



Military Manpower Requirements and Supply 1959-63

Bulletin No. 1262

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
James P. Mitchell, Secretary

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS
Ewan Clague, Commissioner

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Preface

This bulletin presents the findings of a study of military manpower supply and requirements undertaken to provide background information pertinent to a consideration of the extension of the authority to induct men under provisions of the Universal Military Training and Service Act. This authority, which was due to expire on June 30, 1959, was recently extended by the Congress until June 30, 1963. Pages 1 to 7 of this bulletin were reprinted from the Monthly Labor Review for August 1959.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics has made several studies of this nature; the previous edition was Bulletin 1166, Military Manpower Requirements and Supply, 1955-59.

The study was undertaken at the request of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. This bulletin was prepared by Stuart H. Garfinkle of the Division of Manpower and Employment Statistics. Most of the statistical estimates were prepared by the Department of Defense and were included, in summary form, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on January 26, 1959. Harold Wool and Clayton Thompson of the Department of Defense were especially helpful.

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Military Manpower Requirements and Supply, 1959-63

BETWEEN 1959 and 1963, military manpower supply will be more than adequate and no fathers will be inducted, but qualified young men attaining age 26 in that period must count on service. Most young men graduating from high school in 1960 will have 4 or 5 years for college or business before they are drafted. A recent study by the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics¹ discloses these and other facts of prime interest to the public, employers, personnel directors, and government agencies.

Basic Considerations

The method of obtaining men for military service has been a matter of continuing concern to the Armed Forces, to civilian agencies of Government, and to the Congress. Traditionally, except in times of war, dependence upon voluntary enlistment has prevailed. When compulsory service became necessary, the governing principle of equity—equality of obligation—administered through the Selective Service System and its local boards of responsible citizens in each community, made compulsory military service acceptable to the public. There are, however, three major exceptions to this general principle, among which

¹ The Bureau of Labor Statistics has made several studies of this nature. Of the earlier ones, the most recent was *Military Manpower Requirements and Supply, 1955-59*, supplementing *Military Manpower Requirements and Supply, 1954-60*, BLS Bull. 1161 (1955). See also *Monthly Labor Review*, July 1955, pp. 782-784.

The findings in the present study, undertaken at the request of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, were based on data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census and the U.S. Department of Defense. Estimating procedures are described in *Military Manpower Requirements and Supply, 1959-63*, forthcoming BLS Bull. 1262.

a feasible balance must be achieved at any given time.

Personal or family hardships have been accepted as valid reasons for excuse from military service or for a delay in commencing service. The degree of hardship recognized changes from time to time, depending on the need for and availability of manpower.

The second exception to the principle of equity has arisen because manpower needs of the civilian economy must be balanced against those of the military. During World War II, the large Armed Forces and the enormous defense production program strained manpower resources. During the Korean conflict, the need for an adequate flow of highly trained workers, both to meet the increasingly technical requirements of the Armed Forces and the needs of the industrial economy, gave rise to a student deferment program. More recently, special provision has been made for brief periods of active service for members of "critical occupations," to be followed by membership in the reserves. Occupation was also considered in calling up reservists and in screening individuals from the Ready to the Standby Reserve. For these and other purposes, the U.S. Department of Labor prepared an official List of Critical Occupations.

The third exception to the equity principle has arisen because of the varying standards for acceptability for military service. The degree of physical and mental fitness required of men for service has depended upon the nature of warfare as well as the availability of manpower. In recent years, the increasingly technical character of warfare has ac-

centuated the training needs of the Armed Forces and raised the mental demands. This has been accompanied by a rise in the mental standards for service, eliminating a large proportion of the young men.²

Thus, against this general principle of equality of obligation for service have been set three exceptions—one providing excuse or deferment on the basis of family responsibilities; the second limiting the availability of higher skilled men in the interest of the civilian economy; the third rejecting the less capable men in the population. In developing military manpower policies, it has been essential to know the probable effect of various alternatives upon our ability to meet our military manpower needs, particularly when a major


² Qualifying requirements were raised under provisions of P.L. 85-564, approved July 28, 1958, and Executive Order 10776 of the same date.

