Honorabla D. W. Beil,
Under Secretary of the Ireasury, Washington, D. C.

Dear Dan:
The attached is a copy of a memorandum which I left with the Seoretary this morning, outlining the recommendations of the Executive Comittee of the Open Market Committee, the title "A Specific Pinancing Program for July, August and September ${ }^{n}$.

I would greatly appreciate it if you, George Haas, and other members of the staff would study our recomendations prior to a meeting which I hope we can have sometime week after next for the purpose of trying to get together on our suggested program or some modification of it so we can make some definite recommendations to the Secretary as early as possible.

> Sincerely yours,

## Bnclosure

MSE:VE:b

## TREASURX BTMANOLTG

## Confidential

A total of 6 billion dollars will have to be borrowed by the Treasury in the next three monthe in order to meet req̧uirements, This estimate allows for receipts from special issues to trust accounts, from war savings bonds, from tax notes, and from the weekly issuance of 300 million collars of bills.

The following specific financing program is suggested for the three-month period:

1. Intermediate treasury bonds. An offering mould be made on or about July 8 of 2,0 billion dollars of Treasury bonds. Various alternatives for this financing are given below.
2. Treasury bills. The weekly offering would be increased to 350 million dollars for the issue dated July 22 and possibly to $400 \mathrm{mil}-$ lion dollars for the issue dated August 5. Although a substantial part of the offering dated July 1 was taken by the System Account, this may be attributed largely to the fact that the entire 300 million dollars constituted new funds. It would appear preferable to continue the 300 million dollar offering for the issues dated July 8 and 15 and to increase the offering to 350 million dollars for the issue dsted July 22. After two weeks at the 350 million dollar level the offering possibly could be raised to 400 million dollars. By the end of Soptember this source would have provided 1.0 billion dollars of funds.
3. Long registered Treasury bonds. An additional open-end issue of registered $21 / 2$ per cent bonds would be announced before the beginning of trading in the present issue on July 6. In order to avoid confusion in the market the date of this issue might be advanced to September 1962-67 or the 60 -day prohibition on trading might be eliminated. The bookn would be opened within a few days after the closing of the books on next week's offering and would be kept open until aome time in September. This isaue would provide between 500 and 750 million dollars.
4. Short nonmarketable Treasury notes. An open-end issue of short nomarketable notes would be offered as soon as the Treasury can complete the necessary preparations. This might be about the first of August. The books would romain ppen indefinitely, as is the case with savings bonds and tax notes. It sema likely that from 1.0 to 2.0 billion dollsrs could be raised through this issue by the end of September. This issue as well as the long registered bonds would be actively pronoted by the Victory Fund Comititees.
5. Certificates of indebtedness. Although the market for certificates is easier at the present time, an issue of 1.5 or 2.0 billion dollars probably could be sold in September. The amount of the offering would depend in part on the amount of funds raised in the interim
through the other sources mentioned above. As the maturity of certificates is gradually increased to a year with a resultant increase in the coupon rate, these issues will become more attractive to commercial banics outside of the large cities and to investors other than commercial banks.

This program is tabulated below. The smaller amounts shown in the range would raise 6.0 billion dollars, and the larger amounts would raise 7.75 billion dollars.

## Period

July
July - Sept.
July - Sept.
Aug. - Sept.
Sept.

Igsue
Amount
(In billions of dollars)
Intermediate Treasury bonds $\quad 2.0$
Treasury bills 1.0
Long registered Treasury bonds
Short nonmarketable Treasury notes
Certificates of indebtedness Total

$$
2.0
$$

$$
1.0
$$

$$
.5-.75
$$

$$
1.0-2.0
$$

$$
\frac{1.5-2.0}{6.0-7.75}
$$

Regarding next week's financing the following suggestions
are made:

1. A single issue instead of two issues would be in the direction of keeping the number of individual issues at the lowest possible point and would avoid the market difficulties that sometimes arise when two issues of different attractiveness are offered at the same time.
2. The single issue might be of $2,21 / 8$, or $21 / 4$ per cent bonds. Since there is a large amount of bonds that are due or callable in the period where 2 per cent bonds offered at par would fall, such an issue would have some disadvantage. From the point of view of the Treasury's maturity distribution $21 / 4$ per cent bonds would be desirable, but since they would be callable in more than 10 years and would mature in more than 12 years they would be slightly long for comarcial banks, who will be the principal market in this financing. One solution would be to offer 2 per cent bonds of Karch 1950-52 at a slight discount. Such an innovation would be popular with investors, who have a preference for discount issues. One objection would be the possible psychological effect of a Treasury offering at less than par. Pernaps the best solution would be $21 / 8$ per cent bonds, which would be callable early in 1951, a period in waich there is a relatively sall amount of outstanding issues and a period also that would be more suitable for commercial bank investment.
3. If two issues are offered, the second issue might be of notes of sbout three or four years. Notes with a coupon rate of $11 / 4$ per cent would fall in about June 1945 and would be attractive to commercial banks. Instead of announcing the amount that will be allotted on each issue, it would seem preferable to announce the total amount only and to allot each issue in accordance with the amount of subscriptions received on each issue.
4. It is ouggested that subscription rules should not be applicable to this offering, except that full allotment should be given to subscriptions of $\$ 25,000$ or less.

This program is designed to obtain outside of the conmercial banking system the largest possible proportion of the required 6 billion dollars. A considerable part of this would be accomplished by the issue of nonmarketable notes. The existing anount of reserves could be made more affective by increasing the demand from smaller banks and an additional amount could be obtained from investors other than comaercial banks if the buying rate on new issues of bills should be fncreased to $1 / 2$ of 1 per cent. This could be done with the least disturbance after next week's offering is subscribed and the secondary distribution largely completed. The rate on issues already outstanding at the time of the increase would remain at $3 / 8$ of 1 per cent.

