

held in Landsberg Prison under death sentence. He is extending clemency to 11 war criminals by commuting death sentences to life imprisonment and is denying clemency to two others under like sentences.

The death sentences imposed by the trial courts in these cases were originally approved by Gen. Lucius D. Clay in 1948. General Clay ordered further reviews of these cases on the basis of petitions which were filed on behalf of the prisoners.

A War Crimes Board of Review and the then Judge Advocate, European command, concurred in the findings that the 13 were justly convicted, properly sentenced, and that there were no reasons or evidence set forth in the petitions which justified modification of the death sentences imposed. General Clay reaffirmed the death sentences in early 1949.

The cases were also reviewed by the Judge Advocate General of the Army; by a committee headed by Justice Gordon B. Simpson of the Texas Supreme Court, appointed by the then Secretary of the Army, Royall and by committee's of the United States Congress. Nothing was found by them to disturb the finding of guilty arrived at by the courts which tried these prisoners.

Subsequent to reaffirmation of the sentences, the condemned again addressed petitions to General Clay; additionally, to the President of the United States and other high officials of the executive department, to Members of Congress, and petitions to the United States Supreme Court for writs of habeas corpus, two of which were as late as February 10, 1950. All applications for writs of habeas corpus were denied by the United States Supreme Court.

"Since being in this command," General Handy stated, "I have received numerous petitions to extend clemency to these men. All of these petitions have received thorough consideration. Each has had ample opportunity to refute evidence against him. Additionally, out of an abundance of caution, the trial records have been reviewed many times. Even at this time, I am asked to consider more petitions for clemency. To allow them could only occasion further delay. Previously submitted petitions have contained no new evidence of material value and there is no reason to presume that, if allowed, additional ones would. I have studied each of these cases most carefully and particularly with a view of determining if there were any reasonable doubts in any case as to the guilt of the accused or the severity of the sentence. The sentences of 11 prisoners have been commuted to life. Their guilt as charged is unquestioned and their offenses are of such a nature that each should be required to serve a sentence covering his natural life.

"There are two prisoners to whom I cannot rightfully grant clemency. These prisoners are Schallermair and Schmidt. They were guilty of atrocities in concentration camps. I found that they not only contributed to the infamous record of torture and killing which characterized the worst of the concentration camps but also went beyond what they were expected to do in performance of their duties at their respective camps and, on their own initiative, caused the death of many inmates.

"In the concentration camps established and operated in Germany, hundreds of thousands of victims were beaten, tortured, starved, and exterminated by various procedures. The records found at Mauthausen reflected approximately 72,000 deaths. At Buchenwald, during the later part of the war, approximately 5,000 inmates perished monthly. It was the same in other camps, and in addition to the main camps, many of the hundreds of subcamps carried on the same type of tortures and exterminations. The infamy of these concentration camps is well known and requires no further comment.

"George Schallermair, denominated a roll call leader, was directly in charge of prisoners at Muehlendorf, a subcamp of Dachau. Large numbers of inmates died as a result of beatings which he personally administered. Of 300 people brought to the camp in the fall of 1944, only 72 survived some 4 months later. He visited the morgue daily with an inmate dentist to extract the gold teeth from the dead bodies from the camp. There are no factors or arguments which can possibly justify clemency in this case.

"Hans Schmidts was the acknowledged adjutant of the Buchenwald concentration camp for approximately 3 years. It was estimated that at one period while Schmidt was assigned to this camp, approximately 5,000 prisoners, including substantial numbers of French, Russian, Polish, and Czech nationals, died each month as a result of the conditions under which they were forced to live and the cruelties inflicted upon them by the SS. As the SS Adjutant, Schmidt was in a very responsible position in the administration of the camps, frequently acting as the temporary commander during the absence of Colonel Pister, the camp commandant. According to the statement of Pister, Schmidt participated very actively in the activities of the camp, and had to be restrained because he frequently assumed greater authority than was actually delegated to him. He was in charge of all executions of inmates, including the execution of several hundred prisoners of war by a special unit called "Commando 99." These executions were carried out in a former horse stable converted into what appeared to be a dispensary. As the unsuspecting victims were purportedly being measured for height, they were shot in the back of head with a powerful air pistol concealed behind the wall. Sometimes as many as 30 victims were thus disposed of on a single occasion. Some of the executions supervised by Schmidt took place in the camp crematory where the victims were hung from hooks of the wall and slowly strangled to death. I can find no basis for clemency in this case.

