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THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE

REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, LONDON

BY PRIME MINISTER WINSTON CHURCHILL

February 27, 1945

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

BY PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

March 1, 1945

THE ACT OF CHAPULTEPEC

Adopted by the

INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE ON WAR AND PEACE

Mexico City, March 6, 1945



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CONTENTS

Page

Preface 289

Report on the Crimea Conference to the House of Commons,
London, by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Feb-
ruary 27, 1945 291

Report on the Crimea Conference to the Congress of the
United States, by President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
March 1, 1945 319

The Act of Chapultepec: Declaration on Western Hemi-
sphere Security adopted by the Inter-American Con-
ference on War and Peace, Mexico City, on March 6,
1945 335

PREFACE

The statement on the results of the Crimea Conference issued on February 11 by the Heads of the three Governments represented at the meeting at Yalta was published in the March, 1945, issue of *International Conciliation*. For the record of that conference there is included in this issue the report concerning it made by Prime Minister Winston Churchill to the British House of Commons on February 27 and that made by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Congress of the United States on March 1.

In the Act of Chapultepec, one of the major achievements of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of the War and Peace held at Chapultepec Castle overlooking the Mexican capital, February 21–March 8, 1945, the twenty republics participating agreed upon policies to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of the American States against aggression from any quarter. The text of that Act, as made public at Mexico City on March 3, is given in this pamphlet.

NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER

New York, March 14, 1945.

REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, LONDON,
BY PRIME MINISTER WINSTON CHURCHILL¹

February 27, 1945,

The recent conference of the three powers in the Crimea faced realities and difficulties in so exceptional a manner that the result constituted an act of State, on which Parliament should formally express their opinion. His Majesty's Government feel they have the right to know where they stand with the House of Commons. A strong expression of support by the House will strengthen our position among our allies. The intimate and sensitive connections between the Executive Government and the House of Commons will, thereby, also be made plain, thus showing the liveliness of our democratic institutions, and the subordination of Ministers to Parliamentary authority. The House will not shrink from its duty of pronouncing. We live in a time when equality of decision is required from all who take part in our public affairs. In this way also, the firm and tenacious character of the present Parliament, and, generally, of our Parliamentary institutions, emerging as they do fortified from the storms of the war, will be made manifest. We have, therefore, thought it right and necessary to place a positive Motion on the Paper, in support of which I should like to submit some facts and arguments to the House at the opening of this three days' debate.

The difficulties of bringing about a conference of the three Heads of the Governments of the principal Allies are only too obvious. The fact that, in spite of all modern methods of communication, fourteen months elapsed between Teheran and Yalta is a measure of those difficulties. It is well known that His Majesty's Government greatly desired a triple meeting in the autumn. We rejoiced when, at last, Yalta was fixed. On the way there, the British and United States delegations met at Malta to discuss the wide range of our joint military and political affairs. The combined Chiefs of

¹ Reprinted from Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Volume 408, No. 309, February 27, 1945.

Staff of the two countries were for three days in conference upon the great operations now developing on the western front, and upon the war plans against Japan, which it was appropriate for us to discuss together. The Foreign Secretary, accompanied by high officials and assistants some of whom unhappily perished on the way, also met Mr. Stettinius there. On the morning of February 2 the cruiser which bore the President steamed majestically into the battle-scarred harbor. A plenary meeting of the combined Chiefs of Staff was held in the afternoon, at which the President and I approved the proposals which had been so carefully worked out in the preceding days for carrying our joint war effort to the highest pitch, and for the shaping and timing of the military operations. Meantime the Minister of War Transport and the American authorities concerned, had been laboring on a vessel all to themselves at the problems of shipping, which govern our affairs at present and which affect the movement and the reserves of oil, food, munitions, and troops. On all these matters, complete agreement was reached—very difficult and complicated matters—like making an international Bradshaw in which the times of all the express trains may have to be varied, if half a dozen unforeseen contingencies arise. No hard-and-fast agreements were made on any political issues. These, naturally, were to form the subject of the triple conference, and they were carefully kept open for the full meeting.

The reason why shipping is so tight at present is that the peak period of the war in Europe has been prolonged for a good many months beyond what was hoped for last autumn, and, meanwhile, the peak period against Japan has been brought forward by the American victories in the Pacific. Thus, instead of one peak period fading out or dovetailing into the other, there is an overlap, or double peak period, in the two wars which we are waging together on opposite sides of the globe. Although for a couple of years past our joint losses by U-boats have ceased to be an appreciable factor in our main business, and although the shipbuilding output of the United States flows on gigantically, and although the Allies have today, far more shipping than they ever had at any time previously during the war, we are, in fact, more hard-pressed by shipping

shortage than ever before. The same double peak of war effort, of course, affects all our preparations for the turn-over to peace, including housing, and the much-needed supplies for civilians. All these facts call for the most strenuous and searching economy on the military side, where indulgence or miscalculation, or extravagance of any kind, is a grave injury to the common cause. They also lamentably hamper our power to provide for the dire needs of the liberated territories. I am not prepared to have this island cut below its minimum safety reserves of food and oil, except in cases where sure and speedy replacement can be made. Subject to this, we shall do everything in our power to help the liberated countries. It is easy to see the rigorous character of the discussions which Lord Leathers—who is highly competent in these matters and is admitted to be a magnificent authority on all this aspect, and who holds it all in his head, has conducted on our behalf, and we may be satisfied today with the fair and friendly distribution of burden and hardship which has been agreed upon between Great Britain and the United States over the whole inter-Allied shipping pool.

There was the diplomatic conference proceeding on one cruiser; there was the military discussion proceeding on another, and the discussions on shipping going forward on a third vessel. Then, at the end, the President arrived, and the results were submitted to him and to me. I kept in touch with what was going on, and we jointly approved all these matters, on which action was immediately taken.

After that, we all flew safely from Malta to the airfield in the Crimea, and motored over the mountains—about which very alarming accounts had been given, but these proved to be greatly exaggerated—until we found shelter on the southern shore of the Crimea. This is protected by the mountains and forms a beautiful Black Sea Riviera, where there still remain undestroyed by the Nazis, a few villas and palaces of the vanished imperial and aristocratic regime. By extreme exertions and every form of thoughtfulness and ingenuity, our Russian hosts had restored these dwellings to good order, and had provided for our accommodation and comfort in the true style of Russian hospitality. In the background

were the precipices and the mountains; beyond them, the devastated fields and shattered dwellings of the Crimea, across which twice the armies have surged in deadly combat. Here on this shore, we labored for nine days and grappled with many problems of war and policy while friendship grew.

I have seen a criticism in this country that France was not invited to participate in the conference at Yalta. The first principle of British policy in Western Europe is a strong France, and a strong French army. It was, however, felt by all three great powers assembled in the Crimea that, while they are responsible for bearing to an overwhelming degree the main brunt and burden of the conduct of the war and the policy intimately connected with the operations, they could not allow any restrictions to be placed upon their right to meet together as they deemed necessary, in order that they may effectively discharge their duties to the common cause. This view, of course, does not exclude meetings on the highest level to which other powers will be invited.

France may however find many reasons for contentment with the Crimea decisions. Under these decisions France is to be invited to take over a zone of occupation in Germany, which we will immediately proceed to delimit with her, and to sit on the Allied Control Commission in Germany, which regulates the whole affairs of that country after the unconditional surrender has been obtained. France is to be invited to join the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and China in sponsoring the invitations to the San Francisco Conference, which has been arranged for April 25 this year. She is invited to join the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union in operating the procedure laid down in the Declaration on liberated Europe. She is also a member of the European Advisory Commission, to whom most important tasks have been relegated, including advice to the Governments upon most important matters connected with the treatment of Germany. This Commission, with French assistance, has already completed in great detail all the terms upon which unconditional surrender will be received and accepted. Everything is provided for in that sphere. If we were confronted tomorrow with a collapse of the German power, there

is nothing that has not been foreseen and arranged beforehand by this important European Advisory Commission consisting of Mr. Winant, Ambassador Gusev, and Sir William Strang, of the Foreign Office.

