THE OUTPUT, EMPLOYMENT, AND INTEREST RATE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
S. Rao Aiyagari, Lawrence J. Christiano and Martin Eichenbaum

Working Paper Series
Macro Economic Issues
Research Department
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
June, 1990 (WP-90-10)
The Output, Employment, and Interest Rate Effects of Government Consumption*

by

S. Rao Aiyagari
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Lawrence J. Christiano
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Martin Eichenbaum
Northwestern University, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the NBER

March 1990

Abstract

This paper investigates the impact on aggregate variables of changes in government consumption in the context of a stochastic, neoclassical growth model. We show, theoretically, that the impact on output and employment of a persistent change in government consumption exceeds that of a temporary change. We also show that, in principle, there can be an analog to the Keynesian multiplier in the neoclassical growth model. Finally, in an empirically plausible version of the model, we show that the interest rate impact of a persistent government consumption shock exceeds that of a temporary one. Our results provide counterexamples to existing claims in the literature.

*We are grateful to Lars Hansen for helpful comments. Eichenbaum acknowledges research support from the National Science Foundation.
1. Introduction

Early general equilibrium business cycle models, say as represented by the seminal works of Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long and Plosser (1982), emphasized the importance of aggregate shocks to technology as impulses to post war US business cycles. Spurred on by both the empirical successes and shortcomings of these models, recent work has sought to identify and integrate other impulses to aggregate economic activity into equilibrium business cycle models.¹

Curiously, modern equilibrium business cycle analysts have paid relatively little attention to the role of government expenditures as a possible contributor to business cycle activity. It is true that authors like Hall (1980) and Barro (1981,1987), approaching the problem from a neoclassical perspective, have argued that changes in aggregate government consumption can significantly alter aggregate economic activity. Still, very little work has been done on integrating the public sector into formal quantitative general equilibrium models of the business cycle.² This stands in sharp contrast to traditional Keynesian analyses which typically assign great importance to the role of government expenditures in determining aggregate output, employment and interest rates.

This paper investigates the impact of changes in government consumption on aggregate employment, output and interest rates. We proceed at both a theoretical and a quantitative level. Our theoretical analysis is conducted within the confines

¹Hamilton (1983) for example has stressed the important role of oil shocks in business cycles while Barsky and Miron (1988) investigate the role of seasonal shocks arising from weather patterns and holidays. Other authors like Judd (1985) and Braun (1989) consider the role of movements in marginal tax rates on aggregate economic fluctuations. In contrast, authors like Kydland (1987) and Cooley and Hansen (1988) are incorporating monetary shocks into quantitative general equilibrium business cycle models.

of a one sector stochastic neoclassical growth model. Our quantitative analysis is based upon a version of the model whose parameters were estimated in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1988). The reader may be puzzled that we find it necessary at all to consider the theoretical effects of variations in government consumption. Indeed, this question has been previously analyzed by Hall (1980) and Barro (1981,1987), ostensibly using the standard neoclassical growth model. However, our analysis indicates that the neoclassical growth model makes predictions about the impact of government consumption which are, in many ways, fundamentally different from those claimed by Hall and Barro.

It is convenient to begin by summarizing those claims. First, according to Hall (1980) and Barro (1981,1987), both transient and persistent increases in government consumption ought to increase aggregate output and hours worked. Second, Hall (1980) argues that the employment and output effects of persistent increases in government consumption are smaller than those of transient increases. Third, according to Barro (1987), while positive, the ratio of the change in contemporaneous and steady state output to changes in government consumption must be less than one, i.e. there can be no analog to the Keynesian "multiplier" in the neoclassical growth model. Fourth, Barro (1981, 1987) argues that a transient increase in government consumption ought to impact positively on the interest rate, while a permanent increase ought to leave the interest rate unchanged.

While our theoretical analysis leads us to conclude, as do Hall (1980) and

---

3Barro (1981) seems to suggest this as well. In particular he writes that "Under plausible conditions, the temporary case involves an output response that is positive, less than one—to—one with the change in government purchases, and larger than that generated by an equal—sized, but permanent, shift in purchases." However he comments on the relative output effects of temporary and permanent changes in government purchases only in the abstract of the paper and in the section on optimal, non—lump—sum taxes—a case which we do not consider. Therefore, it is not clear whether the previous statement is meant to apply to both lump—sum and optimal non—lump—sum taxation situations, or only the latter.
Barro (1981,1987), that transient as well as persistent increases in government consumption do generate increases in output and employment, we find ourselves in disagreement along other important dimensions. First, we demonstrate analytically that—under standard assumptions spelled out in section 2 below—the employment and output effects of permanent increases in government consumption always exceed those of temporary increases. From this perspective, the more persistent is government consumption, the more likely it is to be an important impulse to business cycle fluctuations. In our quantitative analysis, we find that the differential impact of persistent and temporary shocks to government consumption are quite substantial. Second, we use our parametric model to show that the steady state response of output to a permanent one unit change in government consumption can exceed unity. Further, the contemporaneous response of output to a one unit change in government consumption can also exceed unity if that change is sufficiently persistent. Thus, in principle there can be an analog to the Keynesian "multiplier" in conventional neoclassical models. Third, we show that, in our parametric model, an increase in government consumption causes the real interest rate to rise, regardless of whether the change in government consumption is temporary or persistent. Indeed, for that model, we find that a persistent increase in government consumption has a larger impact on the interest rate than does a transient increase.

---

4This verifies conjectures in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1988) and Baxter and King (1988) that such a result might hold for a reasonably general class of models. See also Barro and King (1982) who suggest in their footnote 13, that under lump sum taxes, a permanent change in government purchases would have a stronger effect than a temporary change in government purchases because "investment tends to decline more when the change in purchases is temporary."
In the remainder of this section we provide some intuition for the difference between our results and those in the existing literature.

The Relative Impact of Temporary Versus Persistent Government Consumption Shocks

The basic argument underlying Hall's conclusion about the relative impact of persistent and temporary changes in government consumption can be summarized as follows. A temporary increase of one unit in government consumption reduces consumers' permanent incomes by much less than one unit (approximately zero). Consequently, the demand for private consumption remains (roughly) unchanged, so that, for a given interest rate, net aggregate demand increases by one unit. Since there has been no change in labor suppliers' permanent incomes, other things equal, when viewed as a function of the interest rate, the aggregate supply curve of output does not shift. Consequently, real interest rates must rise to clear the commodity market. This transient increase in the interest rate induces a positive labor supply response for intertemporal substitution reasons.

In contrast, a permanent increase in government consumption by one unit reduces consumers' permanent incomes by one unit. Other things equal, this induces a fall in the demand for private consumption by one unit. With no net change in aggregate demand there is no need for any offsetting effects on interest rates. Consequently, equilibrium output and hours worked do not change.

The basic problem with Hall's argument is that it makes inconsistent assumptions regarding the income effect on leisure. An implicit assumption of his analysis of a permanent change in government consumption is that there is no income effect on leisure. But this cannot also be a maintained assumption of his
analysis of a temporary change in government consumption. This is because, under that assumption, a temporary change in government consumption also has no impact on equilibrium output and employment.5

In fact, with a positive income effect on leisure, permanent changes in government consumption always have an effect on employment and output that is larger than the effect of transitory changes. We obtain this result by decomposing the effect on household hours worked of a change in government consumption as follows: (a) the direct effect of the change in government consumption on hours worked, holding constant private investment, (b) the effect on investment of the change in government consumption, and (c) the indirect effect of government consumption on hours worked that occurs via the change in investment.

As it turns out, in (a) and (c), increases in government consumption and investment can be viewed as exogenous reductions in income which raise hours worked. However, with respect to (b), a transient increase in government consumption reduces investment, reflecting agents' desire to smooth consumption over time. But, a persistent increase in government consumption either increases investment or does not reduce it by as much as in the transient case. Basically this is because a permanent increase in government consumption raises the steady state level of capital. It is the indirect effect of government that accounts for the fact that persistent changes in government consumption generate larger contemporaneous effects on output and employment than transient changes.

5This follows from two observations. First, if the income effect on leisure is zero, then the marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption depends only on leisure. Therefore, households' labor supply depends only on the current real wage rate — interest rate considerations play no role in determining labor supply. Second, the marginal productivity schedule of labor, which determines the demand for labor, is fixed by the current stock of capital and the level of technology. Taken together, these two observations imply that equilibrium output and employment do not depend on the contemporaneous level of government consumption.
The Multiplier

The basic argument underlying Barro's conclusion that contemporaneous and steady state output increase by less than a given permanent increase in government consumption can be summarized as follows. The negative wealth effect associated with a permanent increase in government consumption leads to a reduction in private consumption. At the same time, investment does not change, because according to Barro's analysis, interest rates do not change. Since aggregate output equals the sum of private consumption, investment and government consumption, the increase in output must be less than the increase in government consumption.