"I have decided to commute the death sentence imposed on six war criminals convicted in the Malmédy case to terms of life imprisonment. The commutation of the death sentences does not mean that there is any doubt whatsoever that each was guilty of the offenses charged. The crimes for which these men were convicted occurred in the area of operations of one specific combat unit that spearheaded the Ardennes offensive. No one who has actually read the record of the trials can question the fact that 142 unarmed American soldiers who had surrendered were grouped in a field at the Malmédy crossroads and were then machine gunned from armored vehicles which were deployed partially around the group. Many were later individually shot and killed as they lay wounded on the ground. One hundred thirty-six frozen bodies in four close rows were found where they had fallen in ranks in the snow when the 'bulge' was reduced. All were without firearms and many had their hands above their heads as they were held prisoners. Likewise, specific killings of unarmed, surrendered prisoners of war or civilians at other definite places to wit: Bullingen, Cheneux, La Gleize, Stoumont, Wanne, and Petit Thier, were each conclusively shown to have been committed by certain specified ones of these six prisoners.

"The leader of the combat group which perpetrated these crimes was Joachim Peiper. His protagonists represent him as a most forceful, inspiring leader who was the active moving spirit in the actions of his organization. Many petitions submitted in his behalf have been based solely on the statement that as fine an officer and soldier as he, could not have been guilty of the crimes charged. I am convinced that Peiper was a remarkable leader; that he was the moving spirit of the armored unit which spearheaded the

desperate attempt of the Battle of the Bulge. General Clay said in his final affirmation of Peiper's death sentence, 'there is no question in my mind that Peiper was, in fact, the principal in the Malmédy case.' I am likewise convinced that Peiper was the motivating spirit of the terror-spreading, killing-prisoners-of-war procedure of this spearhead. The very arguments presented in Peiper's behalf as to his ability as a leader will convince any unprejudiced observer that the killings of prisoners of war which took place in so many different localities covered by the operations of his unit could not have taken place without his knowledge and consent, and, in fact, without the force of his driving personality behind them. No fair-minded man who knows the facts would give a more severe penalty to any other participant in the Malmédy massacre than is given to Peiper.

"The record of trial is detailed and voluminous. The evidence is compelling and has convinced everyone who has read it objectively that these criminals committed the acts as found by the court which tried them. For four and a half years the execution of the sentences has been delayed by a continuous and organized flood of accusations and statements made to discredit the trial and the repeated reviews and studies requested by and on behalf of the prisoners themselves. However, the record is convincing that these men are guilty. Investigations carried on by congressional committees and the reviews by trained judges have failed to unearth any facts which support a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of these prisoners.

"The commutation has been based upon other facts, which are deemed to mitigate in favor of less severe punishment than death. First, the offenses are associated with a confused fluid and desperate combat action, a last attempt to turn the tide of Allied successes and to reestablish a more favorable tactical position for the Germany Army. The crimes are definitely distinguishable from the more deliberate killings in concentration camps. Moreover, these prisoners were of comparatively lower rank and, other than Peiper, they were neither shown to be the ones who initiated nor as far as we know advocated the idea of creating a wave of frightfulness to precede the advance which we usually refer to as the Battle of the Bulge. I cannot overlook the fact that the army commander, his chief of staff, and the corps commander are each serving only terms of imprisonment. Four of the six condemned in this case were sergeants, one was a major, and the highest ranking, Peiper, was a lieutenant colonel.

"Lastly, the Board, headed by Judge Simpson, of the Texas Supreme Court, which reviewed this case, though not questioning the guilt of these accused, recommended that these sentences be commuted to life imprisonment. The Secretary of the Army upon the recommendation of the Judge Advocate General recommended that the sentences to death be reconsidered.

"The sentences of Gustav Heigel, and Max Seidl, both SS sergeants, have been commuted to life imprisonment. Although these individuals participated actively in the brutalities of the concentration camps to which they were assigned for duty, their positions were relatively subordinate. Though nothing can justify the brutality of their personal conduct, still the records do not show that they went out of their way to add to the brutalities. I have decided in these cases to commute each of their sentences to imprisonment for life.