Mr. Bellenger (Bassetlaw): Does that apply to occupation only?

The Prime Minister: No, it applies to what I have said—to the arrangements for the occupation as far as they can be foreseen, and also it is to advise us on various matters connected with Germany apart from the actual taking over by our military authorities. All these arrangements show clearly the importance of the role which France is called upon to play in the settlement of Europe, and how fully it is recognized that she must be intimately associated with the other great powers in this task. In order to give further explanations of the proceedings of the conference, we invited M. Bidault, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, to visit London at the earliest opportunity. He was good enough to come, and during the last few days, we have had the pleasure of a series of clarifying talks with him, in which he has been able to become fully informed of the whole position, and to express in the most effective manner the views and wishes of France upon it.

On world organization, there is little that I can say beyond what is contained in the Report of the Conference, and, of course, in the earlier reports which emanated from Dumbarton Oaks. At the Crimea, the three great powers agreed on a solution of the difficult question of voting procedure, to which no answer had been found at Dumbarton Oaks. Agreement on this vital matter has enabled us to take the next step forward in the setting up of the new world organization, and the arrangements are in hand for the issue of invitations to the United Nations conference which, as I have said, will meet in a couple of months at San Francisco. I wish I could give to the House full particulars of the solution of this question of the voting procedure, to which representatives of the three great powers, formerly in disagreement, have now whole-heartedly agreed. We thought it right, however, that we should consult both France and China, and should endeavor to secure their acceptance

before the formula was published. For the moment, therefore, I can only deal with the matter in general terms.

Here is the difficulty which has to be faced. It is on the great powers that the chief burden of maintaining peace and security will fall. The new world organization must take into account this special responsibility of the great powers, and must be so framed as not to compromise their unity, or their capacity for effective action if it is called for at short notice. At the same time, the world organization cannot be based upon a dictatorship of the great powers. It is their duty to serve the world and not to rule it. We trust the voting procedure on which we agreed at Yalta meets these two essential points and provides a system which is fair and acceptable, having regard to the evident difficulties, which will meet anyone who gives prolonged thought to the subject.

The conference at San Francisco will bring together, upon the invitation of the United States, Great Britain, the British Commonwealth, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the provisional Government of the French Republic, and the Republic of China, all those members of the United Nations who have declared war on Germany or Japan by March 1, 1945, and who have signed the United Nations Conference declaration. Many are declaring war or have done so since Yalta, and their action should be treated with respect and satisfaction by those who have borne the burden and heat of the day. Our future will be consolidated and enriched by the participation of these powers who, together with the founder members, will take the opening steps to form the World Organization to which it is hoped that ultimately and in due course all States will belong. It is to this strongly-armed body that we look to prevent wars of aggression, or the preparation for such wars, and to enable disputes between States, both great and small, to be adjusted by peaceful and lawful means, by persuasion, by the pressure of public opinion, by legal method and eventually by another category of method which constitutes the principle of this new organization.

The former League of Nations, so hardly used and found to be inadequate for the tasks it attempted, will be replaced by a far stronger body in which the United States will play a vitally im-

portant part. It will embody much of the structure and characteristics of its predecessor. All the work that was done in the past, all the experience that has been gathered by the workings of the League of Nations, will not be cast away, but the new body will differ from it in the essential point that it will not shrink from establishing its will against the evil-doer, or evil-planner, in good time and by force of arms. This organization, which is capable of continuous progress and development, is at any rate appropriate to the phase into which the world will enter after our present enemies have been beaten down, and we may have good hopes, and, more than hopes, a resolute determination that it will shield humanity from a third renewal of its agonies. We have all been made aware in the interval between the two world wars of the weaknesses of international bodies, whose work is seriously complicated by the misfortune which occurred in the building of the Tower of Babel. Taught by bitter experience we hope now to make the world conscious of the strength of the new instrument and of the protection which it will be able to afford to all who wish to dwell in peace within their habitations.

This new world structure will, from the outset and in all parts of its work, be aided to the utmost by the ordinary channels of friendly diplomatic intercourse, which it in no way supersedes. For our part, we are determined to do all in our power to insure the success of the conference. On such an occasion it is clearly right that the two leading parties in His Majesty's Government and in the British nation, should be represented and all parties bound for the future in these decisions. I am glad to inform the House that His Majesty's chief representatives at this conference will be my right honorable friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Lord President of the Council, the leader of the Labour Party. I am most anxious that this principle should be established even in what are perhaps the closing stages of this memorable coalition. I am anxious that all parties should be united in this new instrument, so that these supreme affairs shall be, in Mr. Gladstone's words, "high and dry above the ebb and flow of party politics." I confess that I have not verified that quotation, and I ask for all indulgence if I should be proved to have made any slip.

The Crimea Conference finds the Allies more closely united than ever before, both in the military and in the political sphere. Let Germany recognize that it is futile to hope for division among the Allies and that nothing can avert her utter defeat. Further resistance will only be the cause of needless suffering. The Allies are resolved that Germany shall be totally disarmed, that nazism and militarism in Germany shall be destroyed, that war criminals shall be justly and swiftly punished, that all German industry capable of military production shall be eliminated or controlled, and that Germany shall make compensation in kind to the utmost of her ability for damage done to Allied nations. On the other hand, it is not the purpose of the Allies to destroy the people of Germany, or leave them without the necessary means of subsistence. Our policy is not revenge; it is to take such measures as may be necessary to secure the future peace and safety of the world. There will be a place one day for Germans in the community of nations, but only when all traces of nazism and militarism have been effectively and finally extirpated.

On the general plan, there is complete agreement. As to the measures to give effect to it, much still remains to be done. The plans for the Allied Control Commission will come into operation immediately on the defeat of Germany; indeed, they are far advanced, advanced, as I have said, to the point where they could be instantly made effective. On the longer-term measures, there are many points of great importance on which detailed plans have yet to be worked out between the Allies. It would be a great mistake to suppose that questions of this kind can be thrashed out, and solutions found for all the many intractable and complex problems involved, while the Armies are still on the march. To hurry and press matters of this kind might well be to risk causing disunity between the Allies. Many of these matters must await the time when the leaders of the Allies, freed from the burden of the direction of the war, can turn their whole or main attention to the making of a wise and farseeing peace which will, I trust, become a foundation greatly facilitating the work of the World Organization.

I now come to the most difficult and agitating part of the statement which I have to make to the House—the question of Poland.

For more than a year past, and since the tide of war has turned so strongly against Germany, the Polish problem has been divided into two main issues—the frontiers of Poland and the freedom of Poland.

The House is well aware from the speeches I have made to them that the freedom, independence, integrity, and sovereignty of Poland have always seemed to His Majesty's Government more important than the actual frontiers. To establish a free Polish nation with a good home to live in, has always far outweighed, in my mind, the actual tracing of the frontier line, or whether these boundaries should be shifted on both sides of Poland further to the west. The Russian claim, first advanced at Teheran in November, 1943, has always been unchanged for the Curzon Line in the East, and the Russian offer has always been that ample compensation should be gained for Poland at the expense of Germany in the north and in the west. All these matters are tolerably well known now. My right honorable friend the Foreign Secretary explained in detail last December the story of the Curzon Line. I have never concealed from the House, that, personally, I think the Russian claim is just and right. If I champion this frontier for Russia, it is not because I bow to force. It is because I believe it is the fairest division of territory that can, in all the circumstances, be made between the two countries whose history has been so checkered and intermingled.

