

MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS AND SUPPLY, 1954-60

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Bulletin No. 1161

**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
James P. Mitchell, Secretary
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS
Ewan Clague, Commissioner**

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No. 19 in a Series of Manpower Reports

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

United States Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Washington 25, D. C., February 19, 1954.

The Secretary of Labor:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a report on Military Manpower Requirements and Supply, Fiscal Years 1954-60. This report, originally prepared at the request of the Office of Defense Mobilization, is one of several studies of military manpower problems prepared in the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

The Bureau wishes to acknowledge the cooperation of the Department of Defense, the Selective Service System, the Office of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Bureau of the Budget, and other Federal agencies in providing unpublished data or commenting on drafts of this report.

This report was prepared by Stuart A. Pettingill and Stuart H. Garfinkle of the Division of Manpower and Employment Statistics, Seymour Wolfbein, Chief. Some of the techniques and methods of estimating used were developed in an earlier study in the series, prepared under the supervision of Calman R. Winegarden.

Ewan Clague, Commissioner.

Hon. James P. Mitchell,
Secretary of Labor.

Foreword

On August 1, 1953, the President of the United States asked the National Security Training Commission to submit to him, by December 1, 1953, recommendations with respect to the feasibility and desirability of initiating a national security training program (6 months universal military training) during a period in which inductions for 2 years' service in the Armed Forces would also be made. At the same time, he asked the Director of Defense Mobilization to submit a report on the availability of manpower to simultaneously operate a military training program, supply military personnel for active service, and meet the needs of the civilian economy.

The Director of Defense Mobilization established a Committee on Manpower Resources for National Security to assist him in evaluating the facts and formulating recommendations, and he asked the Department of Labor, and other Government agencies to provide information and recommendations bearing on these subjects. The Bureau of Labor Statistics was requested to prepare the present report and additional statistical analyses.

The purpose of this report is to provide estimates of the manpower pool available for military service under alternative assumptions as to the strength of the Armed Forces and national military manpower policies. No specific military manpower recommendations or suggestions are made or intended in this report.

A preliminary draft of the present report, identified as Manpower Report No. 19, which received limited circulation within the Government, was used by the National Security Training Commission and the Committee on Manpower Resources for National Security in preparing their reports. This preliminary report was amended and augmented in the form of addenda (which also received only limited circulation) in order to take account of changes in Armed Forces strength projections and to supply additional information on alternative levels of mobilization.

Although the Bureau of Labor Statistics has studied military manpower problems for many years and prepared a number of reports, the distribution of these reports has been limited because of security considerations. This report is the first which has been based on Armed Forces requirements data released for publication by the Department of Defense. In view of the general public interest in the problems, the present report is being published. It covers the material contained in the preliminary draft and addenda as well as revisions based on data received more recently from the Selective Service System's 1 percent

sample inventory of registrants, the Office of Education, and other sources. These supplementary data have permitted further refinements in techniques and more accurate projections. For this reason some of the data in this report differ from those credited to the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the reports of the Committee on Manpower Resources for National Security and the National Security Training Commission. However, these differences do not involve magnitudes which alter any conclusions which could be drawn from the original data.

The first part of this report deals with the number of men available for military service under current laws and regulations if the strength of the Armed Forces were maintained for the rest of the decade at approximately the level projected for the end of fiscal year 1955. On the basis of this analysis, subsequent sections show the effect on manpower supply of: (a) a National Security Training Program; (b) the maintenance of Armed Forces at approximately the level of the Korean emergency; and (c) maintaining the Armed Forces at roughly their current level. The closing sections deal with military manpower supply for a "stepped-up" partial mobilization such as might result from a further deterioration of the international situation, and for a full mobilization.

The hypothetical projections of Armed Forces strength of 3.03 and 3.36 millions, respectively, used in this report were provided by the Department of Defense; their use beyond fiscal 1955 does not reflect actual plans and policies of the Department of Defense which has not established plans for these years. The alternatives in the section dealing with a stepped-up partial mobilization are not intended as recommendations or suggestions by the Department of Labor, but solely as illustrations of the problems involved in reaching and maintaining an Armed Forces strength of 5 million men. Similarly, the levels of Armed Forces strength used to illustrate problems arising in a stepped-up partial mobilization and a full mobilization situation are merely assumptions, and do not represent Department of Defense plans.

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
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Chart 1. ESTIMATED MILITARY MANPOWER POOL

Fiscal Years 1954-60

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MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS AND SUPPLY, 1954-60

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

An appraisal of the military manpower pool¹ in relation to projected Armed Forces requirements through fiscal 1960 (the year ending June 30, 1960), leads to the following major conclusions bearing on the formulation of manpower policy:

1. More men will be available for military service than are required to maintain Armed Forces strength at 3,030,000 through fiscal 1960 under present Selective Service laws and deferment policies (chart 1).

The size of the Selective Service manpower pool will increase steadily to 1960, and the average age of induction will gradually rise to over 21 years by the end of fiscal 1960. This increase would permit a liberalization of deferment policies and practices if deemed desirable on other grounds.

2. Sufficient manpower would be available to conduct a National Security Training Program covering 200,000 men a year, provided Armed Forces strength would not have to be again increased to meet a new emergency. The desirability of instituting such a program, however, depends upon other factors than the supply of manpower.
3. If Armed Forces strength is further reduced in future years, there will be a more rapid increase in the size of the Selective Service manpower pool.
4. On the other hand, the maintenance of Armed Forces strength at 1953 levels (approximately 3.5 million) would cause a stringency in manpower supply by fiscal 1959. This illustrates the extreme sensitivity of the pool to relatively small changes in Armed Forces strength when projected over a period of years.

¹In this report, the Selective Service manpower pool refers to the estimated number of men who, at the end of each fiscal year, are physically and otherwise qualified; who are liable for the draft; and who would not be exempt from the draft or eligible for deferment if they were reached for induction.

During the present period of international tension, there is always the possibility of again having to increase Armed Forces strength. This consideration must be carefully weighed by manpower policy officials before any changes are made in present military manpower policies.

5. From now until 1960, military manpower supply would be roughly in equilibrium with Armed Forces requirements if the Armed Forces strength were maintained at about 3.36 million. This, of course, assumes the continuation of present number of enlistments, and present rejection and reenlistment rates and Selective Service laws and regulations. Larger Armed Forces would continue to deplete the pool until after 1960 (when there will be a substantial increase in number of men reaching military age) and smaller Armed Forces would result in an accumulation of men available for service.
6. If another emergency like that in Korea required a stepped-up partial mobilization, enough men could be obtained to expand the Armed Forces to 5 million in 1 year's time. Since the initial expansion would probably require an extension of the terms of service of men in the Armed Forces and the recall of Reserves, appropriate changes would have to be made in Selective Service laws and regulations and in legislation relating to the military reserves.

The maintenance of Armed Forces of this size would be increasingly difficult each year. This level could only be maintained by increasing the term of service of inductees and by a drastic reduction in deferments. These modifications would also require changes in current laws and regulations.

7. Armed Forces as large as in World War II could be raised within 3 years, but this would require obtaining a higher yield from men of military age than was achieved during World War II owing to the slight decline in the population of men of prime fighting age (18 through 29 years).
8. These estimates are believed to be generally conservative and sufficiently accurate, under the assumptions stated, to provide a statistical framework for manpower policy. The conclusions of this report are, of course, subject to reexamination as new data become available.

9. Since the pool is extremely sensitive to relatively small changes in Armed Forces strength, the formulation of military manpower policies requires a continuing reappraisal of such changes and other variables affecting the size of the manpower pool. Information should be collected and analyzed on such key points as rejection rates, enlistment and reenlistment rates, and the draft classification of students which also affect the size of the pool.

MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

The rapid expansion of the armed services after the Korean outbreak will continue to affect manpower procurement through fiscal 1960. During the first year after the outbreak of Korean hostilities (fiscal 1951), the Armed Forces were expanded over twofold. This expansion was achieved by calling up about 750,000 reservists and national guardsmen, by voluntary enlistments of 700,000, and by inducting almost 600,000 men through the Selective Service System. The next year (fiscal 1952) was largely a replacement year since net strength increased by only 400,000.

The larger number of inductions in fiscal 1951, as compared with fiscal 1952, created a replacement cycle which will continue through fiscal 1960. Armed Forces requirements are now somewhat higher in odd numbered years than in even numbered years. However, as a result of the projected reduction in Armed Forces strength during fiscal years 1954 and 1955, the amount of the year-to-year variation will be small.

The Armed Forces strength projections for future years and the estimates of expected gains and losses upon which this report is based were provided by the Department of Defense (table 1). These figures project a decline in net strength during fiscal 1954 from 3.56 million to 3.36 million, and during fiscal 1955 to 3.03 million. Thereafter, it is assumed that net strength will remain constant at 3.03 million through fiscal 1960. In preparing their estimates of Armed Forces gains and losses, the Department of Defense relied upon recent operating experience, modified wherever changes could be anticipated. The Department of Defense based its projections on the following stated assumptions as to the future:

1. No active military combat such as occurred in Korea.
2. Extension through fiscal 1960 of the Universal Military Training and Service Act and current regulations, with 24 months of service for inductees.