An extended discussion of problems resulting from the acceptance of men in the lower mental groups can be found in a study by Eli Ginzberg and others, *The Lost Divisions* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1959).

change in policy is being considered. The present study was made early in 1959, primarily to appraise the probable effects of extending the induction authority of the Selective Service System, which was scheduled to expire on June 30, 1959.³ The study examined the military manpower situation as of June 30, 1958, and the size and characteristics of the "military manpower pool" (the number of draft-liable men who would be eligible for induction at any given time under existing Selective Service rules and regulations). The study also examined the prospects of the military manpower pool. Estimates of the future pool were based on the assumptions that current military manpower policies would remain unchanged until at least 1963, and that the size of the Armed Forces would decline from 2.6 million on June 30, 1958, to 2.5 million on June 30, 1959, and remain at that level until June 30, 1963. These

³ The authority was extended by P.L. 86-4, approved March 23, 1959.

Estimated Military Service Status of Men Aged 19-26, June 30 of 1958 and 1963



assumptions, while essential for such a study, are subject to modification as policies and circumstances change; indeed, the results of such a study as this may point to needed policy changes.⁴

Current Situation

Before considering the current size of the military manpower pool, it is necessary to review the present military manpower situation. At the present time, men are obtained for the Armed Forces both through voluntary enlistment and by induction.⁵ During the year ending June 30, 1958, 311,000 men voluntarily entered the Armed Forces for the first time, whereas only 127,000 were inducted. Many of those who enlisted were motivated no doubt by the knowledge that if they did not volunteer they would become subject to the draft. Although volunteers have a longer term of service, they have a choice of services and better opportunities for training.

Most young men who do not volunteer for active duty are classified by the Selective Service System as I-A. They remain in this class until they are drafted, unless they are able to establish a basis for reclassification into a deferred or exempt category. Selective Service regulations in effect on June 30, 1958, call for the following order of induction: Draft delinquents, volunteers for induction, nonfathers aged 19 to 26 (with the oldest being taken first), fathers aged 19 to 26, men over 26 years with draft liability extended, and men under 19 years. At the present time (mid-1959), most inductees are about 22 or 23 years old and have been eligible for the draft since age 18½. All of the men who are called for

induction receive a physical and mental examination which determines their acceptability for active duty. It is estimated that about one-third of the entire male population would, if examined, be rejected by the Armed Forces. Because only those men who have not volunteered are subject to induction, the physical and mental rejection rate for men examined for induction is considerably higher than that of the whole male population; currently, about half are rejected as not qualified.

In addition to the rejectees, others of the men who have not volunteered do not see service because they become fathers by the time they are reached for induction. About 35-40 percent of all civilian men have become fathers by age 22 or 23—the age groups of men currently being inducted. While fatherhood as such is not a reason for deferment, the current order of induction provides that they can be called only after all nonfathers are taken. Because the supply of nonfathers is more than adequate to meet current needs, there is almost no chance that fathers will be inducted unless military manpower requirements increase substantially.

As has been indicated, most of our military manpower comes from volunteers. Virtually all of the manpower used by the Air Force and Navy are volunteers. In the Army, on the other hand, about two out of three enlisted (nonofficer) personnel entering for the first time in the year ending June 30, 1958, were inductees. However, as a result of the longer term of duty of volunteers as compared with inductees and the higher reenlistment rates among volunteers, only about 30 percent of the enlisted Army personnel on active duty in June 1958 were inductees. The Armed Forces find volunteers more desirable recruits than inductees, because the longer term of enlistment provides more adequate time for their training and their use in military assignments.

An important factor which must be considered in appraising our present military manpower situation is the number of men who reenlist for duty after completing one or more enlistment terms. Reenlistment further reduces the ratio of training time to service time, and helps provide a skilled and ready Armed Force. About one-fourth of the volunteers reenlist when their first term expires. This compares with a reenlistment

⁴ In the U.S. Department of Labor's report, *Military Manpower Requirements and Supply, 1955-59*, it was anticipated that the pool would increase to 1.8 million in 1959. Since then, major changes in circumstances and policies have greatly affected the size of the pool. First, the strength of the Armed Forces was reduced from 3.0 million to 2.6 million during the period 1955-58. This reduction, of course, tended to increase the size of the pool. Three other changes, however, more than offset the effects of the lower Armed Forces level: (1) The modification of Selective Service regulations in February 1956 required that all nonfathers be inducted before any father could be taken and provided an effective deferral for fathers; (2) minor administrative changes and the revision of the standards of mental acceptability have had the effect of raising the overall rejection rate from 22 to 33 percent of the population; and (3) the proportions of young men attending school have risen continuously.