The Curzon Line was drawn in 1919 by an expert commission, of which one of our most distinguished foreign representatives of those days, Sir Eyre Crowe, was a member. It was drawn at a time when Russia had few friends among the Allies. In fact, I may say that she was extremely unpopular. One cannot feel that either the circumstances or the personalities concerned, would have given undue favor to Soviet Russia. They just tried to find out what was the right and proper line to draw. The British Government in those days approved this Line including, of course, the exclusion of Lvov from Poland. Apart from all that has happened since, I cannot conceive that we should not regard it as a well-informed and fair proposal.

There are two things to be remembered in justice to our great

ally. I can look back to August, 1914, when Germany first declared war against Russia under the Tsar. In those days, the Russian frontiers on the west were far more spacious than those for which Russia is now asking after all her sufferings and victories. The Tsarist frontiers included all Finland and the whole of the vast Warsaw salient stretching to within sixty miles of Breslau. Russia is, in fact, accepting a frontier which over immense distances is two hundred or three hundred miles further to the east than what was Russian territory and had been Russian territory for many generations under the Tsarist regime. Marshal Stalin told me one day that Lenin objected to the Curzon Line because Bialystok and the region round it were taken from Russia. Marshal Stalin and the modern Soviet Government make no such claim and freely agree with the view taken by the Allied Commission of 1919 that the Bialystok region should go to Poland because of the Polish population predominating there.

We speak of the Curzon Line. A line is not a frontier. A frontier has to be surveyed and traced on the ground and not merely cut in on a map by a pencil and ruler. When my right honorable friend and I were at Moscow in October Marshal Stalin made this point to me, and at that time he said that there might be deviations of eight to ten kilometers in either direction in order to follow the courses of streams and hills or the actual sites of particular villages. It seems to me that this was an eminently sensible way of looking at the problem. However, when we met at Yalta the Russian proposal was changed. It was made clear that all such minor alterations would be at the expense of Russia and not at the expense of Poland in order that the Poles might have their minds set at rest once and for all and there would be no further discussion about that part of the business. We welcomed this Soviet proposal. One must regard these thirty years or more of strife, turmoil, and suffering in Europe as part of one story. I have lived through the whole story since 1911 when I was sent to the Admiralty to prepare the Fleet for an impending German war. In its main essentials it seems to me to be one story of a thirty years' war, or more than a thirty years' war, in which British, Russians, Americans, and French have struggled to their utmost to resist German

aggression at a cost most grievous to all of them, but to none more frightful than to the Russian people, whose country has twice been ravaged over vast areas and whose blood has been poured out in tens of millions of lives in a common cause now reaching final accomplishment.

There is a second reason which appeals to me apart from this sense of continuity which I personally feel. But for the prodigious exertions and sacrifices of Russia, Poland was doomed to utter destruction at the hands of the Germans. Not only Poland as a State and as a nation, but the Poles as a race were doomed by Hitler to be destroyed or reduced to a servile station. Three and a half million Polish Jews are said to have been actually slaughtered. It is certain that enormous numbers have perished in one of the most horrifying acts of cruelty, probably the most horrifying act of cruelty, which has ever darkened the passage of man on the earth. When the Germans had clearly avowed their intention of making the Poles a subject and lower-grade race under the *Herrenvolk*, suddenly, by a superb effort of military force and skill, the Russian Armies, in little more than three weeks, since, in fact, we spoke on these matters here, have advanced from the Vistula to the Oder, driving the Germans in ruin before them and freeing the whole of Poland from the awful cruelty and oppression under which the Poles were writhing.

In supporting the Russian claim to the Curzon Line, I repudiate and repulse any suggestion that we are making a questionable compromise or yielding to force or fear, and I assert with the utmost conviction the broad justice of the policy upon which, for the first time, all the three great Allies have now taken their stand. Moreover, the three powers have now agreed that Poland shall receive substantial accessions of territory both in the north and in the west. In the north she will certainly receive, in the place of a precarious Corridor, the great city of Danzig, the greater part of East Prussia west and south of Koenigsberg and a long, wide sea front on the Baltic. In the west she will receive the important industrial province of Upper Silesia and, in addition, such other territories to the east of the Oder as it may be decided at the peace settlement to detach from Germany after the views

of a broadly based Polish government have been ascertained.

Thus, it seems to me that this talk of cutting half of Poland off is very misleading. In fact, the part which is to be east of the Curzon Line cannot in any case be measured by its size. It includes the enormous, dismal region of the Pripet Marshes, which Poland held between the two wars, and it exchanges for that the far more fruitful and developed land in the west, from which a very large portion of the German population has already departed. We need not fear that the task of holding these new lines will be too heavy for Poland, or that it will bring about another German revenge or that it will, to use a conventional phrase, sow the seeds of future wars. We intend to take steps far more drastic and effective than those which followed the last war, because we know much more about this business, so as to render all offensive action by Germany utterly impossible for generations to come.

Finally, under the world organization of nations great and small, victors and vanquished will be secured against aggression by indisputable law and by overwhelming international force. The published Crimea Agreement is not a ready-made plan, imposed by the great powers on the Polish people. It sets out the agreed views of the three major Allies on the means whereby their common desire to see established a strong, free, independent Poland, may be fulfilled in cooperation with the Poles themselves, and whereby a Polish government which all the United Nations can recognize may be set up in Poland. This has become for the first time a possibility now that practically the whole country has been liberated by the Soviet Army. The fulfilment of the plan will depend upon the willingness of all sections of democratic Polish opinion in Poland or abroad to work together in giving it effect. The plan should be studied as a whole, and with the main common objective always in view. The three powers are agreed that acceptance by the Poles of the provisions on the eastern frontiers and, so far as can now be ascertained on the western frontiers, is an essential condition of the establishment and future welfare and security of a strong, independent, homogeneous Polish State.

The proposals on frontiers are in complete accord, as the

House will remember, with the views expressed by me in Parliament on behalf of His Majesty's Government many times during the past year. I ventured to make pronouncements upon this subject at a time when a great measure of agreement was not expressed by the other important parties to the affair. The eastern frontier must be settled now, if the new Polish administration is to be able to carry on its work in its own territory, and to do this in amity with the Russians and behind their fighting fronts. The western frontiers, which will involve a substantial accession of German territory to Poland, cannot be fixed except as part of the whole German settlement until after the Allies have occupied German territory and after a fully representative Polish government has been able to make its wishes known. It would be a great mistake to press Poland to take a larger portion of these lands than is considered by her and by her friends and allies to be within her compass to man, to develop, and, with the aid of the Allies and the world organization, to maintain.

I have now dealt with the frontiers of Poland. I must say I think it is a case which I can outline with great confidence to the House. An impartial line traced long ago by a British commission in which Britain took a leading part; the moderation with which the Russians have strictly confined themselves to that line; the enormous sacrifices they have made and the sufferings they have undergone; the contributions they have made to our present victory; the great interest, the vital interest, which Poland has in having complete agreement with her powerful neighbor to the east—when you consider all those matters and the way they have been put forward, the temperate, patient manner in which they have been put forward and discussed, I say that I have rarely seen a case in this House which I could commend with more confidence to the good sense of Members of all sides.

But even more important than the frontiers of Poland, within the limits now disclosed, is the freedom of Poland. The home of the Poles is settled. Are they to be masters in their own house? Are they to be free, as we in Britain and the United States or France are free? Is their sovereignty and their independence to be untrammelled, or are they to become a mere projection of the

Soviet State, forced against their will, by an armed minority, to adopt a communist or totalitarian system? Well, I am putting the case in all its bluntness. It is a touchstone far more sensitive and vital than the drawing of frontier lines. Where does Poland stand? Where do we all stand on this?

Most solemn declarations have been made by Marshal Stalin and the Soviet Union that the sovereign independence of Poland is to be maintained, and this decision is now joined in both by Great Britain and the United States. Here also, the world organization will in due course assume a measure of responsibility. The Poles will have their future in their own hands, with the single limitation that they must honestly follow, in harmony with their allies, a policy friendly to Russia. That is surely reasonable—*[Interruption]*.