Table 1.-Projected Armed Services Manpower Requirements, Gains and Losses to Civilian Life, Fiscal Years, 1954-60
(In thousands)

Armed Forces	Fiscal year						
	1954	1955	1956 ^{1/}	1957 ^{1/}	1958 ^{1/}	1959 ^{1/}	1960 ^{1/}
Net strength, start of year	3,560	3,350	3,030	3,030	3,030	3,030	3,030
Personnel leaving service: ^{2/}							
Inductees	380	510	270	300	260	320	280
Enlistees	440	510	510	450	400	440	410
Officers	70	60	60	60	60	60	60
Total	890	1,080	840	810	720	820	750
Personnel entering service:							
Inductees	290	310	280	330	300	330	310
Enlistees	180	210	330	260	210	270	230
Subtotal from the Selective Service pool	(470)	(520)	(610)	(590)	(510)	(600)	(540)
Officers ^{3/}	40	40	40	40	40	40	40
Other ^{4/}	180	190	190	180	170	180	170
Total	690	750	840	810	720	820	750
Net strength, end of year	3,360	3,030	3,030	3,030	3,030	3,030	3,030

^{1/} End of fiscal year 1955 strength projected through fiscal year 1960; the actual strengths for fiscal year 1956 and beyond have not been established. The figures noted are considered reasonable for purposes of this study.

^{2/} Excludes immediate reenlistments and interservice transfers.

^{3/} Officer gains from ROTC, Reserves, and draft commissions.

^{4/} Includes female enlistments, male enlistments under 18-1/2, and other enlistments outside draft ages, enlistments of men with prior service, and enlistments of Reserves in deferred or exempt categories.

Source: U. S. Department of Defense.

3. Continuation of GI bill benefits, i. e., under Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952.
4. Approximate present manpower supply (as a pool for voluntary enlistments) with inductions limited mainly to men over 19-1/2 years of age.
5. No material change in present economic conditions and employment level.
6. No inductions under a National Security Training Program, but only inductions for 24 months of military service.

Estimates of the number of personnel leaving the Armed Forces range between 720,000 and 890,000 in even numbered years and between 810,000 and 1,080,000 in odd numbered years. Implicit in these estimates are assumptions as to the number who will reenlist (immediate reenlistments are not shown as either a gain or loss in table 1). The Department of Defense estimated that approximately 30 percent of their voluntary enlistees would reenlist when their terms of service expire, but that only 5 percent of the inductees would reenlist. This estimate was based on their most recent experience. One of the reasons for using a lower estimated reenlistment rate than used in earlier reports is the reasonable assumption that the large number of men who enlisted during the past 3 years as an alternative to being drafted will be less likely to remain in the service.

Although these estimates are the best that can be made from current information and experience, reenlistment rates vary widely with economic conditions; the age, rank, or length of service of the men whose enlistments are expiring; and other factors. Computations were made in an earlier study of the effect of varying reenlistment rates upon the Selective Service pool. Although computations in table 5 (p. 16) were based upon a higher Armed Forces net strength, they illustrate the effect of such variations on the year-end pool.

Expected gains, of course, equal losses (except in fiscal years 1954 and 1955 when net strength is being reduced). About 1 out of 4 of the men needed to make up Armed Forces losses in fiscal years 1954-60 will come from outside the pool, according to Department of Defense estimates. Officer gains from ROTC, the Reserves, and direct commissions are estimated at 40,000 each year. An estimated 130,000 men under 18-1/2 years of age are expected to

enlist each year. This figure, based on the actual fiscal 1953 experience, is about 30,000 below earlier projections because the Department of Defense anticipates a reduction in these enlistments resulting from the end of the fighting in Korea. Men with prior service, women, and other groups outside the pool are expected to provide an additional 40,000-60,000 enlistments a year.

However, the great majority of men will have to come from the pool, either by voluntary enlistment or induction. The number required will vary between 470,000 and 610,000 in even numbered years and 520,000-600,000 in odd numbered years.

One of the critical points in projecting requirements from the pool is estimating the number of men who will enlist rather than wait to be inducted. Since a 4-year enlistment provides the same manpower for the military as two inductions, a dropoff in enlistments from the pool would increase the total requirements from the pool. Recent experience is not a very reliable guide in estimating expected enlistments from the pool in fiscal years 1954-60 because of the fighting in Korea and several periods when enlistments in the Armed Forces were restricted by quotas during fiscal years 1949-53. For these and other reasons, estimated enlistments from the pool may contain a considerable margin of error. However, any change in the number of enlistments from the pool which might result from the end of the fighting in Korea would not affect the size of the pool until 2 years later.

MANPOWER AVAILABLE FOR SERVICE

In the first year of Korean hostilities (fiscal 1951) it was necessary to draw almost 1 million men from the Selective Service manpower pool through induction or enlistment in the Armed Forces. Almost 800,000 men were withdrawn from the pool in fiscal 1952 and over 800,000 in fiscal 1953. These drains rapidly exhausted the large backlog of draft eligibles available when Korean hostilities began. As a result, the Selective Service System was operating on a current basis in fiscal 1952 and 1953 since the year-end pool contained fewer men than were needed for the next year's draft calls.

As of August 25, 1953, all new dependency deferments were eliminated except in cases of extreme hardship. This removed one major factor contributing to the stringency of the pool and as a result almost all physically and mentally qualified men now reaching the age of liability (with the exception of those enlisting in the National Guard before age 18 and a few other small groups) will eventually be available for service.

Almost three-fourths of the 5.4 million persons whom the Armed Forces will need to draw from civilian life in fiscal years 1954-60 will come from these men who are subject to induction. This includes both those who actually will be inducted and those subject to induction who enter military service through enlistment.

To determine the prospective supply of men subject to induction, estimates were prepared of the numbers of men who are or will become liable for induction under the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 and present draft regulations. These estimates do not correspond with Selective Service data as to the number of registrants in various classifications because they allow both for expected losses from groups currently classified as available for service and for future gains from new registrants and from certain deferred categories. In the absence of direct data on a number of key points relating to the availability for service of registrants, the estimates were made by indirect methods, using collateral data on population characteristics and school enrollments, as well as Selective Service classification reports and their 1 percent sample inventory of registrants. The estimates may contain a considerable margin of error. However, assumptions and methods leading to conservative estimates of availability generally have been used.²

There were two major steps in estimating the number of men available for service. The first was to estimate the Selective Service pool as of the start of fiscal 1954; that is, the expected yield to the Armed Forces from those registered at that time and not in deferred classes. The second was to estimate the number of men becoming available for service each year from deferred classes and from young men reaching draft age.

Selective Service manpower pool as of July 1, 1953

At the start of fiscal 1954, there were approximately 1 million Selective Service registrants who were not in deferred or exempt classes or in the Armed Forces. More than half of these men were classified in I-A but had not received Armed Forces induction examinations. In estimating the yield from these sources, allowances were made for students enrolled in high school or college in the 1953 fall term. (See below.) Also subtracted were the estimated

² See appendix B for a description of sources of data, assumptions, and estimating techniques.

numbers who would be found unfit for service, those who would receive hardship dependency deferments, or those who had become fathers between July 1, 1953, and August 25, 1953, before being reached for induction. This left an estimated 550,000 men in the pool at the beginning of fiscal 1954 (table 2).

Of the estimated 745,000 full-time male nonveteran students of draft age enrolled in institutions of higher learning in the fall of 1953, there were approximately 210,000 who could not be accounted for in Selective Service classification reports, after allowances for the number of students in deferred or postponed classes, or disqualified for service. These students were presumed, therefore, to be in the I-A and "not classified" groups. Although not in specifically deferred or exempt classes, they were excluded from the July 1, 1953 base period pool. This was consistent with the assumption that current deferment and postponement policies would have the net effect of deferring nearly all college students until they graduate or drop out.³ Accordingly, the yield from all college students, whether or not in specifically deferred classes, was included in the inflows to the pool. A similar procedure was followed with respect to high school students.

The flow chart in appendix A (chart 3) illustrates the complexity of the flow of manpower from civilian life into and out of the Selective Service manpower pool and the Armed Forces. The chart shows the flows during fiscal 1955.

Inflows to the Selective Service pool, fiscal years 1954-60

Approximately 660,000 men will be added to the Selective Service pool during fiscal 1954. The numbers of men becoming available for service each year will increase gradually until they reach almost 800,000 during fiscal 1960. These inflows to the pool will consist largely of students who graduate or drop out of school and nonstudents reaching 18-1/2, after allowance for enlistment prior to this age, and Reserve or National Guard status. Appendix B describes in detail how inflows to the pool were estimated.

The year-end pool, 1954-60

Owing to the projected decreases in Armed Forces strength during fiscal years 1954 and 1955, the number of men becoming

³ College students may be deferred on the basis of class standing, Selective Service college qualification test scores, or enrollment in ROTC units. In addition, when first reached for induction, students may receive postponements to the end of their current academic year. (For a more detailed discussion of student deferment standards, see appendix B.)