⁵ The term "volunteers" as used in this report refers to all men who enter active duty in the Armed Forces for the first time, except those inducted by the Selective Service System. Men who volunteer for induction are considered as inductees in this study.

rate of less than 1 in 20 for inductees. Reenlistment rates are highest among career-regulars—men who have completed more than one tour of duty. Almost 9 out of 10 such men reenlist.

Military Manpower Pool, 1958-63

The military manpower supply and demand situation depends not only on the number of inductions, volunteers, and reenlistments, but also on the number of men becoming available for military service. This study of the present and future size of the military manpower pool takes all of these factors into account in estimating the number of men who were available and eligible for induction in July 1958 and the number of men who will be so in July of each year from 1959 to 1963.

The estimates of the size of the military manpower pool in 1958, 1959, and subsequent years are based on the number of men in the Selective Service age group after allowing for those already in service, and those who would be rejected, deferred, or exempt if reached for induction. Table 1 and the chart show the age distribution and military service status of men in the primary military ages on June 30, 1958, and on June 30, 1963.

There were about 9 million men 19 to 26 years of age in mid-1958. About 4.5 million had already entered military service; about 2.4 million were or will be found unfit for service; 1 million were students (many of whom will enter the military manpower pool when they discontinue their education); and about 700,000 were in the non-father military manpower pool. Fewer than 30,000 men in the manpower pool were over 23 years of age.

The projection of the military manpower pool during the next 4 years was made by balancing the number of men reaching military age in the years ahead against the future needs of the Armed Forces. Estimates of the annual additions to the military manpower pool are based upon the number of men reaching age 18½, less an allowance for the unfit and for the able-bodied students, virtually all of whom are deferrable (table 2). In addition to the 18½-year-olds, a number of students become available each year as they discontinue their education. The total additions to the pool will increase significantly in the next few years as the population reaching age 18½ increases sharply.

The estimates of military manpower requirements between June 30, 1958, and June 30, 1963, are based on a number of assumptions regarding

TABLE 1. ESTIMATED MILITARY SERVICE STATUS OF MEN AGED 19-26 YEARS, JUNE 30 OF 1958 AND 1963

[In thousands]

Date and status	Age nearest birthday								
	Total, 19-26 years	19 years	20 years	21 years	22 years	23 years	24 years	25 years	26 years
JUNE 30, 1958									
Male population.....	9,060	1,200	1,190	1,150	1,130	1,120	1,090	1,060	1,100
Entered service ¹	4,450	270	400	460	500	580	700	760	770
Not qualified.....	2,390	390	370	340	310	260	240	240	240
Deferrable ²	1,050	320	230	170	120	90	50	40	30
Fathers ³	490	30	40	60	90	100	80	40	50
Nonfather pool.....	670	190	150	120	110	80	20	(⁴)	(⁴)
JUNE 30, 1963									
Male population.....	10,390	1,430	1,480	1,430	1,290	1,220	1,200	1,190	1,150
Entered service ¹	3,540	240	310	350	400	450	550	610	630
Not qualified.....	3,360	470	490	470	430	400	390	370	340
Deferrable ²	1,300	430	310	220	130	80	50	40	40
Fathers ³	840	20	50	90	120	130	150	140	140
Nonfather pool.....	1,350	270	320	300	210	160	60	30	(⁴)

¹ Includes prior or present active or reserve service.

² Includes a small number in exempt groups.

³ Includes dependency deferments.

⁴ Less than 5,000.

⁵ Includes a small number in exempt groups. Excludes student fathers and certain categories of students in military reserve status.

NOTE: Because of rounding, sums of the individual items may not equal totals.

SOURCE: Prepared from data of the U. S. Bureau of the Census and the U. S. Department of Defense.

strength of the Armed Forces, reenlistment rates, and other factors. At the time this report was prepared, in early 1959, the Department of Defense assumed that the Armed Forces would decline from 2.6 million in June 1958 to 2.5 million in June 1959 and remain at that level through June 30, 1963. Reenlistment rates—the proportions of men who reenlist upon completion of their tours of duty—were taken into account in estimating military manpower requirements. These rates were computed in detail, separately for each service based on recent experience, taking into account variables such as the effects of recently enacted pay legislation.