The procedure which the three great powers have unitedly adopted to achieve this vital aim is set forth in unmistakable terms in the Crimea declaration. The agreement provides for consultation, with a view to the establishment in Poland of a new Polish provisional government of national unity, with which the three major powers can all enter into diplomatic relations, instead of some recognizing one Polish government and the rest another, a situation which, if it had survived the Yalta Conference, would have proclaimed to the world disunity and confusion. We had to settle it, and we settled it there. No binding restrictions have been imposed upon the scope and method of those consultations. His Majesty's Government intend to do all in their power to insure that they shall be as wide as possible and that representative Poles of all democratic parties are given full freedom to come and make their views known. Arrangements for this are now being made in Moscow by the Commission of three, comprising M. Molotov, and Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, representing the United States and Great Britain respectively. It will be for the Poles themselves, with such assistance as the Allies are able to give them, to agree upon the composition and constitution of the new Polish government of national unity. Thereafter, His Majesty's Government, through their representative in Poland, will use all their influence to insure that the free elections to which the

new Polish government will be pledged shall be fairly carried out under all proper democratic safeguards.

Our two guiding principles in dealing with all these problems of the Continent and of liberated countries, have been clear: While the war is on, we give help to anyone who can kill a Hun; when the war is over we look to the solution of a free, unfettered, democratic election. Those two are the two principles which this Coalition Government have applied, to the best of their ability, to the circumstances and situations in this entangled and infinitely varied development.

Lord Dunglass (Lanark): I am sorry to interrupt the Prime Minister, but this point is highly important. So much depends upon the interpretation of the words which the Prime Minister is now using. My only reason for interrupting him is to ask whether he can possibly develop this point a little more. For instance, is there going to be some kind of international supervision? His interpretation will make a great difference to many of us.

The Prime Minister: I should certainly like that, but we have to wait until the new Polish government is set up and to see what are the proposals they make for the carrying out of these free, unfettered elections, to which they will be pledged and to which we are pledged by the responsibility we have assumed. But I have not finished. Perhaps some further words of comfort may come for my noble friend. I should be very sorry if I could not reassure him that the course we have adopted is simple, direct, and trustworthy. The agreement does not affect the continued recognition by His Majesty's Government of the Polish Government in London. This will be maintained until such time as His Majesty's Government consider that a new provisional government has been properly formed in Poland, in accordance with the agreed provisions; nor does it involve the previous or immediate recognition by His Majesty's Government of the present Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland. We are awaiting—[*Interruption.*] Let me remind the House and those who have undertaken what I regard as an honorable task, of being very careful that our affairs in Poland are regulated in accordance with the

dignity and honor of this country—I have no quarrel with them at all, only a difference of opinion on the facts, which I hope to clear away. That is all that is between us.

Let me remind them that there would have been no Lublin Committee or Lublin Provisional Government in Poland if the Polish Government in London had accepted our faithful counsel given to them a year ago. They would have entered into Poland as its active government, with the liberating Armies of Russia. Even in October, when the Foreign Secretary and I toiled night and day in Moscow, M. Mikolajczyk could have gone from Moscow to Lublin, with every assurance of Marshal Stalin's friendship, and become the Prime Minister of a more broadly constructed government, which would now be seated at Warsaw, or wherever, in view of the ruin of Warsaw, the center of government is placed.

But these opportunities were cast aside. Meanwhile, the expulsion of the Germans from Poland has taken place, and of course the new government, the Lublin Government, advanced with the victorious Russian Armies, who were received with great joy in very great areas in Poland. Many great cities changing hands without a shot fired, and with none of that terrible business of underground armies being shot by both sides, and so forth, which we feared so much, having actually taken place during the great forward advance. These opportunities were cast aside. The Russians, who are executing and preparing military operations on the largest scale against the heart of Germany have the right to have the communications of their armies protected by an orderly countryside, under a government acting in accordance with their needs.

It was not therefore possible, so far as recognition was concerned, to procure the dissolution of the Lublin Government as well as of the London Government simultaneously, and start from a swept table. To do that would be to endanger the success of the Russian offensive, and consequently to prolong the war, with increased loss of Russian, British, and American blood. The House should read carefully again and again, those Members who have doubts, the words and the terms of the Declaration, every word of which was the subject of the most profound and searching attention by the Heads of the three Governments, and by the Foreign Secretaries and all their experts.

How will this Declaration be carried out? How will phrases like "Free and unfettered elections on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot" be interpreted? Will the "new" government be "properly" constituted, with a fair representation of the Polish people, as far as can be made practicable at the moment, and as soon as possible? Will the elections be free and unfettered? Will the candidates of all democratic parties be able to present themselves to the electors, and to conduct their campaigns? What are democratic parties? People always take different views. Even in our own country there has been from time to time an effort by one party or the other to claim that they are the true democratic party, and the rest are either Bolsheviks or Tory landlords. What are democratic parties? Obviously this is capable of being settled. Will the election be what we should say was fair and free in this country, making some allowance for the great confusion and disorder which prevails?

Mr. Gallacher (Fife, West): Will there be any caucuses?

The Prime Minister: One cannot entirely avoid some nucleus of party inspiration being formed, even in this country, and no doubt sometimes very able Members find themselves a little out of joint with the party arrangements. But there are a great number of parties in Poland. We have agreed that all those that are democratic parties—not Nazi or Fascist parties or parties of collaborators with the enemy—all these will be able to take their part.

These are questions upon which we have the clearest views, in accordance with the principles of the Declaration on liberated Europe, to which all three Governments have duly subscribed. It is on that basis that the Moscow Commission of three was intended to work, and it is on that basis it has already begun to work.

The impression I brought back from the Crimea, and from all my other contacts, is that Marshal Stalin and the Soviet leaders wish to live in honorable friendship and equity with the Western democracies. I feel also that their word is their bond. I know of no government which stands to its obligations, even in its own despite, more solidly than the Russian Soviet Government. I decline absolutely to embark here on a discussion about Russian good

faith. It is quite evident that these matters touch the whole future of the world. Somber indeed would be the fortunes of mankind if some awful schism arose between the Western democracies and the Russian Soviet Union, if all the future world organization were rent asunder, and if new cataclysms of inconceivable violence destroyed all that is left of the treasures and liberties of mankind.

Finally, on this subject, His Majesty's Government recognize that the large forces of Polish troops, soldiers, sailors, and airmen, now fighting gallantly, as they have fought during the whole war, under British command, owe allegiance to the Polish Government in London. We have every confidence that once the new government, more fully representative of the will of the Polish people than either the present Government in London or the Provisional Administration in Poland, has been established, and recognized by the great powers, means will be found of overcoming these formal difficulties in the wider interest of Poland. Above all, His Majesty's Government are resolved that as many as possible of the Polish troops shall be enabled to return in due course to Poland, of their own free will, and under every safeguard, to play their part in the future life of their country.

In any event, His Majesty's Government will never forget the debt they owe to the Polish troops who have served them so valiantly, and for all those who have fought under our command I earnestly hope it may be possible to offer the citizenship and freedom of the British Empire, if they so desire. I am not able to make a declaration on that subject today because all matters affecting citizenship require to be discussed between this country and the Dominions, and that takes time. But so far as we are concerned we should think it an honor to have such faithful and valiant warriors dwelling among us as if they were men of our own blood.

I think I might remind my right honorable friend that I have indicated I might ask for special indulgence, and this would appear to be a convenient moment.

The brief interval which has separated us, enables me to carry the House to altogether different fields. We leave the Crimean shores, and travel southwards to warmer climes, in which also we find many matters where British interests are important, and where

we are involved. President Roosevelt invited the Emperor of Ethiopia, King Farouk of Egypt, and the King of Saudi Arabia to meet him at Ismailia before sailing for home, and conferences upon his cruiser were accordingly arranged by him. I myself took leave of the President on the fifteenth of this month in Alexandria Harbor, after long and most agreeable talks about the state of our affairs in the light of the Crimea Conference, and also talks about our special business in the Far East, in which, as the Japanese are aware, we both take some interest.