Table 2.-Yields to the Selective Service Pool, by Selective Service Classification, July 1, 1953
(In thousands)

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Classification	Total number in class <u>1/</u>	Estimated deductions	Estimated net yield to pool
Total I-A, examined and acceptable	270	-	-
Less: Last minute deferments	-	5	-
Rejections at induction stations	-	15	-
Yield to pool	-	-	250
Total I-A, not examined, 18-1/2-25 years of age	580	-	-
Less: Students not elsewhere classified (and eligible for deferment)	-	210	-
Other deferments	-	20	-
Rejections (IV-F) expected from men not eligible for deferment	-	100	-
Yield to pool	-	-	250
Total not classified over 18-1/2 years of age	180	-	-
Less: Men who have already served in the Armed Forces	-	75	-
High school students (eligible for deferment)	-	15	-
College students (eligible for deferment)	-	15	-
Other deferments	-	5	-
Rejections (IV-F) expected from men not eligible for deferment	-	20	-
Yield to pool	-	-	50
Total number, July 1, 1953	<u>2/</u> 1,030	-	550

1/ Computed from Selective Service data.

2/ There were 13,070,000 men in classes not shown in this table and 350,000 men (under 18-1/2) who had not been classified on July 1, 1953. However, none of these men could have been available for service on July 1, 1953.

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available for service thereafter will exceed the number leaving to enter the Armed Forces each year. Therefore, the Selective Service pool will increase steadily from the 550,000 men who were available at the beginning of fiscal 1954 to 1,670,000 men at the end of fiscal 1960 (table 3).

Caution should be used in interpreting these findings. The Selective Service pool does not remain constant during the year. Since a fairly large number of high school and college students move into the pool in late May and early June each year, because of graduations and dropouts, the pool reaches its lowest level in the months immediately preceding this influx. The pool level also fluctuates because of variations in monthly military requirements.

Furthermore, the indirect methods used in making these estimates--and the basic assumptions as to enlistments, reenlistments, and rejection rates--may involve some error.⁴ While errors in estimating the base period pool are merely carried across in each year-end pool, errors in projecting inflows to the pool, or outflows to the armed services, may be compounded each year since they are derived by the same technique and from the same assumptions. It is improbable, however, that such errors would all be in one direction. For these and other reasons, the pool projections become less reliable with each succeeding year.

Despite all the uncertainties involved in estimating so far into the future, the evidence is clear that the supply of manpower is more than ample to maintain an Armed Forces strength of 3.03 million through fiscal 1960 (table 3). This would be true even with more pessimistic assumptions as to reenlistment and rejection rates.

Since more men become available each year than enter the Armed Forces, the average age of induction will rise gradually until it reaches over 21 by fiscal 1960. If Armed Forces strength is reduced below 3 million in future years, there will be even more manpower available for military service. On the other hand, the maintenance of Armed Forces strength at current levels would cause a stringency in manpower supply by fiscal 1959. The extreme sensitivity of the year-end pool to relatively small changes in Armed Forces strength projected over a period of years is shown in chart 2.

⁴ Table 5, p. 16, indicates the range of error in the estimates which would result from changes in these variables.


Table 3.-Projections of Selective Service Manpower Pool, Fiscal Years 1954-60
(Armed Forces Strength of 3.03 Million Men)

(In thousands)

Pool	Fiscal year						
	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Pool, start of year	550	740	890	970	1,090	1,300	1,440
Plus men becoming available for service:							
18-1/2 year olds	420	430	440	460	460	480	510
Deferments expiring (largely students)	240	240	250	250	260	260	260
Total men becoming available	<u>660</u>	<u>670</u>	<u>690</u>	<u>710</u>	<u>720</u>	<u>740</u>	<u>770</u>
Less men leaving to enter the armed services.	<u>-470</u>	<u>-520</u>	<u>-610</u>	<u>-590</u>	<u>-510</u>	<u>-600</u>	<u>-540</u>
Pool, end of year	740	890	970	1,090	1,300	1,440	1,670

Chart 2. ESTIMATED YEAR-END MILITARY MANPOWER POOL FISCAL YEARS, 1953-60

Under Various Armed Forces Strength Projections ...



As long as the international situation remains uncertain there is always a possibility of having to increase the Armed Forces strength again. If such a situation occurs the substantial manpower pool shown by these estimates would gradually disappear. If the assumption is made, however, that the reduction in Armed Forces strength below 3 million would continue to 1960, this would permit changes in present laws and regulations with respect to increasing deferments, raising mental and physical standards, or instituting a program of universal military training. The desirability of such changes, of course, would depend on many other factors beyond the scope of this report, factors which might be of overriding importance to those responsible for formulating manpower policy.

THE EFFECT OF A NATIONAL SECURITY TRAINING PROGRAM ON THE POOL

The National Security Training Commission has proposed a program of universal military training which would operate concurrently with inductions for 2 years' service in the Armed Forces. All physically and otherwise qualified young men reaching 18 years of age would be liable for 6 months' National Security Training or 2 years' service in the Armed Forces. Men not needed for service would be selected by lot and inducted for National Security Training through the Selective Service System. Upon completion of their training, they would serve in an immediately callable reserve for 7-1/2 years.

With Armed Forces strength stabilized at 3.03 million men in fiscal years 1954 to 1960, sufficient manpower would be available to conduct a National Security Training Program covering 200,000 men a year without any further change in laws and regulations other than those required to implement the program (table 4).

If laws and regulations were changed, as proposed by the National Security Training Commission,⁵ more than 200,000 men could be trained each year and still leave over 400,000 men in the pool at the end of each year. They have proposed modifying current laws and regulations to make National Security Training a prerequisite for the deferment of men who join the National Guard before reaching age 18-1/2 and so that college students (or high school graduates planning to attend college) selected in a National Security Training lottery would not be eligible for deferment from National Security Training.

⁵In their report to the President, "20th Century Minutemen," National Security Training Commission, December 1, 1953.

Table 4.-The Year-End Military Manpower Pool With 200,000 Men in a National Security Training Program Each Year ^{1/}

(In thousands)

Fiscal year	The year-end pool
1955	770
1956	630
1957	530
1958	520
1959	440
1960	450

^{1/} Assumptions: (1) The training program begins on January 1, 1955; (2) 100,000 men are trained in fiscal 1955 and 200,000 each year thereafter; (3) The ratio of trainees to training staff is 5:1. The training staff is in addition to the projected Armed Forces strength and regular service personnel detached for training can be replaced for inductees; (4) All other assumptions as in table 3.

THE MILITARY MANPOWER POOL, WITH ARMED FORCES STRENGTH AT 3.36 MILLIONS

If international conditions require the maintenance of Armed Forces of 3.36 million men--a level that was considered at one time by the Department of Defense--enough men would be available to maintain this strength through fiscal 1960 without any changes in legislation or deferment policy if the basic assumption as to reenlistment and rejection rates remained valid. The estimated year-end Selective Service pool would be as follows:

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>Year-end pool¹</u> (in thousands)
1953	550
1954	740
1955	550
1956	610
1957	510
1958	680
1959	590
1960	760

¹ These pool figures were computed from the same manpower supply figures used earlier in this report, from Armed Forces strength projections at the 3.36 million level, and from expected accessions and separations provided by the Department of Defense which were based upon the same assumptions as their 3.03 million projections.

These estimates indicate that fiscal 1957 would be the most critical year, with a year-end pool of 510,000 men--less than the projected inductions (515,000) for that year. Enough men would be left in the pool to permit the Selective Service System to meet its monthly calls and still maintain a flow of registrants undergoing classification or examination prior to induction.⁶

⁶ As pointed out previously, the Selective Service pool does not remain constant during the year. Moreover, an error in projecting inflows to the pool or in estimating reenlistment and rejection rates could have a significant effect upon the size of the year-end pool.

Table 5.— Year-End Military Manpower Pool Under Varying Reenlistment and Rejection Rates

(In thousands)

	Fiscal year						
	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
<u>Reenlistment rates assumed, rejection rate and other factors constant:</u>							
Low reenlistment rates (20 percent) <u>1/</u>	690	450	440	290	380	230	350
Best estimate (30 percent) <u>1/</u>	740	550	610	510	680	590	760
High reenlistment rates (40 percent) <u>1/</u>	800	670	790	740	980	950	1,170
<u>Rejection rates assumed, reenlistment rate and other factors constant:</u>							
High rejection rates <u>2/</u>	700	490	530	410	560	440	590
Best estimate <u>3/</u>	740	550	610	510	680	590	760
Low rejection rates <u>4/</u>	790	620	700	620	810	740	940

1/ Assumes that 20, 30, or 40 percent, respectively, of all voluntary enlistees will reenlist when their terms of service expire.

2/ Assumes a rejection rate of 27 percent for the entire nonstudent population, 24 percent for high school students, and 13 percent for college students.

3/ Assumes a rejection rate of 25 percent for the entire nonstudent population, 22 percent for high school students, and 12 percent for college students.

