Choosing the Road to Prosperity

Why We Must End Too Big to Fail—Now
The too-big-to-fail institutions that amplified and prolonged the recent financial crisis remain a hindrance to full economic recovery and to the very ideal of American capitalism. It is imperative that we end TBTF.
If you are running one of the “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) banks—alternatively known as “systemically important financial institutions,” or SIFIs—I doubt you are going to like what you read in this annual report essay written by Harvey Rosenblum, the head of the Dallas Fed’s Research Department, a highly regarded Federal Reserve veteran of 40 years and the former president of the National Association for Business Economics.

Memory fades with the passage of time. Yet it is important to recall that it was in recognition of the precarious position in which the TBTF banks and SIFIs placed our economy in 2008 that the U.S. Congress passed into law the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank). While the act established a number of new macroprudential features to help promote financial stability, its overarching purpose, as stated unambiguously in its preamble, is ending TBTF.

However, Dodd–Frank does not eradicate TBTF. Indeed, it is our view at the Dallas Fed that it may actually perpetuate an already dangerous trend of increasing banking industry concentration. More than half of banking industry assets are on the books of just five institutions. The top 10 banks now account for 61 percent of commercial banking assets, substantially more than the 26 percent of only 20 years ago; their combined assets equate to half of our nation’s GDP. Further, as Rosenblum argues in his essay, there are signs that Dodd–Frank’s complexity and opaqueness may even be working against the economic recovery.

In addition to remaining a lingering threat to financial stability, these megabanks significantly hamper the Federal Reserve’s ability to properly conduct monetary policy. They were a primary culprit in magnifying the financial crisis, and their presence continues to play an important role in prolonging our economic malaise.

There are good reasons why this recovery has remained frustratingly slow compared with periods following previous recessions, and I believe it has very little to do with the Federal Reserve. Since the onset of the Great Recession, we have undertaken a number of initiatives—some orthodox, some not—to revive and kick-start the economy. As I like to say, we’ve filled the tank with plenty of cheap, high-octane gasoline. But as any mechanic can tell you, it takes more than just gas to propel a car. The lackluster nature of the recovery is certainly the byproduct of the debt-infused boom that preceded the Great Recession, as is the excessive uncertainty surrounding the actions—or rather, inactions—of our fiscal authorities in Washington. But to borrow an analogy Rosenblum crafted, if there is sludge on the crankshaft—in the form of losses and bad loans on the balance sheets of the TBTF banks—then the bank-capital linkage that greases the engine of monetary policy does not function properly to drive the real economy. No amount of liquidity provided by the Federal Reserve can change this.

The most damaging effect of propagating TBTF is the erosion of faith in American capitalism. Diverse groups ranging from the Occupy Wall Street movement to the Tea Party argue that government-assisted bailouts of reckless financial institutions are sociologically and politically offensive. From an economic perspective, these bailouts are certainly harmful to the efficient workings of the market.

I encourage you to read the following essay. The TBTF institutions that amplified and prolonged the recent financial crisis remain a hindrance to full economic recovery and to the very ideal of American capitalism. It is imperative that we end TBTF. In my view, downsizing the behemoths over time into institutions that can be prudently managed and regulated across borders is the appropriate policy response. Only then can the process of “creative destruction”—which America has perfected and practiced with such effectiveness that it led our country to unprecedented economic achievement—work its wonders in the financial sector, just as it does elsewhere in our economy. Only then will we have a financial system fit and proper for serving as the lubricant for an economy as dynamic as that of the United States.
As a nation, we face a distinct choice. We can perpetuate too big to fail, with its inequities and dangers, or we can end it. Eliminating TBTF won’t be easy, but the vitality of our capitalist system and the long-term prosperity it produces hang in the balance.
Choosing the Road to Prosperity
Why We Must End Too Big to Fail—Now

by Harvey Rosenblum

More than three years after a crippling financial crisis, the American economy still struggles. Growth sputters. Job creation lags. Unemployment remains high. Housing prices languish. Stock markets gyrate. Headlines bring reports of a shrinking middle class and news about governments stumbling toward bankruptcy, at home and abroad.

Ordinary Americans have every right to feel anxious, uncertain and angry. They have every right to wonder what happened to an economy that once delivered steady progress. They have every right to question whether policymakers know the way back to normalcy.

American workers and taxpayers want a broad-based recovery that restores confidence. Equally important, they seek assurance that the causes of the financial crisis have been dealt with, so a similar breakdown won’t impede the flow of economic activity.

The road back to prosperity will require reform of the financial sector. In particular, a new roadmap must find ways around the potential hazards posed by the financial institutions that the government not all that long ago deemed “too big to fail”—or TBTF, for short.

In 2010, Congress enacted a sweeping, new regulatory framework that attempts to address TBTF. While commendable in some ways, the new law may not prevent the biggest financial institutions from taking excessive risk or growing ever bigger.

TBTF institutions were at the center of the financial crisis and the sluggish recovery that followed. If allowed to remain unchecked, these entities will continue posing a clear and present danger to the U.S. economy.

As a nation, we face a distinct choice. We can perpetuate TBTF, with its inequities and dangers, or we can end it. Eliminating TBTF won’t be easy, but the vitality of our capitalist system and the long-term prosperity it produces hang in the balance.
When competition declines, incentives often turn perverse, and self-interest can turn malevolent. That’s what happened in the years before the financial crisis.

Flaws, Frailities and Foibles

The financial crisis arose from failures of the banking, regulatory and political systems. However, focusing on faceless institutions glosses over the fundamental fact that human beings, with all their flaws, frailties and foibles, were behind the tumultuous events that few saw coming and that quickly spiraled out of control.

Complacency

Good times breed complacency—not right away, of course, but over time as memories of past setbacks fade. In 1983, the U.S. entered a 25-year span disrupted by only two brief, shallow downturns, accounting for just 5 percent of that period (Exhibit 1). The economy performed unusually well, with strong growth, low unemployment and stable prices.

This period of unusual stability and prosperity has been dubbed the Great Moderation, a respite from the usual tumult of a vibrant capitalist economy. Before the Federal Reserve’s founding in 1913, recession held the economy in its grip 48 percent of the time. In the nearly 100 years since the Fed’s creation, the economy has been in recession about 21 percent of the time.

When calamities don’t occur, it’s human nature to stop worrying. The world seems less risky.

Moral hazard reinforces complacency. Moral hazard describes the danger that protection against losses encourages riskier behavior. Government rescues of troubled financial institutions encourage banks and their creditors to take greater risks, knowing they’ll reap the rewards if things turn out well, but will be shielded from losses if things sour.