The key problem with this argument lies in the assertion that investment does not change in response to a permanent increase in government consumption. In general this claim is not true unless there is no income effect on leisure. To see why, it is convenient to consider the nonstochastic case. In standard versions of the neoclassical growth model, the steady state capital-hours worked ratio is determined by agents' subjective discount rate and is not affected by government consumption. But, given a positive income effect on leisure, steady state hours worked increase in response to a permanent increase in government consumption. It follows that the steady state stock of capital and investment must also increase. Given the increase in steady-state investment, there is no longer any reason for the steady state multiplier to be less than one. Similar considerations imply that the contemporaneous output effect of a permanent change in government consumption can also exceed one.6

6An alternative way to rationalize Barro's claim, which does not depend on the absence of an income effect on leisure, is to assume that the marginal productivity of capital does not depend on hours worked. We do not impose this restriction in our analysis.
According to Barro (1981, 1987) permanent increases in government consumption ought to have no impact on the interest rate. To see why this result does not hold in general, it is again useful to consider the nonstochastic case. With a positive income effect on leisure, permanent increases in government consumption drive up the steady-state stock of capital and hours worked. For a model economy like ours, the interest rate is above its steady state value whenever the capital stock is below its steady state. Moreover, convergence is monotonic, with the interest rate eventually returning to its unchanged steady-state value (see Aiyagari (1988), Proposition 3). Consequently, a permanent increase in government consumption induces a temporary increase in the interest rate. Indeed, in our parametric model, we find that this increase is actually larger than that which would result from a temporary change in government consumption. At the same time we wish to emphasize that this last result is by no means a general one. There exist alternative preference and technology assumptions for the one sector growth model in which temporary increases in government consumption have bigger impacts on the interest rate than permanent changes.⁷

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present our basic model and analytical results. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.

---

⁷To see this, suppose the economy is in nonstochastic steady state and there is no income effect on leisure. Then, a permanent increase in government consumption that is met by an equal decrease in private consumption and no change in hours worked is both feasible and optimal. But, this means that the interest rate is left unchanged by the permanent increase in government consumption. If the increase in government consumption is temporary, the proposed consumption and hours worked response would be feasible, but not optimal. In fact, investment would fall and the interest rate would rise.
Section 3 contains our numerical results. Finally section 4 contains some concluding remarks.

2. Dynamic Effects of Government Spending: Theoretical Results

In this section we analyze a variant of the neoclassical growth model modified to include elastic labor supply and government consumption. Our main result is that the contemporaneous effect on employment and output of a persistent increase in government consumption always exceeds the corresponding effect of a temporary increase in government consumption. A formal proof of this proposition is contained in the Appendix. The purpose of this section is to provide an intuitive description of the argument.

2.1 The Model.

We assume that the competitive equilibrium allocation can be represented as the solution to the following planning problem. Maximize,

\[ E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t, n_t), \quad 0 < \beta < 1, \]

subject to,

\[ c_t + g_t + k_{t+1} \leq f(k_t, n_t), \]

and \( 0 \leq n_t \leq N, \ c_t \geq 0, \ k_{t+1} \geq 0, \ k_0 > 0, \) given, by choice of contingency plans for
nt, cn, and kt+1. Here, cn, gt, and kt denote private consumption, public consumption, and the beginning-of-period public plus private stock of capital, respectively. Also, nt denotes hours worked and N is the total time endowment. The function, f(ktn), relates date t gross output and the undepreciated part of capital to the factors of production.

Assumptions on Exogenous Shocks

We assume that government consumption, gt, evolves according to

\[ g_t = G(g^T_t + g^P_t). \]

Here, G(·) > 0 is a strictly increasing function while g^T_t and g^P_t are the zero mean transitory and persistent components of government spending, respectively. Throughout, we assume that g^T_t is iid over time and that g^P_t and g^T_t are mutually independent. Both g^P_t and g^T_t are assumed to have bounded support, [g^P_{min}, g^P_{max}], [g^T_{min}, g^T_{max}], respectively. Further, g^T_t is a Markov process with conditional cumulative distribution function Ψ(g^P' | g^P) = Prob[g^P_{t+1} ≤ g^P' | g^P_t = g^P]. We make the following assumption for Ψ:

E1 \ Ψ is decreasing in g^P.\footnote{Formally, Ψ is decreasing in g^P means that if g^P_2 > g^P_1, then Ψ(g^P' | g^P_1) ≥ Ψ(g^P' | g^P_2) for all g^P', with the inequality being strict for some g^P'}.\footnote{Formally, Ψ is decreasing in g^P means that if g^P_2 > g^P_1, then Ψ(g^P' | g^P_1) ≥ Ψ(g^P' | g^P_2) for all g^P', with the inequality being strict for some g^P'.}

Assumption E1 formalizes our notion of persistence. Intuitively, g^P_t is persistent if
higher values of $g_t^P$ make higher values of $g_{t+1}^P$ more likely.\(^9\) To motivate the usefulness of this definition, consider the random variable

$$E[\omega(g_{t+1}^P | g_t^P = g^P) = \int_{g_{\min}^P}^{g_{\max}^P} \omega(g^P') \psi(g^P' | g^P) \, dg^P',$$

where $\omega$ is any continuous, increasing function. Integrating by parts we obtain:

$$E[\omega(g_{t+1}^P | g_t^P = g^P) = \omega(g_{\max}^P) - \int_{g_{\min}^P}^{g_{\max}^P} \psi(g^P' | g^P) \, d\omega(g^P').$$

From this equation it is evident that our definition of persistence implies that the expectation in (2.5) is increasing in $g_t^P$. Below, we indicate where this implication of $\text{E}1$ is used in proving our result. Our final assumption on the exogenous shocks is:

$$\text{E}2 \quad \text{Prob}\{g_{t+1}^P = g_{\max}^P, g_{t+1}^T = g_{\max}^T | g_t^P\} > 0, \quad \text{for all } g_t^P.$$

Below we indicate how $\text{E}2$ helps guarantee an interior solution to the planning problem.

**Assumptions on Technology**

We begin by listing our assumptions on the function $f$, labeled $T$

---

\(^9\)Our definition of persistence is equivalent to the concept of first order stochastic dominance. See, for example, Hadar and Russel (1969) and Hanoch and Levy (1969). We thank V.V. Chari for drawing our attention to this fact.
("technology"). These assumptions are typical in analyses of the standard neoclassical growth model.

T1 \( f \) is strictly increasing, concave and obeys constant returns to scale; it is twice continuously differentiable for \( k > 0, n > 0 \); and \( f(0,N) - g_{\text{max}} < 0 \).

T2 \( f_k(n,k) \to 0 \) as \( k \to 0 \) for \( 0 < n \leq N \),
\( f_n(n,k) \to 0 \) as \( n \to 0 \) for \( 0 < k \).

T3 \( \lim_{k \to 0} f_k(k,n) < 1 \) for \( 0 < n \leq N \).

T4 there exists a \( k \) such that \( f(k,N) - g_{\text{max}} > k \).

T5 \( f_k > 0, f_n > 0, f_{kk} < 0, f_{nn} < 0, f_{kn} > 0 \) for \( k > 0, n > 0 \).

Throughout, \( f_i \) is defined as the partial derivative of \( f \) with respect to its \( i \)th argument, for \( i = n, k \). Assumptions T1 and T4 assure that there exist values of \( k \) such that \( f(k,N) - g_{\text{max}} = k \), where \( g_{\text{max}} = G(g_{\text{max}} + g_{\text{max}}^T) \). Denote the smallest such value of \( k \) by \( k \), so that

\[
(2.6) \quad f(k,N) - g_{\text{max}} = k.
\]

The existence of \( k \) is necessary for the economy to have the capability of reproducing its capital stock. An additional requirement needed to guarantee the survivability of this economy is:
T6 $\mathbf{k_0 \geq k}.

It is straightforward to show that assumption T3 ensures the existence of a maximum possible value for $k_t$, which we denote by $k$. Taken together, our assumptions imply that we can, without loss of generality, restrict ourselves to consider values of the capital stock that lie between $k$ and $k$. The upper bound is non-binding because it is technically infeasible to exceed it. Our assumptions on preferences (listed below) and E2 guarantee that the lower bound is also non-binding.

Assumptions on Preferences

Let $u_i$ denote the partial derivative of $u$ with respect to $i$ for $i = c_p, n$. In addition, we denote the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption by

\begin{equation}
(2.7) \quad w(c_p,n) = \frac{-u_n(c_p,n)}{u_{c_p}(c_p,n)}, \text{ for } c_p > 0, 0 \leq n < N.
\end{equation}

Our assumptions on preferences are as follows:
\( u \) is strictly concave, strictly increasing in \( \text{c} \) and strictly decreasing in \( n \) for \( \text{c} \geq 0, 0 \leq n \leq N \); it is twice continuously differentiable for \( \text{c} > 0, n < N \); \( u_{\text{cp}} > 0, u_{n} < 0, u_{\text{cp} \text{cp}} < 0, u_{nn} < 0 \) and

\[
\begin{vmatrix}
 u_{\text{cp} \text{cp}} & u_{\text{cp} n} \\
 u_{ncp} & u_{nn}
\end{vmatrix} > 0.
\]

\( w(c_p,n) \to \infty \) as \( n \to N \) for fixed \( c_p > 0 \),
\( w(c_p,n) \to 0 \) as \( c_p \to 0 \) for fixed \( n < N \).

\( \text{P3} \) If \( c_p \to 0 \) and \( (-u_{n}/u_{cp}) \) is decreasing then \( u_{cp} \to \infty \).

