## HE BUSINESS REVIEW

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JUN 1 4 1946



# FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA

JUNE 1, 1946

## **Producing for the Civilian Market**

Since the end of the war the national economy has been operating at a very high level. Goods and services have continued to flow at an annual rate of \$180 billion, not nearly as far below the \$200 billion wartime peak as many had expected. Yet there is a shortage of almost everything—shoes and stockings, milk and butter, sheets and pillow cases, carpets and rugs, refrigerators, washing machines, automobiles, and houses.

## Why the paradox?

The situation is somewhat similar to that of the early days of the war when there was intense activity but a great disparity between goods on hand and on order. In early 1942 we were filling the supply lines with materials for war but the fighting forces had to mark time awaiting delivery of urgently needed supplies. Now we are busily engaged in loading up the arteries of commerce with peacetime goods, and civilians are standing in line at the retailers' counters eagerly buying the increasing but inadequate supply of many end-products.

In numerous industries the transition from war to peace was a major operation. New products had to be designed, inventories had to be accumulated, and machinery had to be replaced or retooled. Emergency working crews had to be replaced by returning veterans. Wage


contracts had to be renegotiated, supply lines had to be re-established, and in many cases manufacturers had to rely temporarily on inferior raw materials. In the face of all these readjustments, business enterprise has demonstrated remarkable resourcefulness.

### Production in This District

The magnitude of readjustments from war to peace is indicated by the huge wartime expansion and the subsequent contraction. Production of goods in this district reached a wartime peak almost double the pre-war level. As shown by the accompanying chart, most of the changes occurred in durable goods. In 1939 production of durable goods in this district accounted for one-third, and nondurable goods for two-thirds of total output. By 1943 this situation was almost reversed—durable goods accounted for almost two-thirds of the total output. This is the area where the greatest difficulties have been encountered, and numerous problems of cost-price relationships still remain to be solved.

## Changes since the end of the war

Although production had receded considerably before V-J Day, nevertheless a further decline occurred immediately after the surrender of Japan last August. Naturally, the sharpest



contraction occurred in durable goods as a result of the immediate cancellation of billions of dollars in Government contracts. However, the retooling of productive facilities was dispatched with such speed that the flow of goods resumed an upward trend within a month or two after the end of the war. The output of nondurable goods, which had expanded moderately in the war period, was not seriously affected by the change from war to peace because no great changes occurred in the character of their products despite the shifts from military to civilian use. Some of the plants in this category had virtually no transitional problems other than repackaging their products for civilian markets.

In the immediate post-war months, output of civilian goods was retarded in some industries by shortages of labor; in others by shortages of materials. Material shortages in some industries were caused by labor shortages in antecedent industries normally producing the required parts or components. Some industries had to contend with shortages of both labor and materials.

Textile and apparel establishments, so prominent in this area, were handicapped by labor shortages in some divisions and lack of materials in others. Production of men's clothing was held up for want of hand finishers and inadequate supplies of both cotton pocketing and rayon lining materials. There was enough wool for the spinners and weavers but some woolen and worsted mills had trouble getting the labor they needed. In carpet and rug mills the situation

was much the same—enough yarn but not enough workers. Labor shortages also stood in the way of expanding output in cigar manufacturing and brick production. Brick producers also faced the problem of reconditioning their plants which had been closed down for several years.

Material shortages obstructed expanding output in a number of lines. Many tanners in this area produce light leather products manufactured from imported goat and kid skins. Imports of these raw materials were sharply curtailed during the war and the supply is still inadequate. Shoe production, though expanding, is still below pre-war levels owing to the shortage of both leather and lining fabrics. Hosiery production which had to be curtailed during the war is still considerably below the market demand. Hosiery mills had to go through a severe raw material conversion program but nylons are now being produced in greater volume than rayon hose.

The physical output of printers and publishers has increased steadily since last August. This is a reflection of a considerably improved situation in the paper industry. Rising imports of pulp since the end of the war have contributed materially to the increasing volume of output by the paper mills, but shortages are still acute in some types of paper and paper products, owing to rapidly increasing demands.

