# FRBSF WEEKLY LETTER

October 27, 1989

### **Bank Earnings and LDC Loss Reserves**

U.S. commercial bank earnings over the first half of the year hit an all time high of \$14.3 billion, smashing the year-earlier record of \$10.4 billion. In the aggregate, the return on bank assets nationally rose to 0.91 percent, the highest of the decade, and approaching the one percent mark that is generally considered excellent for the industry. In the West, bank earnings also hit a record, \$2.4 billion, and the return on assets climbed to 1.12 percent.

Nationally, performance was strong across all size groups and across most regions, with the exception of the Southwest, which is still suffering the after-effects of the energy-related downturn. Strong earnings reflect a favorable widening of net interest margins (the difference between a bank's yield on assets and its cost of funds), increases in fee income, and asset growth.

Matching their first-half performance may prove difficult for banks in the second half, however. Asset quality considerations will dominate the industry's earnings picture, especially for the nation's largest banks. Even without any dramatic changes in overall economic conditions, a number of factors could substantially weaken industry performance through the end of 1989. At the top of the list are concerns about the quality of banks' loans to finance leveraged buyouts (LBOs), real estate loans, and loans to less developed countries (LDCs). In this *Letter* banks' LDC debt exposure will be examined.

#### LDC loan concerns

In recent months, concerns about the value of banks' LDC loans have resurfaced. There has been continued deterioration in the secondary market values of LDC loans. Bankers also have expressed concerns about the current Mexican debt restructuring. And Treasury Secretary Brady's plan to reduce the debts of LDCs likely

will result in increased loan writeoffs. These forces have all served to heighten concern about LDC loan quality and the need to hold adequate reserves against expected losses.

The largest, and most imminent threat to bank portfolios is the status of loans to Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina. Loans to these nations have been a major concern to the industry since repayment difficulties came to light in the early 1980s. Seven years later, these LDCs continue to struggle to make payments on their existing debts. Negotiations for the repayment and rescheduling of these loans continue to be arduous and time consuming, and prospects remain uncertain. Meanwhile, new financing virtually has dried up, making these countries' cashflow problems even more acute.

Secondary market values reflect the concern about many LDC loans. For example, in 1986 the secondary market bid price for loans to Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil was at or above \$60 per \$100 in face value. Those prices fell sharply in 1987, and have continued to deteriorate since then. In September 1989, the bid price for \$100 of Argentine loans was around \$17, the price of Brazilian loans was about \$30, and the price of Mexican loans was about \$43.

### 1987

In 1987, the nine U.S. "money center" banks took a major step in dealing with troubled LDC credits. All told, they increased their loan loss reserves against LDC loans by more than \$15 billion. This raised the level of most banks' reserves to 25 to 35 percent of their total LDC loans outstanding. Industry earnings fell from over \$17 billion in 1986 to less than \$4 billion in 1987, as most of the nation's largest banks reported actual losses associated with the expenses incurred in building their reserves.

### Western Banking

Western Banking is a quarterly review of banking developments in the Twelfth Federal Reserve District. It is published in the Weekly Letter on the fourth Friday of January, April, July, and October.

## **FRBSF**

By building their reserves in 1987, U.S. banks were able to cushion future earnings against the possibility that these LDC loans would have to be "charged off" or marked down in value. In fact, this increase in reserves has given U.S. banks the flexibility to reduce their LDC loan exposure by selling these loans at a discount, swapping them, or writing them off.

Although increased chargeoffs have reduced reserves somewhat, LDC debt exposure has declined significantly. Compared to its peak in 1983 of almost \$94 billion, exposure to troubled nations has been reduced by about \$30 billion. Most of the reductions have come about as a result of loan sales and loan swaps.

Nonetheless, as of March 1989, U.S. banks still held \$63.6 billion in troubled LDC debt. When compared to capital, which for large banks totaled \$137.4 billion, risk still is high, particularly since most of this debt is owed by the large Latin American nations. Moreover, more than seventy percent of this debt is held by the nine U.S. money center banks, making their aggregate troubled LDC debt-to-capital ratio nearly 80 percent.