\( \text{P4} \) \( w_{cp} > 0 \) for \( c_p > 0, 0 \leq n < N \)

Assumption \( \text{P3} \) is required to accommodate situations in which \( c_p \to 0 \) and \( n \to N \) simultaneously. \( \text{P4} \) is the assumption that leisure is a superior good. Assumptions \( \text{P1} - \text{P3} \) help guarantee that the optimal choices of \( k^\prime, c_p \) and \( n \) lie in the interior of the planner's constraint set.10

---

10With one exception, our assumptions on preferences are standard. The exception is that we do not permit \( g_t \) to affect the marginal utility of \( c_p \) and \( n_t \). This rules out utility functions of the form considered in the literature on government consumption (see, e.g., Aschauer (1985), Barro (1987) and Kormendi (1983)), where utility functions of the form \( u(c_p+\alpha g_t, n_t) \) for \( \alpha \neq 0 \) are studied. The numerical findings in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1988) suggest that the results in this paper are robust to this extension, as long as the appropriate analogue of \( \alpha \neq 1 \) obtains.
2.2 Government Consumption and Equilibrium Employment and Output

We discuss the qualitative features of the solution to our planning problem using standard dynamic programming methods. Bellman’s equation for the planning problem is:

\[
v(k, g^P, g^T) = \max \{u(c, n) + E[\beta v(k', g^P', g^T')|g^P]\}
\]

where \(k \in [k_0, k^*]\) and

\[
A(k, g) = \{c, k', n: c > 0, 0 < n < N, k' > k, c + k' + g < f(k, n)\}.
\]

In (2.8)-(2.9), time subscripts have been deleted and the superscript ' denotes next period's value. Formulated in this way, the problem is to find a value function, \(v\), which satisfies (2.8) and (2.9). Given our assumptions, it is straightforward to show that \(v\) exists, is unique and is strictly concave in \(k\) for fixed \((g^P, g^T)\). In addition, for fixed \(g^P\) and \(g^T\), the function \(v\) is continuously differentiable in \(k\) for all \(k \in (k_0, k^*)\). The contingency plans for \(c, n,\) and \(k'\) that we seek are the unique plans which attain the maximum in (2.8).

For our purposes, it is convenient to rewrite (2.8)-(2.9) as

\[
v(k, g^P, g^T)
\]

\[
= \max \{\max u(c, n) + E[\beta v(k', g^P', g^T')|g^P]\}
\]

where,

\[
A(k, g) = \{c, k', n: c > 0, 0 < n < N, k' > k, c + k' + g < f(k, n)\}.
\]

\[
(2.10)
\]
\[(2.11) \quad B(k,k'+g) = \{c_P,n: 0 \leq n \leq N, 0 \leq c_P \leq f(k,n)-(g+k')\},\]

for \(k \in [k,k'], k' \in [k,f(k,n)-g]\). Let the function defined in the first square brackets of (2.10) be denoted

\[(2.12) \quad W(k,k'+g) = \max_{n,c_P \in B(k,k'+g)} u(c_P,n).\]

It is easy to show (see the Appendix) that there exist unique solutions

\[(2.13) \quad n = h(k,k'+g), c_P = q(k,k'+g)\]

that attain the maximum in (2.12). It is also easy to establish (again, see the Appendix) that \(W\) is strictly concave in \((k,k')\) for fixed \(g\) and is twice differentiable in the interior of its domain. With this notation, (2.8) can be written as

\[(2.14) \quad v(k,g^P,g^T) = \max_{k \leq k'} \{W(k,k'+g) + E[\partial v(k',g^P,g^T)|g^P]|g^P]\}.

Thus, problem (2.8) is broken into two parts, a purely static part, (2.12), and a dynamic part, (2.14). This way of splitting the problem corresponds to our description in the introduction of the direct and indirect effects of movements in \(g_t\). Problem (2.12) captures the direct effects of \(g\) and \(k'\) on \((c_P,n)\) whereas problem (2.14) captures the indirect effect of \(g\) on \((c_P,n)\) via \(k'\).

Notice that the distinction between transient and persistent changes in \(g\) enters solely via the indirect effect in problem (2.14). One way to see this is to
decompose the response of \( n \) to a change in \( g \) as:

\[
\frac{dn}{dg} = \frac{\partial h}{\partial g} + \frac{\partial h}{\partial k'} \frac{dk'}{dg} = \frac{\partial h}{\partial g} \frac{dk'}{dg} + \frac{\partial h}{\partial g} \frac{dk'}{dg} \frac{1}{[1 + \frac{\partial h}{\partial g}]}.
\]

where \( h \) is defined in (2.13). The expression after the second equality in (2.15) reflects the symmetry with which \( g \) and \( k' \) enter the \( h \) function. Because \( g^p \) and \( g^T \) enter the static problem's constraint set, \( B \), in a symmetric way, it follows that \( \frac{\partial h}{\partial g} \) does not depend on whether the change in \( g \) reflects a change in \( g^P \) or \( g^T \). However, because a change in \( g^P \) influences the distribution of \( g' \) while a change in \( g^T \) does not, no such symmetry exists for \( \frac{dk'}{dg} \). Hence, our problem reduces to understanding the relative magnitudes of \( \frac{dk'}{dg} \) and \( \frac{dk'}{dg} \).

**The Static Problem**

In the first part of the Appendix we establish that \( h \) is strictly increasing in \( k' + g \) (see equation (A5)). To understand this result, one need only consider the planner's static consumption-leisure choice problem. Here, an increase in \( k' + g \) corresponds to a parallel downward shift in the planner's resource constraint set. When \( w_{cp} > 0 \), i.e., leisure is a superior good, the ensuing negative income effect generates an increase in hours worked. When the income effect on leisure is zero, i.e., \( w_{cp} = 0 \), then \( \frac{\partial h}{\partial g} = 0 \) (see (A.4a) in the Appendix). This last result, in combination with (2.15), shows why the absence of an income effect on leisure cannot be used to rationalize standard arguments regarding the relative impacts of

\[1\] Although our assumptions are sufficient to guarantee differentiability of \( h \), we have not established differentiability of \( k' \) with respect to \( g \), nor does our proof in the Appendix rely on differentiability of \( k' \). Nevertheless, we find this notation useful for pedagogical purposes.

16
transient and persistent changes in government consumption on output and employment.

\textit{The Dynamic Problem}

In this subsection we discuss the impact of transient and persistent changes in government consumption on investment. In particular, we analyze the relative magnitudes of \(\frac{dk'}{dg} \) and \(\frac{dk'}{dg^p} \). Denote the value of \(k'\) which attains the maximum in (2.14) by \(F(k,g^p,g^T)\). Proposition 1 (ii) in the Appendix establishes that \(F(k,g^p,g^T)\) lies in the interior of its constraint set, \([k,f(k,N)-g]\). This guarantees that the first order condition implied by (2.14) is satisfied as an equality, i.e.,

\[
(2.16) -W_{k'}(k,k'+g) = E[\beta v_{k'}(k',g^p,g^T)|g^P]
\]

for \(k' = F(k,g^p,g^T)\). To understand how \(F\) varies with changes in \(g^T\) and \(g^p\), we plot \(-W_{k'}(k,k'+g)\) and \(E[\beta v_{k'}(k',g^p,g^T)|g^P]\) as functions of \(k'\) in Figure 1.

Consider first the graph of \(E[\beta v_{k'}(k',g^p,g^T)|g^P]\), the marginal benefit of an additional unit of \(k'\). Two salient features of this curve are that it is downward sloping and it goes to infinity as \(k' \to k\). The first feature reflects the strict concavity of \(v\) in \(k'\). The second feature follows from E2 and the fact that \(\lim_{k' \to k} v_{k'}(k',g_{\text{max}}^p,g_{\text{max}}^T) = \infty\). To understand the latter, we use the result (established using Proposition 1 (iii) and (A6.a)) that \(v_{k'} = u_{cP}f_{k'}\), evaluated along the optimal plan, as well as the fact that when \((g^p,g^T) = (g_{\text{max}}^p,g_{\text{max}}^T)\) and \(k' \to k\), then \((cP',n') \to (0,N)\). The behavior of \(u_{cP}\) corresponding to this \((cP',n')\) sequence
is governed by assumption P3, which asserts that \( u_{CP} \to \infty \).

Figure 1 also displays the graph of \(-W_{k'}\). In the Appendix we show that \(-W_{k'}(k,k'+g)\) is an increasing function of \(k'\) and goes to infinity as \(k'\) goes to \(f(k,N) - g\) (see equations (A7) and (A8) in the Appendix). Since \(-W_{k'}(k,k'+g) = u_{CP}(cP,n)\) (see (A6.b) in the Appendix), we refer to this curve as the marginal cost curve of acquiring an extra unit of capital. The optimal value of \(k'\) is determined by the intersection of the marginal benefit and cost curves. In figure 1 this value is denoted by \(k^*\).

In Figure 2, we analyze the impact of a change in \(g\) on the marginal cost and benefit curves. The benchmark marginal cost and benefit curves in that figure are labelled \(C_1\) and \(B_1\), respectively. The benchmark optimal value of \(k'\) is \(k'_{1}\). Now suppose there is a purely transitory increase in \(g\), i.e., \(\Delta g^T = x > 0\). By construction, \(g^T\) is not an argument of \(E[\beta v_{k'}(k',g^P',g^T')|g^P]\). Consequently, the marginal benefit curve does not shift. In contrast, \(g^T\) is an argument of \(-W_{k'}(k,k'+g)\). Therefore, the marginal cost curve shifts to the left in response to an increase in \(g^T\). We label the new marginal cost curve \(C_2\), and the new intersection point, \(k'^*\). It is evident that \(d k'/dg^T\) is negative.

