
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT

TRANSMITTED TO THE CONGRESS FEBRUARY 1970



Economic Report of the President



Transmitted to the Congress February 1970

THE ANNUAL REPORT

OF THE

COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS

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ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT

ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT

To the Congress of the United States:

For many years the American people have been seeking, through their Government, the road to full employment with stable prices.

In the first half of the 1960's, we did have price stability—but unemployment averaged $5\frac{1}{2}$ percent of the civilian labor force.

In the second half of that decade, we did have relatively full employment—but with sharply rising prices.

After 5 years of sustained unemployment followed by 5 years of sustained inflation, some have concluded that the price of finding work for the unemployed must be the hardship of inflation for all.

I do not agree.

It is true that we have just passed through a decade when the economy spent most of the time far off the course of reasonably full employment and price stability. But if we apply the hard lessons learned from the sixties to the decade ahead, and add a new realism to the management of our economic policies, I believe we can attain the goal of plentiful jobs earning dollars of stable purchasing power.

Those lessons are plain:

- 1. We have learned that Government itself is often the cause of wide swings in the economy.
- 2. We have learned that there is a human element in economic affairs—habit, confidence, fear—and that the economy cannot be managed mechanistically and will not suspend its laws to accommodate political wishes.
- 3. We have learned that 1-year planning leads to almost as much confusion as no planning at all, and that there is a need to increase public awareness of long-range trends and the consequences for future years of decisions taken now.

My 1970 Economic Report reflects these lessons. The current actions we are taking are designed to help the American economy regain its balance; the plans we are making are designed to build on that balance as our free economy grows and responds to the needs of its citizens.

"Stability of economic policy," Theodore Roosevelt pointed out, "must always be the prime economic need of this country. This stability should not be fossilization." Stability is a means to an end. The end we seek is steady growth, predictable Government action in maintaining a sound economic climate, and constant involvement of the people in setting their own priorities.

Accordingly, this Economic Report "opens up the books" as never before.

We are making available the facts and figures that will enable the people to make more intelligent judgments about the future. If we are to improve the quality of life in this Nation, we must first improve the quality of debate about our national priorities. In this Report, and in the Budget Message, long-range projections are made that will enable the people to discuss their choices more effectively in the light of what is possible.

In the real world of economics, there is a place for dreams—dreams that are realizable if we make the hard choices necessary to make them come true.

THE USES OF OUR NATIONAL OUTPUT

We have placed the Nation's larger decisions in the context of a picture of the total resources available and the competing claims upon them. A summary of this analysis is contained in Chapter 3 of the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers; I hope it will be studied carefully and its precedent carried forward in future years.

That analysis is neutral about which options and claims should be chosen. The purpose of the analysis is to help everyone observe the discipline of keeping claims and plans within the limits of our capacity, and to make sure that excessive claims do not prevent us from achieving our most important goals.

Even in our own highly productive and growing economy, resources are limited. There will be competition between private and government uses for our national income, competition among programs within government budgets, and competition among borrowers for the limited national savings.

Our problem, in short, will be to choose wisely what to do with our output and incomes. Large as they are, the claims upon them, what people expect of them, are even larger. If we add the expenditures that consumers will want to make with larger incomes; the investment that businesses must make to assure rising productivity; the housing construction needed to meet the current shortage and the demands of a growing population with rising incomes; the likely expenditures of State and local governments; the costs of present Federal programs plus the proposals already recommended by this Administration—we find that the total would nearly exhaust the national output until 1975. And that total would not include tens of billions of dollars of new programs that are commonly urged upon the Government.

We shall have to think carefully about how to choose the claims upon the national output that will be met, since we cannot meet them all. This choice is not made exclusively or even mainly by the Federal Government. It is mostly made by the individuals who produce the output, earn the income, and decide how it should be spent. Nevertheless, a Federal Government with a budget of \$200 billion has a great influence on how the national output is used. This influence is not confined to the output the Federal Government uses itself. The taxes the Federal Government collects, the grants it makes to State and local governments, its borrowing or repayment of debt, influence the purchases of private citizens and of State and local governments.

Personal freedom will be increased when there is more economy in government and less government in the economy. Economic domination, like any other government domination, is dangerous to a free society, no matter how benevolent its aims. Freedom depends on our recognizing the line between domination and influence, between control and guidance. The quality of life in America depends on how wisely we use the great influence that Government has.

We know that existing programs of Government and probable demands of the private sector could use up all the output we can produce for several years to come. This does not mean that we cannot do anything new. It does mean that we have to choose. If we decide to do something new, or something more, in one direction we will have to give up something elsewhere. There is no unclaimed pool of real resources from which we shall be able to satisfy new demands without sacrificing or modifying some existing claims.

If we fail to tailor our demands consciously to resources available, the likely consequences would be both misdirection of resources and inflation. We have seen this in the past 5 years. Beginning in mid-1965 the Government imposed on the economy a large increase in nondefense spending and the demands of the Vietnam War effort. It did not, however, face up soon enough to the need to cut back other demands by raising taxes or by following an adequately restrictive monetary policy. Of course, failing to take these steps did not relieve us of the necessity of cutting back. It only meant that the cutback was imposed unfairly by inflation, rather than in a more deliberate and equitable way.

THE PRESENT INFLATION

The inflation unleashed after mid-1965 had gathered powerful momentum by the time this Administration took office a year ago. The expectation of more inflation was widespread, as was skepticism of the determination of Government to control it. Businesses, anticipating rising prices and costs, were eager to invest as early as possible and were willing to incur high interest charges that they would pay later in presumably cheaper dollars. Workers demanded large wage increases to catch up with past increases in the cost of living and to keep up with expected future increases. Prices were being boosted to catch up with past cost increases and to keep up with the future.

Inflation was in full tide.

The inflationary tide could not quickly be turned. At least it could not be turned quickly without a serious recession. Such a recession would itself have brought hardship to millions of people. Moreover, it would have been another episode in the history of stop-go economic policy, when the need was to introduce an era of steadiness in policy that could yield stability in the economy.

Our purpose has been to slow down the rapid expansion of demand firmly and persistently, but not to choke off demand so abruptly as to injure the economy. The greater price stability that all desired could not, given a concern about unemployment, come quickly. This transition would take place in several steps, each of which would require time, and only at the end would increases in the price level slow down.

1969 was a year of progress in the fight against inflation. For the first time since the price spiral began, there was a sustained period of combined fiscal and monetary restraint. During 1969 the rise of Federal expenditures was slowed to an increase of \$9 billion, compared with an annual average of \$20 billion in the 3 preceding years. Instead of the rising budget deficits of earlier years there was a surplus in 1969. Instead of the money supply expanding by 7 percent, as in 1968, it grew at a 4.4-percent annual rate in the first half of 1969 and at a 0.7-percent rate in the second half.

The growth of total spending, public and private, which was the driving force of the inflation, slowed markedly, from 9.4 percent during 1968 to 6.8 percent during 1969 and an annual rate of 4.4 percent in the fourth quarter of 1969. This decline in the growth of spending was inevitably accompanied by what in October I called "slowing pains." Gains in real production slowed down. Industrial production declined. Profits drifted lower as margins were squeezed. All of these slowing pains were increased, and the inflation prolonged, by the failure of productivity to rise, for the first time in many years.

And in the latter part of the year there were the first faint signs of gain on the price front. Instead of continuing to accelerate, the rate of inflation itself began to level out.

THE OUTLOOK FOR 1970

As we enter 1970 continuation of a low rate of growth of sales, production, and employment for several months seems probable. Thereafter, the performance of the economy will depend on both the continued resolve of the Government and the difficult-to-predict behavior of the private sector.

Government policy must now avoid three possible dangers. One is that after a brief lull the demand for output would begin to rise too rapidly and rekindle the inflationary process, as happened in 1967. This possibility cannot be ignored. The tax bill passed in December reduced revenues for the next fiscal year by close to \$3 billion, compared to my original proposals, requiring the Administration to reduce spending plans further in order to retain a surplus. Pressures for increased spending threaten to shift the budget from the surplus position to a deficit by the latter part of calendar 1970 unless the responsible fiscal course urged by the Administration is accepted by the Congress.

A second danger we must consider is that the moderate and necessary slowdown may become more severe. The highly restrictive stance of monetary policy is one reason for considering this possibility. Moreover, there is a question whether the rate of real output can long remain essentially flat without more adverse consequences than we have so far experienced. Until now the unemployment rate has remained low, partly because employers have retained workers despite growing signs of sluggishness in sales. However, they may be unwilling to do this for long with profits shrinking.

A third danger is that although the economy remains on the path of slow rise, and avoids either serious recession or revived inflation, this is achieved with such tight credit conditions as to paralyze the housing industry, preventing needed additions to the supply of homes and apartments. A Federal budget deficit, which would require the Treasury to become again a net borrower in the capital markets, taking funds that would otherwise go to other users, might bring this about. This is one reason why I continue to stress the importance of a strong budget position.

Our objective is to avoid these dangers as we achieve stability. A necessary condition for doing this is to keep the Federal budget in balance in the coming fiscal year.

A prudent fiscal policy, avoiding the risks of returning to budget deficits, and a prudent monetary policy, avoiding the risks of overly long and overly severe restraint, offer the best promise of relieving strains and distortions in financial markets, bringing interest rates down, and encouraging a sustainable and orderly forward movement of the economy.

After some months of slow expansion of sales, output, and employment, which seems likely, a moderately quicker pace later in the year would be consistent with continued progress in reducing the rate of inflation.

The goal of policy should therefore be moderately more rapid economic expansion in the latter part of 1970 than we have recently been experiencing or expect for several months ahead. Keeping the Federal budget in balance, as I have recommended, and a moderate degree of monetary restraint will help achieve this result. This combination of policies would also permit residential construction to revive and begin a rise toward the path of housebuilding required by our growing number of families needing homes and apartments.

As far as can now be foreseen, this pattern of developments through the year could be achieved with a gross national product for 1970 of about \$985 billion. This would be 5½ percent above that for 1969. A slow-down in the rate of increase of consumer prices is a reasonable expectation in this economic outlook.

An unfortunate cost of having allowed the inflation to run for so long is that it courts the risk of some rise in unemployment. The policy of firm and persistent disinflation on which we have embarked, however, holds out the best hope of keeping that risk low.

This risk emphasizes the importance of promptly enacting the legislation this Administration has recommended for manpower training, unemployment compensation, and welfare systems:

- —The proposed Manpower Training Act would not only bring about better planning and management of training programs; it would also trigger an automatic increase in appropriations for these programs if the national unemployment rate reaches 4.5 percent for 3 consecutive months.
- —The unemployment compensation legislation would increase coverage, encourage States to improve benefits, and provide for Federal financing of extended benefits if unemployment of insured workers exceeds 4.5 percent for 3 consecutive months.
- —The proposed Family Assistance Program would provide income support for poor families with children, whether headed by a male or a female, while providing strong incentives and assistance for those who can do so to find and accept employment.

Because our expanding and dynamic economy must have strong and innovative financial institutions if our national savings are to be utilized effectively, I shall appoint a commission to study our financial structure and make recommendations to me for needed changes.

In 1970, we are feeling the postponed pinch of the late sixties. If responsible policies had been followed then, the problems of 1970 would be much easier. But we cannot undo the errors of the past. We have no choice now but to correct them, and to avoid repeating them.

STRENGTHENING THE WORLD ECONOMY

The achievement of greater balance and stability in our own economy is also important for international finance and trade. The dollar is not only our currency; it provides the principal vehicle for world trade and payments. We are the world's largest exporter and importer, and instability in the United States—whether it involves inflation or recession—has unsettling effects on the world economy. Inflationary pressures arising in the United States have added to inflationary problems in other countries in recent years. The long inflation has also weakened our trading position. However, with the restraining of excessive demand in 1969, the deterioration in our trade balance has been arrested.

I am particularly gratified to note improvements in the international monetary scene during the past year with the introduction of Special Drawing Rights and with the realignment of several important currencies. In cooperation with other countries, we are actively investigating other ways to make the international monetary system more stable and orderly, and to give more attention to international coordination and synchronization in the management of domestic economic policies.

Although a high and rising level of international trade can add to the prosperity of the United States and other countries, imports from time to time may cause domestic dislocations. Since the gains from international trade are enjoyed by the country as a whole, it is appropriate that the costs of trade-associated dislocations be spread more evenly. The trade bill presented to the Congress in November contains practical adjustment assistance and escape-clause provisions that would soften the impact of import competition in cases where it harms our own workingmen. It also includes the repeal of the American selling price method of tariff evaluation, a step which is important in reducing the nontariff barriers to U.S. exports.

Trade is vital to the progress of the less developed countries of the world. With other industrialized nations, the United States is exploring

ways of enabling less developed nations to participate more in the growing volume of international trade.

SEVEN BASIC PRINCIPLES

Since this is my first Economic Report, it is in order for me to set out the basic principles that will continue to guide the management of economic policy in my Administration:

First, the integrity and purchasing power of the dollar must be assured. To re-create confidence in a secure future, we must achieve that reasonable stability of the price level which has been so severely eroded since mid-1965. The unfairness of a steeply rising cost of living must not again be inflicted on this Nation.

Second, our economic policy must continue to emphasize a high utilization of the Nation's productive resources. We must maintain a vigorous and expanding economy to provide jobs for our growing labor force.

Third, we must achieve a steadier and more evenhanded management of our economic policies. Business and labor cannot plan, and consumers and homebuyers cannot effectively manage their affairs, when Government alternates between keeping first the accelerator and then the brake pedal to the floor.

Fourth, Government must say what it means and mean what it says. Economic credibility is the basis for confidence, and confidence in turn is the basis for an ongoing prosperity.

Fifth, we must preserve and sustain the free market economy in order to raise the standard of living of every American. The most basic improvement in our national life during the last three decades has come through the doubling of real purchasing power that our free competitive economy has delivered to the average American family. No Government programs during that period begin to approach this doubling of real income per family as a source of our improving economic well-being. Government now has both the ability and the duty to sustain a general climate for stability and growth, but it must do so in the firm conviction that only a free economy provides maximum scope for the knowledge, innovativeness, and creative powers of each individual.

Sixth, we must involve the American people in setting goals and priorities by providing accurate, credible data on the long-range choices open to them, making possible much better informed public discussion about using the resources we will have in meeting the needs of the future. The 1970 Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers is a long first step in that direction.

Finally, the free economy of the future will rest squarely on the foundation of genuinely equal opportunity for all. Some, because of race or national origin, find themselves situated far back of the starting line in our economy. Others by the happenstance of health, accidental injury, education, or economic background are unable to participate fully in our economic life; still others become casualties of obsolete skills. We are deeply committed to make a reality of the promise of an equal opportunity in life, so that the fruits of our economic progress and abundance will become available to all. The national conscience demands it, human dignity requires it, and our free and open economic system cannot be fully effective without it.

Richard Kingan

February 2, 1970.

THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

Council of Economic Advisers, Washington, D.C., January 29, 1970.

THE PRESIDENT:

SIR: The Council of Economic Advisers herewith submits its Annual Report, February 1970, in accordance with Section 4(c) (2) of the Employment Act of 1946.

Respectfully,

Marken

PAUL W. McCracken, Chairman.

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HERBERT STEIN.

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CHAPTER 1

Economic Performance and Policy in 1969 THE GOALS OF STABILIZATION POLICY

THE AMERICAN ECONOMY began 1969 with production, incomes, and prices increasing rapidly from the momentum of earlier inflationary fiscal and monetary policies. As the year moved along, however, the economy began to respond to the constraints of policies which had been changed to combat inflation. The huge budget deficit had been closed with the aid of a tax increase in mid-1968, and the new Administration further tightened fiscal policy in 1969 by a sharp pruning of projected Federal outlays. Monetary policy also shifted its direction, becoming increasingly restrictive during the year.

This was not the ordinary problem of an economy that had veered momentarily toward excessive rates of expansion. It was the problem of an economy already in its fourth year of severe inflationary pressure. The momentum generated by 4 years of inflation was evident in widespread pressures for wage and price increases and in continuing expectations of more inflation. This momentum could not be stopped dead in its tracks without serious consequences. The policies of fiscal and monetary restraint followed in 1969 have reduced it, while at the same time they have laid the ground for a return to price stability and sound economic growth.

Continuation of fiscal and monetary restraint should bring a deceleration of inflation during 1970 and 1971. This will be an important step toward price stability, but it will not mean that the goal has been reached. History contains other instances in which inflation was slowed down or stopped only to break out again as policies shifted too sharply toward expansion. The Nation's goal should be more than just a year or two of declining rates of inflation. This time we should try to reach and maintain price stability.

The longer run goal of continuing price stability would not be served by a sharp or prolonged rise of unemployment. Such a development would be an evil in itself. In addition, by forcing a sharp shift toward expansionary policies, it would intensify the already difficult task of maintaining the restraint necessary for a lasting victory over inflation.

But inflations have seldom ended without a temporary rise in unemployment. While we must direct our efforts to altering the historical pattern, we cannot ignore the possibility that joblessness will rise in the period immediately ahead. But we cannot avoid this problem by allowing the current inflation to continue, for that would harden the expectations of inflation and make subsequent policies to curb it more difficult and harsh. The best hope of curbing inflation and restricting the rise in unemployment to a relatively small and temporary increase rests with a policy of firm and persistent restraint on the expansion in the demand for goods, services, and labor.

Such a policy should ultimately produce high employment with much less inflation than we have recently experienced. During the transition, we may find both unemployment and inflation to be higher than would have been desirable if the inflation had not been allowed to persist so long. This is the price we must pay for having long pursued inflationary policies. Once inflation has been set in motion, there is no way of correcting it without some costs. The aim of policy is to keep the costs as low as possible.

Over the longer run, further progress in reducing unemployment and getting as close to a stable price level as possible is dependent upon holding aggregate demand to moderate and sustainable rates of growth. It will require other measures as well. Public policies can help improve the efficiency of labor markets by providing information, opportunities for training, and assistance in relocation. Persistent effort in these and other ways to make the economy more flexible and adaptable will contribute to lower unemployment rates and to a more stable price level.

THE STRATEGY OF POLICY IN 1969

The current inflation was generated by the mounting budget deficits and rapid monetary expansion that began in 1965 with the escalation of the Vietnam War and the massive increases in Federal spending for domestic programs. These developments stimulated demand for output and labor at a pace which could not be met by growth in the labor force and other productive resources. The resulting pressures caused prices to rise rapidly. Any plan for arresting the inflation called fundamentally for arresting the forces which were causing it. In addition, it was clear that slowing down the inflation after it had gathered momentum would be more difficult than taking the steps necessary to avoid the inflation initially.

Steps to end rising budget deficits and to slow down monetary expansion had been taken in 1968. The Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of June 1968 had helped to shift the budget from a deficit of \$25 billion in the fiscal year ended June 30, 1968, to a surplus estimated in January 1969 at \$2.4 billion for the fiscal year 1969. Near the end of 1968, the Federal Reserve had turned to a policy of more restrained monetary expansion. Each of these moves, however, was only a beginning. Once they had finally been taken, it was important that they remain in force long enough to do the job. Yet the shift in the budget position to surplus had been achieved with the help of a temporary tax surcharge which was scheduled to expire

on June 30, 1969. With continuing strong pressure for increased expenditures in fiscal year 1970, the danger of sliding back into a budget deficit could not be ignored. Nor could it necessarily be assumed that the new and more restrained monetary policy would continue as long as needed. In 1966 monetary tightness had contributed to a dampening of the economy and of the inflation, but the economic slowdown led in turn to a shift back to highly expansive policies in 1967 and to a resurgence of inflation. It was commonly thought that this pattern might be repeated.

At the beginning of 1969, as earlier, there were disagreements among economists about the relative roles of rising budget deficits and rapid monetary expansion in causing the inflation of 1965–68. On one view the rising deficits were the driving force and they would have been enough to cause substantially the inflation that was experienced, even if there had been much less monetary expansion. On the other view the rapid monetary expansion was the primary factor; with it there would have been substantial inflation even with a stable budget policy, and without it there would have been little inflation even with rising deficits. These different views led to different emphases in policy prescriptions for 1969. Following the one theory the critical matter was at least to stabilize the budget in its current position of moderate surplus. According to the other theory a reduction of the rate of monetary growth was the decisive way to slow down the inflation.

The Government could not prudently let the control of inflation depend on the choice of one of these strategies to the neglect of the other. Many uncertainties exist about the relative power of fiscal and monetary actions taken separately. There is much less doubt about the power of fiscal and monetary actions taken together. A reliable policy had to turn away from both the rising deficits and the rapid monetary expansion.

DIRECT INFLUENCE ON WAGES AND PRICES

The Administration's plan of policy for 1969 did not include an attempt to revive wage-price guideposts, such as those existing in 1962-66. The results of our own experience and numerous trials of such policies in other countries over the preceding 20 years did not justify confidence that such efforts would help solve the inflation problem in 1969.

In their usual form these policies enunciate general standards of non-inflationary price and wage behavior, coupled with appeals to labor and business for compliance. The degree to which representatives of labor and business have participated with government in defining standards and seeking compliance has varied from country to country. The sanctions invoked in support of the standards are usually informal and have varied in their severity and nature.

Experience with such policies in other countries has been remarkably consistent. In some cases success in holding down wage settlements or price increases has been achieved in particular industries. There is usually a period in which these programs may have some overall deterrent effect, though

evidence here is less certain. After an interval, however, there is a point at which accumulating pressures make the programs ineffective.

American experience conformed to this pattern. In January 1962, the Council of Economic Advisers promulgated a set of guideposts intended to describe the course of wages and prices that would be consistent with general price stability and certain other objectives. The main element in the statement of these guideposts was that hourly wages should rise in line with the average long-term gain in output per man-hour. Prices should ordinarily be stable; but in a particular industry they could rise if productivity rose less than the average, and they should fall if productivity rose more than the average. A number of exceptions were specified—and indeed these were necessary—to meet requirements of equity and efficiency.

As originally put forth the guideposts were to serve a general educational function of encouraging voluntary patterns of behavior that would be non-inflationary. There was no suggestion that the Government would apply them in particular cases or try to enforce them. But it was natural to question whether actions in particular cases conformed to the guideposts, and the Government felt it necessary to comment on the justification for these actions. Once this threshold had been crossed, the Government also became involved in attempting to insure compliance in particular cases where it was considered necessary. Usually the attempt consisted of discussions with the persons involved. Sometimes there were public exchanges of charges and countercharges. In some cases the Government relied upon its power as purchaser, regulator, and law-enforcer to encourage compliance.

With the upsurge of inflation and inflationary pressure after mid-1965, the difficulty of reconciling the guideposts with market forces became more intense. Labor and business were being asked to act as if prices were not rising, when in fact they were. As it became evident that steps necessary to keep prices from rising were not being taken, it also became more obviously unrealistic and inequitable to make these requests in specific cases. By the fall of 1966 the policy was widely recognized to be unworkable, and it was allowed to fade away. In subsequent years, there were only episodic actions with specific companies regarding prices.

Whether the policy changed the overall behavior of the price level before it ran into intense inflation is uncertain. These were years of relative price stability. But they were also years of considerable slack in the economy, relatively high unemployment, and stable or declining farm prices. That is, they were years in which market conditions favored price stability. Econometric studies attempting to isolate a further contribution that guideposts might have made to price stability have produced uncertain results. The findings of some studies are consistent with the view that the guideposts may have had some effect in reducing the increase of the price level; other studies do not support this conclusion.

Whatever the uncertainties about this earlier period, the guidepost policy clearly did not work once the economy ran into strong and serious pressures of inflationary demand. By that time the question was not whether guideposts would have a measurable influence on the rate of inflation. It was whether they had any credibility and viability at all. The evidence is that they did not. The conspicuous cases in which guidepost policy could exercise some influence were too few and were overrun by the general tide of inflation in the economy as a whole.

The Administration in 1969 recognized that the speed of the disinflationary process would depend in part upon how quickly business and labor became convinced that the economic climate was changing. If business and labor continued to expect demand and prices to rise rapidly, and if they pushed up wages and prices in anticipation, disinflation would come slowly and more painfully. This meant that the public's understanding of the determination to check inflation, of the policies being pursued and of the progress being made would be important to success. There would be room and need for efforts to inform the public. But first there would have to be evidence that the new policies were actually working.

In the exercise of its ordinary functions the Government has a considerable influence on conditions of demand and supply and consequently on prices in particular markets. It would be important for the Government to make sure that its influence did not unnecessarily contribute to inflation in those markets, and beyond that to try to correct malfunctions in particular markets which might aggravate the consequences of the general inflation.

THE EXPECTED CHAIN FROM POLICY TO RESULTS

As the process was viewed at the beginning of 1969, the fiscal and monetary restraint that was the core of anti-inflation policy would slow the rate of inflation through a series of steps which can be summarized as follows:

A Slowdown in the Growth of Total Spending

The growth in aggregate spending for goods and services as measured by gross national product, which was 9 percent from 1967 to 1968, would be reduced. The Federal Government's own purchases would not rise so fast, nor would its payments to State and local governments and to individuals—payments which these sectors ordinarily use to make their own purchases. By avoiding the tax reduction scheduled for midyear, the Government would refrain from boosting private after-tax income and consequently from stimulating private spending.

Monetary restraint and the resulting scarcity and high cost of credit would slow down spending in various ways. Expenditures financed by borrowing—for new houses, for State and local construction projects, for business investment, and for consumers' durables—would be most directly affected. In addition, money balances would decline in relation to rising incomes and transactions, and the market value of other assets would be depressed because of higher interest rates. This would dampen the inclination of businesses and consumers to spend. These effects of monetary restraint on spending would not be immediate or follow a precise formula based on the amount of the restraint, but they would come if the restraint continued.

A Decline in the Rate of Growth of Production

The slowdown in the growth of purchases would mean a slowdown in the growth of sales; businesses cannot sell what others do not buy. Some businesses might respond to a decline in the growth of sales by allowing inventories to accumulate rather than by cutting their planned output, but this could only be a temporary reaction. Others might respond to a slowdown in the growth of sales by cutting prices in an attempt to keep volume up. But this was not likely to be the first response in 1969. Having already experienced several years of rapidly rising demand, costs, and prices, businesses would expect more of the same, and for the most part they would keep their own prices up and rising.

The most general and important response of business to a slowdown of sales would be a slowdown in the rate at which production was increasing. Initially this would involve a decline in the rate of growth and possibly some temporary decline in production itself. An absolute decline in output, however, would not be a necessary aspect of the disinflationary process. In a growing economy the labor force is increasing, new productive equipment is being added, new technology is being introduced, and the basic trend of labor productivity is rising; this means that the potential output of the economy also grows. Therefore, even though output is still rising absolutely, a slowdown in the rate of growth of output reduces actual production relative to its potential and is an anti-inflationary force. This is a part of the process that eventually builds up those back pressures which are essential to the development of a new stability in the level of costs and prices.

A Decline in Profits Per Unit

A deceleration in the rate of growth in real output would adversely affect productivity in the short run. The movement of fixed costs per unit of output would thus be less favorable for a time. After a sustained period of expansion and labor shortages, employers would tend to maintain work forces, and payrolls would tend to be fixed. The deterioration in productivity and increased costs per unit of output would reduce profits per unit. While even higher prices might consequently seem necessary, and while in many cases they might be posted, market conditions would make it difficult for such prices to hold, and the major effect would be heavier pressure on businesses to begin actions to reduce costs. The need to improve productivity and thereby pare unit labor costs would make labor "hoarding" more costly. Employment at overtime would diminish and layoffs would become more common.

A Slowdown in Wage Increases

As profits per unit weakened, employers would become more resistant to granting wage increases. At the same time, a softening labor market would lessen workers' insistence on large wage increases as a condition for employment, since they could not be so sure of finding another job quickly if they

left a current one or rejected a new offer. Moreover, if business profits were less favorable, a major rationale for heavy wage demands would be removed. As a consequence, the average rate of wage increase would ultimately begin to diminish. However, in view of the momentum of past increases in wages and the cost of living, this could not be expected to happen quickly. Nor could it be expected to happen evenly in all sectors.

A Slowdown in Price Increases

While, as already indicated, the unfavorable development in profits would create some incentive to mark up prices, more sluggish market conditions would encourage businesses to pursue temperate pricing policies, especially as this influence began to be reinforced by a slowdown in the rise of wage rates and unit labor costs. The reductions in wage and price increases would tend to reinforce each other. The longer price increases moderated, the weaker would become the expectation of further inflation. In turn, business and labor would be increasingly inclined to respond to the waning inflation by making appropriate price and wage adjustments, in preference to accepting a lower volume of production and less employment. With this change the economy would be on the road to regaining full employment without setting off another round of inflation.

* * *

At the beginning of 1969 no one knew how much of this process might occur during the year. As this Council indicated in its testimony before the Joint Economic Committee in February 1969, the growth of demand would be slowed only a little in the first half of the year, because demand was strong at the outset and the turn to monetary restraint just before the year opened would not have had much time to work. A more marked slowdown of demand was likely for the second half. At first almost all of the slack in demand would probably be taken up by a slowdown of production. Price and cost trends at the beginning of the year were too strong to be deflected by the moderate deceleration expected in the first half. But it could be expected that after midyear the slower growth of real output and of employment would create sufficient excess in the supply of products and labor to begin to have visible effects on price and wage increases. By the end of the year the rate of inflation would be lower than at the beginning. The effects to that point might not be great. Still, the economy would have crossed the threshold from a state of accelerating inflation to one of decelerating inflation, and we could count on making further progress.

THE RECORD IN 1969


Fiscal and monetary policies in 1969 followed the general course that seemed desirable at the beginning of the year. In general the economy responded to those policies by moving through some of the stages just outlined—more slowly than was expected at the beginning of 1969 but in a


manner that confirmed the initial view of the necessary stages in the process. The policy and economic developments of the year are summarized in the next few pages after which the main elements in the story are told in greater detail.

The contribution of fiscal policy to disinflation was a slowdown in the growth of Federal spending and the maintenance of a moderate budget surplus. During calendar 1969 Federal expenditures (as measured in the national income accounts) increased by about \$9 billion as compared with about \$20 billion a year in the 3 preceding years; and the budget surplus amounted to almost \$10 billion for the year as compared with a deficit of \$5 billion in 1968. Monetary policy reduced the rate of growth of the money supply (demand deposits and currency) from 7.2 percent in 1968 to 2.5 percent in 1969. The reduction occurred in successive steps that brought the rate of growth close to zero in the fourth quarter (Chart 1).

Chart 1

Changes in the Money Supply and Federal Expenditures






^{1/}BASED ON SEASONALLY ADJUSTED QUARTERLY AVERAGES OF DAILY FIGURES. 2/SEASONALLY ADJUSTED.

SOURCES: BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM AND DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE.

Changes in GNP, Real GNP, and GNP Deflator



NOTE: BASED ON SEASONALLY ADJUSTED DATA. SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE.

As the year progressed, it became more and more likely that these developments which led to accelerating inflation were transitory. Profits reported by corporations declined after the middle of the year. Also, the slower growth of total output—including an actual decline of industrial production—began to be translated into slower growth of employment and reduction of working hours. This combination of conditions marked a necessary step toward a subsequent decline in the rate of inflation.

FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS

The operating objective of fiscal policy in 1969, initially and throughout the year, was to keep a budget surplus at least as large as had been achieved by the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968—in the neighborhood of \$3 billion to \$5 billion. The first step in the process of fiscal control was a review of the budget for fiscal 1970 that the outgoing Administration had submitted. A program-by-program examination indicated that \$4.0 billion could be cut from the 1970 totals. Of this amount, \$1.1 billion would come from reducing defense outlays, \$1.0 billion from deferring increases in Social Security benefits, and \$1.9 billion from cuts in a wide range of other Federal programs. As a result, the Administration announced in April its intention to hold fiscal 1970 expenditures to \$192.9 billion.

During 1969 the necessary costs of certain "uncontrollable" items, such as interest on the debt, Medicare, public assistance, civil service retirement, and veterans benefits increased beyond the earlier estimates. At several points Congressional action also increased expenditures. In order to hold to the \$192.9 billion total for fiscal year 1970, the Administration therefore announced further cuts in mid-September amounting to \$3.5 billion, of which \$3.0 billion was in the defense program.

Adherence to the \$192.9 billion ceiling required not only making these gross reductions of \$7.5 billion in existing programs but also firmly resisting proposals, originating in Congress, that would have required spending many billions of dollars for new programs or program expansions. By the beginning of 1970 it was clear that the ceiling could not be maintained for the entire fiscal year. For calendar year 1969, however, the tight restraint on expenditures allowed fiscal policy to contribute to the fight against inflation.

The initial review of the budget also revealed that, in order to avoid an abrupt shift from surplus to deficit, it would be necessary to extend the 10-percent income tax surcharge, scheduled to expire on June 30, 1969, and to defer the scheduled reduction of the excise taxes on automobiles and telephone services. Accordingly, in March the President recommended their retention, with the 10-percent surcharge to continue until June 30, 1970.

Subsequent consideration of the longer-range issues led the Administration to conclude that the 7-percent tax credit enacted in 1962 to stimulate business investment should be repealed. The national priorities of the 1970's did not require or justify this special incentive.

Once the decision was made to ask for repeal of the investment credit, the repeal had to be effective immediately, in order to minimize disruptions from heavy advance order placements. Thus, although the repeal served a long-run objective, there would be some revenue increase in the short run, and therefore a gradual phasing out of the tax surcharge was possible. Consequently, on April 21, when the Administration asked for repeal of the investment credit, it also recommended that the surcharge rate be reduced to 5 percent on January 1, 1970, and then allowed to expire on June 30.

The extension of the surcharge was the subject of prolonged debate in Congress. Extension for the last 6 months of 1969 was not signed into law


until August 7, and extension for the first 6 months of 1970, at the 5-percent rate, did not become law until December 30. Continued uncertainty about tax prospects, which raised doubts about how determined the fight against inflation was going to be, contributed to the persistence of an inflationary psychology during the year.

As already indicated, the growth in Federal expenditures slowed down substantially in 1969. The Federal pay raise that went into effect on July 1, 1969, accounted for about one-third of the year's increase. Federal purchases of goods and services, including the pay raise, increased by approximately \$1 billion from the end of 1968 to the end of 1969. All other Federal expenditures combined, however—Social Security and other transfers, grants to States and localities, net interest paid, and subsidies—continued their upward trend, though at a somewhat more moderate pace. Among these, net interest paid rose because of sharply higher interest rates.

On the revenue side, the increase in Social Security tax rates on January 1, 1969, from 8.8 to 9.6 percent, added about \$3 billion to collections in 1969. During the year other tax rates were stable, except that the elimination of

Chart 3

Changes in Federal Surplus
National Income Accounts Basis



the investment tax credit effective April 21, 1969, increased total tax liabilities for calendar 1969 by \$0.9 billion; only the corporation share of this, \$0.5 billion, is counted as Federal receipts within calendar 1969 in the national income accounts. Only a small part of eligible investment made in 1969 lost the advantage of the tax credit because of the rather long leadtime between order placement and expenditures. Total Federal receipts (as measured in the national income accounts) rose by more than \$15 billion from the fourth quarter of 1968 to the fourth quarter of 1969.

The reported figures distort the pattern of receipts and consequently of the budget surplus during the year, because the insufficient withholding of personal income tax payments in 1968 increased final settlements in the first half of 1969. A correction for the bunching of these payments would show that the surplus stayed within a fairly narrow range during the year. (Year-to-year changes in the surplus are shown in Chart 3.)

MONETARY RESTRAINT

Last February, Chairman Martin described the goal of Federal Reserve policy as being "to disinflate without deflating." It was difficult to tell then, or later in the year, however, what rate of growth in the money supply would in fact achieve this general goal. Certainly it was necessary that the money supply grow more slowly than the 7.2-percent increase of 1968. In the circumstances of 1969, with interest rates high and rising and with strong and spreading expectations of inflation, businesses and families would be likely to hold declining money balances in relation to their income. Therefore, to bring about even a moderate slowdown in demand for goods and services might require a very low rate of monetary growth—lower than would be consistent with prosperity in a more stable economy. Past experience, however, threw little light on the requirements of this transitional period, and policy had to be tentative and watchful.

During the first half of 1969 the growth of the money supply fell to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 4.4 percent. (Before revisions in the data were made in late summer, the first half growth had appeared to be lower.) For the second half the policy became even more restrictive, and growth in the money supply was only 0.7 percent at an annual rate (Chart 1). For the year as a whole, time and savings deposits at commercial banks declined by 5.2 percent, as market interest rates rose well above the ceiling rates that banks could pay on these deposits and thus diverted funds to market securities.

The Federal Reserve restricted monetary growth primarily by reducing the expansion of its monetary liabilities. Although currency outside banks expanded during 1969 by 6.0 percent, almost as much as the 7.4 percent expansion in 1968, total reserves of commercial banks (adjusted for changes in reserve requirements) were practically constant for 1969, whereas they had increased 7.8 percent for 1968. Other restrictive steps were also taken

in April. The discount rate on loans to member banks secured by U.S. obligations or other eligible paper was raised from 5½ to 6 percent, and reserve requirements on demand deposits at all member banks were raised one-half of a percentage point.

THE FLOW OF CREDIT

One way in which the monetary restraint was transmitted to the economy was through its effect on the supply of credit. Banks were less able to expand credit through increases in the money supply. Also, as the year went on, the combination of continued slow growth of money and rising transactions and income lessened the inclination of individuals and businesses to reduce

TABLE 1.—Funds raised in credit markets, nonfinancial sectors, 1968-69
[Billions of dollars; seasonally adjusted annual rates]

Borrowing sector		19	68			1969				
	ı	11	111	IV	ı	11	111			
Total funds raised	94. 2	81.5	117.7	95. 2	96. 3	88. 8	100.9			
Change in U.S. Government cash balance out- side Federal Reserve	-5.3	-16.2	26. 4	-9.6	-5.7	-9. 2	14. 8			
Net funds raised	99. 5	97.7	91. 2	104.8	101.9	97.9	86. 1			
U.S. Government net of cash balance	25. 5	25. 5	2.9	4.1	5. 2	-9.6	. 3			
Other sectors	74.0	72.2	88. 3	100.7	96. 7	107.5	85. 8			
State and local governments Business Households	8, 2 32, 0 29, 4	5, 5 35, 6 29, 1	12. 8 39. 9 33. 0	14. 3 48. 7 34. 7	12. 1 47. 9 30. 9	11. 8 54. 4 33. 1	7. 4 45. 1 28. 1			
Home mortgages	15. 5	14.2	14. 2	15.6	15.6	17.1	15. 6			
Foreign	4. 4	2.0	2.6	2. 9	5. 7	8. 2	5. 2			

Note.—Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

their money balances further in order to acquire other financial assets. Whereas earlier the restraint on bank lending could be made up by more borrowing from other lenders who started the year with ample liquidity, this solution became more difficult as the year progressed. The tightening of credit supplies affected borrowing on the open market as well as through financial intermediaries. As a result, by the third quarter of 1969 total funds raised in credit markets, net of changes in Treasury cash at commercial banks, were nearly 20 percent less, seasonally adjusted, than in the fourth quarter of 1968 (Table 1). Most of this decline came in the third quarter.

A dramatic turnabout was made, of course, by the Federal Government. On a seasonally adjusted net basis, it changed from a heavy borrower in the first half of 1968 to a moderate borrower through the first quarter of 1969, then to a substantial lender in the second quarter; in the third quarter it borrowed only a small amount on a net basis. As a result, even though the net funds raised by all sectors declined in the second quarter of 1969, the net funds raised by borrowers other than the Federal Government actually

increased. In the third quarter, however, when the Federal Government was not active in the market on a net basis, borrowing of all other sectors declined and, consequently, total net funds obtained fell sharply.

This restraint in the amount of credit being supplied occurred in the face of an unusually strong private demand for credit. In addition to the strong demand which ordinarily accompanies a high level of economic activity, the expectation of more inflation acted as a further stimulus to borrowing. The fact that inflation had been accelerating since 1965 intensified expectations of future price increases. Individuals and businesses, seeing an opportunity to invest in real assets that would be expected to increase in money value with inflation, were eager to borrow in the expectation of repaying with dollars of reduced purchasing power. They were willing to pay high interest rates because they believed that inflation would substantially reduce the real cost of those rates. On a loan made at the beginning of a year at an 8-percent interest rate and repaid at the end of a year in which prices have risen by 4 percent, the return on the loan in real purchasing power is, of course, about 4 percent.


In these circumstances interest rates would have risen even if the money supply had continued to rise rapidly, as happened in 1968. But the curtailment of monetary expansion in 1969, and the curtailment of the supply of credit that accompanied it, temporarily raised interest rates even more. Until the slowdown of monetary expansion could reduce economic expansion and lessen the expectation of inflation, an extraordinary demand for credit would collide with a more restricted supply, and interest rates would soar.

In fact interest rates did soar in 1969 (Chart 4). By the end of 1969, most interest rates had climbed around 4 percentage points above their 1965 level. One must consult records for the Civil War and earlier to find comparable interest rates. And the steepness of the advance, on long-term as well as short-term securities, may well have been unprecedented.

The high interest rates of 1969 substantially altered financial flows, in large part because legal ceilings put some borrowers at a disadvantage and shunted funds to unrestricted parts of the market. Ceilings on deposit interest rates were particularly important. The maximum interest rates that banks could pay on time and savings accounts and on certificates of deposit had not been changed since April 1968, while market interest rates increased sharply. As a result, commercial banks could not compete, and large certificates of deposit outstanding fell from \$22.8 billion at the end of 1968 to \$14.7 billion at the end of June, and to \$10.8 billion at year-end 1969. (The ceiling rates were adjusted upward in January 1970.)

The two other financial institutions subject to deposit-rate ceilings, mutual savings banks and savings and loan associations, also felt the competition for funds. They experienced heavy withdrawals, and their net growth declined substantially. Time and savings deposits which the public held with

Interest Rates



SOURCES: TREASURY DEPARTMENT, BO ARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, AND STANDARD & POOR'S CORPORATION.

all deposit-type financial institutions grew by \$33.1 billion in 1968 but declined by \$20.5 billion at an annual rate during the third quarter of 1969. Life insurance companies also faced heavy demands for automatic policy loans, since the standard 5-percent rate on such loans became a bargain as other interest rates rose.

TABLE 2.—Changes in deposits and selected nondeposit sources of bank funds, 1968-69 (Billions of dollars)

		Change from preceding period							
Selected source of bank funds	****		1969, not seasonally adjusted						
	1968	1969	I	11	111	IV			
Commercial bank time and savings deposits	22, 2	-10.8	-0.4	-2.6	-6,3	-1.5			
Negotiable certificates of deposit Other time and savings deposits	2. 8 19. 4	-12.0 1.2	-4.0 3.6	-3.5 .9	-3.6 -2.7	9 6			
Selected nondeposit sources of bank funds	(1)	13.0	2 10). 2	2.2	.6			
Euro-dollar borrowing 3	1.8	7.0	3.6	3.6	1.1	-1.3			
Direct foreign borrowing 4 Commercial paper 8 Loan RP's 8	(1) (1)	1.7 4.2 .2	2 1	. 0 . 2 . 8	1.4 3	1.6 3			

¹ Not available.

affiliates or subsidiaries.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

Commercial banks were able to offset deposit withdrawals at first by tapping other sources of funds. They borrowed more heavily in the Eurodollar market, negotiated repurchase agreements of their loans with corporations, and expanded commercial paper issued by subsidiaries and affiliates. In total, as shown in Table 2, banks raised about \$10.2 billion by these devices during the first half of 1969.

Later in the year the Federal Reserve took steps to make the use of these sources more expensive to banks. Most repurchase agreements had to be treated like deposits after August 27 and were thus subjected to reserve requirements and interest-rate ceilings. In effect, this prohibited their further use. Euro-dollar borrowings above May levels were also subjected to reserve requirements beginning in September. Banks did not raise additional funds from these sources after midyear. Commercial paper sales continued to grow, however, and provided \$3.0 billion more in the second half. (Recent proposals, not yet effective, would bring these sales under either reserve requirements or interest rate ceilings, or both.) To meet heavy demands for loans, commercial banks also sold U.S. and municipal securities, depressing the bond market, and they traded actively in the Federal funds market. With time deposits declining and nondeposit sources of funds quite costly, large commercial banks made the terms of their lend-

Change during first half of 1969.
 Bank liabilities to foreign branches.
 Euro-dollars borrowed directly or through brokers and dealers, and liabilities to banks' own branches in U.S. territories and possessions.

5 Paper issued by a bank holding company, affiliate, or subsidiary.

6 Loans or participations in pools of loans sold under repurchase agreements to other than banks and other than

ing more restrictive, and the expansion of business loans slowed significantly after midyear.

The funds withdrawn from or not placed in banks or other financial institutions were not lost to the supply of credit. Funds returned by way of the open market. This can be seen in the shift in the composition of assets acquired by households and nonfinancial businesses. Households accumulated only \$2.1 billion in money and savings deposits at a seasonally adjusted annual rate during the third quarter of 1969, far below usual amounts, and diverted their savings increasingly into market instruments because of the much higher yields. They invested at an annual rate of \$29.1 billion in all credit market instruments in the third quarter of 1969, well above any quarterly rate in recent years. Most of this was accounted for by the purchase of \$27.4 billion of U.S. Government and agency securities. Nonfinancial corporations withdrew funds from time deposits at an annual rate of \$12.3 billion in the third quarter of 1969 and purchased \$13.3 billion (annual rate) of commercial paper.

TABLE 3.—Sources and uses of funds, nonfarm nonfinancial corporate business, 1968-69
[Billions of dollars; seasonally adjusted annual rates]

S		190	68			1969	
Source or use of funds	ı	11	111	IV	1	11	Ш
Sources, total	109. 9	101. 3	110.5	118. 9	118.0	114. 0	108.6
Internal funds Credit market instruments	59. 1 25. 7	63. 9 26. 6	65. 3 31. 1	64. 1 40. 7	62. 9 38. 7	62. 7 43. 6	62. 9 36. 2
Stocks	16.4	6 18. 3 6. 7 2. 2	-1.9 18.0 9.8 5.1	-2.2 22.2 18.2 2.6	. 1 20. 1 12. 7 5. 9	2. 4 16. 1 12. 6 12. 5	1. 6 15. 7 7. 8 11. 1
Trade debt and tax liabilityOther liabilities	18. 9 6. 2	2. 9 7. 9	6. 0 8. 1	8. 3 5. 8	8. 4 8. 0	4. 6 3. 1	7. 8 1. 7
Uses, total	102.7	93. 4	104.7	112.4	111.6	107.3	103. 6
Acquisition of financial assets: Liquid assets Consumer and trade credit Other assets	13. 7 16. 9 1. 4	8. 4 10. 4 2. 3	13.5 18.5 -3.5	4. 5 19. 6 4. 6	8. 0 15. 7 3. 2	1, 8 15, 6 4, 1	6. 1 17. 1 2. 9
Capital expenditures	70.7	76.9	76. 2	83. 7	84.7	85. 8	89. 7
Discrepancy (sources less uses)	7. 2	8.1	5. 7	6.5	6, 4	6.7	5. 0

Note.—Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

Businesses which could borrow on the open market were able to meet their credit needs despite this shift in fund flows from financial intermediaries to credit market instruments. Although the third quarter of 1969 saw a decline in the funds raised by businesses in credit markets compared with the second quarter, the total of funds raised represented an annual rate higher than during most of 1968. Businesses expanded capital expenditures steadily during the first 3 quarters of 1969 despite little increase in the generation of funds internally and a decline in their borrowing from banks

(Table 3). They made up the difference in large part by selling liquid assets. In the third quarter, nonfinancial corporations sold liquid assets at an annual rate of \$6.1 billion, whereas these corporations are typically net purchasers of liquid assets, often by substantial amounts.

For the housing sector the job of tapping the open market to find the funds no longer available through private financial intermediaries fell upon federally sponsored agencies, chiefly the Federal National Mortgage Association and Federal Home Loan Banks. These agencies stepped up their support of the mortgage market substantially. Their annual rate of support for residential and farm mortgages, furnished either directly by purchases of mortgages or indirectly through loans to savings and loan associations, increased from \$3.0 billion in all of 1968 to a \$10.3 billion annual rate in the third quarter of 1969. This represented 47 percent of the total supply of noncommercial mortgages, as compared with 14 percent in 1968. Despite this increased assistance, the growth of total mortgage credit declined in the fourth quarter.

The support of mortgages by federally sponsored agencies was financed by issuing securities, which competed with other financial assets and to some extent depleted private sources supplying the mortgage market. Total issues of sponsored Federal credit agencies, made mainly for mortgages, rose from \$3.2 billion in 1968 to a \$12.3 billion annual rate in the third quarter of 1969.

The largest and earliest decline in net funds raised outside of the Federal Government was experienced by State and local governments. By the third quarter their acquisition of credit was one-fourth below the 1968 rate. Many States and localities were prevented from borrowing in 1969 by legal ceilings on the interest rates they could pay. Also, during parts of the year the market was disturbed by uncertainty about possible changes in the tax status of State and local securities in addition to heavy selling of these securities by commercial banks.

THE DEMAND FOR OUTPUT

The policies of fiscal and monetary restraint and the associated credit stringency, described earlier, affected the behavior of the economy by slowing down the total demand for output.

Total expenditure for goods and services (gross national product or GNP) rose \$67 billion from 1968 to 1969, when it reached \$932 billion. This was an increase of 7.7 percent as compared with the 9.1 percent rise from 1967 to 1968 (Table 4).

A major factor in the slower growth of spending was the slower increase of Federal purchases, mainly for defense. In fact, GNP other than Federal purchases rose as much in 1969 as in the preceding year. The most marked shift within the non-Federal total was the much larger increase in business fixed investment and the much smaller increase in residential construction than had occurred in the preceding year. These movements were at least partly related. The large absorption of funds to finance business

TABLE 4.—Changes in gross national product and components, 1968-69
[Billions of dollars]

		Chang	hange from preceding period						
Component	1968	1969 1	1969, seasonally adjusted annual rates						
			ı	11	111	 V 1			
Gross national product	72.2	66.6	16. 2	16. 1	18. 0	10. 3			
Federal Government purchases	8.8	2.5	3	-1.0	2.6	5			
Non-Federal purchases	63.4	64. 1	16.5	17.1	15. 4	10. 8			
State and local government purchases	11.4	12.0	3.7	3.8	1.5	2. 4			
Fixed investment	10.4	12.5	5. 2	1.9	2.0	2.0			
Nonresidential	5. 1 5. 2	10. 5 2. 0	3. 8 1. 4	2.5 6	3.3 -1.3	1.9 .2			
Personal consumption expenditures	44.3	39. 4	11.3	10.8	7.0	9. 4			
Net exports of goods and services	-2.7	4	. 3	.1	1.1	 1			
Change in business inventories	1	.7	-3.9	. 3	3.8	-2.9			

¹ Preliminary.

Note,-Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Department of Commerce.

investment, together with tightening monetary conditions, meant that less funds were available to finance residential construction. Monetary restraint also had some effect on State and local government purchases, which nonetheless continued to rise at a much higher rate than GNP.

The main categories of GNP other than Federal purchases and net exports are reviewed below. Exports and imports are discussed in Chapter 5.

Fixed Investment by Business

Business demand for plant and equipment was strong throughout 1969 and offered stubborn resistance to restraint even though the rate of expansion moderated within the year. The 12-percent increase in investment over that of 1968 was the eighth annual advance in a row, marking the longest sustained increase since before World War I. However, businessmen spent less than they had anticipated in the February 1969 Commerce-SEC annual survey of investment plans.

The rise in investment during 1969 was an extension of a recovery that started haltingly in late 1967 and early 1968 but gathered momentum from the upsurge in sales and profits in the first half of 1968. The surtax on corporations resulting from the passage of the tax increase in mid-1968 did not seem to have much impact on the developing investment expansion, perhaps in part because the tax rise was small and was expected to be temporary. During the second half of 1968, the financing of these programs was facilitated when the monetary authorities shifted to an easier policy and the Federal deficit declined sharply, making additional funds available for the

private sector. At the end of 1968 businessmen projected for the first half of 1969 one of the largest half-year increases ever recorded in the Commerce-SEC survey.

Several influences that should have inhibited business investment emerged in 1969, although at best they served only to slow down the increase in the second half. They included the shift to monetary restraint and the rapid rise in interest costs; the tapering in the expansion of demand and output, and the emergence of excess plant capacity in a number of industries; the decline in book profits after the second quarter; and the proposed repeal of the investment tax credit announced on April 21, 1969, although this move could not have greatly affected spending until late in the year because of the sizable backlog of equipment orders that existed in mid-April. In any event, speculation that the termination of the investment tax credit might be in the Administration's proposals led to an upsurge in order placements immediately prior to April 21, as businessmen acted to take advantage of the credit while it was still allowed.

Although their spending fell somewhat short of expectations in the first half of the year, businessmen forged ahead with their investment programs as 1969 progressed. New appropriations by manufacturers and new projects started by manufacturers and public utilities rose through the third quarter. And at the end of 1969, businessmen reporting in the Commerce-SEC survey were once again projecting a substantial increase in expenditures in the coming year.

The industrial composition of investment provides a clue to the strength of business investment. Over the past few years the demand for capital goods by electric and gas utilities and telephone companies has been exceptionally strong. In contrast to other groups, investment in these industries has increased steadily and substantially each year. Several successive years of sharply rising demand have strained facilities, and the service failures that have appeared in particular areas have accentuated the need for additional capacity. High interest rates have not seriously deterred these industries from investment because they must meet demands for service and because the regulatory authorities permit such cost increases to be reflected in higher rates. Actual spending by these firms rose sharply in 1969, and their planned spending is a major source of strength in the near-term investment outlook.

Housing

Housing in 1969 showed the effects of disrupted capital markets and high interest rates. Private nonfarm housing starts, at about 1.45 million units for the year as a whole, were unchanged from 1968, but they declined irregularly from an early 1969 peak. Expenditures for the full year were 6½ percent greater than in 1968, but the increase was due almost entirely to higher prices. During the year, private housing outlays declined 6.7 percent (annual rate) from the first to the fourth quarter, and this decline was a major reason for the dampening in the rise of aggregate demand.

Homebuilding never did recover fully from the effects of the credit stringency of 1966. The housing upturn in 1967 came to a temporary halt in the first half of 1968 because of rising interest rates. Since housing starts from 1966 to 1968 fell considerably below the number needed to satisfy the requirements created by new households and the replacement of obsolete units, a substantial backlog in demand built up. Vacancy rates continued to be low, prices for new and existing homes recorded sharp increases, and rents rose at an accelerated rate.

In the second half of 1968, the somewhat easier credit market conditions that followed enactment of the surtax led to a pronounced pickup in private nonfarm starts. From a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 1.4 million units in the second quarter of 1968 they rose to 1.7 million in the first quarter of 1969. However, this upsurge in starts was also short lived. The slower monetary growth near the beginning of 1969 was followed by a further rise in what were already high interest rates. Some lending institutions shifted from mortgages to more lucrative investments, and most experienced much less favorable savings flows. The further sharp tightening by the monetary authorities after mid-1969 hampered housing. As was indicated earlier, the thrift institutions, which are important in mortgage financing, were handicapped in their attempt to compete for savings. These institutions experienced large outflows of savings because depositors sought the higher yields available on market securities. After starts had fallen to a 1.5 million unit rate in the second quarter, they declined to 1.4 million units in the third and 1.3 million in the fourth.

Partly in an effort to support homebuilding, the Administration took several steps to alter supply and demand conditions in ways that would curb inflationary trends in construction (including the homebuilding industry). Early in the year, lumber and plywood prices rose sharply as a result of tight supply conditions and the expectation of further tightness. The Government curtailed its own purchases and initiated measures to increase the supply of timber from the national forests. These actions played a part in the sharp retreat of lumber and plywood prices from their speculative peaks.

Increases in construction wage rates were very pronounced in 1969, with collective bargaining agreements commonly calling for rises in excess of 12 percent per year for 2 or 3 years. These increases and the consequent advances in costs made it even more difficult to sustain an already weak residential construction industry. Moreover, building such large wage increases into costs for future years raised the danger that the entire construction industry would be left stranded by excessive costs when inflation abated. There was also concern that the exceptional wage increases in this industry would set an example that might be followed in other industries.

On September 4, the President announced a program to attack the inflationary aspects of construction wage settlements.

1. The Federal Government would cut new contracts for direct Federal construction by 75 percent, with the cut to continue until conditions eased

in the economy or in the construction industry. If that limitation were to remain in effect through fiscal 1970, it would reduce contract awards by \$1.8 billion.

- 2. State and local governments were requested to cut their new construction contracts voluntarily. If not enough voluntary restraint was forthcoming, the Administration would consider a reduction in Federal grants for construction.
- 3. Private business was requested to cooperate in restricting nonresidential construction.
- 4. The Departments of Labor and of Health, Education, and Welfare were directed to apply more of their manpower training programs to increasing the number of skilled construction workers.
- 5. A Cabinet Committee on Construction, headed by the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, was established to develop long- and short-range programs for analyzing problems in the construction industry.

On September 22, the President established a tripartite Construction Industry Collective Bargaining Commission to consider solutions to a number of labor-management and manpower problems in the industry, including productivity, seasonality, settlement of disputes, and the training of labor.

Consumer Income and Spending

Personal income rose \$59 billion, or 8.6 percent, from 1968 to 1969 (Table 5). There were large increases in payrolls and incomes from property, and still larger percentage rises in transfer payments (such as payments for Social Security, Medicare, and veterans benefits).

Personal taxes rose last year by \$20 billion, or 20 percent, an even greater increase than from 1967 to 1968, when the surtax went into effect. Last year

	Cha	nge from prec	eding period (l	oillions of dolla	ırs)	
Period	Personal income	Personal tax and nontax payments	Disposable personal income	Personal consump- tion ex- penditures	Personal saving ¹	Saving rate for period (percent)
1967 1968 1969 ²	42. 2 58. 5 59. 2	7. 5 15. 0 19. 6	34. 6 43. 5 39. 6	26. 0 44. 3 39. 4	7.9 -2.0 8	7. 4 6. 5 6. 0
		Seasonali	y adjusted ann	nual rates		
1967: Second half	21. 5	4. 4	17. 0	13. 8	3.1	7.5
1968: First half Second half	32. 0 31. 4	5. 9 13. 8	26. 2 17. 6	26. 2 22. 4	—. 8 —5. 5	7. 1 5. 9
1969: First half Second half?	28. 8 29. 3	11.6 2.2	17. 3 26. 9	19. 6 17. 1	-2. 7 9. 5	5. 3 6. 6

TABLE 5.—Changes in personal income, taxes, and saving, 1967-69

Source: Department of Commerce.

Disposable personal income less personal outlays (personal consumption expenditures, interest paid by consumers, and personal transfer payments to foreigners).
2 Preliminary.

Note.—Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.

was the first full year of the surtax; for this reason surtax liabilites were higher, rising from $7\frac{1}{2}$ to 10 percent. In addition, 1969 tax payments were unusually high because of the underwithholding of taxes in 1968. Because of the substantial increase in taxes, personal disposable (after-tax) income rose only 6.7 percent, the smallest percentage advance in 6 years.

Consumer spending rose more rapidly than disposable income from 1968 to 1969. The pattern of consumer expenditures within the year was particularly interesting for the light it threw on the impact of the surtax. When the surtax was imposed in mid-1968, it was recognized that some of its effects might be offset if consumers decided to reduce their rate of saving. For reasons that are still not entirely clear, the rate of saving had been rather high for almost 2 years before the tax increase was enacted. Furthermore, there was always the possibility that consumers might be slow in adjusting their expenditures to an anticipated change in disposable income, especially if they regarded the surtax as temporary. As it turned out, consumers did reduce their rate of saving—but to an extent that was much greater than anticipated.

The imposition of the tax had little immediate impact on consumer spending. In the third quarter of 1968, spending rose sharply, and the saving rate fell; not until the fourth quarter did spending show signs of slowing down. At the start of 1969, many analysts counted on the slowdown in consumer spending that had finally emerged in the fourth quarter of 1968 to continue in the first half of 1969, particularly since consumers had heavy tax payments to make on their 1968 liabilities and since Social Security taxes were increased at the start of the year. In fact, however, consumer spending rose sharply in both the first and second quarters, despite the slow expansion in disposable income. The personal saving rate fell to exceptionally low levels. Helping to explain the high rate of spending relative to disposable income in 1968 and 1969 was the rapid monetary expansion and the substantial accumulation of liquid assets that preceded these 2 years. The liquidity of households increased at very rapid rates throughout 1967 and 1968. The process of attempting to adjust these liquid asset holdings to normal levels may have contributed to the heavy consumer spending in 1968 and the first half of 1969, as it did in the case of business investment.

During the second half of 1969, increasing concern over the economic outlook, which showed up in a number of surveys of consumer sentiment, was reflected in a more subdued pace of consumer spending and a rise in the saving rate. Spending for durable goods edged down, bringing to a halt a rise that had started in the summer of 1967. Auto purchases showed considerable weakness late in the year, as a result of which auto producers made substantial cuts in production.

State and Local Purchases

State and local government purchases, with a 12-percent increase, showed the largest percentage advance of any of the major demand components in 1969. The somewhat slower rise as compared with the increases from 1966 to 1968 was the result of credit tightness. Several State and local jurisdictions either found it impossible to sell securities because of statutory ceilings on interest rates or decided to postpone new bond issues because of high rates. Hardest hit was construction, which accounts for about one-fourth of State and local government purchases, and which rose very little after annual increases of about 10 percent in the 3 preceding years. The Administration's request to State and local governments in September to curb construction came too late in the year to influence 1969 outlays significantly.

Inventory Investment

Investment in business inventories totaled \$8 billion last year—about as much as the year before. Businessmen tended to be cautious in their inventory policies, possibly because of the high cost of borrowed money and uncertainties over the sales outlook. Accumulation was moderate in the first half, but during the third quarter there was some evidence that unwanted stocks were piling up. However, the actual rate of accumulation apparently fell in the final quarter as steps were taken to adjust production. A good part of the swing in inventory accumulation centered in the automobile industry.

SHARES IN THE NATIONAL INCOME

The value of the Nation's production can also be measured by the national income, which is obtained by adding up all of the incomes earned in current production—wages and salaries, corporate profits, proprietors' incomes, net interest, and rental incomes of persons. Since incomes are the factor costs of production, an analysis of them is particularly instructive in a time of inflation. It provides a useful backdrop for the discussion of the labor market, profits, and prices that follows.

The 1969 rise in employee compensation, approximately 10 percent, matched the large increase from 1967 to 1968. The combination of higher employment and substantial increases in rates of pay resulted in the largest percentage increase in private payrolls since 1951. Government payrolls grew less rapidly than in the preceding year, mainly because the growth in employment slowed. The slowdown in military payrolls was especially pronounced because for the first time since 1965 the size of the Armed Forces showed no increase. The rise in Federal civilian employment was deliberately held down as a measure of restraint. Growth in State and local government employment remained substantial, but its rate of increase fell for the third year in a row.

In 1969, the national income accounts measure of corporate profits (that is, adjusted to exclude inventory profits) was slightly above the 1968 total. However, according to preliminary data, profits declined in each quarter of 1969, continuing a movement that started in late 1968. Book profits (including inventory profits) made a better showing in 1969 than the national

income version; the rise from 1968 came to \$3 billion, bringing the total to more than \$94 billion. After-tax profits rose \$1 billion to a new peak, the repeal of the investment tax credit adding \$\frac{1}{2}\$ billion to 1969 tax liabilities. Corporations increased dividends more than after-tax profits rose so that undistributed profits edged down.

Both farm and nonfarm proprietors experienced increased incomes in 1969. Large increases in farm prices helped raise the total net income of farm proprietors by \$1.5 billion. Last year's income of about \$16 billion was the same as the 1966 total, which in turn was the highest since 1948. Cash receipts from marketings of livestock and livestock products were bolstered by a 12-percent price rise that reflected a continued increase in consumer demand for meat coupled with only moderate increases in market supplies and in imports, which are limited by voluntary restraints. In the case of crops, however, another record harvest, combined with big carryovers of grains and soybeans, resulted in a 3-percent decline in prices. Direct Government payments totaled about \$33/4 billion last year, up \$1/3 billion from 1968. They accounted, as in 1968, for 6 percent of the cash receipts from farm marketings.

Inflation had an important effect on farm expenses as well as on receipts last year. Prices were higher for all major inputs except fertilizers. Sharp increases were recorded for farm wage rates, which were up 10 percent from 1968. Because the number of hired farmworkers dropped, however, total cash wages showed an increase of 6 percent over the 1968 figure.

THE LABOR MARKET

The pressures of excess demand that the economy has experienced most of the time since 1966 have been nowhere more evident than in the labor market. The tight market that prevailed during most of 1969 showed up in many different ways. For the year as a whole, the unemployment rate was the lowest since 1953. In response to the heavy demand for workers, there was an abnormally large increase in the civilian labor force; the number of persons employed rose by 2 million to a record 77.9 million. The workweek remained long. Wage rates continued their rapid advance, and the rise in productivity came to a halt. Within the year, labor demand was less intense in the second half than in the first.

Employment

The increase of 2 million persons in the civilian labor force was not only some 600,000 greater than the average rise of the 5 preceding years, but it was the largest since 1946–47, after the demobilization of the Armed Forces. With their unemployment rates extremely low and labor force participation rates already high, adult men accounted for a significantly smaller proportion of the increase in total employment than in the 2 preceding years. Adult women and teenagers, apparently attracted by the ease of finding jobs, ac-

counted for about three-fourths of the employment rise, a much larger proportion than in 1967 and 1968, when employment increases were not so great (Table 6). A large proportion of the jobs that women and young persons found last year were part-time jobs, which have been growing in importance over the past several years.

Table 6.—Changes in civilian employment and distribution of change, 1965-69

	Change from preceding year						
Year	Total employment	Both sexes 16–19 years	Females 20 years and over	Males 20 years and over			
		Thousands	of persons				
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	1,783 1,807 1,477 1,548 1,982	520 685 —39 98 337	727 877 890 884 1,116	536 245 626 566 529			
		Percentage distri	bution of change				
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0	29. 2 37. 9 -2. 6 6. 3 17. 0	40. 8 48. 5 60. 3 57. 1 56. 3	30. 1 13. 6 42. 4 36. 6 26. 7			

Note.—Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Department of Labor.

The long-term downward trend in agricultural employment, which had slowed markedly in 1967 and 1968, accelerated in 1969. All of the major industry divisions in the nonagricultural sector recorded employment increases, but most of the gains were outside manufacturing, increases in construction and retail trade being especially noteworthy. The rise in manufacturing employment was moderate, far below the advances in 1965 and 1966 when the buildup for the Vietnam War was underway.

Unemployment

The average number of persons out of work in 1969 was almost the same as in 1968, and the unemployment rate edged down from 3.6 percent to 3.5 percent of the labor force. Most groups experienced decreased rates. The shortage of adult male workers, who account for nearly 60 percent of total employment and constitute the mainstay of the labor force, was especially evident last year. Their unemployment rate fell from 2.2 to 2.1 percent—the lowest for any year in the postwar period. Last year's 12.2 percent rate for teenagers was the lowest since 1957, and the 6.4 percent rate for Negroes and other nonwhite races combined showed a decline. Decreases occurred in the relatively unskilled occupations, but they were also significant among craftsmen and foremen (Table 7).

TABLE 7.—Selected unemployment rates, 1961 and 1965-69
[Percent]

Group of workers	1961	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
All workers	6. 7	4. 5	3. 8	3. 8	3. 6	3, 5
Sex and age: Both sexes 16–19 years Men 20 years and over Women 20 years and over	16. 8	14. 8	12. 8	12. 8	12. 7	12. 2
	5. 7	3. 2	2. 5	2. 3	2. 2	2. 1
	6. 3	4. 5	3. 8	4. 2	3. 8	3. 7
Race: White Negro and other races	6. 0	4. 1	3. 4	3. 4	3. 2	3. 1
	12. 4	8. 1	7. 3	7. 4	6. 7	6. 4
Selected groups: White collar workers	3. 3	2. 3	2. 0	2. 2	2. 0	2. 1
	9. 2	5. 3	4. 2	4. 4	4. 1	3. 9
Craftsmen and foremen Operatives	6. 3 9. 6 14. 7	3. 6 5. 5 8. 6	2.8 4.3 7.4	2. 5 5. 0 7. 6	2. 4 4. 5 7. 2	2. 2 4. 4 6. 7
Private wage and salary workers in nonagricultural industries	7. 5	4.6	3.8	3. 9	3. 6	3.5
Construction	15. 7	10. 1	8. 1	7. 4	6. 9	6. 0
Manufacturing	7. 7	4. 0	3. 2	3. 7	3. 3	3. 3


Source: Department of Labor.

Although the demand for labor was strong through the year, it showed some easing as the year progressed, notably after midyear. In nonfarm establishments, employment increases, which had averaged 700,000 per quarter in the first half, fell to 300,000 per quarter in the second half. The length of the workweek in private nonfarm industries fell noticeably in the final quarter after remaining high and remarkably steady through September. The unemployment rate rose from 3.3 percent in the first quarter to 3.5 percent in the second and edged up further in the second half, showing little change, on average, from the third to the fourth quarter (Chart 5).

Productivity Changes

Output per man-hour for all employees in the private nonfarm sector recorded no change from 1968 to 1969. This was the poorest performance for productivity growth since the mid-1950's. The absence of comprehensive and detailed data makes it difficult to specify the reasons for this poor showing. The explanation probably involves two factors which differed in importance from industry to industry and time to time. One is that the slower rate of increase of demand and output itself limited the gains of productivity. Employers not only retained staff, technical, and other "overhead" workers as they usually do; they also expanded their work forces despite the slower sales rise in order to be prepared for a future higher level of demand. The consequence of combining this with slow growth of current output was a poor performance of output per man-hour. The other explanation is that productivity was limited by the shortage of labor, as evidenced by the low unemployment rates, especially for experienced workers. Employers were forced to turn to marginal workers such as teenagers and housewives, most of whom have relatively little work experience and a lower

Unemployment Rate



*UNEMPLOYMENT AS PERCENT OF CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE. SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

than average rate of productivity. Probably also as a result of labor shortage, absenteeism and turnover were both unusually high, which depressed productivity. Finally, under the conditions that prevailed in 1969, delays in the delivery of materials and equipment were common, especially in the capital goods sector, and production schedules were hard to maintain, at least through the summer.

Wage Changes

Since the demand for labor in recent years has been strong in relation to supply at existing wage rates, labor has been in a position to win large gains in hourly compensation. During this period, the rapid rise in living costs and expectations of further increases in the cost of living have added to labor's wage demands. Employers have bid up wages because of their own expectations that higher costs could readily be passed on in the form of higher prices.

Increases in average hourly earnings, excluding fringe benefits, were again very large in 1969 (Table 8). In construction and mining, where the demand for labor was extremely strong, hourly earnings showed their sharpest gains since 1951. In manufacturing, where the increase in labor demand was more moderate, the rise in earnings fell a little short of the increases in 1968.

TABLE 8.—Increases in average gross hourly earnings of private nonagricultural production or nonsupervisory workers since 1960

	Percentage change per year							
Industry	1960	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968		
	to	to	to	to	to	to		
	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969 1		
Total private 2	3, 1	3. 8	4.5	4.7	6.3	6. 7		
Mining	1. 9	3. 9	4. 5	4.6	5. 0	7. 2		
Contract construction	3. 6	4. 2	5. 1	5.7	7. 1	8. 4		
Manufacturing.	2. 9	3. 2	4. 2	4.0	6. 4	6. 0		
Durable goods	2. 8	3. 0	3. 9	3. 4	6. 3	6. 0		
Nondurable goods	2. 8	3. 1	3. 8	4. 9	6. 6	6. 2		
Wholesale and retail trade	3, 5	3.6	4.9	5, 2	7.1	6.7		
Wholesale trade	3. 0	3.6	4.6	5. 5	5. 9	5. 9		
	3. 6	4.0	4.9	5. 2	7. 5	6. 5		
Finance, insurance, and real estate	3.3	3.9	3.3	4, 5	6.6	6. 2		

Note.—Data relate to production workers in mining and manufacturing, to construction workers in contract construction, and, generally, to nonsupervisory workers in all other industries.

Source: Department of Labor.

Table 9.—Wage and benefit decisions, 1965-69

Manage	Median ann	ual rate of	increase in	decisions re	ached in-	
Measure	1965	1966	1967	1968	19691	
Major collective bargaining situations: 2						
Wage and benefit changes (packages): Equal timing 3 Time weighted (actual timing) 4	3. 3 (⁵)	4. 0 4. 7	5. 2 5. 5	6. 0 6. 6	7. 4 8. 2	
Negotiated wage-rate increases averaged over life of contract: All industries	• 3. 3	3. 9	5. 0	5. 2	7. 1	
ManufacturingNonmanufacturing	(5) (6)	3. 8 3. 9	5, 1 5, 0	4. 9 5. 9	5. 9 8. 8	
Negotiated first-year wage-rate increases: All industries	3.9	4.8	5.7	7.2	8.3	
ManufacturingNonmanufacturing	4. 1 3. 7	4. 2 5. 0	6. 4 5. 0	6. 9 7. 5	7. 1 10. 5	
Wage increases in manufacturing:						
All establishments	3.7	4.2	5, 3	6.0	7 6. 2	
Union establishments Nonunion establishments	3. 6 4. 0	4. 1 4. 4	5, 5 5, 0	6. 5 5. 0	7 6. 9 7 5. 8	

Source: Department of Labor.

¹ Preliminary.
2 Includes transportation and public utilities and services, not shown separately in this table.

 ¹ Preliminary.
 2 Except for packages, data are for contracts affecting 1,000 workers or more. Package cost estimates are limited to settlements affecting 5,000 workers or more (10,000 in 1965). The package cost of a few settlements affecting relatively few workers has not been determined.
 3 Based on estimated increases in hourly costs at end of contract period and assumes equal spacing of wage and benefit changes over life of contract.
 4 Takes account of actual effective dates of wage and benefit changes.

⁵ Not available

Based on settlements affecting 10,000 workers or more.
 Data not available for year 1969; data apply to first 9 months of 1969.

Note.—Possible increases in wages resulting from cost-of-living escalator adjustments (except those guaranteed in the contracts) were omitted

Although 1969 was not a year of collective bargaining agreements on an extensive or major scale, the increase in wage rates and benefits won by unions was considerably above their gains in 1968. Pay raises were not only much larger in nonmanufacturing industries than in manufacturing—as was true in 1968—but the acceleration in comparison with that in the preceding year was also much greater in nonmanufacturing (Table 9). As in earlier years, "front-end loading" was common last year. This is the practice of concentrating a pay raise in the first year of a contract covering more than 1 year. It reflects attempts by unions to make up quickly for the erosion of prior wage gains because of rising living costs.

The combination of higher hourly compensation and no rise in productivity resulted in a 7-percent rise in labor costs per unit of output—the sharpest annual advance for employees in the private nonfarm sector since 1951. It was far above the preceding year's rise of 4 percent because of the pronounced difference in productivity performance (Chart 6). The rise in unit labor costs continued throughout the year.

PRICE MOVEMENTS

As a result of last year's pressures in the economy, all major price indicators—the comprehensive GNP price deflator, the consumer price index (CPI) and the wholesale price index (WPI)—rose more rapidly than in any year since 1951. Changes in GNP deflators by sector are shown in Table 10 while changes in the CPI and WPI are shown in Table 12.

The rise in the GNP deflator was intensified by the sharp advance in farm prices and by continued large increases in pay scales for Government workers and members of the Armed Forces. Although the price rise for the private nonfarm business sector (which produces about five-sixths of the GNP) was smaller than for the GNP as a whole, it represented a significant stepup over the preceding year's change.

TABLE 10.—Changes in implicit price deflators for GNP, by sector, 1965-69

	Percentage change							
Producing sector	1965 to 1966	1966 to 1967	1967 to 1968	1968 to 1969 1				
Gross national product	2.7	3. 2	4.0	4.				
Private	2.6	2.9	3.6	4,5				
Business	2.4	2,8	3, 5	4.				
NonfarmFarm	2. 0 11. 5	3. 2 -7. 5	3. 5 3. 8	4. 3 7. 4				
Households and institutions	4.9	6.6	7.7	4. :				
General government	5.1	5.6	7.6	7.0				


¹ Preliminary.

Source: Department of Commerce.

Chart 6

Changes in Compensation, Productivity, Labor Costs, and Prices

Private Nonfarm Sector



NOTE.-DATA RELATE TO ALL EMPLOYEES.

SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE.

Some insight into price movements in the nonfarm business sector is provided by Table 11, which shows for nonfinancial corporations the composition of price change in terms of changes in its components—costs and profits per unit of output. These data link the various income flows such as wages and profits with real output. Costs and profits per unit of output are derived by dividing each cost aggregate and aggregate profits measured in current dollars by real output measured in 1958 prices throughout the period. The sum of the costs and profits per unit equals price per unit, which is the deflator for nonfinancial corporations. (As indicated in the table, for example, the price of a unit of output thus measured rose 4.1 cents from 1968 to 1969.)

Labor cost is the single most important component of price; in the period from 1965 through 1969, its relative importance varied from 62½ to 65 percent of price. All other costs combined—depreciation, indirect business taxes, and net interest—accounted for about 20 to 21 percent of price while profits (including the inventory valuation adjustment) accounted for the remainder.

Last year, as in 1966 and 1967, increased labor costs per unit of output were almost equal to the rise in prices. Depreciation, indirect business taxes, and net interest also added small amounts to the price rise. However, businessmen were only partly successful in translating unit cost increases into higher prices, and consequently profits per unit of output edged lower. This differed from the experience from 1967 to 1968, a period of very rapid increase in demand, when the price advance was accompanied by larger unit profit margins.

TABLE 11.—Changes in current dollar costs and profits per unit of real output of nonfinancial corporations since 1960

[Dollars per unit of real output]

			r		
Item	1960-65 average	1965 to 1966	1966 to 1967	1967 to 1968	1968 to 1969 1
Total price	. 007	. 018	. 030	. 030	. 041
Labor costs Other costs ² Profits ³	002 . 003 . 006	018 001 . 001	. 028 . 014 —. 013	. 017 . 007 . 007	. 038 . 011 —. 008

1 Preliminary.

3 Before tax and including inventory valuation adjustment.

Note.—Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Department of Commerce.

Although the price rise was substantial throughout 1969, the character of the rise appeared to be undergoing a transition some time late in the year. Unit costs continued to increase rapidly. With real output growing more slowly, aggregate overhead costs became increasingly burdensome. But demand pressures, which had been the dominant element in the price rise earlier in the year, diminished, making it more difficult for business fully to recoup cost increases through higher prices. However, the further narrowing of unit profit margins did not prevent prices from rising sharply at the end of the year.

² Capital consumption allowances, indirect business taxes plus transfer payments less subsidies, and net interest.

Wholesale and Retail Prices

Large increases in wholesale prices of farm products and foods and wide-spread advances in industrial prices brought about a 4.0-percent rise in wholesale prices from 1968 to 1969, considerably more than the 2.5-percent rise from 1967 to 1968 (Chart 7). All of the main parts of the industrial component increased, and for most the rises were greater than they had been from 1967 to 1968. Increases were considerably above average for metals and metal products, amounting to almost 6 percent, as a result of large increases in steel and nonferrous metals prices. Prices of lumber and wood products recorded a rise of 11 percent from 1968 to 1969 after a 13-percent advance from 1967 to 1968.


TABLE 12.—Changes in wholesale and consumer prices, 1966-69

		Percent	age chang	e (annual	rate) over	preceding	period		
Commodity or item group						1969			
	1966	1967	1968	1969	ı	II	Ш	IV	
						Unadjusted			
Wholesale prices: All commodities	3, 3	0. 2	2. 5	4.0	6.4	5.1	2.9	4. 3	
Farm products Processed foods and feeds Industrial commodities	7. 3 5. 9 2. 1	-5.6 -1.2 1.5	2. 5 2. 1 2. 5	6. 2 5. 0 3. 4	12. 2 5. 7 5. 6	14. 4 11. 5 2. 9	7.6 2.2	3. 3 1. 3 5. 1	
Consumer prices: All items	2.9	2, 8	4. 2	5, 4	5. 0	6.9	5, 8	5. 7	
Food Nonfood commodities Services	5, 0 1, 3 3, 8	. 9 2. 5 4. 4	3. 6 3. 7 5. 2	5. 2 4. 2 7. 0	4. 0 2. 5 7. 5	6. 7 6. 4 8. 2	10. 4 2. 4 6. 6	3. 8 6. 2 6. 5	
						Seasonally	adjusted		
Consumer prices: All items.					5. 3	6. 9	5. 5	5. 7	
Food Nonfood commodities Services					4. 0 4. 6 7. 5	7. 0 5. 6 8. 3	6. 6 3. 1 6. 6	7. 5 4. 1 6. 8	

Source: Department of Labor.

Industrial prices rose at a very rapid rate early in the year, showed a declining rate of increase in the second and third quarters, and then accelerated again in the final quarter, when prices advanced at an annual rate of 5.1 percent. This movement through the year was distorted to some extent by the behavior of lumber and wood products prices, which rose very rapidly through March and thereafter declined 18 percent, falling back almost to the level of the preceding year. That decline followed from a weakening in demand as a result of the downturn in housing starts and from special efforts undertaken by the Administration to improve supplies. The exclusion of the lumber and wood products component from the industrial average would reduce the first quarter increase and raise the second and third. On this basis, the increases in the first three quarters would be about the same while the fourth quarter would represent a peak for the year.

Price Changes



SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

The consumer price index rose 5.4 percent in 1969 following a 1968 advance of 4.2 percent and increases of just under 3 percent in 1966 and 1967. All of the broad components registered sizable advances, the largest—7 percent—being in services. However, the acceleration in relation to the 1968 record was attributable almost wholly to food (5.2 percent in 1969 as compared with 3.6 percent in 1968) and housing (6.4 percent in 1969 as compared with 4.2 percent in 1968).

Consumer prices rose rapidly throughout the year. The increase was largest from the first to the second quarter, when it came to an annual rate of almost 7 percent. However, the rise subsided a little in the third and fourth quarters.

* * *

By the end of 1969, the first signs that the inflationary tide was no longer rising had begun to appear. They had been slow in coming. Strong expectations of inflation, an abundant supply of liquidity when the year opened, and poor productivity performance all contributed to the delay in the response to anti-inflationary policy. But there was enough response to indicate that if the policy was continued the desired results would be achieved. The steadfastness of policy would be tested in 1970.

CHAPTER 2

Stabilization Policy for 1970 and Beyond

POLICY AND OUTLOOK FOR 1970

THE YEAR 1970 OPENS with total demand slowed down substantially and real output approximately stable, but with prices still rising rapidly. The objectives of policy for 1970 are to reduce the rise of prices and to revive the growth of output. These objectives are difficult to reconcile. Measures that would most quickly revive the growth of real output would almost certainly accelerate the rise of prices. Measures that would assure the most rapid stabilization of the price level would almost certainly force a sharp contraction of production and employment. But there is a path of moderate expansion of demand which will yield both a decline of the rate of inflation and a resumption of growth of output. The task of economic policy in 1970 is to achieve that path.

The path of the economy in the early part of 1970 is already largely determined. Policy actions taken in the first few months of the year will probably not have much immediate effect. However, the course of the economy later in the year will depend heavily on policy actions still to be taken. The policy problem for 1970 is to take actions in the first half of the year which will place the economy on the sustainable path of moderately rising output and significantly declining inflation in the second half. This desirable path will also be the probable path if the policy needed is correctly identified and carried through.

THE POLICY OBJECTIVES FOR 1970

Although the course of the economy in the early part of 1970 is already largely determined, this is not to say that it is already known. In fact, even for the next few months there are considerable uncertainties. A continued slow rise of money gross national product (GNP) at about the annual rate of the fourth quarter of 1969 seems likely. The very small monetary expansion of the second half of 1969 may portend an even slower rise of GNP. If this were about to occur in the months immediately ahead, however, clearer evidence might already have been expected in developments such as new orders for durable goods, which reflect the intermediate processes between changes in the money supply and changes in GNP.

With continued slow increase of GNP in the early months of 1970 the growth of real output would remain close to zero, and there should be some

decline in the rate of inflation. The sharp rise of wholesale prices at the end of 1969, however, holds out the possibility that the rise of over-all prices (as measured by the GNP deflator) in early 1970 may differ little from that in late 1969. However, if the slowing of final demand leads to an increased rate of inventory accumulation early in the year, subsequent reductions in production schedules might mean losses in output and some softening of prices as inventories were being worked back down.

Despite these uncertainties of degree, it does seem likely that by mid-1970 the economy, after three quarters of very little increase of real output, would be producing significantly below its potential. Such a GNP gap places a downward pressure on the rate of inflation. Businesses find themselves selling in markets less receptive to price increases. This forces greater resistance to cost increases, including wage increases. These pressures against inflation will continue if demand remains below potential output, even though demand begins to rise more rapidly.

Thus, in the second half of 1970 a moderately more rapid rise of money demand, bringing about an increase of real output, would be consistent with a further reduction of the rate of inflation. The demand for output would be short of the potential so that a moderately larger increase in demand would call forth mainly an increase in real output, not in the price level.

On the other hand, if demand continues to rise so slowly that real output does not rise, this could be expected to result in rising unemployment. It is well to remember, however, that the unemployment rate does not move in any fixed, precise relationship to other measures of business activity. We were reminded of that again in 1969. There was a considerable slowdown of real output gains, and in the fourth quarter a cessation, but this did not cause a significant rise in the unemployment rate. Still, this slippage between real output and employment cannot be expected to go on indefinitely. The prospect of a rise in unemployment increases the importance of bringing about a rise in real output when that is consistent with continued progress in reducing inflation.

The exact timing and degree of expansion that would be consistent with a significant reduction in inflation in 1970 are uncertain. However, it seems a reasonable estimate that the slow increases of GNP foreseeable in the first half plus the moderately larger but still noninflationary increases desirable in the second half would add up to a GNP for the year between \$980 and \$990 billion—a range which for convenience may be described by the figure of \$985 billion. This would be an increase of about $5\frac{1}{2}$ percent over 1969, as compared with the increase of 7.7 percent from 1968 to 1969. Part of this smaller GNP rise would be reflected in a smaller increase of real output. Part of it would be reflected in less inflation. Whereas the GNP price deflator went up 5.1 percent from the fourth quarter of 1968 to the fourth quarter of 1969, and was still rising at a 4.7-percent annual rate at the end of 1969, it is reasonable to expect these figures to be substantially lower in 1970.

It is not necessary at this point in history to emphasize the fallibility of such estimates of a desirable pattern of the GNP and of the consequences of that pattern for the behavior of prices. However, precision in such estimates is not required for the success of policy. The estimates indicate the desirable general direction of policy. The basic point is that if the rate of growth of GNP is slowed, the rate of inflation will in time also decline, although the timing and magnitude of the effect is inevitably somewhat uncertain. The growth of GNP has already been slowed to a rate which although temporarily necessary is lower than needs to be sustained for long in order to achieve significant disinflation. Therefore we can tolerate a moderate rise in the rates of increase of GNP and of real output without reviving inflation and should have such a rise in order to avoid mounting unemployment.

POLICY FOR 1970

There is substantial room for judgment about the combination of policies that would get the economy on the desired path. There are two dangers to be avoided. One is that after the slowdown of activity which is now in progress total demand will rise too soon and too sharply, touching off another round of inflation, as in 1967. Some have expressed concern about the expansiveness of fiscal policy—with the two-step elimination of the income tax surcharge, the institution of the low-income allowance and the increase of the personal exemption in the income tax, and the large rise in Social Security benefits. This, some fear, could add up to excessive stimulus; the tight expenditure control recommended in the budget for fiscal year 1971 submitted by the Administration is intended to prevent that.

Others are concerned that the highly restrictive stance of monetary policy after mid-1969 and the slow growth of real output experienced in late 1969 and expected to continue into early 1970 will make the slowdown too severe. The combination of tight credit conditions, slow sales growth, and declining profits could bring unexpected weakness in business investment (including inventories) at the same time that Federal purchases are falling and credit tightness is restraining construction and purchases by State and local governments.

It would not be prudent to count on these two possibilities—an expansive swing in the budget position and cumulating severity of monetary restraint—to offset each other, although it is possible that they might. Not enough is known about the relative influences of the fiscal and monetary factors to preclude the possibility that one or the other might be heavily dominant, resulting in either excessive expansion or excessive contraction. The safer course would be a more moderate posture for both fiscal and monetary policies.

There are other important reasons for not relying on a combination of an expansive fiscal policy, with a budget deficit, and an extremely restrictive

monetary policy. Even if this combination should result in the desired moderate disinflation, it would do so only with high interest rates and scarcity of funds that would limit the rate of residential construction to a level inadequate for the needs of the growing population. Moreover, excessive pressures in U.S. money and capital markets are reflected in international financial markets, tending to lead toward a disturbing escalation of interest rates in those markets.

Fiscal policy in 1970 should therefore aim at continuing a modest surplus in the unified budget. Combined with moderate monetary restraint this might be expected to yield the GNP path indicated above as desirable without overly severe pressures in credit markets. This does not mean a return to the rates of monetary expansion of 1967 and 1968. The appropriate rate of expansion is between that of 1967–68 and the severe restraint of the latter part of 1969. But just what this rate should be is particularly difficult to tell, because of uncertainty about the adjustment of the economy to the lower demand for money resulting from high interest rates, inflationary expectations, and the development of new money substitutes. In these circumstances policy must be cautious and tentative and feel its way along.

OUTLOOK FOR GNP AND ITS COMPONENTS

The fiscal and monetary policy described is intended to bring a moderate revival along a sustainable path, after slow expansion of the GNP in the first half of the year. This target has been indicated above by a path which would yield a total GNP of about \$985 billion for 1970. The behavior of the components of GNP that might be expected to accompany this policy, and realization of the GNP total, is subject to a number of uncertainties, but the following is a reasonable expectation for the major sectors of the economy that is consistent with this picture for the whole.

Business Fixed Investment. Private investment surveys suggest a 7- to 10percent increase in plant and equipment spending in 1970, and the Commerce Department-SEC survey suggests a 9-percent increase from 1969 to the second quarter of 1970, with a further small increase in the second half of 1970. Since a large fraction of the anticipated increase in plant and equipment spending is in nonmanufacturing industries such as public utilities, which have somewhat independent investment demands, a strong further gain for investment in 1970 seems likely. On the other hand, there are constraints on a further substantial expansion of capital outlays. Credit is expensive and for some firms difficult to obtain. The liquidity of many companies has been reduced sharply. And profits are going to be under adverse pressures. These suggest that investment demand in other sectors might be sluggish. Thus, with the economy slowing, realized investment spending may come in somewhat less than anticipated. On balance, an increase of about 8 percent—on the low side of the anticipations surveys—seems to be a reasonable expectation for 1970.

Inventories. Although auto inventories were a bit high at the end of 1969, inventories in general did not seem out of line with their relationship to sales in recent years. Businesses seem for the most part to be successful in pursuing a cautious inventory policy. Thus only a slight decline in inventory investment is expected in 1970.

Both inventories and business fixed investment present a major uncertainty on the down side of the forecast. A major downturn in sales expectations could bring a large downward revision in both kinds of business investment. But no such swing seems to be in the making now. Such factors as the need to reduce costs with modern equipment, the expectations of the business community concerning the price level, and for many companies the still thin margin of spare capacity, are all acting to keep capital expenditures strong.

Residential Construction. Housebuilding is the sector most exposed to increasing tightness in the capital markets, and it has also been hard hit by distortion in the flow of funds in response to interest rate ceilings. The rate of housing starts (private nonfarm) fell from an average 1.7 million (seasonally adjusted) in the first quarter of 1969 to 1.3 million in the last quarter as credit conditions tightened.

Housing starts are expected to remain low in the first half of 1970. If, as expected, conditions become easier in the money and capital markets, housing starts should respond favorably in the second half of the year. Nevertheless in 1970 housing will be below the longer-run demand indicated by present and prospective rates of new family formation and real income and normal replacement needs.

Despite housing costs rising, residential construction expenditures are expected to fall to about \$30 billion in 1970, from \$32.2 billion in 1969.

State and Local Government. The strong upward trend of State and local government purchases of goods and services is expected to continue in 1970, rising about \$11 to \$12 billion over those in 1969. Much depends on credit conditions. The increase is expected to be less in the first half of 1970, reflecting credit conditions in 1969. As capital market conditions gradually ease during the first half of 1970, outlays may accelerate in the second half.

Federal Purchases. The tight expenditure control projected in the budget for fiscal 1971 is reflected in the estimates of Federal purchases of goods and services in 1970. Total Federal purchases, which came to \$102.0 billion in 1969, are expected to fall by about \$4½ billion in 1970. This declining Federal Government demand for output is a major factor in the projected reduction of the rate in inflation. All of the decrease in Federal purchases is projected to come in the defense area, which is expected to reduce its purchases from \$79.3 billion in 1969 to about \$74 billion in 1970. Nondefense Federal purchases are expected to remain about at the 1969 level of \$22.8 billion.

Consumption. Consumer spending in 1970 is another major source of uncertainty. Surveys indicate that consumer sentiment has been falling sharply since the first quarter of 1969, and experience suggests that these changes in consumer attitudes are associated with slower buying. Indeed, automobile sales began to show some weakness toward the end of 1969, and into this year. On the other hand, reduction of the income tax surcharge to 5 percent on January 1, and to zero on July 1, in addition to an increase in Social Security benefits of about \$4.4 billion (annual rate) in April 1970 with an additional \$2.8 billion one-time payment for benefits retroactive to January 1970, should tend to stimulate consumer spending.

On balance, it is expected that consumer expenditures will rise by about \$40 billion from 1969 to 1970. With some of the addition to disposable income from the surcharge elimination going into saving, the saving rate is expected to rise from 6 percent in 1969 to about $6\frac{1}{2}$ -7 percent in 1970.

Net Exports. Net exports of goods and services are expected to rise from about \$2.1 billion in 1969 to about \$3 billion in 1970. While the slowdown expected in the growth of U.S. demand should reduce the growth of merchandise imports, the combined effect of less buoyant demand conditions in some markets abroad and the lagged impact of rising prices in the United States on our exports and imports may limit the improvement in 1970.

Summary. The general trends in the composition of the GNP described above are consistent with a GNP for 1970 of about \$985 billion or, more realistically, between \$980 and \$990 billion. While specific figures in billions of dollars have been put down for each major component of GNP, it would, of course, be possible to achieve the total with a different mixture. If this total is achieved, the year should see progress toward establishing the basis for sustained gains against inflation, and for more sustainable rates of expansion. Policy will have to be open for reconsideration if the economy seems to be on a markedly different path or if the path is not leading to the desired results.

UNEMPLOYMENT AND MANPOWER POLICY FOR 1970

With little growth of real output likely in the first half of 1970, and with the restraint that will have to be maintained in the second half, some increase in the rate of unemployment is possible. This depends in large part on the change in output per worker and in the proportion of the population that seeks employment, variables that are particularly difficult to predict. Much of the increase would be the result of a small lengthening in the average interval of unemployment experienced by people between jobs or newly entering the labor force. (For a discussion of the character and significance of unemployment see Appendix A.)

The reduction in Department of Defense procurement, reflected in the budget and in the projections of defense purchases, will directly cause a decline in defense production and employment. This has been taken into account in the earlier discussion of monetary and fiscal policy and of the possibility of changes in overall unemployment. The Federal Government, in action coordinated by the President's office, will assist the workers and communities directly affected to make the smoothest possible transition to other activities. This action will include, in addition to the programs discussed in the next few paragraphs, planning assistance, loans and grants for severely affected communities, and, in some cases, transfer of federally owned facilities to nondefense use.

The risk of a rise in unemployment, even if small and temporary, adds to the urgency of steps to spread its burden more equitably and to minimize its adverse effects on those who become temporarily unemployed. The Administration's programs in manpower training and welfare reform, while primarily aimed at longer-run structural improvement, will also help to cushion the impact of a temporary increase in unemployment.

MANPOWER TRAINING ACT

The Administration has proposed many improvements in manpower training efforts in the Manpower Training Act of 1969, which coordinates separate manpower programs and creates a comprehensive manpower services system. The bill would decentralize the administration of manpower programs to State and local governments because they can more accurately identify specific local problems and priorities. The decentralization would take place in three steps as States and municipalities demonstrate interest and establish administrative capability in the manpower area. The bill would unify the administration of manpower services, providing for the establishment of State and area single prime sponsors who will be responsible for planning and providing services. It would provide flexible funding for manpower programs so that they may be better utilized in the community to meet local needs.

In addition, it would facilitate the use of manpower programs as an economic stabilizer by authorizing a 10-percent increase in the manpower appropriation when the national unemployment rate reaches 4.5 percent (seasonally adjusted) for 3 consecutive months.

EMPLOYMENT SECURITY AMENDMENTS

The Administration has also proposed legislation to strengthen our unemployment insurance system. The legislation would extend unemployment insurance to 5.1 million workers not now covered and automatically extend the duration of benefits in periods of high unemployment. Eligible workers would receive benefits for up to an additional 13 weeks beyond the present limit (usually 26 weeks) if insured unemployment were to go as high as 4.5 percent (seasonally adjusted) for 3 consecutive months. The legislation would also require States to permit workers to continue to receive unemployment insurance benefits while enrolled in job training programs. These changes will make the unemployment insurance system more effective than ever before in maintaining the purchasing power of the unemployed.

FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN

The proposed Family Assistance Plan (FAP) ties in closely with the manpower training programs. It greatly reduces the danger that poor people who had not been covered by unemployment compensation would be seriously injured by an increase in unemployment, or that workers with large families would find themselves in difficult straits in periods of temporary unemployment. The Plan would supplement the incomes of the poor whose wages are too low to meet the needs of their families, and of those who have difficulty working, or probably ought not to be working, such as women with low incomes who head families with young children.

The Plan, in conjunction with the Administration's food stamp program, would have its greatest impact on the working poor, while maintaining the incentive to work. A family of four with no income would receive \$1,600, plus about \$850 in food stamps, for a potential income of \$2,450. An incentive is provided for recipients to obtain jobs by permitting a family of four to receive some FAP payment until its income reaches \$3,920. Able-bodied men who are not employed, and mothers of families with no such man at home and no children under 6, must register at the State employment office for training or employment as a condition of receiving their benefit (although payments to their dependents are in any event automatic). Day care would be provided for children whose mothers are at work, or in training.

The Family Assistance Plan would eliminate the existing system of welfare-conditioned-on-dependency. By providing aid to families headed by working men, and by providing incentives to work, it would presumably contribute to family stability in low income groups. The FAP payment (with food stamps) at any income level would be well above the present welfare payment at that income level in many States, thereby reducing State-to-State differences in benefit levels. The Federal Government would finance the Plan, relieving the States of some of the burden of high welfare costs. Payments would be made on the basis of declaration of income. There will be a presumptive need test, but it would be simple and straightforward, and the citizen's word would have approximately the same weight as it does in self-reporting for personal income tax deductions. With this method the social worker no longer has to judge eligibility for benefits and supervise the use of the family income.

OTHER MANPOWER PROGRAMS

The Computerized Job Bank is a promising innovation in job placement. It currently is operating in seven U.S. cities, and by next June, the target is to have such facilities established in a total of 56 cities. The Job Bank plan produces a daily, up-to-date computerized list of available jobs to help place the unemployed. In addition, the establishment of a national system of job vacancy statistics, presently under development, will provide current information on the numbers and locations of jobs available in different industries and occupations.

Changes have been made in the Job Corps to improve its operation and to integrate it better with other manpower programs, as well as with local labor markets. Fifty-nine centers were closed and 30 new inner-city and near-city training centers will be established in order to shift the emphasis from conservation work to training and job placement.

The Administration has emphasized well conceived and carefully planned manpower training programs. Pilot projects to test manpower programs are an important means to accomplish this objective. A pilot project presently is being conducted in several States to test various methods of using computers to match specific jobs to the needs, interest, and ability of a particular applicant. All of these programs will help to ease the slowing pains of the disinflationary policy that must be followed in 1970, while improving labor mobility and skills to provide the base for a noninflationary expansion back to full employment beginning in late 1970.

THE TRANSITION TO FULL EMPLOYMENT GROWTH

At the end of 1970 total output should be rising, and the price level should be rising significantly less rapidly than at the beginning of the year. Nevertheless, total output will be below its potential and the rate of inflation, while declining, will probably still be too high. The transition to an economy growing along the path of potential output at full employment with reasonable price stability will not have been completed.

The problem then will be to raise the rate of increase of real output while continuing to reduce the rate of inflation. This will be essentially a continuation of the 1970 problem. There will, however, be two differences.

Whereas in 1970 it is necessary that real output should rise by less than its potential, at some point it will be necessary that output should rise somewhat more rapidly than potential for an interval. This would be the only way for actual output, starting below potential, to regain the potential.

This temporary period of regaining potential output will have to be negotiated cautiously to avoid reviving inflation. The possibility of doing this should be strengthened by another development. As persistence of policy brings the actual inflation rate down, the expected rate of inflation will also fall, and this will influence both buyers and sellers of goods and services (including labor). Workers will accept smaller increases in money wages if expected price increases are smaller. Interest rates will be lower because lenders will no longer want as much compensation for the expected fall in the value of money and borrowers will be less ready to give such compensation. In other words, the inflationary momentum that resisted anti-inflationary policy strongly in its early phases will subside.

With the economy starting from a position below potential, and inflationary expectations reduced, an increase of demand sufficient to restore output to its potential rate need not revive inflation if it does not occur too rapidly. Just how fast it will be safe to proceed can be much better judged after the behavior of the economy in 1970 is tested.

It is impossible to state a target for reduction of unemployment and the rate of inflation in the years just ahead. As both are reduced, the costs and benefits of further reduction must be weighed. It would be foolish to predict now where the margin of improvement in unemployment and inflation lies.

But after 1970 we will have a clear guide for the *direction* of policy: lower inflation, and lower unemployment.

THE STABILIZATION PROBLEM IN THE LONGER RUN

The main lesson of stabilization policy in 1969 was the importance of avoiding in the future the kind of inflationary situation and pervasive inflation-mindedness that had built up by the end of 1968. Starting from that situation a major change in the behavior of the economy and in expectations was required, a change that would run against the current of strong ongoing forces. No one could tell how fast that change could be successfully accomplished or the degree of monetary and fiscal restraint required to accomplish it.

The objective of stabilization policy in 1970 will be to move us toward a position where the main goal can be continuity. That position will have been reached when inflation has been brought down to a significantly slower rate, and real output is growing at about its potential rate. At that point growth of the GNP in current dollars at a steady and moderate rate, such as 6 percent per year, would serve to support steady growth of output at its potential rate with a far better performance of the price level than has been experienced in recent years.

The problem then will be threefold:

- 1. To stablize the rate of growth of money GNP as far as feasible at a pace that will permit the economy to produce at its potential;
- 2. To adapt the economy so that it lives better with whatever remaining instability may develop; and
- 3. To press on with measures to reduce both inflation and unemployment further.

STABILIZING THE GROWTH OF GNP

To stabilize the growth of GNP will require avoiding destabilizing moves in fiscal and monetary policies and instead using these policies to offset, or at least constrain, destabilizing forces arising in the private economy. One difficulty is that the attempt to use fiscal and monetary policies to counter fluctuations arising in the private economy may itself be destabilizing, if moves are not made in the right amounts and at the right times.

Stabilization by Fiscal Policy

Fiscal policy should avoid large destabilizing swings occurring at random or contrary to the clear requirements of the economy. The big upsurge of Federal spending (nondefense as well as defense spending) after mid-1965, which was unmatched by any general tax increase for 3 years, is a major example of such a destabilizing movement.

The likelihood of achieving economic stability would not be greatly affected by the size of the surplus or deficit, within a reasonable range, if that size were itself stable or changing only slowly, and if the effects on liquidity resulting from secular increases or decreases in the Federal debt were offset by monetary policy. Therefore, it should be possible to decide on the desired full-employment surplus or deficit on grounds other than stability, and without sacrificing stability if the target itself is kept reasonably stable. If the budget position changes sharply in the short run in the absence of marked shifts in private demand, the adaptation of the private economy and the compensatory force of monetary policy may not come into play quickly enough to prevent large swings in overall economic activity. This is a major lesson for the 1970's.

The considerations which should govern the decision about the average size of the surplus or deficit are discussed in Chapter 3. Except as a result of a national emergency, there is probably no reason for this decision to change in a way that would radically alter, from year to year, the size of the surplus or deficit that would be the objective under conditions of high employment.

If the surplus or deficit position of the budget that would be yielded by a steadily growing, full-employment GNP were kept stable, the actual figure would, of course, automatically respond to changes in the pace of the economy. If the economy were to grow unusually slowly in any year, receipts would rise slowly also, and the surplus would be below normal (or the deficit would be enlarged further). These variations in the size of the surplus or deficit would tend to stabilize the growth rate of the GNP. The question is in what circumstances and how to go beyond this and vary expenditure programs and tax rates to offset fluctuations in the private economy. There is now abundant experience with the obstacles to effective and flexible use of tax changes for this purpose. Moreover, recent experience and analysis suggest that the stabilizing power of temporary income tax changes may not be as great as had been hoped, and it might become less if they were used frequently, because people would tend to adjust their behavior to what they regard as the normal rate of taxation. Nevertheless, there will be situations in which tax rates must be changed in order to maintain the desired longrun deficit or surplus position and there may also be circumstances in which the effort should be made to use a temporary tax change to offset destabilizing shifts in private demand.

The possibility of varying the rate of increase of Federal spending in the interest of stability is somewhat greater though still limited. Although tax and expenditure decisions are both politically sensitive, the fact that the President has some discretion to adjust the timing of expenditures within the limits of legislation avoids some of the complications that beset tax changes. Moreover, the effect of expenditure changes on economic activity can probably be more reliably foreseen than the effect of temporary tax changes. It is true that the part of the total expenditures that is open to deliberate variation is small, because of legal and implied commitments. Nevertheless, some variations can, in fact, be made, as they were in 1969, and it would be unwise to rule out the attempt to do more of this when the economic necessity is clear. Furthermore, it is possible to broaden the "automatic stabilizers" in Federal expenditure, as the Administration has proposed in the Manpower Training Act and Employment Security Amendments mentioned earlier.

The possibility of using debt management as an instrument of stabilization policy has been severely inhibited by the 4½-percent interest rate ceiling on Government bonds. This ceiling has forced the Federal Government to sell only short or intermediate securities since 1965. Raising or eliminating the ceiling to realistic levels, or eliminating it, would provide the Federal Government with a desirable degree of latitude in conducting its financing operations.

Stabilization by Monetary Policy

Monetary policy can be devoted somewhat more singlemindedly to maintaining stability than can fiscal policy. Nevertheless, there are a number of difficulties in its use. Apparently the effects of changes in monetary policy are felt in the economy with widely varying and often long lags. Therefore, if policy that is intended to have a restrictive effect is continued until the effect is visible, the lagged consequences of what has been done may show up in excessive contraction. The attempt to counter this by a sharp reversal in policy to an expansive posture may, after a while, generate inflationary rates of expansion. In the present state of knowledge there is no ideal solution for this problem. Prudence, therefore, suggests the desirability of not allowing monetary policy to stray widely from the steady posture that is likely on the average to be consistent with long-term economic growth, even though forecasts at particular times may seem to call for a sharp variation in one direction or another.

The suggestion that monetary policy might well be steady, or at least steadier than it has been, raises the question of the terms in which this stability is to be measured. There is abundant evidence that the steadiness of monetary policy cannot be measured by the steadiness of interest rates. Interest rates will tend to rise when business is booming and inflation is present or expected; they will tend to decline in the opposite circumstances. Better results might be obtained by concentrating more on the steadiness of the main monetary aggregates, such as the supply of money, of money plus time deposits, and of total bank credit. This still leaves questions of policy to be resolved when

these aggregates are tending to move in different directions, or at different rates of change, as they often do. There is no substitute for trying to understand in particular cases what the significance of the divergences is and what they indicate about the underlying behavior of the supply of liquidity.

IMPROVING OUR ECONOMIC DATA

Since the Federal Government has the responsibility for keeping the economy on a noninflationary growth path with high employment, it must have at its disposal the tools for accurately measuring on a timely basis the performance of the economy at the national level. The Government now publishes a broad array of economic statistics that serve this purpose. These statistics, particularly those relating to economic activity in the short run, have grown over the years in volume and quality and have served the Nation well. But our demands for economic data of high quality keep outrunning the supply. The Federal Government is not alone in requiring better statistics, since to an increasing extent businesses have been making use of economic data for planning their own operations. Indeed, never before have so many businesses watched so closely the economic indicators that appear each month or quarter.

More accurate measurement of economic performance would improve the management of policy in a number of ways. It would tell us more certainly where we have been. Elementary as this may sound, it is of crucial importance. Too often this is a fundamental problem for the policymaker. The economy, or some important part of it, may be on a somewhat different course from that indicated by the data. Or economic series that purport to measure the same thing, or almost the same thing, may move in contradictory directions. Sometimes a series that moves in one direction one month moves in the opposite direction when revised the following month. The first requirement for making judgments about where the economy is going or what policies are needed is an accurate picture of where we have been.

Accurate data are also needed in order to help analyze the past and find relationships that have some degree of stability. Accomplishing this aim is obviously only partly a question of statistics; the economy is, of course, more than a mechanism. For example, swings in sentiment and attitudes in our affluent economy have a powerful effect on the inclinations of consumers and businesses to spend. Consumer behavior has been especially difficult to predict in recent years, and may be more complex than had been thought previously. Business decisionmaking is equally complex. Yet economic analysis is a continuing search for patterns of regularity that can be helpful in forming judgments about the economy. And the first requirement for this search is reliable basic data. The Administration has proposed substantial improvements in many of the key economic statistics, including, for example, those relating to retail sales, construction, the service industries, international prices, and job vacancies.

Having data on a timely basis is also important for the policymaker. This is particularly important if there is reason to think that the economy may be shifting its course. This Nation probably has more timely statistics than any other economy, but clearly much improvement is in order here. Early in 1969 the President directed the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to take action that would secure prompter issuance of monthly and quarterly statistical series by Federal agencies. The Bureau of the Budget issued a set of guidelines governing release of major economic indicators, and the statistical agencies have already achieved a considerable speedup. Further progress depends heavily on obtaining prompter reporting from the business community.

LIVING WITH INSTABILITY

If the American people assign sufficient priority to doing so, they should be able to enjoy a higher degree of economic stability than in the past. Still, some instability will remain, and this emphasizes the importance of improving the operation of the economy so that the remaining instability will cause less pain and inefficiency. The most obvious and probably most important step in this direction is improvement of the unemployment compensation system. Proposals of the Administration to accomplish this have been discussed earlier in this chapter. Improvement of labor markets—through better provision for retraining and movement of workers—would also help to prevent the concentration of unemployment on a small group of workers who are substantially injured by it.

On the inflation side, also, some useful steps can be taken. The distortions introduced into the economy by the presence of interest rate ceilings of various kinds—on savings deposits and shares, on guaranteed and insured mortgages, on loans generally under State usury laws—have become evident in this inflationary period. When market interest rates rise certain uses of credit are shrunk disproportionately because of these ceilings. The need to free the economy of these rigidities is discussed in Chapter 4.

The construction industry has experienced much greater fluctuations in conjunction with general economic instability than most other industries. This has been painful to the workers and contractors in the industry and harmful to the growth of its productivity. Steps to reduce this extreme instability are also discussed in Chapter 4.

THE CONTINUING PROBLEMS OF INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT

The present anti-inflation effort should reduce the rate of inflation substantially and demote inflation from its position as the Nation's most important economic problem. Still the problem of getting the inflation rate down further, while at the same time maintaining high employment, will probably remain. This will require persistent efforts to reduce the inflation that occurs when demand is growing sufficiently to keep employment high. One of the most hopeful lines of attack will be to improve the adaptation of the labor

force—in skills and location—to the pattern of demand for labor. This will shorten the interval of job-search for persons losing or leaving old jobs or entering the labor force, in given conditions of the labor market. It will permit an increasingly high rate of employment to be attained without so strong a pressure of demand as to cause inflation. Manpower programs to move in this direction by better training programs, application of computer technology to job placement and general overhaul of the Nation's job exchange system, have already been discussed. Evaluation of experience with them should permit further development of improved methods. Measures to improve the competitiveness of product markets to assure that business policies will freely and flexibly adapt to changes in market demand will also contribute to reducing the average rate of inflation that accompanies high employment. Some of these measures are considered in Chapter 4.

There is no inherent reason why a high employment economy must be an inflationary economy—even a mildly inflationary economy. After the series of inflationary episodes since World War II, the transition to a stable condition of high employment without inflation will come slowly. But with persistent attention and effort it is attainable.

CHAPTER 3

Uses of the National Output

INTRODUCTION

BY ANY USUAL MEASURE, AMERICA ENTERS THE 1970's a wealthy nation which is growing wealthier at a rapid rate. Per capita national income in 1969 was about \$3,400 and had increased in real terms about 40 percent since 1959. It is expected to increase 20 percent more by 1975.

Despite this, or perhaps because of it, Americans are becoming acutely aware that being rich and growing richer does not solve all of our problems. The realization that we expect more than the economy can produce, productive as it is, points the way to the real problem, which is to make sure that the output is used efficiently to meet our most important needs. There is a growing sense that the limited national output is not being used in this way.

The focusing of increased attention on how the national output is divided comes after a generation in which it had seemed that the country could make a quantum jump in available output that would dramatically improve the quality of life. In fact, for a time this was true. During the 1930's, when the Nation was producing far below its economic capacity, we expected that our needs could be satisfied by the return of production to reasonably full employment. During World War II, when the economy actually operated at capacity, private citizens could foresee a large increase in the output available to them after the war.

Later, in the 1950's and early 1960's, many people were impressed with the possible contribution that a "small" increase in the annual rate of economic growth—from 3 or 4 percent to 5 or 6 percent—would make to providing the output available for every kind of purpose. "Faster growth" became the source from which all new claims on the national output would be met. But in time this was seen to be largely an illusion. The basic full-employment growth path of an economy is not readily raised by any of the policy instruments that we now know about. The country could count on sustained growth to increase its capacity for doing many things. It could not count on being able to boost the growth rate at will to support every new claim.