4/ Assumes a rejection rate of 23 percent for the entire nonstudent population, 20 percent for high school students, and 11 percent for college students.

Table 5 indicates what would happen to the year-end pool if two of the major variables affecting the size of the pool--the reenlistment and rejection rates--were altered. If the proportion of enlistees who reenlist upon completing their terms of service were to decline from current levels (approximately 30 percent) to 20 percent in fiscal 1959 the year-end pool would approach the lowest operating level considered administratively feasible by the Selective Service System.

THE MILITARY MANPOWER POOL WITH ARMED FORCES STRENGTH AT 3.5 MILLION

The maintenance of an Armed Forces strength of 3.5 million men (approximately the present level) would bring the estimated year-end pool in fiscal 1959 and 1960 below the lowest operating level considered administratively feasible by the Selective Service System. The estimated year-end pool (for an Armed Forces strength of 3.5 million) is shown in the following tabulation:

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>Year-end pool¹</u> (In thousands)
1954	600
1955	400
1956	320
1957	210
1958	230
1959	140
1960	160

¹ These projections are based on the same assumptions that were used in projecting the pool estimates for Armed Forces of 3.36 million. It was assumed that the difference in strength (between 3.36 and 3.5 million) would be made up entirely by induction and that these additional inductees would experience the same attrition rates (6 percent) while in the service as other inductees.

Armed Forces of this size could be maintained in fiscal years 1959 and 1960 by relatively small changes in Selective Service regulations or procedures, e. g., by reducing deferments and lowering rejection standards. This, of course, assumes the continuation of the present reenlistment experience. Any substantial drop in reenlistments would necessitate more drastic revisions in Selective

Service regulations and might require changes in legislation.

It is concluded, therefore, that Armed Forces of 3.5 million men is about the maximum that could be maintained until 1960 within the framework of current laws and regulations.

MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS AND SUPPLY FOR A STEPPED-UP PARTIAL MOBILIZATION

The possibility of a military emergency short of full-scale war, but requiring larger Armed Forces than we now have, must be considered in assessing the adequacy of our military manpower supply. During its deliberations, the Committee on Manpower Resources for National Security requested information from the Bureau of Labor Statistics on the military manpower problems which would result from a partial mobilization to meet another Korean-type emergency. Since some assumptions as to the timing and extent of the expansion in Armed Forces strength are necessary for such estimates, the committee requested that the Bureau use the following illustrative assumptions in the analysis: a national emergency might occur on July 1, 1954, which would require a buildup of Armed Forces strength to 5 million men; and this expansion would have to be completed within 1 year (by June 30, 1955) and be maintained indefinitely. Both the strength figure and the dates were selected purely for illustrative purposes, and in no way reflect strategic plans of the Department of Defense.

In preparing these estimates, no allowances were made for combat losses. The estimates, therefore, may understate the difficulties involved in a partial mobilization. An allowance of 6 percent a year was made for normal attrition among all members of the Armed Forces--a rate consistent with the experience of the Department of Defense. Major reasons for this attrition are physical and mental disabilities developing during a military service, unsuitability for service, and desertions.

Expanding the Armed Forces to 5 million men would represent more than a partial mobilization. This is about the same number of men as were mobilized in World War I. Never in the history of this country, not even in World War II, were so many men under arms for so long a period as that projected in the present report.

Increasing the Armed Forces from 3.36 million to 5 million men would require an additional 1.9 million men, after allowing for normal attrition, and assuming that the term of service of all men in Armed Forces whose tours of duty expire during fiscal 1955 would be extended 1 year (table 6). This assumption has been used in all the computations in this section because the requirements for such an unprecedented peacetime strength suggests an immediate deployment in strength which could be obtained in no other way.

Table 6.-Armed Forces Requirements Resulting From Expansion of
Net Strength From 3.36 Million to 5 Million

(In thousands)

Armed Forces strength goal, June 30, 1955	-----	5,000
Armed Forces strength, June 30, 1954	3,360	-----
Less 6 percent attrition <u>1/</u>	<u>-200</u>	-----
Personnel remaining on June 30, 1955	-----	<u>-3,160</u>
Net inflows required to achieve 5 million net strength by June 30, 1955	-----	1,840
Gross inflows required (after allowing for attri- tion on inflows at 3 percent <u>2/</u> (1,840 * .97)...	-----	1,900

1/ The Department of Defense estimates normal attrition at 6 per-
cent per year.

2/ Since these men would enter military service during the year,
they would be subject, on the average, to only a half year's
attrition.

The manpower problems involved would be more difficult in some ways than those presented by full mobilization. Under full mobilization, almost everyone qualified for service would have to enter the Armed Forces, including ex-servicemen. In a large partial mobilization, however, some--but not all--men of military age with prior service might have to serve again. Policymakers would be faced with the problem of "double jeopardy" for some groups in the face of a general desire to equalize the burden of military service among all groups.

To achieve and maintain Armed Forces of 5 million men would require changes in Selective Service laws and regulations and in legislation relating to the military Reserves. The alternative sources of the additional manpower required and the estimated number of men each alternative would produce are shown in table 7. It is apparent that no single one of the alternatives shown would provide enough men to expand the Armed Forces to 5.0 million men. It is also apparent that it is feasible to raise the 1.9 million men required by some combination of alternatives. The choice of alternatives would depend in large measure upon the nature and anticipated duration of the emergency.

A national emergency which would require the immediate deployment of large Armed Forces would necessitate recalling most of the active Reserves and the National Guard--since these men would require a minimum of training--in addition to extending the term of service of men already in the Armed Forces. On the other hand, a steady deterioration of the international situation might permit a buildup to 5 million men without the use of men with prior service except for officer and technical personnel drawn from the Reserves.

While it is feasible to obtain enough men to increase the Armed Forces to 5 million, the maintenance of forces of this size is much more difficult, and the difficulty increases each year. The yield from among young men reaching military age cannot be expanded appreciably, although some additional men might be obtained by lowering rejection standards and tightening deferment policies. Lowering the age of liability or eliminating student deferments, while providing an immediate increment of untrained men in an emergency, will not provide any more men over an extended period of time because these men eventually see service anyway. Moreover, the elimination of student deferments might jeopardize the future supply of trained scientists, technical and other personnel, and thereby endanger the national security.

The continued maintenance of an Armed Force of 5 million men can only be accomplished by extending the term of service. How long a tour of duty would be required depends on other military

Table 7.-Estimated Maximum Yield to the Armed Forces From Various Sources of Military Manpower, Fiscal Year 1955

(In thousands)

Source	Estimated number
One-year extension of the terms of service of all men in the Armed Forces (assumed in all computations)	<u>1/</u> 1,290
Recall of all active Reserve and National Guardsmen	1,770
Exhausting the Selective Service manpower pool	1,470
Eliminating all student deferments, including ROTC	<u>2/</u> 710
Drafting pre-August 25, 1953 fathers	750
Lowering age of liability to 18	<u>3/</u> 430
Drafting able-bodied veterans under age 26 with less than 24 months' service	<u>4/</u> 75
Increased use of women	<u>5/</u> -
Manpower which might be obtained from increasing male enlistments outside the draft age and increasing reenlistments	<u>5/</u> -

1/ Resulting from a 1-year extension of the terms of service of all men whose tours of duty expire in fiscal year 1955, less an allowance of 6 percent for normal attrition, and 1-year extension of the terms of service of all inductees whose tours of duty expire in fiscal 1956, less an allowance of 6 percent for normal attrition.

2/ The number of additional men which could be obtained if all student deferments were eliminated on June 30, 1954.

3/ The number of additional men which could be obtained if the age of liability was lowered from 18-1/2 to 18 years of age on June 30, 1954, without elimination of high school student deferments.

4/ Approximated.

5/ Cannot be quantified.

manpower policies, including the way in which the initial expansion was achieved. The term would be somewhat shorter if reserves were called up to achieve the initial expansion than if it were achieved by exhausting the pool and eliminating college and pre-August 25, fatherhood deferments. It could be shorter still if larger numbers of men and women not subject to the draft could be induced to enlist or if a higher proportion of men in the service were to reenlist.

Each year that the 5 million strength level is maintained, policymakers will have fewer alternatives to choose from and more vexing problems to solve. For example, the maintenance of this strength to 1960 and beyond would require a 3-year term of service for all inductees (more service than most veterans of World War II had), the recall of most of the active Reserves (many of whom have at least one combat tour) and an improvement in the current Armed Forces enlistment and reenlistment experience. As an alternative to recalling Reserves, the term of induction could be extended to 4 years.

Estimates of the year-end Selective Service manpower pool were made for fiscal years 1955-60 based upon manpower policies which might be adopted to meet two sharply different strategic situations. These policies were selected only to illustrate the extremes within which policy might be formulated in a hypothetical partial mobilization; they are not intended as recommendations by the Department of Labor. Owing to limitations of time and staff, the estimates could not be prepared with the detail or accuracy of the estimates contained in the earlier sections of this report.