Now suppose that the increase in \(g\) reflects \(\Delta g^P = x\). In contrast to the previous experiment, the marginal benefit curve is affected by this change. This effect arises because the conditional distribution of \(g^P'\) depends on the value of \(g^P\). Under assumption E1 regarding the probability law of \(g^P\), an increase in \(g^P\) shifts probability mass towards higher values of \(g^P'\). To see the impact on \(E[\beta v_{k'}(k',g^P',g^T')|g^P]\), it is useful to exploit relation (2.5). Proposition 3 in the Appendix establishes that \(v_{k'}\) is an increasing function of \(g^P'\), so that we may set \(\omega = \beta v_{k'}\). Consequently, assumption E1 guarantees that \(E[\beta v_{k'}(k',g^P',g^T')|g^P]\) is an increasing function of \(g^P\). In Figure 2, \(B_2\) denotes the marginal benefit curve corresponding to the higher
value of \( g^P \). The new marginal cost curve coincides with \( C_1 \) since \( g^P \) and \( g^T \) enter \( W_k \), in a symmetric fashion. The optimal value of \( k' \) under these circumstances is denoted by \( k'_{3} \). In general one cannot determine the sign of \( k'_{3} - k'_{1} \). However, it must be the case that \( k'_{3} - k'_{2} \) is positive so that \( \frac{dk'}{dg^P} > \frac{dk'}{dg^T} \).

The previous result, in conjunction with (2.15), establishes the central result of our paper, namely, *the contemporaneous impact on \( n \) of a persistent increase in \( g \) exceeds the corresponding impact of a transient increase in \( g \).* This result is formalized in Theorem 1 of the Appendix. It follows that the output effect of an increase in government spending is larger for increases that are persistent than for those that are transient.


In this section we accomplish four tasks. First, we provide a numerical example of the theoretical results discussed in section 2. Second, we show that both the contemporaneous and the nonstochastic steady state impacts of a persistent increase in government consumption on output can exceed unity. Third, we demonstrate that the contemporaneous impact on the interest rate of a persistent increase in government consumption is non-zero in general. Fourth, we show that the impact on interest rates of a persistent increase in government consumption can exceed the corresponding impact of a transient increase in government consumption.

We accomplish these tasks using a version of the parametric growth model considered by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1988).\(^{12}\) That model is a special case of the one analyzed in section 2, except for the fact that we allow for shocks to the

---

\(^{12}\)That model is the same as Kydland and Prescott's (1982) model and corresponds to the version of Gary Hansen's (1985) model in which labor is divisible.
aggregate production technology. This allows us to use values of the structural parameters estimated by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1988). In any event, it is trivial to extend the results of section 2 to allow for this additional source of uncertainty.

3.1 The Parametric Model.

Our parametric model assumes \( u(c_t, n_t) = \log(c_t) + \gamma \log(N-n_t) \), \( f(\lambda_t, k_t, n_t) = \exp(-\theta \lambda_t) n_t \left( 1 - \delta \right) k_t + (1-\delta) \exp(-\lambda_t) k_t \) and \( G(g_t^p + g_t^T) = \exp(g_t^p + g_t^T) \). Our specification of \( f \) reflects the presence of a technology shock, whose time \( t \) value we denote by \( \lambda_t \). We assume that \( \lambda_t \) and \( g_t^T \) are mutually independent and independently distributed over time, with mean \( \lambda \) and zero, respectively.\(^{13}\)

Regarding \( \Psi \), we suppose that \( g_t^p \) has the AR(1) representation,

\[
(3.1) \quad g_t^p = \rho g_{t-1}^p + \mu_t, \quad |\rho| < 1,
\]

where \( \mu_t \) is fundamental for \( g_t^p \) and independent of \( \lambda_t \).

In general it is not possible to obtain an analytic solution to this planning problem. Instead, we work with the log-linear approximation to the optimal decision rules for \( k_{t+1} \) and \( n_t \) described in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1988). These are of the form

\(^{13}\)This specification actually corresponds to what Christiano and Eichenbaum (1988) refer to as the stationary version of their model. In the nonstationary version of their model the function \( f \) is given by \( (z_t n_t) \left( 1 - \delta \right) k_t^\theta + (1-\delta)K_t \) and the function \( u \) is given by \( \log(C_t) + \gamma \log(N-n_t) \). Here, \( z_t \) is a technology shock with law of motion \( z_t = z_{t-1} \exp(\lambda_t) \). The model in the text is obtained by rewriting the planning problem in terms of the stationary variables \( c_t = C_t/z_t \) and \( k_{t+1} = K_{t+1}/z_t \). The unorthodox specification of \( f \) in the text reflects this transformation.
\[ k_{t+1} = k_s \left( k_t / k_s \right)^{r_k} \exp \left[ d_k g_t^T + d_k' g_t^P + e_k^T \lambda_t^P \right] \]

\[ n_t = n_s \left( k_t / k_s \right)^{r_n} \exp \left[ d_n g_t^T + d_n' g_t^P + e_n^T \lambda_t^P \right], \]

where \( n_s \) and \( k_s \) are the values of \( n_t \) and \( k_t \), respectively, in the nonstochastic steady state. The coefficients \( r_k, d_k, d_k', e_k, r_n, d_n, d_n', e_n \) are scalar functions of the model's structural parameters.

### 3.2 Non-Stochastic Steady State Results

Let \( \eta_{n,g} \) and \( \eta_{y,g} \) denote the elasticities of non-stochastic steady state employment and output with respect to \( \bar{g} \). The fact that the steady state output-hours worked ratio is fixed by the discount rate implies

\[ \eta_{n,g} = \eta_{y,g} = \frac{d y_s}{d \bar{g}} \frac{y_s}{y_s}. \]

It can be shown that,

\[ \frac{d y_s}{d \bar{g}} = \left( \frac{c_p s}{y_s} + \frac{\bar{g}}{y_s} + \frac{c_p}{y_s} \frac{1}{[N/n_s]-1} \right)^{-1}. \]

Here, \( c_p \) and \( y_s \) denote the nonstochastic steady-state values of private consumption and output.\(^{14}\)

\(^{14}\)We derive (3.5) as follows. In steady state the resource constraint and the planner's
To assess the magnitude of the multiplier and the elasticities, we used the same measures of $n_t$, $c_p$, $g_t$, and $y_t$ analyzed in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1988). In particular $c_p$ was measured using post-war quarterly U.S. time series data on purchases of nondurables and services plus an imputed service flow from the stock of household durable goods. A time series on $g_t$ was constructed using data on government (federal plus state and local) purchases of goods and services minus a measure of government investment. Output, $y_t$, was measured as public plus private consumption, plus gross public and private investment. Finally, our hours worked data, $n_t$, were obtained from Gary Hansen (1984) (see Christiano and Eichenbaum (1988) for details). We estimated $n_s$, $c_p/y_s$ and $g/y_s$ by the sample averages of our measures of $n_t$, $c_p/y_t$ and $g_t/y_t$ over the period 1955.4 to 1983.4. These equal 320.2, .55 and .177, respectively. In addition, we set $N = 2190$, the number of hours in a quarter. Substituting these parameter values into (3.4) and (3.5), we obtain

\[
\frac{dy_s}{dg} = 1.22, \quad \eta_{n,g} = \eta_{n,g} = .22.
\]

Since $dy_s/dg$ exceeds unity, it follows that there can be a non-stochastic steady-state analog to the Keynesian multiplier in the neoclassical growth model.

Of course, this does not necessarily imply that the most plausible empirical value for $dy_s/dg$ exceeds one. Even if we condition on the strong functional form

\[
\text{intratemporal first order condition are: (i) } c_s + g = Q_1n_s \text{ and (ii) } Q_2(N-n_s) = c_sP_s,\]

respectively, where, $Q_1 = \{y_s/n_s\} - (1-(1-\theta)\exp(-\Lambda))\{k_s/n_s\}$, $Q_2 = [(1-\theta)/\gamma](y_s/n_s)$. Using (i) and (ii), together with the fact that $y_s/n_s$ and $k_s/n_s$ (and, hence $Q_1$ and $Q_2$) are independent of $g$ yields $dn_s/dg = (Q_1+Q_2)^{-1}$. The result follows by exploiting the facts $dy_s/dn_s = y_s/n_s$, $Q_1n_s = c_sP_s + g$, and $Q_2n_s/y_s = (1-\theta)/\gamma$. 