"Hermann Dammann, Richard Schulze and Kurt Hans, were sentenced for participating in the murder of American and Allied airmen who parachuted from disabled planes. There is no question as to their responsibility of these murders. However, certain mitigating circumstances, such as the excitement resulting from the aerial activity, the

offenses being committed after heavy bombing, and the fact that their crimes did not show a pattern of their character have been advanced along with many other reasons which I deem less important. I feel that I can commute the death sentence of each to imprisonment for life.

"In addition to the review of the cases of prisoners under death sentence, the European Command War Crimes Modification Board is in the process of reviewing the cases of all war criminals confined in Landsberg Prison under the jurisdiction of the European Command. Reviews of some 120 cases have been completed. There remain over 300 noncapital additional cases to be reviewed. The review of this Board has resulted in recommendations for substantial modification of sentences. A system of giving credit to prisoners for good conduct time in line with the best prison practices in the United States has also been instituted. This credit for good conduct time has resulted in the release of 91 war criminals prior to the expiration of sentences imposed by the Court."

WANTED: A PLAN FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE MOBILIZATION

Mr. BRICKER. Mr. President, it is apparent to all patriots that our energies must be dedicated to building a completely adequate defense for our country. Any preparedness program is futile if it results in runaway inflation. It makes little difference to future generations whether our cherished freedoms are lost through failure to stop Communist infiltration at home or through failure to avoid economic disaster at home. Our two major problems, therefore, concern manpower and money. Both are limited.

All our foreign and domestic policies must be framed in the light of limited manpower and limited financial resources. We have hundreds of plans for various foreign and domestic programs, but taken together they exceed the money and manpower available. For example, the Acheson containment plan involves policing the 20,000-mile Soviet perimeter with American ground forces. It would bleed us white both physically and financially. The Ewing plan for socialized medicine, the Foley plan for socialized defense housing, and the Brannan plan for socialized agriculture are but a few of the plans based on the assumption that the Federal Treasury is a bottomless well. We have many material shortages, Mr. President, but there is no shortage of administration plans or Government coordinators. In fact, we probably have more coordinators than there are functions to coordinate. We have a plan on almost every conceivable subject except one—a plan to save America.

The latest plans to spring into being are those of the Economic Stabilization Agency for the control of prices and wages. As yet, no one, including the stabilizers themselves, has the faintest idea about how prices and wages will be controlled. However, the statement which accompanied the first general price regulation contains some very important observations on the place of price and wage controls in the fight against inflation. This statement contains some half-truths and omits some significant facts, but it also expresses a great deal of good commonsense.

INFLATIONARY FORCES IN THE NATION'S ECONOMY

It is encouraging to see that the Economic Stabilization Agency recognizes the enemy it is supposed to fight. Its statement says in part:

The fact that prices have been frozen by this regulation should not be interpreted as ending the danger of inflation. This would be to confuse controlling the symptoms of a disease with its cure. The effect of price control is not to eliminate inflation, but to suppress it. Inflation comes about as a result of a gap between the available supply of goods and the amounts which consumers, business firms, and governments would like to buy and can pay for. Price control does not eliminate this gap.

According to the ESA statement, "since June 1950 the country has been in the throes of a mounting inflation." That is a half-truth. We have been the victims of creeping inflation ever since the conclusion of World War II and of galloping inflation since January 1950. The inflation of the past 4 years cannot be blamed on shortages. From 1947 through 1950 we had the greatest production of civilian goods in our history. Nevertheless, we have had inflation because the Government's fiscal and credit policies produced new money and credit faster than American farms and factories could produce goods.

The Economic Stabilization Agency says that inflationary pressures began to develop after the invasion of Korea. Recognizing that defense spending in 1950 had only a negligible impact on the economy, the ESA says:

Scare buying and profiteering were major factors in the sharp price advances which occurred in the last half of 1950.

Unquestionably, the outbreak of war in Korea inspired some speculative and panic buying beginning in July 1950. However, the major cause of inflation throughout 1950 was the administration policy of deficit spending. We were told by the Fair Deal medicine men that a little inflation was a good thing and that a \$43,000,000,000 budget did not have to be balanced. The myth that the Federal Government does not have to live within its income has finally been exploded. Mr. Truman, who warned against trying to balance a peacetime budget of \$43,000,000,000 in the fiscal year 1950, now insists that the 1952 budget of over \$71,000,000,000 must be balanced. However, if we accept all of the defense mobilization plans offered by Mr. Truman and his lieutenants, we will fall many billions of dollars short of paying as we go.