Although the necessity to confine total uses of output to a growing but limited productive capacity is becoming more recognized in principle, it tends to be ignored in practice. This is obvious in Federal Government policy involving claims on resources. Even when the economy is operating at fairly full employment it is possible to increase Government expenditures, to reduce taxes, and to finance Government borrowing by monetary expansion. This may seem to provide an escape from the limitation on resources and the necessity for hard choices that all individuals and State and local governments face. But in fact it does not. All it does is let inflation choose which demands are satisfied and which are not. A mature people can find a better way to make these choices. The basic problem is to make better decisions about the uses of the national output. This chapter discusses the role of the Federal Government in this process.

The attention given here to the Federal Government's role in allocating the national output may seem excessive for a nation committed to a free-market, decentralized economic system. The idea that the Federal Government must make hard decisions to allocate the limited resources within its own budget is commonplace. The idea that it does or should influence the allocation of the output of the entire economy is not. However, the Federal Government does have an important influence on decisions about the use of resources in the private, as well as the Government sector. Perhaps that influence should not be as big or as detailed as it is. Nevertheless a large influence exists, and much of it is inevitable or desirable or both. This influence should be recognized, its effects appraised, and decisions consciously made to achieve the effects that are preferred.

In 1969 the Federal Government purchased and used, mainly for defense, 11 percent of the gross national product. The remainder, except for a small amount of net exports, was used for personal consumption, for private investment, and for State and local government purposes. The Federal Government was a major influence in the division of the remainder among these three categories and within them. While it purchased only about 11 percent of the national output for its own use, it collected about 20 percent of the national output in taxes and social insurance contributions. It returned the difference to State and local governments in grants, to households in transfer and interest payments, and, since there was a budget surplus, to private capital markets for investment through repayment of Government debt. Grants to State and local governments to finance purchases (as opposed to transfer payments) were about 13 percent of their purchases. Federally financed transfer and interest payments to persons were equal to about 11 percent of consumer expenditures. The funds supplied by the Federal surplus to capital markets and available for private investment were 6 percent of gross private domestic investment. The relative amounts of these flows, and the taxes used to raise the revenues, substantially affected the division of the available output among these three broad categories.

Federal decisions also influence the division of the output within these categories. The Federal Government not only provides the States and

localities with billions of dollars in grants, but it provides these grants through hundreds of separate programs for specific purposes. The taxes it collects from households and the transfers it pays to them come from and go to particular classes of persons, and thus affect the distribution of income and the composition of consumer spending. Taxes levied on specific items, such as automobiles or alcoholic beverages, also affect what is consumed. Facilities and services provided by the Federal Government stimulate private consumption or investment expenditures that are complementary with them or curtail private expenditures that are competitive with them. For example, Federal expenditures on highways encourage private expenditures for automobiles and trucks.

THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

The Federal Government has a large and pervasive influence on the allocation of the national output. Its decisions in this role fundamentally affect the national welfare. There can be no single, scientifically determined "best" allocation of the national output. Differences of interest, value, and opinion among people are inevitable, and they are not of a character that can be resolved objectively. They must, however, be reconciled, and it is the function of the political democratic process to do this.

Given the distribution of interests and the location of powers to make decisions, there is still much that needs to be done to reach better decisions—to make sure that as far as possible the consequences of decisions are known and are taken into account as they are made. Decisionmakers need to know the longrun as well as the immediate results of what they do, and the indirect as well as the direct results. They need to see the options that are open to them, and there must be an opportunity for differing viewpoints to confront each other. The effort to improve decisionmaking has a long history, in which the establishment of the modern budget, the consolidation of the Appropriations Committees in Congress, the development of the Executive Office of the President, and the creation of the Council of Economic Advisers were milestones.

THE LEVEL OF DECISIONMAKING

One basic requirement for good choices about the use of the national output is, of course, that they should be made at the right level and by the right people. The mere size of the Federal Government will influence the division of decisionmaking between it and the non-Federal—private, State, and local—parts of the community. There is a strong case for holding down that size in order not to load responsibilities on the Federal Government beyond its capacity to discharge them, as well as for other reasons. The character of the Federal activities is probably as important as their volume in determining the location of decisionmaking. For example, Federal tax policy inescapably influences the total amount of

consumption expenditures by private households, but some kinds of taxes go further and influence the composition of consumption. Similarly, the Federal Government probably cannot avoid influencing the total rate of private investment, but different Federal policies can involve more or less Federal influence over the character of the investment.

The problem of the appropriate level of decisionmaking has become critically important in the relations between the Federal Government and the States and localities. The amount of Federal financial assistance to the lower levels of government has grown markedly in the postwar period. This growth has raised the question whether the Federal Government should be a neutral supplier of funds or should attempt to determine how States and localities use these funds, and their own. Undoubtedly there is room for some Federal intervention in the decisionmaking process. However, grants for highly specified purposes have reached a degree of detail which is neither necessary nor efficient.

The Administration has proposed to alter the Federal-State-local relationship by instituting a system of revenue sharing, through which the Federal Government would supply funds without dictating their use. In addition the Administration has asked for authority to consolidate some of the innumerable specific grant programs when they relate to similar functions. In these ways it is hoped to improve the overall decisionmaking process.

BUDGETARY BALANCE AS DISCIPLINE

Balancing the Federal budget has long been a symbol and instrument of discipline in Government decisionmaking. The requirement that if some expenditures are raised others must be cut or taxes must be increased has forced Government officials to count the costs of expenditures. In recent years the Nation has become more sophisticated about budget deficits and surpluses. It has learned that the size of the surplus or deficit will and should vary with economic conditions. It is now learning that the longrun average size of the surplus or deficit should be determined by the amount of savings it is desired to make available for private business and housing investment in total. But this does not reduce the relevance or value of the budget-balancing discipline.

Once the appropriate longrun average size of the surplus or deficit has been determined, that goal should not be changed except upon reconsideration of the longrun objectives. Shortrun fluctuations in private demand will sometimes require offsetting temporary changes in tax rates or Federal expenditures. And the size of any specific year's surplus or deficit will inevitably depart from the target level as a result of economic fluctuations, even with tax rates unchanged and expenditures at longrun levels. But achieving the desired average budget position over a period of years means that on the average expenditures can grow only as fast as full-employment revenues.

Beyond that, expenditure increases in one area must be matched by expenditure cuts in another, or by increased taxes. In principle, every decision on Government expenditures should reopen the question of the desirable size of the surplus or deficit. In fact, Government cannot operate that way. The objectives served by the surplus or deficit, although important, are remote and indirect. These objectives will suffer if they are implicitly reevaluated every time an expenditure decision is made. In their day-to-day decisions about spending, Government officials need to be confronted with costs that are obviously and directly within their purview and responsibility. This means that they must at least count costs that appear in the form of tax and expenditure requirements to meet a given surplus or deficit target.

The budgetary discipline in the Federal Government can only be self-discipline. If the old symbolism of the balanced budget is losing its force, a new understanding of its value must replace it.

TOWARD IMPROVING FEDERAL DECISIONS

Although a budgetary rule that requires the balancing of additional expenditures against additional revenues has an essential role in Federal decisionmaking, it is by itself far from a sufficient guide to the discharge of the Federal Government's fiscal responsibility. This rule tends to focus attention on the shortrun aspects of what are also longrun commitments. It forces the counting of costs, but it does not provide realistic information on what the costs are. It concentrates on choices among uses of the relatively small part of the national output that is within the budget without adequately revealing the effects that the choices will have on the larger part that is outside the budget.

This Administration has taken several important steps to improve decisions about the allocation of resources. The President established in July 1969 the National Goals Research Staff to identify alternative goals important to Americans and to study long-range social trends of significance for national policy. The Cabinet level Urban Affairs and Rural Affairs Councils and the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy are interagency groups the President has formed to coordinate the development of policy. The Defense Program Review Committee, on which the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget serve, helps to assure that the broad picture of total national resources and claims enters into the process of decisionmaking for defense.

As a further step toward improving the organization of the Executive Branch for making its major policy decisions, including those which importantly affect the allocation of the national output, the President established the President's Council on Executive Organization—the Ash Council.

In 1965, a new effort was inaugurated throughout the Government, in the planning-programing-budgeting system, to evaluate more objectively the costs and benefits of existing and proposed programs. Building on this beginning, the Administration is now focusing economic analysis primarily upon major policy issues. By examining especially carefully the most important programs, scarce analytical resources are economized; thus analysis can penetrate further into the decisionmaking process. Potential savings from improved decisions can be large.

Analysis of the possible implications of proposed decisions before they are taken is, although speculative, obviously necessary. Equally necessary, and somewhat less speculative, is evaluation of the results of decisions after they have been taken. Persistent efforts to evaluate existing programs are necessary if the Nation is going to be able to do the new things it wants to do. One of the steps in this direction was the President's instruction to the Office of Economic Opportunity to establish a research and evaluation office capable of independent appraisal of Federal social programs affecting the disadvantaged. Evaluation of the results of Government programs remains one of the most urgent needs of Government as it seeks to make effective decisions about the use of resources.

Besides assessing the full costs and benefits of Federal programs, agencies must take into account the time pattern in which benefits and costs of programs occur. The Government, like private firms and individuals, must recognize that benefits are worth more if they occur today rather than tomorrow. Accordingly, agencies have been directed to apply a discount factor to all programs which have costs or benefits that occur 3 or more years in the future. Studies have been undertaken to determine the appropriate factors to use in this kind of calculation. In addition, explicit account is being taken of risks involved in public projects.

The Administration is seeking to formulate the larger choices it faces in the allocation of national output in the light of the competing options. Among the most important steps in this direction have been the interrelated studies conducted through the National Security Council and the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy. These studies examined alternative defense strategies with their associated costs and alternative nondefense Federal programs. Various defense strategies were translated with rough accuracy into a large number of possible forces and budgets. Similarly, alternative nondefense Federal programs were developed. The studies revealed the probable effects of different combinations of defense and nondefense programs on private consumption, housing, other investment, and State and local expenditures, given the limit set by potential national output. These studies in the Cabinet Committee have also explored trade-offs among various nondefense programs within resources that will be available from continued economic growth and assumed reductions in defense expenditures. All of these studies have served as background for consideration of long-range revenue and expenditure decisions.

FUTURE NATIONAL OUTPUT AND THE CLAIMS UPON IT

The last few pages have discussed mainly the budgetary rules and decision-making procedures that might improve Federal Government decisions. These decisions affect the use of the entire national output, as was pointed out in this chapter's introduction. The substance of the priorities problem is to allocate the future national output among alternative uses in a rational way that reflects decisions about national priorities. This tailoring of Federal decisions concerning allocation to a view of national priorities requires—

- 1. An estimate of what the future national output can be.
- 2. A view of the claims upon the national output—the things we would like to do with it—that are eligible for serious consideration.
- 3. A view of the policy measures that would be necessary to bring about satisfaction of some claims rather than others.
- 4. A decision about the claims to be satisfied and the policies to carry out the decision.

Step 4 in this process must, of course, ultimately reflect Government decisionmaking at the highest level. This section undertakes a tentative approach to the first three steps. No one can now confidently draw comprehensive and detailed conclusions on these first three steps. But even the rough and preliminary estimates presented here reveal much about the priorities problem confronting the Nation and establish the need for further efforts to analyze it.

Projections of available future output and the potential claims on it can move discussion of the priorities problem from vague and sometimes easily ignored knowledge to the concrete realization of just how limited the available output will be. First, a projection will be made of available output—GNP in real terms for the years 1970–75. Then visible claims on this output by consumers, governments, and business will be projected. Adding up these claims and comparing the total to available GNP will indicate the magnitude of the priorities problem. The projections will also provide a framework for discussing various policy alternatives that would meet various sets of claims on the output.

The principal objective of this section, therefore, is to estimate the claims against GNP and to show how different patterns of allocation of the GNP can be achieved. Since it is assumed throughout that the projected real GNP is in fact achieved, the only problem discussed here is how the GNP is to be allocated. The projected GNP can be achieved by any one of a number of different combinations or "mixes" of fiscal and monetary policy, which will differ in the allocation of the total GNP that results from them. In these terms this section is concerned with which mix will give a desired allocation of the total GNP. In the short run, this is probably an exaggeration of the choices available; the number of mixes consistent with economic stability may be more limited. But for the long run, which is the appropriate

context of this analysis, the assumption of a given GNP achievable with any of a large variety of policy mixes and resource allocations is reasonable.

Since the problem here is allocation of a projected real GNP as it moves along its growth path, the projections are made in constant 1969 prices. This does not imply any forecast about the price level; rather the assumption keeps the focus on the allocation problem.

POTENTIAL AND PROJECTED GNP

The output the economy would be capable of producing when operating at an unemployment rate of about 3.8 percent—called here potential output—is estimated to rise by about 4.3 percent per year in real terms. This results from projected growth of the labor force at 13/4 percent per year, a decline in annual average hours of work per person of onequarter of 1 percent per year, and an increase of output per man-hour in the total economy of 2.8 percent per year. Projected available output is assumed to be below potential from 1970 until 1972, as a result of policies to slow inflation, but to equal potential output thereafter.

The resulting illustrative projections of available GNP at 1969 prices are shown at the top of Table 13.

CLAIMS ON THE NATIONAL OUTPUT

To list uses of the national output which though desirable would exceed potential output is not difficult. But that is not the purpose here. The purpose is to present the claims that already exist. The largest part of the claims is found in the usual consumption behavior of households, given the incomes they would be earning and the taxes they would be paying, and in the investment behavior of businesses, given the total output and demand projected. Other claims exist in the form of ongoing Government programs, goals stated in legislation, and proposals made by the Administration.

TABLE 13.—Gross national product, 1969 and projections for 1970-75 [Billions of dollars, 1969 prices; calendar years]

Claim	1969, actual	Projections						
		1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	
Gross national product available	932. 3	944	980	1, 042	1, 103	1, 150	1,200	
Claims on available GNP	932.3	944	980	1, 042	1, 100	1, 144	1, 188	
Federal Government purchases_ State and local government	102.0	93	89	88	87	87	86	
purchases Personal consumption expend-	112.7	116	120	125	131	137	142	
ituresGross private investment	576. 0 141. 7	594 141	620 152	664 166	704 178	735 186	769 192	
Business fixed investment_ Residential structures	99. 3 32. 2	103 29	105 34	111 40	116 46	120 49	125 49	
Other investment	10. 1	10	14	15	16	17	18	
Excess of claims	.0	0	0	0	-3	-6	-12	

Note.—Projections are based on projected Federal expenditures (see Table 14) and their influence on various componote.—Projections are based on projected rederal expenditurents of GNP.

Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Council of Economic Advisers.

Large claims not recognized in these estimates exist and new ones will emerge. However, it is sufficient here to show that the existing, visible, and strongly supported claims already exhaust the national output for some years ahead. This is not to say that no other claims will be satisfied, or that claims included in these calculations should have preference over claims not recognized here. The basic point is that if other claims are to be satisfied some of those recognized here will have to be sacrificed.

The projection of claims on the national output shown here corresponds to a projection of Federal spending. Federal spending affects not only the Federal Government's own purchases of goods and services but also the purchases of State and local governments, through Federal grants to them, and the purchases of consumers, through Government transfer payments. The method of estimating the claims is described briefly here and in more detail in the Appendix to this chapter.

- 1. The estimate of Federal spending includes a baseline projection of the costs of the Federal Government's 1970 program, in 1969 prices, and the costs of new programs already proposed by the Administration. The baseline adjusts the 1970 program for changes related to population, workload, and pay increases in 1969 dollars. The new initiatives, shown separately in Table 14, project the 1969 dollar costs of proposed new programs, such as the Family Assistance Program and Revenue Sharing, and proposed expansion of existing programs.
- 2. State and local spending is the estimated consequence of projected growth of GNP (in 1969 prices) and population to 1975 plus the grants included in the Federal expenditure projections of Table 14.
- 3. Personal consumption is the expenditure that would result from the amount of income that households would have available if the projected GNP at 1969 prices were produced, present tax laws remained in force (with the income tax surcharge expiring June 30, 1970), and governments made the transfer payments included in the government expenditure projections.

TABLE 14.—Projections of Federal expenditures, national income accounts basis, 1970-75
[Billions of dollars, 1969 prices; calendar years]

Priority category	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Federal expenditures	189	192	196	200	204	206
Baseline	188	186	186	188	190	191
Purchases of goods and services. Transfer payments to persons 1 Grants-in-aid Other	92 56 22 19	88 59 22 16	87 62 22 15	86 65 23 14	85 68 23 14	84 70 24 14
New initiatives	1	6	10	12	14	15
Purchases of goods and services Transfer payments to persons ¹ Grants-in-aid Other	1 0 0 0	1 3 2 0	1 6 3 0	1 6 5 0	2 5 6 0	2 5 7 0

¹ Excludes transfer payments to foreigners, which are included under "Other."

Note.—Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Bureau of the Budget.

It is assumed that personal saving is 6.5 percent of personal disposable income.

- 4. Residential construction expenditures are the amounts consistent with reaching the goal specified in the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 along the path of housing construction shown in the Second Annual Report on National Housing Goals.
- 5. Business fixed investment in real terms is estimated to decline as a fraction of privately produced real GNP from 12 percent, which it has averaged since 1966, to 11.5 percent by 1975. This would continue the downward trend of the ratio of capital stock to real output experienced since World War II.
- 6. The two other components of real GNP—inventory investment and net exports—are both projected to rise slowly with their total growing from \$10.1 billion in 1969 to \$18 billion in 1975 (in 1969 prices).

BALANCING CLAIMS AND RESOURCES

The results of these calculations are summarized at the bottom of Table 13 in the figures on the excess of claims over resources. The projected claims, which assume no addition to present Federal nondefense programs beyond those already proposed by the Administration, would approximately absorb all available resources through 1973 and leave room for significant additions only by 1975.

The basic lesson of the estimates is that the country is already at a point where, despite prospective rapid growth of output, a decision to satisfy an existing claim on a larger scale or to satisfy a new claim will require giving up something on which people are already counting.

These estimates are based on a number of assumptions which may turn out to be wide of the mark. Even a generous allowance for errors in the assumptions, however, is unlikely to change the fundamental picture. And some of the assumptions may themselves be optimistic. If potential output grew by only 4.0 percent rather than 4.3 percent, the excess of claims would increase, but only slightly, because consumption expenditures and business investment, which amount to about 80 percent of total claims, would also be smaller. On the other hand, the excess of available output over claims would be a little larger, about \$4 billion more in 1975 (in 1969 prices), if personal savings were 7 percent of disposable income instead of the 6.5 percent assumed here. This is possible, but it is no more likely than that the personal savings rate should turn out to be 6 percent, which would increase claims on available output. Other departures from the assumptions are possible—certainly there will be some—but none seems sufficiently large or probable to change the conclusion. Moreover, there is little reason to expect that these departures will all be in the same direction.

Inability to meet all the visible claims would not deny that the country is rich and growing richer. The most comprehensive index of the economic

condition of the population—real per capita personal consumption—would rise about $3\frac{1}{2}$ percent per year under the Table 13 projections, compared to $2\frac{1}{2}$ percent per year in the period 1957 to 1967. The conclusion is simply that choices must be made.

In fact, of course, choices will be made. The total of satisfied claims cannot exceed the available output. Policies, whether of omission or commission, will determine which claims get satisfied and which do not. The following discussion of ways in which claims and resources can be brought into balance is not intended to support any particular claims or any particular ways of meeting them. It is only intended to illustrate the options that are permitted and not permitted by the arithmetic of the economic system.

If the projections of output prove reasonably accurate, and Federal expenditures run at the projected level, or higher, with taxes unchanged, trimming of claims on output would fall mainly on investment. Private saving, together with the Federal surplus, would be inadequate to finance all the private investment claims shown here through 1973. Interest rates would rise, and, while this might stimulate saving, the main effect would be to make funds scarce and expensive and keep some investment demands from being met. Since housing is more sensitive to the supply of funds than other investment, the shortfall would probably be relatively larger in housing. If, however, the shortfall occurred in capital outlays of businesses, productivity would tend to be adversely affected, and the economy's rate of growth would lag.

Government policy could bring about a different pattern of resource allocation. If it were desired to do so, the combined investment claims shown here could be satisfied by either of two approaches, or some combination of them. One would be to hold Federal expenditures down, below the level projected here through 1973 and not too much higher thereafter. Federal purchases of goods and services would be lower, and State and local purchases and consumers' purchases would also be lower as a result of smaller grants and transfer payments. With purchases in these categories lower, more of the national output would be available for investment. As a corollary to this, there would be a larger budget surplus, which would make more funds available to finance private investment. To obtain the same level of investment with higher Federal expenditures, the second alternative would be to raise taxes to restrict private consumption, thus releasing resources for investment and sustaining the budget surplus needed to finance investment. These methods of generating a surplus to finance a desired total of private investment would not in themselves assure any particular division of the total between business investment and housing.

What has been said about the combination of taxes and expenditure programs that would be required to permit satisfaction of the private investment claims implies a certain relationship between the Federal surplus and private investment. The surplus must be large enough, when added to private saving, to finance the private investment. The higher the private investment desired, the larger, in general, will be the budget surplus required. This is the main longrun implication of a budget surplus.

The additional surplus that would be required to support an additional amount of private investment, say \$1 billion, would probably be larger than \$1 billion if the additional surplus is created by raising taxes to reduce consumer spending. This is because the higher taxes will probably reduce private saving somewhat, and the surplus must be large enough to cover the additional investment desired plus the loss of private saving. Thus, on the assumption used in this section that personal saving is 6.5 percent of personal income after tax, additional personal taxes and a further surplus of \$1.07 billion would be required to increase the total of private saving and the surplus by \$1 billion.

These are propositions about the national income accounts budget, which, unlike the unified budget, does not include as an outlay the net lending of the Federal Government. To the extent that net lending of the Federal Government to finance private investment is already included in the unified budget as outlays, the surplus that would be required in the unified budget would be smaller. The required surplus would be the excess (if any) of desired private investment over private saving plus Government net lending. That would not, however, affect the amount of taxes that would be required to bring about a given amount of private investment. It would only mean that part of the taxes would be used to finance the Government lending, rather than the repayment of Federal debt which would permit private lenders to supply more funds to private investment.

CONCLUSIONS

The estimates of this section are, of course, hypothetical calculations based on inevitably somewhat arbitrary assumptions. The costs of programs now on the books may turn out to be different from projections used here. Moreover, programs now in being can be modified or eliminated if people decide that costs are excessive or that other things are more important. The capability of the economy to grow may be different from what has been assumed. Nevertheless, for all of their necessarily hypothetical character, these estimates do highlight three important points that have major implications for fiscal policy. First, existing claims upon the growing available national output already exhaust the probable output and real national income that the economy can generate for several years to come. The satisfaction of a new claim, therefore, necessarily will require the rejection of another claim which now exists. Second, the Federal Government's fiscal policies will directly affect which claims on our national income are satisfied—not only the direct Federal claims but also State, local, and private claims. Federal actions that increase State, local, or private expenditures—even if those actions are not reflected in the Federal budgetgenerate claims against the national output. Therefore, the Federal Government should be concerned that its extrabudgetary as well as its budgetary actions do not generate excessive claims or do not cause more important uses of the national output to be displaced by less important ones. Third, the level of private investment in business plant and equipment, and particularly in housing, is necessarily directly affected by decisions that determine the character of the budget and the target for a longrun average surplus or deficit. The budget and the budget surplus should not be regarded merely as conventional symbols of sound finance; they have a profoundly important functional role in achieving national goals.

APPENDIX

Basis for Estimates of Output and Claims


POTENTIAL AND PROJECTED GNP

The available total output by years from 1970 to 1975 is estimated in two stages, one yielding potential output and the second yielding projected available output.

Potential output is considered to be the output the economy would produce when operating at a 3.8 percent unemployment rate. This is slightly above the rate in the last half of 1969 when actual output was considered to be close to the potential. The annual growth of real potential output is determined by the growth of the labor force, estimated at 13/4 percent per year, the decline in annual average hours of work per person, estimated at one-quarter of 1 percent per year, and the growth of output per man-hour. In the private sector of the economy, output per man-hour is estimated to grow by about 3.1 percent per year—less than in the early 1960's when resource utilization rose, but more than in 1965-69 when the economy operated under excessive demand pressure. Allowance for the fact that productivity growth in the Government sector, which produces about 9 percent of national output, is zero by definition (because Government output is measured by labor input) reduces the overall productivity growth rate to about 2.8 percent per year. Combined with the estimates of labor input, this yields about a 4.3 percent rate of growth of potential real GNP.

Projected available real output lies below potential output from 1970 to 1972 because some gap between actual and potential output is necessary to slow down inflation. A gradual closing of the gap is projected to permit the potential to be regained without reviving inflation. Potential and projected real GNP, in 1958 dollars, are shown in Chart 8. Projected available GNP in 1969 dollars is shown at the top of Table 13.

Gross National Product, Actual and Potential



^{*}SEASONALLY ADJUSTED ANNUAL RATES.

SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS.

CLAIMS ON THE NATIONAL OUTPUT

Federal Expenditure Projections

Federal expenditure projections are presented before those for the private and State and local government sectors, because the level and nature of Federal expenditures affect the other expenditure components. The amount of Federal transfer payments to individuals affects consumer expenditure, and the level of grants affects State and local purchases. Because of these effects it is convenient to have an initial projection of Federal spending preparatory to making projections of expenditures in the rest of the economy.

Baseline Expenditures. The cost of the 1970 Federal program, adjusted for increases in workload and pay increases at 1969 prices, gives the projection of baseline expenditures in Table 14, broken down into purchases of goods and services, transfer payments, grants, and other expenditures.

The major increases in the baseline are projected for transfer payments, which rise by \$14 billion (in 1969 prices) from 1970 to 1975, and grants to

¹ TREND LINE OF 3.5 PERCENT FROM MIDDLE OF 1955 TO 1962 IV, 3.75 PERCENT FROM 1962 IV TO 1965 IV, 4 PERCENT FROM 1965 IV, 4.3 PERCENT FROM 1969 IV TO 1970 IV, 4.4 PERCENT FROM 1970 IV TO 1971 IV, AND 4.3 PERCENT FROM 1971 IV TO 1975 IV.

State and local governments, which rise by \$2 billion in that period. Much of the increase in transfers will be due to increased coverage and population growth, as more people receive checks for social security, disability insurance, and so forth. But part will also be due to higher real benefits. Much of the increase in grants will come in essentially open-ended programs, such as Medicaid, in which the Federal Government must provide matching funds if the States choose to provide funds for the program.

New Initiatives. The costs at 1969 prices of new programs proposed by the Administration in the Fiscal 1971 Budget are added to the baseline expenditures to give the projections of Federal expenditures used here. These in turn are broken down into purchases, transfer payments, grants, and other expenditures.

The costs of Federal programs at 1969 prices are projected to rise from \$189 billion in 1970 to \$206 billion in 1975. Two aspects of these expenditure projections are especially noteworthy. First, the projections include expansions of transfer and grant programs and a reduction of purchases. Expanded Federal programs would focus upon providing money to people in transfers, and to States in grants, rather than upon purchasing output directly. Second, projected Federal expenditures build up rapidly through 1974 and rise less rapidly thereafter. If this path were in fact to materialize, the claims-resources position would be tighter in the early 1970's, and a bit easier in the middle 1970's. But this flattening out of the expenditure path may instead reflect simply the difficulty of seeing more than 3 or 4 years ahead. As these years arrive, further proposals for new programs or extensions of existing programs can be expected to come forward. Thus it should probably be assumed that the position will be just as tight in the middle 1970's as in the next year or so.

State and Local Government Purchases

State and local government purchases of goods and services at 1969 prices are projected to grow with real GNP, population, and projected levels of Federal grants-in-aid from 1970 to 1975. Projected growth of these items yields the estimates of State and local purchases shown in Table 13. In 1969 dollars, State and local purchases are projected to increase from \$116 billion in 1970 to \$142 billion in 1975, or at an average annual rate of 4 percent. Of the \$26 billion increase in State and local purchases from 1970 to 1975, \$8 billion is projected to be due to population increases. This leaves a projected increase of \$18 billion over and above the cost of providing State and local services at the present per capita level. This \$18 billion represents an increase of 2.8 percent per year in the real per capita quantity of the services provided by State and local purchases, compared to the 1962 to 1968 average increase of 3.8 percent.

Personal Consumption Expenditures

Consumer spending is a fairly stable fraction of personal income after taxes, aside from shortrun variations. Personal income other than transfer

payments is assumed to be 73 percent of GNP. Adding to this transfers by Federal, State, and local governments gives total personal income. Projected Federal, State, and local personal taxes are subtracted to arrive at disposable personal income, which is allocated between consumption expenditures, personal interest and transfer payments, and personal saving.

The projections assume a saving rate of 6.5 percent, and 2.5 percent for personal interest and transfers, leaving 91 percent for consumer spending. The projections of consumer expenditures in 1969 prices, based on the projected Federal expenditures, are shown in Table 13.

Two important assumptions in the consumer spending projections should be noted. First, the 6.5 percent saving rate is near the middle of the 4.9–7.4 percent range experienced since 1960. Second, the projections in the table assume present tax law.

Private Investment Demand

The remaining four elements of private demand are estimated independently of the Federal expenditure projections. These are business fixed investment, residential construction, inventory investment, and net exports.


Business Fixed Investment. Since cumulative net business investment equals capital stock, the projection of investment should yield an accumulated capital stock consistent with the projected GNP path and a reasonable capital-output ratio.

Since 1966, real business fixed investment has averaged 12 percent of real private output. It is estimated that if this fraction gradually falls to 11½ percent by 1975, the ratio of capital stock to real output would continue the slow downward trend experienced since World War II. The projections of business fixed investment in 1969 dollars are shown in Table 13.

Residential Construction. A key area of the projections is residential construction. Twice in the last half decade homebuilding has been severely squeezed by the competition of the Federal deficit and high business investment for the supply of private saving. Moreover as Chart 9 shows there will be a substantial increase in the rate of family formation in the next 5 years. Both because of the backlog of need created by the housing declines in 1966 and 1969–70 and because of the increased demand for housing generated by family formation, the number of housing starts is likely to rise considerably in the early 1970's.

In the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Congress stated a goal of 26 million new housing units to be constructed from fiscal year 1969 to fiscal year 1978. The Second Annual Report on National Housing Goals to be submitted by the President this month projects a path of housing construction, including both conventional and mobile homes, to 1978 which will meet the goal and is considered feasible. The conventional

Net Family Formation



SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS.

housing starts portion of this path, on which the residential construction projection is based, is shown in Chart 10.


This path of starts gives the residential construction projection in 1969 dollars shown in Table 13. The projection assumes residential construction expenditures per start (in 1969 dollars) of \$21,800— the 1959–68 average—from 1970 to 1975. This cost figure will turn out to be high if the cost-reducing potential of Operation Breakthrough, the industrial housing program of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, is fulfilled.

The two small remaining components of GNP—inventory investment and net exports—are both projected to grow roughly in line with GNP from 1970 to 1975. Inventory investment along trend is expected to be roughly a constant fraction of GNP, perhaps 1 percent. This would maintain an approximately constant ratio of stocks to final sales. Net exports are projected to expand from the 1969 low as the U.S. trade position improves.

Total Expenditure Projections

The second line of Table 13. "Claims on available GNP," which adds up the expenditure projections assuming projected Federal expenditures, shows total visible claims on potential GNP.

Housing Starts



*TOTAL PRIVATE AND PUBLIC. DATA EXCLUDE MOBILE HOME SHIPMENTS.

SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT.

To avoid confusion, it should be noted here that the "Claims on available GNP" of Table 13 is not the equilibrium GNP in 1969 dollars that would result if the "exogenous" investment and government expenditures were realized. This is because consumer spending is projected on the basis of present tax law, transfer payments in the Federal spending projections, and available GNP. Thus the difference between available GNP and "Claims on available GNP" is the reduction in exogenous expenditure needed to bring the demand for output down to the level of available GNP.

CHAPTER 4

Government and the Market

GIL . . . to appraise the various programs and activities of the Federal Government . . . [and] to develop and recommend to the President national economic policies to foster and promote free competitive enterprise. . . ." With these words in Section 4, the Employment Act of 1946 makes clear the responsibilities of Government for the vast range of policies and programs that are concerned with strengthening the vitality and efficiency of our market economy. This chapter, therefore, focuses on the essential role of the Government in maintaining a competitive free market economy and in supplementing the market where necessary to achieve efficiency and progress.

This role of the Government is especially important today when many people have become disenchanted with the effects of the Government's participation in economic life. We rely upon the Government to do more than ever before, but we grow less and less confident that its ways of discharging the responsibilities placed upon it are the most effective. On occasion the Government's action has run counter to its responsibility, restricting rather than promoting competition and failing to observe the principles of the market economy in the management of its own affairs.

In the main, we depend for the satisfaction of our economic goals on the voluntary activity of individuals. Traditionally this Nation has accepted the premise that the individual should be as free as possible to decide for himself what goods and services will be best for him and where and how he will exercise his own talents and energies in the common productive efforts. By and large the resultant system serves us well. It has made possible a large and growing measure of personal liberty, wider job opportunities, and rising levels of living. Because each of us has considerable freedom in applying his knowledge and talents, our system is more flexible, innovative, and progressive than if it were guided in detail by Government edicts.

ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT

An economic system cannot, however, operate in a vacuum. Besides controlling general monetary and fiscal policies, Government must establish the necessary framework for economic activity if our free and open economy is to keep its responsive and effective character.

The need for rules of the game concerning contracts, property rights, fraud, and fair methods of competition is obvious. In the course of time additional rules have become necessary as our economy and our society have become increasingly complex. It is necessary to prohibit the sale of harmful foods and drugs and to proscribe child labor, unsanitary working conditions, and discrimination in employment. But just as new rules have become necessary, old rules can become obsolete and hamper our efforts to realize the capability of the economy.

Since we depend on the private sector to produce the overwhelming proportion of our goods and services, the Government must insure that competition is vigorous and that markets are efficient. Vigorous competition is the main protection of consumer interests; in most areas of the economy it helps create efficient markets that respond quickly to the desires of consumers, and in which costs of production and distribution are kept low. A well working financial system and well-informed consumers are also necessary for efficient markets; the Government can and does play a vital role in these areas.

In a relatively few instances, competition alone may not be sufficient to protect consumers' interest, or it may not be a possibility. Economies of large-scale production may be so great as to leave room for only a few firms—too few for competition to be effective. Where property rights are poorly defined, competition may lead to the waste of valuable resources or to degradation of the environment. As a result, in these areas elaborate regulations concerning prices, outputs, and standards of service have been prescribed. In a few sectors of the economy—agriculture is one example—the ability of buyers and sellers to respond promptly to shifts in demand or supply may be so limited that prices fluctuate more widely than is good for either consumers or producers. In such situations, Government intervention in the markets may be desirable.

The Government also has a role as a participant in market activity. Some enterprises, essential to the national well-being or the national defense, have been confined to governmental operation. Traditionally, the Post Office has been a Government operation, even though it exists chiefly to provide a service for which a price is charged and attempts to cover its costs with its receipts. In other cases, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, the commercial activity has been mainly incidental to the principal objective of the project, which was, in that case, unified resource development in a region especially hard hit during the Great Depression.

Whatever reason the Government has for engaging in market activity, it should follow certain rules to insure that the operation is efficient and its effects are equitable. Certain operations are, of course, deliberately subsidized to serve essential public objectives; in such cases, it is always good practice to identify the subsidy explicitly in the budget. Except in these cases, however, prices should reflect costs if resources are not to be wasted and users unintentionally subsidized at the expense of others. Rules are also

needed to guide the managers of Government enterprises so that they take all costs into account, not simply those in their budgets.

The Government is involved, therefore, in economic activity for many different reasons. It must establish the "rules of the game" for private participants; it must facilitate competition and improve the efficiency of markets; it must impose detailed regulations where the market does not offer sufficient safeguards to consumers' interests because of inevitable monopolistic conditions; and it must establish rules for its own participation in market activity.

COSTS OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

Generally, this Nation has preferred to limit the rules and regulations it imposes on individuals and on market operations, in order to encourage private initiative; and it leaves the burden of proof on any who assert a need for more governmental involvement. A business in the private sector, operating under normal competition, has a direct test of how well the business is doing its job-profits. All companies that are inefficient or put out products not desired by the public must face the consequences. A Government agency, a Government operation—or even Government rules need not submit to such a direct test. Inefficient operations can limp along for years without being called to account. Some regulatory rules that persist protect obsolete or inefficient production. Import quotas, agricultural marketing agreements, and outdated regulations can encourage or preserve high-cost, badly located, or obsolete facilities with little interference and no direct test of their net value. Indeed, a major problem in Government's participation in our economic life is that we have developed no systematic procedure for eliminating obsolete rules, activities, and programs. In principle, and generally in practice, the competitive marketplace has an answer, and this is one of its crucial advantages. In a competitive market, if a private company uses productive resources inefficiently, market pressures force it to relinquish them. This is one of the reasons why we should rely as much as possible on the discipline of the market place to protect the public interest.

Government involvement is not always the best answer—even when private activities are producing undesirable side effects or markets are not completely efficient. Government regulations are themselves not costless. Certain provisions in building codes, for instance, were originally intended to protect consumers by specifying the materials that can be used. Now that some of the prohibited materials have been improved, these regulations can result in needlessly higher costs of construction.

The sections below discuss the role of the Government in providing the framework for efficient markets, the role of the Government when regulation is necessary, and the rules under which the Government should participate in the market.

IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF MARKETS

Government has a major role in promoting the efficiency of markets. Where markets are efficient, prices and output respond swiftly to shifts in consumer demand. Efficient markets result in reasonable uniformity in the prices charged by sellers or offered by buyers. Markets that work well also have low transaction costs; that is, buyers and sellers can conduct transactions swiftly and cheaply.

For efficient markets, it is necessary to have clearly defined and appropriately specified property rights, enforceable contracts, competition, informed consumers, and a well working monetary system. Where no one owns scarce resources such as fish in the ocean, oil under the ground, or radio frequencies, Government regulations are necessary to prevent wasteful exploitation. Some of the problems that result from such common property resources are treated below in the discussion of regulation.

A similar problem, on which attention is now focusing, is the inadequate demarcation of public and private property rights in the atmosphere and in bodies of water. At present most private citizens have little or no legal recourse against others who cause pollution. Since private property rights are rarely established for air or water, the Government must find alternative ways of protecting the environment. These are discussed later in this chapter.

PROMOTION OF COMPETITION

A major role of the Government in providing for efficient markets is to promote competition. The nature and extent of competition have been continually changing as our economy has grown. Some changes have made markets more competitive, others have made them less so. The most notable change has been the increase in size of markets because of advances in transportation and communications, the growth of the population, and its concentration in metropolitan areas. Most firms now compete over a much wider area and for a much larger sales volume. Consumers find that many more sellers are seeking their favor. This growth in size of the market leads toward larger (but not necessarily fewer) firms that are better able to take advantage of a large market.

As educational levels have risen, buyers have also become better informed and more sophisticated. On the other hand, products have become more complex and more difficult to evaluate. Incomes of most consumers have risen and these increases have made them better able to choose different combinations of products. In every market segment new products and services are competing vigorously for the consumer's dollar.

The vigor of competition often depends on the number and size of rival companies offering similar products or services. Although no data exist for the economy as a whole, data on manufacturing do not support claims that competition in general is diminishing. Concentration within manufacturing industries has changed little since World War II and may have

declined since 1900. The average share of the market for the largest four firms among the same 213 manufacturing industries was between 41 and 42 percent in both 1947 and 1966. On average, rough estimates indicate that the concentrated portion of manufacturing has probably not increased and may even have decreased since the turn of the century.

Partly as a result of merger and partly as a result of internal growth, however, there has been a steady increase in the proportion of total manufacturing assets controlled by the largest firms in manufacturing. In 1929, 46 percent of the total assets of all manufacturing firms belonged to the 200 largest corporations; in 1968, the comparable figure was 60 percent. Thus in manufacturing the concentration of ownership of assets by corporations has increased dramatically, while concentration in the share of markets has not gone up. These conflicting trends apparently result from an increase in conglomerate activity.

Antitrust

Competition is not always self-sustaining. Collusion on prices, output, or market share can usually increase profits. Mergers between major competitors will eliminate their rivalry and may reduce competition. Consequently, the antitrust laws have long been accepted as necessary to market efficiency. This Administration has continued vigorous enforcement. During 1969, 44 cases were brought, of which 20 involved alleged violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (conspiring to restrain trade). There have been five conglomerate merger cases, some of which involve vertical relationships between buyers and sellers in some product lines. There were 15 cases involving mergers between firms in the same line of business.

The Justice Department is actively pursuing a course designed to apply the antitrust laws to the changing and expanding economy. For example, in both the legislative and judicial branches, a broader concept of interstate commerce has been recognized. In consequence, the Justice Department is considering whether the antitrust laws apply to transactions, including those in the service industries, heretofore regarded as intrastate. Indeed, the Department has recently brought suit to enjoin a county association of real estate brokers from conspiring to fix minimum commission rates.

Remedies and Sanctions. Enforcement in itself may not be enough, however, if the remedies or sanctions are inadequate. Generally, the remedies now available to the Department of Justice in civil cases are felt to be adequate. But some have criticized the Expediting Act, governing appeals in Government civil antitrust cases, because it provides no right of appeal from the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction. This shortcoming in the law would be corrected under an Administration bill to revise this Act.

Inflation and the growth in size of companies have lessened the force of maximum fines for criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Because a corporation can be fined no more than \$50,000 for each criminal violation, regardless of the seriousness of the crime or its cost to the economy, the cor-

porate fine is often ineffectual. Accordingly, the major deterrent to price fixing and other criminal antitrust action has been the threat of treble damage suits and the possibility of jail sentences for company executives. The Administration has accordingly requested Congress to raise the maximum fines for corporations to \$500,000.

Mergers. A horizontal merger between major firms in an industry can be at least as effective in eliminating price competition as any agreement between the firms. Mergers, even between competitors, are not per se violations of the law, however, and they may even favor healthy competition. The ready marketability of a firm may encourage others to become entrepreneurs and establish new enterprises. Mergers may also be an efficient way of replacing incompetent managements. They may lead to greater economies of scale in production and marketing. And they may make it easier to transfer resources to the industries or enterprises that can most effectively employ them. In addition, access to capital markets may be facilitated. Nonetheless, the law prohibits mergers whose effect ". . . may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." An accomplished effect deleterious to competition need not be proved; it is sufficient if there is a reasonable likelihood that such an effect will follow.

Problems may arise when a merger involves two firms in the same line of business that until then had not competed in the same market. A recent case of this kind involved the merger between Standard Oil of Ohio (Sohio) and a subsidiary of the British Petroleum Company, Ltd. (BP), operating in the States along the Atlantic seaboard. The Justice Department has established guidelines for such market extension mergers: A proceeding will be brought when a company that is one of a few most likely entrants into a concentrated market joins in a merger with a leading firm in that market. In this case, because BP was a likely entrant and Sohio had by far the largest market share in Ohio, the Department of Justice brought suit. A consent decree has been entered requiring that some of Sohio's stations be divested (sold or exchanged) to other firms, so that they will supply additional competition. Sohio-BP will now not only operate in the Ohio market but extend its operations elsewhere. The general effect on competition in the gasoline retailing market should be beneficial.

Conglomerate mergers are growing in importance. Over two-thirds of the mergers between 1926 and 1930 were between competitors (horizontal), 8 percent represented market extensions, 5 percent were between a buyer and the seller (vertical), and only 19 percent were between unrelated firms (conglomerate). In the 1966–68 period the proportion of horizontal mergers fell to 8 percent, the drop being at least partly due to antitrust action, while conglomerate mergers rose to 82 percent of all combinations. These mergers are more difficult to evaluate. They do not increase the market share of either part of the joint firm. Their effect may be to stimulate competition, but because of its very size, diversity, and financial strength, the combination may operate to lessen competition.

Conglomerate firms can use the profits in one market to subsidize price wars or promotional expenditures in other markets and so eventually reduce competition. Conglomerates may also be in a position to require suppliers to purchase some goods from other divisions of the conglomerate. This practice of reciprocity may exclude competitors from a part of the market.

The Department of Justice has announced that it intends generally to adhere to its 1968 guidelines, but that it probably will oppose any merger among the top 200 manufacturing firms or firms of comparable size in other industries, or any merger by one of the top 200 manufacturing firms with any leading producer in any concentrated industry. This program is based upon recent decisions of the Supreme Court condemning mergers that eliminate significant potential competition, entrench leading firms in concentrated markets, substantially increase the power of large firms to engage in reciprocity, or further a trend of mergers that would lessen competition. The staff of the Federal Trade Commission has recently issued a report on conglomerate mergers. The Commission is planning to continue its study and to coordinate it with a projected Administration study of economic concentration, including conglomerate mergers.

Resale Price Maintenance

The Miller-Tydings Act and the McGuire Act, under which resale price maintenance arrangements established under State law are exempted from the Sherman Act, reflect a major exception to the antitrust laws and to the policy of promoting competition. The State laws in question permit a manufacturer to contract with a retailer not to sell his product or products for less than a specified amount. In a State with a "nonsigner" clause in its statute, no retailer is permitted to undercut this price. While the "nonsigner" clause has been found to violate State constitutions in 18 States, 20 States with over half the population still have effective resale price maintenance statutes.

A major objective of permitting resale price maintenance is to protect and encourage small business by eliminating price competition between retailers of the same branded product. Resale price maintenance reflects the dilemma of whether to protect competitors or competition. Generally under resale price maintenance, manufacturers establish generous margins for retailers as an inducement to promote their product. But other manufacturers can quickly counter with similar margins, and they do. Retailers often profit temporarily from these higher gross margins, but competition usually eliminates the gain by encouraging additional outlets to carry the product, with the result that sales per store decline. For example, a Justice Department study found that for eight lines of retailing in States with strong provisions for resale price maintenance, the sales per store in metropolitan areas were 12 to 34 percent less than in States without any such law. Thus manufacturers receive at best only a temporary edge from resale price maintenance. Retailers' gains

are also eroded over time, but consumers normally will continue to pay higher prices.

ADEQUATE INFORMATION FOR CONSUMERS

For retail markets to be efficient in providing buyers with the goods wanted, consumers must have adequate information. Ill-informed consumers can be defrauded, or they can be misled even when there is no intent to defraud in the legal sense. Unless he has a technical background and enough time to evaluate a product fully, the most careful buyer often finds it difficult to decide what he should purchase. He can perhaps reduce his risk by keeping strictly to well-known brands and reputable retailers, but this may cost him the chance to profit by satisfactory low-cost alternatives. Moreover, on a wide scale this practice could entrench existing manufacturers and create new barriers against entry into the market.

Often the most effective way to help buyers become well informed is to require proper labeling. The Truth in Lending Act and the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act are intended to help the consumer make "value comparisons." In certain instances, however, labeling is impractical, and the Government may need to prescribe standards for certain products. Moreover, with automobiles and some other products, an unsafe feature poses a danger not only to the owner but also to others. The Government has therefore established Federal safety standards for new vehicles, and many States require periodic safety inspections. Since January 1st, a prospective new car buyer must be told the stopping distance, acceleration, and the tire reserve load of a vehicle.

Considerations of safety may require the Government to ban the sale of certain products altogether rather than rely on the consumer's ability to protect himself even when provided with adequate information. For example, where complex products like drugs are involved the necessary information may be unintelligible to the layman, and it is simplest and safest to prohibit their sale unless they are prescribed by physicians.

Increasing public concern about standards for the safety and quality of products has led to proposals that the Government widen its influence in the marketplace. Particularly where products represent a potential hazard, there is obviously a strong case for having the Government set and enforce standards for producers. Nevertheless, we need to evaluate carefully the advantages and disadvantages to the consumer when considering such proposals. Despite their beneficial intent, their adoption could in some cases have the undesirable effect of lessening competition among producers—and thus breaching one of the consumer's most effective defenses. The consumer's interest may not be served if so much reliability is required that it adds heavily to the cost. Another possible disadvantage in these restrictions is their effect on the development of new products. Producers may be uncertain about how well potential new products or services can meet published standards requiring reliable performance and freedom from other defects. Such

uncertainty, together with the threat of costly damage suits, confiscation of goods, or time-consuming delays in satisfying a multitude of Federal requirements, may inhibit the development of new products and the entry of new firms into the market to compete with established companies. We must also consider whether safety is better served by educating consumers in the proper use of a product rather than making the product completely safe against even remote contingencies.

The Consumer and the Market

To defend the public from misinformation offered by sellers, the Administration has proposed a Consumer Protection Act. This act would specify and prohibit many unfair and deceptive practices, such as "bait and switch" advertising (where the victim is attracted by a low-cost line and then switched to a more expensive product), passing off used goods as new, and misrepresenting price reductions. Responsibility for enforcing these prohibitions would lie in a new Consumer Protection Division to be established in the Department of Justice. The Federal Trade Commission would also have powers to enforce these prohibitions. As soon as a violation was determined in a proceeding by either agency, consumers could bring suits individually or on behalf of a group of consumers for damages in the Federal courts. This procedure would give consumers effective relief in proven cases of deception or fraud; at the same time it would protect firms against nuisance suits.

Because information provided by the private market must be reliable, a Consumer Product Testing Bill has been recommended to Congress. Under the provisions of this bill, the Office of Consumer Affairs, to be established in the Executive Office of the President, would review the adequacy of current methods now used to test consumer products. One purpose of the bill is to upgrade the tests used by private laboratories when necessary. If test standards were lacking or deficient, the Government could ask industry to establish proper ones. If industry were unable to establish acceptable standards by itself, the Government could then identify the standards it believes should be followed. Firms meeting approved standards would be entitled to say so in their product promotion activities.

The Consumer and the Government

In the past, the interests of labor, capital, and management have been well considered in Government deliberations. Consumers are less organized, however, and they have not always been adequately represented. To help remedy this defect, the Administration has proposed, as noted above, an Office of Consumer Affairs and a Consumer Protection Division in the Department of Justice.

The Office of Consumer Affairs would have broad powers to coordinate and improve present programs relating to consumers. It would see that the interests of consumers receive consideration at appropriate levels of the Federal Government. Among other powers it could conduct research, hold conferences on consumer problems, and develop a program for the release and publication on a generic basis of product information derived from the Federal Government's purchasing expertise. This office may also publish a Consumer Register which would translate the legal terminology of the Federal Register into layman's language so that interested consumers would be properly informed of Federal regulatory proposals and rules.

The Consumer Protection Division would have broad powers of advocacy and enforcement. It would be authorized to intervene in any proceedings by Federal agencies which affect consumer interests, as the Antitrust Division now does in proceedings which affect competition. It would thus offer a counterweight in formal hearings to the briefs filed on behalf of producers.

PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT

The existing rules of the game governing the economic system were not primarily designed to deal with our common responsibility for the environment in which we live. As public concern for the environment increases, the demand for appropriate rules, and for Government action if these rules fail, becomes more pressing. The environment is threatened when the wastes originating in a factory, home, or automobile find their way to the outside world, or when outsiders are bothered by noise, odors, or unsightliness. The following discussion will be confined to pollution caused by wastes, though some of the remarks also apply to other forms.

The problems created by wastes can be handled by five general approaches. They can be left to nature; the public sector can dispose of wastes at general expense; standards can be imposed to prevent or reduce pollution; the costs of reducing pollution can be shared by the Government and the polluter; or incentives to control pollution can be developed by levying special charges on emissions. Each of these approaches, which can be used in combination, has its advantages and disadvantages.

As long as pollution is insignificant it is possible to ignore wastes and their consequences. This traditional approach depends primarily on the ability of the environment to clean itself or to absorb wastes without unduly harmful effects. But the quantity of wastes has now become so great that pollution is affecting peoples' lives noticeably. Air pollution, for example, is not only unpleasant but has a measurable impact on death and morbidity rates. Water pollution has prevented millions from utilizing rivers, lakes, and ocean fronts for recreational activity and has interfered with farming and commercial fishing. In addition, water pollution and the residues of fertilizers and pesticides are held responsible for undesirable changes in the ecology.

Consequently, the Government has found it necessary to develop programs to deal with pollution. Water pollution has normally been handled by treating wastes before releasing them to the environment. The public costs of treatment have traditionally been borne most heavily by local authorities, although recently the Federal and State shares have increased. Most treatment of industrial wastes is performed by industrial firms through their own

treatment plants, but some firms release their effluents untreated or rely on municipal systems. In the latter case it is important to charge for treatment; if the direct costs of dealing with pollution are charged to the general tax-payer rather than to the polluter, there is no incentive to reduce pollution.

The backbone of pollution abatement programs for both water and air pollution utilizes the regulatory approach. Under the Air Quality Act of 1967, air quality standards for stationary sources of emissions are being established for control regions throughout the Nation. Subject to the approval of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, standards are established by the States and an implementation program is drawn up. A special regulatory scheme, enacted to cover motor vehicles, requires that new cars can be sold in the United States only if emissions comply with standards specified by HEW. Under the Water Quality Act of 1965, water quality standards are being set for all parts of interstate and coastal waters, under a similar Federal-State partnership. For example, each section of a river is designated for a particular use, such as water supply, swimming, fish production, etc., and the standards are set to achieve that quality. All States have developed water quality standards and enforcement procedures which have been approved, at least in part, by the Secretary of the Interior. The cost of complying with these standards normally falls on the polluter and in some cases on municipalities aided by Federal and State grants.

A related and supplemental method of pollution abatement would be to provide some form of cost sharing payment for individuals or firms to reduce the pollution they cause. Such payments might conceivably take the form of tax concessions on the costs of pollution abatement methods. A stronger incentive is provided by taxes on effluents or treatment fees, which can lead firms to change their processes or install new equipment to reduce their effluents. The cost of pollution would then be charged to those who cause it, and as a result they may decide to reduce or eliminate their discharge of wastes.

In some water pollution cases, however, economies of scale may make it more economical for a public agency to deal with the wastes than it would be for the individual polluters. Who should provide abatement equipment, and how, depends both on the cost of treatment and on the costs to the environment of the pollution. In some cases regulation combined with tax incentives may be most efficient and equitable. In other cases effluent charges may be appropriate.

REGULATION

Regulation has been imposed for two purposes: to make the market perform more satisfactorily and as a substitute for competition. In the financial area it is particularly important that markets work well, not only for stabilization purposes but also to insure that product and labor markets are efficient.

GOVERNMENT AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM

Throughout our history the Government has been involved in regulation of the financial markets. Such regulation serves three broad purposes: (1) It provides for an appropriate money supply and efficient operation of the payments system; (2) it protects the public from loss due to financial failures, as well as from misrepresentation and fraud; and (3) it encourages and subsidizes the allocation of credit to particular sectors. Achievement of the first two objectives increases the efficiency of markets. The third is aimed at using regulation to accomplish other policy objectives.

A well-functioning payments system is vital to the economy, as the banking panics of 1933 and earlier periods forcefully remind us. The Constitution authorizes Congress "to coin Money [and] regulate the Value thereof," an authority that has been broadly construed. The United States has established a variety of regulations and agencies for controlling the creation of money and the operation of commercial banks and other depository institutions. For example, the Federal Government issues currency, charters banks, imposes reserve requirements, oversees foreign exchange operations, insures deposits, prohibits interest on checking accounts, and sets ceilings on the rates to be paid on time and savings deposits.

The stock market crash of 1929 and some financial malpractices that subsequently came to light created doubts about relying solely on the general laws of contract in financial markets. Since 1933, Congress has aided the investing public by enacting laws curbing unethical financial practices and by making pertinent information more accessible. The Securities and Exchange Commission was established to formulate and enforce requirements relating to operations of securities exchanges and the disclosure of information about publicly issued and traded stock (later extended to bonds). To protect public shareholders, Federal legislation also restricts and requires publication of the trading of stock by corporate "insiders." The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and the Truth in Lending Act are examples of laws designed to improve the information upon which the public bases financial decisions.

Problems of Financial Regulation

While the ultimate objectives of Federal involvement in the financial sector are clear, the problems and costs do not always receive sufficient attention. The direct costs to the Government and the public of imposing restrictions on financial institutions may not seem large, but an important cost easily overlooked, because it is difficult to quantify, stems from the inflexibility of regulations once they are issued. Regulations devised for an earlier economic environment can stifle innovations and new developments in today's market. Examples are the restrictions on branch banking imposed by many States, which Federal law makes applicable also to national banks; the geographical and portfolio restrictions on savings and loan associations, which are particularly onerous when their potential market


has been shifting to new areas; and restrictions on commercial banks that hamper them in meeting emerging demands for new services.

Sometimes regulations created to protect the public against malpractices are extended and used to restrict new entry into a market. Regulations also often prescribe or support minimum or maximum prices. The Investment Company Act of 1940 in effect establishes a resale price maintenance law for mutual funds that prevents retail dealers of mutual funds from charging lower commissions. Minimum brokerage fees set by major stock exchanges are currently under review. Many financial regulations distort credit flows by imposing interest-rate ceilings on mortgages and deposits. The problem is to make certain that "fairness" in setting rates does not put an umbrella over inefficiency, and that "soundness" in financial institutions does not become a pretext for impeding competition and innovation.

Deposit-Rate Ceilings as a Case History. An example of the problems created by the inflexibility of regulation can be found in recent developments arising from interest-rate ceilings on time and savings deposits at commercial banks and other financial institutions. Authorized by the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935, these ceilings were intended to prevent banks from paying more interest on deposits than "sound" banking would warrant. The fear was that banks might otherwise make high-rate but risky loans (to cover excessive interest rates on their deposits) and would thus become vulnerable to default whenever business activity weakened. There was also concern that, in a system composed of thousands of banks, competition for funds on a rate basis might draw funds away from many individual institutions and seriously weaken them. In reality, the ceilings made very little difference until the mid-1950's, because interest rates on all assets remained very low and the deposit rates actually paid remained below the ceilings.

In later years, these ceilings on deposit rates at commercial banks have come to serve quite different purposes than those originally contemplated. In particular, they are viewed as a device to ensure a larger flow of funds into home building, because they help protect savings and loan associations, a mainstay of home financing. These associations, specializing in mortgages, have attracted deposits by paving a slightly higher return than commercial banks, which are prevented by the ceilings from offering competitive rates. Because of the slow turnover of the long-term mortgage holdings of savings and loan associations, however, these institutions were not in a position, as interest rates rose rapidly in the past several years, to increase the rates paid to depositors sufficiently to prevent large withdrawals. Chart 11 illustrates how the yield on new mortgages, which reflects what homebuyers are willing to pay, climbed in recent years above the average return on association portfolios, a figure which, after allowing for costs, represents what these institutions could afford to pay to attract deposits and still show a positive net income. Because of these competitive pressures, rate ceilings were extended in 1966 to cover savings and loan associations.

Mortgage Yields and Dividend Rate of Federal Savings and Loan Associations



1/TOTAL INTEREST RECEIVED AS PERCENT OF AVERAGE MORTGAGE LOANS HELD.
2/TOTAL DIVIDENDS PAID AS PERCENT OF AVERAGE SAVINGS CAPITAL.
SOURCES: FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION AND FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD.

During 1969, a consequence of rate ceilings has been a net reduction in the inflow of savings to depository institutions as a group. Many of their depositors have withdrawn funds in order to invest directly in market securities, which have recently paid much higher interest rates. Rate ceilings have also discriminated against small savers who cannot so easily switch to securities and must be content with lower rates.

Since mid-1969, deposits of savings and loan associations have practically stopped growing, despite the lack of competition from commercial banks, and the consequence has been a decline in mortgage financing. The savings and loan associations must now depend heavily on loans from the Federal Home Loan Bank System. Indeed, only a massive dose of support by

federally sponsored agencies has been able to prevent an even larger decline in mortgage financing and housing starts.

Direct regulation of interest rate ceilings on deposits, together with portfolio restrictions, has contributed to these problems, because it has encouraged some developments and delayed others in such a way that an important part of the financial system is now ill-adapted to a world of changing interest rates. These ceilings have not provided a satisfactory answer to the financial needs of housing, while they have prevented the free and efficient movement of funds through financial markets. Mortgage financing and the role of interest ceilings need reexamination. Savings and loan associations need greater flexibility to adapt to market developments, and new sources of funds for the mortgage market need to be devised. Given the consequences of four decades of deposit-rate ceilings, they cannot be suddenly removed without serious financial disruptions. Some basic reforms in financial regulations are, however, needed.

Presidential Commission on Financial Structure and Regulation

Our expanding and increasingly complex economy must have financial institutions reflecting the vitality that comes from vigorous innovation and competition. Financial services required by tomorrow's economy will differ in as yet undefinable ways from those appropriate today. The demands on our flow of national savings, as indicated in Chapter 3, will be heavy in the years ahead, and our financial institutions and financial structure must have the flexibility that will permit a sensitive response to changing demands. Thus the time has come for a thorough examination of needed changes in our financial institutions and our regulatory structure. This study will be carried out by a commission to be appointed by the President early this year.

GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF AGRICULTURE


Agriculture is another important sector of the economy where regulation has been used in an attempt to make market performance more satisfactory.

Many of the problems of agriculture are the result of a steady increase in agricultural output per farmer, which has made farmers a continually dwindling minority, and of insufficient mobility, which has kept their average income below that of most other occupational groups. As early as 1870, the number of farmers had dropped below the number of persons in other occupations. This trend has continued, and the proportion of the population gainfully employed in agriculture at the present time is only 5 percent. This is the usual transition in an advancing economy. Fewer and fewer people are required to produce the food and fiber for the rest of the population; or, stated another way, as the real income of consumers rises, an increasing proportion of income becomes available for other things than the basic necessities of life. Currently, about 16 percent of consumer income is spent on food.

Thus we get the familiar adjustment problem in the agricultural sector. Stimulated by the yield from public and private programs to develop and facilitate adoption of technological innovations, output grows more rapidly than consumer demand. Since the demand for farm products is relatively inelastic, increased supplies generally lead to markedly lower farm prices. As a result, farm incomes are depressed, and farmworkers and proprietors move to other occupations. But because there are impediments to this movement, per capita personal farm income does not catch up with the level in other sectors.

At the depth of the depression, per capita personal income of farm people was less than one-third that of the nonfarm population. In the middle fifties it was about 46 percent. Currently, the per capita personal income of farm people is about 70 percent of that of the rest of the population, but the narrowing of the income gap is due in large part to increasing Government payments to farmers, steady gains by farmers in adding to their income from nonfarm sources, and substantial declines in farm population (Chart 12).

Per Capita Personal Income of Farm and Nonfarm Population



SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, AND COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS.

Government Intervention in Agricultural Markets

The depression of the 1930's led the Federal Government to intervene directly to support falling prices in agricultural markets with the objective of stabilizing farm income. Since that time, commodity programs that were originally adopted largely as emergency measures have varied only in emphasis from one decade to another. They have generally involved direct payments to farmers, production controls on output, price supports, and storage and marketing activities. All these programs have entailed substantial budgetary costs. Direct payments alone were about \$3.75 billion in 1969, accounting for about 23 percent of realized net farm income.

Because most commodity programs have been related to output, their main benefits go to the larger commercial farms; for example, in 1968 the top 6 percent of the farms (those with sales of \$40,000 or more) received nearly one-fifth of the Government payments and accounted for about one-third of the realized net farm income.

As another indirect form of regulation, Federal and State marketing orders and agreements are in effect for many perishable commodities such as milk, fresh fruit, and fresh vegetables. Milk marketing orders illustrate one method of market control. For each milk marketing order, minimum prices are established for the milk sold by dairy farmers. Using criteria provided by statute, the Secretary of Agriculture sets these prices; prices may be different for the same milk depending on its final use. Drinking or Class I milk carries a higher price than manufacturing or Class II milk. The average or "blend" price is paid to all farmers.

In an attempt to reinforce price discrimination between the two classes of milk, the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965 provided for so-called Class I Base Plans in Federal milk markets. These plans, which are instituted at the request of dairy farmers, can be used to restrict production to the level of Class I requirements in an individual market. Under this plan, each producer receives a high price on his "base" (his share in the Class I market), rather than a "blend" price on all production. Milk produced in excess of the established base is then priced at the lower Class II level, thus discouraging the production of milk for manufacturing. When access to the Class I market with its higher prices is sharply restricted, title to a base may be very advantageous. The value of these bases subsequently becomes capitalized into production costs for new producers, who purchase them. And consumers of Class I milk must continue to pay substantially higher prices.

A Market-Oriented Agriculture Policy

Farm policies on field crops should give greater emphasis to market forces and thus reduce direct governmental participation in the marketplace. Specifically, three goals should be sought. First, prices should become more flexible so that they approximate equilibrium between supply and demand when averaged over a period of years. With this flexibility farmers should be able to hold and even expand both domestic and foreign markets. Price supports should not interfere with normal commercial transactions, but should serve only as a price floor to prevent excessive fluctuations and to provide a basis for credit.

Second, production should not be controlled by limiting individual crop acreages; rather it should be guided by market prices. Because the Government cannot immediately withdraw the influence on production that it has exercised during its four decades of direct intervention, a gradual approach is needed by which greater freedom will be gained through restrictions on total land use only. Such a program would restore considerable freedom of choice to participating farmers, permitting each one to produce as much of any crop as he thinks will be most profitable up to the limits of his authorized cropland. Eventually, we may be able to discard even this control measure.

Third, direct income payments, properly applied, offer a more efficient way to support farm income than high price supports. The potential benefits of high prices are largely dissipated because they make additional purchases of inputs profitable. Direct income payments will be necessary for some time to compensate for inequities and to smooth the adjustment process. Reasonable limits on payments to individuals, however, would help prevent the undue enrichment of large operators at public expense.

REGULATION OF NONCOMPETITIVE MARKETS

In a few markets, competition does not flourish. In fact, in some instances one large firm can supply an entire market at lower cost than several smaller firms. When this is true, there tends to be a natural monopoly.

The American answer to these problems has generally been to substitute regulation by Government agencies for reliance on the market. Nationalization and Government operation have only been experimented with in a number of instances. This preference for regulation instead of nationalization has given rise to a variety of Federal and State agencies that set up and enforce restrictions on many economic activities. There are agencies covering transportation, communications, electric power, pipelines, and petroleum, to cite most of the important ones.

The American experience with regulation, despite notable achievements, has had its disappointing aspects. Regulation has too often resulted in protection of the *status quo*. Entry is often blocked, prices are kept from falling, and the industry becomes inflexible and insensitive to new techniques and opportunities for progress. Competition can sometimes develop outside the jurisdiction of a regulatory agency and make inroads on the regulated companies, threatening their profitability or even survival. In such cases, pressure is usually exerted to extend the regulatory umbrella to guard against this outside competition, so that the problems of regulation multiply and detract from the original purpose of preventing overpricing and unwanted side effects.

The fundamental problem lies in the complex and conflicting objectives that sometimes characterize economic regulation itself. Agencies are supposed to protect the present and future interests of consumers, employees, investors, and the Government. No one can begin to see the full consequences of current decisions on all these groups. As quasi-judicial bodies, the regulatory commissions tend to give much weight to precedent. As a result, change of any kind becomes hard to justify and even harder to allow when some affected group can claim immediate harm, whereas the potential beneficiaries are widely diffused and usually not represented. Yet innovation and adaptation are the dynamics of economic progress.

There is no clear safeguard against these dangers, but more reliance on economic incentives and market mechanisms in regulated industries would be a step forward. The record in transportation and communications, and other examples in this chapter, point to that lesson. Industries have been more progressive when the agencies have endeavored to confine regulation to a necessary minimum and have otherwise fostered competition. When regulation has stifled competition, performance has deteriorated. The clearest lesson of all, however, is that regulation should be narrowed or halted when it has outlived its original purpose.

Transportation

The Interstate Commerce Commission's efforts to eliminate price cutting among truckers, railroads, and bargelines is a classic example of the attempts to curb competition through regulation. The original justification for regulation—that railroads were monopolistic—has lost much of its validity since there is now considerable competition from other modes of transportation, although the shippers of some bulk commodities are still heavily dependent on rail transportation. Yet the ICC must continue to operate under the mandate of past transportation acts. Greater reliance on the market would be beneficial to transportation, but, in view of long established practices, this would have to be approached gradually. Except for predatory pricing to drive competitors from a market, which is prohibited under antitrust law, many transportation rates could safely be allowed to find their own level through competition. A policy of permitting and encouraging competition of all kinds would, if general economic experience is any guide, make the industry more efficient as well as benefit the public.

ICC regulations also have the effect of restricting entry into markets, particularly in the trucking industry, where economies of scale are limited and costs of entry low. Lack of free entry protects the profits of existing carriers, but it hardly benefits the public. Here the regulatory process is arrayed against new entrants. Those who could suffer from competition make themselves known and actively plead their cause. Those who might enter if restrictions were relaxed are less clearly identifiable, and they have less interest in advocating the case for free entry.

The origin of regulation was somewhat different in the air transportation industry. The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was given a mandate to foster competition consistent with orderly growth and the convenience and needs of the public. Public safety was to be an important dimension of convenience. As a result, the air transportation industry blends competition with a high degree of safety and convenience. Regulation has inevitably reduced price competition, however, and has tended to reduce new entry in air transportation. With the exception of two carriers serving Alaska, no new trunkline carriers have been certified since the CAB was established. The CAB has, however, encouraged limited competition by certifying competing carriers on some routes, and this limited competition has resulted in increased service to the public.

Communications

Common-carrier communications service, such as the telephone service, is a natural monopoly. In many parts of the world, the practice has been to nationalize this industry. Here we have chosen to provide detailed regulation of privately owned service. The results have been generally satisfactory, in terms of convenience to customers. Regulation should be carried out in such a manner that it does not prevent or limit competition in sectors that are not natural monopolies. Recently, after a series of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and court decisions, new carriers of private wire and microwave systems have been permitted, with beneficial effects on rates and services.

Long-distance communications may be entering a new and more competitive era with the development of satellite communications systems. Economies of scale in the operation of satellites do not appear to be sufficient to bar competitive operations. Hence the Administration has recommended to the FCC that multiple domestic satellite systems be authorized and that restrictions on entry be applied only where they are necessary to prevent undue interference. It is the Administration's hope that increased competition will eventually make it possible to let market forces assume more of the role of detailed regulation.

Radio Spectrum

Property rights in radio frequencies do not exist, nor are markets allowed to determine the allocation of frequencies. The FCC currently allocates spectrum among the competing users and thus creates quasi-rights. Unfortunately, it is difficult for any regulatory body to determine the most beneficial uses of a scarce resource. While the FCC attempts to make sound allocative judgments, it is faced with continual requests for spectrum for many different uses. Without a market test it has no way of being sure that its allocative decisions are appropriate.

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The absence of property rights to the radio frequencies also helps create congestion in the spectrum. No single user feels impelled to develop methods that will require less spectrum. Nor does he have an incentive to share his spectrum with others who may make more efficient use of the frequency.

Here too the market should probably have a stronger influence on the allocative process. As an illustration, it might be possible to experiment with a mechanism reflecting the economic value of the entire spectrum. Such an experiment might involve a system of fees varying with the estimated value of particular frequencies and subject to repeated adjustments.

GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION IN THE MARKET

The Government participates in the market primarily as a buyer of goods and services. It also participates as a seller or provider of goods and services. Some of these are collective goods, such as national defense, that can only be provided by the Government. Others, such as education, can and are furnished by the private sector as well. A full treatment of the Government's participation in the marketplace is beyond the scope of this Report, but certain aspects are worth emphasizing.

When the Government is the only supplier, the public is not always adequately serviced. The Government makes many items available free or below cost, so that it becomes a monopoly supplier. Sometimes the Government has established a legal monopoly and prohibited competition. Unless there is a compelling reason to justify a Government monopoly, it should not be established; rather competition should be encouraged wherever possible.

In some instances goods or services are supplied below cost, when the Government could accomplish the same aim, yet encourage competition, by supplying buyers with funds earmarked for the purchase of the desired item in the market. The food stamp program is an example of this approach. In general the recipients will derive less benefit from such earmarked funds than from unrestricted grants in the same amount. The Administration's Family Assistance Program therefore envisages replacing food stamps by cash grants as rapidly as possible.

In the Government's role as a supplier of goods and services its charges should clearly reflect the incremental costs of its operations, including capital charges except where subsidization is a conscious objective. When charges are below such costs, a wasteful use of resources may result, since consumers are encouraged to use more of the product or service than they would if charges reflected costs more accurately. Subsidization is, of course, appropriate wherever such greater use is the explicit objective (and in this case there should be an explicit accounting for the subsidy).

Costs of Government enterprises are especially difficult to measure. In principle, the appropriate measure of cost to the Government is what the resources it consumes could have earned in the private sector. As the previous chapter pointed out, when any resources are used by the Government,

it lessens by that much the resources available to the private sector. One alternative to Government use of resources would be to make more funds available for private investment. As a first approximation, the appropriate cost of a Government investment would be the expected earnings—pretax—on a similar private investment, and not the cost to the Government of borrowing funds.

If a Government enterprise is operated in a market framework, the discipline of the marketplace is likely to improve the results. When an enterprise faces active competition, it cannot afford to offer poor service. If it must raise capital in the private sector, it will naturally take account of the full cost to the economy of such investment. And when it operates without Government aid, it must cover its costs.

Thus, a practical way to improve the workings of Government enterprises, unless subsidizing is a major objective, is to move the operation as close to the private sector as possible. This Administration has initiated two important moves in this direction. It has recommended the establishment of a Government-owned postal corporation which would ultimately have to cover nearly all its costs. It has also recommended that the Atomic Energy Commission's uranium enriching plants be sold to private industry at an appropriate time and that in the interim the operation of the plants resemble private operation as nearly as is practical.

POSTAL SERVICE

The Post Office is essentially a commercial operation run as a Government agency, but modern management practices are difficult to introduce. Personnel costs, which account for about 80 percent of Post Office costs, are fixed by Congress. Net fixed assets per postal employee were only \$1,145 in 1967, while they were \$2,836 per employee in merchandising, \$7,170 in manufacturing, and \$25,053 in transportation. Partly as a consequence of these conditions postal productivity has been increasing since 1956 at a rate of about 0.2 percent per year compared with 3.4 percent for the private sector of the economy.

According to the Kappel Commission's review of the Post Office, working conditions in many post offices leave much to be desired. More than 60 percent of the regular postal employees finish their careers at the same level at which they started. Patronage and residence requirements for postmasters' appointments have held down career opportunities. Efforts to improve productivity are often frustrated. The system has been "run by the book," a 2,000-page *Postal Manual* intended to cover all contingencies.

Most postal rates are currently set by Congress. Under the current accounting system, it is impossible to ascertain the incremental cost of any service. For this reason little basis exists for confirming or denying the popular belief that first-class mail more than pays for itself while other mail is delivered at a loss.

The Kappel Commission pointed to the political nature of Post Office appointments as one of the most serious problems in the postal system. The President has asked that Congress no longer require Senate confirmation of appointments to postmasterships at first-, second-, and third-class offices. He has also requested legislation to bar political tests in the selection, appointment, and promotion of Department employees. Departing from a former practice, the President does not seek local political endorsement of prospective postmasters. All these steps are designed to strengthen the merit system and permit candidates to be chosen for their competence rather than their political activity.

An even more fundamental departure is the Administration's proposal for reform of the postal service through the creation of a Government-owned, self-supporting corporation to operate the postal system under a directive that costs must be covered with revenues after a transitional period, except for public service costs for which appropriations would be made. The corporation would have the power to borrow funds for capital investment, to negotiate wage rates with postal unions, and, subject to veto by Congress, to set postal rates. The Government-owned postal corporation would be allowed great flexibility in operating the postal system, especially in its personnel and capital expenditure programs.

The postal reform proposal would obligate the board of directors of the postal corporation to report to Congress within 2 years concerning modernization of the postal monopoly laws, which effectively prohibit a private firm from delivering first-class mail. A careful review of these laws might show that additional competition could prove beneficial to the using public.

URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITIES

In the current state of technology the most efficient method of providing nuclear power is the use of light water reactors which operate on enriched uranium. Three plants owned by the Atomic Energy Commission and operated under contract by private enterprise supply this uranium. Constructed at a cost of \$2.4 billion, these plants are located in Oak Ridge, Tenn., Paducah, Ky., and Portsmouth, Ohio.

Originally the plants were built for the nuclear weapons program. Military needs for enriched uranium are expected to be small in future years, much below the capacity of these plants, but the growth of the nuclear power industry is expected to lead to capacity operations by the late 1970's.

In the chain of operations involving this form of energy—from mining uranium to generating nuclear power—the enriching plants are the last link to remain exclusively in Government hands. Since demand for enriched uranium is likely to come almost entirely from the commercial sector, the President has indicated that these plants should also be sold to private industry when conditions for disposal are advantageous.

Conditions for such sale are not advantageous at present. The plants are currently being operated at only about 40 percent of their existing capacity. Moreover, because of existing long-term contracts for power supplies, the plants will produce considerably more enriched uranium than can be sold at present, though it may be needed to meet future demands.

So long as the Government keeps the plants, it should encourage their efficient use in order to strengthen competition in the power field. The President has asked the AEC to establish a Directorate to run these plants in a manner that approaches more closely commercial enterprises, implying that they should earn commercial rates of return on the investment. The Directorate will use commercial accounting procedures and prepare annual financial statements equivalent to those of private corporations.

An important feature of this change is that nuclear generating plants will not enjoy a subsidy giving them an advantage in their competition with fossil fuels as sources of electric power. The proposed Directorate's operations, modeled after commercial operations, should provide a record of earnings that will facilitate subsequent sale to private industry and help to assure that the Government receives a fair price for the plants when they are sold.

THE GOVERNMENT AND HOUSING

All levels of government have been involved to an exceptionally high degree in the housing industry—in its financing, its technology, its labor supply and labor relations, and even in its supply of some basic materials. In addition, housing is the only major private industry for whose output a fairly specific goal has been stated by legislation. The Housing Act of 1949 declared a goal of "a decent home . . . for every American family," and the Act of 1968 said that this goal could be met by constructing or rehabilitating 26 million houses in the next decade, of which 6 million would be for low-and moderate-income families.

The enactment of this goal was not based on a calculation of the costs of achieving it and a decision to pay those costs whatever they might be. Until the costs and possible methods of achieving this goal are assessed more accurately it cannot be regarded as a firm basis for planning. Moreover, any goal set now would certainly have to be regarded as open to review and revision as time passes. Nevertheless, the kind of concern expressed by the 26 million housing goal, together with the prospect that rising family formation will greatly increase the demand for houses in the next decade, calls for a reexamination of the Federal role with respect to housing.

A distinction should be made between policy about housing for low-income people and housing for the rest of the population. An intention to subsidize housing for low-income people is clear. This may be explained on the same grounds as other contributions from the more affluent to the poor, although there are questions about whether in the long run subsidizing housing is an efficient way to make this transfer.

Federal policy toward the nonsubsidized part of housing is probably best understood as an effort to improve the operation of private markets. This is clearest with respect to finance. The cost of capital to finance housing has been affected by the real or apparent riskiness and illiquidity of mortgage instruments. Policies to reduce these costs, without subsidies from the Federal Government, include FHA insurance, the provision of insurance and a reserve lending source for savings and loan associations, and the establishment of the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) to create a secondary market for mortgages. Further action along this line may be useful, especially to reduce the great instability of the residential construction industry, which in turn would contribute much to increasing productivity in the industry.

It is probably inevitable that housing construction should be particularly sensitive to variations in interest rates, given the heavy weight of interest charges in housing costs and the fact that much of the demand for housing can be postponed, at least for a time. However, this sensitivity has been greatly increased by a number of institutional arrangements of which interest rate ceilings have been among the most important. In the past, legal ceilings on the interest rates payable on FHA and VA mortgages have caused the supply of funds available through those programs to dry up whenever market interest rates rose much above the ceilings. The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development is authorized to vary the ceiling rate, and this flexibility can somewhat ease that particular problem. Usury ceilings in some States prevent the flow of funds into mortgages when market rates are high. In 1969, the supply of mortgage money in States with low usury ceilings appeared to be more limited than in other States. Stability in construction would be improved if these usury ceilings were eliminated. The fact is that these ceilings, instead of protecting people from having to pay exorbitant rates, often prevent their obtaining mortgage credit at all.

The housing industry is also less able to compete for funds when interest rates are rising because by custom it has depended heavily on specialized financial intermediaries, as noted elsewhere. The possibility of raising funds in the face of high interest rates might be improved if housing had recourse to more varied sources. Several steps have recently been taken to remedy this lack. The Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) have greatly expanded their borrowing on their own securities in the open capital market in order to supply funds to mortgage markets directly or through savings and loan associations. In 1969, regulations were promulgated for the issue of mortgage-backed securities of various kinds, guaranteed by the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA). This action was intended to authorize a mortgage investment instrument that would be marketable and attractive to a wide range of investors not now interested in mortgages directly. Establishment of a facility providing a secondary market for conven-

tional mortgages somewhat along the lines that FNMA now provides for FHA-VA mortgages is currently being considered.

The housing industry is unable to raise sufficient funds during a period of rising interest rates and inflation because of the nearly universal use of a long-term credit instrument with a fixed interest rate and amortization schedule. When future interest rates and rates of inflation are uncertain, both lenders and borrowers may be better satisfied with an instrument that provides some hedge against these uncertainties. One possibility would be a mortgage in which the interest rate varied with some prevailing market rate, adjustment to be made by lengthening or shortening the repayment schedule. Lending institutions may need greater flexibility to work out terms of mortgages that are accepable both to them and to their customers.

The Government's efforts to improve the flow of finance into housing has only recently begun to be matched by efforts to increase the supply and improve the utilization of real resources—notably labor. But the imperfections on this side of the industry have probably been as great as on the financial side. Entry into the construction workforce has been limited by prevailing practices. The large turnover of firms, the seasonality of the work, and the traditionally long apprenticeships contribute to the difficulty in securing an adequate supply of skilled workers. The fragmented structure of the industry and the instability of its operations have impeded the research and development that might lead to greater efficiency and lower cost.

In order to improve the utilization of construction manpower, the President issued an Executive Order on September 22, 1969, establishing a Construction Industry Collective Bargaining Commission. The Commission was established to assist in the settlement of labor disputes through voluntary procedures and to seek solutions to a wide range of manpower problems, including training and development of construction manpower, instability and seasonality of employment, and productivity and mobility of the construction labor force.

Significant expansion of training programs will be necessary to meet the large projected demand for skilled construction workers. Expansion of vocational education programs emphasizing construction skills can play an important supplementary role in increasing the supply of craftsmen with skills appropriate for entering construction work or for further training to attain full journeyman status. Federal officials will work with State and local authorities to encourage programs in construction skill training, and some Federal funds will be used to obtain direct expansion of these programs. Cooperative programs between the schools, unions, and contractors, in which credit toward apprenticeship requirements is granted for vocational education programs, is also a promising new direction which HEW is currently emphasizing.

The Administration has also made a major effort to expand participation of minority workers in training and employment in construction work, especially on Federal and federally assisted construction projects. The

widespread shortage of skilled construction workers in the industry is indicated by the ability of unions to obtain very large wage settlements. To open a greater flow of minority workers into the industry in order to help relieve these skill shortages is a major objective of the Philadelphia Plan. The Plan requires contractors bidding on Federal construction projects to make good faith efforts through affirmative action to meet established hiring goals for minority employment. The Department of Housing and Urban Development has also been working to develop local coalitions that will help increase opportunities for members of minority groups to join craft unions and apprenticeship and other training programs.

Through its "Operation Breakthrough" program, the Department of Housing and Urban Development has solicited proposals for experimental projects to demonstrate the use of new production techniques, including improved building management and financial arrangements, as a basis for significant improvements in productivity and efficiency. Simultaneously, the Department has solicited prototype site proposals from State and local governments willing to cooperate in eliminating building code and zoning constraints and in combining markets for volume production. The goal is to develop techniques to meet opportunities for mass marketing through the use of volume production methods and the capital resources of large companies. The Department of Housing and Urban Development has received 236 proposals for the use of new systems in residential construction projects. About 20 of these will be underwritten, in part, by the Department.

An essential part of the "Breakthrough" program is to change zoning and building regulations that presently impede building of low- and moderate-cost residential units in and around many major cities. While some States are now enacting statutes capable of overruling local ordinances, the remaining political and social obstacles are great. There is also need for a breakthrough to reduce the administrative delays and unnecessary redtape that are characteristic of many Federal housing programs and of many local housing authorities.

The Department has also taken the lead in the negotiation of a pilot labor-management agreement which will reduce obstacles hampering the introduction of new techniques. This nationwide agreement permits the factory production of modular homes, provides for locally negotiated wages and fringe benefits uniform for three building trades, allows for the crossing of craft jurisdictions, and incorporates effective dispute settlement machinery. In addition, provision is also made for training and employment opportunities for minority group members. It is felt by many observers that the agreement will provide a viable model to others similarly engaged in construction of housing units in an industrial context.

Improving the financing arrangements for housing, removing obstacles to the supply of labor, increasing investment in the training of construction labor where the payoffs justify the costs, and improving technology should all raise the rate of housing construction in the years ahead. Whether

they will suffice to achieve a predetermined goal for the number of houses to be built in the decade remains to be seen. Much will depend upon concurrent developments in the economy, including the strength of business demands for capital, the degree to which the Federal Government is adding to or subtracting from the supply of capital by its surplus or deficit, and the success of the home building industry itself in offering innovative products at a reasonable cost.

CHAPTER 5

Freedom and Stability in the World Economy

International Specialization and Exchange have made an important contribution to rising standards of living in the United States and abroad. By offering its own products in payment, a nation can acquire imports with less sacrifice of domestic resources than would be required to produce the same goods at home. Imports are the fruits of international trade, and exports are what must be given up to obtain them. The ability of a country to import depends primarily on how much of its production it can sell abroad. And this depends in turn on its domestic production costs, compared to those abroad, its access to foreign markets, and the exchange rates which translate the exporters' selling prices into the importers' currencies.

Of these determinants, domestic production costs are the result in part of general monetary and fiscal policy, discussed in Chapter 1, and in part of market performance, discussed in Chapter 4. Access to foreign markets is one of the subjects taken up in the first part of the present chapter, and exchange rates are considered in the last part. This chapter also deals with international capital movements and the Euro-dollar market, and with other recent developments in international finance.

THE EXPANSION OF TRADE

The case for free markets in international trade is much the same as it is in the domestic economy. Artificial barriers to trade, such as tariffs and quotas, usually act to reduce or eliminate exchange that would have benefited the trading parties. Similarly, by insulating domestic producers from foreign competition, trade restrictions reduce the incentives to increase innovation, efficiency, and specialization—dynamic forces that have made a major contribution to the economic growth of industrial nations. Restrictions on trade also limit the extent to which imports can compete with domestic products, and thus weaken an important restraint on domestic price increases.

In a dynamic world economy, changing conditions require continuous adjustments. These may inflict hardship on some and evoke resistance. But American industry is used to adapting to changing competitive pressures from both at home and abroad, and American labor has always been mobile, both among regions and among industries. Most of the necessary adjustments can be taken in stride, but some may prove more difficult. By

providing temporary adjustment assistance, the Government can help those who must adapt to changing patterns of world trade, and improve the capability of our market economy to take full advantage of the benefits of international trade and investment.

NONTARIFF BARRIERS

The rapid growth of international trade in the past decade attests to the progress made in reducing trade barriers. In 1969 total world trade approached a quarter of a trillion dollars, an increase of about 14 percent over that for 1968. During the decade of the 1960's the international trade of industrial nations increased at an average rate of almost 10 percent per year. As incomes rise and wants become more diverse, it is to be expected that opportunities for trade among these nations will grow rapidly, and this clearly has been happening. Progress towards freer trade, however, has been uneven. A serious problem is that the lowering of tariff walls has not been accompanied by similar progress in the lowering of nontariff barriers, which have increased in relative importance—and in some cases absolutely—as tariffs have declined. Recognizing the importance of attacking nontariff barriers in a systematic and coordinated manner, the countries adhering to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) assigned high priority to this problem in the work program planned to follow the Kennedy Round. On industrial products, an analysis of existing nontariff barriers was completed during 1969, and it was agreed to begin early in 1970 to formulate means of dealing with various types of these restrictions. A similar project has been initiated in relation to agricultural trade.

Nontariff barriers range from formal and explicit quotas to unpublicized administrative procedures that have the effect of impeding or excluding imports. One clear-cut example is quota restrictions that are imposed during periods of an unfavorable balance of payments, but often continue after the difficulties have disappeared. (The GATT allows the use of quantitative restrictions to correct deficits in the balance of payments under certain circumstances, provided that such restrictions are progressively relaxed as the balance of payments improves.)

More commonly, however, nontariff import barriers have been imposed for a variety of other reasons. In some cases their explicit purpose is to protect domestic industry. In other cases, legitimate domestic measures may have a protective side effect; health and sanitary regulations primarily designed to protect the consumer, for example, may also make it more difficult for foreign competitors to gain access to the domestic market.

Government procurement policies are frequently designed to provide protection for domestic industries. Domestic procurement may be explicitly required, or a price preference may be allowed on bids by domestic concerns. In a number of countries the responsible administrative agencies are given wide latitude in accepting or rejecting bids by foreign producers. As a result, American corporations may run into a combination of high barriers and frustrating uncertainties about how the barriers are administered.

On the U.S. side, preferences are also granted to domestic suppliers but these are generally explicit and easily understood. Thus regulations issued under the Buy American Act grant a 6-percent preference, plus another 6 percent if the materials are produced by a small business or in an area with substantial labor surplus. A 50-percent preference in overseas procurement is applied for balance-of-payments reasons by the Department of Defense and most other Government agencies. The case for the 50-percent preference involves weighing balance-of-payments gains against budgetary costs.

Restrictions abroad on trade in agricultural products are arousing particular concern in the United States because we have a comparative advantage in many of these products. The farm programs of most developed countries include special measures to support the prices farmers receive and to give them protection beyond that provided by customs duties. Measures taken pursuant to the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Economic Community have an especially distorting effect on world agricultural trade because they insulate domestic producers from foreign competition in order to keep internal farm prices far above world prices. The surpluses in some commodities resulting from these high prices are sold abroad with the aid of large export subsidies. While the United States also supports the prices of most basic crops, these prices (with a few exceptions) do not greatly exceed the world market level. We also maintain import quotas, notably on sugar and dairy products, and have arranged for exporting countries to limit exports of beef to the United States.

THE TRADE BILL OF 1969

The trade bill submitted by the President to Congress in November continues the movement toward freer world trade, and it also explicitly recognizes the importance of insuring that U.S. producers have fair access to foreign markets. Specifically, the bill would restore Presidential power to make limited tariff reductions. It envisions the elimination of the American selling price (ASP) system (in which certain import duties are based on the domestic selling price of competing American products rather than on the normal basis of actual export price). It would broaden the present authority to act against countries that treat U.S. products unfairly and would provide new authority to act against those countries that grant export subsidies which result in unfair competition against U.S. exports in third markets. At the same time, it would significantly improve the procedure by which business and workers injured by imports can receive Government assistance.

The tariff authority requested in the bill would make it possible for the President to approve occasional minor adjustments in tariffs that may be required—to compensate foreign countries, for example, if the United States applies an escape clause, or if a statutory change is made in tariff classification. It is not designed to be used for major tariff negotiations.

The American selling price system of customs valuation which applies to a few American products (primarily benzenoid chemicals) has taken

on symbolic importance for our trading partners. In conjunction with the Kennedy Round of tariff reductions, an agreement was reached providing that if the United States removed ASP, others would make specified further reductions in foreign tariffs on chemicals as well as reductions in several important nontariff barriers, such as European road taxes which discriminate against larger automobiles. Legislation to eliminate ASP would achieve these already negotiated trade benefits, and would also be an important positive step toward multilateral reduction of nontariff barriers, a liberalization which would benefit the United States both as an exporter and as an importer.

Although the relaxation of tariffs and other barriers in international trade promises clear benefits to the national economy as a whole, it must be recognized that the effects on some industries and individuals may be adverse, at least in the short run. Because the gains from trade are widely distributed to the consuming public, the costs of major resulting adjustments should be borne in part by the economy as a whole, not just by those who must suffer the direct effect of liberalization. For the economy as a whole, increased imports need not create unemployment. This was demonstrated, for instance, during the inflationary expansion of 1968, when unemployment fell from 3.8 to 3.6 percent, in spite of the record increase of 23 percent in imports. Nevertheless, specific imports may cause disruption in directly competing industries. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 provided for assistance to help those injured by tariff reductions adjust to the change, but in practice the criteria for assistance have been excessively stringent. The new bill would relax these criteria and make aid more readily available to those who require it.

In his trade message of November 18, the President stated that provisions concerning both the escape clause and adjustment assistance in the 1962 act were too tightly drawn and too technical to insure prompt and effective relief for those actually injured by imports. The President therefore recommended that the escape clause be made more flexible by providing a simple and clear statement of what should constitute injury under the law: Relief should be available whenever increased imports are the primary cause of actual or potential serious injury.

Under the present law, the injury must be related to a prior tariff reduction. In many cases, the tariff rates originally set in the Tariff Act of 1930 have been reduced in a series of trade agreements from 1934 to 1967, and it has become increasingly difficult to determine whether past tariff reductions are the cause of increased imports. Since the same problem arises in investigations of adjustment assistance, the President recommended a similar change in the criteria applicable to petitions for adjustment assistance filed by firms or groups of workers. The President observed that improving the provisions for relief from import injury should lessen the pressure for legislation to restrict imports and should thus aid in the continuing U.S. attack

on trade restrictions of other countries, which currently impede the access of U.S. exports to foreign markets.

THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY

Greater access to markets is especially important to the developing countries. Although aid from abroad is vital to most of their plans for achieving greater prosperity, the most important condition for success is their ability to make better use of their own resources, both internally and externally. An effective strategy must be designed to further their participation in foreign trade and attract private investment from abroad.

The Flow of Resources

For more than two decades the United States has provided large amounts of financial aid to the less developed countries (LDC's). In recent years other industrialized countries have also begun to provide substantial amounts. In 1968, industrial countries contributed \$6.4 billion in official development assistance (which excludes private investment and loans on commercial terms). Although the flow of resources from the United States rose steadily up to the mid-1960's, it has leveled off in recent years. Private investment, on the other hand, has grown rapidly during the last 5 years. In 1968, U.S. private investment in less developed countries increased to \$2 billion, more than double the 1963 rate. Total private investment in the LDC's by developed countries as a whole rose to \$5.9 billion in 1968, also more than doubling the 1963 figure. To encourage a continuation of this trend the President signed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969 providing for the establishment of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, which would sell insurance and guarantees to U.S. private investors. The President has also endorsed the multilateral institutions—the World Bank and its affiliates and the regional banks—as channels through which development assistance can be provided on an equitable basis.

The Efficiency of Aid

Greater reliance on the market mechanism can contribute significantly to economic growth in the LDC's as well as in developed countries. It is especially appropriate that the United States, whose strong economy owes so much to the freedom of our market system, set an example by showing a willingness to let market forces operate. When this Administration came to office, foreign aid was subject to "additionality" and "tying" conditions which hampered its effectiveness. Tying requires that aid funds be used only to purchase U.S. goods and services; additionality further requires that aid funds not otherwise restricted be spent on U.S. products or services that do not substitute for commercial exports from the United States.

In June 1969 the Administration acted to end additionality requirements for aid. Later, the tying requirement in aid to Latin American nations was relaxed; they may now spend aid funds anywhere in Latin America as well as in the United States. The speed with which the United States can

make further improvements in the efficiency of its aid is governed to a major extent by its balance of payments and by the aid policies of other countries.

Tariff Preferences

In the long run, the LDC's must look to a continued and vigorous expansion of export earnings as an important part of their economic progress. Aid can help them overcome their initial handicaps, but by itself it cannot constitute a lasting solution. Greater internal efforts are also required.

From 1960 to 1967, export earnings of the developed nations grew at a rate of 8.4 percent per year. Although rates for different countries differ widely, export earnings of LDC's as a whole rose at the rate of only 6.1 percent. At present, primary products account for almost 80 percent of the exports of LDC's and the rate at which exports of these products are growing is substantially below the rate of growth of world trade generally. Because of the limited potential for future expansion of trade in traditional exports, the ability of the LDC's to develop new exports, especially of manufactured products, will be increasingly important. This development is inhibited by tariffs and quotas imposed by developed countries, and by internal economic difficulties within the LDC's.

To assist in meeting the goals of the LDC's the 1968 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) recommended that the more prosperous nations offer preferential tariff rates on the exports of the LDC's. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has appointed a working group, consisting of representatives of the OECD members plus Australia and New Zealand, to formulate a plan for a system of generalized tariff preferences. The United States has submitted a proposal to this body. Some of the key provisions are:

- (1) All duties on manufactured and semimanufactured products imported from less developed countries, except textiles, footwear, and petroleum and petroleum products, would be eliminated. A selected list of agricultural and fishery products that would also benefit from the preferences is provided.
- (2) There would be no quantitative limits on the additional imports eligible for preferential treatment. Injury to domestic producers would be handled by standard escape clauses and adjustment assistance.
- (3) The preferences would be temporary, scheduled to last no more than 10 years, and should not obstruct further general tariff reductions.
 - (4) All major developed countries would adopt a common plan.
- (5) The United States would not grant preferences to any country that received an exclusive trade preference from any developed country for a product covered by the plan, nor would we grant preferences to LDC's that gave exclusive trade preferences to any developed country (reverse preferences).

Other participants in the OECD working group have also submitted proposals, some of which vary in important respects from the U.S. approach. The European Community's proposal, for example, calls for limits on the quantities of imports granted preferential treatment.

In November 1969, the OECD transmitted to the UNCTAD a report setting forth the positions taken by the prospective preference-granting countries. The United States will be engaged during the coming months in discussions in OECD and UNCTAD with the other developed countries and with the potential LDC beneficiaries with a view to reaching agreement on a mutually satisfactory arrangement.

Tariff preferences for the LDC's will mark a significant departure from the most-favored-nation principle on which the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade has been built. This principle, which requires nondiscriminatory treatment of all imports regardless of origin, lies at the heart of free international trade, and departures should be avoided except for compelling reasons.

When one country gives another preferential access to its markets, an increase in trade between the two countries will normally result. This may represent new international trade, or it may come from substituting the exports of one country for those of others. In the first case, there will normally be an increase in efficiency. In the second case, where trade is diverted from the lower cost third countries, the result will generally be lower economic efficiency. Countries negotiating trade matters find it least painful to give one another the markets that were previously the province of third parties. The general GATT proscription of preferential arrangements was aimed to counteract the natural bias toward trade diversion when countries exchange selective preferences.

The departure from the most-favored-nation principle is justified by two considerations. The development of manufacturing industries is essential to the progress of the LDC's, and these industries will be stimulated by preferences. Second, a liberal system of general preferences replacing specialized regional preferences will create additional world trade and may reduce existing distortions in trade patterns.

THE U.S. TRADE BALANCE

The U.S. economy and developments in our own external payments have a profound influence on the stability and growth of the world trading and financial system. Our exports now account for 17 percent of total world trade, and the dollar has achieved high standing as an international currency. Growing economies abroad have provided expanding markets for our output. In turn the level of our material welfare has been raised by an increasingly diverse array of products from abroad.

During the 1960's, U.S. exports grew rapidly, at an average annual rate of over 7 percent. Imports grew even more rapidly, however, with the result that the trade surplus in merchandise shrank from a peak of \$6.8 billion in 1964 to less than \$1 billion during 1968.

The growth of U.S. exports has been fostered by high technology, exemplified in such manufactured items as computers, jet aircraft, and control

instruments. Even the rapidly growing international demand for these products, however, has not been sufficient to prevent a decline in the U.S. share of total world exports. One reason is that growth in the traditional U.S. export markets has been below the average. And even within these markets, U.S. competitive shares of manufactured exports have declined.

During recent years export prices of some of our major competitors—such as Germany, Italy, and Japan—have performed better than those of the United States. It is not surprising, therefore, that from 1961 through 1968 U.S. bilateral trade balances with these three countries declined by more than \$3.8 billion. In the same interval, the overall trade balances of these three countries improved by roughly \$7.6 billion.

The U.S. trade balance with Canada has also shown a large decline in recent years, but the reason appears to lie in special conditions affecting U.S.-Canadian trade. Canada's trade balance with other countries deteriorated slightly during the 1960's.

There have been other important changes in the composition of U.S. trade during the decade. From 1960 through 1966, U.S. agricultural exports increased rapidly, but they have been at a standstill since 1967. The sharp rise in U.S. imports of finished manufactured goods other than foods, from \$5.3 billion in 1960 to almost \$17 billion in 1968, was also significant. The share of these products in total U.S. imports increased from 35 to over 50 percent in the period from 1960 through 1968. The increase was particularly strong in imports of consumer goods, especially luxury products.

A part of the recent surge in U.S. imports can be attributed to inflation in the domestic economy. During the years of relatively stable prices between 1955 and 1965, the value of merchandise imports as a percentage of GNP varied little, hovering around 3 percent, but by 1968 it had increased to almost 4 percent. In 1969 it edged slightly higher but remained just under 4 percent.

Because of the prolonged dock strike in the first quarter of 1969, it is difficult to interpret the currently available trade figures for last year. There are signs of improvement in the merchandise trade balance after midyear, and the deterioration of the trade balance typical of the past several years appears at least to have been arrested. As inflation is slowed in the United States, the trade balance should improve. It is not likely, however, that regaining internal stability will be enough by itself to restore promptly the large surplus in the trade balance of the early and middle 1960's. For one thing, the excessive domestic demand emerging toward the end of 1965 has become incorporated into higher costs and prices, and these tend to be inflexible downwards. Thus, the inflation of recent years will continue to have an adverse effect on our competitive position in the world economy. At the same time our technological superiority in many fields has been narrowed by the notable advances of countries like Japan and Germany.

INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOBILITY AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

While the gradual narrowing of our trade balance has dominated the general trend of the U.S. balance of payments, short-term fluctuations have become increasingly dominated by capital movements. Capital flows are treated differently in the two most widely publicized measures of the balance of payments: the official settlements balance and the liquidity balance. Because short-term capital movements have been large, these two measures have recently yielded very different results. During the first half of 1969, the United States registered a record surplus measured on the official settlements basis, while the same period showed a record deficit in terms of the liquidity definition. For the full year, preliminary estimates indicate an official settlements surplus significantly larger than the \$1.6 billion surplus of 1968. The liquidity balance was in surplus during the fourth quarter, although the deficit for the year was far larger in 1969 than in any previous year (Chart 13).

Two Measures of the Balance of Payments

The differences in the coverage and concept provided by these two measures must be kept in mind. The official settlements balance measures the change in our holdings of international reserve assets, less the change in liquid and certain nonliquid claims on the United States by foreign official institutions such as central banks or finance ministries. The liquidity balance measures the change in our holdings of international reserve assets, less the change in *liquid* liabilities to *all* foreigners, whether official or private.

Thus, sales to foreign official institutions of securities that exceed 1 year in original maturity (and are hence technically nonliquid) in replacement of short-term instruments do not affect the results according to the official settlements basis, but they do improve the liquidity measure. For 1968, for example, Table 15 shows that such special financial transactions shifted what would have been a liquidity deficit of \$2.1 billion to a liquidity surplus of \$0.2 billion. As these instruments are paid off with liquid claims on the United States, they correspondingly augment the liquidity deficit, leaving the official settlements basis unchanged. In the second and third quarters of 1969, for example, the reversal of previous special transactions added approximately \$1 billion to the liquidity deficit.

Perhaps an even more fundamental difference between the two measures concerns the treatment of flows of foreign private short-term funds into the United States. To the extent that private foreigners obtain or withhold dollars from their central banks, these flows reduce the official settlements measure of the deficit (or increase the surplus). Under the liquidity definition, however, a net increase in liquid liabilities to foreigners (whether official or private) indicates an enlarged deficit. Thus if private foreigners

Table 15.—U.S. balance of payments, 1960-69 [Billions of dollars]

Type of transaction	1960–64 average	196 5	1966	1967	1968	1969 first 3 quarters 1	
Merchandise trade balance Exports	5. 4 21. 7 -16. 2	5. 0 26. 4 —21. 5	3. 9 29. 4 —25. 5	3. 9 30. 7 -26. 8	0. 6 33. 6 -33. 0	0, 3 35, 5 —35, 2	
Balance on investment income U.S. investments abroad Foreign investments in the	3.2 4.3	4. 2 5. 9	4. 1 6. 3	4. 5 6. 9	4.8 7.7	4. 5 8. 8	
United States	-1.2	-1.7	-2.1	-2.4	-2.9	-4.3	
Balance on other services Exports 2 Imports	-2, 7 5. 3 -8. 0	-2.0 7.1 -9.1	-2.8 7.7 -10.5	-3.2 8.6 -11.8	-2.9 9.3 -12.2	-3.0 9.9 -12.9	
BALANCE ON GOODS AND SERVICES 2	5. 9	7.1	5. 3	5. 2	2.5	1.9	
Unilateral transfers, net; trans- fers to foreigners (—) 3	-2.6	-2. 8	-2. 8	-3. 0	-2.9	2.8	
BALANCE ON CURRENT ACCOUNT	3. 3	4.4	2.4	2. 2	3	9	
Balance on direct private investments U.S. direct investments	-1.8	-3.4	-3.6	-2.9	-2.7	-3.4	
abroad	-1.8	-3.5	-3.6	-3.2	-3.0	-4.1	
Foreign direct investments in the United States	.1	.1	.1	.3	.3	.7	
BALANCE ON CURRENT AND DIRECT INVESTMENT ACCOUNTS	1.6	1.0	-1.1	7	-3.1	-4.4	
Transactions in U.S. private non- direct assets, net	-2 .7	3	7	-2.5	-2.1	-2.1	
assets, excluding officia reserve assets, net	-1.3	-1.6	-1.5	-2.4	-2.2	-2.3	
nonliquid assets, net	. 6	.2	2. 4	3. 1	8. 2	2.3	
Errors and omissions	-1.0	6	 5	-1.0	6	-4.3	
BALANCE ON LIQUIDITY BASIS	-2.8	-1.3	-1.4	-3.5	.2	-10.8	
Less: Certain nonliquid liabilities to foreign official agencies	.2	.1	.8	1.3	2.3	-1.1	
Plus: Foreign private liquid capital, net	.8	.1	2, 4	1, 5	3.8	11.6	
BALANCE ON OFFICIAL RE- SERVE TRANSACTIONS BASIS.	-2. 2	-1.3	.3	-3.4	1.6	1.9	
Addendum: Special financial transactions	(4)	1	1.6	1.0	2.3	-1.2	
BALANCE ON LIQUIDITY BASIS EXCLUDING SPECIAL FI- NANCIAL TRANSACTIONS	(4)	-1.2	-2.9	-4.6	-2.1	−9. €	

Average of the first 3 quarters at seasonally adjusted annual rates.
 Excludes transfers under military grants.
 Excludes military grants of goods and services.

Note.—Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Department of Commerce.

gain more short-term claims on the United States than are lost by official foreign holders of dollars, the difference adds to our liquidity deficit. During 1969, the large short-term capital flow into the United States caused by the Euro-dollar borrowings of U.S. commercial banks has made the difference in treatment unusually important.

The Euro-Dollar Market and Short-Term Capital Movements


Euro-dollar deposits are liabilities of banks outside the United States (including foreign branches of U.S. banks) which are denominated in dollars rather than local currency. London is the center of the Euro-dollar market in which such funds are placed and borrowed. Large amounts of U.S. dollars are also on deposit in continental Europe, Canada, and Japan. The Euro-dollar market consists almost entirely of short-term funds, with few deposit maturities exceeding 180 days. (There is a counterpart long-term market for Euro-bonds, including substantial amounts of securities of U.S. corporations, offered in Europe but denominated in dollars.)

While exact measurement of the size of the Euro-dollar market is not possible, estimates published by the Bank for International Settlements indicate that the market may have been roughly three times as large in 1968 as it was in 1964, growing from \$9 billion to \$25 billion, with further growth during 1969. One can gain some idea of the increasing importance of this market as a source of foreign borrowing for U.S. banks by looking at the liabilities of U.S. banks to their foreign branches. These grew from approximately \$1 billion in 1964 to more than \$14 billion by the summer of 1969, after which they remained relatively constant. The branches themselves had Euro-dollar liabilities amounting to \$23.2 billion on September 30, 1969. Euro-dollar deposits are also held in foreign-owned banks abroad.

The Euro-dollar market has become a major link among national short-term money markets. Its growth owes much to the impetus generated by various restrictions on competitive practices in national money markets. The part that domestic banking regulations play in stimulating the growth of the Euro-dollar market is well illustrated by the effects of the Federal Reserve's Regulation Q, fixing the maximum interest rates which member banks can pay on most types of time deposits. During 1969, short-term interest rates moved well above the Regulation Q ceiling, impeding the access of American banks to domestic money markets. In their search for funds, U.S. banks turned to Euro-dollar borrowing through their foreign branches. This demand helped push Euro-dollar interest rates upward to more than 11 percent in June, and they stayed close to that level for the remainder of 1969 (Chart 4, page 36).

These high interest rates attracted funds from Europe's domestic money and capital markets. Participation in the Euro-dollar market required U.S. dollars, and the major part of these dollars ultimately came from European central banks, with the result that European countries did not gain official reserves on the scale they might otherwise have done, or even lost part of these reserves. Thus, such flows from European domestic money and capital markets into Euro-dollars contributed to the U.S. official settlements surplus. As private European funds were attracted to the Euro-dollar markets, interest rates in European money markets rose. In response to the pull exerted by the Euro-dollar market, several European countries have taken actions

U.S. Balance of International Payments



LABALANCES ON LIQUIDITY BASIS AND ON OFFICIAL RESERVE TRANSACTIONS BASIS ARE ESTIMATES FOR FULL YEAR. ALL OTHER DATA ARE FOR FIRST 3 QUARTERS AT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED ANNUAL RATES. SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE.

to restrict the outflow of funds from their domestic money and capital markets.

The surge in Euro-dollar interest rates, together with the Regulation Q ceiling on domestic deposit rates, also provided a strong incentive for U.S. depositors to place funds in the Euro-dollar market rather than directly with U.S. banks. As a result a circular flow of U.S. funds developed, in which dollars moved from the United States to the Euro-dollar market and back again through the foreign branches of U.S. banks. This flow involved both an increase in U.S. residents' claims on foreign institutions (which largely went unrecorded and therefore showed up as "errors and omissions" in the

balance of payments) and an increase in liquid liabilities to foreign branches of U.S. banks. The result of the circular flow was an increase in the liquidity deficit.

On both counts, then, Euro-dollars contributed to a divergence between the official settlements and liquidity balances. When dollars were drawn out of foreign official reserves, they influenced the official settlements balance without affecting the liquidity balance. When dollars originating in the United States were routed through the Euro-dollar market, they increased the liquidity deficit without affecting the official settlements balance.

Long-Term Capital Movements and Investment Income

Long-term capital movements have also strongly influenced the U.S. balance of payments in recent years. In response to the limits imposed by the Direct Investment Program on net direct investment abroad with U.S. funds and to the high cost and reduced availability of domestic funds, U.S. corporations have been increasing their efforts to raise long-term funds abroad. At the same time, a substantial number of foreign investors have broadened their portfolios to include American common stocks. During the first three quarters of 1969, foreign purchases of U.S. corporate securities are estimated to have been \$1.8 billion, or \$0.5 billion more than net sales of foreign stocks and bonds to U.S. investors over the same period. Direct U.S. investment abroad also continued to be large during the first three quarters of 1969.

The heavy U.S. borrowing abroad in recent years brought to a halt the rapid growth of the U.S. net international investment position. Between the end of 1966 and the end of 1968 net assets remained virtually unchanged at \$65 billion. The composition and growth of the U.S. international investment position are given in Table 16.

Earnings on U.S. investments abroad have continued to contribute to the U.S. balance of payments. During 1968, our rate of return on direct investments abroad reversed its previous decline and rose almost a full percentage point above the 11 percent of 1967. During the first three quarters of 1969, income from direct and other private U.S. investment abroad is estimated to have reached an annual rate of almost \$8.0 billion, up about \$1.0 billion from 1968.

On the other hand, interest payments on foreign investments in the United States have increased even more rapidly, reflecting heavy U.S. short-term borrowing from abroad during the first half of 1969. High interest rates also increased the cost of refinancing previous borrowings. In the third quarter, interest payments by U.S. commercial banks on their liabilities to foreign branches were running at an annual rate of approximately \$1.5 billion, rising from less than a quarter of a billion dollars in late 1967. For the first three quarters of 1969, income on private foreign investments in the United States is estimated at roughly \$2.6 billion, \$0.4 billion more than the total for the whole of 1968.