Since the turn of the year industrial production has been restricted by disputes between labor and management over wage rates. Difficulties of this nature were to be expected, especially in the durable goods industries where management was confronted with more difficult problems of physical readjustment and workers faced greater difficulties of readjustment from their high wartime levels of earnings. The plants and products of these industries required extensive redesigning and the workers in these industries encountered substantial loss of income as a result of reductions in working time and abolition of overtime rates of pay.


Work stoppages incident to renegotiation of wage agreements struck the hardest blow to reconversion in the metal-working industries. The strike in the automobile industry had little direct effect in this district because motor vehicle manufacturing is not one of our major industries, but the steel strike disrupted operations considerably in this area. The February nose-

dive in the manufacturing index was caused primarily by the trouble in steel. The 100-point drop in the steel index naturally had adverse effects upon the steel-consuming industries such as the producers of construction, refrigeration, machinery, and transportation equipment. Total manufacturing output had not recovered completely by April, owing to work stoppages not only in steel but also in some branches of the electrical industry and others.

#### Production above pre-war levels

In spite of all obstacles, production in April was above pre-war levels in most of the major lines of industry. In this district only leather and textiles lagged behind, as the chart shows. These industries encountered serious setbacks during the war but have shown substantial improvement since the return to peace.

The transportation equipment industries which had the greatest wartime expansion have also had the greatest decline since the end of the war. Further recession may take place in these lines as unfinished projects in the ship-yards are completed.



## The problem of expanding production

Expanding production for the civilian market is encountering obstacles of an entirely different nature than those which confronted industry immediately after the war ended. Industrial concerns emerged from the mire of plant and personnel reconversion with comparative ease, but one industry after another bogged down in labor-management controversies. The first major shutdown occurred in the automobile industry—later came steel, electrical industries, coal, and railroads. More are to come, according to current reports.

Workers want higher wages to bridge the gap between reduced take-home pay and rising costs of living. Management is reluctant to incur higher costs in the face of continued price ceilings. Regardless of the merits in these disputes, prolonged strikes only delay and complicate the processes of readjustment. Production is held up while labor and management stop to bargain and the final solution is usually a compromise, winding up with higher wage rates. Higher wages spell higher costs, and that means higher prices. The effects are transmitted to other industries and to the ultimate consumers.

The inflationary tug-of-war between slowly expanding production and our huge spending power is the central problem at this stage of reconversion. It is a heritage of the war which upset former relationships between production and consumption, saving and spending, cost and prices. The flow of urgently needed goods and services is interrupted by the processes of reestablishing satisfactory cost-price relationships. This is a difficult process in many industries, particularly in durable goods, and delays in any one industry are quickly felt in other linestheir suppliers and customers. Meanwhile, the lack of balance between the supply of goods and services and spendable money in people's hands is the crucial issue facing all of us—labor, management, banking, Government, and the public. It calls for restraint and cooperation on the part of all interests.



## Philadelphia's Experience with G. I. Business Loans

During its first year of operation the Philadelphia Agency for Business Loans to Servicemen, Inc., interviewed nearly 7,500 veterans inquiring about or applying for business loans under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944. More than 5,000 of these veterans were seeking advice and information. The Agency approved 276 loans and actually disbursed 167 loans aggregating \$310,000.

Formed May 1, 1945 by all thirty-six Philadelphia banks, the Agency is the only organization of its kind in the United States. Other cities have established veterans' centers, but these merely refer veterans to local banks whenever loans are desired. The Philadelphia Agency, on the other hand, performs a complete lending service in making guaranteed or insured business loans to veterans. The banks have subscribed to a \$10 million fund; each bank participates in the loans and expenses of the Agency on a pro rata basis determined by the ratio of its capital and surplus to the aggregate of the group. Because all lending operations are centered in this one organization, it is possible to analyze Philadelphia's experience with G.I. business loans during the past year.