PAST EFFORTS TO PREVENT INFLATION

In discussing prior efforts to stabilize prices, the Economic Stabilization Agency refers to increased taxes, selective credit controls, and the use of priorities and allocations powers. The statement of the ESA continues:

Moreover, the President, prior to the passage of the Defense Production Act and since, has repeatedly urged business, labor, farmers, and consumers to exercise restraint in their buying and selling.

The ESA maintains a discreet silence about the necessity of having the President exercise a similar restraint. It is

futile for Mr. Truman to denounce business as usual and spending as usual as long as his administration continues to be the worst example of these attitudes. We have already passed legislation which seems adequate to protect us against profiteering on Government contracts and on war-created shortages. Our most dangerous type of profiteer, however, is the political profiteer. In the 1952 budget we see how the political profiteer has dressed up all of his discredited proposals in the uniform of national defense. Congress not only must cut out all nonessential spending, but also must learn to distinguish between the less essential and more essential forms of Government spending.

In speaking of its general ceiling-price regulation, ESA says:

Because of the comprehensive character of this action and the need for speed, it has not been practicable to establish committees of representatives of the persons substantially affected by this general ceiling-price regulation and to consult with them.

The truth of the statement just quoted is questionable. The Defense Production Act was signed by the President on September 8, 1950. The Economic Stabilization Agency was created less than 2 weeks later. It has had ample time to consult with representatives of business and labor in the formulation of its regulations. In that bill Congress made such consultation mandatory. If officials of the ESA had followed the procedure prescribed by law, a great deal of confusion and countless inequities made inevitable by the present regulations might have been avoided, and thus we might have been able to avoid the very critical situation which exists at this very hour; for if the ceiling on wages, as fixed by the Board, is broken, there likely will be no stability to the economic stabilization program at any time in the future.

The fact that some of the Members of Congress do not agree, and then bring political pressure to bear upon the heads of the agency, is no reason why the American people should not be protected by a sound wage-scale regulation fixed by the majority.

Even though price and wage controls merely suppress inflation temporarily, there is no question but that the American people are entitled to this temporary relief against rising prices. It is certainly not the fault of the American housewife that the effective weapons against inflation have not yet been fully and effectively utilized. The Congress was persuaded on the ground that such authority was needed immediately, to pass price- and wage-control legislation without even holding hearings. Now, after almost 5 months, the price-control agency is reported to have only about 600 employees with which to control billions of daily sales transactions. With such a limited staff, any general price-control order can be nothing more than an empty gesture.

DANGERS INHERENT IN PRICE AND WAGE CONTROLS

It is encouraging to note that Mr. Johnston and Mr. DiSalle seem to be aware of the dangers which general

price and wage control involve. One very great danger is described by them in this language:

It must be clearly understood that, even if price control does a perfect job in holding the prices of individual commodities, it is powerless to insure that the essential commodities will be produced in the right quantities.

In a free economy, prices reflect the combined judgment of millions of producers, distributors, and consumers. When the votes of millions of consumers in the market-place register an increased demand through a higher price, increased production of the article comes quickly and automatically. Even if the most able men in America were assigned to the job of price control, they would be unable to satisfy the demands of the public one-tenth as effectively as a free economy can. It is inevitable that price and wage controls will curtail production of many things which are vitally needed. Instead of blaming the price administrators for mistakes which are inevitable, we should hold them accountable for first, providing machinery for the prompt correction of mistakes and inequities; second, acting in accordance with the price- and wage-control statute—and I dare say they have not done so; and, third, adopting policies which will facilitate the removal of price and wage controls at the earliest possible date.

Another danger inherent in price and wage controls is that they breed disunity and social conflict. Many employers who suffer as a result of price ceilings put the blame on excessively high wages. Many workers trace their hardships in a controlled economy to profiteering by business. Furthermore, many consumers charge that farmers have been favored for political reasons, and many farmers try to shift the blame to that familiar devil the middleman. People who live on static incomes blame the price-control agency for sacrificing them in favor of business, labor, and farm pressure groups. Price and wage controls are politically attractive because they sugar-coat, at least temporarily, the sacrifices which an emergency requires. In the past, price and wage controls have been proposed as a painless remedy for inflation. It is hardly surprising that every group in our society seeks to avoid that pain by transferring it to some other group. The fact, of course, is that our present mobilization effort will require a lower standard of living for everyone who is not already at the subsistence level. In the long run, it is much better to face these sacrifices by resorting to measures which prevent inflation instead of concealing it temporarily. No matter how hard the sacrifices may seem, we could at least accept them as a united—not divided—people.