In the first instance--"Model I"--the national emergency requires an immediate deployment of large Armed Forces. Getting the trained men quickly can only be accomplished by extending the terms of service 1 year and recalling most of the active Reserve and National Guard for 21-month tours of duty. It is assumed that existing laws and regulations would be modified to permit the Selective Service System to: (1) induct all men for 3 years; (2) draft pre-August 25, 1953, fathers; (3) reduce college deferments when required; (4) lower the age of liability to age 18 when required. It is further assumed that an additional 50,000 men and women not liable for the draft could be induced to enlist (or reenlist) each year.

The estimated year-end pool and the detailed assumptions as to Reserve recalls and draft policies are shown in table 8. In this model, it would not be necessary to draft fathers until fiscal 1957, although a higher yield could be obtained from this group if they were drafted immediately. College deferments would not have to be reduced until fiscal 1959 when almost half of them would have to be

Table 8. - Projected Year-End Military Manpower Pool, Fiscal 1954-60, Based on Various Assumptions as to Sources of Manpower for the Buildup and Maintenance of 5 Million Armed Force.¹

(In thousands)

Fiscal Year	MODEL I: Large-scale recalls of Reserves and National Guard; 3-year induction	MODEL II: Limited recall of Reserves or National Guard; 4-year inductions
	1954	800
1955	1,450	975
1956	1,150	300
1957	465	416 ²
1958	310	785
1959	235 ²	380
1960	40 ³	245 ³

¹ Estimates are based on the following assumptions: (1) The Armed Forces expand from 3.36 million to 5 million during fiscal year 1955; (2) The terms of service of all men whose tours of duty expire during fiscal 1955 are extended 1 year and all inductees whose terms of service expire during fiscal 1956 have to serve another year; (3) Enlistments from the pool, officer gains, reenlistments, etc., are all assumed to remain the same as in the Department of Defense 3.36 million projections. (Although this is an unrealistic assumption, with 3- and 4-years inductions, changes in these rates have only a moderate effect upon the pool so the possible error is minimized.); (4) The expansion in fiscal 1955 and the maintenance of the new strength are achieved by:

MODEL I

Recalling 850,000 Reservists and National Guardsmen and inducting 860,000 men from the Selective Service pool. 280,000 men are obtained from outside the pool by voluntary enlistment. (600,000 Reservists and National Guardsmen serve 21-month tours of duty.)

Inducting men for 3-year terms from the following groups in the order listed:

- Pre-August 1953 fathers;
- Men reaching 18-1/2, high school and college graduates, and dropouts;
- College students (deferment standards would be tightened);
- Men 18-18-1/2 not in high school nor eligible for college deferment.

Obtaining 50,000 additional enlistments (or reenlistments) each year from men with prior service, women, and other groups outside the Selective Service manpower pool.

MODEL II

Obtaining 1,245,000 men from the augmented Selective Service pool, recalling 350,000 Reserve and National Guard officers and technical personnel for 2-year tours of duty, and obtaining 305,000 men from outside the pool by voluntary enlistment.

Inducting men for 4-year terms from the same groups in the same order as in Model I.

Obtaining 75,000 additional enlistments (or reenlistments) each year from men with prior service, women, and other groups outside the Selective Service manpower pool.

² College deferments would have to be restricted enough to provide an estimated 200,000 - 350,000 men in these years. This would require the elimination of almost half of all college deferments and reduce college graduations by 40 percent. The number of graduate students would be cut in half.

³ An estimated 300,000 men age 18 - 18-1/2 (not in high school nor eligibles for college deferments) would have to be drawn into the pool in these years. This would require lowering the age of registration to 17-1/2 to provide Selective Service with an operating margin.

eliminated. This would reduce college graduations by about 40 percent and cut the number of graduations in half. Draft calls until fiscal 1960 could be met from among men over 18-1/2 years of age.

During fiscal 1960, however, the pool would be almost exhausted--even of 18-year olds. In fiscal 1960, the age of registration would have to be lowered to 17-1/2 to provide the Selective Service System with an operating margin or additional men would have to be obtained from some other source.

Although it might be argued that this model yields the most effective results from a long-range "manpower management" standpoint, it might not be feasible or desirable because:

1. The duration of the emergency might not be foreseen far enough ahead to implement it;
2. The recall of large numbers of veterans in the Reserves and drafting of the pre-August 25 fathers while college students are permitted to remain in school might be unacceptable to the public even though a greater yield could be obtained from this group if they were drafted immediately.

The other extreme--Model II--might be feasible in an emergency which required an equally rapid buildup but which would not require the immediate deployment of many trained troops. Under such strategic conditions, the expansion and maintenance of the Armed Forces might be accomplished largely with untrained men and would not require an extensive recall of Reserves and veterans. The terms of service of men in the Armed Forces at the beginning of the emergency would still have to be extended and officer and technical personnel would have to be drawn from the Reserves to provide the large training complement needed for so many untrained recruits. Even then, because of the large number of experienced men required as training staff, the effective strength which could be deployed during the early months of the emergency would be less than under the 3.36 million strength level. While the probability of such a "convenient" emergency is rather remote, the computations on this basis may be useful to illustrate the manpower problems which would result from using untrained men for the buildup instead of the Reserves.

This model is based on the same changes in laws and regulations (except for 4-year inductions) as the earlier one. Table 8 shows the estimated year-end pool and the detailed assumptions

it is based upon. The very heavy inductions during fiscal 1955 would require drafting most of the pre-August 25, 1953, fathers during that year. College deferments would have to be reduced in fiscal 1957, but not as sharply as in "Model I" until fiscal 1960. During fiscal 1960, the age of liability would have to be lowered to 18 and the age of registration to 17-1/2.

This manpower policy would be certain to create strong public opposition on the basis of equity. It would create a new class of veterans with more service than the veterans of any of the Nation's wars.

The manpower policy adopted in the event of a partial mobilization would probably be a compromise between these two extremes-- especially since it would probably not be anticipated initially that such an emergency would continue for 6 or more years.

Thus, it appears that the maintenance of Armed Forces of 5 million for an indefinite period would impose severe economic, social, and political strains on the Nation.

MILITARY MANPOWER SUPPLY FOR FULL MOBILIZATION

An appraisal of our military manpower resources for full mobilization is an essential part of any analysis of military manpower requirements and supply. The Committee on Manpower Resources for National Security requested information from the Bureau of Labor Statistics on our manpower resources for full mobilization. Since the population of military age varies from year to year, the Committee recommended that, for purposes of illustration, fiscal year 1957 be assumed as the year in which full mobilization would be achieved. The analysis that follows is, therefore, purely hypothetical and in no way reflects the mobilization planning of the Department of Defense or of any other agency.

In the absence of data on the probable size of the Armed Forces, the following analysis was based on World War II Armed Forces strength. Although any future period of mobilization would probably be quite different from World War II, the World War II experience serves as a guide in estimating the manpower available for military service in event of full mobilization.

No attempt was made to evaluate the feasibility of providing adequate manpower for both the Armed Forces and civilian work force. The estimates, therefore, shed no light on the critical problems of balance of military and civilian manpower. However, studies are now being conducted by Government agencies which explore the optimum balance between Armed Forces strength and manpower requirements for war supporting production.

Owing to the lack of information as to probable combat or civilian losses resulting from enemy action, no allowance was made for such losses. This analysis, therefore, depicts the possibility of military manpower mobilization under the most favorable conditions--conditions we could not expect would obtain in war.

During World War II, the Armed Forces reached a peak of approximately 12.3 millions in June 1945 after experiencing appreciable combat losses. If the same proportion of men were obtained from each age group as in World War II, the Armed Forces would only reach 12.3 million before allowance for combat losses (table 9). The military manpower supply in fiscal year 1957 would, therefore, be somewhat smaller than in World War II.

Moreover, the Armed Forces personnel would be older than during World War II because there has been a decline in the population of prime fighting age (men 18 through 29 years of age) since that time. While this decline is more than offset by the increase in the male population in ages 26 to 38, the latter group yields a much lower proportion of men for military service because more men in this group are rejected for physical disabilities or deferred for occupational or dependency reasons. The disadvantages in using older men in the Armed Forces may be partially offset by their greater skills which are required by the increasing technological complexity of modern warfare.

The withdrawal of the same proportion of men in the age groups 30 to 38 as in World War II would probably work greater hardship on war supporting industry than in World War II. Over a million more men in the age groups 25 to 35 (an age group in which the supply of men would be favorable in 1957 compared with World War II) were employed in professional and skilled occupations in 1950 than in 1940.⁷

For these reasons, it would be more difficult to obtain the same number of men as in World War II even though the male population in the age group 18 to 38 has increased slightly since then. The yield from the age groups 18 to 30 would probably have to be increased above that in World War II, although this might be difficult to accomplish.

⁷Derived from the 1940 and the 1950 Census of Population data on employed professional, technical, and kindred workers and craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers by age groups.