In the run-up to the crisis of 2008, the public sector grew complacent and relaxed the financial system’s constraints, explicitly in law and implicitly in enforcement. Additionally, government felt secure enough in prosperity to pursue social engineering goals—most notably, expanding home ownership among low-income families.

At the same time, the private sector also became complacent, downplaying the risks of borrowing and lending. For example, the traditional guideline of 20 percent down payment for the purchase of a home kept slipping toward zero, especially among lightly regulated mortgage companies. More money went to those with less ability to repay.

Greed

You need not be a reader of Adam Smith to know the power of self-interest—the human desire for material gain. Capitalism couldn’t operate without it. Most of the time, competition and the rule of law provide market discipline that keeps self-interest in check and steers it toward the social good of producing more of what consumers want at lower prices.

When competition declines, incentives often turn perverse, and self-interest can turn malevolent. That’s what happened in the years before the financial crisis. New technologies and business practices reduced lenders’ “skin in the game”—for example, consider how lenders, instead of retaining the mortgages they made, adopted the new originate-to-distribute model, allowing them to pocket huge fees for making loans, packaging them into securities and selling them to investors. Credit default swaps fed the mania for easy money by opening a casino of sorts, where investors placed bets on—and a few financial institutions sold protection on—companies’ creditworthiness.

Greed led innovative legal minds to push the boundaries of financial integrity...
with off-balance-sheet entities and other accounting expedients. Practices that weren't necessarily illegal were certainly misleading—at least that's the conclusion of many postcrisis investigations.²

**Complicity**

We admire success. When everybody's making money, we're eager to go along for the ride—even in the face of a suspicion that something may be amiss. Before the financial crisis, for example, investors relied heavily on the credit-rating companies that gave a green light to new, highly complex financial products that hadn't been tested under duress. The agencies bestowed their top rating to securities backed by high-risk assets—most notably mortgages with small down payments and little documentation of the borrowers' income and employment. Billions of dollars of these securities were later downgraded to "junk" status.

Complicity extended to the public sector. The Fed kept interest rates too low for too long, contributing to the speculative binge in housing and pushing investors toward higher yields in riskier markets. Congress pushed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the de facto government-backed mortgage

**Exhibit 1**

**Reduced Time Spent in Recession**

![Graph showing time spent in recession from 1915-2011]
Concentration amplified the speed and breadth of the subsequent damage to the banking sector and the economy as a whole.

Exhibit 2
U.S. Banking Concentration Increased Dramatically

NOTE: Assets were calculated using the regulatory high holder or top holder for a bank and summing assets for all the banks with the same top holder to get an estimate of organization-level bank assets.
SOURCES: Reports of Condition and Income, Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council; National Information Center, Federal Reserve System.

giants, to become the largest buyers of these specious mortgage products.

Hindsight leaves us wondering what financial gurus and policymakers could have been thinking. But complicity presupposes a willful blindness—we see what we want to see or what life’s experiences condition us to see. Why spoil the party when the economy is growing and more people are employed? Imagine the political storms and public ridicule that would sweep over anyone who tried!

Exuberance

Easy money leads to a giddy self-delusion—it’s human nature. A contagious divorce from reality lies behind many of history’s great speculative episodes, such as the Dutch tulip mania of 1637 and the South Sea bubble of 1720. Closer to home in time and space, exuberance fueled the Texas oil boom of the early 1980s. In the first decade of this century, it fed the illusion that housing prices could rise forever.

In the run-up to the financial crisis, the certainty of rising housing prices convinced some homebuyers that high-risk mortgages, with little or no equity, weren’t that risky. It induced consumers
to borrow on rising home prices to pay for
new cars, their children's education or a
long-hoped-for vacation. Prudence would
have meant sitting out the dance; buying
into the exuberance gave people what they
wanted—at least for a while.

All booms end up busts. Then comes
the sad refrain of regret: How could we
have been so foolish?

Concentration

In the financial crisis, the human traits of
complacency, greed, complicity and exuber-
ance were intertwined with concentration,
the result of businesses' natural desire to
grow into a bigger, more important and
dominant force in their industries. Concen-
tration amplified the speed and breadth
of the subsequent damage to the banking
sector and the economy as a whole.

The biggest U.S. banks have gotten a
lot bigger. Since the early 1970s, the share
of banking industry assets controlled by
the five largest U.S. institutions has more
than tripled to 52 percent from 17 percent
(Exhibit 2).

Mammoth institutions were built on a
foundation of leverage, sometimes mislead-
ing regulators and investors through the
use of off-balance-sheet financing.1 Equity's
share of assets dwindled as banks borrowed
to the hilt to chase the easy profits in new,
complex and risky financial instruments.
Their balance sheets deteriorated—too little
capital, too much debt, too much risk.

The troubles weren't always apparent.
Financial institutions kept marking assets
on their books at acquisition cost and
sometimes higher values if their proprietary
models could support such valuations.
These accounting expedients allowed them
to claim they were healthy—until they
weren't. Write-downs were later revised by
several orders of magnitude to acknowledge
mounting problems.

With size came complexity. Many big
banks stretched their operations to include
proprietary trading and hedge fund invest-
ments. They spread their reach into dozens
of countries as financial markets globalized.
Complexity magnifies the opportunities
for obfuscation. Top management may not
have known all of what was going on—par-
ticularly the exposure to risk. Regulators
didn't have the time, manpower and other
resources to oversee the biggest banks' vast
operations and ferret out the problems that
might be buried in financial footnotes or
legal boilerplate.

These large, complex financial institu-
tions aggressively pursued profits in the
overheated markets for subprime mort-
gages and related securities. They pushed
the limits of regulatory ambiguity and lax
enforcement. They carried greater risk and
overestimated their ability to manage it.
In some cases, top management groped
around in the dark because accounting and
monitoring systems didn't keep pace with
the expanding enterprises.

Blowing a Gasket

In normal times, flows of money and
credit keep the economy humming. A
healthy financial system facilitates payments
and transactions by businesses and consum-
ers. It allocates capital to competing invest-
ments. It values assets. It prices risk. For the
most part, we take the financial system's
routine workings for granted—until the ma-
achinery blows a gasket. Then we scramble
to fix it, so the economy can return to the fast
lane.

In 2007, the nation's biggest in-
vestment and commercial banks were
among the first to take huge write-offs on
mortgage-backed securities (Exhibit 3).