WEAPONS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST INFLATION.

Mr. Eric Johnston has stated on several occasions that price and wage controls should be viewed only as stop-gap measures in the fight against inflation. In issuing its general price-control order, the ESA observed that in preventing inflation "major reliance must be placed

upon vigorous taxation and credit policy." I agree wholeheartedly with that statement except that I would add as equally important a drastic reduction in proposed Government spending and the encouragement of individual saving.

Taxation is one of our best weapons in the fight against inflation. To prevent inflation without reducing the President's budget, it would be necessary to raise an additional \$16,500,000,000 in taxes and probably more. It is unlikely that we can raise this much in additional taxes without impairing the productivity of our economy. Corporate, individual, and excise tax rates are already close to the record levels which prevailed during World War II. Increasing existing tax rates would be a simple matter if we were not already close to the point of diminishing returns. Higher taxes are inflationary when they become so confiscatory as to stifle production, kill incentives for profits and efficiency, and keep workers from entering the labor force.

To the extent that taxes can be increased without adding to inflationary pressures, higher taxes are much better than a price-and-wage-control strait-jacket. The great advantage in fighting inflation with taxation is that consumer rationing can be avoided. Taxes are, in effect, a rationing of money. Higher taxes would give almost all of us less to spend, but no bureaucrat would tell us how many shoes or how much meat we could buy. By rationing money and credit instead of goods we would not have the black-market problem, which is bound to confront us under wage and price controls in peacetime.

It is now clear that we did not tax ourselves enough during World War II. Taxes and sales of bonds to nonbank investors fell about 25 percent short of paying for the cost of the last war. This deficit was financed inside the commercial banking structure, with the result that the 1939 dollar is today worth only 55 cents in purchasing power.

It would be absurd, of course, to reduce individual income through taxation and allow the reduced income to be supplemented by easy credit. For that reason the Defense Production Act provides for consumer-credit controls and control of credit for real-estate construction. Nothing has been done, however, to restrain general credit expansion by making it more expensive for business to borrow money. The Federal Reserve Board has ample power to fight inflation by reducing the over-all supply of money and credit. However, the Board cannot make the cost of borrowing money more expensive for banks and their customers without also making the cost higher for the Federal Government. Secretary of the Treasury Snyder recently announced that the cheap-money policy made possible by Federal Reserve Board support of the Government securities market would be continued. It is this policy which, in the words of Marriner S. Eccles, "makes the entire banking system, through the action of the Federal Reserve System, an engine of inflation." Congress, and not Secretary Snyder, should decide whether it is more important to have cheap money

in the interest of debt management or to preserve the value of the dollar by making the cost of money more expensive.

If we fail to reduce Government spending, restrict credit, or increase taxes enough to avoid a deficit, our only chance of preventing inflation is to borrow from nonbank sources. Almost everyone agrees with the statement of the Economic Stabilization Agency that inflation "destroys the value of savings and, therefore, the motive to save," and that "it creates a panic flight from liquid assets to goods." There is no question that that situation exists at this very moment. Any banker or savings and loan official, if asked, will give the record of the past few months to show that money is being withdrawn from savings and put into materials and goods. There is grave danger that the economic and fiscal policies hitherto pursued by this administration have already destroyed for millions of Americans the incentive to save. We must take our heads out of the sand and face this question: Do the American people have enough confidence in the stability of the dollar to defer current spending by investing in Government bonds?