Table 16.—International investment position of the United States, 1955, 1965, and 1968
[Millions of dollars; end of year]

	Total		Western	Canada,	Latin American
1955 1965 1968		19681	19681	1968 1	Republics, 1968 ¹
37, 237	61, 387	65, 013	-8, 278	20, 704	15, 060
65, 076	120, 126	146, 134	39, 658	31,694	22, 281
29, 136	81, 197	101, 900	28, 124	31,679	17, 077
26, 750 19, 395 7, 355 2, 386	71, 044 49, 474 21, 570 10, 153	88, 930 64, 756 24, 174 12, 970	24, 687 19, 386 5, 301 3, 437	30, 476 19, 488 10, 988 1, 203	13, 791 11, 010 2, 781 3, 286
13, 143	23, 479	28, 524	8, 011	11	5, 204
22, 797	15, 450	15, 710	3, 523	4	
27, 839	58, 739	81, 121	47, 936	10, 990	7, 221
13, 408	26, 374	40, 267	26, 037	6, 172	2,749
5, 076 6, 575 1, 757	8, 797 14, 599 2, 978	10, 815 19, 528 9, 924	7, 750 12, 989 5, 298	2, 659 3, 271 242	164 1, 411 1, 174
900	3, 250	7, 237	4, 591	1,638	164
13, 531	29, 115	33, 617	17, 308	3, 180	4, 308
7, 686 5, 845	17, 195 11, 920	24, 460 9, 157	12, 580 4, 728	2,615 565	4, 190 118
	37, 237 65, 076 29, 136 26, 750 19, 395 7, 355 2, 386 13, 143 22, 797 27, 839 13, 408 5, 076 6, 575 1, 757 900 13, 531 7, 686	1955 1965 37, 237 61, 387 65, 076 120, 126 29, 136 81, 197 26, 750 71, 044 19, 395 49, 474 7, 355 21, 570 2, 386 10, 153 13, 143 23, 479 22, 797 15, 450 27, 839 58, 739 13, 408 26, 374 5, 076 8, 797 6, 575 14, 599 1, 757 2, 978 900 3, 250 13, 531 29, 115 7, 686 17, 195	1955 1965 19681 37, 237 61, 387 65, 013 65, 076 120, 126 146, 134 29, 136 81, 197 101, 900 26, 750 71, 044 88, 930 19, 395 49, 474 64, 756 7, 355 21, 570 24, 174 2, 386 10, 153 12, 970 13, 143 23, 479 28, 524 22, 797 15, 450 15, 710 27, 839 58, 739 81, 121 13, 408 26, 374 40, 267 5, 076 8, 797 10, 815 6, 575 14, 599 19, 528 1, 757 2, 978 9, 924 900 3, 250 7, 237 13, 531 29, 115 33, 617 7, 686 17, 195 24, 460	1955 1965 19681 19	1955 1965 19681 Europe, 19681 Canada, 19681 19681 19681 37, 237 61, 387 65, 013 -8, 278 20, 704 65, 076 120, 126 146, 134 39, 658 31, 694 29, 136 81, 197 101, 900 28, 124 31, 679 26, 750 71, 044 88, 930 19, 395 21, 570 24, 174 5, 301 10, 988 2, 386 10, 153 12, 970 3, 437 1, 203 13, 143 23, 479 28, 524 8, 011 11 22, 797 15, 450 15, 710 3, 523 4 27, 839 58, 739 81, 121 47, 936 10, 990 13, 408 26, 374 40, 267 26, 037 6, 172 5, 076 8, 797 10, 815 7, 750 2, 659 1, 757 2, 978 9, 924 5, 298 242 900 3, 250 7, 237 4, 591 1, 638 13, 531 29, 115 33, 617 17, 308 3, 180 7, 686 17, 195 24, 460 12, 580 2, 615

¹ Preliminary. Total includes other foreign countries and international organizations and unallocated, not shown separately in this table.
² Includes U.S., gold stock.

Source: Department of Commerce.

THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM

The rapid growth of international trade and capital flows has brought into sharper focus two essential requirements for an adequate world monetary system. In the first place, there must be sufficient official liquidity to finance temporary imbalances. Second, the terms of exchange between national currencies should be sufficiently stable to foster confidence in international dealings, but not so rigid that they preclude the adjustments that may be needed from time to time as trading patterns and terms of trade undergo inevitable change. The urgency of progress in both these directions has been underlined in recent years by the increasing frequency of international financial disturbances. The ad hoc solutions for these have often been to impose various restraints that now threaten to obstruct further advances in the efficiency of the international economy.

The past year has seen important improvements, especially in the direction of greater liquidity. Years of discussion and negotiations culminated in final agreement to create Special Drawing Rights, a new international reserve asset. Now, for the first time in history, there is an international arrangement for systematically creating reserves. Also, the official parities of two important currencies were adjusted during 1969. France reduced

the exchange value of the French franc in August. Following repeated inflows of speculative capital—most notably, the flood of between \$4 billion and \$5 billion in May and over \$1.5 billion in September—the Germans allowed the mark to float upward at the end of September, and a new, higher parity was chosen in October. These two parity adjustments, together with the devaluation of the British pound in November 1967, have resulted in a pattern of exchange rates that is more closely in line with international competitive positions. A lessening of strains and instability in the international financial situation has followed, and the effects are apparent in the exchange markets. Most notable, perhaps, has been the narrowing of the discounts and premiums on forward exchange, which had become abnormally large before these adjustments in parities were made.

The agreement to create Special Drawing Rights provides a fundamental and lasting method for dealing with the liquidity question, but the changes in exchange rates during the past year do not assure an equally permanent solution to the adjustment problem. Some of the major maladjustments have been relieved for the time being, but basic forces that could produce new disequilibria continue to operate. Nations attach different degrees of importance to different objectives for economic policy. Changes in technology and demands have varying effects among countries. We should use the period of reduced tensions, which recent currency realignments and advances in providing for needed liquidity have granted us, to consider how the international financial system might be made more capable of adjusting to possible future shifts in the world economy.

International Liquidity: Special Drawing Rights

Consideration of how the international economic system might become better able to cope with changes in the relative positions of individual economies must begin with the landmark decision to establish Special Drawing Rights (SDR's). As trade and investment grow, countries tend to need higher reserves. If the reserves coming into the system are insufficient, general success in meeting goals for national reserves becomes impossible, and the outcome is destructive competition for reserves. Domestic and international policies are warped by a preoccupation with the balance of payments. Reductions in barriers to trade and investment become ever more difficult; indeed, international barriers may be increased as a result of the desire to protect national reserves.

To avoid these undesirable consequences international studies were started in 1964, focusing on the possibilities of creating a new reserve asset. The establishment of Special Drawing Rights resulted from these studies and from protracted negotiations later on involving the Group of Ten and the International Monetary Fund. SDR's are created by the IMF and allocated among the member countries in proportion to their Fund quotas. Because they are counted as an increase in reserves of the member countries, incentives to compete for reserves should be correspondingly lessened.

The preliminary steps to create the SDR's were discussed in the Council's Annual Reports for 1968 and 1969. During the past year, two final steps were taken in preparation for activation in January 1970. The amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund creating Special Drawing Rights was ratified during August by the required 67 member countries having 80 percent of the voting power of the IMF. The next step resolved the important question of the appropriate amounts of SDR's. The deficient growth of international reserves made it desirable that initial allocations of Special Drawing Rights should be substantial. The decision by the International Monetary Fund to create \$9.5 billion in Special Drawing Rights between 1970 and 1972 should permit an adequate but not excessive growth of official reserves.

In using SDR's, countries are expected to fulfill the "requirement of need." SDR's are to be transferred to meet balance-of-payments needs and cover reserve losses, but not solely to change the composition of reserves. A country may use SDR's to purchase balances of its own currency from another participant, if the other participant agrees. Another set of provisions enables the Fund to guide SDR transactions from using countries to countries designated as eligible recipients on the basis of a number of criteria, including their balance-of-payments and reserve position. No country is bound to accept additional SDR's if its holdings already amount to three times its cumulative allocations.

During 1969 the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund also agreed to recommend an increase in quotas in the Fund by a total of \$7.6 billion, or 35.5 percent. While an increase in IMF quotas does not, in itself, result in an increase in "owned" international reserves, it does create a larger pool of international credit, which acts as a partial substitute for reserves. (When countries can borrow to finance temporary balance-of-payments deficits, they are under less pressure to acquire and hold reserves.) As part of the general increase in quotas, the U.S. quota will, if Congress approves, rise from \$5,160 million to \$6,700 million, an increase of 29.8 percent. Special arrangements were made in order that the proportion of the quotas held by less developed countries should not fall as much as they would with a mechanical application of the usual criteria based on trade and GNP. These countries' share of the total quotas will decrease only from 28.3 percent to 27.7 percent, and in absolute terms they will rise from \$6,032 million to \$8,014 million.

INTERNATIONAL ADJUSTMENT

Creating the Special Drawing Rights and increasing the IMF quotas will give nations more time to redress their balance-of-payments disequilibria in an orderly fashion, but the question of the most effective way to correct imbalances is still open. In principle, they can be corrected by three basic measures applied singly or in combination. First, domestic policy can be altered. Countries with a surplus can adopt more expansive policies and thereby increase their imports and reduce their exports. Countries with defi-

cits can restrict domestic demand, thereby reducing their imports and increasing their exports. Second, governments can take direct action by adopting certain selective measures. To correct deficits, countries can increase tariff rates, or institute import quotas or controls on capital movements and tourist expenditures. In countries where a surplus exists, governments can reduce tariffs, remove other obstructions to imports, or encourage the outflow of capital. Third, exchange rates can be altered (although, as a practical matter, the United States cannot adjust its exchange rate). Countries may aim to correct deficits by adjusting the exchange rate of their currencies downward, a move that will discourage imports and encourage exports. Surplus countries can appreciate the exchange rate of their currencies, thereby encouraging imports and discouraging exports. The measures a country selects and its quickness in applying them will depend on its willingness and ability to finance deficits out of reserves and borrowings, or to permit surpluses to build up reserves.

Each of the three general methods for redressing balance-of-payments disequilibria has its advantages and disadvantages. How much international synchronization of domestic policies is desirable depends partly on whether policies to achieve internal stabilization will also restore a balance-of-payments equilibrium. It has been argued, for instance, that maintaining fixed exchange rates encourages countries to keep inflationary pressures under control, thus reinforcing "discipline." There is no automatic assurance, however, that the internal adjustment required to correct a country's balance of payments will also contribute to domestic stability. A balance-of-payments surplus might coincide with a domestic boom, in which case the restrictive policies needed by the domestic economy would further enlarge the surplus in the country's external payments. Another country might face the reverse of that situation, with underemployment at home and a deficit in its external payments. In such instances, there will be strong pressure to adopt direct action affecting international transactions, and, in some cases, to alter the exchange rate.

Direct Actions

International adjustment may be attempted through direct actions aimed at any of the components of the balance of payments, but the nature and limitations of such controls must be fully recognized. Although at times they may relieve an urgent situation, their function is essentially palliative. Once established, moreover, it often proves difficult either to deactivate them or to integrate them effectively into longer range solutions.

At the time the International Monetary Fund was established, capital transactions were believed to be a possible source of international disequilibrium, and capital controls were therefore considered preferable to current account controls as a means of correcting the balance of payments. Capital controls, however, also have their costs. The case for free international investment is similar to that for free international trade. Broader and freer

markets for both capital and goods contribute to economic efficiency, the growth of the world economy, and a more rapid improvement of living standards generally. Capital controls create serious administrative difficulties and are likely to inspire a search for loopholes in their provisions. Once set up, they have a tendency to enmesh the economy in an everwidening circle of restrictions rather than to develop conditions that would obviate the need for curbs. Furthermore, they are inconsistent with a liberal approach to economic policy and are irksome to business.

In his message of April 4, 1969, the President affirmed the Administration's intention to move away from controls on capital movements. The program to restrict direct investment abroad was relaxed; the minimum amount of investment, that is, the leeway before restraints are applicable, was raised from \$200,000 to \$1 million. This measure reduced the number of firms required to furnish quarterly reports under the program from 3,400 to 650. Furthermore, an optional earnings quota was established which allows companies to reinvest up to 30 percent of their foreign earnings. The Federal Reserve guidelines for banks were revised to give them more flexibility in financing U.S. exports and to resolve some equity problems. For 1970, further changes were made in the Federal Reserve program to encourage the financing of exports. The former minimum of \$1 million under the Foreign Direct Investment Program was raised to \$5 million, so long as investment over \$1 million is used in the less developed countries.

On the trade side, temporary quantitative restrictions on imports are sanctioned under the GATT as a method for protecting the balance of payments. Since quantitative restrictions are particularly likely to disrupt trade, however, there has been some tendency to use import surcharges or a combination of import surcharges and export subsidies in their place. In theory, the imposition of a uniform import surcharge combined with an equivalent export subsidy is close to a change in the exchange rate in its effects on the trade balance, and therefore almost as neutral as an exchange rate adjustment with respect to the allocation of resources. In one important respect, however, these measures are not equivalent to an adjustment in the exchange rate. The latter applies to all international transactions, including tourist expenditures and other invisibles, as well as capital items. In contrast, the combination of import surcharges and export grants applies only to merchandise trade. Furthermore, almost inevitably there are pressures to exclude certain items from the surcharge-grant system, with the consequence that specified industries enjoy a degree of protection not granted to others.

It is appropriate for countries having a surplus to reduce their restrictions on imports and on capital flows, and a number of countries have taken such steps. (Countries may also undertake unilateral reductions in import barriers, or a speedup of reductions already agreed upon, to reduce domestic inflationary pressures, as Austria and Canada did during 1969, and as Switzerland plans to do in early 1970.) Although direct restrictions on imports or capital flows to correct deficits will normally have the undesirable

side effect of inhibiting mutually advantageous international exchange, direct action to deal with a country's surplus by reducing barriers to trade or capital flows will have favorable side effects and will also lessen the likelihood of restrictive measures by deficit nations. Where possible, therefore, direct actions should take the form of a relaxation of controls and restraints by countries with a surplus rather than the introduction or tightening of such measures by deficit countries.

Exchange Rate Adjustments

Proper management of domestic economic policy, as indicated above, will not always be sufficient to avoid balance-of-payments difficulties. Other factors besides improper demand management may create imbalances. Where the economic policies required for external equilibrium differ greatly from those that promote price stability and high employment at home, the Bretton Woods system provides for discrete adjustments in exchange parities. In practice, however, countries have been reluctant to make such adjustments promptly, and their delays have often generated speculative movements of funds and use of restrictionist measures. The frequency of international financial crises in recent years has focused attention on the possibility of adjusting exchange rates in a calmer and more orderly manner.

At the Annual Meeting of the Governors of the International Monetary Fund in September, the Managing Director announced that the Fund will continue its study and appraisal of proposals for "limited flexibility" in exchange rates. The Secretary of the Treasury made it clear that the United States will actively participate in and contribute to this study. Although the results of such studies cannot be foreseen, it is possible to point out some of the technical and policy problems that will need clarification.

Within the general framework of the Bretton Woods system there is scope for greater flexibility of exchange rates than has been evident in practice. It has been suggested that parity adjustments could be made more frequently and hence in smaller amounts. Some official interest has also focused on proposals to widen the band within which exchange rates would be permitted to fluctuate around parities, and to provide mechanisms, like the so-called crawling peg or sliding parity, that would make movements in parity more gradual than they have been in the past.

Wider Bands

Interest in proposals for wider bands has concentrated on the possible effects of a modest widening—perhaps changing the present maximum range of 1 percent on each side of parity to permit a range of 2 percent. In itself this would do little to improve the adjustment mechanism. What it might do is to help insulate domestic money markets from movements of interest-sensitive short-term funds and reduce the largely one-sided speculative options that occur under the present system. However, a modest widening of the band can have no substantial effect in reducing troublesome flows

of short-term money unless abrupt changes in parities are considered unlikely. If people commonly believe that the equilibrium exchange rate falls well outside the band, the broader band in itself can do little to discourage movements of short-term funds.

For a number of reasons, widening of the present bands cannot wholly guard against international imbalances sufficiently severe to throw established parities into question. As already pointed out, countries do not attach equal weight to the different objectives of economic policy. Some nations are more tolerant of inflation—or of increases in unemployment—than others. Governments also differ in their ability to influence the trend of costs and prices effectively. And, even if general price trends were identical in all countries, balance could be disturbed by changes in demand and supply patterns for internationally traded goods, or differing trends in government purchases and receipts. This situation has encouraged some to ask whether stability of the international monetary system would be improved if smaller and more frequent changes in parity were made in the hope of avoiding large discrete jumps.

Smoothly Moving Parities

A number of proposals have been made for smooth and gradual adjustments in parity of up to 2 or 3 percent per year. While these proposals for "crawling pegs" differ in technical detail, they present in common a number of the fundamental questions that figure in debates on this subject. One important issue turns on the degree of national discretion to be encouraged or permitted in altering exchange rates. Another question is whether smoothly moving parities would tie interest rates more closely to international developments and thus reduce the independence of domestic monetary policies. It is also feared that parity movements would weaken the external discipline on domestic policies. And there has been concern about whether these movements might complicate the conditions under which international business transactions take place.

The Degree of Discretion. The various proposals for slowly moving parities range from a completely permissive, discretionary authority to a completely automatic, mandatory system. A purely discretionary system might be no more successful than present arrangements in preventing fundamental imbalances that require abrupt changes in parity. Experience suggests that, left to their own discretion, individual countries might postpone parity changes until political or financial developments made them imperative. On the other hand, a fully automatic system might be unacceptable to nations that regard control over their exchange rate as an established prerogative of national sovereignty.

A possible compromise may lie between complete discretion and binding rules. One solution might be to develop presumptive rules that, with a degree of multilateral surveillance, would guide countries in making appropriate adjustments in parities.

The objective criteria most frequently recommended for incorporation into such presumptive rules are based on the behavior of spot and forward exchange rates, and on the changes in reserve levels, defined in various ways—for example, to include or not include short-term funds held by commercial banks. Typical proposals have urged that desirable parity changes be indicated by a moving average of past spot rates or by reserve movements. An advantage of including some measure of reserve movements in the criteria is that rules on direct official intervention in the spot or forward market might then be unnecessary. (If exchange rates were the only criterion, such rules might be deemed necessary, since exchange rates can be influenced by official intervention.) Much technical work remains to be done, however, before satisfactory criteria for parity changes can be established.

A number of other questions about the most desirable form of a moving parity system also require further study. For instance, how general would participation in the system need to be? As an initial step, should one or a few countries be encouraged to experiment with greater flexibility? Would slowly moving parities work best if they were accompanied by a widening of the band around parity? What special problems might arise for regional economic groupings?

In addition to these technical points, questions have been asked about the fundamental value of any form of slowly moving parities or widening of the band in improving the operation of the international monetary system. A full discussion of all of these issues would go beyond the scope of this chapter, but five of the most commonly raised questions about the desirability of greater exchange rate flexibility will be considered briefly. These ask what effects a greater flexibility in exchange rates would have on monetary independence; whether internal discipline would suffer; what provision would be made for forward cover on exchange transactions; whether small but frequent exchange rate adjustments would actually be effective; and what the implications of greater exchange-rate flexibility would be for the U.S. dollar.

Monetary Independence. One criticism of smoothly moving parities has been that they would bind monetary policy too closely to international conditions. If, for example, it was generally believed that a country's parity would move downward at the maximum permitted annual rate—say, 2 percent—for an extended time and that its spot rate would move down accordingly, there would be an incentive for capital to move out of the country unless domestic interest rates were 2-percent higher than foreign rates.

This criticism assumes that movements in the spot rate are predictable. Under certain conditions they might be. If sliding parities were used in an attempt to overcome an already existing and sizable disequilibrium, the direction of future movements in the exchange rate would be clear. This, however, is a purpose for which sliding parities are not particularly well suited. Alternatively, movement of the spot rate might be predictable if the equilibrium rate were gradually rising or falling over time. If a downward

crawl in the exchange rate resulted from a more rapid rate of inflation in one country than in others, that country's domestic capital markets would tend to reflect these inflationary pressures, and the higher interest rates could exist for domestic reasons. The need to have higher interest rates because of the crawling peg might not, therefore, represent a restraint on domestic policy. Similarly, in countries with less inflation, there would be a tendency for interest rates to be lower whether there was a crawling peg or not.

Different rates of inflation are not, of course, the only forces that would cause a crawling peg to move. If the par value of a country's currency were too high for other reasons, a predictable one-way downward crawl might raise complications, with international capital flows impelling the monetary authorities to keep interest rates above the level that they consider desirable for domestic reasons, perhaps over fairly long periods. In any event, the important comparison lies between the policy restraint that might result from the crawl and the policy restraint that now occurs when an exchange rate is generally considered out of line, and when capital flows may consequently be stimulated by the expectation of a large discrete adjustment in the exchange rate. Because such adjustments offer the prospect of immediate sizable gains, the expectation that they will occur has often been an important motive behind short-term capital flows.

Furthermore, the initial capital flows in response to expected movements in the exchange rate will greatly overstate the magnitude of continuing flows. Once financial positions adjust to these changed incentives, capital movements would probably become much smaller, and the cessation of the crawl in due course would eliminate the incentives. Finally, the reversible nature of most liquid capital movements means that problems arising from short-term capital flows under a sliding parity could to some extent be dealt with by official financing instead of adjustments in interest rates.

Domestic Discipline. Another concern about slowly moving parities centers on whether they would reduce the disciplinary effects that reserve losses may have on nations needing to deal with domestic inflation. Since upward movements in the par value would have no such effects, it has been suggested that greater flexibility be allowed only in moving exchange rates upward. Indeed, an upward movement of the exchange rate would reduce inflationary pressures and facilitate the maintenance of domestic price stability in countries having a surplus. For countries with deficits, the validity of the discipline argument is difficult to assess in general terms. The response of countries to reserve losses varies considerably. Most countries have been reluctant to devalue. Some have adopted more restrained domestic policies as well as imposing restrictions on international transactions. The problems that might be caused by permitting a downward crawl therefore do not lend themselves to easy generalization.

The Provision of Forward Cover. A third question has to do with the operation of the forward market when there is greater flexibility in exchange rates. A change in the international financial system that, whatever its

merits, aroused even more uncertainty about exchange rates, might have an adverse effect on trade and investment. On the other hand, to the extent that greater flexibility in the exchange rate promoted better adjustment and that speculative expectations became more stabilized, demands by international traders to cover their exchange risk in the forward market might actually fluctuate less than they do at present. Moreover, as the chances of an abrupt and large adjustment in the exchange rate are reduced, the consequences of being caught without forward cover become correspondingly less serious.

The Effectiveness of Small Changes in Parity. Another question is whether small but frequent changes in parity would be an effective means of promoting adjustments, since the evidence suggests that it takes time for trade to respond fully to a change in exchange rates; that is, elasticities in international trade are generally higher in the long run than in the short run. This lag is, of course, more relevant in situations where small changes in the exchange rate are used to correct already existing imbalances than where such changes are used to prevent a disequilibrium from developing. That being so, small but frequent adjustments of parity would probably be more useful in maintaining approximate equilibrium than in restoring a balance after a substantial disequilibrium has been allowed to develop.

The U.S. Position. Because of the central role of the U.S. dollar in the international monetary system, the United States cannot move its own parity with respect to other currencies. This implies that the United States would be particularly concerned with the direction in which other countries were moving their parities. A bias in one direction or the other could lead to an overvaluation or undervaluation of the dollar. Historically, devaluations of currencies with respect to the dollar have been more frequent and on average larger than revaluations. While to some extent this may reflect greater price stability in the United States than in many foreign countries, the danger of systematic overvaluation as a result of greater flexibility should be guarded against. This could be done by appropriate specification of the presumptive rules mentioned earlier.

THE DOLLAR AND INTERNATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM

The United States has the world's largest economy, and its exports and imports are larger than those of any other nation. These facts alone would make economic developments and policy here a matter of great concern to the world economy. A further point, however, is that the dollar has become the principal international currency. Much of the world's trade is denominated in dollars, and throughout the world dollars are widely held as reserves and as working balances to accommodate trade and investment.

Because the dollar plays a central role in the international monetary system, the United States is more constrained in its adjustment policies than other countries. Since the United States does not have primary control over any market exchange rate, other nations in effect determine the exchange value of the dollar. It is generally recognized that exchange rates are a matter of international concern, and the United States is consulted through the IMF and other organizations regarding the appropriateness of exchange rate adjustments. Yet the United States clearly exercises only indirect influence over the exchange value of its currency, in contrast to the more direct control exercised by other countries.

The central position of the dollar in the international system was not the result of any conscious decision or strategy on the part of the U.S. Government. It was the natural consequence of the size, strength, and stability of the U.S. economy, traits which were especially evident during the early years after the Second World War. This central role provides benefits for the United States, but it also entails problems and responsibilities.

For some years now, concern over the state of the U.S. balance of payments has been evident. The discussions of a dollar shortage in the 1950's have given way to discussions of the U.S. payments deficits. Nevertheless, in this same interval the predominant change in the exchange parities of other currencies has been downward (not upward) in relation to the dollar. There have been only three upward changes in the past decade—the revaluations of the German mark by 5 percent in 1961 and 9.3 percent in 1969, and the revaluation of the Dutch guilder by 5 percent in 1961.

In part—perhaps in large part—this paradox can be attributed to the fact that international liquidity needed to grow, and a large part of this growth has been through official accumulation of dollars. To be sure, not every payments imbalance is an indication of a low overall level of liquidity. But when many countries simultaneously begin to feel that their balance-of-payments positions are too weak, it is evident that there is a general shortage of liquidity. It was precisely to eliminate this shortage and the resultant danger of a destructive competition for reserves that the Special Drawing Rights were instituted. The introduction of SDR's should moderate the general tendency to consider that official reserves are too low.

It is also important to the United States and to the international community that the international adjustment mechanism be strengthened. Failure to achieve this could have serious consequences. New strains on the world monetary system could develop unless our payments position assures foreign monetary authorities and private traders that the dollar will remain strong. The present situation, in which we maintain an official settlements surplus only because of large-scale foreign borrowing by U.S. corporations and banks at high interest rates, creates a feeling of some uneasiness here and abroad, and observers generally regard the present structure of the U.S. international accounts as abnormal and temporary.

Whatever the United States does is felt in other countries. We, therefore, have every reason to consider the effects that our economic policies will have on them. Continuing prosperity and economic stability abroad depends in part on stable growth in the United States. Because of our size, other countries feel the influence of inflationary or deflationary pressures originat-

ing in this country. If U.S. inflation were to continue at its recent levels, some countries might face the painful necessity of choosing between the inflationary consequences of a large export surplus or an upward adjustment of their exchange rates. For international as well as domestic reasons, it is most important that the United States restore internal balance and achieve sustainable, noninflationary growth. This responsibility, along with reasonably free access to U.S. markets, constitutes our predominant obligation toward international economic well-being.

Appendix A UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE ECONOMY

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Unemployment and the Economy

The unemployment rate occupies a prominent place in the array of economic statistics that indicate the overall state of the economy. This central position is to a large extent attributable to the fact that it serves as a broad but direct index of the extent to which the mandate of the Federal Government embodied in the Employment Act of 1946 is being fulfilled.

Much of the attention the unemployment rate receives, however, is a result of its role as an indicator of economic waste and public welfare. As a Nation we are highly and properly sensitive to the problem, of the person seeking employment and unable to find a job. We need to know as much as possible about the numbers and characteristics of the unemployed, and the reasons they are not working, so that the most effective remedies can be devised. In the management of economic policy it is essential to see this complex picture clearly in order to formulate a judgment about the relative emphasis to be placed on general measures to enlarge employment opportunities and on other special-purpose programs to deal with more specific manpower problems. This appendix examines information bearing on the character and composition of unemployment in our recent experience.

UNEMPLOYMENT STATISTICS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION

Unemployment is usually accompanied by an interruption or decline in the income flow that often represents the principal source of livelihood for a family or individual. Unemployment can, therefore, cause substantial hardship, particularly if it occurs for the family breadwinner and if it persists for a considerable period of time. The implications of unemployment and loss of income for economic well-being and morale provide ample justification for public concern about unemployment and for government policies to reduce its incidence and to cushion its impact when it occurs.

While these social implications of unemployment are widely recognized, and appropriately given great emphasis, some other facets of unemployment in the economy and the interpretation of the unemployment rate have received much less recognition and discussion.

The unemployment rate is sometimes viewed as an indicator of wasted resources in the economy. In its simplest formulation this view often rests on the notion that labor services lost through involuntary unemployment are irretrievably lost, and that the loss serves no economic purpose. It can legitimately be argued that the loss in labor services is not restricted to the period of idleness if unemployment is accompanied by loss of income

that results in a decline in the health and well-being of workers. In addition, loss of proficiency in skills and loss of motivation and morale accompanying idleness may further increase the waste of human resources that involuntary unemployment entails. Nevertheless this view of unemployment as an important source of waste is applicable to only a part of actual unemployment and that portion declines as lower unemployment rates are achieved.

The level of the unemployment rate and the numbers of unemployed persons in various subcategories are often taken to indicate the narrow segment on which the incidence of slack in the economy falls—the unemployed. The cost to society of unemployment is then viewed as the earnings loss implied for those experiencing unemployment. Viewed in the context of aggregate economic policy, the cost of economic conditions or policies that result in increased unemployment thus appears to be concentrated on those in the fraction of the labor force reported as unemployed. While these costs are borne disproportionately by some groups, the portion of the work force experiencing unemployment over a period of time is much larger than the unemployment rate suggests. Moreover, involuntary part-time employment, other forms of underemployment, and nonparticipation in the labor force as a result of poor prospects for obtaining employment are not reflected in the unemployment rate. Some unemployment is a byproduct of labor market adjustments such as entry into the labor force, seasonal variation in manpower requirements, and changes in the composition of demand. Although its origins may be inherent in the operation of a free labor market, even under conditions of high demand, such unemployment may cause serious problems for some workers.

Recent unemployment rates have been low compared to our historical experience since World War II. The interim goal of a 4-percent average annual unemployment rate, set out in the early sixties, has been surpassed for 4 years (1966–69), and in this period the unemployment rate was at its lowest level since the Korean conflict in the early fifties. The primary policy emphasis has now shifted from one of reducing slack in the economy and further decreasing unemployment to one of monetary and fiscal restraint to contain the forces of inflation. Thus an examination of the character and composition of unemployment in our recent experience will indicate the dimensions of the labor market adjustment process under high employment conditions.

UNEMPLOYMENT AND LABOR MOBILITY

The American economy has been characterized by growth and technological change. This has been accompanied by a shifting pattern of output and resource use. A highly mobile labor force has facilitated the adjustment processes necessary to accommodate rapid and continued change. New employment opportunities constantly open up providing more productive and higher paying jobs than in other sectors of the economy. Increasing productivity and rising wages have resulted from this continuing

reallocation of labor to more productive employment as well as from improvement in workers' skill levels and an increasing supply of more productive capital inputs.

Many workers are able to change jobs without an intervening period of unemployment, and many of those leaving school or reentering the labor force have jobs lined up in advance. But obtaining new employment often involves time and effort in search of the most suitable and productive opportunities consistent with workers' skills and preferences. Time spent in search of the most suitable employment in a generally active labor market can be regarded as a constructive activity on the part of some workers. In those cases it should not be regarded as a waste of resources, just as time spent in schooling, skill training, or other activities to upgrade earning power are not regarded as economic waste. There is a cost to the worker and to the economy of such "frictional" unemployment, but improvements in job status, earnings, working conditions, and job satisfaction are offsetting benefits.

Ways should be sought to reduce this cost, without losing the attendant benefits. For example, information plays a crucial role in the process of satisfactorily matching workers with jobs. Providing job information may be a worthwhile social investment, decreasing the time and effort workers must typically spend in search of suitable employment and improving labor utilization. The Department of Labor has long played a leading role in gathering and disseminating job market information, and this Administration is accelerating the development and introduction of systems such as the Job Bank and experiments in computerized matching of workers with jobs.

Many job changes with accompanying periods of unemployment are a result of voluntary turnover, workers leaving their previous employment in search of more favorable alternatives. In 1969, 15 percent of the unemployed voluntarily left their last job (Table A-1). In addition, many of those unemployed were entering or reentering the labor force—49 percent in 1969. These workers who entered or reentered the labor force are actively using this time in an effort to find suitable jobs. Unemployment for workers in these categories often is not strictly involuntary. For many of them it can be described more properly as time voluntarily devoted to obtaining productive employment, improved job status, or more suitable and perhaps higher paid employment.

TABLE A-1.—Unemployed persons by reason for unemployment, 1969

Reason	Number (thousands)	Percentage distribution
Total unemployment.	2, 831	100
Lost last job	1, 017 436 965 413	36 15 34 15


Note.—Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

The rapid pace of technological change contributing to rising living standards leads to changes in the pattern of labor use that often require some involuntary job changes. In addition, the seasonal nature of some work, secondary effects of work stoppages, and temporary adjustments in production and inventories result in involuntary loss of employment. In 1969, 36 percent of those unemployed left their last job involuntarily. Most were unemployed for only a short time. One out of two were unemployed less than 5 weeks as compared to slightly over 4 weeks for those who became unemployed for reasons other than job loss.

The nature of the job search required to obtain suitable employment for those workers experiencing unemployment is indicated by the amount of time the typical unemployed worker spends in search of employment. In 1969, the median duration of unemployment was less than 4.5 weeks (Chart A-1). The search period required for the typical unemployed worker to obtain employment varies with the level of the unemployment rate. Since 1965, it has been less than 5 weeks. Thus the predominant share of those unemployed spend a relatively short time in search of suitable jobs. Some workers experiencing frequent short periods of unemployment are, nevertheless, seriously affected by unemployment that is typically of short duration.

Unemployment Rate and Duration



Many workers, of course, enter or leave the labor force without suffering any unemployment. In 1968, for example, over 90 million persons worked at some time during the year. (Data for 1969 are not yet available.) Slightly over 10 million of those who worked were unemployed at some time during the year. Hence over 80 million persons worked in 1968 and experienced no unemployment even though the average number employed was less than 76 million. Viewed in a slightly different manner, over 32 million persons worked less than 50 weeks in 1968. But less than 9 million (27 percent) of these part-year workers experienced some unemployment. The rest of those who worked less than a full year entered or voluntarily left the labor force during the year. In addition, many workers who worked a full year changed jobs without experiencing any intervening unemployment. In manufacturing alone, a sector accounting for over 25 percent of average employment in 1968, Bureau of Labor Statistics data indicate that almost 11 million job changes and new hires occurred-a number almost equal to the total number of persons experiencing unemployment throughout the entire economy in that year. These data illustrate the amount of flux in the labor force. They also indicate that changing jobs and obtaining employment typically require far less search time than is indicated by the median duration of unemployment, since those statistics refer only to workers experiencing unemployment.

THE DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT

An increase in the unemployment rate obviously results in additional persons experiencing unemployment. It is less generally recognized that part of the increase in the unemployment rate is attributable to a lengthening in the time that workers must typically spend in search of suitable employment. More people are unemployed because of layoffs and an inability to find other employment immediately. Others who enter the labor force or who left previous employment are more likely than before to go through a period of job search instead of finding suitable employment immediately. Since the increase in the period of time typically required to find work is reflected in the reported unemployment rate, the number of additional people experiencing unemployment over a period of time is proportionately less than the increase in the number reported as unemployed at any given time.

An increase of 1 percentage point in the unemployment rate would, on the basis of past experience, be expected to result in an increase of about 1.4 weeks in the median time required for those becoming unemployed to obtain jobs. Thus, from the point of view of both the larger number of workers experiencing unemployment and the longer average duration of unemployment, higher unemployment rates increase the costs that must be incurred to find suitable jobs by those entering the labor force or changing employment.

Workers most seriously affected by unemployment and increases in the unemployment rate are the long-term unemployed. In 1968, for example, over 900,000 workers experienced more than 6 months of unemployment

during the year, more than half of them having more than one interval of unemployment. Yet the number unemployed more than 6 months at any given time averaged about 156,000. Thus even this group of long-term unemployed is subject to substantial turnover.

For the long-term unemployed, searching for suitable employment is extremely costly, and the consequences for family income when the principal earner is unemployed for a long period are likely to be severe. Many of these workers undoubtedly have handicaps impairing their ability to get and hold jobs. Manpower training programs to improve their employability or special programs to give them access to job opportunities are required. Fortunately, their numbers are relatively small. There were 133,000 reported as unemployed for 6 months or more in 1969 monthly statistics; 42,000 of these were married males with wives present. Although they represent a small group in a labor force of over 80 million, the costs unemployment imposes on them justify strong manpower policies to improve their employment prospects and further reduce the number in this group.

UNEMPLOYMENT AMONG DIFFERENT GROUPS

Unemployment rates differ markedly among classes of workers and population groups. They are particularly high for teenagers, and relatively high for women and for Negro and other races (Tables A-2 and A-3).

TABLE A-2.—Unemployment by age, sex, and race, 1969

Age, sex, and race	Number	Percentage	Rate
	(thousands)	distribution	(percent) 1
Total unemployment	2, 831	100	3, 5
Teenagers 16–19 years of age	853	30	12, 2
Males	441	16	11, 4
White	343	12	10, 1
Negro and other races	97	3	21, 3
Females	412	15	13. 3
	317	11	11. 5
	95	3	27. 7
Adults 20–44 years of age	1, 370	48	3. 2
Males	630	22	2. 4
White	509	18	2. 1
Negro and other races	122	4	4. 2
Females	740	26	4.7
White	571	20	4.2
Negro and other races	168	6	7.2
Adults 45 years of age and over	608	21	2, 0
Males	332	12	1. 7
White	285	10	1. 6
Negro and other races	47	2	2. 8
Females	276	10	2. 4
	235	8	2. 3
	41	1	3. 3

¹ Number of unemployed in each group as percent of labor force in that group.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Note.—Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.

Table A-3.—Selected measures of unemployment, 1969

Measure	Number (thousands)	Rate (percent)
Total unemployment	2, 831	3. 9
Race: White	2, 261 570	3. 1 6. 4
Selected type of worker: Blue collar. White collar.	1, 154 780	3. 9 2.
Sex: Male	1, 403 1, 428	2.1 4.1
Marital status: Male: Married Other	582 821	1. ¹ . ⁷ .
Female: MarriedOther	689 739	3.9 5.

Note.—Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Teenagers and Young People

Almost 40 percent of the unemployed in 1969 were persons 16–21, although this age group comprised only 13 percent of the labor force. The unemployment rate for persons 16–21 years of age was 10.4 percent in 1969, while that for persons 22 years of age and over was 2.4 percent. Since the overall unemployment rate was 3.5 percent, the high rates for persons 16–21 years of age contributed 1.1 percentage points to the overall rate. But the high unemployment rates of young workers give a misleading impression of the incidence of unemployment among teenagers as a group as well as of their welfare implications.

The pattern of activities of persons in the 16–21 age class differs markedly from that for older persons. The primary activity of nearly half (45.5 percent in 1969) of the persons in the civilian population age 16–21 years old is schooling. Although their unemployment rate was 10.4 percent, only 3.9 percent of all the persons in this age class were both unemployed and not attending school.

Examining only annual averages obscures the large seasonal variation in the labor force and employment that occurs in this age class. During the school year (October 1968–May 1969) 58.9 percent were attending school (Table A-4). The percentage in school dropped to 6.5 percent in the summer months (July and August 1969) and the unemployment rate of the 16–21 year age group increased from 9.8 to 10.1 percent. The percent of those in this age class who were unemployed and not in school increased from 2.7 to 6.5 percent. The number in the labor force, however, increased by more than one-third. This short-term increase for the summer months occurs for a period averaging about 3 months or less.

Table A-4.—Distribution of activities of persons 16-21 years of age, 1968-69

Activity	1969 annual average	School year, October 1968- May 1969	Summer months, July and August 1969
Percentage distribution of civilian noninstitutional population 16-21 years of age, total	100. 0	100. 0	100. 0
Major activity, going to school: In civilian labor force:			
EmployedUnemployed	13. 0 1. 7	17. 3 2. 1	1. <u>2</u> . 2
Not in labor force	30, 8	39. 6	5. 0
Major activity, other: In civilian labor force:			
EmployedUnemployed	35. 5 3. 9	27. 2 2. 7	58. 2 6. 5
Not in labor force	15. 1	11.1	28. 9
Unemployment rate, persons 16–21 years of age (percent): In school Not in school	11. 7 9. 9	10. 7 9. 2	15. 3 10. 0

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

During the school year 2.1 percent of those in the 16–21 year age class were in school and unemployed. During most of the school year over 90 percent of those unemployed and in school were interested in only part-time work. In the summer months about 25 percent were looking for part-time work. Even in the large short-term bulge in the labor force occurring in the summer months only 4.8 percent of the population in this age class was unemployed, not in school, and looking for full-time work.

Unemployment rates, particularly in the summer months and for Negro and other nonwhite races, are comparatively high for persons in the 16–21 year age class (Table A–5). This is in part a result of the large seasonal change in the labor force that occurs in the summer months. For this age class entry and reentry into the labor force are also much more prevalent than for older workers. This is a period in which a large share of the transition between schooling and attachment to the work force is accomplished.

Persons in this age class are particularly vulnerable to unemployment because many are seeking their first job. Moreover, many of the early school-leavers enter the labor force without skills or qualifications that are easily recognizable by employers. Many are inexperienced at searching for work and often change jobs frequently to explore different types of employment. The large share of those in this age class that are usually searching for employment, their inexperience in job search, and the relative lack of information both on the part of employers and job seekers are all factors contributing to the high unemployment rates they experience. Lack of family and other commitments also often makes their attachment to work and to any given job more casual than that for older workers.

Devid on and an	Percent of noninstitutional population 16–21 years of age			Unemployment rate (percent), persons 16–21 years of age	
Period, sex, and race	In	Unemployed			Not in
	school	In school	Not in school	In school	school
School year, October 1968-May 1969:					
Males: White Negro and other races	67. 8 59. 2	2. 5 3. 5	2. 2 5. 0	9.7 22.2	7. 7 14. 4
Females: White Negro and other races	52.9 47.5	1. 4 2. 2	2. 4 6. 0	9. 4 25. 2	8. 0 19. 7
Summer months, July and August 1969:		•			
Males: White Negro and other races	6. 2 6. 6	.²	5. 9 12. 7	11. 6 9. 1	7.9 17.6
Females: White Negro and other races	6. 3 8. 6	.2	5, 5 10, 4	19.3 27.3	9. 6 21, 1

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

The earning capability of many workers in this age class is low relative to that for older, more experienced workers. A large fraction is also interested in only part-time work, and part-time jobs typically pay lower wages than full-time, long-term job commitments. Higher minimum wage levels and expanding coverage requirements may, therefore, be significant factors influencing recent high unemployment rates for persons in this age class.

The welfare and income implications of unemployment among young persons are somewhat less serious than for other groups such as adult married men. Many of these young persons are part of larger family units. The contribution of working teenagers to average family income in 1966 was about 10 percent. More than three-quarters of those who worked earned less than \$1,000. Moreover, many unemployed teenagers are from families that are relatively well-to-do. Over 30 percent of unemployed teenagers were in families with annual incomes of more than \$10,000; about the same fraction were in families with incomes of less than \$5,000.

Women

Unemployment rates for women are also relatively high. In 1969, the unemployment rate for females was 4.7 percent compared to 2.8 percent for males. Nearly half of unemployed women were married with husbands present. In a large fraction of these families the husband was undoubtedly employed, and employment for the wife would represent a secondary source of income. Among the 739,000 unemployed females not married or whose husbands are not present, many are young persons with the special reasons for high unemployment already discussed. Since there were 412,000 unemployed female teenagers in 1969, they account for a

large fraction of the unemployed females who were not married or whose husbands were not present.

Negro and Other Races

Unemployment rates for Negroes and other minority races are roughly double those for whites, a pattern that has prevailed since the late fifties. The higher unemployment rate for Negro and other races reflects in part their different labor force composition. Standardizing for age and sex differences in the labor force decreases the unemployment rates for Negro and other races from 6.4 to 6.0 percent, but the adjusted rate is still almost double that for whites (3.1 percent). Standardizing for years of schooling, industry, occupation, and the like would further decrease the relative unemployment rate of Negro and other races. But the need for adjustments of this sort simply reflects an historical pattern of discrimination and disadvantage that more recent policies to improve employment qualifications and opportunities have only begun to ameliorate.

An additional 290,000 jobs for unemployed Negroes and members of other races in 1969 would have made their unemployment rate equal to that of whites. This is about 20 percent of the annual increase in average employment in each of the last 5 years. Focusing on the additional jobs required for members of Negro and other races to bring their unemployment rate down to the level for whites, however, gives a misleading impression of the nature of the problem. The problem is not that 290,000 additional members of Negro and other races are totally unable to obtain employment. In 1969, for example, 29,000 persons of Negro and other races were reported as unemployed for 6 months or more in a typical month. The fraction of those unemployed who were unemployed for 6 months or more was slightly higher for Negro and other races than for whites-5.1 compared to 4.6 percent. Bringing the unemployment rate for Negro and other races down to the level prevailing for whites requires long-term policies designed to improve the distribution of education, skill levels, occupational and industrial affiliation, and job opportunities.

Appendix B

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS DURING 1969

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

Council of Economic Advisers, Washington, D.C., December 31, 1969.

THE PRESIDENT:

SIR: The Council of Economic Advisers submits this report on its activities during the calendar year 1969 in accordance with the requirements of the Congress, as set forth in Section 4(d) of the Employment Act of 1946.

Respectfully,

Paul W. McCracken, Chairman. Hendrik S. Houthakker. Herbert Stein.

Report to the President on the Activities of the Council of Economic Advisers During 1969

In 1969, for the third time in its history, the Council of Economic Advisers was entirely reconstituted as the result of a change of Administration. Paul W. McCracken took office as Chairman of the Council on February 4, 1969, replacing Arthur M. Okun, who became a Senior Research Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. Mr. McCracken, who had previously served as a Council Member for 2 years during 1957 and 1958, is on leave of absence from the University of Michigan where he is Edmund Ezra Day University Professor of Business Administration.

Herbert Stein and Hendrik S. Houthakker also became Members on February 4, 1969. They succeeded Merton J. Peck, of Yale University, and Warren L. Smith, of the University of Michigan. Mr. Houthakker is on leave of absence from Harvard University where he is Professor of Economics. Mr. Stein is on leave from his post as Senior Research Fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Below is a list of all past Council Members and their dates of service:

Name	Position	Oath of office date	Separation date
Edwin G. Nourse	Chairman	August 9, 1946	November 1, 1949.
Leon H. Keyserling	Vice Chairman	August 9, 1946	
,	Acting Chairman	November 2, 1949	
	Acting Chairman Chairman	May 10, 1950	January 20, 1953.
John D, Clark	Membar	August 9, 1946	20
	Vice Chairman	May 10, 1950	February 11, 1953.
Roy Blough	Member	June 29, 1950	August 20, 1952,
Roy Blough	Member	September 8, 1952	January 20, 1953.
Arthur F. Burns	Chairman	March 19 1953	December 1 1956
Neil H. Jacoby	Member	September 15, 1953	February 9, 1955.
Walter W. Stewart	Member	December 2, 1953	April 29, 1955.
Raymond J. Saulnier	Member	April 4, 1955	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
,	Chairman	December 3, 1956	January 20, 1961.
loseph S. Davis	Member	May 2, 1955	October 31, 1958,
Paul W. McCracken	Member	December 3, 1956	January 31, 1959.
Karl Brandt	Member	November 1, 1958	January 20, 1961.
Henry C. Wallich	Member	May 7, 1959	January 20, 1961.
lamés Tobin	Member	January 29, 1961	July 31, 1962,
Kermit Gordon	Member	January 29, 1961	December 27, 1962.
Walter W. Heller	Chairman	January 29, 1961	November 15, 1964.
Gardner Ackley		August 3, 1962	
,	Chairman		February 15, 1968.
John P. Lewis	Member	May 17, 1963	August 31, 1964.
Otto Eckstein.	Member	September 2 1964	February 1, 1966.
Arthur M. Okun			
	Chairman	Feburary 15, 1968	January 20 1969.
James S, Duesenberry	Member		
Merton J. Peck.			
Warren L. Smith	Member		January 20, 1969.

ECONOMIC POLICYMAKING AND THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COUNCIL

The Employment Act of 1946 describes explicitly the objectives of economic policy as "creating and maintaining, in a manner calculated to foster and promote free competitive enterprise and the general welfare, conditions under which there will be afforded useful employment opportunities, including self-employment, for those able, willing, and seeking to work, and to promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power." The foremost duty of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) is to give the President advice, based on economic analysis, which will assist him in assuring that this responsibility of the Federal Government is met.

A variety of analytical techniques is used, ranging from economic models incorporating complex equation systems to the careful judgment and appraisal that must finally temper the answers from formal systems. Statistical analyses of many aspects of economic conditions and stabilization policies are a continuing part of Council work. Final output of this analysis is reflected in personal consultations with the President and in memoranda from the Chairman of the Council to the President and others in the Administration.

Although the Employment Act of 1946 specifically directs the Council "to appraise the various programs and activities of the Federal Government," this function of the Agency is less familiar to the general public because it is largely internal. The Council works with other agencies to assist the Administration in formulating proposals for new programs and policies and in reappraising existing ones. It also recommends positions on bills proposed in Congress. Since January 20 the Council has made formal recommendations on 190 bills that have been either in the early stages of consideration by the Administration or the Congress or have come to the President's desk to be signed or vetoed. The Council brings to its appraisal the analytical methods of economics, and it seeks to take the viewpoint of the public at large, or the economy as a whole.

During 1969, the Council participated in formulating a number of new Administration programs, including programs for manpower training, transportation, social security, unemployment compensation, welfare, and agriculture. In each case, following background analysis by the staff, the Council's position was defined in memoranda to the President. The CEA also played a role in drafting some proposed legislation.

Analysis by the Council and its staff also helped reexamine a number of existing Federal Government programs, policies, and procedures. Among these was the CEA's participation in interagency efforts directed at such matters as interest rate ceilings on bank deposits, minority business enter-

prise, international monetary reform and trade policy, meat and oil imports, wheat exports, and a wide range of other programs and policies.

Much attention was devoted to the pressing problems in the construction and housing sectors of the economy during 1969. The Council played an active role in interagency groups dealing with lumber prices, housing prospects in the seventies, and the cutback in new contracts for direct Federal construction. The Council also participated in the Cabinet Committee on Construction appointed by the President, and the Chairman of the Council was directed by the President to serve as Chairman of this Committee. The Chairman of the Council also chaired a committee to study policies for handling the Government's uranium enrichment plants.

The CEA assists the President in the preparation of his *Economic Report* and also prepares its own *Annual Report*.

POLICY COORDINATION

The Council and its staff are in daily contact with other Government officials. There is especially close coordination among the Treasury, the Budget Bureau, and the CEA. At least weekly the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman of the Council meet. Known as the "Troika," this coordinating group has two other "tiers." The second tier consists of one of the other two Council Members, the Assistant Director of the Budget for Economic Policy, and the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Economic Policy. A third tier, consisting of senior staff economists from the three agencies, meets frequently to appraise the economic situation and its policy implications. Outlook memoranda are prepared and cleared through the second tier of the Troika for use by the principals. The Troika meets with the President frequently. From time to time the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System participates in these meetings also.

The new Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy, established by Executive Order of the President on January 24, 1969, serves as a major forum for broader policy discussion and coordination. Members include the President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of the Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and Housing and Urban Development, the Counselors to the President (Mr. Burns and Mr. Moynihan), the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (who coordinates the work of the Committee).

This Cabinet Committee considers the broad spectrum of economic program and policy issues. During 1969, the President appointed subcommittees to study such problems as post-Vietnam planning, agricultural trade, economic aspects of antitrust laws, legal ceilings on interest rates, Federal lending policies and procedures, establishment of a commission to review

Federal statistics, and the availability and prices of softwood lumber and plywood.

The Cabinet Committee on Construction was established by the President on September 4, 1969, in response to the growing problems in this industry. Its purpose is to study the impact of Federal activities on the industry and to appraise the Nation's needs for construction and housing and to devise ways to meet these needs. Formerly under the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy, the interagency Task Force on Requirements for the Housing Program became a part of this Cabinet Committee. Members of the Cabinet Committee on Construction are the Secretaries of Commerce, Labor, Housing and Urban Development, and Transportation, the Postmaster General, the Administrator of the General Services Administration, and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.

The Council participates in a variety of other activities of interagency concern. Reflecting this wider role, the Chairman of the Council serves as a member of the Rural Affairs Council, the Urban Affairs Council, and the National Defense Review Committee; he meets with the National Security Council and the Environmental Quality Council when agenda items make this relevant. The other two Council Members as well as senior staff economists also participate in the task forces and study groups designated by these councils. The Chairman of the Council regularly attends Cabinet meetings.

There is a particularly close association between the Council and the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) of the Congress, a Committee which was also created by the Employment Act of 1946 "to make a continuing study of matters relating to the Economic Report" and generally for the purposes of furthering the objectives of the Act. Each year, soon after the President has submitted his Economic Report to Congress, the Council testifies before the JEC, which itself is required by the Act to file a report to the Senate and House by March 1 of each year, presenting its findings on the recommendations and content of the Economic Report. Testimony may also be presented to the JEC at other times throughout the year. During 1969, the Council testified four times before the JEC. On February 17, the Council testified on the economic thinking of the new Administration. On April 30, the Chairman testified before the Subcommittee on Economic Statistics of the JEC in support of the decennial census. On June 12, the Chairman testified before the JEC's Subcommittee on Economy in Government on defense spending and national priorities in the years ahead. And on October 23, the Council reviewed economic conditions and the outlook with the Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy of the JEC.

Although Council testimony in the past has largely been limited to the Joint Economic Committee, three exceptions arose in 1969. On March 25, the Chairman testified before the Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-

rency with regard to interest rates and monetary policy. On May 20, the Chairman appeared with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget before the Committee on Ways and Means of the House on behalf of the Administration recommendations for extending the income tax surcharge. And on September 23, the Council testified before the Committee on Government Operations of the House of Representatives on a bill that sought to formalize the apparatus of wage-price guideposts.

At the international level, the Council Members and staff are active participants in meetings of the Economic Policy Commitee (EPC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The Chairman of the Council heads the U.S. delegation to the EPC. This Committee is part of the international machinery by which nations strive for better mutual understanding and coordination of their domestic economic policies. A Member and senior staff economists also participated in the subcommittees of the EPC on balance of payments and international financial problems (Working Party III), and Council staff have been active in OECD studies of the short-term outlook (Working Group on Short-Term Economic Prospects), of long-term economic growth (Working Party II), and of manpower policies pursued in the member countries (Manpower and Social Affairs Committee). In 1969, Council personnel attended seven of these international meetings.

PUBLICATIONS

The Council's Annual Report remains a major communication between the Council and citizens generally. About 54,000 copies of the January 1969 Economic Report have been distributed. The Council also prepares Economic Indicators, a monthly publication of the Joint Economic Committee. The current circulation of Economic Indicators is approximately 10,000.

PUBLIC CONTACTS

The Council arranged periodic meetings during the year with groups of leading academic, business, and labor union economists, in order to keep informed about their views on the major economic questions of the day. There is a constant stream of visitors to the Council from outside of Government, among them business and labor leaders, students, educators, foreign visitors, the press, and interested citizens generally. Informal interviews and discussions are also held on a wide range of economic policy problems and issues. Finally, to explain economic conditions and policies during the year, Council Members made a number of public speeches and granted interviews to newspapers and magazines.

ORGANIZATION AND STAFF OF THE COUNCIL

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Under authority of the Employment Act, as amended by Reorganization Plan No. 9 in 1953, the Chairman of the Council bears full responsibility for employing the Agency's staff, and he is officially charged with reporting the Council's views to the President.

OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS

The day-to-day direction of the professional staff is the general responsibility of the other two Council Members. While the Council has no departments, there is an informal division of responsibilities by subject area. Mr. Houthakker's responsibilities include economic analyses by the Council's staff in such areas as the balance of payments and international financial matters, trade policy, foreign aid and economic development, agriculture, transportation, industrial organization and antitrust, labor relations, long-term economic growth, consumer affairs, natural resources, technology, and environmental problems.

Mr. Stein's responsibilities include forecasting and analyses of economic conditions, fiscal policy and taxation, monetary policy and financial institutions, housing and urban affairs, welfare and social security problems, education, manpower and human resources, national defense matters, and post-Vietnam planning generally.

In addition to these responsibilities, Mr. Houthakker and Mr. Stein represent the Council in a wide variety of official capacities, including meetings of the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy and the Cabinet Committee on Construction. One of these two Members is always designated as Acting Chairman when the Chairman is absent from Washington.

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

At the end of 1969, the Council's senior professional staff included 16 economists and one statistician. Assisting the Chairman in carrying out his numerous official responsibilities is the Special Assistant to the Chairman, Albert H. Cox, Jr. Mr. Cox also handles press relations for the Council, acts as staff secretary for the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy, and performs professional duties, including work in his primary fields of specialty (financial markets and monetary conditions).

Senior Staff Economists William H. Branson, Murray F. Foss, and Frank C. Ripley work primarily on analyses and forecasting of economic conditions. Mr. Branson, who along with Mr. Foss represents the CEA in the third tier of the Troika (discussed earlier), also did extensive work during the year on the Administration's proposed welfare program and on the review of economic aspects of the defense program. Mr. Ripley's primary responsibility has been in the development and refinement of the Troika

forecasting models, the analysis of price-making forces, and other econometric studies.

Senior Staff Economist Phillip D. Cagan and Staff Economist Robert René de Cotret cover monetary policy and financial institutions and the influence of developments in this area on economic activity. Senior Staff Economist Charles E. McLure, Jr., has been concerned with matters of fiscal policy and public finance, including tax policy, problems of measuring the Federal budget, cost-benefit analyses of expenditure programs, social security, and economic and budgetary aspects of Federal credit programs.

The fields of human resource development and labor market analysis are assigned to Marvin H. Kosters and Michael H. Moskow, both Senior Staff Economists. Mr. Kosters and Mr. Moskow are primarily concerned with labor market conditions, manpower programs and problems, industrial relations, labor union developments, and wage trends and prospects.

Housing and construction problems, and the problems of small business and minority business enterprise are the primary focus of Sidney L. Jones, Senior Staff Economist. Mr. Jones also serves as the staff secretary for the Cabinet Committee on Construction. Staff Economist Irene Lurie works in the field of welfare and income maintenance and on other economic aspects of poverty problems.

Three Senior Staff Economists specialize in economic analysis of particular programs and activities of the Federal Government. During 1969, Thomas G. Moore participated in a wide variety of interagency studies, including those concerned with the uranium enrichment facilities of the Atomic Energy Commission, urban mass transit, the supersonic transport, pollution problems, domestic satellite communications, antitrust policy, airports and airways, economics of marine resources, electric power reliability, and international aviation policy. Studies relating to oil import quotas, tariff preferences for less developed countries, and foreign aid were among those to which Senior Staff Economist Edward J. Mitchell contributed. Senior Staff Economist Harold O. Carter is concerned with the economics of agriculture and the many aspects of agricultural and rural development programs and policies.

Saul Nelson has been the Senior Staff Economist concerned with price and commodity developments, and during the year he participated in various interagency studies in these fields. In October, Mr. Nelson was given a leave of absence to work on a project for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Analysis of international economic problems is carried forward by G. Paul Wonnacott and Thomas D. Willett, Senior Staff Economists. Mr. Wonnacott has been concerned with such areas as balance of payments and international financial developments, foreign trade policy, and problems concerning the interrelationships of domestic economies. In addition to participating in the coverage of these areas, Mr. Willett has been engaged in the study of longer range aspects of international financial policy.

Frances M. James, Senior Staff Statistician, is in charge of the Council's Statistical Office. Miss James has major responsibility for managing the Council's economic and statistical information system. She also supervises the preparation of *Economic Indicators* for publication, the preparation of tables and charts for a wide variety of meetings throughout the year and for the *Economic Report*, and the fact-checking of memoranda, speeches, and testimony.

Assisting the senior professional staff are four Junior Economists, Leslie J. Barr, Paul N. Courant, Robert A. Kelly, and Rosemary D. Marcuss. Barry M. Levenson and Timothy B. Sivia are research assistants. Assisting Miss James in the Statistical Office are Teresa D. Bradburn, Catherine H. Furlong, Christine L. Johnson, and V. Madge McMahon.

From time to time, leading members of the economics profession have acted as consultants to the Council in various capacities. At the end of 1969, the list of active consultants included Edward F. Denison (Brookings Institution), Marten S. Estey (University of Pennsylvania), Ray C. Fair (Princeton University), Milton Friedman (University of Chicago), Gottfried Haberler (Harvard University), Arnold Harberger (University of Chicago), David J. Ott (Clark University), George Stigler (University of Chicago), and Lloyd Ulman (University of California).

In 1969 the Council continued its student intern program. Under this program the Council employs a limited number of outstanding students in economics, both graduate and undergraduate, for various periods of time, particularly in the summer. Employed under this program in 1969 were Henry E. Cole, W. Donald Dresser, H. Diana Hicks, Neil J. McMullen, Paul B. Manchester, Richard C. Marston, Mary E. Procter, Daniel L. Rubenfeld, and Earl M. Unger. Mr. Dresser, Mr. McMullen, and Miss Procter also returned as consultants during preparation of this *Annual Report*.

SUPPORTING STAFF

The Council's Administrative Officer, James H. Ayres, has responsibility for office management, including general supervision of the secretaries and messengers, duplicating, and the Agency's budget. Mr. Ayres, who reports to the Special Assistant to the Chairman, is assisted by Nancy F. Skidmore, Elizabeth A. Zea, and Bettye T. Siegel.

The secretarial staff includes Daisy S. Babione, Mayme Burnett, Mary C. Fibich, Elizabeth F. Gray, Laura B. Hoffman, Bessie M. Lafakis, Patricia A. Lee, Betty Lu Lowry, Eleanor A. McStay, Joyce A. Pilkerton, Dorothy L. Reid, Earnestine Reid, and Linda A. Reilly. Margaret L. Snyder serves primarily as the Agency's contact for general public information. James W. Gatling, Judson A. Byrd, and A. Keith Miles operate the duplicating and messenger department.

In preparing its *Annual Report*, the Council relied upon the editorial skills of Rosannah C. Steinhoff.

DEPARTURES

Charles B. Warden, Jr., who had served as Special Assistant to the Chairman for more than 3 years, resigned to accept a position with Data Resources, Inc., Lexington, Mass.

The Council's professional staff is drawn primarily from universities, largely on a 1-year basis. Many, therefore, who had served the Council during 1969 were not on the staff at the end of the year. Senior Staff Economists who resigned during the year were Leonall C. Andersen, F. Gerard Adams, Barry P. Bosworth, Frederick W. Deming, Marten S. Estey, Lawrence B. Krause, James W. Kuhn, Roger G. Noll, David J. Ott, Jack Rosen, Courtenay M. Slater, Thomas T. Stout, and Luther T. Wallace. Junior economists who served the Council in 1969, but were not members of the staff at the end of the year, were Susan R. Ackerman and Roselee N. Roberts. Research assistants Elaine R. Goldstein and Joanne C. Turner also served for a part of the year. Secretarial resignations included Frances V. Broderick, Anne G. Donnelly, Gladys R. Durkin, Roberta R. Kirk, Helen H. Knox, Karen J. MacFarland, Lucille F. Saverino, and Joy T. Sindelar.

The Council of Economic Advisers suffered a great loss with the passing of David W. Lusher, June 15, 1969. Mr. Lusher, widely known in this country and abroad as a student of economic developments and policy, joined the staff of the Council in March 1952.

Appendix C

STATISTICAL TABLES RELATING TO INCOME, EMPLOYMENT, AND PRODUCTION

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General Notes

Detail in these tables will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding. Unless otherwise noted, all dollar figures are in current prices.

Symbols used:

- Preliminary.
- __ Not available (also, not applicable).
 * Amount insignificant in terms of the particular unit (e.g., less than \$50 million where unit is billions of dollars).

NATIONAL INCOME OR EXPENDITURE

Table C-1.—Gross national product or expenditure, 1929-69

[Billions of dollars]

		Per- sonal	Gross	Net	Govern	ment purc	hases of go	ods and s	ervices 1
Year or quarter	Total gross national	con- sump- tion	private do- mestic	exports of goods and			Federal		State
	product	expend- itures ¹	invest- ment ²	ices 3	Total	Total	National defense ⁵	Other	and local
929	103.1	77.2	16. 2	1.1	8, 5	1.3	1.	3	7. 2
930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 937 938	90. 4 75. 8 58. 0 55. 6 65. 1 72. 2 82. 5 90. 4 84. 7 90. 5	69. 9 60. 5 48. 6 45. 8 51. 3 55. 7 66. 5 63. 9 66. 8	10. 3 5. 6 1. 0 1. 4 3. 3 6. 4 8. 5 11. 8 6. 5 9. 3	1. 0 .5 .4 .4 .6 .1 .1 .3 1. 3	9. 2 9. 2 8. 1 8. 0 9. 8 10. 0 12. 0 11. 9 13. 0 13. 3	1. 4 1. 5 1. 5 2. 0 3. 0 2. 9 4. 7 5. 4 5. 1	1. 1. 1. 2. 3. 2. 4. 4. 5.	0 0 9 9 7	7.8 7.7 6.6 6.8 7.1 7.0 7.2 7.6 8.2
940	99. 7 124. 5 157. 9 191. 6 210. 1 211. 9 208. 5 231. 3 257. 6 256. 5	70. 8 80. 6 88. 5 99. 3 108. 3 119. 7 143. 4 160. 7 173. 6 176. 8	13. 1 17. 9 9. 8 5. 7 7. 1 10. 6 30. 6 34. 0 46. 0 35. 7	1. 7 1. 3 -2. 0 -1. 8 6 7. 5 11. 5 6. 4 6. 1	14. 0 24. 8 59. 6 88. 6 96. 5 82. 3 27. 0 25. 1 31. 6 37. 8	6. 0 16. 9 51. 9 81. 1 89. 0 74. 2 17. 2 12. 5 16. 5 20. 1	2. 2 13. 8 49. 4 79. 7 87. 4 73. 5 14. 7 9. 1 10. 7 13. 3	3. 8 3. 1 2. 5 1. 4 1. 6 7 2. 5 3. 5 6. 8	8. 0 7. 9 7. 7 7. 4 7. 5 8. 1 9. 8 12. 6 17. 7
950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 957	284.8 328.4 345.5 364.6 364.8 398.0 419.2 441.1	191. 0 206. 3 216. 7 230. 0 236. 5 254. 4 266. 7 281. 4 290. 1 311. 2	54. 1 59. 3 51. 9 52. 6 51. 7 67. 4 70. 0 67. 8 60. 9 75. 3	1.8 3.7 2.2 .4 1.8 2.0 4.0 5.7 2.2	37. 9 59. 1 74. 7 81. 6 74. 8 74. 2 78. 6 86. 1 94. 2 97. 0	18. 4 37. 7 51. 8 57. 0 47. 4 44. 1 45. 6 49. 5 53. 6	14. 1 33. 6 45. 9 48. 7 41. 2 38. 6 40. 3 44. 2 45. 9 46. 0	4. 3 4. 1 5. 9 8. 4 6. 2 5. 5 5. 3 7. 7 7. 6	19. 5 21. 5 22. 9 24. 6 27. 4 30. 1 33. 0 40. 6 43. 3
960	503. 7 520. 1 560. 3 590. 5 632. 4 684. 9 749. 9 793. 5 865. 7 932. 3	325. 2 335. 2 355. 1 375. 0 401. 2 432. 8 466. 3 492. 3 536. 6 576. 0	74. 8 71. 7 83. 0 87. 1 94. 0 108. 1 121. 4 116. 0 126. 3 139. 6	4. 0 5. 6 5. 1 5. 9 8. 9 5. 3 5. 2 2. 5	99. 6 107. 6 117. 1 122. 5 128. 7 137. 0 156. 8 180. 1 200. 3 214. 7	53. 5 57. 4 63. 4 64. 2 65. 2 66. 9 77. 8 90. 7 99. 5 102. 0	44. 9 47. 8 51. 6 50. 8 50. 0 50. 1 60. 7 72. 4 78. 0 79. 3	8.6 9.6 11.8 13.5 15.2 16.8 17.1 18.4 21.5 22.8	46. 1 50. 2 53. 7 58. 2 63. 5 70. 1 79. 0 89. 3 100. 7
				Seasonally	adjusted a	nnual rates			
1967; 	774, 2 783, 5 800, 4 816, 1	480. 9 489. 8 495. 7 502. 6	113.6 109.4 117.7 123.3	5. 4 5. 8 5. 6 3. 8	174, 2 178, 5 181, 3 186, 4	87. 8 90. 3 91. 3 93. 5	69. 9 71. 9 73. 0 74. 6	17.9 18.4 18.4 18.9	86. 4 88. 1 90. 0 92. 9
1968; 1		520. 6 530. 3 544. 9 550. 7	119. 4 126. 6 125. 2 133. 9	1. 9 3. 4 3. 6 1. 2	193. 4 198. 4 202. 5 206. 7	96. 3 99. 0 100. 9 101. 9	76. 1 77. 9 78. 8 79. 3	20. 1 21. 1 22. 1 22. 5	97. 1 99. 4 101. 7 104. 8
1969: 1 	908. 7 924. 8	562. 0 572. 8 579. 8 589. 2	135. 2 137. 4 143. 3 142. 4	1. 5 1. 6 2. 7 2. 6	210. 0 212. 9 217. 0 218. 9	101. 6 100. 6 103. 2 102. 7	79. 0 78. 5 80. 3 79. 2	22. 6 22. 1 22. 9 23. 5	108.5 112.3 113.8 116.2

¹ See Table C-10 for detailed components.
2 See Table C-11 for detailed components.
8 See Table C-6 for exports and imports separately.
Net of Government sales.

^{*} This category corresponds closely to the national defense classification in the "Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1971."

TABLE C-2.—Gross national product or expenditure, in 1958 prices, 1929-69
[Billions of dollars, 1958 prices]

		Pe	rsonal co expend	nsumptio litures	n			Gross p	rivate don	nestic inves	tment	
	Total							F	ixed inves	tment		
Year or quarter	gross na- tional prod-		Dura-	Non- dura-	Serv-				Nonreside	ntial		Change in busi-
	uct	Total	ble goods	ble goods	ices	Total	Total	Total	Struc- tures	Pro- ducers' durable equip- ment	Resi- dential struc- tures	ness- inven- tories
1929	203.6	139.6	16. 3	69. 3	54. 0	40.4	36. 9	26. 5	13.9	12, 6	10, 4	3, 5
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939	183. 5 169. 3 144. 2 141. 5 154. 3 169. 5 193. 0 203. 2 192. 9 209. 4	130. 4 126. 1 114. 8 112. 8 118. 1 125. 5 138. 4 143. 1 140. 2 148. 2	12.9 11.2 8.4 8.3 9.4 11.7 14.5 15.1 12.2 14.5	65. 9 65. 6 60. 4 58. 6 62. 5 65. 9 73. 4 76. 0 77. 1 81. 2	51. 5 49. 4 45. 9 46. 0 46. 1 47. 9 50. 5 50. 9 52. 0	27. 4 16. 8 4. 7 5. 3 9. 4 18. 0 24. 0 29. 9 17. 0 24. 7	28. 0 19. 2 10. 9 9. 7 12. 1 15. 6 20. 9 24. 5 19. 4 23. 5	21. 7 14. 1 8. 2 7. 6 9. 2 11. 5 15. 8 18. 8 13. 7 15. 3	11. 8 7. 5 4. 4 3. 3 3. 6 4. 0 5. 4 7. 1 5. 6 5. 9	9. 9 6. 6 3. 8 4. 3 5. 6 7. 5 10. 3 11. 8 8. 1 9. 4	6. 3 5. 1 2. 7 2. 1 2. 9 4. 0 5. 1 5. 6 5. 7 8. 2	6 -2. 4 -6. 2 -4. 7 2. 4 3. 1 5. 5 -2. 4
1940	227. 2 263. 7 297. 8 337. 1 361. 3 355. 2 312. 6 309. 9	155, 7 165, 4 161, 4 165, 8 171, 4 183, 0 203, 5 206, 3 210, 8 216, 5	16. 7 19. 1 11. 7 10. 2 9. 4 10. 6 20. 5 24. 7 26. 3 28. 4	84. 6 89. 9 91. 3 93. 7 97. 3 104. 7 110. 8 108. 3 108. 7 110. 5	54. 4 56. 3 58. 5 61. 8 64. 7 67. 7 72. 1 73. 4 75. 8 77. 6	33. 0 41. 6 21. 4 12. 7 14. 0 19. 6 52. 3 51. 5 60. 4 48. 0	28. 1 32. 0 17. 3 12. 9 15. 9 22. 6 42. 3 51. 7 55. 9 51. 9	18. 9 22. 2 12. 5 10. 0 13. 4 19. 8 30. 2 36. 2 38. 0 34. 5	6. 8 8. 1 4. 6 2. 9 3. 8 5. 7 12. 5 11. 6 12. 3	12. 1 14. 2 7. 9 7. 2 9. 6 14. 1 17. 7 24. 6 25. 7 22. 6	9. 2 9. 8 4. 9 2. 9 2. 5 2. 8 12. 1 15. 4 17. 9	4.9 9.6 4.0 -1.2 -2.9 10.0 2 4.6
1950	383. 4 395. 1 412. 8 407. 0 438. 0 446. 1	230. 5 232. 8 239. 4 250. 8 255. 7 274. 2 281. 4 288. 2 290. 1 307. 3	34. 7 31. 5 30. 8 35. 3 35. 4 43. 2 41. 0 41. 5 37. 9 43. 7	114. 0 116. 5 120. 8 124. 4 125. 5 131. 7 136. 2 138. 7 140. 2 146. 8	81. 8 84. 8 87. 8 91. 1 94. 8 99. 3 104. 1 108. 0 112. 0 116. 8	69. 3 70. 0 60. 5 61. 2 59. 4 75. 4 74. 3 68. 8 60. 9 73. 6	61. 0 59. 0 57. 2 60. 2 61. 4 69. 0 69. 5 67. 6 62. 4 68. 8	37. 5 39. 6 38. 3 40. 7 39. 6 43. 9 47. 3 47. 4 41. 6 44. 1	12.7 14.1 13.7 14.9 15.2 16.2 18.5 18.2 16.6 16.2	24. 8 25. 5 24. 6 25. 8 24. 5 27. 7 28. 8 29. 1 25. 0 27. 9	23.5 19.5 18.9 19.6 21.7 25.1 22.2 20.2 20.8 24.7	8. 3 10. 9 3. 3 -2. 0 6. 4 4. 8 1. 2 -1. 5 4. 8
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 P	487.7 497.2 529.8 551.0 581.1 617.8 658.1	316. 1 322. 5 338. 4 353. 3 373. 7 397. 7 418. 1 430. 3 452. 6 466. 0	44. 9 43. 9 49. 2 53. 7 59. 0 66. 6 71. 7 72. 8 80. 7 84. 8	149. 6 153. 0 158. 2 162. 2 170. 3 178. 6 187. 0 190. 3 196. 9 199. 5	121. 6 125. 6 131. 1 137. 4 144. 4 152. 5 159. 4 167. 2 175. 0 181. 7	72. 4 69. 0 79. 4 82. 5 87. 8 99. 2 109. 3 100. 8 105. 7 111. 9	68. 9 67. 0 73. 4 76. 7 81. 9 90. 1 95. 4 93. 9 99. 1 104. 9	47. 1 45. 5 49. 7 51. 9 57. 8 66. 3 74. 1 73. 6 75. 8 81. 5	17. 4 17. 4 17. 9 17. 9 19. 1 22. 3 24. 0 22. 6 22. 7 24. 0	29. 6 28. 1 31. 7 34. 0 38. 7 44. 0 50. 1 51. 0 53. 2 57. 5	21. 9 21. 6 23. 8 24. 8 24. 2 23. 8 21. 3 20. 3 23. 3 23. 5	3.5 2.0 6.0 5.8 9.0 13.9 6.6
					Seas	onally a	djusted	annual	rates			<u> </u>
1967: I II III IV	- 670.5 - 678.0	424. 4 430. 5 431. 9 434. 3	70. 3 73. 9 73. 0 73. 9	190. 2 190. 6 190. 3 190. 2	163. 9 166. 1 168. 6 170. 3	95 7	92. 0 92. 6 94. 3 96. 7	74. 1 73. 5 73. 1 73. 8	23. 8 22. 1 22. 3 22. 1	50. 3 51. 4 50. 8 51. 6	17. 9 19. 0 21. 2 23. 0	8. 5 3. 1 7. 4 8. 7
1968: V	705. 8 712. 8	449.0	83.0	196. 0 195. 8 198. 7 197. 2	171. 8 173. 7 176. 5 177. 7	101. 2 106. 6 104. 1 110. 9	99. 8 97. 6 97. 7 101. 4	77.1 74.0 75.0 77.3	23. 6 22. 0 22. 2 22. 9	53. 5 52. 0 52. 7 54. 4	22. 7 23. 5 22. 7 24. 1	1. 5 9. 0 6. 4 9. 6
1969: I II IV P.	723. 1 726. 7 730. 6	462. 9 466. 2 466. 5	84. 3 85. 9 84. 7	199. 3 199. 3	179. 3	109. 9 110. 8	104. 0 104. 8 105. 0 106. 0	79. 4 81. 0 82. 4	23. 9 23. 3 24. 6 24. 2	55, 5 57, 7 57, 8 59, 0	24. 6 23. 8 22. 6 22. 8	5. 9 6. 0 9. 3 6. 7

See footnotes at end of table.

Table C-2.—Gross national product or expenditure, in 1958 prices, 1929-69—Continued [Billions of dollars, 1958 prices]

	Net export	s of goods and	services	Government	purchases of services 1	goods and
Year or quarter -	Net exports	Exports	Imports	Total	Federal	State and local
1929	1. 5	11. 8	10.3	22.0	3. 5	18. 5
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938	1. 4 .9 .6 .0 .3 -1. 0 -1. 2 7 1. 9 1. 3	10. 4 8. 9 7. 1 7. 1 7. 3 7. 7 8. 2 9. 8 9. 9 10. 0	9. 0 7. 9 6. 6 7. 1 7. 1 8. 7 9. 3 10. 5 8. 0 8. 7	24. 3 25. 4 24. 2 23. 3 26. 6 27. 0 31. 8 30. 8 33. 9 35. 2	4. 0 4. 3 4. 6 6. 0 8. 0 7. 9 12. 2 11. 5 13. 3 12. 5	20. 2 21. 1 19. 6 17. 3 18. 6 19. 2 19. 4 20. 6
1940	2. 1 -4 -2. 1 -5. 9 -5. 8 -3. 8 -3. 8 12. 3 6. 1 6. 4	11. 0 11. 2 7. 8 6. 8 7. 6 10. 2 19. 6 22. 6 18. 1	8. 9 10. 8 9. 9 12. 6 13. 4 13. 9 11. 2 10. 3 12. 0 11. 7	36. 4 56. 3 117. 1 164. 4 181. 7 156. 4 48. 4 39. 9 46. 3 53. 3	15. 0 36. 2 98. 9 147. 8 165. 4 139. 7 30. 1 19. 1 23. 7 27. 6	21. 4 20. 1 18. 3 16. 6 16. 3 16. 7 18. 4 20. 8 22. 7 25. 7
950	2. 7 5. 3 3. 0 1. 1 3. 0 3. 2 5. 0 6. 2 2. 2	16. 3 19. 3 18. 2 17. 8 18. 8 20. 9 24. 2 26. 2 23. 1 23. 8	13.6 14.1 15.2 16.7 15.8 17.7 19.1 19.9 20.9 23.5	52. 8 75. 4 92. 1 99. 8 88. 9 85. 2 85. 3 89. 3 94. 2 94. 7	25. 3 47. 4 63. 8 70. 0 56. 8 50. 7 49. 7 51. 7 53. 6 52. 5	27. 5 27. 9 28. 4 29. 7 32. 1 34. 4 35. 6 40. 6 42. 2
960	4. 3 5. 1 4. 5 5. 6 8. 3 6. 2 3. 6 9	27. 3 28. 0 30. 0 32. 1 36. 5 37. 4 40. 2 42. 1 45. 6 48. 4	23. 0 22. 9 25. 5 26. 6 28. 2 31. 2 36. 1 38. 5 44. 7 48. 4	94. 9 100. 5 107. 5 109. 6 111. 2 114. 7 126. 5 140. 0 148. 4 149. 8	51. 4 54. 6 60. 0 59. 5 58. 1 57. 9 65. 4 78. 9 76. 1	43. 5 47. 5 50. 1 53. 2 56. 8 61. 1 65. 2 73. 7
-		Se	asonally adjus	ted annual rate	es	
1967: 1	4. 0 4. 2 4. 1 2. 0	41. 8 41. 9 42. 2 42. 5	37. 8 37. 8 38. 1 40. 5	137. 6 140. 1 140. 4 141. 7	72. 8 75. 1 75. 5 75. 7	64. 8 65. 0 64. 9 66. 0
1968: I	.9 1.3 1.7 2	43. 9 45. 2 48. 0 45. 5	43. 0 43. 9 46. 3 45. 7	145. 6 148. 9 148. 8 150. 2	77.3 79.6 79.2 79.4	68.3 69.6 70.8
1969: 	3 5 .4 .3	41. 9 50. 4 50. 2 51. 3	42. 2 50. 8 49. 8 50. 9	150. 6 150. 2 149. 4 149. 0	78. 3 76. 3 75. 5 74. 4	72.3 73.9 73.9 74.

¹ Net of Government sales.

TABLE C-3.—Implicit price deflators for gross national product, 1929-69
[Index numbers, 1958=100]

		P		onsumptio	n	Gro	ss private	domestic	investme	nt 1
	Total		expen	ditures			Fixe	d investm	ent	
Year or quarter	Total gross national prod-						No	nresident	ial	
	uct 1	Total	Dur- able goods	Non- durable goods	Serv- ices	Total	Total	Struc- tures	Pro- ducers' durable equip- ment	Resi- dential struc- tures
929		55. 3	56.4	54, 5	56. 1	39. 4	39. 9	35, 7	44.6	38, 1
930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938	49. 3 44. 8 40. 2 39. 3 42. 2 42. 6 42. 7 44. 5 43. 9	53. 6 47. 9 42. 3 40. 6 43. 5 44. 7 46. 5 45. 6	55. 3 49. 1 43. 2 41. 9 44. 7 43. 7 43. 6 45. 8 46. 7	51, 6 44, 1 37, 7 38, 0 42, 7 44, 5 44, 5 46, 4 44, 0 43, 2	55. 7 52. 7 48. 3 43. 6 44. 4 45. 0 46. 8 47. 7	37, 9 35, 2 31, 6 30, 6 33, 7 34, 3 34, 6 37, 8 38, 2 37, 7	38. 1 35. 8 32. 9 31. 6 34. 9 35. 6 38. 8 39. 3	34. 0 31. 1 27. 6 27. 9 28. 9 30. 6 30. 2 34. 4 33. 9	43. 0 41. 1 39. 1 34. 5 38. 8 38. 7 38. 5 41. 4 43. 0	37. 1 33. 6 27. 3 27. 1 30. 1 29. 8 31. 3 34. 3 35. 35.
940 941 942 943 943 944 945 946 947 947	43. 9 47. 2 53. 0 56. 8 58. 2 59. 7 66. 7 74. 6 79. 6	45. 5 48. 7 54. 8 59. 9 63. 2 65. 4 70. 5 77. 9 82. 3 81. 7	46. 5 50. 4 59. 3 64. 2 71. 5 75. 8 82. 7 86. 3	43. 8 47. 7 55. 6 62. 5 66. 2 68. 7 74. 3 88. 5 85. 6	47. 9 49. 8 52. 7 55. 3 57. 5 62. 7 67. 9 72. 1 74. 3	39. 0 42. 0 46. 5 49. 3 51. 5 58. 5 66. 7 73. 9 74. 7	40. 0 42. 7 47. 8 49. 9 51. 0 56. 3 64. 5 70. 7 72. 8	33. 9 36. 4 41. 3 46. 8 48. 6 49. 2 54. 4 71. 5 71. 2	43. 4 46. 3 51. 5 51. 1 51. 7 57. 5 64. 6 70. 3 73. 6	36. 9 40. 43. 47. 0 51. 54. 59. 71. 80. 78.
950 951 952 953 954 955 956 977 958	80. 2 85. 6 87. 5 88. 3 89. 6 90. 9 94. 0 97. 5 100. 0 101. 6	82. 9 88. 6 90. 5 91. 7 92. 5 92. 8 94. 8 97. 7 100. 0 101. 3	87. 8 94. 2 95. 4 94. 3 92. 9 91. 9 94. 9 98. 4 100. 0 101. 4	86. 0 93. 3 94. 3 93. 9 94. 2 93. 6 94. 9 97. 7 100. 0 99. 9	76. 3 80. 0 83. 6 87. 7 90. 0 92. 0 94. 6 97. 3 100. 0 103. 0	77. 5 83. 1 85. 3 86. 6 86. 8 89. 0 94. 0 98. 5 100. 0 102. 6	74. 4 80. 4 82. 6 84. 0 84. 8 86. 7 92. 4 97. 9 100. 0 102. 2	72. 9 79. 3 83. 2 84. 9 86. 0 88. 1 93. 4 93. 6 100. 0 102. 7	75. 2 80. 9 82. 2 83. 5 84. 0 85. 9 91. 8 97. 5 100. 0 102. 0	82, 90, 191, 191, 191, 191, 191, 191, 191,
960	103. 3 104. 6 105. 8 107. 2 108. 8 110. 9 113. 9 117. 6 122. 3 128. 1	102. 9 103. 9 104. 9 106. 1 107. 4 108. 8 111. 5 114. 4 118. 6 123. 6	100. 9 100. 6 100. 8 100. 4 100. 4 99. 6 98. 7 100. 3 103. 3 105. 7	101. 2 101. 9 102. 8 104. 0 106. 9 110. 7 113. 0 117. 1 122. 2	105. 8 107. 6 109. 0 110. 9 113. 1 115. 1 118. 3 122. 1 127. 3 133. 5	103. 4 103. 9 104. 9 106. 0 107. 6 109. 3 111. 8 115. 7 120. 0 125. 3	102. 9 103. 4 104. 1 104. 5 105. 7 107. 5 110. 2 113. 7 117. 1 121. 9	104. 0 105. 6 107. 1 108. 9 111. 1 114. 7 118. 9 123. 6 129. 3 139. 1	102. 2 102. 1 102. 3 102. 3 103. 0 103. 9 106. 0 109. 2 111. 9 114. 7	104. 105. 106. 108. 112. 114. 117. 123. 129.
1967: II II	116. 2 116. 9 118. 1 119. 4	113.3 113.8 114.8 115.7	99. 6 99. 5 100. 5 101. 7	112. 1 112. 5 113. 4 114. 0	120. 6 121. 5 122. 5 123. 7	113. 8 114. 6 116. 6 117. 7	112. 4 112. 9 114. 2 115. 2	121. 8 122. 8 124. 6 125. 5	107. 9 108. 6 109. 7 110. 8	119.1 121.4 124.4 125.6
1968: 1 II III IV		116. 8 118. 1 118. 9 120. 4	102.3 102.9 103.4 104.5	115. 3 116. 7 117. 5 118. 8	125. 2 126. 6 127. 9 129. 5	118. 0 119. 6 120. 8 121. 7	115. 7 116. 7 117. 6 118. 4	126. 5 128. 7 130. 6 131. 4	110.9 111.6 112.1 113.0	126. 128. 131. 132.
1969: V P		121. 4 122. 9 124. 3 125. 8	104, 9 105, 5 106, 0 106, 6	119. 8 121. 5 123. 0 124. 6	131. 0 132. 7 134. 2 135. 9	123. 7 124. 5 126. 2 127. 0	120. 1 120. 8 122. 7 123. 8	135, 3 137, 8 141, 0 142, 2	113. 5 113. 9 114. 9 116. 3	135. 137. 138. 138.

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE C-3.—Implicit price deflators for gross national product, 1929-69—Continued
[Index numbers, 1958=100]

Vana as avantas	Exports and goods and		Governme	ent purchases and services	of goods		al product by ctor
Year or quarter	Exports	Imports	Total	Federal	State and local	Private 2	General government
1929	59. 5	57.3	38. 6	36. 0	39. 1	51.7	34. 1
1930 1931 1932 1933	52. 3 41. 0 34. 7 33. 7	49. 0 39. 3 31. 5 28. 8	37. 9 36. 3 33. 4 34, 5	34. 1 34. 5 31. 9 33. 1	38. 7 36. 6 33. 8 35. 0	50. 4 45. 7 40. 9 39. 9	34. 1 34. 5 33. 7 33. 5
1934 1935 1936 1937 1938	40. 6 42. 3 43. 4 46. 5	33. 6 36. 0 36. 7 40. 7	36. 8 37. 0 37. 6 38. 4	37. 4 37. 0 40. 5 40. 7	36. 6 37. 0 35. 9 37. 1	43. 0 43. 5 43. 4 45. 3	33. 5 34. 8 34. 7 36. 5 36. 5
1939	43. 8 44. 1	37. 9 38. 6	38. 3 37. 9	40. 5 40. 8	36. 8 36. 3	44. 6 43. 9	37. 4 36. 8
1940	48. 6 53. 0 61. 5 65. 2 69. 9	40. 8 43. 0 48. 3 51. 2 53. 2 56. 4	38. 5 44. 0 50. 9 53. 9 53. 1 52. 6	40. 2 46. 6 52. 5 54. 9 53. 8	37. 3 39. 2 42. 3 44. 6 46. 1	44. 7 48. 7 55. 5 60. 9 62. 0	36. 0 34. 7 37. 3 39. 7 43. 3 48. 3
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949	71. 3 75. 4 87. 3 92. 7 87. 0	56. 4 64. 9 79. 4 86. 4 82. 2	52. 6 55. 8 62. 9 68. 1 71. 0	53. 1 57. 3 65. 6 69. 8 73. 0	48. 6 53. 2 60. 4 66. 4 68. 9	62. 6 68. 2 76. 3 81. 4 80. 6	48.3 55.4 58.5 60.8 64.7
1950	84. 9 97. 0 98. 8 95. 2 94. 3 94. 9 97. 5 101. 3	88. 7 107. 2 103. 6 99. 1 100. 6 102. 5 104. 0	71. 8 78. 5 81. 0 81. 8 84. 1 87. 1 92. 1	72. 9 79. 4 81. 2 81. 4 83. 5 86. 9 91. 7 95. 8	70. 8 76. 9 80. 6 82. 8 85. 3 87. 5 92. 7 97. 3 100. 0	81. 4 87. 4 89. 0 89. 6 90. 8 91. 6 94. 5 97. 9	67. 1 70. 5 74. 4 76. 6 79. 5 84. 0 88. 7
1958	100. 0 98. 8	100. 0 99. 3	100, 0 102, 4	100. 0 102. 2	100.0 102.6	100.0 101.4	100, 0 104, 2
1960	99. 9 101. 9 100. 8 100. 6 101. 5 104. 7 107. 7 109. 7 110. 9 114. 4	101. 0 100. 1 98. 5 99. 5 101. 5 103. 4 105. 6 106. 5 107. 6 110. 0	105. 0 107. 1 109. 0 111. 8 115. 7 119. 4 124. 0 128. 7 135. 0 143. 3	104, 2 105, 2 105, 6 108, 0 112, 2 115, 5 118, 8 121, 3 126, 2 134, 1	105. 9 109. 4 113. 2 116. 3 119. 5 123. 5 129. 4 137. 1 145. 0 152. 9	102. 8 103. 7 104. 7 105. 8 107. 0 108. 8 111. 6 114. 8 118. 9	108.6 113.6 116.6 121.1 128.2 133.5 140.3 148.1 159.4
1967: I	109. 7 109. 6 109. 7 109. 8	106. 9 106. 3 106. 8 105. 9	126. 6 127. 4 129. 2 131. 5	120. 5 120. 3 121. 0 123. 5	133. 4 135. 6 138. 7 140. 7	113.5 114.1 115.2 116.3	144. 5 146. 5 148. 4 153. 1
1968: I	108. 9 112. 1 111. 3 111. 3	106.7 107.8 107.5 108.2	132. 8 133. 3 136. 2 137. 6	124. 5 124. 5 127. 4 128. 3	142. 3 143. 4 146. 2 148. 1	117. 2 118. 4 119. 4 120. 6	155. 1 156. 9 161. 3 163. 6
1969:	113. 5 113. 4 115. 2 115. 2	109. 2 109. 2 110. 8 110. 8	139. 5 141. 8 145. 3 146. 9	129. 8 131. 9 136. 8 138. 1	150. 1 151. 9 153. 9 155. 6	122. 0 123. 6 125. 0 126. 4	165. 6 167. 9 173. 7 175. 3

Separate deflators are not available for total gross private domestic investment, change in business inventories, and net exports of goods and services.
 Gross national product less compensation of general government employees. See also Tables C-7 and C-8.

TABLE C-4.—Gross national product by major type of product, 1929-69
[Billions of dollars]

_							Goo	ds outp	ut						
Year or	Total gross na-	Final	Inventory change		Total		Dura	ble go	ods	Nondu	rable g	oods	Serv-	Struc-	Gross auto
quarter	tional prod- uct	sales	Inver	Total	Final sales	Inventory change	Total	Final sales	Inventory change	Total	Final sales	Inventory	ices	tures	prod- uct
1929	103, 1	101.4	1.7	56.1	54.3	1.7	17. 5	16. 1	1.4	38, 5	38. 2	0.3	35.6	11.4	
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939	90. 4 75. 8 58. 0 55. 6 65. 1 72. 2 82. 5 90. 4 84. 7 90. 5	90. 7 77. 0 60. 5 57. 2 65. 8 71. 2 81. 2 87. 9 85. 6	-2.5 -1.6 7 1.1 1.3	46. 9 37. 4 26. 7 27. 0 34. 4 39. 9 45. 8 51. 5 49. 0	47. 3 38. 6 29. 2 28. 6 35. 1 38. 8 44. 5 48. 9 46. 2 48. 6	1.1 1.3 2.5 9	11. 4 7. 7 3. 6 4. 9 7. 4 9. 3 12. 2 13. 9 9. 9	12. 5 9. 0 5. 7 5. 4 7. 3 8. 9 11. 2 13. 1 10. 8 12. 4	-2.0 5 3 9	35. 5 29. 7 23. 1 22. 1 27. 0 30. 6 33. 6 37. 6 35. 4 36. 3	34. 8 29. 6 23. 2 27. 8 29. 9 33. 3 35. 8 36. 2	4 -1.1 9 .7 .3	27. 1 28. 3 31. 0 32. 3	4. 0 5. 6 6. 7 6. 2	
1940	99. 7 124. 5 157. 9 191. 6 210. 1 211. 9 208. 5 231. 3 257. 6 256. 5	97. 5 120. 1 156. 2 192. 2 211. 1 213. 0 202. 1 231. 8 252. 9 259. 6	-1.0 -1.0 6.4 5 4.7	56. 0 72. 5 93. 6 120. 4 132. 3 128. 9 124. 9 139. 7 154. 2 147. 5	121.0 133.3 129.9 118.5	1.8 6 -1.0 -1.0 6.4 5	16. 6 26. 8 35. 5 54. 2 57. 9 48. 9 36. 9 46. 0 48. 7	15. 4 23. 8 34. 5 54. 2 58. 5 50. 2 31. 6 44. 3 48. 0 49. 9	3.0 1.0 6 -1.3 5.3 1.7	39. 3 45. 6 58. 1 66. 2 74. 4 80. 0 88. 0 93. 7 105. 5 99. 7	38. 4 44. 2 57. 4 66. 8 74. 8 79. 7 86. 9 95. 9 101. 5 100. 6	1.4 .7 6 3 .2 1.1	71.8 76.5 68.0 70.2 75.7	11.8 14.0 8.7 6.1 6.5 15.6 21.4 27.7	7. 2 8. 8 11. 9
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958	284. 8 328. 4 345. 5 364. 6 364. 8 398. 0 419. 2 441. 1 447. 3 483. 7	342. 4 364. 1 366. 4 392. 0	10, 3 3, 1 -1, 5 6, 0 4, 7 1, 3 -1, 5	162. 4 189. 7 195. 6 204. 1 197. 1 216. 4 225. 4 234. 6 230. 8 249. 1	155. 6 179. 4 192. 5 203. 7 198. 6 210. 4 220. 7 233. 3 232. 3 244. 4	3. 1 -4 -1. 5 6. 0 4. 7 1. 3 -1. 5	60. 4 73. 7 74. 6 79. 4 72. 1 85. 7 90. 3 94. 4 83. 6 95. 6	56. 3 66. 8 73. 5 78. 5 74. 6 82. 7 87. 5 93. 1 86. 4 93. 2	1.1 .9 -2.5 3.0 2.8 1.3	102. 0 116. 0 121. 0 124. 8 125. 0 130. 7 135. 1 140. 2 147. 2 153. 6		3. 4 2. 0 5 1. 0 2. 9 1. 9	110. 8 118. 8 123. 5 132. 6 142. 3 154. 2 163. 4	39.1 41.7 44.2 49.0 51.5 52.3	15. 4 13. 5 12. 0 16. 3 14. 6 21. 2 16. 9 19. 5 14. 5 19. 1
1960	503.7	626. 6 675. 3 735. 1 786. 2 858. 4	2. 0 6. 0 5. 9 5. 8 9. 6 14. 8 7. 4 7. 3	347.2 383.3 398.4 431.1	278. 5 292. 7 313. 6 337. 6 368. 5 391. 0	2. 0 6. 0 5. 9 5. 8 9. 6 14. 8 7. 4	116.1 127.0 139.6 156.7 160.9	113.3 122.8 133.0 146.2 157.0	1 2.8 2.8 4.2 6.7 10.5 3.9 5.3	160. 1 165. 8 175. 5 182. 5 192. 4 207. 6 226. 6 237. 5 254. 4 267. 5	179. 4 190. 7 204. 7 222. 3 234. 1	2.1 3.2 3.1 1.6 3.0 4.3 3.5 2.0	199. 5 213. 3 226. 2 244. 2 262. 9	58.3 62.6 65.7 68.8 74.8 77.5 78.4 87.1	21. 4 17. 9 22. 5 25. 1 25. 8 31. 8 30. 0 28. 6 35. 9 36. 5
					s	еаѕопа	lly adju	sted ar	nual r	ates					
1967: [V	774, 2 783, 5 800, 4 816, 1	792.6	3. 4 7. 8	395. 9 401. 1	392. 5 393. 3	9. 0 3. 4 7. 8 9. 5	i 162. 2	151. 9 158. 3 157. 7 160. 0	1.5	238.9	l 235. 5	1.8	312. 0 320. 1	75.6 79.3	28.7
1968: 1 !! !!! !V	835, 3 858, 7 876, 4 892, 5	833. 6 848. 8 869. 2 882. 6	9.9	429. 2 437. 0	412.8 419.3 429.9 433.0	1. 6 9. 9 7. 2 10. 5	168, 3 175, 7 178, 8 184, 0	166. 4 168. 9 173. 7 176. 6	1.9 6.8 5.1 7.4	246. 2 253. 5 258. 3 259. 5	246, 5 250, 4 256, 1 256, 4	2.1	335. 0 343. 4 353. 2 358. 5	86.0 86.1	34. 0 36. 3 36. 0 37. 5
1969: I	924. 8 942. 8	917. S 932.	6, 6 6, 9 10, 7 7, 8	447. 9 456, 5 465. 9 469. 0	441.3 449.6 455.2 461.2	6. 6 6. 9 10. 7 7. 8	186. 4 190. 3 195. 4 197. 1	181. 6 185. 5 187. 8 189. 7	4.8 4.9 7.6 7.4	261. 5 266. 2 270. 5 271. 9	259. 7 264. 1 267. 4 271. 5	1.8 2.1 3.1	373. 4 381. 6	94. 8 95. 3	37. 5 34. 5 38. 0 35. 9

TABLE C-5.—Gross national product by major type of product, in 1958 prices, 1929-69
[Billions of dollars, 1958 prices]

							Goo	ds outp	out						
Year or	Total gross na-	Final	tory 8e		Total		Dura	able go	ods	Nonda	rable g	oods	Serv-	Struc-	Gross auto
quarter	tional prod- uct	sales	Inventory	Total	Final sales	Inventory change	Total	Final sales	Inventory	Total	Final sales	Inventory	ices	tures	prod- uct
1929		200, 1	3. 5	103.9	100. 4	3. 5	33.6	30.9	2. 7	70. 4	69. 5	0.8	69. 3	30. 3	
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939	183. 5 169. 3 144. 2 141. 5 154. 3 169. 5 193. 0 203. 2 192. 9 209. 4	184. 1 171. 7 150. 5 145. 9 157. 0 167. 1 189. 9 197. 8 195. 3 208. 2	-2.7 2.4	90. 5 83. 2 68. 7 68. 8 77. 9 88. 6 102. 2 110. 2 110. 5	91.1 85.7 74.9 73.2 80.5 86.2 99.1 104.8 102.9	-4.3 -2.7 2.4 3.1 5.5	22. 4 16. 3 8. 3 11. 7 16. 9 21. 5 28. 7 31. 0 21. 1	24. 5 19. 2 13. 4 13. 4 16. 7 20. 6 26. 3 29. 1 23. 4 27. 0	-1.7 .9 2.4	68. 0 67. 0 60. 4 57. 1 61. 0 67. 1 73. 5 79. 2 79. 4	66. 5 66 5 61. 5 59. 8 63. 8 65. 6 72. 8 75. 7 79. 5	-2.7 -2.8 1.5	68. 1 73. 3	13.7 9.8 11.1 12.8 17.5 19.1 17.7	
1940	227. 2 263. 7 297. 8 337. 1 361. 3 355. 2 312. 6 309. 9 323. 7 324. 1	222. 3 254. 1 293. 8 337. 3 363. 2 358. 2 302. 6 310. 1 319. 1 328. 1		124. 0 143. 4 158. 1 187. 4 204. 8 198. 0 172. 1 172. 2 178. 4 174. 2	187.6 206.7 201.0	9.6 4.0 2 -1.9	85. 6 95. 9 84. 3 54. 7 60. 1 61. 3	54. 4 85. 2 97. 4 87. 4 46. 1 58. 6 60. 0	2.9 -4 -1.5 -3.1 8.6 1.5	108.8	86. 2 90. 3 99. 7 102. 4 109. 3 113. 6 116. 0 113. 8 117. 1	6 4 .2	131.8 144.0 144.3 113.3	30.5 31.9 17.9	10.3
1950	355. 3 383. 4 395. 1 412. 8 407. 0 438. 0 446. 1 452. 5 447. 3 475. 9	347. 0 372. 5 391. 8 411. 8 409. 0 431. 6 441. 2 451. 2 448. 8 471. 1	10. 9 3. 3 . 9 -2. 0	192. 6 208. 4 214. 0 225. 4 215. 1 236. 1 239. 0 239. 8 230. 8 247. 7	197. 5 210. 7 224. 5 217. 1 229. 7 234. 2 238. 5	3.3 -9 -2.0	91. 0 81. 9 96. 5 96. 2 96. 2 83. 6	89. 9 84. 8 93. 0 93. 5 95. 0	8.0 1.5 1.2 -3.0	129, 4 134, 4 133, 2 139, 7 142, 5	116. 0 121. 4 127. 6 134. 6 132. 3 136. 7 140. 7 143. 6 145. 9 151. 2	2.9 1.8 2 .9 3.0 1.8	136.3 140.3 141.8 147.5	44, 4 44, 7 47, 0 50, 2 54, 3 54, 0 52, 6	19. 1 15. 9 13. 5 18. 7 17. 1 24. 6 18. 6 20. 2 14. 5 18. 5
1960	487. 7 497. 2 529. 8 551. 0 581. 1 617. 8 658. 1 674. 6 707. 6 727. 7	484. 2 495. 2 523. 8 545. 2 575. 2 608. 8 644. 2 667. 7 701. 0 720. 8	5. 8 5. 8 9. 0 13. 9 6. 9 6. 6	256. 0 257. 3 277. 3 289. 7 308. 6 330. 7 356. 8 362. 7 381. 3 392. 7	302. 8 321. 7 342. 9 355. 7	13. 9 6. 9 6. 6	151.8 152.0	94. 9 104. 1 111. 4 120. 4 130. 1 141. 9 148. 5	2.8 2.8 4.1 6.5 9.8 3.5	184. 1 194. 2 205. 1 210. 7 218. 6	156. 7 160. 3 167. 2 172. 5 182. 3 191. 6 201. 0 207. 3 216. 7 218. 6	4. 1 3. 4 1. 9	184. 0 193. 7 200. 9 210. 8 221. 9 236. 3 249 1 259. 9	55. 8 58. 8 60. 4 61. 6 65. 2 65. 0 62. 9	21. 0 17. 5 22. 0 24. 7 25. 5 31. 8 30. 6 28. 7 35. 1 34. 9
						Seasor	ally ad	justed :	annual	rates					
1967: 	666. 5 670. 5 678. 0 683. 5	658. 0 667. 4 670. 7 674. 8	3. 1 7. 4	359. 2 362. 3 364. 2 365. 0	350. 7 359. 2 356. 8 356. 3	8. 5 3. 1 7. 4 8. 7	148. 8 152. 1 153. 0 154. 1	150.8	1.3 4.1	210.2 211.2	205. 7 208. 4 207. 9 207. 1	1.8	246.9 251.0	61.3	26. 6 29. 3 28. 5 30. 4
1968: l 	693. 3 705. 8 712. 8 718. 5	691.8 696.8 796.3 709.0	ו פו	370. 8 380. 8 385. 5 388. 2	371.7 379.1	9.0	162.3 164.5	154. 8 156. 2 159. 9 161. 2	6. 1 4. 5	214.3 218.4 221.1 220.5	214.6 215.5 219.2 217.5	3 2.9 1.9 3.0	255. 4 258. 9 262. 4 262. 7	67.1 66.2 64.8 67.5	33. 4 35. 6 35. 2 36. 2
1969: I II III IV P	723. 1 726. 7 730. 6 730. 5	717. 2 720. 7 721. 3 723. 8	11 9.3	389. 1 391. 6 395. 9 394. 1	386.€	5. 9 6. 0 9. 3 6. 7	171.4	167.3 168.1	4. 1 6. 6	221.2	218. 4 218. 4 218. 5 219. 2	1.9 2.7	267, 6	68.0 67.1	36. 2 33. 0 36. 4 34. 2

Table C-6.—Gross national product: Receipts and expenditures by major economic groups, 1929-69

[Billions of dollars]

			Persons					G	overnme	nt		
	Disp	osable po income	ersonal			ľ	let rece	ipts	E	xpenditu	res	Sur- plus
Year or quarter	Total 1	Less: Inter- est paid and trans- fer pay- ments to for- eigners	Equals: Total exclud- ing in- terest and trans- fers	Per- sonal con- sump- tion ex- pendi- tures	Per- sonal saving or dis- saving (—)	Tax and non- tax re- ceipts or ac- cruals	Less: Trans- fers, inter- est, and sub- sidies ²	Equals: Net re- ceipts	Total ex- pendi- tures	Less: Trans- fers, inter- est, and sub- sidies 2	Equals: Pur- chases of goods and serv- ices	or deficit (—), na-tional in-come and product ac-counts
1929		1.9	81.4	77.2	4. 2	11.3	1.8	9. 5	10.3	1.8	8, 5	1.0
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938	74. 5 64. 0 48. 7 45. 5 52. 4 58. 5 66. 3 71. 2 65. 5 70. 3	1. 2 .9 .7 .7 .6 .7 .8 .9	73. 3 63. 1 48. 0 44. 9 51. 7 57. 8 65. 5 70. 3 64. 6 69. 4	69. 9 60. 5 48. 6 45. 8 51. 3 55. 7 61. 9 66. 5 63. 9 66. 8	3. 4 2. 6 9 . 4 2. 1 3. 6 3. 8 . 7 2. 6	10. 8 9. 5 8. 9 9. 3 10. 5 11. 4 12. 9 15. 4 15. 0	1. 9 3. 1 2. 6 2. 7 3. 1 3. 4 4. 1 3. 2 3. 8 4. 2	8. 9 6. 3 6. 7 7. 4 8. 0 8. 8 12. 2 11. 2	11. 1 12. 4 10. 6 10. 7 12. 9 13. 4 16. 1 15. 0 16. 8 17. 6	1. 9 3. 1 2. 6 2. 7 3. 1 3. 4 4. 1 3. 2 3. 8 4. 2	9. 2 9. 2 8. 1 8. 0 9. 8 10. 0 12. 0 11. 9 13. 0 13. 3	3 -2.9 -1.8 -1.4 -2.4 -2.0 -3.1 -1.8 -2.2
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1946 1947	75. 7 92. 7 116. 9 133. 5 146. 3 150. 2 160. 0 169. 8	1. 0 1. 1 . 8 . 8 . 8 1. 0 1. 4 1. 8 2. 2 2. 4	74. 7 91. 6 116. 1 132. 7 145. 5 149. 3 158. 6 168. 0 186. 9 186. 2	70. 8 80. 6 88. 5 99. 3 108. 3 119. 7 143. 4 160. 7 173. 6 176. 8	3. 8 11. 0 27. 6 33. 4 37. 3 29. 6 15. 2 7. 3 13. 4 9. 4	17. 7 25. 0 32. 6 49. 2 51. 2 53. 2 50. 9 56. 8 58. 9 56. 0	4. 4 4. 0 4. 4 4. 7 6. 5 10. 4 18. 5 17. 3 18. 8 21. 3	13. 3 21. 0 28. 2 44. 4 44. 7 42. 8 32. 4 39. 5 40. 1 34. 7	18, 4 28, 8 64, 0 93, 3 103, 0 92, 7 45, 5 42, 4 50, 3 59, 1	4. 4 4. 0 4. 4 4. 7 6. 5 10. 4 18. 5 17. 3 18. 8 21. 3	14. 0 24. 8 59. 6 88. 6 96. 5 82. 3 27. 0 25. 1 31. 6 37. 8	7 -3.8 -31.4 -44.1 -51.8 -39.5 5.4 14.4 8.5 -3.2
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1956 1957	206. 9 226. 6 238. 3 252. 6 257. 4 275. 3 293. 2 308. 5 318. 8 337. 3	2.9 3.1 3.5 4.3 4.6 5.1 5.9 6.4 6.5	204. 1 223. 5 234. 8 248. 3 252. 9 270. 2 287. 2 302. 2 312. 3 330. 3	191. 0 206. 3 216. 7 230. 0 236. 5 254. 4 266. 7 281. 4 290. 1 311. 2	13. 1 17. 3 18. 1 18. 3 16. 4 15. 8 20. 6 20. 7 22. 3 19. 1	68. 7 84. 8 89. 8 94. 3 89. 7 100. 4 109. 0 115. 6 114. 7 128. 9	22. 9 19. 9 19. 0 19. 5 21. 9 23. 4 25. 5 28. 7 33. 0 34. 0	45. 8 64. 9 70. 8 74. 8 67. 8 76. 9 83. 5 86. 8 81. 6 95. 0	60. 8 79. 0 93. 7 101. 2 96. 7 97. 6 104. 1 114. 9 127. 2 131. 0	22. 9 19. 9 19. 0 19. 5 21. 9 23. 4 25. 5 28. 7 33. 0 34. 0	37. 9 59. 1 74. 7 81. 6 74. 8 74. 2 78. 6 86. 1 94. 2 97. 0	7.8 5.8 -3.8 -6.9 -7.0 2.7 4.9 .7 -12.5 -2.1
1960	364. 4 385. 3 404. 6 438. 1 473. 2 511. 9 546. 5	7. 8 8. 1 8. 6 9. 7 10. 7 12. 0 13. 0 15. 0 16. 0	342. 3 356. 3 376. 6 394. 9 427. 4 461. 3 498. 9 532. 6 575. 0 613. 6	325. 2 335. 2 355. 1 375. 0 401. 2 432. 8 466. 3 492. 3 536. 6 576. 0	17. 0 21. 2 21. 6 19. 9 26. 2 28. 4 32. 5 40. 4 38. 4 37. 6	139. 8 144. 6 157. 0 168. 8 174. 1 189. 1 213. 3 228. 4 264. 2 302. 0	36. 5 41. 3 42. 8 44. 4 46. 7 49. 9 55. 5 62. 8 70. 6 78. 3	103. 3 103. 3 114. 2 124. 3 127. 3 139. 2 157. 9 165. 6 193. 6 223. 7	136. 1 149. 0 159. 9 166. 9 175. 4 186. 9 212. 3 242. 9 270. 8 293. 0	36. 5 41. 3 42. 8 44. 4 46. 7 49. 9 55. 5 62. 8 70. 6 78. 3	99. 6 107. 6 117. 1 122. 5 128. 7 137. 0 156. 8 180. 1 200. 3 214. 7	3. 7 -4. 3 -2. 9 1. 8 -1. 4 2. 2 1. 1 -14. 5 -6. 7 9. 0
		•			Seaso	naily adj	usted an	nual rates	<u>' </u>			<u>' </u>
1967: V	541.6 550.3	13. 5 14. 1 13. 9 14. 1	520, 9 527, 5 536, 4 545, 7	480. 9 489. 8 495. 7 502. 6	40. 0 37. 7 40. 7 43. 1	222. 0 224. 5 230. 2 236. 9	61. 9 61. 9 63. 4 64. 0	160. 1 162. 5 166. 7 173. 0	236. 1 240. 4 244. 8 250. 4	61. 9 61. 9 63. 4 64. 0	174. 2 178. 5 181. 3 186. 4	-14.1 -16.0 -14.6 -13.4
1968: V	587.4 593.4	14. 5 14. 8 15. 2 15. 5	560. 5 572. 6 578. 2 588. 8	520. 6 530. 3 544. 9 550. 7	39. 9 42. 3 33. 2 38. 0	248. 5 257. 3 271. 0 279. 7	66. 6 69. 7 72. 0 73. 9	181. 9 187. 6 199. 1 205. 8	260. 0 268. 1 274. 5 280. 6	66. 6 69. 7 72. 0 73. 9	193. 4 198. 4 202. 5 206. 7	-11.5 -10.8 -3.5 9
1969: ! V _P	610. 2 622. 0 639. 0	15.7	594. 5 606. 1 622. 9 630. 9	562. 0 572. 8	I	294. 1 302. 0 303. 4	75. 8 77. 6 78. 9	218. 3 224. 4	285. 9 290. 6 296. 0	75. 8 77. 6	210. 0 212. 9 217. 0 218. 9	8. 3 11. 4 7. 4

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE C-6.-Gross national product: Receipts and expenditures by major economic groups, 1929-69—Continued

[Billions of dollars]

				[DIIII0113	or dollar	3]					
		Business			lr	ternatio	nal				
Year or quarter	Gross re-	Gross pri- vate	Excess of in-	Trans- fers to for- eigners by per-	Net e	xports of nd servic	es	Excess of trans- fers or	Total income or re-	Statis- tical dis- crep-	Gross na- tional prod- uct
•	tained earn- ings 3	domes- tic in- vest- ment 4	vest- ment (-)	sons and Gov- ern- ment	Ex- ports	Less: Im- ports	Equals: Net ex- ports	of net ex- ports (-) ⁵	ceipts	ancy	or ex- pendi- ture
1929	11. 2	16. 2	-5.1	0.4	7.0	5. 9	1, 1	-0.8	102. 4	0. 7	103. 1
1930	8. 6 5. 3 3. 2 3. 2 5. 2 6. 4 6. 7 7. 7 8. 0 8. 4	10. 3 5. 6 1. 0 1. 4 3. 3 6. 4 8. 5 11. 8 6. 5 9. 3	-1.6 3 2.2 1.8 1.9 -1.8 -4.0 1.6 9	.33.22.22.22.22.22.22.22.22.22.22.22.22.	5. 4 3. 6 2. 5 2. 4 3. 0 3. 3 3. 5 4. 6 4. 3	4. 4 3. 1 2. 1 2. 0 2. 4 3. 1 3. 4 4. 3 3. 0 3. 4	1. 0 . 5 . 4 . 6 . 1 . 1 . 3 1. 3	7 2 2 4 1 1 1 1	91. 2 75. 1 57. 7 55. 0 64. 5 72. 5 81. 3 90. 5 84. 1 89. 2	8 .7 .3 .6 .5 2 1.2	90. 4 75. 8 58. 0 55. 6 65. 1 72. 2 82. 5 90. 4 84. 7 90. 5
1940	10. 5 11. 4 14. 5 16. 3 17. 1 15. 1 14. 5 20. 2 28. 0	13. 1 17. 9 9. 8 5. 7 7. 1 10. 6 30. 6 34. 0 46. 0 35. 7	-2.7 -6.5 4.6 10.6 10.0 4.6 -16.1 -13.8 -18.0 -6.0	.2 .2 .2 .3 .8 2.9 2.6 4.5 5.6	5. 4 5. 9 4. 8 4. 4 5. 3 7. 2 14. 7 19. 7 16. 8 15. 8	3.6 4.6 4.8 6.5 7.1 7.9 7.2 8.2 10.3 9.6	1.7 1.3 -2.0 -1.8 6 7.5 11.5 6.4 6.1	-1.5 -1.1 .2 2.2 2.1 1.4 -4.6 -8.9 -1.9	98. 7 124. 1 159. 0 193. 6 207. 6 208. 0 208. 4 230. 4 259. 5 256. 2	1.0 .4 -1.1 -2.0 2.5 3.9 .1 .9 -2.0 .3	99. 7 124. 5 157. 9 191. 6 210. 1 211. 9 208. 5 231. 3 257. 6 256. 5
1950	29. 4 33. 1 35. 1 36. 1 39. 2 46. 3 47. 3 49. 8 49. 4 56. 8	54. 1 59. 3 51. 9 52. 6 51. 7 67. 4 70. 0 67. 8 60. 9 75. 3	-24.7 -26.2 -16.8 -16.5 -12.5 -21.1 -22.8 -18.1 -11.5 -18.5	4.0 3.5 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.4	13. 8 18. 7 18. 0 16. 9 17. 8 19. 8 23. 6 26. 5 23. 1 23. 5	12. 0 15. 1 15. 8 16. 6 15. 9 17. 8 19. 6 20. 8 20. 9 23. 3	1.8 3.7 2.2 .4 1.8 2.0 4.0 5.7 2.2	2.2 2 .3 2.1 .5 -1.5 -3.4 -2 2.3	283. 3 325. 1 343. 3 361. 6 362. 1 395. 9 420. 4 441. 1 445. 8 484. 5	1.5 3.3 2.2 3.0 2.7 2.1 -1.1 1.6	284. 8 328. 4 345. 5 364. 6 364. 8 398. 0 419. 2 441. 1 447. 3 483. 7
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1966 1967 1968		74. 8 71. 7 83. 0 87. 1 94. 0 108. 1 121. 4 116. 0 126. 3 139. 6	-18. 0 -13. 0 -16. 8 -18. 4 -17. 8 -23. 4 -30. 1 -22. 7 -29. 6 -41. 0	2. 4 2. 6 2. 7 2. 8 2. 8 2. 8 3. 0 2. 9 2. 6	27. 2 28. 6 30. 3 32. 3 37. 1 39. 2 43. 4 46. 2 50. 6 55. 4	23. 2 23. 0 25. 1 26. 4 28. 6 32. 3 38. 1 41. 0 48. 1 53. 3	4. 0 5. 6 5. 1 5. 9 8. 5 6. 9 5. 3 5. 2 2. 1	-1.7 -3.0 -2.5 -3.1 -5.7 -4.1 -2.4 -2.2 .3	504. 8 520. 8 559. 8 590. 8 633. 7 688. 0 750. 9 794. 5 868. 2 938. 5	-1.0 8 -5 -1.3 -1.3 -3.1 -1.0 -1.0 -2.5 -6.2	503. 7 520. 1 560. 3 590. 5 632. 4 684. 9 749. 5 793. 5 865. 7 932. 3
				Se	asonally	adjusted	l annual ra	ites			
1967: V	91. 6 91. 9 93. 8 95. 9	113.6 109.4 117.7 123.3	-21.9 -17.5 -23.9 -27.4	2. 8 3. 3 3. 3 2. 6	45. 8 45. 9 46. 3 46. 7	40. 4 40. 1 40. 7 42. 8	5. 4 5. 8 5. 6 3. 8	-2.7 -2.5 -2.3 -1.3	775. 4 785. 2 800. 3 817. 2	-1.2 -1.7 -1.1	774. 2 783. 5 800. 4 816. 1
1968: I		119. 4 126. 6 125. 2 133. 9	-27. 3 -29. 4 -26. 0 -35. 7	2. 5 2. 8 3. 1 3. 1	47. 7 50. 7 53. 4 50. 6	45. 9 47. 3 49. 7 49. 4	1. 9 3. 4 3. 6 1. 2	6 6 1.9	837. 1 860. 2 879. 6 895. 9	-1.8 -1.6 -3.3 -3.4	835. 3 858. 7 876. 4 892. 5
1969: 1 II II IV P		135. 2 137. 4 143. 3 142. 4	-37.5 -39.4 -43.6	2. 4 2. 8 2. 6 2. 7	47. 6 57. 1 57. 8 59. 1	46. 1 55. 5 55. 2 56. 4	1.5 1.6 2.7 2.6	1.0 1.2 .0	912. 9 931. 3 949. 7	-4. 2 -6. 5 -6. 9	908. 7 924. 8 942. 8 953. 1

Personal income less personal tax and nontax payments (fines, penalties, etc.).
 Government transfer payments to persons, foreign net transfers by Government, net interest paid by government, and subsidies less current surplus of government enterprises.
 Undistributed corporate profits, corporate inventory valuation adjustment, capital consumption allowances, and wage accruals less disbursements.
 Private business investment, purchases of capital goods by private nonprofit institutions, and residential housing.