The Agency limits itself to business loans only. As Table 1 shows, the great majority of veterans' loans are home loans. Applications for these and for farm loans are referred by the Agency to other lending institutions. The importance of business loans in relation to home and farm loans is indicated by the following data for the three states which lie wholly or partly in the Third Federal Reserve District—Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware.

Table 1
GUARANTEE COMMITMENTS BY TYPE OF LOAN
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware

(From inauguration of lending program to April 27, 1946)	Number	Percentage Distribution
Business loans	13,374 100	4.8% 94.5 .7
Total	14,146	100.0%

Source: Veterans Administration.

For the purpose of analysis, the Agency's first year may be divided into two periods: (1) the ten months from May 1, 1945 through February 1946 when it operated under the orig-

inal Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944; and (2) the two months (March and April 1946) under the amended Act. Although the Agency was established almost one year after the original Act was passed, the comparatively small demand for loans gave it sufficient time to become acquainted with the Act and to set up lending procedures. After V-J Day the growing volume of discharges from the services stimulated the demand for G.I. business loans. By February 1946 the number of veterans interviewed daily by the Agency was two and one-half times as great as it was a few months earlier.

During the first ten months, 65 per cent of the Agency's interviews with veterans involved merely supplying information. For every loan disbursed there were more than thirty requests for information. Establishment of a central agency to provide this service has several advantages. Perhaps the most important is the greater experience that comes from specialization. Since the cost of the service would far exceed the return, there would be no immediate pecuniary incentive for the individual bank to provide as extensive services and counseling facilities as are offered by the Agency.

Table 2
ACTIVITIES OF THE PHILADELPHIA AGENCY
FOR BUSINESS LOANS TO SERVICEMEN, INC.

	May 1, 1945 to Feb. 28, 1946	March and Apr. 1946	May 1, 1945 to Apr. 30, 1946
Veterans interviewed Informational requests Ineligible loan requests Eligible loan requests	65.0% 17.0 18.0	77.5% 6.9 15.6	68.5% 14.1 17.4
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Eligible loan requests Applications withdrawn Incomplete applications Applications considered	8.5% 67.1 24.4	4.7% 53.3 42.0	7.5% 63.7 28.8
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Applications considered Withdrawn. Declined or deferredApproved	9.7% 16.1 74.2	12.6% 12.6 74.8	10.8% 14.8 74.4
Loans disbursed Loans in process or awaiting disbursement	46.6 27.6	42.2 32.6	45. 29.4
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

More than one-sixth of the veterans interviewed during the ten-month period requested loans but were ineligible under the terms of the old Act. At that time business loans were permitted only for the purchase of equipment or of

the business itself. Loans were not permitted for the purchase of inventory or to supply working capital, to refinance existing loans or mortgages on real estate or equipment, to pay expenses or overhead in a business operation, or to finance the purchase of a stock interest in a corporation. The applications classified as ineligible also include those requests which clearly were out of the question, usually because the chances of success were slim or because the veteran had no experience. Such applications are discouraged at an early stage.

The bulk of the eligible requests—67 per cent —were in processing stage awaiting filing of formal applications. Some of these may eventually be withdrawn by the applicant because of changed plans, and the remainder will be considered by the Agency's Loan Committee. Only 16 per cent of the applications considered during the ten months were declined, and 74 per cent were approved. Three-fourths of those approved were for the purpose of purchasing equipment—for the most part trucks and automobiles for use in various types of businesses and equipment for dentists' and doctors' offices. The remaining one-fourth of the approved requests were for the purchase of established businesses. More than half of these were grocery and delicatessen businesses, restaurants, luncheonettes, and confectionery stores.

The amendments to the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 became effective March 1, 1946. The two main changes brought about by the new provisions were streamlining the lending procedure and liberalization of the conditions under which loans may be made. Steps were taken to eliminate unnecessary and delaying transactions between the lending agency and the Veterans Administration; notably by simplifying the method of proving eligibility, and by speeding the process of making guarantees effective. The elimination of much of the paper work and involved procedures placed a greater degree of responsibility on the lending institution.