(continued on page 11)
Exhibit 3
Employment Plummets as Financial System Implodes
Selected Timeline, 2007–2010

Trouble starts with shadow banks

- Loans spread to investors in subprime mortgage-backed securities; Bear Stearns fights unsuccessfully to save two ailing hedge funds (4/07)
- Subprime mortgage lenders show losses and some go bankrupt; New Century Financial (4/07)

Crisis spreads to larger shadow/investment banks

- Investment banks acquire largest commercial banks with government assistance: Bear Stearns (3/08); Merrill Lynch (1/09)
- Monoline insurers downgraded (6/08)
- Bankruptcy failures: IndyMac (7/08); Washington Mutual (9/08)
- Subprime mortgage-related and leveraged loan losses mount amid serial restatements of write-downs; execs at Citi and Merrill Lynch step down (6/07)
- Nationalization of systemically important mortgage-lending institutions: Northern Rock (2/08); Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (9/08)

Commercial banks are affected

- Government intervention—Citi and Bank of America receive government guarantees; troubled asset relief program (TARP) funds released, restrictions on executive pay, “stress tests” introduced; Fed pushes policy rate near zero, creates special liquidity and credit facilities and introduces large-scale asset purchases (6/08–9/09)
- Financial market disarray—Lehman bankruptcy; AIG backstopped (9/08)
- Banking behemoth consolidation—Wells Fargo acquires Wachovia; PNC acquires National City; Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley become bank holding companies (10/08)
- Banking timeouts and related regulatory uncertainty
- Troubled asset relief program (TARP) funds of largest banks repaid at a profit to taxpayers: JPMorgan (6/09); Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Citi (12/09)

Smaller banks struggle amid a mixed recovery

- Roughly 800,000 jobs lost per month
- Prosecution procedures questioned, halted and federally mandated to be improved at several major banks/mortgage servicers (10/10)

Small banks face rising uncertainty about compliance costs, unknown implementation of complicated new regulations and anemic loan demand

Fallout through 2011

- FDIC’s “problem list” reaches a peak asset total of $431 billion (3/10) and peak number of 888 banks (3/11).
- Roughly 400 smaller banks still owe nearly $2 billion in TARP funds (10/11).
- Only two of the 248 banks that failed in 2010 and 2011 held more than $5 billion in assets (12/11).

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Box 1
Degrees of Failure: Bankruptcies, Buyouts and Bailouts

For capitalist economies to thrive, weak companies must go out of business. The reasons for failure vary from outdated products, excess industry capacity, mismanagement and simple bad luck. The demise of existing firms helps the economy by freeing up resources for new enterprises, leaving healthier survivors in place. Joseph Schumpeter coined the term “creative destruction” to describe this failure and renewal process—a major driver of progress in a free-enterprise economy. Schumpeter and his disciples view this process as beneficial despite the accompanying loss of jobs, asset values and equity.

The U.S. economy offers a range of options for this process of failure and rebirth:

Bankruptcies
Enterprises beyond saving wind up in Chapter 7 bankruptcy, with operations ended and assets sold off. Firms with a viable business but too much debt or other contractual obligations usually file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, continuing to operate under court protection from creditors. Both forms of bankruptcy result in a hit to stakeholders: shareholders, employees, top managers and creditors are wiped out or allowed to survive at a significant haircut. Bankruptcy means liquidation or reduction; whether the bankrupt firm dies completely or scales down and survives with the same or similar name, the end game is reallocation of resources.

Buyouts
A company facing potential bankruptcy may instead be sold. The acquisition usually produces similar stakeholder reduction results as a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, but without the obliteration of equity ownership and creditor fallout.

Bailouts
The government steps in to prevent bankruptcy by providing loans or new capital. The government becomes the most senior secured creditor and begins downsizing losses, management, the corporate balance sheet and risk appetite. As the company restructures, the government, often very slowly, weans the company off life support.

Banks are special
The FDIC handles most bank failures through a resolution similar to a private-sector buyout. The FDIC is funded primarily by fees garnered from the banking industry. The failed institution’s shareholders, employees, management and unsecured creditors still generally suffer significant losses, while insured depositors are protected.

In the wake of the financial crisis, Dodd–Frank added a new option: the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA). In theory, OLA will follow the spirit of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy—liquidation of the failed firm’s assets—but in an “orderly” manner. “Orderly” may involve some FDIC/government financing to maximize firm value prior to the sale, thus blending some of the degrees of failure already discussed.

Buyouts, bankruptcies and FDIC resolutions have a long history of providing a reasonably predictable process that imposes no costs to taxpayers. Bankruptcies and buyouts support creative destruction using private sector funding. By contrast, bailouts and OLA are specifically aimed at dealing with too-big-to-fail institutions and are likely to involve some form of taxpayer assistance since this degree of failure comes after private sector solutions are deemed unavailable. Bailouts provide delayed support of the creative destruction process, using sometimes politically influenced taxpayer funds instead of the free-enterprise route of reduction, rebirth and reallocation.

In essence, dealing with TBTF financial institutions necessitates quasi-nationalization of a private company, a process antithetical to a capitalist system.

But make no mistake about it: A bailout is a failure, just with a different label.
As housing markets deteriorated, policymakers became alarmed, seeing the number of big, globally interconnected banks among the wounded. The loss of even one of them, they feared, would create a domino effect that would lead to a collapse of the payment system and severely damage an economy already battered by the housing bust.

Capital markets did in fact seize up when Lehman Brothers, the fourth-largest investment bank, declared bankruptcy in September 2008. To prevent a complete collapse of the financial system and to unfreeze the flow of finance, the expedient fix was hundreds of billions of dollars in federal government loans to keep these institutions and the financial system afloat.

In short, the situation in 2008 removed any doubt that several of the largest U.S. banks were too big to fail. At that time, no agency compiled, let alone published, a list of TBTF institutions. Nor did any bank advertise itself to be TBTF. In fact, TBTF did not exist explicitly, in law or policy—and the term itself disguised the fact that commercial banks holding roughly one-third of the assets in the banking system did essentially fail, surviving only with extraordinary government assistance (Exhibit 4). Most of the largest financial institutions did not fail in the strictest sense. However, bankruptcies, buyouts and bailouts facilitated by the government nonetheless constitute failure (Box 1). The U.S. financial institutions that failed outright between 2008 and 2011 numbered more than 400—the most since the 1980s.

The housing bust and recession disabled the financial system, stranding many institutions on the roadway, creating unprecedented traffic jams. Struggling...
Psychological side effects of TBTF can’t be measured, but they’re too important to ignore because they affect economic behavior.

Exhibit 5
Positive Feedback

Vehicle, home and durable goods sales increase
Credit expands
Real economy expands
Equipment, software and other business investments increase
Spending increases
Profits increase
Real income grows
Employment increases

Progressing Expansion
Good begets good

Monetary Policy Engine
In an internal combustion engine, small explosions in the cylinders’ combus-
tion chambers propel a vehicle; likewise, the monetary policy engine operates through cylinders that transmit the impact of Fed actions to decisions made by businesses, lenders, borrowers and consumers (Exhibit 6).6

When it wants to get the economy moving faster, the Fed reduces its policy interest rate—the federal funds rate, what banks charge one another for overnight loans. Banks usually respond by making more credit available at lower rates, adding a spark to the bank loan cylinder that drives borrowing by consumers and companies. Subsequent buying and hiring boost the economy.