We also spoke of our joint occupation of Italy and of our policy there. Upon this, the House is aware, there was a great deal of misunderstanding in large sections of the American press some weeks ago. During our recent talks I repeatedly asked both the President and Mr. Stettinius to state whether there are any, and if so what, complaints by the United States Government against us for any steps we have taken in Italy, or have not taken in Italy; and I received categorical assurances that there are none. Moreover, I must place it on record that when I visited Italy in August last I made a series of proposals to His Majesty's Government, of which I informed the President, for mitigating the severity of the Allied occupation in Italy, and generally for alleviating the hard lot of the Italian people. These matters were discussed at our second Quebec Conference, and it was at Hyde Park, the President's private country home, that he and I drafted the declaration of September 28, which was, and is, intended to make a very definite mitigation in the attitude of the victorious powers toward the Italian people, and to show our desire to help them in due course to resume their place among the leading nations of Europe. Last Saturday the right honorable Member for Stockton-on-Tees (Mr. Harold Macmillan), who is acting President of the Allied Commission, and Admiral Stone of the United States Navy, who is its Chief Commissioner, were received by the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary of Italy, and announced to them the new measures decided upon in favor of the Italian Government, in fulfillment of this September declaration.

As I myself have taken the lead in bringing these proposals forward and eventually securing their adoption, I am not prepared to

accept suggestions from any quarter—although we suffered injury and ill-usage at Italy's hands in the days of Mussolini's power—that Great Britain has fallen behind other victorious powers in taking a generous view toward Italy, or that we nourish any design of "power politics" which involved Italy. The sentence I used was that we had no need of Italy for any of our designs, and that was wrested from its context, but, as a matter of fact, it was a mere reply which I was bound to make to suggestions in some quarters of the United States press, that we were embarking on some power politics—whatever they may be—in the Mediterranean. I am glad to say that the facts I am now setting forth have been explicitly accepted by the United States, or at any rate in all responsible quarters, and that this view was thoroughly endorsed by the President and Mr. Stettinius, and I have received quite definite assurances that no complaints of any kind were or are preferred against us, which would call for any reply on my part, such as would certainly be forthcoming.

Our two nations can, therefore, proceed on their joint task in Italy—which in future will be burdened with many new complications and difficulties—in the closest confidence and unity. We look forward to Italy's return under a truly democratic regime to the community of industrious and peace-loving nations. In her efforts to help herself, Italy can count upon British good will, and upon Allied good will. She can count also on such material aid as is at our disposal, and she will continually receive her fair share. I said some time ago that Italy would have to work her passage home. She has some way to go yet, but it would be less than just if I did not pay a tribute to the invaluable services, the full tale of which cannot yet be told, of Italian men and women in the Armed Forces, on the seas, in the countryside, and behind the enemy lines in the north, which are being rendered steadily and steadfastly to the common cause. New difficulties may be cast upon us when the great districts in the north are cleared, and when the problem of feeding the great masses for whom we shall then become responsible is thrown upon us and upon the Provisional Italian Government, which government may itself be called upon to undergo changes as a consequence of the greatly increased con-

stituency for which it will become responsible, through the liberation of the northern districts.

My right honorable friend and I thought it would be becoming as well as convenient and agreeable, that we should also see the two rulers who had made long journeys to Egypt at the President's invitation, and that we should pass in friendly review with them the many matters in which we have common concern. It was our duty also to pay our respects to King Farouk of Egypt, and we thought it right to seek a talk with President Shukri of Syria, in order to calm things down as much as possible in the Levant. It should not, however, be supposed that anything in the nature of a general conference on Middle East affairs took place. The mere fact that the Regent of Iraq and the Emir Abdulla of Transjordan were not on the spot should make this perfectly clear. Any conference would naturally include authorities of that sort. There was no question of shaping new policy for the Middle East, but rather of making those friendly personal contacts by which public business between various States is often helped. I must at once express our grief and horror at the assassination of the Egyptian Prime Minister, Ahmed Maher Pasha, with whom my right honorable friend had a long and cordial interview only a few days, almost hours, before he fell a victim to foul play. His death is a serious loss to his King and to his country. The sympathy of Great Britain for the widow and family of the late Prime Minister of Egypt has, of course, been expressed, not only in telegrams from the Foreign Office, but also by various personal visits of our Ambassador, Lord Killearn, and I am sure the House will associate itself with these expressions. There is little doubt that security measures in Egypt require considerable tightening, and above all that the execution of justice upon men proved guilty of political murder should be swift and exemplary.

The Egyptian Government have, we feel, acted rightly and wisely in deciding to declare war on Germany and Japan, and to sign the United Nations Declaration. We did not press the Egyptian Government at any time to come into the war, and indeed upon more than one occasion in the past our advice has been on the contrary. There were evident advantages in sparing the populous and

famous city of Cairo from wholesale bombardment, and we have been content with the attitude of Egypt as a co-belligerent. Egyptian troops have, during the war, played an important part. They have maintained order throughout the Delta, they have guarded many strong-points and depots, and, in all kinds of ways, they have been of assistance to our war effort, which has once again proved successful in shielding the fertile lands of the Delta from the shock of the foreign invader. We have had every facility from Egypt, under our Treaty of Alliance, and successive Egyptian Prime Ministers and Governments have given us support in the manner which we deemed to be the most effective. Egypt is an associated power, and she should take her rightful place as a future member of the world organization and as one of its founders, when the occasion is reached at San Francisco at the end of April.

We are also very glad to welcome Turkey into the ranks of the United Nations. Turkey declared herself most firmly on our side by the Treaty of Alliance in 1939, at a time when the gathering dangers were only too apparent. As I explained to the House on a former occasion, Turkey became conscious of unexpected military weakness after the war had started in earnest on account of the influence—the decisive influence—of new weapons with which she was quite unprovided and which we were not in a position to supply. As these weapons exercise a decisive effect on the modern battlefield, the Turks felt that they could no longer confide their safety to their renowned infantry and to the artillery of the last war. We did not, therefore, for a long time press them for a Turkish declaration of war. It was not until after the Teheran Conference that we considered that the moment had come, when Turkey could enter the struggle without grave imprudence. The Turkish Government did not feel able to do so at that time, but they have aided us in various ways which it would not be profitable to recount, and we have never had the slightest doubt where their hearts lay. They, also, will be welcomed by Great Britain into the ranks of the United Nations, and I do not consider that the ties renewed between our two countries after the miserable disasters of the last war have been in any way impaired.

I was greatly interested in meeting King Ibn Saud, the famous

ruler of Saudi Arabia. I had the honor of entertaining this most remarkable man to luncheon in the Fayoum Oasis, and of expressing to him the thanks of Great Britain for his steadfast unswerving and unflinching loyalty to our country and the common cause, which never shone more brightly than in the darkest days and in the hours of mortal peril. His aid will be needed at the close of the war in reaching a solution of the problem of the Arab world and of the Jewish people in Palestine. I have hopes that, when the war is over, good arrangements can be made for securing the peace and progress of the Arab world, and, generally of the Middle East, and that Great Britain and the United States, which is taking an increasing interest in these regions, will be able to play a valuable part in proving that well-known maxim of the old Free Trader "All legitimate interests are in harmony." [*Laughter.*] I knew that would give pleasure to the right honorable Baronet the Member for South-West Bethnal Green (Sir P. Harris). My right honorable friend enjoys these reminiscences of by-gone controversies, or comparatively by-gone controversies.