The most important revisions, however, were those which liberalized the loan purposes and terms. Business loans are now permitted for the construction of buildings, repairs and improvements, purchase of inventory, and for working capital. The period during which the veteran may apply for guaranteed loans was extended. Maximum maturities were lengthened. The requirement that the price of prop-

erty or costs of construction may not exceed a "reasonable normal value" as determined by appraisal was changed to "reasonable value" in order to allow veterans to operate under existing inflationary conditions. Finally, lenders were given the alternative of insuring against losses up to 15 per cent or \$2,000 (whichever is less) of each insured loan rather than taking a 50 per cent maximum guarantee on individual loans. By acquiring a large volume of loans, a lender may build up an insurance reserve sufficient to cover the full loss on any defaulted loan. This may encourage an institution to lend more liberally so long as its average loss ratio is kept within reasonable limits.

These changes in the law had a noticeable effect on the activities of the Philadelphia Agency. The number of interviews increased at an accelerated rate, many of them apparently being return visits of veterans who had previously been unable to obtain loans under the terms of the old Act. As evidence of increased interest in business loans, requests for information occupied a larger proportion of the Agency's time. The proportion of ineligible loan requests declined. Before the changes, nearly five out of every ten loan requests were ineligible; in the last two months only three out of every ten were ineligible, reflecting less rigid requirements.

The new regulations also had the effect of lowering somewhat the ratio of requests declined to requests approved. The Agency continued, however, to act on the principle that—in the best interests of the lender, the borrower, and the economy in general—loans should be made only if the business venture holds forth reasonable prospects of success.

As might be expected, some of the Agency's loans have "turned sour." But losses have been nominal, occurring principally on loans to purchase automotive equipment. In only one case was the unpaid balance of the loan not covered by the guarantee.

The essential function of the Agency, however, is to serve the best interest of the veteran. It was not established with the expectation of making profits. The principle on which it was founded was that a centralized organization could perform more effectively than could the participating banks acting individually. The merits of this theory have been demonstrated by Philadelphia's experience.