Interest rates in money and capital markets generally fall along with the federal funds rate. The reduced cost of financing taking place in the securities market cylinder enables many large businesses to finance expansion through sales of stock, bonds and other instruments. Increased activity occurs in the asset prices and wealth cylinder stemming from the propensity of falling interest rates to push up the value of assets—bonds, equities, homes and other real estate. Rising asset values bolster businesses' balance sheets and consumers' wealth, leading to greater capacity to borrow and spend.

Declining interest rates stimulate activity in the exchange rate cylinder, making investing in U.S. assets less attractive relative to other countries, putting downward pressure on the dollar. The exchange rate adjustments make U.S. exports cheaper, stimulating employment and economic activity in export industries. However, what other countries do is important; if they also lower interest rates, then the effect on exchange rates and exports will be muted.

From the first moments of the financial crisis, the Fed has worked diligently—often quite imaginatively—to repair damage to the banking and financial sectors, fight the recession, clear away impediments and jump-start the economy. The Fed has kept the federal funds rate close to zero since December 2008. To deal with the zero lower bound on the federal funds rate, the Fed has injected billions of dollars into the economy by purchasing long-maturity assets on a massive scale, creating an unprecedented bulge in its balance sheet. That has helped push down borrowing costs at all maturities to their lowest levels in more than a half century.

While reducing the interest burden for borrowers, monetary policy in recent years has had a punishing impact on savers, particularly those dependent on shrinking interest payments.

In the United States, economic growth resumed in mid-2009—but it has been tenuous and fragile through its first two-plus years. Annual growth has averaged about 2.5 percent, one of the weakest rebounds of any post-WWII recovery. Stock prices quickly bounced back from their recessionary lows but seem suspended in trendless volatility. Home prices have languished.

At the same time, job gains have been disappointing. Averaging 120,000 a month from January 2010 to December 2011, less than half what they were in the mid-to late 1990s when the labor force was considerably smaller. Through 2011, only a third of the jobs lost in the recession have been regained.

What's Different Now?

The sluggish recovery has confounded monetary policy. Much more modest Fed actions have produced much stronger results in the past. So, what's different now?
A vehicle’s engine with one cylinder misfiring may get you where you want to go; it just takes longer. The same goes for the machinery of monetary policy, largely because of the interdependence of all the moving parts.

Part of the answer lies in excesses that haven’t been wrung out of the economy—falling housing prices have been a lingering drag. Jump-starting the housing market would surely spur growth, but TBTF banks remain at the epicenter of the foreclosure mess and the backlog of toxic assets standing in the way of a housing revival. Mortgage credit standards remain relatively tight.

Loan demand lags because of uncertainty about the economic outlook and diminished faith in American capitalism. Even though banks have begun easing lending standards, potential borrowers believe the tight credit standards of 2008–10 remain in place.

Another part of the answer centers on the monetary policy engine. It still isn’t hitting on all cylinders, impairing the Fed’s ability to stimulate the real economy’s growth of output and employment. As a result, historically low federal funds rates haven’t delivered a large expansion of overall credit. With bank lending weak, financial markets couldn’t play their usual role in recovery—revving up lending by nonbanks to the household and business sectors.

A vehicle’s engine with one cylinder
misfiring may get you where you want to go; it just takes longer. The same goes for
the machinery of monetary policy, largely because of the interdependence of all the
moving parts. When one is malfunctioning, it degrades the rest. A scarcity of bank
credit, for example, inhibits firms’ capacity to increase output for exports, undermining
the power within the exchange rate cylinder.

Similarly, the contributions to recovery from securities markets and asset prices
and wealth have been weaker than expected. A prime reason is that burned investors
demand higher-than-normal compensation for investing in private-sector projects. They
remain uncertain about whether the financial system has been fixed and whether
an economic recovery is sustainable. They worry about additional financial shocks—
such as the euro zone crisis.

**Sludge on the Crankshaft**

A fine-tuned financial system requires well-capitalized banks, with the resources
to cover losses from bad loans and investments. In essence, bank capital is a key
lubricant in the economic engine (see *Exhibit 6*). Insufficient capital creates a
grinding friction that weakens the entire financial system. Bank capital is an issue of
regulatory policy, not monetary policy. But monetary policy cannot be effective when
a major portion of the banking system is undercapitalized.

The machinery of monetary policy hasn’t worked well in the current recovery.
The primary reason: TBTF financial institutions. Many of the biggest banks have sput-
tered, their balance sheets still clogged with toxic assets accumulated in the boom years.

In contrast, the nation’s smaller banks are in somewhat better shape by some mea-
sures. Before the financial crisis, most didn’t make big bets on mortgage-backed securi-
ties, derivatives and other highly risky assets whose value imploded. Those that did were
closed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC), a government agency.

Coming out of the crisis, the surviving small banks had healthier balance sheets.
However, smaller banks comprise only one-sixth of the banking system’s capacity and
can’t provide the financial clout needed for a strong economic rebound.

The rationale for providing public funds to TBTF banks was preserving the
financial system and staving off an even worse recession. The episode had its
downside because most Americans came away from the financial crisis believing that
economic policy favors the big and well-connected. They saw a topsy-turvy world
that rewarded many of the largest financial institutions, banks and nonbanks alike, that
lost risky bets and drove the economy into a ditch.8

These events left a residue of distrust for the government, the banking system,
the Fed and capitalism itself (*Box 2*). These psychological side effects of TBTF can’t be
measured, but they’re too important to ignore because they affect economic be-
havior. People disillusioned with capitalism aren’t as eager to engage in productive ac-
tivities. They’re likely to approach economic decisions with suspicion and cynicism,
shying away from the risk taking that drives entrepreneurial capitalism. The ebbing of
faith has added friction to an economy trying to regain cruising speed.

**Shifting into Gear**

Looking back at the financial crisis, recession and the tepid recovery that followed
points to two challenges facing the U.S. economy in 2012 and beyond. The short
term demands a focus on repairing the
An unfortunate side effect of the government’s massive aid to TBTF banks has been an erosion of faith in American capitalism. Ordinary workers and consumers who might usually thank capitalism for their higher living standards have seen a perverse side of the system, where they see that normal rules of markets don’t apply to the rich, powerful and well-connected.

Here are some ways TBTF has violated basic tenets of a capitalist system:

**Capitalism requires the freedom to succeed and the freedom to fail.**
Hard work and good decisions should be rewarded. Perhaps more important, bad decisions should lead to failure—openly and publicly. Economist Allan Meltzer put it this way: “Capitalism without failure is like religion without sin.”

