

A. No, I haven't. The Secretary of the Army comes into the picture only after the current review by General Connor, the 3rd Army Commander, is completed and then the two intervening court reviews are completed—the Court of Military Review and the Court of Military Appeals. The first review is mandatory, the second one depends as one of the parties' appealing to the civilian court, the Court of Military Appeals. And only after those three intermediate reviews are completed does the option arise of going to the Secretary of the Army with respect to sentencing.

Q. So you probably won't get to do it then before you leave in June?

A. Oh, no, that's quite clear.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the defense lawyers at Fort Meade yesterday charged that your decisions with regard to Generals Koster and Young were prejudicial in the case of Colonel Henderson. Can you comment on that, sir?

A. No, I don't think I should—I've consistently taken the position that I shouldn't comment on the My Lai case at all for good legal reasons, and I think it's safer to adhere to that.

Q. Then you presume that it was not prejudicial or that it did not indicate command influence?

A. That's right.

Q. To go back to your first answer—you said the wisdom of our entry into Vietnam could not now be assessed. Could I ask you, in the light of your long service and the turmoil here at home and the long drawn out nature of the war, if you now have any doubts about our entry into Vietnam?

A. Yes, I think I would, but as I say, I'm not myself—I haven't reached a personal final conclusion. I think if it turns out we achieve our objective—and I think there is a good chance that we still can—namely, that they stand on their own feet with a viable and stable government that can defend itself, and then if domestically we recover from our discouragement and current divisive situation, then I think on balance it may turn to have been the wise thing to do. I think we're going through today a critical period where we are as a nation discouraged by our experience in Vietnam, discouraged by the other problems of our society as a whole—drugs, for example, and the polarization among the races. If this were to result in a return to an isolationist policy or a neo-isolationist policy, if this were to result in significant unilateral reductions of force in Europe, which in turn caused the Germans to accommodate with the Soviets and undermine the possibility which looks so promising today with the potential entry of Europe in the Common Market—the potential of developing stronger cohesiveness among the Western European countries and a greater power to contribute to their own defense. If that were all undermined by a revulsion with respect to our experience in Vietnam, then I think surely it would have been an unwise thing to have done.

I hope and think that we're mature enough not to let that come about and to distinguish between Asia and Western Europe. I think myself the Nixon policy, it is clear, means in Asia a greater reliance on allied manpower, but I think it also is clear that it means Western Europe is still the center of focus of our international policy and that stability in Western Europe is absolutely essential to the kind of free world that we know, and that we will make the sacrifices that are necessary to maintain the force levels, to maintain stability, and to buy the time. These force levels in my view buy time for Western Europe to develop these political institutions which you see growing right before your eyes, the Common Market being the most important one. Then as those institutions develop, the tremendous resources of Western Europe—which are greater than the resources of all the Warsaw Pact put

together, greater in population, greater in Gross National Product—those great resources then can be effectively used in their own defense. And then our U.S. burden will be lessened, but it won't be lessened if we don't stay the course and have the patience. If we unilaterally move now to withdraw, we'll undermine this hope; and there's a real danger that the Germans will turn east as they have so often in their history.

Q. Do I understand you to say that the German Ost Politik is inconsistent with a Strong Common Market?

A. No, I don't. In fact, the Ost Politik is, as Helmut Schmidt has made so clear, dependent on a strong NATO. The building of bridges in the proper way from a strong Germany to Russia is made possible only by a strong NATO. That's what I understand Ost Politik is. But if we unilaterally withdraw, then we force the Germans into accommodation with the Soviets, sort of a Finlandization of Germany; and that's something entirely different from what they now contemplate by Ost Politik.

Q. Mr. Resor, again back to the figures. You said that you need the draft extension two years if you are not going to run 100,000 men short of the minimum number the Army will have on board. What is that number from which you would be 100,000 short?

A. It's certainly no more than 900,000 and even at an Army as low as 900,000 you would still be at least 100,000 short. I think actually it's a figure lower than that. I think it's a figure around 870,000, and you would be 100,000 short of that figure.