On the basis of these data, it was estimated that about 500,000 men will be needed annually from the military manpower pool (table 3). Of these, 100,000 men will be needed to meet the requirements of the reserve forces, and about 300,000 of the Armed Forces annual requirements will come from volunteers. This leaves about 100,000 to be inducted through the Selective Service System.

Characteristics of Men in the Manpower Pool

Most of the volunteers entering military service between 1958 and 1963 will be young men in their teens, while the inductees will be mainly 23 or 24 years old. Almost 8 out of 10 of the volunteers entering the Armed Forces will be under 21.⁶ Since the number of able-bodied men reaching military age will be larger than the Armed Forces' requirements, the manpower pool will increase from about 1 million in 1959 to about 1¾ million by 1963 (table 3). Even if only nonfathers are considered, the pool will increase from about a half million in July 1958 to 1¼ million by June 1963.

Despite the sharp increase in the military manpower pool, the number of available men in the upper age groups will increase only slightly. In 1963, about 60,000 nonfathers aged 24, 30,000 aged 25, and less than 5,000 aged 26 will be in the pool, compared with 20,000 aged 24 years and less than 5,000 25- and 26-year-olds in 1958. This situation is expected to occur because the oldest inductees in the age range 19–26 are taken first. Further, the number of draft-liable nonfathers, acceptable

TABLE 2. ESTIMATED ANNUAL INFLOWS TO MILITARY MANPOWER POOL, MEN AGED 18½–25, FISCAL YEARS 1959–63

[In thousands]

Inflows and outflows	Fiscal year				
	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
Male population reaching age 18½ ¹	1,220	1,290	1,430	1,480	1,430
Less:					
Not qualified for service.....	400	430	470	490	470
Able-bodied students and other deferred groups.....	350	390	440	510	560
Net inflows from 18½ years old....	470	470	520	480	400
Plus: Inflows from student deferments expiring ²	230	260	300	350	390
Total inflows to pool.....	700	730	820	830	790

¹ Includes men who have volunteered before reaching age 18½.

² Excludes ROTC graduates.

SOURCE: Prepared from data of the U.S. Bureau of the Census and the U.S. Department of Defense.

for service, who are expected to reach these ages without having been in service is very small. There are three main reasons for this: First, a substantial number of men will have already enlisted in the Armed Forces well before they reach their 24th birthday. Second, almost half of the men who have not entered the Armed Forces will have become fathers by the time they reach their 24th birthday. Third, about half of the nonfathers who have not entered service are expected to be found not qualified for military service when they are reached for induction.

Most of the increase in the size of the military manpower pool will be in the younger ages, as a result of the increases in the number of men who will be reaching age 19 and an assumed drop in the number and proportion of volunteers among young men between 1958 and 1963. For example, only 310,000 or about 20 percent of the 20-year-olds in 1963 will have volunteered for active duty, compared with 400,000 or about 33 percent of those men who were 20 years old in 1958. Similarly, the assumed numbers of 21- and 22-year-olds who will have volunteered by 1963 are 350,000 and 400,000 (25 and 33 percent of the respective age groups), compared with 460,000 and 500,000 (40 and 44 percent, respectively) for the corresponding age groups in 1958.

A comparison at selected ages of men of military age in 1958 and in 1963 illustrates the effects of these changes. The most obvious change among the 19-year-olds in the two periods is the increase in the size of the population from about 1,200,000

⁶ The minimum age for enlistment is 17.