**Capitalism requires government to enforce the rule of law.** This requires maintaining a level playing field. The privatization of profits and socialization of losses is completely unacceptable. TBTF undermines equal treatment, reinforcing the perception of a system tilted in favor of the rich and powerful.

**Capitalism requires businesses and individuals be held accountable for the consequences of their actions.** Accountability is a key ingredient for maintaining public faith in the economic system. The perception—and the reality—is that virtually nobody has been punished or held accountable for their roles in the financial crisis.

*The idea that some institutions are TBTF inexorably erodes the foundations of our market-based system of capitalism.*

Box 2

TBTF: A Perversion of Capitalism

The verdict on Dodd-Frank will depend on what the final rules look like. So far, the new law hasn’t helped revive the economy and may have inadvertently undermined growth.
financial system’s machinery, so the impacts of monetary policy can be transmitted to the economy quickly and with greater force. To secure the long term, the country must find a way to ensure that taxpayers won’t be on the hook for another massive bailout.

Both challenges require dealing with the threat posed by TBTF financial institutions; otherwise, it will be difficult to restore confidence in the financial system and the capitalist economy that depends on it.

The government’s principal response to the financial crisis has been the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank), signed into law on July 21, 2010. It’s a sprawling, complex piece of legislation, addressing issues as diverse as banks’ debit card fees and systemic risk to the financial system. Since Dodd–Frank became law, at least a dozen agencies, including the Fed, have been working to translate its provisions into regulations to govern the financial system. They’re unlikely to finish until 2013 at the earliest.

The verdict on Dodd–Frank will depend on what the final rules look like. So far, the new law hasn’t helped revive the economy and may have inadvertently undermined growth by adding to uncertainty about the future.

A prolonged legislative process preceded the protracted implementation period, with bureaucratic procedure trumping decisiveness. Neither banks nor financial markets know what the new rules will be, and the lack of clarity is delaying repair of the bank-lending and financial market parts of the monetary policy engine.

The law’s sheer length, breadth and complexity create an obstacle to transparency, which may deepen Main Street’s distrust of Washington and Wall Street, especially as big institutions use their lawyers and lobbyists to protect their turf. At the same time, small banks worry about a massive increase in compliance burdens.

Policymakers can make their most immediate impact by requiring banks to hold additional capital, providing added protection against bad loans and investments. In the years leading up to the financial crisis, TBTF banks squeezed equity to a minimum. They ran into trouble because they used piles of debt to expand risky investments—in the end finding that excessive leverage is lethal.

The new regulations should establish basic capital levels for all financial institutions, tacking on additional requirements for the big banks that pose systemic risk, hold the riskiest assets and venture into the more exotic realms of the financial landscape. Mandating larger capital cushions tied to size, complexity and business lines will give TBTF institutions more “skin in the game” and restore some badly needed market discipline. Overall, the revised regulatory scheme should provide incentives to cut risk. Some banks may even rethink their mania for growing bigger.

Higher capital requirements across the board could burden smaller banks and probably further crimp lending. These institutions didn’t ignite the financial crisis. They didn’t get much of a helping hand from Uncle Sam. They tend to stick to traditional banking practices. They shouldn’t face the same regulatory burdens as the big banks that follow risky business models.

TBTF banks’ sheer size and their presumed guarantee of government help in time of crisis have provided a significant edge—perhaps a percentage point or more—in the cost of raising funds. Making these institutions hold added capital will level the playing field for all banks, large and small.
Higher capital requirements across the board could burden smaller banks and probably further crimp lending. These institutions shouldn’t face the same regulatory burdens as the big banks that follow risky business models.

Facing higher capital requirements, the biggest banks will need to raise additional equity through stock offerings or increased retained earnings through reduced dividends. Attracting new investment will be comparatively less burdensome for the healthiest institutions, difficult for many and daunting for the weaker banks.

Dodd–Frank leaves the details for rebuilding capital to several supervisory agencies. The specifics are still being worked out; it appears banks will have until 2016 or 2017 to meet the higher thresholds.

Given the urgent need for restoring the vitality of the banking industry, this may seem a long wait. However, capital rebuilding will likely take place faster as the stronger banks recognize the advantages of being first movers. Recently, many of the largest banks have made efforts to raise capital and have met or surpassed supervisory expectations for capital adequacy under stress tests.¹¹

Banks that quickly clean up their balance sheets will have a better chance of raising new funds—so they can then be in shape to attract even more new capital. Past evidence shows that financial markets favor institutions that offer the best prospects for returns with acceptable risk.¹²

Laggards will be worse off, finding it even more difficult to attract new investors. Ultimately, these institutions will further weaken and may need to be broken up, their viable parts sold off to competitors. With the industry already too concentrated, it’s important to redistribute these banking assets in a way that enhances overall competition.

Ensuring that banks have adequate capital is essential to effective monetary policy. It comes back to the bank capital linkage, which recognizes that banks must have healthy capital ratios to expand lending and absorb losses that normally occur. Repairing the damaged mechanism through which monetary policy impacts the economy will be the key to accelerating positive feedbacks.

To some extent, the Fed’s zero interest rate policy, adopted in December 2008 at the height of the financial crisis, assisted the banking industry’s capital rebuilding process. It reduced banks’ costs of funds and enhanced profitability. But short-term interest rates cannot cross the zero lower bound, limiting any additional impact from this capital-building mechanism. It could
be argued that zero interest rates are taxing savers to pay for the recapitalization of the TBTF banks whose dire problems brought about the calamity that created the original need for the zero interest rate policy.

Unfortunately, the sluggish recovery is a cost of the long delay in establishing the new standards for bank capital. Given the urgent need to restore economic growth and a healthy job market, the guiding principles for bank capital regulation should be: codify and clarify, quickly. There is no statutory mandate to write hundreds of pages of regulations and hundreds more pages of commentary and interpretation. Millions of jobs hang in the balance.

A Potential Roadblock

Dodd–Frank says explicitly that American taxpayers won’t again ride to the rescue of troubled financial institutions. It proposes to minimize the possibility of an Armageddon by revamping the regulatory architecture.

As part of its strategy to end TBTF, Dodd–Frank expanded the powers of the Fed, FDIC and most other existing regulators. New watchdogs will be put on alert. A 10-member Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), aided by a new Office of Financial Research, has been charged with monitoring systemic risk. It will try to identify and resolve problems at big banks and other financial institutions before they threaten the financial system. In an effort to increase transparency, much of the new information will be made public. Opaque business practices thwart market discipline.

Can Dodd–Frank do what was unthinkable back in 2008—identify and liquidate systemically important financial institutions in an orderly manner that minimizes risk to the financial system and economy?