#### How much is needed?

Faced with such high exposure and the continued decline in the secondary market values of these loans, three of the nation's largest banks took dramatic action in the third quarter of this year. Chase Manhattan, Manufacturers Hanover, and Morgan Guaranty made substantial increases in their reserves against LDC loans. These three institutions alone raised their loan loss reserves by about \$5 billion. More recently, Chemical Bank and Bank of New York added a total of \$1.4 billion to their reserves as well.

As in 1987, the large expense necessary to build loan loss reserves likely will result in actual losses for the year at these banks. At the same time, it also will substantially strengthen their future earnings cushions. The stock market's initial reaction to these actions was positive, suggesting that investors applaud banks' efforts to address asset quality problems.

These actions raise questions about how large reserves need to be. At the major U.S. banks, loss reserves against medium- and long-term LDC loans now range from a low of about 27 percent to a high of 100 percent. Most of the large U.S.

banks currently fall in the 30-46 percent range. In contrast, earlier in the year the major British banks increased their reserves against LDC loans to about 50 percent. And the generally conservative German and Swiss banks are reported to hold reserves of about 80 percent, although European banks have the added inducement of tax incentives to hold larger reserves.

Efforts by the industry to boost loss reserves to the 40-45 percent range thought necessary by some bank analysts likely would have a major impact on industry earnings for 1989. However, the impact would not be as large as that of the 1987 increase in reserves. In any event, because of the actions that already have been taken, industry earnings will be reduced substantially in the second half of 1989, even if other large U.S. banks do not follow suit and add reserves.

Whether more banks decide to add reserves will depend on other considerations as well. Concerns about exposure to highly leveraged merger and acquisition deals and to troubled real estate markets are high on the list of these considerations. Industry watchers are concerned about exposure in these areas on account of recent deterioration in the financial conditions of some of the large firms that have been financed by junk bonds and bank loans, and because of regional weakness in real estate markets.

### More capital

Following their actions to boost loss reserves, three of the large banks also announced their intention to sell new stock to boost their equity capital positions. Equity capital also provides a cushion in the event of asset quality problems or earnings difficulties. The money center banks are not alone in their desire to maintain adequate capital in the face of tightening regulatory standards and concerns about asset quality. Salomon Brothers recently estimated that the nation's banks might issue more than \$5 billion in new stock by the end of this year. That equity could prove a most timely boost to capital.

Asset quality problems could have a dramatic impact on earnings through the remainder of 1989. However, if the economy remains healthy, the regional and small banks generally should remain strong performers.

Gary C. Zimmerman Economist

### **REGIONAL BANKING DATA**

JUNE 30, 1989

(Not Seasonally Adjusted, Preliminary Data)

