{Krgess}^{\text {Preferred }}$ ( H) | 110 70 |  |  | Neisisker |  |  | 032 |
| Kroger Grocary \& | 0 |  | ${ }_{90}^{21 / 2}$ | Preferred 7 \%\%-100 160 | 180 |  | ${ }^{25}$ |
|  | 61 | Prior prefe-Mi-7 Merchants Miners | 90 | Newberry (J) ${ }_{\text {N }}$ |  | Preferred ---100 ${ }^{100}$ |  |
|  |  |  |  | Common- ${ }^{\text {Proferre }}$ | 105 |  |  |
|  | ${ }_{10736}$ |  | 818 |  | ${ }^{90}$ |  | $\begin{array}{r}3 \\ 45 \\ \hline\end{array}$ |
| Lackawanna Sec (t) d 37 | 109 | Merrlimac Ohem- 60 d 75 | 82 | New Hav | 20 | Prererred-100 100 |  |
| Lago Oill ${ }^{\text {a }}$ Trans-(t) d 24 | 241/4 | O | 70 | Tew |  | Pllsbury Flour M111 common | /2 |
|  | 14/2 | Preferred.-......--- | 50 |  |  | Prealic Co of italy |  |
| Lake of the Woods Milling......- 100 r | 52 | Mesabi Iron------- ${ }^{-1}$ <br> Metal Door \& Trim | $23 / 2$ |  | $\begin{array}{r} 10712 \\ 278 \\ 27 \end{array}$ |  | $51^{1 / 3}$ |
|  | 122 |  |  | New Doparture - 100 |  | Preferred ${ }^{\text {Praja }}$ |  |
| Lakey | 110 |  | 98 |  | $7{ }^{-7}$ | Pltas Preferred (Pa)-100, 63 |  |
| Lamson \& Hubb'd.-- |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0 |
|  | 19 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Landers, Frary <br> Olark | 65 |  | $\begin{aligned} & 50 \\ & 50 \\ & 38 \end{aligned}$ | New Stand Aircraft   <br> N Y Air Brake $d$ $d$ <br> $d$ $\overline{4} 0$  <br> $1 / 2$   | 4136 |  | 107 |
|  | 65 55 |  |  | N Y Y Arir brake ${ }^{\text {N }}$ | 41/2 | Pittaburgh steel Fit) |  |
| $7 \%$ <br>  <br> 10 | 120 |  | $2{ }_{5} 5$ | A Ares Line-...īd d ${ }^{\text {d }}$ |  | Preferred- ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |  |
| Lenst M | ${ }^{124}$ | Mex Eagle Oll ${ }_{\text {Mex }}$ | 20 |  | - 38 | Plttsb Term Coalile Preferred | 2731/2 |
| Leh Ooal | 130 | Mextcan Petrol-. 100 | 200 | N Y Merchancom $(t)$ d ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | 30 | Plimpton Mfg ${ }^{\text {coiol }} 1200$ |  |
| ${ }_{\text {Leh }}{ }_{\text {Pree }}$ |  | chigan | 133 80 |  | 104 15 | ${ }^{\text {Plymouth }}$ Cord_100 | 85 |
|  | ${ }_{21}^{102}$ |  | ${ }_{950}^{80}$ |  |  | (eal | ${ }^{3}{ }^{-1}$ |
| $6^{6 \%}{ }^{\text {cum convpp }} 50$ d 46 | 512 | Mididoon Peti-(t) d | 29312 |  | 51 | Port Alfred P \& P ${ }^{\text {P/ }}$ |  |
| Lehhy Vh Val Ooal |  |  |  | Nickel Hldg Corp ${ }^{\text {a }}$ d ${ }^{\text {d }}$ |  | (\%\% pref |  |
| Lehn \& Mink Prod. $\dagger$ |  |  | $11 / 2$ | Vor \& W Stboat-100 ${ }^{\text {No }}$ | ${ }^{295}$ | Cla |  |
| Lerner Prore | 104 | ${ }_{\text {Producte }}$ Midiam. ${ }^{\text {P }}$ |  | No Amer Aviation- ${ }^{\text {North German Lloyd }}$ |  | Prai | 57 |
| Libbey-Owens Glassit d 29 |  | Preferred----100 |  | Amer sha |  | Pratt \& Lambert- $-\dagger$ d 60 |  |
| Lib McNeil\& Lib_10 d $1 /$ Preferred. | --- |  | $\begin{aligned} & 10 \\ & 40 \end{aligned}$ | North \& Judd-_-25 Northern Pipe N N | $\begin{aligned} & 23 \\ & 50 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{l\|l\|l} \text { ed Steel Car }(\dagger) \\ \text { Bferred } \end{array}$ | 70 |
| Lig \& Myers Tob-25 ${ }^{d} 98$ <br> Oommon B... 25 d 98 | $\begin{aligned} & 1000^{-} \\ & 99 \end{aligned}$ |  | $50$ | $\begin{array}{llll}\text { Northern } & \\ \text { N'west } & & \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 00 \\ & 25 \end{aligned}$ |   | 104 |
|  | $\begin{array}{r} 99 \\ 136 \\ \hline \end{array}$ |  | 50 |  |  |  |  |

