

SOME FARM PROGRAMS NEEDED TO MAINTAIN
AND INCREASE FARM PRODUCTION AND TO HOLD
DOWN FOOD SHORTAGES AND INFLATION

Proposed by
James G. Patton,
President, National Farmers Union

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The proposals herewith presented are suggested for action during the coming months to improve war production on farms before the Spring of 1944. Other steps than those suggested here are undoubtedly needed now. These proposals do not call for full conversion of agriculture to meet the demands of total war. Agriculture has by its nature lagged behind industry in conversion to total war. Full conversion will require more time than in any other section of our national life. Compared to the British, or the other major nations, our farming has just begun to convert. We should be no slower than the unchangeable cycles of seasons, crops and livestock.

It is probable that extraordinary food demands will last through at least the next three crop seasons. Therefore, our farm policy should be based on the needs and possibilities for conversion in that period, rather than being month-to-month and year-to-year adjustments.

But for the 1943 crop season, a short view and fast action are essential. There are gaps in the program offered. However, it is presented with hope that even this much improvement will be of great value.

Some of these proposals are now before the Congress in restricted or incomplete form. The principles of others have been adopted by the Department of Agriculture, but plans for their execution are insufficient. Still others are under discussion in the Department, and could be acted upon quickly. One of the proposals, that for neighborhood machinery and labor pools, has been put into action in one State already by farmers independently of direction from Washington.

Maintaining and increasing farm production depends upon two types of activities:

1. the direction and organization of present production facilities to insure their most efficient use, in terms of the changed food requirements;
2. the enlargement of our farm plant to allow fuller use of the labor and other capacities of some 4,000,000 farmers whose operations are below minimum standards of efficiency.

To this should be added the necessity for a rapid overhauling of our practices in processing and consuming farm products, so as to attain greater use from our supply.

Both the job on the farm and the portion of the job which lies between the farmer's gate and the consumer's table require better leadership by Government. This leadership must place more local responsibility on farmers, their organizations and committees. Government leadership would be better understood and would elicit more effective effort if it came from a single integrated direction of the war at home. This might be attained by administrative action or by adoption of the Tolan-Kilgore-Pepper Bill, the principles and provisions of which have the full support of our organization.

Here, in summary, are the major proposals which we are now making:

- (1) Invest at least one billion dollars of production capital in the most suitable of the 4,000,000 less-productive farms, and extend them appropriate farm management assistance so as to secure approximately a 10 per cent increase in our civilian food supply during 1943-44.
- (2) Organize neighborhood machinery and labor pools throughout the nation to increase the efficient full-time use of equipment and manpower on our 2,000,000 most efficient farms.
- (3) Insure adequate skilled farm labor by increasing the President's \$65,000,000 special farm labor budget request, promptly putting that program into effect so that a land army of 400,000 mobile workers can be organized and utilized under government supervision.
- (4) Encourage heavier production and use of feeds, making U.S. and Canadian supplies of wheat available at low prices. Subsidize cotton producers to encourage a more rapid shift from cotton production to livestock, oil crops and livestock feeds.
- (5) Extend more guaranteed prices to farmers, including crop insurance on all high risk production. Maintain present farm price levels, but adjust individual prices by means of guaranteed "forward" pricing so as to use prices to direct the production effort into the right channels; supplement this by incentive payments for increasing production, especially for milk.
- (6) Revise 1943-44 goals into line with possibilities opened up by the above program, and allow individual farmers more leeway in deciding which products to grow than the arbitrary farm quotas now allowed.
- (7) Further consolidate Federal farm agencies at county and state levels; double or triple the number of farmers on official committees who, in the last analysis, have the know-how, the ability to get the job done.
- (8) Rationalize food processing and distribution, utilizing nutritious foods now being neglected, cutting out frills and luxuries; get more efficiency out of our supply of calories, vitamins and minerals.