See Table C-11.

Net foreign investment with sign changed.

Note.—Corporate profits tax and related items for 1969 reflect repeal of investment tax credit.

Source: Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics.

TABLE C-7.—Gross national product by sector, 1929-69 [Billions of dollars]

				Gross privat	e product 1	-		
Year or quarter	Total gross national	Total		Business		House- holds	Rest of	Gross govern- ment
	product	Total	Total	Nonfarm 2	Farm	and institutions	the world	product 3
1929	103. 1	98. 8	95. 1	85. 4	9.7	2.9	0.8	4. 3
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939	90. 4 75. 8 58. 0 55. 6 65. 1 72. 2 82. 5 90. 4 84. 7 90. 5	85. 8 71. 2 53. 6 50. 9 59. 5 66. 3 75. 2 83. 5 77. 0 82. 9	82. 4 68. 3 51. 3 48. 9 57. 4 64. 1 72. 9 81. 0 74. 5 80. 3	74. 8 62. 0 46. 8 44. 3 52. 7 57. 1 66. 5 72. 7 67. 9 74. 0	7. 7 6. 5 4. 6 4. 7 7. 0 6. 3 6. 3	2.7 2.3 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.3	7543343343	4.5 4.4 4.7 5.6 5.9 7.39 7.6
1940	99. 7 124. 5 157. 9 191. 6 210. 1 211. 9 208. 5 231. 3 257. 6 256. 5	91. 9 115. 1 142. 8 166. 0 177. 9 176. 8 187. 7 214. 6 240. 1 237. 0	89. 1 112. 2 139. 5 162. 4 173. 8 172. 3 182. 7 208. 6 233. 5 230. 1	82.6 103.3 126.5 147.2 158.5 156.4 163.9 188.5 210.2 211.4	6. 5 8. 9 13. 0 15. 3 15. 3 15. 8 20. 2 23. 3 18. 8	2.4 2.5 2.2 3.2 3.1 4.5 5.6 5.9	.4 .4 .4 .4 .6 .8 1.0	7. 8 9. 4 15. 1 25. 6 32. 2 35. 2 20. 8 16. 7 17. 4 19. 4
1950	284. 8 328. 4 345. 5 364. 6 364. 8 398. 0 419. 2 441. 1 447. 3 483. 7	263. 9 301. 0 314. 3 332. 7 332. 4 363. 8 382. 6 402. 0 405. 2 439. 4	256. 3 292. 8 305. 8 323. 6 322. 7 352. 9 370. 8 389. 3 391. 7 425. 0	236. 3 269. 9 283. 7 303. 3 303. 1 334. 1 352. 2 370. 9 405. 3	20. 0 22. 9 22. 2 20. 3 19. 6 18. 8 18. 6 20. 8 19. 6	6. 4 6. 9 7. 2 7. 8 8. 1 9. 1 9. 8 10. 5 11. 4 12. 2	1. 2 1. 3 1. 3 1. 6 1. 8 2. 1 2. 2 2. 2	20. 9 27. 4 31. 2 31. 9 32. 5 34. 2 36. 6 39. 1 42. 1
1960 1961	503. 7 520. 1 560. 3 590. 5 632. 4 684. 9 749. 9 793. 5 865. 7 932. 3	456. 3 469. 2 505. 7 532. 4 569. 4 617. 1 673. 3 708. 2 770. 5 828. 2	440. 7 452. 3 487. 4 513. 0 548. 2 594. 4 648. 9 681. 0 740. 6 795. 4	420. 2 431. 4 466. 2 491. 5 527. 6 570. 8 624. 0 656. 6 715. 7 768. 4	20. 5 20. 9 21. 2 21. 5 20. 6 23. 7 24. 9 24. 4 24. 9 27. 0	13. 2 14. 0 15. 0 16. 0 17. 3 18. 5 20. 2 22. 7 25. 2 28. 6	2.4 2.9 3.3 3.4 4.0 4.2 4.1 4.5 4.7	47. 5 50. 9 54. 7 58. 1 63. 0 67. 8 76. 6 85. 3 95. 2
			Seaso	onally adjusted	l annual rate	S		
1967: i II IV	774. 2 783. 5 800. 4 816. 1	692. 0 699. 5 714. 2 727. 1	665. 9 673. 0 686. 4 698. 6	642. 1 648. 6 661. 7 673. 9	23. 8 24. 4 24. 7 24. 7	22. 0 22. 5 22. 9 23. 4	4. 1 4. 0 4. 9 5. 1	82. 2 84. 0 86. 2 89. 0
1968: I II III IV	835. 3 858. 7 876. 4 892. 5	743. 9 764. 9 779. 2 794. 0	715. 4 734. 6 749. 3 763. 1	690. 5 709. 8 724. 1 738. 4	24. 9 24. 8 25. 2 24. 7	24. 3 25. 4 25. 0 26. 0	4. 3 4. 9 4. 9 4. 9	91. 3 93. 8 97. 1 98. 5
1969: 1 11 1V P	908. 7 924. 8 942. 8 953. 1	808. 5 822. 7 836. 5 845. 2	776. 7 790. 5 803. 6 810. 8	751. 1 763. 0 775. 9 783. 8	25. 7 27. 6 27. 7 26. 9	27. 2 28. 3 28. 9 30. 0	4. 5 3. 9 4. 1 4. 4	100, 2 102, 1 106, 2 107, 9

¹ Gross national product less compensation of general government employees.
² Includes compensation of employees in government enterprises. Government enterprises are those agencies of government whose operating costs are to a substantial extent covered by the sale of goods and services, in contrast to the general activities of government, which are financed mainly by tax revenues and debt creation. The Post Office and public power systems are examples of government enterprises; on the other hand, State universities and public parks are part of general government activities.
³ Compensation of general government employees.

TABLE C-8.—Gross national product by sector, in 1958 prices, 1929-69 [Billions of dollars, 1958 prices]

	Total			Gross privat	e product 1			Gross
Year or quarter	gross national product	Total		Business		House- holds	Rest of	govern- ment product 3
	product	_ lotal	Totai	Nonfarm 2	Farm	and institutions	the world	products
1929	203.6	190. 9	182.1	165. 1	17. 0	7.4	1.4	12.7
1930	183. 5 169. 3 144. 2 141. 5 154. 3 169. 5 193. 0 203. 2 192. 9 209. 4	170. 1 155. 8 131. 0 127. 5 138. 3 152. 4 173. 1 184. 3 172. 6 188. 7	161. 4 147. 7 123. 8 120. 6 131. 1 144. 9 165. 4 176. 4 164. 6 180. 7	145. 4 129. 2 105. 8 103. 0 116. 6 128. 4 150. 5 158. 5 146. 8 162. 5	16. 1 18. 5 18. 0 17. 5 14. 6 14. 9 17. 9 17. 8 18. 2	7.1 6.6 5.7 6.2 6.8 7.1 6.8 7.1	1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.0 .8	13.3 13.5 13.2 14.0 16.0 17.1 19.9 20.4 20.6
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1947	227. 2 263. 7 297. 8 337. 1 361. 3 355. 2 312. 6 309. 9 323. 7 324. 1	205. 6 236. 6 257. 3 272. 8 286. 9 282. 5 275. 1 281. 4 295. 0 294. 1	197. 1 228. 1 248. 7 264. 9 278. 9 274. 6 267. 0 272. 8 286. 0 284. 7	179. 6 209. 3 228. 0 245. 3 259. 5 256. 5 248. 6 255. 8 267. 0 266. 2	17. 5 18. 8 20. 6 19. 6 19. 4 18. 5 17. 0 19. 0 18. 4	7.6 7.5 7.8 7.2 7.1 7.1 7.5 7.9 8.2	1.0 .9 .8 .8 .9 .8 .9 1.1 1.2	21. 6 27. 2 40. 5 64. 3 74. 4 72. 8 37. 5 28. 6 28. 7 30. 1
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958	355. 3 383. 4 395. 1 412. 8 407. 0 438. 0 446. 1 452. 5 447. 3 475. 9	324. 2 344. 6 353. 2 371. 1 366. 2 397. 2 404. 8 410. 5 405. 2 433. 4	314, 2 334, 5 343, 2 360, 7 355, 4 385, 4 392, 2 397, 5 391, 7 419, 4	294. 9 316. 2 324. 2 340. 7 335. 0 364. 4 371. 4 377. 2 370. 9 398. 3	19. 4 18. 4 19. 0 20. 0 20. 4 20. 9 20. 8 20. 8 21. 1	8. 7 8. 8 8. 8 9. 1 9. 2 10. 1 10. 6 11. 4 11. 7	1.3 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.2	31. 1 38. 8 41. 8 41. 7 40. 9 40. 7 41. 3 41. 9 42. 5
1960	487. 7 497. 2 529. 8 551. 0 581. 1 617. 8 658. 1 674. 6 707. 6 727. 7	444. 0 452. 3 482. 9 503. 2 532. 0 567. 0 603. 5 617. 0 647. 9 666. 7	429. 5 436. 9 466. 7 486. 6 514. 4 548. 9 584. 9 597. 3 627. 5 645. 3	407. 6 414. 8 444. 6 463. 8 492. 1 525. 2 562. 5 573. 5 604. 2 621. 8	21. 9 22. 2 22. 1 22. 8 22. 3 23. 7 22. 4 23. 7 23. 3 23. 5	12. 2 12. 4 12. 9 13. 2 13. 7 14. 0 14. 6 15. 4 15. 9	2.39 3.4 3.9 4.19 4.5 4.0	43. 7 44. 8 46. 9 47. 8 49. 1 50. 8 54. 6 57. 6 61. 0
			Se	asonally adjus	ted annual r	ates		
1967: V	666. 5 670. 5 678. 0 683. 5	609. 6 613. 1 619. 9 625. 4	590. 6 593. 9 599. 7 604. 8	567. 3 570. 0 575. 9 581. 1	23. 3 24. 0 23. 9 23. 7	15. 1 15. 4 15. 5 15. 7	3. 9 3. 8 4. 7 4. 9	56. 9 57. 3 58. 1 58. 1
1968: 1 	693. 3 705. 8 712. 8 718. 5	634. 6 646. 1 652. 6 658. 3	615. 0 625. 3 632. 1 637. 5	591. 0 602. 3 608. 8 614. 6	24. 0 23. 0 23. 4 22. 9	15. 5 16. 1 15. 7 16. 2	4. 1 4. 7 4. 7 4. 6	58. 7 59. 8 60. 2 60. 2
1969: V p	723, 1 726, 7 730, 6 730, 5	662. 6 665. 8 669. 4 668. 9	641. 5 644. 8 648. 2 646. 9	617. 8 621. 1 624. 1 624. 3	23. 7 23. 7 24. 1 22. 6	16. 8 17. 2 17. 4 17. 8	4. 3 3. 7 3. 9 4. 2	60, 5 60, 9 61, 1 61, 6

¹ Gross national product less compensation of general government employees.
² Includes compensation of employees in government enterprises. Government enterprises are those agencies of government whose operating costs are to a substantial extent covered by the sale of goods and services, in contrast to the general activities of government, which are financed mainly by tax revenues and debt creation. The Post Office and public power systems are examples of government enterprises; on the other hand, State universities and public parks are part of general government activities.
³ Compensation of general government employees.

TABLE C-9.—Gross national product by industry, in 1958 prices, 1947-68
[Billions of dollars, 1958 prices]

		Agri-		Ma	nufactur	ing	Trans-	Milesta	Finance.		Gov-	
Year	Total gross na- tional product	culture, fores- try, and fish- eries	Con- tract con- struc- tion	Total	Dur- able goods indus- tries	Non- durable goods indus- tries	tion, com- muni- cation, and utili- ties	Whole- sale and retail trade	insur- ance, and real estate	Serv- ices	ment and govern- ment enter- prises	All other ¹
1947	309. 9	17. 9	12. 9	91. 8	52. 3	39. 4	29. 6	52. 7	35. 6	30, 6	32. 4	6. 7
1948	323. 7	20. 0	14. 1	96. 3	55. 0	41. 3	30. 4	54. 2	36. 5	31, 9	33. 2	7. 1
1949	324. 1	19. 4	14. 7	90. 9	50. 5	40. 4	28. 7	55. 2	37. 8	32, 1	34. 7	10. 6
1950	355. 3	20, 4	16. 2	105. 5	60. 8	44. 7	30, 8	60. 4	41. 0	33. 1	35. 9	12. 1
1951	383. 4	19, 5	18. 2	116. 2	69. 0	47. 2	34, 3	61. 4	42. 9	34. 0	43. 9	13. 0
1952	395. 1	20, 2	18. 3	118. 7	71. 5	47. 3	34, 6	62. 9	44. 7	34. 5	47. 2	14. 0
1953	412. 8	21, 2	18. 9	128. 6	79. 1	49. 5	35, 7	64. 9	46. 8	35. 3	47. 1	14. 3
1954	407. 0	21, 6	19. 3	119. 5	71. 2	48. 3	36, 4	65. 5	49. 8	35. 4	46. 1	13. 5
1955	438. 0	22. 1	20. 8	133. 6	80, 7	52. 9	38. 6	71. 6	52. 7	38. 2	46. 0	14, 4
1956	446. 1	22. 0	21. 8	134. 1	79, 4	54. 6	40. 5	73. 8	54. 8	40. 2	46. 2	12, 7
1957	452. 5	21. 5	21. 1	134. 6	79, 6	54. 9	41. 3	75. 1	57. 0	41. 8	46. 9	13, 1
1958	447. 3	22. 0	20. 7	123. 7	69, 6	54. 0	40. 6	75. 1	59. 2	42. 9	47. 3	16, 0
1959	475. 9	22. 3	22. 0	138. 9	79, 9	59. 0	43. 3	80. 8	61. 4	45. 1	47. 9	14, 1
1960	487. 7	23. 1	21. 7	140. 9	81. 0	59. 9	44. 9	82. 3	64. 1	46. 7	49. 2	14.7
1961	497. 2	23. 4	21. 4	140. 4	79. 7	60. 7	46. 0	83. 5	67. 1	48. 3	50. 6	16.3
1962	529. 8	23. 3	21. 7	154. 6	90. 0	64. 7	48. 9	88. 9	71. 2	50. 8	52. 6	17.9
1963	551. 0	24. 0	21. 9	162. 4	95. 6	66. 8	51. 9	92. 8	74. 4	52. 2	53. 9	17.4
1964	581. 1	23. 6	23. 3	173. 7	102.4	71. 3	54. 7	98. 9	78. 3	54. 7	56. 1	17.8
1965 1966 1967 1968	658. 1 674. 6	25. 0 23. 7 25. 0 24. 6	23. 5 24. 7 23. 1 23. 8	190. 5 205. 7 205. 6 220. 6	114. 8 125. 1 124. 4 133. 3	75. 7 80. 7 81. 3 87. 2	59. 2 64. 0 66. 5 70. 4	104.8 111.6 113.9 119.9	83. 1 86. 8 91. 3 95. 8	57. 7 60. 6 63. 6 65. 9	58. 0 61. 8 65. 5 68. 6	15. 8 19. 4 20. 0 17. 6

¹ Mining, rest of the world, and residual (the difference between gross national product measured as sum of final products and gross national product measured as sum of gross product by industries).

Table C-10.—Personal consumption expenditures, 1929-69
[Billions of dollars]

					····											
		fig		Durabl	e goods			Nond	urable s	goods				Service	s	
q	Year or uarter	Total personal consumption expenditures	Total	Automobiles and parts	Furniture and house- hold equipment	0ther	Total	Food and beverages	Clothing and shoes ¹	Gasoline and oil	Other .	Total	Housing 3	Household operation	Transportation	Other
19	29	77. 2	9. 2	3. 2	4.8	1. 2	37.7	19. 5	9. 4	1.8	7.0	30. 3	11.5	4.0	2.6	12. 2
19 19 19 19 19 19	30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 38	69. 9 60. 5 48. 6 45. 8 51. 3 55. 7 61. 9 66. 5 63. 9 66. 8	7. 2 5. 5 3. 6 3. 5 4. 2 5. 1 6. 3 6. 9 5. 7 6. 7	2. 2 1. 6 . 9 1. 1 1. 4 1. 9 2. 3 2. 4 1. 6 2. 2	3. 9 3. 1 2. 1 1. 9 2. 2 2. 6 3. 2 3. 6 3. 1 3. 5	1. 1 . 9 . 6 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 1. 0 . 9 1. 0	34. 0 29. 0 22. 7 22. 3 26. 7 29. 3 32. 9 35. 2 34. 0 35. 1	18. 0 14. 7 11. 4 11. 5 14. 2 16. 2 18. 4 19. 9 18. 9 19. 1	8. 0 6. 9 5. 1 4. 6 5. 7 6. 0 6. 6 6. 8 7. 1	1. 7 1. 5 1. 5 1. 5 1. 6 1. 7 1. 9 2. 1 2. 1 2. 2	6.3 5.7 4.6 5.4 5.4 5.6 6.7	28. 7 26. 0 22. 2 20. 1 20. 4 21. 3 22. 8 24. 4 24. 3 25. 0	11. 0 10. 3 9. 0 7. 9 7. 6 7. 7 8. 0 8. 5 8. 9 9. 1	3.9 3.5 3.0 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.7 3.6 8	2. 2 1. 9 1. 6 1. 5 1. 6 1. 7 1. 9 2. 0 1. 9 2. 0	11. 5 10. 3 8. 6 7. 9 8. 2 8. 7 9. 5 10. 2 9. 9
19 19 19 19 19 19	45 46 47	70. 8 80. 6 88. 5 99. 3 108. 3 119. 7 143. 4 160. 7 173. 6 176. 8	7. 8 9. 6 6. 9 6. 6 6. 7 8. 0 15. 8 20. 4 22. 7 24. 6	2.7 3.4 .7 .8 1.0 4.0 6.2 7.5 9.9	3.9 4.9 4.7 3.9 3.8 4.6 8.6 10.9 11.9	1. 1 1. 4 1. 6 1. 9 2. 2 2. 5 3. 3 3. 4 3. 2	37. 0 42. 9 50. 8 58. 6 64. 3 71. 9 82. 4 90. 5 96. 2 94. 5	20. 2 23. 4 28. 4 33. 2 36. 7 40. 6 47. 4 52. 3 54. 2 52. 5	7. 4 8. 8 11. 0 13. 4 14. 4 16. 5 18. 2 18. 8 20. 1 19. 3	2. 3 2. 6 2. 1 1. 3 1. 6 1. 8 3. 0 4. 4 5. 0	7. 1 8. 0 9. 3 10. 6 11. 7 13. 0 13. 8 15. 7 17. 5 17. 7	26. 0 28. 1 30. 8 34. 2 37. 2 39. 8 45. 3 49. 8 54. 7 57. 6	9.4 10.2 11.0 11.5 12.0 12.5 13.9 15.7 17.5 19.3	4. 0 4. 3 4. 8 5. 2 5. 9 6. 4 6. 8 7. 5 8. 1	2. 1 2. 4 2. 7 3. 4 3. 7 4. 0 5. 0 5. 3 5. 8 5. 9	10. 4 11. 2 12. 3 14. 0 15. 6 16. 8 19. 7 21. 4 23. 3 23. 9
19 19 19 19 19 19	51 52 53 54 55	191. 0 206. 3 216. 7 230. 0 236. 5 254. 4 266. 7 281. 4 290. 1 311. 2	30. 5 29. 6 29. 3 33. 2 32. 8 39. 6 38. 9 40. 8 37. 9 44. 3	13. 1 11. 6 11. 1 14. 2 13. 6 18. 4 16. 4 18. 3 15. 4 19. 5	14. 1 14. 4 14. 3 14. 9 15. 0 16. 6 17. 5 17. 3 17. 1 18. 9	3.3 3.6 3.9 4.1 4.2 4.6 5.0 5.2 5.4 5.9	98. 1 108. 8 114. 0 116. 8 118. 3 123. 3 129. 3 135. 6 140. 2 146. 6	53. 9 60. 4 63. 4 64. 4 65. 4 67. 2 69. 9 73. 6 76. 4 78. 6	19. 6 21. 2 21. 9 22. 1 22. 1 23. 1 24. 1 24. 3 24. 7 26. 4	5. 4 6. 1 6. 8 7. 7 8. 2 9. 0 9. 8 10. 6 11. 0 11. 6	19. 2 21. 1 21. 7 22. 7 22. 6 24. 0 25. 4 27. 1 28. 2 30. 1	62. 4 67. 9 73. 4 79. 9 85. 4 91. 4 98. 5 105. 0 112. 0 120. 3	21. 3 23. 9 26. 5 29. 3 31. 7 36. 0 38. 5 41. 1 43. 7	9. 5 10. 4 11. 1 12. 0 12. 6 14. 0 15. 2 16. 2 17. 3 18. 5	6. 2 6. 7 7. 1 7. 8 7. 9 8. 2 8. 6 9. 0 9. 3 10. 1	25. 4 26. 9 28. 7 30. 8 33. 2 35. 5 38. 6 41. 3 44. 3 48. 0
19 19 19 19 19	160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 P	325. 2 335. 2 355. 1 375. 0 401. 2 432. 8 466. 3 492. 3 536. 6 576. 0	45. 3 44. 2 49. 5 53. 9 59. 2 66. 3 70. 8 73. 0 83. 3 89. 6	20. 1 18. 4 22. 0 24. 3 25. 8 30. 3 30. 5 37. 0 40. 3	18. 9 19. 3 20. 5 22. 2 25. 0 26. 9 29. 9 31. 3 34. 2 35. 9	6. 3 6. 5 6. 9 7. 5 8. 5 9. 1 10. 5 11. 2 12. 1 13. 4	151. 3 155. 9 162. 6 168. 6 178. 7 191. 1 206. 9 215. 1 230. 6 243. 8	80, 5 82, 9 85, 7 88, 2 92, 9 98, 8 105, 8 108, 1 115, 0 120, 0	27. 3 27. 9 29. 6 30. 6 33. 5 35. 9 40. 3 42. 5 46. 3 49. 9	12. 3 12. 4 12. 9 13. 5 14. 0 15. 3 16. 6 17. 7 19. 1 21. 3	31. 2 32. 7 34. 4 36. 3 38. 2 41. 1 44. 4 46. 8 50. 1 52. 7	128. 7 135. 1 143. 0 152. 4 163. 3 175. 5 188. 6 204. 2 222. 8 242. 5	46. 3 48. 7 52. 0 55. 4 59. 3 63. 5 67. 5 71. 8 77. 4 83. 7	20. 0 20. 8 22. 0 23. 1 24. 3 25. 6 27. 1 29. 1 31. 2 33. 5	10, 8 10, 6 11, 0 11, 4 11, 6 12, 6 13, 6 14, 7 16, 1 17, 5	51. 6 54. 9 58. 0 62. 5 68. 1 73. 8 80. 4 88. 6 98. 1 107. 8
							Sea	sonally	adjusted	1 annua	l rates					
19	967 : 1 11. 111 1V.	495. /	70. 0 73. 5 73. 3 75. 2	28. 4 31. 3 30. 9 31. 2	30. 7 31. 2 31. 2 32. 2	10.9 11.0 11.2 11.7	213. 2 214. 4 215. 8 216. 8	107. 8 107. 6 108. 1 108. 9	41. 7 42. 6 42. 9 42. 7	17. 3 17. 5 17. 9 18. 1	46. 4 46. 7 46. 8 47. 1	197. 7 201. 8 206. 6 210. 6	70. 1 71. 1 72. 3 73. 7	28. 2 29. 0 29. 3 30. 1	14. 4 14. 5 14. 8 15. 0	85. 0 87. 2 90. 3 91. 8
19	968: I. II. III IV.	520. 6 530. 3 544. 9 550. 7	79. 5 81. 8 85. 8 86. 3	34. 8 35. 6 38. 6 39. 0	33. 4 33. 8 35. 0 34. 6	11. 3 12. 4 12. 1 12. 8	226. 1 228. 5 233. 3 234. 3	112.6 114.8 116.1 116.4	45. 0 45. 6 47. 4 47. 3	18. 9 18. 8 19. 5 19. 5	49. 6 49. 4 50. 3 51. 1	215. 1 220. 0 225. 8 230. 1	75. 2 76. 7 77. 9 79. 8	30, 5 30, 7 31, 6 31, 9	15. 5 15. 9 16. 3 16. 5	93. 8 96. 7 100. 0 101. 8
19	969 : 1 	579, 8	88. 4 90. 6 89. 8 89. 6	39. 4 40. 0 40. 8 40. 9	35. 5 36. 8 35. 8 35. 6	13. 6 13. 8 13. 2 13. 1	238. 6 242. 1 245. 1 249. 4	118. 4 119. 1 119. 9 122. 6	48. 1 50. 0 50. 8 50. 6	20. 4 21. 0 21. 8 22. 0	51. 8 52. 0 52. 7 54. 2	235. 0 240. 1 244. 9 250. 2	81. 3 82. 8 84. 4 86. 3	32.7 33.1 33.9 34.2	17. 1 17. 3 17. 7 17. 9	103. 9 106. 9 108. 8 111. 8
-																

¹ Includes standard clothing issued to military personnel.
2 Includes imputed rental value of owner-occupied dwellings.

⁻ Includes imputed tental value of owner-occupied awarings.

TABLE C-11.—Gross private domestic investment, 1929-69
[Billions of dollars]

					Fixed	l investm	ent				busi	ge in ness tories
.	Total gross			No	nresident	ial		Reside	ntial str	uctures	1	
Year or quarter	private domestic invest- ment	Total	Totai	Struc	tures	Produ dura equip	ble	Total	Non- farm	Farm	Total	Non- farm
				Total	Non- farm	Total	Non- farm		taini			
1929	16.2	14. 5	10.6	5. 0	4. 8	5. 6	4. 9	4.0	3. 8	0. 2	1.7	1.8
1930	5.6 1.0 1.4 3.3 6.4 8.5 11.8	10.6 6.8 3.4 3.0 4.1 5.3 7.2 9.2 7.4 8.9	8. 3 5. 0 2. 7 2. 4 3. 2 4. 1 5. 6 7. 3 5. 4 5. 9	4. 0 2. 3 1. 2 . 9 1. 0 1. 2 1. 6 2. 4 1. 9 2. 0	3.9 2.3 1.2 .9 1.0 1.2 1.6 2.4 1.8	4.3 2.7 1.5 1.5 2.2 2.9 4.0 4.9 3.5	3.7 2.4 1.3 1.3 1.8 2.4 3.3 4.1 2.9 3.4	2.3 1.7 .7 .6 .9 1.2 1.6 1.9 2.0	2.2 1.6 .7 .5 .8 1.1 1.5 1.8 1.9 2.8	.1 .1 * .1 .1 .1 .1	4 -1.1 -2.5 -1.6 7 1.1 2.5 9	1 -1.6 -2.6 -1.4 .2 .4 2.1 1.7 -1.0
1940	17. 9 9. 8 5. 7 7. 1 10. 6 30. 6 34. 0 46. 0	11. 0 13. 4 8. 1 6. 4 8. 1 11. 6 24. 2 34. 4 41. 3 38. 8	7. 5 9. 5 6. 0 5. 0 6. 8 10. 1 17. 0 23. 4 26. 9 25. 1	2.3 2.9 1.9 1.3 1.8 2.8 6.8 7.5 8.8 8.5	2.2 2.8 1.8 1.2 1.7 2.7 6.1 6.7 8.0 7.7	5. 3 6. 6 4. 1 3. 7 5. 0 7. 3 10. 2 15. 9 18. 1 16. 6	4. 6 5. 6 3. 5 3. 2 4. 2 6. 3 9. 2 14. 0 15. 5 13. 7	3. 4 3. 9 2. 1 1. 4 1. 3 1. 5 7. 2 11. 1 14. 4 13. 7	3. 2 3. 7 1. 9 1. 2 1. 1 1. 4 6. 7 10. 4 13. 6 12. 8	.2 .2 .2 .11	2.2 4.5 1.8 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 6.4 5 4.7 -3.1	1.9 4.0 -7 6 6 6 6.4 1.3 3.0 -2.2
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	59. 3 51. 9 52. 6 51. 7 67. 4 70. 0 67. 8 60. 9	47. 3 49. 0 48. 8 52. 1 53. 3 61. 4 65. 3 66. 5 62. 4 70. 5	27. 9 31. 8 31. 6 34. 2 33. 6 38. 1 43. 7 46. 4 41. 6 45. 1	9. 2 11. 2 11. 4 12. 7 13. 1 14. 3 17. 2 18. 0 16. 6 16. 7	8. 5 10. 4 10. 5 11. 9 12. 3 13. 6 16. 5 17. 2 15. 8 15. 9	18.7 20.7 20.2 21.5 20.6 23.8 26.5 28.4 25.0 28.4	15. 7 17. 7 17. 6 18. 6 18. 0 21. 2 24. 2 25. 9 22. 0 25. 4	19.40 17.2 17.2 18.0 19.7 23.3 21.6 20.2 20.8 25.5	18.6 16.4 16.4 17.2 19.0 22.7 20.9 19.5 20.1 24.8	.88 .88 .77 .66	6.8 10.3 3.1 -1.5 6.0 4.7 1.3 -1.5 4.8	6. 0 9. 1 2. 1 1. 1 -2. 1 5. 5 5. 1 -2. 3 -2. 3
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 p	74. 8 71. 7 83. 0 87. 1 94. 0 108. 1 121. 4 116. 0 126. 3 139. 6	71. 3 69. 7 77. 0 81. 3 88. 2 98. 5 106. 6 108. 6 119. 0 131. 5	48. 4 47. 0 51. 7 54. 3 61. 1 71. 3 81. 6 83. 7 88. 8 99. 3	18. 1 18. 4 19. 2 19. 5 21. 2 25. 5 27. 9 29. 3 33. 4	17. 4 17. 7 18. 5 18. 8 20. 5 24. 9 27. 8 27. 2 28. 6 32. 6	30, 3 28, 6 32, 5 34, 8 39, 9 45, 8 53, 1 55, 7 59, 5 65, 9	27. 7 25. 8 29. 4 31. 2 36. 3 41. 6 48. 4 50. 9 54. 6 61. 4	22. 8 22. 6 25. 3 27. 0 27. 1 27. 2 25. 0 25. 0 30. 2 32. 2	22. 2 22. 0 24. 8 26. 4 26. 6 26. 7 24. 5 24. 4 29. 6 31. 7	.66.66 .65.55 .55.65 .55	3. 6 2. 0 6. 0 5. 9 5. 8 9. 6 14. 8 7. 4 7. 3 8. 0	3. 3 1. 7 5. 3 5. 1 6. 4 8. 6 15. 0 6. 8 7. 8
	-				Seasona	lly adjust	ed annu	al rates				
1967: 	117.7	104. 7 106. 1 109. 9 113. 8	83. 3 83. 0 83. 5 85. 0	29. 0 27. 2 27. 8 27. 8	28. 3 26. 4 27. 0 27. 0	54. 2 55. 8 55. 7 57. 2	49. 6 50. 9 50. 8 52. 3	21. 4 23. 1 26. 5 28. 8	20. 9 22. 5 25. 9 28. 3	0.6 .6 .6	9. 0 3. 4 7. 8 9. 5	9. 1 3. 0 7. 0 8. 0
1968: I II IV	119.4	117. 7 116. 7 118. 0 123. 4	89. 1 86. 4 88. 1 91. 5	29. 8 28. 3 29. 0 30. 1	29. 0 27. 6 28. 3 29. 3	59. 4 58. 1 59. 1 61. 4	54. 2 53. 1 54. 3 56. 7	28. 6 30. 3 29. 9 31. 9	28. 0 29. 7 29. 4 31. 4	.6 .6 .5	1.6 9.9 7.2 10.5	1.3 10.3 7.5 10.7
1969; V p	135. 2 137. 4 143. 3	128. 6 130. 5 132. 5 134. 5	95. 3 97. 8 101. 1 103. 0	32. 3 32. 1 34. 7 34. 4	31. 6 31. 4 34. 0 33. 6	63. 0 65. 7 66. 4 68. 6	58. 7 61. 0 62. 4 63. 6	33. 3 32. 7 31. 4 31. 6	32. 8 32. 2 30. 9 31. 0	.5 .5 .5	6. 6 6. 9 10. 7 7. 8	6. 6 6. 7 10. 3 7. 6

Table C-12.—National income by type of income, 1929-69 [Billions of dollars]

			pensatio mployee:			ness and sional inc		In-	Rental	an	porate p d invent valuation djustme	tory n	
Year or quarter	Total na- tional in- come ¹	Total	Wages and sala- ries	Supple- ple- ments to wages and sala- ries 2	Total	In- come of unin- corpo- rated enter- prises	Inven- tory valu- ation adjust- ment	come of farm pro- prie- tors 3	in- come of per- sons	Total	Corpo- rate profits before taxes 4	Inven- tory valu- ation adjust- ment	Net inter- est
1929	86. 8	51. 1	50. 4	0. 7	9. 0	8. 8	0.1	6. 2	5. 4	10. 5	10.0	0. 5	4.7
1930	75. 4 59. 7 42. 8 40. 3 49. 5 57. 2 65. 0 73. 6 67. 4 72. 6	46. 8 39. 8 31. 1 29. 5 34. 3 37. 3 42. 9 47. 9 45. 0 48. 1	46. 2 39. 1 30. 5 29. 0 33. 7 36. 7 41. 9 46. 1 43. 0 45. 9	.7 .6 .5 .6 1.0 1.8 2.0 2.2	7.6 5.8 3.6 3.7 5.5 6.7 7.4	6.8 5.1 3.9 4.8 5.8 7.6 7.6	.8 .6 .3 5 1 1 1	4. 3 3. 4 2. 6 3. 0 5. 3 4. 0 4. 4	4.8 3.8 2.7 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.6	7. 0 2. 0 -1. 3 -1. 2 1. 7 3. 4 5. 6 4. 9 6. 3	3.7 -2.3 1.0 2.3 3.6 6.3 6.8 4.0 7.0	3.3 2.4 1.0 -2.1 6 2 7	4. 9 5. 0 4. 6 4. 1 4. 1 3. 8 3. 7 3. 6 3. 5
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949	181.9	52. 1 64. 8 85. 3 109. 5 121. 2 123. 1 117. 9 128. 9 141. 1 141. 0	49. 8 62. 1 82. 1 105. 8 116. 7 117. 5 112. 0 123. 0 135. 4 134. 5	2. 3 2. 7 3. 2 3. 8 4. 5 5. 6 5. 9 5. 9 5. 8 6. 5	8. 6 11. 1 14. 0 17. 0 18. 2 19. 2 21. 6 20. 3 22. 7 22. 6	8. 6 11. 7 14. 4 17. 1 18. 3 19. 3 23. 3 21. 8 23. 1 22. 2	6 4 2 1 17 -1.7 -1.5 4	4. 5 6. 4 9. 8 11. 7 11. 6 12. 2 14. 9 15. 2 17. 5 12. 7	2. 9 3. 5 4. 5 5. 1 5. 4 5. 6 6. 6 7. 1 8. 0 8. 4	9. 8 15. 2 20. 3 24. 4 23. 8 19. 2 19. 3 25. 6 33. 0 30. 8	10. 0 17. 7 21. 5 25. 1 24. 1 19. 7 24. 6 31. 5 35. 2 28. 9	2 -2.5 -1.2 8 6 -5.3 -5.9 -2.2 1.9	3. 3 3. 2 3. 1 2. 7 2. 3 2. 2 1. 5 1. 9 1. 8 1. 9
1950	278, 0 291, 4 304, 7 303, 1 331, 0 350, 8 366, 1 367, 8	154.6 180.7 195.3 209.1 208.0 224.5 243.1 256.0 257.8 279.1	146. 8 171. 1 185. 1 198. 3 196. 5 211. 3 227. 8 238. 7 239. 9 258. 2	7.8 9.6 10.2 10.9 11.5 13.2 15.2 17.3 17.9 20.9	24. 0 26. 1 27. 1 27. 5 27. 6 30. 3 31. 3 32. 8 33. 2 35. 1	25. 1 26. 5 26. 9 27. 6 27. 6 30. 5 31. 8 33. 1 33. 2 35. 3	-1.1 3 2 2 5 3 1 1	13. 5 15. 8 15. 0 13. 0 12. 4 11. 4 11. 3 13. 4 11. 4	9. 4 10. 3 11. 5 12. 7 13. 6 13. 9 14. 3 14. 8 15. 4	37. 7 42. 7 39. 9 39. 6 38. 0 46. 9 46. 1 45. 6 41. 1 51. 7	42. 6 43. 9 38. 9 40. 6 38. 3 48. 6 48. 8 47. 2 41. 4 52. 1	-5.0 -1.2 1.0 -1.0 3 -1.7 -2.7 -1.5 3 5	2. 0 2. 3 2. 6 2. 8 3. 6 4. 1 4. 6 5. 6 6. 8 7. 1
1960 1961 1962 1963 1965 1966 1967 1968	427. 3 457. 7 481. 9 518. 1 564. 3 620. 6 654. 0 714. 4	294. 2 302. 6 323. 6 341. 0 365. 7 393. 8 435. 5 467. 4 513. 6 564. 2	270. 8 278. 1 296. 1 311. 1 333. 7 358. 9 394. 5 423. 5 465. 0 509. 8	23. 4 24. 6 27. 5 29. 9 32. 0 41. 0 43. 9 48. 6 54. 4	34. 2 35. 6 37. 1 37. 9 40. 2 42. 4 45. 2 47. 2 49. 2 50. 2	34. 3 35. 6 37. 1 37. 9 40. 3 42. 8 45. 6 47. 5 49. 9 51. 1	1 4 3 7 9	12. 0 12. 8 13. 0 13. 1 12. 1 14. 8 16. 1 14. 6 16. 1	15. 8 16. 0 16. 7 17. 1 18. 0 19. 0 20. 0 20. 8 21. 2 21. 6	49. 9 50. 3 55. 7 58. 9 66. 3 76. 1 82. 4 79. 2 87. 9 88. 7	49. 7 50. 3 55. 4 59. 4 66. 8 77. 8 84. 2 80. 3 91. 1 94. 3	1 3 5 -1.7 -1.8 -1.1 -3.2 -5.6	8. 4 10. 0 11. 6 13. 8 15. 8 18. 2 21. 4 24. 7 28. 0 30. 6
					Seaso	nally adj	usted an	nual rate	s				
1967: V	646.2	456. 2 461. 1 470. 7 481. 7	413. 2 417. 7 426. 5 436. 5	43. 0 43. 4 44. 2 45. 1	46. 5 47. 1 47. 8 47. 5			14. 3 14. 7 14. 8 14. 9	20. 6 20. 8 20. 9 21. 0	78. 3 78. 3 79. 1 81. 1	78. 4 79. 1 79. 5 84. 4	-0.1 7 4 -3.3	23. 5 24. 3 25. 1 25. 9
1968: I II IV	707.4	495. 1 507. 0 519. 8 532. 3	448. 2 459. 0 470. 7 482. 1	47. 0 48. 0 49. 1 50. 2	48. 4 49. 2 49. 3 49. 7			14. 8 14. 3 14. 8 14. 4	21. 1 21. 2 21. 2 21. 4	82. 5 88. 2 90. 6 90. 3	87. 9 90. 7 91. 5 94. 5	-5.3 -2.6 9 -4.2	26. 7 27. 5 28. 4 29. 3
1969: I II III IV »	780.6	546. 0 558. 2 571. 9 580. 9	493. 3 504. 3 516. 9 524. 8	52. 7 53. 8 55. 0 56. 1	49. 7 50. 1 50. 5 50. 4			14. 9 16. 4 16. 8 16. 3	21. 5 21. 6 21. 7 21. 8	89. 5 89. 2 88. 8	95. 5 95. 4 92. 5	-6. 1 -6. 2 -3. 7 -6. 4	29, 8 30, 3 30, 9 31, 6

¹ National income is the total net income earned in production. It differs from gross national product mainly in that it excludes depreciation charges and other allowances for business and institutional consumption of durable capital goods, and indirect business taxes. See Table C-13.

2 Employer contributions for social insurance and to private pension, health, and welfare funds; compensation for injuries; directors' fees; pay of the military reserve; and a few other minor items.

3 Includes change in inventories.

4 See Table C-71 for corporate tax liability and profifs after taxes.

TABLE C-13.—Relation of gross national product and national income, 1929-69
[Billions of dollars]

			* *	Plus: Sub-			Less:			
	Gross na-	Less: Capital con-	Equals: Net na-	sidies less current	Indired	t business	taxes	Busi-	Sta-	Equals: Na-
Year or quarter	tional prod- uct	sump- tion allow- ances	tional prod- uct	surplus of gov- ern- ment enter- prises	Total	Federal	State and local	ness transfer pay- ments	tistical dis- crep- ancy	tional income
1929	103. 1	7. 9	95. 2	-0.1	7. 0	1. 2	5, 8	0, 6	0. 7	86. 8
930 931 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 936 937 938 939 939 938	90. 4 75. 8 58. 0 55. 6 65. 1 72. 2 82. 5 90. 4 84. 7 90. 5	8. 0 7. 9 7. 4 7. 0 6. 8 6. 9 7. 0 7. 2 7. 3	82. 4 68. 0 50. 7 48. 6 58. 2 65. 4 75. 4 83. 3 77. 4 83. 2	1 * * .3 .4 * .1 .2 .5	7. 2 6. 9 6. 8 7. 1 7. 8 8. 7 9. 2 9. 2 9. 4	1. 0 . 9 1. 6 2. 2 2. 2 2. 3 2. 4 2. 2 2. 3	6. 1 6. 8 5. 4 5. 6 6. 4 6. 9 7. 0	.56 .77 .66 .66 .44	8 .7 .3 .6 2 1.2	75. 4 59. 1 42. 8 40. 3 49. 1 57. 6 65. 0 73. 0
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1946 1947 1948	99. 7 124. 5 157. 9 191. 6 210. 1 211. 9 208. 5 231. 3 257. 6 256. 5	7. 5 8. 2 9. 8 10. 2 11. 0 11. 3 9. 9 12. 2 14. 5 16. 6	92. 2 116. 3 148. 1 181. 3 199. 1 200. 7 198. 6 219. 1 243. 1 239. 9	.4 .1 .2 .7 .8 .9 2 1	10. 0 11. 3 11. 8 12. 7 14. 1 15. 5 17. 1 18. 4 20. 1 21. 3	2.6 3.6 4.0 4.9 6.2 7.1 7.8 7.8 8.0 8.0	7. 4 7. 7 7. 7 7. 8 8. 0 8. 4 9. 3 10. 6 12. 1 13. 3	.45.55.55.55.66.78	1.0 -4 -1.1 -2.0 2.5 3.9 -1 -2.0 3	81. 104. 137. 170. 182. 181. 181. 199. 224.
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957	284. 8 328. 4 345. 5 364. 6 364. 8 398. 0 419. 2 441. 1 447. 3 483. 7	18. 3 21. 2 23. 2 25. 7 28. 2 31. 5 34. 1 37. 1 38. 9 41. 4	266. 4 307. 2 322. 3 338. 9 336. 6 366. 5 385. 2 404. 0 408. 4 442. 3	.2 1 4 2 1 .8 .9	23. 3 25. 2 27. 6 29. 6 29. 4 32. 1 34. 9 37. 3 38. 5 41. 5	8.9 9.4 10.3 10.9 9.7 10.7 11.2 11.8 11.5	14. 5 15. 8 17. 3 18. 7 19. 7 21. 4 23. 6 25. 5 27. 0 28. 9	.8 .9 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.5	1.5 3.3 2.2 3.0 2.7 2.1 -1.1 *	241. 278. 291. 304. 303. 331. 350. 366. 367. 400.
1960	503. 7 520. 1 560. 3 590. 5 632. 4 684. 9 749. 9 793. 5 865. 7 932. 3	43. 4 45. 2 50. 0 52. 6 56. 1 59. 8 63. 9 68. 6 73. 3 77. 9	460. 3 474. 9 510. 4 537. 9 576. 3 625. 1 685. 9 725. 0 792. 4 854. 4	1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 2.3 1.4 8	45. 2 47. 7 51. 5 54. 7 58. 4 62. 5 65. 7 70. 1 77. 9 86. 6	13. 5 13. 6 14. 6 15. 3 16. 1 16. 5 15. 7 16. 3 18. 8	31. 7 34. 1 36. 9 39. 4 42. 3 45. 9 49. 9 53. 8 59. 9 67. 8	1. 9 2. 0 2. 1 2. 3 2. 5 2. 7 3. 0 3. 2 3. 4	-1.0 8 3 -1.3 -3.1 -1.0 -1.0 -2.5 -6.2	414. 427. 457. 481. 518. 564. 620. 654. 714.
				Seasoi	nally adju	sted annua	al rates			
1967: I	774. 2 783. 5 800. 4 816. 1	66. 8 67. 9 69. 2 70. 4	. 707. 4 715. 6 731. 2 745. 7	1.7 1.2 1.4 1.2	67. 9 69. 2 70. 8 72. 7	15. 9 16. 2 16. 5 16. 7	52. 0 53. 0 54. 3 55. 9	3. 1 3. 2 3. 2 3. 3	-1.2 -1.7 .1 -1.1	639. 646. 658. 672.
1968: † V	835.3	71. 7 73. 0 73. 7 74. 6	763. 6 785. 6 802. 6 817. 9	.6 .7 1.1	73. 9 77. 0 79. 4 81. 4	17. 4 17. 9 18. 3 18. 5	56. 5 59. 2 61. 1 62. 9	3. 3 3. 4 3. 4 3. 5	-1.8 -1.6 -3.3 -3.4	688. 707. 724. 737.
1969: I	1	75. 9 77. 2 78. 6 79. 9	832. 8 847. 6 864. 2 873. 2		83. 3 85. 7 88. 0 89. 3	18. 5 18. 6 19. 1 18. 9	64. 8 67. 1 68. 9 70. 4	3. 5 3. 6 3. 6 3. 6	-4.2 -6.5 -6.9	751. 765. 780.

Table C-14.—Relation of national income and personal income, 1929-69
[Billions of dollars]

	i		Less:			Plus:			Equals:
Year or quarter	National income	Corpo- rate profits and in- ventory valuation adjust- ment	Contri- butions for social insur- ance	Wage accruals less dis- burse- ments	Gov- ernment transfer payments to per- sons	Interest paid by govern- ment (net) and by consumers	Divi- dends	Busi- ness transfer pay- ments	Persona income
1929	86.8	10.5	0. 2	0.0	0.9	2.5	5.8	0.6	85. 9
1930	75. 4 59. 7 42. 8 40. 3 49. 5 57. 2 65. 0 73. 6 67. 4 72. 6	7. 0 2. 0 -1. 3 -1. 2 1. 7 3. 4 5. 6 6. 8 4. 9 6. 3	.3 .3 .3 .3 .6 1.8 2.0 2.1	.00	1. 0 2. 1 1. 4 1. 5 1. 6 1. 8 2. 9 1. 9 2. 4 2. 5	1. 8 1. 8 1. 7 1. 6 1. 7 1. 7 1. 7 1. 9 1. 9	5. 5 4. 1 2. 5 2. 0 2. 6 2. 8 4. 5 4. 7 3. 2 3. 8	.5 .6 .7 .6 .6 .6	77. 0 65. 9 50. 2 47. 0 54. 0 60. 4 68. 6 74. 1 68. 3 72. 8
1940	81. 1 104. 2 137. 1 170. 3 182. 6 181. 5 181. 9 199. 0 224. 2 217. 5	9. 8 15. 2 20. 3 24. 4 23. 8 19. 2 19. 3 25. 6 33. 0 30. 8	2.3 2.85 3.55 4.2 6.0 5.7 5.27	.0 .0 .0 .2 2 .0 .0	2. 7 2. 6 2. 6 2. 5 3. 1 5. 6 10. 8 11. 1 10. 5 11. 6	2. 1 2. 2 2. 2 2. 6 3. 3 4. 2 5. 2 5. 5 6. 1 6. 5	4. 0 4. 4 4. 3 4. 6 4. 6 5. 6 7. 0 7. 2	.45.55 .55.55 .55.67 .8	78. 3 96. 0 122. 9 151. 3 165. 3 171. 1 178. 7 191. 3 210. 2 207. 2
1950	241. 1 278. 0 291. 4 304. 7 303. 1 331. 0 350. 8 366. 1 367. 8 400. 0	37. 7 42. 7 39. 9 39. 6 38. 0 46. 9 46. 1 45. 6 41. 1 51. 7	6. 9 8. 2 8. 7 8. 8 9. 8 11. 1 12. 6 14. 5 14. 8 17. 6	.0 .1 .0 1 .0 .0 .0	14. 3 11. 5 12. 0 12. 8 14. 9 16. 1 17. 1 19. 9 24. 1 24. 9	7. 2 7. 6 8. 1 9. 0 9. 5 10. 1 11. 2 12. 0 12. 1 13. 6	8. 8 8. 6 8. 9 9. 3 10. 5 11. 3 11. 7 11. 6 12. 6	.8 .9 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.6	227. 6 252. 5 288. 2 290. 1 310. 9 333. 0 351. 1 361. 2 383. 5
1960. 1961. 1962. 1963. 1964. 1965. 1966. 1967. 1968.	414. 5 427. 3 457. 7 481. 9 518. 1 5620. 6 654. 0 714. 4 771. 5	49. 9 50. 3 55. 7 58. 9 66. 3 76. 1 82. 4 79. 2 87. 9 88. 7	20. 7 21. 4 24. 0 26. 9 27. 9 29. 6 38. 0 42. 4 47. 0 54. 4	.0	26. 6 30. 4 31. 2 33. 0 34. 2 37. 2 41. 1 48. 8 55. 8 61. 9	15. 1 15. 0 16. 1 17. 6 19. 1 20. 5 22. 2 23. 6 26. 1 28. 7	13. 4 13. 8 15. 2 16. 5 17. 8 20. 8 21. 5 23. 1 24. 6	1.9 2.01 2.3 2.5 2.7 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.6	401. 0 416. 0 442. 6 465. 5 497. 5 538. 9 587. 2 629. 4 687. 9 747. 1
			Seas	onally adj	usted annua	l rates			
1967: 	639. 3 646. 2 658. 5 672. 0	78. 3 78. 3 79. 1 81. 1	41. 1 42. 0 42. 8 43. 7	0. 0 . 0 . 0	47. 6 48. 4 49. 0 50. 0	23. 4 23. 0 23. 6 24. 3	21. 1 21. 7 22. 0 21. 1	3. 1 3. 2 3. 2 3. 3	615. 2 622. 2 634. 5 645. 9
1968: I II III IV	688. 8 707. 4 724. 1 737. 3	82. 5 88. 2 90. 6 90. 3	45, 4 46, 5 47, 6 48, 6	.0 .0 .0	52. 9 55. 3 56. 7 58. 1	25. 0 25. 7 26. 4 27. 4	22. 2 22. 9 23. 6 23. 8	3, 3 3, 4 3, 4 3, 5	664. 3 680. 1 696. 1 711. 2
1969: ! 	l	89, 5 89, 2 88, 8	52. 7 53. 8 55. 1 56. 1	.0 .0 .0	60. 1 61. 3 62. 5 63. 6	27. 9 28. 5 28. 9 29. 5	23. 8 24. 3 24. 9 25. 2	3, 5 3, 6 3, 6 3, 6	724. 4 740. 5 756. 5 766. 9

TABLE C-15.—Disposition of personal income, 1929-69

				L	ess: Pers	onal outla	ys		Perce per	nt of dispo rsonal inco	sable me
Year or quarter	Per- sonal	Less: Per- sonal tax and	Equals: Dispos- able per-		Per- sonal con-	Interest	Per- sonal transfer	Equals: Per- sonal		sonal lays	Per-
quertor	income	nontax pay- ments	sonal income	Total	sump- tion expend- itures	paid by con- sumers	pay- ments to for- eigners	saving	Total	Con- sump- tion expend- itures	sonal saving
				Billions	of dollars					Percent	
1929	85. 9	2.6	83.3	79. 1	77. 2	1.5	0.3	4.2	95. 0	92. 7	5. 0
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939	77. 0 65. 9 50. 2 47. 0 54. 0 60. 4 68. 6 74. 1 68. 3 72. 8	2. 5 1. 9 1. 5 1. 6 1. 9 2. 3 2. 9 2. 9 2. 4	74. 5 64. 0 48. 7 45. 5 52. 4 58. 5 66. 3 71. 2 65. 5 70. 3	71. 1 61. 4 49. 3 46. 5 52. 0 56. 4 62. 7 67. 4 64. 8 67. 7	69. 9 60. 5 48. 6 45. 8 51. 3 55. 7 61. 9 66. 5 63. 9 66. 8	.9 .7 .5 .5 .5 .6 .7	.3 .3 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2	3.4 2.6 6 9 .4 2.1 3.6 3.8 .7 2.6	95. 4 95. 9 101. 3 102. 0 99. 3 96. 3 94. 6 94. 7 98. 9 96. 3	93. 8 94. 4 99. 8 100. 6 98. 0 95. 2 93. 3 93. 4 97. 6 95. 0	4. 6 4. 1 -1. 3 -2. 0 . 7 3. 7 5. 4 5. 3 1. 1
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948	96. 0 122. 9 151. 3 165. 3 171. 1 178. 7 191. 3 210. 2	2.6 3.3 6.0 17.8 18.9 20.9 18.7 21.4 21.1	75. 7 92. 7 116. 9 133. 5 146. 3 150. 2 160. 0 169. 8 189. 1 188. 6	71.8 81.7 89.3 100.1 109.1 120.7 144.8 162.5 175.8 179.2	70. 8 80. 6 88. 5 99. 3 108. 3 119. 7 143. 4 160. 7 173. 6 176. 8	.8 .9 .7 .5 .5 .8 1.1 1.5 1.9	.2 .2 .1 .2 .4 .5 .7 .7	3.8 11.0 27.6 33.4 37.3 29.6 15.2 7.3 13.4 9.4	94. 9 88. 2 76. 4 75. 5 80. 3 90. 5 95. 7 92. 9 95. 0	93. 6 86. 9 75. 7 74. 4 74. 0 79. 7 89. 6 91. 8 93. 8	5. 1 11. 8 23. 6 25. 0 25. 9 19. 7 9. 5 4. 3 7. 1
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	272. 5 288. 2 290. 1 310. 9 333. 0	20. 7 29. 0 34. 1 35. 6 32. 7 35. 5 39. 8 42. 6 42. 3 46. 2	206. 9 226. 6 238. 3 252. 6 257. 4 275. 3 293. 2 308. 5 318. 8 337. 3	193. 9 209. 3 220. 2 234. 3 241. 0 259. 5 272. 6 287. 8 296. 6 318. 3	191. 0 206. 3 216. 7 230. 0 236. 5 254. 4 266. 7 281. 4 290. 1 311. 2	2. 4 2. 7 3. 0 3. 8 4. 0 4. 7 5. 4 5. 9 6. 5	. 54 . 45 . 55 . 66 . 66	13. 1 17. 3 18. 1 18. 3 16. 4 15. 8 20. 6 20. 7 22. 3 19. 1	93. 7 92. 4 92. 4 92. 8 93. 6 94. 3 93. 0 93. 3 93. 0 94. 4	92. 3 91. 0 90. 9 91. 1 91. 9 92. 4 91. 0 91. 2 91. 0 92. 3	6. 3 7. 6 7. 6 7. 2 6. 7 7. 0 6. 7
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1967 1968 1969 p	442.6 465.5 497.5 538.9 587.2 629.4	50. 9 52. 4 57. 4 60. 9 59. 4 65. 7 75. 4 82. 9 97. 9 117. 5	350. 0 364. 4 385. 3 404. 6 438. 1 473. 2 511. 9 546. 5 590. 0 629. 6	333. 0 343. 3 363. 7 384. 7 411. 9 444. 8 479. 3 506. 2 551. 6 592. 0	325. 2 335. 2 355. 1 375. 0 401. 2 432. 8 466. 3 492. 3 536. 6 576. 0	7. 3 7. 6 8. 1 9. 1 10. 1 11. 3 12. 4 13. 1 14. 2 15. 3	.55 .55 .66 .76 .88 .87	17. 0 21. 2 21. 6 19. 9 26. 2 28. 4 32. 5 40. 4 38. 4 37. 6	95. 1 94. 2 94. 4 95. 1 94. 0 94. 0 93. 6 93. 5 94. 0	92. 9 92. 0 92. 2 92. 7 91. 6 91. 5 91. 1 90. 1 91. 0	4. 9 5. 8 5. 9 6. 0 6. 4 7. 4 6. 0 6. 0
			Seaso	nally adju	isted annu	al rates					
1967: I II III IV	634.5	80. 8 80. 6 84. 1 86. 1	534. 4 541. 6 550. 3 559. 8	494. 5 503. 9 509. 7 516. 6	480. 9 489. 8 495. 7 502. 6	12. 9 13. 0 13. 2 13. 4	0.6 1.1 .7 .6	40. 0 37. 7 40. 7 43. 1	92. 5 93. 0 92. 6 92. 3	90. 0 90. 4 90. 1 89. 8	7. 5 7. 0 7. 4 7. 7
1968: 	664. 3 680. 1 696. 1	89. 3 92. 7 102. 6 107. 0	575. 0 587. 4 593. 4 604. 3	535. 1 545. 1 560. 2 566. 2	520. 6 530. 3 544. 9 550. 7	13. 7 14. 0 14. 4 14. 7	.7 .7 .8 .7	39. 9 42. 3 33. 2 38. 0	93. 1 92. 8 94. 4 93. 7	90. 5 90. 3 91. 8 91. 1	6. 9 7. 2 5. 6 6. 3
1969: I II IV P.	740. 5 756. 5	114. 2 118. 5 117. 5 119. 8	610, 2 622, 0 639, 0 647, 1	577. 7 588. 8 596. 0 605. 5	562. 0 572. 8 579. 8 589. 2	15. 0 15. 2 15. 4 15. 5	.7 .7 .8 .7	32. 5 33. 3 43. 1 41. 6	94. 7 94. 7 93. 3 93. 6	92. 1 92. 1 90. 7 91. 1	5. 3 5. 3 6. 7 6. 4

Table C-16.—Total and per capita disposable personal income and personal consumption expenditures, in current and 1958 prices, 1929-69

	Disp	osable pe	rsonal incom	ie	Persona	l consump	tion expend	itures	
Year or quarter	Total (b	illions ars)	Per ca (dolla		Total (b of doll	illions ars)	Per ca (dolla		Popu- lation (thou-
	Current prices	1958 prices	Current prices	1958 prices	Current prices	1958 prices	Current prices	1958 prices	sands) 1
929	83. 3	150.6	683	1,236	77. 2	139.6	634	1, 145	121, 87
930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 937 938	74. 5 64. 0 48. 7 45. 5 52. 4 58. 5 66. 3 71. 2 65. 5 70. 3	139. 0 133. 7 115. 1 112. 2 120. 4 131. 8 148. 4 153. 1 143. 6 155. 9	605 516 390 362 414 459 518 552 504 537	1, 128 1, 077 921 893 952 1, 035 1, 158 1, 187 1, 105 1, 190	69. 9 60. 5 48. 6 45. 8 51. 3 55. 7 61. 9 66. 5 63. 9 66. 8	130. 4 126. 1 114. 8 112. 8 118. 1 125. 5 138. 4 143. 1 140. 2 148. 2	567 487 389 364 406 437 483 516 492 510	1, 059 1, 016 919 897 934 985 1, 080 1, 110 1, 079 1, 131	123, 188 124, 149 124, 949 125, 699 126, 489 127, 362 128, 181 128, 961 129, 969 131, 028
940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 947	116.9	166. 3 190. 3 213. 4 222. 8 231. 6 229. 7 227. 0 218. 0 229. 8 230. 8	573 695 867 976 1,057 1,074 1,132 1,178 1,290 1,264	1, 259 1, 427 1, 582 1, 629 1, 673 1, 642 1, 606 1, 513 1, 567 1, 547	70. 8 80. 6 88. 5 99. 3 108. 3 119. 7 143. 4 160. 7 173. 6 176. 8	155. 7 165. 4 161. 4 165. 8 171. 4 183. 0 203. 5 206. 3 210. 8 216. 5	536 604 656 726 782 855 1,014 1,115 1,184 1,185	1, 178 1, 240 1, 197 1, 213 1, 238 1, 308 1, 439 1, 431 1, 438 1, 451	132, 122 133, 402 134, 866 136, 739 138, 397 139, 928 141, 389 144, 126 146, 631 149, 188
950 951 952 952 953 954 955 955 957 957	206. 9 226. 6 238. 3 252. 6 257. 4 275. 3 293. 2 308. 5 318. 8 337. 3	249. 6 255. 7 263. 3 275. 4 278. 3 296. 7 309. 3 315. 8 318. 8 333. 0	1,364 1,469 1,518 1,583 1,585 1,666 1,743 1,801 1,831 1,905	1,646 1,657 1,678 1,726 1,714 1,795 1,839 1,844 1,831 1,881	191. 0 206. 3 216. 7 230. 0 236. 5 254. 4 266. 7 281. 4 290. 1 311. 2	230. 5 232. 8 239. 4 250. 8 255. 7 274. 2 281. 4 288. 2 290. 1 307. 3	1, 259 1, 337 1, 381 1, 441 1, 456 1, 539 1, 585 1, 643 1, 666 1, 758	1,520 1,509 1,525 1,572 1,575 1,659 1,673 1,683 1,666 1,735	151, 68 154, 28 156, 95 159, 56 162, 39 165, 27 168, 22 171, 27 174, 14 177, 07
960 961 962 963 964 965 966 966 986 987	350. 0 364. 4 385. 3 404. 6 438. 1 473. 2 511. 9 546. 5 590. 0 629. 6	340. 2 350. 7 367. 3 381. 3 407. 9 435. 0 458. 9 477. 7 497. 6 509. 4	1, 937 1, 983 2, 064 2, 136 2, 280 2, 432 2, 599 2, 745 2, 933 3, 098	1, 883 1, 909 1, 968 2, 013 2, 123 2, 235 2, 331 2, 399 2, 474 2, 507	325. 2 335. 2 355. 1 375. 0 401. 2 432. 8 466. 3 492. 3 536. 6 576. 0	316. 1 322. 5 338. 4 353. 3 373. 7 397. 7 418. 1 430. 3 452. 6 466. 0	1,800 1,824 1,902 1,980 2,088 2,224 2,368 2,472 2,668 2,834	1, 749 1, 755 1, 813 1, 865 1, 945 2, 044 2, 123 2, 161 2, 250 2, 293	180, 68- 183, 75- 186, 65- 189, 41- 192, 12- 194, 59- 196, 90- 199, 11- 201, 15- 203, 21-
			Seaso	nally adjus	sted annual i	rates			
967: I	534, 4 541, 6 550, 3 559, 8	471.6 476.0 479.4 483.7	2, 694 2, 724 2, 760 2, 799	2, 378 2, 394 2, 404 2, 419	480. 9 489. 8 495. 7 502. 6	424. 4 430. 5 431. 9 434. 3	2, 425 2, 463 2, 486 2, 513	2, 140 2, 165 2, 166 2, 172	198, 349 198, 849 199, 417 199, 996
968: 1	575. 0 587. 4 593. 4 604. 3	492. 1 497. 4 498. 9 502. 1	2, 869 2, 924 2, 946 2, 991	2, 455 2, 476 2, 477 2, 485	520. 6 530. 3 544. 9 550. 7	445. 6 449. 0 458. 2 457. 6	2, 597 2, 640 2, 705 2, 726	2, 223 2, 235 2, 275 2, 265	200, 425 200, 895 201, 450 202, 015
1969: I 11 11 11 11	610. 2 622. 0	502. 6 506. 2 514. 1 514. 5	3, 014 3, 065 3, 140 3, 171	2, 482 2, 494 2, 526 2, 521	562. 0 572. 8 579. 8 589. 2	462. 9 466. 2 466. 5 468. 5	2, 776 2, 822 2, 849 2, 887	2, 286 2, 297 2, 292 2, 295	202, 472 202, 964 203, 507 204, 093

¹ Population of the United States including Armed Forces overseas; includes Alaska and Hawaii beginning 1960. Annual data are for July 1; quarterly data are for middle of period, interpolated from monthly data.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Office of Business Economics and Bureau of the Census) and Council of Economic Advisers.

TABLE C-17.—Sources of personal income, 1929-69
[Billions of dollars]

			Wage a	and salary	disburser	nents 1			Propri inco	
Year or quarter	Total per- sonal income	Total	Comm prod indus	odity- ucing stries	Distrib- utive indus-	Service indus-	Gov- ern- ment	Other labor in- come t	Busi- ness and	Farm 2
			Total	Manu- factur- ing	tries	tries	ment		profes- sional	
929	85. 9	50. 4	21.5	16. 1	15.6	8. 4	4. 9	0.6	9. 0	6. 2
930 931 932 933 933 934 936 936 937 938 939	77. 0 65. 9 50. 2 47. 0 54. 0 60. 4 68. 6 74. 1 68. 3 72. 8	46. 2 39. 1 30. 5 29. 0 33. 7 36. 7 41. 9 46. 1 43. 0 45. 9	18. 5 14. 3 9. 9 9. 8 12. 1 13. 5 15. 8 18. 4 15. 3 17. 4	13. 8 10. 8 7. 7 7. 8 9. 6 10. 8 12. 4 14. 6 11. 8 13. 6	14. 5 12. 5 9. 8 8. 8 9. 9 10. 7 11. 8 13. 2 12. 6 13. 3	8. 0 7. 1 5. 8 5. 2 5. 7 5. 9 6. 5 7. 1 6. 8 7. 1	5. 2 5. 3 5. 0 5. 1 6. 5 7. 9 7. 5 8. 2	.6 .5 .4 .4 .5 .6 .6	7.6 5.8 3.3 4.7 5.5 6.7 7.2 6.9	4. 3 3. 4 2. 1 2. 6 3. 3 4. 3 6. 0 4. 4
940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 947	78. 3 96. 0 122. 9 151. 3 165. 3 171. 1 178. 7 191. 3 210. 2 207. 2	49. 8 62. 1 82. 1 105. 6 116. 9 117. 5 112. 0 123. 0 135. 3 134. 6	19. 7 27. 5 39. 1 48. 9 50. 3 45. 8 46. 0 54. 3 61. 0 57. 7	15. 6 21. 7 30. 9 40. 9 42. 9 38. 2 36. 5 42. 5 47. 2 44. 7	14. 2 16. 3 18. 0 20. 1 22. 7 24. 8 31. 0 35. 2 37. 6 37. 7	7. 5 8. 1 9. 0 9. 9 10. 9 12. 0 14. 4 16. 1 17. 9 18. 6	8. 4 10. 2 16. 0 26. 6 33. 0 34. 9 20. 7 17. 4 18. 9 20. 6	.7 .7 .9 1.1 1.5 1.8 1.9 2.3 2.7 3.0	8. 6 11. 1 14. 0 17. 0 18. 2 19. 2 21. 6 20. 3 22. 7 22. 6	4. 5 6. 4. 5 9. 8 11. 7 11. 6 12. 2 14. 9 15. 2 17. 5
950 951 952 953 954 955 955 955 955 957	227. 6 255. 6 272. 5 288. 2 290. 1 310. 9 333. 0 351. 1 361. 2 383. 5	146. 7 171. 0 185. 1 198. 3 196. 5 211. 3 227. 8 238. 7 239. 9 258. 2	64. 6 76. 1 81. 8 89. 4 92. 8 100. 2 103. 8 99. 7 109. 1	50. 3 59. 4 64. 2 67. 6 73. 9 79. 5 82. 5 78. 7 86. 9	39. 9 44. 3 46. 9 49. 8 50. 2 53. 4 57. 7 60. 5 60. 8 64. 8	19. 9 21. 7 23. 3 25. 1 26. 4 28. 9 31. 6 33. 9 35. 9 38. 7	22. 4 28. 9 33. 1 34. 6 36. 2 38. 3 40. 4 43. 5 45. 6	3. 8 4. 8 5. 3 6. 0 7. 3 8. 4 9. 5 9. 9	24. 0 26. 1 27. 1 27. 5 27. 6 30. 3 31. 3 32. 8 33. 2 35. 1	13. ! 15. ! 15. ! 13. ! 11. ! 11. !
1960	401. 0 416. 8 442. 6 465. 5 497. 5 538. 9 587. 2 629. 4 687. 9	270. 8 278. 1 296. 1 311. 1 333. 7 358. 9 394. 5 423. 5 465. 0 509. 8	112. 5 112. 8 120. 8 125. 7 134. 1 144. 5 159. 3 166. 5 181. 5 197. 7	89. 7 89. 8 96. 7 100. 6 107. 2 115. 6 128. 1 134. 2 145. 9	68. 1 69. 1 72. 5 76. 0 81. 2 86. 9 93. 8 100. 3 109. 2 119. 5	41. 5 44. 0 46. 8 49. 9 54. 1 58. 3 63. 7 70. 5 78. 3 88. 1	48. 7 52. 2 56. 0 59. 5 64. 3 69. 3 77. 7 86. 2 96. 0 104. 5	12. 0 12. 7 13. 9 14. 9 16. 6 18. 7 20. 7 22. 1 24. 2 26. 2	34. 2 35. 6 37. 1 37. 9 40. 2 42. 4 45. 2 47. 2 49. 2 50. 2	12. 12. 13. 13. 12. 14. 16. 14. 14.
				Seaso	nally adjus	sted annua	rates			
1967: V	615. 2 622. 2 634. 5 645. 9	413. 2 417. 7 426. 5 436. 5	164. 5 163. 9 167. 2 170. 6	132.3 132.3 134.6 137.4	97. 9 99. 4 101. 0 102. 7	67. 8 69. 7 71. 4 72. 9	83. 0 84. 7 86. 9 90. 3	21. 8 21. 9 22. 3 22. 6	46.5 47.1 47.8 47.5	14.3 14. 14. 14.
1968: 1		448. 2 459. 0 470. 7 482. 1	175. 7 179. 3 183. 0 187. 8	141. 2 144. 2 147. 4 150. 7	105. 1 107. 9 110. 8 113. 1	75. 1 77. 3 78. 9 82. 0	92. 3 94. 5 97. 9 99. 2	23. 4 23. 9 24. 5 25. 0	48. 4 49. 2 49. 3 49. 7	14. 14. 14. 14.
1969:	724.4	493. 3 504. 3 516. 9 524. 8	191. 5 196. 5 200. 5 202. 1	153. 3 156. 6 159. 9 160. 3	115. 5 118. 3 121. 1 123. 2	85. 4 87. 1 88. 7 91. 2	100, 8 102, 4 106, 6 108, 4	25. 5 26. 0 26. 4 26. 9	49. 7 50. 1 50. 5 50. 4	14. 9 16. 4 16. 3

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE C-17.—Sources of personal income, 1929-69-Continued [Billions of dollars]

					Tra	nsfer payme	nts		Less:	
Year or quarter	Rental income of per- sons	Divi- dends	Personal interest income	Total	Old-age, survivors, disability, and health insurance benefits	State unem- ploy- ment in- surance benefits	Vet- erans' benefits	Other	Personal contri- butions for social insur- ance	Non- agricul- tural personal income 3
1929	5. 4	5. 8	7. 2	1. 5			0. 6	0.9	0. 1	77.6
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939	4.8 3.8 2.7 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.6	5. 5 4. 1 2. 5 2. 0 2. 6 4. 5 3. 8	6.87 6.37 5.55 5.55 5.55 5.55 5.55	1.5 2.7 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.4 3.5 2.4 2.8 3.0		0, 4	.6 1.6 .8 .5 .4 .5 1.9 .5 .5	.9 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.6 1.8 1.9	.12.22.22.22.66.66.6	70. 8 60. 8 46. 7 43. 2 49. 8 53. 0 63. 0 66. 7 62. 6 66. 9
1940	2. 9 3. 5 4. 5 5. 4 5. 6 6. 6 7. 1 8. 4	4. 0 4. 4 4. 3 4. 4 4. 6 5. 6 6. 3 7. 0 7. 2	5.4 5.5 5.3 5.6 6.8 7.9 8.5	3.1 3.1 3.0 3.6 6.2 11.3 11.7 11.2	0. 1 .1 .2 .2 .3 .4 .5	.5 .3 .3 .1 .1 .4 1.1 .8 .8	. 5 . 5 . 5 . 9 2.8 7 6.7 8 5.1	2. 0 2. 2 2. 2 2. 2 2. 4 2. 7 3. 1 4. 1 4. 9	.7 .8 1.2 1.8 2.2 2.3 2.0 2.1 2.2	72. 3 87. 8 111. 0 137. 3 151. 2 156. 4 161. 0 173. 0 189. 4 191. 3
1950	9. 4 10. 3 11. 5 12. 7 13. 6 13. 9 14. 3 14. 8 15. 4	8. 8 8. 6 8. 9 9. 3 10. 5 11. 3 11. 7 11. 6 12. 6	9. 2 9. 9 10. 6 11. 8 13. 1 14. 2 15. 7 17. 6 18. 9 20. 7	15. 1 12. 5 13. 0 14. 0 16. 0 17. 3 18. 5 21. 4 25. 7 26. 6	1. 0 1. 9 2. 2 3. 0 3. 6 4. 9 5. 7 7. 3 8. 5 10. 2	1. 4 .8 1. 0 2. 0 1. 4 1. 4 1. 8 3. 9 2. 5	4.9 3.9 3.7 3.9 4.3 4.4 4.6	7. 9 5. 9 6. 0 6. 3 6. 5 6. 8 7. 2 7. 9 8. 7 9. 4	2. 9 3. 4 3. 8 4. 0 4. 6 5. 2 5. 8 6. 7 6. 9 7. 9	210. 9 236. 4 254. 1 271. 9 274. 7 296. 4 318. 5 336. 6 344. 3 368. 5
1960	16. 0 16. 7	13. 4 13. 8 15. 2 16. 5 17. 8 19. 8 20. 8 21. 5 23. 1 24. 6	23. 4 25. 0 27. 7 31. 4 34. 9 38. 7 43. 6 48. 3 54. 1 59. 3	28. 5 32. 4 33. 3 35. 3 36. 7 39. 9 44. 1 52. 0 59. 2 65. 5	11. 1 12. 6 14. 3 15. 2 16. 0 18. 1 20. 8 25. 7 30. 3 33. 1	2.8 4.0 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.2 1.8 2.1 2.1	4.4.8 4.4.5.3 5.5.5.6.7 8.	10. 0 10. 9 11. 2 12. 2 12. 9 14. 0 15. 7 17. 6 19. 7 22. 0	9. 3 9. 6 10. 3 11. 8 12. 5 13. 4 17. 7 20. 6 22. 6 26. 2	385. 2 400. 0 425. 5 448. 1 480. 9 519. 5 566. 3 609. 7 667. 9 725. 1
					Seaso	nally adjust	ed annual ra	ites		
1967: i II III IV	20.8	21. 1 21. 7 22. 0 21. 1	46. 8 47. 3 48. 7 50. 2	50. 7 51. 6 52. 2 53. 3	24. 5 25. 8 26. 0 26. 4	2.1 2.1 2.2 2.0	6, 5 6, 5 6, 5 6, 8	17. 7 17. 1 17. 5 18. 1	19. 8 20. 4 20. 8 21. 2	595. 8 602. 5 614. 5 625. 8
1968: I II III IV	1	22. 2 22. 9 23. 6 23. 8	51. 7 53. 2 54. 8 56. 7	56. 3 58. 7 60. 1 61. 6	28. 2 30. 3 30. 9 31. 8	2, 2 1, 9 2, 1 2, 0	7. 1 7. 2 7. 1 7. 3	18.9 19.4 20.0 20.5	21. 8 22. 4 22. 9 23. 3	644. 1 660. 4 675. 7 691. 2
1969: 	21. 5 21. 6	23. 8 24. 3 24. 9 25. 2	57. 6 58. 8 59. 8 61. 1	63. 6 64. 9 66. 1 67. 2	32. 4 32. 9 33. 3 33. 7	2. 2 1. 9 2. 2 2. 2	7. 8 8. 2 8. 4 8. 6	21. 3 21. 9 22. 2 22. 6	25. 4 25. 9 26. 6 27. 0	703. 7 718. 2 733. 9 744. 7

 ¹ The total of wage and salary disbursements and other labor income differs from compensation of employees in Table C-12 in that it excludes employer contributions for social insurance and the excess of wage accruals over wage disbursements.
 2 Includes change in inventories.
 3 Nonagricultural income is personal income exclusive of net income of unincorporated farm enterprises, farm wages, agricultural net interest, and net dividends paid by agricultural corporations.

TABLE C-18.—Sources and uses of gross saving, 1929-69 [Billions of dollars]

	Gross	private natio	saving an nal incom	e and pro	ment sui duct acci	rplus or ounts	deficit,	Gr	oss investi	nent	
Year or quarter		Pı	ivate sav	ing	Gover	nment s deficit (urplus —)		Gross private	Net	Statis- tical dis- crep-
	Total	Total	Per- sonal saving	Gross busi- ness saving	Total	Fed- eral	State and local	Total	domes- tic in- vest- ment	foreign invest- ment 1	ancy
929	16. 3	15, 3	4, 2	11.2	1.0	1.2	-0.2	17. 0	16. 2	0.8	0.
930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938	11.8 5.1 .8 .9 3.2 6.6 7.2 11.9	12. 1 8. 0 2. 5 2. 3 5. 6 10. 3 11. 5	3.4 2.6 6 9 2.1 3.6 3.8 7 2.6	8.6 5.3 3.2 5.2 6.7 7.0	3 -2.9 -1.8 -1.4 -2.4 -2.0 -3.1 .3 -1.8 -2.2	-2.1 -1.5 -1.3 -2.9 -2.6 -3.6 4 -2.1 -2.2	6 8 3 1 .5 .6	11. 0 5. 8 1. 1 1. 6 3. 8 6. 4 8. 4 11. 8	10. 3 5. 6 1. 0 1. 4 3. 3 6. 4 8. 5 11. 8	.7 .2 .2 .4 1 1	 : : : 1.
940 941 942 943 944 945 945 946 9947 9948 9949	8. 8 13. 6 18. 6 10. 7 5. 5 2. 5 5. 2 35. 1 42. 0 49. 9 35. 9	11. 0 14. 3 22. 4 42. 0 49. 7 54. 3 44. 7 29. 7 27. 5 41. 4 39. 0	3. 8 11. 0 27. 6 33. 4 37. 3 29. 6 15. 2 7. 3 13. 4 9. 4	8. 4 10. 5 11. 4 14. 5 16. 3 17. 1 15. 1 14. 5 20. 2 28. 0 29. 7	-2.2 7 -3.8 -31.4 -44.1 -51.8 -39.5 5.4 14.4 8.5 -3.2	-1.3 -5.1 -33.1 -46.6 -54.5 -42.1 3.5 13.4 8.4 -2.4	.6 1.3 1.8 2.5 2.7 2.6 1.9 1.0	10. 2 14. 6 19. 0 9. 6 3. 5 5. 0 9. 1 35. 2 42. 9 47. 9 36. 2	9. 3 13. 1 17. 9 9. 8 5. 7 7. 1 10. 6 30. 6 34. 0 46. 0 35. 7	1.5 1.1 2 -2.2 -2.1 -1.4 4.6 8.9 1.9	1. 1. -1. -2. 2. 3. -2.
950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959	50, 4 56, 1 49, 5 47, 5 48, 5 64, 8 72, 7 71, 2 59, 2 73, 8	42. 5 50. 3 53. 3 54. 4 55. 6 62. 1 67. 8 70. 5 71. 7 75. 9	13. 1 17. 3 18. 1 18. 3 16. 4 15. 8 20. 6 20. 7 22. 3 19. 1	29. 4 33. 1 35. 1 36. 1 39. 2 46. 3 47. 3 49. 8 49. 4 56. 8	7.8 5.8 -3.8 -6.9 -7.0 2.7 4.9 .7 -12.5 -2.1	9.1 6.2 -3.8 -7.0 -5.9 4.0 5.7 2.1 -10.2 -1.2	-1.2 4 (³) -1.1 -1.3 9 -1.4 -2.3 8	51. 8 59. 5 51. 6 50. 5 51. 3 66. 9 71. 6 71. 2 60. 7 73. 0	54. 1 59. 3 51. 9 52. 6 51. 7 67. 4 70. 0 67. 8 60. 9 75. 3	-2.2 3 -2.1 5 5 1.5 3.4 2 -2.3	1. 3. 2. 3. 2. -1.
1960	77. 5 75. 5 85. 0 90. 5 101. 0 115. 3 124. 9 119. 2 128. 4 145. 2	73. 9 79. 8 87. 9 88. 7 102. 4 113. 1 123. 8 133. 7 135. 1 136. 2	17. 0 21. 2 21. 6 19. 9 26. 2 28. 4 32. 5 40. 4 38. 4 37. 6	56. 8 58. 7 66. 3 68. 8 76. 2 84. 7 91. 3 93. 3 96. 7 98. 6	3.7 -4.3 -2.9 1.8 -1.4 2.2 1.1 -14.5 -6.7 9.0	3. 5 -3. 8 -3. 8 -7 -3. 0 1. 2 -12. 7 -5. 2 9. 7	1.2 5 9 1.2 1.7 1.0 1.3 -1.8 -1.5	76. 5 74. 7 85. 5 90. 3 99. 7 112. 2 123. 9 118. 3 125. 9 139. 0	74. 8 71. 7 83. 0 87. 1 94. 0 108. 1 121. 4 116. 0 126. 3 139. 6	1. 7 3. 0 2. 5 3. 1 5. 7 4. 1 2. 4 2. 2 3	-1. -1. -3. -1. -1. -2. -6.
				Se	asonally	adjusted	annual r	ates			
1967: I II III	117. 5 113. 6 119. 9 125. 6	131. 6 129. 6 134. 5 139. 0	40. 0 37. 7 40. 7 43. 1	91. 6 91. 9 93. 8 95. 9	-14.1 -16.0 -14.6 -13.4	-12.0 -13.2 -13.4 -12.3	-2.1 -2.8 -1.3 -1.0	116. 3 112. 0 120. 0 124. 5	113.6 109.4 117.7 123.3	2. 7 2. 5 2. 3 1. 3	-1.: -1.: -1.
1968: [120 5	132. 0 139. 6 132. 6 136. 3	39. 9 42. 3 33. 2 38. 0	92. 1 97. 2 99. 3 98. 3	-11.5 -10.8 -3.5 9	-8.4 -9.5 -2.8 1	-3.1 -1.3 7 8	118. 7 127. 2 125. 8 132. 0	119. 4 126. 6 125. 2 133. 9	7 .6 .6 -1.9	-1. -1. -3. -3.
1969: [[] []]	138. 4 142. 7	130. 2 131. 3	32. 5 33. 3 43. 1 41. 6	97. 7 98. 0 99. 7	8. 3 11. 4 7. 4	10. 1 13. 5 7. 7	-1.8 -2.1 3	134. 2 136. 2 143. 3 142. 3	135. 2 137. 4 143. 3 142. 4	-1.0 -1.2 .0 1	-4. -6. -6.

Net exports of goods and services less net transfers to foreigners.
 Surplus of \$32 million.
 Deficit of \$41 million.

Note.—Corporate profits tax and related items for 1969 reflect repeal of investment tax credit.

Source: Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics.

TABLE C-19.—Saving by individuals, 1946-691 [Billions of dollars]

į		:	in	crease i	n financ	ial asse	ts		Net i	nvestme	ent in	Less	: Increa debt	se in
Year or quarter	Total	Total 2		Sav- ings ac-	Gov-	Corpo-	ı	Insur- ance and pen- sion	Non- farm	Con- sumer du-	rate	Mort- gage debt on	Con- sumer	Other debt 6
			mand de- posits	counts	ern- ment bonds ³	and for- eign bonds	rain	re- serves (5)	homes	rables	busi- ness assets	non- farm homes	2.2.2.9 4.1.2.8.9 1.6.3.5.6.2.4.6.8.9.1.6.3.5.7.8.5	
1946 1947 1948 1949	25. 4 20. 7 23. 9 19. 2	18. 4 13. 3 9. 2 10. 0	4.8 5 -2.5 -1.9	6. 3 3. 4 2. 3 2. 6	-1.1 2.3 1.2 1.8	-0.9 8 2 4	1. 1 1. 1 1. 0 . 8	5. 3 5. 3 5. 2 5. 5	4.8 7.9 11.2 10.1	5. 8 7. 5 7. 1 7. 0	2. 7 2. 2 6. 6 1. 4	4. 1 4. 7 4. 9 4. 2	3. 2 2. 8	-0.4 2.3 2.7 2.2
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958	27. 3 30. 3 26. 3 29. 9 27. 9 33. 7 34. 9 33. 5 32. 3 33. 2	13. 7 18. 0 21. 9 22. 1 22. 3 28. 0 28. 8 28. 1 31. 0 35. 0	2. 2 4. 6 1. 7 . 5 1. 8 1. 2 5 3. 2	2. 5 4. 5 7. 7 8. 3 9. 2 8. 8 9. 5 12. 1 14. 0 11. 4	.3 5 1.4 2.4 1.0 5.9 3.4 1.9 -1.5 7.9	8 2 1 4 1.1 .9 1.0	.7 1.5 1.6 .9 .7 1.1 2.0 1.5 1.5	6. 9 6. 2 7. 7 7. 9 7. 9 8. 4 9. 6 9. 5 10. 0 11. 4	15. 2 13. 9 13. 4 14. 0 14. 8 18. 4 16. 7 14. 5 14. 1 18. 2	10. 2 5. 5 6. 4 4. 9 5. 9 5. 9 5. 5	4. 9 4. 3 1. 9 1. 1 1. 6 2. 7 1. 6 1. 9 1. 4	7. 5 6. 8 7. 0 7. 6 9. 0 12. 3 11. 0 8. 7 9. 1 12. 6	1. 2 4. 8 3. 9 1. 1 6. 4 3. 5 2. 6	5. 1 3. 2 2. 7 2. 2 5. 7 6. 7 4. 3 6. 0 7. 8
1960	28. 9 30. 9 37. 3 37. 7 45. 0 52. 5 54. 5 61. 7 59. 9	28. 3 34. 3 39. 3 43. 7 51. 3 56. 0 52. 8 66. 7 66. 6	-1. 4 .7 2. 9 4. 3 6. 5 7. 3 3. 1 10. 2 10. 7	12. 4 17. 4 23. 4 23. 0 23. 9 26. 4 19. 1 32. 5 27. 7	2.9 .7 .8 4.3 4.2 4.4 7.8 6 6.9	.4 5 6 5 2.0 4.6 4.0	4 -2. 0 -2. 7 1 -1. 9 -1. 0 -4. 9 -7. 7	11. 6 12. 2 12. 8 13. 9 15. 2 17. 1 18. 1 20. 1 19. 3	15. 8 14. 5 16. 5 17. 5 17. 7 17. 5 16. 0 14. 3 19. 2	5. 1 2. 9 6. 7 8. 9 11. 2 14. 8 15. 2 12. 4 16. 9	.8 .6 1.8 2.1 1.0 3.4 2.7 2.0 1.3	10. 5 11. 0 12. 7 14. 9 15. 8 15. 3 11. 8 11. 1 15. 0	1. 8 5. 8 7. 9	6. 0 8. 6 8. 4 11. 6 11. 9 13. 1 18. 1 18. 0
1967: L II III IV	14. 4 7. 2 19. 2 20. 3	11. 8 12. 3 20. 7 21. 1	-1.1 2.0 3.7 6.9		-1.5 -4.7 3.6 .5	.7 .6 1.3 1.5	8 -2.2 -1.6 2	4. 4 5. 7 5. 0 5. 0	2.6 2.8 4.3 4.7	. 8 3. 8 2. 1 5. 7	.8 .6 .3	1.6 2.0 3.4 4.0	-2.3 2.1 1.3 3.5	2, 2 8, 1 3, 6 3, 9
1968: I II IV	4. 7 18. 5	13, 5 11, 0 19, 8 19, 3	-5. 0 6. 2 5. 7	5.7	3.9 8 3.2 .7	.6 1.6 .9 1.3	. 7 -2. 4 -2. 6 -3. 3	4. 3 5. 4 4. 8 5. 0	4. 0 4. 3 5. 3 5. 4	1.7 4.4 3.3 7.5	.9 .7 3	3. 5 3. 5 3. 7 4. 3	-1.2 3.6 3.0 5.6	1.5 8.5 2.8 4.3
1969: [16. 2 5. 1 20. 8	14. 4 9. 8 21. 2	-4.6 2.5 3.8	7. 5 2. 9 -2. 1	5.7 -1.0 12.3	. 9 . 8 2. 5	-2. 2 -1. 2	4. 1 5. 9 5. 1	4. 7 4. 8 5. 3	2. 2 5. 0 2. 8	.4 .4 2	3. 7 4. 1 4. 1	-1.2 4.0 1.6	3. 0 6. 7 2. 6

Individuals' saving sector includes households, private trust funds, nonprofit institutions, farms, and other noncorporate businesses. Revisions in account structure and estimation procedure are reflected in these data.

 Includes miscellaneous financial assets not shown separately.

 U.S. Government and agency securities and State and local obligations.

 Includes investment company shares.
 Private life insurance reserves, private insured and noninsured pension reserves, and government insurance and pension reserves.

 Security credit, policy loans, noncorporate business debt, and other debt.

Sources: Securities and Exchange Commission and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

Table C-20.—Number and money income (in 1968 prices) of families and unrelated individuals, by race of head, 1947-68

		Tot	al			Wh	ite		Ne	gro and o	ther rac	es
	Total			comes \$3,000	Total		With in under		Total		With in under	comes \$3,000
Year	ber (mil- lions)	Median income	Num- ber (mil- lions)	Per- cent	ber (mil- lions)	Median income	Num- ber (mil- lions)	Per- cent	ber (mil- lions)	Median income	Num- ber (mil- lions)	Per- cent
FAMILIES: 1 1947 1948 1949	37. 2 38. 6 39. 3	\$4,716 4,613 4,537	9.7 10.3 11.0	26. 0 26. 7 28. 0	34. 1 35. 3	\$4, 916 4, 790 4, 718	7. 8 8. 4	22. 8 23. 5 25. 2	3. 1 3. 3	\$2,514 2,559 2,414	1.9	60. 0 58. 0 60. 8
1950 1951 1952 1952 1953 1954 1955 1955 1957 1957	39. 9 40. 6 40. 8 41. 2 42. 0 42. 9 43. 5 43. 7 44. 2 45. 1	4, 804 4, 965 5, 105 5, 524 5, 402 5, 744 6, 120 6, 131 6, 120 6, 472	10. 4 9. 9 9. 4 9. 0 9. 8 9. 0 8. 3 8. 6 8. 1	26. 1 24. 3 23. 1 21. 9 23. 4 20. 9 19. 1 19. 4 19. 4 18. 0	38. 2 39. 0 39. 5 39. 7 40. 2 40. 9	4, 985 5, 173 5, 402 5, 733 5, 629 5, 991 6, 404 6, 379 6, 377 6, 742	8. 0 7. 2 6. 5 6. 7 6. 7 6. 3	23. 4 21. 2 20. 0 19. 4 20. 9 18. 4 16. 6 16. 6 15. 5	3.8 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.2	2, 704 2, 725 3, 064 3, 229 3, 126 3, 320 3, 380 3, 421 3, 270 3, 482	1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9	55. 4 54. 9 48. 4 46. 4 44. 9 46. 8 43. 8
960	45 5	6, 604 6, 671 6, 851 7, 101 7, 367 7, 666 7, 971	8. 1 8. 3 7. 8 7. 5 7. 1 6. 8 6. 4	17. 9 18. 0 16. 7 15. 8 14. 9 14. 1 13. 0	41. 1 41. 9 42. 4 42. 7 43. 1 43. 5 44. 0	6, 857 6, 957 7, 170 7, 443 7, 691 7, 995 8, 290	6. 4 6. 4 6. 0 5. 7 5. 5 5. 3	15. 5 15. 3 14. 4 13. 5 13. 1 12. 1 11. 3	4. 3 4. 5 4. 6 4. 8 4. 8 4. 8 4. 9	3, 794 3, 709 3, 825 3, 940 4, 303 4, 419 4, 945	1.7 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.5	40. 5 41. 2 38. 3 37. 4 32. 8 31. 4 27. 8
966 2 967 2 968 2		8, 040 8, 318 8, 632	6. 2 5. 9 5. 2	12. 7 11. 8 10. 3	44. 1 44. 8 45. 4	8, 366 8, 625 8, 937	4. 8 4. 6 4. 0	11.0 10.2 8.9	5, 0 5, 0 5, 1	4, 994 5, 352 5, 590	1. 4 1. 3 1. 2	27.0 25.9 22.
			With in under	comes \$1,500			With in					comes \$1,500
			Num- ber (mil- lions)	Per- cent			Num- ber (mil- lions)	Per- cent			Num- ber (mil- lions)	Per- cent
UNRELATED INDIVIDUALS: 3 1947	8. 2 8. 4 9. 0	1, 538 1, 463 1, 532	4. 0 4. 3 4. 5	49. 3 51. 1 49. 6	7. 2 7. 3	1,634 1,524 1,654	3. 4 3. 6	47. 9 49. 6 47. 7	1.0	1, 163 1, 148 1, 205	0.6	59. 8 62. 1 60. 3
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1956 1956 1957 1958 1959	9. 4 9. 1 9. 7 9. 5 9. 7 9. 9 10. 4 10. 9	1,512 1,598 1,853 1,822 1,585 1,718 1,835 1,882 1,844 1,891	4. 7 4. 4 4. 2 4. 3 4. 7 4. 5 4. 3 4. 5 4. 8 4. 6	49. 8 48. 6 43. 7 45. 2 48. 6 45. 9 44. 2 42. 9 43. 6 42. 5	8. 2 8. 5 8. 5 8. 9 9. 2 9. 3	1,613 1,682 1,992 1,923 1,710 1,830 1,887 1,981 1,940 1,991	3. 8 3. 7 3. 6 3. 7 3. 9 3. 7	48. 4 47. 6 42. 0 44. 1 46. 5 44. 0 41. 0 41. 8 40. 0	1.5 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.6	1,190 1,299 1,389 1,504 1,184 1,264 1,448 1,354 1,355 1,351	.9 .8 .7 .8 .9 .9	59. 6 55. 53. 49. 5 57. 51. 54. 54.
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965	11. 1 11. 2 11. 0 11. 2 12. 1 12. 1 12. 4	2, 021 2, 041 2, 017 2, 052 2, 235 2, 384 2, 438	4. 5 4. 5 4. 3 4. 3 4. 5 4. 1 4. 1	40. 9 40. 0 38. 8 38. 3 36. 9 33. 9 33. 3	9. 6 9. 6 9. 5 9. 7 10. 4 10. 5 10. 8	2, 187 2, 203 2, 174 2, 166 2, 354 2, 478 2, 536	3. 7 3. 6 3. 5 3. 5 3. 7 3. 4 3. 4	38. 6 37. 7 36. 6 36. 5 35. 2 32. 6 32. 0	1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7	1,332 1,370 1,446 1,475 1,663 1,847 1,866	.8 .9 .8 .8 .8 .7	55. 2 54. 6 51. 5 50. 47. 6 42. 8
1966 ² 1967 ² 1968 ²		2, 491 2, 786	4. 3 4. 0	32. 8 28. 8	10. 7 11. 3 12. 0	2,607 2,952	3. 6 3. 3	31. 4 27. 2	1.6 1.8 1.8	1,917 1,999	.7	41.6 39.5

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

The term "family" refers to a group of two or more persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption and residing together; all such persons are considered members of the same family.
 Based on revised methodology.
 The term "Unrelated individuals" refers to persons 14 years old and over (other than inmates of institutions) who are not living with any relatives.

POPULATION, EMPLOYMENT, WAGES, AND PRODUCTIVITY

Table C-21.—Population by age groups: Estimates, 1929-69, and projections, 1970-851
[Thousands of persons]

	1.				Age (years)			4
July 1	Total	Under 5	5–15	16-19	20–24	25–44	45-64	65 and over
Estimates:	121,767	11, 734	26, 800	9, 127	10, 694	35, 862	21, 076	6, 474
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934	123, 077 124, 040 124, 840 125, 579 126, 374	11, 372 11, 179 10, 903 10, 612 10, 331	26, 983 26, 984 26, 969 26, 897 26, 796	9, 220 9, 259 9, 284 9, 302 9, 331	10, 915 11, 003 11, 077 11, 152 11, 238	36, 309 36, 654 36, 988 37, 319 37, 662	21, 573 22, 031 22, 473 22, 933 23, 435	6, 705 6, 928 7, 147 7, 363 7, 582
1935 1936 1937 1938	127, 250 128, 053 128, 825 129, 825 130, 880	10, 170 10, 044 10, 009 10, 176 10, 418	26, 645 26, 415 26, 062 25, 631 25, 179	9, 381 9, 461 9, 578 9, 717 9, 822	11, 317 11, 375 11, 411 11, 453 11, 519	37, 987 38, 288 38, 589 38, 954 39, 354	23, 947 24, 444 24, 917 25, 387 25, 823	7, 804 8, 027 8, 258 8, 508 8, 764
1940 1941 1942 1942 1943	132, 122 133, 402 134, 860 136, 739 138, 397	10, 579 10, 850 11, 301 12, 016 12, 524	24, 811 24, 516 24, 231 24, 093 23, 949	9, 895 9, 840 9, 730 9, 607 9, 561	11, 690 11, 807 11, 955 12, 064 12, 062	39, 868 40, 383 40, °61 41, 420 42, 016	26, 249 26, 718 27, 196 27, 671 28, 138	9, 031 9, 288 9, 584 9, 867 10, 147
1945	139, 928 141, 389 144, 126 146, 631 149, 188	12, 979 13, 244 14, 406 14, 919 15, 607	23, 907 24, 103 24, 468 25, 209 25, 852	9, 361 9, 119 9, 097 8, 952 8, 788	12, 036 12, 004 11, 814 11, 794 11, 700	42, 521 43, 027 43, 657 44, 288 44, 916	28, 630 29, 064 29, 498 29, 931 30, 405	10, 494 10, 828 11, 185 11, 538 11, 921
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	152, 271 154, 878 157, 553 160, 184 163, 026	16, 410 17, 333 17, 312 17, 638 18, 057	26, 721 27, 279 28, 894 30, 227 31, 480	8, 542 8, 446 8, 414 8, 460 8, 637	11, 680 11, 552 11, 350 11, 062 10, 832	45, 672 46, 103 46, 495 46, 786 47, 001	30, 849 31, 362 31, 884 32, 394 32, 942	12, 397 12, 803 13, 203 13, 617 14, 076
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	165, 931 168, 903 171, 984 174, 882 177, 830	18, 566 19, 003 19, 494 19, 887 20, 175	32, 682 33, 994 35, 272 36, 445 37, 368	8, 744 8, 916 9, 195 9, 543 10, 215	10, 714 10, 616 10, 603 10, 756 10, 969	47, 194 47, 379 47, 440 47, 337 47, 192	33, 506 34, 057 34, 591 35, 109 35, 663	14, 525 14, 938 15, 388 15, 806 16, 248
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	180, 684 183, 756 186, 656 189, 417 192, 120	20, 364 20, 657 20, 746 20, 750 20, 670	38, 504 39, 768 41, 168 41, 620 42, 294	10,698 11,093 11,258 12,061 12,819	11, 116 11, 408 11, 889 12, 620 13, 154	47, 134 47, 061 46, 968 46, 932 46, 881	36, 208 36, 756 37, 316 37, 869 38, 438	16, 659 17, 013 17, 311 17, 565 17, 863
1965 1966 1967 1968 //C 1969 // 0 4 2 8	194, 592 196, 9 20 199, 11 8 201, 1 66 203, 216	# 19 191	42, 963 43, 822 44, 488 44, 977 45, 260	13, 563 14, 304 14, 167 14, 338 14, 655	13, 679 14, 063 15, 197 15, 788 16, 484	46, 807 46, 855 47, 077 47, 614 47, 994	39, 015 39, 601 40, 194 40, 768 41, 393	18, 162 18, 464 18, 796 19, 129 19, 470
Projections: 1 1970: Series C Series D	206, 039 204, 923	18, 740 17, 625	45, 273	15, 087	17, 261	48, 276	} 41,817	} } 19, 585
1975: Series C Series D	219, 366 215, 367	21, 211 18, 323	43, 836 42, 726	16,614]	53, 881	} 43,364	21, 159
1980: Series C Series D	235, 212 227, 665	24, 298 20, 736	44, 360 40, 376	16, 940	20, 997	62, 374	} 43, 180	23, 063
1985: Series C Series D	252, 871 241, 731	26, 645 23, 030	49, 944 43, 123	15, 213 14, 509	21,068	72, 083	42,940	24, 978

¹ Two of four series projected by the cohort method and based on different assumptions with regard to completed fertility, which moves gradually toward a level of 2,775 children per 1,000 women for Series C and 2,450 children per 1,000 women for Series D. For further explanation of method of projection and for additional data, see "Population Estimates, Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 381," December 1967.

Note.—Data for Armed Forces overseas included beginning 1940. Includes Alaska and Hawaii beginning 1950.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

Table C-22.—Noninstitutional population and the labor force, 1929-69

		Total			Civili	an labor f	orce		Total	Unem-
Year or month	Nonin- stitu- tional	Total labor force (includ-	Armed		E	mploymen	t		labor force as percent of non-	ploy- ment as per-
	popu- lation	ing Armed Forces)	Forces	Total	Total	Agri- cut- tural	Non- agri- cui- tural	Unem- ploy- ment	institu- tional popu- lation	cent of civilian labor force
		Thou	sands of	persons 14	years of	age and o	ver		Per	ent
		49, 440	260	49, 180	47, 630	10, 450	37, 180	1,550		3, 2
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934		50, 080 50, 680 51, 250 51, 840 52, 490	260 260 250 250 260	49, 820 50, 420 51, 000 51, 590 52, 230	45, 480 42, 400 38, 940 38, 760 40, 890	10, 340 10, 290 10, 170 10, 090 9, 900	35, 140 32, 110 28, 770 28, 670 30, 990	4, 340 8, 020 12, 060 12, 830 11, 340		8. 7 15. 9 23. 6 24. 9 21. 7
1935 1936 1937 1938		53, 140 53, 740 54, 320 54, 950 55, 600	270 300 320 340 370	52, 870 53, 440 54, 000 54, 610 55, 230	42, 260 44, 410 46, 300 44, 220 45, 750	10, 110 10, 000 9, 820 9, 690 9, 610	32, 150 34, 410 36, 480 34, 530 36, 140	10,610 9,030 7,700 10,390 9,480		20. 1 16. 9 14. 3 19. 0 17. 2
1940		56, 180 57, 530 60, 380 64, 560 66, 040	540 1,620 3,970 9,020 11,410	55,640 55,910 56,410 55,540 54,630	47, 520 50, 350 53, 750 54, 470 53, 960	9, 540 9, 100 9, 250 9, 080 8, 950	37, 980 41, 250 44, 500 45, 390 45, 010	8, 120 5, 560 2, 660 1, 070 670	56. 0 56. 7 58. 8 62. 3 63. 1	14.6 9.9 4.7 1.9
1945 1946 1947		65, 300 60, 970 61, 758	11,440 3,450 1,590	53, 860 57, 520 60, 168	52, 820 55, 250 57, 812	8, 580 8, 320 8, 256	44, 240 46, 930 49, 557	1,040 2,270 2,356	61. 9 57. 2 57. 4	1, 9 3, 9 3, 9
		Tho	sands of	persons 1	6 years of	age and o	ver		Per	cent
1947 1948 1949	103, 418 104, 527 105, 611	60, 941 62, 080 62, 903	1,591 1,459 1,617	59, 350 60, 621 61, 286	57, 039 58, 344 57, 649	7, 891 7, 629 7, 656	49, 148 50, 713 49, 990	2,311 2,276 3,637	58. 9 59. 4 59. 6	3. 9 3. 8 5. 9
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	106, 645 107, 721 108, 823 110, 601 111, 671	63, 858 65, 117 65, 730 66, 560 66, 993	1,650 3,100 3,592 3,545 3,350	62, 208 62, 017 62, 138 63, 015 63, 643	58, 920 59, 962 60, 254 61, 181 60, 110	7, 160 6, 726 6, 501 6, 261 6, 206	51,760 53,239 53,753 54,922 53,903	3, 288 2, 055 1, 883 1, 834 3, 532	59. 9 60. 4 60. 4 60. 2 60. 0	5. 3 3. 3 2. 9 5. 1
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959		68, 072 69, 409 69, 729 70, 275 70, 921	3, 049 2, 857 2, 800 2, 636 2, 552	65, 023 66, 552 66, 929 67, 639 68, 369	62, 171 63, 802 64, 071 63, 036 64, 630	6, 449 6, 283 5, 947 5, 586 5, 565	55, 724 57, 517 58, 123 57, 450 59, 065	2, 852 2, 750 2, 859 4, 602 3, 740	60. 4 61. 0 60. 6 60. 4 60. 2	4. 4. 4. 6. 5.
1960		72, 142 73, 031 73, 442 74, 571 75, 830	2,514 2,572 2,828 2,738 2,739	69, 628 70, 459 70, 614 71, 833 73, 091	65, 778 65, 746 66, 702 67, 762 69, 305	5, 458 5, 200 4, 944 4, 687 4, 523	60, 318 60, 546 61, 759 63, 076 64, 782	3, 852 4, 714 3, 911 4, 070 3, 786	60. 2 60. 2 59. 7 59. 6 59. 6	5. 6. 5. 5.
1965		77, 178 78, 893 80, 793 82, 272 84, 239	2, 723 3, 123 3, 446 3, 535 3, 506	74, 455 75, 770 77, 347 78, 737 80, 733	71, 088 72, 895 74, 372 75, 920 77, 902	4, 361 3, 979 3, 844 3, 817 3, 606	66, 726 68, 915 70, 527 72, 103 74, 296	3, 366 2, 875 2, 975 2, 817 2, 831	59. 7 60. 1 60. 6 60. 7 61. 1	4. 1 3. 3 3. 3 3. 3
1968: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	134, 576 134, 744 134, 904 135, 059 135, 249	79, 811 80, 869 80, 938 81, 141 81, 770 84, 454	3, 464 3, 467 3, 491 3, 507 3, 536 3, 567	76, 347 77, 402 77, 447 77, 634 78, 234 80, 887	73, 273 74, 114 74, 517 75, 143 75, 931 77, 273	3, 366 3, 462 3, 537 3, 851 3, 996 4, 516	69, 908 70, 653 70, 980 71, 292 71, 935 72, 757	3, 074 3, 288 2, 929 2, 491 2, 303 3, 614	59. 3 60. 0 60. 0 60. 1 60. 5 62. 4	4. 4. 3. 3. 2. 4.
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	135 639	84, 550 83, 792 82, 137 82, 477 82, 702 82, 618	3, 586 3, 589 3, 591 3, 603 3, 517 3, 500	80, 964 80, 203 78, 546 78, 874 79, 185	77, 746 77, 432 75, 939 76, 364 76, 609 76, 700	4, 476 4, 107 3, 836	73, 270 73, 325 72, 103 72, 596 73, 001 73, 421			4. 3. 3. 3. 3.