## BUSINESS STATISTICS

## Production Philadelphia Federal Reserve District

	Adj	justed	for s	eason	al varia	ition	Not	adjus	sted
Indexes: 1923-5=100	Apr. 1946	Mar. 1946	Apr. 1945	Apr.	cent cl	1946 from	Apr. 1946	Mar. 1946	Apr. 1945
Tital and State 1 190 s.A	1940	1940	1940	Mo. ago	Year ago	mos. 1945	1940	1940	1940
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION MANUFACTURING. Durable goods. Consumers' goods. Metal products. Textile products. Transportation equipment. Food products. Tobacco and products. Building materials.	103p 105p 112p 99p 104 73p 198p 119p 128	102 102 110 96 90 68 216 122 123 48	136 139r 210 92 179 65 481 121r 99 36	+ 2 + 3 +16 + 7 - 8	- 24 - 25 - 47 + 7 - 42 + 13 - 59 - 1 + 29 + 25	- 26 - 28 - 49 + 5 - 48 + 5 - 57 + 1 + 27 + 25	102p 103p  103 70p 208p 113p 116 44p	103 103  93 70 227 117 114 42	134 137  172 63 498 115 90 35
Chemicals and products Leather and products Paper and printing	133p 86p 115	135 84 117r	169r 82 94	- 2 + 2 - 2	- 21 + 5 + 23	- 19 - 4 + 22	135p 85p 119	136 87 120r	171r 81 96
Individual lines Pig iron Steel. Iron castings. Steel castings. Electrical apparatus Motor vehicles. Auto. parts and bodies Locomotives and cars. Shipbuilding. Silk manufactures. Woolen and worsteds. Cotton products. Carpets and rugs. Hosiery. Underwear. Cement. Brick. Lumber and products. Slaughtering, meat packing. Sugar refining. Canning and preserving. Cigars. Paper and wood pulp. Printing and publishing. Shoes. Leather, goat and kid. Explosives. Petroleum products. Coke, by-product. COAL MINING. Anthracite. Bituminous. CRUDE OIL. ELECTRIC POWER.	78 100 81 110 121 35 56 57 79p 75 143 65p 74p 129 69 88 178 181 147p 67 75 4 296	76r 92r 78 73 91r 76 36 63 64 72 130 74 47 72 130 124 123r 124 125 125 72 126 27 72 124 42 403	86 130 70 302 51 119 90 83 64 40 54 40 65 138 82 7 7 101 105 1166 98 83 96 65 83 83 82 83 83 83 82 83 83 84 84 85 84 85 85 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86	+ 4 4 4 4 + 52 + 83 + 55 + 55 + 65 + 61 + 10 - 11 - 11 - 12 - 13 - 22 - 18 - 25 - 26 - 15 + 55 + 56 + 56 + 10 - 11 - 11 - 11 - 11 - 11 - 11 - 11	- 9 - 23 + 16 - 49 - 60 - 30 - 37 - 65 + 24 + 18 + 37 + 16 + 3 + 142 + 4 - 4 - 4 - 15	$\begin{array}{c} -21\\ -41\\ +4\\ -63\\ -57\\ -35\\ -35\\ -30\\ -52\\ -61\\ 0\\ +13\\ +29\\ +13\\ +29\\ +13\\ +4\\ -19\\ -39\\ +30\\ -39\\ -10\\ -68\\ -24\\ -24\\ -24\\ -24\\ -24\\ -24\\ -24\\ -24$	89 105 84 44 1550p 111 13 105 50 50 50 50 110 110 1117 93 125 120 110 1153p 67 75 4 305	87 99 82 81 85r 83 39 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 71 124 111 115 125 125 124 111 125 127 127 129 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130	97 136 73 263 63 63 97 81 130 97 125 32 26 55 26 55 23 22 127 99 63r 120 89 84 84 98 84 99 63r 161 161 82 82 82 82 82 83 83 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
Sales, total	412 290	413 305	424 350	- 5	- 3 - 17	- 6 - 17	424 293	409 290	436 353
Residential†	138 162 128 85	107 93 132 73	81 4 75 327	+29 +74 - 3 +16	+ 69 + 71 - 74	+109 ** + 83 - 44	133 151 131 78	93 71 132 67	78 3 77 301

p—Preliminary. r—Revised.

\*Unadjusted for seasonal variation.
† 3-month moving daily average centered at 3rd month.
\*\*Increase of 1000% or more from the low level of a year ago.

## Local Business Conditions\*

Percentage change— April	Fact		Fact		Building permits value		Retail sales		Debits	
1946 from month and year ago	Mar. 1946	Apr. 1945	Mar. 1946	Apr. 1945	Mar. 1946	Apr. 1945	Mar. 1946	Apr. 1945	Mar. 1946	Apr. 1945
Allentown Altoona Harrisburg Johnstown Lancaster Philadelphia Reading Scranton Trenton Wilkes-Barre Williamsport Wilmington York	+ 3 + 4 + 5 + 8 + 3 - 1 + 1 + 14	-19 - 3 -10 +10 - 7 -18 - 3 -18 - 27 -12 - 33 - 4	+6 +6 +5 +5 +12 +3 -2 +1 +6 +4 +20	-30 -10 -15 - 2 - 7 -27 - 4 -14 -10 -40 -14	-81 -60 +11 -76 -88 +77 -66 -71 -56 -56 -91 -28 +12	+313 + 39 ** + 72 + 29 +320 + 92 +108 +238 +134 +352 ** +615	$ \begin{array}{c} +1 \\ -7 \\ +11 \\ -6 \\ +5 \\ 0 \\ +3 \\ +11 \\ +2 \\ \\ -5 \\ -5 \end{array} $	+54 +53 +50 +50 +46 +53 +55 +69 +70 +63 	+ 3 + 1 + 1 + 3 + 1 + 4 - 23 + 35 - 5 + 2 + 17 - 2	+15 +31 +16 +17 +10 +22 + 6 +21 +37 +16 + 2 +21 +21 +10

<sup>\*</sup> Area not restricted to the corporate limits of cities given here. \*\* Increase of 1000% or more from the low level of a year ago.