$\frac{\text { Btocks. }}{\text { Proc \& Gamble-( ( })}$ Proc \& Gamble_- ( $\dagger$
8\% Preferred.-10t
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Pyrene MPg
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Railway \& Express. Rallway \& Express- 1
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Raybestos-Manhat seece Button-Hote Machine M-1.-10 Reece foid Mach. 10
Reeves (Daniel) prof
Regal shoe pref 100 $k e l s)($ Robt $) \& \mathrm{OO}_{-1}-1$
1st preferred Realiance Mfg.-.
 1at pref......-100
2d pref...-106
Remington 1 1st preferred.-106 2d preferrea.-106
2ed Motor Oar.-. 16
Regublic Brass.... $7 \%$ pref_-....- 100 Repub i \& Steen-i ( $\dagger$ )
Preforred Repuol Mot Tr vtc-
Reynolds (exp Ning
R1) Reynolds Cob_-10 10
R common 10 1st pref $-\cdots-100$ Richfield oil or Uait
 Ro Gran
Ritter De tall Mifg- $\dagger$
River Raisin l'ape Rocky Mt Fuel.-10¢
Preferred Rogers Peet.com-106 Roosevelt FYeud.-.- $\dagger$ Royal Brak Pow
Freferred Royal Dutch Co- N y Rumidor Oorp com safety Car H \& L10C
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70 pres. 100
Old Fifth warr. Old Fifth warr--
Second series wart St Lawrence Flour.

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Val
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Preferred
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\&ons ervel Oo =-----100 Preferred vic_( $\dagger$ harf O\&R pr $7 \% 100$ haffer Stores com Sharp \& Dohme... Shattuck (Frane pref hattuck (Frank $G$
 $51 / 2 \%$ conv $\mathrm{pf}-100$ $6 \%$ prof AA -100
Bher-Wme Oan..
( $\dagger$ Preferred .....-10 10 r 11
 Common vtilat


## United States and Municipal Bonds

In reporting below prices for state and municipal securities, we glve bld and assked guotations wherover they can be obtalined. The castosa prices we have niserted In the column headed To Nete certann figures to ndicate the interest rate at which bustness to the bond tagtaed belng done
 ing the lowest rate, and the longer, maturities yielding the highest return Recently however, owing to the tension th the money market, it has


on. There are a very few which form exceptions to the rule-that la, where the prices given are nat prices, the acrued interest must fn all cases be addec $\xlongequal{\text { cocount in making them. Thase are Indicated by a special mark; thus }(f) \text {. }}$

| Bonds. | Bda. | Ask. ${ }_{\text {a }}$ Tot. | Bonds. | Bia. |  |  | Bonda. | Ba. | 485. |  |
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| PTw OMITED STATES-See |  | 13. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| nv $4 \%$ of 193 |  |  | Roosevelt Irr Dis 6 |  |  |  | (eame |  |  |  |
| Con ${ }^{\text {Oin }}$ |  | 981/2 |  |  | 100 |  |  |  |  |  |
| d cony ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |  | 98\%2 |  |  |  |  | 19 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | ${ }^{88}$ | 100 |  | Brigto 43, Water 193日_Jta |  |  |  |
|  |  | $\xrightarrow{10612}$ | Yumater Side sew Dist jo ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | 95 | 98 |  |  | b.50 |  |  |
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| 3a Panama Canal 196 | ${ }_{90} 9$ | ${ }_{84}$ | 45ss Pens Notes 1931-51A |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
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| 4 s 1958 opt 1938 -M |  | $90$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 91 \\ & 91 \\ & 91 \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  | *44 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ |  |  |  |
| 48419588 opt $1333-M$ |  | ${ }_{91}^{97}$ | 4, |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{4}^{43} 19442$ opt 1932 |  |  | 439 Jan 219 |  |  |  | ${ }^{4}$ |  |  |  |
|  |  | $\frac{94}{94}$ | Alarbimp |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | $90$ | ${ }_{94}^{94}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
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|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Mater |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{59} \mathrm{Pub}$ Impt |  |  | , |  | 90 |  | Manc |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | ${ }^{48} \mathrm{~W}^{\text {Watar }}$ |  |  |  | 4iss $1931-1951-2$ |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Meriden (T) 48 30-8 |  |  |  |
|  |  | to 4.25\% | ${ }_{4}^{4585}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\begin{array}{ll} 401019 \end{array}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | . 25 |  |  |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & 98 \\ & 98 \\ & \hline 88 \end{aligned}$ | 1 | Sols |  |  |  | *434 8chaol 18 |  |  |  |
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| ${ }^{6}$ fi foily 1954 |  | $\text { to } 0.000 \% \text { or }$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | *59 ${ }^{\text {Soun }}$ |  | ${ }_{4}$ |  |
| Harbor |  |  | Redis |  |  |  | ${ }^{4} 4$ | 5. 50 | to |  |
| ${ }_{68}{ }_{68}{ }^{4}$ |  | to $4.35 \%$ | Riverside 56.1930 .63 |  |  |  | ${ }^{4} 488$ Water 1950 |  |  |  |
| ${ }^{19355}$ | . 20 | to $5.40 \%$ | ${ }_{\text {R }}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ${ }^{4} 4180$ |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{\text {Bessemer }}^{5 \text { sispubimp }}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  | *ism |  |  |  |
| Brimingham $53 / 8 \mathrm{P}$ Pub |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{4}^{1930-35} 4$ |  | ${ }_{\text {to }}^{\text {to }}$ to 5 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | ${ }_{4}^{468}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
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|  |  |  | ${ }_{58} 5 \mathrm{~F}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
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| ${ }^{68 \text { R Road 1933-1947- }}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
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| Somer Pub |  |  | Colorado Springs ${ }_{\text {4 }}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | $5 \%$ | to 6\% |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
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| \% W $1939-1$ | - 5 \% |  | 4\% ${ }^{\text {s }}$ Water Ext 1944 - Mes | 4.5 | 4.25\% ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
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Basis, f Fiat price. 1 In London. a Nominal. \&ale price. y Per s20. Tax-free In Oo aderticus.