The current remedy for insolvent institutions works well for smaller banks, protecting customers’ money while the FDIC arranges sales or mergers that transfer assets and deposits to healthy competitors. During the financial crisis, however, the FDIC didn’t have the staff, financial resources and time to wind down the activities of even one truly mammoth bank. Thus, many TBTF institutions stayed in business through government support.13

Dodd–Frank envisions new procedures for troubled big banks and financial institutions, directed by the FSOC watchdog and funded by fees charged to the biggest financial institutions.

The goal is an alternative to the TBTF rescues of the past three decades. In practice, these rescues have penalized equity holders while protecting bond holders and, to a lesser extent, bank managers. Disciplining the management of big banks, just as happens at smaller banks, would reassure a public angry with those whose reckless decisions necessitated government assistance.

Will the new resolution procedures be adequate in a major financial crisis? Big banks often follow parallel business strategies and hold similar assets. In hard times, odds are that several big financial institutions will get into trouble at the same time.14 Liquid assets are a lot less liquid if these institutions try to sell them at the same time. A nightmare scenario of several big banks requiring attention might still overwhelm even the most far-reaching regulatory scheme. In all likelihood, TBTF could again become TMTF—too many to fail, as happened in 2008.

A second important issue is credibility. Going into the financial crisis, markets assumed there was government backing for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bonds
A financial system composed of more banks—numerous enough to ensure competition but none of them big enough to put the overall economy in jeopardy—will give the United States a better chance of navigating through future financial potholes, restoring our nation’s faith in market capitalism.

despite a lack of explicit guarantees. When push came to shove, Washington rode to the rescue. Similarly, no specific mandate existed for the extraordinary governmental assistance provided to Bear Stearns, AIG, Citigroup and Bank of America in the midst of the financial crisis.15 Lehman Brothers didn’t get government help, but many of the big institutions exposed to Lehman did.16

Words on paper only go so far. What matters more is whether bankers and their creditors actually believe Dodd–Frank puts the government out of the financial bailout business. If so, both groups will practice more prudent behavior.

Dodd–Frank has begun imposing some market discipline and eroding the big banks’ cost-of-funds advantage. Credit-rating agencies have lowered the scores for some larger banks, recognizing that the law reduces government bailout protections that existed just a few years ago and that Washington’s fiscal problems limit its ability to help beleaguered financial institutions in a financial emergency.

While decrying TBTF, Dodd–Frank lays out conditions for sidestepping the law’s proscriptions on aiding financial institutions. In the future, the ultimate decision won’t rest with the Fed but with the Treasury secretary and, therefore, the president. The shift puts an increasingly political cast on whether to rescue a systemically important financial institution. (It may be hard for many Americans to imagine political leaders sticking to their anti-TBTF guns, especially if they face a too-many-to-fail situation again.)

If the new law lacks credibility, the risky behaviors of the past will likely recur, and the problems of excessive risk and debt could lead to another financial crisis. Government authorities would then face the same edge-of-the-precipice choice they did in 2008—aid the troubled banking behemoths to buoy the financial system or risk grave consequences for the economy.

The pretense of toughness on TBTF sounds the right note for the aftermath of the financial crisis. But it doesn’t give the watchdog FSOC and the Treasury secretary the foresight and the backbone to end TBTF by closing and liquidating a large financial institution in a manner consistent with Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (see Box 1). The credibility of Dodd–Frank’s disavowal of TBTF will remain in question
until a big financial institution actually fails and the wreckage is quickly removed so the economy doesn’t slow to a halt. Nothing would do more to change the risky behavior of the industry and its creditors.

For all its bluster, Dodd–Frank leaves TBTF entrenched. The overall strategy for dealing with problems in the financial industry involves counting on regulators to reduce and manage the risk. But huge institutions still dominate the industry—just as they did in 2008. In fact, the financial crisis increased concentration because some TBTF institutions acquired the assets of other troubled TBTF institutions.

The TBTF survivors of the financial crisis look a lot like they did in 2008. They maintain corporate cultures based on the short-term incentives of fees and bonuses derived from increased oligopoly power. They remain difficult to control because they have the lawyers and the money to resist the pressures of federal regulation. Just as important, their significant presence in dozens of states confers enormous political clout in their quest to refocus banking statutes and regulatory enforcement to their advantage.

The Dallas Fed has advocated the ultimate solution for TBTF—breaking up the nation’s biggest banks into smaller units. It won’t be easy for several reasons. First, the prospect raises a range of thorny issues about how to go about slimming down the big banks. Second, the level of concentration considered safe will be difficult to determine. Is it rolling things back to 1990? Or 1970? Third, the political economy of TBTF suggests that the big financial institutions will dig in to contest any breakups.

Taking apart the big banks isn’t costless. But it is the least costly alternative, and it trumps the status quo.

A financial system composed of more banks, numerous enough to ensure competition in funding businesses and households but none of them big enough to put the overall economy in jeopardy, will give the United States a better chance of navigating through future financial potholes and precipices. As this more level playing field emerges, it will begin to restore our nation’s faith in the system of market capitalism.

**Taking the Right Route**

Periodic stresses that roil the financial system can’t be wished away or legislated out of existence. They arise from human weaknesses—the complacency that comes from sustained good times, the greed and irresponsibility that run riot without market discipline, the exuberance that overrules common sense, the complicity that results from going along with the crowd. We should be vigilant for these failings, but we’re unlikely to change them. They’re a natural part of our human DNA.

By contrast, concentration in the financial sector is anything but natural. Banks have grown larger in recent years because of artificial advantages, particularly the widespread belief that government will rescue the creditors of the biggest financial institutions. Human weakness will cause occasional market disruptions. Big banks backed by government turn these manageable episodes into catastrophes.

Greater stability in the financial sector begins when TBTF ends and the assumption of government rescue is driven from the marketplace. Dodd–Frank hopes to accomplish this by foreshewing TBTF, tightening supervision and compiling more information on institutions whose failure could upend the economy.

These well-intentioned initiatives may
The road to prosperity requires recapitalizing the financial system as quickly as possible. Achieving an economy relatively free from financial crises requires us to have the fortitude to break up the giant banks.

be laudable, but the new law leaves the big banks largely intact. TBTF institutions remain a potential danger to the financial system. We can’t be sure that some future government won’t choose the expediency of bailouts over the risk of severe recession or worse. The only viable solution to TBTF lies in reducing concentration in the banking system, thus increasing competition and transparency.

The road to prosperity requires recapitalizing the financial system as quickly as possible. The safer the individual banks, the safer the financial system. The ultimate destination—an economy relatively free from financial crises—won’t be reached until we have the fortitude to break up the giant banks.