Table 9. - Age Distribution of the Armed Forces Under a Hypothetical Full Mobilization

(In thousands)

Age group	Estimated male population, June 30, 1957	Men in the Armed Forces on June 30, 1957, using World War II Armed Forces participation rates		Men in the Armed Forces on June 30, 1945
		Rate (percent) <u>1/</u>	Number <u>2/</u>	Number <u>3/</u>
18 - 25 years - - -	8,830	71	6,450	6,710
26 - 29 years - - -	4,590	53	2,500	2,515
30 - 34 years - - -	5,930	30	1,840	1,785
35 - 38 years - - -	4,700	21	1,020	860
Under 18 and over 38 years - - - -	-----	--	490	430
Total - - - -	24,050		12,300	12,300

1/ These rates pertain only to men in the service at a given time and underestimate the total yield to the Armed Forces from each age group. A much higher proportion of men in each age group were in service at some time during World War II, but some of these men were discharged before June 1945 and some entered service after that date.

2/ Includes 300,000 women distributed according to the age of the women in the Armed Forces on June 30, 1945.

3/ Includes almost 300,000 women distributed according to age.

Source: Estimated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics from data provided by the Bureau of Census, the Department of Defense, and the Veterans Administration.

Table 10.—Population of Military Age on July 1, 1954, by Military Status and Age

(In thousands)

Age group	Estimated male population	In the Armed Forces	Veterans	Other ^{1/}
Under 18 years	^{2/} 4,300	40	-----	4,260
18-25 years	8,810	2,420	2,030	4,360
26-29 years	4,690	290	3,220	1,180
30-34 years	6,060	280	5,100	680
35-38 years	4,510	140	3,000	1,370
Total 18-38 years	^{2/} 28,370	^{3/} 3,360	13,350	11,850

^{1/} A very high proportion of the "other" men will not be suitable for service—particularly in the age groups from which World War II and Korean military manpower was drawn.

^{2/} Includes all men under 18 years at the beginning of the mobilization who will reach 18 years before June 30, 1957.

^{3/} Includes 150,000 men over 38 years of age and 40,000 women.


Source: Data estimated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics from data provided by the Bureau of Census, the Department of Defense, and the Veterans Administration.

In summary, our supply of manpower for military service would be somewhat smaller than in World War II; the Armed Forces, if as large, would include a smaller proportion of men of prime fighting age; and the impact on industry's skilled and professional manpower would be greater.

The initial expansion, however, would be easier than in World War II because the mobilization would be starting from a higher base. The Armed Forces would have approximately 3 million men to begin with. In addition, a much larger trained Reserve and a larger veteran population of military age is available. There will be approximately 15 million veterans of military age on July 1, 1954. This figure includes most of the estimated 2 million men who will be in the Reserves and National Guard at that time (some Reservists and Guardsmen will not be veterans and some will be over age 38). A substantial proportion of these men would be available for military service after allowance for high rejection and occupational deferment rates. This relatively large reservoir of trained men would facilitate the initial expansion and not create the severe training cadre problems faced in World War II (table 10).

Chart 3. FLOW CHART ILLUSTRATING THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE INTO AND OUT OF THE MILITARY MANPOWER POOL AND THE ARMED FORCES

Fiscal Year 1955



APPENDIX A
IXChart illustrating the flows of manpower into and out of the Armed Forces

Men and women enter the Armed Forces in various ways. For some, military service is delayed by deferment; others fail to pass minimum physical or mental requirements at one stage or another; a few are exempted. These diverse situations complicate not only the estimating of our military manpower potential but also a ready understanding of the process and the estimates.

The chart illustrates the flow of manpower from civilian life into and out of the Selective Service manpower pool and the Armed Forces during fiscal 1955. It should be noted that this is a closed system in that everyone reaching military age must be accounted for in some flow. These flows must either enter the pool or Armed Forces (shown as tanks or reservoirs in the chart), return to civilian life, or go into a future year (and eventually enter the pool, Armed Forces, or return to civilian life). The flow to and from civilian life must balance or cause corresponding changes in the level of the pool or Armed Forces "reservoirs." The circled numbers below refer to corresponding numbers on the chart.

- (1). The size of the Armed Forces, as determined by National Security considerations, is the starting point in this chart. During fiscal 1955, projected Armed Forces strength declines from 3,360,000 to 3,030,000 men.
- (2). Owing to the decline in net strength, the number of men leaving the Armed Forces (1,090,000) will exceed the inflow from civilian life by 330,000.
- (3) (4) (5). An estimated 230,000 of the 750,000 personnel which the Armed Forces will have to obtain from civilian life can be obtained outside the Selective Service pool from the five sources shown on the chart:

(3) Female enlistments	10,000
(3) Officer gains from the Reserves and direct commissions,	10,000
(3) Enlistments from among men with prior service	50,000
(4) Enlistments of men under 18-1/2 years of age	130,000
(5) ROTC graduates	<u>30,000</u>
Total	230,000
- (6). The remaining men (520,000) will have to be obtained from the Selective Service pool either through voluntary enlistment or induction.
- (7). The Selective Service pool contains all men (at any given time such as the end of a fiscal year) who are physically and otherwise qualified for service, liable for service, and not eligible for deferment. During fiscal 1955, an estimated 520,000 men will leave the pool to enter the Armed Forces. However, the pool will be replenished by an inflow of an estimated 670,000 men during the year. As a result, the number of men in the pool will increase from 740,000 at the beginning of the year to 890,000 at the end of the year.
- (8). The pool will be augmented by an estimated 240,000 men whose deferments (or cause for deferment) expire during fiscal 1955. These men will have been deferred from service (or became eligible for deferment) when they reached the age of liability in prior years.
- (9). The pool will also be augmented by 430,000 men reaching age 18-1/2 during fiscal 1955.
- (10). However, this is only part of the 1,125,000 men who will reach 18-1/2 years of age during fiscal 1955. How the estimate of 430,000 is reached and what will have happened to the remainder is detailed below:
- (11). An estimated 30,000 physically and otherwise qualified men will have already enlisted in the National Guard before they reach age 18; they are exempt from military service as long as they maintain this status.
- (12). An estimated 130,000 men will have discharged their military obligation by enlisting in the Armed Forces before they reach 18-1/2 (also listed as item 4).
- (13). Approximately 10,000 men will probably be permanently deferred or exempt from service by law (most of these men will be divinity students).
- (14). Of the remaining 955,000 men aged 18-1/2, an estimated 40,000 will be rejected (placed in class IV-F) by the local boards of the Selective Service for disqualifying reasons that are so obvious that formal examination is not required.
- (15). An estimated 330,000 men will be eligible for deferment as students and will not enter the pool until after fiscal 1955.
- (16). Of these, 55,000 will be found to be physically or otherwise disqualified for service (IV-F) when reached for induction; the remainder (275,000) will eventually see service.
- (17). Out of the remaining 585,000 men, an estimated 155,000 (27 percent) would be disqualified for service (IV-F) if reached for induction. Since part of the remaining 430,000 qualified men (item 9) who enter the pool during fiscal 1955 will enlist voluntarily, the rejection rate experienced by the Selective Service System will be substantially higher than 27 percent because they will have to examine all of the 155,000 rejectees in order to get the balance of the 430,000.
- (18). Thus, an estimated 250,000 out of the 1,125,000 men who reach age 18-1/2 during fiscal 1955 will eventually be found unfit for service. (Sum losses listed in items 14, 16, and 17.) This is the rejection rate for the entire male population of military age--22 percent. It is consistent with the rejection rates experienced by the Selective Service System (30 to 40 percent) among the men examined for induction, simply because this group contains all of the men who do not meet Armed Forces physical and mental standards after 190,000 men who meet Armed Forces physical and mental standards have removed themselves from the Selective Service pool in various ways (see items 4, 5, and 11) and an additional number have enlisted voluntarily (item 17).

APPENDIX B

I. The Selective Service Manpower Pool at the Start of Fiscal 1954

The derivation of the base-period pool is summarized in table A. Methods and sources of data used in estimating the net yield from each class are outlined below.

I-A Examined and Acceptable. -- This group consists of registrants who had been found acceptable for service at Armed Forces examining stations. A 2-percent deduction was made to allow for those who would be able to establish grounds for deferment prior to induction. An additional 5 percent was subtracted for the number who would not pass final physical inspection at time of delivery for induction.

I-A Not Examined. -- These are men 18-1/2 years of age and over who had not been granted deferment or exemption as of July 1, 1953. They had not yet been sent to Armed Forces examining stations, but had been partially screened by their local boards for obvious disqualifying defects which would result in a IV-F classification. In estimating the yield from this class, allowances were made for the number who at a later date would be classified as deferred or exempt because of physical or mental unfitness, hardship, or employment in essential occupations. The estimated numbers of high school and college students in this class also were deducted. These allowances were made as follows:

1. The I-A Not Examined classification as of July 1, 1953, contained an estimated 210,000 men who were enrolled in colleges and universities in the fall of that year. This represents the number of male non-veteran full-time college students of draft age who could not be accounted for in other Selective Service classifications. The derivation of this estimate is summarized in table B.