Q. That's the end of FY 72 figure?

A. 73. Now, this is not a—we haven't set the 73 budget yet, and so this is just looking at the impact of a no-two-year extension, trying to get a range of what the impact would be. Now, of course, you would have a very serious—more serious—impact on the Reserve Components. They would go down a couple of hundred thousand below their currently mandated manpower level.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you say that overall in future our country might be better off if our Army did not get involved in another Asian land war?

A. Yes, Well, I don't think, again, I think it's terribly unwise to generalize for long periods in the future, but I think certainly one would say that we would weigh much more carefully the use of ground troops in Asia because, I think, we see more clearly today the costs of it. We see more clearly the difficulties of limited war; but I think one of the things that was done right in the Vietnam War, and was done right in the Korean War was that it was a limited use of power for a limited objective, which of course turned out successfully in Korea. Korea is, I think, something we can be very proud of, the result of our effort there, because today Korea's Gross National Product expands at 10 per cent a year. It has a strong ground force capable of defending themselves against the North Koreans alone, and in South Vietnam we learned from the Korean War and we continued the policy of a limited application of military power. I think the days of all-out war are gone, and I think it's clear that our policymakers have accepted that conclusion, of course, because of the problems of nuclear weapons.

Q. Has Vietnam shown, Mr. Secretary, that our Army possibly cannot win a conclusive victory against jungle guerrillas?

A. No, I think victory is an ambiguous term which causes, I think, a lot of confusion if applied to the Vietnam scene. I think you have to keep firmly in mind what our objectives are. Our objectives are that the Government of South Vietnam shall be viable and be able to stand on its own feet, and I think we have the potential to achieve that objective. I don't think, as I indicated the other day, that it's by any means assured; but I think that we have a good chance of

achieving that. We will have done it, if we do, by this total strategy of the military, the economic, and the political together; and that is what I think we've learned from the Vietnam War—a better understanding of how to deal with guerrilla attacks and insurgency.

Q. But does it seem practical to eradicate a guerrilla force?

A. What we've learned is that you have to first furnish relative security for most of the population. That's what's going on in the Delta today under General Trung, who is as fine a military leader as there is, as we have in our Army. He has set up fire bases throughout all the enemy based areas, and he's going to provide relative security in the Delta. That doesn't mean you're not going to have some terrorism, and that will continue, and continue for a long time; but if you have relative security, then you control the population, and the guerrilla movement no longer can replace its losses. And gradually over time it will be able to be handled by the police power of the state more and the military less.

Q. Aren't you saying, sir, that it's impossible for one side to fight a limited war? We say we're fighting a limited war but they're not, they're fighting all out.

A. I'm talking limited in the sense of we're not using our total military power, namely for example, our nuclear power. We've never bombed cities, and I think quite wisely so. Thank you very much.

After coordination with Mr. Kester, Dep ASA(M&RA), LTC Smith contacted Fred Hoffman, AP Pentagon Correspondent at 1210 hours, 22 May 71 and provided the following information regarding his question on costs for a volunteer force:

"The Gates Commission underestimated the number of accessions required—underestimated by approximately 35,000 the number of true volunteers (partly because they did not have the benefit of the experience gained from the lottery system); and did not differentiate for combat skilled and non-combat skilled personnel.

"Our accessions plus the number of true volunteers, computed by the Gates Commission formula, indicate that the cost for FY 73 will be in the neighborhood of 7.5 billion dollars—although this too is still a very imprecise figure—instead of the 2.7 billion dollars estimated by the Gates Commission."

REUSS PROPOSAL TO LET DOLLAR FLOAT HAS GREAT MERIT

Mr. PROXMIRE, Mr. President, there is no Member of Congress who surpasses Congressman HENRY REUSS of Wisconsin in his knowledge of international financial and economic affairs. Time and again he has proposed innovative and constructive ideas which the highly conservative international banking community has originally opposed, but which in the end they have adopted—usually without giving Congressman REUSS the great credit he deserves.