22
assumptions which we have made in our example, several important caveats must be attached to (3.6). First, according to (3.4) and (3.5) $\eta_{n,g}$, $\eta_{y,g}$ and $dy_g/d\bar{g}$ are increasing functions of $N/n_s$. In fact, there is substantial uncertainty about the value of this ratio. Consider first the numerator, $N$. Various papers make different assumptions about the time endowment of the representative consumer. For example, Eichenbaum, Hansen and Singleton (1988) and Mankiw, Rotemberg and Summers (1985) set $N = 1460$, i.e., the representative consumer is endowed with 16 hours per day. Other things equal, this reduces the value of $dy_g/d\bar{g}$ to 1.13, while $\eta_{y,g}$ and $\eta_{n,g}$ fall to .20. Next, consider the denominator, $n_s$. The calculations underlying (3.6) utilize an estimate of $n_s$ based upon average hours worked in the marketplace (i.e., private business and government). However, the model implies that our measure of $n_t$ should also include the time required to produce services from the stock of household capital (i.e., durable goods and housing). Consequently, the estimates in (3.6) may well be biased upwards. Assessing the magnitude of this bias is difficult, absent a reliable measure of the missing component of hours worked.15

3.3 A Dynamic Analysis.

In order to evaluate the contemporaneous output and employment impacts of

---

15In principle, our model suggests a way to correct for this bias. In particular, we can use its implication that the capital—labor ratio in the market and household sectors are the same. Then, a measure of total hours, adjusted to include time spent operating household capital, is obtained by scaling market hours by the ratio of total capital to market capital. The average value of this scale factor in our data is 1.73, and our adjusted estimate of $n_s$ is 554.59. This implies that $N/n_s$ and the multiplier equal 3.95 and 1.09, respectively, when $N = 2190$. These calculations must be interpreted with caution, since the scale factor exhibits growth over the post—war period, reflecting relatively rapid growth in the stock of consumer durables. In the early 1960s the scale factor was around 1.64, while by the early 1980s it stood at roughly 1.76.
government consumption, we calculated the planner's decision rules using the values of the structural parameters estimated by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1988). We report results for three values of $\rho$: (i) $\rho = .99999$, so that $g_t^p$ is highly persistent; (ii) $\rho = .97$, which corresponds (after rounding) to the value estimated by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1988); (iii) $\rho = .9$, the value used by Baxter and King (1988).

The Effects of Shocks to Government Consumption on Hours Worked and Output

Table 1 reports the log-linear decision rules for the three values of $\rho$ which were considered. These can be used to deduce the contemporaneous multipliers. Consider first the contemporaneous elasticities of $n_t$ and $y_t$ with respect to a transitory shock to government consumption, $g_t^T$. These are given by $d_n^T$ and $(1-\theta)d_n^T$, respectively. According to our calculations, these elasticities equal 0.018 and 0.012, respectively. We converted the output elasticity to a contemporaneous multiplier assuming that $g/y_s = .18$. The corresponding multiplier, $(1-\theta)d_n^T/(g/y_s)$, equals .07, i.e., a unit increase in $g_t$ induced by an increase in $g_t^T$ causes a .07 unit increase in $y_t$. At least according to our model, then, the impact of purely transitory movements in government consumption on output and employment is small.

Next we consider the impact of a persistent increase in $g_t$. When $\rho = .99999$, the elasticities of employment and output with respect to $g_t^P$ equal 0.315 and 0.206, respectively. The corresponding output multiplier is 1.15. At least for this value of $\rho$ the output and employment effects of a persistent increase in $g_t$ are quite substantial. Indeed, the contemporaneous output multiplier actually exceeds one. More plausibly, when $\rho = .97$, the employment and output elasticities are 0.214 and
0.14, respectively, while the corresponding output multiplier in this case is .78. When \( p = .9 \) the employment and output elasticities are 0.12 and 0.078, respectively and the output multiplier is .44.

To summarize, we find that the contemporaneous impact on output and employment of a change in government consumption is an increasing function of \( p \). This illustrates the basic result of section 2. Moreover, we find that given the values of the structural parameters estimated by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1988), the impact of a persistent change in government consumption is substantially larger than that of a temporary change. In addition, we provide a counterexample to the claim in Barro (1981,1987) that the contemporaneous output government multiplier must be less than one.

**The Effect of Shocks to Government Consumption on the Risk Free Interest Rate**

In equilibrium, the time \( t \) risk free rate of return on consumption loans, \( r_t \), is equal to the expected value of the planner's intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption. There is substantial evidence that indicates that the log-linear quadratic approximation method used to calculate the output and employment multipliers are quite accurate (see Christiano [1987,1990] and footnote 19). Less evidence exists regarding the quality of these approximations for asset returns. Consequently, we calculated \( r_t \) using decision rules for \( k_t \) and \( n_t \) obtained using the value function iteration procedure described in Christiano (1990). This involves discretizing the support of the exogenous processes of the model and of \( k_t \). The very fine grid which we use for \( k_t \) gives us confidence in the accuracy of this
In particular we assume that $g_t^P$ is a realization from a 3 state, Markov chain with

$$g_t^P = \{g_1^P, g_2^P, g_3^P\} = \{-1.444, 0, 1.444\}$$

and

$$\text{Probability } [g_{t+1}^P = g_j^P | g_t^P = g_i^P ] = \pi_{ij}, \text{ i,j = 1,2,3}$$

With this specification, $g_t^P$ has the first order autoregressive representation, $g_t^P = .97g_{t-1}^P + \mu_t$, where $\mu_t = g_t^P - \tilde{E}[g_t^P | g_{t-\tau}^P, \tau > 0]$ and $\tilde{E}$ denotes the linear least squares projection operator. While the variable $\mu_t$ is conditionally heteroscedastic, it has an unconditional standard deviation equal to .020. In stochastic steady state, $g_t^P$ equals $-1.444, 0, 1.444$ with probability $1/6, 4/6, 1/6$ respectively. The corresponding degree of kurtosis is 3, the value implied by the normal distribution. Also, the standard deviation of $g_t^P$ is .083.

We assume that $g_t^T$ is identically and independently distributed over time and can take on one of three values.

---

16 We used a grid with 15,000 points evenly distributed between $k_t = 7,000$ and $23,300$. The unconditional means of $n_t$ and $k_t$ implied by the discrete decision rule are 318 and 11752, respectively. In addition, the associated ergodic set for capital has boundaries 7574 and 23121. For the sake of comparison, we computed the same objects using the log—LQ decision rules, (3.2) and (3.3). The mean of $n_t$ and $k_t$ implied by these decision rules are 318 and 11709, respectively. In addition, the ergodic set for $k_t$ is defined by boundaries 7081 and 19364. The stochastic models for the exogenous shocks underlying these calculations are specified in equations (3.7) — (3.9) below.
\( g_t^T = \{g_1^T, g_2^T, g_3^T\} = \{-0.1444, 0, 0.1444\} \)

Probability \( \{g_t^T = g_i^T\} = \Pi_i, i = 1, 2, 3 \)

\[ \Pi_1 = \Pi_3 = p, \Pi_2 = 1-2p, p = 0.000311. \]

With this specification, \( g_t^T \) has an unconditional mean of zero and standard deviation of 0.0036.\(^{17}\)

Finally, we assume that \( \lambda_t \) is identically and independently distributed over time and can take on one of three values. In particular,

\( \lambda_t = \{\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \lambda_3\} = \{-0.02, 0.0047, 0.0295\} \)

\[ \text{Prob}\{\lambda_t = \lambda_i\} = \mu_i, i = 1, 2, 3 \]

\[ \mu = \{0.264, 0.471, 0.264\}. \]

It follows that \( \lambda_t \) has unconditional mean equal to 0.0047 and standard deviation of 0.018. These values correspond to the ones estimated in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1988).

The response of \( r_t \) to a shock in either \( g_t^T \) or \( g_t^P \) depends on the values of the date-\( t \) state variables, \( k_t, \lambda_t, g_t^P, g_t^T \). Here, we report the expected value of the derivative of \( r_t \) with respect to \( g_t^P \) and \( g_t^T \). These are denoted by \( \Delta_{r_t}^P \) and \( \Delta_{r_t}^T \), respectively. The expectation is taken with respect to the steady state distribution.

\(^{17}\)Under our assumptions, the univariate Wold representation of \( \log g_t \) is \( \log g_t = 0.97 \log g_{t-1} + c + \epsilon_t - 0.03 \epsilon_{t-1} \), where \( c \) is a constant. In Christiano and Eichenbaum (1988) the moving average coefficient in the representation for \( \log g_t \) equals 0.
of the capital stock, and is evaluated at the mean values of the exogenous shocks.

To be precise, we calculated

\[
(3.10) \Delta^P_r = E[r(k_t | \lambda_t = .0047, g^P_t = .1444, g^T_t = 0) - r(k_t | \lambda_t = .0047, g^P_t = 0, g^T_t = 0)] / .1444
\]

\[
(3.11) \Delta^T_r = E[r(k_t | \lambda_t = .0047, g^P_t = 0, g^T_t = .1444) - r(k_t | \lambda_t = .0047, g^P_t = 0, g^T_t = 0)] / .1444,
\]

and found that

\[
\Delta^P_r = .0048, \Delta^T_r = .0005.
\]

Thus, a persistent change of one percent in government consumption induces a .5 basis point increase in the interest rate. In contrast, a transient change of one percent in government consumption induces a barely perceptible rise of .05 basis points.\(^{18}\) The fact that \(\Delta^P_r > 0\) shows that, the arguments in Barro and Hall notwithstanding, a persistent increase in government consumption does change the interest rate. The fact that \(\Delta^P_r > \Delta^T_r\) provides a counterexample to their claim that the interest rate necessarily responds more to a temporary change in government consumption than to a persistent change.\(^{19}\) Finally, we note that,

---

\(^{18}\)The standard deviations associated with the random variables implicit in the definition of \(\Delta^T_r\) and \(\Delta^P_r\) are .002 in each case. Thus, the interest rate response to government consumption varies substantially with the capital stock. We believe that much of this variation reflects approximation error induced by discretizing the capital space. The differential response is much less sensitive to the value of the capital stock, however. For example, the standard deviation associated with \(\Delta^P_r - \Delta^T_r\) is .001. Moreover, we found that the probability that the interest rate response to a temporary shock exceeds that of a permanent one is only about 1 percent.