UNDER-EMPLOYED FARMERS

Figures are now available which for the first time allow an accurate analysis of the minimum production possibilities of our farmers. These figures indicate that

Less than two million farms are adequate in their land, equipment, credit and management resources to use at full efficiency the labor of one or more farm families. The farms which are experiencing a labor shortage are to be found among this less than two million.

On four million other farms there is no over-all labor shortage, but rather there is an underemployment of labor on most of them. This is due to lack of land, credit, equipment and modern management practices.

To determine the number of farms on which large and rapid increases of production could be obtained, we requested the assistance of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. The Bureau had available new information from the 1940 Census which enabled it to indicate accurately the number of farms immediately available for increases. This information is contained in the attached letter (Appendix 1) and is summarized in

Table I. It shows 1,636,000 such farms. This figure includes about 250,000 present Farm Security borrowers. By our own estimates, based upon a further analysis of Census data, these farms are distributed about equally between the Northern and Southern states, the number in each State and Region being shown in Table II. From 10 to 20 per cent of the farms listed in each State are now receiving FSA assistance; the national average is 15 per cent.

To calculate the minimum increased production possible from these families, we have assumed that the production record established by 463,000 FSA borrowers during 1942 (appendix 2) can be extended to the 1,390,000 similar farms. We have also assumed that present FSA borrowers, if assistance is continued for them, could secure approximately the same increases in 1943 as in 1942. By using the Regional production figures for FSA borrowers on these nine important war products, we have estimated that the entire group of 1,840,000 farmers could make the increases in their production on these commodities shown in Table III.

Important increases will be secured in all other commodities in addition to these nine, and much food will also be produced for home use, thereby lowering the drain by low income farmers on the Nation's food supply. We estimate that the total effect of such a program would be the production of three-quarters of a billion dollars' worth of food at farm prices, or about 5 per cent of the expected national total for 1943. It would, however, represent 7 per cent of the supply available for civilian consumption, assuming that the amount available for civilians is not further reduced during the coming year.

The initial investment for such a program would be approximately one billion dollars, with increased food available in the first year of about one and a half billion dollars at consumers' price levels. This would represent \$1.50 in new food supply for every \$1.00 advanced. Virtually all of the dollars advanced would be repaid within 2 or 3 years, making the cost of administration the only cost.

It is true that such a program, which would call for a tripling of the FSA operations, cannot get in full swing in time to get full benefits, from the 1943 crop season. Nevertheless, much could be done to increase livestock production before the Spring of 1944 and to prepare for the following crop-year. Loan operations of FSA have been restricted by lack of funds. Assistance to farmers has been on a minimum basis. A real program of building up to efficiency will produce considerably greater results. The important thing to remember is that, without help the big majority of these farms will make no increase in production; they will constitute drains on the food supply produced by other farmers. They must be given management assistance as well as credit to build up their capital. Not only the experience of FSA, but the independent judgments of qualified economists have verified this fact.

LABOR AND MACHINERY

Our proposals for insuring adequate supplies of labor and machinery include provisions for immediate action to organize and use present resources on a neighborhood basis. However, we must have a reliable land army of volunteer civilians to meet seasonal needs for mobile labor. To succeed, this plan must guarantee the workers minimum standards and provide that producers needing their labor make contracts with the government so that maximum man hours of productive work will be obtained.

Machinery utilization can be made more efficient. Maximum use can be obtained by community agreements. Farmers' machinery-and-repair cooperatives should be assured government aid when needed. Machinery pools can draw in privately owned implements

only if (a) the owner is guaranteed first call on his own implement; and (b) the government gives him a guarantee that the machinery will be maintained in working order, to be returned to him in as good condition as when he pooled it, or if depreciated or worn out will be replaced by a new implement. This pooling of machinery and labor can best be carried out on a democratic co-operative basis.

PRICES AND GOALS AS TOOLS IN INCREASING FOOD PRODUCTION

In, of and by themselves, prices cannot be relied upon to produce war vital foods in the kinds and quantities needed. But properly adjusted and used with other tools, prices can be of great service.