My discussions with the Emperor of Ethiopia raised no serious difficulties, because an agreement for the next two years had already been reached, as the result of the mission to Ethiopia which Lord De La Warr had just completed with much patience and address. It was a satisfaction for me to see for the first time in the flesh Haile Selassie, that historical figure who pleaded the cause of his country amid the storms of the League of Nations, who was the first victim of Mussolini's lust for power and conquest, and who was also the first to be restored to his ancient throne by the heavy exertions of our British and Indian armies in the far off days of 1940 and 1941.

Finally, we had the pleasure of a long discussion with President Shukri of Syria, in which we did our utmost to enjoin a friendly attitude toward the French and to encourage negotiations for a suitable settlement with the French, affecting not only Syria but also the Lebanon. I must make clear, once and for all, the position of His Majesty's Government in respect of Syria and the Lebanon, and in relation to our French allies. That position is governed by the statements made in 1941, in which the independence of

these Levant States was definitely declared by Great Britain and France. At that time, and ever since, His Majesty's Government have made it clear that they would never seek to supplant French influence by British influence in the Levant States. We are determined also to respect the independence of these States and to use our best endeavors to preserve a special position for France in view of the many cultural and historic connections, which France has so long established with Syria. We hope that it may be possible for the French to preserve that special position. We trust that these States will be firmly established by the authority of the world organization, and that French privilege will also be recognized.

However, I must make it clear that it is not for us alone to defend by force either Syrian or Lebanese independence or French privilege. We seek both, and we do not believe that they are incompatible. Too much must not be placed, therefore, upon the shoulders of Great Britain alone. We have to take note of the fact that Russia and the United States have recognized and favor Syrian and Lebanese independence, but do not favor any special position for any other foreign country. All these and many other matters affecting the Middle East are fitting and necessary subjects for the Peace Conference, at which we must resolutely strive for final settlements of lasting peace between all the States and races comprised in the Middle East, and in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean.

On the way back from the Crimea, to say "good-bye" to the President at Alexandria, my right honorable friend the Foreign Secretary and I stopped in Athens. I must say that from my point of view this was the high spot of the whole journey. I could not help recalling the grim conditions of our visit only seven weeks before, when the cannon were firing close at hand, and bullets continually struck the walls and people were killed and wounded in the streets not far away. The contrast between these violent scenes and the really rapturous welcome we received from vast crowds of delighted citizens was one of the most vivid, impressive, and agreeable experiences of my life. Peace reigned over the beautiful, immortal city. Its citizens were wild with joy. His Beatitude the

Archbishop was seated in the Regency, firmly grasping the reins of power. Together we drove through the crowded streets, lined by the first instalment of the new national Greek Army, until I found myself called upon to address what was, incomparably, the largest and most enthusiastic gathering that, in a very long experience of such demonstrations, I have ever seen. There is no subject in my recollection on which the policy of His Majesty's Government has received more complete vindication than in regard to Greece, nor has there been any on which greater prejudice and misrepresentation has been poured out against them in the United States—not without some assistance from these shores. All this was done with a gay, and, as I said, a wanton disregard of the ill effects produced on the spot, and the encouragement given to the resistance of the terrorists in Greece. I am sure we rescued Athens from a horrible fate. I believe that the Greek people will long acclaim our action, both military and political. Peace without vengeance has been achieved. A great mass of arms has been surrendered. Most of the prisoners and hostages have been restored. The great work of bringing in food supplies has resumed its former activity. Public order and security are so established that UNRRA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration] is about to resume its functions. The popularity of British troops and of those who have guided the course of policy, such as Mr. Leeper and General Scobie, is unbounded in these regions, and their conduct continues to receive the approbation of His Majesty's Coalition Government.

I should by no means lead the House to suppose that our difficulties are over. The Greek National Army has still to be formed, and to be effective to maintain impartial order. The Greek Budget has to be balanced in some way. The drachma has to be restrained within reasonable limits; the raw materials have to be provided to enable industries of various kinds to get to work in Athens, where there are considerably more than a million people. The sense of unity and responsibility has to grow stronger with the Greek people. And here I must remark that the future of Greece is in the Greeks' own hands. The Greeks must not expect that the whole process of their restoration can be accomplished by British labors

or American assistance. My right honorable friend the Foreign Secretary remained a day longer in Athens than I did, and he was at pains to bring home to the Greek authorities the fact that, now that political stability has been achieved, financial and economic problems must take first place, and that the burden and responsibility are upon the Greek nation and that they must, on no account, sit back and leave these tasks to foreigners.

I trust that these remarks will in no way detract from the great kindness and enthusiasm with which I was received a little while ago, but if my words should cause pain I am not entirely sorry for it. The intense political activity of the Greek mind must continue to give way to practical problems. As soon as possible they must reach that election, fair, free, unfettered, with secret ballot and on a basis of universal suffrage, to which everyone is looking forward, and which can alone regulate and adjust everything that has been done. I look forward to it with the greatest confidence. I particularly welcome the wish of the Greek Government that Russian, British, and American observers shall be free, on the spot, to make sure that the will of the people finds complete and sincere expression. So much for that episode, upon which we have had several exciting and even momentarily heated debates in recent times.

I thank the House very much for their courtesy and attention. I would refer, for a moment or two before sitting down, to the conference as a whole, and in relation to the grave matters which I mentioned before the interval with which the House indulged me. It was the custom of the conference at Yalta to hold its meetings of the three Heads of Governments and Foreign Secretaries late in the afternoon, and to sit for several hours each day. Here the main issues were deployed, and the measures both of agreement and of difference were clearly revealed. I remember particularly one moment when a prolonged silence fell upon our small body, maintained for two or three minutes. It was immediately found very convenient to remit the measures of agreement or of difference, wherever our discussion had carried us, to the morning meetings of the Foreign Secretaries. Each Foreign Secretary presided over these meetings in rotation. So excellent was the combined work of the Foreign Secretaries that our problems were

returned to us nearly every day in time for the full meeting, in a form in which final agreement could be reached, and lasting decisions taken.

There was a proposal on the agenda for the institution during the present anxious period of regular meetings of the Foreign Secretaries, an improvement of the combined and collective work which has often been asked for here, in order to prevent avoidable divergence of views, and to concert the actions of the three great powers. This was to meet a felt want, and to serve to bridge the unavoidable gap in the meetings of the three Heads of Government. There was, however, no need to argue this matter at Yalta, because the work of the three Foreign Secretaries proved itself so invaluable, efficient, and indispensable that its continuing collective activity was acclaimed by all. It is, of course, only a temporary arrangement, appropriate to these times of special stress, when so heavy a military burden is resting on the three great powers. We may expect it eventually to merge in the larger and permanent organization which will be set up at San Francisco, once that organization is in full working order, and the Peace Conference has finished its labors. In the intervening period these meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries to whom, from time to time, the Foreign Secretaries of other countries may be added, will prove of undoubted advantage.

Here is the moment when the House should pay its tribute to the work of my right honorable friend the Foreign Secretary. I cannot describe to the House the aid and comfort he has been to me in all our difficulties. His hard life when quite young in the infantry in the last war, his constant self-preparation for the tasks which had fallen to him, his unequalled experience as a Minister at the Foreign Office, his knowledge of foreign affairs and their past history, his experience of conferences of all kinds, his breadth of view, his powers of exposition, his moral courage, have gained for him a position second to none among the Foreign Secretaries of the Grand Alliance. It is not only my own personal debt, but even more that of the House to him which I now acknowledge.

I suppose that during these last three winter months the human race all the world over has undergone more physical agony and

misery than at any other period through which this planet has passed. In the Stone Age the numbers were fewer, and the primitive creatures, little removed from their animal origin, knew no better. We suffer more and we feel more. I must admit that in all this war I never felt so grave a sense of responsibility as I did at Yalta. In 1940 and 1941 when we in this island were all alone, and invasion was so near, the actual steps one ought to take and our attitude toward them seemed plain and simple. If a man is coming across the sea to kill you, you do everything in your power to make sure he dies before finishing his journey. That may be difficult, it may be painful, but at least it is simple. Now we are entering a world of imponderables, and at every stage occasions for self-questioning arise. It is a mistake to look too far ahead. Only one link in the chain of destiny can be handled at a time.