\(^{19}\)We used the decision rules obtained by value iteration methods to check the employment responses of government spending shocks obtained using the log-linear quadratic decision
according to our model, the interest rate effects of movements in government consumption—temporary or persistent—are very small. This is the case even though the output and employment effects of government consumption are substantial. From this perspective, it is not surprising that Barro (1981, 1987) fails to find markedly higher real interest rates during periods of temporarily high government consumption, such as wartime.

4. Conclusion

This paper has investigated the effects of changes in government consumption on aggregate economic activity, using a simple stochastic one sector neoclassical growth model. Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, persistent changes in government consumption always have contemporaneous employment and output effects which are larger than those due to transitory changes. Moreover, the distinction between temporary and persistent increases in government consumption on employment and output can be quantitatively very important. Second, there is no reason for either the contemporaneous or steady state output/government consumption multiplier to be less than unity. Finally, for the specific parametric model which we analyze, we found that both temporary and persistent increases in government consumption increase the interest rate. For our model, a persistent increase in government consumption actually has a larger effect rules analyzed in the text. In particular, we found $\Delta^P_{\log(n)} = .228 (.0039)$ and $\Delta^T_{\log(n)} = .020 (.0032)$. Numbers in parentheses are the associated standard deviation. Here, $\Delta^P_{\log(n)}$ and $\Delta^T_{\log(n)}$ are defined by replacing $r$ by $\log(n)$ in equations (3.10) and (3.11). These are close to the corresponding quantities reported in Table 1, for $\rho = .97$. Assuming the decision rules obtained by value iterations are highly accurate, this suggests the multiplier implications of the log-linear quadratic decision rules are reliable.

29
on the interest rate than a transitory increase.

In order to obtain these results, we made a number of important simplifying assumptions. First, we assumed that agents' preferences are additively separable across public and private consumption. In fact a variety of authors, including Barro (1981, 1987), Kormendi (1983), Aschauer (1985) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1988) have considered parametric models in which this assumption is relaxed. Numerical results in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1988) indicate that the results of this paper could be extended to allow for certain forms of non—separabilities across public and private consumption goods. Second, we assumed that government purchases are financed solely via lump—sum taxes. To us, this seems like a natural benchmark for isolating the theoretical effects of changes in government consumption on aggregate economic activity. Nevertheless, this is clearly not a natural assumption to make from the perspective of empirical work. Allowing for distorting taxes is an important task which we leave to future research.
Table 1

A: Model Parameters (Standard Errors)

\[ N = 2190, \delta = 0.0207, \beta = 1.03^{25}, \theta = 0.347, \gamma = 7.00, \lambda = 0.0047, \bar{g} = 199.0 \]
\[ (0.0003) (0.003) (3.25) \]

B: Decision Rule Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \rho = .9 )</th>
<th>( \rho = .97 )</th>
<th>( \rho = .99999 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( k_s )</td>
<td>11709</td>
<td>11709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( r_k )</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( d_k^T )</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( d_k^P )</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( e_k )</td>
<td>-0.95</td>
<td>-0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( n_s )</td>
<td>317.5</td>
<td>317.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( r_n )</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( d_n^T )</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( d_n^P )</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( e_n )</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\text{Standard errors are reported only for estimated parameters. \( N \) and \( \beta \) were set a priori.}\)
Appendix

As noted in the text, the dynamic programming problem (2.8) can be decomposed into a static part which is (2.12) and a dynamic part which is (2.14).

The Static Problem

\[(A1.a)\] \[W(k,k' + g) = \max_{\{c^p, n\}} u(c^p, n)\]

subject to

\[(A1.b)\] \[c^p \leq f(k, n) - k' - g\]

\[(A1.c)\] \[0 \leq n \leq N, 0 \leq c^p\]

given \((k, k', g)\) such that

\[(A1.d)\] \[k \leq k' \leq f(k, N) - g\]

\[(A1.e)\] \[k \leq k \leq \bar{k}.

Since \(u(\cdot, \cdot)\) is continuous and strictly concave and the constraint set defined by \((A1.b)\) and \((A1.c)\) is nonempty, compact and convex, there is a unique solution to \((c^p, n)\) which we denote by
\[(A2.a) \quad c^p = q(k, k' + g)\]

\[(A2.b) \quad n = h(k, k' + g).\]

So long as \(k' < f(k, N) - g\), the solutions \((A2)\) will be in the interior (i.e., \(c^p > 0, \ 0 < n < N\) by virtue of the Inada conditions, \(P2\)) and will satisfy the following first order condition

\[(A3) \quad - \frac{u_n(c^p, n)}{u_{cp}(c^p, n)} \equiv w(c^p, n) = f_2(k, n).\]

Standard comparative statics exercise using \((A3)\) and \((A1.b)\) at equality shows that

\[(A4.a) \quad \frac{\partial c^p}{\partial k} \quad \quad \frac{\partial n}{\partial k} \quad \quad \frac{\partial c^p}{\partial (k' + g)} \quad \frac{\partial n}{\partial (k' + g)} = \frac{1}{\Delta} \begin{bmatrix} f_{n}f_{kn} + f_{n}(w_{n} - f_{nn}) : f_{k}w_{cp} + f_{kn} \\ f_{nn} - w_{n} : w_{cp} \end{bmatrix}\]

where,

\[(A4.b) \quad \Delta = f_{n}w_{cp} + w_{n} - f_{nn}\]

\[= w_{cp} + w_{n} - f_{nn} > 0\]

by strict concavity of \(u(\cdot, \cdot)\).

Therefore, by assumption \(P4\) (leisure is superior) we conclude
(A5) \( h(k,k'+g) \) is strictly increasing in \((k'+g)\) whenever \(k' < f(k,N) - g\).

\( W(k,k'+g) \) is continuous and strictly concave in \((k,k')\) for each fixed \(g\). Continuity follows from Berge's maximum theorem. Strict concavity follows from the fact that \( u(\cdot,\cdot) \) is strictly concave and that if \((c_1^p,n_1)\) and \((c_2^p,n_2)\) are feasible for \((k_1,k_1')\) and \((k_2,k_2')\) respectively, and \( \lambda \in (0,1) \), then \( \lambda (c_1^p,n_1) + (1-\lambda)(c_2^p,n_2) \) is a feasible choice for \( \lambda (k_1,k_1') + (1-\lambda)(k_2,k_2') \). Furthermore, the envelope theorem implies that \( W(k,k'+g) \) is continuously differentiable whenever \( k' < f(k,N) - g \) and its derivatives are given by

\[
\begin{align*}
(A6.a) \quad W_k &= u_{cp}(c_p,n)f_k(k,n) \\
(A6.b) \quad W_{k'} &= -u_{cp}(c_p,n)
\end{align*}
\]

where \((c_p,n)\) are given by \((A2)\). Using \((A4)\) it is easy to show that

\[
(A7) \quad W_{k'k'} < 0, \quad W_{kk'} > 0.
\]

As \( k' \to f(k,N) - g \), \( c_p \to 0 \), and \( n \to N \) since in the limit \((c_p,n) = (0,N)\) is the only feasible point in the constraint set \((A1.b\text{ and }c)\). By \((A3)\) this implies that \( w(c_p,n) \) is decreasing. Assumption \((P3)\) then implies that

\[
(A8) \quad W_{k'} \to -\infty \text{ as } k' \to f(k,N) - g.
\]

A similar argument applies as \((k,g) \to (k,g_{\text{max}})\) because by \((A1.d)\) this
automatically implies that \( k' \rightarrow f(k,N) - g_{\text{max}} = k \). Therefore, from (A6.a) and using assumption (P3) we have

\[(A9)\quad W_k \rightarrow \infty \text{ as } (k,g) \rightarrow (k,g_{\text{max}}).\]

The Dynamic Problem

Let \( C \) be the space of real valued, continuous functions on \( S \equiv [k,k] \times [g_{\text{min}},g_{\text{max}}] \) with the sup norm. The mapping \( T \) given by

\[(A10.a)\quad (Ta)(k,g^P,g^T) = \max_{k'} \{W(k,k'+g) + \mathbb{E}[a(k',g^P',g^T')|g^P']\}\]

subject to

\[(A10.b)\quad k \leq k' \leq f(k,N) - g\]

maps function \( a \in C \) into function \( (Ta) \in C \). Any fixed point of this mapping is a solution to (2.14). It is a standard result in dynamic programming that there exists a unique \( v \in C \) (known as the optimal value function) that satisfies (2.14). Further, for any \( a^0 \in C \), \( v = \lim_{n \to \infty} T^n(a^0) \).