TABLE 3. PROJECTED MILITARY MANPOWER POOL, MEN AGED 18½-25, FISCAL YEARS 1959-63

[In thousands]

Pool	Fiscal year				
	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
Pool, beginning of year.....	1,010	1,100	1,220	1,420	1,610
Plus annual inflows to pool.....	710	740	830	840	800
Ages 18½-25 and volunteers aged 17-18½ ¹	700	730	820	830	790
Ages 26 and over.....	10	10	10	10	10
Less outflows from pool.....	620	620	630	650	670
Men entering active or reserve service.....	520	500	500	500	500
Inductees.....	120	80	100	90	90
Volunteers.....	310	330	310	310	310
Reserves.....	90	90	100	100	100
Reclassified to III-A ²	100	120	130	150	170
Pool, end of year.....	1,100	1,220	1,420	1,610	1,740
Nonfathers, aged 19-25.....	630	740	920	1,100	1,240
Fathers, aged 19-25.....	300	300	300	300	300
Under age 19.....	110	110	120	120	100
Ages 26 and over.....	60	70	80	90	100

¹ Estimated pool as of June 30, 1958. Includes 300,000 fathers and 50,000 men aged 26 and over.

² Men volunteering before reaching age 18½ are counted as in the military manpower pool.

³ Assumes that the number of fathers in the military manpower pool will not exceed 300,000 because of reclassification into class III-A—dependency deferments.

⁴ The nonfather pool in this table is smaller than that shown in table 1 because men aged 18½-19 are excluded from this figure.

NOTE: Because of rounding, sums of individual items may not equal totals.

SOURCE: Prepared from data of the U.S. Bureau of the Census and the U.S. Department of Defense.

to about 1,430,000. None of this increase is reflected in the number of men in the Armed Forces and there is therefore a substantial increase in the manpower pool and in the number of deferred men.

An even sharper rise from 1,150,000 to 1,430,000 occurs among 21-year-old men between 1958 and 1963. A relatively sharp drop from 460,000 to 350,000 in the number of 21-year-old men who will be or will have been in service is expected to occur. This drop is expected from assumptions regarding age of enlistment and the number of men expected to enlist in the years ahead. As a result of this decline as well as the increase in the size of the age group, the number of 21-year-old men not in service will increase by almost 400,000 between 1958 and 1963.

The size of the 23-year-old group is also expected to increase, but by only 100,000 during this period. The number of men in service in this age is expected to decline from 590,000 to 450,000. As a result, the number of men not in service will increase by about 240,000. The larger number of men in this and younger age groups not in service

in 1963 will mean that more of them will probably become fathers before being reached for induction.

Comparison of the 26-year-olds in 1958 and 1963 indicates that virtually no men are left in the pool in either year, but the number of deferred men (most of whom are fathers) is about 90,000 higher in 1963 and the number not qualified is 100,000 higher. Most of the increase in the number not qualified will result from the higher mental and physical standards now in effect. The increase between 1958 and 1963 in the draft-liable men who are expected to become fathers before being reached for induction is due to the larger number of men in the 26-year-old group in 1963 who will have had more years to become fathers.

Conclusions

The conclusions reached from the findings of this study of military manpower requirements and supply are:

1. There will be a more than adequate supply of men for military service in the next few years if it is assumed that the Armed Forces will remain at a level of about 2½ million.

2. Unless military manpower needs increase much more than is assumed here, virtually no fathers will be inducted in the years ahead.

3. As of now, a young man must count on serving if he meets the mental and physical standards, and does not become a father. Virtually no physically and mentally fit nonfathers who reached age 26 in 1958 escaped service. Similarly, among young men who will be 26 in 1963 (who were 21 years old in 1958), no physically and mentally fit nonfathers will escape service.

4. This study has particular significance for the young men who were 17 in 1959—most of whom will finish high school in 1960. There are a great many ways in which young men can satisfy their military obligation.⁷ Some will volunteer for active duty in one of the military services for terms of 3, 4, or more years. Others will volunteer for from 3- to 6-month periods of active duty for training and fulfill the remainder of their military obligation by participating in reserve programs. Those who do not choose to volunteer

⁷ These alternatives are described in detail in *It's Your Choice* (U.S. Department of Defense rev., 1958).

will wait until they are reached for induction. By 1963, when these men will be 21 years old, 350,000 are expected to have voluntarily entered the Armed Forces. Those who have not volunteered by 1963 will probably not be inducted until after 1963, and perhaps not until 1965 when they will be 23 years old—and then only if the induction authority is again extended. As a result, the nonvolunteers will have at least 4 or 5 years after completing high school during which they could complete a 4-year college education without being affected by the draft. For those who do not go to college, a similar time lapse would occur during which they may choose to begin a work career. Of course, men who do not volunteer may marry and become fathers during the time lag before they are reached for induction. Because the number of men who have not entered service by the time they are 21 years old is expected to increase sharply between 1958 and 1963, the number of draft eligibles in this age group who will become fathers before being reached for induction will probably increase significantly.