Data from the Selective Service System's 1 percent sample inventory supports this conclusion in that it shows smaller numbers of persons in class II-S in ages 19 and 20 than for the immediately older age group. Since most freshmen enter college during their 18th year of age, it is clear that many 19- and 20-year old students were not classified as such in April 1953. Actually there are many more deferred students aged 19 or 20 than in the next higher age groups because of the heavy dropouts from college.

Table A.-Yield to the Selective Service Pool by Selective Service Classification, July 1, 1953 1/
(In thousands)

Selective Service published statistics	:	BLS adjustments	:	Estimated
	:		:	net yield
	:		:	to pool
Total living registrants	14,446			
Under 18-1/2 years	- 443			
Over 18-1/2 years	14,013			
Total classified registrants	13,919			
Under 18-1/2 years	- 84			
Over 18-1/2 years	2/ 13,835			
Total living registrants over 18-1/2 years (line 3)	14,013			
Total classified over 18-1/2 years (line 7)	-13,835			
Total unclassified over 18-1/2 years	2/ 178			
		Total unclassified over 18-1/2 years	180	
		Less: Men who have already served	-75	
		High school students (eligible for deferment) ..	-15	
		College students (eligible for deferment)	-15	
		Other deferments	- 5	
		Not eligible for deferment	70	
		Less rejections (IV-F)	-20	
		Estimated number available	50	50
Total classified registrants	13,919			
I-A and I-A-O not examined	667			
Less those under 18-1/2 years (line 6)	(- 84)			
Over 18-1/2 years	2/ (583)			
		I-A and I-A-O not examined over 18-1/2	580	
		Less: Students not elsewhere classified (eligible for		
		deferment)	-210	
		Other deferments	- 20	
		Not eligible for deferment	350	
		Less rejections (IV-F)	-100	
		Estimated number available	250	250
I-A and I-A-O examined and acceptable	247	Total I-A and I-A-O, I-O examined and acceptable	270	
I-A and I-A-O inductions postponed	21	Less: Last minute deferments	- 5	
I-O conscientious objectors, examined and acceptable	2	Rejections at induction stations	-15	
Total	2/ (270)	Estimated number available	250	250
I-S Statutory deferment, high school	69)			
I-S Statutory deferment, college	41)			
I-O Conscientious objectors, not examined	2)			
I-C (Inducted)	934)			
I-C (Enlisted or commissioned)	1,476)			
I-C (Discharged)	455)			
I-C (Reserve)	632)			
I-W (At work)	3)			
I-W (Released)	(3/)			
I-D Member of reserve component	370)			
II-A Occupational deferment (except agricultural)	26)			
II-A (Apprentice)	7)			
II-C Agricultural deferments	87)			
II-S Occupational deferments, Students	162)			
III-A Dependency deferments	1,144)			
IV-A Completed service 1/	876)			
IV-B Officials	(3/)			
IV-C Aliens	12)			
IV-D Ministers, divinity students	63)			
IV-F Unfit for service	1,737)			
V-A Over age of liability	4,889)			
Total				550

1/ Figures may not add or subtract exactly due to rounding.
 2/ Computations by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
 3/ Negligible.
 4/ Includes a small number of sole surviving sons.

Table B.-Estimated Distribution of College and University Students,
Fall 1953, by Selective Service Status as of July 1, 1953

(In thousands)

Selective Service status	:	Number
Total male enrollment		1,430
Less: Veterans		-320
Part-time nonveterans		-230
Full-time nonveterans outside draft ages..		<u>-160</u>
Full-time nonveterans in draft ages		720
Less: Students in deferred or exempt classes:		
I-D ROTC and National Guard		-170
I-S Statutory deferment -- college		- 40
II-S Occupational deferment (student)...		-160
III-A Dependency deferment		- 40
IV-D Divinity students		- 40
IV-F Unfit for service		- 40
Not classified		<u>- 20</u>
In I-A Not examined		210

Source: Adapted from U. S. Office of Education, Veterans Administration,
and Selective Service data.

An arbitrary estimate of 10,000 veterans enrolled after the expiration of their educational benefits was made in the absence of data on this point. An allowance for the number of part-time nonveteran male students was made on the basis of data from a partially completed study on part-time enrollments in the fall of 1953 made by the U. S. Office of Education. An estimate of the number of college students under age 18-1/2 was based on a sample study made by the American Council on Education in the fall of 1951.⁹

The number of specifically deferred or postponed college students in classes I-S and II-S totaled about 200,000 as of the start of the fiscal year. An estimated 40,000 additional students were in class IV-D (ministers and divinity students). Students enrolled in college ROTC were estimated to account for 150,000 of the total classed in I-D (members of reserve components) as of mid-1953. A small allowance was made for students in I-D as members of National Guard or other Reserve units. On the basis of enrollment rates for the population aged 18-1/2 to 19, it was estimated that some 20,000 college students were among the recent registrants who had not yet been classified by their local boards.¹⁰ Small allowances of 40,000 each were made for students assumed to be in class III-A (dependency) and IV-F.

It was assumed that the remaining 210,000 male college students of draft age not in deferred or exempt classes as of mid-1953 would be allowed, under present Selective Service policy, to remain in school until they graduate or drop out. In the absence of direct data on the Selective Service classification of students, by age and college class, it is impossible to gage the extent to which students in nondeferred classifications had been denied or had not applied for deferment and the extent to which they had not yet been processed for deferment.¹¹

⁹ Higher Education and National Affairs, Bulletin No. 180, March 24, 1952. American Council on Education, Washington, D. C.

¹⁰ U. S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 52, School Enrollment, October 1953.

¹¹ Because of the use of fall enrollment figures in conjunction with a mid-year pool estimate, this group probably includes a sizable number of draft-age men who

However, this assumption, which leads to a relatively conservative estimate of the pool, is generally consistent with what would appear to be the net effect of the various deferment and postponement policies relating to college students. (See pp. 42 and 43.)

2. A rough allowance was made for the number of men in class I-A Not Examined who would qualify for hardship deferments or who would have received fatherhood deferments between July 1, 1953, and August 25, 1953, when this ground for deferments was eliminated by a change in the Selective Service regulations.

3. Selective Service rejection experience understates the proportion of qualified men in the population, since this experience refers only to those reaching induction examination and excludes significant numbers of qualified men not exposed to examination because they are veterans or are currently serving in the Armed Forces. Therefore, in estimating the yield from groups not yet fully processed for induction, a rejection rate first was estimated for the population.

This rejection rate was derived from data from the Selective Service System's 1 percent sample inventory of registrants and the Department of Defense. A tabulation of classification status by year of birth was used (for ages 22, 23, and 24) in deriving the rejection rate shown in table C. These ages were selected because men in them had been almost completely processed (the average age of induction in July 1953 was about 20 years) and had not passed age 25 (after which age Selective Service classification is somewhat obscure).

The rejection rate was estimated by relating all men in these ages who are classified IV-F to all men who had been exposed to a pre-induction examination (i. e., classes I-A Examined and Acceptable, I-C, I-D, IV-A,^{1 2} and IV-F). The remaining registrants were assigned a rejection rate based on this initial rejection rate modified by the particular

enrolled in college for the first time in the fall and then became eligible for a deferred or postponed student classification. The same factor partially accounts for the difference between the estimated 150,000 ROTC students in class I-D and the much higher estimate of total ROTC enrollment. (This difference also reflects the enrollment in ROTC of students under draft age, veterans, and men in other Selective Service classes.)

^{1 2} No allowance could be made for sole surviving sons. This rate may be modified as additional tabulations become available.

Table C.-Derivation of the Rejection Rate for the Male Population Aged 22-24
in April 1953 ^{1/}

Class	Number in Class	Unfit for service	
		Number	Percent
Population (age 22-24 years) in sample	40,289	8,853	22
Examined	33,039	7,314	22
Qualified for military service:			
Unregistered enlistees ^{2/}	1,484	-	0
Unclassified	340	-	0
Class I-C	19,947	-	0
Class IV-A	2,149	-	0
Partially qualified:			
Class I-A, examined and acceptable ^{3/}	342	20	5
Class I-S, college	114	6	5
Class I-D	1,447	72	5
Unfit for service (IV-F)	7,216	7,216	100
Not examined	7,250	1,539	21
Class I-A	341	102	30
Class I-S, high school	8	2	22
Class II-A	161	35	22
Class II-C	380	95	25
Class II-S	941	113	12
Class III-A	5,080	1,118	22
Classes IV-B, IV-C, IV-D	339	74	22

^{1/} Derived from data from the the Selective Service System's 1 percent sample inventory and the Department of Defense. This rate may be modified as additional tabulations become available and are analyzed.

^{2/} Men who were not required to register since they were already in the service due to voluntary enlistment.

^{3/} Includes I-A postponed, I-O, and I-A-O.

characteristics of the men in the classification. For example, a tabulation from the Selective Service System's 1 percent sample inventory revealed that men aged 22-24 years who had been classified as II-S (students) at some time and who subsequently had some form of physical examination, experienced a rejection rate of about 11-12 percent. The derivation of the rejection rate is shown in table C.