Lemma 1. Let \( a^0 \in C \) and \( a = Ta^0 \)

(i) \( a \) is strictly increasing in \( k \)
(ii) If $a^o$ is concave:

(a) there is a unique $k^\prime$ (denoted $F_{a^o}(k,g^P,g^T)$) that attains $Ta^o$. Further, if $(k,g) \not= (k,g_{\text{max}})$ then $F_{a^o} < f(k,N) - g$.

(b) $a$ is strictly concave in $k$ and is continuously differentiable in $k$ for all $k \in (\bar{k},\bar{k})$ with

$$a_k(k,g^P,g^T) = W_k(k,F_{a^o}+g).$$

(c) If $(k,g) \not= (k,g_{\text{max}})$ then $F_a > k$.

Proof.

(i) Follows from the facts that $W(\cdot,\cdot)$ is strictly increasing in $k$ and the constraint set for $k^\prime$ in (A10.b) is also increasing in $k$.

(ii) (a) uniqueness follows since $W(\cdot,\cdot)$ is strictly concave. The second part follows from (A8).

(b) Strict concavity of $a$ follows from the strict concavity of $W$. The Benveniste–Scheinkman (1979) theorem implies the differentiability result.

(c) $a^P(k,g_{\text{max}}^P,g_{\text{max}}^T) = W(k,k+g_{\text{max}}) + \beta E[a^o(k,g^P,g^T)|g_{\text{max}}]$ since $k^\prime = k$ is the only feasible element. Further,

$$a(k,g_{\text{max}}^P,g_{\text{max}}^T) > W(k,k+g_{\text{max}}) + \beta E[a^o(k,g^P,g^T)|g_{\text{max}}]$$

since $k^\prime = k$ is feasible.

It follows that,
\[
\frac{a(k,g_{\text{max}}P,g_{\text{max}}T) - a(k,g_{\text{max}}P,g_{\text{max}}T)}{(k-k)} \geq \frac{W(k,k+g_{\text{max}}) - W(k,k+g_{\text{max}})}{(k-k)}
\]

\[\rightarrow -\infty \text{ as } k \to k \text{ (see A9).}\]

Further, for \((k,g) \neq (k,g_{\text{max}}), W_{k',}(k,k+g)\) is finite by (A6.b). Therefore,

\[
\max_{k'}[W(k,k'+g) + \beta E[a(k',g_{\text{P}}P',g_{\text{T}}T')|g_{\text{P}}]]
\]

must be attained (uniquely, by strict concavity) by some \(k' > k\). Note that assumption (E2) is used here. □

**Proposition 1.** Let \(v\) be the optimal value function.

(i) \(v\) is strictly increasing and strictly concave in \(k\) for each fixed \((g_{\text{P}}, g_{\text{T}})\).

(ii) If \((k,g) \neq (k,g_{\text{max}})\) then \(k < F < f(k,N) - g\).

(iii) \(v(\cdot)\) is continuously differentiable in \(k\) for all \(k \in (k, \overline{k})\) with

\[v_k(k,g_{\text{P}},g_{\text{T}}) = W_k(k,F+g)\]

(iv) Let \(a^o \in C\) be concave and let \(a^n = T^n(a^o)\). Then \(f_{a^n} \to F\) pointwise.

**Proof.**

(i) Start with \(a^o \in C\) such that \(a^o\) is concave and let \(a^n = T^n(a^o)\). By Lemma 1 (iib), \(a^n\) is strictly concave and \(a^n \to v\). Therefore, \(v\) is concave. Using Lemma 1 (i and iib) with \(a^o \equiv v\) implies that \(v\) is strictly increasing and strictly concave in \(k\).

(ii) Follows from Lemma 1 (iia and c) with \(a^o \equiv v\).
(iii) Follows from Lemma 1 (iiib) with \( a^0 \equiv v \).

(iv) \( a^n \to v \) in sup norm. Hence for each fixed \((g^P, g^T)\), the sequence of unique maximizers \( F_{a^n} \to F \). □

**Lemma 2.** If \( f(g^P) \) is nondecreasing (strictly increasing) then \( f(g^P) \equiv E[f(g^P)|g^P] \) is nondecreasing (strictly increasing).

**Proof.** Follows from the fact that our assumption of persistence on \( \Psi(g^P|g^P) \) is equivalent to the definition of first order stochastic dominance. That is, \( \Psi(g^P|g_1^P) \) first order stochastically dominates \( \Psi(g^P|g_2^P) \) whenever \( g_1^P > g_2^P \). □

**Proposition 2.** Let \( a^0 \in C \) be concave in \( k \) and suppose that \((F_{a^0} + g)\) is nondecreasing in \( g^P \). Let \( a \equiv Ta^0 \). Then \((F_a + g)\) is strictly increasing in \( g^P \) whenever \((k, g) \neq (k, g_{\max})\).

**Proof.** From Lemma 1, \( a \) is strictly increasing, strictly concave in \( k \), and continuously differentiable in \( k \) for all \( k \in (k^b, k^a) \) with \( a_k = W_k(k, F_{a^0} + g) \). Since \( W_k(k, k') > 0 \) (see A7), \( a_k \) is nondecreasing in \( g^P \) whenever \( k \in (k, k) \). Further, by Lemma 1 (iia) (with \( a \) in place of \( a^0 \)) and Lemma 1 (iic) we know that

\[
k < F_a < f(N, k) - g, \quad (k, g) \neq (k, g_{\max}).
\]

Hence, \( F_a \) satisfies the following first order condition
(A11) \[ W_{k'}[k,F_a(k,g^P,g^T)+g] + E[\beta_k \{F_a(k,g^P,g^T),g^P,g^T\}|g^P] = 0, \]

for \((k,g) \neq (k,g_{\text{max}})\).

By Lemma 2, the second term in (A11) is nondecreasing in \(g^P\). Therefore, when \(g^P\) goes up \(F_a + g\) must go up. Otherwise, either \(F_a\) falls or both \(F_a\) and \(F_a + g\) fall. In either case strict concavity of \(W\) in \(k'\) and \(a\) in \(k\) will result in a contradiction. \(\square\)

**Proposition 3.** \((F+g)\) as well as \(v_k\) are both strictly increasing in \(g^P\), for \(k \in (k,k']\).

**Proof.** From Proposition 1 (iii), \(v_k\) is strictly increasing in \(g^P\) if and only if \((F+g)\) is. To establish the result, we start with \(a^0 = 0\) and let \(a^n = T^n(a^0), n \geq 1\). It is obvious that \(F^0 = k\) and hence \((F^0+g)\) is strictly increasing in \(g^P\). Proposition 2 then implies that \((F^n+g)\) is nondecreasing in \(g^P\) for all \(n\). Since \(F_n \rightarrow F\) point wise (Proposition 1 (iv)), it follows that \((F+g)\) is nondecreasing in \(g^P\). Applying Proposition 2 again with \(a^0 = v\) shows that \(F + g\) is strictly increasing in \(g^P\). \(\square\)

We now prove the main theorem which says that employment goes up with \(g^T\) well as \(g^P\) and that the rise in employment is larger for a given increase in \(g^P\) as compared to the same increase in \(g^T\). Let

(A12) \[ H(k,g^P,g^T) = h(k,F(k,g^P,g^T) + g) \] where the optimal policy function \(F\) satisfies,

(A13) \[ W_{k'}(k,F+g) + E[\beta_k \{F_a(k,g^P,g^T),g^P,g^T\}|g^P] = 0, (k,g) \neq (k,g_{\text{max}}). \]
Theorem 1. For any \((k,g^P,g^T)\) such that \((k,g) \neq (k,g_{\text{max}})\) and \(\Delta \neq 0\),

\[
\frac{1}{\Delta} [H(k,g^P + \Delta, g^T) > 1 \Delta H(k,g^P + \Delta, g^T + \Delta)] > \frac{1}{\Delta} H(k,g^P + \Delta, g^T).
\]

Proof. The FONC (A13) implies that when \(g^T\) goes up \(F + g\) must go up. Therefore, the second inequality in the theorem is established since \(h(\cdot)\) is strictly increasing in \((F+g)\) (see A5). In proving the first inequality note that \(g\) remains fixed at \((g^P + g^T + \Delta)\). Since \(v_k\) is strictly increasing in \(g^P\) the second term in (A13) goes up with \(g^P\) but does not depend on \(g^T\). It follows that \(F(k,g^P + \Delta, g^T) > F(k,g^P + \Delta, g^T + \Delta)\). Therefore, the first inequality is established since \(h(\cdot)\) is strictly increasing in \((F+g)\) (again, from A5). \(\Box\)
References


FIGURE 1
DYNAMIC INVESTMENT PROBLEM

\[ \beta E[v_{k'}(k', g P', T') | g P'] \]
(BENEFITS)

\[ -W_{k'}(k, k' + g) \]
(COSTS)
FIGURE 2

INVESTMENT EFFECTS OF TRANSITORY AND
PERSISTENT GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION SHOCKS
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

RESEARCH STAFF MEMORANDA, WORKING PAPERS AND STAFF STUDIES

The following lists papers developed in recent years by the Bank's research staff. Copies of those materials that are currently available can be obtained by contacting the Public Information Center (312) 322-5111.

Working Paper Series—A series of research studies on regional economic issues relating to the Seventh Federal Reserve District, and on financial and economic topics.