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE C-22.—Noninstitutional population and the labor force, 1929-69—Continued

		7.1.1			Civil	ian labor	force		Total	Unem-
V	Nonin- stitu-	Total labor force	Armed		E	mploymer	nt		labor force as percent	ploy- ment as per-
Year or month	tional popu- lation	(includ- ing Armed Forces)	Forces	Total	Total	Agri- cul- tural	Non- agri- cul- tural	Unem- ploy- ment	of non- institu- tional popu- lation	cent of civilian labor force
	-	Tho	usands of	persons 16	6 years of	age and o	ver		Per	cent
1969: Jan	136, 940 137, 143 137, 337 137, 549	81, 711 82, 579 82, 770 83, 137 83, 085 85, 880	3, 477 3, 475 3, 504 3, 516 3, 522 3, 524	78, 234 79, 104 79, 266 79, 621 79, 563 82, 356	75, 358 76, 181 76, 520 77, 079 77, 264 78, 956	3, 165 3, 285 3, 327 3, 607 3, 894 4, 367	72, 192 72, 896 73, 193 73, 471 73, 370 74, 589	2, 876 2, 923 2, 746 2, 542 2, 299 3, 400	59. 7 60. 3 60. 4 60. 5 60. 4 62. 4	3, 7 3, 7 3, 5 3, 2 2, 9 4, 1
July	138, 127 138, 317 138, 539	86, 318 86, 046 84, 527 85, 038 84, 920 84, 856	3, 521 3, 530 3, 543 3, 528 3, 493 3, 440	82, 797 82, 516 80, 984 81, 510 81, 427 81, 416	79, 616 79, 646 78, 026 78, 671 78, 716 78, 788	4, 155 3, 977 3, 629 3, 561 3, 322 2, 984	75, 460 75, 669 74, 397 75, 110 75, 395 75, 805	3, 182 2, 869 2, 958 2, 839 2, 710 2, 628	62. 6 62. 3 61. 1 61. 4 61. 2 61. 1	3. 8 3. 5 3. 7 3. 5 3. 3 3. 2
					Seasonally	adjusted	<u> </u>			
1968: Jan		81, 344 82, 035 82, 137 81, 933 82, 278 82, 486		77, 881 78, 569 78, 645 78, 427 78, 742 78, 919	75, 086 75, 640 75, 764 75, 653 75, 932 76, 005	3, 962 4, 074 3, 978 3, 916 3, 905 3, 849	71, 124 71, 566 71, 786 71, 737 72, 027 72, 156	2, 795 2, 929 2, 881 2, 774 2, 810 2, 914		3. 6 3. 7 3. 7 3. 5 3. 6 3. 7
July		82, 504 82, 338 82, 438 82, 403 82, 559 82, 868		78, 917 78, 749 78, 847 78, 800 79, 042 79, 368	76, 020 75, 973 76, 000 76, 002 76, 388 76, 765	3, 825 3, 751 3, 651 3, 525 3, 706 3, 842	72, 195 72, 222 72, 349 72, 477 72, 682 72, 923	2, 897 2, 776 2, 847 2, 798 2, 654 2, 603		3. 7 3. 5 3. 6 3. 6 3. 4 3. 3
1969: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June		83, 351 83, 831 83, 999 83, 966 83, 593 83, 957		79, 874 80, 356 80, 495 80, 450 80, 071 80, 433	77, 229 77, 729 77, 767 77, 605 77, 265 77, 671	3, 752 3, 881 3, 732 3, 664 3, 805 3, 705	73, 477 73, 848 74, 035 73, 941 73, 460 73, 966	2, 645 2, 627 2, 728 2, 845 2, 806 2, 762		3. 3 3. 3 3. 4 3. 5 3. 5
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec		84,584 84,902 85,014		81,054 81,359 81,486	77, 874 78, 187 78, 127 78, 325 78, 497 78, 779	3, 551 3, 634 3, 458 3, 332 3, 429 3, 505	74, 323 74, 553 74, 669 74, 993 75, 068 75, 274	2,882 2,867 3,232 3,161 2,798 2,810		3. 6 3. 5 4. 0 3. 9 3. 4 3, 4

Note.—Labor force data in Tables C-22 through C-25 are based on household interviews and relate to the calendar week including the 12th of the month. For definitions of terms, area samples used, historical comparability of the data comparability with other series, etc., see "Employment and Earnings."

Table C-23.—Civilian employment and unemployment, by sex and age, 1947-69
[Thousands of persons 16 years of age and over]

			Er	nploym	ent		ļ		Unemployment					
Year or			Males			Females				Males			Females	
month	Total	Total	16-19 years	20 years and over	Total	16-19 years	20 years and over	Total	Total	16–19 years	20 years and over	Total	16-19 years	20 years and over
947 948 949	57, 039 58, 344 57, 649	40, 994 41, 726 40, 926	2, 218 2, 345 2, 124	38, 776 39, 382 38, 803	16, 045 16, 618 16, 723	1, 691 1, 683 1, 588	14, 354 14, 937 15, 137	2, 311 2, 276 3, 637	1,692 1,559 2,572	270 255 352	1, 422 1, 305 2, 219	619 717 1, 065	144 152 223	47 56 84
950 951 952 953 954	58, 920 59, 962 60, 254 61, 181 60, 110	41,580 41,780 41,684 42,431 41,620	2, 186 2, 156 2, 106 2, 135 1, 985	39, 394 39, 626 39, 578 40, 296 39, 634	17, 340 18, 182 18, 570 18, 750 18, 490	1,517 1,611 1,612 1,584 1,490	15, 824 16, 570 16, 958 17, 164 17, 000	1, 883	2,239 1,221 1,185 1,202 2,344	318 191 205 184 310	1, 029 980 1, 019	1,049 834 698 632 1,188	140 123	85 68 55 51 99
955			2 095	40, 526 41, 216 41, 239 40, 411 41, 267	19, 550 20, 422 20, 714 20, 613 21, 164	1,548 1,654 1,663 1,570 1,640	18, 002 18, 767 19, 052 19, 043 19, 524	2, 852 2, 750 2, 859 4, 602 3, 740	1, 854 1, 711 1, 841 3, 098 2, 420	274 269 299 416 398	2,681	998 1,039 1,018 1,504 1,320	176 209 197 262 256	8: 8: 1,24 1,00
960 961 962 963 964	65, 778 65, 746	43, 904 43, 656	2,360 2,314 2,362 2,406 2,587	41, 543 41, 342 41, 815 42, 251 42, 886	21, 874 22, 090 22, 525 23, 105 23, 831	1,769 1,793 1,833 1,849 1,929	20, 105 20, 296 20, 693 21, 257 21, 903	3, 852 4, 714 3, 911 4, 070 3, 786	2, 486 2, 997 2, 423 2, 472 2, 205	425 479 407 500 487		1,366 1,717 1,488 1,598 1,581	286 349 313 383 386	1, 0 1, 3 1, 1 1, 2 1, 1
965 966 967 968 969	71, 088 72, 895 74, 372 75, 920 77, 902	46, 340 46, 919 47, 479 48, 114 48, 818	2, 918 3, 252 3, 186 3, 254 3, 430	43, 422 43, 667 44, 293 44, 859 45, 388	24, 748 25, 976 26, 893 27, 807 29, 084	2, 118 2, 469 2, 496 2, 525 2, 687	22, 630 23, 507 24, 397 25, 281 26, 397	3, 366 2, 875 2, 975 2, 817 2, 831	1,914 1,551 1,508 1,419 1,403	479 432 448 427 441	1,119	1,452 1,324 1,468 1,397 1,428	395 404 390 412 412	1,0 9 1,0 9 1,0
		<u> </u>		·		Se	asonali	y adjust	ed	•				
968: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	75, 640 75, 764 75, 653 75, 932	47, 986 48, 034 48, 058 48, 073	3, 064 3, 216 3, 257 3, 278 3, 286 3, 241	44, 688 44, 770 44, 777 44, 787 44, 787 44, 861	27, 334 27, 654 27, 730 27, 595 27, 859 27, 803	2, 558 2, 615 2, 603 2, 567 2, 578 2, 592	24, 776 25, 039 25, 127 25, 028 25, 281 25, 311	2, 795 2, 929 2, 881 2, 774 2, 810 2, 914	1, 456 1, 491 1, 459 1, 385 1, 382 1, 498	417 438 441 406 399 456	1,039 1,053 1,018 979 983 1,042	1, 339 1, 438 1, 422 1, 389 1, 428 1, 416	412 437 421	1, 0 1, 0 9; 9; 9; 9;
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec			3, 249 3, 282 3, 262 3, 257 3, 295 3, 325	44, 913 44, 921 44, 858 44, 773 44, 940 45, 254	27, 858 27, 770 27, 880 27, 972 28, 153 28, 186	2, 517 2, 530 2, 505 2, 477 2, 451 2, 384	25, 341 25, 240 25, 375 25, 495 25, 702 25, 802	2, 897 2, 776 2, 847 2, 798 2, 654 2, 603		431 403 401 432 420 437	1,003 985 1,005 1,009 931 839	1,463 1,388 1,441 1,357 1,303 1,327	I 412	1,0 9 1,0 9
969: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June			3, 455 3, 453 3, 497 3, 481 3, 382 3, 393	45, 231 45, 422 45, 422 45, 285 45, 227 45, 260	28, 543 28, 854 28, 848 28, 839 28, 656 29, 018	2, 544 2, 590 2, 620 2, 670 2, 610 2, 767	25, 999 26, 264 26, 228 26, 169 26, 046 26, 251	2, 645 2, 627 2, 728 2, 845 2, 806 2, 762			900 858 875 910 944 946	1, 284 1, 344 1, 398 1, 489 1, 446 1, 421	333 378 437 453	9 9 1,0 1,0
July	77, 874 77, 187 78, 127 78, 325 78, 497	48, 638 48, 864 48, 939 48, 825 49, 036	3, 345 3, 313 3, 497 3, 401 3, 549	45, 293 45, 551 45, 442 45, 424 45, 487	29, 236 29, 323 29, 188 29, 500 29, 475 29, 670	2, 731 2, 701 2, 669 2, 789 2, 780	26, 505 26, 622 26, 519 26, 711 26, 695 26, 932	2, 882 2, 867 3, 232 3, 161 2, 798 2, 810	1,485 1,370 1,608 1,601 1,461		956	1,397 1,497	391 442 457 454 372	1,0 1,0 1,1 1,1 9

Note.—See Note, Table C-22.

TABLE C-24.—Selected unemployment rates, 1948-69

[Percent]

		Ву	sex and	age	Ву	color	В	y select	ed group:	3	
Year or month	All work- ers	Both sexes, 16–19 years	Men, 20 years and over	Wom- en, 20 years and over	White	Negro and other races	Expe- rienced wage and salary workers	Mar- ried men 1	Full- time work- ers ²	Blue- collar work- ers ³	Labor force time lost 6
1948	3, 8 5, 9	9. 2 13. 4	3. 2 5. 4	3. 6 5. 3	3. 5 5. 6	5. 9 8. 9	3. 7 6. 2	3, 5	5. 4	4. 2 8. 0	
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	5. 3 3. 3 3. 0 2. 9 5. 5	12. 2 8. 2 8. 5 7. 6 12. 6	4. 7 2. 5 2. 4 2. 5 4. 9	5. 1 4. 0 3. 2 2. 9 5. 5	4. 9 3. 1 2. 8 2. 7 5. 0	9. 0 5. 3 5. 4 4. 5 9. 9	5. 6 3. 2 2. 9 2. 6 6. 2	4.6 1.5 1.4 1.7 4.0	5. 0 2. 6 2. 5	7. 2 3. 9 3. 6 3. 4 7. 2	
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	4 1	11. 0 11. 1 11. 6 15. 9 14. 6	3. 8 3. 4 3. 6 6. 2 4. 7	4. 4 4. 2 4. 1 6. 1 5. 2	3. 9 3. 6 3. 8 6. 1 4. 8	8. 7 8. 3 7. 9 12. 6 10. 7	4. 8 4. 4 4. 6 7. 2 5. 7	2. 6 2. 3 2. 8 5. 1 3. 6	3.8 3.7 4.0 7.2	5. 8 5. 1 6. 2 10. 2 7. 6	5. 1 5. 3 8. 1 6. 6
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	5. 5 6. 7 5. 5 5. 7 5. 2	14. 7 16. 8 14. 7 17. 2 16. 2	4. 7 5. 7 4. 6 4. 5 3. 9	5. 1 6. 3 5. 4 5. 4 5. 2	4. 9 6. 0 4. 9 5. 0 4. 6	10. 2 12. 4 10. 9 10. 8 9. 6	5. 7 6. 8 5. 6 5. 5 5. 0	3. 7 4. 6 3. 6 3. 4 2. 8	6. 7 5. 4 4. 8	7.8 9.2 7.4 7.3 6.3	6. 7 8. 0 6. 7 6. 4 5. 8
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	4.5 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.5	14. 8 12. 8 12. 8 12. 7 12. 7	3. 2 2. 5 2. 3 2. 2 2. 1	4. 5 3. 8 4. 2 3. 8 3. 7	4. 1 3. 4 3. 4 3. 2 3. 1	8.1 7.3 7.4 6.7 6.4	4. 3 3. 5 3. 6 3. 4 3. 3	2. 4 1. 9 1. 8 1. 6 1. 5	4. 2 3. 4 3. 5 3. 1 3. 1	5. 3 4. 2 4. 4 4. 1 3. 9	5. 0 4. 2 4. 2 4. 0 3. 9
				<u> </u>	Sea	asonally a	adjusted	<u> </u>		·	
1968: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	3.6 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.6 3.7	11.6 12.7 13.0 12.4 12.6 13.3	2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.3	4. 0 3. 9 3. 8 3. 7 3. 7 3. 7	3.2 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.3	6.6 7.1 6.9 6.8 6.5 7.1	3. 4 3. 5 3. 4 3. 3 3. 2 3. 5	1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6	3.3 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.2	4. 3 4. 4 4. 4 4. 0 3. 8 4. 1	4. 1 4. 2 4. 0 3. 8 3. 7 4. 1
July	3.5	13. 3 12. 3 12. 5 12. 3 12. 2 12. 7	2. 2 2. 1 2. 2 2. 2 2. 0 1. 8	3.8 3.7 3.9 3.7 3.5 3.5	3.3 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.0	6. 8 6. 4 6. 6 7. 3 6. 5 6. 0	3. 5 3. 3 3. 4 3. 3 3. 2 3. 1	1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6	3.3 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.7	4.3 4.2 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.6	4. 2 4. 0 4. 0 3. 9 3. 8 3. 6
1969: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	3. 3 3. 3 3. 4 3. 5 3. 5 3. 4	11. 7 11. 7 12. 7 12. 8 12. 5 11. 6	2. 0 1. 9 1. 9 2. 0 2. 0 2. 0	3. 5 3. 5 3. 5 3. 8 3. 7 3. 7	3. 0 2. 9 3. 1 3. 1 3. 1 3. 0	6. 0 5. 7 6. 0 6. 9 6. 5 7. 0	3. 1 3. 0 3. 1 3. 2 3. 1 3. 2	1. 4 1. 4 1. 5 1. 5 1. 5	2.9 2.8 2.9 3.2 3.1 3.1	3.8 3.6 3.7 4.1 3.8 3.7	3.6 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.5
July	3.6 3.5 4.0 3.9	12. 2 12. 5 13. 2 13. 0 11. 6 11. 9	2. 2 2. 1 2. 4 2. 4 2. 2 2. 2	3.7 3.8 4.2 4.0 3.5 3.4	3. 2 3. 2 3. 6 3. 5 3. 1 3. 2	6. 4 6. 5 6. 8 6. 9 6. 2 5. 5	3. 5 3. 5 3. 8 3. 6 3. 3 3. 3	1.6 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.5	3. 1 3. 4 3. 2 3. 0 3. 1	3. 8 3. 8 4. 4 4. 3 4. 2 4. 3	4. 1 4. 1 4. 4 4. 4 4. 0 3. 8

Note.—See Note, Table C-22.

Married men living with their wives. Data for 1949 and 1951-54 are for April; 1950, for March.
 Data for 1949-61 are for May.
 Includes craftsmen, operatives, and nonfarm laborers. Data for 1948-57 are based on data for January, April, July, and October.
 Man-hours lost by the unemployed and persons on part time for economic reasons as a percent of potentially available

labor force man-hours.

TABLE C-25.—Unemployment by duration, 1947-69

ļ	Total un-		Duration of un	employment	
Year or month	employ-	Less than	5–14	15–26	27 weeks
	ment	5 weeks	weeks	weeks	and over
	T	housands of per	sons 16 years	of age and ov	er
147	2, 311	1,210	704	234	16-
	2, 276	1,300	669	193	11:
	3, 637	1,756	1, 194	427	25
50	3, 288	1,450	1, 055	425	357
	2, 055	1,177	574	166	137
	1, 883	1,135	516	148	84
	1, 834	1,142	482	132	78
	3, 532	1,605	1, 116	495	317
55	2, 852	1,335	815	367	33
	2, 750	1,412	805	301	23
	2, 859	1,408	891	321	23
	4, 602	1,753	1,396	785	66
	3, 740	1,585	1,114	469	57
50	3, 852	1,719	1, 176	502	454
	4, 714	1,806	1, 376	728	804
	3, 911	1,659	1, 134	534	581
	4, 070	1,751	1, 231	535	551
	3, 786	1,697	1, 117	490	481
55	3, 366	1,628	983	404	35
	2, 875	1,535	804	295	24
	2, 975	1,635	893	271	17
	2, 817	1,594	810	256	15
	2, 831	1,629	829	242	13
		Seas	sonally adjuste	e d 1	
68: Jan	2,795	1, 380	855	290	181
	2,929	1, 707	808	285	168
	2,881	1, 703	768	272	177
	2,774	1, 542	829	244	158
	2,810	1, 681	711	278	140
	2,914	1, 701	830	260	163
July	2,897	1, 657	844	295	175
	2,776	1, 629	765	238	162
	2,847	1, 631	811	235	138
	2,798	1, 542	892	253	128
	2,654	1, 576	785	221	127
	2,603	1, 363	825	177	145
\$9: Jan	2, 645	1, 476	741	193	123
	2, 627	1, 436	829	237	109
	2, 728	1, 646	757	237	118
	2, 845	1, 724	737	254	139
	2, 806	1, 777	629	278	131
	2, 762	1, 591	813	258	125
July	2,882 2,867 3,232 3,161 2,798 2,810	1,677 1,636 1,818 1,857 1,564 1,436	830 861 1,000 948 910 910	244 244 233 240 244 262	175 138 156 130 140

¹ Because of independent seasonal adjustment of the various series, detail will not necessarily add to totals.

Note.—See Note, Table C-22.

	A 20.	il progran	ns		we progr		te progra			
Year or month	Cov- ered em- ploy- ment ¹	Insured unem- ploy- ment (weekly aver- age) ²³	Total benefits paid (mil- lions of dol- lars) ² ⁴	Insured unem- ploy- ment ³	Initial claims	Ex- haus- tions 5	ploymen cent of	unem- t as per- covered yment Season- ally ad- justed	Total (mil- lions of dol- lars) 4	Average weekly check (dollars) 6
	Thou	sands		Weekly a	verage, th	nousands	Per	cent		
1940	24, 291 28, 136 30, 819 32, 419 31, 714 30, 087 31, 856 33, 876 34, 646 33, 098	1, 331 842 661 149 111 720 2, 804 1, 793 1, 446 2, 474	534. 7 358. 8 350. 4 80. 5 67. 2 574. 9 2, 878. 5 1, 785. 5 1, 785. 5 1, 328. 7 2, 269. 8	1, 282 814 649 147 105 589 1, 295 997 980 1, 973	214 164 122 36 29 116 189 187 200 340	50 30 21 4 2 5 38 24 20 37	5. 6 3. 0 2. 2 . 5 4 2. 1 4. 3 3. 1 3. 0 6. 2		775.1	10, 56 11, 06 12, 66 13, 84 15, 90 18, 77 18, 50 17, 83 19, 03 20, 48
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1957 1958	34, 308 36, 334 37, 006 38, 072 36, 622 40, 018 42, 751 43, 436 44, 411 45, 728	1,605 1,000 1,069 1,067 2,051 1,399 1,323 1,571 3,269 2,099	1, 467. 6 862. 9 1, 043. 5 1, 050. 6 2, 291. 8 1, 560. 2 1, 540. 6 1, 913. 0 4, 290. 6 2, 854. 3	1,513 969 1,044 990 1,870 1,265 1,215 1,446 2,526 1,684	236 208 215 218 304 226 227 270 369 277	36 16 18 15 34 25 20 23 50 33	4.6 2.8 2.9 2.8 5.5 3.5 3.6 6.4 4.4		1, 373. 1 840. 4 998. 2 962. 2 2, 026. 9 1, 350. 3 1, 380. 7 1, 733. 9 3, 512. 7 2, 279. 0	20. 76 21. 09 22. 79 23. 58 24. 93 25. 04 27. 02 28. 17 30. 58 30. 41
1960	46, 334 46, 266 47, 776 48, 434 49, 637 51, 580 54, 739 56, 342 \$\nu\$57, 969	2, 071 2, 994 1, 946 7 1, 973 1, 753 1, 450 1, 129 1, 270 1, 187 1, 175	3, 022. 8 4, 358. 1 3, 145. 1 3, 025. 9 2, 749. 2 2, 360. 4 1, 890. 9 2, 220. 0 2, 191. 3 2, 265. 0	1, 908 2, 290 1, 783 7 1, 806 1, 605 1, 328 1, 061 1, 205 1, 111 1, 098	331 350 302 7 297 268 232 203 226 201 197	31 46 32 30 26 21 15 17 16	4. 8 5. 6 4. 4 3. 8 3. 0 2. 3 2. 5 2. 2		2, 726. 7 3, 422. 7 2, 675. 4 2, 774. 7 2, 522. 1 2, 166. 0 1, 771. 3 2, 101. 0 2, 031. 9 2, 099. 5	32. 87 33. 80 34. 56 35. 27 35. 92 37. 19 39. 75 41. 25 43. 43 46. 10
1968: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	55, 956 56, 419 57, 157 57, 676 58, 771	1,719 1,653 1,480 1,216 1,026 944	264. 8 259. 4 247. 5 207. 2 170. 2 139. 3	1,624 1,556 1,390 1,142 964 883	316 227 183 183 156 157	18 18 19 20 18 17	3. 3 3. 2 2. 8 2. 3 2. 0 1. 8	2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2	248. 5 243. 7 231. 1 195. 1 159. 1 129. 1	42. 60 43. 58 43. 64 43. 12 42. 42 42. 26
July	258, 833 259, 179 259, 036 258, 738 258, 865 8 59, 249	1, 058 1, 024 868 862 985 1, 253	156. 9 162. 8 133. 4 138. 7 134. 8 185. 4	991 955 802 794 913 1,172	240 174 141 154 189 261	15 15 13 14 13	2.0 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.8 2.3	2. 2 2. 2 2. 2 2. 1 2. 1 2. 1	145.6 150.0 121.8 126.0 122.5 170.3	42. 39 43. 73 43. 78 44. 37 44. 72 45. 34
1969: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June		1,585 1,551 1,385 1,163 970 912	264.6 250.8 242.6 214.9 164.9 145.7	1,491 1,459 1,300 1,090 906 852	275 219 173 167 144 162	16 17 17 19 17	3. 0 2. 9 2. 6 2. 2 1. 8 1. 7	2. 1 2. 1 2. 1 2. 0 2. 0 2. 1	246. 1 234. 2 226. 5 200. 1 153. 0 135. 0	46.16 46.80 46.70 46.03 45.14 44.88
July		1,089 1,016 903 930 1,106 1,449	171. 8 169. 7 148. 3 153. 8 147. 7 208. 5	1, 021 948 840 864 1, 030 1, 378	246 172 146 167 213 289	15 14 13 13 12 13	2. 0 1. 8 1. 6 1. 6 2. 0 2. 7	2. 2 2. 2 2. 2 2. 2 2. 3 2. 3	159. 2 156. 7 136. 2 140. 9 134. 7 194. 8	45. 30 46. 16 45. 70 46. 17 46. 91 47. 25

¹ Includes persons under the State, UCFE (Federal employee, effective January 1955), and RRB (Railroad Retirement Board) programs. Beginning October 1958, also includes the UCX program (unemployment compensation for ex-service-

Source: Department of Labor, Manpower Administration.

Board) programs. Beginning vectors 1306, also includes and 50% personal programs. Beginning vectors 1306, and 12 Includes State, UCFE, RR, UCX, UCV (unemployment compensation for veterans, October 1952–January 1960), and SRA (Servicemen's Readjustment Act, September 1944–September 1951) programs. Also includes Federal and State programs for temporary extension of benefits from June 1958 through June 1962, expiration date of program.

3 Covered workers who have completed at least 1 week of unemployment.

4 Includes benefits paid under extended duration provisions of State laws, beginning June 1958. Annual data are net amounts and monthly data are gross amounts.

Includes benefits paid under extended duration provisions of State laws, beginning June 1998. Almual data are net amounts and monthly data are gross amounts.
 Individuals receiving final payments in benefit year.
 For total unemployment only.
 Programs include Puerto Rican sugarcane workers for initial claims and insured unemployment beginning July 1963.
 Preliminary; December 1968 is latest month for which data are available for all programs combined. Workers covered by State programs account for about 88 percent of the total.

TABLE C-27.—Wage and salary workers in nonagricultural establishments, 1929-69
[All employees; thousands of persons]

	Total	Ma	nufacturir	ıg		0	Trans- porta-	10/5-1-	Fi-		Gover	ıment
Year or month	wage and salary work- ers	Total	Dura- ble goods	Non- dura- ble goods	Min- ing	Con- tract con- struc- tion	tion and pub- lic utili- ties	Whole- sale and retail trade	nance, insur- ance, and real estate	Serv- ices	Fed- eral	State and local
1929	31, 339	10,702			1,087	1, 497	3,916	6, 123	1,509	3, 440	533	2, 532
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934	29, 424 26, 649 23, 628 23, 711 25, 953	9, 562 8, 170 6, 931 7, 397 8, 501			1,009 873 731 744 883	1, 372 1, 214 970 809 862	3, 685 3, 254 2, 816 2, 672 2, 750	5, 797 5, 284 4, 683 4, 755 5, 281	1,475 1,407 1,341 1,295 1,319	3, 376 3, 183 2, 931 2, 873 3, 058	526 560 559 565 652	2, 622 2, 704 2, 666 2, 601 2, 647
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939	27, 053 29, 082 31, 026 29, 209 30, 618	9, 069 9, 827 10, 794 9, 440 10, 278	4,715		897 946 1,015 891 854	912 1, 145 1, 112 1, 055 1, 150	2,786 2,973 3,134 2,863 2,936	5, 431 5, 809 6, 265 6, 179 6, 426	1,335 1,388 1,432 1,425 1,462	3, 142 3, 326 3, 518 3, 473 3, 517	753 826 833 829 905	2, 728 2, 842 2, 923 3, 054 3, 090
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944		10, 985 13, 192 15, 280 17, 602 17, 328	5, 363 6, 968 8, 823 11, 084 10, 856	5, 622 6, 225 6, 458 6, 518 6, 472	925 957 992 925 892	1,294 1,790 2,170 1,567 1,094	3, 038 3, 274 3, 460 3, 647 3, 829	6,750 7,210 7,118 6,982 7,058	1,502 1,549 1,538 1,502 1,476	3, 681 3, 921 4, 084 4, 148 4, 163	996 1,340 2,213 2,905 2,928	3, 206 3, 320 3, 270 3, 174 3, 116
1945 1946 1947 1948 1949	40, 394 41, 674 43, 881	15, 524 14, 703 15, 545 15, 582 14, 441	9,074 7,742 8,385 8,326 7,489	6, 450 6, 962 7, 159 7, 256 6, 953	836 862 955 994 930	1,132 1,661 1,982 2,169 2,165	3, 906 4, 061 4, 166 4, 189 4, 001	7, 314 8, 376 8, 955 9, 272 9, 264	1,497 1,697 1,754 1,829 1,857	4, 241 4, 719 5, 050 5, 206 5, 264	2,808 2,254 1,892 1,863 1,908	3, 137 3, 341 3, 582 3, 787 3, 948
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	45, 222 47, 849 48, 825 50, 232 49, 022	15, 241 16, 393 16, 632 17, 549 16, 314	8, 094 9, 089 9, 349 10, 110 9, 129	7, 147 7, 304 7, 284 7, 438 7, 185	901 929 898 866 791	2,333 2,603 2,634 2,623 2,612	4, 034 4, 226 4, 248 4, 290 4, 084	9, 386 9, 742 10, 004 10, 247 10, 235	1,919 1,991 2,069 2,146 2,234	5, 382 5, 576 5, 730 5, 867 6, 002	1,928 2,302 2,420 2,305 2,188	4, 098 4, 087 4, 188 4, 340 4, 563
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	52.408	16, 882 17, 243 17, 174 15, 945 16, 675	9, 541 9, 834 9, 856 8, 830 9, 373	7,340 7,409 7,319 7,116 7,303	792 822 828 751 732	2,802 2,999 2,923 2,778 2,960	4, 141 4, 244 4, 241 3, 976 4, 011	10, 535 10, 858 10, 886 10, 750 11, 127	2, 335 2, 429 2, 477 2, 519 2, 594	6,274 6,536 6,749 6,806 7,130	2, 187 2, 209 2, 217 2, 191 2, 233	4,727 5,069 5,399 5,648 5,850
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	54, 234 54, 042 55, 596 56, 702 58, 331	16,796 16,326 16,853 16,995 17,274	9, 459 9, 070 9, 480 9, 616 9, 816	7,336 7,256 7,373 7,380 7,458	712 672 650 635 634	2,885 2,816 2,902 2,963 3,050	4,004 3,903 3,906 3,903 3,951	11,391 11,337 11,566 11,778 12,160	2,669 2,731 2,800 2,877 2,957	7, 423 7, 664 8, 028 8, 325 8, 709	2,270 2,279 2,340 2,358 2,348	6, 083 6, 315 6, 550 6, 868 7, 248
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 P	60, 815 63, 955 65, 857 67, 860	18, 062 19, 214 19, 447 19, 768 20, 121	10, 406 11, 284 11, 439 11, 624 11, 881	7, 656 7, 930 8, 008 8, 144 8, 240	632 627 613 610 628	3, 186 3, 275 3, 208 3, 267 3, 410	4, 036 4, 151 4, 261 4, 313 4, 449	12,716 13,245 13,606 14,081 14,644	3,023 3,100 3,225 3,383 3,558	9, 087 9, 551 10, 099 10, 592 11, 102	2,378 2,564 2,719 2,737 2,756	7, 696 8, 227 8, 679 9, 109 9, 471

See footnotes at end of table.

Table C-27.—Wage and salary workers in nonagricultural establishments, 1929-69—Continued

[All employees; thousands of persons]

	Total	Ma	nufacturii	ng		0	Trans- porta-		Fi-		Govern	ment
Year or month	wage and salary work- ers	Total	Dura- ble goods	Non- dura- ble goods	Min- ing	Con- tract con- struc- tion	tion and pub- lic utili- ties	Whole- sale and retail trade	nance, insur- ance, and real estate	Serv- ices	Fed- eral	State and local
					Sea	asonally	adjusted			<u></u>		
1967: Jan	65, 342	19, 616	11,560	8, 056	628	3, 237	4, 247	13, 457	3, 146	9, 839	2, 667	8, 505
Feb	65, 379	19, 562	11,541	8, 021	626	3, 213	4, 245	13, 461	3, 159	9, 888	2, 679	8, 546
Mar	65, 459	19, 504	11,500	8, 004	626	3, 205	4, 255	13, 484	3, 172	9, 946	2, 691	8, 576
Apr	65, 469	19, 431	11,427	8, 004	622	3, 192	4, 220	13, 524	3, 187	9, 987	2, 694	8, 612
May	65, 563	19, 362	11,407	7, 955	619	3, 175	4, 272	13, 557	3, 202	10, 026	2, 704	8, 646
June	65, 747	19, 364	11,391	7, 973	618	3, 192	4, 274	13, 584	3, 225	10, 067	2, 728	8, 695
July	65, 799	19, 307	11, 356	7, 951	621	3, 203	4, 286	13, 615	3, 231	10, 116	2, 735	8, 685
Aug	66, 016	19, 437	11, 471	7, 966	606	3, 200	4, 268	13, 642	3, 252	10, 161	2, 735	8, 715
Sept	66, 003	19, 335	11, 321	8, 014	601	3, 199	4, 264	13, 687	3, 264	10, 207	2, 721	8, 725
Oct	66, 083	19, 329	11, 297	8, 032	598	3, 208	4, 251	13, 695	3, 271	10, 250	2, 718	8, 763
Nov	66, 600	19, 546	11, 497	8, 049	597	3, 242	4, 277	13, 777	3, 288	10, 330	2, 719	8, 824
Dec	66, 734	19, 582	11, 513	8, 069	598	3, 243	4, 275	13, 781	3, 304	10, 370	2, 719	8, 862
1968: Jan	66, 720	19, 617	11, 557	8, 060	596	3, 075	4, 280	13, 786	3, 314	10, 398	2, 721	8, 933
Feb	67, 165	19, 627	11, 538	8, 089	599	3, 265	4, 297	13, 890	3, 327	10, 465	2, 724	8, 971
Mar	67, 286	19, 631	11, 536	8, 095	600	3, 269	4, 299	13, 938	3, 336	10, 490	2, 721	9, 002
Apr	67, 466	19, 702	11, 590	8, 112	617	3, 272	4, 298	13, 984	3, 348	10, 488	2, 723	9, 034
May	67, 550	19, 737	11, 606	8, 131	614	3, 266	4, 250	14, 017	3, 359	10, 510	2, 724	9, 073
June	67, 816	19, 790	11, 620	8, 170	615	3, 267	4, 300	14, 057	3, 363	10, 554	2, 774	9, 096
July	67, 945	19, 804	11,666	8, 138	619	3, 268	4, 315	14, 093	3, 376	10, 582	2,779	9, 109
Aug	68, 088	19, 800	11,634	8, 166	620	3, 272	4, 327	14, 154	3, 399	10, 625	2,743	9, 148
Sept	68, 195	19, 820	11,646	8, 174	622	3, 286	4, 333	14, 198	3, 414	10, 635	2,721	9, 166
Oct	68, 427	19, 840	11,649	8, 191	573	3, 305	4, 341	14, 265	3, 433	10, 721	2,708	9, 241
Nov	68, 664	19, 897	11,700	8, 197	622	3, 313	4, 352	14, 291	3, 453	10, 787	2,709	9, 240
Dec	68, 875	19, 958	11,744	8, 214	623	3, 330	4, 360	14, 271	3, 463	10, 838	2,724	9, 308
1969: Jan	69, 199	19, 999	11, 819	8, 180	626	3, 338	4, 353	14, 412	3, 541	10, 900	2, 760	9, 321
Feb	69, 487	20, 061	11, 839	8, 222	628	3, 366	4, 373	14, 468		10, 967	2, 767	9, 355
Mar	69, 710	20, 122	11, 881	8, 241	626	3, 374	4, 399	14, 508		11, 034	2, 759	9, 373
Apr	69, 789	20, 111	11, 868	8, 243	624	3, 363	4, 439	14, 533		11, 044	2, 758	9, 386
May	70, 013	20, 118	11, 874	8, 244	622	3, 407	4, 444	14, 609		11, 065	2, 754	9, 453
June	70, 300	20, 198	11, 931	8, 267	622	3, 466	4, 467	14, 665		11, 066	2, 790	9, 469
July Aug Sept Oct Nov P_ Dec P_	70, 247 70, 500 70, 390 70, 651 70, 653 70, 639	20, 164 20, 334 20, 197 20, 156 20, 018 19, 988	11, 912 12, 081 11, 965 11, 932 11, 758 11, 732	8, 252 8, 253 8, 232 8, 224 8, 260 8, 256	629 631 631 631 632 636	3, 434 3, 410 3, 420 3, 418 3, 460 3, 446	4, 483 4, 484 4, 480 4, 480 4, 488 4, 493	14,671 14,702 14,716 14,809 14,823 14,785	3, 581 3, 586	11,067 11,120 11,150 11,244 11,265 11,288	2,777 2,752 2,749 2,729 2,721 2,713	9, 454 9, 486 9, 461 9, 589 9, 636 9, 675

Note.—Data in Tables C-27 through C-33 are based on reports from employing establishments and relate to full- and part-time wage and salary workers in nonagricultural establishments who worked during, or received pay for, any part of the pay period which includes the 12th of the month.

Not comparable with labor force data (Tables C-22 through C-25), which include proprietors, self-amployed persons, domestic servants, and unpaid family workers, and which count persons as employed when they are not at work because of industrial disputes, bad weather, etc.

For description and details of the various establishment data, see "Employment and Earnings."

Table C-28.—Average weekly hours of work in selected nonagricultural industries, 1929-69

	ī——-	1				ī		1		
Year or month	Total non- agri- cultural	M	anufacturi 	ī	Con- tract con-	Retail	Whole- sale	Bitumi- nous coal	Class I	Tele- phone com-
	pri- vate 1	Total	Durable goods	Non- durable goods	struc- tion	trade	trade	and lignite mining	roads	muni- cation
1929		44. 2			1			38. 1		
1930		42. 1						33. 3		
1931		40. 5 38. 3	32.5	41.9				28. 1 27. 0 29. 3 26. 8 26. 2 28. 5 27. 7 23. 3		
1933		38. 1	32.5 34.7	40.0				27.0		
1934		34.6	33.8 37.2	35. 1 36. 1				26. 8		
1935		36.6	37. 2	36. 1			41.6	26. 2		Í
1936		39. 2	40.9	37. 7 37. 4			42.9	28. 5		
1937		38. 6 35. 6	39. 9 34. 9	36. 1			41. 6 42. 9 43. 1 42. 3	27.7		38. 8 38. 9
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938		37.7	37. 9	37.4		43, 4	41.8	26.8	43.7	39.1
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948		38. 1	39. 2	37.0			41.3	27. 8	44.3	20.5
1941		40.6	42. 0 45. 0	38. 9 40. 3		43. 2 42. 8	41.1	30.7	45.X	40. 1 40. 5 41. 9 42. 3 41. 7
1942		43.1	45.0	40.3		41.8	41.4	32.4	47. 0 48. 7	40.5
1943		45. 0 45. 2	46. 5 46. 5	42. 5 43. 1		40, 9 41, 0	42.3	36. 3	48.7	41.9
1945		43. 5	44.0	43.1		40.9	43. 0 42. 8	43.0	48. 9 48. 5	42.3
1946		40. 3	40.4	40.5		41.3	41.6	41.3	46.0	
1947	40.3	40.4	40, 5	42. 3 40. 5 40. 2	38. 2	41. 3 3 40. 3 40. 2	41.1	43. 0 42. 0 41. 3 40. 3 37. 7	46. 4 46. 2 43. 7	37. 4 39. 2 38. 5
1948	40.0	40.0	40. 4	39.6	38. 1 37. 7	40.2	41.0	37.7	46. 2	39.2
1949	39. 4		39, 4	38.9		40. 4	40.8	32.3		38, 5
1950	39.8	40.5	41.1	39.7	37.4	40.4	40.7	34.7	40.8	38. 9 39. 1 38. 5 38. 7
1951	39.9 39.9	40.6 40.7	41.5 41.5	39. 5 39. 7	38. 1 38. 9	40, 4 39, 8	40.8 40.7	34.9	41.0	39. 1
1953	39.6	40.5	41.2	39.6	37.9	39.1	40.7	33. 8 34. 1	40.6 40.6	38. 5 39. 7
1954	39. 1	39.6	40.1	39.0	37.2	39. 2	40.5	32. 3	40.8	38.9
1955	39.6	40.7	41.3	39.9	37. 1 37. 5 37. 0 36. 8	39.0	40.7	32. 3 37. 3	41.9	39.6
1956	39.3	40.4	41.0	39.6	37.5	38.6	40.5	37.5	41.7	39.5
1957	38. 8 38. 5	39, 8 39, 2	40. 3 39. 5	39. 2 38. 8	37.0	38. 1 38. 1	40.3 40.2	36.3	41.7	39.0
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958	39.0	40.3	40.7	39.7	37.0	38. 2	40. 6	33. 3 35. 8	41.6 41.9	38. 4 39. 2
1060	38.6	39. 7	40.1	39. 2	36, 7	38.0	40.5	35. 8	41.7	39.6
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965	38.6	39.8	40.3	39.3	36.9	37. 6	40.5	35. 9	42. 3	39. 0
1962	38.7	' Δ∩ Δ	40.9	39.6	37.0	37. 4 37. 3	40.6	4 37.0	42.6	39. 9
1963	38.8	40. 5 40. 7	41.1	39.6	36. 9 37. 0 37. 3 37. 2	37.3	40.6	4 38.9	42. 9 43. 5	40.0
1964	38. 7 38. 8	40.7	41. 4 42. 0	39.7 40.1	37.2 37.4	37.0	40.6	4 39. 2	43.5	40, 2 40, 4 40, 6 39, 3
1966	38.6	41. 2 41. 3 40. 6	42.1	40.1	37.6	36, 6 35, 9	40. 8 40. 7	4 40. 2 4 40. 8	43. 6 43. 9	40.4
1967	38. 6 38. 0	40.6	42.1 41.2	40. 2 39. 7	37.7	35. 3	40.3	4407	43.2	39.3
1968	37. 8 37. 7	40, /	41. 4 41. 3	39.8	37.4 38.0	34.7	40. 1 40. 2	4 39. 7	43.9	39.7
1966 1967 1968 1969 P	37.7	40.6	41.3	39.7	38.0	34. 2	40, 2	40.0		40. 4
			Seas	onally adj	usted				Unadjuste	d
1968: Jan	37.7	40. 2	41.0	39. 3	36.5	34, 9	40.0	40.7	44. 3	39.2
-Ah	37.9	40, 7	41.3	39.9	37.6	34.9	40.0	40.6	44.0	39. 2 39. 1
MarAprMay	37. 9 37. 8 37. 7 37. 8 37. 9	40, 8	41.4	39.9	36.9	34.8	40, 0	41. 1	42.7	30-1
Apr	37.7	40.1	40.6	39. 2 39. 9	37. 7 37. 5 37. 5	34. 8 34. 7	40.0	40.5	44. 3 45. 0	38. 6 38. 1 39. 9
May	37.8	40. 9 40. 9	41.6 41.6	40.0	37.5	34.7	40. 0 40. 2	40. 5 41. 5	43.0	30.1
Julie	37.3							71.5		
July	37.9 37.9	40, 9 40, 7	41.5 41.3	39. 9 39. 9	37.3	34. 8 34. 8	40. 1 40. 2	40.9	44.7	40. 2 39. 9
Sent	37.9	41.0	41.6	40.0	37.5 37.5 37.5 36.2	34.7	40.2	40.6	43. 7 42. 9 44. 5	40.6
Oct	37.8 37.6 37.6	40, 9	41.6	39. 9	37, 5	34.5	40.1	29.0	44. 5	40.6
Nov	37.6	40.8	41.6	39.7	36. 2	34, 5	40.0	40.6	43.9	41. 5 39. 9
July	37.6	40. 8	41. 3	39. 9	37.6	34. 3	40.0	41.1	43.8	
1060 · fan	37 9	40, 6	41.3	39.8	38. 2	34. 4	40.1	41.6	44.7	40.0
Feb	37.5	40, 1	40. 9	39. 1	38.0	34.2	40.1	40.7	45.3	40.6
Mar	37.8	40.9	41, 5 41, 4	39. 9 39. 8	37.9 38.0	34. 3 34. 1	40. 1 40. 2	38. 8 41. 5	43. 0 44. 3	39. 9 39. 5 39. 8
May	37. 8 37. 8	40, 8 40, 7	41.4	39.8	38.1	34. 1	40. 2	40.5	44.5	39.8
Feb Mar Apr May June June	37.8	40.7	41.3	39.8	37.6	34. 2	40.0	35.7	44. 5 43. 5	40. 4
luly	37.8	40, 7	41.2	39.7	37.5	34, 2	40, 0	l .		40.8
July	37.8	40.6	41.3	39.6	37 9	34.3	40.3	40.8		40.3
Sept	37.8	40.8	41. 5 41. 2 41. 1	39.7	38. 1 37. 5 38. 2	34.2	40.3	40.5		40.8
Oct	37.6 37.6 37.5	40. 5 40. 5	41. 2	39. 5 39. 5	37.5	33. 9 34. 0	40. 3 40. 2	40.6		40.4 40.8
Nov P	3/.6	40. 5 40. 6	41. 1 41. 2	39. 5 39. 8	38. 2 38. 2	34. 0 33. 9	40, 2	39.5		
Dec P	3/.3	40.0	41.2	33.0	30.2	33.3	ر ۱۰۰۰			

¹ In addition to industries shown separately, total includes other mining; other transportation and public utilities; finance, insurance, and real estate; and services.

2 Nine-month average, April through December, because of new series started in April 1945.

3 Beginning 1947, data include eating and drinking places.

4 Eleven-month average; excludes data for July.

Note.—Hours and earnings data in Tables C–28 through C–33 relate to production workers in manufacturing and mining, to construction workers in contract construction, and generally, to nonsupervisory employees in other industries. See Table C–31 for unadjusted weekly hours in manufacturing. See also Note, Table C–27.

	Total non-	М	anufactur	ing	Con-			Bitu- minous	ļ., .	Tele-	
Year or month	agricul- tural private 1	Total	Durable goods	Non- durable goods	tract con- struc- tion	Retail trade	Whole- sale trade	coal and lignite mining	Class I rail- roads	phone com- munica- tion	Agri- cul- ture ²
1929		\$0.560						\$0.659			\$0. 24
930		. 546 . 509 . 441 . 437 . 526 . 544 . 550 . 617 . 620 . 627	\$0, 492 . 467 . 550 . 571 . 580 . 667 . 679 . 691	\$0.412 .419 .505 .520 .519 .566 .572 .571		\$0.484	\$0.610 .628 .658 .674 .688	. 662 . 626 . 503 . 485 . 651 . 720 . 768 . 828 . 849 . 858	\$0.730	\$0, 774 . 816 . 822	. 220 . 17: . 12: . 11: . 12: . 14: . 15: . 17: . 16: . 16:
940	\$1. 131 1. 225 1. 275	. 655 . 726 . 851 . 957 1, 011 1, 016 1, 075 1, 217 1, 328 1, 378	. 716 . 799 . 937 1. 048 1. 105 1. 099 1. 144 1. 278 1. 395 1. 453	. 590 . 627 . 709 . 787 . 844 . 886 . 995 1. 145 1. 250 1. 295	\$1.541 1.713 1.792	. 494 . 518 . 559 . 606 . 653 . 699 . 797 4 . 838 . 901 . 951	.711 .763 .828 .898 .948 .990 1.107 1.220 1.308 1.360	. 854 . 960 1. 030 1. 101 1. 147 1. 199 1. 357 1. 582 1. 835 1. 877	. 733 . 743 . 837 . 852 . 948 . 955 1. 087 1. 186 1. 301 1. 427	. 827 . 820 . 843 . 870 . 911 3 . 962 1. 124 1. 197 1. 248 1. 345	. 169 . 206 . 268 . 353 . 423 . 472 . 515 . 547 . 580 . 559
950	1. 335 1. 45 1. 52 1. 61 1. 65 1. 71 1. 80 1. 89 1. 95 2. 02	1. 440 1. 56 1. 65 1. 74 1. 78 1. 86 1. 95 2. 05 2. 11 2. 19	1. 519 1. 65 1. 75 1. 86 1. 90 1. 99 2. 08 2. 19 2. 26 2. 36	1. 347 1. 44 1. 51 1. 58 1. 62 1. 67 1. 77 1. 85 1. 91	1. 863 2. 02 2. 13 2. 28 2. 39 2. 45 2. 57 2. 71 2. 82 2. 93	. 983 1. 06 1. 09 1. 16 1. 20 1. 25 1. 30 1. 37 1. 42 1. 47	1. 427 1. 52 1. 61 1. 70 1. 76 1. 83 1. 94 2. 02 2. 09 2. 18	1. 944 2. 14 2. 22 2. 40 2. 40 2. 47 2. 72 2. 92 2. 93 3. 11	1. 572 1. 73 1. 83 1. 88 1. 93 1. 96 2. 12 2. 26 2. 44 2. 54	1. 398 1. 49 1. 59 1. 68 1. 76 1. 82 1. 86 1. 95 2. 05 2. 18	. 561 . 625 . 661 . 672 . 661 . 675 . 705 . 728 . 757
960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968	2. 09 2. 14 2. 22 2. 28 2. 36 2. 45 2. 56 2. 68 2. 85 3. 04	2. 26 2. 32 2. 39 2. 46 2. 53 2. 61 2. 72 2. 83 3. 01 3. 19	2. 43 2. 49 2. 56 2. 56 2. 71 2. 79 2. 90 3. 00 3. 19 3. 38	2. 05 2. 11 2. 17 2. 22 2. 29 2. 36 2. 45 2. 57 2. 74 2. 91	3. 08 3. 20 3. 31 3. 41 3. 55 3. 70 3. 89 4. 11 4. 40 4. 77	1. 52 1. 56 1. 63 1. 68 1. 75 1. 82 1. 91 2. 01 2. 16 2. 30	2. 24 2. 31 2. 37 2. 45 2. 52 2. 61 2. 73 2. 88 3. 05 3. 23	3. 14 3. 12 5 3. 12 5 3. 15 5 3. 30 5 3. 49 5 3. 66 5 3. 75 5 3. 86 4. 17	2. 61 2. 67 2. 72 2. 76 2. 80 3. 00 3. 09 3. 24 3. 44	2, 26 2, 37 2, 48 2, 56 2, 62 2, 70 2, 79 2, 88 3, 04 3, 24	. 818 . 834 . 856 . 880 . 904 . 951 1. 03 1. 12 1. 21 1. 33
968: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	2. 76 2. 78 2. 79 2. 80 2. 83 2. 84	2. 94 2. 94 2. 96 2. 97 2. 99 3. 00	3. 13 3. 12 3. 14 3. 15 3. 18 3. 18	2. 67 2. 68 2. 69 2. 70 2. 72 2. 73	4. 36 4. 29 4. 30 4. 29 4. 34 4. 31	2. 09 2. 11 2. 12 2. 13 2. 14 2. 16	2. 96 3. 00 3. 01 3. 02 3. 04 3. 04	3. 82 3. 79 3. 79 3. 77 3. 78 3. 82	3. 33 3. 38 3. 35 3. 35 3. 34 3. 40	2. 90 2. 90 2. 91 2. 89 2. 96 3. 05	1. 24
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	2. 85 2. 85 2. 90 2. 91 2. 92 2. 92	3. 00 2. 99 3. 04 3. 06 3. 08 3. 11	3. 18 3. 17 3. 23 3. 24 3. 27 3. 30	2. 75 2. 75 2. 78 2. 79 2. 80 2. 82	4. 36 4. 40 4. 49 4. 52 4. 54 4. 55	2. 16 2. 16 2. 19 2. 20 2. 22 2. 21	3. 04 3. 04 3. 09 3. 08 3. 11 3. 12	3. 78 3. 80 3. 79 4. 13 4. 14	3. 46 3. 49 3. 53 3. 50 3. 56 3. 55	3, 04 3, 06 3, 14 3, 16 3, 19 3, 17	1. 18
969: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	2. 94 2. 96 2. 97 2. 98 3. 01 3. 03	3. 12 3. 12 3. 13 3. 15 3. 16 3. 17	3. 31 3. 31 3. 32 3. 33 3. 35 3. 36	2. 83 2. 84 2. 85 2. 87 2. 88 2. 89	4. 58 4. 56 4. 62 4. 64 4. 71 4. 71	2. 24 2. 26 2. 26 2. 27 2. 29 2. 30	3. 12 3. 16 3. 16 3. 18 3. 20 3. 24	4. 12 4. 12 4. 11 4. 16 4. 18 4. 09	3. 58 3. 64 3. 60 3. 60 3. 62 3. 65	3. 17 3. 20 3. 16 3. 17 3. 22 3. 22	1. 38
July Aug Sept Oct Nov * Dec *	3. 04 3. 05 3. 10 3. 11 3. 12 3. 11	3. 19 3. 19 3. 24 3. 24 3. 26 3. 28	3. 37 3. 39 3. 44 3. 44 3. 45 3. 48	2. 92 2. 92 2. 95 2. 96 2. 97 2. 99	4. 74 4. 79 4. 91 4. 95 4. 95 4. 99	2. 30 2. 30 2. 33 2. 35 2. 36 2. 33	3. 23 3. 24 3. 29 3. 29 3. 33 3. 34	4. 14 4. 18 4. 37 4. 42		3. 22 3. 24 3. 30 3. 28 3. 31	1, 29

Sources: Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics) and Department of Agriculture.

For coverage, see footnote 1, Table C-28.
 Weighted average of all farm wage rates on a per hour basis.
 Nine-month average, April through December, because of new series started in April 1945.
 Beginning 1947, data include eating and drinking places.
 Eleven-month average; excludes data for July.

Note.—See Note, Tables C-27 and C-28.

Table C-30.—Average gross weekly earnings in selected nonagricultural industries, 1929-69

	Total non-	Ma	nufacturin	g	Con-		14/6-1-	Bitumi- nous		Tele- phone
Year or month	agricul- tural pri- vate 1	Total	Dura- ble goods	Non- durabie goods	tract con- struc- tion	Retail trade	Whole- sale trade	nous coal and lignite mining	Class I rail- roads	com- mu- nica- tion
1929		\$24. 76	\$26. 84	\$22.47					 - -	
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1934 1935 1936 1937 1937		23. 00 20. 64 16. 89 16. 65 18. 20 19. 91 21. 56 23. 82 22. 07 23. 64	24. 42 20. 98 15. 99 16. 20 18. 59 21. 24 23. 72 26. 61 23. 70 26. 19	21. 40 20. 09 17. 26 16. 76 17. 73 18. 77 19. 57 21. 17 20. 65 21. 36		\$21.01	\$26. 75 25. 19 25. 44 25. 38 26. 96 28. 36 28. 51 28. 76	22. 94 19. 78 22. 99	\$31, 90	\$30, 03 31, 74 32, 14
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948	\$45. 58 49. 00 50. 24	24. 96 29. 48 36. 68 43. 07 45. 70 44. 20 43. 32 49. 17 53. 12 53. 88	28. 07 33. 56 42. 17 48. 73 51. 38 48. 36 46. 22 51. 76 56. 36 57. 25	21. 83 24. 39 28. 57 33. 45 36. 38 37. 48 40. 30 46. 03 49. 50 50. 38	\$58.87 65.27 67.56	21.34 22.17 23.37 24.79	29. 36 31. 36 34. 28 37. 99 40. 76 42. 37 46. 05 50. 14 53. 63 55. 49	23. 74 29. 47 33. 37 39. 97 49. 32 50. 36 56. 04 63. 75 69. 18 60. 63	32. 47 34. 03 39. 34 41. 49 46. 36 46. 32 50. 00 55. 03 60. 11 62. 36	32. 67 32. 88 34. 14 36. 45 38. 54 2 40. 12 44. 29 44. 77 48. 92 51. 78
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958	53. 13 57. 86 60. 65 63. 76 64. 52 67. 72 70. 74 73. 33 75. 08 78. 78	58. 32 63. 34 67. 16 70. 47 70. 49 75. 70 78. 78 81. 59 82. 71 88. 26	62. 43 68. 48 72. 63 76. 63 76. 19 82. 19 85. 28 88. 26 89. 27 96. 05	53. 48 56. 88 59. 95 62. 57 63. 18 66. 63 70. 09 72. 52 74. 11 78. 61	69. 68 76, 96 82. 86 86. 41 88. 91 90. 90 96. 38 100. 27 103. 78 108. 41	39. 71 42. 82 43. 38 45. 36 47. 04 48. 75 50. 18 52. 20 54. 10 56. 15	58. 08 62. 02 65. 53 69. 02 71. 28 74. 48 78. 57 81. 41 84. 02 88. 51	67. 46 74. 69 75. 04 81. 84 77. 52 92. 13 102. 00 106. 00 97. 57 111. 34	64. 14 70. 93 74. 30 76. 33 78. 74 82. 12 88. 40 94. 24 101. 50 106. 43	54. 38 58. 26 65. 02 65. 02 68. 46 72. 07 73. 47 76. 05 78. 72 85. 46
1960 1961 1962 1963 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968	80. 67 82. 60 85. 91 88. 46 91. 33 95. 06 98. 82 101. 84 107. 73 114. 61	89. 72 92. 34 96. 56 99. 63 102. 97 107. 53 112. 34 114. 90 122. 51 129. 51	97. 44 100. 35 104. 70 108. 09 112. 19 117. 18 122. 09 123. 60 132. 07 139. 59	80. 36 82. 92 85. 93 87. 91 90. 91 94. 64 98. 49 102. 03 109. 05 115. 53	113. 04 118. 08 122. 47 127. 19 132. 06 138. 38 146. 26 154. 95 164. 56 181. 26	57. 76 58. 66 60. 96 62. 66 64. 75 66. 61 68. 57 70. 95 74. 95 78. 66	90. 72 93. 56 96. 22 99. 47 102. 31 106. 49 111. 11 116. 06 122. 31 129. 85	112. 41 112. 01 114. 46 121. 43 128. 91 140. 26 149. 74 153. 28 153. 65 165. 91	108. 84 112. 94 115. 87 118. 40 121. 80 130. 80 135. 65 139. 97 151. 02	89. 56 93. 38 98. 98 102. 44 105. 33 109. 06 113. 21 120. 66 130. 9
1968: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	103. 22 104. 53 104. 90 104. 72 106. 69 108. 20	117. 60 119. 36 120. 18 118. 21 122. 29 123. 30	127. 70 128. 54 129. 68 127. 26 132. 29 132. 92	103. 86 106. 40 106. 79 104. 76 108. 26 109. 47	152. 60 155. 30 155. 60 160. 02 163. 18 165. 50	72. 11 72. 80 72. 93 73. 49 73. 40 75. 82	118, 10 119, 40 120, 10 120, 20 121, 30 122, 51	155, 47 153, 87 155, 77 152, 69 153, 09 158, 53	147. 52 148. 72 143. 05 148. 41 150. 30 146. 20	113. 68 113. 39 113. 78 111. 55 112. 78 121. 70
July	108. 87 109. 16 110. 49 110. 29 109. 50 110. 38	122. 10 121. 69 125. 25 125. 77 125. 97 127. 82	131. 02 130. 29 135. 01 135. 43 136. 36 137. 61	110.00 110.55 112.03 111.88 111.72 113.08	168. 30 · 170. 72 173. 76 173. 57 159. 35 168. 81	77. 33 77. 33 75. 99 75. 46 75. 70 76. 47	123. 12 122. 82 124. 22 123. 82 124. 40 125. 74	157. 70 154. 60 154. 28 109. 91 167. 68 170. 15	154. 66 152. 51 151. 44 155. 75 156. 28 155. 49	122. 21 122. 09 127. 48 128. 30 132. 39 126. 48
1969: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	110. 25 110. 11 111. 67 111. 75 113. 48 115. 14	126, 05 124, 80 127, 39 127, 58 128, 61 129, 65	136. 04 135. 05 137. 45 137. 20 138. 69 139. 44	111.50 110.48 113.15 113.08 114.34 115.31	168. 09 166. 90 171. 86 174. 46 179. 92 181. 34	76. 16 76. 39 76. 61 76. 73 77. 63 79. 35	124. 80 126. 08 126. 40 127. 20 128. 00 129. 92	171, 39 167, 68 159, 47 172, 64 169, 29 146, 01	160. 03 164. 89 154. 80 159. 48 161. 09 158. 78	126. 80 129. 92 126. 08 125. 22 128. 16 130. 09
July	115. 82 116. 51 117. 80 117. 25 117. 00 117. 25	129. 20 129. 51 132. 84 131. 87 132. 36 134. 15	137. 83 139. 33 143. 45 142. 42 142. 14 144. 77	116. 22 116. 51 118. 00 117. 51 117. 91 119. 60	183. 91 187. 77 192. 96 190. 08 183. 65 188. 12	80. 96 81. 19 79. 69 79. 20 79. 30 79. 69	130, 17 131, 22 132, 59 132, 59 133, 87 135, 27	159, 18 168, 91 169, 29 177, 42 174, 59		131, 38 130, 57 134, 64 132, 51 135, 05

Note.—See Note, Tables C-27 and C-28.

For coverage, see footnote 1, Table C-28.
 Nine-month average, April through December, because of new series started in April 1945.
 Beginning 1947, data include eating and drinking places.

Table C-31.—Average weekly hours and hourly earnings, gross and excluding overtime, in manufacturing industries, 1939-69

	Al	i manu	facturin	g indus	tries	Dura	ble goo uring in	ds manu Idustrie	ıfac- s	Nond fa	urable cturing	goods r industr	nanu- ies
Year or month	we	rage ekly urs	A	erage h earning		Wee	rage ekly urs	hou	rage Irly ings	we	rage ekly urs	ho	rage urly nings
	Gross	Ex- clud- ing over- time	Gross	Ex- clud- ing over- time	Adjusted hourly earnings, (1957- 59= 100) 1	Gross	Ex- clud- ing over- time	Gross	Ex- clud- ing over- time	Gross	Ex- clud- ing over- time	Gross	Ex- clud- ing over- time
1939	37.7		\$0.627		32. 2	37.9		\$0.691		37. 4		\$0. 571	
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949	38. 1 40. 6 43. 1 45. 0 45. 2 43. 5 40. 3 40. 4 40. 0 39. 1		. 851 . 957 1. 011 1. 016 1. 075 1. 217 1. 328	. 881 . 933 3. 949 1. 035 1. 18 1. 29	2 33. 4 2 37. 5 2 40. 8 2 43. 7 2 45. 5 2 50. 4 57. 8 63. 2 66. 1	39. 2 42. 0 45. 0 46. 5 46. 5 44. 0 40. 4 40. 5 40. 4 39. 4		. 937 1. 048 1. 105 1. 099 1. 144	3 1, 031 1, 111 1, 24 1, 35	37. 0 38. 9 40. 3 42. 5 43. 1 42. 3 40. 5 40. 2 39. 6 38. 9		. 709 . 787 . 844 . 886 . 995 1. 145 1. 250	\$0.613 .684 .748 .798 3.841 .962 1.11 1.21
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1957	40. 5 40. 6 40. 7 40. 5 39. 6 40. 7 40. 4 39. 8 39. 2 40. 3	37. 6 37. 5 37. 2 37. 6	1,65	1. 39 1. 51 1. 59 1. 68 1. 73 1. 79 1. 89 1. 99 2. 05 2. 12	68. 2 73. 6 77. 4 81. 6 84. 3 86. 9 91. 5 96. 2 100. 2 103. 4	41. 1 41. 5 41. 5 41. 2 40. 1 41. 3 41. 0 40. 3 39. 5 40. 7	38. 0 37. 9 37. 6 38. 0	1. 519 1. 65 1. 75 1. 86 1. 90 1. 99 2. 08 2. 19 2. 26 2. 36	1. 46 1. 59 1. 68 1. 79 1. 84 1. 91 2. 01 2. 12 2. 21 2. 28	39. 7 39. 5 39. 7 39. 6 39. 0 39. 9 39. 6 39. 2 38. 8 39. 7	37. 2 37. 0 36. 6 37. 0	1.51	1. 31 1. 40 1. 46 1. 53 1. 58 1. 62 1. 72 1. 80 1. 86 1. 92
1960	39. 7 39. 8 40. 4 40. 5 40. 7 41. 2 41. 3 40. 6 40. 7 40. 6	37. 3 37. 4 37. 6 37. 7 37. 6 37. 4 37. 2 37. 1 37. 0	2. 26 2. 32 2. 39 2. 46 2. 53 2. 61 2. 72 2. 83 3. 01 3. 19	2, 20 2, 25 2, 31 2, 37 2, 44 2, 51 2, 59 2, 72 2, 88 3, 05	106. 8 109. 9 112. 7 115. 5 118. 4 121. 5 125. 6 131. 5 139. 5 147. 7	40. 1 40. 3 40. 9 41. 1 41. 4 42. 0 42. 1 41. 2 41. 4 41. 3	37. 7 38. 0 38. 1 38. 2 38. 1 37. 8 37. 7 37. 6 37. 5	2. 43 2. 49 2. 56 2. 63 2. 71 2. 79 2. 90 3. 00 3. 19 3. 38	2. 36 2. 42 2. 48 2. 54 2. 60 2. 67 2. 76 2. 88 3. 05 3. 23	39. 2 39. 3 39. 6 39. 6 39. 7 40. 1 40. 2 39. 7 39. 8 39. 7	36. 7 36. 8 36. 9 36. 8 36. 8 36. 8 36. 6 36. 5 36. 3	2. 05 2. 11 2. 17 2. 22 2. 29 2. 36 2. 45 2. 57 2. 74 2. 91	1. 99 2. 05 2. 09 2. 15 2. 21 2. 27 2. 35 2. 47 2. 63 2. 79
1968: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	40.0 40.6	36. 7 37. 3 37. 3 36. 9 37. 3 37. 4	2. 94 2. 94 2. 96 2. 97 2. 99 3. 00	2. 83 2. 83 2. 84 2. 86 2. 87 2. 87	136. 1 136. 9 137. 5 138. 2 138. 6 138. 8	40. 8 41. 2 41. 3 40. 4 41. 6 41. 8	37. 3 37. 8 37. 8 37. 4 37. 8 37. 9	3. 13 3. 12 3. 14 3. 15 3. 18 3. 18	3, 00 3, 00 3, 02 3, 03 3, 04 3, 04	38. 9 39. 7 39. 7 38. 8 39. 8 40. I	35. 9 36. 6 36. 6 36. 1 36. 6 36. 7	2. 67 2. 68 2. 69 2. 70 2. 72 2. 73	2. 57 2. 58 2. 59 2. 61 2. 61 2. 62
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	40.7 40.7 41.2 41.1 40.9 41.1	37. 2 37. 1 37. 2 37. 2 37. 0 37. 2	3, 00 2, 99 3, 04 3, 06 3, 08 3, 11	2. 88 2. 86 2. 90 2. 92 2. 94 2. 97	139. 1 139. 8 141. 2 141. 7 142. 6 143. 6	41.2 41.1 41.8 41.8 41.7 41.7	37. 6 37. 5 37. 6 37. 6 37. 6 37. 5 37. 6	3. 18 3. 17 3. 23 3. 24 3. 27 3. 30	3, 04 3, 03 3, 07 3, 09 3, 11 3, 15	40. 0 40. 2 40. 3 40. 1 39. 9 40. 1	36. 6 36. 7 36. 5 36. 6 36. 4 36. 6	2. 75 2. 75 2. 78 2. 79 2. 80 2. 82	2. 63 2. 64 2. 66 2. 67 2. 69 2. 70
1969: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	40. 4 40. 0 40. 7 40. 5 40. 7 40. 9	36. 8 36. 7 37. 2 37. 0 37. 1 37. 2	3. 12 3. 12 3. 13 3. 15 3. 16 3. 17	2. 98 3. 00 3. 00 3. 02 3. 03 3. 03	144. 4 144. 9 145. 2 146. 0 146. 6 146. 9	41. 1 40. 8 41. 4 41. 2 41. 4 41. 5	37. 4 37. 2 37. 7 37. 6 37. 7 37. 6	3, 31 3, 31 3, 32 3, 33 3, 35 3, 36	3. 16 3. 17 3. 17 3. 19 3. 20 3. 21	39. 4 38. 9 39. 7 39. 4 39. 7 39. 9	36. 1 35. 9 36. 5 36. 2 36. 4 36. 5	2. 83 2. 84 2. 85 2. 87 2. 88 2. 89	2.72 2.73 2.74 2.76 2.77 2.77
July	40. 5 40. 6 41. 0 40. 7	37. 0 36. 9 37. 0 37. 0 37. 0 37. 4	3. 19 3. 19 3. 24 3. 24 3. 26 3. 28	3. 06 3. 06 3. 09 3. 10 3. 12 3. 15	147. 8 148. 4 149. 5 150. 2 151. 0 152. 0	40. 9 41. 1 41. 7 41. 4 41. 2 41. 6	37. 3 37. 3 37. 5 37. 5 37. 5 38. 0	3. 37 3. 39 3. 44 3. 45 3. 45 3. 48	3. 23 3. 24 3. 27 3. 29 3. 31 3. 34	39. 8 39. 9 40. 0 39. 7 , 39. 7 40. 0	36. 4 36. 3 36. 2 36. 3 36. 6	2. 92 2. 92 2. 95 2. 96 2. 97 2. 99	2.80 2.79 2.82 2.83 2.85 2.87

 ¹ Earnings in current prices adjusted to exclude the effects of overtime and interindustry shifts.
 2 Annual average not available; April used.
 3 Eleven-month average; August 1945 excluded because of VJ Day holiday period.

Note.—See Note, Tables C-27 and C-28. See Table C-28 for seasonally adjusted average gross weekly hours.

Table C-32.—Average weekly earnings, gross and spendable, total private nonagricultural industries, in current and 1957-59 prices, 1947-69

	_		Aver	age spendable	weekly earnin	gs ²	
Year or month	Average gro		Worker depen		Worker with three dependents		
	Current prices	1957–59 prices ¹	Current prices	1957-59 prices ¹	Current prices	1957-59 prices ¹	
1947	\$45. 58	\$58. 59	\$39. 16	\$50. 33	\$44. 64	\$57. 38	
1948	49. 00	58. 47	43. 11	51. 44	48. 51	57. 89	
949	50. 24	60. 53	44. 15	53. 19	49. 74	59. 93	
950	53. 13 57. 86 60. 65 63. 76 64. 52 67. 72 70. 74 73. 33 75. 08 78. 78	63. 40 63. 93 65. 57 68. 41 68. 93 72. 58 74. 70 74. 83 74. 56 77. 62	46. 02 48. 68 50. 07 52. 45 53. 76 56. 27 58. 63 60. 47 61. 83 64. 52	54. 92 53. 79 54. 13 56. 28 57. 44 60. 31 61. 91 61. 70 61. 40 63. 57	52. 04 55. 79 57. 87 60. 31 60. 85 63. 41 65. 82 67. 71 69. 11 71. 86	62. 10 61. 65 62. 56 64. 71 65. 01 67. 96 69. 50 68. 63 70. 80	
1960	80. 67 82. 60 85. 91 88. 46 91. 33 95. 06 98. 82 101. 84 107. 73 114. 61	78. 24 79. 27 81. 55 82. 91 84. 49 86. 50 87. 37 87. 57 88. 89 89. 75	65. 59 67. 08 69. 56 71. 05 75. 04 78. 99 81. 29 83. 38 86. 71 90. 96	63. 62 64. 38 66. 00 66. 59 69. 42 71. 87 71. 87 71. 69 71. 54 71. 23	72. 96 74. 48 76. 99 78. 56 82. 57 86. 30 88. 66 90. 86 95. 28 99. 99	70, 77 71, 48 73, 05 73, 63 76, 38 78, 53 78, 13 78, 61 78, 30	
1968: Jan	103. 22	87. 03	84, 43	71. 19	91. 96	77. 54	
	104. 53	87. 84	85, 42	71. 78	93. 01	78. 16	
	104. 90	87. 78	85, 70	71. 72	93. 30	78. 08	
	104. 72	87. 34	84, 11	70. 15	92. 90	77. 48	
	106. 69	88. 69	85, 57	71. 13	94. 40	78. 47	
	108. 20	89. 50	86, 68	71. 70	95. 55	79. 03	
July	108, 87	89. 60	87. 18	71. 75	96. 07	79. 07	
	109, 16	89. 55	87. 39	71. 69	96. 29	78. 99	
	110, 49	90. 42	88. 37	72. 32	97. 30	79. 62	
	110, 29	89. 74	88. 23	71. 79	97. 15	79. 05	
	109, 50	88. 74	87. 64	71. 02	96. 55	78. 24	
	110, 38	89. 23	88. 29	71. 37	97. 22	78. 59	
1969: Jan	110. 25	88. 84	87. 76	70. 72	96. 68	77. 90	
	110. 11	88. 37	87. 65	70. 35	96. 57	77. 50	
	111. 67	88. 91	88. 80	70. 70	97. 76	77. 83	
	111. 75	88. 41	88. 86	70. 30	97. 82	77. 39	
	113. 48	89. 50	90. 13	71. 08	99. 13	78. 18	
	115. 14	90. 24	91. 35	71. 59	100. 40	78. 68	
July	115. 82	90. 34	91. 85	71. 65	100. 92	78. 72	
	116. 51	90. 53	92. 35	71. 76	101. 45	78. 83	
	117. 80	91. 11	93. 30	72. 16	102. 44	79. 23	
	117. 25	90. 33	92. 89	71. 56	102. 01	78. 59	
	117. 00	89. 66	92. 71	71. 04	101. 82	78. 02	
	117. 25	89. 30	92. 89	70. 75	102. 01	77. 69	

 $^{^{\}rm I}$ Earnings in current prices divided by the consumer price index, $^{\rm 2}$ Average gross weekly earnings less social security and income taxes.

Note.—"'Total private" consists of manufacturing; contract construction; retail and wholesale trade; mining; transportation and public utilities; finance, insurance, and real estate; and services.

See also Note, Tables C-27 and C-28.

Table C-33.—Average weekly earnings, gross and spendable, in manufacturing industries, in current and 1957-59 prices, 1939-69

			Aver	age spendable	weekly earnin	gs ²
Year or month	Average green	oss weekly ings	Worker v	with no dents	Worker wi	
:	Current prices	1957-59 prices ¹	Current prices	1957-59 prices ¹	Current prices	1957-59 prices ¹
1939	\$23. 64	\$48. 84	\$23. 37	\$48. 29	\$23.40	\$48. 35
1940	24. 96	51. 15	24. 46	50. 12	24. 71	50, 64
	29. 48	57. 47	27. 96	54. 50	29. 19	56, 90
	36. 68	64. 58	31. 80	55. 99	36. 31	63, 93
	43. 07	71. 43	35. 95	59. 62	41. 33	68, 54
	45. 70	74. 55	37. 99	61. 97	43. 76	71, 39
	44. 20	70. 49	36. 82	58. 72	42. 59	67, 93
	43. 32	63. 71	37. 31	54. 87	42. 79	62, 93
	49. 17	63. 20	42. 10	54. 11	47. 58	61, 10
	53. 12	63. 39	46. 57	55. 57	52. 31	62, 42
	53. 88	64. 92	47. 21	56. 88	52. 95	63, 80
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957	67. 16 70. 47 70. 49 75. 70	69. 59 69. 99 72. 61 75. 61 75. 31 81. 14 83. 19 83. 26 82. 14 86. 96	50. 26 52. 97 55. 04 57. 59 58. 45 62. 51 64. 92 66. 93 67. 82 71. 89	59. 98 58. 53 59. 50 61. 79 62. 45 67. 00 68. 55 68. 30 67. 35 70. 83	56. 36 60. 18 62. 98 65. 65 69. 79 72. 25 74. 31 75. 23	67. 26 66. 56 68. 09 70. 39 70. 14 74. 80 76. 29 75. 8 74. 71 78. 23
1960	89. 72	87. 02	72. 57	70. 39	80, 11	77. 74
	92. 34	88. 62	74. 60	71. 59	82, 18	78. 8
	96. 56	91. 61	77. 86	73. 87	85, 53	81. 1:
	99. 63	93. 37	79. 82	74. 81	87, 58	82. 0
	102. 97	95. 25	84. 40	78. 08	92, 18	85. 2
	107. 53	97. 84	89. 08	81. 06	96, 78	88. 0
	112. 34	99. 33	91. 57	80. 96	99, 45	87. 9
	114. 90	98. 80	93. 28	80. 21	101, 26	87. 9
	122. 51	101. 08	97. 70	80. 61	106, 75	87. 0
	129. 51	101. 42	101. 90	79. 80	111, 44	87. 0
1968: Jan	117. 60	99. 16	95. 33	80. 38	103. 43	87. 2
	119. 36	100. 30	96. 66	81. 23	104. 85	88. 1
	120. 18	100. 57	97. 29	81. 41	105. 50	88. 2
	118. 21	98. 59	94. 07	78. 46	103. 23	86. 1
	112. 29	101. 65	97. 08	80. 70	106. 38	88. 4
	123. 30	101. 99	97. 83	80. 92	107. 16	88. 6
July	122. 10	100. 49	96. 94	79. 79	106 23	87. 4
	121. 69	99. 83	96. 64	79. 28	105. 91	86. 8
	125. 25	102. 50	99. 27	81. 24	108. 66	88. 9
	125. 77	102. 34	99. 65	81. 08	109. 06	88. 7
	125. 97	102. 08	99. 80	80. 88	109. 22	88. 5
	127. 82	103. 33	101. 17	81. 79	110. 65	89. 4
1969: Jan	126. 05	101. 57	99. 36	80. 06	108. 78	87. 6
	124. 80	100. 16	98. 44	79. 00	107. 82	86. 5
	127. 39	101. 43	100. 34	79. 89	109. 81	87. 4
	127. 58	100. 93	100. 48	79. 49	109. 95	86. 9
	128. 61	101. 43	101. 24	79. 84	110. 74	87. 3
	129. 65	101. 61	102. 00	79. 94	111. 54	87. 4
July	129. 20	100, 78	101. 67	79. 31	111. 20	86. 7
	129. 51	100, 63	101. 90	79. 18	111. 44	86. 5
	132. 84	102, 74	104. 34	80. 70	114. 01	88. 1
	131. 87	101, 59	103. 63	79. 84	113. 25	87. 2
	132. 36	101, 43	103. 99	79. 69	113. 63	87. 0
	134. 15	102, 17	105. 30	80. 20	115. 03	87. 6

Note.—See Note, Tables C-27 and C-28.

Earnings in current prices divided by the consumer price index.
 Average gross weekly earnings less social security and income taxes.

TABLE C-34.-Indexes of output per man-hour and related data, private economy, 1947-69 [1957-59=100]

		Outpu	t per ma	an-hour				Output	ı			М	an-hou	's ²	
			Nonfa	arm ind	ustries			Nonfa	arm ind	ustries			Nonfa	arm ind	ustries
Year	Total pri- vate	Farm	Total	Man- ufac- tur- ing	Non- man- ufac- tur- ing	Total pri- vate	Farm	Total	Man- ufac- tur- ing	Non- man- ufac- tur- ing	Total pri- vate	Farm	Total	Man- ufac- tur- ing	Non- man- ufac- tur- ing
						Est	ablishm	ent basi	S 3			_			
1947 1948 1949	69. 0 72. 0 74. 2	49. 8 58. 0 56. 5	74. 1 76. 5 79. 5	72.3 76.4 79.3	75. 1 76. 3 79. 6	67. 6 70. 8 70. 6	82. 1 91. 8 88. 9	66. 8 69. 8 69. 7	69. 3 72. 7 68. 7	65, 6 68, 3 70, 2	98. 0 98. 4 95. 1	164. 8 158. 4 157. 3	90. 1 91. 3 87. 7	95. 8 95. 1 86. 6	87. 4 89. 5 88. 2
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	80. 3 82. 7 84. 3 87. 8 89. 9	64. 4 64. 7 70. 3 79. 6 83. 7	84. 4 86. 3 87. 0 89. 6 91. 6	85. 0 86. 9 87. 3 90. 2 91. 8	84. 1 85. 6 86. 7 88. 8 91. 5	77. 9 82. 8 84. 8 89. 1 87. 9	93. 7 88. 9 91. 8 96. 6 98. 6	77. 0 82. 5 84. 5 88. 8 87. 4	79. 7 87. 8 89. 7 97. 1 90. 3	75. 7 79. 8 81. 9 84. 5 86. 0	97. 0 100. 1 100. 6 101. 5 97. 8	145. 6 137. 5 130. 6 121. 4 117. 8	91. 2 95. 6 97. 1 99. 1 95. 4	93. 8 101. 0 102. 7 107. 7 98. 4	90. 0 93. 2 94. 5 95. 2 94. 0
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	93. 9 94. 1 96. 9 99. 8 103. 4	84. 4 88. 0 93. 3 103. 0 104. 8	95. 7 95. 2 97. 2 99. 7 103. 1	97. 2 96. 2 98. 2 98. 1 103. 7	94. 7 94. 3 96. 7 100. 6 102. 9	95, 4 97, 2 98, 6 97, 3 104, 1	101. 0 100. 5 98. 1 100. 5 101. 9	95. 1 97. 1 98. 6 97. 2 104. 2	100. 9 101. 3 101. 7 93. 4 104. 9	92. 2 94. 9 97. 1 99. 1 103. 9	101. 6 103. 3 101. 8 97. 5 100. 7	119. 6 114. 2 105. 1 97. 6 97. 2	99. 4 102. 0 101. 4 97. 5 101. 1	103. 8 105. 3 103. 6 95. 2 101. 2	97. 4 100. 6 100. 4 98. 5 101. 0
	105. 0 108. 6 113. 8 117. 9 122. 5	110. 7 119. 4 122. 2 133. 1 135. 5	104. 4 107. 4 112. 3 115. 7 120. 0	105. 5 107. 9 114. 3 118. 9 124. 7	103.9 107.4 111.5 114.3 118.0	106. 6 108. 6 116. 0 120. 8 127. 8	105. 8 107. 2 106. 8 110. 1 107. 7	106. 7 108. 7 116. 5 121. 4 128. 8	106. 4 106. 0 116. 8 122. 7 131. 2	106. 8 110. 1 116. 3 120. 8 127. 7	101. 5 100. 0 101. 9 102. 5 104. 3	95. 6 89. 8 87. 4 82. 7 79. 5	102. 2 101. 2 103. 7 104. 9 107. 3	100. 9 98. 2 102. 2 103. 2 105. 2	102. 8 102. 5 104. 3 105. 7 108. 2
	126. 6 131. 7 134. 3 138. 7 139. 9	148. 1 153. 8 168. 5 168. 5 181. 4	123.6 127.9 129.9 134.2 134.8	129. 8 131. 8 132. 1 139. 2 142. 8	120. 5 125. 8 128. 7 131. 6 130. 6	136. 2 144. 9 148. 2 155. 6 160. 1	114.5 108.2 114.5 112.6 113.5	137. 3 146. 9 150. 0 157. 9 162. 6	143. 9 155. 4 155. 3 166. 6 173. 6	134. 0 142. 6 147. 3 153. 5 157. 0	107. 5 110. 1 110. 4 112. 2 114. 4	77. 3 70. 1 67. 7 66. 6 62. 4	111. 1 114. 8 115. 4 117. 6 120. 6	110, 9 117, 9 117, 6 119, 7 121, 6	111, 2 113, 4 114, 4 116, 6 120, 2
		<u>'</u> ,	<u> </u>	·	<u> </u>	14	Labor	force b	asis 4	•		' -			<u>'</u>
1947 1948 1949	67. 9 70. 2 71. 9	49. 8 58. 0 56. 1	72. 9 74. 5 76. 8			67. 6 70. 8 70. 6	82. 1 91. 8 88. 9	66. 8 69. 8 69. 7			99. 6 100. 8 98. 2	164. 8 158. 2 158. 6	91. 6 93. 7 90. 8		
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	78. 5 82. 1 84. 5 88. 4 90. 8	64. 1 64. 3 69. 9 79. 1 83. 3	82. 4 85. 7 87. 5 90. 4 92. 8			77. 9 82. 8 84. 8 89. 1 87. 9	93. 7 88. 9 91. 8 96. 6 98. 6	77. 0 82. 5 84. 5 88. 8 87. 4			99. 2 100. 9 100. 4 100. 8 96. 8	146. 2 138. 3 131. 3 122. 1 118. 3	93. 4 96. 3 96. 6 98. 2 94. 2		
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	94. 7 94. 6 97. 2 99. 4 103. 4	84. 0 87. 5 93. 3 103. 1 104. 7	96. 7 95. 9 97. 7 99. 2 103. 1			95. 4 97. 2 98. 6 97. 3 104. 1	101. 0 100. 5 98. 1 100. 5 101. 9	95. 1 97. 1 98. 6 97. 2 104. 2			100. 7 102. 7 101. 4 97. 9 100. 7	120. 3 114. 9 105. 2 97. 5 97. 3	98. 3 101. 2 100. 9 98. 0 101. 1		
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	113.0 116.7	110, 7 119, 9 122, 3 133, 5 135, 8	103. 8 105. 9 111. 4 114. 4 118. 4				105. 8 107. 2 106. 8 110. 1 107. 7	106. 7 108. 7 116. 5 121. 4 128. 8			102. 0 101. 2 102. 7 103. 5 105. 6	89. 4 87. 3 82. 5	102. 8 102. 6 104. 6 106. 1 108. 8		
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 p.	130. / 133. 3 138. 6	148. 3 153. 7 168. 2 169. 1 182. 0	121. 8 126. 7 128. 7 133. 9 134. 8			136. 2 144. 9 148. 2 155. 6 160. 1	114. 5 108. 2 114. 5 112. 6 113. 5	137. 3 146. 9 150. 0 157. 9 162. 6			108. 9 110. 9 111. 2 112. 3 114. 3	77. 2 70. 2 67. 8 66. 3 62. 4	112. 8 115. 9 116. 5 117. 9 120. 6		

Output refers to gross national product in 1958 prices.
 Hours of all persons in private industry engaged in production, including man-hours of proprietors and unpaid family workers.
 Man-hours estimates based primarily on establishment data.
 Man-hours estimates based primarily on labor force data.

Note.—For information on sources, methodology, trends, and underlying factors influencing the measures, see Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor, Bulletin No. 1249 "Trends in Output per Man-Hour in the Private Economy, 1909–58," December 1959.

PRODUCTION AND BUSINESS ACTIVITY

Table C-35.—Industrial production indexes, major industry divisions, 1929-69 [1957-59=100]

	Total	1	Manufacturing			
Year or month	industrial production	Total	Durable	Nondurable	Mining	Utilities
929	38. 4	38. 6	38. 2	38. 3	54. 2	12. 7
930	32. 0 26. 5 20. 7 24. 4 26. 6 30. 7 36. 3 39. 7 31. 4 38. 3	31. 7 25. 9 19. 9 23. 7 26. 0 30. 6 36. 4 39. 7 30. 5 37. 9	28. 4 19. 5 11. 9 15. 5 18. 8 24. 1 31. 2 35. 2 22. 6 31. 4	34. 8 32. 8 28. 9 32. 8 33. 8 37. 4 41. 6 44. 1 39. 1 44. 9	47. 0 40. 3 33. 6 38. 5 40. 3 43. 7 50. 3 56. 7 49. 0 53. 8	13. 1 12. 5 11. 7 11. 5 12. 2 13. 2 14. 9 16. 4 18. 3
940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948	81. 7 70. 5 59. 5 65. 7 68, 4	43. 8 58. 3 73. 1 88. 7 86. 3 73. 0 60. 0 66. 4 68. 9 65. 1	40. 0 57. 7 79. 9 102. 9 100. 9 78. 2 54. 7 64. 3 67. 0 60. 9	47. 3 57. 6 63. 7 70. 7 68. 2 65. 6 64. 8 67. 2 69. 5 68. 3	60. 1 64. 8 67. 0 69. 0 74. 2 73. 0 72. 2 79. 9 84. 0 74. 5	20. 3 22. 8 25. 6 28. 3 30. 1 30. 8 31. 8 40. 8 43. 4
950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959	81. 3 84. 3 91. 3 85. 8 96. 6 99. 9 100. 7 93. 7	75. 8 81. 9 85. 2 92. 7 86. 3 97. 3 100. 2 100. 2 100. 8	74. 1 83. 5 88. 5 99. 9 88. 4 101. 9 104. 0 104. 0 90. 3 105. 6	76. 0 78. 5 80. 0 83. 6 83. 6 91. 6 95. 4 96. 7 96. 8 106. 5	83. 2 91. 3 90. 5 92. 9 90. 2 99. 2 104. 8 104. 8 95. 6 99. 7	49. 5 56. 4 61. 2 66. 8 71. 8 80. 2 87. 9 93. 9 108. 0
1960	109. 7 118. 3 124. 3 132. 3 143. 4 156. 3 158. 1 165. 5	108. 9 109. 6 118. 7 124. 9 133. 1 145. 0 158. 6 159. 7 166. 9 173. 8	108. 5 107. 0 117. 9 124. 5 133. 5 148. 4 164. 8 163. 7 169. 8 176. 4	109. 5 112. 9 119. 8 125. 3 132. 6 140. 8 150. 8 154. 6 163. 3 170. 5	101. 6 102. 6 105. 0 107. 9 111. 5 114. 8 120. 5 123. 8 126. 6 130. 2	115.6 122.3 131.4 140.0 151.3 160.2 173.9 184.9 202.1
			Seasonall	y adjusted		
1968: Jan Feb. Mar. Apr. May. June	162. 5 163. 3 163. 0 164. 9	163. 1 163. 9 164. 7 164. 4 166. 4 167. 6	167. 5 167. 9 168. 2 167. 3 169. 9 171. 2	157. 7 158. 9 160. 2 160. 7 162. 0 163. 0	121. 9 124. 3 126. 5 127. 2 127. 9 128. 6	196. 1 198. 5 198. 6 196. 8 198. 4
July	. 167.8	167. 8 166. 0 166. 9 167. 9 169. 2 170. 1	171. 2 167. 9 168. 6 169. 4 171. 0 172. 1	163. 5 163. 6 164. 8 166. 1 167. 1 167. 5	130. 3 129. 7 127. 3 120. 8 126. 6 127. 8	202. 204. 206. 209. 207. 210.
1969: Jan	170.1 171.4 171.7	170. 2 171. 8 173. 1 173. 0 173. 8 174. 8	173. 0 174. 5 175. 9 175. 7 176. 7 178. 3	166. 7 168. 3 169. 5 169. 6 170. 3 170. 5	125. 8 124. 8 126. 7 128. 8 130. 3 134. 4	215. 1 214. 9 215. 1 216. 3 213. 6
July	174. 6 174. 3 173. 9 173. 1 171. 4	175.6 175.4 175.2 174.1 171.9 171.2	178. 7 178. 8 178. 7 177. 3 172. 5 171. 3	171. 8 171. 3 170. 9 170. 1 171. 1 171. 1	133. 2 131. 2 131. 6 130. 2 132. 0 133. 9	222. 222. 222. 224. 224. 225. 5

TABLE C-36.—Industrial production indexes, market groupings, 1947-69 [1957-59=100]

				Final p	roducts				Materials	
V	Total indus- trial		Con	sumer goo	ods 1	Equip	ment			
Year or month	pro- duc- tion	Total	Total	Auto- motive prod- ucts	Home goods	Total, includ- ing defense	Busi- ness	Total	Dura- ble goods	Non- durable goods
947 948 949	65. 7 68. 4 64. 7	64. 2 66. 6 64. 5	67. 1 69. 2 68. 8	69. 4 72. 6 72. 0	68. 8 71. 7 66. 3	55. 4 58. 3 52. 0	69. 9 72. 6 63. 5	67. 0 70. 2 64. 8	68. 2 71. 0 64. 2	64. 68. 64.
950 951 952 953	74. 9 81. 3 84. 3 91. 3 85. 8	72. 8 78. 6 84. 3 89. 9 85. 7	78. 6 77. 8 79. 5 85. 0 84. 3	90. 6 80. 1 72. 1 91. 3 85. 0	91. 4 78. 7 78. 8 90. 2 86. 0	56. 4 78. 4 94. 1 100. 5 88. 9	68. 0 83. 1 94. 1 96. 6 85. 1	76. 9 83. 8 84. 3 92. 6 85. 9	79. 5 87. 8 88. 9 100. 7 88. 4	73. 78. 79. 84. 83.
55. 56. 57. 58.	96. 6 99. 9 100. 7 93. 7 105. 6	93. 9 98. 1 99. 4 94. 8 105. 7	93. 3 95. 5 97. 0 96. 4 106. 6	118.3 97.8 105.2 86.7 108.1	97. 3 100. 9 96. 6 92. 8 110. 7	95. 0 103. 7 104. 6 91. 3 104. 1	91. 9 104. 7 105. 3 89. 8 104. 9	99. 0 101. 6 101. 9 92. 7 105. 4	104. 7 105. 3 104. 8 90. 0 105. 1	93. 97. 98. 95. 105.
60 61 62 63 64	108. 7 109. 7 118. 3 124. 3 132. 3	109. 9 111. 2 119. 7 124. 9 131. 8	111. 0 112. 6 119. 7 125. 2 131. 7	123. 2 111. 8 131. 1 141. 2 145. 1	110, 8 112, 2 122, 2 129, 6 141, 1	107. 6 108. 3 119. 6 124. 2 132. 0	110. 2 110. 1 122. 1 128. 3 139. 1	107. 6 108. 4 117. 0 123. 7 132. 8	106. 6 104. 8 114. 1 121. 2 131. 2	108. 112. 120. 126. 134.
65 66 67 68 69 *	143. 4 156. 3 158. 1 165. 5 172. 7	142. 5 155. 5 158. 3 165. 1 170. 8	140, 3 147, 5 148, 5 156, 9 162, 4	167. 2 163. 0 149. 1 174. 3 172. 9	154. 8 168. 9 166. 0 175. 4 184. 1	147. 0 172. 6 179. 4 182. 6 188. 6	156. 7 181. 2 182. 8 184. 7 195. 6	144, 2 157, 0 157, 8 165, 8 174, 6	144. 3 156. 9 151. 9 157. 8 165. 5	144. 157. 163. 174. 184.
					Seasonally	adjusted				
168: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	161. 5 162. 5 163. 3 163. 0 164. 9 166. 0	161. 2 162. 2 163. 5 162. 2 163. 7 165. 5	151. 9 153. 1 155. 0 154. 0 155. 5 157. 4	164. 7 162. 7 173. 0 169. 3 178. 3 179. 8	168. 4 171. 5 173. 5 170. 1 170. 4 173. 2	181. 1 181. 6 181. 9 179. 8 181. 3 183. 1	183. 1 182. 9 183. 5 181. 5 182. 9 184. 2	162. 3 162. 6 162. 9 163. 8 166. 4 167. 0	155. 4 156. 4 156. 5 158. 1 160. 4 160. 4	169. 168. 169. 169. 172. 173.
July	166. 5 165. 1 165. 9 166. 3 167. 8 168. 7	165. 2 165. 4 166. 0 167. 3 167. 6 167. 9	157. 2 157. 6 157. 9 159. 0 159. 2 160. 2	180. 4 177. 0 175. 5 178. 9 180. 8 177. 8	172. 3 174. 5 175. 9 176. 9 178. 6 180. 4	182, 5 181, 9 183, 7 183, 6 185, 5 184, 5	183. 3 182. 4 185. 5 187. 7 190. 3 189. 3	168, 2 164, 6 166, 3 165, 9 168, 1 168, 8	161. 3 153. 9 155. 4 155. 4 158. 6 158. 9	175. 175. 177. 176. 177. 179.
69: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	169. 1 170. 1 171. 4 171. 7 172. 5 173. 7	168. 2 169. 3 170. 8 170. 2 170. 0 170. 7	161. 0 161. 7 162. 8 161. 8 160. 7 161. 5	176. 2 174. 7 175. 4 166. 1 165. 8 178. 7	184. 3 183. 0 186. 3 186. 1 185. 9 186. 1	183. 5 185. 5 187. 8 188. 4 190. 0 190. 4	191. 4 191. 9 192. 9 194. 1 195. 7 197. 0	169. 6 170. 8 172. 1 172. 9 174. 5 176. 3	161. 2 162. 6 164. 0 165. 8 165. 5 167. 0	178. 179. 180. 180. 183. 185.
July	174. 6 174. 3 173. 9 173. 1 171. 4 170. 9	172. 8 172. 7 172. 2 170. 7 168. 0 167. 6	164. 4 164. 2 162. 8 160. 8 159. 6 159. 1	184. 6 179. 5 176. 6 172. 8 167. 5 161	184. 4 184. 5 181. 2 179. 5 167. 7	190, 8 190, 3 192, 4 191, 8 185, 9 185, 8	196. 9 197. 0 200. 4 200. 8 194. 6 195	176. 5 175. 9 176. 0 175. 9 174. 6	167. 0 167. 3 166. 6 165. 8 163. 1 162	186. 184. 185. 186. 186.

¹ Also includes apparel and consumer staples, not shown separately.

TABLE C-37.—Industrial production indexes, selected manufactures, 1947-69 [1957-59=100]

			Dura	ble manul	factures			No	ndurable i	manufactu	ıres
Year or month	Pri- mary metals	Fabri- cated metal prod- ucts	Ma- chinery	Trans- porta- tion equip- ment	Instru- ments and re- lated prod- ucts	Clay, glass, and lumber	Furni- ture and miscel- laneous	Textile, apparel, and leather prod- ucts	Paper and printing	Chemical, petro- leum, and rubber prod- ucts	Foods, bever- ages, and tobacco
1947 1948 1949	90. 7 94. 3 79. 4	75. 9 77. 2 69. 8	65. 3 66. 5 59. 0	42. 9 46. 9 47. 1	53. 7 55. 2 49. 2	75. 8 79. 7 72. 3	73. 5 77. 4 71. 6	81. 0 84. 5 80. 6	66. 7 69. 4 69. 3	47. 5 50. 8 49. 4	80. 7 80. 0 80. 8
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	99. 9 108. 7 99. 3 112. 5 91. 3	85, 4 91, 2 89, 0 100, 3 90, 2	72. 7 83. 0 92. 1 100. 5 87. 7	56. 4 62. 9 73. 1 91. 7 83. 8	57. 3 65. 7 78. 1 85. 3 82. 9	87. 7 92. 0 89. 3 92. 7 89. 6	83. 7 80. 2 82. 4 89. 7 86. 8	89. 1 87. 4 89. 5 90. 7 86. 9	76. 7 79. 4 77. 7 82. 6 85. 0	60. 7 67. 4 69. 9 75. 2 74. 7	83. 6 85. 4 87. 3 88. 2 89. 8
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	118. 4 116. 4 112. 2 87. 5 100. 4	98. 3 98. 8 101. 5 92. 9 105. 5	96. 5 107. 1 104. 2 88. 8 107. 1	102. 0 97. 4 106. 4 89. 5 104. 0	88. 7 95. 4 98. 0 92. 1 109. 9	100. 7 102. 0 97. 5 94. 1 108. 5	97. 9 101. 0 97. 6 93. 3 109. 0	95. 5 98. 0 96. 9 95. 0 108. 1	92. 5 97. 1 97. 8 97. 0 105. 2	86. 8 91. 4 95. 6 95. 5 108. 9	93. 1 96. 6 96. 7 99. 4 103. 9
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964		107. 6 106. 5 117. 1 123. 4 132. 7	110. 8 110. 4 123. 5 129. 2 141. 4	108. 2 103. 6 118. 3 127. 0 130. 7	116. 5 115. 8 123. 0 130. 2 136. 4	105. 7 104. 5 109. 3 114. 4 121. 1	113. 3 114. 1 124. 5 129. 1 138. 4	107. 5 108. 4 115. 1 118. 5 125. 2	109. 0 112. 4 116. 7 120. 1 127. 5	113. 9 118. 9 131. 2 141. 8 152. 5	106. 6 110. 2 113. 3 116. 8 120. 8
1965	1	147. 8 163. 0 161. 9 167. 9 179. 8	160. 5 183. 8 183. 4 184. 3 195. 6	149. 2 166. 9 165. 7 179. 5 174. 6	151. 4 176. 5 184. 8 184. 2 194. 2	127. 6 132. 9 130. 7 137. 4 142. 1	151. 8 165. 0 162. 6 169. 9 176. 6	135. 8 141. 6 139. 4 144. 8 143. 9	135. 3 146. 4 149. 6 155. 5 164. 7	164. 6 181. 9 190. 0 207. 7 222. 4	123. 4 128. 1 131. 7 135. 3 138. 9
				<u> </u>	,	Seasonally	adjusted	1	1		
1968: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	140.3 144.3 148.1	163. 9 165. 7 166. 5 161. 3 164. 9 167. 6	183. 4 183. 5 183. 3 179. 4 180. 4 181. 7	175. 6 175. 1 177. 6 175. 3 180. 4 182. 6	186. 7 184. 7 183. 8 181. 4 181. 2 181. 3	132. 7 130. 7 129. 0 137. 8 137. 9 137. 1	165. 2 166. 9 166. 9 166. 5 169. 8 169. 5	141. 1 141. 9 143. 9 144. 2 144. 8 145. 6	150. 0 150. 1 152. 4 152. 3 155. 1 155. 2	197. 9 200. 5 201. 6 202. 9 204. 6 206. 3	132. 8 133. 7 133. 9 134. 3 134. 4 135. 6
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	147. 4 124. 1 120. 6 123. 2 127. 9 134. 8	166. 1 166. 2 167. 5 172. 1 173. 7 175. 4	183, 0 183, 8 186, 4 186, 2 187, 4 188, 5	183. 2 181. 7 180. 5 180. 4 180. 0 176. 4	179. 2 182. 6 184. 3 185. 8 188. 5 189. 7	136, 2 135, 3 138, 8 140, 0 140, 5 144, 3	169. 5 170. 1 170. 9 172. 2 173. 4 173. 4	144. 3 144. 1 144. 8 146. 9 147. 3 145. 1	155, 8 156, 9 158, 2 158, 0 158, 8 160, 8	208. 0 208. 3 211. 0 213. 1 216. 7 215. 9	136. 0 135. 2 135. 3 136. 3 135. 0 137. 3
1969: Jan	139.5	176. 4 177. 6 178. 5 178. 3 179. 2 180. 6	191. 8 192. 7 194. 7 194. 6 196. 9 197. 2	171, 2 173, 1 174, 1 172, 4 171, 8 176, 6	191. 6 190. 4 192. 8 195. 4 195. 3 195. 7	143. 8 145. 6 145. 1 143. 2 143. 6 140. 6	176. 6 175. 7 176. 5 178. 4 179. 0 179. 1	143. 6 142. 6 144. 7 143. 7 146. 3 146. 0	160. 2 161. 2 162. 2 162. 4 163. 8 164. 4	214. 1 218. 0 219. 6 221. 7 222. 7 223. 2	138. 0 139. 5 139. 5 138. 2 136. 9 137. 0
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec »	152. 4 151. 3 149. 3 150. 4 151, 1	179, 1 180, 6 179, 1 179, 5 179, 2 180	198. 1 199. 4 201. 2 198. 9 188. 2 188	181. 1 179. 1 178. 8 175. 7 168. 2 164	194. 7 194. 9 195. 4 193. 9 194. 9	138. 3 140. 2 140. 6 140. 6 141. 0 141	176. 3 176. 2 175. 4 174. 7 175. 2 174	145. 4 143. 3 141. 1 141. 7 141. 3 142	165. 9 166. 3 165. 8 165. 7 166. 9	225. 2 222. 4 223. 3 224. 3 224. 9 224	138.4 141.6 140.4 136.2 138.6

TABLE C-38.—Manufacturing output, capacity, and utilization rate, 1948-69

			U	tilization rate	2
Period	Output	Capacity ¹	Total	Advanced products	Primary products
	1957–59 oi	utput=100		Percent	
1948	68. 9	76. 8	89. 7	87. 9	92, 2
1949	65. 1	81. 1	80. 2	80. 3	80, 0
1950	75. 8	84.3	90. 4	87. 3	94. 8
	81. 9	87.4	94. 0	91. 0	98. 1
	85. 2	92.7	91. 3	91. 9	90. 4
	9 2. 7	98.4	94. 2	94. 1	94. 4
	86. 3	103.3	83. 5	83. 8	83. 0
1955	97. 3	108. 4	90. 0	87. 8	93. 2
1956	100. 2	114. 3	87. 7	86. 0	90. 1
1957	100. 8	120. 7	83. 6	82. 3	85. 3
1958	93. 2	125. 8	74. 0	73. 6	74. 6
1959	106. 0	130. 1	81. 5	81. 0	82. 1
1960	108. 9	134. 9	80. 6	81. 1	80. 0
1961	109. 6	139. 6	78. 5	78. 9	78. 1
1962	118. 7	144. 4	82. 1	82. 5	81. 6
1963	124. 9	149. 8	83. 3	83. 1	83. 6
1964	133. 1	155. 6	85. 7	84. 4	87. 4
1965	145, 0	164. 0	88. 5	87. 6	89. 7
	158, 6	175. 0	90. 5	90. 5	90. 5
	159, 7	186. 1	85. 3	85. 9	84. 6
	166, 9	196. 9	84. 6	83. 8	85. 8
	173, 8	207. 7	83. 7	81. 5	86. 8
		Sea	sonally adjust	ed	
1963: 1	121. 3	147. 8	82, 0	82, 2	81. 7
	124. 9	149. 1	83, 9	82, 9	85. 2
	126. 0	150. 5	83, 7	83, 6	83. 9
	127. 2	151. 8	83, 7	83, 7	83. 8
1964:	129. 4	153. 3	84. 5	83. 8	85. 5
	132. 5	154. 9	85. 7	84. 7	87. 1
	134. 7	156. 4	86. 3	84. 9	88. 3
	135. 9	158. 0	86. 2	84. 4	88. 8
1965: I	141. 4	160, 1	88. 5	87. 2	90. 2
	143. 5	162, 7	88. 4	87. 1	90. 1
	146. 1	165, 3	88. 5	87. 4	90. 1
	148. 9	167, 9	88. 6	88. 7	88. 5
1966: I	154. 5	170.7	90, 5	90. 2	90. 9
	157. 7	173.6	90, 8	90. 4	91. 4
	159. 9	176.5	90, 6	90. 6	90. 6
	161. 7	179.3	90, 0	90. 6	89. 1
1967: I	159, 0	182. 1	87. 1	87. 8	86. 2
	157, 5	184. 8	85. 0	86. 2	83. 4
	158, 3	187. 5	84. 3	85. 1	83. 2
	161, 3	190. 1	84. 8	84. 3	85. 6
1968: I	163. 9	192. 8	85. 0	84. 5	85, 7
	166. 1	195. 5	85. 1	83. 8	86, 9
	166. 9	198. 2	84. 2	83. 7	84, 9
	169. 1	200. 9	84. 2	83. 2	85, 6
1969: p	171, 7	203. 6	84. 5	82. 7	87. 0
	173, 9	206. 3	84. 5	82. 2	87. 8
	175, 4	208. 9	84. 2	82. 3	86. 7
	172, 4	212. 2	81. 8	79. 0	85. 6

¹ For description and source of data see "A Revised Index of Manufacturing Capacity" Frank de Leeuw, Frank E. Hopkins, and Michael D. Sherman "Federal Reserve Bulletiu". November 1966, pp. 1605–1615. See also McGraw-Hill surveys on 'Business Plans for New Plants and Equipment" for data on capacity and operating rates.

² Output as percent of capacity; based on unrounded data.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (output) and sources in footnote 1 (capacity and utilization rate).

Table C-39.—Business expenditures for new plant and equipment, 1947-691 [Billions of dollars]

		М	anufacturi	ng		Transp	ortation	D. LU.	Com-
Year or quarter	Total	Total	Dura- ble goods	Non- durable goods	Mining	Rail- road	Other	Public utili- ties	mer- cial and other ²
1947	19. 33	8. 44	3. 25	5. 19	0.69	0. 91	1.30	1. 54	6. 45
	21. 30	9. 01	3. 30	5. 71	.93	1. 37	1.28	2. 54	6. 16
	18. 98	7. 12	2. 45	4. 68	.88	1. 42	.87	3. 10	5. 58
1950	20, 21	7. 39	2. 94	4. 45	. 84	1. 18	1.19	3. 24	6. 36
1951	25, 46	10. 71	4. 82	5. 89	1. 11	1. 58	1.46	3. 56	7. 04
1952	26, 43	11. 45	5. 21	6. 24	1. 21	1. 50	1.47	3. 74	7. 06
1953	28, 20	11. 86	5. 31	6. 56	1. 25	1. 42	1.53	4. 34	7. 79
1954	27, 19	11. 24	4. 91	6. 33	1. 28	. 93	1.47	3. 99	8. 27
1955. 1956. 1957. 1958.	29. 53 35. 73 37. 94 31. 89 33. 55	11. 89 15. 40 16. 51 12. 38 12. 77	5. 41 7. 45 7. 84 5. 61 5. 81	6. 48 7. 95 8. 68 6. 77 6. 95	1.31 1.64 1.69 1.43 1.36	1. 02 1. 37 1. 58 . 86 1. 02	1. 55 1. 65 1. 71 1. 43 2. 10	4. 03 4. 52 5. 67 5. 52 5. 14	9. 73 11. 15 10. 79 10. 27 11. 16
1960	36. 75	15. 09	7.23	7.85	1.30	1. 16	1. 97	5. 24	11. 99
1961	35. 91	14. 33	6.31	8.02	1.29	. 82	1. 96	5. 00	12. 52
1962	38. 39	15. 06	6.79	8.26	1.40	1. 02	2. 17	4. 90	13. 84
1963	40. 77	16. 22	7.53	8.70	1.27	1. 26	1. 98	4. 98	15. 06
1964	46. 97	19. 34	9.28	10.07	1.34	1. 66	2. 52	5. 49	16. 63
1965.	54. 42	23. 44	11.50	11.94	1. 46	1. 99	2, 91	6. 13	18. 49
1966.	63. 51	28. 20	14.06	14.14	1. 62	2. 37	3, 39	7. 43	20. 50
1967.	65. 47	28. 51	14.06	14.45	1. 65	1. 86	3, 77	8. 74	20. 94
1968.	67. 76	28. 37	14.12	14.25	1. 63	1. 45	4, 15	10. 20	21. 97
1969 ».	75. 30	31. 74	15.99	15.74	1. 87	1. 83	4, 20	11. 56	24. 10
			Se	easonally a	adjusted a	nnual rate	es	'	
1967: I	65, 23	29. 78	14. 46	15. 32	1. 54	2. 12	3. 04	7. 98	20. 76
	65, 60	29. 16	14. 26	14. 90	1. 52	1. 78	3. 81	8. 51	20. 83
	65, 48	27. 85	13. 92	13. 93	1. 76	1. 72	4. 01	8. 86	21. 28
	65, 66	27. 51	13. 71	13. 80	1. 78	1. 82	4. 20	9. 46	20. 90
1968: I	68. 09	28. 02	14. 11	13. 91	1. 80	1. 68	4. 31	10, 08	22. 20
	66. 29	27. 84	13. 51	14. 33	1. 66	1. 49	3. 47	10, 24	21. 59
	67. 77	28. 86	14. 47	14. 40	1. 57	1. 29	4. 34	9, 82	21. 89
	69. 05	28. 70	14. 39	14. 31	1. 52	1. 34	4. 62	10, 63	22. 24
1969: I	72. 52	29, 99	15. 47	14. 52	1. 83	1. 68	4. 76	11.52	22.74
	73. 94	31, 16	15. 98	15. 18	1. 88	1. 76	3. 88	11.68	23.59
	77. 84	33, 05	16. 53	16. 52	1. 89	2. 06	3. 88	11.48	25.49

¹ Excludes agricultural business; real estate operators; medical, legal, educational, and cultural service; and nonprofit organizations. These figures do not agree precisely with the fixed investment data in the gross national product estimates, mainly because those data include investment by farmers, professionals, institutions, and real estate firms, and certain outlays charged to current account.
² Commercial and other includes trade, service, finance, insurance, communications, and construction.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Office of Business Economics) and Securities and Exchange Commission.

Note, -- Annual total is the sum of unadjusted expenditures; it does not necessarily coincide with the average of season-

ally adjusted figures.

Series revised beginning 1947. Comparable data prior to 1947 are not available. A full description of the new actual expenditure series will appear in the January 1970 issue of the "Survey of Current Business" and of the revised expectations data in the February 1970 issue.