STATE AND MUNICIPAL BONDE


STATE AND MUNICIPAL BONDE

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[^16]

[^17]STATE AND MUNICIPAL BONDS
105

$b$ Basis. $f$ Flat price. $n$ Nominal. $d$ Now paid by N. Y. Oity.

| Bonds. | Bid. | Ask. | Tot. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Oohoes ferer Wat $30-45$ J\&J | 6\% | 4.60 | \% |
|  | 5.50 |  | $\%$ |
| 4138 $1936-1959-\cdots-\cdots{ }^{\text {a }}$ |  |  | \% |
|  | ${ }_{5}^{5.50}$ | to 4.35 | \% |
|  |  | to 4.30 | \% |
|  | 5.50 | to 4.40 |  |
| mira-49 1935-...-M88 |  | - $-\bar{\square}$ | 4.40 |
|  |  | to 4.40 | \% |
|  | ${ }^{\text {b }} 5.50$ | to to 4.2 | \% |
|  | ¢ 4.60 | to 4. |  |
| 43 s 1934-1935------J®D | 4.30 | to 4.25 |  |
| 43 s 1936-1938--.---J J D |  |  |  |
| 81945-1953-195.-.-.-M8 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |



| Bonds. | Bid. | Ask. | Tot. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Wolcott-4168. Jly 15 ${ }^{\prime} 30-42 \mathrm{~J} \& \mathrm{~J}$ | b 6\% | to. 4.80 | \% |
| Yonkers - <br> 51/5 Jan 1930-1961....A\&O | 75 | to 4.40 | $\%$ |
|  | b 5.50 | to ${ }^{\text {to }} 4.75$ | \% |
| ${ }_{4}^{438} 8 \mathrm{seb}$ | ${ }^{5} 4.50$ | to 4.40 | \% |
|  |  | to 4.30 |  |
|  | 5.50 | to 4.25 | \% |



## NORTH CAROLINA





Esgex 4 Oounty-

 Garaen OIty $43 / 1 / 81930-52 \mathrm{JkJ}$
Greenburgh
Usch Dist No
 Hemputead (Village)- Mes 5.75 Hempstead Un F ®
 Harason- 4388 1934-1947...




${ }_{43}^{4}$ 4n Ref Water 1942_-J J\&J Jamestin 4 s Mar 20 1943 A\&O Johnstown 41/8-Dec.1929:37-


 Ss 1930-1942-30 M\& Mamaroneck Un Fs D No 11



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$\frac{4}{0.4}$ 
roy 6 s 1930-1940 reg-A\&O A
415 School 1930-31-F\& $b$4138 School 1930-31
43 F Feb 15 1930-1957.
43 s 1930-1985
44 s
418 B
4.20 s
4.20 s
4.20 s
4.10 s
3.908

Watertown 41/8 1942.......J\&
West Seneca $5 s^{\prime}{ }^{\prime} 29-38$
Westchester County-
$53 / 281830$.






Gr48 s
43 1930-1933.......M\&NMecklenburg 0 O-195
6s Ref NovG\& Ref Nov $1950 \ldots$ M\&N
Pitt Co $5 \mathrm{~s} 1930-36$4138 $1948-1959$.Surrey o 58 May 1933-1958
Ware Oo 5 Fund 1948_JWeldon 6s Jan 1930-1942_.....
Wimington
Ss Ref \&mpt 1955 _ _ $4 * 0$Ss Ref \& Impt 1955_._A\&O5s gen Impt 1944.
5 g Sept 1930-1947


## NOZTH DAKOTA

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[^18]STATE AND MUNICIPAL BONDS

| Bonde | $1 s t .$ | Bonds $\quad$ Bid. | As | Bonds |  | Ask. |  |
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| 4438 July 1943....J*J |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
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| nc 8 D ${ }^{41} 191934-48013$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
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| ${ }_{4}^{4}$ S Sewer 33 opt 13 M\& 8 . |  | 48 Highway 1930-41---- |  | Oent ralla 481930 |  |  |  |
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| *44s ${ }^{4}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \% 1930-1937.......A48 |  | ${ }_{4}^{4} 88$ Bridge $1931-1844-\mathrm{J} \mathrm{\& D}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
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| \%s (after 10 years) $-\overline{\text { a }}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
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## tennessee








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 Knoxylll ${ }_{4}^{501}$





 Montzomery Co-5 Oumber-






 smith Joult 1940-1951..M\&S
 Wasin Roantyly $2 \cdot 30-588 \& J$




| Bonds. | Bid. | Ask. | $\left\|\begin{array}{c} \text { To } \\ \text { Net } \end{array}\right\|$ |
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| Fort Worth $581951 \ldots \ldots \ldots$ |  |  | 80 |
| 6s 1930-1934-...------ - - ${ }^{\text {J }}$ - |  |  | 80 |

${ }^{\text {F }}$

## Banks \& Trust Companies

## STATE AND NATIONAL BANK STATEMENTS

Quotations in this department are given per share, not per cent, except for stocks of Canadian Institutions, and are as near as possible for the closing day of the month preceding date of issue, though of ten are nominal. An asterisk (*) denotes sales.