In applying a rejection rate to the I-A Not Examined group, the population rate was adjusted to allow for members of the Armed Forces and veterans in each age, for those in class I-A Examined and Acceptable (less 5 percent), and for some reclassification into IV-F by local boards. The computed rejection rate for men in class I-A Not Examined in mid-1953 was 27 percent. This is reasonably consistent with recent Selective Service experience, after allowance for the noncomparable nature of the two rates.

4. No allowance was made for deductions from men in class I-A Not Examined for occupational or apprenticeship deferments since the numbers of men in these classifications have not increased over the past several months.

Not Classified. -- Estimates of the number of unclassified men over 18-1/2 years of age were made from Selective Service data. A deduction (about 40 percent) was made from all unclassified men over 18-1/2 to take account of men in this category who had met their military obligation by enlistment prior to reaching age 18-1/2 and who registered subsequent to leaving military service.¹³ The remaining registrants in this group were slightly over 18-1/2 years of age and had the characteristics of the population of that age. The estimated numbers enrolled in high school or college were based on enrollment rates, by veteran status and age, for October 1952. A small allowance was also made for other deferments.

II. Additions to the Selective Service Pool, Fiscal Years 1953-55

Flows into the Selective Service pool come from two main sources: (a) men reaching draft age; and (b) students leaving school. Except for students, no allowances were made for inflows from deferred classes. There probably are some men who enter the pool

¹³ Derived from data obtained from the Selective Service System's 1 percent sample inventory of registrants of April 1953.

after receiving dependency, occupational, National Guard, or other deferments. These entries may result from the loss of grounds for deferral or they may represent voluntary enlistment in the Armed Forces. It was assumed that these entries will be balanced by flows into deferred classes and that, consequently, there would be no net yield to the pool from this source. This assumption is supported by the relative stability in the size of the occupationally deferred classifications.

Additions from 18-1/2-year-olds. -- The projected numbers of men reaching age 18-1/2 during each fiscal year (i. e., those age 17-1/2 to 18-1/2 at the start of the year) were interpolated from Census Bureau projections of the population by single year of age. These data were adjusted to allow for Selective Service registrants outside the Continental United States. Table D shows the derivation of the net yield to the pool from these inflows. No deduction was made for hardship deferments because this classification has not changed materially since the effective date of the executive order which eliminated all dependency deferments except in cases of extreme hardship. Because of the stability or actual decline in the size of the occupationally deferred classes in the past several months, no allowance was made for "occupational" deferments. Because of their eligibility for deferment or postponement, the estimated numbers of men who would be attending high school or college in the following year were subtracted from the 17-1/2 to 18-1/2-year-olds. (See below.)

A rejection rate of 25 percent was applied to all nondeferred nonstudents reaching draft age. Since enlistments were not deducted from the base population before applying rejection rates, the population rejection rate was used after adjustment for the lower rejection rate of college students.

On the basis of Defense Department estimates, the number of able-bodied nondeferred 18-1/2-year-olds available to the pool was reduced by an allowance of 130,000 for enlistments prior to reaching draft age and for a net loss of 30,000 men obtaining deferment as National Guardsmen. (Men enlisting in the National Guard before age 18-1/2 are eligible for deferment as long as they remain in the Guard.)

Additions from students. -- The number of high school students discontinuing their education each year was derived from differences in enrollment rates, by single year of age (based on Census data), applied to the projected population in each year. Office of Education data on high school graduations and first-time college enrollments for 1951-52 indicated that about half of the male high school graduates went on to college. Accordingly, discontinuations were estimated at about half the differences in high school enrollments, by single year of age.

Table D.-Estimated Additions to Selective Service Pool From 18-1/2 Year Olds,
Fiscal Years 1953-60

(In thousands)

Item	Fiscal Year							
	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Male population ^{1/}	1,090	1,120	1,130	1,150	1,190	1,200	1,220	1,290
Less: Enrolled in school	-330	-340	-340	-350	-360	-370	-370	-390
High school	(170)	(180)	(180)	(180)	(190)	(190)	(190)	(200)
College	(160)	(160)	(160)	(170)	(170)	(180)	(180)	(190)
Nondeferred nonstudents	760	780	790	800	830	830	850	900
Less: Rejections	-190	-200	-200	-200	-210	-210	-210	-230
Able-bodied men	570	580	590	600	620	620	640	670
Less: Enlistments under age 18-1/2...	-130	-130	-130	-130	-130	-130	-130	-130
Reserves and National Guard....	- 30	- 30	- 30	- 30	- 30	- 30	- 30	- 30
Net additions to pool	410	420	430	440	460	460	480	510

^{1/} Aged 17-1/2 to 18-1/2 at start of each period.

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A rejection rate of 22 percent was applied to those former high school students. (Armed Forces Qualifications Test failures account for a substantial proportion of all rejections. Since few high school men should be rejected for this reason, the population rejection rate was adjusted accordingly.) No other deductions were made from this group, since the allowances for occupational, dependency, and National Guard deferments were taken from the base population.

In the absence of data on college and university enrollments by class, it was necessary to derive estimates of dropouts and graduations from available data on first-time enrollments of male students. Estimates of the number of male nonveteran freshmen could not be constructed for years prior to 1951 because of the inclusion of unknown, but probably significant, numbers of World War II veterans in first-time enrollments. An estimate of 240,000 male nonveteran full-time freshmen students in the fall of 1953 was derived from Office of Education data on total first-time male enrollments by subtracting allowances for "Korean" veterans and part-time students.¹⁴ The ratio of this 1953 full-time, nonveteran, male freshman class to the male population 18 years of age in 1953 was used to estimate freshman enrollment from 1953 to 1960. Rough estimates of the "normal" dropout rates, as estimated by the Office of Education, indicate that the average college "dropout" has completed about 2 years of college at the time he discontinues his education and that only about half of the freshman class graduate from college. Accordingly, the dropouts were estimated at half the freshman class, all of which were assumed to occur 2 years after their entry into college. The remaining half of the freshmen graduate 4 years after entering college.

This method of estimating the numbers of students who will be added to the Selective Service pool each year is supported by data from the Selective Service System's 1 percent sample inventory of registrants. Of the registrants aged 21-22-23 (age groups containing the greatest numbers of registrants deferred as students) who were classified as II-S on April 30, 1952, only about half still held those classifications 1 year later. Of the remainder, almost none of the physically qualified men had classifications indicating that they would not be available for service. Furthermore, only about 3 percent of all registrants ever classified as II-S are over age 26.

¹⁴ Preliminary data from the Office of Education indicate that about 37 percent of the full-time "Korean" veterans enrolled in the fall of 1953 were freshmen. These data also indicated that about 16 percent of all nonveteran, first time students were attending college part-time.

A small allowance was deducted from dropouts and graduates for those who might receive occupational or hardship deferments and a 12-percent rejection rate was applied to the nondeferred students. (See p. 38.)

In the estimates of college discontinuations, no allowance was made for the effects of the draft. The various possibilities for deferment or postponement open to college students under present legislation and regulations imply that nearly all college students could continue their education until they either graduate or drop out of school for reasons not associated with the draft. Moreover, so long as men are not inducted before age 19, normal numbers of male high school graduates should be able to enter college.

Current provisions for deferment or postponement of college students are summarized below:

- a. All full-time college students not otherwise subject to deferment must be deferred by statute until the end of the academic year during which they are first called up for induction.
- b. National Headquarters of the Selective Service System has recommended to the local draft boards a set of deferment standards based on class standing or on college qualification test scores. Undergraduates scoring 70 or higher are to be considered for deferment as long as they remain students in good standing. A freshman who completes his first year in the upper half of the male portion of his class is recommended for deferment through the sophomore year. Similarly, a sophomore in the upper two-thirds of his class or a junior in the upper three-fourths is considered for deferment through the subsequent year. Under these standards, eligibility for deferment as a graduate student is based on a test score of 75 or higher, or graduation in the upper half of the class.

The combined effect of the class-standing-test score deferment criteria is to make eligible for deferment a very high proportion of all students. Of the 340,000 students who took the Selective Service college qualification test during the spring and summer of 1951, 35 percent of those who finished their freshman year in the lower half of their class achieved test scores above the minimum needed for deferment.

- c. ROTC students who agree to accept a reserve commission --if offered--and undertake certain obligations for active and inactive service are deferred until they graduate.

The proportion of students who would be permitted, under a literal application of the present deferment and postponement policy, to continue in school from one year to the next are generally consistent with pre-World War II college dropout rates estimated by the Office of Education. According to these estimates, about half of all freshmen students dropped out before graduation. To the extent that dropout rates under conditions of high employment may be below those experienced in the 1930's there may be small numbers of students who will be drawn into military service before they would otherwise graduate or drop out. There also may be significant numbers who are eligible for deferment but who discontinue their education for other reasons. On the other hand, the availability of deferments may prolong the period of education for other students. In the absence of any data bearing on the operation of these factors, it was assumed that total enrollments of male nonveteran students would increase with the population in school ages.

Deductions for ROTC graduates who will be called to active service were made on the basis of Defense Department requirements estimates. (ROTC enrollees not completing the requirements for reserve commissions were included in the estimate of student discontinuations.)

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