## Employment and Income in Pennsylvania

Industry, Trade and Service

	Em	ploym	ent	Payrolls			
Indexes: 1932 = 100	Apr. 1946	chang	cent e from		Per chang		
GENERAL INDEX		Mar. 1946	Apr. 1945	1946 index	Mar. 1946	Apr. 1945	
GENERAL INDEX Manufacturing Bituminous coal mining Building and construction Quar. and nonmet. mining. Crude petroleum prod Public utilities. Retail trade Wholesale trade Hotels Laundries Dyeing and cleaning	123 156 13 61 90 146 110 137 118 114 105 106	$   \begin{array}{r}     + 1 \\     + 5 \\     -84 \\     + 5 \\     + 11 \\     + 2 \\     + 1 \\     + 4 \\     + 4 \\     + 2 \\     + 5   \end{array} $	- 4 -11 -80 +36 +21 +13 +14 +15 +13 + 6 + 8	298 404 266 134 315 271 179 208 182 223 222 245	+ 4 + 8 - 94 + 3 + 10 0 + 3 + 4 0 + 6 + 2 + 8	$\begin{array}{c} -6 \\ -16 \\ +28 \\ +18 \\ +30 \\ +8 \\ +22 \\ +30 \\ +19 \\ +27 \\ +21 \\ +33 \end{array}$	

#### Manufacturing

	Em	ploym	ent*	Payrolls*			
Indexes: 1923-5 =100	Apr.	Per chang	cent e from		Per chang		
	1946 index	Mar. 1946	Apr. 1945	1946 index	Mar. 1946	Apr. 1945	
TOTAL. Iron, steel and products. Nonferrous metal products. Transportation equipment. Textiles and clothing. Textiles. Clothing. Food products. Stone, clay and glass. Lumber products. Chemicals and products. Leather and products. Paper and printing. Printing. Others:	100 97 186 98 81 77 99 120 97 51 112 85 121 118	+5 +13 +3 +5 0 +1 0 -1 +2 +3 -1 +1 +1	-11 -19 -15 -35 + 8 +10 + 1 - 3 +21 + 2 - 3 +20 +22 +27	165 196 414 169 144 136 180 195 162 85 203 147 206 194	+8 +14 +7 +14 0 0 0 -1 +5 +4 0 0 0	$\begin{array}{c} -16 \\ -26 \\ -12 \\ -38 \\ +20 \\ +23 \\ +11 \\ +1 \\ +26 \\ 0 \\ -4 \\ +23 \\ +35 \\ +42 \end{array}$	
Cigars and tobacco Rubber tires, goods Musical instruments	53 137 116	+ 9 0 + 5	+11 - 6 +16	82 322 198	+ 7 + 1 + 7	$^{+14}_{+2}_{+44}$	

<sup>\*</sup> Figures from 2771 plants.

### Hours and Wages

Factory workers Averages	Weekly working time*		Hourly earnings*		Weekly earnings†		
April 1946 and per cent change from year ago	Average hours	Ch'ge	Aver- age	Ch'ge	Aver- age	Ch'ge	
TOTAL.  Iron, steel and prods. Nonfer. metal prods. Transportation equip. Textiles and clothing. Textiles. Clothing. Food products. Stone, clay and glass. Lumber products. Chemicals and prods. Leather and products. Paper and printing. Printing. Others:	40.2 39.3 41.0 41.5 39.5 40.4 37.2 42.7 39.8 42.0 41.1 40.7 43.2 41.4	-11 -16 - 9 -10 - 1 - 1 - 3 - 6 - 3 -12 - 5 - 3 0	.922 .855 .891 1.041 .838 1.194	+ 4 + 7 - 3 +12 +12 + 9 + 8 +10 + 4 +11 + 6 +13	\$44 .33 46 .97 44 .62 52 .10 35 .74 37 .26 32 .20 38 .40 41 .31 34 .88 48 .95 34 .30 46 .37 51 .46	-9 -12 -3 -13 +11 +12 +9 +4 +1 -3 +11 +112	
Cigars and tobacco Rubber tires, goods Musical instruments.	37.5 44.4 44.7	$\begin{vmatrix} -12 \\ -1 \\ +12 \end{vmatrix}$	1.178	$  ^{+14}_{+10}_{+10} $	28.21 52.32 44.66	$\begin{vmatrix} 0 \\ + 9 \\ +24 \end{vmatrix}$	