Figures of deposits, capital and profits for the national banks are from the Comptroller's last call; for all other institutions they are the latest obtainable, direct returns being procured by us where no periodic statements are required. For the Clearing House banks of New York, Philadelphia and Boston, deposits are taken from the latest-weekly statement.



| Colorado Spgs. Oolorado Sav Bank | 50,000 | 239,955 | 2,403,929 | 100 | Per | share |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Colorado Spgs Nat B | 100000 | 158,241 | 2,065,272 | 100 |  |  |
| Firstange Nat Bank- | - 300.0000 | 366,112 412,859 | 5,366,477 | 100 |  |  |
| Oolo Title \& Tr Oo-- | 150,000 | 96,504 | 2,170,075 | 100 |  |  |

[^19]

| National Lanks |  |
| :---: | :---: |
|  |  |






| Natitana Bat | ILLINOIS | ${ }^{\text {oct }}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |
| ato |  |  |
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| sta |  |  |
|  |  |  |
| at |  |  |
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |

* Sale price. $\dagger$ Branch of Savannah. $a$ Formerly the City
Controlled by Ational Bank dend. $y$ Ex-rights.

BANKS AND TRUST CGMPANIES




1.000.000

## mõo <br> Bal Oa Oa O 0 D D

Kansas City-
Comm'cial
Exchange State Bank
Ont Rivervew State Bk-

ToperaOentral Nat Bank
Earmers Nat Bank Guaranty State Bank Kaw Valley Nat Bk-
Merchants Nat Bk Nat Bank of Topeka Topeka State Bank
Oentral Trust WichitaFIrst National Bank. Fourth Nat Bank:tate Reserve Bankouthwest Nat Bank Stoce Yds Na

| National Banks ${ }_{\text {Of, }}$ KENTUCKY |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Ask. |
|  | $\xrightarrow{\text { log.oon }}$ |  | stare |
|  |  |  |  |


| New Orloans- |  | 644,902 | 9,020,960 | 100 | $173$ | share |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Omerican Bank \& Trust | 1,000,000 | 644,902 | 9,020,960 | 109 |  |  |
| Oo --------- | 6,000,000 | u4,537,563 | 93,814,767 | 100 | 301 | $3011 / 6$ |
| Int-State Tr \& B Oo- | 750,000 | 1,425.291 | 13,636,557 | 100 | 375 |  |
| New Orl Bk \& Tr Co. | 12,200.000 | 5,379,265 | 64.283,407 | 105 | 120 | 12 $25^{-\%}$ |
| Hibernla $\mathrm{Bk} \& \mathrm{Tr} \mathrm{C}_{0}$ | 2,500,000 | 3,629,022 | 50,300,655 | 25 | 101 |  |
| Whitney Trust \& | r1,000,000 | 5,379,265 | 64,283,756 | 25 | 120 | 140 |
| shreveportAmerican Bk \& T Co | 150,00 | 51,229 |  | 50 | Por | share |
| American Nat Bank- | 300.000 | 78,208 | 2,356,822 | 100 | 125 | 140 |
| Eirat National Bank- | 1.000000 | 645,743 | 11,872,614 | 1001 | 315 | 330 |
| Oity Sav Bk \% Tr Co | 1,000.000 | 721,561 841,223 | 17,246,915 | 100 | 245 |  |
| Exchange Nat Bank. | - 200000 | 63,841 | 3,018,558 | 100 | 175 | 0 |
| Exchange Bk \& Tr 0 | 100,000 | See Excha | nge Nat Bk | 100 | 175 | 185 |



| $\begin{gathered} \text { National Bank } \\ \text { Oct. } 4 . \end{gathered}$ | 3 MICHIGAN state |  |  | Institutions |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Capital. | Surplus \& | Deposits. | Pa | Bid. |
| Grand Rapld |  |  |  |  |  |
| Arand Rap Nat Bank | S1,000,0000 | 250,000 804,072 | 21,281,613 | 100 | ${ }_{500}^{170}$ |
| Grand Rap Sav Bank | s 750,000 | 858,050 | c22,237,332 | 100 | 800 |
| Old Kent Bank | 2.000.000 | 2,793,531 |  | 100 | 300 100 |
| Grand Rapids Tr ${ }^{\text {Oo- }}$ | $s 750.000$ |  | g1,219,528 | 100 | 300 |
| ${ }_{\text {Industrial }}$ Michigan Trust ${ }^{\text {a }}$ - ${ }^{---}$ | 1,000000 | 121,450 | 2,286,846 |  | 50 |
|  | 1,000,000 |  | g2,004,853 | 100 | 425 |
| Bank or Saginaw | 1,250,000 |  |  |  | Per |
| American State Bank | 1, 400,000 | 1,449,206 | 17,420,566 | 100 | ${ }^{2} \overline{5} \overline{0}{ }^{-}$ |
| Second Nat Bank--- | 1,250,000 | 1,965,618 | 13,889,677 |  | $t 4512$ |




| Butto- | 300.000 | 857,157 | 14,240,023 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Miners ${ }^{\text {S Bk }}$ \& Tr Co | 200.000 | -91,027 | 1.434.627 | 100 |  |
| Metals Bank \& Tr Oo | 600,000 | 762,677 | 20,385,692 |  |  |
| Helena- |  |  |  |  |  |
| American Nat Bank- | 200,000 | $\begin{array}{r}336,126 \\ 198 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | 4,551,302 | 100 |  |
| Nat Bk of Montana-- | 250,000 150,000 | 198,894 | 2,586,547 | 100 |  |
| Unlon Bank \& Tr ${ }^{\text {Ofo }}$ | 250,000 | -270,642 | 3,237,752 | 100 |  |