Reliance upon parity prices will not get increased food production. Increase of parity prices by the inclusion of cost of labor paid and/or unpaid, will not do the job. Parity was not invented or designed to get production; its purpose was to assure the relative position of farmers in our economy.

The present farm price level is about right to help production--neither too high nor too low. Prices must be stabilized at the present level. But, within the list of farm prices, adjustments downward and upward are necessary in order to get the kinds and quantities of foods and fibres most needed.

The USDA has done well in keeping livestock feed prices from spiralling upward. Wheat production has finally been turned loose, after long urging by the Farmers Union. Better distribution of corn and wheat acreages will increase production of both crops.

Prof. Theodore W. Schultz, of Iowa State College, in his pamphlet "Farm Prices for Food Production" just published, and attached hereto as an appendix, sets forth in Table 14, Page 38, the extent to which he believes parity prices are out of line, from the point of view of getting maximum production of the crops most needed. In a series of tables (Tables 6, 7, 9, 11 and 12) he gives his estimate of the best farm price to assist in getting required production of each principal vital crop.

Dr. Schultz also proposes important changes in the goals for various commodities. In applying these goals to individual farms the effort to award mechanically quotas to individual farms on the basis of a county average should be discontinued, in order not to misuse land, labor and machinery.

I have examined these tables and Dr. Schultz's supporting arguments and am of the opinion that the adjustment of goals and ^{private} prices he proposes will contribute greatly to increased production and should be adopted. Such adjustments will not result in an increase in the total price for all farm production.

In addition to price changes, we urgently need incentive or bounty payments for increasing production as proposed by Secretary Wickard. This proposal is a MUST, and the Administration should immediately announce the details of plans to extend it to milk and milk products.

Farmers also must have assurance of minimum support prices on many more commodities, as the Farmers Union has repeatedly pointed out. The special war crop advances being made with RACC funds should be made available for livestock production. Crop insurance plans are ready for high risk crops, but should be revised to include, in addition to production costs, at least the normal return which would be made on the commodity being displaced by the high risk crop. Farmers must have something which

approximates the guarantee extended to industry in constructing and/or operating additional war plants. Perhaps an individual farm contract for certain commodities would be a part of the answer. Farms are war plants, and in expanding our farm plants the government now asks the farmer to assume much more risk than any industrial firm has undertaken.

FOOD UTILIZATION

Much effort has been devoted to price control and rationing of farm products. Little attention has yet been paid to eliminating waste of manpower and materials in assembling and processing our foods. Little attention has been paid to fuller use of some of our best sources of good nutrition. Nothing has been done to introduce mass feeding, particularly in war factories, as a great saving of both food and manpower. We suggest the rationalizing of milk distribution as a good place to start. We suggest also much fuller use of our supply of skimmed milk and steps toward the eventual elimination of white flours, if that becomes necessary. Food utilization in itself offers great economies and merits extended examination and fast action to promote conservation of our scarce supplies.

DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATION

Many more farmers must be allowed to bear responsibility in the farm programs. Total war will call for much greater individual responsibility and discipline in what has been an almost unorganized industry. Problems cannot be solved by officials away from the grass roots nor can the will to succeed be developed unless comparable democratic responsibility is made possible. As part of such a change should come the unification of government agencies dealing with farmers, and the unification of the war effort at the top.