TABLE C-40.—New construction activity, 1929-69 [Value put in place, millions of dollars]

				Privat	e construc	tion			Public	constru	ction
Year or month	Total new con-		Residenti		Nonresi	dential be constr	uilding a uction	nd other		Fed-	State
	struc- tion	Total	Totai1	New hous- ing units	Total	Com- mer- cial ²	In- dus- trial	Other 3	Total	erally owned	and locally owned
1929	10, 793	8, 307	3, 625	3, 040	4, 682	1, 135	949	2, 598	2,486	155	2, 331
930 931 932 933 933 934 1935 1936 1937 1938	8,741 6,427 3,538 2,879 3,720 4,232 6,497 6,999 6,980 8,198	5, 883 3, 768 1, 676 1, 231 1, 509 1, 999 2, 981 3, 903 3, 560 4, 389	2, 075 1, 565 639 470 625 1, 010 1, 565 1, 875 1, 990 2, 680	1,570 1,320 485 290 380 710 1,210 1,475 1,620 2,270	3,808 2,203 1,046 761 884 989 1,416 2,028 1,570 1,709	893 454 223 130 173 211 290 387 285 292	532 221 74 176 191 158 266 492 232 254	2, 383 1, 528 749 455 520 620 860 1, 149 1, 053 1, 163	2, 858 2, 659 1, 862 1, 648 2, 211 2, 233 3, 516 3, 096 3, 420 3, 809	209 271 333 516 626 814 797 776 717 759	2,649 2,388 1,529 1,132 1,585 1,419 2,719 2,320 2,703 3,050
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945	8, 682 11, 957	5, 054 6, 206 3, 415 1, 979 2, 186 3, 411 10, 396	2, 985 3, 510 1, 715 885 815 1, 276 4, 752	2, 560 3, 040 1, 440 710 570 720 3, 300	2, 069 2, 696 1, 700 1, 094 1, 371 2, 135 5, 644	348 409 155 33 56 203 1,153	442 801 346 156 208 642 1,689	1,279 1,486 1,199 905 1,107 1,290 2,802	3, 628 5, 751 10, 660 6, 322 3, 073 2, 398 2, 231	1,182 3,751 9,313 5,609 2,505 1,737 865	2, 446 2, 000 1, 347 713 568 661 1, 366
New series ⁵ 1946 1947 1948 1949	14, 308 20, 041 26, 078	12,077 16,722 21,374 20,453	6, 247 9, 850 13, 128 12, 428	4, 795 7, 765 10, 506 10, 043	5, 830 6, 872 8, 246 8, 025	1, 153 957 1, 397 1, 182	1,689 1,702 1,397 972	2, 988 4, 213 5, 452 5, 871	2, 231 3, 319 4, 704 6, 269	865 840 1,177 1,488	1,366 2,479 3,527 4,78
1950	33, 575 35, 435 36, 828 39, 136 41, 380 46, 519 47, 601 49, 139 50, 153 55, 305	26, 709 26, 180 26, 049 27, 894 29, 668 34, 804 34, 869 35, 080 34, 696 39, 235	18, 126 15, 881 15, 803 16, 594 18, 187 21, 877 20, 178 19, 006 19, 789 24, 251	15, 551 13, 207 12, 851 13, 411 14, 931 18, 242 16, 143 14, 736 15, 445 19, 233	8, 583 10, 299 10, 246 11, 300 11, 481 12, 927 14, 691 16, 074 14, 907 14, 984	1,415 1,498 1,137 1,791 2,212 3,218 3,631 3,564 3,589 3,930	1,062 2,117 2,320 2,229 2,030 2,399 3,084 3,557 2,382 2,106	6, 106 6, 684 6, 789 7, 280 7, 239 7, 310 7, 976 8, 953 8, 936 8, 948	6, 866 9, 255 10, 779 11, 242 11, 712 11, 715 12, 732 14, 059 15, 457 16, 070	1,624 2,981 4,185 4,139 3,428 2,769 2,726 2,974 3,387 3,724	5, 242 6, 274 6, 594 7, 103 8, 284 10, 000 11, 081 12, 070 12, 340
1960 1961 1962 1963	53, 941 55, 447 59, 576	38,078 38,299 41,707 43,859	21,706 21,680 24,292 25,843	16, 410 16, 189 18, 638 20, 064	16, 372 16, 619 17, 415 18, 016	4, 180 4, 674 4, 955 5, 200	2,851 2,780 2,949 2,962	9, 341 9, 165 9, 511 9, 854	15, 863 17, 148 17, 869 18, 896	3,622 3,879 3,913 3,970	12, 24 13, 26 13, 95 14, 92
New series ⁶ 1962	63, 423 66, 200 72, 319 75, 120 76, 160	41, 798 44, 057 45, 810 50, 253 51, 120 50, 587 56, 996 63, 730	24, 292 26, 187 26, 258 26, 268 23, 971 23, 736 28, 823 31, 600	18, 638 20, 385 20, 354 20, 351 17, 964 17, 885 22, 423 23, 640	17, 506 17, 870 19, 552 23, 985 27, 149 26, 851 28, 173 32, 130	5, 144 4, 995 5, 396 6, 739 6, 879 6, 982 8, 333 10, 010	2, 842 2, 906 3, 565 5, 118 6, 679 6, 131 5, 594 6, 380	9, 520 9, 969 10, 591 12, 128 13, 591 13, 738 14, 246 15, 740	17, 869 19, 366 20, 390 22, 066 24, 000 25, 573 27, 694 28, 290	3, 913 4, 010 3, 905 4, 018 3, 957 3, 512 3, 456 3, 430	13, 956 15, 356 16, 481 18, 042 20, 042 22, 06 24, 233 24, 866

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE C-40.—New construction activity, 1929-69—Continued [Value put in place, millions of dollars]

				Priva	ate constru	ıction			Public	constru	ıction
Year or month	Total new con-		Residentia		Nonresi	dential bu	uilding ar truction	nd other			State
	struc- tion	Total	Total	New hous- ing units	Total	Com- mer- cial ²	In- dus- trial	Other 3	Total	Fed- erally owned	and locally owned 4
				Sea	asonally a	djusted an	nual rates	3	·		
1968: Jan	82, 873	55, 316	26, 988	21, 226	28, 328	7, 721	6, 330	14, 277	27, 557	3, 528	24, 029
Feb	83, 884	55, 380	26, 754	21, 282	28, 626	8, 328	5, 740	14, 558	28, 504	3, 692	24, 812
Mar	83, 572	56, 055	27, 698	21, 677	28, 357	8, 258	5, 528	14, 571	27, 517	3, 561	23, 956
Apr	85, 299	57, 403	29, 320	22, 300	28, 083	8, 512	5, 484	14, 087	27, 896	3, 381	24, 515
May	85, 707	57, 260	29, 628	22, 312	27, 632	8, 111	5, 275	14, 246	28, 447	3, 436	25, 011
June	82, 050	54, 981	28, 187	21, 450	26, 794	8, 122	4, 852	13, 820	27, 069	3, 287	23, 782
July	81, 658	54, 988	27, 770	21, 248	27, 218	8, 272	4, 752	14, 194	26, 670	3, 052	23, 618
Aug	83, 736	56, 682	28, 325	21, 919	28, 357	8, 641	5, 575	14, 141	27, 054	3, 384	23, 670
Sept	85, 266	57, 444	29, 350	22, 771	28, 094	8, 534	5, 492	14, 068	27, 822	3, 340	24, 482
Oct	87, 757	59, 259	29, 823	23, 562	29, 436	8, 939	6, 096	14, 401	28, 498	3, 539	24, 959
Nov	87, 812	59, 014	30, 152	24, 118	28, 862	8, 262	6, 271	14, 329	28, 798	3, 545	25, 253
Dec	88, 068	58, 899	30, 937	24, 953	27, 962	8, 046	5, 905	14, 011	29, 169	3, 839	25, 330
1969: Jan	91, 972	62, 875	31, 084	24, 972	31, 791	9, 971	6, 800	15, 020	29, 097	3, 551	25, 546
Feb	92, 066	62, 550	31, 436	25, 472	31, 114	9, 941	6, 318	14, 855	29, 516	3, 463	26, 053
Mar	91, 722	62, 762	32, 423	25, 458	30, 339	9, 751	6, 019	14, 569	28, 960	3, 530	25, 430
Apr	92, 696	62, 962	32, 930	24, 995	30, 032	9, 066	5, 857	15, 109	29, 734	3, 784	25, 950
May	92, 254	63, 564	32, 866	24, 490	30, 698	9, 284	5, 923	15, 491	28, 690	3, 488	25, 202
June	91, 539	63, 197	31, 805	23, 887	31, 392	10, 020	6, 050	15, 322	28, 342	3, 574	24, 768
July	91,787	64, 242	31, 385	23, 214	32, 857	10, 417	6, 404	16, 036	27, 545	3, 114	24, 431
Aug	91,687	64, 008	30, 880	22, 577	33, 128	10, 343	6, 414	16, 371	27, 679	3, 413	24, 266
Sept	93,608	65, 564	31, 053	22, 624	34, 511	11, 118	6, 714	16, 679	28, 044	3, 431	24, 613
Oct	93,896	65, 811	31, 530	23, 003	34, 281	10, 856	6, 946	16, 479	28, 085	3, 437	24, 648
Nov **	91,950	63, 756	31, 203	22, 604	32, 553	9, 557	6, 526	16, 470	28, 194	3, 168	25, 026

¹ Total includes additions and alterations and nonhousekeeping units not shown separately.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, except as noted.

¹ Total includes additions and alterations and nonhousekeeping units not shown separately.
2 Office buildings, warehouses, stores, restaurants, and garages.
3 Farm, institutional, public utilities, and all other private.
4 Includes Federal grants-in-aid for State and locally owned projects.
3 New series in 1946 reflects differences due to the new higher level series of housing starts and farm construction expenditures and the reduced level value in place series for public utilities. See "Construction Report C30-61 (Supplement)" for a description of the differences.
4 New series differs from old in that it reflects differences in 1962 due to the introduction of new series for private non-residential buildings and differences in 1963 due to the introduction of new series for State and locally owned public construction. See "Construction Report C30-65s" for a description of the differences.

7 Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

TABLE C-41.—New housing starts and applications for financing, 1929-69
[Thousands of units]

				Housir	ng starts					Propo	
		e and lic ¹			Priv	ate 1				home o	
Year or			Total (fa	arm and n	onfarm)		Nonfarm		New private housing	Appli-	Re-
month	Total (farm and	Non- farm			e of ture ²		Gover home p		units author- ized+	cations for FHA	quest: for VA
	non- farm)		Total	One family	Two or more families	Total	FHA 3	VA		com- mit- ments ³	ap- prais- als
929		509. 0				509. 0					
930 931 932 933 934 935		330. 0 254. 0 134. 0				330. 0 254. 0 134. 0			Į.		1
932		93.0				93.0					
34		126. 0				126.0					
35		221.0				215.7	13. 2 48. 8 57. 0 106. 8			4 20. 6	<u>-</u>
		319.0 336.0				304. 2	48.8			47.8	
3/		406.0				332. 4 399. 3	106.8			121 1	
37 38 39		515.0				458, 4	144.7			*20.6 47.8 49.8 131.1 179.8	
40 41							176.6 217.1			231. 2 288. 5	
142		356.0				301.2	160. 2			238.5	
43		191.0				183.7	126, 1			144.4	
144		141.8				138.7	83.6			62. 9	
w series		200				204.0	20.0				
45		1 022 2				1 015 2	38.9 67.1	78.8 91.8		56.6 121.7	
40		1, 268, 5				1, 265, 1	178.3	160.3		286.4	
48		1, 362, 1				1,344.0	216.4	71.1		293. 2	
45 46 47 48 49		1, 466. 1				1, 429. 8	252.6	90.8		327.0	
50		1,951.9				1,908.1	328. 2 186. 9	191. 2 148. 6		397.7 192.8	164.
52		1, 503. 9				1, 445, 4	229. 1	141.3	l. 	192. 8 267. 9	226.
53		1, 437. 6				1, 402. 1	216.5	156.5		253.7	251.
54		1,550.5				1,531.8	250. 9 268. 7	307. 0		338.6	535. 620.
55 56		1 349 1				1, 324, 9	183. 4	392. 9 270. 7		306. 2 197. 7	401.
57		1, 223, 9				1, 174, 8	150.1	128.3		198.8	159
58	1.552.5.	1, 382. 0					270. 3	102. 1		341.7	234. 234.
59	1,553.5	1, 531. 3	'	1, 234. 1		1, 494. 6	307. 0	109. 3	1,208.3	369. 7	
160	1, 296. 0 1, 365. 0	1, 274. 0 1, 336. 8	1, 252. 1 1, 313. 0	994. 7 974. 4	338.6	1, 230. 1 1, 284. 8	225. 7 198. 8	74. 6 83. 3 77. 8	998. 0 1, 064. 2	242. 4 243. 8	142. 177.
962	1, 492. 4	1,468.7	1,462.7	991.3	471.4	1, 439. 0	197.3	77.8	1, 186. 6	221. 1	171.
963 964	1 561 6	1,614.8 1,534.7	1,610.3 1,529.3	1,020.7 971.5	589. 6 557. 8	1, 582. 9 1, 502. 3	166. 2 154. 0	71. 0 59. 2	1, 334. 7 1, 285. 8	190. 2 182. 1	139.
965	1, 509, 6	1, 487. 5	1, 472. 9	963.8	509.1	1.450.6	159.9	49.4	1, 239, 8	188.9	102.
966	1, 196. 2	1, 487. 5 1, 172. 8	1, 165, 0	778, 5	386. 5 447. 7	1, 141. 5	129.1	36. 8 52. 5	971.9	153.0	99.
967	1, 321. 9	1, 298. 8	1, 291. 6	843.9	447.7	1, 268. 4	141.9	52. 5	1, 141. 0	167.2	124.
)68)69	1, 496. 6	1, 523. 6 1, 479. 0	1, 463. 2	899. 5 809. 3	608. 2 653. 8	1, 483. 6 1, 445. 5	147. 7 153. 6	56. 1 51. 2	1, 341. 4 1, 296. 2	168. 9 187. 6	131. 138.
				!	Monthly	totals, un	adjusted				<u> </u>
968: Jan	82.7	82.0	80, 5	45, 2	35, 3	79.8	9, 7	3, 4	73, 4	11, 2	8.
Feb	87, 2	853			35. 3 29. 2 47. 3	82. 8 123. 9	10.6 12.0		88, 8 115, 5 132, 4	12.4	10. 11. 12. 11.
Mar	128.6	126.0	126.6	79.3	47.3	123.9	12.0	4.1	115.5	15.9	11.
Apr May	165, 2 145, 1	126. 0 162. 2 143. 3	84. 6 126. 6 162. 0 140. 9	55. 4 79. 3 98. 0 86. 8	64. 0 54. 1	159. 1 139. 0	14.3 13.8	5.4	132. 4	14. /	11.
June	142.9	141.1	137. 9	81.4	56.5	136.0	12.3	5. 4 5. 5 5. 0	113. 9	12. 4 15. 9 14. 7 15. 7 13. 7	10.
July Aug		140. 0 138. 9	139.8 136.6	86. 4 82. 5	53. 4 54. 1	137. 3 134. 5 132. 4	12.9 13.6 12.2	4.9 4.8	118.0 113.7	13. 2 15. 1	12. 11. 10. 12.
Sept	139.8	138.0	134. 3	80.2	54.1	132.4	12.2	4.6	116.3	14.0	10.
Oct	. 143.3	140.6	140.8	85. 6	55.2	138 1	14.5	5.3	127.6	17.1	12.
Nov Dec	. 129.5	127. 5	127.1	64.8	62.3	125. 1	11.4	4. 2 4. 4	104.3	13.6	11. 9.
	99.8	98. 9	96. 4	53.8	1 47 6	95.5	10.5	· 44	95.9	12.3	1 9.

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE C-41.—New housing starts and applications for financing, 1929-69—Continued [Thousands of units]

				Housin	g starts					Propo	
		te and lic ¹			Priv	ate 1				home struct	
Year or			Total (f	arm and r	onfarm)		Nonfarm		New private housing	8 bi	
month	Total (farm and	Non- farm		Typ struc	e of ture ²		Gover home p	nment rograms	units author- ized 4	Appli- cations for FHA	Re- quests for VA
	non- farm)		Total	One family	Two or more families	Total	FHA 3	VA		com- mit- ments ³	ap- prais- als
					Monthly to	tals, unad	ljusted			<u> </u>	<u> </u>
1969: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	105. 8 94. 8 135. 6 159. 9 157. 7 150. 8	104. 5 93. 9 134. 4 158. 3 156. 1 148. 3	101. 5 90. 1 131. 9 159. 0 155. 5 147. 3	51. 3 47. 9 71. 9 85. 0 91. 3 82. 7	50. 2 42. 2 60. 0 74. 0 64. 2 64. 6	100, 2 89, 2 130, 6 157, 4 154, 0 144, 8	8, 8 9, 2 12, 7 16, 0 13, 4 13, 9	3. 8 3. 5 3. 9 4. 4 4. 3 4. 6	92. 7 94. 6 119. 4 146. 4 126. 2 123. 2	12. 5 13. 9 16. 1 16. 9 15. 5 16. 2	10. 1 9. 9 12. 2 12. 2 11. 5 11. 4
July Aug Sept Oct Nov P Dec P	126, 5 127, 6 132, 9 125, 8 97, 4 81, 8	124. 3 126. 2 131. 2 124. 5 95. 9 81. 5	125. 2 124. 9 129. 3 123. 4 94. 6 80. 5	73. 5 69. 5 71. 5 68. 0 54. 4 42. 2	51. 7 55. 4 57. 9 55. 3 40. 2 38. 3	122. 9 123. 5 127. 6 122. 1 93. 1 80. 2	13. 1 12. 6 13. 1 15. 1 12. 2 13. 4	4. 7 4. 2 4. 8 5. 0 3. 9 4. 2	111.8 104.0 104.7 109.1 82.9 81.0	15. 3 14. 6 16. 8 20. 0 14. 8 15. 2	13.6 13.0 11.1 11.4 11.5 10.1
				·	Se	asonally a	djusted a	nnual rate	es		<u> </u>
1968; Jan Feb Mar Apr May June			1, 456 1, 537 1, 511 1, 591 1, 364 1, 365	912 1, 075 920 922 838 790	544 462 591 669 526 575	1, 430 1, 499 1, 479 1, 562 1, 345 1, 348	157 164 149 147 133 137	52 63 63 59 57 54	1,148 1,394 1,416 1,340 1,280 1,281	163 152 160 144 161 157	122 141 127 126 110
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec				904 867 944 965 905 922	627 651 648 605 828 585	1,507 1,496 1,570 1,541 1,705 1,492	134 144 145 153 158 158	49 51 54 55 53 65	1, 289 1, 290 1, 393 1, 378 1, 425 1, 463	146 167 169 199 212 187	135 127 125 147 172 136
1969: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June				1, 066 975 828 797 883 808	812 711 756 766 626 661	1, 845 1, 664 1, 567 1, 548 1, 495 1, 446	137 138 157 166 134 147	57 52 53 48 47 48	1,403 1,477 1,421 1,502 1,323 1,340	179 169 161 166 168 175	148 132 136 124 122 126
				765 723 846 777 783 718	606 661 696 615 514 527	1, 349 1, 370 1, 522 1, 379 1, 277 1, 240	137 143 152 163 179 193	46 47 54 52 53 59	1,228 1,245 1,201 1,183 1,191 1,177	175 170 193 231 239 209	145 151 127 130 184 147

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census), Department of Housing and Urban Development, Federal Housing Administration (FHA), and Veterans Administration (VA), except as noted.

¹ Military housing starts, including those financed with mortgages insured by FHA under Section 803 of the National Housing Act, are included in publicly financed starts but excluded from total private starts and from FHA starts.
2 Not available prior to 1959 except for nonfarm for 1929-44.
8 Units are for I - to 4- family housing.
4 Data beginning 1967 cover approximately 13,000 permit-issuing places. Data for 1963-66 are based on 12,000 places and 1959-62, 10,000 places. The addition of approximately 1,000 permit-issuing places in 1967 contributed an increase of 3 percent in total permit authorizations.
4 Units in mortgage applications or appraisal requests for new home construction.
5 FHA program approved in June 1934: all 1934 activity included in 1935.
7 Monthly estimates for September 1945-May 1950 were prepared by Housing and Home Finance Agency.

TABLE C-42.—Sales and inventories in manufacturing and trade, 1947-69

[Amounts in millions of dollars]

Year or month	Total	manufac and trade	turing	Ma	nufactur	ing	Merch	ant whole	esalers	R	etail trad	e
	Sales 1	Inven- tories ²	Ratio 3	Sales 1	Inven- tories ²	Ratio 3	Sales 1	Inven- tories ²	Ratio ³	Sales 1	Inven- tories ²	Ratio 3
947 948 949	35, 260 33, 788	52, 507 49, 49 7	1. 42 1. 53	15, 513 17, 316 16, 126	25, 897 28, 543 26, 321	1. 58 1. 57 1. 75	6, 808 6, 514	7, 957 7, 706	1, 13 1, 19	10, 200 11, 135 11, 149	14, 241 16, 007 15, 470	1, 20 1, 30 1, 4
950	38, 596 43, 356 44, 840 47, 987 46, 443	59, 822 70, 242 72, 377 76, 122 73, 175	1. 36 1. 55 1. 58 1. 58 1. 60	18, 634 21, 714 22, 529 24, 843 23, 355	31, 078 39, 306 41, 136 43, 948 41, 612	1. 66 1. 78	7, 695 8, 597 8, 782 9, 052 8, 993	9, 284 9, 886 10, 210 10, 686 10, 637	1. 07 1. 16 1, 12 1. 17 1. 18	12, 268 13, 046 13, 529 14, 091 14, 095	19, 460 21, 050 21, 031 21, 488 20, 926	1, 3 1, 6 1, 5 1, 5 1, 5
955 956 957 958 959	51, 694 54, 063 55, 879 54, 233	79, 516 87, 304 89, 052	1. 47 1. 55 1. 59	26, 480 27, 740 28, 736 27, 280		1. 62 1. 73 1. 80 1. 84 1. 70	10.475	11,678 13,260 12,730 12,739 13,879			22, 769 23, 402 24, 451	
960 961 4 962 963 964	60,746 61,133 65,417 68,969 73,685	94, 747 95, 728 101, 149 105, 525 111, 548	1.56 1.54 1.51 1.49 1.47	30, 796 30, 896 33, 113		1.76 1.74 1.72 1.69 1.64	11, 656 11, 988 12, 674 13, 382 14, 527				26, 813 26, 297	1.4 1.4
965 966 967 968 969 ⁸				41,003 44,876 45,712 50,310	CO 170	1 60	15, 595 16, 979 17, 099 18, 329		1 14	23, 677 25, 330 26, 151 28, 277		1. 4 1. 4 1. 4 1. 4
					S	easonall	y adjuste	d			1	<u> </u>
968: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	93, 184 93, 758 94, 463 94, 552 96, 069 97, 423	144, 029 144, 738 145, 082 146, 405 147, 727 148, 436	1. 55 1. 54 1. 54 1. 55 1. 54 1. 52	48, 447 48, 356 48, 446 48, 755 50, 014 50, 729	82, 890 83, 408 83, 759 84, 382 85, 278 85, 582	1. 71 1. 72 1. 73 1. 73 1. 71 1. 69	17, 694 17, 953 18, 021 18, 006 17, 897 18, 374	21,564 21,542 21,547 21,781 21,843 22,012	1. 22 1. 20 1. 20 1. 21 1. 22 1. 20	27, 043 27, 449 27, 996 27, 791 28, 158 28, 320	39, 575 39, 788 39, 776 40, 242 40, 606 40, 842	1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	98, 368 97, 083 98, 549 99, 675 100, 142 98, 671	148, 972 149, 825 150, 652 152, 017 152, 830 153, 764	1, 51 1, 54 1, 53 1, 53 1, 53 1, 56		85, 829 86, 713 87, 109 87, 566 87, 947 88, 579			22, 078 22, 102 22, 119 22, 231 22, 395 22, 528		28, 674 28, 760 28, 316 28, 697 28, 806	41,065 41,010 41,424 42,220	
969: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	100, 137 101, 390 101, 510 102, 352 103, 232 104, 127	154, 086 155, 339 156, 401 157, 477 158, 602 159, 264	1. 54 1. 53 1. 54 1. 54 1. 54 1. 53	52, 801 53, 302 53, 078 53, 298		1.68 1.68	18, 347 18, 799 19, 516 19, 612 20, 105	22, 441 22, 769 23, 080 23, 341 23, 438 23, 611	1. 22 1. 21	28, 989 29, 289 28, 916 29, 442 29, 386 29, 371		1.4 1.4 1.4
July	104, 201 104, 644 105, 903 106, 907 106, 036	160, 631 161, 659 162, 733 164, 250 164, 992	1 54	55, 392 55, 239 56, 434 56, 999 56, 143		l	19, 719 20, 059 20, 210 20, 288 20, 345			29, 090 29, 346 29, 259 29, 620 29, 548 29, 581		

Note.—The inventory figures in this table do not agree with the estimates of change in business inventories included in the gross national product since these figures cover only manufacturing and trade rather than all business, and show inventories in terms of current book value without adjustment for revaluation.

Source: Department of Commerce (Office of Business Economics and Bureau of the Census).

¹ Monthly average for year and total for month.
2 Seasonally adjusted, end of period.
3 Inventory/sales ratio. For annual periods, ratio of weighted average inventories to average monthly sales; for monthly data, ratio of inventories at end of month to sales for month.
4 Manufacturing sales prior to 1961 not completely comparable with later data. See Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "Series M3-1.1," page 9, September 1968.
5 Where December data not available, data for year calculated on basis of no change from November.

Table C-43.—Manufacturers' shipments and inventories, 1947-69 [Millions of dollars]

	S	Shipment	s 1				Inv	entories/	2			
					Dura	ble goo	ds indus	tries	Nond	urable go	ods indu	stries
Year or month	Total	Dura- ble goods indus- tries	Non- durable goods indus- tries	Total	Total	Mate- rials and sup- plies	Work in process	Fin- ished goods	Total	Mate- rials and sup- plies	Work in process	Fin- ished goods
1947 1948 1949	15, 513 17, 316 16, 126	6,694 7,579 7,191	8, 819 9, 738 8, 935	25, 897 28, 543 26, 321	13, 061 14, 662 13, 060				12, 836 13, 881 13, 261			
1950	18,634 21,714 22,529 24,843 23,355	8,845 10,493 11,313 13,349 11,828	9,789 11,221 11,216 11,494 11,527	31,078 39,306 41,136 43,948 41,612	15, 539 20, 991 23, 731 25, 878 23, 710		10, 720 9, 721	6, 206 6, 040	15,539 18,315 17,405 18,070 17,902	8, 317 8, 167	2, 472 2, 440	7,409 7,415
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	26, 480 27, 740 28, 736 27, 280 30, 219	14, 071 14, 715 15, 237	12 409	45, 069 50, 642	26, 405 30, 447 31, 728 30, 095 31, 839	9, 194 10, 417 10, 608 9, 847 10, 585	12,317 12,837	6,348 7,565 8,125 7,749 8,143	18, 664 20, 195 20, 143 19, 975 20, 868	8, 556 8, 971 8, 775 8, 671 9, 089	2,571 2,721 2,864 2,800 2,928	7,666 8,622 8,624 8,498 8,857
1960 1961 ³ 1962 1963 1964	30, 796 30, 896 33, 113 35, 032 37, 335	17, 103	14, 979 15, 352 16, 010 16, 786 17, 701	53, 814 54, 943 58, 212 60, 027 63, 370	32, 360 32, 518 34, 609 35, 807 38, 433	10, 286 10, 241 10, 803 10, 997 11, 928	12,780 13,221 14,210 15,000 16,254	9, 190 9, 056 9, 596 9, 810 10, 251	21, 454 22, 425 23, 603 24, 220 24, 937	9, 113 9, 463 9, 837 9, 999 10, 179	2, 935 3, 192 3, 303 3, 412 3, 519	9, 353 9, 770 10, 463 10, 809 11, 239
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 4	41, 003 44, 876 45, 712 50, 310 54, 780	24,635 24,973	18 788		42, 204 49, 797 53, 540 57, 422	13, 285			25, 975 28, 328 29, 279 31, 157 32, 340	10, 478 11, 266 11, 247 11, 598	3, 823 4, 255 4, 496 4, 855 5, 058	14, 704
	' 	!	<u>'</u>	1	Se	asonally	adjusted					<u> </u>
1968: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	48, 447 48, 356 48, 446 48, 755 50, 014 50, 729	26,844 26,888	21, 522 21, 645 21, 602 21, 867 22, 505 23, 096	82, 890 83, 408 83, 759 84, 382 85, 278 85, 582	53, 525 54, 009 54, 295 54, 724 55, 234 55, 442	15, 489 15, 648 15, 840 16, 071 16, 379 16, 498	24, 641 24, 926 25, 078 25, 214 25, 392 25, 490	13, 395 13, 435 13, 377 13, 439 13, 463 13, 454	29, 365 29, 399 29, 464 29, 658 30, 044 30, 140	11, 306 11, 249 11, 128 11, 228 11, 312 11, 333	4, 482 4, 497 4, 508 4, 522 4, 604 4, 619	13, 577 13, 653 13, 829 13, 909 14, 128 14, 188
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	51, 425 49, 825 51, 441 52, 560 52, 548 51, 494	28, 211 26, 837 27, 985	23, 214 22, 988 23, 456 23, 600 23, 762 23, 752	85, 829 86, 713 87, 109 87, 566 87, 947 88, 579	55, 461 56, 069 56, 458 56, 657 56, 953 57, 422	16, 753 16, 781 16, 704 16, 763 16, 676 16, 637	25, 237 25, 544 25, 772 25, 825 26, 085 26, 357	14, 0691	30, 368 30, 644 30, 651 30, 909 30, 994 31, 157	11, 366 11, 508 11, 511 11, 609 11, 512 11, 598	4, 682 4, 729 4, 679 4, 724 4, 752 4, 855	14, 320 14, 407 14, 461 14, 576 14, 730 14, 704
1969: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	52, 801 53, 302 53, 078 53, 298 53, 741 54, 786	29, 325 29, 914 29, 530 29, 643 29, 573 30, 136	23, 476 23, 388 23, 548 23, 655 24, 168 24, 650		57, 879 58, 282 58, 978 59, 426 60, 222 60, 479	16, 706 16, 613 16, 980 16, 935 17, 055 17, 045	26, 631 26, 961 27, 264 27, 463 27, 872 28, 072	14, 542 14, 708 14, 734 15, 028 15, 295 15, 362	31, 026 31, 274 31, 339 31, 592 31, 917 31, 736	11, 497 11, 554 11, 519 11, 672 11, 783 11, 704	4, 991 5, 014 4, 943 4, 970 5, 016 4, 946	14, 538 14, 706 14, 877 14, 950 15, 118 15, 086
July Aug Sept Oct */ Nov */	55, 392 55, 239 56, 434 56, 999 56, 143	30, 605 30, 868	24, 787 24, 371 24, 692 25, 110 25, 044	93, 166 93, 728 94, 211 94, 916	61, 441 61, 724 62, 036 62, 631 63, 076	17, 159 17, 011 17, 023 17, 104 17, 194		15, 568 15, 736 15, 789 16, 033 16, 222	31, 725 32, 004 32, 175 32, 285 32, 340	11, 684 11, 790 11, 837 12, 048 11, 963	4, 945 4, 988 5, 028 5, 062 5, 058	15, 096 15, 226 15, 310 15, 175 15, 319

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

Monthly average for year and total for month.
 Book value, seasonally adjusted, end of period.
 Data prior to 1961 not completely comparable with later data. See Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "Series M3-1.1," page 9, September 1968.
 Where December data not available, data for year calculated on basis of no change from November.

TABLE C-44.-Manufacturers' new and unfilled orders, 1947-69

[Amounts in millions of dollars]

		New o	rders i		Un	filled orde	rs ²	Unfill n	ed orders nents ratio	-ship- 13
Year or month	Total	Durabl indu	e goods stries	Non- dura-		Dura- ble	Non- dura- ble		Dura- ble	Non- dura- ble
	10001	Total	Machin- ery and equip- ment	ble goods indus- tries	Total	goods indus- tries	goods indus- tries	Total	goods indus- tries	goods indus- tries
1947 1948	15, 256 17, 692 15, 614	6, 388 8, 126 6, 633		8, 868 9, 566 8, 981	34, 415 30, 717 24, 506	28, 532 26, 601 20, 018	5, 883 4, 116 4, 488			
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	20, 110 23, 907 23, 203 23, 533 22, 313	10, 165 12, 841 12, 061 12, 105 10, 743	2, 084 1, 770	9,945 11,066 11,142 11,428 11,570	43, 055 69, 785 75, 649 61, 178 48, 266	36, 838 65, 835 72, 480 58, 637 45, 250	6, 217 3, 950 3, 169 2, 541 3, 016	3, 42	4, 12	0, 96
1955 1956 1957 1958	27, 423 28, 383 27, 514 26, 901 30, 679	14, 954 15, 381 14, 073 13, 170 15, 951	2, 499 2, 870 2, 566 2, 354 2, 878	12, 469 13, 002 13, 441 13, 731 14, 728	60, 004 67, 375 53, 183 48, 882 54, 494	56, 241 63, 880 50, 352 45, 739 50, 654	3, 763 3, 495 2, 831 3, 143 3, 840	3. 63 3. 87 3. 35 2. 60 2. 85	4, 27 4, 55 4, 00 3, 49 3, 44	1. 12 1. 04 . 85 . 55
1960 1961 4 1962 1963 1964	30, 115 31, 085 33, 005	15, 223 15, 698 17, 026 18, 522 20, 258	2, 791 2, 854 3, 090 3, 412 3, 935	14, 892 15, 387 15, 979 16, 800 17, 694	46, 133 48, 485 47, 351 50, 960 58, 536	43, 401 45, 336 44, 531 47, 980 55, 652	2, 732 3, 149 2, 820 2, 980 2, 884	2. 58 2. 52 2. 46 2. 41 2. 50	3. 21 3. 02 2. 96 2. 89 2. 99	. 63 . 75 . 68 . 65
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 5	41, 803 45, 938 45, 928	22, 986 25, 710 25, 189 27, 868 30, 630	4, 435 5, 268 5, 250 5, 804 6, 402	18, 817 20, 228 20, 739 22, 728 24, 327	68, 208 81, 072 83, 686 87, 152 89, 288	64, 980 77, 987 80, 578 84, 071 86, 235	3, 228 3, 085 3, 108 3, 081 3, 053	2. 63 2. 92 2. 83 2. 78	3, 13 3, 50 3, 39 3, 38	. 62 . 56 . 53 . 48
			<u> </u>	<u></u>	Seasonal	ly adjusted	i			<u> </u>
1968: Jan	48, 353 48, 453 49, 566 49, 237 49, 650 49, 850	26, 837 26, 814 28, 005 27, 373 27, 172 26, 701	5, 466 5, 380 5, 382 5, 492 5, 447 5, 968	21, 516 21, 639 21, 561 21, 864 22, 478 23, 149	83, 592 83, 689 84, 809 85, 291 84, 927 84, 048	80, 490 80, 593 81, 754 82, 239 81, 902 80, 970	3, 102 3, 096 3, 055 3, 052 3, 025 3, 078	2. 80 2. 79 2. 82 2. 83 2. 78 2. 72	3. 37 3. 36 3. 39 3. 41 3. 36 3. 28	0. 52 . 52 . 52 . 50 . 49
July		26, 925 27, 329 28, 381 30, 280 29, 325 29, 380	5, 714 6, 027 5, 916 6, 550 6, 089 6, 237	23, 256 22, 872 23, 496 23, 651 23, 775 23, 721	82, 806 83, 184 83, 617 84, 991 85, 539 87, 152	79, 684 80, 177 80, 572 81, 894 82, 429 84, 071	3, 122 3, 007 3, 045 3, 097 3, 110 3, 081	2. 64 2. 79 2. 67 2. 64 2. 67 2. 78	3. 17 3. 38 3. 24 3. 19 3. 22 3. 38	. 50 . 50 . 48 . 48 . 48
1969: Jan	53, 119 53, 901 53, 283 54, 635 54, 133 53, 861	29, 684 30, 482 29, 697 30, 944 29, 998 29, 171	6, 204 6, 511 6, 414 7, 099 6, 428 6, 528	23, 435 23, 419 23, 586 23, 691 24, 135 24, 690	87, 469 88, 064 88, 267 89, 603 89, 986 89, 058	84, 431 84, 994 85, 159 86, 461 86, 878 85, 910	3, 038 3, 070 3, 108 3, 142 3, 108 3, 148	2. 68 2. 65 2. 67 2. 69 2. 70 2. 64	3. 22 3. 18 3. 21 3. 24 3. 26 3. 17	. 47 . 47 . 48 . 48 . 47
July	55, 793 54, 799 56, 829 56, 917	31, 069 30, 482 32, 135 31, 795 31, 049	6, 346 6, 245 7, 352 6, 450 6, 402	24, 724 24, 317 24, 694 25, 122 25, 054	89, 456 89, 014 89, 411 89, 333 89, 288	86, 369 85, 984 86, 377 86, 288 86, 235	3, 087 3, 030 3, 034 3, 045 3, 053	2. 64 2. 62 2. 57 2. 52 2. 55	3. 20 3. 15 3. 07 3. 03 3. 07	. 45 . 45 . 44 . 45

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

¹ Monthly average for year and total for month.
2 Seasonally adjusted, end of period.
3 Ratio of unfilled orders at end of period to shipments for period. Annual figures relate to seasonally adjusted data

⁴ Data prior to 1961 not completely comparable with later data. Comparable data for new orders (total, durable, and non-durable) are available for 1958, 1959, and 1960 only. See Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "Series M3-1.1," page 9, September 1968, for these data.

5 Where December data not available, data for year calculated on basis of no change from November.

PRICES

Table C-45.—Consumer price indexes, by major groups, 1929-69

For city wage earners and clerical workers

[1957-59=100]

Yeaf or month	All	Food	Hou	sing	Apparel and	Trans-		Personal	Reading and	Other goods
	items		Total	Rent	upkeep	tion	care	care	recrea- tion	and services
1929	59. 7	55, 6		85. 4	55. 3					
1930	58. 2 53. 0 47. 6 45. 1 46. 6 47. 8 48. 3 50. 0 49. 1 48. 4	52. 9 43. 6 36. 3 35. 3 39. 3 42. 1 42. 5 44. 2 41. 0 39. 9	56. 3 57. 1 59. 1 60. 1 59. 7	83. 1 78. 7 70. 6 60. 8 57. 0 56. 9 58. 3 60. 9 62. 9 63. 0	54. 1 49. 2 43. 6 42. 1 46. 1 46. 5 46. 9 49. 3 49. 0 48. 3	49. 4 49. 8 50. 6 51. 0 49. 8	49. 4 49. 6 50. 0 50. 2 50. 2	42. 6 43. 2 45. 7 46. 7 46. 5	50. 2 51. 0 52. 5 54. 3 54. 4	52. 7 52. 6 54. 0 54. 5 55. 4
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1945 1946 1947 1948	48. 8 51. 3 56. 8 60. 3 61. 3 62. 7 68. 0 77. 8 83. 8	40. 5 44. 2 51. 9 57. 1 58. 4 66. 9 81. 3 88. 2 84. 7	59. 9 61. 4 64. 9 66. 4 67. 5 69. 3 74. 5 79. 8	63. 2 64. 3 65. 7 65. 7 65. 9 66. 1 66. 5 68. 7 73. 2 76. 4	48. 8 51. 1 59. 6 62. 2 66. 7 70. 1 76. 9 89. 2 95. 0 91. 3	49. 5 51. 2 55. 7 55. 5 55. 5 55. 4 58. 3 71. 6 77. 0	50. 3 50. 6 52. 0 54. 5 56. 2 57. 5 60. 7 65. 7 69. 8 72. 0	46. 4 47. 6 52. 2 57. 6 61. 7 63. 6 68. 2 76. 2 79. 1 78. 9	55. 4 57. 3 60. 0 65. 0 72. 0 75. 0 77. 5 82. 5 86. 7 89. 9	57. 1 58. 9 63. 0 64. 7 67. 3 69. 5 75. 4 78. 9 81. 2
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958	83. 8 90. 5 92. 5 93. 2 93. 6 93. 3 94. 7 98. 0 100. 7 101. 5	85, 8 95, 4 97, 1 95, 6 95, 4 94, 0 94, 7 97, 8 101, 9 100, 3	83. 2 88. 2 89. 9 92. 3 93. 4 94. 1 95. 5 98. 5 100. 2 101. 3	79. 1 82. 3 85. 7 90. 3 93. 5 94. 8 96. 5 98. 3 100. 1 101. 6	90. 1 98. 2 97. 2 96. 5 96. 3 95. 9 97. 8 99. 5 99. 8 100. 6	79. 0 84. 0 89. 6 92. 1 90. 8 89. 7 91. 3 96. 5 99. 7 103. 8	73. 4 76. 9 81. 1 83. 9 86. 6 88. 6 91. 8 95. 5 100. 1 104. 4	78. 9 86. 3 87. 3 88. 1 88. 5 90. 0 93. 7 97. 1 100. 4 102. 4	89. 3 92. 0 92. 4 93. 3 92. 4 92. 1 93. 4 96. 9 100. 8 102. 4	82, 6 86, 1 90, 6 92, 8 94, 3 94, 3 95, 8 98, 5 99, 8 101, 8
1960. 1961. 1962. 1963. 1964. 1965. 1966. 1967. 1967.	103. 1 104. 2 105. 4 106. 7 108. 1 109. 9 113. 1	101. 4 102. 6 103. 6 105. 1 106. 4 108. 8 114. 2 115. 2 119. 3 125. 5	103. 1 103. 9 104. 8 106. 0 107. 2 108. 5 111. 1 114. 3 119. 1 126. 7	103. 1 104. 4 105. 7 106. 8 107. 8 108. 9 110. 4 112. 4 115. 1 118. 8	102. 2 103. 0 103. 6 104. 8 105. 7 106. 8 109. 6 114. 0 120. 1 127. 1	103. 8 105. 0 107. 2 107. 8 109. 3 111. 1 112. 7 115. 9 119. 6 124. 2	108. 1 111. 3 114. 2 117. 0 119. 4 122. 3 127. 7 136. 7 145. 0 155. 0	104. 1 104. 6 106. 5 107. 9 109. 2 109. 9 112. 2 115. 5 120. 3 126. 2	104. 9 107. 2 109. 6 111. 5 114. 1 115. 2 117. 1 120. 1 125. 7 130. 5	103, 8 104, 6 105, 3 107, 1 108, 8 111, 4 114, 9 118, 2 123, 6 129, 0
1968: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	118.6 119.0 119.5 119.9 120.3 120.9	117. 0 117. 4 117. 9 118. 3 118. 8 119. 1	116. 4 116. 9 117. 2 117. 5 117. 8 118. 7	113.7 113.9 114.2 114.4 114.6 114.9	115.9 116.6 117.6 118.4 119.5 119.9	118.7 118.6 119.0 119.0 119.1 119.7	141. 2 141. 9 142. 9 143. 5 144. 0 144. 4	117.6 117.6 118.4 119.0 119.6 120.1	122. 7 123. 0 124. 2 124. 9 125. 3 125. 6	121. 9 122. 1 122. 4 122. 5 122. 6 123. 5
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	121. 5 121. 9 122. 2 122. 9 123. 4 123. 7	120. 0 120. 5 120. 4 120. 9 120. 5 121. 2	119. 5 120. 1 120. 4 120. 9 121. 7 122. 3	115. 1 115. 4 115. 7 116. 0 116. 3 116. 7	119. 7 120. 3 122. 2 123. 3 124. 0 124. 3	119. 8 120. 0 119. 5 120. 6 121. 2 120. 2	145. 1 145. 5 146. 4 147. 4 148. 2 149. 1	120. 4 120. 9 121. 5 122. 1 122. 8 123. 4	125. 9 126. 3 126. 7 127. 5 128. 0 128. 2	123. 9 124. 2 124. 4 125. 1 125. 4 125. 6
1969: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	124, 1 124, 6 125, 6 126, 4 126, 8 127, 6	122. 0 121. 9 122. 4 123. 2 123. 7 125. 5	122. 7 123. 3 124. 4 125. 3 125. 8 126. 3	116. 9 117. 2 117. 5 117. 8 118. 1 118. 5	123. 4 123. 9 124. 9 125. 6 126. 6 127. 0	120. 7 122. 0 124. 3 124. 6 124. 0 124. 6	150, 2 151, 3 152, 5 153, 6 154, 5 155, 2	123. 7 124. 1 124. 8 125. 5 125. 8 126. 2	128. 4 128. 4 128. 7 129. 6 130. 2 130. 4	125. 6 125. 8 126. 1 126. 6 126. 9 127. 9
July	128. 2 128. 7 129. 3 129. 8 130. 5 131. 3	126. 7 127. 4 127. 5 127. 2 128. 1 129. 9	127. 0 127. 8 128. 6 129. 2 129. 8 130. 5	118. 8 119. 3 119. 7 120. 1 120. 5 121. 0	126. 8 126. 6 128. 7 129. 8 130. 7 130. 8	124. 3 124. 2 123. 6 125. 7 125. 6 126. 4	155. 9 156. 8 157. 6 156. 9 157. 4 158. 1	126. 6 126. 8 127. 3 127. 3 127. 8 128. 1	130. 7 131. 2 131. 6 132. 0 132. 3 132. 7	129, 1 130, 1 131, 3 132, 2 133, 1 133, 5

Table C-46.—Consumer price indexes, by special groups, 1935-69

For city wage earners and clerical workers

[1957-59=100]

						Comm	odities				Services	
Year or	All	All items less	All items less	Ali		Commo	dities le	ss food	Total			All serv-
month	items	food	shel- ter	com- modi- ties	Food	All	Dura- ble	Non- dura- ble	non- dura- ble	AII services	Rent	ices less rent
935 936 937 938 939	47. 8 48. 3 50. 0 49. 1 48. 4	52. 5 53. 0 54. 9 55. 5 55. 1	46. 1 46. 7 48. 2 46. 8 46. 0	45. 0 45. 6 47. 4 45. 6 44. 7	42. 1 42. 5 44. 2 41. 0 39. 9	50. 2 50. 8 53. 0 53. 0 52. 1	47. 1 47. 8 50. 8 51. 7 50. 6	48. 8 49. 2 51. 2 50. 9 50. 1	44. 5 45. 1 46. 8 44. 7 43. 8	52. 2 52. 8 54. 4 55. 4 55. 5	56. 9 58. 3 60. 9 62. 9 63. 0	49. (49. (49. (49. (
940 941 942 943 944 945 945 946 947 948 949	48. 8 51. 3 56. 8 60. 3 61. 3 62. 7 68. 0 77. 8 83. 8 83. 0	55. 3 56. 9 60. 9 62. 6 65. 0 66. 5 69. 4 75. 8 81. 3	46. 3 49. 1 55. 3 59. 5 60. 5 62. 1 68. 4 79. 4 85. 6 84. 1	45. 1 48. 2 55. 2 60. 1 60. 8 62. 6 69. 4 83. 4 89. 4	40. 5 44. 2 51. 9 57. 9 57. 1 58. 4 66. 9 81. 3 88. 2 84. 7	52. 4 55. 0 61. 2 63. 8 67. 3 70. 0 74. 4 83. 9 90. 3 89. 0	50. 2 53. 6 60. 9 62. 9 68. 7 73. 9 77. 3 83. 8 89. 9 91. 2	50. 6 52. 8 58. 4 60. 9 64. 0 66. 3 71. 1 81. 7 88. 0 86. 3	44. 3 47. 4 54. 3 59. 0 59. 5 61. 2 68. 0 82. 0 88. 0 85. 4	55. 7 56. 4 58. 2 59. 3 60. 7 61. 5 62. 7 65. 3 69. 4 72. 6	63. 2 64. 3 65. 7 65. 7 65. 9 66. 1 66. 5 68. 7 73. 2 76. 4	50. 50. 52. 55. 57. 59. 61. 64. 68.
950 951 952 953 954 955 956 956 957 958 959	83. 8 90. 5 92. 5 93. 2 93. 6 93. 3 94. 7 98. 0 100. 7 101. 5	83. 1 88. 4 90. 5 92. 3 92. 8 93. 1 94. 7 97. 9 100. 1 102. 0	84. 7 91. 8 93. 6 93. 9 93. 9 93. 4 94. 7 97. 8 100. 7 101. 5	87. 6 95. 5 96. 7 96. 4 95. 5 94. 6 95. 5 98. 5 100. 8 100. 9	85. 8 95. 4 97. 1 95. 6 95. 4 94. 0 94. 7 97. 8 101. 9 100. 3	88. 9 95. 6 96. 4 96. 6 95. 6 94. 9 95. 9 98. 8 99. 9 101. 2	92: 2 99. 2 100. 5 99. 8 97. 3 95. 4 95. 4 98. 5 100. 0 101. 5	86. 2 92. 7 93. 2 94. 0 94. 4 96. 5 99. 1 99. 8 101. 0	85. 9 94. 0 95. 1 94. 9 94. 8 94. 1 95. 4 98. 4 101. 0 100. 6	75. 0 78. 9 82. 4 86. 0 88. 7 90. 5 92. 8 96. 6 100. 3 103. 2	79. 1 82. 3 85. 7 90. 3 93. 5 94. 8 96. 5 98. 3 100. 1 101. 6	73. 77. 81. 84. 87. 89. 91. 96. 100.
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968	103. 1 104. 2 105. 4 106. 7 108. 1 109. 9 113. 1 116. 3 121. 2 127. 7	103. 7 104. 8 106. 1 107. 4 108. 9 110. 4 113. 0 116. 8 121. 9 128. 6	103. 0 104. 2 105. 4 106. 7 108. 0 109. 6 112. 9 115. 9 120. 6 126. 3	101. 7 102. 3 103. 2 104. 1 105. 2 106. 4 109. 2 111. 2 115. 3 120. 5	101. 4 102. 6 103. 6 105. 1 106. 4 108. 8 114. 2 115. 2 119. 3 125. 5	101. 7 102. 0 102. 8 103. 5 104. 4 105. 1 106. 5 109. 2 113. 2 118. 0	100. 9 100. 8 101. 8 102. 1 103. 0 102. 6 102. 7 104. 3 107. 5 111. 6	102.6 103.2 103.8 104.8 105.7 107.2 109.7 113.1 117.7 123.0	101. 9 102. 8 103. 6 104. 9 106. 0 107. 9 111. 8 114. 0 118. 4 124. 1	106. 6 108. 8 110. 9 113. 0 115. 2 117. 8 122. 3 127. 7 134. 3 143. 7	103. 1 104. 4 105. 7 106. 8 107. 8 108. 9 110. 4 112. 4 115. 1 118. 8	107. 110. 112. 114. 117. 120. 125. 131. 138. 149.
1968: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	118. 6 119. 0 119. 5 119. 9 120. 3 120. 9	119. 3 119. 7 120. 2 120. 6 121. 0 121. 6	118. 2 118. 5 119. 1 119. 6 120. 0 120. 4	113. 2 113. 5 113. 9 114. 3 114. 7 115. 1	117. 0 117. 4 117. 9 118. 3 118. 8 119. 1	111. 2 111. 5 111. 9 112. 2 112. 5 113. 0	106. 3 106. 4 106. 6 106. 9 106. 9 107. 4	115. 1 115. 6 116. 1 116. 4 117. 0 117. 5	116. 0 116. 4 116. 9 117. 3 117. 8 118. 2	130. 8 131. 3 132. 1 132. 5 133. 0 133. 9	113. 7 113. 9 114. 2 114. 4 114. 6 114. 9	134. 135. 136. 136. 137. 138.
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	121. 5 121. 9 122. 2 122. 9 123. 4 123. 7	122. 1 122. 6 123. 0 123. 8 124. 4 124. 7	120. 8 121. 2 121. 5 122. 2 122. 5 122. 7	115. 5 115. 9 116. 1 116. 8 117. 1 117. 2	120. 0 120. 5 120. 4 120. 9 120. 5 121. 2	113. 2 113. 5 113. 9 114. 7 115. 3 115. 2	107. 6 107. 7 107. 6 108. 5 109. 3 108. 7	117. 6 118. 1 118. 9 119. 7 120. 2 120. 3	118. 7 119. 2 119. 6 120. 2 120. 3 120. 7	134. 9 135. 5 136. 0 136. 6 137. 4 138. 1	115. 1 115. 4 115. 7 116. 0 116. 3 116. 7	139. 140. 140. 141. 142. 142.
1969: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	126. 4 126. 8	124. 9 125. 6 126. 8 127. 5 127. 9 128. 4	123. 1 123. 5 124. 4 125. 0 125. 4 126. 3	117. 4 117. 8 118. 7 119. 3 119. 6 120. 5	122. 0 121. 9 122. 4 123. 2 123. 7 125. 5	115. 0 115. 7 116. 8 117. 2 117. 5 118. 0	108. 6 109. 7 111. 1 111. 4 111. 3 111. 7	120. 1 120. 5 121. 4 121. 9 122. 4 123. 0	121. 0 121. 1 121. 8 122. 5 123. 0 124. 1	139. 0 139. 7 140. 9 142. 0 142. 7 143. 3	116. 9 117. 2 117. 5 117. 8 118. 1 118. 5	143. 144. 146. 147. 148. 148.
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	128.2	128. 8 129. 3 130. 0 130. 8 131. 4 131. 9	126. 7 127. 1 127. 6 128. 1 128. 6 129. 5	121. 0 121. 4 121. 7 122. 4 122. 9 123. 6	126. 7 127. 4 127. 5 127. 2 128. 1 129. 9	118. 1 118. 2 118. 7 119. 8 120. 2 120. 3	111. 9 111. 9 111. 6 113. 2 113. 5 113. 6	123. 1 123. 3 124. 4 125. 1 125. 5 125. 7	124. 7 125. 2 125. 8 126. 1 126. 7 127. 7	144. 0 145. 0 146. 0 146. 5 147. 2 148. 3	118. 8 119. 3 119. 7 120. 1 120. 5 121. 0	149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154.

Table C-47.—Consumer price indexes, selected commodities and services, 1935-69

For city wage earners and clerical workers

[1957-59=100]

		Durab	le comm	odities			urable co ies less f			Servi	ices less	rent	
Year or month	Total 1	New cars	Used cars	House- hold dura- bles	House fur- nish- ings	Total	Apparel com- mod- ities	Non- dura- bles less food and apparel	Total	House- hold serv- ices less rent	Trans- porta- tion serv- ices	Med- ical care serv- ices	Other ²
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939	47. 1 47. 8 50. 8 51. 7 50. 6	40, 3 40, 6 41, 4 43, 4 42, 4		52, 1 56, 7	48. 0 48. 8 52. 8 52. 4 51. 3	48, 8 49, 2 51, 2 50, 9 50, 1	46. 7 47. 2 49. 8 49. 4 48. 6	51. 4 51. 9 53. 2 53. 1 52. 4	49. 3 49. 0 49. 5 49. 9 49. 9		46. 6 46. 2 45. 9 46. 2 46. 4	46. 3 46. 5 47. 1 47. 2 47. 3	
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949		42. 5 45. 7 67. 9 74. 2 81. 2		65.7 68.2	50, 9 54, 4 61, 9 63, 6 69, 1 73, 9 80, 6 93, 4 99, 1 95, 7	50. 6 52. 8 58. 4 60. 9 64. 0 66. 3 71. 1 81. 7 88. 0 86. 3	49. 2 51. 7 60. 4 63. 2 67. 6 71. 2 78. 5 90. 9 96. 5 92. 7	52. 9 54. 7 57. 8 60. 2 61. 9 63. 1 65. 8 74. 9 81. 8 81. 9	50. 0 50. 6 52. 8 55. 2 57. 9 59. 1 61. 2 64. 3 68. 0 71. 4		46. 3 46. 6 49. 1 49. 1 49. 0 49. 1 50. 1 51. 7 57. 7 64. 2	47. 3 47. 6 49. 0 51. 6 53. 7 55. 2 58. 4 63. 3 67. 6 70. 1	
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1957 1958	92. 2 99. 2 100. 5 99. 8 97. 3 95. 4 98. 5 100. 0 101. 5	81. 8 85. 7 93. 1 94. 0 92. 5 89. 2 91. 7 96. 5 99. 6 103. 9	108.4 92.2 87.2 83.9 94.0 97.4 108.8	98. 4 107. 8 105. 0 103. 8 101. 0 98. 3 97. 9 99. 6 100. 3 100. 2	96. 3 106. 8 104. 2 103. 7 101. 9 100. 0 98. 9 100. 5 99. 8 99. 8	86. 2 92. 7 93. 2 94. 0 94. 4 96. 5 99. 1 99. 8 101. 0	91. 6 100. 2 99. 1 98. 0 97. 5 97. 0 98. 6 99. 7 99. 7 100. 6	1	73. 4 77. 8 81. 5 84. 9 87. 4 89. 4 91. 9 96. 1 100. 2 103. 6	90. 4 95. 7 100. 8 103. 6	68, 4 74, 8 80, 1 85, 2 88, 9 89, 1 90, 5 94, 8 100, 8 104, 3	71. 7 75. 3 80. 1 83. 0 85. 5 88. 0 91. 4 95. 3 100. 0 104. 8	93. 5 97. 2 100. 2 102. 6
1960	100, 9 100, 8 101, 8 102, 1 103, 0 102, 6 102, 7 104, 3 107, 5 111, 6	102. 5 102. 5 102. 1 101. 5 101. 2 99. 0 97. 2 98. 1 100. 8 102. 4	101.6 105.6 115.2 116.6 121.6 120.8 117.8 121.5	100, 1 98, 9 98, 8 98, 5 98, 4 96, 9 96, 8 98, 2 101, 4 105, 5	98. 9 98. 5 98. 4 97. 9 98. 8 100. 8 104. 7	102.6 103.2 103.8 104.8 105.7 107.2 109.7 113.1 117.7 123.0	102. 0 102. 6 103. 0 104. 0 104. 9 105. 8 108. 5 113. 0 119. 3 126. 5	102.8 103.3 104.2 105.3 106.2 108.0 110.3 113.1 116.8 121.0	107. 4 110. 0 112. 1 114. 5 117. 0 120. 0 125. 0 131. 1 138. 6 149. 2	108. 0 109. 2 110. 6 113. 0 114. 8 117. 0 121. 5 127. 0 134. 5 146. 4	107. 0 109. 5 111. 2 112. 4 115. 0 119. 3 124. 3 128. 4 133. 5 142. 9	109. 1 113. 1 116. 8 120. 3 123. 2 127. 1 133. 9 145. 6 156. 3 168. 9	106. 2 109. 7 112. 6 115. 3 118. 5 121. 8 126. 5 131. 5 138. 8 145. 5
1968: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	106. 3 106. 4 106. 6 106. 9 106. 9 107. 4	1100 6	125. 8 123. 6 126. 3 126. 7	99. 6 99. 9 100. 4 100. 8 101. 1 101. 3	102.6 103.1 103.8 104.2 104.4 104.7	115. 1 115. 6 116. 1 116. 4 117. 0 117. 5	114. 8 115. 6 116. 6 117. 6 118. 7 119. 1	115.3 115.5 115.8 115.8 116.0 116.6	134. 6 135. 2 136. 1 136. 6 137. 1 138. 1	129. 9 130. 6 131. 1 131. 5 132. 1 133. 7	131.5 131.9	151. 4 152. 3 153. 6 154. 3 155. 0 155. 5	134. 8 135. 3 137. 0 137. 6 138. 3 138. 9
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	107. 6 107. 7 107. 6 108. 5 109. 3 108. 7	99. 8 99. 1 98. 4 102. 8 103. 8 102. 7	126. 7	101. 5 101. 6 102. 0 102. 3 102. 8 103. 0	104. 8 104. 9 105. 4 105. 9 106. 5 106. 6	117.6 118.1 118.9 119.7 120.2 120.3	118.9 119.5 121.5 122.7 123.4 123.7	117.3 117.4 117.9	139.3 140.0 140.5 141.2 142.0 142.9	135.6 136.7 137.0 137.6 138.5 139.2	133. 5 133. 6 133. 8 134. 6 135. 2 136. 8	156. 6 157. 1 158. 2 159. 4 160. 3 161. 4	139. 2 139. 7 140. 3 140. 9 141. 5 142. 0
1969: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	108. 6 109. 7 111. 1 111. 4 111. 3 111. 7	101.9	115. 5 122. 6 130. 5 131. 2 126. 8 128. 2	103. 3 103. 7 104. 4 105. 0 105. 6 105. 8	106. 6 107. 1 107. 8 108. 3 108. 8 109. 0	120. 1 120. 5 121. 4 121. 9 122. 4 123. 0	122. 6 123. 1 124. 3 124. 9 126. 0 126. 4	118.6 118.9 119.7 120.2	143. 9 144. 6 146. 1 147. 4 148. 1 148. 8	139. 8 140. 6 142. 5 144. 2 145. 0 145. 7	139. 2 139. 8 140. 9 141. 4 141. 8 142. 3	162. 8 164. 3 165. 8 167. 2 168. 2 169. 1	142.3 142.7 143.2 144.2 144.7 145.2
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	111.9 111.9 111.6 113.2 113.5 113.6	101.6 101.0 99.5 104.2 105.1 104.9	127. 0 125. 4 121. 4 125. 8 124. 9 123. 9	106. 0 106. 0 106. 2 106. 4 106. 5 106. 5		123. 1 123. 3 124. 4	126. 2 125. 9 128. 1 129. 3 130. 4 130. 3	121. 3 121. 7 122. 2 122. 6 122. 6 123. 0	149. 6 150. 7 151. 7 152. 3 153. 1 154. 3	146. 9 148. 2 149. 5 150. 4 151. 4 152. 4	142.5	170. 1 171. 1 172. 2 171. 2 171. 8 172. 8	145.7 146.5 147.2 147.6 148.2 148.9

Includes certain items not shown separately.
 Includes the services components of apparel, personal care, reading and recreation, and other goods and services. Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Table C-48.—Wholesale price indexes, by major commodity groups, 1929-69 [1957-59=100]

					Indus	trial commo	dities	
Year or month	All com- modities	Farm products	Processed foods and feeds	Total	Textile products and apparel	Hides, skins, leather, and related products	Fuels and related products, and power	Chemicals and allied products
1929	52. 1	63. 9		51.7		56. 6	61. 5	
930 931 932 933 934	47. 3 39. 9 35. 6 36. 1 41. 0	54, 0 39, 6 29, 4 31, 3 39, 9		48. 1 42. 4 39. 7 40. 2 44. 2		52. 0 44. 7 38. 0 42. 0 44. 9	58. 2 50. 0 52. 1 49. 3 54. 3	46. 6 48. 8
930 931 932 933 934 935 935 936 937	43. 8 44. 2 47. 2 43. 0 42. 2	48. 0 49. 4 52. 7 41. 9 39. 9		44. 0 44. 9 48. 1 46. 1 46. 0		46. 5 49. 5 54. 3 48. 2 49. 6	54. 5 56. 5 57. 5 56. 6 54. 2	50. 9 51. 2 53. 6 51. 0 50. 7
940	43. 0 47. 8 54. 0 56. 5 56. 9 57. 9 66. 1 81. 2 87. 9	41. 3 50. 1 64. 6 74. 8 75. 3 78. 3 90. 6 109. 1 117. 1	92. 6 99. 1 90. 0	46. 8 50. 3 53. 9 54. 7 55. 6 56. 3 61. 7 75. 3 81. 0	105. 7 110. 3 100. 9	52. 3 56. 1 61. 1 61. 0 60. 5 61. 3 70. 7 96. 5 97. 5	53. 2 56. 6 58. 2 59. 9 61. 6 62. 3 66. 7 79. 7 93. 8	51, 6 56, 1 62, 3 63, 1 63, 8 64, 2 92, 4 92, 4 86, 2
950 951 952 953 954 955 955 956 957 958	86. 8 96. 7 94. 0 92. 7 92. 9 93. 2 96. 2 99. 0 100. 4 100. 6	106. 4 123. 8 116. 9 105. 9 104. 4 97. 9 96. 6 99. 2 103. 6 97. 2	93. 2 103. 5 102. 3 97. 6 99. 3 95. 0 94. 8 97. 6 102. 5	82. 9 91. 5 89. 4 90. 1 90. 4 92. 4 96. 5 99. 5 99. 5	104. 8 116. 9 105. 5 102. 8 100. 6 100. 7 100. 7 100. 8 98. 9	99. 9 114. 8 92. 8 94. 1 89. 9 89. 5 94. 8 94. 8 96. 0 109. 1	90. 2 93. 5 93. 3 95. 9 94. 6 94. 5 97. 4 102. 7 98. 7	87. 100. 95. 96. 97. 96. 97. 99. 100.
960 961 962 963 964 965 967 966 967 968 968 968 969 969	100. 7 100. 3 100. 6 100. 3 100. 5 102. 5 105. 9 106. 1 108. 7 113. 0	96. 9 96. 0 97. 7 95. 7 94. 3 98. 4 105. 6 99. 7 102. 2 108. 5	100. 0 101. 6 102. 7 103. 3 103. 1 106. 7 113. 0 111. 7 114. 1 119. 8	101.3 100.8 100.8 100.7 101.2 102.5 104.7 106.3 109.0 112.7	101. 5 99. 7 100. 6 100. 5 101. 2 101. 8 102. 1 102. 0 105. 7 108. 0	105. 2 106. 2 107. 4 104. 2 104. 6 109. 2 119. 7 115. 8 119. 5 125. 8	99. 6 100. 7 100. 2 99. 8 97. 1 98. 9 101. 3 103. 6 102. 4 104. 6	100. 99. 97. 96. 96. 97. 97. 98. 98.
968: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	107. 2 108. 0 108. 2 108. 3 108. 5 108. 7	99. 0 101. 3 102. 1 102. 1 103. 6 102. 5	112.4 113.3 112.9 112.8 113.6 114.6	107. 8 108. 3 108. 6 108. 8 108. 6 108. 8	104. 3 104. 6 104. 6 104. 7 104. 8 105. 2	116. 5 116. 7 117. 9 118. 3 118. 8 118. 7	101. 8 102. 5 102. 0 102. 4 102. 4 103. 7	98. 98. 98. 98. 98.
JulyAugSept OctNovDec	109. 1 108. 7 109. 1 109. 1 109. 6 109. 8	103. 9 101. 4 102. 8 101. 2 103. 1 103. 3	115. 9 114. 9 115. 3 114. 4 114. 7	108.8 108.9 109.2 109.7 109.9 110.2	105. 8 106. 0 106. 5 107. 0 107. 2 107. 1	119. 5 119. 5 120. 7 122. 3 122. 4 122. 8	103. 3 102. 6 102. 5 101. 9 102. 0 102. 2	98. 98. 97. 97. 97.
1969: Jan	112.8	104 9 105. 0 106. 5 105. 6 110. 5 111. 2	116. 0 116. 3 116. 4 117. 3 119. 4 121. 4	110. 9 111. 4 112. 0 112. 1 112. 2 112. 2	107. 4 107. 2 107. 1 107. 1 106. 9 107. 2	123. 5 123. 4 123. 4 126. 0 126. 1 125. 7	102. 4 102. 7 104. 2 104. 5 104. 5 105. 0	97. 97. 98. 97. 98. 98.
July	113. 3 113. 4 113. 6 114. 0 114. 7	110. 5 108. 9 108. 4	122. 0 121. 5 121. 3 121. 6 121. 8 122. 6	112. 4 112. 8 113. 2 113. 8 114. 2 114. 6	107. 7 108. 7 109. 0 109. 1 109. 2 109. 2	126. 4 126. 4 128. 2 127. 4 126. 8 126. 5	105. 0 104. 7 104. 7 105. 4 105. 5 103. 1	98. 98. 98. 98. 98. 98.

See footnotes at end of table.

Table C-48.—Wholesale price indexes, by major commodity groups, 1929-69—Continued [1957-59=100]

				ndustrial c	ommodities	Continue	d		
Year or month	Rubber and rubber products	Lumber and wood products	Pulp, paper, and allied products	Metals and metal products	Machin- ery and equip- ment	Furni- ture and house- hold durables	Nonme- tallic mineral products	Trans- portation equip- ment: Motor vehicles and equip- ment 1	Miscel- laneous products
1929	57.6	26, 4		44.1		56.4	53. 4	42.8	
1930	50. 4 42. 8 37. 1 39. 0 45. 5 45. 8 49. 4 58. 1 57. 1 59. 3	24. 1 19. 6 16 9 20. 0 23. 5 22. 6 23. 6 27. 9 25. 4 26. 1		39. 7 35. 7 32. 8 33. 6 37. 1 37. 0 37. 8 43. 2 41. 6 41. 2	46. 2	55, 5 51, 1 45, 0 45, 1 49, 0 48, 6 49, 3 54, 7 53, 4 53, 2	53. 2 49. 7 46. 5 49. 2 52. 6 52. 7 53. 9 52. 2 51. 2	40.8	
1940. 1941. 1942. 1943. 1944. 1945. 1946. 1947. 1948.	55, 3 59, 6 69, 4 71, 3 70, 4 68, 3 68, 3 70, 5 68, 3	28. 9 34. 5 37. 5 39. 7 42. 8 43. 4 49. 7 77. 4 88. 5 81. 9	75. 3 78. 6 75. 2	41. 4 42. 2 42. 8 42. 7 42. 7 43. 4 48. 5 60. 2 68. 5 69. 0	46. 3 47. 1 47. 8 47. 4 47. 1 47. 2 51. 9 60. 0 65. 1 68. 2	54. 4 57. 8 62. 5 62. 1 63. 8 63. 9 67. 8 77. 8 82. 5 83. 8	51. 2 52. 4 54. 5 54. 7 55. 8 58. 1 61. 8 69. 1 74. 7 76. 7	41. 3 44. 2 48. 2 48. 2 48. 5 49. 4 57. 2 65. 5 72. 4 77. 4	80. 3 83. 6 85. 2
1950	83. 2 102. 1 92. 5 86. 3 87. 6 99. 2 100. 6 100. 2 100. 1	94. 1 102. 5 99. 5 99. 4 97. 6 102. 3 103. 8 98. 5 97. 4 104. 1	77. 1 91. 3 89. 0 88. 7 88. 8 91. 1 97. 2 99. 0 100. 1 101. 0	72. 7 80. 9 81. 0 83. 6 84. 3 90. 0 97. 8 99. 7 99. 1 101. 2	70. 5 78. 8 78. 9 80. 7 82. 1 84. 6 91. 5 97. 9 100. 0 102. 1	85. 6 92. 8 91. 1 92. 9 93. 9 94. 3 96. 9 99. 4 100. 2 100, 4	78. 6 83. 5 86. 9 88. 8 91. 3 95. 2 98. 9 99. 9	77. 0 81. 1 85. 8 85. 4 85. 6 88. 2 93. 2 97. 2 100. 3 102. 5	86. 6 91. 7 91. 2 93. 6 94. 4 94. 5 95. 8 98. 6 100. 6
1960	99. 9 96. 1 93. 3 93. 8 92. 5 92. 9 94. 8 96. 9 100. 3 102. 1	100. 4 95. 9 96. 5 98. 6 100. 6 101. 1 105. 6 105. 4 119. 3 132. 0	101. 8 98. 8 100. 0 99. 2 99. 0 99. 9 102. 6 103. 8 105. 2 108. 2	101. 3 100. 7 100. 0 100. 1 102. 8 105. 7 108. 3 109. 6 112. 4 118. 9	102. 9 102. 9 102. 9 103. 1 103. 8 105. 0 108. 2 111. 8 115. 2 119. 0	100. 1 99. 5 98. 8 98. 1 98. 5 98. 0 99. 1 101. 1 104. 0 106. 1	101. 4 101. 8 101. 8 101. 3 101. 5 101. 7 102. 6 104. 3 108. 1 112. 8	101. 0 100. 8 100. 8 100. 0 100. 5 100. 7 100. 8 102. 2 104. 9 107. 0	101. 7 102. 0 102. 4 103. 3 104. 1 104. 8 106. 8 109. 3 111. 8
1968; Jan	99. 5 99. 5 99. 7 99. 7 99. 8 99. 9	108. 6 111. 6 113. 9 115. 8 117. 0 117. 2	105. 2 105. 7 105. 2 105. 2 105. 5 104. 7	112. 2 113. 3 113. 8 113. 3 111. 7 111. 7	113.9 114.1 114.3 114.8 115.0 115.0	103.0 103.3 103.6 103.8 104.0 103.9	106. 0 106. 9 107. 3 107. 4 107. 8 108. 3	104. 3 104. 3 104. 3 104. 3 104. 2 104. 5	111.0 111.3 111.5 111.8 111.8
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	100. 7 100. 6 100. 7 101. 0 101. 1 101. 1	119. 2 120. 5 122. 6 124. 9 126. 8 133. 5	104. 9 104. 9 105. 1 105. 2 105. 2 105. 2	111. 4 111. 3 112. 2 112. 5 112. 4 112. 8	115. 2 115. 4 115. 8 116. 1 116. 6 116. 7	104. 1 104. 2 104. 4 104. 5 104. 7 105. 0	108. 4 108. 7 108. 7 108. 9 109. 2 109. 3	104. 2 104. 4 104. 1 106. 5 106. 6 106. 6	111, 5 111, 6 111, 9 112, 0 112, 5 112, 5
1969: Jan	100, 0 100, 5 100, 9 101, 2 101, 1 101, 2	137. 8 144. 5 149. 5 143. 3 138. 0 129. 8	106. 2 106. 8 107. 4 108. 0 108. 1 108. 3	114. 4 115. 2 115. 8 116. 5 117. 5 117. 9	117. 0 117. 3 117. 8 118. 0 118. 3 118. 6	105. 3 105. 4 105. 7 105. 8 105. 9 105. 9	110, 6 111, 2 111, 9 112, 3 112, 6 112, 8	106. 5 106. 4 106. 3 106. 4 106. 5 106. 6	112, 5 112, 5 112, 5 112, 7 112, 8 115, 1
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	102, 5 103, 0 102, 7 103, 5 104, 4 104, 5	125, 3 124, 0 123, 2 122, 6 123, 9 122, 5	108, 4 108, 7 108, 8 109, 0 109, 3 109, 5	118, 7 120, 4 121, 7 122, 4 122, 9 123, 8	119. 0 119. 1 119. 9 120. 5 121. 0 121. 9	106. 1 106. 2 106. 4 106. 5 106. 9 107. 2	113. 0 113. 0 113. 5 113. 8 113. 9	106. 6 106. 0 106. 1 108. 7 109. 0 109. 0	115. 5 115. 9 116. 4 116. 7 117. 0

¹ Index for total transportation equipment available only beginning December 1968.

TABLE C-49.—Wholesale price indexes, by stage of processing, 1947-69 [1957-59=100]

			-			Inte	rmediat	e materia	ıls, suppl	ies, and	compone	nts ‡
	Alı		Crude n	naterials			W	laterials ma	and com inufactur	ponents fing	or	Mate-
Year or month	com- modi- ties		Food-	Non-		Total			Materials	3		rials and com-
	lies	Total	stuffs and feed- stuffs	food mate- rials, except fuel	Fuel	Total	Total	For food manu- factur- ing	Fornon- durable manu- factur- ing	For durable manu- factur- ing	Com- ponents	ponents for con- struc- tion
1947 1948 1949	81. 2 87. 9 83. 5	100, 8 110, 5 95, 6	113.0 122.2 101.5	86. 5 96. 2 87. 5	73. 6 87. 0 86. 5	76. 5 82. 7 79. 4	75. 5 81. 5 78. 0	102.6 105.8 91.0	94. 0 99. 5 90. 7	58. 8 66. 4 68. 2	63. 0 68. 0 69. 3	69. 6 77. 0 77. 2
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	86. 8 96. 7 94. 0 92. 7 92. 9	104. 2 119. 6 109. 9 101. 5 100. 6	108. 9 126. 0 118. 6 106. 2 106. 2	100. 0 115. 3 99. 9 95. 6 93. 8	86. 1 87. 7 88. 3 91. 4 87. 3	83. 0 93. 0 90. 3 90. 8 91. 3	81. 8 92. 7 88. 8 90. 2 90. 4	94. 7 105. 5 101. 4 101. 6 100. 7	95. 2 110. 3 99. 3 98. 5 96. 9	72. 1 80. 1 80. 3 83. 9 85. 7	71. 9 81. 6 81. 8 85. 3 83. 7	81. 2 88. 8 88. 2 89. 7 90. 1
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	93. 2 96. 2 99. 0 100. 4 100. 6	96. 7 97. 2 99. 4 101. 6 99. 0	96. 2 94. 2 98. 4 104. 2 97. 4	99. 1 102. 8 101. 4 97. 6 101. 0	87. 1 93. 3 98. 6 99. 8 101. 6	93. 0 97. 1 99. 4 99. 6 101. 0	92. 6 96. 9 99. 3 99. 7 101. 0	97. 5 97. 9 99. 7 102. 0 98. 3	97. 3 98. 8 100. 1 99. 1 100. 8	90. 0 95. 7 98. 8 99. 5 101. 8	87. 4 95. 4 99. 1 99. 9 101. 1	93. 7 98. 5 99. 1 99. 1
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	100. 7 100. 3 100. 6 100. 3 100. 5	96. 6 96. 1 97. 1 95. 0 94. 1	96. 2 94. 9 96. 8 94. 0 91. 9	96. 8 97. 9 97. 4 96. 2 97. 8	102. 5 102. 3 101. 8 103. 0 102. 5	101. 0 100. 3 100. 2 100. 5 100. 9	101. 0 99. 8 99. 2 99. 4 100. 4	99. 5 102. 6 100. 5 105. 5 104. 0	100. 8 98. 6 98. 0 97. 1 97. 8	101. 9 100. 5 100. 4 100. 5 102. 5	100. 6 99. 6 98. 8 98. 8 99. 7	101. 1 99. 7 99. 3 99. 6
1965	102. 5 105. 9 106. 1 108. 7 113. 0	98. 9 105. 3 99. 6 101. 1 107. 9	98. 3 107. 2 101. 2 102. 5 110. 4	99. 8 101. 9 95. 5 97. 4 102. 0	103. 3 106. 4 110. 5 112. 7 117. 6	102. 2 104. 8 105. 6 108. 0 111. 8	102. 0 104. 0 104. 7 107. 1 110. 8	106.6 111.3 109.2 110.7 116.8	98. 7 99. 5 98. 7 100. 2 101. 2	104. 6 106. 6 108. 1 111. 7 118. 1	101.3 104.9 108.0 110.5 114.0	101. 4 104. 1 105. 4 110. 7
1968: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	108.0	99. 1 100. 9 101. 6 101. 4 102. 0 101. 4	99. 1 101. 8 102. 6 102. 9 104. 1 103. 2	98. 2 98. 4 98. 9 97. 6 96. 6 96. 7	111. 4 111. 7 112. 2 112. 3 112. 4 112. 2	106. 9 107. 6 107. 7 107. 9 107. 7 107. 8	106. 3 106. 9 107. 1 107. 2 106. 9 106. 8	108. 7 109. 9 109. 6 109. 7 110. 6 111. 3	99. 8 100. 1 99. 9 100. 0 100. 3 100. 0	110.9 112.0 112.7 112.3 110.9 110.9	109. 4 109. 9 110. 0 110. 6 110. 5 110. 3	107. 4 108. 5 109. 3 109. 8 109. 8
July	109. 1 108. 7 109. 1 109. 1 109. 6 109. 8	102.6 100.8 100.9 100.2 101.5 101.3	104. 9 102. 0 102. 1 101. 2 103. 2 102. 6	96. 8 97. 4 97. 7 97. 0 96. 8 97. 1	112.5 112.4 112.6 113.2 114.3 115.3	107. 9 107. 9 108. 3 108. 5 108. 6 109. 2	106. 9 106. 8 107. 3 107. 4 107. 6 107. 8	112. 0 111. 3 111. 6 110. 6 111. 3 111. 5	100. 0 100. 1 100. 4 100. 4 100. 5 100. 5	110. 9 110. 9 111. 9 112. 2 112. 1 112. 9	110. 4 110. 5 110. 6 111. 0 111. 3 111. 4	110. 4 110. 9 111. 7 112. 4 112. 9
1969: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	110. 7 111. 1 111. 7 111. 9 112. 8 113. 2	102. 8 103. 8 105. 2 105. 7 109. 7 111. 2	104. 5 105. 9 107. 6 107. 6 113. 5 115. 6	97. 9 98. 3 99. 5 101. 1 101. 8 102. 1	115. 7 115. 4 115. 8 116. 2 116. 4 116. 8	110.1 110.7 111.4 111.4 111.4	108. 5 109. 1 109. 6 109. 8 110. 2 110. 4	112.7 113.1 113.4 114.1 116.3 117.8	100. 5 100. 6 100. 7 100. 8 100. 9 101. 1	114.8 116.0 117.0 117.3 117.5 117.1	111. 5 111. 9 112. 4 112. 6 113. 1 113. 4	116.3 118.3 119.7 118.4 117.6
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	113. 3 113. 4 113. 6 114. 0 114. 7 115. 1	110. 2 109. 5 108. 7 108. 7 109. 0 109. 9	113. 8 112. 1 110. 4 110. 5 111. 0 112. 2	102.6 104.1 104.8 104.0 104.0 104.2	117. 1 117. 2 118. 1 119. 9 121. 1 121. 5	111. 4 111. 9 112. 4 112. 8 113. 1 113. 5	110.6 111.4 111.8 112.2 112.6 112.9	117. 8 118. 4 118. 3 119. 2 120. 0 119. 9	101. 2 101. 7 101. 7 101. 5 101. 7 101. 6	117. 4 118. 7 119. 6 120. 0 120. 4 121. 4	113. 9 114. 3 115. 1 116. 1 116. 7 117. 0	115. 4 115. 8 115. 8 116. 7 116. 8

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE C-49.—Wholesale price indexes, by stage of processing, 1947-69—Continued [1957-59=100]

			Finishe	d goods			Special	groups of in products	dustrial
Year or month	Total	Total	Foods	Other non- durable goods	Du- rable goods	Pro- ducer finished goods	Crude mate- rials ²	Inter- mediate materials, supplies, and com- ponents 3	Con- sumer finished goods ex- cluding foods
1947	80. 1	86. 1	90. 7	86. 5	75, 9	61. 8	79. 2	73. 4	83. 1
1948	86. 4	92. 6	99. 0	92. 0	81, 1	67. 4	92. 5	79. 8	88. 4
1949	84. 0	88. 3	91. 0	88. 2	83, 2	70. 7	84. 0	77. 8	86. 5
1950	85. 5	89. 8	92. 8	89. 6	84. 1	72. 4	93. 6	81. 4	87. 8
1951	93. 6	98. 2	104. 2	96. 5	89. 7	79. 5	102. 9	91. 2	94. 2
1952	93. 0	97. 0	103. 3	94. 1	90. 4	80. 8	93. 1	88. 3	92. 9
1953	92. 1	95. 4	97. 9	95. 0	91. 1	82. 1	92. 4	89. 4	93. 7
1954	92. 3	95. 3	97. 1	95. 3	91. 8	83. 1	88. 0	89. 8	94. 1
1955	92. 5	94. 7	94. 7	95. 8	92. 8	85. 6	96. 6	92. 5	94. 8
1956	95. 1	96. 1	94. 5	97. 7	95. 9	92. 0	102. 3	97. 0	97. 1
1957	98. 6	98. 9	97. 8	99. 9	98. 7	97. 7	100. 9	99. 6	99. 5
1958	100. 8	101. 0	103. 5	99. 3	100. 1	100. 2	96. 9	99. 4	99. 6
1959	100. 6	100. 1	98. 7	100. 8	101. 3	102. 1	102. 3	101. 0	100. 9
1960	101.4	101. 1	100. 8	101.5	100. 9	102.3	98. 3	101. 4	101.3
1961	101.4	100. 9	100. 4	101.5	100. 5	102.5	97. 2	100. 1	101.2
1962	101.7	101. 2	101. 3	101.6	100. 0	102.9	95. 6	99. 9	101.0
1963	101.4	100. 7	100. 1	101.9	99. 5	103.1	94. 3	99. 6	101.0
1964	101.8	100. 9	100. 6	101.6	99. 9	104.1	97. 1	100. 2	100.9
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	103.6 106.9 108.2 111.3 115.3	102. 8 106. 4 107. 0 109. 9 114. 0	104. 5 111. 2 109. 5 113. 4 120. 3	102. 8 104. 8 107. 2 109. 4 112. 3	99. 6 100. 2 101. 7 103. 9 105. 8	105. 4 108. 0 111. 6 115. 3 119. 3	100.9 104.5 100.0 101.8 110.5	101.5 103.6 104.8 107.5	101.7 103.2 105.2 107.4 109.9
1968; Jan	109. 7	108. 2	110.6	108. 0	103. 5	114. 0	101. 4	106. 3	106. 4
Feb	110. 2	108. 9	112.0	108. 4	103. 5	114. 2	102. 4	107. 0	106. 7
Mar	110. 4	109. 0	111.9	108. 6	103. 6	114. 4	103. 1	107. 3	106. 8
Apr	110. 5	109. 0	111.7	109. 0	103. 5	-114. 8	101. 7	107. 5	107. 0
May	110. 9	109. 5	113.0	109. 1	103. 5	114. 9	100. 5	107. 3	107. 0
June	111. 3	110. 0	113.6	109. 8	103. 5	115. 1	100. 6	107. 2	107. 5
July	111. 9 111. 4 112. 0 112. 0 112. 5 112. 6	110.7 110.0 110.7 110.6 111.0	115. 3 113. 7 115. 6 113. 9 114. 8 115. 2	110, 0 109, 7 109, 9 110, 0 110, 2 110, 2	103. 3 103. 6 103. 4 104. 9 105. 0 105. 0	115. 2 115. 4 115. 7 116. 4 116. 9 117. 1	100. 9 101. 0 101. 5 102. 2 103. 0 103. 8	107. 3 107. 4 107. 8 108. 1 108. 2 108. 8	107. 5 107. 5 107. 5 108. 2 108. 4 108. 3
1969: Jan	113. 2	111. 8	116. 8	110. 4	105. 1	117. 6	105. 0	109.7	108. 4
Feb	113. 3	111. 7	116. 4	110. 7	105. 1	117. 8	105. 5	110.4	108. 7
Mar	113. 7	112. 2	117. 1	111. 2	105. 3	118. 0	107. 2	111.1	109. 0
Apr	113. 8	112. 3	116. 9	111. 5	105. 4	118. 1	109. 0	111.0	109. 2
May	114. 7	113. 5	120. 1	111. 4	105. 4	118. 5	109. 7	111.1	109. 2
June	115. 4	114. 2	121. 3	112. 2	105. 5	118. 7	110. 2	110.8	109. 7
July	115. 9	114. 8	122. 3	112.6	105. 6	119. 3	110. 7	110. 9	110. 0
Aug	115. 7	114. 4	121. 2	113.0	105. 2	119. 3	112. 5	111. 3	110. 1
Sept	116. 0	114. 7	121. 6	113.3	105. 3	119. 9	113. 9	111. 8	110. 3
Oct	116. 5	115. 1	121. 2	113.6	106. 9	120. 8	113. 7	112. 2	111. 1
Nov	117. 6	116. 2	123. 9	113.8	107. 1	121. 5	114. 1	112. 6	111. 3
Dec	118. 0	116. 5	124. 5	114.1	107. 2	122. 3	114. 5	112. 9	111. 5

Includes, in addition to subgroups shown, processed fuels and lubricants, containers, and supplies.
 Excludes crude foodstuffs and feedstuffs, plant and animal fibers, oilseeds, and leaf tobacco.
 Excludes intermediate materials for food manufacturing and manufactured animal feeds.

Note.—For a listing of the commodities included in each sector, see monthly report "Wholesale Prices and Price Indexes," January-February 1967.

MONEY SUPPLY, CREDIT, AND FINANCE

Table C-50.—Money supply, 1947-69

[Averages of daily figures, billions of dollars]

	Total money	Mc	ney sup	ply	Time	Total money	Mo	ney sup	ply	Time	U.S. Gov-
Year and month	supply and time depos- its ad- justed	Total	Cur- rency com- po- nent 1	De- mand dèposit com- ponent 2	Time de- posits ad- just- ed ³	supply and time depos- its ad- justed	Total	Cur- rency com- po- nent 1	De- mand deposit com- ponent ²	Time de- posits ad- just- ed 3	ern- ment de- mand de- pos- its 4
		Season	ally adj	usted				Unadj	usted		<u> </u>
1947: Dec 1948: Dec 1949: Dec	148. 5 147. 6 147. 6	113. 1 111. 5 111. 2	26. 4 25. 8 25. 1	86. 7 85. 8 86. 0	35. 4 36. 0 36. 4	151.1 150.0 150.0	115. 9 114. 3 113. 9	26. 8 26. 2 25. 5	89. 1 88. 1 88. 4	35. 1 35. 7 36. 1	1. 0 1. 8 2. 8
1950: Dec	152. 9 160. 8 168. 6 173. 3 180. 6	116. 2 122. 7 127. 4 128. 8 132. 3	25. 0 26. 1 27. 3 27. 7 27. 4	91. 2 96. 5 100. 1 101. 1 104. 9	36. 7 38. 2 41. 1 44. 5 48. 3	155. 6 163. 8 171. 7 176. 4 183. 6	119. 2 125. 8 130. 8 132. 1 135. 6	25. 4 26. 6 27. 8 28. 2 27. 9	93. 8 99. 2 103. 0 103. 9 107. 7	36. 4 38. 0 40. 9 44. 2 48. 0	2.4 2.7 4.9 3.8 5.0
1955: Dec	185. 2 188. 8 193. 3 206. 6 209. 3	135. 2 136. 9 135. 9 141. 1 141. 9	27. 8 28. 2 28. 3 28. 6 28. 9	107. 4 108. 7 107. 6 112. 6 113. 1	50. 0 51. 9 57. 4 65. 4 67. 4	188. 2 191. 7 196. 0 209. 3 212. 2	138. 6 140. 3 139. 3 144. 7 145. 6	28. 4 28. 8 28. 9 29. 2 29. 5	110, 2 111, 5 110, 4 115, 5 116, 1	49. 6 51. 4 56. 7 64. 6 66. 6	3. 4 3. 4 3. 5 3. 9 4. 9
960: Dec 961: Dec 962: Dec 963: Dec 964: Dec	213. 9 228. 1 245. 2 265. 2 285. 9	141. 1 145. 4 147. 4 153. 0 159. 3	28. 9 29. 6 30. 6 32. 5 34. 2	112. 1 115. 9 116. 8 120. 5 125. 1	72. 9 82. 7 97. 8 112. 2 126. 6	216. 8 231. 2 248. 2 268. 2 289. 2	144. 7 149. 4 151. 6 157. 3 164. 0	29. 6 30. 2 31. 2 33. 1 35. 0	115. 2 119. 2 120. 3 124. 1 129. 1	72.1 81.8 96.7 111.0 125.2	4. 7 4. 9 5. 6 5. 1 5. 5
1965: Dec	313. 4 328. 9 365. 4 399. 7 393. 8	166. 7 170. 4 181. 7 194. 8 199. 7	36. 3 38. 3 40. 4 43. 4 46. 0	132.1 141.3 151.4	146. 7 158. 5 183. 7 201. 9 194. 1	317. 3 332. 7 369. 5 404. 1 398. 4	172. 0 175. 8 187. 5 201. 0 206. 0	37. 1 39. 1 41. 2 44. 3 47. 0	146, 2 156, 7	145. 2 156. 9 182. 0 203. 1 192. 4	4. 6 3. 4 5. 0 5. 0 5. 5
1968: Jan	366. 7 369. 1 371. 5 372. 8 375. 1 376. 9	182. 6 183. 3 184. 2 185. 1 186. 8 188. 2	40.6 40.7 41.1 41.3 41.6 41.9	142. 0 142. 6 143. 2 143. 8 145. 3 146. 3	184. 1 185. 8 187. 2 187. 7 188. 2 188. 6	371. 8 367. 7 370. 3 374. 2 371. 8 375. 2	188. 1 181. 9 182. 6 186. 1 183. 2 186. 4	40.5 40.3 40.7 41.0 41.3 41.8	147.5 141.6 141.9 145.1 141.9 144.6	183. 8 185. 8 187. 8 188. 0 188. 6 188. 8	5, 0 7, 2 6, 7 4, 3 6, 5
JulyAugSeptOctNovDec	380. 7 384. 8 387. 8 391. 3 395. 7 399. 7	189. 6 191. 0 191. 4 191. 8 193. 6 194. 8	42. 1 42. 4 42. 7 42. 8 43. 2 43. 4	147. 5 148. 6 148. 8 149. 1 150. 5	191. 1 193. 8 196. 4 199. 4 202. 1 204. 9	379. 3 382. 7 386. 7 391. 6 396. 5 404. 1	188. 1 188. 0 190. 1 192. 0 195. 3 201. 0	42.3 42.5 42.7 42.8 43.6 44.3	145. 9 145. 5 147. 4 149. 2 151. 7 156. 7	191. 1 194. 7 196. 6 199. 6 201. 3 203. 1	5. 8 5. 6 6. 1 6. 3 4. 5
1969: Jan	399. 0 398. 7 399. 1 400. 4 400. 0 399. 8	195. 8 196. 3 196. 8 198. 1 198. 3 199. 0	43. 5 43. 8 44. 1 44. 2 44. 5 44. 8	152. 3 152. 5 152. 6 154. 0 153. 8 154. 2	203. 2 202. 4 202. 3 202. 3 201. 7 200. 8	404. 5 397. 2 397. 9 401. 9 396. 6 398. 0	201.7 194.8 195.0 199.2 194.4 197.0	43. 5 43. 4 43. 7 43. 8 44. 2 44. 7	158. 2 151. 4 151. 3 155. 3 150. 3 152. 3	202. 8 202. 4 202. 9 202. 7 202. 2 201. 0	4. 9 6. 9 4. 8 5. 4 9. 2 6. 0
July	397. 0 393. 5 393. 1 392. 6 392. 7 393. 8	199. 3 199. 0 199. 0 199. 1 199. 3 199. 7	45. 0 45. 3 45. 2 45. 6 45. 9 46. 0	154. 4 153. 8 153. 7 153. 6 153. 4	197. 7 194. 5 194. 1 193. 5 193. 4 194. 1	395. 5 391. 4 391. 9 393. 0 393. 6 398. 4	197. 8 195. 9 197. 6 199. 3 201. 0 20à. 0	45. 2 45. 4 45. 2 45. 6 46. 4 47. 0	152. 7 150. 5 152. 4 153. 7 154. 7 159. 1	197. 7 195. 5 194. 3 193. 7 192. 6 192. 4	5. 6 4. 3 5. 3 4. 2 5. 1 5. 5

¹ Currency outside the Treasury, the Federal Reserve System, and the vaults of all commercial banks.

² Demand deposits at all commercial banks, other than those due to domestic commercial banks and the U.S. Government, less cash items in process of collection and Federal Reserve float, plus foreign demand balances at Federal Reserve

Time deposits adjusted are time deposits at all commercial banks other than those due to domestic commercial banks and the U.S. Government.
 Deposits at all commercial banks.

Note.—Effective June 1966, balances accumulated for payment of personal loans are reclassified for reserve purposes and are excluded from time deposits reported by member banks. The estimated amount of such deposits at all commercial banks (\$1.1 billion) is excluded from time deposits adjusted thereafter.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

TABLE C-51.—Bank loans and investments, 1930-69 [Billions of dollars]

İ		All comme	rcial banks	Weekly re- porting larg	
End of year or month 1	Total loans		Investr	nents	commercial banks ³
	and invest- ments 2	Loans 2	U.S. Govern- ment securities	Other securities	Business Ioan
0 June	48. 9	34. 5 29. 2 21. 8 16. 3 15. 7	5. 0	9. 4	
1 June	44.9	29. 2	6.0	9. 7 8. 1 6. 5 6. 7	
2 June	36. 1 30. 4	16.3	6. 2 7. 5 10. 3	6.5	
4 June	32.7	15.7	10.3	6. 7	
5	36.1	15, 2	13.8	7.1	
<u>6</u>	39.6	16. 4	15.3	7. 9	
7	38. 4	17. 2	14.2	7.0	
8 9	38. 7 40. 7	16. 4 17. 2	15. 1 16. 3	7. 2 7. 1	
10	43.9	18. 8	17.8	7.4	
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	50.7	21.7	21.8	7. 2	}
2	67. 4	19. 2	41.4	6.8	ļ ē
13	85. 1	19. 1	59.8	6.1	1 (
4	105.5	21.6	77.6	6.3	1
5	124.0	26. 1	90.6	6. 3 7. 3 8. 1	1
6	114.0	31.1	74. 8 69. 2	8.1	1 1
8	116.3 114.2	38. 1 42. 4	69. 2 62. 6	9. 0 9. 2	i
			ly adjusted		
18_ 	113.0	41.5 42.0	62.3	9. 2	15
!9	118.7		66. 4	10. 3	1.
50	124. 7 130. 2	51. 1	61.1	12.4	1 2
ili2	130. 2	56. 5 62. 8	60. 4 62. 2	13. 4 14. 2	2
%	143.1	66.2	62.2	14.7)
3	153.1	66. 2 69. 1	62. 2 67. 6	16. 4	2 2
)5 <u></u>	157.6	80.6	60. 3 57. 2	16.8	2
6 	161.6	88. 1	57. 2	16. 3	3
57	166. 4 181. 2	91.5	56.9	17. 9 20. 5	3
58 59	185.9	95. 6 107. 8	65. 1 57. 7	20. 5 20. 5	3
30	194. 5	113.8	59.8	20. 3	3
51	209.6	120. 4	65.3	23.9	3
52 	227.9	134. 0	64.6	29. 2	3
53 . 	246.2	149. 6	61.7	35.0	3
<u> </u>	267. 2	167. 7	60.7	38.7	4
55	294. 4 5 310. 5	192. 6 5 208. 2	57.1	44. 8 3 48. 7	3 5
66 57	346.5	° 208. 2 225. 4	53. 6 59. 7	61.4	6
88	384.6	251.6	61.5	71.5	}
68 69 P	398.6	251. 6 276. 2	51.8	70. 5	1 8
68: Jan	349.9	227, 5	60.0	62. 4 62. 7	6
Feb	353.9 352.5	229, 2	62. 0 59. 9	62. 7	9
Mar	352.5	229.0	59.9	63. 6 63. 4	6
Apr	355. 2 357. 3	231. 4 232. 6	60.3 61.0	63.4	6
June		232. 5	60.4	63.9	ě
luly	365.9	238. 4	63.1	64.4	\ 6
Aug	370.4	241.1	63.9	64. 4 65. 5	6
Aug Sept Oct	374.6	243.6	64.0	67.0	6
Uct	379. 4 381. 6	246. 7	64.2	68. 5 70. 2	5
Nov Dec	384.6	250. 4 251. 6	61.0 61.5	70. 2 71. 5	1 5
69: Jan		253. 7	60.8	71. 4	1 3
Feb	387.9	258.4	58. 1	71. 5	} 7
Mar	386.6	258. 4 257. 3	57.4	71.9	1 7
Apr	390.7	261.0	57. 7	72. 1	
May	392. 2	264. 1	56. 1	72. 0 72. 0	
June	392.5	264.3 6 269.2	56. 2 6 56. 3	72. U 6 71. 8	1 '
June					
July	397. 7 397. 5	269.9	56. 8 56. 9	71. 0 70. 3	
AUV	39/.5	270, 3	54. 7	70. 3 70. 5	1 :
Sent	306 5				
July	396. 5 396. 8	271.3 273.3	53. 4	70. 3	

¹ Data are for last Wednesday of month (except June 30 and December 31 call dates used for all commercial banks).
2 Adjusted to exclude interbank loans beginning 1948.
3 Loans by weekly reporting large commercial banks beginning 1965 and formerly weekly reporting member banks.
4 Commercial and industrial loans and prior to 1956, agricultural loans. Beginning July 1959, loans to financial institutions excluded. Prior to 1943, published data adjusted to include open-market paper.
5 Effective June 1966, balances accumulated for payment of personal loans (about \$1.1 billion) are excluded from loans at all commercial banks, and certain certificates of CCC and Export-Import Bank totaling about \$1 billion are included in other securities rather than in loans.
6 New series beginning June 1969; for details see "Federal Reserve Bulletin", August 1969.

TABLE C-52.—Total funds raised in credit markets by nonfinancial sectors, 1961-69
[Billions of dollars]

Nonfinancial sector	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
Total funds raised	46. 9	54. 1	57. 7	66. 9	70. 4	68. 5	82.6	97. 4
U.S. Government	7. 2	7.0	4.0	6.4	1.7	3.5	13, 0	13. 4
Public debt securities Budget agency issues	6. 7 . 6	6, 2 . 8	4. 1 1	5. 4 1. 0	1.3 .4	2. 3 1. 2	8. 9 4. 1	10.3 3.0
All other sectors	39.6	47.1	53. 7	60, 5	68. 7	64. 9	69.6	84. 1
Capital market instruments	31.9	33.1	35, 7	37.9	39. 1	39. 9	48.0	50. 5
Corporate equity shares Debt capital instruments	2. 8 29. 1	. 6 32. 6	2 35. 9	1.6 36.3	. 3 38. 8	. 9 39, 0	2. 4 45. 7	7 51. 2
State and local govern- ments Corporate and foreign	5. 2	5. 3	5.9	5. 7	7.3	5, 7	7.7	9.9
bonds Mortgages	5, 1 18, 8	5. 5 21. 7	4. 9 25. 1	4. 5 26. 1	5. 9 25, 6	11. 0 22. 3	15.9 22.0	14. 0 27. 3
Home Other residential Commercial Farm	11.1 2.6 4.0 1.1	12.8 2.8 4.8 1.3	15. 1 3. 2 5. 1 1. 6	15.6 4.5 3.8 2.1	15. 4 3. 6 4. 4 2. 2	11. 4 3. 1 5. 7 2. 1	11.6 3.6 4.7 2.1	15. 2 3. 5 6. 6 2. 1
Other private credit	7.7	14.0	18.0	22.6	2 9 . 5	25, 0	21.6	33.6
Bank loans n.e.c	2.9 1.8 1.0 2.0	5. 2 5. 8 . 1 2. 8	6. 0 7. 9 * 4. 1	8.3 8.5 .7 5.1	14.2 10.0 3 5.7	10, 3 7, 2 1, 0 6, 4	9. 6 4. 6 2. 1 5. 2	13. 4 11. 1 1. 6 7. 5
Total funds supplied directly	46. 9	54.1	57.7	66. 9	70, 4	68, 5	82.6	97.4
U.S. Government U.S. Government credit agencies, net_	1.6 .4	2. 0 . 1	1.5 .1	2. 8 . 4	2.8	4. 9 . 3	4. 6 . 5	5. 2 2
Funds advanced Less funds raised	1.0 .7	1.6 1.5	1.6 1.4	. 7 . 4	2. 2 2. 3	5. 1 4. 8	-: 1 -: 6	3, 2 3, 5
Federal Reserve System Commercial banks, net Private nonbank finance	1. 5 15. 7 23. 8	2. 0 19. 5 26. 6	2. 9 19. 1 29. 9	3. 4 21. 8 31. 0	3. 8 28. 3 30. 1	3. 5 16. 7 25. 9	4. 8 36. 8 36. 1	3, 7 39, 0 33, 5
Savings institutions, net Insurance Finance n.e.c., net	10. 9 13. 1 2	12. 9 14. 4 7	15. 5 14. 3 . 1	16. 0 15. 6 —. 5	13. 7 17. 9 -1. 4	7.8 19.3 -1.3	16. 9 20. 4 -1. 2	14. 5 21. 5 -2. 5
Funds advancedLess funds raised	3. 3 3. 5	4. 6 5. 3	5. 8 5. 8	5. 5 6. 1	6. 9 8. 3	5. 8 7. 1	4. 4 5. 6	9.8 12.3
Foreign	.8	1.5	.9	.6	3	-1.8	2.8	2. 5
Private domestic nonfinancial	3.1	2.4	3. 4	7.0	5. 6	19. 1	-3.0	13, 8
Business State and local government,	.5	1.8	2. 9	2.0	1.0	3. 6	•	9 . 0
general funds	3.0 1.3	1.2 8 2	1. 1 1. 3 2. 0	4.0 2	2. 5 2. 5 . 3	3. 4 11. 9 2	-2.0 2.2	. 7 5. 5 1. 4

See footnote at end of table.

TABLE C-52.—Total funds raised in credit markets by nonfinancial sectors, 1961-69—Continued
[Billions of dollars]

Nonfinancial sector	1969 un	adjusted Iy totals		1969 se a	asonally a nnual rat	adjusted es
	1	11	111	I	П	111
Total funds raised	17.0	23.0	20. 8	96. 3	88. 8	100. 9
U.S. Government	.2	-10.9	3.4	4	18.7	15, 1
Public debt securities		-11.6 .8	4.6 -1.2	4 1	-22.5 3.8	19.2 -4.1
All other sectors	16.8	33.9	17. 5	96. 7	107. 5	85. 8
Capital market instruments	12.4	15. 4	12.7	56, 1	55. 9	48. 1
Corporate equity shares Debt capital instruments		15. 0	12. 4	56. 0	1. 7 54. 2	1. 0 47. 2
State and local governments Corporate and foreign bonds Mortgages	3, 8	3. 4 3. 9 7. 6	1. 6 3. 6 7. 2	11.5 16.3 28.2	11. 5 14. 7 28. 0	6. 8 13. 1 27. 2
Home_ Other residential Commercial Farm	1.3	4.3 1.1 1.4 .7	4. 4 1. 0 1. 4 . 5	16. 3 3. 7 5. 9 2. 2	16. 2 4. 3 5. 1 2. 4	15. 9 3. 9 5. 3 2. 1
Other private credit	4. 4	18.5	4.8	40.6	51. 6	37. 6
Bank loans n.e.c. Consumer credit. Open-market paper Other.	-1.2 1.7	8. 3 4. 0 1. 5 4. 7	-1.5 1.6 1.4 3.3	15. 1 9. 9 5. 7 9. 8	17. 9 10. 4 5. 2 18. 1	5, 8 8, 2 5, 6 18, 0
Total funds supplied directly	17.0	23.0	20.8	96.3	88, 8	100.9
U.S. Government	1.2	1.4	1.7 2	5. 1 2	5. 9 -1. 1	7.3 6
Funds advanced Less funds raised	.9 .9	2.3 2.3	2. 5 2. 7	4. 8 5. 0	6.5 7.6	11. 8 12. 3
Federal Reserve System	—7.4	1.7 9.0 7.5	-4. 5 7. 6	4. 6 31. 6	2. 3 15. 3 35. 8	3. 5 2 30. 7
Savings institutions, net Insurance Finance, n.e.c., net	5,5	3.0 4.6	1.7 6.2 3	16.3 20.8 -5.5	16. 2 21. 0 -1. 4	6. 4 24. 5 —. 2
Funds advanced Less funds raised	-2.3 -1.0	5. 6 5. 6	1. 6 1. 9	-6.7 -1.2	17. 1 18. 5	15. 7 15. 8
Foreign	3	1	1.8	1	.4	5.7
Private domestic nonfinancial	15. 2	3.5	14.4	55. 2	30. 2	54. 4
Business. State and local government, general funds. Households. Less net security credit.	3.5 7.3	3.4 2.2 -2.2 1	3.8 3 11.3 .3	21. 2 9. 3 21. 8 -2. 8	15. 9 6. 9 6. 8 —. 6	22. 3 4. 5 29. 1 1. 5

TABLE C-53.—Selected liquid assets held by the public, 1946-69 1 [Billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted]

		D	Time d	eposits		0	U.S.	U.S. Govern-
End of year or month	Total	Demand deposits and currency ²	Com- mercial banks ³	Mutual savings banks	Postal savings system	Savings and loan shares	Govern- ment savings bonds 4	ment securities maturing within 1 year 4
1946 1947 1948 1949	239. 1 246. 2 254. 1 262. 1	108. 5 112. 4 110. 5 110. 4	33. 9 35. 3 35. 9 36. 3	16. 9 17. 8 18. 4 19. 3	3. 3 3. 4 3. 3 3. 2	8. 5 9. 7 11. 0 12. 5	48. 6 50. 9 53. 4 55. 0	19. 4 16. 6 21. 6 25. 5
1950	271. 4 281. 0 296. 0 311. 5 320. 3	115. 5 120. 9 125. 5 127. 3 130. 2	36. 6 38. 2 41. 2 44. 6 48. 2	20, 1 20, 9 22, 6 24, 4 26, 3	2. 9 2. 7 2. 5 2. 4 2. 1	14. 0 16. 1 19. 2 22. 8 27. 2	55. 8 55. 4 55. 7 55. 6 55. 6	26. 4 26. 8 29. 3 34. 4 30. 6
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	332, 5 343, 2 356, 0 373, 1 393, 9	133. 3 134. 6 133. 5 138. 8 139. 7	49. 7 52. 0 57. 5 65. 4 67. 4	28. 1 30. 0 31. 6 33. 9 34. 9	1.9 1.6 1.3 1.1	32. 0 37. 0 41. 7 47. 7 54. 3	55. 9 54. 8 51. 6 50. 5 47. 9	31, 6 33, 2 38, 8 35, 6 48, 8
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	399. 2 424. 6 459. 0 495. 4 530. 5	138, 4 142, 6 144, 8 149, 6 156, 7	73. 1 82. 5 98. 1 112. 9 127. 1	36. 2 38. 3 41. 4 44. 5 49. 0	.8 .6 .5 .5	61. 8 70. 5 79. 8 90. 9 101. 4	47. 0 47. 4 47. 6 49. 0 49. 9	41. 9 42. 6 46. 8 48. 1 46. I
1965	573. 1 601. 5 650. 4 709. 6 729. 0	164. 1 168. 6 180. 7 6 199. 2 206. 2	147. 1 159. 3 183. 1 203. 8 195. 9	52. 6 55. 2 60. 3 64. 7 67. 1	.3	109, 8 113, 4 123, 9 131, 0 134, 7	50. 5 50. 9 51. 9 52. 5 52. 4	48. 6 53. 9 50. 5 58. 5 72. 7
968: Jan	655. 8 658. 6 665. 6 664. 6 667. 8 670. 8	179. 6 178. 2 181. 7 181. 1 183. 9 186. 7	186. 5 187. 6 187. 9 187. 6 187. 7 187. 9	60. 6 61. 1 61. 4 61. 7 62. 1 62. 6		123. 6 124. 6 125. 8 125. 9 126. 4 126. 8	51. 9 51. 8 51. 8 51. 8 51. 8 51. 9	53. 6 55. 4 57. 0 56. 5 55. 9 54. 9
July	676. 5 679. 6 684. 9 693. 1 699. 4 709. 6	186. 2 185. 9 186. 4 188. 0 190. 6 6 199. 2	191. 5 194. 0 196. 2 200. 4 204. 7 203. 8	62. 8 63. 0 63. 4 63. 8 64. 3 64. 7		127. 2 128. 1 129. 5 130. 0 130. 8 131. 0	51. 9 52. 0 52. 0 52. 0 52. 1 52. 5	56. 9 56. 6 57. 4 58. 9 57. 0 58. 5
1969: Jan	7703.7 705.7 713.2 710.0 714.3 713.8	188. 8 189. 8 192. 4 190. 8 191. 5 194. 1	203. 4 202. 9 201. 9 200. 6 202. 7 200. 4	64. 8 65. 2 65. 5 65. 7 66. 1 66. 3		131. 0 132. 0 133. 4 133. 3 133. 5 133. 6	52. 5 52. 3 52. 2 52. 2 52. 2 52. 2	⁷ 63. 4 63. 4 67. 7 67. 5 68. 3 67. 3
July	² 709. 5 713. 1 718. 0 714. 3 720. 6 729. 0	² 191. 8 193. 2 194. 1 193. 6 195. 0 206. 2	197. 5 195. 7 195. 6 195. 4 197. 1 195. 9	66. 3 66. 4 66. 6 66. 7 67. 0 67. 1		133. 6 134. 1 135. 3 134. 9 135. 3 134. 7	52. 2 52. 1 52. 0 52. 0 52. 0 52. 4	68. 1 71. 6 74. 6 71. 7 74. 2 72. 7

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (except as noted).

¹ Excludes holdings of the U.S. Government, Government agencies and trust funds, domestic commercial banks, and Federal Reserve banks. Adjusted wherever possible to avoid double counting.
2 Agrees in concept with the money supply, Table C-50, except for deduction of demand deposits held by mutual savings banks and savings and loan associations. Data are for last Wednesday of month. Data prior to July 1969 have not been revised to conform to the money supply revision.
3 Time deposits at all commercial banks other than those due to domestic commercial banks and the U.S. Government (same concept as in Table C-50). Data are for last Wednesday of month, except that June 30 and December 31 call data are used where available.
4 Excludes holdings of Government agencies and trust funds, domestic commercial and mutual savings banks, Federal Reserve banks, and beginning February 1960, savings and loan associations.
5 Effective June 1966, balances accumulated for the payment of personal loans (about \$1.1 billion) are excluded from time deposits at all commercial banks and from total liquid assets.
6 Estimates for Tuesday, December 31, rather than last Wednesday of December.
7 Beginning 1969, data have been adjusted to conform to the new budget concept.

Table C-54.—Federal Reserve Bank credit and member bank reserves, 1929-69

[Averages of daily figures, millions of dollars]

	Rese	erve Bank cr	edit outstand	ling	Memb	er bank res	erves	Member bank free
Year and month	Total	U.S. Govern- ment se- curities	Member bank borrow- ings	All other, mainly float	Total	Re- quired	Excess	reserves (excess reserves less bor- rowings)
1929: Dec	1,643	446	801	396	2, 395	2, 347	48	—753
1930: Dec	1, 273 1, 950 2, 192 2, 669 2, 472 2, 494 2, 498 2, 628 2, 618 2, 612	644 777 1, 854 2, 432 2, 430 2, 430 2, 434 2, 565 2, 564 2, 510	337 763 281 95 10 6 7 16	292 410 57 142 32 58 57 47 47 99	2, 415 2, 069 2, 435 2, 588 4, 037 5, 716 6, 665 6, 879 8, 745 11, 473	2, 342 2, 010 1, 909 1, 822 2, 290 2, 733 4, 619 5, 808 5, 520 6, 462	73 60 526 1 766 1,748 2,983 2,046 1,071 3,226 5,011	-264 -703 245 671 1,738 2,977 2,039 1,055 3,219 5,008
1940: Dec	2, 305	2, 188	3	114	14, 049	7, 403	6, 646	6, 643
	2, 404	2, 219	5	180	12, 812	9, 422	3, 390	3, 385
	6, 035	5, 549	4	482	13, 152	10, 776	2, 376	2, 372
	11, 914	11, 166	90	658	12, 749	11, 701	1, 048	958
	19, 612	18, 693	265	654	14, 168	12, 884	1, 284	1, 019
	24, 744	23, 708	334	702	16, 027	14, 536	1, 491	1, 157
	24, 746	23, 767	157	822	16, 517	15, 617	900	743
	22, 858	21, 905	224	729	17, 261	16, 275	986	762
	23, 978	23, 002	134	842	19, 990	19, 193	797	663
	19, 012	18, 287	118	607	16, 291	15, 488	803	685
1950: Dec	21, 606	20, 345	142	1, 119	17, 391	16, 364	1, 027	885
	25, 446	23, 409	657	1, 380	20, 310	19, 484	826	169
	27, 299	24, 400	1,593	1, 306	21, 180	20, 457	723	—870
	27, 107	25, 639	441	1, 027	19, 920	19, 227	693	252
	26, 317	24, 917	246	1, 154	19, 279	18, 576	703	457
	26, 853	24, 602	839	1, 412	19, 240	18, 646	594	—245
	27, 156	24, 765	688	1, 703	19, 535	18, 883	652	—33
	26, 186	23, 982	710	1, 494	19, 420	18, 883	577	—133
	28, 412	26, 312	557	1, 543	18, 899	18, 383	516	—41
	29, 435	27, 036	906	1, 493	2 18, 932	18, 450	482	—424
1960: Dec	29, 060 31, 217 33, 218 36, 610 39, 873 43, 853 46, 864 51, 268 56, 610 64, 083	27, 248 29, 098 30, 546 33, 729 37, 126 40, 885 43, 760 48, 891 52, 529 57, 500	87 149 304 327 243 454 557 238 765 1,087	1, 725 1, 970 2, 368 2, 554 2, 504 2, 514 2, 547 2, 139 3, 316 5, 496	19, 283 20, 118 20, 040 20, 746 21, 609 22, 719 23, 830 25, 260 27, 221 28, 012	18, 527 19, 550 19, 468 20, 210 21, 198 22, 267 23, 438 24, 915 26, 766 27, 774	756 568 572 536 411 452 392 345 455 238	669 419 268 209 168
1968: Jan	51, 287	49, 046	237	2,004	25, 834	25, 453	381	144
	50, 873	48, 930	361	1,582	25, 610	25, 211	399	38
	51, 863	49, 511	671	1,681	25, 580	25, 224	356	-315
	52, 509	50, 090	683	1,736	25, 546	25, 276	270	-413
	52, 998	50, 581	746	1,671	25, 505	25, 085	420	-326
	53, 813	51, 306	692	1,815	25, 713	25, 362	351	-341
July	54, 573	52, 090	525	1,958	26, 001	25, 702	299	-226
	55, 048	52, 646	565	1,837	26, 069	25, 694	375	-190
	54, 778	52, 222	515	2,041	26, 077	25, 694	383	-132
	55, 770	53, 300	427	2,043	26, 653	26, 393	260	-167
	56, 189	53, 388	569	2,232	26, 785	26, 461	324	245
	56, 610	52, 529	765	3,316	27, 221	26, 766	455	-310
1969: Jan	56, 476	52, 665	697	3, 114	28, 063	27, 846	217	480
	55, 786	52, 265	824	2, 697	27, 291	27, 063	228	596
	55, 477	52, 122	918	2, 437	26, 754	26, 537	217	701
	58, 821	52, 463	996	5, 362	27, 079	26, 927	152	844
	59, 999	53, 390	1,402	5, 207	27, 903	27, 603	300	1, 102
	60, 565	54, 028	1,407	5, 130	27, 317	26, 974	343	1, 064
July	60, 887	54, 298	1, 190	5, 399	26, 980	26, 864	116	-1, 07/
	60, 876	54, 599	1, 249	5, 028	27, 079	26, 776	303	-94(
	60, 459	53, 840	1, 067	5, 552	26, 971	26, 735	236	-831
	61, 516	54, 708	1, 135	5, 673	27, 340	27, 197	143	-992
	62, 767	56, 499	1, 241	5, 027	27, 764	27, 511	253	-988
	64, 083	57, 500	1, 087	5, 496	28, 012	27, 774	238	-849

Data from March 1933 through April 1934 are for licensed banks only.
 Beginning December 1959, total reserves held include vault cash allowed.