I trust the House will feel that hope has been powerfully strengthened by our meeting in the Crimea. The ties that bind the three great powers together, and their mutual comprehension of each other, have grown. The United States has entered deeply and constructively into the life and salvation of Europe. We have all three set our hands to far-reaching engagements at once practical and solemn. United we have the unchallengeable power to lead the world to prosperity, freedom, and happiness. The great powers must seek to serve and not to rule. Joined with other States, both large and small, we may found a world organization which, armed with ample power, will guard the rights of all States, great or small, from aggression, or from the gathering of the means of aggression. I am sure that a fairer choice is open to mankind than they have known in recorded ages. The lights burn brighter and shine more broadly than before. Let us walk forward together.

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
BY PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT¹

March 1, 1945

I hope you will pardon me for the unusual posture of sitting down during the presentation of what I wish to say, but I know you will realize it makes it a lot easier for me in not having to carry about ten pounds of steel around the bottom of my legs and also because of the fact I have just completed a 14,000-mile trip.

First of all, I want to say that it is good to be home. It has been a long journey, and I hope you will also agree, so far, a fruitful one.

Speaking in all frankness, the question of whether it is entirely fruitful or not lies to a great extent in your hands, for unless you, here in the Halls of the American Congress, with the support of the American people, concur in the general conclusions reached at that place called Yalta, and give them your active support, the meeting will not have produced lasting results. And that is why I have come before you at the earliest hour I could after my return. I want to make a personal report to you and, at the same time, to the people of the country.

Many months of earnest work are ahead of us all, and I should like to feel that when the last stone is laid on the structure of international peace it will be an achievement toward which all of us in America have worked steadfastly and unselfishly together.

I am returning from this trip that took me so far, refreshed and inspired. I was well the entire time. I was not ill for a second until I arrived back in Washington, and here I heard all of the rumors which had occurred in my absence. Yes; I returned from the trip refreshed and inspired. The Roosevelts are not, as you may suspect, averse to travel; we seem to thrive on it.

And far away as I was, I was kept constantly informed of affairs in the United States. The modern miracles of rapid communication have made this world very small. We must always bear in

¹ Reprinted from House Document No. 106, 79th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, 1945.

mind that fact when we speak or think of international relations. I received a steady stream of messages from Washington, I might say from not only the executive branch with all its departments, but also from the legislative branch in its two departments; and except where radio silence was necessary for security purposes I could continuously send messages any place in the world; and, of course, in a grave emergency we could even have risked the breaking of the security rule.

I come from the Crimean Conference with a firm belief that we have made a good start on the road to a world of peace. There were two main purposes in this Crimean Conference: The first was to bring defeat to Germany with the greatest possible speed and the smallest possible loss of Allied men. That purpose is now being carried out in great force. The German Army, the German people, are feeling the ever-increasing might of our fighting men and of the Allied armies; and every hour gives us added pride in the heroic advance of our troops in Germany on German soil toward a meeting with the gallant Red Army.

The second purpose was to continue to build the foundation for an international accord that would bring order and security after the chaos of the war, that would give some assurance of lasting peace among the nations of the world. Toward that goal a tremendous stride was made.

At Teheran a little over a year ago there were long-range military plans laid by the Chiefs of Staffs of the three most powerful nations. Among the civilian leaders at Teheran, however, at that time there were only exchanges of views and expressions of opinion. No political arrangements were made and none was attempted.

At the Crimean Conference, however, the time had come for getting down to specific cases in the political field.

There was on all sides at this conference an enthusiastic effort to reach an agreement. Since the time of Teheran, a year ago, there had developed among all of us—what shall I call it?—a greater facility in negotiating with each other that augurs well for the peace of the world; we know each other better.

I have never for an instant wavered in my belief that an agreement to insure world peace and security can be reached.

There were a number of things that we did that were concrete, that were definite; for instance, the lapse of time between Teheran and Yalta without conferences of representatives, of civilian representatives of the three major powers, has proved to be too long—fourteen months. During that long period local problems were permitted to become acute in places like Poland, Greece, Italy, and Yugoslavia.

Therefore, we decided at Yalta that even if circumstances made it impossible for the Heads of the three Governments to meet more often in the future, we would make sure that there would be more frequent personal contacts for exchange of views between the Secretaries of State and the Foreign Ministers of these three powers.

We arranged for periodic meetings at intervals of three or four months. I feel very confident that under this arrangement there will be no recurrences of the incidents which this winter disturbed the friends of world-wide cooperation and collaboration.

When we met at Yalta, in addition to laying out strategic and tactical plans for the complete and final military victory over Germany, there were other problems of vital political consequence.

For instance, first there was the problem of the occupation and control of Germany after victory, the complete destruction of her military power, and the assurance that neither nazism nor Prussian militarism could again be revived to threaten the peace and civilization of the world.

Second, again for example, there was the settlement of the few differences that remained among us with respect to the International Security Organization after the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. As you remember, at that time and afterward, I said we had agreed 90 per cent. That is a pretty good percentage. I think the other 10 per cent was ironed out at Yalta.

Third, there were the general political and economic problems common to all of the areas that would be in the future, or which have been, liberated from the Nazi yoke. We over here find it very difficult to understand the ramifications of many of these problems in foreign lands, but we are trying to.

Fourth, there were the special problems created by Poland and Yugoslavia.

Days were spent in discussing these momentous matters, and we argued freely and frankly across the table. But at the end, on every point, unanimous agreement was reached. And, more important even than the agreement of words, I may say, we achieved a unity of thought and a way of getting along together.

We know, of course, that it was Hitler's hope and the German war lords' hope that we would not agree—that some slight crack might appear in the solid wall of Allied unity, a crack that would give him and his fellow gangsters one last hope of escaping their just doom. That is the objective for which his propaganda machine has been working for many months.

But Hitler has failed.

Never before have the major Allies been more closely united—not only in their war aims, but also in their peace aims. And they are determined to continue to be united, to be united with each other—and with all peace-loving nations—so that the ideal of lasting peace will become a reality.

The Soviet, and British, and United States Chiefs of Staff held daily meetings with each other. They conferred frequently with Marshal Stalin, Prime Minister Churchill, and with me on the problem of coordinating the strategic and tactical efforts of the Allied powers. They completed their plans for the final knock-out blows to Germany.

At the time of the Teheran Conference, the Russian front, for instance, was removed so far from the American and British fronts that, while certain long-range strategic cooperation was possible, there could be no tactical, day-by-day coordination. They were too far apart. But Russian troops have now crossed Poland. They are fighting on the eastern soil of Germany herself; British and American troops are now on German soil close to the Rhine River in the West. It is a different situation today from what it was fourteen months ago. A closer tactical liaison has become possible for the first time in Europe. That was something else that was accomplished in the Crimean Conference.

Provision was made for daily exchange of information between the armies under the command of General Eisenhower on the western front and those armies under the command of the Soviet

marshals on that long eastern front, and also with our armies in Italy—without the necessity of going through the Chiefs of Staff in Washington or London as in the past.

You have seen one result of this exchange of information in the recent bombings by American and English aircraft of points which are directly related to the Russian advance on Berlin.

From now on, American and British heavy bombers will be used in the day-by-day tactics of the war. We have begun to realize, I think, that there is all the difference in the world between tactics on the one side and strategy on the other—day-by-day tactical war in direct support of Soviet armies as well as in the support of our own on the western front.

They are now engaged in bombing and strafing in order to hamper the movement of German reserves, German materials to the eastern and western fronts from other parts of Germany or from Italy.