5. Another inference which can be drawn from this study is that it will become increasingly more difficult for young men to volunteer in the service of their choice in the years ahead. According to the assumption made by the Department of Defense regarding the number and age distribution of volunteers, there will be a significant drop between 1959 and 1963 in the number and proportion of men in each age who will have volunteered for active service. Since both the Air Force and Navy, who obtain nearly all of their manpower by voluntary enlistment, occasionally find themselves unable, even now, to accept all the men who volunteer in a given month, it is reasonable to expect that they will be more selective in the future in regard to volunteers. In the years ahead, as it becomes more difficult to enlist in the Air Force and Navy, it is possible that the Army (which is the only military branch to use inductees) may obtain enough volunteers so that it will not need as many inductees as has been indicated in this article.

6. Other considerations may change the expected number of inductees that will be needed in the years ahead. As the larger number of young men now in their early teens approach military age, they may find the competition for entry jobs keener for inexperienced workers and may volun-

tarily enter the Armed Forces in greater numbers than currently anticipated. On the other hand, as these young men become more aware that their chances of seeing service are getting smaller because their numbers are larger, some of these who volunteer only because they expect to be inducted anyway may decide to delay volunteering. Of course, these phenomena may offset each other.

7. While the official Department of Defense figures on military manpower requirements do not go beyond 1963 and the extension of the draft beyond that year will depend on the circumstances of that time, it is interesting to estimate what would happen thereafter, with the increase in population of military age, if there were no changes in military manpower policy. If it is assumed that the draft authority will again be extended, that current Selective Service rules and regulations will remain in effect, and that the Armed Forces strength will be continued at about 2.5 million (and it is dubious that all of these assumptions will hold true), the proportion of men who would not have been in service by the time they reach age 26 would continue to increase. The size of the population groups reaching age 26 will continue to get larger for several years after 1963, and as a result of the increase in the number of men not in service in each age group, a greater proportion would undoubtedly become fathers before being reached for induction than will be true in the 1958-63 period. It is even possible that some nonfathers could reach age 26 without having been in service.

8. It should be kept in mind that the estimates presented in this study are subject to a considerable margin of error. The projections were based on assumptions as to the behavior of individuals and economic conditions. These assumptions, based on past experience, appeared reasonable at the date of the study, but events may work out differently. For example, enlistment and reenlistment rates are strongly affected by the level of prosperity and by attitudes toward military service; fatherhood rates also may be affected by economic conditions as well as by the operation of the draft; the age of induction depends to a large extent on variable factors. It seems clear that an appraisal of the military manpower pool should be repeated at regular intervals in order to take into account changes in these relationships which may occur.

TECHNICAL APPENDIX

This appendix describes the methods of preparing estimates of the military manpower pool and the sources of data used in this study.

Manpower Pool, July 1, 1958

Estimates of the military manpower pool for June 30, 1958, (table 1), were prepared in the following manner:

Information on the total male population from ages 18½ to 25 in Continental United States in 1958 was obtained from unpublished estimates of the U.S. Bureau of the Census. These estimates were adjusted to allow for the population of the territories and to correspond with data from the Selective Service System and Military Departments which are tabulated by year of birth.

The numbers of men in each age group who had entered service by July 1958 were obtained from Department of Defense records. These were deducted from the total population to obtain the number who had not entered service.

An estimate of the number of men physically or mentally unfit for service was deducted from those available for service. An earlier study based on Selective Service data shows that in April 1953 about 22 percent of the young men who had been subject to physical examinations were not physically and mentally acceptable.¹ In August 1958, the standards of acceptability were raised by the Congress to permit the Armed Forces to reject a substantially larger proportion of men with low Armed Forces Qualification Test scores than was permitted before. This, along with other minor administrative changes, has had the effect of raising the rejection rate for the population to about 33 percent. Because many of the older age groups had already been fully examined before the standards were raised, the rejection rates were graduated from 22 percent at age 26 to 33 percent at age 19 and younger ages.