Table C-55.—Bond yields and interest rates, 1929-69

[Percent per annum]

	U,S	. Governm	ent securi	ities	Corporate bonds (Moody's)		High- grade munic-		Prime com-	Fed- eral	FHA new
Year or month	3-month Treas- ury bills 1	9–12 month issues ²	3–5 year issues ³	Taxable bonds 4	Aaa	Baa	ipal bonds (Stand- ard & Poor's)	bank loans to busi- ness— selected cities	mer- cial paper, 4-6 months	Reserve Bank dis- count rate	home mort- gage yields ⁵
1929	(6)				4. 73	5.90	4. 27	(7)	5, 85	5. 16	
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934	(6) 1, 402 . 879 . 515 . 256		2, 66 2, 12		4. 55 4. 58 5. 01 4. 49 4. 00	5. 90 7. 62 9. 30 7. 76 6. 32	4. 07 4. 01 4. 65 4. 71 4. 03	0000	3. 59 2. 64 2. 73 1. 73 1. 02	3. 04 2. 11 2. 82 2. 56 1. 54	
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939	. 137 . 143 . 447 . 053 . 023		1.29 1.11 1.40 .83 .59		3. 60 3. 24 3. 26 3. 19 3. 01	5. 75 4. 77 5. 03 5. 80 4. 96	3, 41 3, 07 3, 10 2, 91 2, 76	(f) (f) (f) (g) 2.1	.75 .75 .94 .81 .59	1.50 1.50 1.33 1.00 1.00	
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944		0. 75 . 79	. 50 . 73 1. 46 1. 34 1. 33	2. 46 2. 47 2. 48	2. 84 2. 77 2. 83 2. 73 2. 72	4, 75 4, 33 4, 28 3, 91 3, 61	2.50 2.10 2.36 2.06 1.86	2.1 2.0 2.2 2.6 2.4	. 56 . 53 . 66 . 69 . 73	1.00 1.00 81.00 81.00 81.00	
1945 1946 1947 1948		. 81 . 82 . 88 1. 14 1. 14	1.18 1.16 1.32 1.62 1.43	2.37 2.19 2.25 2.44 2.31	2. 62 2. 53 2. 61 2. 82 2. 66	3. 29 3. 05 3. 24 3. 47 3. 42	1. 67 1. 64 2. 01 2. 40 2. 21	2. 2 2. 1 2. 1 2. 5 2. 68	.75 .81 1.03 1.44 1.49	\$ 1.00 \$ 1.00 1.00 1.34 1.50	4. 3
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954		1. 26 1. 73 1. 81 2. 07 . 92	1. 50 1. 93 2. 13 2. 56 1. 82	2. 32 2. 57 2. 68 2. 94 2. 55	2.62 2.86 2.96 3.20 2.90	3. 24 3. 41 3. 52 3. 74 3. 51	1. 98 2. 00 2. 19 2. 72 2. 37	2. 69 3. 11 3. 49 3. 69 3. 61	1. 45 2. 16 2. 33 2. 52 1. 58	1. 59 1. 75 1. 75 1. 99 1. 60	4. 1 4. 2 4. 2 4. 6 4. 6
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959		1. 89 2. 83 3. 53 2. 09 4. 11	2.50 3.12 3.62 2.90 4.33	2. 84 3. 08 3. 47 3. 43 4. 08	3. 06 3. 36 3. 89 3. 79 4. 38	3. 53 3. 88 4. 71 4. 73 5. 05	2. 53 2. 93 3. 60 3. 56 3. 95	3. 70 4. 20 4. 62 4. 34 9 5. 00	2. 18 3. 31 3. 81 2. 46 3. 97	1. 89 2. 77 3. 12 2. 16 3. 36	4. 6 4. 7 5. 4 5. 7
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964		3. 55 2. 91 3. 02 3. 28 3. 76	3. 99 3. 60 3. 57 3. 72 4. 06	4. 02 3. 90 3. 95 4. 00 4. 15	4, 41 4, 35 4, 33 4, 26 4, 40	5. 19 5. 08 5. 02 4. 86 4. 83	3. 73 3. 46 3. 18 3. 23 3. 22	5. 16 4. 97 5. 00 5. 01 4. 99	3. 85 2. 97 3. 26 3. 55 3. 97	3. 53 3. 00 3. 00 3. 23 3. 55	6. 1 5. 8 5. 6 5. 4
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	3. 954 4. 881 4. 321 5, 339	4. 09 5. 17 4. 84 5. 62 7. 06	4. 22 5. 16 5. 07 5. 59 6. 85	4. 21 4. 65 4. 85 5. 26 6. 12	4. 49 5. 13 5. 51 6. 18 7. 03	4. 87 5. 67 6. 23 6. 94 7. 81	3. 27 3. 82 3. 96 4. 51 5. 81	5. 06 6. 00 10 6. 00 6. 68 8. 21	4. 38 5. 55 5. 10 5. 90 7. 83	4. 04 4. 50 4. 19 5. 17 5. 87	5. 4 6. 2 6. 5 7. 1 8. 1
1967: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	1 554	4. 71 4. 64 4. 35 4. 03 4. 09 4. 40	4. 71 4. 73 4. 52 4. 46 4. 68 4. 96	4, 40 4, 47 4, 45 4, 51 4, 76 4, 86	5. 20 5. 03 5. 13 5. 11 5. 24 5. 44	5. 97 5. 82 5. 85 5. 83 5. 96 6. 15	3. 58 3. 56 3. 60 3. 66 3. 92 3. 99	¹⁰ 6. 13	5. 73 5. 38 5. 24 4. 83 4. 67 4. 65	4. 50 4. 50 4. 50 4. 10 4. 00 4. 00	6. 7 6. 6 6. 4 6. 3 6. 2 6. 4
July	4. 308 4. 275 4. 451 4. 588 4. 762	4. 98 5. 10 5. 21 5. 32 5. 55 5. 69	5. 17 5. 28 5. 40 5. 52 5. 73 5. 72	4. 86 4. 95 4. 99 5. 19 5. 44 5. 36	5. 58 5. 62 5. 65 5. 82 6. 07 6. 19	6. 26 6. 33 6. 40 6. 52 6. 72 6. 93	4. 05 4. 03 4. 15 4. 31 4. 36 4. 49	5. 95 5. 96	4. 92 5. 00 5. 00 5. 07 5. 28 5. 56	4. 00 4. 00 4. 00 4. 00 4. 18 4. 50	6. 5 6. 5 6. 6 6. 6 6. 7

See footnotes at end of table.

Table C-55.—Bond yields and interest rates, 1929-69—Continued

[Percent per annum]

	U.S	. Governm	ent securi	ities	bó	orate nds idy's)	High- grade munic-	Average rate on short- term	Prime com- mer-	Fed- eral Reserve	FHA new
Year or month	3-month Treas- ury bills ¹	9–12 month issues ²	3–5 year issues ³	Taxable bonds 4	Aaa	Baa	ipal bonds (Stand- ard & Poor's)	bank loans to busi- ness— selected cities	cial paper, 4–6 months	Bank dis- count rate	home mort- gage yields ⁵
1968: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	5. 081 4. 969 5. 144 5. 365 5. 621 5. 544	5. 39 5. 37 5. 55 5. 63 6. 06 6. 01	5. 53 5. 59 5. 77 5. 69 5. 95 5. 71	5. 18 5. 16 5. 39 5. 28 5. 40 5. 23	6. 17 6. 10 6. 11 6. 21 6. 27 6. 28	6. 84 6. 80 6. 85 6. 97 7. 03 7. 07	4. 34 4. 39 4. 56 4. 41 4. 56 4. 56	6. 36	5. 60 5. 50 5. 64 5. 81 6. 18 6. 25	4. 50 4. 50 4. 66 5. 20 5. 50 5. 50	6. 81 6. 81 6. 78 6. 83 6. 94
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	5.095	5. 68 5. 41 5. 40 5. 44 5. 56 6. 00	5. 44 5. 32 5. 30 5. 42 5. 47 5. 99	5. 09 5. 04 5. 09 5. 24 5. 36 5. 66	6. 24 6. 02 5. 97 6. 09 6. 19 6. 45	6. 98 6. 82 6. 79 6. 84 7. 01 7. 23	4. 36 4. 31 4. 47 4. 56 4. 68 4. 91	6. 89 6. 61	6. 19 5. 88 5. 82 5. 80 5. 92 6. 17	5. 50 5. 48 5. 25 5. 25 5. 25 5. 36	7. 52 7. 42 7. 35 7. 28 7. 29 7. 36
1969: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	6.150	6. 26 6. 21 6. 22 6. 11 6. 26 7. 07	6. 04 6. 16 6. 33 6. 15 6. 33 6. 64	5, 74 5, 86 6, 05 5, 84 5, 85 6, 05	6. 59 6. 66 6. 85 6. 89 6. 79 6. 98	7. 32 7. 30 7. 51 7. 54 7. 52 7. 70	4, 95 5, 10 5, 34 5, 29 5, 47 5, 83	7. 32	6. 53 6. 62 6. 82 7. 04 7. 35 8. 23	5, 50 5, 50 5, 50 5, 95 6, 00 6, 00	7. 50 7. 99 8. 05 8. 06 8. 06
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	7.004 7.007 7.129 7.040 7.193 7.720	7.59 7.51 7.76 7.63 7.94 8.34	7. 02 7. 08 7. 58 7. 47 7. 57 7. 98	6. 07 6. 02 6. 32 6. 27 6. 52 6. 81	7. 08 6. 97 7. 14 7. 33 7. 35 7. 72	7. 84 7. 86 8. 05 8. 22 8. 25 8. 65	5. 84 6. 07 6. 35 6. 21 6. 37 6. 91	8, 82	8, 65 8, 33 8, 48 8, 57 8, 46 8, 84	6. 00 6. 00 6. 00 6. 00 6. 00 6. 00	8. 35 8. 36 8. 36 8. 40 8. 48 8. 48

Note. - Yields and rates computed for New York City except for short-term bank loans.

Sources: Treasury Department, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Moody's Investors Service, Standard & Poor's Corporation, and Federal Housing Administration.

¹ Rate on new issues within period. Issues were tax exempt prior to March 1, 1941, and fully taxable thereafter. For the period 1934-37, series includes issues with maturities of more than 3 months.

2 Certificates of indebtedness and selected note and bond issues (fully taxable).

3 Selected note and bond issues. Issues were partially tax exempt prior to 1941, and fully taxable thereafter.

4 First issued in 1941. Series includes bonds which are neither due nor callable before a given number of years as follows: April 1952 to date, 10 years; April 1952-March 1953, 12 years; October 1941-March 1952, 15 years.

3 Data for first of the month, based on the maximum permissible interest rate (7½ percent beginning late January 1969). Thru July 1961, computed on 25-year mortgages paid in 12 years and thereafter, 30-year mortgages prepaid in 15 years.

4 Treasury bills were first issued in December 1929 and were issued irregularly in 1930.

5 Prom October 30, 1942, to April 24, 1946, a preferential rate of 0.50 percent was in effect for advances secured by Government securities maturing in 1 year or less.

9 Beginning 1959, series revised to exclude loans to nonbank financial institutions.

10 Beginning 1959, series revised to exclude loans to nonbank financial institutions.

10 Beginning February 1967, series revised to incorporate changes in coverage, in the sample of reporting banks, and in the reporting period (shifted to the middle month of the quarter).

Table C-56. -- Short- and intermediate-term consumer credit outstanding, 1929-69 [Millions of dollars]

			Inst	alment cr	edit		Noni	nstalment	credit	Adden- dum:
End of year or month	Total	Totai	Auto- mobile paper	Other con- sumer goods paper	Repair and modern- ization loans 1	Per- sonal loans	Total	Charge ac- counts	Other 2	Policy loans b life in- surance com- panies
1929		3, 524	1, 384	1, 544	27	569	3, 592	1, 996	1, 596	2, 37
930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 937	6, 351 5, 315 4, 026 3, 885 4, 218 5, 190 6, 375 6, 948 6, 370 7, 222	3, 022 2, 463 1, 672 1, 723 1, 999 2, 817 3, 747 4, 118 3, 686 4, 503	986 684 356 493 614 992 1, 372 1, 494 1, 099 1, 497	1, 432 1, 214 834 799 889 1,000 1,290 1,505 1,442 1,620	25 22 18 15 37 253 364 219 218 298	579 543 464 416 459 572 721 900 927 1,088	3, 329 2, 852 2, 354 2, 162 2, 219 2, 373 2, 628 2, 830 2, 684 2, 719	1, 833 1, 635 1, 374 1, 286 1, 306 1, 354 1, 428 1, 504 1, 403 1, 414	1, 496 1, 217 980 876 913 1, 019 1, 200 1, 326 1, 281 1, 305	2, 80 3, 36 3, 80 3, 76 3, 65 3, 54 3, 39 3, 38 3, 24
940 941 942 943 944 945 945 946 947	8, 338 9, 172 5, 983 4, 901 5, 111 5, 665 8, 384 11, 598 14, 447	5, 514 6, 085 3, 166 2, 136 2, 176 2, 462 4, 172 6, 695 8, 996 11, 590	2, 071 2, 458 742 355 397 455 981 1, 924 3, 018 4, 555	1,827 1,929 1,195 819 791 816 1,290 2,143 2,901 3,706	371 376 255 130 119 182 405 718 853 898	1, 245 1, 322 974 832 869 1, 009 1, 496 1, 910 2, 224 2, 431	2,824 3,087 2,817 2,765 2,935 3,203 4,212 4,903 5,451 5,774	1, 471 1, 645 1, 444 1, 440 1, 517 1, 612 2, 076 2, 381 2, 722 2, 854	1, 353 1, 442 1, 373 1, 325 1, 418 1, 591 2, 136 2, 522 2, 729 2, 920	3, 09 2, 91 2, 68 2, 37 2, 13 1, 96 1, 89 1, 93 2, 05 2, 2
950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 957	21, 471 22, 712 27, 520 31, 393 32, 464 38, 830 42, 334 44, 971 45, 129 51, 544	14, 703 15, 294 19, 403 23, 005 23, 568 28, 906 31, 720 33, 868 33, 642 39, 247	6, 074 5, 972 7, 733 9, 835 9, 809 13, 460 14, 420 15, 340 14, 152 16, 420	4, 799 4, 880 6, 174 6, 779 6, 751 7, 641 8, 606 8, 844 9, 028 10, 631	1,016 1,085 1,385 1,610 1,616 1,693 1,905 2,101 2,346 2,809	2,814 3,357 4,111 4,781 5,392 6,112 6,789 7,582 8,116 9,386	6, 768 7, 418 8, 117 8, 388 8, 896 9, 924 10, 614 11, 103 11, 487 12, 297	3, 367 3, 700 4, 130 4, 274 4, 485 4, 795 4, 995 5, 146 5, 060 5, 104	3, 401 3, 718 3, 987 4, 114 4, 411 5, 129 5, 619 5, 957 6, 427 7, 193	2, 4 2, 59 2, 7 2, 9 3, 1 3, 29 3, 5 3, 8 4, 19 4, 6
960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968	56, 141 57, 982 63, 821 71, 739 80, 268 90, 314 97, 543 102, 132 113, 191 122, 200	42, 968 43, 891 48, 720 55, 486 62, 692 71, 324 77, 539 80, 926 89, 890 98, 100	17, 658 17, 135 19, 381 22, 254 24, 934 28, 619 30, 556 30, 724 34, 130 36, 800	11, 545 11, 862 12, 627 14, 177 16, 333 18, 565 20, 978 22, 395 24, 899 27, 300	3, 148 3, 221 3, 298 3, 437 3, 577 3, 728 3, 818 3, 789 3, 925 4, 000	10, 617 11, 673 13, 414 15, 618 17, 848 20, 412 22, 187 24, 018 26, 936 30, 000	13, 173 14, 091 15, 101 16, 253 17, 576 18, 990 20, 004 21, 206 23, 301 24, 100	5, 329 5, 324 5, 684 5, 903 6, 195 6, 430 6, 686 6, 968 7, 755 8, 100	7,844 8,767 9,417 10,350 11,381 12,560 13,318 14,238 15,546 16,000	5, 2: 5, 7: 6, 2: 6, 6: 7, 1: 7, 6: 9, 1: 10, 0: 11, 2:
Feb	101, 260 100, 771 100, 981 102, 257 103, 411 104, 620	80, 379 80, 233 80, 474 81, 328 82, 312 83, 433	30, 579 30, 682 30, 942 31, 331 31, 818 32, 364	22, 117 21, 767 21, 644 21, 841 22, 011 22, 248	3, 734 3, 708 3, 688 3, 697 3, 746 3, 769	23, 949 24, 076 24, 200 24, 459 24, 737 25, 052	20, 881 20, 538 20, 507 20, 929 21, 099 21, 187	6, 424 5, 859 5, 710 6, 026 6, 276 6, 368	14, 457 14, 679 14, 797 14, 903 14, 823 14, 819	10, 14 10, 22 10, 33 10, 44 10, 56
July	105, 680 107, 090 107, 636 108, 643 110, 035 113, 191	84, 448 85, 684 86, 184 87, 058 87, 953 89, 890	32, 874 33, 325 33, 336 33, 698 33, 925 34, 130	22, 452 22, 777 22, 988 23, 248 23, 668 24, 899	3, 808 3, 857 3, 881 3, 910 3, 931 3, 925	25, 314 25, 725 25, 979 26, 202 26, 429 26, 936	21, 232 21, 406 21, 452 21, 585 22, 082 23, 301	6, 457 6, 574 6, 550 6, 692 6, 964 7, 755	14, 775 14, 832 14, 902 14, 893 15, 118 15, 546	10, 82 10, 94 11, 04 11, 13 11, 15
969: Jan Feb	112, 117 111, 569 111, 950 113, 231 114, 750 115, 995	89, 492 89, 380 89, 672 90, 663 91, 813 93, 087	34, 013 34, 053 34, 262 34, 733 35, 230 35, 804	24, 682 24, 404 24, 306 24, 399 24, 636 24, 956	3, 886 3, 875 3, 874 3, 903 3, 964 4, 022	26, 911 27, 048 27, 230 27, 628 27, 983 28, 305	22, 625 22, 189 22, 278 22, 568 22, 937 22, 908	7, 097 6, 403 6, 340 6, 557 6, 971 7, 002	15, 528 15, 786 15, 938 16, 011 15, 966 15, 906	11, 3: 11, 5: 11, 6: 11, 9: 12, 0: 12, 3:
July	116, 597 117, 380 118, 008 118, 515 119, 378 122, 200	93, 833 94, 732 95, 356 95, 850 96, 478 98, 100	36, 081 36, 245 36, 321 36, 599 36, 650 36, 800	25, 172 25, 467 25, 732 25, 855 26, 223 27, 300	4, 039 4, 063 4, 096 4, 084 4, 076 4, 000	28, 541 28, 957 29, 207 29, 312 29, 529 30, 000	22, 764 22, 648 22, 652 22, 665 22, 900 24, 100	7, 039 6, 988 7, 005 7, 085 7, 238 8, 100	15, 725 15, 660 15, 647 15, 580 15, 662 16, 000	12, 69 12, 92 13, 17 13, 40 13, 50

Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Institute of Life Insurance (except as noted).

Holdings of financial institutions only; holdings of retail outlets are included in "other consumer goods paper."
 Single-payment loans and service credit.
 Year-end figures are annual statement asset values; month-end figures are book value of ledger assets. These loans are not included in consumer credit series.
 Preliminary; December by Council of Economic Advisers.

TABLE C-57.—Instalment credit extended and repaid, 1946-69 [Millions of dollars]

	То	tal	Autor pa	nobile per	Other co goods		Repair a ernizatio	nd mod- n loans	Perso Ioa	
Year or month	Ex- tended	Re- paid	Ex- tended	Re- paid	Ex- tended	Re- paid	Ex- tended	Re- paid	Ex- tended	Re- paid
1946 1947 1948	8, 495 12, 713 15, 585 18, 108	6, 785 10, 190 13, 284 15, 514	1, 969 3, 692 5, 217 6, 967	1, 443 2, 749 4, 123 5, 430	3, 077 4, 498 5, 383 5, 865	2,603 3,645 4,625 5,060	423 704 714 734	200 391 579 689	3, 026 3, 819 4, 271 4, 542	2, 539 3, 405 3, 957 4, 335
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	21, 558 23, 576 29, 514 31, 558 31, 051	18, 445 22, 985 25, 405 27, 956 30, 488	8,530 8,956 11,764 12,981 11,807	7,011 9,058 10,003 10,879 11,833	7, 150 7, 485 9, 186 9, 227 9, 117	6,057 7,404 7,892 8,622 9,145	835 841 1,217 1,344 1,261	717 772 917 1,119 1,255	5, 043 6, 294 7, 347 8, 006 8, 866	4, 660 5, 751 6, 593 7, 336 8, 255
1955 1956 1957 1958		33, 634 37, 056 39, 870 40, 339 42, 603	16, 734 15, 515 16, 465 14, 226 17, 779	13, 082 14, 555 15, 545 15, 415 15, 579	10, 642 11, 721 11, 810 11, 738 13, 981	9, 752 10, 758 11, 574 11, 557 12, 402	1,393 1,582 1,674 1,871 2,222	1,316 1,370 1,477 1,626 1,765	10, 203 11, 051 12, 069 12, 275 14, 070	9, 484 10, 373 11, 276 11, 741 12, 857
1960 1961 1962 1963	10 703	46, 073 48, 124 51, 360 56, 825 63, 470	17,657 16,029 19,694 22,126 24,046	16, 419 16, 552 17, 447 19, 254 21, 369	14, 525 14, 551 15, 701 17, 920 20, 821	13, 613 14, 235 14, 935 16, 369 18, 666	2, 215 2, 092 2, 084 2, 186 2, 225	1,876 2,015 2,010 2,046 2,086	15, 396 16, 377 18, 710 21, 359 23, 578	14, 165 15, 319 16, 969 19, 156 21, 349
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1	78, 586 82, 335 84, 693	69, 957 76, 120 81, 306 88, 089 94, 600	27, 227 27, 341 26, 667 31, 424 32, 500	23, 543 25, 404 26, 499 28, 018 29, 900	22, 750 25, 591 26, 952 30, 593 32, 800	20, 518 23, 178 25, 535 28, 089 30, 400	2, 266 2, 200 2, 113 2, 268 2, 300	2, 116 2, 110 2, 142 2, 132 2, 200	26, 343 27, 203 28, 961 32, 768 35, 200	23, 780 25, 428 27, 130 29, 850 32, 100
			<u> </u>		Seasonali	y adjusted	' I			
1968: Jan	7,847	7, 054 7, 111 7, 281 7, 222 7, 301 7, 287	2, 385 2, 559 2, 605 2, 509 2, 590 2, 570	2, 254 2, 275 2, 316 2, 297 2, 327 2, 327 2, 289	2,339 2,458 2,531 2,597 2,535 2,536	2, 223 2, 269 2, 372 2, 340 2, 312 2, 324	169 184 183 189 197 179	182 173 185 176 184 175	2,560 2,646 2,584 2,568 2,711 2,718	2,395 2,394 2,408 2,409 2,478 2,499
July	8, 247 8, 187 8, 416 8, 533 8, 288 8, 277	7,390 7,253 7,701 7,586 7,454 7,502	2,673 2,684 2,783 2,782 2,681 2,592	2,352 2,327 2,482 2,391 2,363 2,357	2,622 2,483 2,560 2,645 2,640 2,656	2, 374 2, 209 2, 428 2, 451 2, 388 2, 422	195 185 196 202 191 192	181 170 179 177 175	2, 757 2, 835 2, 877 2, 904 2, 776 2, 837	2, 483 2, 547 2, 612 2, 567 2, 528 2, 548
1969: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	8, 371 8, 414 8, 381	7,730 7,616 7,735 7,960 7,834 7,910	2, 661 2, 716 2, 730 2, 772 2, 757 2, 725	2, 467 2, 468 2, 501 2, 519 2, 488 2, 460	2, 654 2, 598 2, 625 2, 763 2, 767 2, 869	2, 442 2, 352 2, 461 2, 569 2, 507 2, 602	179 201 198 219 209 218	173 172 180 185 183 183	2, 877 2, 899 2, 828 2, 966 2, 947 2, 893	2, 648 2, 624 2, 593 2, 687 2, 656 2, 668
July Aug Sept. Oct Nov Dec 1	8, 521 8, 680 8, 669 8, 661 8, 632 8, 650	7, 899 8, 080 7, 971 7, 992 8, 012 8, 050	2, 582 2, 634 2, 794 2, 808 2, 683 2, 650	2, 471 2, 562 2, 498 2, 463 2, 503 2, 500	2,777 2,819 2,740 2,707 2,841 2,800	2, 511 2, 574 2, 600 2, 615 2, 623 2, 600	185 177 180 175 164 200	191 185 156 189 179 200	2, 977 3, 050 2, 955 2, 971 2, 944 3, 000	2, 720 2, 759 2, 71 2, 729 2, 707 2, 750

¹ Preliminary; December by Council of Economic Advisers.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (except as noted).

Table C-58.—Mortgage debt outstanding, by type of property and of financing, 1939-69 [Billions of dollars]

				Nonfarm (propertie	s	No	onfarm p	roperties	by type	of mortg	ıge
	All	Farm					FH	IA-VA ui	nderwritt	еп	Conve	ntional 2
End of year or quarter	prop- erties	prop- erties	Total	1- to 4- family	Multi-	Com- mer- cial		1- to 4	l-family	houses		1- to 4-
				houses	family	prop- erties 1	Total	Total	FHA in- sured	VA guar- anteed	Totai	family houses
1939	35. 5	6. 6	28. 9	16. 3	5. 6	7.0	1.8	1.8	1.8		27.1	14, 5
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944	36. 5 37. 6 36. 7 35. 3 34. 7	6. 5 6. 4 6. 0 5. 4 4. 9	30. 0 31. 2 30. 8 29. 9 29. 7	17. 4 18. 4 18. 2 17. 8 17. 9	5. 7 5. 9 5. 8 5. 8 5. 6	6. 9 7. 0 6. 7 6. 3 6. 2	2.3 3.0 3.7 4.1 4.2	2. 3 3. 0 3. 7 4. 1 4. 2	2.3 3.0 3.7 4.1 4.2		27. 7 28. 2 27. 1 25. 8 25. 5	15. 1 15. 4 14. 5 13. 7 13. 7
1945 1946 1947 1948 1949	35. 5 41. 8 48. 9 56. 2 62. 7	4. 8 4. 9 5. 1 5. 3 5. 6	30. 8 36. 9 43. 9 50. 9 57. 1	18.6 23.0 28.2 33.3 37.6	5. 7 6. 1 6. 6 7. 5 8. 6	6. 4 7. 7 9. 1 10. 2 10. 8	4. 3 6. 3 9. 8 13. 6 18. 1	4. 3 6. 1 9. 3 12. 5 15. 0	4. 1 3. 7 3. 8 5. 3 6. 9	0, 2 2, 4 5, 5 7, 2 8, 1	26. 5 30. 6 34. 1 37. 3 39. 0	14. 3 16. 9 18. 9 20. 8 22. 6
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	72. 8 82. 3 91. 4 101. 3 113. 7	6. 1 6. 7 7. 2 7. 7 8. 2	66. 7 75. 6 84. 2 93. 6 105. 4	45. 2 51. 7 58. 5 66. 1 75. 7	10. 1 11. 5 12. 3 12. 9 13. 5	11. 5 12. 5 13. 4 14. 5 16. 3	22. 1 26. 6 29. 3 32. 1 36. 2	18. 9 22. 9 25. 4 28. 1 32. 1	8.6 9.7 10.8 12.0 12.8	10. 3 13. 2 14. 6 16. 1 19. 3	44. 6 49. 0 54. 9 61. 5 69. 2	26. 3 28. 8 33. 1 38. 0 43. 6
1955 1956 1957 1958 1958	129. 9 144. 5 156. 5 171. 8 190. 8	9. 0 9. 8 10. 4 11. 1 12. 1	120. 9 134. 6 146. 1 160. 7 178. 7	88. 2 99. 0 107. 6 117. 7 130. 9	14. 3 14. 9 15. 3 16. 8 18. 7	18. 3 20. 7 23. 2 26. 1 29. 2	42. 9 47. 8 51. 6 55. 2 59. 2	38. 9 43. 9 47. 2 50. 1 53. 8	14. 3 15. 5 16. 5 19. 7 23. 8	24. 6 28. 4 30. 7 30. 4 30. 0	78. 0 86. 8 94. 5 105. 5 119. 4	49. 3 55. 1 60. 4 67. 6 77. 0
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	206. 8 226. 2 248. 6 274. 3 300. 1	12. 8 13. 9 15. 2 16. 8 18. 9	194. 0 212. 3 233. 4 257. 4 281. 2	141. 3 153. 0 166. 5 182. 2 197. 6	20. 3 22. 9 25. 8 29. 0 33. 6	32. 4 36. 4 41. 1 46. 2 50. 0	62. 3 65. 5 69. 4 73. 4 77. 2	56. 4 59. 1 62. 2 65. 9 69. 2	26. 7 29. 5 32. 3 35. 0 38. 3	29. 7 29. 6 29. 9 30. 9 30. 9	131. 7 146. 9 164. 0 184. 0 204. 0	84. 8 93. 9 104. 3 116. 3 128. 3
1965 1966 1967 P 1968 P	325. 8 347. 4 370. 2 397. 5 424. 7	21. 2 23. 3 25. 5 27. 5 29. 6	304. 6 324. 1 344. 8 370. 0 395. 0	212. 9 223. 6 236. 1 251. 2 266. 8	37. 2 40. 3 43. 9 47. 3 51. 7	54. 5 60. 1 64. 8 71. 4 76. 5	81. 2 84. 1 88. 2 93. 4	73. 1 76. 1 79. 9 84. 4	42. 0 44. 8 47. 4 50. 6	31. 1 31. 3 32. 5 33. 8	223. 4 240. 0 256. 6 276. 6	139. 8 147. 5 156. 1 166. 8
1966: 	331. 9 338. 7 343. 6 347. 4	21.8 22.5 23.0 23.3	310. 2 316. 2 320. 6 324. 1	216. 2 219. 6 221. 9 223. 6	38, 2 39, 1 39, 7 40, 3	55. 8 57. 5 59. 0 60. 1	82. 1 82. 7 83. 4 84. 1	74. 1 74. 7 75. 4 76. 1	43. 0 43. 7 44. 4 44. 8	31.1 31.0 31.0 31.3	228. 1 233. 5 237. 2 240. 0	142.1 145.0 146.5 147.5
1967: p p p V p	350. 5 356. 2 363. 3 370. 2	23. 7 24. 3 24. 9 25. 5	326. 8 331. 9 338. 3 344. 8	224. 9 227. 8 232. 0 236. 1	41. 0 41. 9 42. 8 43. 9	60. 9 62. 2 63. 5 64. 8	84. 5 85. 3 86. 4 88. 2	76. 4 77. 2 78. 3 79. 9	45. 2 45. 7 46. 6 47. 4	31. 2 31. 5 31. 7 32. 5	242.3 246.6 251.9 256.6	148, 4 150, 6 153, 7 156, 1
1968: p p p V p	375. 8 382. 9 389. 8 397. 5	26. 0 26. 7 27. 2 27. 5	349. 8 356. 1 362. 6 370. 0	239. 1 243. 2 247. 0 251. 2	44. 6 45. 3 46. 2 47. 3	66. 1 67. 6 69. 3 71. 4	89. 4 90. 7 92. 0 93. 4	81. 0 82. 1 83. 2 84. 4	48. 1 48. 7 49. 6 50. 6	32.9 33.4 33.6 33.8	260, 4 265, 4 270, 6 276, 6	158, 1 161, 1 163, 8 166, 8
1969 : p p p V p	403. 7 411. 7 418. 5 424. 7	28. 1 28. 8 29. 3 29. 6	375, 7 382, 9 389, 2 395, 0	254, 8 259, 5 263, 4 266, 8	48. 3 49. 4 50. 6 51. 7	72.6 74.0 75.2 76.5	94, 5 96, 6 98, 5	85, 3 87, 1 88, 9	51. 4 52. 2 53. 4	33. 9 34. 9 35. 5	281. 2 286. 3 290. 7	169. 6 172. 3 174. 6

¹ Includes negligible amount of farm loans held by savings and loan associations. 2 Derived figures.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, estimated and compiled from data supplied by various Government and private organizations.

TABLE C-59.—Mortgage debt outstanding, by lender, 1939-69
[Billions of dollars]

			Selected f	inancial insti	itutions		Other lenders		
End of year or quarter	Totai	Total	Savings and loan associa- tions	Mutuai savings banks	Com- mercial banks ¹	Life insurance com- panies	U.S. agencies ²	Indi- viduals and others	
1939	35. 5	18.6	3.8	4.8	4. 3	5. 7	5. 0	11.9	
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944	36. 5 37. 6 36. 7 35. 3 34. 7	19. 5 20. 7 20. 7 20. 2 20. 2	4. 1 4. 6 4. 6 4. 6 4. 8	4. 9 4. 8 4. 6 4. 4 4. 3	4. 6 4. 9 4. 7 4. 5 4. 4	6. 0 6. 4 6. 7 6. 7 6. 7	4. 9 4. 7 4. 3 3. 6 3. 0	12. 0 12. 2 11. 7 11. 5	
945946947948949	35. 5 41. 8 48. 9 56. 2 62. 7	21. 0 26. 0 31. 8 37. 8 42. 9	5. 4 7. 1 8. 9 10. 3 11. 6	4. 2 4. 4 4. 9 5. 8 6. 7	4.8 7.2 9.4 10.9 11.6	6. 6 7. 2 8. 7 10. 8 12. 9	2. 4 2. 0 1. 8 1. 9 2. 4	12. 1 13. 8 15. 3 16. 5	
950	72.8	51. 7	13. 7	8. 3	13.7	16. 1	2. 7	18. 4	
	82.3	59. 5	15. 6	9. 9	14.7	19. 3	3. 4	19. 4	
	91.4	66. 9	18. 4	11. 4	15.9	21. 3	4. 0	20. 5	
	101.3	75. 1	22. 0	12. 9	16.9	23. 3	4. 4	21. 8	
	113.7	85. 7	26. 1	15. 0	18.6	26. 0	4. 6	23. 4	
955	129. 9	99. 3	31. 4	17. 5	21. 0	29. 4	5. 2	25. 4	
956	144. 5	111. 2	35. 7	19. 7	22. 7	33. 0	6. 0	27. 3	
957	156. 5	119. 7	40. 0	21. 2	23. 3	35. 2	7. 4	29. 3	
958	171. 8	131. 5	45. 6	23. 3	25. 5	37. 1	7. 8	32. 5	
959	190. 8	145. 5	53. 1	25. 0	28. 1	39. 2	10. 0	35. 4	
960	206. 8	157. 6	60. 1	26. 9	28. 8	41. 8	11. 2	38, 6	
961	226. 2	172. 6	68. 8	29. 1	30. 4	44. 2	11. 8	41, 8	
962	248. 6	192. 5	78. 8	32. 3	34. 5	46. 9	12. 2	44, 6	
963	274. 3	217. 1	90. 9	36. 2	39. 4	50. 5	11. 2	45, 9	
964	300. 1	241. 0	101. 3	40. 6	44. 0	55. 2	11. 4	47, 7	
965	325. 8	264. 6	110.3	44.6	49. 7	60. 0	12. 4	48.7	
966	347. 4	280. 8	114.4	47.3	54. 4	64. 6	15. 8	50.9	
967 **	370. 2	298. 8	121.8	50.5	59. 0	67. 5	18. 4	53.0	
968 **	397. 5	319. 9	130,8	53.5	65. 7	70. 0	21. 7	55.8	
969 **	424. 7	339. 1	140.2	55.8	70. 9	72. 1	26. 8	58.8	
966: I II III	331. 9 338. 7 343. 6 347. 4	269. 6 274. 7 278. 2 280. 8	112.3 114.0 114.4 114.4	45. 4 45. 9 46. 6 47. 3	50. 7 52. 3 53. 6 54. 4	61. 2 62. 5 63. 6 64. 6	13. 5 14. 4 15. 2 15. 8	48. 8 49. 6 50. 8 50. 8	
967: p	350. 5	282. 9	114.8	48. 1	54. 5	65. 5	16. 4	51.3	
p	356. 2	287. 6	116.9	48. 9	55. 7	66. 1	16. 7	51.3	
P	363. 3	293. 3	119.5	49. 7	57. 5	66. 6	17. 5	52.3	
V p	370. 2	298. 8	121.8	50. 5	59. 0	67. 5	18. 4	53.0	
968; 1 p	375, 8	302. 6	123. 3	51. 2	60. 1	68. 0	19.6	53.5	
	382, 9	308. 1	125. 9	51. 8	62. 0	68. 4	20.6	54.5	
	389, 8	313. 5	128. 3	52. 5	63. 8	68. 9	21.1	55.5	
	397, 5	319. 9	130. 8	53. 5	65. 7	70. 0	21.7	55.1	
969: p	403. 7	324. 7	133. 0	54. 2	67. 1	70. 4	22. 6	56. 4	
p	411. 7	331. 0	136. 2	54. 8	69. 1	70. 9	23. 4	57. 2	
p	418. 5	335. 5	138. 6	55. 4	70. 2	71. 3	24. 9	58. 1	
V p	424. 7	339. 1	140. 2	55, 8	70. 9	72. 1	26. 8	58. 1	

¹ Includes loans held by nondeposit trust companies, but not bank trust departments.
² Includes former FNMA and new GNMA, as well as FHA, VA, PHA, Farmers' Home Administration and in earlier years RFC, HOLC, and FFMC. Also includes U.S.-sponsored agencies such as new FNMA and Federal Land Banks. Other U.S. agencies (amounts small or current separate data not readily available) included with "individuals and others."

Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, based on data from various Government and private organizations.

TABLE C-60.-Net public and private debt, 1929-681 [Billions of dollars]

			Public					Priva	ite			
								Indivi	dual and	noncorp	orate	
End of year	Total	<u> </u>	Fed- eral	State						Nonfa	ırm	
		Fed- eral ²	finan- cial agen- cies ³	cial and	and Total	Cor- porate	Total	Farm 4	Total	Mort- gage	Com- mer- cial and finan- cial ⁸	Con- sumer
1929	191. 9	16. 5		13.6	161.8	88. 9	72.9	12. 2	60.7	31. 2	22. 4	7.1
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934	192. 3 182. 9 175. 0 168. 5 171. 6	16. 5 18. 5 21. 3 24. 3 30. 4		14. 7 16. 0 16. 6 16. 3 15. 9	161, 1 148, 4 137, 1 127, 9 125, 3	89. 3 83. 5 80. 0 76. 9 75. 5	71. 8 64. 9 57. 1 51. 0 49. 8	11. 8 11. 1 10. 1 9. 1 8. 9	60. 0 53. 8 47. 0 41. 9 40. 9	32. 0 30. 9 29. 0 26. 3 25. 5	21. 6 17. 6 14. 0 11. 7 11. 2	6. 4 5. 3 4. 0 3. 9
1935	175. 0 180. 6 182. 2 179. 9 183. 3	34. 4 37. 7 39. 2 40. 5 42. 6		16. 1 16. 2 16. 1 16. 1 16. 4	124, 5 126, 7 126, 9 123, 3 124, 3	74. 8 76. 1 75. 8 73. 3 73. 5	49. 7 50. 6 51. 1 50. 0 50. 8	8. 9 8. 6 8. 6 9. 0 8. 8	40, 8 42, 0 42, 5 41, 0 42, 0	24. 8 24. 4 24. 3 24. 5 25. 0	10. 8 11. 2 11. 3 10. 1 9. 8	5. 2 6. 9 6. 9 7. 2
1940 1941 1942 1943	189. 8 211. 4 258. 6 313. 2 370. 6	44. 8 56. 3 101. 7 154. 4 211. 9		16. 4 16. 1 15. 4 14. 5 13. 9	128.6 139.0 141.5 144.3 144.8	75. 6 83. 4 91. 6 95. 5 94. 1	53. 0 55. 6 49. 9 48. 8 50. 7	9. 1 9. 3 9. 0 8. 2 7. 7	43. 9 46. 3 40. 9 40. 5 42. 9	26. 1 27. 1 26. 8 26. 1 26. 0	9. 5 10. 0 8. 1 9. 5 11. 8	8. 9. 6. 4. 5.
1945 1946 1947 1948 1949	405. 9 396. 6 415. 7 431. 3 445. 8	252. 5 229. 5 221. 7 215. 3 217. 6	0.7 .6 .7	13. 4 13. 7 15. 0 17. 0 19. 1	140. 0 153. 4 178. 3 198. 4 208. 4	85. 3 93. 5 108. 9 117. 8 118. 0	54. 7 59. 9 69. 4 80. 6 90. 4	7. 3 7. 6 8. 6 10. 8 12. 0	47. 4 52. 3 60. 7 69. 7 78. 4	27. 0 31. 8 37. 2 42. 4 47. 1	14. 7 12. 1 11. 9 12. 9 13. 9	5, 7 8, 4 11, 6 14, 4
1950 1951 1952 1953	519. 2 550. 2	217. 4 216. 9 221. 5 226. 8 229. 1	.7 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3	21. 7 24. 2 27. 0 30. 7 35. 5	246. 4 276. 8 300. 4 322. 7 340. 0	142. 1 162. 5 171. 0 179. 5 182. 8	104. 3 114. 3 129. 4 143. 2 157. 2	12. 3 13. 7 15. 2 16. 8 17. 5	92. 0 100. 6 114. 2 126. 4 139. 7	54. 8 61. 7 68. 9 76. 7 86. 4	15. 8 16. 2 17. 8 18. 4 20. 8	21. 22. 27. 31. 32.
1955 1956 1957 1958	664. 9 698. 3 728. 3	229. 6 224. 3 223. 0 231. 0 241. 4	2. 9 2. 4 2. 4 2. 5 3. 7	40. 2 44. 4 48. 6 53. 2 58. 0	392. 2 427. 2 454. 3 482. 4 528. 3	212. 1 231. 7 246. 7 259. 5 283. 3	180. 1 195. 5 207. 6 222. 9 245. 0	18. 7 19. 4 20. 2 23. 2 23. 8	161. 4 176. 1 187. 4 199. 7 221. 2	98. 7 109. 4 118. 1 128. 1 141. 0	24. 0 24. 4 24. 3 26. 5 28. 7	38, 4 42, 3 45, 0 45, 1 51, 1
1960 1961 1962 1963	872. 4 929. 8 997. 1 1, 071. 7 1, 153. 7	239. 8 246. 7 253. 6 257. 5 264. 0	3. 5 4. 0 5. 3 7. 2 7. 5	63. 0 70. 0 78. 1 84. 7 92. 4	566. 1 609. 1 660. 1 722. 3 789. 7	302. 8 324. 3 348. 2 376. 4 409. 6	263. 3 284. 8 311. 9 345. 8 380. 1	25. 1 27. 5 30. 2 33. 2 36. 0	238. 2 257. 3 281. 7 312. 6 344. 1	151. 3 164. 5 180. 3 198. 6 218. 9	30. 8 34. 8 37. 6 42. 3 45. 0	56. 1 58. 0 63. 1 71. 80.
1965 1966 1967 1968	1, 245. 6 1, 340. 8	266. 4 271. 8 286. 4 291. 9	8. 9 11. 2 9. 0 21. 5	99. 9 107. 1 117. 9 128. 6	870, 4 950, 6 1, 023, 1 1, 126, 6	454. 3 502. 7 541. 7 604. 5	416. 1 447. 9 481. 4 522. 2	39, 3 42, 4 48, 3 50, 2	376. 8 405. 5 433. 2 472. 0	236. 8 252. 8 266. 9 285. 5	49. 7 55. 2 64. 2 73. 2	90. 3 97. 3 102. 3 113. 2

¹ Net public and private debt is a comprehensive aggregate of the indebtedness of borrowers after eliminating certain types of duplicating governmental and corporate debt.

2 Net Federal Government and agency debt is the outstanding debt held by the public, as defined in the "Budget of the United States Government, for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1971." Figures shown here are subject to revision.

3 This comprises the debt of federally sponsored agencies, in which there is no longer any Federal proprietary interest. The obligations of the Federal Land Banks are included here beginning in 1947; the debt of the Federal Home Loan Banks is included beginning in 1951; and the debts of the Federal National Mortgage Association—Secondary Market Operations, Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, and Banks for Cooperatives are included beginning with 1968.

4 Farm mortgages and farm production loans. Farmers' financial and consumer deits included in the nonfarm categories.

5 Financial debt is debt owed to banks for purchasing or carrying securities, customers' debt to brokers, and debt owed to life insurance companies by policyholders.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Office of Business Economics), Treasury Department, Department of Agriculture, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Federal Land Banks, and Federal National Mortgage Association.

GOVERNMENT FINANCE

TABLE C-61.—Federal budget receipts and outlays, 1929-71

[Millions of dollars]

Fiscal year	Receipts	Outlays	Surplus or deficit (—)
ministrative budget:			
1929	3, 861	3, 127	734
1930	4, 058	3, 320	738
1931	3, 116	3, 577	-462
1932	1.924	4,659	-2,735
1933	1, 997 3, 015	4, 598	-2,602
1934 1935	3,706	6, 645 6, 497	-3,630 -2,791
1020	3, 997	0 422	•
1936	3, 957 4 956	8, 422 7, 733	-4, 425 -2, 777
1938	4, 956 5, 588	6, 765	_1, 177 _1, 177
1939	4, 979	8, 841	—3, 862
nsolidated cash statement:			
1940	6, 879	9, 589	2,710
1941	9, 202	13, 980	4,778
1942	15, 104	34,500	19, 396 53, 812
1943	25, 097	78, 909	-53, 812
1944	47, 818 50, 162	93, 956 95, 184	46, 138 45, 022
1945	30, 162	55, 164	-45, 022
1946	43, 537	61,738	18, 201
1947	43, 531 45, 357	36, 931 36, 493	6,600 8,864
1948 1949	41, 576	40, 57 0	1,006
1950	40, 940	43, 147	-2,207
1951	53, 390	45, 797	7, 593
1952	68, 011	67, 962	´ 49
1953	71, 495	76, 769	-5, 274
ified budget:		ĺ	
1954	69, 719	70, 890	-1,170
1955	65, 469	68, 509	—3 , 041
1956	74, 547	70, 460 76, 741	4, 087
1957	79, 990	76,741	3, 249
1958	79, 636	82, 575 92, 104	—2, 939 —12, 855
1959	79, 249	92, 104	-12,855
1960	92, 492	92, 223	269
1961	94, 389	97, 795	-3,406
1962	99,676	106, 813	-7, 137
1963 1964	106, 560 112, 662	111, 311 118, 584	-4,751 -5,922
1965	116, 833	118, 430	-1,596
1966	130, 856	134, 652	_3 796
1967	149, 552	158, 254	-3, 796 -8, 702
1968	153, 671	178, 833	25, 161
1969	187, 792 199, 386	184, 556 197, 885	3, 236
1970 1	199, 386	197, 885	1, 501
1971 1	202, 103	200, 771	1, 331

¹ Estimate.

Source: Bureau of the Budget.

Note.—Certain interfund transactions are excluded from receipts and outlays starting in 1932. For years prior to 1932 the amounts of such transactions are not significant.

Refunds of receipts are excluded from receipts and outlays starting in 1913; comparable data are not available for prior years.

Table C-62.—Federal budget receipts, outlays, financing, and debt, 1960-71 [Millions of dollars; fiscal years]

Description	Actual										
	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965					
RECEIPTS, EXPENDITURES, AND NET LEND-											
ING: Expenditure account:											
Receipts Expenditures (excludes net lending)	92, 492 90, 341	94, 389 96, 597	99, 676 104, 462	106, 560 111, 456	112, 662 118, 039	116, 8 33 117, 1 8 1					
	30, 341	30, 337	104, 402	111,430	110,033	117, 101					
Expenditure account surplus or deficit (—)	2, 151	-2,208	-4, 786	4, 896	-5, 377	347					
Loan account:	0.210	7 000	0.001	0.040	10.007						
Loan disbursements Loan repayments	8, 310 6, 427	7, 8 69 6, 671	9, 621 7, 271	9, 646 9, 791	10, 237 9, 693	10, 911 9, 662					
Net lending	1,882	1, 198	2, 351	145	545	1, 249					
Total budget:											
Receipts Outlays (expenditures and net lending)_	92, 492 92, 223	94, 389 97, 795	99, 676 106, 813	106, 560 111, 311	112, 662 118, 584	116, 833 118, 430					
Budget surplus or deficit (—)	269	-3, 406	-7, 137	-4, 751	-5, 922	—1, 59 6					
BUDGET FINANCING:		·									
Net borrowing from the public or repay- ment of borrowing (—)	2.174	1 427	9, 769	6.088	3 092	4, 061					
Other means of financing	2, 174 -2, 443	1, 427 1, 979	-2, 632	6, 088 -1, 337	3, 092 2, 830	-2, 465					
Total means of financing	-269	3, 406	7, 137	4, 751	5, 922	1,596					
OUTSTANDING DEBT, END OF YEAR:	200 962	202 005	202 201	210 007	216 762	122 154					
Gross Federal debt Held by the public	290, 8 62 237, 177	292, 895 238, 604	303, 291 248, 373	310, 807 254, 4 61	316, 763 257, 553	323, 1 54 261, 614					
BUDGET RECEIPTS	92, 492 40, 741	94, 389	99, 676	106, 560 47, 588 21, 579 14, 746	112,662	116, 833 48, 792 25, 461 17, 359 3, 819					
Individual income taxes	21, 494 11, 248	94, 389 41, 338 20, 954	20, 523	21, 579	48, 697 23, 493 16, 959	25, 461					
Employment taxes and contributions Unemployment insurance 2	11, 248 2, 667	12, 679 2, 9 02	45, 571 20, 523 12, 835 3, 337	4, 112	16, 959 4, 045	17, 359 3, 819					
Unem ployment insurance 2. Contributions for other insurance and retirement.	768	857	875	946	1,008						
Excise taxes	11, 676 1, 606	11,860 1,896	12, 534 2, 016	13, 194 2, 167	1,008 13,731 2,394 1,252	1, 081 14, 570 2, 716					
Excise taxes Estate and gift taxes Customs duties Miscellaneous receipts ⁸	1, 105 1, 187	982 919	1, 142 843	1, 205 1, 023	1, 252 1, 084	1, 442 1, 594					
	1, 107	919	043	1,023	1,004	1, 334					
MEMORANDUM: Federal funds	75, 650 19, 228	75, 179 21, 800	79, 703 22, 652	83, 550 25, 799	87, 205	90, 943 29, 230					
Trust funds	19, 228	21,800	22, 632	25, 799	28, 518	29, 230					
BUDGET OUTLAYS (EXPENDITURES AND NET LENDING)	92, 223 45, 908	97, 795	106, 813 51, 097	111, 311 52, 257	118, 584 53, 591	118, 430 49, 578					
National defense	45, 908 3, 054	97, 795 47, 381 3, 357	51,097 4,492		53, 591 4, 117	49, 578 4, 340 5, 091					
Space research and technology Agriculture and rural development Natural resources Commerce and transportation Community development and housing	401	/44	4, 492 1, 257 4, 123	2, 552 5, 139 1, 505 5, 743	4, 170	5, 091					
Natural resources	3, 322 1, 019 4, 774	3, 340 1, 568 5, 048	1.686	1,505	5, 185 1, 972	4, 807 2, 063 7, 364					
Commerce and transportation	4, 774 971	5, 048 191	5, 408 589	5, 743 880	6, 482 185	7, 364 288					
Education and manpower	1, 286	1, 499	1 732	1 732	2, 028	2, 533					
Education and manpower Health Income security Veterans benefits and services Interest General government	756 17, 977	873 20, 956	1, 139 22, 205 5, 625 8, 321	1, 393 23, 854 5, 520 9, 215	1, 737 24, 833	1, 730 25, 453					
Veterans benefits and services	17, 977 5, 426 8, 299	20, 956 5, 688 8, 108	5, 625	5, 520	5, 681 9, 810	25, 453 5, 722 10, 357					
General government	8, 299 1, 327	8, 108 1, 491	1, 650	1, 810	2, 040	2, 210					
Undistributed intragovernmental trans-											
actions	-2, 297	-2, 449	-2, 513	-2, 644	-2,877	-3, 109					
MEMORANDUM: Federal funds	74, 865	79, 336	86, 594	90, 141	95, 761 25, 884	94, 807					
Trust funds Intragovernmental transactions	74, 865 19, 743 2, 385	21, 048 2, 589	86, 594 22, 898 2, 680	90, 141 23, 958 2, 788	25, 884 3, 061	26, 962 —3, 339					
intragovernmentar transactions	-2, 303	2, 503	-2,000	-2,750	3, 001	- 0, 000					

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE C-62.—Federal budget receipts, outlays, financing, and debt, 1960-71—Continued [Millions of dollars; fiscal years]

Description		Ac	tuai		Estimate		
	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	
RECEIPTS, EXPENDITURES, AND NET LEND-		-					
ING: Expenditure account:		_	ĺ				
Receipts Expenditures (excluding net lending)	130, 856 130, 820	149, 552 153, 201	153, 671 172, 802	187, 792 183, 080	199, 386 194, 985	202, 103 200, 088	
Expenditure account surplus or deficit (—)	36	-3, 649	-19, 131	4, 712	4, 401	2, 014	
Loan account: Loan disbursements Loan repayments	14, 628 10, 796	17, 676 12, 623	20, 327 14, 297	13, 117 11, 640	9, 489 6, 589	8, 604 7, 921	
Net lending	3, 832	5, 053	6, 030	1,476	2, 900	683	
Total budget:							
Receipts Outlays (expenditures and net lending)_	130, 856 134, 652	149, 552 158, 254	153, 671 178, 833	187, 792 184, 556	199, 386 197, 885	202, 103 200, 771	
Budget surplus or deficit (—)	-3, 796	-8, 702	-25, 161	3, 236	1,501	1, 331	
BUDGET FINANCING: Net borrowing from the public or repayment of borrowing (—) Other means of financing	3, 076 720	2, 838 5, 863	23, 100 2, 061	-1, 044 -2, 192	-2, 583 1, 082	-1,200 -131	
Total means of financing	3, 796	8, 702	25, 161	1 -3, 236	1-1,501	1-1,331	
OUTSTANDING DEBT END OF YEAR: Gross Federal debtHeld by the public	329, 474 264, 690	341, 348 267, 529	369, 769 290, 629	367, 144 279, 483	374, 734 278, 483	382, 503 277, 283	
BUDGET RECEIPTS	130, 856	149, 552	153, 671	187, 792	199, 386	202, 103	
Individual income taxes	55, 446 30, 073 20, 662 3, 777	61, 526 33, 971 27, 823 3, 659	68, 726 28, 665 29, 224 3, 346	87, 249 36, 678 34, 236 3, 328	92, 200 37, 000 38, 914 3, 340	91, 000 35, 000 42, 842 3, 335	
Contributions for other insurance and re- tirement. Excise taxes Estate and gift taxes. Customs duties. Miscellaneous receipts ³	1, 129 13, 062 3, 066 1, 767 1, 875	1, 867 13, 719 2, 978 1, 901 2, 108	2, 052 14, 079 3, 051 2, 038 2, 491	2, 353 15, 222 3, 491 2, 319 2, 916	2, 551 15, 940 3, 500 2, 260 3, 681	2, 931 17, 520 3, 600 2, 260 3, 614	
MEMORANDUM: Federal fundsTrust funds	101, 427 32, 997	111, 835 42, 935	114, 726 44, 716	143, 329 52, 009	149, 579 58, 141	147, 600 64, 107	
BUDGET OUTLAYS (EXPENDITURES AND NET LENDING)	134, 652	158, 254	178, 833	184, 556	197, 885	200,771	
National defense International affairs and finance Space research and technology Agriculture and rural development Natural resources Commerce and transportation Community development and housing Education and manpower Health Income security Veterans benefits and services Interest General government Allowances Undistributed intragovernmental trans-	56, 785 4, 490 5, 933 3, 679 2, 035 7, 135 2, 644 4, 523 2, 543 28, 751 5, 920 11, 285 2, 292	70, 081 4, 547 5, 423 4, 376 1, 860 7, 554 2, 616 6, 135 6, 721 30, 881 6, 897 12, 588 2, 510	80, 517 4, 619 4, 721 5, 943 1, 702 8, 047 4, 076 7, 012 9, 672 33, 835 6, 882 13, 744 2, 561	81, 240 3, 785 4, 247 6, 221 2, 129 7, 873 1, 961 11, 696 37, 399 7, 640 15, 791 2, 866	79, 432 4, 113 3, 886 6, 343 2, 485 9, 436 3, 046 7, 538 13, 265 43, 832 8, 681 17, 821 3, 620 475	73, 583 3, 589 3, 400 5, 364 2, 503 8, 785 3, 781 8, 129 14, 957 50, 384 8, 475 17, 799 4, 084 2, 575	
actions	3, 364	-3, 936	4, 499	— 5, 117	6, 088	-6, 639	
MEMORANDUM: Federal funds Trust funds Intragovernmental transactions	106, 512 31, 708 -3, 568	126, 779 36, 693 -5, 218	143, 105 41, 499 —5, 771	148, 819 43, 284 -7, 547	156, 703 49, 517 —8, 335	154, 936 55, 440 —9, 605	

Excludes changes due to reclassification and to conversion of mixed-ownership enterprises to private ownership. (See footnote to Table 9 of the 1971 Budget Document.)
 Includes Federal funds of \$339 million in 1960.
 Includes both Federal funds and trust funds.

Source: Bureau of the Budget.

Table C-63.—Relation of the Federal Budget to the Federal sector of the national income and product accounts, 1968-71

[Billions of dollars; fiscal years]

Receipts and expenditures	Act	ual	Estimate			
	1968	1969	1970	1971		
RECEIPTS						
Total receipts, budget	153, 7	187. 8	199. 4	202. 1		
Government contribution for employee retirement (grossing) Other netting and grossing Adjustment to accruals Other	1.9 1.1 4.3 —, 1	2.1 1.3 1.7 2	2.4 1.4 9 4	2.6 1.4 5 2		
Federal sector, national income and product accounts, receipts.	160, 9	192. 7	201.8	205, 4		
EXPENDITURES						
Total outlays, budget	178. 8	184. 6	197. 9	200, 8		
Loan account	-6.0 -1.6	-1.5 -1.0	-2.9 -1.8	7 -1.9		
(grossing). Other netting and grossing. Defense timing adjustment. Dollar expenditures to finance agricultural exports. Other.	1.9 1.1 -2.1 7 1.0	2.1 1.3 .7 3	2.4 1.4 1.7 3 2	2.6 1.4 1.3 2 .5		
Federal sector, national income and product accounts, expenditures.	172, 4	186. 7	198. 1	203. 8		

Note.—See Special Analysis A, "Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1971," for description of these categories.

Sources: Bureau of the Budget and Department of Commerce (Office of Business Economics).

TABLE C-64.—Receipts and expenditures of the Federal Government sector of the national income and product accounts, 1946-71

(Billions of dollars)

		F	Receipts			ns of del		Ex	penditu	res			Sur-
		Per-	Car	Indi- rect	Con		D		nsfer nents	Consta		Subsi- dies less cur-	or defi- cit (—),
Year or quarter	Total	sonal tax and non- tax re- ceipts	Cor- po- rate profits tax ac- cruals	ness tax and non- tax ac- cru- als	Con- tribu- tions for social insur- ance	Total	Pur- chases of goods and serv- ices	To per- sons	To for- eign- ers (net)	Grants- in-aid to State and local govern- ments	Net in- ter- est paid	rent sur- plus of gov- ern- ment enter- prises	na- tion- ai in- come and prod- uct ac- counts
Fiscal year: 1946- 1947- 1948- 1948- 1950- 1951- 1952- 1953- 1954- 1955- 1956- 1957- 1958- 1959- 1960- 1961- 1962- 1963- 1964- 1965- 1966- 1967- 1968- 1968- 1969- 19701- 19711 Calendar year:	38. 4 42. 7 43. 6 40. 0 60. 8 65. 1 65. 8 65. 8 67. 2 75. 8 80. 7 77. 9 85. 4 94. 8 95. 3 104. 2 115. 5 132. 8 147. 3 160. 9 192. 7 201. 8 205. 4	16.98 18.00 16.35 16.35 28.43 30.76 36.32 33.67 33.76 42.56 47.67 50.73 67.73	8.36 11.29 111.9 111.5 1	7.49 7.79 8.25 9.77 10.4 10.08 11.69 11.33 13.32 15.69 17.18 18.61 17.86 11.92 11.93 11.93 11.94 11.94 11.95	5.5.6.8.5.6.3.5.8.7.2.7.2.8.7.1.1.2.3.4.5.5.6.3.5.8.0.6.3.9.1.1.2.3.4.5.5.0.6.3.9.1.5.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0	55. 5 29. 5 30. 9 39. 6 44. 6 66. 6 67. 3 69. 8 76. 2 69. 8 76. 0 90. 9 91. 3 98. 0 116. 4 111. 5 131. 9 154. 6 172. 4 186. 7 198. 1 190. 8	40. 1 13. 0 13. 2 19. 3 19. 3 25. 1 46. 6 56. 1 553. 2 45. 7 54. 7 55. 5 60. 9 63. 4 71. 7 85. 3 101. 1 100. 8 96. 6	8.37 8.13 8.53 10.51 12.18 14.88 10.51 12.18 14.88 10.66 11.28 12.26 12.27 12.28 13.37 14.28 14.27 14.28 14.27 14.28 14.27 14.28 14.27 14.28 14.27 14.28 14.27 14.28 14.27 14.28 14.	1.2.5.4.3.2.2.1.2.1.1.1.2.2.3.2.1.2.2.2.2.2.2.2	0.9 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.5 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.7 6.2 6.9 7.6 8.4 9.8 10.9 12.7 14.8 9.2 12.4	3.4.4.4.4.6.8.8.0.9.1.5.7.9.0.8.8.5.1.5.0.9.8.3.6.3.1.3.1.3.1.3.1.3.1.3.1.3.1.3.1.3.1	2. 17580 11. 1903785432868 11. 1. 22. 23. 33. 34. 54. 11. 151	-17. 13. 12161685522111. 63. 3. 1. 63.
1946	70.0 63.8 72.1 77.6 81.6 78.7	17. 2 19. 6 19. 0 16. 1 18. 1 26. 1 31. 0 32. 2 29. 0 31. 4 35. 2 37. 48. 6 51. 5 51. 5 53. 8 67. 5 79. 5	8. 6 10. 7 11. 8 9. 8 17. 0 21. 5 19. 5 17. 0 20. 6 20. 6 20. 6 22. 7 21. 8 22. 7 21. 8 22. 7 21. 8 32. 1 30. 6 38. 3 40. 4	7.8 8.0 8.9 9.7 10.9 10.7 11.8 11.5 12.5 13.6 14.6 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 18.8	5.515 44.99 7.7.44 89.10.62 112.48 117.25 123.88 123.88 10.59 10.6	35. 6 29. 8 34. 9 41. 3 40. 8 71. 0 77. 0 69. 7 79. 6 88. 9 91. 0 93. 0 102. 1 110. 3 113. 9 118. 1 123. 5 142. 8 181. 5 191. 9	17. 2 12. 5 16. 5 20. 1 18. 4 37. 7 51. 8 57. 0 47. 4 44. 1 45. 6 53. 6 53. 6 53. 6 63. 4 64. 2 66. 9 90. 7 99. 5 102. 0 adjusted	9. 2 8. 8 7. 6 8. 7 10. 8 8. 8 9. 5 11. 5 12. 4 13. 4 19. 5 21. 5 22. 8 30. 3 40. 0 45. 7 annual	2.29 3.16 3.11 2.08 1.89 1.88 1.91 2.22 2.23 2.19 rates	1. 1 1. 70 2. 22 2. 25 2. 68 2. 91 3. 32 4. 66. 85 7. 20 9. 14 11. 14 15. 9 18. 3 19. 9	4.224.4.574.5.993.764.1627.375.360 113.0	1.66782308115467158062344.736	3. 13. 82. 9. 63775. 4. 5. 2101333. 115. 9.
1968: V	165. 7 170. 8 181. 4 187. 3	72. 1 74. 7 83. 7 87. 4	37. 0 38. 1 38. 4 39. 8	17. 4 17. 9 18. 3 18. 5	39. 3 40. 1 40. 9 41. 7	174. 1 180. 3 184. 2 187. 4	96. 3 99. 0 100. 9 101. 9	43. 3 45. 5 46. 5 47. 6	1.8 2.0 2.3 2.4	17. 7 18. 2 18. 4 19. 0	11. 0 11. 4 11. 7 12. 2	4. 0 4. 1 4. 6 4. 4	-8. -9. -2.
1969: I II III IV P	198. 6 202. 8 201. 3	93. 8 96. 9 95. 0 96. 6	40.7 41.0 39.8	18. 5 18. 6 19. 1 18. 9	45. 6 46. 4 47. 5 48. 1	188. 5 189. 3 193. 6 196. 2	101. 6 100. 6 103. 2 102. 7	49. 1 50. 0 50. 9 51. 6	1.7 2.1 1.8 2.0	19. 0 19. 3 19. 8 21. 4	12. 5 12. 9 13. 1 13. 5	4. 6 4. 4 4. 6 4. 9	10. 13. 7.

¹ Estimates.

Receipts for 1969 reflect repeal of investment tax credit.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Office of Business Economics) and Bureau of the Budget.

Note.—Includes the transactions of the trust accounts and excludes certain financial transactions. Corporate profits taxes are included in receipts on an accrual basis; purchases of goods and services from business are timed with delivery; and CCC guaranteed price-support crop loans are counted as expenditures when the loans are made, not when CCC redeems them.

TABLE C-65.—Public debt securities by kind of obligation, 1946-69 [Billions of dollars]

		Interest-bearing public debt									
	Total public	Marketa by i	able public naturity cl	issues ass	Non	marketabl	e public is	sues	Matured public debt and		
End of year or month	debt securi- ties	Within 1 year	1 to 10 years	10 years and over	Special issues ¹	U.S. sav- ings bonds ²	For- eign and inter- na- tional	Other	debt bear- ing no inter- est		
1946	_ 256.9	54. 8 49. 6 44. 6 49. 4	61. 7 56. 1 55. 1 51. 8	60, 1 60, 0 57, 7 53, 9	24. 6 29. 0 31. 7 33. 9	49. 8 52. 1 55. 1 56. 7		6. 7 7. 4 6. 3 9. 3	1. 5 2. 7 2. 2 2. 1		
1950	259. 4 267. 4 275. 2 278. 7 280. 8 276. 6 274. 9 282. 9	49. 4 47. 1 57. 7 73. 9 62. 8 61. 7 68. 6 75. 3 72. 6 79. 9	50, 5 56, 7 62, 2 50, 4 64, 7 68, 6 58, 9 71, 0 83, 7	52. 5 38. 8 28. 7 30. 3 30. 2 32. 9 32. 9 32. 0 24. 6	33. 7 35. 9 39. 1 41. 2 42. 6 43. 9 45. 6 45. 8 44. 8 43. 5	58. 0 57. 6 57. 9 57. 7 57. 7 57. 9 56. 3 52. 5 51. 2 48. 2		10. 1 20. 9 19. 6 19. 3 17. 7 12. 7 11. 9 10. 4 9. 2 7. 8	2. 4 2. 3 2. 1 2. 3 3. 0 2. 4 2. 0 2. 1 3. 1		
1960	296. 2 303. 5 309. 3 317. 9 320. 9 329. 3 344. 7	75. 3 85. 9 87. 3 89. 4 88. 5 93. 4 105. 2 104. 4 108. 6 118. 1	89. 5 84. 7 95. 6 94. 2 100. 4 95. 6 87. 5 97. 0 103. 4 93. 3	24. 2 25. 4 20. 1 24. 0 25. 6 25. 4 25. 1 24. 8 24. 4	44. 3 43. 5 43. 4 43. 7 46. 1 46. 3 52. 0 57. 2 59. 1 71. 0	47. 2 47. 5 47. 5 48. 8 49. 7 50. 3 50. 8 51. 7 52. 3 52. 2	0.5 .7 1.3 1.7 2.4 1.5 3.1 4.3 3.8	6. 3 5. 3 4. 6 3. 8 3. 0 2. 8 2. 7 2. 6 3. 4	3. 4 3. 5 4. 3 4. 1 4. 4 4. 4 3. 5 2. 9 2. 0		
1968: Jan	351.6 349.5 347.0	107. 2 116. 3 114. 6 111. 8 109. 0 106. 4	97. 0 92. 0 92. 0 91. 9 97. 8 95. 2	25. 1 25. 0 25. 0 25. 0 25. 0 25. 0	55. 9 57. 2 56. 7 57. 0 59. 2 59. 5	51.7 51.7 51.8 51.8 51.9 51.9	3. 2 3. 4 3. 3 3. 5 3. 5 3. 7	2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6	3. 4 3. 2 3. 3 3. 4 3. 4 3. 2		
JulyAugSeptOctNov	_ 356.9	110.8 106.1 106.5 116.0 104.9 108.6	95. 2 102. 1 102. 1 95. 7 105. 9 103. 4	24.9 24.9 24.9 24.9 24.8 24.8	58. 9 60. 1 59. 7 58. 8 59. 0 59. 1	52. 0 52. 0 52. 1 52. 2 52. 3 52. 3	3.5 3.3 3.7 3.8 4.4 4.3	2. 6 2. 6 2. 6 2. 6 2. 6 2. 6	3. 1 3. 1 3. 2 3. 1 3. 0 2. 9		
1969: Jan	358.8	110. 4 100. 3 103. 3 101. 2 111. 9 103. 9	103. 4 111. 5 109. 2 109. 1 97. 6 97. 6	24. 8 24. 7 24. 7 24. 7 24. 6 24. 6	59. 8 60. 9 61. 1 62. 3 64. 9 66. 8	52. 3 52. 3 52. 3 52. 2 52. 2 52. 2 52. 2	4. 4 4. 5 4. 5 4. 5 4. 4 4. 1	2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5	1.8 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0		
July	357. 0 360. 2 360. 7 364. 4 368. 1	107. 4 112. 6 112. 6 109. 6 120. 1 118. 1	97. 6 94. 1 94. 1 101. 0 93. 3 93. 3	24. 6 24. 5 24. 5 24. 5 24. 4 24. 4	66. 8 68. 4 68. 9 68. 1 69. 3 71. 0	52. 2 52. 1 52. 1 52. 1 52. 1 52. 2	4, 0 3, 8 3, 8 4, 1 3, 8 3, 8	2. 6 2. 7 2. 8 3. 1 3. 1 3. 4	1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.8 2.0		

Issued to U.S. Government accounts. These accounts also held \$18.4 billion of public marketable and nonmarketable issues on December 31, 1969.
 Includes sales of U.S. savings notes beginning May 1967.

Source: Treasury Department.

Table C-66.—Estimated ownership of public debt securities, 1939-69

[Par values,1 billions of dollars]

				Tota	l public d	ebt securi	ties 2			
						Held by	private in	vestors		
End of year or month	Total	Held by Govern- ment ac- counts	Held by Federal Reserve banks	Total	Com- mercial banks ³	Mutual savings banks and in- surance com- panies	Other corpo- rations 4	State and local govern- ments 5	Indi- viduals ⁶	Miscel- laneous inves- tors ⁷
1939	41.9	6. 1	2. 5	33.4	12.7	8. 4	2.0	0.4	9. 4	0.5
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1944 1946 1946 1947 1948 1949	45. 0 57. 9 108. 2 165. 9 230. 6 278. 1 259. 1 256. 9 252. 8 257. 1	6. 7 8. 5 10. 5 14. 5 19. 0 23. 9 27. 4 30. 8 33. 7 35. 9	2. 2 2. 3 6. 2 11. 5 18. 8 24. 3 23. 3 22. 6 23. 3 18. 9	36. 2 47. 1 91. 5 139. 8 192. 8 230. 0 208. 3 203. 6 195. 8 202. 4	13. 7 17. 1 38. 2 57. 3 76. 7 90. 8 74. 5 68. 7 62. 4 66. 8	9. 2 11. 0 15. 4 20. 8 28. 0 34. 7 36. 7 35. 9 32. 7 31. 5	2. 0 4. 0 10. 1 16. 4 21. 4 22. 2 15. 3 14. 1 14. 8 16. 8	.57 1.0 2.1 4.3 6.5 6.3 7.3 7.9 8.1	10. 0 13. 0 23. 3 37. 2 53. 1 64. 0 64. 1 65. 7 65. 5 66. 3	.8 1.3 3.5 6.0 9.3 11.8 11.4 11.9 12.5
1950	256. 7 259. 4 267. 4 275. 2 278. 7 280. 8 276. 6 274. 9 282. 9 290. 8	36. 0 39. 3 42. 9 45. 4 46. 7 49. 0 51. 2 52. 8 52. 1 51. 4	20. 8 23. 8 24. 7 25. 9 24. 9 24. 8 24. 9 24. 2 26. 3 26. 6	199. 9 196. 3 199. 8 203. 8 207. 1 207. 0 200. 5 197. 9 204. 5 212. 7	61. 8 61. 5 63. 4 63. 7 69. 1 62. 0 59. 5 59. 5 67. 5 60. 3	29. 6 26. 2 25. 5 25. 1 24. 1 23. 1 21. 2 20. 1 19. 8 19. 4	19. 7 20. 7 19. 9 21. 5 19. 1 23. 2 18. 7 17. 7 18. 1 21. 4	8. 8 9. 6 11. 1 12. 7 14. 4 15. 4 16. 3 16. 6 16. 5 18. 0	66. 3 64. 6 65. 2 64. 8 63. 5 65. 0 65. 9 64. 9 63. 7	13. 6 13. 7 14. 7 16. 1 16. 9 18. 3 18. 9 19. 1 18. 9 24. 3
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968	290. 2 296. 2 303. 5 309. 3 317. 9 320. 9 329. 3 344. 7 358. 0 368. 2	52. 8 52. 5 53. 2 55. 3 58. 4 59. 7 65. 8 73. 1 76. 6	27. 4 28. 9 30. 8 33. 6 37. 0 40. 8 44. 3 49. 1 52. 9 57. 2	210. 0 214. 8 219. 5 220. 5 222. 5 220. 5 219. 2 222. 4 228. 5 222. 0	62. 1 67. 2 67. 1 64. 2 63. 9 60. 7 57. 4 63. 8 65. 5 56. 1	18. 0 17. 4 17. 5 16. 8 16. 5 15. 6 14. 1 12. 7 11. 6	18. 7 18. 5 18. 6 18. 7 18. 2 15. 8 14. 9 12. 2 14. 6 15. 8	18. 7 19. 0 20. 1 21. 1 21. 1 22. 9 24. 9 25. 1 27. 1	66. 1 65. 9 66. 0 68. 2 69. 8 72. 1 74. 6 74. 0 75. 3	26. 5 26. 9 30. 1 31. 5 33. 0 33. 4 33. 3 34. 7 34. 4 33. 5
1968: JanFebMarAprMayMayJuneJune	346. 3 351. 6 349. 5 347. 0 352. 3 347. 6	71. 8 73. 4 72. 9 73. 1 75. 7 76. 1	49. 1 49. 0 49. 7 50. 5 50. 6 52. 2	225. 3 229. 2 226. 9 223. 4 226. 0 219. 2	62. 8 63. 7 62. 0 59. 8 60. 8 59. 8	12. 5 12. 5 12. 6 12. 3 12. 4 12. 0	13. 4 14. 8 14. 1 13. 6 15. 6 13. 0	25. 6 26. 4 27. 1 26. 9 26. 8 26. 6	74. 5 75. 2 75. 2 75. 2 75. 4 74. 2	36. 5 36. 6 35. 9 35. 6 34. 9 33. 7
July	351. 1 354. 4 354. 7 357. 2 356. 9 358. 0	75. 6 76. 9 76. 5 76. 2 76. 6 76. 6	52. 4 53. 0 53. 3 53. 3 53. 4 52. 9	223. 1 224. 5 224. 9 227. 7 226. 9 228. 5	61. 2 62. 1 63. 5 65. 3 63. 9 65. 5	12.0 11.9 11.9 11.7 11.6 11.6	14. 3 14. 5 12. 9 14. 0 14. 8 14. 6	26. 7 26. 9 26. 7 26. 8 26. 7 27. 1	74. 7 74. 9 75. 2 75. 0 74. 7 75. 3	34. 2 34. 2 34. 7 34. 8 35. 2 34. 4
1969: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	359. 4 358. 8 359. 5 358. 5 360. 1 353. 7	77. 3 78. 7 79. 0 79. 8 82. 7 84. 8	52. 1 52. 3 52. 4 53. 1 53. 8 54. 1	230. 0 227. 8 228. 1 225. 6 223. 6 214. 8	64. 2 60. 8 60. 6 58. 6 56. 4 54. 9	11.5 11.4 11.3 11.1 11.6 11.0	16.8 17.8 17.6 17.0 17.4 15.1	27. 8 28. 4 28. 1 28. 7 28. 1 27. 3	75. 9 76. 1 76. 4 76. 6 76. 8 76. 4	33. 7 33. 1 33. 9 33. 5 33. 2 30. 2
July	357. 0 360. 2 360. 7 364. 4 368. 1	85. 0 86. 6 86. 9 86. 1 87. 0 89. 0	54. 1 54. 9 54. 1 55. 5 57. 3 57. 2	217. 9 218. 6 219. 6 222. 7 223. 8 222. 0	56. 0 54. 7 54. 4 55. 7 56. 4 56. 1	10.6 10.4 10.2 10.1 10.2 10.1	15. 8 16. 8 15. 2 16. 4 16. 8 15. 8	27. 5 27. 3 27. 6 27. 0 27. 3 27. 1	76. 9 77. 2 77. 8 78. 5 78. 7 79. 4	31. 0 32. 3 34. 3 35. 0 34. 3 33. 5

¹ United States savings bonds, series A-F and J, and U.S. savings notes are included at current redemption value.
2 Not all of total shown is subject to statutory debt limitation.
3 Includes commercial banks, trust companies, and stock savings banks in the United States and Territories and island possessions; figures exclude securities held in trust departments. Since the estimates in this table are on the basis of par values and include holdings of banks in United States Territories and possessions, they do not agree with the estimates in Table C-51, which are based on book values and relate only to banks within the United States.
4 Exclusive of banks and insurance companies.
5 Includes trust eligibles and investment finds of State and local governments and their generies, and of Territories.

⁵ Includes trust, sinking, and investment funds of State and local governments and their agencies, and of Territories and possessions.

and possessions.

§ Includes partnerships and personal trust accounts.

Includes partnerships and loan associations, nonprofit institutions, corporate pension trust funds, dealers and brokers, rederal oriented agencies not included in Government accounts, and investments of foreign balances and international accounts in this country. Beginning with December 1946, the international accounts include investments by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the International Development Association, the Inter-American Development Bank, and various United Nations' funds, in special non-interest-bearing notes and bonds issued by the U.S. Government.

Source: Treasury Department.

Table C-67.—Average length and maturity distribution of marketable interest-bearing public debt, 1946-69

	Amount		٨	laturity clas	s				
End of year or month	out- standing	Within 1 year	1 to 5 years	5 to 10 years	10 to 20 years	20 years and over	Average length		
			Millions	of dollars		!	Years	Months	
Fiscal year: 1946	189, 606 168, 702 160, 346 155, 147	61, 974 51, 211 48, 742 48, 130	24, 763 21, 851 21, 630 32, 562	41, 807 35, 562 32, 264 16, 746	17, 461 18, 597 16, 229 22, 821	43, 599 41, 481 41, 481 34, 888	9 9 9 8	1	
1950	155, 310 137, 917 140, 407 147, 335 150, 354	42, 338 43, 908 46, 367 65, 270 62, 734	51, 292 46, 526 47, 814 36, 161 29, 866	7, 792 8, 707 13, 933 15, 651 27, 515	28, 035 29, 979 25, 700 28, 662 28, 634	25, 853 8, 797 6, 594 1, 592 1, 606	8 6 5 5 5	2 2 4	
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	155, 206 154, 953 155, 705 166, 675 178, 027	49,703 58,714 71,952 67,782 72,958	39, 107 34, 401 40, 669 42, 557 58, 304	34, 253 28, 908 12, 328 21, 476 17, 052	28, 613 28, 578 26, 407 27, 652 21, 625	3, 530 4, 351 4, 349 7, 208 8, 088	5 5 4 5 4	10	
1960	183, 845	70, 467 81, 120 88, 442 85, 294 81, 424	72, 844 58, 400 57, 041 58, 026 65, 453	20, 246 26, 435 26, 049 37, 385 34, 929	12, 630 10, 233 9, 319 8, 360 8, 355	7, 658 10, 960 15, 221 14, 444 16, 328	4 4 5 5	1	
1965 1966 1967 1968	209, 127	87,637 89,136 89,648 106,407 103,910	56, 198 60, 933 71, 424 64, 470 62, 770	39, 169 33, 596 24, 378 30, 754 34, 837	8, 449 8, 439 8, 425 8, 407 8, 374	17, 241 17, 023 16, 797 16, 553 16, 217	5 4 4 4	1	
1968: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	233, 273 231, 651	107, 199 116, 253 114, 646 111, 783 109, 012 106, 407	78, 157 67, 967 67, 969 67, 922 67, 017 64, 470	18, 859 24, 005 24, 006 24, 006 30, 752 30, 754	8, 416 8, 414 8, 413 8, 411 8, 409 8, 407	16, 654 16, 635 16, 617 16, 596 16, 571 16, 553	4 4 4 4 4	,	
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	230, 977 233, 167 233, 556 236, 651 235, 653 236, 812	110, 824 106, 121 106, 534 116, 040 104, 938 108, 611	64, 469 64, 996 64, 997 58, 606 70, 751 68, 260	30, 754 37, 143 37, 143 37, 142 35, 130 35, 130	8, 406 8, 402 8, 401 8, 400 8, 398 8, 396	16, 525 16, 504 16, 482 16, 464 16, 435 16, 415	4 4 4 4	•	
1969: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	238, 543 236, 535 237, 272	110, 377 100, 282 103, 342 101, 159 111, 855 103, 910	68, 260 75, 778 73, 494 73, 407 62, 769 62, 770	35, 129 35, 727 35, 726 35, 726 34, 837 34, 837	8, 395 8, 394 8, 390 8, 386 8, 379 8, 374	16, 382 16, 354 16, 320 16, 291 16, 257 16, 217	3 4 3 3 4	11 11 11 11	
July Aug Sept Oct Nov	229, 581 231, 230 231, 203 235, 029 237, 919	107, 416 112, 618 112, 616 109, 550 120, 144 118, 124	62, 763 69, 519 69, 522 74, 762 73, 305 73, 302	34, 837 24, 553 24, 553 26, 247 20, 026 20, 026	8, 372 8, 370 8, 367 8, 363 8, 360 8, 358	16, 194 16, 170 16, 145 16, 107 16, 083 16, 054	3 3 3 3	1 1 1	

Note.—All issues classified to final maturity except partially tax-exempt bonds, which were classified to earliest call date (the last of these bonds were called on August 14, 1962, for redemption on December 15, 1962).

Source: Treasury Department.

[Billions of dollars]

			HILLOUIS OF	uonars ₁				_	
	Tota	al governr	nent	Feder	al Govern	ment 1		ate and lo overnmen	
Calendar year or quarter	Re- ceipts	Ex- pendi- tures	Sur- plus or deficit (-), national income and prod- uct ac- counts	Re- ceipts	Ex- pendi- tures	Sur- plus or deficit (), national income and prod- uct ac- counts	Re- ceipts	Ex- pendi- tures	Sur- plus or deficit (—), national income and prod- uct ac- counts
1929	11.3	10.3	1.0	3. 8	2, 6	1. 2	7.6	7.8	-0.2
1930	10. 8 9. 5 8. 9 9. 3 10. 5 11. 4 12. 9 15. 4 15. 0 15. 4	11. 1 12. 4 10. 6 10. 7 12. 9 13. 4 16. 1 15. 0 16. 8 17. 6	3 -2.9 -1.8 -1.4 -2.4 -2.0 -3.1 -1.8 -2.2	3.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.5 4.0 7.0 6.7	2. 8 4. 2 3. 4. 6 6. 5 7. 4 8. 9	-3 -2.1 -1.5 -1.3 -2.9 -2.6 -3.6 4 -2.1 -2.2	7.87 7.73 7.86 9.6 9.3 9.6	8. 4 8. 5 7. 2 8. 6 8. 1 9. 0 9. 6	6 3 1 .5 .6 .5 .7
1940 1941 1942 1943 1943 1945 1946 1946 1947 1948	17. 7 25. 0 32. 6 49. 2 51. 2 53. 2 56. 8 58. 9 56. 0	18. 4 28. 8 64. 0 93. 3 103. 0 92. 7 45. 5 42. 4 50. 3 59. 1	7 -3.8 -31.4 -44.1 -51.8 -39.5 5.4 14.4 8.5 -3.2	8. 6 15. 4 22. 9 39. 3 41. 0 42. 5 39. 1 43. 2 43. 3 38. 9	10, 0 20, 5 56, 1 85, 8 95, 5 84, 6 35, 6 29, 8 34, 9 41, 3	-1.3 -5.1 -33.1 -46.6 -54.5 -42.1 3.5 13.4 8.4 -2.4	10. 0 10. 4 10. 6 10. 9 11. 1 11. 6 12. 9 15. 3 17. 6 19. 3	9. 3 9. 1 8. 8 8. 4 8. 5 9. 0 11. 0 14. 3 17. 4 20. 0	.6 1.3 1.8 2.5 2.7 2.6 1.9 1.0
1950	68. 7 84. 8 89. 8 94. 3 89. 7 100. 4 109. 0 115. 6 114. 7 128. 9	60. 8 79. 0 93. 7 101. 2 96. 7 97. 6 104. 1 114. 9 127. 2 131. 0	7.8 5.8 -3.8 -6.9 -7.0 2.7 4.9 -12.5 -2.1	49. 9 64. 0 67. 2 70. 0 63. 8 72. 1 77. 6 81. 6 78. 7 89. 7	40. 8 57. 8 71. 0 77. 0 69. 1 71. 9 79. 6 88. 9 91. 0	9. 1 6. 2 -3. 8 -7. 0 -5. 9 4. 0 5. 7 2. 1 -10. 2 -1. 2	21. 1 23. 3 25. 2 27. 2 28. 8 31. 4 34. 7 38. 2 41. 6	22. 3 23. 7 25. 3 27. 0 29. 7 35. 6 39. 5 44. 0 46. 8	-1.2 4 (*) -1.1 -1.3 9 -1.4 -2.3
1960	139. 8 144. 6 157. 0 168. 8 174. 1 189. 1 213. 3 228. 4 264. 2 302. 0	136. 1 149. 0 159. 9 166. 9 175. 4 186. 9 212. 3 242. 9 270. 8 293. 0	3. 7 -4. 3 -2. 9 1. 8 -1. 4 2. 2 1. 1 -14. 5 -6. 7 9. 0	96. 5 98. 3 106. 4 114. 5 115. 0 124. 7 142. 5 151. 1 176. 3 201. 6	93. 0 102. 1 110. 3 113. 9 118. 1 123. 5 142. 8 163. 8 181. 5 191. 9	3.5 -3.8 -3.8 -7 -3.0 1.2 -2 -12.7 -5.2 9.7	49. 9 53. 6 58. 6 63. 4 69. 5 75. 5 85. 2 93. 2 106. 2 120. 2	49, 6 54, 1 57, 6 62, 2 67, 8 74, 5 83, 9 95, 0 107, 6 121, 0	.2 5 1.7 1.7 1.0 1.3 -1.8 -1.5
			S	easonally	adjusted a	innual rate	es		
1967:	222. 0 224. 4 230. 1 237. 0	236. 1 240. 4 244. 8 250. 4	-14.1 -16.0 -14.6 -13.4	147. 5 148. 3 152. 0 156. 4	159. 5 161. 4 165. 3 168. 8	-12.0 -13.2 -13.4 -12.3	89. 6 90. 9 94. 4 97. 9	91. 7 93. 6 95. 6 99. 0	-2, 1 -2, 8 -1, 3 -1, 0
1968:	248, 5 257, 3 271, 1 279, 7	260, 0 268, 1 274, 5 280, 6	-11.5 -10.8 -3.5 9	165, 7 170, 8 181, 4 187, 3	174, 1 180, 3 184, 2 187, 4	-8.4 -9.5 -2.8 1	100, 5 104, 7 108, 0 111, 4	103. 6 106. 0 108. 7 112. 2	-3.1 -1.3 7 8
1969:	294. 1 302. 0 303. 4	285. 9 290. 6 296. 0 299. 7	8. 3 11. 4 7. 4	198. 6 202. 8 201. 3	188, 5 189, 3 193, 6 196, 2	10. 1 13. 5 7. 7	114.5 118.5 121.9	116.3 120.5 122.2 124.9	-1.8 -2.1 3

¹ See Note, Table C-64. ² Surplus of \$32 million. ³ Deficit of \$41 million.

Note.—Federal grants-in-aid to State and local governments are reflected in Federal expenditures and State and local receipts and expenditures. Total government receipts and expenditures have been adjusted to eliminate this duplication. Federal receipts for 1969 reflect repeal of investment tax credit.

Table C-69.—Receipts and expenditures of the State and local government sector of the national income and product accounts, 1946-69

[Billions of dollars; calendar years]

			Rec	eipts				Ex	penditu	es		Surplus
Year or quarter	Total	Per- sonal tax and nontax receipts	Cor- porate profits tax accruals	Indirect busi- ness tax and nontax accruals	Contri- butions for social insur- ance	Fed- eral grants- in-aid	Total	Pur- chases of goods and serv- ices	Trans- fer pay- ments to per- sons	Net interest paid	Less: Current surplus of gov- ern- ment enter- prises	or deficit (-), national income and prod- uct ac- counts
1946 1947 1948	12. 9 15. 3 17. 6 19. 3	1. 5 1. 8 2. 1 2. 4	0, 5 . 6 . 7 . 6	9, 3 10, 6 12, 1 13, 3	0.5 .6 .7	1. 1 1. 7 2. 0 2. 2	11. 0 14. 3 17. 4 20. 0	9, 8 12, 6 15, 0 17, 7	1. 7 2. 3 2. 9 2. 9	0, 3 .3 .3	0.7 .8 .8	1.9 1.0 .1 7
1950	21. 1 23. 3 25. 2 27. 2 28. 8	2. 6 2. 9 3. 1 3. 4 3. 7	.8 .9 .8 .8	14. 5 15. 8 17. 3 18. 7 19. 7	1.0 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.7	2. 3 2. 5 2. 6 2. 8 2. 9	22. 3 23. 7 25. 3 27. 0 29. 9	19. 5 21. 5 22. 9 24. 6 27. 4	3. 5 3. 0 3. 2 3. 3 3. 4	.3 .3 .3	1.1 1.1 1.2 1.4	-1.2 4 (i) -1.1
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	31. 4 34. 7 38. 2 41. 6 46. 0	4. 1 4. 7 5. 2 5. 6 6. 3	1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0	21. 4 23. 6 25. 5 27. 0 28. 9	1. 8 2. 0 2. 3 2. 5 2. 7	3. 1 3. 3 4. 2 5. 6 6. 8	32. 7 35. 6 39. 5 44. 0 46. 8	30. 1 33. 0 36. 6 40. 6 43. 3	3. 7 3. 8 4. 2 4. 6 4. 8	.5 .5 .6	1. 6 1. 7 1. 8 1. 8 2. 0	-1.3 9 -1.4 -2.3 8
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	49. 9 53. 6 58. 6 63. 4 69. 5	7.3 7.7 8.7 9.4 10.8	1.3 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.9	31. 7 34. 1 36. 9 39. 4 42. 3	3. 0 3. 2 3. 5 3. 8 4. 1	6. 5 7. 2 8. 0 9. 1 10. 4	49. 6 54. 1 57. 6 62. 2 67. 8	46. 1 50. 2 53. 7 58. 2 63. 5	5. 1 5. 5 5. 7 6. 0 6. 5	.7 .8 .8 .8	2. 2 2. 3 2. 6 2. 8 2. 9	5 9 1.2 1.7
1965	75. 5 85. 2 93. 2 106. 2 120. 2	11. 8 13. 7 15. 4 18. 4 21. 9	2, 1 2, 2 2, 4 3, 0 3, 1	45. 9 49. 9 53. 8 59. 9 67. 8	4.5 5.0 5.7 6.5 7.5	11. 1 14. 4 15. 9 18. 3 19. 9	74. 5 83. 9 95. 0 107. 6 121. 0	70. 1 79. 0 89. 3 100. 7 112. 7	6. 9 7. 7 8. 8 10. 0 11. 4	.5 .3 .2 .3	3. 0 3. 1 3. 3 3. 4 3. 5	1.0 1.3 -1.8 -1.5 7
			<u>'</u>		Seasona	lly adjus	ted annu	ial rates			<u>'</u>	
1967:	89. 6 90. 9 94. 4 97. 9	14. 7 15. 2 15. 7 16. 1	2. 4 2. 4 2. 4 2. 5	52. 0 53. 0 54. 3 55. 9	5. 4 5. 6 5. 8 6. 0	15. 1 14. 7 16. 2 17. 4	91. 7 93. 6 95. 6 99. 0	86. 4 88. 1 90. 0 92. 9	8. 4 8. 6 8. 9 9. 3	0. 2 . 1 . 1 . 2	3. 2 3. 3 3. 3 3. 3	-2. 1 -2. 8 -1. 3 -1. 0
1968: V	100. 5 104. 7 108. 0 111. 4	17. 2 18. 0 18. 9 19. 5	2. 9 3. 0 3. 0 3. 1	56. 5 59. 2 61. 1 62. 9	6. 2 6. 4 6. 6 6. 9	17. 7 18. 2 18. 4 19. 0	103. 6 106. 0 108. 7 112. 2	97. 1 99. 4 101. 7 104. 8	9. 7 9. 8 10. 2 10. 5	.2 .3 .3 .4	3. 4 3. 4 3. 5 3. 5	-3.1 -1.3 7 8
1969: I II III IV P	121.9	20. 5 21. 5 22. 5 23. 3	3. 1 3. 1 3. 0	64. 8 67. 1 68. 9 70. 4	7. 1 7. 4 7. 7 8. 0	19. 0 19. 3 19. 8 21. 4	116. 3 120. 5 122. 2 124. 9	108. 5 112. 3 113. 8 116. 2	11.0 11.3 11.6 11.9	.4	3. 5 3. 5 3. 6 3. 6	-1.8 -2.1 3

¹ Deficit of \$41 million.

Source: Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics.

TABLE C-70.—State and local government revenues and expenditures, selected fiscal years, 1927-68 [Millions of dollars]

		G	eneral re	venues b	y source	2		General expenditures by function ²					
Fiscal year 1	Total	Prop- erty taxes	Sales and gross re- ceipts taxes	Indi- vidual income taxes	Corpo- ration net income taxes	Reve- nue from Federal Govern- ment	All other reve- nue ⁸	Total	Edu- cation	High- ways	Public wel- fare	All other 4	
1927	7, 271	4, 730	470	70	92	116	1,793	7, 210	2, 235	1, 809	151	3, 015	
1932 1934 1936 1938	7, 267 7, 678 8, 395 9, 228	4, 487 4, 076 4, 093 4, 440	752 1, 008 1, 484 1, 794	74 80 153 218	79 49 113 165	1, 016 948	1,643 1,449 1,604 1,811	7, 765 7, 181 7, 644 8, 757	2, 311 1, 831 2, 177 2, 491	1, 741 1, 509 1, 425 1, 650	444 889 827 1, 069	3, 269 2, 952 3, 215 3, 547	
1940 1942 1944 1946 1948	9, 609 10, 418 10, 908 12, 356 17, 250	4, 430 4, 537 4, 604 4, 986 6, 126	1, 982 2, 351 2, 289 2, 986 4, 442	422	156 272 451 447 592	858 954 855	1, 872 2, 123 2, 269 2, 661 3, 685	9, 229 9, 190 8, 863 11, 028 17, 684	2, 638 2, 586 2, 793 3, 356 5, 379	1, 573 1, 490 1, 200 1, 672 3, 036	1, 156 1, 225 1, 133 1, 409 2, 099	3, 862 3, 889 3, 737 4, 591 7, 170	
1950 1952 1953 1954		· 1	5, 154 6, 357 6, 927 7, 276	788 998 1, 065	593 846 817 778	2, 486 2, 566 2, 870	4, 541 5, 763 6, 252	22, 787 26, 098 27, 910 30, 701	7, 177 8, 318 9, 390	3, 803 4, 650 4, 987 5, 527	2, 940 2, 788 2, 914 3, 060	8, 867 10, 342 10, 619 11, 557	
1955	21 072	10, 735 11, 749 12, 864 14, 047	7, 643 8, 691 9, 467 9, 829 10, 437	1,538 1,754 1,759	744 890 984 1,018	3,335 3,843 4,865	7, 584 8, 465 9, 250 9, 699 10, 516	33,724 36,711 40,375 44,851 48,887	11,907 13,220 14,134 15,919 17,283	6, 452 6, 953 7, 816 8, 567 9, 592	3, 168 3, 139 3, 485 3, 818 4, 136	12, 197 13, 399 14, 940 16, 547 17, 876	
1960 1961 1962 1963	50, 505 54, 037	19, 054	11, 849 12, 463 13, 494 14, 456	2,613 3,037	1,180 1,266 1,308 1,505	6, 974 7, 131	13.489	56, 201 60, 206	18, 719 20, 574 22, 216 23, 776	9,844 10,357	4, 404 4, 720 5, 084 5, 481	19, 32! 21, 063 22, 549 24, 423	
1962-63 5 1963-64 5 1964-65 5 1965-66 5 1966-67 5 1967-68 5 1967-6	68, 443 74, 000 83, 036 91, 197	24, 670 26, 047	14, 446 15, 762 17, 118 19, 085 20, 530 22, 911	3,791 4,090 4,760 5,826	2,038 2,227	10,002 11,029 13,214 15,370	15, 951 17, 250 19, 269 21, 197	63, 977 69, 302 74, 546 82, 843 93, 350 102, 411	23, 729 26, 286 28, 563 33, 287 37, 919 41, 158	12,221 12,770 13,932	5, 420 5, 766 6, 315 6, 757 8, 218 9, 857	33, 28	

¹ Fiscal years not the same for all governments. See footnote 5.

Note.—Data are not available for intervening years.

See Table C-60 for net debt of State and local governments.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

¹ Fiscal years not the same for all governments. See footnote 5.
2 Excludes revenues or expenditures of publicly owned utilities and liquor stores, and of insurance-trust activities. Intergovernmental receipts and payments between State and local governments are also excluded.
3 Includes licenses and other taxes and charges and miscellaneous revenues.
4 Includes expenditures for health, hospitals, police, local fire protection, natural resources, sanitation, housing and urban renewal, local parks and recreation, general control, financial administration, interest on general debt, and unallocable expenditures.
5 Data for fiscal year ending in the 12-month period through June 30. Data for 1963 and earlier years include local government amounts grouped in terms of fiscal years ended during the particular calendar year.

CORPORATE PROFITS AND FINANCE

TABLE C-71.—Profits before and after taxes, all private corporations, 1929-69

[Billions of dollars]

	Cor	porate invento	profits ry valu	(before ation ac	taxes) Ijustment	and				orate p fter tax			
Year or quarter	All in- dus- tries	Ma Total	Dur- able goods in- dus- tries	Non- dur- able goods in- dus- tries	Trans- porta- tion, com- muni- cation, and public utilities	All other in- dus- tries	Cor- po- rate prof- its be- fore taxes	Cor- po- rate tax lia- bil- ity I	Total	Divi- dend pay- ments	Un- dis- trib- uted prof- its	Corporate capital consumption allowances 2	Profits plus capital con- sump- tion allow- ances 8
1929	10.5	5. 2	2.6	2.6	1.8	3. 4	10.0	1. 4	8.6	5, 8	2.8	4.2	12.8
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939	7. 0 2. 0 -1. 3 -1. 2 1. 7 3. 4 5. 6 4. 9 6. 3	3.9 1.3 5 4 1.1 2.1 3.8 2.3 3.3	1.5 -0 -1.0 4 .3 .9 1.7 1.7	2. 4 1. 3 . 5 . 0 . 8 1. 1 1. 5 2. 1 1. 6 1. 7	1.2 .5 .0 .4 .7 .8 .5	1.9 9 8 .9 1.7 2.2 2.1 2.0	3.7 4 -2.3 1.0 2.3 3.6 6.3 6.8 4.0 7.0	.8 .5 .7 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.0	2.9 -2.7 -2.7 1.6 2.6 4.9 5.3 2.9 5.6	5.5 4.1 2.5 2.0 2.6 2.8 4.5 4.7 3.2 3.8	-2.6 -4.9 -5.2 -1.6 -1.0 2 .6 2	4. 3 4. 3 4. 0 3. 6 3. 6 3. 6 3. 6 3. 7	7. 2 3. 3 4. 2 5. 3 8. 5 8. 9 6. 6 9. 3
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947	9.8 15.2 20.3 24.4 23.8 19.2 19.3 25.6 33.0	5. 5 9. 5 11. 8 13. 8 13. 2 9. 7 9. 0 13. 6 17. 6 16. 2	3.1 6.4 7.2 8.1 7.4 4.5 2.4 5.8 7.5	2. 4 3. 1 4. 6 5. 7 5. 9 5. 6 7. 8 10. 0	1.3 2.0 3.4 4.4 3.9 2.7 1.8 2.2 3.0 3.0	3. 0 3. 7 5. 1 6. 7 6. 7 8. 5 9. 9 12. 5 11. 6	10. 0 17. 7 21. 5 25. 1 24. 1 19. 7 24. 6 31. 5 35. 2 28. 9	2.8 7.6 11.4 14.1 12.9 10.7 9.1 11.3 12.5 10.4	7. 2 10. 1 10. 1 11. 1 11. 2 9. 0 15. 5 20. 2 22. 7 18. 5	4. 0 4. 4 4. 3 4. 4 4. 6 5. 6 7. 0 7. 2	3. 2 5. 7 5. 9 6. 6 6. 5 4. 4 9. 9 13. 9 15. 6 11. 3	3.8 4.2 5.0 5.4 6.1 6.4 7.0 7.9	11. 0 14. 4 15. 2 16. 4 17. 2 15. 4 20. 2 26. 0 29. 7 26. 5
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1955 1956	37. 7 42. 7 39. 9 39. 6 46. 9 46. 1 45. 6 41. 1	20. 9 24. 6 21. 6 22. 0 19. 9 26. 0 24. 7 24. 0 19. 3 26. 3	12. 0 13. 2 11. 7 11. 9 10. 5 14. 3 12. 8 13. 3 9. 3 13. 6	8.9 11.4 9.9 10.1 9.4 11.8 11.9 10.7 10.0	4.0 4.9 4.9 5.7 5.9 5.9 7.0	12. 7 13. 3 12. 6 15. 2 15. 8 15. 9 15. 9 18. 4	42. 6 43. 9 38. 9 40. 6 38. 3 48. 6 48. 8 47. 2 41. 4 52. 1	17. 8 22. 3 19. 4 20. 3 17. 7 21. 6 21. 7 21. 2 19. 0 23. 7	24. 9 21. 6 19. 6 20. 4 20. 6 27. 0 27. 2 26. 0 22. 3 28. 5	8.8 8.6 8.9 9.3 10.5 11.7 11.6 12.6	16. 0 13. 0 11. 0 11. 5 11. 3 16. 5 15. 9 14. 2 10. 8 15. 9	8.8 10.3 11.5 13.2 15.0 17.4 18.9 20.8 22.0 23.5	33. 7 31. 8 31. 0 33. 5 44. 4 46. 1 46. 8 44. 3 52. 0
1960	49. 9 50. 3 55. 7 58. 9 66. 3 76. 1 82. 4 79. 2 87. 9 88. 7	24. 4 23. 3 26. 6 28. 8 32. 7 39. 3 42. 6 39. 0 44. 4 44. 0	12. 0 11. 4 14. 1 15. 8 17. 8 22. 8 24. 0 20. 9 24. 5 23. 7	12. 4 11. 9 12. 5 13. 0 14. 9 16. 6 18. 6 18. 1 19. 9 20. 2	7.5 7.9 8.5 9.5 10.1 11.1 11.9 10.8 11.6	17. 9 19. 1 20. 5 20. 6 23. 5 25. 6 27. 9 29. 4 31. 9 32. 9	49. 7 50. 3 55. 4 59. 4 66. 8 77. 8 84. 2 80. 3 91. 1 94. 3	23. 0 23. 1 24. 2 26. 3 28. 3 31. 3 34. 3 33. 0 41. 3 43. 5	26. 7 27. 2 31. 2 33. 1 38. 4 46. 5 49. 9 47. 3 49. 8 50. 8	13. 4 13. 8 15. 2 16. 5 17. 8 19. 8 20. 8 21. 5 23. 1 24. 6	13. 2 13. 5 16. 0 16. 6 20. 6 26. 7 29. 1 25. 9 26. 7 26. 3	24. 9 26. 2 30. 1 31. 8 33. 9 36. 4 39. 5 42. 6 45. 9 49. 1	51. 6 53. 5 61. 3 64. 8 72. 3 82. 9 89. 5 90. 0 95. 7 99. 9
		·			Sea	sonally	adjusted	annua	rates	<u>' </u>		`	
1967: V	78. 3 78. 3 79. 1 81. 1	39. 2 38. 8 38. 3 39. 5	21. 0 20. 8 20. 4 21. 2	18, 2 17, 9 18, 0 18, 3	10.9 10.7 10.8 10.9	28. 2 28. 8 30. 1 30. 7	78. 4 79. 1 79. 5 84. 4	32. 3 32. 6 32. 5 34. 5	46. 1 46. 4 47. 0 49. 9	21.1 21.7 22.0 21.1	24. 9 24. 8 25. 0 28. 8	41. 5 42. 2 43. 0 43. 8	87. 5 88. 6 90, 0 93. 7
1968: I II IV	82. 5 88. 2 90. 6 90. 3	41.1 44.9 45.4 46.2	22. 0 25. 1 25. 0 25. 8	19. 1 19. 8 20. 4 20. 4	11.3 11.5 12.0 11.6	30, 1 31, 8 33, 1 32, 6	87.9 90.7 91.5 94.5	39. 9 41. 1 41. 4 42. 9	47. 9 49. 7 50. 0 51. 6	22. 2 22. 9 23 6 23. 8	25. 7 26. 7 26. 5 27. 8	44. 8 45. 8 46. 2 46. 7	92. 8 95. 5 96. 3 98. 4
1969: V	89, 5 89, 2 88, 8	45, 1 44, 9 43, 8	24. 7 23. 9 23. 8	20. 3 21. 0 20. 0	11.8 11.7 11.9	32. 6 32. 6 33. 1	95. 5 95. 4 92. 5	43. 9 44. 1 42. 8	51. 7 51. 3 49. 7	23.8 24.3 24.9 25.2	27. 9 27. 0 24. 9	47. 7 48. 6 49. 6 50. 5	99. 4 100. 0 99. 3

Note.—Corporate profits tax and related items for 1969 reflect repeal of investment tax credit.

Source: Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics.

Federal and State corporate income and excess profits taxes.
 Includes depreciation and accidental damages.
 Corporate profits after taxes plus corporate capital consumption allowances.

[Billions of dollars]

		All ma corp	nufacturi orations	ing	Ðı	ırabie go	ods indu:	stries		Nondura indu	ible good istries	ls
Year or quarter	S-1	Pro	fits	Stock-	0.1	Pro	fits	Stock-	Calas	Pro	fits	Stock-
	Sales (net)	Before taxes	After taxes	holders' equity 2	Sales (net)	Before taxes	After taxes	holders' equity 2	Sales (net)	Before taxes	After taxes	holders' equity 2
1947 1948 1949	150. 7 165. 6 154. 9	16. 6 18. 4 14. 4	10. 1 11. 5 9. 0	65. 1 72. 2 77. 6	66. 6 75. 3 70. 3	7. 6 8. 9 7. 5	4. 5 5. 4 4. 5	31. 1 34. 1 37. 0	84. 1 90. 4 84. 6	9. 0 9. 5 7. 0	5. 6 6. 2 4. 6	34. 0 38. 1 40. 6
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	181. 9 245. 0 250. 2 265. 9 248. 5	23. 2 27. 4 22. 9 24. 4 20. 9	12.9 11.9 10.7 11.3 11.2	83. 3 98. 3 103. 7 108. 2 113. 1	86. 8 116. 8 122. 0 137. 9 122. 8	12.9 15.4 12.9 14.0 11.4	6. 7 6. 1 5. 5 5. 8 5. 6	39. 9 47. 2 49. 8 52. 4 54. 9	95. 1 128. 1 128. 0 128. 0 125. 7	10.3 12.1 10.0 10.4 9.6	6. 1 5. 7 5. 2 5. 5 5. 6	43, 5 51, 1 53, 9 55, 7 58, 2
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	278. 4 307. 3 320. 0 305. 3 338. 0	28. 6 29. 8 28. 2 22. 7 29. 7	15. 1 16. 2 15. 4 12. 7 16. 3	120. 1 131. 6 141. 1 147. 4 157. 1	142. 1 159. 5 166. 0 148. 6 169. 4	16. 5 16. 5 15. 8 11. 4 15. 8	8. 1 8. 3 7. 9 5. 8 8. 1	58. 8 65. 2 70. 5 72. 8 77. 9	136. 3 147. 8 154. 1 156. 7 168. 5	12.1 13.2 12.4 11.3 13.9	7. 0 7. 8 7. 5 6. 9 8. 3	61.3 66.4 70.6 74.6 79.2
1960 1961 1962 1963	345. 7 356. 4 389. 9 412. 7 443. 1	27. 5 27. 5 31. 9 34. 9 39. 6	15. 2 15. 3 17. 7 19. 5 23. 2	165. 4 172. 6 181. 4 189. 7 199. 8	173. 9 175. 2 195. 5 209. 0 226. 3	14. 0 13. 6 16. 7 18. 5 21. 2	7. 0 6. 9 8. 6 9. 5 11. 6	82. 3 84. 9 89. 1 93. 3 98. 5	171. 8 181. 2 194. 4 203. 6 216. 8	13. 5 13. 9 15. 1 16. 4 18. 3	8. 2 8. 5 9. 2 10. 0 11. 6	83. 1 87. 7 92. 3 96. 3 101. 3
1965 1966 1967 1968	492. 2 554. 2 575. 4 631. 9	46. 5 51. 8 47. 8 55. 4	27. 5 30. 9 29. 0 32. 1	211. 7 230. 3 247. 6 265. 9	257. 0 291. 7 300. 6 335. 5	26. 2 29. 2 25. 7 30. 7	14. 5 16. 4 14. 6 16. 5	105. 4 115. 2 125. 0 135. 6	235. 2 262. 4 274. 8 296. 4	20. 3 22. 6 22. 0 24. 7	13. 0 14. 6 14. 4 15. 5	106.3 115.1 122.0 130.3
1967: 	137. 0 145. 1 141. 5 151. 8	11. 4 12. 6 11. 0 12. 8	6. 7 7. 6 6. 7 7. 9	240. 9 245. 6 249. 7 254. 3	71. 1 77. 0 72. 6 80. 0	6. 2 7. 2 5. 4 7. 0	3. 4 4. 1 3. 1 4. 0	121. 6 123. 7 126. 0 128. 6	65. 9 68. 2 68. 9 71. 8	5. 2 5. 4 5. 6 5. 9	3.3 3.5 3.6 3.9	119. 3 121. 8 123. 6 125. 7
1968: 	148. 9 158. 9 155. 7 168. 4	12.5 14.8 13.2 14.9	7. 4 8. 3 7. 6 8. 7	258. 6 263. 4 268. 4 273. 2	78. 8 86. 0 81. 0 89. 8	6. 7 8. 6 6. 8 8. 6	3.7 4.5 3.7 4.7	130. 9 134. 1 137. 2 140. 4	70.1 72.9 74.8 78.6	5. 8 6. 2 6. 4 6. 3	3.7 3.8 4.0 4.1	127.7 129.4 131.2 132.9
1969: [1 1 1	162. 8 176. 1 172. 4	14. 1 15. 8 13. 9	7. 9 8. 9 8. 0	281. 5 288. 0 293. 0	86. 0 94. 2 89. 8	7. 8 8. 9 7. 1	4. 1 4. 7 3. 8	143. 4 146. 8 148. 9	76. 8 81. 9 82. 7	6. 3 6. 9 6. 8	3. 8 4. 2 4. 2	138.0 141.2 144.1

¹ Includes newspapers beginning 1969.

Sources: Federal Trade Commission and Securities and Exchange Commission.

² Annual data are average equity for the year (using four end-of-quarter figures).

Note.—For explanatory notes concerning compilation of the series, see "Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing Corporations," Federal Trade Commission and Securities and Exchange Commission.