Notes

2 See speech by U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, Columbia University Law School, New York City, Feb. 23, 2012, in which he noted that “much of the conduct that led to the financial crisis was unethical and irresponsible ... but this behavior—while morally reprehensible—may not necessarily have been criminal.” www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-120223.html

3 A structured investment vehicle (SIV) is an “off-balance-sheet” legal entity that issues securities collateralized by loans or other receivables from a separate but related entity while investing in assets of longer maturity. Several of the largest banks used SIVs to issue commercial paper to fund investments in high-yielding securitized assets. When these risky assets began to default, the banks reluctantly took them back onto their balance sheets and suffered large write-downs.

4 In conjunction with the 1984 rescue of Continental Bank, the Comptroller of the Currency, the supervisor of nationally chartered banks, acknowledged the TBTF status of the largest banks. See “U.S. Won’t Let 11 Biggest Banks in Nation Fail,” by Tim Carrington, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 20, 1984.

5 In 2008 and 2009, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) facilitated the failure of 165 institutions with $542 billion in assets. The largest bank failure in history occurred when Washington Mutual shuttered its doors in late September 2008, its $307 billion in assets accounting for the lion’s share of the $372 billion total of failed institutions’ assets that year. Although staggering, the amount of capital drained from the banking system due to failures during the crisis pales in comparison with the $3.2 trillion in assets associated with institutions receiving extraordinary assistance from the FDIC during this period, most of it involving just two entities, Citigroup and Bank of America.


7 According to the July 2011 Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey, a majority of large banks have eased standards for consumer loans and for commercial and industrial loans. However, credit standards on residential and commercial real estate lending remain tight over the period since 2005.

8 Taxpayers’ money wasn’t “given” to the banks. It was loaned, and most loans have been repaid with interest. Nevertheless, the perception remains that bailout dollars were gifts. And perception drives public sentiment.

9 At this time (March 2012), it appears that bank capital regulations under Dodd–Frank will follow the Basel III framework, with capital surcharges of at least 1 percentage point imposed on global systematically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs). In addition, a more realistic definition of capital is likely to be put in place to avoid a repeat of the situation in 2008–09, when two of the largest banks were never rated less than “adequately capitalized” at the height of the crisis, while at the same time they together received hundreds of billions in capital infusions and loan guarantees and never made it onto the FDIC’s Problem Bank List.

Harvey Rosenblum is the Dallas Fed’s executive vice president and director of research. Special mention and thanks go to Richard Alm for his journalistic assistance, to David Luttrell for research and documentation, and to Samantha Coplen and Darcy Melton for their artistry in the exhibits.
interest rates paid for uninsured liabilities. Banks that held more capital had higher returns on equity (ROE) primarily because of reduced regulatory minimum levels under the hypothetical stress scenario, even after considering the proposed capital actions, such as dividend increases or share buybacks. For more information, see www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20120313a.htm.


For other large nonbank financial firms (for example, Lehman Brothers, AIG and Bear Stearns) and for bank holding companies, there was no resolution authority at all. The choice came down to buyouts, bankruptcies or bailouts (see Box 1). With no private-sector buyers willing to step up, and with bankruptcy generally a long and uncertain process, government intervention in the form of bailouts became the least disruptive alternative, at least in the short run. The FDIC estimates that it could have performed an orderly liquidation of Lehman, if it had Dodd–Frank powers six months before Lehman declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy in September 2008, and would have paid creditors 97 percent of what they were owed. But this assumes that other giant financial institutions did not require simultaneous and similar attention.

On March 24, 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York announced that it would provide term financing to facilitate JPMorgan’s buyout of Bear Stearns at $10/share, or $1.4 billion. On Sept. 15, 2008, the world’s largest underwriter of mortgage bonds, Lehman Brothers, filed for the world’s largest bankruptcy with listed liabilities of $613 billion. The following day, one of the world’s largest insurance organizations and counterparties for credit default swaps, AIG, received Federal Reserve support; an $85 billion secured credit facility amid credit rating downgrades and financial market panic. On Nov. 23, 2008, the Treasury, Federal Reserve and the FDIC entered into an agreement with Citigroup to provide a package of guarantees, liquidity access and nonrecourse capital to protect against losses on an asset pool of approximately $306 billion of loans and securities. On Jan. 16, 2009, a similar government loan-loss agreement was offered to Bank of America, backstopping an asset pool of $118 billion, a large majority of which was assumed as a result of BofA’s acquisition of broker-dealer Merrill Lynch.

More than three years have passed since the Lehman bankruptcy. A vigorous debate persists regarding (1) whether the Fed could have found a way to bail out Lehman and (2) whether this might have avoided a global financial and economic collapse. Using data from late 2008 and early 2009 shown in Exhibit 3, the inescapable answer to both questions is: It would not have mattered. Two days later, AIG was essentially nationalized, and within a matter of a few months, the already imbedded but unrecognized and undisclosed losses at Citigroup and Bank of America necessitated a combined Fed and FDIC assistance package that quasi-nationalized these institutions. The extent of these losses was disavowed by management up until assistance packages were announced.

Evidence of economies of scale (that is, reduced average costs associated with increased size) in banking suggests that there are, at best, limited cost reductions beyond the $100 billion asset size threshold. Cost reductions beyond this size cutoff may be more attributable to TBTF subsidies enjoyed by the largest banks, especially after the government interventions and bailouts of 2008 and 2009. See “Scale Economies Are a Distraction,” by Robert DeYoung, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis The Region, September 2010, pp. 14–16, as well as Brewer and Jagtiani, note 10. However, Dodd–Frank seeks to reduce these TBTF subsidies.
The vibrant economy of the Eleventh Federal Reserve District became the focus of national attention in 2011 as the region grew significantly faster than the nation. Employment increased by 2 percent—212,000 jobs—compared with 1.3 percent nationally. The district employs over 11 million workers.

Texas, which makes up the major part of the Eleventh District, was the last state to enter the recent recession and one of the strongest coming out, moving from recovery to expansion in 2011. A source of Texas economic strength, oil and gas extraction recorded a 25 percent increase in the number of drilling rigs in 2011, almost reaching its mid-2008 peak. Texas exports grew at a faster pace than in the rest of the U.S., and housing continued to mend.

The district’s economy appears poised for another year of moderate growth as leading economic indicators increased at the end of 2011. Slower growth in exports and energy will likely be offset by a gradual improvement in construction and fewer cuts in state and local government jobs.

Monetary Policy and Research

The Dallas Fed began providing to the public a timely state-level gauge of service sector activity with the introduction midyear of the Texas Service Sector Outlook Survey (TSSOS). The service sector drives the Texas economy, and TSSOS fills a regional data gap. Both TSSOS and the established Texas Manufacturing Outlook Survey (TMOS) are routinely cited in the business media and have proved to be reliable indicators of the Texas economy.

