



EMBARGOED UNTIL FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2018 AT 10:15 A.M.; OR UPON DELIVERY

# Comments on “A Skeptical View of the Impact of the Fed’s Balance Sheet”

Eric S. Rosengren  
President & CEO  
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

February 23, 2018

U.S. Monetary Policy Forum  
New York, New York

[bostonfed.org](http://bostonfed.org)



## Overview

---

The paper:

- ▶ Provides a nice overview of the literature on large scale asset purchases (LSAPs)
  - ▶ Provides a careful historical description of the various LSAP programs
  - ▶ Expands on the empirical literature
  - ▶ Concludes that:
    - ▶ Previous literature may overstate reliability and effectiveness of LSAPs
    - ▶ LSAPs are not a full replacement for conventional policies
-



# Why Should We Care, Now That the LSAP Program is Winding Down?

---

- ▶ How likely is it that we will need the LSAP Program in the future?
  - ▶ My view is that it is quite likely that we will, because:
    - ▶ U.S. is likely to have low real rates for some time, due to slow productivity and slow labor force growth
    - ▶ The median long-run federal funds rate in the most recent SEP is only 2.8 percent
    - ▶ Almost all recessions have resulted in the Fed lowering nominal rates by much more than 2.8 percentage points
  - ▶ But if LSAPs are indeed not effective, then the Fed may need to take other measures
    - ▶ Might entail altering the monetary policy framework, in a way that would be more likely to avoid short-term rates hitting zero
-



## LSAP versus Conventional Policy Efficacy

---

- ▶ Central bank policymakers have a much better understanding of the impact of short-term interest rates, developed over 30 years
    - ▶ Compared to LSAPs, policymakers have navigated many more episodes of short-rate tightening and easing
    - ▶ Still, appropriate identification is non-trivial, and we still experience puzzles
      - ▷ Proverbial “long and variable lags”
      - ▷ Long rate “conundrums” – the expected response of long rates does not materialize
  - ▶ For LSAP analysis, assessment is much more difficult – in part, due to very limited historical experience
    - ▶ Basically just three observations – three LSAP programs during and post crisis
    - ▶ Only one exit from LSAP program – and it has barely begun
-



## The Paper's Empirical Approach

---

- ▶ Identifies days where the 10-year Treasury moves more than one standard deviation and uses Reuters news reports to identify “Fed News” versus other events
  - ▶ 1125 event days, 161 Fed event days, 348 economic data event days, 191 Europe event days
  - ▶ Assumptions
    - ▶ Fed events are accurately identified and non-Fed events are not due to Fed actions
    - ▶ Events captured in one day – no lingering impact
-



## Are the Paper's Assumptions Actually Innocuous?

---

- ▶ Speeches by FOMC participants often referred to policy as “data dependent”
  - ▶ Note: 348 economic data event days, 191 Europe days, but 161 Fed days – third party identification does not necessarily make it more accurate
  - ▶ “Data dependence” implies meaningful economic data have implications for monetary policy
    - ▶ Weak economic data in the study viewed as having no implications for monetary policy
    - ▶ However, weak data likely to also imply more LSAPs and longer period before raising rates
    - ▶ Similarly, Europe days have implications for both LSAPs in Europe and future strength in U.S., from international impact
-



## 10-Year Treasury Rate

---

- ▶ Potential confounding events?
    - ▶ Fiscal policy
      - ▷ Changes in government deficit expectations
      - ▷ Government shutdowns, debt ceilings, Treasury debt management changes
    - ▶ International: LSAP programs and interest rate changes in Japan and Europe likely influence U.S. Treasuries – global arbitrage in sovereigns
    - ▶ Inflation surprises (because of focus on nominal rates) – what happened to real rates?
-



## Alternative Focus on Enduring Impact


---

- ▶ I suggest more focus on term premia... potentially providing better measure of effects of LSAPs?
  - ▶ Term premia in U.S. and countries that used LSAPs remain low by historical standards – could this, in part, be the enduring impact from LSAPs?
  - ▶ Did LSAP programs lower the volatility of financial markets?
  - ▶ Consider suggestive evidence – using other than event study techniques
-






# Figure 1: Ten-Year Treasury Term Premium June 1961 - January 2018





## Figure 2: Ten-Year Treasury Term Premium and Excess Reserves

January 2000 - January 2018




Note: The average term premium is calculated for four different periods – when excess reserves are less than \$500 billion, \$500 billion to \$1 trillion, \$1-\$2 trillion and \$2 trillion or more.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Adrian, Crump and Moench (ACM) Treasury Term Premia Estimates; Federal Reserve Board; NBER; Haver Analytics



# Figure 3: CBOE Market Volatility Index and Excess Reserves

January 2000 - January 2018



Note: The average VIX is calculated for four different periods – when excess reserves are less than \$500 billion, \$500 billion to \$1 trillion, \$1-\$2 trillion and \$2 trillion or more.

Source: CBOE, WSJ, Federal Reserve Board, NBER, Haver Analytics



## Overall Assessment

---

- ▶ It was a difficult empirical task to unravel the impact of limited programs with confounding effects
  - ▶ With only 3 decisions, having so many events describing the decisions reduces the average effect, which is one reason why I have a more favorable assessment of LSAPs
  - ▶ Might want to expand ways of determining enduring effects beyond event analysis
  - ▶ Agree the evidence is consistent with some impact, of uncertain magnitude
  - ▶ While not tested in this paper – agree that short-term rates are the better understood and tested way to conduct monetary policy
-



## Implications for Next Recession, in My View

---

- ▶ Should avoid hitting effective lower bound with short-term rates
  - ▶ Fiscal policy represents one alternative
    - ▶ Difficult to depend on given political pressures and uncertainties
    - ▶ Large deficits now may make future actions difficult
  - ▶ Could alter the Fed's monetary policy framework to reduce probability of hitting zero lower bound
    - ▶ There are many possible alternative frameworks – I personally view inflation range with varying inflation target as promising
-