| $\begin{gathered} \text { National Banks } \\ \text { Oct. } 4 . \end{gathered}$ | NEBRASKA |  | State Institutions Seyt. 24. |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Lincoln- |  |  |  |  | Por | shar |
| Oontinental Nat'l Bk | 200.000 | 229,349 | 5,293,138 | 100 |  |  |
| First National Bank- | 850.000 | 337,217 239 | 15,680,722 | 100 |  |  |
| LucolnNatBk\&TrOo | 200.000 | 106,579 | 2,623,334 | 100 |  |  |
| Omaha- |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| First National Bank | $1,250,000$ 450,000 | 1,238,099 | $26,491,381$ $5,376,795$ | 100 | 275 | 300 |
| Omaha Nat Bank. .- | 1,250,000 | 1,278,000 | 35.355,383 | 25 | 300 |  |
| Packers Nat Bank- | 200.000 | 120,807 | 3,357,863 | 100 | 120 | - |
| Peters Nat Bank-1-- | 200.000 750.000 | 131,103 | 2,9072,108 |  |  |  |
| State Bank.-.--- | 300.000 | 280,718 | 4,918,144 |  | 16.5 |  |
| Sou Omaha State Bk | 100,000 | d48,266 | 1,532,311 |  | 140 |  |
| U8 National Bank.-- | e1.100.000 200.000 | 891,675 | 20,125,132 | 100 | 90 | 125 |




[^20]

[^21]


$\quad \begin{aligned} & \text { *Sale price } \\ & \text { a Dec. } 31 \\ & \text { 1928. }\end{aligned}$ b Merger with the Aldine Trust Co. effective Nov. 1 1929. $c$ June 29 1929. $a$ A mutual savings bank. $e$ Merger



| National Bank Oct. 4. | PENNSYLVANIA ${ }^{\text {State }}$ ( ${ }_{\text {Oct. }}^{\text {Institutions }}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Capital. | ${ }_{\text {Surplus }}^{\text {Profits. }}$ \& | $\underset{\text { Deposits. }}{\text { Gross }}$ | Par. | Bid. | Ask. |
| York- |  |  |  |  | Per | share |
| Oentral Nat Bank-- | 250,000 <br> 150,100 | - 294.303 | ${ }_{2}^{2,2425,940}$ | 100 |  |  |
| Prirat National Bank-- | 500.000 | 732,257 | 6,072,602 | 100 | 275 |  |
| Industrial Nat Bank- | 125.000 | 243, ${ }^{296}$ | 1,410,924 | 100 | 228 |  |
| Western ${ }^{\text {Nat Bank-- }}$ | 225,000 | 1.003,180 | 3,648,502 | 20 | 70 | $\overline{7} 1$ |
|  | 800.000 | -644,173 | 3,439;740 | 25 | 62 | 63 |
| Guar Tr Oo of York- | 500.000 750 | - $712,632,675$ | $3,657,066$ 7392,796 | 5 | 22036 | $222{ }^{-}$ |
| qork Trust ${ }^{\text {Oon-.-- }}$ |  | $a 1,532,285$ |  |  |  |  |


| National BanksOct. 4. RHODE ISLAND ${ }^{\text {State }} \begin{gathered}\text { Institutions } \\ \text { June 29. }\end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Newport- |  |  |  |  | Per | share. |
| Aquidneck Nat Exich |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bre \& Bav Co | 300,000 120,000 | -428,500 | 9,535,610 |  | *105 |  |
|  | 800,000 | 01490,620 | 5,094,906 |  | *212 |  |
| Providenco- |  |  |  |  |  | , |
| Blackstone Oan Nat- | 800,000 | 993,865 | 2,977,568 | 25 | 81 | 861/2 |
| Oolumbus Exch Bk- | 200,000 | 992,721 | 3,746,657 | 50 | 140 | 150 |
| High 8treet Bank-- | 120,000 80000 | a475,731 | 6,147,730 |  |  |  |
| Mechanics Nat Br-- | 800,000 | $1,238,836$ | $8,166,745$ | 50 | 111 | ${ }_{116}{ }^{-}$ |
| Phenlx Nat Bank -- | 450.000 | $a 1,268,212$ | 2,562,490 | 50 | 175 | 18 |
| Providence Nat Bk- | 1,500,000 | 2,734,895 | 137,558,611 | 100 |  | $\overline{5} \overline{0} 1^{--}$ |
| Industrial Trust OoUncoln Trust Oo | 4,000,000 | -10243,863 | 137,547,118 |  |  | 61 |
| Rhode I Hos $\operatorname{Tr}$ ÖO.- | 3,000,000 | 99,827,512 | 96,065,473 |  | 7500 | 800 |
| Rights ...-....-- | $0 \overline{0}_{0}$ |  |  |  |  | 122 |
| Union Trust Oo...- | 00,000 | g1,323,670 | 26,344,287 |  |  |  |
| WoonsocketWeonsocket Trust Co | 100,000 | 296,029 | 4,258,849 | 0 | er | share. $l 225$ |


| National Banks <br> Oct. 4. | SOUTH |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |


| National Banks oct. 4. | TENNESSEE |  | - State Institutions |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| tanooga |  |  |  |  | r |  |
|  | 600,000 | d992 | -5,276,40 | 100 |  |  |
| Hamilton Nat Bank. | 2,000,000 | 1,502,140 | 19,549,662 | 100 |  |  |
| Snoxillo- |  |  |  |  | er | hare |
| Ey National Bank- | 1,000.000 | 596,034 $a 16.337$ | 13,111,955 |  | 0 |  |
| Kast Tenn Nat Bank | 1,000.000 | 662,919 | $8,946,650$ | 100 | 300 | 325 |
| \#nast Tenn Save Bank | 200.000 | - $\begin{array}{r}326,767 \\ 991259\end{array}$ | 11,362,731 | iō | c340 | 34 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{\text {Bank of }}^{\text {Memphis }} \& \mathrm{TrCo}$ | 3,000.000 |  | 30,617,460 |  | 5 | 450 460 |
| First National Bank- | 1.000 .000 50,000 | $\begin{array}{r} 1,065,451 \\ d 76,802 \end{array}$ | $25,364,826$ $1,483,380$ |  | $55$ |  |
| Union Plantors' Nat'l | 3.500,000 |  | 30,26 |  | 57 | 60 |
| Manhat S Bk\& TrCo | 700,000 | 1,732,413 | 765, |  |  |  |
| Nashrillo- |  |  |  |  | er |  |
| nerican Nat Bank. | 2.000 .000 | 2,055, 802 | 19,968,481 |  |  |  |
| American Trust- ${ }_{\text {Brank }}$ | 1,000,000 | 389,739 | 5,246,477 |  |  |  |
| Oomamerce-OUnon Bk | ${ }^{800} 0000$ | ${ }_{3}{ }^{\text {S } 577}$ | - ${ }^{9,733,177}$ |  | 5 | ${ }_{22}^{21}$ |
|  | 2,825,000 | 1,023,200 | $\begin{array}{r} 26,423,522 \\ 9,949,903 \end{array}$ |  | , |  |
| Nnessee Hermitage |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | $\begin{gathered} 600.000 \\ 100.000 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0194,393 \\ a 26,355 \end{array}$ | 5,183,903 |  | 115 | 120 |


| National Banks oct. 4 . | TEXAS |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { State Institutions } \\ & \text { Oct. } 4 . \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Austin- ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |  |  |  | 100 | ${ }_{275}^{\text {Pet }}$ | 300 |
| Austicn Nat Bank | 800.000 | 748.158 | 8,698,807 | 100 | 328 |  |
|  | 200.000 400.000 | ${ }_{\text {a }}{ }_{382}{ }^{38,1987}$ | - 7 2,1008,912 | 100 | 110 | ${ }_{280}^{120}$ |
| Texas Eanls \% Trust- | 200.000 | a70,492 | 2,719,632 | 100 | 135 |  |
| Braumont- |  |  |  |  | Per | znars |
| American Nat Bank | 250,000 | 232,122 | - $6,100,181$ | 100 | 200 |  |
| First National Bank. | 400.000 | 709.696 | 11,600,310 | 100 | 300 135 |  |
| Secur st Bk \& Trust | 100,000 250,000 |  | 3,647,709 | 100 |  | $\mathrm{ii}^{-7}$ |