During the last war bonds were sold to the public in huge quantities. At that time, however, the Treasury could point to the fact that the purchasing power of the dollar had remained fairly constant for more than 70 years. A man who bought a \$75 bond in 1941 was promised \$100 in 1951. The Federal Government will fulfill the letter of its obligation, but the bondholder knows that he will receive only \$55 worth of purchasing power. There are signs that existing bondholders and the general public are weighing the possibility of cheaper dollars in the future. In several recent months bond redemptions have exceeded sales. The boom in farm land is attributed in part to attempts to hedge against inflation. The greatest mistake we can make is to assume that no matter what Congress does, the American people will extend their bonds and buy additional bonds in sufficient quantities to prevent inflation. In my opinion, the American people will make a substantial investment in Government bonds only if they have reasonable assurance that the value of the dollar will not be further depreciated. Sales talk is not enough. Only by the following deeds can we assure the American people that the integrity of the dollar will be maintained: first, elimination of all nonessential Government spending; second, adherence to a mobilization plan which makes efficient use of our limited manpower and money; and third, a determined effort to finance the mobilization program on a pay-as-you-go basis.

THE EFFECT OF INFLATION

For the past 18 years we have been told by economists of the New Deal and the Fair Deal that the size of the national debt is a matter of no importance. Their favorite bromide was "we owe it to ourselves." The great majority of our people are just beginning to appreciate the significance of the fact they not only owe but also own the national debt. The

savings of almost every American citizen would be wiped out if our debt were repudiated either directly or indirectly by wild inflation. So long as confidence in the dollar can be maintained we can handle a national debt even in excess of what we now have. But if confidence in the dollar is lost through the prospect of runaway inflation, it is immaterial whether the national debt is \$100,000,000,000 or \$300,000,000,000. No system of a price control and rationing can stop a panic-stricken flight from the dollar to obtain real wealth in the form of materials and property.

The present financial condition of the Federal Government makes it not only immoral but probably impossible to finance our mobilization effort by inflation. While inflation can be regarded as an indirect form of taxation, it preys upon the most helpless and most deserving groups in our society. Anyone who advocates another dose of inflation for the economy is, in effect, proposing a capital levy on the value of all annuities, pensions, bonds, life-insurance policies, and savings accounts. Only by adopting courageous monetary, fiscal, and credit policies can we hope to avoid economic disaster in the years ahead.

PLANNING FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD OF MOBILIZATION

Our present national emergency is unique in one vital respect. The present emergency may last for 5, 10, 20 years, or even longer. We remember that when General Eisenhower was here he emphasized the fact that it might continue for a period of 20 years. We cannot blindly follow the methods which were employed in response to emergencies of limited duration and hope to escape disaster.

The need for skillful leadership and careful planning is far more important today than it ever was during World War II. After Pearl Harbor there was never much doubt that victory over the Axis Powers would come within a relatively short period. It was possible to adopt economic policies which were suitable for a temporary war period, but which would have been disastrous as long-range policies. The last war proved that our economy can be completely regimented for a short period, that the American people will accept all-out controls on a temporary basis, and that the patriotism kindled by war makes it possible to have inflation without loss of confidence in the currency. In a long-range preparedness program, however, we cannot ignore economic principles. We must keep the cost of a more or less permanent mobilization program within our ability to pay for it. If we fail to do so, we will lose our freedom through overwhelming debt and massive inflation without Russia firing a single shot.

Where is the over-all plan for a long-range program of defense mobilization? Mr. Truman has failed to produce it. In the coming months we will hear much about shortages of tin, zinc, nickel, skilled labor, housing, and many others. All these shortages can be overcome by the ingenuity of the American people and their ability to substitute and to improvise. Our most critical shortage

today is executive leadership. Unfortunately, there is no available substitute for such leadership except at 4-year intervals.

A blueprint for national defense mobilization would tell us the maximum number of men we could, in the absence of all-out war, place in the Armed Forces without hampering production or exceeding our ability to pay. With this figure definite, everyone would be able to form an intelligent conclusion as to how many American soldiers, if any, should be provided for international land armies. Our educational institutions and our young people would be able to make plans for the future. But we have no such blueprint. The recommended size of the Armed Forces increases almost from day to day. Are we to drift by degrees into an army of 4,000,000, then 6,000,000, and eventually 10,000,000?

A blueprint for national defense mobilization would specify the peacetime spending which must be curtailed and the peacetime proposals which must be shelved for the duration. We not only have no such blueprint, but practically every Government department and agency is clamoring for more money and more employees to perform work in the magic name of national defense.

A blueprint for national mobilization, short of all-out war, would indicate exactly how much material would be required for our own Armed Forces and for military aid to foreign countries. However, no one, in or out of the executive branch, has any clear idea of what military spending will amount to or how it will be spent. As a result business and labor do not know to what extent they must shift to defense production.