Dependency deferments (class III-A) were also deducted from the "available" group. The men in the III-A category in April 1953² were aged to July 1958 to obtain the number of this group still in the militarily liable age group. An estimate of new fathers and new hardship cases who had been classified as III-A was

made on the basis of an increase in the III-A group between July 1957 and July 1958. Age distributions of all the dependency deferments since April 1953 were based, in general, on the age distribution of men who had not entered service and estimated fatherhood rates for each age. A detailed discussion of methods of estimating fathers in June 1958 and the number becoming fathers in each year from 1958 to 1963 begins on page 10. An allowance was made also for men deferred because they were employed in certain critical occupations.

Estimates of the number of deferrable students who were physically and mentally fit for military duty were also deducted from men otherwise available in June 1958 since these men presumably would not be available for service until they discontinued their education. Virtually all students who maintain certain academic standards and attend school on a full-time basis are deferrable. Since those students who are fathers are deferrable under other Selective Service policies, they were not deducted as students in this computation.

The number of deferrable students was derived in the following manner:

(1) The number of enrolled male students, by single years of age, was available for October 1958 from unpublished Bureau of the Census data.

(2) The number of veterans enrolled in institutions of higher learning was available from the Veterans Administration. The age distribution of veterans in school was estimated by constructing a "normal" set of school enrollment rates from data for urban white males, in 1940, from the 1940 Decennial Census. These rates at the younger ages were reasonably comparable in level to the overall male rates in 1958 and were not affected by the inclusion of large numbers of older veteran students who attended school under the provisions of the various GI bills. By comparing that age pattern of these rates with those of the 1958 Census, an estimated normal age pattern of nonveteran enrollment rates was obtained. The number of part-time students

¹Military Manpower Requirements and Supply, 1954-60 (BLS Bull. 1161, March 1954), p. 37.

²A special survey was made in April 1953 of Selective Service Registrants which contained Selective Service classifications by single year of age of registrants.

was also estimated from 1958 Census data, as was the number of married men among full-time college students. In deriving the number of fathers who were students it was assumed that married students would have fatherhood rates about half that of the general population.

The rejection rate among all students was roughly estimated at 15 percent. Since very few college students fail the mental requirements test, and since slightly more than half of the rejectees are rejected for mental reasons, the rejection rate for these men was reduced to allow for this fact.

Projected Manpower Pool, 1959-63

The estimates of the military manpower pool in future years were computed by deducting annual outflows from the July 1958 pool and adding estimated annual inflows to the pool.

Outflows from the military manpower pool were prepared by the Department of Defense. They are based essentially on estimates of manpower losses owing to normal attrition and to the expiration of enlistments and tours of duty, since this study assumes a small decline in the size of the Armed Forces from 2.6 million in mid-1958 to 2.5 in mid-1959, and no change between 1959 and 1963. The total outflows from the military manpower pool also includes an estimate of the number of non-prior-service men who will enter the reserve forces. The number of men whose term of service will expire in the years ahead is estimated from records of past enlistments for each of the services. Not all of the men whose enlistments expire, however, require a replacement. About 85 to 90 of every 100 men who complete their second or higher tour of duty reenlist immediately after their term is over. Even among those completing their first enlistment, 25 to 30 percent reenlist. Among inductees, however, only 4 or 5 out of every 100 reenlist. Estimates based on experience and an appraisal of future developments were made of future levels of these rates. In addition to those men who reenlist immediately, an allowance was made for those men who re-enter service after a significant elapse of time.

Another estimated outflow from the manpower pool was made to allow for men who are expected to become fathers. An assumption was made, in preparing these estimates, that the number of fathers in the pool would not exceed 300,000 and all other draft-liable fathers would be classified as III-A.

Inflows to the Military Manpower Pool

The number of able-bodied men reaching age 18½ who will be available for military service in the next few years is based upon Bureau of the Census estimates of males reaching that age less an allowance for those who will not be physically and mentally acceptable to the Armed Forces and an allowance for able-bodied students who will be in school when they reach age 18½.

The inflows to the military manpower pool also include students who discontinue their education, because most become liable for the draft when they drop out of school or graduate. The estimates of the number of students who are eligible for the draft but who are deferred and the number who become available each year were computed as follows.