| National Banks Oct. 4. |  | EXAS | State Institutions |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Capital. | Surplus \& Profits. | Gross Deposits. | Par | Bid. | Ask. |
| Am Exch Nat Bank. |  | 4,668,282 | 54,361,395 | 100 | ${ }_{315}$ Per | $\begin{aligned} & \text { share } \\ & 325 \end{aligned}$ |
| Oity National Bank- | 3.000 .000 | 2,166,704 | 31,374,117 | 100 | 310 |  |
| Liberty State Bank- | 150.000 | 14,277 | 15,663,433 | 100 | 150 $1371 / 2$ | 1421/2 |
| Mercantlie Bk \& Tr- | 2.000 .000 500,000 | 727,240 171,724 | 15,426,938 | 100 | 135 | 140 |
| Republic Nat Bk \& | r3,500,000 | 2,434,930 | 35,174,662 | 20 | 70 | 75 |
| Nat Bk of Oomme | 150,000 | 2,490,142 | 4,464,260 | 100 | 277 | $40^{--}$ |
| North Texas N Bk- | r1,000,000 | 496,726 | 15,849,731 | 120 | + 150 | 4016 |
| Dallas Tr \& Sav Bk- | $1.000,000$ 100,000 | 488,398 19,799 | 1,127,655 | 100 |  |  |
| State Trust \& Sav Bk | 100.000 | 10,499 | -891,378 | 100 |  | 100 |
|  | 300,000 | a147,377 | 3,054,323 | 100 | 145 |  |
| First National Bank- | 1,000,000 | 256,890 | 13,394,950 | 100 | 125 | 150 |
| State Nat Bank.---- | 300,000 | 810,056 | 12,470,214 | 100 | 450 |  |
| Fort Worth Amer Bank \& Tr Co | 100,000 | 19,982 | 1,536,217 | 100 | ${ }^{\text {Per }}$ | share |
| Amer Bant ${ }^{\text {Oontinental }}$ Nat Bk- | 100,000 | 431,135 | 9,014,362 | 100 | 155 | 175 |
| First National Bank- | 1,000.000 | 1,281,955 | 23,146,122 | 100 | 300 61 | 65 |
| Ft Worth Nat Bank- | 2,500,000 | 2,580,005 | 35,630,094 | 100 |  |  |
| Stockyards Nat Bk.- | 2000000 | 250,552 | 7,008,395 | 100 | -185 | 190 |
| Unlon Bk \& Tr Co.- | 100,000 | a21,653 | 321,003 | 100 | 110 |  |
| Gaiveston- |  |  |  |  | 200 | share $225$ |
| Oity National Bank- | 200,000 200,000 | 344,514 <br> 313,751 | $7,871,691$ $3,781,346$ | 100 | 250 |  |
| First National Bank. South Texas Nat Bk | 200,000 | 313,751 <br> 341,832 | $3,7629,243$ 4,602 | 100 | 145 |  |
| U 8 National Bank-- | 1.000.000 | 336,673 | 10,360,857 | 100 | 135 |  |
| Houston- |  |  | 906,650 | N0 | ${ }_{\text {minal }}$ | prices $105$ |
| Citizens State Bank. First National Bank- | 2.500 .000 | 1,146,249 | 38,621,364 | 100 | 365 |  |
| Guaranty Nat Bank- | i 300,000 | 191,744 | 2,639,071 | 100 | 295 | , |
| Oity Bank \& Tr Oo. | $f 300,000$ | 127,479 | 3,858,497 | 100 | 190 |  |
| Houston Nat Bank.- | 1.000,000 | 828,465 | 13,988,942 | 100 | 190 | 200 |
| Seaport Nat Bank | $)_{1} 2500000$ | 1,252,466 | 15,995,278 | 100 | $\overline{2} 9 \overline{0}^{-}$ |  |
| Second Nat Bank--- | 1,000,000 | 2,454,865 | 11,489,542 | 100 | 355 |  |
| Public NatBk \& TrCo | 1500.000 | 269,018 | 6,361,804 | 10 | $291 / 2$ | 3012 |
| State Nat Bank. | 600,000 | 221,139 | 6,190,331 | 100 | 260 | 300 |
| Unlon Nat Bank.-.-7 | 1.000.000 | 1,349,411 | 15,122,069 | 100 | 275 | 300 |
| South Texas Comm Nat Bank | 1.500.000 | 1,305,493 | 27,660,867 | 100 | 322 | 330 |
| Federal Trust Oow-.- | 400.000 | 204,156 | 2,170,159 | 100 | 155 |  |
| Fidelity Trust Co.-- | 200,000 | a308,328 | 5 2222.841 | 100 |  | $4{ }^{4} 0^{--}$ |
| Guardian Trust ${ }^{\text {Oo }}$ | 18000.000 | 1,102,870 | $5,050,608$ $4,723,719$ | 100 | 170 |  |
|  | $1.000,000$ 3000 | -658,922 | 2,203,690 | 100 | 175 |  |
| gan Jacinto Trust. | 500.000 | 525,447 | 4,779,237 | 100 | 250 | 260 |
| Port Arthur First National Bank. | 100,000 | 821,657 | 5,004,331 | 100 |  | , |
| Merchants Nat'l Bk- | 100,000 | 310,667 | 3,911,160 | 100 | 425 | 450 |
| Seaboard Bk\& Tr Co | 100,000 |  | 185,234 | 100 |  |  |
| San Antonio Alamo Nat Bank | 2,000,000 | 1,192,939 | 13,293,259 | 100 | Per | $\begin{aligned} & \text { share } \\ & 205 \end{aligned}$ |
| City Cent' 1 Bk\&TrOo | 1,300,000 | -554,231 | 20,063,362 | 100 |  | 225 |
| Oommerclal Nat Bk. | 1300.000 | - 78,991 | 18,162,628 | 100 |  | 14 |
| Frost National Bank | $1,200,000$ 250,000 | $1,439,432$ 421 | 18,545,401 | 100 |  | 200 |
| Groos Nat Bank_-.-- | 600,000 | 508,590 | 7,849,266 | 100 |  | 200 |
| Sam Houston State Bank \& Trust | 100.000 | 33,230 | 537,430 | 100 |  | 1173/ |
| San Antonlo Nat Bra | 500,000 | 133,864 | 2,490,044 | 100 |  | 100 |
| Oom'wealth B \& TCo | 300,000 | 152,909 | 3,091,686 | 100 |  | 100 |
| Waco- |  |  |  |  | ${ }_{2}$ Per | share |
| Oitizens' Nat Bank, | 1250,000 | $\begin{aligned} & a 243,298 \\ & a 310,554 \end{aligned}$ | 10,825,734 | 100 | 240 | 220 |
| First National Bank | 1,000,000 | a320,795 | 1,115,550 | 100 | 100 | 110 |
| Liberty Nat Bank... | 800,000 | a150,000 | 2,500,000 | 100 | - |  |
| National Oity Bank. | 100,000 | 052,023 | 569,912 | 100 | 90 | 100 |


| National Banks Oct. 4. |  | JTAH | State InstitutionsOct. 4. |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Ogden- |  |  |  |  | Per | share |
| Oommercial sec Bk- | 200,000 | 132,669 | 2,597,124 |  | 100 | 110 |
| Nat Bank of Sav Bank....- | 250,000 | a255,230 | $4,040,069$ | 100 | b140 | 142 |
| Ogden state Bank.-- | 100,000 | a354,226 | $8,078,954$ | 100 |  | - |
| First Nat Bank...... | 500,000 | -0129,134 | 7,029,736 | 100 | b140 | 142 |
| 3alt Lake City |  |  |  |  | Per | share |
| Oontinental Nat Bk- | 600.000 | 295,705 | 12,066,823 | 100 | 139 | 142 |
| Deseret Nat Bank--- | 5100.000 | 710,443 | 5,232,030 | 100 | 303 209 | - 310 |
| Deseret Sav. Bank Natlonal Copper Bk- | b 5000000 | -169,012 | 9,101,151 | 100 | 155 | 200 |
| Utah State Nat Bank | 500.000 | 548,017 | 9,525,199 | 100 | 297 | 302 |
| Utah Sav \& Tr Co.- | 300,000 | 190,624 | 2,076,763 | 100 | 175 | 185 |
| Walker Bros, B'kers- | $1.500,000$ | 690,879 | 21,718,570 | 100 | 202 | ${ }_{343}^{205}$ |
| zion Sav Bk \& Tr Co | 1.000,000 | 657,820 | 13,562,856 |  | 338 | 343 |