The Bank conducts high-level research that contributes to the understanding of our dynamic economy. Research staff had 27 new submissions and nine acceptances in refereed journals. The Bank’s economists presented research at 40 meetings, organized or chaired sessions or served as discussants at 20 conferences, gave 31 academic seminars at universities, central banks or other research institutions and presented over 260 speeches to area, district and national audiences.

The Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute continued to expand its reach and activities. The institute’s staff, fellows and research associates circulated working papers that were read extensively worldwide, and several of those papers were accepted for publication in leading international academic journals, such as the Journal of International Economics. The institute cosponsored a conference with the Swiss National Bank in Zurich on the globalization of inflation and held its inaugural public lecture, “Globalization and Monetary Policy: From Virtue to Vice?,” delivered by Jürgen Stark, member of the executive board of the European Central Bank.

Financial Services

The new Go Direct® Contact Center began operations in March 2011 to support the All-Electronic Treasury Initiative. To accom-
One of the most diverse regions of the country, culturally, economically and geographically

moderate expansion of Go Direct operations, staff members were relocated to a new space on the ground floor of the Dallas building that was previously used for check processing. Staff levels were increased to handle phone calls generated by the Treasury’s announcement and promotion of the initiative, designed to move federal benefit recipients from paper to electronic payments.

To reduce operating costs, the Bank replaced the San Antonio office’s cash services operation with a cash depot administered by the Houston Branch. The Dallas Fed has completed a multiyear upgrade to its high-speed currency processing machines, thereby increasing processing capability to 100,000 notes per hour.

Banking Supervision and Discount and Credit

The Bank continued its active participation in the implementation of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, signed into law in July 2010. In addition to the 39 state member banks and 459 bank holding companies the Dallas Fed supervises, the Bank on July 21, 2011, became the federal supervisor for 23 savings-and-loan holding companies (SLHCs) in the Eleventh District, ranging in size from less than $150 million to more than $100 billion in assets. Banking Supervision added staff to oversee SLHCs and to prepare for implementing enhanced supervision standards for the largest financial services organizations as required by Dodd–Frank.

To reduce the cost to and burden on depository institutions, the Federal Reserve System announced an initiative to simplify administration of the framework under which organizations calculate and maintain reserves.

Office of Minority and Women Inclusion

As mandated by the Dodd–Frank Act, the Bank established an Office of Minority and Women Inclusion (OMWI). The OMWI is designed to ensure that minorities and women are fairly included in employment-related activities and that minority- and women-owned businesses have an increasing role as providers of goods and services. Further, the OMWI’s influence extends to efforts to support financial literacy and economic education in the Bank’s service areas.

Public Outreach

The Bank remains committed to providing high-quality informational and educational programs that improve financial literacy and help the public know and understand the structure and role of the Fed.

The Bank’s economic education programs reach several thousand educators each year, and through them, tens of thousands of students. The Economics Scholars Program, presented in cooperation with Austin College, brought together 150 participants from 44 universities and colleges across 14 states.

The Community Development pro-

gram advanced the concept of asset building through events across Texas. Partnering with RAISE Texas, Texas Rural Innovators and local hosts, Bank staff brought together practitioners, service providers and policymakers in Texas’ rural communities to explore innovative ways to help families achieve financial security. The Bank also organized and hosted conferences on Hispanic migration, labor and social trends to widen understanding of this dynamic population; social influences on health to understand how groups are collaborating with leaders in community development and health; and housing issues for people with disabilities to identify challenges, new initiatives and financing opportunities.

The Dallas Fed held events across the Eleventh District to provide an opportunity for CEOs of financial institutions to meet with the Bank’s top leaders and discuss regional economic issues and matters affecting banking. The Bank reached more than 3,000 banks and credit unions at roundtables on economic topics in communities across the district and hosted four webcasts on current economic issues.

The Bank’s Community Depository Institutions Advisory Council and San Antonio Regional Bank Council continued to provide essential information about the changing practices of financial institutions, in particular community banks. In 2011, the Bank formed a Corporate Payments Council—whose members represent large retail operations—so it can stay in touch with the evolving payment services practices of the corporate community.
Senior Management

(Left to right) seated: Holcomb and Fisher; standing: Kolson, Gholson, McKee, Peschel, Hastings, Black, Hankins, Rosenblum, Sweatt and Gilmer.

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President, Southern Distributing Co.
Examinations of the Reserve Bank

The Reserve Banks and the consolidated limited liability company (LLC) entities are subject to several levels of audit and review. The combined financial statements of the Reserve Banks as well as the annual financial statements of each of the 12 Banks and the consolidated LLC entities are audited annually by an independent auditing firm retained by the Board of Governors. In addition, the Reserve Banks, including the consolidated LLC entities, are subject to oversight by the Board of Governors, which performs its own reviews. The Reserve Banks use the framework established by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) to assess their internal controls over financial reporting, including the safeguarding of assets. Within this framework, the management of each Reserve Bank annually provides an assertion letter to its board of directors that confirms adherence to COSO standards. In 2011, the Board of Governors engaged Deloitte & Touche LLP (D&T) to audit the combined and individual financial statements of the Reserve Banks and those of the consolidated LLC entities. In 2011, D&T also conducted audits of internal control over financial reporting for each of the Reserve Banks and the consolidated LLC entities. Fees for D&T’s services totaled $8 million, of which $2 million was for the audits of the consolidated LLC entities. To ensure auditor independence, the Board of Governors requires that D&T be independent in all matters relating to the audits. Specifically, D&T may not perform services for the Reserve Banks or others that would place it in a position of auditing its own work, making management decisions on behalf of the Reserve Banks, or in any other way impairing its audit independence. In 2011, the Bank did not engage D&T for any nonaudit services.

The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas’ financial statements as of and for the years ended December 31, 2011 and 2010 and the independent auditors’ report can be found at the following link: www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/BSTDallasfinstmt2011.pdf

1 Each LLC will reimburse the Board of Governors for the fees related to the audit of its financial statements from the entity’s available net assets.
About the Dallas Fed

The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas is one of 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks in the United States. Together with the Board of Governors in Washington, D.C., these organizations form the Federal Reserve System and function as the nation’s central bank. The System’s basic purpose is to provide a flow of money and credit that will foster orderly economic growth and a stable dollar. In addition, Federal Reserve Banks supervise banks and bank holding companies and provide certain financial services to the banking industry, the federal government and the public.

The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas has served the financial institutions in the Eleventh District since 1914. The district encompasses 360,000 square miles and comprises the state of Texas, northern Louisiana and southern New Mexico. The three branch offices of the Dallas Fed are in El Paso, Houston and San Antonio.

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