DETAILED SUGGESTIONS FOR FARM PROGRAM

A. TO INCREASE PRODUCTION BY UNDEREMPLOYED FARMERS:

1. Use credit alone, with responsibility resting on County War Boards for aggressive action; private credit, PCA's, RACC as sources; AAA, county agents, War Board Loan representatives, and FSA supervisors to give advice at time of loan.
2. Greatly expand supervised credit program for full-time farmers. Should reach at least 1,000,000 out of 1,385,000 farmers best situated to use it, and be continued for 460,000 present Farm Security borrowers. Funds needed: approximately a billion dollars at once. Build up an adequate staff to furnish the necessary type of farm management assistance. Use both FSA and AAA personnel.
3. Adopt a farm expansion program for farms now fairly well operated but too small. Lease available land adjoining them to expand to fully efficient basis. This should reach a quarter million farmers. They will need in addition some credit, machinery, and livestock. A joint Extension Service and FSA program.
4. Establish procedure and authority for consolidating farm units wherever and whenever opportunity arises. This applies to areas where farms are now much too small, and to many farms that have been or will be vacated as employment opportunities open up further. This requires methods similar to those used in the Tenant Purchase (Bankhead-Jones) program.

5. Set up a special loan program for part-time farmers, elderly farmers, subsistence farms, and share-croppers, who can not handle a full-size production loan, but can develop one particular product, such as poultry. Between a million and two million farms are available for such projects.

6. Give special assistance to farm cooperatives for handling the increased production which will result from the above program as well as the increases already projected in the USDA 1943 program. Cooperatives are also needed to make heavy equipment available for efficient use by small farmers, and to furnish other farm supplies.

7. Insure increased production of farm machinery, particularly horse-drawn equipment and small tools, that these programs will need.

These seven points will shift more livestock to low-income farm areas, produce more livestock feeds, improve land-use in those areas, and use the labor of low-income farmers much more fully.

B. TO MAINTAIN AND INCREASE PRODUCTION ON 2,000,000 MOST EFFICIENT FARMS:

1. Launch at once a nationwide drive to organize neighborhood "Machinery and Labor Pools," as already underway in Ohio under the leadership of state Farm Bureau and Grange, and as planned by the National Farmers Union through our local, county, and state War Mobilization Councils. Every community is to be divided into neighborhood groups of five to ten farmers for this purpose. Is to be initiated and led by farmers with the aid of all government employees in each area. Program will increase custom use of equipment, develop machinery co-ops for heavy equipment where desired. Present equipment owners must be given a guarantee of replacement when replacements become available, if they will pool their equipment under community direction. A parallel pooling of repair facilities is necessary, cooperative repair centers, being set up where needed. In case of extreme shortages of equipment, County War Boards should have authority to commandeer equipment, with guaranteed repayment to owners for use. Present machinery is far from being used to capacity on many farms, while other farmers are trying to get along with obsolete equipment. Labor exchange among neighbors is to be exhausted before other labor is brought into community by government agencies.

2. Start mobilization of "U.S. Crop Corps.," simultaneously insisting that Congress appropriate necessary funds. Take definite steps now to have careful estimates made of the supply and demand in each local area for seasonal labor peaks.

3. Establish now short courses for at least 200,000 high school youths who will be available for the entire growing season and can be placed with individual farm families. (Courses are now planned for end of school terms).

4. Make clear that the only solution to the needs for migratory labor is by immediate action to set up the mobile land army requested by the President. Failure to act soon will cut planting and later endanger many crops. Expand the proposed program from 275,000 to 400,000, and make it a volunteer enlistment for at least a year, with minimum living and wage conditions guaranteed by the government, the growers to contract with government for workers. Develop a group of labor utilization specialists to tackle problems of efficient labor use and efficient labor skills. Agriculture is the only industry which does not have such skilled assistance.

5. Double budget request so as to train and place at least 100,000 year-round skilled workers from ranks of underemployed farmers. Offer housing and medical subsidies as partial incentive to attract back to farming some workers who left farms for industry.

6. Set up a Farmer Placement Service so that capable tenants or owners on less efficient farms can be promptly moved to better farms that have been vacated, or to farms where operator desires to retire but can't find a satisfactory replacement.

C. FOR ALL FARMERS:

1. Put into effect crop insurance (for all high-risk crops) plans now developed by the Department of Agriculture. Plans should include repayment of all costs incurred, plus the normal net returns on the crop from which acres are being diverted. This approach would reach all farmers and be easier to administer than the RACC Special War Crop Advances.