Now, once again, he has made an innovative and constructive proposal. And once again the Treasury and the international financial community has pooh-poohed the idea. But Congressman REUSS is right and they are wrong. I predict that in the not too distant future they will accept his proposal.

Congressman REUSS has introduced a resolution to let the dollar float in the international currency markets. At the present time its price is pegged. Unlike other commodities—and money is a commodity—its price is fixed arbitrarily.

But a floating dollar would introduce

into the present-day international money mechanism the automatic adjustments reflecting the genuine economic conditions in the world. If U.S. prices are too high, if the economy is sated with inflation, then a floating dollar would adjust those prices internationally to their real market price. That would help stimulate our exports, when prices are too high; bring in dollars from abroad, and help to make economic adjustments long overdue.

Congressman REUSS is right. It is amazing to me that his obviously correct proposal is opposed by the Treasury. For the only substitute for it is a controlled market and a controlled price which otherwise highly conservative bankers shun.

What they appear to want is competition for others, but controlled prices for themselves.

I commend the Reuss position to the Congress and the country. I ask unanimous consent that a short article from the Wall Street Journal reporting it and the opposition to it be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REPRESENTATIVE REUSS WOULD LET DOLLAR "FLOAT" DOWN; RESOLUTION SEEN ATTRACTING LITTLE INTEREST

WASHINGTON.—A resolution calling for the Nixon administration to let the dollar "float" down in international currency markets was introduced by Rep. Henry Reuss, but drew an instant Treasury rebuttal.

The proposal by the Wisconsin Democrat, who heads the international exchange unit of the Congressional Joint Economic Committee, is similar to the views of a number of European financial authorities who contend the dollar is overvalued and should be allowed to drift moderately lower.

However, there has been little thought about such matters in Congress generally, analysts say, and they figure the resolution will attract little interest. A Treasury spokesman said emphatically that Mr. Reuss's proposal "is certainly not the position of the U.S. government" noting that Secretary John B. Connally made clear last week in a speech in Munich that "we aren't going to devalue" the dollar.

At present, the dollar is held to a fixed value by the Treasury's practice of paying out gold at the official price of \$35 an ounce to foreign central banks wishing to turn in excess dollars. "Only by closing the gold window," Mr. Reuss argued, can the dollar "find a new and sounder relationship" with the Japanese yen and other undervalued currencies, thus avoiding "deterioration of our trading position and a return to trade autarchy."

The dollar is no longer so far out of line against a number of other currencies, Mr. Reuss noted, with Germany, Holland and Canada currently allowing their currencies to float up in exchange markets, and with Austria and Switzerland recently having set higher fixed parities for their currencies.

But Japan, he said, can still "flood our markets" with its goods and, thus, send American business and labor into seeking import curbs that "could be the end of free trade." Talk of the dollar going down in value, Mr. Reuss suggested, "may very well" prompt the Japanese central bank to follow the German example and let the yen float up and the dollar down in Japan's exchange markets. "This would be a good thing for the U.S., for the world monetary system, and in the end for Japan, too," he said.

OXVII—1141—Part 14

The U.S., he added, ought to compensate foreign central banks for any loss in the value of the dollar reserves as of June 1, provided they avoid gold and other dealings that could frustrate the "unilateral" action he recommends.

TRIBUTE TO AUDIE MURPHY

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, on Friday, May 28, a tragic airplane accident took the life of one of America's most distinguished soldiers. Audie Murphy was only 20 years old when his heroism stunned America and gave each of us a sense of pride that he was ours. During World War II, a war of unprecedented bravery, Lieutenant Murphy became our most decorated serviceman. In and of themselves these decorations had little meaning—a piece of metal, a scrap of cloth. He gave most of them away to children. It is the fact that each of these medals represent some heroic act, a risk of life and safety that gives meaning to the fact that Audie Murphy was our most decorated hero. He was our bravest hero. Of 235 men in his original company, only he and a supply sergeant survived the struggle from Italy to southern France.