		DISTRICT	ALASKA	ARIZ.	CALIF.	HAWAII	IDAHO	NEVADA	OREGON	UTAH	WASH.
		ASSETS	AND LIABI	LITIES	S MILLION	(ALL COMMER	CIAL BANKS	<b>)</b>			
ASSETS	TOTAL	446,718	4,413	27,815	312,496	13,685	7,618	13,978	20,694	10,694	35,324
	FOREIGN	42,706	1	N/A	40,815	1,297	N/A	N/A	N/A	74	519
	DOMESTIC	404,011	4,413	27,815	271,681	12,388	7,618	13,978	20,694	10,620	34,805
LOANS	TOTAL	309,937	1,850	19,935	217,277	8,127	5,113	10,917	13,589	6,855	26,274
	FOREIGN	31,202	1	N/A	30,231	772	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	199
	DOMESTIC	278,734	1,849	19,935	187,046	7,356	5,113	10,917	13,589	6,855	26,075
	REAL ESTATE	121,734	693	8,594	88,382	3,483	1,304	1,955	4,343	2,842	10,139
	COMMERCIAL	75,518	720	4,817	51,199	2,117	1,354	1,517	5,012	1,791	6,992
	CONSUMER AGRICULTURE	55,828 5,249	223	4,711 463	30,638	1,213 28	1,361 629	7,136 19	2,993 345	1,635 123	5,918 1,015
	INTERNATIONAL	96	N/A	10	2,619 84	20 0	N/A	N/A	0	2	0
SECURITIES	: TOTAL	44,204	1,628	3,590	24,135	2,610	1,456	1,951	3,580	1,750	3,503
OLCONI I ILO	U.S.T.S.	13,869	1,155	1,410	6,672	840	419	602	1,141	346	1,284
	SECONDARY MARKET	17,268	194	580	12,010	718	608	458	856	850	994
	OTHER SECURITIES	13,067	279	1,600	5,453	1,052	430	892	1,582	553	1,225
LIABILITIE	S TOTAL	419,968	4,000	26,153	294,587	12,842	7,076	13,092	19,293	9,988	32,937
	DOMESTIC	377,262	3,999	26,153	253,772	11,545	7,076	13,092	19,293	9,914	32,418
DEPOSITS	TOTAL	347,726	3,483	22,375	243,590	12,134	6,129	6,717	15,8 <del>9</del> 1	8,646	28,762
	FOREIGN	34,992	1	N/A	33,308	1,114	N/A	N/A	N/A	74	495
	DOMESTIC	312,733	3,483	22,375	210,282	11,019	6,129	6,717	15,891	8,572	28,266
	DEMAND	79,005	990	4,698	57,040	2,031	995	1,852	3,349	1,600 6,972	6,451 21,816
	TIME AND SAVINGS	233,728	2,493	17,677	153,242	8,988	5,134	4,865	12,542	•	21,010
OTHER BORR		48,035	460	3,390	30,600	248	859	5,766	2,548	1,146	3,019
EQUITY CAP		26,750	414	1,662	17,908	843	541	886	1,401	706	2,388
LOAN LOSS		7,953	40	565	6,222	128	89	195	185	134	396 1,826
LOAN COMMI	TTERS OF CREDIT	33,540	22	685	29,429	453	115	166	566 4,867	279 1,604	10,502
LOANS SOLD		136,949 116,703	261 10	3,434 232	109,920 115,833	3,657 66	1,095 55	1,609 62	235	1,004	196
	nnan Pantan Barnesan Pantan.										170
		ASSET (	DUALITY	PERCENT C	OF LOANS (L	ARGE COMMER	CIAL BANK	i)			
	RESERVE (ALL BANKS)	2.57	2.16	2.83	2.86	1.58	1.74	1.78	1.36	1.96	1.51
NET CHARGE	OFFS, TOTAL	0.95	0.86	2.41	0.88	0.08	0.27	2.31	0.69	0.84	0.38
	REAL ESTATE	0.40	1.19	3.43	0.08	0.02	0.05	1.05	0.63	0.63	0.34
	COMMERCIAL	0.37	0.84	1.94	0.30	-0.08	0.02	0.39	0.66	1.04	-0.14
	CONSUMER	1.86	0.41	1.72	1.95	0.35	0.77	3.09	0.98	1.23	1.18 0.43
	AGRICULTURE	0.42	N/A	1.28	0.22	-1.20	0.42	-0.01	1.06	0.17	
PAST DUE &	NON-ACCRUAL, TOTAL	5.01	9.53	10.20	5.29	1.29	1.91	1.80	2.30	4.10	3.14
	REAL ESTATE	5.01	14.50	17.40	4.01	1.08	2.41	4.51	3.70	5.53	4.34
	COMMERCIAL CONSUMER	5.94 2.16	8.77 2.43	7.52 1.98	6.80	1.43 2.00	2.17 1.83	3.02 0.95	1.84 1.72	3.82 2.98	2.41 1.95
	AGRICULTURE	10.10	2.43 N/A	5.06	2.55 15.40	2.00 8.87	2.02	0.54	2.69	3.30	5.40
		FARNTA	IGS AND PE	TUDNS S	MILLION (	ALL COMMERC	TAL RANKS				
		etase partirologi			ka da ka sa						4 4/-
INCOME	TOTAL	25,338	204	1,498	17,875	689	414	1,035	1,073	581	1,969
	INTEREST	21,299	173	1,307	14,800	609	373	930	932	513	1,662
	FEES & CHARGES	1,015	9	74	681	17	20	25	58	29	102
EXPENSES	TOTAL	21,840	179	1,749	15,046	570	349	838	907	535	1,667
	INTEREST	11,503	96	752	8,046	339	212	410	495	297	856
	SALARIES	4,024	36	280	2,844	115	55	89	179	78	346
	LOAN LOSS PROVISION OTHER	1,521 4,792	10 37	397 320	813 3,342	16 100	9 72	94 245	59 174	38 122	85 380
INCOME BEF		-			•			196		43	302
TAXES	OUE INYES	3,469 1,259	25 3	-251 -119	2,807	117 41	64 21	196 94	166 50	43 12	92
NET INCOME		2,416	22	-119 -132	1,066 1,902	41 76	43	127	116	33	228
		•								0.47	4 ***
ROA (%) ROE (%)		1.12 18.10	1.06 10.90	-0.96	1.26	1.17	1.16 15.90	1.86 28.70	1.18 16.60	0.63 9.27	1.34 19.10
	ST MARGIN (%)	4.53	3.65	-16.00 4.03	21.20 4.47	18.10 4.14	4.32	7.62	4.41	4.13	4.74
HET THIERE		4.73	رن. د	4.03	4.4/	4.14	4.32	1.02	7.71	7.13	7.17