2. Announce immediately the details of incentive payment program for milk.

3. Extend RACC Special War Crop Advances (non-recourse loans) to livestock production.

4. Place definite price floors under poultry and other important products not now having adequate price supports.

5. Work out a war contract for the government to make directly with individual farmers for possible future use.

6. Enlarge purchase-placement program of dairy cows by FSA, and extend to include good dairy calves and gilts which should be held off market; if necessary, embargo stockyards from receiving productive dairy cows, overweight calves, underweight hogs and cattle.

7. Assure farmers of unrestricted use for feed of the wheat supplies of U. S. and Canada. Concentrate wheat production on land not having better uses, and restrict it elsewhere. Re-examine corn and soybean acreages to achieve same type of concentration.

8. Immediately develop a campaign under the slogan "Not An Idle Acre."

9. Secure complete enforcement of draft regulations on deferment of farm workers. Extend draft deferment through harvest season to all skilled men serving agriculture in the marketing and processing of farm products, distribution of farm supplies, and organization and execution of war food programs. At present only county agents and some of the highly-skilled technicians serving marketing and processing business are covered.

10. Prepare plans to furlough men in armed services if still in the country to their own farms or those of their parents during summer peak months.

11. Compile a list of skilled farm operators and workers who have quit farming but whom we may need to return to the land in 1944.

12. Request Congress to complete action on farm appropriations prior to planting time, so that farmers may know where they stand.
13. Place all farm agencies at county and state levels under one responsible head.
14. Expand AAA county and township committees, bringing in representation of all types of farmers and farm labor. Make them action committees at neighborhood and community levels, and policy committees at the county and state levels.

D. CONVERT FOOD PROCESSING AND DISTRIBUTION PRACTICES TO WARTIME NEEDS:

1. Complete the simplifying of country milk collections, and extend to all assembly and marketing operations to conserve rubber and manpower.
2. Concentrate leading lines of farm supply distribution to maintain service and save manpower.
3. Eliminate wasteful frills and trick packaging in food processing and distribution.
4. Put city distribution of food, particularly milk, on the basis of utility.
5. Increase use of inexpensive nutritious foods beginning with skimmed milk, and require at least 50% of our flour production to be whole wheat.
6. Take vigorous steps to keep high income families and higher-price caterers from black market and hoarding practices.
7. Start immediately a program of mass feeding with its greater efficiencies wherever possible. Begin at once with war factories.

E. PROCEED FASTER TOWARD THE SINGLE UNIFIED DIRECTION OF THE WAR ON THE HOME FRONT CALLED FOR BY THE KILGORE-PEPPER-TOLAN BILL.

Otherwise, Agriculture, a prime war industry, will continue to eat at the second table (in terms of manpower, machinery, fertilizer, processing equipment, and transportation) and millions will go unnecessarily hungry this year and next.

TABLE I. CLASSIFICATION OF THE NATION'S FARMS AND FARMERS ACCORDING TO CAPACITY TO PRODUCE

Classification	Number of Farms	Operators With:		Assistance Needed for Maximum War Output
		Limited Possibilities for Additional Food Production <u>1/</u>	Capacity for Expanding Wartime Food Production Effort	
<u>Group I</u> Full employment for one or more workers. Operations almost at full capacity.	1,950,000	440,000	1,510,000	Adequate labor supply <u>2/</u> Production credit <u>3/</u>
<u>Group II</u> Less than full employment for operator but readily convertible to Group I by addition of capital resources.	1,820,000	630,000	1,190,000	Production credit <u>3/</u> Supervised loans <u>4/</u>
<u>Group III</u> Limited land resources, cannot be expanded to full employment in short period.	860,000	400,000	460,000	Supervised loans <u>4/</u> Mobilization for Farm Work <u>5/</u>
<u>Group IV</u> Inadequate land resources, little or no expansion of production possible	1,460,000	820,000	640,000	Mobilization for Farm Work <u>5/</u> Special food loans <u>6/</u>
ALL FARMERS	6,090,000	2,290,000	3,800,000 <u>7/</u>	