The proportion of males in each age group who were enrolled as full-time nonveteran students in October 1958 is described on page 8. These proportions were projected to 1963 using the rising trends indicated in the enrollment rates for men for the period 1947-58. Table 5 shows the assumed proportions of the male population deferrable as students during the future period 1959-63. An estimate of the number of students deferrable in each year from 1959-63 was obtained by applying the projected rates to the future population estimates. The number of students becoming available each year by discontinuing their education was obtained as the sum of differences between the number enrolled in draft-liable ages in one year and the number enrolled in the next older ages in the next year.

Table 5. Projected proportions of male population 18-25 years of age eligible for deferment as students, 1959-63

Age	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
18	42.8	45.8	48.9	51.9	53.8
19	24.0	25.6	27.3	28.9	30.5
20	17.9	19.0	20.2	21.4	22.4
21	13.8	14.6	15.4	16.3	17.2
22	9.0	9.6	10.1	10.6	11.1
23	5.5	5.8	6.1	6.4	6.7
24	3.4	3.6	3.7	3.9	4.0
25	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.9

Source: Based on data from the Bureau of the Census.

Estimates of the Number of Fathers in the Military Manpower Pool

Since nonfather inductees are called up for active duty before fathers it was necessary to break down the manpower pool accordingly. Men in the Selective Service ages who are not fathers represent the largest single source of military manpower. No direct data are available on the numbers of fathers in the population by detailed ages. For this reason, estimates were made of the number of fathers in the military manpower pool. Data from Selective Service records are available on the number of fathers in the LA classification, but these data are probably understated because of the large number of unclassified men and the normal lag in reclassification for status changes.

Data from the Bureau of the Census' Current Population Survey and from the National Office of Vital Statistics were used to obtain marriage rates for the civilian population for both men and women. Estimates also were made from the Current Population Surveys and Vital data of the percent of married women at each age who were mothers. By relating data on age of husbands to age of wives and to the proportion of wives at each age who are mothers, it was possible to estimate the proportions of men at each age who are fathers. To estimate the proportion of nonfathers in each age who will become fathers before reaching the next older age, the increase from age to age in the percent of all civilian males who are fathers was related to the proportion of men who were nonfathers in corresponding ages. The following tabulation shows the method of estimating the percent of men who are fathers at each age and the proportions of nonfathers who become fathers in each year of age.

The fatherhood rates derived in the manner described above were used to estimate the

number of fathers among otherwise draft-liable men in June 1958 and the number becoming fathers in each year. Because the changes of becoming a father prior to entering military service depend on how long men remain in the military manpower pool before they enter the Armed Forces, it was necessary to reconstruct for past periods and to estimate for future periods, the actual experience of each age group in regard to the time of entry into the Armed Forces. In order to do this, a distribution was obtained from the Bureau of the Census for each year from July 1956 to July 1963 of the male population in the Selective Service ages by single years of age. Men who entered upon military duty were deducted from each age group in the year in which they entered service. Deductions were also made from these population estimates to allow for the small proportion of the male population who are rejected for military service by the local draft boards immediately after they register at age $18\frac{1}{2}$, and the small proportion of each group which, it was assumed, will gain exempt status. An allowance was also made for the rejections³ in the population who, according to the normal Selective Service procedure, do not get examined until the last year or two before most of the men in their age group are reached for induction.

Estimates of the number of fathers among those remaining men who were not allowed for in these computations were made by applying the fatherhood rates described earlier. Estimates of the number of men becoming fathers in each age in each year were obtained by applying appropriate fatherhood rates for the nonfather civilian population in each age group who were not in service and who were not unfit for service as they passed from one age to the next older age.

³The rejection rate is discussed on page 8 .

Age (1)	Percent of male civilian population married (2)	Median age of wife corresponding with age of husband (3)	Percent of wives who are mothers at ages shown in column 3 (4)	Percent of men who are fathers (2) x (4) (5)	Percent of non-fathers becoming fathers during the year (6)
18	5	17.9	44	2	2
19	12	18.5	48	6	4
20	22	18.9	52	11	5
21	39	19.7	56	22	12
22	51	20.3	59	30	10
23	61	20.7	62	38	11
24	68	21.2	67	46	13
25	73	21.7	70	52	11