Opinions expressed in this newsletter do not necessarily reflect the views of the management of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, or of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

Editorial comments may be addressed to the editor (Barbara Bennett) or to the author. . . . Free copies of Federal Reserve publications can be obtained from the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco 94120. Phone (415) 974-2246.

San Francisco, CA 94120 P.O. Box 7702

## Son Francisco BONK OF Federal Reserve Research Department

	PERCEN	T OF COMBIN	ED MARKET TO	OTAL FOR AU	GUST 1989, I	BY REGION			
DISTRICT	ALASKA	ARIZONA	CALIF	HAWAII	IDAHO	NEVADA	OREGON	UTAH	WASH
CB SL CU	CB SL CU	CB SL CU	CB SL CU	CB SL CU	CB SL CU	CB SL CU	CB SL CU	CB SL CU	CB SL CU
46 50 4	71 9 20	60.36.5	43 54 3	65 30 5	86 11 3	67 30 3	66 29 5	68 22 10	55 39 7

DEPOSIT TYPE TOTAL DEPOSITS DEMAND 65 30 94 3 72 25 61 28 40 57 78 20 NOW SAVINGS & MMDA SMALL TIME LARGE TIME

MARKET SHARE STATISTICS

CB = COMMERCIAL BANKS; SL = SAVINGS & LOANS AND SAVINGS BANKS; CU = CREDIT UNIONS; MAY NOT SUM TO 100% DUE TO ROUNDING

TYPE OF ACCOUNT OR LOAN	DATE	US	DISTRICT	ARIZONA	CALIF	HAWAII	IDAHO	OREGON	UTAH	WASI
MONEY MARKET DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS	JUL89	6.56	6.29	5.95	6.51	6.33	6.26	6.10	6.48	5.3
	AUG89	6.54	6.25	6.01	6.48	6.33	6.12	6.01	6.46	5.3
	SEP89	N/A	6.28	5.95	6.58	6.33	6.12	5.85	6.46	5.6
6-MONTH CERTIFICATES	JUL89	8.24	7.77	7.81	8.31	7.21	8.26	8.04	7.82	7.12
	AUG89	8.12	7.69	7.62	8.18	7.15	8.08	7.96	7.88	7.0
	SEP89	N/A	7.73	7.58	8.09	7.15	8.05	8.04	7.77	7.1
2-1/2 YEAR CERTIFICATES	JUL89	8.21	8.07	8.02	8.28	8.22	8.23	7.92	7.94	7.93
	AUG89	8.10	7.98	7.83	8.17	8.01	8.08	7.69	8.00	7.8
	SEP89	N/A	7.95	7.83	8.22	8.07	8.09	7.73	8.02	7.80

Loan rate data is not available.