<sup>\*</sup> Figures from 2628 plants.

† Figures from 2771 plants.

## Distribution and Prices

	Per ce	ent cha	inge
Wholesale trade Unadjusted for seasonal variation	Apr. fro	1946 m	1946 from
Variation	Month ago	Year ago	mos. 1945
Sales		Yerre	
Total of all lines. Boots and shoes. Drugs. Dry goods. Electrical supplies. Groceries. Hardware. Jewelry. Paper.	+ 5 + 6 + 8 + 7 + 2 + 4 + 5 + 8	+28 +68 +13 +44 +37 +29 +61 +90 +23	+21 +14 +27 +23 +21 +76 + 8
Inventories Total of all lines Dry goods. Electrical supplies. Groceries. Hardware. Paper.	+ 5 +13 + 3 + 1 + 5 - 5	$^{+33}_{+78}$ $^{+29}_{+18}$ $^{+6}_{+9}$	

Source: U. S. Department of Commerce.

	Apr.	Per cent change from					
Prices		Month ago	Year ago	Aug. 1939			
Basic commodities (Aug.1939 = 100)	190	0	+4	+ 90			
Wholesale	100			1 30			
(1926 = 100)	110	+1	+4	+ 47			
Farm	135	+1	+5	+122			
Food	111	+1	+5	+ 65			
Other	103	+1	+4	+ 29			
Living costs							
(1935-1939=100)	E. H						
United States	131	+1	+3	+ 33			
Philadelphia	130	0	+3	+ 32			
Food	140	0	+4	+ 50			
Clothing	152	0	+5	+ 53			
Fuels	115	0	+5	+ 19			
Housefurnishings	152	+1	+5	+ 51			
Other	122	0	+1	+ 21			

Source: U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

	Ad	justed	l for s	easona	variat	tion	Not	adjus	sted
				Per	ent ch	ange			
Indexes: 1935-1939 =100	Apr. 1946	Mar. 1946	Mar. Apr. 1946 1945			1946 from	Apr. 1946	Mar. 1946	Apr. 1945
				Month ago	Year ago	4 mos. 1945			
RETAIL TRADE Sales Department stores—District Philadelphia. Women's apparel. Men's apparel. Shoe. Furniture	223 207 226 263 203	244 223 286r 278 240	161r 150r 150 150 112		+39 +38 +51 +75 +32 +65*	+ 22 + 20 + 31 + 28 + 37	228 211 262 252 248	219r 199 284r 224 228	141
Inventories Department stores—District. Philadelphia. Women's Apparel. Shoe. Furniture.	170 170 210 53	158 156 192 53	148 146r 181 58	+ 8 + 9 + 9 + 5*	+15 +17 +16 - 9 +15*		173 172 209 59	158 158 211 59	151 147 181 64
FREIGHT-CAR LOADINGS Total Merchandise and miscellaneous. Merchandise—l.c.l. Coal Ore. Coke. Forest products. Grain and products. Livestock	117	142 129 95 166 138 185 107 123 125	151 141 96 177 401 220 123 158 121	$ \begin{array}{r} -27 \\ -2 \\ +7 \\ -74 \\ -15 \\ -54 \\ +5 \\ -13 \\ +13 \end{array} $	$ \begin{array}{r} -31 \\ -10 \\ +6 \\ -76 \\ -71 \\ -61 \\ -8 \\ -32 \\ +17 \end{array} $	- 15 - 16 + 6 - 5 - 60 - 39 - 6 - 2 - 3	98 125 101 34 61 69 95 100 130	133 124 95 171 61 174 93 117 116	144 140 96 141 208 178 103 147 111
MISCELLANEOUS Life insurance sales. Business liquidations Number. Amount of liabilities. Check payments.		219	140	+16 0* -98* +10	+82 0* -25* +20		255 * 3 1 221	228 3 49 204	140 3 1 184