Regional Economic Issues

| WP-82-1 | Donna Craig Vandenbrink | "The Effects of Usury Ceilings: the Economic Evidence," 1982 |
| WP-83-1 | William A. Testa | "Natural Gas Policy and the Midwest Region," 1983 |
| WP-87-1 | Alenka S. Giese, William A. Testa | "Measuring Regional High Tech Activity with Occupational Data" |
| WP-87-2 | Robert H. Schnorbus, Philip R. Israilevich | "Alternative Approaches to Analysis of Total Factor Productivity at the Plant Level" |
| WP-87-3 | Alenka S. Giese, William A. Testa | "Industrial R&D An Analysis of the Chicago Area" |
| WP-89-1 | William A. Testa | "Metro Area Growth from 1976 to 1985: Theory and Evidence" |
| WP-89-2 | William A. Testa, Natalie A. Davila | "Unemployment Insurance: A State Economic Development Perspective" |
| WP-89-4 | Philip R. Israilevich, William A. Testa | "Determining Manufacturing Output for States and Regions" |
| WP-89-5 | Alenka S. Giese | "The Opening of Midwest Manufacturing to Foreign Companies: The Influx of Foreign Direct Investment" |

*Limited quantity available.
**Out of print.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working Paper Series (cont'd)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>WP-89-7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **WP-89-8** | Alenka S. Giese  
William A. Testa | “Regional Specialization and Technology in Manufacturing” |
| **WP-89-9** | Christopher Erceg  
Philip R. Israilevich  
| **WP-89-10** | David R. Allardice  
William A. Testa | “Regional Energy Costs and Business Siting Decisions: An Illinois Perspective” |
| **WP-89-21** | William A. Testa | “Manufacturing’s Changeover to Services in the Great Lakes Economy” |
| **WP-90-1** | P.R. Israilevich | “Construction of Input-Output Coefficients with Flexible Functional Forms” |
| **WP-90-4** | Douglas D. Evanoff  
Philip R. Israilevich | “Regional Regulatory Effects on Bank Efficiency” |
| **WP-90-5** | Geoffrey J.D. Hewings | “Regional Growth and Development Theory: Summary and Evaluation” |
| **WP-90-6** | Michael Kendix | “Institutional Rigidities as Barriers to Regional Growth: A Midwest Perspective” |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues in Financial Regulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **WP-89-11** | Douglas D. Evanoff  
Philip R. Israilevich  
Randall C. Merris | “Technical Change, Regulation, and Economies of Scale for Large Commercial Banks: An Application of a Modified Version of Shepard's Lemma” |
| **WP-89-12** | Douglas D. Evanoff | “Reserve Account Management Behavior: Impact of the Reserve Accounting Scheme and Carry Forward Provision” |
| **WP-89-14** | George G. Kaufman | “Are Some Banks too Large to Fail? Myth and Reality” |
| **WP-89-16** | Ramon P. De Gennaro  
James T. Moser | “Variability and Stationarity of Term Premia” |
| **WP-89-17** | Thomas Mondschean | “A Model of Borrowing and Lending with Fixed and Variable Interest Rates” |
| **WP-89-18** | Charles W. Calomiris | “Do "Vulnerable" Economies Need Deposit Insurance?: Lessons from the U.S. Agricultural Boom and Bust of the 1920s” |

*Limited quantity available.  
**Out of print.
Working Paper Series (cont’d)

| WP-89-24 | Elijah Brewer III | “The Impact of Deposit Insurance on S&L Shareholders’ Risk/Return Trade-offs” |

Macro Economic Issues

| WP-89-15 | Kenneth N. Kuttner | “Monetary and Non-Monetary Sources of Inflation: An Error Correction Analysis” |
| WP-89-19 | Ellen R. Rissman | “Trade Policy and Union Wage Dynamics” |
| WP-89-20 | Bruce C. Petersen, William A. Strauss | “Investment Cyclicality in Manufacturing Industries” |
| WP-89-22 | Prakash Loungani, Richard Rogerson, Yang-Hoon Sonn | “Labor Mobility, Unemployment and Sectoral Shifts: Evidence from Micro Data” |
| WP-90-2 | Lawrence J. Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum | “Unit Roots in Real GNP: Do We Know, and Do We Care?” |
| WP-90-3 | Steven Strongin, Vefa Tarhan | “Money Supply Announcements and the Market’s Perception of Federal Reserve Policy” |
| WP-90-7 | Prakash Loungani, Mark Rush | “Sectoral Shifts in Interwar Britain” |
| WP-90-8 | Kenneth N. Kuttner | “Money, Output, and Inflation: Testing The P-Star Restrictions” |
| WP-90-9 | Lawrence J. Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum | “Current Real Business Cycle Theories and Aggregate Labor Market Fluctuations” |
| WP-90-10 | S. Rao Aiyagari, Lawrence J. Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum | “The Output, Employment, And Interest Rate Effects of Government Consumption” |

*Limited quantity available.
**Out of print.
Staff Memoranda—A series of research papers in draft form prepared by members of the Research Department and distributed to the academic community for review and comment. (Series discontinued in December, 1988. Later works appear in working paper series).


**SM-81-3** Alan K. Reichert  “An Examination of the Conceptual Issues Involved in Developing Credit Scoring Models in the Consumer Lending Field,” 1981


SM-82-1 Harvey Rosenblum  “Deposit Strategies of Minimizing the Interest Rate Risk Exposure of S&Ls,” 1982


SM-83-7 John J. Di Clemente  “The Inclusion of Thrifts in Bank Merger Analysis,” 1983

SM-84-1 Harvey Rosenblum  Christine Pavel  “Financial Services in Transition: The Effects of Nonbank Competitors,” 1984

*Limited quantity available.
**Out of print.
Staff Memoranda (cont'd)

SM-84-3  George G. Kaufman  Larry Mote  Harvey Rosenblum  "Consequences of Deregulation for Commercial Banking"
SM-84-4  George G. Kaufman  "The Role of Traditional Mortgage Lenders in Future Mortgage Lending: Problems and Prospects"
SM-84-5  Robert D. Laurent  "The Problems of Monetary Control Under Quasi-Contemporaneous Reserves"
SM-85-1  Harvey Rosenblum  M. Kathleen O'Brien  John J. Di Clemente  "On Banks, Nonbanks, and Overlapping Markets: A Reassessment of Commercial Banking as a Line of Commerce"
SM-85-3  George G. Kaufman  "Implications of Large Bank Problems and Insolvencies for the Banking System and Economic Policy"
SM-85-4  Elijah Brewer, III  "The Impact of Deregulation on The True Cost of Savings Deposits: Evidence From Illinois and Wisconsin Savings & Loan Association"
SM-85-5  Christine Pavel  Harvey Rosenblum  "Financial Darwinism: Nonbanks—and Banks—are Surviving"
SM-85-6  G. D. Koppenhaver  "Variable-Rate Loan Commitments, Deposit Withdrawal Risk, and Anticipatory Hedging"
SM-85-7  G. D. Koppenhaver  "A Note on Managing Deposit Flows With Cash and Futures Market Decisions"
SM-85-8  G. D. Koppenhaver  "Regulating Financial Intermediary Use of Futures and Option Contracts: Policies and Issues"
SM-85-9  Douglas D. Evanoff  "The Impact of Branch Banking on Service Accessibility"
SM-86-1  George J. Benston  George G. Kaufman  "Risks and Failures in Banking: Overview, History, and Evaluation"
SM-86-2  David Alan Aschauer  "The Equilibrium Approach to Fiscal Policy"

*Limited quantity available.
**Out of print.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff Memoranda (cont’d)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SM-86-3 George G. Kaufman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-87-2 Randall C. Merris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-87-3 George G. Kaufman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-87-4 Gary D. Koppenhaver Roger Stover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-87-6 Gary D. Koppenhaver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-87-7 Vefa Tarhan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-87-8 David Alan Aschauer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-87-9 Douglas D. Evanoff Diana L. Fortier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-88-2 David Aschauer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-88-3 David Aschauer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-88-4 George G. Kaufman Larry R. Mote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-88-5 Elijah Brewer, III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-88-6 G. O. Bierwag George G. Kaufman Cynthia M. Latta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. O. Bierwag George G. Kaufman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Limited quantity available.
**Out of print.
**Staff Memoranda (cont'd)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff Memoranda</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SM-88-7</td>
<td>David Aschauer</td>
<td>&quot;Is Public Expenditure Productive?&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-88-8</td>
<td>Elijah Brewer, III, Thomas H. Mondschean</td>
<td>&quot;Commercial Bank Capacity to Pay Interest on Demand Deposits: Evidence from Large Weekly Reporting Banks&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-88-9</td>
<td>Abhijit V. Banerjee, Kenneth N. Kuttner</td>
<td>&quot;Imperfect Information and the Permanent Income Hypothesis&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-88-10</td>
<td>David Aschauer</td>
<td>&quot;Does Public Capital Crowd out Private Capital?&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-88-11</td>
<td>Ellen Rissman</td>
<td>&quot;Imports, Trade Policy, and Union Wage Dynamics&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Staff Studies**—A series of research studies dealing with various economic policy issues on a national level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff Studies</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SS-83-1</td>
<td>Harvey Rosenblum, Diane Siegel</td>
<td>&quot;Competition in Financial Services: the Impact of Nonbank Entry,&quot; 1983</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Limited quantity available.
**Out of print.