

In 1940 (July)

Total Labor Force	57 million
Unemployed	- 9 million
Employed	<u>48 million</u>
Gross National Product	\$97 billion
Gross Product Per Employed	\$2100 ($\$97 \text{ billion} \div 48 \text{ million workers}$)

at End of War (July 1945)

Total Labor Force	66 million
Including 11 million in Armed Force	
1 million unemployed	
	<u>- 12</u>
Employed	<u>54</u>

Prognosis after War

Total Labor Force	66 million
Return of wives to school, kitchens, and retirement	<u>- 6 million</u>
Armed Forces Home Left	<u>- 2 million</u>
Normal seasonal and temporary unemployed	<u>- 2 million</u>
Members to be Employed	<u>56 million</u>

Productivity 20 percent higher than in 1940 means \$2500 gross product per worker at 1940 prices and hours ($\$2100 \text{ in } 1940 \times 120\% = \2500)

Gross Product Required to Provide Full Employment \$140 billion ($\$2500 \text{ per worker} \times 56 \text{ million workers}$) ($\$165 \text{ billion at } 1942 \text{ prices}$)

A return to 1940 level of gross national product ([#]97 billion) would leave 17 million in need of jobs.

Number to Be Employed 56 million

Number of jobs Available 39

([#]97 billion ÷ [#]2500 gross product per worker)

Jobs Needed 17 million

Thus at 1940 levels of production and hours (39) 40 percent of the number of employed would need jobs — or almost $\frac{1}{3}$ of total labor force would be idle.