<sup>\*</sup> Computed from unadjusted data.

## BANKING STATISTICS

#### MEMBER BANK RESERVES AND RELATED FACTORS

Reporting member	May	Chang	es in—
banks (Millions \$)	22, 1946	Four weeks	One
Assets Commercial loans. Loans to brokers, etc Other loans to carry secur Loans on real estate. Loans to banks. Other loans.	\$ 275 42 62 41 1 154	+ \$6 - 2 - 8 + 3	+\$ 73 - 3 + 47 + 8 + 32
Total loans	\$ 575	- \$1	+\$157
Government securities Obligations fully guar'teed Other securities	\$1840 192	-\$56 - i	+\$104 - 54 + 17
Total investments	\$2032	-\$57	+\$ 67
Total loans & investments. Reserve with F. R. Bank Cash in vault Balances with other banks Other assets—net	\$2607 417 33 85 49	-\$58 - 3 + 4 + 1	+\$224 - 29 + 3 + 6 + 1
Liabilities Demand deposits, adjusted. Time deposits. U. S. Government deposits. Interbank deposits. Borrowings. Other liabilities. Capital account.	\$1775 241 525 361 5 24 260	+\$42 + 1 - 79 - 13 - 8 - 1 + 2	-\$159 + 34 + 293 + 17 - 5 + 18

Third Federal Reserve District	Cha	anges in w	eeks ende	Changes	
(Millions of dollars)	May 1	May 8	May 15	May 22	in four weeks
Sources of funds: Reserve Bank credit extended in district. Commercial transfers (chiefly interdistrict). Treasury operations.	- 6 +13 -11	$ \begin{array}{r} -25 \\ +37 \\ +2 \end{array} $	$^{+14}_{+17}_{-34}$	-24 +15 - 1	-41 +82 -44
Total	- 4	+14	- 3	-10	- 3
Uses of funds: Currency demand Member bank reserve deposits 'Other deposits' at Reserve Bank Other Federal Reserve accounts		+ 5 +10 - 1	+ 4 - 7 	+ 1 -11 	+ 6 - 8 - 1
Total	- 4	+14	- 3	-10	- 3

Member bank reserves (Daily averages; dollar figures in millions)	Held	Re- quired	Ex- cess	Ratio of excess to re- quired
Phila banks				
1945: May .1-15	\$431	\$421	\$10	2%
1946: Apr. 1-15	406	398	8	2
Apr. 16-30	408	398	10	2
May 1-15	412	400	12	2% 2 2 3
Country banks				
1945: May 1-15	\$335	\$271	\$64	24%
1946: Apr. 1-15	369	306	63	20
Apr. 16-30	364	309	55	18
May 1-15	372	313	59	19

Federal Reserve Bank of Phila. (Dollar figures in millions)		Changes in—		
	May 22, 1946	Four weeks	One	
Disc. and advances Industrial loans U. S. securities	\$ 8 1 1594	-\$13 7	-\$ 4 - 2 + 236	
Total Fed. Res. notes Member bk. deposits U.S. general account Foreign deposits	\$1603 1607 767 41 52 3	-\$20 + 4 - 8 + 21 - 5 - 1	+\$230 + 109 - 4 + 13 - 49 - 1	
Gold ctf. reserves Reserve ratio	872 35.3%	+ 33 +1.2%	- 147 - 7.19	

p-Preliminary.

r-Revised