- 1/ Included in this column are operators over 65 years of age, sharecroppers, and off-farm workers.
- 2/ This will be provided by the Department's new farm labor supply and transportation program, the budget for which has already been submitted.
- 3/ It is anticipated that these needs will be set by local banks and the Department's new loan program utilizing the Regional Agricultural Credit Corporations.
- 4/ The loan program of the Farm Security Administration in 1942 reached about 450,000 farmers, many of whom were able to move up into Group I. A rapid expansion of this type of program is needed.
- 5/ The Department's labor supply program will recruit from these groups. An estimated labor reservoir of 1,000,000 workers is available from these families at the present time, which should be ample to meet all labor demands of Group I farmers in the years ahead and also certain demands for increases in industry.
- 6/ Although technical guidance is needed for these loans similar to that given with supervised loans, this credit constitutes a special category of very small loans for the production of one or two food enterprises. Some of these loans might also be made to part-time and semi-retired farmers in the other groups.
- 7/ This table was based primarily upon figures from the Census of 1940. Although it is estimated that a net loss of perhaps 300,000 operators has occurred since then, it is likely that there has been no loss in the number of farms operated in Groups I and II. In spite of losses of farms in Groups III and IV, a labor reservoir of 1,000,000 is still available on the remaining farms.

TABLE II

Estimated Number by States of Farms Having Best Possibilities for Expanding Production if Provided Credit, Marketing and Management Assistance.*

	Excellent Opportunities (1)	Good Op- portunities (2)	Total Available (3)	Number All Farms (4)	Percent (3) of (4) (5)
<u>Region I</u>	60,000	20,000	80,000	534,000	15
New England	15,000	5,000	20,000	135,000	15
New York	15,000	5,000	20,000	153,000	13
Pennsylvania	20,000	5,000	25,000	169,000	15
N.J., Md., Dela.	10,000	5,000	15,000	77,000	20
<u>Region II</u>	155,000	30,000	185,000	572,000	32
Michigan	50,000	10,000	60,000	188,000	32
Wisconsin	55,000	10,000	65,000	187,000	35
Minnesota	50,000	10,000	60,000	197,000	30
<u>Region III</u>	235,000	65,000	300,000	1,101,000	27
Ohio	50,000	10,000	60,000	234,000	26
Indiana	40,000	10,000	50,000	185,000	27
Illinois	40,000	10,000	50,000	213,000	23
Iowa	40,000	10,000	50,000	213,000	23
Missouri	65,000	25,000	90,000	256,000	35
<u>Region IV</u>	150,000	85,000	235,000	1,053,000	22
Kentucky	35,000	25,000	60,000	253,000	24
Tennessee	40,000	20,000	60,000	248,000	24
West Virginia	15,000	10,000	25,000	99,000	25
Virginia	25,000	15,000	40,000	175,000	22
North Carolina	35,000	15,000	50,000	278,000	18
<u>Region V</u>	110,000	70,000	180,000	648,000	28
South Carolina	20,000	10,000	30,000	138,000	22
Georgia	35,000	20,000	55,000	216,000	25
Alabama	45,000	35,000	80,000	232,000	34
Florida	10,000	5,000	15,000	62,000	24
<u>Region VI</u>	105,000	65,000	170,000	658,000	26
Arkansas	40,000	20,000	60,000	217,000	28
Mississippi	35,000	30,000	85,000	291,000	22
Louisiana	30,000	15,000	45,000	150,000	30
<u>Region VII</u>	135,000	35,000	170,000	423,000	40
Kansas	45,000	15,000	60,000	156,000	38
Nebraska	40,000	10,000	50,000	121,000	41
South Dakota	25,000	5,000	30,000	72,000	42
North Dakota	25,000	5,000	30,000	74,000	40