 merged with the North Texas National Ba


## Canadian Bank Statements <br> Returns are all of Aug. 31 1929. Prices are per cent. not per share.



[^22]
## Insurance Stocks


a Holding company. b Incorp. 1928. f All stock owned by National Surety Co., gall stock owned by North British \& Mercantile Co, $h$ Capita educed from $\$ 1,000,000$ to $\$ 500,000$, this amount being added to surplus. i Capital of North River increased from $\$ 2,000,000$ to $\$ 4,000,000$, stock dividend of $100 \%$ declared, par value change
shown are Dec. 31 1927. $\dagger$ No par value.


[^0]:     11929:
    satate of Now York, County of Now York, bs.: Betore me, a notary pubilic, in And or the state and County atoresald, persionanily anpeared Jacoob silierti, who
     publication for the datement of the ownership, management, \&cc., of the aforesald 1912, enr bodied in Seotlon 411, Postal Laws and Regulations, printed on the reverse
    of this form, to wit: of this form, to wit:
    (1) That the names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor
    and bustness managers are:

    Publisher, William B. Dana Company, 138 Front St., New York.
    Editor, Jacob Selbert, 138 Front St., New York.
    Managing Editor, Jacob Selbert, 138 Front St., New York
    Business Manager, wullam D. Riggs, 138 Front St., New York
    (2) That the owner is (If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated, and slso Immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1\% or more of the total amount of stock. If not owned by a
    corporation, the names and addrasses of the individual owners must be given. If
    owned by a firm, company, or other unincorporated concern, Its name and address, as well as those of each individual member, must be given):
    Owner, William B. Dana Company, 138 Front St., New York.
    Owner, William B. Dana Company, 138 Front St, New Yor
    Stockholders: Jacob Seibert, 138 Front St., New York.
    (3) That the known bondholders, mortgagee and other security holders owning
    or holding $1 \%$ or more of the total or holding $1 \%$ or more of the total amount of bonds, mortgages or other securities
    are: (If there are none, so state) None. are: (4) That the two paragraphs next above
    (4) That the two paragraphs next above, giving the names of the owners, stock-
    holders and security holders, if any, contain not only the list of stockholders and holders and security holders, if any, contain not only the list of stockholders and
    security holders as they appear upon the books of the company, but also, In cases
    where Where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company
    as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation
    for whom such trustee is acting. is given: also that the sald two paragraphs contain statements embracing affiant's full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear
    upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner, and this affiant has no reason to believe that any other person, assoclation or corporation has any interest, direct or Indirect, in
    the said stock, bonds or other securities than as so stated by him. the said stock, bonds or other securities than as so stated by him.
    (Signed) Jacob Selbert. Editor. Sworn to and subseribed bet
    day of October 1929 , Thomas A. Creegan, Notary Public, Kings County Yaork County Clerk's No. 425. New York County Register No. 1 C311.
    commission explres March 30 1931.)

[^1]:    a Ex-dividend Distributed one additional share for each share held

[^2]:    For footnoter see page 543

[^3]:    For footnotes see Usge 54

[^4]:    For footnotes see pare 54.

[^5]:    Fot Pootnotes see page 5

[^6]:    No par value $s$ Ex-dividend

[^7]:    * No par value. $x$ Ex-dividend.

[^8]:    - No par value. $x$ Ex-dividend.

[^9]:    * No par value. $t$ new stock. $x$ Ex-dividend. $v$ Ex-rights. $\uparrow$ Includes also record for period when in unlisted department. (z)Now listed.

[^10]:    No per Vauc. $s$ Ex-Dividend y Ex-Right

[^11]:    $\dagger$ No par value. $d$ Price per share, not per cent. $z$ Ex-stock dividend.

[^12]:    

[^13]:    b Basla．f Thls price includes accrued interest．$k$ Last eals．I In London．$n$ Nominal．

[^14]:    

[^15]:    

[^16]:    
    

[^17]:    

[^18]:    

[^19]:    * Sale price. a Bank of America and the Pacific National Bank merged with the Bank of Italy National Trust \& Savings Association. $b$ June 29

    1929. $\boldsymbol{c}$ Dec. 31.199 , $d$ New stock, $e$ Trust deposits. $f$ Merger of the Orocker First National Bank, Crocker First Federal Trust Co. and the
    American Trust Co. pending. lLast sale price. $n$ March 27 1929. $x$ Ex-dividend.
[^20]:     ${ }^{f}$ div. $y$ Ex-rights. 23 Mew stock.

[^21]:    
    

[^22]:    * Sale price, $a$ Shareholders on, Sept. 161929 ratified the merger of the First National Bank, Seattle National Bank and the Dexter Horton
     March 27 1929.
    $r$ Dec. 31 1928. $x$ Ex-dividend. $y$ Ex-rights. $u$ Traded in as Spokane Eastern Corp.