A blueprint for national mobilization would coordinate monetary, fiscal and credit policies with a view to eliminating price and wage controls at an early date. In the absence of such a blueprint, and in spite of Mr. Johnston's announced intentions, we can never get rid of price and wage controls.

I have no doubt that Congress will do its part if it is given an over-all plan with which to work. With our specialized committee system, and the absence of information which the executive departments have, it is practically impossible for us to devise a long-range mobilization plan. Only Mr. Truman can provide such a plan. It is time for him to cast aside all other plans and concentrate on a plan which is concerned exclusively with the preservation of the American way of life in the critical years which lie ahead. Now is the time for the President to forget narrow, sordid political motives and plans such as those which seem at this time to be actuating very much of what he does.

RECESS

Mr. HUNT. Mr. President, I move that the Senate stand in recess until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 2 o'clock and 54 minutes p. m.) the Senate took a recess until tomorrow, Tuesday, February 27, 1951, at 12 o'clock meridian.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate February 26 (legislative day of January 29), 1951:

UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INFORMATION

Ben Hibbs, of Pennsylvania, to be a member of the United States Advisory Commission on Information for a term expiring January 27, 1954, and until his successor has been appointed and qualified, vice Mark Foster Ethridge, resigned.

UNITED STATES MARSHAL

James R. Wright, of Texas, to be United States Marshal for the northern district of Texas. He is now serving in this office under an appointment which expired January 24, 1951.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA REDEVELOPMENT LAND AGENCY

James E. Colliflower, for a term of 5 years, effective on and after March 4, 1951.

IN THE ARMY

The following-named persons for appointment in the Regular Army of the United States in the grades and corps specified, under the provisions of section 506 of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 (Public Law 381, 80th Cong.), title II of the act of August 5, 1947 (Public Law 365, 80th Cong.), Public Law 36, Eightieth Congress, as amended by Public Law 514, Eighty-first Congress, and Public Law 625, Eightieth Congress, subject to physical qualification:

To be lieutenant colonel

John F. Kellogg, Jr., MC, O230050.

To be majors:

Arren C. Buchanan, Jr., MC, O1689921.
Joseph W. Cooch, MC, O476993.
James R. Drake, MC, O371656.
Charles F. Kramer, MC, O461082.
Francisco T. Roque, MC, O1897087.
Peter S. Scoles, MC, O977064.
Charles E. Tegtmeier, MC, O335197.

To be captains

James P. Albrite, MC, O983789.
Cora L. Allebach, ANC, N767038.
Margaret F. Alt, WMSC, M458.
Louise S. Andersland, WMSC, J100042.
Robena C. Anderson, ANC, N760086.
Louise P. Appel, ANC, N776730.
Dorothy M. Atwood, ANC, N800115.
Hazel Belsit, ANC, N786065.
Bernice D. Brandt, ANC, N730555.
Mary Breazeale, WMSC, R84.
Rachel V. Briggs, ANC, N731483.
Treva B. Brookens, ANC, N724687.
Mary L. Burrows, ANC, N762512.
Marjorie J. K. Burts, ANC, N788828.
Samuel W. Caldwell, MC, O447880.
Helen L. Callentine, ANC, N728324.
Irving H. Canfield, MC, O474732.
Margaret R. Cannon, ANC, N771862.
Gracie L. Chapman, ANC, N734009.
Louise M. Clifford, ANC, N700958.
Ruth L. Craig, ANC, N800006.
Bess Crim, ANC, N727499.
Geneva H. Culpepper, ANC, N755251.
Mabel E. Dayton, ANC, N743221.
Pamela E. Duer, WMSC, M2375.
Anita M. Dumas, ANC, N790099.
Anna D'Zurko, ANC, N725880.
Bernice E. Epps, ANC, N763854.
Hazel E. Evans, ANC, N722276.
Adele F. Foreman, ANC, AN703172.
Margaret A. Fournelle, ANC, N738800.
Bruna G. Fusl, ANC, N721750.
John F. Geer, DC, O960673.
Julia T. Graves, ANC, N754449.
Alice Gunlogson, ANC, N733003.
Pauline A. C. Gustafson, ANC, N735552.
Thomas A. Haedicke, MC, O1756156.
Laura R. Hagen, ANC, N771467.
Helen Harnett, ANC, N744157.
Dorothy B. Harper, ANC, N745335.