If the program that is adopted should result in a substantisl amount of purchases by commercial banks, it would appear necessary for the System Account to purchase a substantial amount of securities or for the Board to reduce the reserve requirements of central reserve city banks. From the point of view of reducing the inflationary effect of Governaent financing it would appear preferable to offer all of the various types of securities mentioned in the early part of this memorandum. The Victory Pund Comittees would actively promote the sale of these ascurities. The suggested increase in the bill buying rate would be another anti-inflationary factor. After all methods of reaching investors other than commercial banks had been tried and the largeat possible amount of funds obtained from these investors, it would then be posaible to determine the amount of securities that it is absolutely necessary for commercial banks to purchase. In that event a program could be developed for whatever open-market operations, or reduction in reserve requirements, or both as would be necessary to assure the success of the war financing with the smallest possible inflationary effect.

|  | 1942 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1943 | Fiscal years |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | liar ch | April | May | June | July* | Aug.* | Sept.* | Oct. Dec.* | Jan.June* | 1942 | 1943* |
| War activities | 2,797 | 3.231 | 3.553 | 3,823 | 4,000 | 4,300 | 4.500 | 15.300 | 34,900 | 25,954 | 63,000 |
| Total budget expenditure | 3,421 | 3.753 | 3,953 | 4,530 | 4,600 | 4,700 | 5,000 | 16,800 | 37.900 | 32,397 | 69,000 |
| Current individual income tax. | 1,457 | 132 | 12 | 800* | 30 | 20 | 720 | 680 | 3.200 | 3,200* | 4,600 |
| Current corporation income tax | 832 | 44 | 84 | 750* | 60 | 40 | 720 | 880 | 2,200 | 2,750* | 3,900 |
| Excess~profits tax . . . . . . | 728 | 46 | 75 | 500* | 50 | 30 | 630 | 770 | 2,800 | 1,550* | 4.300 |
| Back and unjust enrichment taxes | 56 | 73 | 33 | $50 *$ | 30 | 30 | 20 | 70 | 300 | 450* | 500 |
| Total income taxes . . . . . . | 3,083 | 335 | 216 | 2,086 | 200 | 100 | 2,100 | 2,400 | 8,500 | 7.960 | 13.300 |
| Miscellaneous internal revenue | 364 | 305 | 270 | 298 | 400 | 300 | 400 | 1,100 | 2,000 | 3,847 | 4,200 |
| Other. . . . . . . . . . | 100 | 55 | 77 | 108 | -- | 100 | 100 | 200 | 600 | 992 | 1,000 |
| Net budget receipts. | 3,547 | 695 | 563 | 2,492 | 600 | 500 | 2,600 | 3,700 | 11,100 | 12,799 | 18,500 |
| Budget deficit . | -126 | 3,058 | 3,391 | 2,037 | 4,000 | 4,200 | 2,400 | 13,100 | 26,800 | 19.598 | 50,500 |
| Budget deficit after proposed now taxes. | -126 | 3,058 | 3,391 | 2,037 | 4,000 | 4,200 | 2,400 | 11,100 | 21,800 | 19.598 | 43.500 |
| Net expenditures by Government corporations <br> : Other net expenditures or receipts (-) | $\begin{array}{r}68 \\ 186 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | 189 54 | 430 -369 | 298 386 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 600 | 1,300 | 1,814 135 | 2,500 |
| Total requirements . . . . . . . . | 128 | 3,301 | 3,452 | 2,721 | 4,200 | 4,400 | 2,600 | 11,700 | 23,100 | 21,547 | 46,000 |
| Special issucs to trust accounts . . . . | 143 | 24 | 160 | 367 | 200 | 100 | 200 | 1/1.400 | 1/2,900 | 1,765 | 1/4,800 |
| Tuar savings bonds. . . . . . . . . . . | 543 | 515 | 618 | 619 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 | - 3,000 | -6,000 | 5,874 | 12,000 |
| Depositary bonds . . . . . . . . . . | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | , | , | --- | , | -- | 79 | , |
| Tax notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . | -271 | 208 | 355 | -85 | 250 | 250 | -200 | 100 | 200 | 3,015 | 600 |
| Trcasury bills . . . . . | -349 | 301 | 303 | 252 | 1.050 | 300 | 50 | -- | --- | . 905 | 1,400 |
| Other direct securitios. . . . . | -22 | 1,507 | 2,175 | 1,587 | 1,720 | 2,750 | 1.550 | 7,200 | 14,000 | 9,725 | 27,200 |
| To refund guaranteod securities. . | -- | -- |  | 1,119 | -- | -- | -- | 300 | 300 | 2,230 | 600 |
| Guaranteed debt. . . . . . . . . | -7 | -- | --- | -1,118 | --- | --- | -- | -300 | -300 | -1,811 | -600 |
| Change in interost-bearing debt. . | 38 | 2,557 | 3,612 | 2,742 | 4,220 | 4,400 | 2,600 | 11,700 | 23,100 | 21,770 | 46,000 |
| Change in Treasury cash balance. . . . . | -90 | -744 | +160 | +21 | +20 | -- | -- | -- | -- | $+223$ | -- |
| Treasury cash balance at ond of poriod. | 2,544 | 1,800 | 1,960 | 1,981 | 2,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 | 1,981 | 2,000 |

* Estimated.

1/ Including proposed now social socurity receipts to be invosted in special issuos.