	: Excellent : Opportunities (1)	: Good Op- : portunities (2)	: Total : Available (3)	: Number : All Farms (4)	: Percent : (3) of (4): (5)
<u>Region VIII</u>	155,000	50,000	205,000	598,000	34
Texas	105,000	35,000	145,000	418,000	35
Oklahoma	50,000	15,000	60,000	180,000	33
<u>Region IX</u>	25,000	5,000	30,000	162,000	19
California	20,000	5,000	25,000	133,000	19
Utah	5,000	**	5,000	25,000	20
Nevada	**	**	**	4,000	--
<u>Region X</u>	25,000	5,000	30,000	108,000	28
Montana	10,000	2,000	12,000	42,000	29
Wyoming	5,000	**	5,000	15,000	33
Colorado	10,000	3,000	13,000	51,000	25
<u>Region XI</u>	25,000	5,000	30,000	188,000	16
Washington	10,000	2,000	12,000	82,000	15
Oregon	8,000	2,000	10,000	62,000	16
Idaho	7,000	1,000	8,000	44,000	18
<u>Region XII</u>	10,000	5,000	15,000	52,000	29
Arizona	3,000	2,000	5,000	18,000	28
New Mexico	7,000	3,000	10,000	34,000	29
 U. S. TOTAL	 <u>1,190,000</u>	 <u>440,000</u>	 <u>1,630,000***</u>	 <u>6,097,000</u>	 <u>27</u>
 14 Southern States	 520,000	 270,000	 790,000	 2,956,000	 27
All Other States	670,000	170,000	840,000	3,041,000	28

* Based on regional totals derived from Census data, with Census and other data being used to apportion regional totals among states.

** Less than 2,000.

*** Includes about 250,000 farmers or 15% who are now FSA borrowers, or between 10% and 20% of each state total.

TABLE III
 MINIMUM INCREASES IN SELECTED PRODUCTS POSSIBLE
 BY 1,840,000 UNDER-EMPLOYED FARMERS
 (In Millions of Units)

	Increase	1,380,000	460,000	Total In-	%	'43	%	:
'43	Over '42	Non-FSA	FSA	creases,	Goal In-	'43	Farm	:
Goals	Produc-	Borrowers	Borrow-	1,840,000:	creases	Goals	Value	:
	tion	1/	ers 2/	farmers				:

Commodity

<u>Milk</u> , lbs.	122,000	2,588	4,951	1,419	6,370	250	5.2	\$190
<u>Pork</u> , lbs.	13,800	2,860	516	144	660	23	4.8	\$125
(dressed)								
<u>Beef</u> , lbs.	10,910	930	231	69	330	32	2.7	\$ 65
(dressed)								
<u>Eggs</u> , doz.	4,345	348	170	50	220	63	5.1	\$ 90
<u>Chickens</u> , lbs.	4,000 ^{5/}	800	105	33	138	17	3.4	\$ 35
(dressed)								
<u>Soybeans</u> , bu.	216	22.3/ _{3/}	13.2	3.4	16.6	75	7.7	\$ 25
<u>Peanuts</u> , lbs.	3,712	1,208	265	102	367	30	9.9	\$ 25
<u>Dry Edible beans</u>	2,554	593	63	30	93	16	3.6	\$ 5
lbs.								
<u>Beet Sugar</u> ,	3,800	472/ _{4/}	93	34	127	27	3.4	\$ 5
lbs.								

\$565
6/

- 1/ Calculated from data in B.A.E. and Census studies, and 1942 FSA production records; increases on other commodities proportionate.
- 2/ Actual 1942 increases in these commodities by FSA borrowers; increases on all other commodities proportionate
- 3/ Increased acreage times expected yield.
- 4/ From higher yields and sugar content; acreage goal same; this potential production indicates capacity to produce competing crops more badly needed, such as potatoes.
- 5/ Farm-produced eggs only.
- 6/ Approximate price to consumer \$1,000,000,000.