It is Audie Murphy's selfless courage that serves as an inspiration to all Americans, young and old. The altruistic willingness to lay down one's own life for his comrades is man's most noble trait. Lieutenant Murphy exhibited that trait from Casablanca to France.

I take particular pride in the fact that Audie Murphy was from my home State. He was born near Kingston in Hunt County, Tex. He contributed enormously to the Texas heritage of courage which has found its way from the Alamo to Khe Sanh. We shall not forget him.

ANOTHER SILENT MAJORITY

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, a New Hampshire doctor has written to the editor of the New York Times concerning the inequities of the draft. Of particular concern are his remarks which indicate that certain minority groups are contributing their sons to the Armed Forces in far greater measure than would be required by their share of the Nation's population.

I ask unanimous consent that the letter from Dr. George Margolis be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter to the editor was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ANOTHER SILENT MAJORITY

To the Editor:

As Congress considers extension of the military draft it is imperative that it review its extraordinarily vulnerable position.

Over one million Americans have had a close family member either killed or seriously wounded in Vietnam. But it must be recognized that the risks are not shared equally across the population. The bereaved families overrepresent the great American underclass, consisting of less privileged whites and all but the very upper crust of nonwhites. Two statistics drive home this point.

First, let us look at Congress itself. A Congressional Quarterly survey (February 13, 1970) found that only 3.6 per cent of the Congressmen had sons or grandsons who saw combat in Vietnam. Of 234 draft-eligible

sons, half were deferred and only 26 ever served in Vietnam. One was wounded—only one.

For comparison, let us look at figures from a single minority group. Forty-five per cent of Mexican-Americans eligible for the draft are drafted, while only 19 per cent of Anglos eligible for the draft are drafted. As a result, the former ethnic group, which constitutes only 5 per cent of the American population makes up 20 per cent of the casualties in Vietnam.

E. James Lieberman, from whom comes much of the argument presented here ("War and the Family," Modern Medicine, April 19, 1971) calls this attrition "genasthenia" (race weakening) to bring home the concept of systematic, albeit unwitting, attenuation of ethnic group strength. As he states, "This group who are hurting the most—and grieving the most—cannot be heard above the regimental drums, the blaring television, the Congressional oratory" and are living in poverty and deprivation—the tragic version of a silent majority.

To me, such examples constitute a cogent argument against the present military draft system.

GEORGE MARGOLIS, M.D.
HANOVER, N.H., May 17, 1971.

THE SOLAR ENERGY ALTERNATIVE

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, we all recognize the fact that this country is facing a grave energy crisis. A rising population with increasing power needs must have energy supplied in a manner which will not leave us with a seriously damaged environment.

Among the alternatives which must be considered to meet long-range power needs is solar energy. Certainly, more resources must be directed toward research and development of this nonpolluting form of energy.

The International Solar Energy Society recently held a conference at the NASA-Goddard Space Flight center near Washington. I ask unanimous consent that the keynote address of Dr. Manfred Altman, of the University of Pennsylvania, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ADDRESS BY DR. MANFRED ALTMAN

A keynote speaker is to be a fighter. He is to set the tone for a meeting not unlike the football coach who inspires his team to go out and conquer.

Unfortunately there is also another kind of keynote speaker—namely the one who comes not to praise Caesar, but to bury him!

Some of my remarks may suggest the latter, but please believe me when I tell you that I really mean to be the former—just be a little patient with me.

Not very long ago one of my friends told me the following story.

His little daughter had just received many beautiful Xmas toys—

Must share with little visitor.

Beat him up.

Why?

Refused to share her toys.

In some ways this little story reminds me of solar energy proponents and the public at large. They refuse to take us seriously and will not play with our toys—Why?

I am first of all reminded of a conversation I had with a gentleman who is pretty high up the ladder in an Electric Utility which shall remain nameless. We talked about the aerospace industry and its poten-