Data are not necessarily comparable from one period to another due to changes in accounting procedures, industry classifications, sampling procedures, etc. Specific information about the effects of the more significant changes and revisions is contained in the following issues of the "Quarterly Financial Report": third quarter 1953, third quarter 1956, first quarter 1959, and first quarter 1965.

Table C-73.—Relation of profits after taxes to stockholders' equity and to sales, all manufacturing corporations (except newspapers1), by industry group, 1948-69

		reneg co	porari		nocpi i	cwspa	pers),	0)		group,	1010			
	AII					ļ	Durable	goods i	ndustri	es				
Year or quarter	man- ufac- tur- ing cor- pora- tions (ex- cept news- pap- ers ¹)	Total dur- able ²	Mo- tor vehi- cles and equip- ment	Air- craft and parts	Elec- trical ma- chin- eryip- ment, and sup- plies	Ma- chin- ery (ex- cept elec- trical)	Fab- ri- cated metal prod- ucts	Pri- mary iron and steel in- dus- tries	Pri- mary non- fer- rous metal in- dus- tries	Stone, clay, and glass prod- ucts	Fur- niture and fix- tures	Lumber and wood products (except furniture)	In- stru- ments and re- lated prod- ucts	Mis- cella- neous man- ufac- tur- ing (in- clud- ing ord- nance
		Rai	tio of p	rofits af	ter Fede	eral taxe	s (annu	ai rate)	to stoc	kholders	equity	—perce	nt 3	
948 949	16. 0 11. 6	15. 7 12. 1	19. 9 22. 1		16. 1 13. 6	16.3 11.6	17. 0 10. 4	14. 7 10. 0	14. 2 8. 1	15. 0 13. 1	15. 9 8. 1	19. 2 9. 1	14. 0 12. 1	12. 7.
950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959	15. 4 12. 1 10. 3 10. 5 9. 9 12. 6 12. 3 10. 9 8. 6 10. 4	16. 9 13. 0 11. 1 11. 1 10. 3 13. 8 12. 8 11. 3 8. 0 10. 4	25. 3 14. 3 13. 9 14. 1 21. 7 13. 1 14. 2 8. 2 14. 5	17.7 13.2 8.1	20. 9 14. 0 13. 7 13. 1 12. 4 12. 3 11. 4 12. 5 10. 2 12. 5	14. 1 13. 0 11. 3 9. 8 8. 6 10. 3 12. 6 10. 7 6. 9 9. 7	16. 0 13. 4 10. 1 9. 8 7. 6 10. 0 10. 7 9. 3 7. 3 8. 0	14. 3 12. 3 8. 5 10. 7 8. 1 13. 5 12. 7 11. 4 7. 2 8. 0	15. 1 13. 8 11. 6 11. 1 10. 4 15. 5 16. 4 9. 3 6. 0 7. 9	17. 7 14. 2 11. 7 11. 8 12. 5 15. 6 14. 9 12. 4 10. 2 12. 7	15.2 11.3 8.6 8.2 6.0 9.2 11.6 8.5 6.3 8.9	17. 5 11. 9 8. 5 7. 1 6. 3 11. 1 8. 7 4. 7 5. 7 9. 4	16.7 13.2 11.6 11.4 12.3 12.5 12.4 12.0 10.6 13.1	12. 9. 7. 8. 7. 8. 11. 7. 8. 9.
960 961 962 963 964 965 965 967 968	0.2	8. 5 8. 1 9. 6 10. 1 11. 7 13. 8 14. 2 11. 7 12. 2	13. 5 11. 4 16. 3 16. 7 16. 9 19. 5 15. 9 11. 7 15. 1	7.3 9.8 12.7 11.3 12.2 15.2 14.4 12.9 14.2	9.5 8.9 10.0 10.1 11.2 13.5 14.8 12.8	7.5 7.8 9.1 9.6 12.5 14.1 15.0 12.9 12.3	5.6 5.9 7.9 8.3 10.1 13.2 14.7 12.7	7. 2 6. 1 5. 4 7. 0 8. 8 9. 8 10. 2 7. 7	7.1 7.5 7.6 9.8 11.9 14.8 10.9	9.9 8.9 8.7 9.6 10.3 9.9 8.2 9.2	6.5 4.9 7.9 8.3 10.1 13.4 14.2 12.1 12.2	3.6 4.1 5.6 8.2 9.9 10.1 10.0 8.6 14.6	11.6 10.6 12.0 12.1 14.4 17.5 20.9 18.0 16.6	9. 9. 8. 9. 10. 15. 13.
968: i II IV	11.5 12.6 11.4 12.8	11.3 13.4 10.7 13.3	16.5 17.9 7.4 18.5	13.6 14.4 14.3 14.5	11.8 11.4 11.5 13.9	11.1 13.6 12.3 12.1	10.0 12.5 12.1 12.3	8.6 10.5 4.5 6.7	8, 9 11, 5 9, 9 12, 6	3.9 11.7 12.0 9.1	9.1 12.8 12.5 14.6	10. 9 16. 1 16. 3 15. 1	14. 1 15. 5 18. 0 18. 4	12. 9. 12. 15.
.969; 1 1 1	11. 3 12. 4 10. 9	11. 4 12. 9 10. 3	15. 4 14. 5 7. 2	12. 1 11. 0 9. 7	11.2 11.3 11.2	11.2 14.6 11.7	10. 8 12. 5 11. 1	7. 4 8. 7 6. 1	11.3 12.9 11.5	4. 9 11. 9 12. 2	11.0 13.4 13.5	17. 1 18. 9 8. 6	13. 8 16. 0 15. 7	11. 10. 11.
		!	l)	'	after to				<u> </u>	1	<u> </u>	!	
1948 1949	7. 0 5. 8	7. 1 6. 4	6. 9 7. 9		5, 9 5, 7	7.3 6.4	7. 1 5. 1	7. 6 6. 5	9. 0 6. 9	8. 6 8. 6	5. 5 3. 3	9. 9 5. 9	7.8 7.1	5. t 3. t
950 951 952 953 954 955 955 956 957 958	7.1 4.8 4.3 4.5 5.4 5.4 4.2 4.8	7.35 4.67 4.67 5.28 4.3.8	8.37 4.77 3.9 5.19 5.24 4.0 6.3	2.9 2.4 1.6	7.20 5.51 4.54 4.82 4.83 4.84	7.55 4.24 4.41 5.48 7.54.8 7.54.8 7.54.8	6.80 5.00 3.6 3.18 4.06 3.12	7.9 7.9 4.7 5.3 7.6.6 5.4	10.28 7.87 6.3 6.63 9.67 8.3	10.1 7.1 6.6 7.4 8.2 7.5 6.8	5. 1 3. 4 2. 6 2. 1 2. 9 3. 4 2. 0 2. 7	9.4 5.5 4.5 4.5 3.4 5.4 5.9 2.8 2.8 4.2	8.6.1.86.5.0.87.4.5.6.5.5.5.6.5	5. 6 3. 7 2. 7 2. 8 3. 6 3. 6 3. 5
960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968	4. 4 4. 3 4. 5 5. 6 5. 6 5. 0 5. 1	4. 0 3. 9 4. 4. 5 5. 7 5. 6 4. 9	5.9 5.5 6.9 7.0 7.2 6.9 5.7	1. 4 1. 8 2. 4 2. 3 2. 6 3. 3 3. 0 2. 7 3. 2	3.5 3.7 3.8 4.8 4.4 4.3	3.9 4.5 4.7 5.2 6.4 5.5 5.5	2.4 2.5 3.1 3.2 3.7 4.5 4.5 4.1	5. 1 4. 6 3. 9 4. 8 5. 6 5. 7 5. 8 4. 8	5.4 5.5 5.5 5.5 6.5 7.8 6.8 6.2	6. 6 5. 8 5. 6 5. 3 5. 9 5. 9 5. 8 5. 2	2.1 1.6 2.4 2.9 3.7 3.5 3.5 4	1.7 1.9 2.5 3.3 4.0 3.4 5.3	5.9 5.4 5.9 6.0 7.2 8.6 9.5 8.1	3.5 3.4 3.3 4.2 4.0
1968: I II IV	5.0 5.2 4.9 5.2	4. 7 5. 2 4. 5 5. 2	6. 1 6. 2 3. 4 6. 3	2.9 3.2 3.4 3.3	4.2 4.1 4.1 4.7	5. 1 5. 7 5. 6 5. 4	3. 6 4. 4 4. 2 4. 1	5, 1 5, 5 2, 9 4, 6	5. 4 6. 4 5. 9 6. 9	2. 6 6. 4 6. 3 4. 9	2. 8 3. 6 3. 5 3. 8	4. 4 5. 7 5. 8 5. 4	7.4 7.6 8.7 8.5	4. 3. 4. 6 4. 6
	4.9	4.8	5.6	3. 5 3. 3 3. 0	4.0	5. 2 6. 1 5. 3	3. 8 4. 1	4. 5 4. 8	6. 4 6. 8	2. 9 5. 7 5. 9	3, 1 3, 6 3, 8	6. 3 6. 6 3. 2	7.3 7.8 8.1	4. 3. 3.

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE C-73.—Relation of profits after taxes to stockholders' equity and to sales, all manufacturing corporations (except newspapers1), by industry group, 1948-69—Continued

					Nondurab	le goods i	ndustries				
Year or quarter	Total non- dur- a ble 2	Food and kin- dred prod- ucts	To- bacco man- ufac- tures	Tex- tile mill prod- ucts	Ap- parel and related prod- ucts	Paper and allied prod- ucts	Print- ing and pub- lish- ing (ex- cept news- pa- pers 1)	Chemicals and allied prod- ucts	Petro- leum refin- ing	Rub- ber and mis- cella- neous plastic prod- ucts	Leather and leather prod- ucts
				after Fed	eral taxes		ate) to sto		equity—		
1948 1949	1 6 . 2 11. 2	12. 8 11. 8	13. 6 12. 6	18. 7 7. 6	12. 1 7. 5	16. 4 10. 7	14.7 11.4	15. 8 13. 2		12. 3 8. 7	10. 4 6 . 3
950 951 952 953 954 955 955 957 958	14. 1 11. 2 9. 7 9. 9 9. 6 11. 4 11. 8 10. 6 9. 2 10. 4	12.3 8.1 7.6 8.1 8.9 9.3 8.7 8.7 9.3	11. 5 9. 5 8. 4 9. 4 10. 2 11. 4 11. 7 12. 5 13. 5	12. 7 8. 2 4. 2 4. 6 1. 8 5. 7 5. 8 4. 2 3. 5 7. 5	10. 1 2. 9 4. 4 5. 1 4. 5 6. 1 6. 3 4. 9 8. 6	16. 2 13. 9 10. 5 10. 1 9. 9 11. 5 11. 6 8. 9 8. 1 9. 5	11.5 10.3 9.1 9.4 9.2 10.2 13.0 11.7 9.0	17. 8 12. 2 10. 9 10. 7 11. 6 14. 7 14. 2 13. 3 11. 4	15. 2 13. 3 13. 4 12. 7 13. 4 13. 9 12. 5 10. 0 9. 8	16. 9 14. 8 11. 1 11. 3 10. 6 13. 2 12. 2 11. 1 9. 1	10. 2. 5. 6. 5. 8. 7. 7. 5.
960	9. 8 9. 6 9. 9 10. 4 11. 5 12. 2 12. 7 11. 8 11. 9	8. 7 8. 9 8. 8 9. 0 10. 0 10. 7 11. 2 10. 8 10. 8	13. 4 13. 6 13. 1 13. 4 13. 5 14. 1 14. 4 14. 4	5. 8 5. 0 6. 2 6. 1 8. 5 10. 9 10. 1 7. 6 8. 8	7. 7 7. 2 9. 3 7. 7 11. 7 12. 7 13. 3 12. 0 13. 0	8. 5 7. 9 8. 1 9. 3 9. 4 10. 6 9. 1 9. 7	10. 6 8. 5 10. 3 9. 2 12. 6 14. 2 15. 6 13. 0 12. 5	12. 2 11. 8 12. 4 12. 9 14. 4 15. 2 15. 1 13. 1	10. 1 10. 3 10. 1 11. 3 11. 4 11. 8 12. 4 12. 5 12. 3	9. 1 9. 3 9. 6 9. 2 10. 6 11. 7 12. 2 10. 3 12. 3	6. 4. 6. 10. 11. 12. 11.
968: [V	11.7 11.7 12.1 12.2	9.9 10.2 11.4 11.4	13.5 13.6 15.9 14.8	7.1 9.1 9.5 9.3	12. 0 9. 3 15. 0 15. 3	8. 5 10. 5 9. 2 10. 6	10.9 10.7 14.8 13.8	13. 4 13. 6 12. 8 13. 3	12.9 11.9 12.1 12.2	10. 8 13. 5 11. 8 12. 9	13. 12. 12. 14.
969: [1 [1 [1 1	11.1 11.9 11.5	9.6 10.7 11.9	12. 1 14. 8 15. 6	7. 2 8. 8 7. 7	10. 3 11. 4 15. 9	9, 8 11, 1 9, 6	10, 8 13, 1 12, 4	12. 9 13. 8 12. 4	12. 0 11. 9 11. 4	9. 6 11. 9 9. 5	8. 8. 9.
				Profits	after taxe						
948949	6. 8 5. 4	3. 3 3. 3	5. 2 5. 1	8. 3 4. 1	3. 1 2. 1	8. 5 6. 5	5. 2 4. 5	8. 8 8. 2		4. 7 3. 8	3. 2.
950 951 952 953 954 955 955 957 958 959	6. 5 4. 5 4. 1 4. 3 4. 4 5. 1 5. 3 4. 9 4. 4 4. 9	3. 4 2. 0 1. 9 2. 0 2. 1 2. 3 2. 4 2. 2 2. 2	4.9 3.2 3.7 4.8 5.2 4.5 5.4 5.4	5.8 3.4 1.9 2.0 2.6 2.6 1.9 1.6	2.8 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.3	8. 8 6. 7 5. 6 6. 1 5. 7 5. 7 5. 2	4.57 3.34 3.34 4.27 3.10	10.3 6.5 6.1 6.8 8.3 7.6 7.9	11. 1 10. 1 10. 4 10. 6 11. 1 11. 6 10. 6 9. 5 9. 5	5.4.6804.44.250	3. 1. 1. 2. 2. 2. 2.
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967	4. 8 4. 7 4. 7 5. 4 5. 5 5. 6 5. 3	2.3 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6	5,7,7,9,9,9,9,9,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,	2.5 2.14 2.3 3.8 3.6 9 3.1	1. 4 1. 3 1. 6 1. 4 2. 1 2. 3 2. 4 2. 3 2. 4	5.0 4.6 4.5 5.1 4.9 5.4 4.7	3.6 2.8 3.4 3.2 4.3 4.8 5.1 4.4	7.5 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.9 7.8 6.9 6.8	9.9 10.3 9.7 10.8 10.9 11.1 11.2 11.0	3.68 3.76 3.16 4.13 4.49 4.5	1. 1. 1. 2. 2. 3.
1968; I II III IV	5. 3 5. 2 5. 3 5. 2	2.5 2.5 2.7 2.7	5. 7 5. 5 6. 0 - 5. 1	2.7 3.2 3.4 3.2	2,5 1,9 2,7 2,6	4.4 5.1 4.5 5.0	3. 8 3. 6 4. 8 4. 3	7. 0 6. 9 6. 6 6. 6	11.2 10.6 10.7 10.3	4. 2 4. 8 4. 5 4. 6	3. 3. 3. 3.
969: [1 [1 1 1	5, 0 5, 1 5, 0	2. 4 2. 6 2. 8	4. 6 5. 2 5. 6	2. 7 3. 2 2. 8	2. 2 2. 2 3. 0	4. 7 5. 2 4. 7	4. 1 4. 9 4. 7	6. 7 6. 8 6. 3	10. 6 10. 2 10. 0	3. 7 4. 1 3. 5	2. 2. 2.

Sources: Federal Trade Commission and Securities and Exchange Commission.

Includes newspapers beginning 1969.
 Includes certain industries not shown separately.
 Annual ratios based on average equity for the year (using four end-of-quarter figures). Quarterly ratios based on equity at end of quarter only.

Note.—For explanatory notes concerning compilation of the series, see "Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing Corporations," Federal Trade Commission and Securities and Exchange Commission. See also Note, Table C-72.

Table C-74.—Sources and uses of funds, nonfarm nonfinancial corporate business, 1958-68
[Billions of dollars]

Source or use of funds	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
Sources, total	44. 2	57.9	48. 1	56. 6	64. 9	67. 1	71.8	93. 1	100.6	94. 2	110. 4
Internal sources 1	29.5	35.0	34.4	35.6	41.8	43.9	50.5	56.6	61.2	61, 2	63.1
Undistributed profits 1 Corporate inventory valuation ad-	8.3	12.6	10.0	10, 2	12.4	13.6	18.3	23. 1	24.7	21. 2	22.0
justmentCapital consumption allowances 1_	3 21. 4	5 22. 9	24. 2	1 25. 4	29. 2	5 30. 8	5 32. 8	-1.7 35.2	-1.8 38.2	-1.1 41.2	-3.2 44.3
External sources	14.7	22.9	13.7	21.0	23. 1	23. 2	21.3	36, 5	39. 4	33.0	47.3
Stocks Bonds Mortgages Bank loans n.e.c. Other loans Trade debt Profits tax liability Other liabilities	5.7 2.9 3 2 4.7	2.2 3.0 3.5 3 5.5 2.4 3.6	1.6 3.5 2.5 1.9 1.9 -2.2 4.0	2.5 4.6 3.9 .7 .6 5.4 1.4	.6 4.6 4.5 3.0 4.6 5.2	3 3.9 4.9 3.7 .2 5.3 1.9 3.7	1. 4 4. 0 3. 6 3. 8 . 9 3. 6 . 5 3. 5	5. 4 3. 9 10. 6 9. 1 2. 2 4. 6	1.2 10.2 4.2 8.4 1.4 7.3 .2 6.5	2.3 14.7 4.5 6.4 1.4 2.6 4.1 5.2	8 12.9 5.8 9.6 3.6 5.7 3.7 6.9
Uses, total	40. 5	53. 1	43.7	52. 2	60.0	63. 2	64.9	85, 8	92, 5	85. 9	103, 5
Purchases of physical assets	27.3	36. 9	39.0	36. 7	44.0	45.6	52. 1	62, 8	77.1	72.5	76.9
Nonresidential fixed investment. Residential structures Change in business inventories	28. 4 1. 4 -2. 5	31. 1 1. 7 4. 1	34. 9 1. 1 3. 0	33. 2 1. 9 1. 5	37. 0 2. 3 4. 7	38 6 2.6 4.3	44. 1 2. 1 5. 9	52. 8 2. 0 7. 9	61. 6 1. 1 14. 4	63. 8 2. 2 6. 4	68. 0 2. 3 6. 5
Increase in financial assets	13.2	16. 2	4.7	15.6	16.0	17.7	12.8	23. 1	15. 5	13. 5	26. 6
Liquid assets Demand deposits and cur-	2.7	5.6	-3.2	3.7	3, 5	4.7	1.2	1.7	1.9	.6	10.1
rency Time deposits and currency. U.S. Government securities Open-market paper State and local obligations	1.5 .9 .0 2 .5	-1.0 4 6.6 2	5 1.3 -5.4 1.7 2	1.7 1.9 2 .4 .0	9 3.7 .5 .6 3	8 3.9 .5 .9	-2.3 3.2 -1.5 1.6	-1.5 3.9 -1.6 .5	7 -1.2 2.0 1.0	-2. 2 4. 1 -2. 5 1. 5 -; 4	1.3 2.2 1.8 4.5
Consumer credit Trade credit Other financial assets	. 6 8. 3 1. 7	. 8 7. 7 2. 0	. 4 5. 3 2. 2	. 2 9. 5 2. 1	.7 8.5 3.2	1. 0 8. 1 3. 9	1.3 8.1 2.2	1. 2 15. 1 5. 1	1. 2 11. 3 1. 0	. 9 8. 8 3. 2	1.7 14.8 .1
Discrepancy (sources less uses)	3. 7	4.8	4. 3	4, 3	5, 0	3.8	6. 9	7.2	8, 0	8. 2	6. 9

¹ The figures shown here for "internal sources," "undistributed profits," and "capital consumption allowances" differ from those shown for "cash flow, net of dividends," "undistributed profits," and "capital consumption allowances" in the gross corporate product table in the national income and product accounts of the Department of Commerce for the following reasons: (1) these figures include, and the statistics in the gross corporate product table exclude, branch profits remitted from foreigners net of corresponding U.S. remittances to foreigners; and (2) these figures exclude, and the gross corporate product figures include, the internal funds of corporations whose major activity is farming.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

TABLE C-75.—Current assets and liabilities of United States corporations, 1939-69 [Billions of dollars]

			Cu	rrent ass	ets				Curr	ent liabi	ities		
End of year or quarter	Total	Cash on hand and in banks ¹	U.S. Gov- ern- ment securi- ties ²	Re- ceiv- ables from U.S. Gov- ern- ment ³	Notes and ac- counts receiv- able	In- ven- tories	Other cur- rent as- sets 4	Total	Advances and pre- pay- ments, U.S. Gov- ern- ment 3	Notes and ac- counts pay- able	Fed- eral in- come tax liabili- ties	Other cur- rent lia- bili- ties	Net work- ing capi- tal
1939	54. 5	10.8	2.2		22.1	18.0	1.4	30.0		21.9	1.2	6.9	24. 5
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944	72. 9 83. 6 93. 8 97. 2	13. 1 13. 9 17. 6 21. 6 21. 6	2. 0 4. 0 10. 1 16. 4 20. 9	0. 1 . 6 4. 0 5. 0 4. 7	23. 9 27. 4 23. 3 21. 9 21. 8	19. 8 25. 6 27. 3 27. 6 26. 8	1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3	32.8 40.7 47.3 51.6 51.7	0.6 .8 2.0 2.2 1.8	22.6 25.6 24.0 24.1 25.0	2. 5 7. 1 12. 6 16. 6 15. 5	7. 1 7. 2 8. 7 8. 7 9. 4	27. 5 32. 3 36. 3 42. 1 45. 6
1945 1946	97. 4 108. 1	21. 7 22. 8	21. 1 15. 3	2.7	23. 2 30. 0	26. 3 37. 6	2. 4 1. 7	45. 8 51. 9	.9	24. 8 31. 5	10. 4 8. 5	9.7 11.8	51.6 56.2
1947 1948 1949	123. 6 133. 0 133. 1	25. 0 25. 3 26. 5	14. 1 14. 8 16. 8	42	3. 3 2. 4 3. 0	44. 6 48. 9 45. 3	1.6 1.6 1.4	61.5 64.4 60.7	39	7.6).3 7.5	10.7 11.5 9.3	13.2 13.5 14.0	62. 1 68. 6 72. 4
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	1179.1	28. 1 30. 0 30. 8 31. 1 33. 4	19. 7 20. 7 19. 9 21. 5 19. 2	1. 1 2. 7 2. 8 2. 6 2. 4	55. 7 58. 8 64. 6 65. 9 71. 2	55. 1 64. 9 65. 8 67. 2 65. 3	1.7 2.1 2.4 2.4 3.1	79.8 92.6 96.1 98.9 99.7	1.3 2.3 2.2 2.4	47. 9 53. 6 57. 0 57. 3 59. 3	16. 7 21. 3 18. 1 18. 7 15. 5	14.9 16.5 18.7 20.7 22.5	81.6 86.5 90.1 91.8 94.9
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	224. 0 237. 9 244. 7 255. 3	34. 6 34. 8 34. 9 37. 4 36. 3	23. 5 19. 1 18. 6 18. 8 22. 8	2. 3 2. 6 2. 8 2. 8 2. 9	86. 6 95. 1 99. 4 106. 9 117. 7	72. 8 80. 4 82. 2 81. 9 88. 4	4. 2 5. 9 6. 7 7. 5 9. 1	121. 0 130. 5 133. 1 136. 6 153. 1	2.3 2.4 2.3 1.7 1.7	73. 8 81. 5 84. 3 88. 7 99. 3	19.3 17.6 15.4 12.9 15.0	25. 7 29. 0 31. 1 33. 3 37. 0	103. 0 107. 4 111. 6 118. 7 124. 2
1960 1961	289. 0 306. 8	37. 2 41. 1	20, 1 20, 0	3. 1 3. 4	126. 1 135. 8	91.8 95.2	10.6 11.4	160. 4 171. 2	1.8 1.8	105.0 112.8	13. 5 14. 1	40. 1 42. 5	128.6 135.6
New series 5 1961	304. 6 326. 5 351. 7 372. 2	40. 7 43. 7 46. 5 47. 3	19. 2 19. 6 20. 2 18. 6	3. 4 3. 7 3. 6 3. 4	133.3 144.2 156.8 169.9	95. 2 100. 7 107. 0 113. 5	12.9 14.7 17.8 19.6	155. 8 170. 9 188. 2 202. 2	1.8 2.0 2.5 2.7	110. 0 119. 1 130. 4 140. 3	14. 2 15. 2 16. 5 17. 0	29. 8 34. 5 38. 7 42. 2	148. 8 155. 6 163. 5 170. 0
1965 1966 1967 1968	442. 6 463. 1 506. 3	49. 9 49. 3 51. 4 55. 1	17. 0 15. 4 12. 2 13. 7	3.9 4.5 5.1 5.1	190. 2 205. 2 214. 6 235. 6	126. 9 143. 1 152. 3 164. 6	22. 3 25. 1 27. 6 32. 2	229. 6 254. 4 264. 3 293. 9	3. 1 4. 4 5. 8 6. 4	160. 4 179. 0 186. 4 205. 2	19. 1 18. 3 14. 6 16. 8	46. 9 52. 8 57. 4 65. 4	180. 7 188. 2 198. 8 212. 4
1967; V	443. 2 444. 2 451. 9 463. 1	46. 6 46. 9 48. 3 51. 4	14. 1 11. 3 10. 6 12. 2	4. 4 4. 6 4. 7 5. 1	205. 2 207. 6 211. 5 214. 6	146. 6 147. 7 149. 7 152. 3	26. 4 26. 0 27. 1 27. 6	252. 4 252. 5 256. 9 264. 3	4. 9 5. 4 5. 7 5. 8	176. 3 179. 8 181. 4 186. 4	17. 8 12. 2 13. 0 14. 6	53. 5 55. 1 56. 7 57. 4	190, 7 191, 6 195, 0 198, 8
1968: I II IV	470. 9 481. 2 491. 5 506. 3	49. 3 50. 5 51. 9 55. 1	14. 5 13. 0 12. 6 13. 7	4. 8 4. 7 4. 8 5. 1	216. 6 223. 5 229. 4 235. 6	155. 0 158. 3 162. 1 164. 6	30. 7 31. 2 30. 8 32. 2	266. 6 273. 5 282. 7 293. 9	6. 1 6. 2 6. 3 6. 4	184. 7 190. 9 196. 8 205. 2	16. 5 14. 8 15. 1 16. 8	59, 3 61, 5 64, 6 65, 4	204. 3 207. 8 208. 7 212. 4
1969: { 	515.7 526.7	51. 9 52. 6 51. 2	15. 4 13. 0 11. 8	4. 8 4. 8 4. 6	239. 8 247. 1 254. 7	169. 2 174. 0 178. 7	34. 6 35. 3 35. 7	300. 8 310. 4 322. 2	6. 9 7. 2 7. 5	206. 1 215. 3 222. 9	19. 1 15. 4 16. 4	68. 8 72. 5 75. 4	215. 0 216. 3 214. 6

Includes time certificates of deposit.

Note.—Data relate to all United States corporations, excluding banks, savings and loan associations, insurance companies, and beginning with the new series for 1961, investment companies. Year-end data through 1966 are based on "Statistics of Income" (Treasury Department), covering virtually all corporations in the United States. "Statistics of Income" data may not be strictly comparable from year to year because of changes in the tax laws, basis for filling returns, and processing of data for compilation purposes. All other figures shown are estimates based on data compiled from many different sources, including data on corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Source: Securities and Exchange Commission.

² Includes Federal agency issues.

^{*} Includes receivables from and payables to U.S. Government do not include amounts offset against each other on corporations' books or amounts arising from subcontracting which are not directly due from or to the U.S. Government. Wherever possible, adjustments have been made to include U.S. Government advances offset against inventories on corporations' books.
Includes marketable investments (other than Government securities and time certificates of deposit) as well as sundry

current assets.

⁵ Generally reflects definitions and classifications used in "Statistics of Income" for 1961.

TABLE C-76.—State and municipal and corporate securities offered, 1934-69 [Millions of dollars]

	State and municipal		Type of	corporate	security			of corpo	rate user	
Year or quarter	securities offered for cash (principal amounts)	Total corpo- rate offer- ings	Com- mon stock	Pre- ferred stock	Bonds and notes	Manu- fac- turing ¹	Elec- tric, gas, and water ²	Trans- porta- tion ³	Com- munica- tion	Other
934	939	397	19	6	371	67	133	176		2:
935 936 937 938 939	1, 232 1, 121 908 1, 108 1, 128	2, 332 4, 572 2, 310 2, 155 2, 164	22 272 285 25 87	86 271 406 86 98	2, 225 4, 029 1, 618 2, 044 1, 980	797 1, 332 1, 120 848 604	1, 284 2, 040 771 1, 234 1, 271	126 797 344 55 186		125 407 74 18 103
940 941 942 943 944		2,677 2,667 1,062 1,170 3,202	108 110 34 56 163	183 167 112 124 369	2, 386 2, 390 917 990 2, 669	992 848 539 510 1,061	1, 203 1, 357 472 477 1, 422	324 366 48 161 609		15: 9: 2: 10:
945946947948949		6, 011 6, 900 6, 577 7, 078 6, 052	397 891 779 614 736	758 1, 127 762 492 425	4, 855 4, 882 5, 036 5, 973 4, 890	2,026 3,701 2,742 2,226 1,414	2, 319 2, 158 3, 257 2, 187 2, 320	1, 454 711 286 755 800	902 571	21 32 29 1,00 94
950 951 952 953 954		6, 361 7, 741 9, 534 8, 898 9, 516	811 1, 212 1, 369 1, 326 1, 213	631 838 564 489 816	4, 920 5, 691 7, 601 7, 083 7, 488	1, 200 3, 122 4, 039 2, 254 2, 268	2, 649 2, 455 2, 675 3, 029 3, 713	813 494 992 595 778	399 612 760 882 720	1, 30 1, 05 1, 06 2, 13 2, 03
955956957958959		10, 240 10, 939 12, 884 11, 558 9, 748	2, 185 2, 301 2, 516 1, 334 2, 027	635 636 411 571 531	7, 420 8, 002 9, 957 9, 653 7, 190	2, 994 3, 647 4, 234 3, 515 2, 073	2, 464 2, 529 3, 938 3, 804 3, 258	893 724 824 824 967	1, 132 1, 419 1, 462 1, 424 717	2, 75 2, 61 2, 42 1, 99 2, 73
960 961 962 963 964		10, 154 13, 165 10, 705 12, 211 13, 957	1,664 3,294 1,314 1,011 2,679	409 450 422 343 412	8, 081 9, 420 8, 969 10, 856 10, 865	2, 152 4, 077 3, 249 3, 514 3, 046	2, 851 3, 032 2, 825 2, 677 2, 760	718 694 567 957 982	1,050 1,834 1,303 1,105 2,189	3, 38 3, 52 2, 76 3, 95 4, 98
965 966 967 968 969 p	11, 148 11, 089 14, 288 16, 374 11, 442	15, 992 18, 074 24, 798 21, 966 26, 790	1, 547 1, 939 1, 959 3, 946 7, 740	725 574 885 637 690	13, 720 15, 561 21, 954 17, 383 18, 360	5, 417 7, 070 11, 058 6, 979 6, 310	2, 936 3, 665 4, 935 5, 281 6, 700	1, 013 1, 972 2, 067 1, 875 2, 120	947 2, 003 1, 979 1, 766 2, 190	5, 68 3, 36 4, 75 6, 06 9, 48
967 : 1 		5, 464 6, 208 6, 832 6, 294	298 518 447 696	92 208 231 354	5, 074 5, 482 6, 154 5, 244	2,502 3,084 2,880 2,591	1,011 1,304 1,281 1,339	503 437 659 469	548 556 601 274	89 82 1,41 1,62
968: I II III	3,771 4,511 4,435	5, 178 5, 705 5, 133 5, 950	740 832 986 1,389	249 124 179 85	4, 189 4, 749 3, 967 4, 477	1,907 1,703 1,657 1,712	1, 442 1, 244 1, 160 1, 435	404 470 427 574	422 536 490 319	1,00 1,75 1,39 1,91
969: I II IV P	2,738 3,426 2,376 2,902	6, 219 7, 354 6, 332 6, 880	1,786 2,141 1,616 2,200	236 128 182 150	4, 197 5, 085 4, 534 4, 530	1,407 1,774 1,862 1,270	1,345 1,879 1,544 1,930	807 612 371 320	474 432 684 600	2, 18 2, 65 1, 87 2, 76

¹ Prior to 1948, also includes extractive, radio broadcasting, airline companies, commercial and miscellaneous company

Note.—Covers substantially all new issues of state, municipal, and corporate securities offered for cash sale in the United States in amounts over \$100,000 and with terms to maturity of more than 1 year; excludes notes issued exclusively to commercial banks, intercorporate transactions, investment company issues, and issues to be sold over an extended period, such as employee-purchase plans.

Sources: Securities and Exchange Commission, "The Commercial and Financial Chronicle," and "The Bond Buyer."

issues.

2 Prior to 1948, also includes telephone, street railway, and bus company issues.

3 Prior to 1948, includes railroad issues only.

			Standard	& Poor's	common s	tock data			Stock ma	rket credit	
Year or mont	th		Price i	ndex 1		Divi- dend	Price/	Custom U.	er credit (S. Governi securities	excluding nent s)	Bank loans to
	(5	ital 00 cks)	Indus- trials (425 stocks)	Public utilities (55 stocks)	Rail- roads (20 stocks)	yield ² (per- cent)	ings ratio ³	Total	Net debit bal- ances 4	Bank loans to "others" s	brokers and dealers
			1941-4	3=10					Millions	of dollars	
1939	12	. 06	11,77	16.34	9. 82	4. 05	13. 80				715
940	11	. 02	10.69	15.05	9, 41 9, 39	5, 59 6, 82	10. 25 8. 27				584 535
941	8	3. 67	9, 72 8, 78	10. 93 7. 74	8, 81	7 24	8.80				850
943 944	(11	. 50 . 47	11, 49 12, 34	11.34	11.81	4. 93 4. 86	12.84			353	1,328
945	15	5. 16	14,72	12. 81 16. 84	13. 47 18. 21 19. 09	4.17	13. 66 16. 33 17. 69	1,374 976	942	432	2, 137 2, 782
946 0 <i>4</i> 7	17	. 08 5. 17	16. 48 14. 85	20.76	19.09	3.85	17.69	976 1, 032	473 517	503 515	1, 471 784
945 946 947 948	15	. 53 . 23	15. 34 15. 00	18. 01 16. 77 17. 87	14. 02 15. 27 12. 83	4. 93 5. 54	9.36 6.91	968	499	469	1,331
949	10	. 23 3. 40				6. 59	6.64	1,249 1,798	821	428	1,608
950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957	22	2.34 1.50	18, 33 22, 68 24, 78	19, 96 20, 59	15. 53 19. 91 22. 49	6. 57 6. 13 5. 80	6. 63 9. 27 10. 47	1 926	1, 237 1, 253 1, 332	561 573	1 410
952	24	. 50 . 73	24.78	20. 59 22. 86 24. 03 27. 57 31. 37	22. 49	5. 80 5. 80	10.47	1,980 2,445	1,332	648 780 1,048 1,239 1,161	2,002
954	29	. 69	24, 84 30, 25	27.57	22. 60 23. 96	4. 95	9. 69 11. 25	2, 445 3, 436 4, 030	1,665 2,388 2,791	1,048	2,688
955	40). 49 5. 62	42. 40 49. 80	31. 37 32. 25	32. 94 33. 65	4. 08 4. 09	11. 51 14. 05	4, 030 3, 984	2,791	1, 239	2,852
957	44	1. 38	47.63	32, 19	28. 11	4. 35	12.89	3,576	2, 823 2, 482	1,054	2, 190
1958 1959		3. 24 7. 38	49. 36 61. 45	37, 22 44, 15	27. 05 35. 09	3. 97 3. 23	16. 64 17. 05	4, 537 4, 461	3, 285 3, 280	1, 252 1, 181	2, 002 2, 248 2, 688 2, 852 2, 214 2, 190 2, 569 2, 584
960	50	. 85	59, 43	46, 86	30, 31	3.47	17.09	4, 415		1, 193	1 2,614
961	66	i. 27 2. 38	69. 99	60, 20	32, 83	2. 98 3. 37	21.06	5,602	3, 222 4, 259	1 7/17	3, 398 4, 352
961 962 963	69	. 30). 87	65. 54 73. 39	59. 16 64. 99	30, 56 37, 58	3. 3/ 3. 17	16.68 17.62	5, 494 7, 242	4, 125 5, 515	1,369 1,727	4,754
.964	81	l. 37 3. 17	86. 19 93. 48	69.91 76.08	45, 46 46, 78	3. 17 3. 01 3. 00	18. 08 17. 08	7, 053 7, 770	5, 079 5, 521	1,974 2,249	4,631
.965 !966	85	5. 26	91.08	68, 21	46. 74 46. 72	3. 40	14. 92	7,444	5,329 7,883	. Z. 113	4, 501
967	91	l. 93 3. 70	99.18	68. 10 66. 42	46.72	3. 40 3. 20 3. 07	14. 92 17. 52 17. 20	10, 347 12, 488	7,883 9,790	2, 464 2, 698	5, 082 5, 796
967 968 969 P	97	7. 84	107.49 107.13	62.64	48. 84 45. 95	3. 24	17.20	10, 026	7,447	2, 579	5, 146
1968: Jan	95	5. 04	103.11	68. 02	43.38 42.35	3, 13		10, 218	7, 797	2, 421 2, 421 2, 374 2, 346 2, 357 2, 410	5, 826
Feb Mar	89), 75 9, 09	98. 33 96. 77	65. 61 62. 62	42.35	3, 28 3, 34	16.40	9, 840 9, 622	7,419	2,421	5, 052 4, 305
Apr May	95	5. 67	104. 42	63.66	41.68 44.79	3. 34 3. 12 3. 07		10,047	7,701	2,346	4, 376 4, 282
June	100	7. 87 0. 53	104. 42 107. 02 109. 73	62.62 63.66 62.92 65.21	48.00 51.72	3.07	17. 23	10, 047 10, 625 11, 138	7, 419 7, 248 7, 701 8, 268 8, 728	2,337	4, 282 4, 584
July	100	3 20	100 16	67, 55	51, 01	3,00		11 277	8 861	2 410	6, 327
Aug Sept Oct	101	3.11 1.34 3.76 5.40	106.77 110.53 113.29 114.77	66.60 66.77	48.80 51.11	3, 09	17.61	10,976 11,238 11,416	8, 489 8, 723	2,487	6, 156 6, 452
Oct	10	3.76	113. 29	66. 93 70. 59	54. 26 53. 74	2. 94		11, 416	8.859	2, 557	5,642
Nov Dec	10	5. 40 5. 48	114.77 116.01	70. 59 70. 54	53.74 55.19	3.01 2.94 2.92 2.93	17.54	11,666 12,488	9, 029 9, 790	2, 416 2, 487 2, 515 2, 557 2, 637 2, 698	4, 960 5, 796
l 969: Jan	102	2. 04	110, 97 110, 15	68, 65 69, 24	54.11 54.78	3. 06 3. 10		11, 793	9, 042	2,751	4, 539
Feb Mar	101	1. 46 9. 30	110, 15 108, 20	69. 24 66. 07	54,78	3. 10 3. 17	17, 68	11, 949	9, 148 8, 318	2,801	4, 334 3, 697
Apr	10	1, 26	110.68	65.63	50, 46 49, 53	3, 11	17.00	10,807	8,044	2,763	4, 364
Apr May June	104	4. 62 9. 14	114, 53 108, 59	66. 91 63. 29	49.97 46.43	3. 02 3. 18	16, 59	11, 240 10, 951	8, 474 8, 214	2, 751 2, 801 2, 781 2, 763 2, 766 7 2, 737	4, 051 7 4, 379
July	94	4, 71	103, 68		43, 00	3, 34	10.00	10, 216	7, 515	2,701	4, 46
Aug Sept	94	4. 18	103.68 103.39 103.97	61, 32 59, 20	42. 04 42. 03	3, 37	15.70	9, 684	7, 019 7, 039	2, 701 2, 665 2, 616 2, 573 2, 524 2, 579	3, 389 3, 579
Oct	∤ 98	4. 51 5. 52	105,07	57. 84 58. 80	41.75	3, 33 3, 33 3, 31	13.70	9, 655 9, 816	7, 243	2, 573	3,588
Nov	96	5. 21 1. 11	105, 86 100, 48	59, 46 55, 28	40, 63 36, 69	3. 31 3. 52		9,635 10,026	7, 111	2, 524	4, 197 5, 140

¹ Annual data are averages of monthly figures and monthly data are averages of daily figures.

² Aggregate cash dividends (based on latest known annual rate) divided by the aggregate monthly market value of the stocks in the group. Annual yields are averages of monthly data.
3 Ratio of quarterly earnings (seasonally adjusted annual rate) to price index for last day in quarter. Annual ratios are averages of quarterly data.

⁴ As reported by member firms of the New York Stock Exchange carrying margin accounts. Includes net debit balances of all customers (other than general partners in the reporting firm and member firms of national exchanges) whose com-bined accounts net to a debit. Balances secured by U.S. Government obligations are excluded through 1967 and included thereafter. Data are for end of period.

⁵ Loans by weekly reporting member banks (weekly reporting large commercial banks beginning 1965) to others than brokers and dealers for purchasing or carrying securities except U.S. Government obligations. Data are for last Wednesday

of period.

6 Loans by weekly reporting member banks (weekly reporting large commercial banks beginning 1965) for purchasing or carrying securities, including U.S. Government obligations. Data are for last Wednesday of period.

7 Revised series; not strictly comparable with earlier data.

Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Standard & Poor's Corporation, and New York Stock Exchange.

TAB	LE C-78.—	Business j	ormano	n ana ou	<u>-</u> _	ness failur			
							Ame	ount of cu	
Year or month	Index of net business	New business incorpo-	.Busi-	Num	ber of fai		IIAD	ilities (mil of dollars))
	formation (1957-59 = 100)	rations (num- ber)	ness failure rate 2		Liabili	ty size		Liabili cla	ty size
				Total	Under \$100,000	\$100,000 and over	Total	Under \$100,000	\$100,000 and over
929			103.9	22,909	22, 165	744	483.3	261.5	221.
930 931 932 933 934 934 935 936 937 938 939 938			121.6 133.4 154.1 100.3 61.1	26, 355 28, 285 31, 822 19, 859 12, 091	25, 408 27, 230 30, 197 18, 880 11, 421	947 1,055 1,625 979 670	668.3 736.3 928.3 457.5 334.0	303. 5 354. 2 432. 6 215. 5 138. 5	364. 382. 495. 242. 195.
935 936 937 938			61. 7 47. 8 45. 9 61. 1	12, 244 9, 607 9, 490 12, 836 14, 768	11,691 9,285 9,203 12,553	553 322 287 283 227	310.6 203.2 183.3 246.5 182.5	135. 5 102. 8 101. 9 140. 1	175. 100. 81. 106. 49.
940 941 942			69.6 63.0 54.5 44.6	13,619 11,848 9,405 3,221	14, 541 13, 400 11, 685 9, 282 3, 155	219 163 123	166. 7 136. 1 100. 8 45. 3	132.9 119.9 100.7 80.3	49. 46. 35. 20. 15.
940 941 942 943 944 945 945 947 947	123. 1	132, 916 112, 897 96, 346	16. 4 6. 5 4. 2 5. 2 14. 3 20. 4	1, 222 809 1, 129 3, 474 5, 250	1, 176 759 1, 003 3, 103 4, 853	66 46 50 126 371 397	31. 7 30. 2 67. 3 204. 6 234. 6	30. 2 14. 5 11. 4 15. 7 63. 7 93. 9	17. 18. 51. 140. 140.
950 951 952 953	102. 3 102. 8 108. 0 103. 5	93, 092	34. 3 30. 7 28. 7 33. 2	9, 246 9, 162 8, 058 7, 611 8, 862	8,708 8,746 7,626 7,081 8,075	538 416 432 530 787	308. 1 248. 3 259. 5 283. 3 394. 2	161. 4 151. 2 131. 6 131. 9 167. 5	146. 97. 128. 151. 226.
954 955 956 957 958	99. 8 107. 6 103. 2 98. 3 97. 1 104. 6	83, 7/8 92, 946 102, 706 117, 411 139, 915 141, 163 137, 112 150, 781 193, 067	42. 0 41. 6 48. 0 51. 7 55. 9 51. 8	11,086 10,969 12,686 13,739 14,964 14,053	8, 075 10, 226 10, 113 11, 615 12, 547 13, 499 12, 707	860 856 1,071 1,192 1,465 1,346	462. 6 449. 4 562. 7 615. 3 728. 3 692. 8	211. 4 206. 4 239. 8 267. 1 297. 6 278. 9	251. 243. 322. 348. 430. 413.
960 961 962 963 964 965 967 967	99. 8 95. 4 98. 0 100. 6 104. 5	182, 713 181, 535 182, 057 186, 404 197, 724 203, 897 200, 010 206, 569 233, 635	57. 0 64. 4 60. 8 56. 3 53. 2 53. 3 51. 6 49. 0 38. 6 37. 3	15, 445 17, 075 15, 782 14, 374 13, 501 13, 514 13, 061 12, 364 9, 636 9, 154	13, 650 15, 006 13, 772 12, 192 11, 346 11, 340 10, 833 10, 144 7, 829 7, 192	1, 795 2, 069 2, 010 2, 182 2, 155 2, 174 2, 228	938. 6 1, 090. 1 1, 213. 6 1, 352. 6 1, 329. 2 1, 321. 7 1, 385. 7 1, 265. 2 941. 0	327. 2 370. 1 346. 5 321. 0 313. 6 321. 7 321. 5 297. 9 241. 1 231. 3	611. 720. 867. 1,031. 1,015. 1,000. 1,064. 967. 699. 910.
309		naily adjuste	<u>'</u>	3, 134	7, 192	1, 302	1, 142. 1	231.3	310.
968: Jan		17, 223 18, 014 17, 974 18, 659 18, 796 19, 197	38. 2 37. 5 44. 3 43. 5 40. 9 36. 9	844 832 1, 021 1, 003 909 751	651 682 839 833 707 616	193 150 182 170 202 135	104. 5 79. 6 88. 6 80. 1 91. 4 74. 7	20. 4 21. 4 26. 1 24. 8 21. 9 18. 6	84. 58. 62. 55. 69. 56.
July	1 110 0	19, 530 20, 011 20, 986 21, 394 21, 155 20, 292	41. 0 36. 5 40. 3 37. 5 35. 7 29. 9	810 734 705 768 696 563	646 607 598 614 569 467	164 127 107 154 127 96	90. 3 65. 8 58. 7 65. 4 58. 7 83. 4	19. 2 18. 3 19. 1 18. 6 17. 9 14. 8	71. 47. 39. 46. 40. 68.
969: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	125. 2 125. 8 123. 2 123. 9	20, 578 22, 199 21, 353 23, 467 23, 230 23, 711	32.0 35.6 38.0 36.4 36.9	689 731 868 823 812 792	545 566 722 643 661 630	144 165 146 180 151 162	75. 0 90. 0 84. 1 118. 8 92. 6 91. 9	18. 1 17. 7 23. 4 19. 7 21. 6 19. 0	56. 72. 60. 99. 71. 72.
June	124, 6	23, 711 22, 991 23, 141 24, 683 22, 749	39. 8 34. 9 36. 0 39. 9 39. 5 40. 9 38. 2	689 702 726 815 759 748	537 563 573 600 570 582	152 139 153 215 189 166	112.7 62.8 73.7 116.4 127.1 96.8	17. 8 18. 6 17. 9 19. 2 18. 7 19. 4	95. 44. 55. 97. 108. 77.

Commercial and industrial failures only. Excludes failures of banks and railroads and, beginning 1933, of real estate, insurance, holding, and financial companies, steamship lines, travel agencies, etc.
 Failure rate per 10,000 listed enterprises.
 Series revised; not strictly comparable with earlier data.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census) and Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.

AGRICULTURE

Table C-79.—Income from agriculture, 1929-69

	Pe	rsonal inc	ome			Inco	me receiv	ed from far	ming	
Year or	rec	ceived by trim popula	total	Realize	ed gross		Net to oper	o farm ators	Net inco farm, in net inv	cluding entory
quarter	From all sources	From farm sources ¹	From non- farm sources 2	Total ³	Cash receipts from market- ings	Produc- tion ex- penses	Exclud- ing net inven- tory change	Includ- ing net inven- tory change 4	Current prices	1957–59 prices ⁵
				Billions	of dollars				Doil	ars
1929				13.9	11,3	7.7	6.3	6. 2	945	1,750
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1936 1937 1938	5, 4 7, 7 7, 2 9, 0 7, 2 7, 4	3.2 5.4 4.6 6.2 4.7	2. 2 2. 3 2. 6 2. 7 2. 5 2. 6	11.5 8.4 6.4 7.1 8.6 9.7 10.8 11.4 10.1	9.1 6.4 4.7 5.3 6.4 7.1 8.4 8.9 7.7	6.9 5.5 4.4 4.7 5.6 6.2 5.9 6.3	4.5 2.9 1.9 2.7 3.9 4.6 5.1 5.2 4.2	4.3 3.3 2.0 2.9 5.3 4.3 6.4 4.4	651 506 304 379 431 775 639 905 668 685	1,302 1,177 822 997 1,002 1,802 1,486 2,011 1,553 1,631
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1947 1948	7.6 10.1 14.1 16.5 16.6 17.2 20.0 21.1 23.8 19.5	4. 8 6. 8 10. 1 12. 1 12. 2 12. 8 15. 5 15. 8 18. 0 13. 3	2. 8 3. 3 3. 9 4. 4 4. 4 4. 6 5. 3 5. 8 6. 2	11. 1 13. 9 18. 8 23. 4 24. 4 25. 8 29. 5 34. 1 34. 7 31. 6	8. 4 11. 1 15. 6 19. 6 20. 5 21. 7 24. 8 29. 6 30. 2 27. 8	6. 9 7. 8 10. 0 11. 6 12. 3 13. 1 14. 5 17. 0 18. 8 18. 0	4. 2 6. 1 8. 8 11. 8 12. 1 12. 8 15. 0 17. 1 15. 9 13. 6	4. 5 6. 5 9. 9 11. 7 11. 7 12. 3 15. 1 15. 4 17. 7 12. 8	706 1,031 1,588 1,927 1,950 2,063 2,543 2,615 3,044 2,233	1, 681 2, 291 3, 054 3, 322 3, 197 3, 223 3, 581 3, 151 3, 459 2, 627
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1957	20. 4 22. 7 22. 1 19. 8 18. 4 17. 6 17. 8 17. 7 19. 5 18. 1	14. 1 16. 2 15. 4 13. 4 12. 5 11. 4 11. 2 11. 0 12. 8 11. 0	6.3 6.5 6.7 6.4 5.9 6.2 6.6 6.6 6.7	32. 3 37. 1 36. 8 35. 0 33. 6 33. 1 34. 3 34. 0 37. 9 37. 5	28, 5 32, 9 32, 5 31, 0 29, 8 29, 5 30, 4 29, 7 33, 5	19. 4 22. 3 22. 6 21. 3 21. 9 22. 4 23. 3 25. 2 26. 1	12. 9 14. 8 14. 1 13. 7 12. 0 11. 2 11. 9 10. 7 12. 7 11. 4	13. 7 16. 0 15. 1 13. 1 12. 5 11. 5 11. 3 13. 5 11. 5	2, 421 2, 946 2, 896 2, 626 2, 606 2, 463 2, 535 2, 590 3, 189 2, 795	2, 815 3, 134 3, 048 2, 794 2, 772 2, 593 2, 641 2, 616 3, 189 2, 767
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1967	18. 7 19. 7 20. 4 20. 6 20. 6 23. 6 24. 9 23. 9 24. 9 27. 1	11. 5 12. 2 12. 3 12. 1 11. 3 13. 5 14. 4 13. 0 13. 1 14. 5	7. 2 7. 5 8. 2 8. 5 9. 3 10. 0 10. 5 10. 9 11. 8 12. 6	38. 1 39. 8 41. 3 42. 3 42. 6 44. 9 49. 7 49. 0 51. 1 54. 6	34. 2 35. 1 36. 4 37. 2 39. 3 43. 3 42. 7 44. 4 47. 4	26. 4 27. 1 28. 6 29. 7 29. 5 30. 9 33. 4 34. 8 36. 3 38. 6	11. 7 12. 6 12. 6 12. 6 13. 1 14. 0 16. 3 14. 2 14. 8 16. 0	12. 1 13. 0 13. 2 13. 2 12. 3 15. 0 16. 3 14. 7 14. 7	3, 049 3, 399 3, 586 3, 708 3, 564 4, 487 5, 019 4, 683 4, 805 5, 468	2, 989 3, 332 3, 482 3, 565 3, 394 4, 193 4, 563 4, 144 4, 107 4, 446
[-				Seas	sonally ad	usted ann	ual rates	········	·	
1968: I				50. 0 50. 9 51. 8 51. 9	43. 4 44. 2 45. 0 45. 0	35, 6 36, 1 36, 5 37, 2	14. 4 14. 8 15. 3 14. 7	14. 9 14. 4 14. 9 14. 5	4, 880 4, 710 4, 880 4, 750	4, 210 4, 030 4, 140 3, 990
1969: 			- 1	52. 9 55. 1 55. 3 55. 1	46. 0 48. 2 48. 0 47. 5	37. 9 38. 8 38. 8 38. 9	15. 0 16. 3 16. 5 16. 2	15. 0 16. 5 16. 9 16. 4	5, 050 5, 550 5, 690 5, 520	4, 170 4, 510 4, 630 4, 420

¹ Net income to farm operators including net inventory change, less net income of nonresident operators, plus wages and salaries and other labor income of farm resident workers, less contributions of farm resident operators and workers to social insurance.

2 Consists of income received by farm residents from nonfarm sources, such as wages and salaries from nonfarm employment, nonfarm business and professional income, rents from nonfarm real estate, dividends, interest, royalties, unemployment compensation, and social security payments.

3 Cash receipts from marketings, Government payments, and nonmoney income furnished by farms.

4 Includes net change in inventory of crops and livestock valued at the average price for the year.

3 Income in current prices divided by the index of prices paid by farmers for family living items on a 1957–59 base.

Table C-80.—Farm production indexes, 1929-09 [1957-59 = 100]

	Farm					Crops					Live	stock an	d produ	cts
Year	Farm out- put 1	Total 2	Feed grains	Hay and forage	Food grains	Vege- tables	Fruits and nuts	Cot- ton	To- bacco	Oil crops	Total 8	Meat ani- mals	Dairy prod- ucts	Poul- try and eggs
1929	62	73	62	79	68	73	75	120	88	13	63	62	75	44
1930	61	69	56	66	74	74	73	113	95	14	64	63	76	45
1931	66	77	63	72	79	75	92	138	89	14	65	66	78	44
1932	64	73	73	74	63	76	75	105	58	13	66	67	79	44
1933	59	65	56	69	47	73	76	105	80	11	67	70	79	44
1934	51	54	33	64	45	80	71	78	63	13	61	59	78	41
1935 1936 1937 1938	61 55 69 67 68	70 59 81 76 75	60 38 67 65 65	82 66 75 81 75	55 54 74 77 63	81 75 82 81 81	90 70 93 84 96	86 101 154 97 96	76 68 91 80 110	21 16 18 22 29	59 63 62 65 70	53 60 58 63 71	78 79 79 81 82	41 44 44 45 48
1940	70	78	66	86	69	83	93	102	84	34	71	72	84	49
1941	73	79	71	86	79	84	99	88	73	37	75	76	89	54
1942	82	89	81	93	83	89	98	105	81	56	84	87	92	62
1943	80	83	74	91	72	97	84	93	81	60	91	97	91	71
1944	83	88	78	90	88	92	98	100	113	50	86	88	92	71
1945	81	85	75	93	92	94	89	74	114	54	86	84	95	74
1946	84	89	82	87	95	105	106	71	134	52	83	82	94	69
1947	81	85	63	84	111	91	101	97	122	55	82	81	93	68
1948	88	97	91	84	107	97	92	122	115	67	80	79	90	67
1949	87	92	80	83	92	94	98	131	114	61	85	83	93	74
1950	86	89	81	89	86	96	98	82	117	71	88	89	93	78
1951	89	91	75	92	85	89	100	124	135	65	92	95	92	81
1952	92	95	79	90	109	90	97	124	130	63	92	95	92	82
1953	93	94	77	92	100	95	98	134	119	63	93	94	97	84
1954	93	93	81	92	88	93	99	111	130	71	96	98	98	87
1955	96	96	86	98	83	96	99	120	127	78	99	103	99	86
1956	97	95	85	94	87	102	103	108	126	92	99	100	101	94
1957	95	93	93	101	82	98	94	89	96	91	97	96	101	95
1958	102	104	101	102	121	102	102	93	100	111	99	98	100	101
1959	103	103	106	97	97	100	104	118	104	98	104	106	99	104
1960	106	108	109	103	115	102	98	116	112	104	102	103	101	104
1961	107	106	99	102	106	108	102	116	119	121	107	107	103	112
1962	108	107	100	106	98	106	103	121	134	122	108	109	104	112
1963	112	111	108	106	102	106	100	125	135	128	111	114	103	115
1964	111	108	95	107	114	101	101	124	129	128	114	117	105	119
1965	114	115	111	112	117	108	106	121	107	153	111	111	103	124
1966	113	111	110	110	118	109	108	78	109	164	114	116	100	132
1967	118	117	124	115	135	112	112	60	114	170	117	120	99	138
1968	120	120	119	114	141	113	109	89	99	192	118	123	98	135
1969 »	121	121	123	117	130	111	131	82	104	196	118	122	98	139

¹ Farm output measures the annual volume of farm production available for eventual human use through sales from farms or consumption in farm households. Total excludes production of seeds and of feed for horses and mules. ² Includes production of seeds and of feed for horses and mules and certain items not shown separately. ³ Includes certain items not shown separately.

Source: Department of Agriculture.

	Farm po (Apr	pulation il 1) ¹	Fari (1	n employi thousands	ment		Farm o	output		
Year	Num-	As per-				Per	Pe	r man-ho	ur	Crop produc- tion
	ber (thou- sands)	cent of total popu- lation?	Total	Family workers	Hired workers	unit of total input	Total	Crops	Live- stock and products	per acre 4
							Index	, 1957–59	==100	•
1929	30, 580	25. 1	12,763	9,360	3,403	63	28	28	48	69
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934	30, 529 30, 845 31, 388 32, 393 32, 305	24. 8 24. 8 25. 1 25. 8 25. 5	12, 497 12, 745 12, 816 12, 739 12, 627	9, 307 9, 642 9, 922 9, 874 9, 765	3, 190 3, 103 2, 894 2, 865 2, 862	63 69 69 65 59	28 30 30 28 27	27 30 30 27 27	47 47 47 46 43	64 72 68 61 51
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939	32, 161 31, 737 31, 266 30, 980 30, 840	25. 3 24. 8 24. 2 23. 8 23. 5	12,733 12,331 11,978 11,622 11,338	9, 855 9, 350 9, 054 8, 815 8, 611	2,878 2,981 2,924 2,807 2,727	69 62 73 74 72	31 29 33 35 35	31 28 33 35 34	44 46 46 48 50	66 56 76 73 74
1940	30, 547 30, 118 28, 914 26, 186 24, 815	23. 1 22. 6 21. 4 19. 2 17. 9	10, 979 10, 669 10, 504 10, 446 10, 219	8, 300 8, 017 7, 949 8, 010 7, 988	2,679 2,652 2,555 2,436 2,231	72 75 82 79 82	36 39 42 42 44	37 39 43 41 44	50 51 56 58 56	76 77 86 78 83
1945 1946 1947 1948 1949	24, 420 25, 403 25, 829 24, 383 24, 194	17. 5 18. 0 17. 9 16. 6 16. 2	10,000 10,295 10,382 10,363 9,964	7, 881 8, 106 8, 115 8, 026 7, 712	2, 119 2, 189 2, 267 2, 337 2, 252	82 85 82 88 86	46 49 50 56 57	46 50 50 57 57	58 59 61 62 66	82 86 82 92 85
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	23, 048 21, 890 21, 748 19, 874 19, 019	15. 2 14. 2 13. 9 12. 5 11. 7	9, 926 9, 546 9, 149 8, 864 8, 651	7,597 7,310 7,005 6,775 6,570	2, 329 2, 236 2, 144 2, 089 2, 081	85 86 89 90 91	61 62 68 71 74	63 61 67 69 73	68 72 74 76 80	84 85 90 89 88
1955	19 078	11. 5 11. 1 10. 3 9. 8 9. 4	8, 381 7, 853 7, 600 7, 503 7, 342	6, 345 5, 900 5, 660 5, 521 5, 390	2, 036 1, 953 1, 940 1, 982 1, 952	94 96 96 103 101	80 86 91 103 106	77 83 90 105 105	85 89 92 100 108	91 92 93 105 102
1960		8. 7 8. 1 7. 7 7. 1 6. 7	7,057 6,919 6,700 6,518 6,110	5, 172 5, 029 4, 873 4, 738 4, 506	1,885 1,890 1,827 1,780 1,604	105 106 107 108 107	115 122 129 138 144	115 118 124 132 135	113 123 130 140 152	109 112 115 118 115
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 p	b .	6. 4 5. 9 5. 4 5. 2 5. 1	5,610 5,214 4,903 4,746 4,582	4, 128 3, 854 3, 650 3, 532 3, 429	1, 482 1, 360 1, 253 1, 213 1, 153	110 106 108 108 108	156 164 174 182 183	151 154 162 170 168	159 170 183 193 198	122 119 122 126 129

Sources: Department of Agriculture and Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census).

¹ Farm population as defined by Department of Agriculture and Department of Commerce, i.e., civilian population living on farms, regardless of occupation.
² Total population of United States as of July 1 including Armed Forces abroad.
³ Includes persons doing farmwork on all farms. These data, published by the Department of Agriculture, Statistical Reporting Service, differ from those on agricultural employment by the Department of Labor (see Table C-22) because of differences in the method of approach, in concepts of employment, and in time of month for which the data are collected. See monthly report on "Farm Labor."

4 Computed from variable weights for individual crops produced each year.

Table C-82.—Indexes of prices received and prices paid by farmers, and parity ratio, 1929-69 [1957-59=100]

				[19	57-59=1	00}						
					Prices	receive	d by far	mers				
					Crops				Live	stock ar	d produ	ıcts
Year or month	All farm prod- ucts ¹	All crops 1	Food grains	Feed and	grains hay	Cot-	To- bacco	Oil- bear- ing	All live- stock and	Meat ani-	Dairy prod-	Poul- try and
		crops -	grains	Total	Feed grains		Dacco	crops	prod- ucts 1	mals	ucts	eggs
1929	61	61	55	74	77	57	35	62	62	50	65	102
930 931 932 932 933 934 935 936 937 937 938 939 939	52 36 27 29 37 45 47 51 40 39	52 34 26 32 44 46 49 53 36 37	44 27 21 31 43 46 51 57 35	67 46 31 36 60 68 65 79 45 46	68 44 28 36 60 70 68 84 45	40 24 19 26 39 38 38 36 27 28	29 20 18 22 32 35 33 41 36 31	48 32 19 25 45 55 52 56 42 42	52 38 28 27 32 44 46 49 43	43 30 20 19 22 38 38 42 37 36	55 43 33 34 40 45 49 51 45 43	81 62 51 47 56 74 73 70 69
1940	42 51 66 80 82 86 98 114 119	41 48 65 84 89 91 102 118 114	40 46 57 70 78 81 95 128 118	54 58 72 96 108 106 127 161 162 112	54 58 73 97 109 104 131 171 170 109	32 43 60 64 66 69 91 105 104	28 32 51 66 72 74 78 77 78 82	45 60 80 88 97 100 114 158 153 106	42 53 66 77 76 82 94 111 122 106	35 46 60 66 62 67 81 107 117 101	47 55 63 77 86 89 104 106 117 98	62 77 96 121 112 126 127 141 153 140
950	107 125 119 105 102 96 95 97 104	104 119 120 108 108 104 105 101 100 99	106 115 116 111 110 107 106 106 98 96	122 143 147 130 128 116 115 105 97 98	123 147 150 132 130 116 116 105 97	108 129 119 102 105 104 103 101 97 102	83 90 89 89 91 90 93 96 100	120 148 129 122 133 109 111 106 98 96	108 130 119 104 97 90 88 94 106 100	110 133 115 94 92 80 76 89 109	97 112 118 104 96 96 99 101 99	118 144 130 140 113 121 112 102 108 90
960	99 99 101 100 98 103 110 105 108 114	100 102 104 107 107 104 106 101 103 100	96 99 107 106 90 77 87 84 76 73	96 95 98 104 105 110 114 110 100 105	94 94 96 102 103 108 112 108 97 102	97 100 104 104 100 94 82 73 74 66	103 109 109 102 101 106 114 114 117 123	93 112 108 113 112 116 128 121 115	98 99 95 91 101 113 107 112 125	96 97 101 94 88 104 116 109 112 130	101 101 99 99 100 102 115 119 124 129	101 92 92 92 90 92 102 84 90 102
1968: Jan 15 Feb 15 Mar 15 Apr 15 May 15 June 15	105 107 108 108 108 108	103 103 104 105 106 103	80 82 82 79 79 74	102 104 104 103 104 103	99 101 101 101 102 101	73 66 66 65 70 69	115 116 116 116 116 116	117 119 118 118 118 118	107 109 110 109 109 111	106 111 113 113 113 115	124 122 120 119 119 117	84 84 84 81 78 85
July 15 Aug 15 Sept 15 Oct 15 Nov 15 Dec 15	108 108 111 108 109 108	100 101 103 102 103 100	71 70 71 73 75 73	99 93 95 93 98 100	97 90 92 90 96 97	70 84 85 86 78 70	117 118 119 116 119 120	117 115 111 109 111 112	114 113 116 113 113 115	118 115 114 110 109 111	120 124 128 131 132 131	91 92 105 94 97 103
1969: Jan 15 Feb 15 Mar 15 Apr 15 May 15 June 15	109 110 112 112 117 117	99 101 102 102 106 103	73 74 74 74 74 71	102 104 103 105 109 109	99 101 99 102 107 107	62 64 66 67 65 69	119 120 120 121 121 121	113 114 113 114 115 114	116 117 119 120 124 128	113 118 122 125 136 142	130 128 126 124 122 121	105 99 101 95 85 88
July 15	117 115 114 115 118 118	100 99 96 97 102 99	67 68 72 74 75 75	107 105 104 104 102 103	106 103 102 101 99 100	70 67 63 70 69 65	122 125 127 126 125 124	114 109 102 102 105 106	129 128 127 127 129 133	138 137 132 130 129 133	124 127 131 136 138 137	101 97 104 102 116 126

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE C-82.—Indexes of prices received and prices paid by farmers, and parity ratio, 1929-69— Continued

[1957-59=100]

					[195/-	-28=100						
				<u> </u>	Prices	paid by fa	armers					
	All items.	1		Commodi	ties an	d services	s		1			
	in-		1	1	Dane	lunkina ik						D. alta.
Year or month	terest, taxes,		Fam-		Proc	luction ite	ems	,_	Inter-	Taxes 3	Wage	Parity ratio s
	and	All	ily	All -		Motor	Farm	Fer-	est 2		rates4	
	wage rates	Items	items	produc-	Feed	Ve-	ma-	til-		ł		
	(parity index)			tion items 1		hicles	chin- ery	izer				
	<u>-</u> -		- <u></u> -									
929	55	55	54	56	68	36	43	85	116	56	32	92
930	52 44	51 44	50 43	52 43	61 43	35 35	43 42	83 75	113 108	57 56	30 24	83 67 58
932	38	38	37	. 38	32	35 34	40	66	101	51	24 18	58
933	37 41	38 43	38 43	38 44	37 52	34 36 37 38 39	39 40	61 69	90 80	44 38	15 17	64 (66 75 (80 88 (95
930	42	45	43	46	53 55	37	41	68	74	36	18	64 (66 75 (80 88 (95
936 937 938 939	42 45	45 48	43 45	46 50	62	38	42 43	64 67	68 64	36 36	20 22 22 22	42 /45
938	42	45	43	47	47	42	44	67	60	38	22	78 (83)
939	42 42	44	42 42	46 47	47 50	40 40	43 43	66	58	37		
941	42	48	45 52	50	54	40	43	64 64	56 54	38 38	22 26	81 (88 93 (98
942	52	55 61	52 58	57	66 78	45	46 48	71	51	38 37	34 45	105 (109
940	58 62	64	61	63 66	/8 87	51	49	71 76 77	46 43 41	37	45 54	113 (116 108 (110
945	65	66 72	64	67	86	45 47 51 53 55	49	79	41 40	39	54 62 66 72	109 (111
946	71 82	85	71 83	73 85	100 118	63	51 58	79 88	40	43 48	66 72	113 (115 115 (116
948	89	92	88	95	125	63 71 78	67	96	43	56	76 74	110 (111
949	86 87	88 90	85 86	91 94	103 105	78 78	76 78	98 94	45 49	60 65		100 (100 101 (102
951	.96	100	94	104	118 -	83 87	78 83	100	54	68	73 81	107 (108
952	98	100	95 94	104 97	126 114	87	86 87	102	59	71 74	87	100 (101
950 951 952 953 954	95 95	96	94	97	113	86 86 87	87 87	103 102	63 68	77	88 88 89	100 (101 92 (93 89 (89 84 (85
955	94 95	95	95	96 95	106	87 89	87 92	101	74 83	81	89	84 (85
957	98	96 98	96 99	98	103 101	96 1	96	100 100	91	87 93	92 96	83 (84 82 (85 85 (88
958	100	101	100	100 102	99 100	100	96 100 104	100	100 109	100	99	85 (88
960	102 102	101	101 102	102	98	104 102	104	100	120	107	105 109	81 (82 80 (81
961	103	101	102	101	98	102	110	100	131	125	110	79 (83 80 (83
961 962 963	105 107	103	103 104	103 104	100 104	105 109	111 113	100 100	145 162	117 125 132 139	114 116	80 (81 79 (83 80 (83 78 (81
964	107	104	105	103	103	111	116	99	182	147	119	76 (80
964 965 966 967	110 114	106 109	107 110	105 108	104 109	113 117 121 128	119 124 129 135	100 100	206 231 255	156 165	125 135	76 (80 77 (82 80 (86 74 (80
967	116	111	113	109	106	121	129	100	255	165 179 192	146 158	74 (80
968	121 127	114	117 123	111 116	102 103	128 133	135 142	97 94	283 315	192 206	158 174	74 (79 74 (80
968: Jan 15	118	112	115	110	103			100	283	192	150 150	
Feb 15 Mar 15	119 120	113	116 116	111 111	104 103	126	133	100 100	283 283	192 192	150 150	74 (80 74 (80
Apr 15	121 121	114	117	111	103			98	283	192	157 157	74 (80
May 15 June 15	121 121	114 114	117	112 112	103 102	129 129	136	98 98	283 283	192 192	157 157	73 (79 73 (79
July 15		114	118	112	101	123	100	98	283	192	159	
Aug 15 Sept 15	121 121	1114	118	111	99			98	283	192	159	74 (79 74 (79 75 (81
Sept 15	122 122	115 115 115	118	111 111	100 99	128	138	96 96	283 283	192 192	159 166	73 (79
Nov 15	123 123	115	119	112	101	130		96 96	283	192	166	73 (79
Dec 15 969: Jan 15	123	116	119 120	113 113	101 102	130	139	96	283 315	192 206	166 166	
Feb 15	125	117	120	114	102			96	315	206	166	73 (79
Mar 15	126 127	118	122	115	102 103	132	140	96 94	315 315	206 206	166	72 (78 73 (79 73 (79 73 (79 75 (82 76 (82
Apr 15 May 15 June 15	127 128	118 120 120	122 123	116 117	104	133		94	315	206	177 177	75 (82
	128		123	117	103	133	143	94	315	206	177	
July 15 Aug 15	128 127	120	123 123 124 124	116 116	103 103			94 94	315 315	206	174	75 (82 75 (81 74 (79 74 (80
Sept 15	127 128	119 120 120 120 120 121	124	116	103	133	145	93	315 315	206 206	174 174	74 (79
Oct 15 Nov 15	128 129	120	124 125	116 117	102 102	135		93 93	315 315	206 206	179 179	74 (80 76 (82
Dec 15	129	121	125	117	104	133		93	315	206	179	76 (82 76 (82
	1	í	1	í	l	t	l	1	ŀ	1		

¹ Includes items not shown separately.
2 Interest payable per acre on farm real estate debt.
3 Farm real estate taxes payable per acre (levied in preceding year).
4 Monthly data are seasonally adjusted.
5 Percentage ratio of prices received for all farm products to parity index, on a 1910–14=100 base. The adjusted parity ratio (shown in pareintheses in the table) reflects Government payments made directly to farmers.

bigli Source: Department of Agriculture.

http://fraser.stiouisfed.org/
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TABLE C-83.—Selected measures of farm resources and inputs, 1929-69

			iira I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I									
Year	Crops harvested (millions of acres) ¹	Man- hours of farm work (bil- lions)	Total	Farm labor	Farm real estate ²	Me- chani- cal power and ma- chinery	Ferti- lizer and liming materials	Feed, seed, and live- stock pur- chases ³	Miscel- laneous			
1929	365	23. 2	98	218	92	38	21	27	76			
1930	369	22. 9	97	216	91	40	21	26	76			
1931	365	23. 4	96	220	89	38	16	23	78			
1932	371	22. 6	93	213	86	35	11	24	79			
1933	340	22. 6	91	212	87	32	12	24	76			
1934	304	20. 2	86	190	86	32	14	24	69			
1935	345	21. 1	88	198	88	33	17	23	66			
1936	323	20. 4	89	192	89	35	20	31	68			
1937	347	22. 1	94	208	90	38	24	29	68			
1938	349	20. 6	91	193	91	40	23	30	70			
1939	331	20. 7	94	194	92	40	24	37	72			
1940	341	20, 5	97	192	92	42	28	45	73			
1941	344	20, 0	97	188	92	44	30	46	74			
1942	348	20, 6	100	194	91	48	34	57	75			
1943	357	20, 3	101	191	89	50	38	63	76			
1944	362	20, 2	101	190	88	51	43	64	76			
1945	354	18. 8	99	177	88	54	45	72	76			
1946	352	18. 1	99	170	91	58	53	69	77			
1947	355	17. 2	99	162	92	64	56	73	78			
1948	356	16. 8	100	158	95	72	57	72	74			
1949	360	16. 2	101	152	95	80	61	69	82			
1950	345	15. 1	101	142	97	86	68	72	85			
1951	344	15. 2	104	143	98	92	73	80	88			
1952	349	14. 5	103	136	99	96	80	81	88			
1953	348	14. 0	103	131	99	97	83	80	91			
1954	346	13. 3	102	125	100	98	88	82	91			
1955	340	12. 8	102	120	100	99	90	86	94			
1956	324	12. 0	101	113	99	99	91	91	98			
1957	324	11. 1	99	104	100	100	94	93	95			
1958	324	10. 5	99	99	100	99	97	101	100			
1959	324	10. 3	102	97	100	101	109	106	105			
1960	324	9. 8	101	92	101	104	111	109	106			
1961	303	9. 4	101	88	101	101	117	111	109			
1962	295	9. 0	101	84	103	100	125	117	113			
1963	300	8. 7	104	81	104	104	141	123	117			
1964	301	8. 2	104	77	106	102	155	126	120			
1965	298	7. 8	104	73	106	105	162	127	120			
1966	295	7. 4	107	69	107	110	182	136	123			
1967	308	7. 3	109	68	108	112	203	139	127			
1968	303	7. 0	111	66	107	114	214	143	130			
1969 p	294	7. 0	112	66	107	115	217	147	134			

Acreage harvested (excluding duplication) plus acreages in fruits, tree nuts, and farm gardens.
 Includes service buildings and improvements on land.
 Nonfarm portion of feed, seed, and livestock purchases.

TABLE C-84.—Comparative balance sheet of agriculture, 1929-70 [Billions of dollars]

					Asse	ts					Cla	ims	
			o	Other physical assets			Fir	nancial ass	ets				
Beginning of year	Total	Real estate	Live- stock ¹	Ma- chin- ery and motor vehi- cles	Crops 2	House- hold equip- ment and furnish- ings	De- posits and cur- rency	U.S. savings bonds	Invest- ment in co- opera- tives	Total	Real estate debt	Other debt	Pro- prie- tors' equi- ties
1929		48. 0	6.6	3. 2							9.8		
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934		37. 2 30. 8 32. 2	6. 5 4. 9 3. 6 3. 0 3. 2	3. 4 3. 3 3. 0 2. 5 2. 2	2.5	4.0	3.6		0.6	68.5	9. 6 9. 4 9. 1 8. 5 7. 7	5.0	
1935		33. 3 34. 3 35. 2 35. 2 34. 1	3.5 5.2 5.1 5.0 5.1	2. 2 2. 4 2. 6 3. 0 3. 2							7.6 7.4 7.2 7.0 6 8		
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944	52. 9 55. 0	33.6 34.4 37.5 41.6 48.2	5. 1 5. 3 7. 1 9. 6 9. 7	3. 1 3. 3 4. 0 4. 9 5. 4	2.7 3.0 3.8 5.1 6.1	4. 2 4. 2 4. 9 5. 0 5. 3	3. 2 3. 5 4. 2 5. 4 6. 6	0, 2 . 4 . 5 1, 1 2, 2	.8 .9 .9 1.0	52.9 55.0 62.9 73.7 84.6	6. 6 6. 5 6. 4 6. 0 5. 4	3.4 3.9 4.1 4.0 3.5	42. 9 44. 6 52. 4 63. 7 75. 7
1945 1946 1947 1948 1949	103. 5 116. 4 127. 9	53. 9 61. 0 68. 5 73. 7 76. 6	9.0 9.7 11.9 13.3 14.4	6. 5 5. 4 5. 3 7. 4 10. 1	6.7 6.3 7.1 9.0 8.6	5. 6 6. 1 7. 7 8. 5 9. 1	7.9 9.4 10.2 9.9 9.6	3. 4 4. 2 4. 2 4. 4 4. 6	1.5	94. 2 103. 5 116. 4 127. 9 134. 9	4.9 4.8 4.9 5.1 5.3	3. 4 3. 2 3. 6 4. 2 6. 1	85. 9 95. 5 107. 9 118. 6 123. 5
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	132.5 151.5 167.0 164.3 161.2	75. 3 86. 6 95. 1 96. 5 95. 0	12.9 17.1 19.5 14.8 11.7	12. 2 14. 1 16. 7 17. 4 18. 4	7. 6 7. 9 8. 8 9. 0 9. 2	8. 6 9. 7 10. 3 9. 9 9. 9	9. 1 9. 1 9. 4 9. 4 9. 4	4. 7 4. 7 4. 7 4. 6 4. 7	2.3 2.5 2.7	132. 5 151. 5 167. 0 164. 3 161. 2	5. 6 6. 1 6. 7 7. 2 7. 7	6.8 7.0 8.0 8.9 9.2	120, 1 138, 4 152, 3 148, 2 144, 3
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	169.6 178.0 185.8	98. 2 102. 9 110. 4 115. 9 124. 4	11. 2 10. 6 11. 0 13. 9 17. 7	18. 6 19. 3 20. 3 20. 2 21. 8	9.6 8.3 8.3 7.6 9.3	10.0 10.5 10.0 9.9 9.8	9. 4 9. 5 9. 4 9. 5 10. 0	5. 0 5. 2 5. 1 5. 1 5. 2	3. 3 3. 5 3. 7	165. 1 169. 6 178. 0 185. 8 202. 2	8. 2 9. 0 9. 8 10. 4 11. 1	9. 4 9. 8 9. 6 10. 0 12. 5	147.5 150.8 158.6 165.4 178.6
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	203. 1 204. 0 212. 9 221. 0 229. 8	130. 2 131. 7 138. 0 143. 8 152. 1	15. 2 15. 6 16. 4 17. 3 15. 8	22. 2 21. 8 22. 3 22. 7 24. 1	7. 7 8. 0 8. 8 9. 3 9. 8	9. 6 8. 9 9. 1 9. 0 8. 9	9. 2 8. 7 8. 8 9. 2 9. 2	4. 7 4. 6 4. 5 4. 4 4. 2	5. 0 5. 3	203. 1 204. 0 212. 9 221. 0 229. 8	12. 1 12. 8 13. 9 15. 2 16. 8	12.7 13.4 14.8 16.5 18.1	178. 3 177. 8 184. 2 189. 3 194. 9
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	238. 5 256. 0 269. 9 283. 4 298. 0	160. 9 172. 5 182. 5 193. 1 202. 6	14. 5 17. 5 18. 9 18. 8 20. 1	25. 5 27. 1 28. 9 31. 1 32. 6	9. 2 9. 7 10. 0 9. 6 10. 5	8.6 8.6 8.4 8.7 9.1	9.6 10.0 10.3 10.9 11.5	4, 2 4, 1 3, 9 3, 8 3, 8	6.5	238. 5 256. 0 269. 9 283. 4 298. 0	18. 9 21. 2 23. 3 25. 5 27. 1	18. 6 20. 4 22. 4 24. 9 27. 5	201. 0 214. 4 224. 2 233. 0 243. 4
1970	307.1	208. 6			4.7			23, 8		307.1	28.7	29. 4	249.0

Source: Department of Agriculture.

¹ Beginning with 1961, horses and mules are excluded.
² Includes all crops held on farms and crops held off farms by farmers as security for Commodity Credit Corporation loans. The latter on January 1, 1969, totaled \$1, 188 million.

INTERNATIONAL STATISTICS

SABLE C-85. United States balance of payments, 1946-69

[Millions of dollars]

		Exports of goods and services					lmp	orts of good	ts and ser	vices		
Year or	Tabal	Mer-	Mili-	Incor	ne on Iments	Other	Tabel	Mer-	Mili- tary	Other	Bal- ance on goods	Remit- tances and
quarter	Total	chan- dise 1	tary sales	Pri- vate	Gov- ern- ment	serv- ices	Total	chan- dise 1	ex- pend- itures	serv- ices	and serv- ices	pen- sions
1946 1947 1948 1949	16, 861	11, 764 16, 097 13, 265 12, 213	(8) (8) (8) (6)	751 1, 036 1, 238 1, 297	21 66 102 98	2, 256 2, 620 2, 256 2, 226	-6, 985 -8, 202 -10, 343 -9, 616	—5, 067 —5, 973 —7, 557 —6, 874	-493 -455 -799 -621	1, 425 1, 774 1, 987 2, 121	7, 807 11, 617 6, 518 6, 218	648 728 631 641
1951 1952 1953	13, 893 18, 864 18, 122 17, 078 17, 889	10, 203 14, 243 13, 449 12, 412 12, 929	(8) (8) (8) 192 182	1, 484 1, 684 1, 624 1, 658 1, 955	204 252	2, 097 2, 739 2, 845 2, 564 2, 551	—12, 001 —15, 047 —15, 766 —16, 546 —15, 930	9, 081 11, 176 10, 838 10, 975 10, 353	-576 -1, 270 -2, 054 -2, 615 -2, 642	2, 344 2, 601 2, 874 2, 956 2, 935	1, 892 3, 817 2, 356 532 1, 959	533 480 571 644 633
1955 1956 1957 1958	19, 948 23, 772 26, 653 23, 217 23, 652	14, 424 17, 556 19, 562 16, 414 16, 458	200 161 375 300 302	2, 170 2, 468 2, 612 2, 538 2, 694	274 194 205 307 349	2, 880 3, 393 3, 899 3, 658 3, 849	—17, 795 —19, 627 —20, 752 —20, 861 —23, 342	-11, 527 -12, 803 -13, 291 -12, 952 -15, 310	-2, 901 -2, 949 -3, 216 -3, 435 -3, 107	-3, 367 -3, 875 -4, 245 -4, 474 -4, 925	2, 153 4, 145 5, 901 2, 356 310	597 690 729 745 815
1963	27, 488 28, 770 30, 506 32, 601 37, 271	19, 650 20, 107 20, 779 22, 252 25, 478	335 402 656 657	3, 000 3, 561 3, 948 4, 151 4, 930	348 381 471 498 456	4, 155 4, 318 4, 651 5, 043 5, 659	-23, 355 -23, 148 -25, 357 -26, 617 -28, 691	-14,744 -14,519 -16,218 -17,011 -18,647	-3, 087 -2, 998 -3, 105 -2, 961 -2, 880	-5, 523 -5, 631 -6, 035 -6, 647 -7, 164	4, 133 5, 622 5, 149 5, 984 8, 580	596 632 695 798 809
1966	39, 399 43, 360 46, 188 50, 594 54, 275	26, 447 29, 389 30, 681 33, 598 35, 489	830 829 1, 240 1, 427 1, 564	5, 384 5, 659 6, 234 6, 934 7, 887		6, 230 6, 891 7, 394 7, 871 8, 384	-32, 278 -38, 081 -41, 011 -48, 078 -52, 405	-21, 496 -25, 463 -26, 821 -32, 972 -35, 193	-2, 952 -3, 764 -4, 378 -4, 530 -4, 813	-7, 831 -8, 854 -9, 813 -10, 577 -12, 399	7, 121 5, 279 5, 177 2, 516 1, 869	—950 —923 —1, 196 —1, 159 —1, 152
		<u></u>	<u>·</u>	<u>. </u>	Se	asonaliy	adjusted a	annual rate	s	·	<u>·</u>	
# 	45, 844 45, 936 46, 308 46, 668	30, 752 30, 892 30, 676 30, 404	1, 332 1, 340 956 1, 328	5, 824 5, 680 6, 596 6, 836	624 640 608 680	7, 312 7, 384 7, 472 7, 420	-40, 400 -40, 132 -40, 692 -42, 824	-26, 640 -25, 860 -26, 168 -28, 616	_4, 340 _4, 300 _4, 424 _4, 448	-9, 420 -9, 972 -10, 100 -9, 760	5, 444 5, 804 5, 616 3, 844	-1,464 -1,360
1968: V	47, 736 50, 672 53, 376 50, 612	31, 764 33, 580 35, 516 33, 532	1, 220 1, 412 1, 624 1, 456	6, 248 7, 072 7, 312 7, 108	836 820 848 560	7, 668 7, 788 8, 076 7, 956	—45, 852 —47, 308 —49, 740 —49, 408	31, 268 32, 524 34, 264 33, 832	4, 408 4, 464 4, 572 4, 676	-10, 176 -10, 320 -10, 904 -10, 900	1, 884 3, 364 3, 636 1, 204	1, 096 1, 300
	47, 652 56, 980 58, 192	29, 876 38, 352 38, 240	1, 672 1, 336 1, 684	7, 544 7, 672 8, 444	936 932 984	7, 624 8, 688 8, 840	46, 200 55, 768 55, 248	30, 288 38, 364 36, 928	-4, 816 -4, 832 -4, 792	11, 096 12, 572 13, 528	1, 452 1, 212 2, 944	-1,144

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE C-85.—United States balance of payments, 1946-69—Continued

[Millions of dollars]

	U.S. Gov-	U.S.	private ca net	pital,			Bala	nce	Changes bilities (Changes in gold, convert-
Year or quarter	ern- ment grants and	Direct	Other		For- eign capi-	Errors and omis-	Li-	Offi- cial	To for official h		To other	ible cur- rencies, and 1MF
	capi- tal, net ²	invest- ment	long- term	Short- term	tal, net ²	sions	quidity basis 8	reserve trans- actions basis 4	Liquid	Non- liquid	foreign hold- ers ⁷	gold tranche position (increase (—))
1946 1947 1948 1949	-5, 293 -6, 121 -4, 918 -5, 649	-230 -749 -721 -660	127 49 69 80	-310 -189 -116 187	-615 -432 -361 44	155 861 1,115 717	993 4, 210 817 136					-623 -3,315 -1,736 -266
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	-3,640 -3,191 -2,380 -2,055 -1,554	-621 -508 -852 -735 -667	495 437 214 185 320	-149 -103 -94 167 -635	181 540 52 146 249	-124 354 497 220 60	-3, 489 -8 -1, 206 -2, 184 -1, 541					1,758 -33 -415 1,256 480
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	-2, 362 -2, 574 -2, 587	-823 -1,951 -2,442 -1,181 -1,372	-241 -603 -859 -1,444 -926	-191 -517 -276 -311 -77	297 615 545 186 736	371 390 1,012 361 260	-1, 242 -973 578 -3, 365 -3, 870					182 869 -1,165 2,292 1,035
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	-2, 768 -2, 779 -3, 013 -3, 578 -3, 564	-1,674 -1,598 -1,654 -1,976 -2,328	-855 -1,025 -1,227 -1,698 -2,103	-1,349 -1,556 -546 -785 -2,147	364 702 1,026 690 689	-1, 156 -1, 103 -1, 246 -509 -1, 118	-3,901 -2,371 -2,204 -2,670 -2,800	-3, 403 -1, 347 -2, 702 -2, 011 -1, 564	1,448 6681 457 1,673 1,075	250 -39 318	308 1,084 214 620 1,554	606 1,533 377
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 10	-3,444 -4 223	-3,639	-1,079 -256 -1,292 -1,082 -1,505	753 415 1, 209 1, 049 623	8,565	-489 -1,007 -642	-1,335	-1,289 266	-18 -1,595 2,020 -3,099	85 761 1,346 2,341	131 2,384 1,472 3,811	52
			Season	ally adjus	ted ann	ual rates			Quar	terly tota	ls unadj	usted
1967: V	-4, 436 -3, 996 -4, 168 -4, 288	-2, 868 -2, 132 -3, 788 -3, 824	-552 -1,004 -2,068 -1,544	-852 -920 -1,244 -1,820	3, 468 4, 884 3, 168 1, 924	-2,496 -276	-1,320 -4,124	-2, 876 -284	80 540 260 1,300	332 589 135 290	-709 90 1,331 760	1,027 -419 -375 -181
1968: V	-4,388 -4,220 -3,872 -3,340	~1,888 -4,036 -5,048 -1,132	-548 -588 -916 -2,280	-788 -1,524 -1,508 -376	6, 220 10, 068 7, 220 10, 752	-1,640 -1,920 1,236 -240	-2, 256 36 -556 3, 448	6,212 388	-1,358 -2,190 -38 487	363 777 537 664	721 2,222 1,017 —149	904 -137 -571 -1,076
1969: l _{P_}	-3, 172 -4, 620 -4, 208	1 1 220	1 700	-2.072	1,420	-5,040 -4,352 -3,564	-15,484	4,944	1,708 543 2,239		4,654	-299

¹ Adjusted from customs data for differences in timing and coverage.

Note.—Data exclude military grant-aid and U.S. subscriptions to International Monetary Fund.

Source: Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics.

² Includes certain special Government transactions.

⁴ Equals changes in liquid liabilities to foreign official holders, other foreign holders, and changes in official reserve assets consisting of gold, convertible currencies, and the U.S. gold tranche position in the IMF.
⁴ Equals changes in liquid and nonliquid liabilities to foreign official holders and changes in official reserve assets consisting of gold, convertible currencies, and the U.S. gold tranche position in the IMF.
⁵ Includes short-term official and banking liabilities, foreign holdings of U.S. Government bonds and notes, and certain popularial liabilities to foreign official holders.

nonliquid liabilities to foreign official holder 6 Central banks, governments, and U.S. liabilities to the IMF arising from reversible gold sales to, and gold deposits with, the United States.

⁷ Private holders; includes banks and international and regional organizations; excludes IMF.

⁸ Not reported separately.

Includes change in Treasury liabilities to certain foreign military agencies; excluding these changes, data (\$ millions) are 1,258 (1960), 741 (1961), 918 (1962).
 Average of the first 3 quarters on a seasonally adjusted annual rates basis.

[Millions of dollars]

		М	erchandis	se export	S 1			Mer	chandise	imports		Gross	
		includ- xports 2		Domestic	exports			Gen	eral impo	orts 4		mer- chan- dise	
Year or quarter	Sea-		_	Food,	Crude	Man-	Tot	al4	Food,	Crude	Man-	trade sur- plus, sea-	
	sonally ad- justed	Unad- justed	Total 23	bever- ages, and to- bacco	mate- rials and fuels 4	ufac- tured goods	Sea- sonally ad- justed	Unad- justed	bever- ages, and to- bacco	mate- rials and fuels [§]	ufac- tured goods 6	sonally ad- justed ⁷	
1958 1959			16, 211 16, 243	2, 688 2, 852	3, 052 2, 996	11,547 11,179		13, 392 15, 690	3, 550 3, 580	4, 164 4, 615	5, 311 7, 117	2, 983 736	
1960		19, 659 20, 226 20, 986 22, 467 25, 832	19, 459 19, 982 20, 717 22, 182 25, 479	3, 167 3, 466 3, 743 4, 188 4, 637	3,864 3,356 3,775	12, 583 12, 784 13, 668 14, 297 16, 529		15, 073 14, 761 16, 464 17, 207 18, 749	3, 392 3, 455 3, 674 3, 863 4, 022	4, 418 4, 334 4, 691 4, 755 5, 029	6, 863 6, 537 7, 649 8, 070 9, 106	4, 586 5, 465 4, 522 5, 260 7, 083	
1965		34, 063	26, 408 29, 054 30, 646 33, 626 36, 770	4, 520 5, 186 4, 710 4, 592 4, 446	4, 275 4, 404 4, 726 4, 864 5, 008	17, 439 19, 218 20, 844 23, 819 26, 764		21, 429 25, 618 26, 889 33, 226 36, 052	4, 013 4, 590 4, 701 5, 365 5, 309	5, 440 5, 718 5, 367 6, 031 6, 391	11, 245 14, 446 15, 756 20, 624 23, 021	5, 322 3, 872 4, 141 837 1, 262	
1967:	7,779 7,783 7,772 7,772	7,713 8,012 7,281 8,024	7, 618 7, 912 7, 184 7, 933	1, 127 1, 157 1, 131 1, 295	1, 160 1, 208 1, 123 1, 235	5, 229 5, 476 4, 836 5, 303	6, 718 6, 525 6, 605 7, 157	6, 636 6, 606 6, 422 7, 226	1, 213 1, 125 1, 100 1, 264	1, 396 1, 348 1, 260 1, 363	3, 814 3, 858 3, 790 4, 293	1,061 1,258 1,167 615	
1968: 	8, 465 9, 019	8, 022 8, 704 8, 425 8, 911	7, 922 8, 596 8, 317 8, 792	1, 195 1, 090 1, 122 1, 185	1,180 1,217 1,174 1,293	5, 465 6, 182 5, 955 6, 217	7, 867 8, 151 8, 548 8, 527	7, 764 8, 256 8, 457 8, 750	1,257 1,308 1,430 1,369	1,443 1,463 1,570 1,555	4, 804 5, 180 5, 142 5, 499	161 314 471 54	
1969 ⁸ :1 V	9, 859	7, 568 10, 150 9, 276 10, 348	7, 451 10, 009 9, 137 10, 201	699 1,256 1,148 1,342	878 1,389 1,238 1,508	5, 774 7, 264 6, 613 7, 135	7, 654 9, 641 9, 302 9, 443	7,420 9,787 9,195 9,667	1,013 1,478 1,331 1,487	1,479 1,641 1,583 1,692	4, 655 6, 328 5, 931 6, 074	68 218 580 532	

¹ Beginning 1960, data have been adjusted for comparability with the revised commodity classifications effective in 1965. ² Totals exclude Department of Defense shipments of grant-aid military supplies and equipment under the Military Assistance Program

3 Total arrivals of imported goods other than intransit shipments.

Note.—Data are as reported by the Bureau of the Census adjusted to include silver ore and bullion reported separately prior to 1969. Export statistics cover all merchandise shipped from the U.S. customs area, except supplies for U.S. Armed Forces. Export values are f.a.s. port of export and include shipments under Agency for International Development and Food for Peace programs as well as other private relief shipments. Import values are defined generally as the market value in the foreign country, excluding the U.S. import duty and transportation costs such as ocean freight and marine insurance,

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of International Commerce.

^{*} Total includes commodities and transactions not classified according to kind.

⁵ Includes fats and oils.

Includes machinery, transportation equipment, chemicals, metals, and other manufactures. Export data for these items include military grant-aid shipments.

Exports, excluding military grant-aid, less general imports; quarterly data seasonally adjusted.

Quarterly data have not been revised and therefore do not add up to annual totals, which are based on more recent

TABLE C-87.—United States merchandise exports and imports, by area, 1963-69 [Millions of dollars]

Area	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969 ₽
Exports (including reexports and special category shipments):	-						
Total	23, 387	26, 650	27, 530	30, 430	31,622	34, 636	37 , 9 88
Developed countries Developing countries	15, 164 8, 057	17, 343 8, 967	18, 366 9, 023	20, 120 10, 112	21, 467 9, 960	23,600 10,821	26, 458 11, 281
Canada Other Western Hemisphere Western Europe 1 Eastern Europe Asia Australia and Oceania Africa	4,261 3,692 8,198 167 5,450 565 1,054	4, 921 4, 293 9, 222 340 5, 811 804 1, 259	5,658 4,275 9,257 140 6,015 956 1,229	6, 679 4, 769 9, 891 198 6, 740 805 1, 348	7, 172 4, 718 10, 187 195 7, 150 1, 018 1, 182	8,072 5,339 11,132 215 7,582 1,026 1,270	9, 138 5, 576 12, 370 249 8, 265 998 1, 392
General imports: Total	17, 207	18, 749	21, 429	25,618	26, 889	33, 226	36, 052
Developed countries Developing countries	10, 832 6, 283	11, 924 6, 711	14, 101 7, 174	17, 632 7, 795	18, 993 7, 709	24, 130 8, 886	26, 465 9, 377
Canada Other Western Hemisphere Western Europe 1 Eastern Europe Asia. Australia and Oceania Africa. Unidentified countries 2	3,851 4,063 4,731 81 3,192 504 778	4, 265 4, 185 5, 209 99 3, 620 442 917 12	4,858 4,399 6,155 137 4,528 4,528 883 14	6, 152 4, 737 7, 679 179 5, 277 596 992 6	7, 140 4, 662 8, 052 177 5, 349 583 920 6	9,005 5,143 10,139 198 6,911 697 1,122	10, 390 5, 165 10, 140 196 8, 276 828 1, 045

Note.—Developed countries include Canada, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the Republic of South Africa. Developing countries include rest of the world except Communist areas in Eastern Europe and Asia and unidentified countries.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of International Commerce.

I includes Finland, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey.
 Consists of certain low-valued shipments not identified by country.

TABLE C-88.—United States overseas loans and grants, by type and area, fiscal years, 1962-69

		[Milli	ions of doll	ars]				
Type of program and fiscal period	Total	Near East and South Asia	Latin America	Vietnam	East Asia	Africa	Europe	Other and non- regional
Total economic loans and grants (net obligations and loan authorizations): 1						-		
1962–68 average Loans Grants	4, 734 2, 545 2, 189	1,534 1,154 380	1, 191 771 420	361 362	520 197 323	388 172 216	258 216 42	482 35 447
1969 Loans Grants	3, 936 2, 023 1, 912	781 604 178	1, 022 555 467	358 358	774 498 275	326 143 183	163 152 11	513 72 441
Economic loans and grants to less developed countries, by program: 2 Net obligations and loan								
authorizations: 1962-68 average 1969.	4, 526 3, 687	1,534 781	1, 191 1, 022	361 358	449 665	388 326	146 83	457 453
Repayments and interest: 1962–68 average 1969	719 1, 080	260 414	290 411	10 5	55 73	31 58	67 113	6 5
Agency for International Development:	,				-			
Net obligations and loan authorizations: 1962–68 average 1969	2, 239 1, 449	718 285	548 290	282 259	227 200	196 108	2	268 30 8
Repayments and interest: 1962-68 average 1969	207 301	114 163	24 49	10 5	22 31	18 24	17 27	3 1
Export-Import Bank long-term loans:								
Loan authorizations: 1962–68 average 1969	404 537	93 68	196 289		27 40	30 58	58 81	
Repayments and interest: 1962-68 average 1969	383 546	74 113	245 317		25 28	10 24	29 64	
Food for Peace: Obligations: 1962-68 average 1969	1,389 1,212	710 416	162 115	79 99	160 397	140 139	87 2	50 45
Repayments and interest: 1962–68 average 1969	107 198	68 133	11 20	*	5 14	10 10	22 22	
Contributions and Subscriptions to International Lending Or- ganizations: 3								
Obligations: 1962-68 average 1969	267 320		181 300					86 20
Peace Corps and other: 4					}	1		
Obligations: 1962-68 average 1969	228 170	13 12	104 28		35 29	22 22		54 80
Repayments and interest: 1962–68 average 1969	22 34	5 4	10 25		3	1		3 4

¹ Some data are preliminary.
2 Countries have been classified "less developed" on the basis of the standard list of less developed countries used by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. On this basis, "less developed" countries include all countries receiving U.S. loans or grants except the following which are considered "developed": Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Republic of South Africa, Canada, and all of Europe except Malta, Spain and Yugoslavia.
3 Includes capital experience and contributions to the later American Development Bank the International Development.

Includes capital subscriptions and contributions to the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Development Association, and the Asian Development Bank.

¹ Data for certain programs from Department of Commerce (Office of Business Economics).

Table C-89.—International reserves, 1949, 1953, and 1964-69

[Millions of dollars; end of period]

					! :			19	69 »
Area and country	1949	1953	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	Sep- tember	Decem- ber
All countries	45, 635	51,780	68, 740	70, 520	71, 980	73, 600	76, 565	79, 615	
Developed areas	37, 245	41,375	59, 015	59, 540	60, 330	61, 145	62, 940	64, 925	
United States	26, 024	23, 458	16, 672	15, 450	14, 882	14, 830	15, 710	16, 743	16, 964
United Kingdom	1,752	2,670	2, 316	3, 004	3, 100	2, 695	2, 422	2, 434	2,527
Other Western Europe	92 978 580 196 (¹) 434	10,500 325 1,144 829 1,773 768 1,232	32, 350 1, 317 2, 222 5, 724 7, 882 3, 824 2, 349 2, 380	33, 665 1, 311 2, 334 6, 343 7, 429 4, 800 2, 416	35, 040 1, 333 2, 350 6, 733 8, 028 4, 911 2, 448	36, 540 1, 484 2, 590 6, 994 8, 152 5, 463 2, 619	35, 780 1, 510 2, 187 4, 201 9, 948 5, 342 2, 463	36, 450 1, 445 2, 176 4, 006 12, 178 5, 370 2, 365	1, 537 2, 386 3, 833 7, 134 5, 005 2, 529 2, 216
SpainSwitzerlandOther 2	(1) 1,692 1,222	150 1,768 1,484	1,513 3,120 2,017	1,409 3,244 2,052	1, 205 3, 324 2, 368	1,049 3,555 2,396	1, 095 3, 932 2, 780	981 3,218 2,977	833 3, 995
Canada	'	1, 902	2, 881	3, 027	2, 693	2,709	3, 041	2,949	3,100
Japan	(1)	892	2, 019	2, 152	2, 119	2, 030	2,906	3, 299	3,654
Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa	1, 587	1,953	2,777	2, 245	2, 494	2, 341	3, 083	3, 052	
Less developed areas 3	8, 390	10, 405	9,725	10, 980	11,655	12, 460	13, 625	14,685	
Latin America Middle East Other Asia Other Africa	2, 775 1, 475 3, 395 4 290	3, 400 1, 200 3, 840 1, 800	2, 855 2, 320 3, 070 1, 415	3, 280 2, 675 3, 395 1, 570	3, 180 2, 845 3, 840 1, 725	3, 465 3, 195 3, 975 1, 755	3, 950 3, 230 4, 110 2, 160	4, 175 3, 100 4, 655 2, 580	

Note.—Includes gold holdings, reserve positions in the International Monetary Fund, and foreign exchange of all countries except U.S.S.R., other Eastern European countries, Communist China, and Cuba (after 1960). Beginning 1959, when most of the major currencies of the world became convertible, data exclude known holdings of inconvertible currencies, balances under payments agreements, and the bilateral claims arising from liquidation of the European Payments Union.

Source: International Monetary Fund, "International Financial Statistics."

Not available separately.
 In addition to other Western European countries, includes unpublished gold reserves of Greece and an estimate of gold to be distributed by the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold.
 Includes unpublished gold holdings not allocable by area.

Table C-90 .- United States reserve assets: Gold stock, holdings of convertible foreign currencies, and reserve position in the International Monetary Fund, 1946-69

[Millions of dollars]

	Total reserve	Gold s	tock ¹	Convertible	Reserve position in
End of year or month	assets	Total 2	Treasury	foreign currencies ³	International Monetary Fund 4
1946. 1947. 1948. 1949.	20, 706 24, 021 25, 758 26, 024	20, 706 22, 868 24, 399 24, 553	20, 529 22, 754 24, 244 24, 427		1, 153 1, 359 1, 461
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	24, 265 24, 299 24, 714 23, 458 22, 978	22, 820 22, 873 23, 252 22, 091 21, 793	22, 706 22, 695 23, 187 22, 030 21, 713		1, 445 1, 426 1, 462 1, 367 1, 185
1955	22, 797 23, 666 24, 832 22, 540 21, 504	21, 753 22, 058 22, 857 20, 582 19, 507	21,690 21,949 22,781 20,534 19,456		1,044 1,608 1,975 1,958 1,997
1960	19, 359 18, 753 17, 220 16, 843 16, 672	17, 804 16, 947 16, 057 15, 596 15, 471	17, 767 16, 889 15, 978 15, 513 15, 388	116 99 212 432	1,555 1,690 1,064 1,035 769
1965	15, 450 14, 882 14, 830 15, 710 16, 964	\$ 13, 806 13, 235 12, 065 10, 892 11, 859	⁵ 13,733 13,159 11,982 10,367 10,367	781 1,321 2,345 3,528 2,781	4 863 326 420 1, 290 2, 324
1968: Jan	14, 620 14, 790 13, 926 13, 840 14, 348 14, 063	12, 003 11, 900 10, 703 10, 547 10, 468 10, 681	11, 984 11, 882 10, 484 10, 484 10, 384 10, 367	2, 176 2, 235 2, 746 2, 804 3, 386 2, 479	441 655 477 489 494
July	14, 366 14, 427 14, 634 14, 427 15, 660 15, 710	10, 676 10, 681 10, 755 10, 788 10, 897 10, 892	10, 367 10, 367 10, 367 10, 367 10, 367 10, 367	2, 773 2, 817 2, 953 2, 703 3, 655 3, 528	917 929 926 936 1,108 1,290
1969: Jan	15, 454 15, 499 15, 758 15, 948 16, 070 16, 057	10, 828 10, 801 10, 836 10, 936 11, 153 11, 153	10, 367 10, 367 10, 367 10, 367 10, 367 10, 367	3, 338 3, 399 3, 601 3, 624 3, 474 3, 355	1, 288 1, 299 1, 321 1, 388 1, 443 1, 549
July	15, 936 16, 195 16, 743 16, 316 16, 000 16, 964	11, 144 11, 154 11, 164 11, 190 11, 171 11, 859	10, 367 10, 367 10, 367 10, 367 10, 367 10, 367	3, 166 3, 399 3, 797 3, 341 2, 865 2, 781	1, 626 1, 642 1, 782 1, 785 1, 964 2, 324

¹ Includes gold sold to the United States by the International Monetary Fund with the right of repurchase which amounted to \$800 million on December 31, 1969. Beginning September 1965 also includes gold deposited by the IMF to mitigate the impact on the U.S. gold stock of purchases by foreign countries for gold subscriptions on increased IMF quotas. Amount outstanding was \$219 million on December 31, 1969. The United States has a corresponding gold liability to the IMF.

Note.—Gold held under earmark at Federal Reserve Banks for foreign and international accounts is not included in the gold stock of the United States.

Sources: Treasury Department and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

to the IMF.

2 Includes gold in Exchange Stabilization Fund.

3 Includes holdings of Treasury and Federal Reserve System.

4 In accordance with Fund policies the United States has the right to draw foreign currencies equivalent to its reserve position in the Fund virtually automatically if needed. Under appropriate conditions the United States could draw additional amounts equal to the United States quota.

5 Passarve position includes and gold stock expludes \$259 million gold subscription to the Fund in June 1965 for a U.S.

To Reserve position includes, and gold stock excludes, \$259 million gold subscription to the Fund in June 1965 for a U.S. quota increase which became effective on February 23, 1966. In figures published by the Fund from June 1965 through January 1966, this gold subscription was included in the U.S. gold stock and excluded from the reserve position.

TABLE C-91.—Price changes in international trade, 1961-69 [1963 = 100]

Area or commodity class	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969 Third
			l l	Jnit valu	ıe index	es by a	геа		quarter
Developed areas									
Total: Exports Terms of trade!	99 99	99 100	100 100	102 100	103 100	105 100	105 101	104 101	108 102
United States 2									
Exports Terms of trade 1	101 99	100 101	100 100	101 99	104 101	107 101	110 102	111 102	115 103
Developing areas									
Total: Exports Terms of trade 1	100 100	97 98	100 100	103 102	103 100	104 102	103 101	104 102	107 104
Latin Ambrica ExportsTerms of trade 1	96 95	95 92	100 100	107 105	107 102	108 105	107 103	108 101	⁸ 109 ⁸ 102
Southern and Eastern Asia 4									
Exports Terms of trade 1	103 104	100 102	100 100	100 99	101 99	101 100	99 99	98 100	* 101 * 102
			W	orid ex	port pri	ce Inde	ces ⁵		·
Primary commodities: Total	97	96	100	103	103	104	101	100	105
Foodstuffs	92	94	100	105	103	105	104	102	106
Coffee, tea, and cocoaCereals	99 94	96 99	100 100	121 103	111 99	113 104	111 106	111 102	118 100
Other agricultural commodities 6	102	97	100	102	103	104	96	96	102
Fats, oils, and oilseeds Textile fibers	102 93 84 115	94 91 84 107	100 100 100 100	104 102 103 95	114 92 86 97	111 92 90 91	102 88 77 75	100 88 74 73	99 87 76 107
Minerals Metal ores	100 102	99 100	100 100	102 108	104 114	104 105	103 109	102 108	105 119
Manufactured goods: Total 8	99	99	100	101	103 135	106 156	107 142	106 150	109 173
Nonferrous base metals 5	102	100	100	119	123	130	142	150	1/3

Terms of trade indexes are unit value indexes of exports divided by unit value indexes of imports.
 Includes foreign trade of Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico.
 Data are for second quarter 1969.

Note.—Data exclude trade of Communist areas in Eastern Europe (except Yugoslavia) and Asia.

Sources: United Nations and Department of Commerce (Bureau of International Commerce).

⁴ Excludes Japan.

⁵ Data for manufactured goods are unit value indexes.

⁶ Includes nonfood fish and forest products.

Table C-92.—Consumer price indexes in the United States and other major industrial countries, 1957-69

[1963=100]

Period	United States	Canada	Japan	France	Germany	Italy	Nether- lands	United Kingdom
1957	91. 8	91. 7	79. 3	69. 6	88. 1	83. 2	88	86. 9
1958	94. 4	94. 1	78. 9	80. 1	90. 0	85. 5	90	89. 5
1959	95. 1	95. 1	79. 8	85. 0	90. 9	85. 1	91	90. 0
1960	96. 6	96. 2	82.6	88. 1	92. 1	87. 1	94	90. 9
	97. 7	97. 1	87.0	91. 0	94. 3	88. 9	95	94. 0
	98. 8	98. 3	93.0	95. 4	97. 1	93. 1	97	98. 0
	100. 0	100. 0	100.0	100. 0	100. 0	100. 0	100	100. 0
	101. 3	101. 8	103.9	103. 4	102. 3	105. 9	106	103. 3
1965	103. 0	104. 3	110. 7	106. 0	105. 8	110.7	111	108. 2
1966	106. 0	108. 2	116. 4	108. 9	109. 5	113.3	117	112. 4
1967	109. 0	112. 0	121. 0	111. 8	111. 1	116.9	121	115. 2
1968	113. 6	116. 7	127. 5	116. 9	113. 1	118.5	126	120. 6
1969 1	119. 7	121. 7	133. 8	123. 7	115. 9	121.0	135	127. 0
1966:	104 5	106. 7	114. 9	107. 7	108. 5	112.7	116	110. 4
	105.6	107. 9	116. 4	108. 5	109. 8	113.0	120	112. 5
	106.6	108. 9	116. 5	109. 2	109. 6	113.3	118	112. 9
	107.4	109. 5	117. 6	109. 8	110. 1	114.2	118	113. 8
1967: I	107. 6	109. 9	119. 8	110. 8	110.9	115.9	120	114. 4
II	108. 4	111. 5	119. 7	111. 2	111.5	116.6	121	115. 4
III	109. 5	113. 2	120. 2	111. 9	111.2	117.5	122	114. 8
IV	110. 4	113. 6	124. 1	113. 5	110.8	117.9	123	116. 2
1968: I	111.6	115.0	126. 2	115. 1	112.8	118. 2	124	117. 8
	112.8	116.0	126. 4	115. 8	113.0	118. 5	126	120. 6
	114.2	117.3	127. 4	117. 2	112.9	118. 3	126	121. 3
	115.6	118.5	129. 8	119. 6	113.8	118. 8	128	122. 7
1969:	116. 9 119. 0 120. 7 122. 3	119. 4 121. 6 123. 0 123. 5	130. 4 132. 8 135. 8 137. 3	121. 6 123. 2 124. 6 126. 3	115. 4 115. 9 116. 0 116. 8	119, 7 120, 9 122, 3	134 136 135 137	125. 2 127. 2 127. 4 128. 7

¹ Except for the United States, averages are for January-September for Italy; and January-November for all other countries.

2 October–November average for all countries other than the United States.

Sources: Department of Labor and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.