Arrangements have been made for the most effective distribution of all available material and transportation to the places where they can best be used in the combined war effort—American, British, and Russian.

The details of these plans and arrangements are military secrets, of course; but this tying of things in together is going to hasten the day of the final collapse of Germany. The Nazis are learning about some of them already, to their sorrow, and I think all three of us at the Conference felt that they will learn more about them tomorrow, and the next day, and the day after that.

There will be no respite from these attacks. We will not desist for one moment until unconditional surrender.

You know, I have always felt that common sense prevails in the long run—quiet, overnight thinking. I think that is true in Germany just as much as it is here. The German people as well as the German soldiers must realize that the sooner—the sooner they give up and surrender—surrender by groups or as individuals, the sooner their present agony will be over. They must realize that only with complete surrender can they begin to reestablish themselves as people whom the world might accept as decent neighbors.

We made it clear again at Yalta, and I now repeat, that uncon-

ditional surrender does not mean the destruction or enslavement of the German people. The Nazi leaders have deliberately withheld that part of the Yalta declaration from the German press and radio. They seek to convince the people of Germany that the Yalta declaration does mean slavery and destruction for them. They are working at it day and night, for that is how the Nazis hope to save their own skins—to deceive their people into continued and useless resistance.

We did, however, make it clear at the Conference just what unconditional surrender does mean for Germany.

It means the temporary control of Germany by Great Britain, Russia, France, and the United States. Each of these nations will occupy and control a separate zone of Germany—and the administration of the four zones will be coordinated—coordinated in Berlin by a Control Council composed of the representatives of the four nations.

Unconditional surrender means something else. It means the end of nazism. It means the end of the Nazi Party and all of its barbaric laws and institutions.

It means the termination of all militaristic influence in the public, private, and cultural life of Germany.

It means for the Nazi war criminals a punishment that is speedy and just—and severe.

It means the complete disarmament of Germany; the destruction of its militarism and its military equipment; the end of its production of armament; the dispersal of all of its armed forces; the permanent dismemberment of the German General Staff which has so often shattered the peace of the world.

It means that Germany will have to make reparations—reparations in kind for the damage which it has done to the innocent victims of its aggression.

By compelling reparations in kind—in plants, in machinery, in rolling stock, in raw materials—we shall avoid the mistakes that we and other people—other nations—made after the last war, the demanding of reparations in the form of money which Germany could never pay.

We do not want the German people to starve, or to become a burden on the rest of the world.

Our objective in handling Germany is simple—it is to secure the peace of the rest of the world now and in the future. Too much experience has shown that that objective is impossible if Germany is allowed to retain any ability to wage aggressive warfare.

These objectives will not hurt the German people. On the contrary, they will protect them from a repetition of the fate which the General Staff and Kaiserism imposed on them before, and which Hitlerism is now imposing upon them again a hundredfold. It will be removing a cancer from the German body politic, which for generations has produced only misery, only pain for the whole world.

During my stay in Yalta, I saw the kind of reckless, senseless fury, and terrible destruction which comes out of German militarism. Yalta on the Black Sea had no military significance of any kind. It had no defense.

Before the last war, it had been a resort—a resort for people like the czars and princes, and aristocracy and the hangers-on. However, after the war, after the Red Revolution, and until the attack on the Soviet Union by Hitler a few years ago, the palaces and the villas of Yalta had been used as a rest and recreation center by the Russian people.

The Nazi officers took over the former palaces and villas for their own use. The only reason that the so-called palace of the former Czar was still habitable when we got there was that it had been given—or he thought it had been given—to a German general for his own property, and his own use. And when the rest of Yalta was destroyed, he kept soldiers there to protect what he thought had become his own personal villa. When the Red Army forced the Nazis out of the Crimea almost a year ago last April, it was found that all of the palaces were looted by the Nazis, and then nearly all of them were destroyed by bombs placed on the inside. Even the humblest of the homes of Yalta were not spared.

There was little left of it except blank walls, ruins, destruction.

Sevastopol—that was a fortified port about forty or fifty miles away—there again was a scene of utter destruction of a large city and great navy yards and great fortifications. I think less than a dozen buildings were left intact in the entire city.

I had read about Warsaw and Lidice and Rotterdam and Coven-

try, but I saw Sevastopol and Yalta! And I know there is not room enough on earth for both German militarism and Christian decency.

But—to go on with the story which I hope to do in under an hour—of equal importance with the military arrangements at the Crimean Conference were the agreements reached with respect to a general international organization for lasting world peace. The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. There was one point, however, on which agreement was not reached. It involved the procedure of voting—of voting in the Security Council. I want to try to make it clear by making it simple. It took me hours and hours to get the thing straight in my own mind—and many conferences.

At the Crimean Conference the Americans made a proposal—a proposal on the subject which, after full discussion, I am glad to say was unanimously adopted by the other two nations.

It is not yet possible to announce the terms of it publicly, but it will be in a very short time.

When the conclusions reached with respect to voting are made known, I think and I hope that you will find them fair—that you will find them a fair solution of this complicated and difficult problem—I might almost say a legislative problem! They are founded in justice, and will go far to insure international cooperation for the maintenance of peace.

There is going to be held, you know—after we have straightened that voting matter out—in San Francisco a meeting of all the United Nations of the world on the twenty-fifth of April. There, we all hope, and confidently expect, to execute a definite charter of organization under which the peace of the world will be preserved and the forces of aggression permanently outlawed.

This time we are not making the mistake of waiting until the end of the war to set up the machinery of peace. This time as we fight together to win the war finally, we work together to keep it from happening again.

As you know I have always been a believer in the document called the Constitution. I spent a good deal of time in educating two other nations of the world with regard to the Constitution of the United States—that the charter has to be and should be approved by the Senate of the United States under the Constitution. I think

the other nations of the world know it now. I am aware of that fact and now all the other nations are. And we hope the Senate will approve what is set forth as the charter of the United Nations when they all come together in San Francisco next month.

The Senate of the United States, through its appropriate representatives, has been kept continuously advised of the program of this Government in the creation of the International Security Organization.

The Senate and the House will both be represented at the San Francisco Conference. The congressional delegates will consist of an equal number of Republican and Democratic Members. The American delegation is—in every sense of the word—bipartisan because world peace is not exactly a party question. I think that Republicans want peace just as much as Democrats. It is not a party question any more than is military victory—the winning of the war.

When the Republic was threatened, first by the Nazi clutch for world conquest back in 1939 and 1940, and then by the Japanese treachery in 1941, partisanship and politics were laid aside by nearly every American; and every resource was dedicated to our common safety. The same consecration to the cause of peace will be expected, I think, by every patriotic American—by every human soul overseas, too.

The structure of world peace cannot be the work of one man, or one party, or one nation. It cannot be just an American peace, or a British peace, or a Russian, French, or a Chinese peace. It cannot be a peace of large nations—or of small nations. It must be a peace which rests on the cooperative effort of the whole world.

It cannot be a structure complete. It cannot be what some people think—a structure of complete perfection at first. But it can be a peace—and it will be a peace—based on the sound and just principles of the Atlantic Charter—on the conception of the dignity of the human being—and on the guaranties of tolerance and freedom of religious worship.

As the Allied armies have marched to military victory, they have liberated peoples whose liberties had been crushed by the Nazis for four long years, and whose economy had been reduced to ruin by Nazi despoilers.

There have been instances of political confusion and unrest in these liberated areas—that is not unexpected—as in Greece, or in Poland, or in Yugoslavia, and there may be more. Worse than that, there actually began to grow up in some of these places queer ideas of, for instance, “spheres of influence” that were incompatible with the basic principles of international collaboration. If allowed to go on unchecked, these developments might have had tragic results.

It is fruitless to try to place blame for this situation on one particular nation or on another. It is the kind of development that is almost inevitable unless the major powers of the world continue without interruption to work together and assume joint responsibility for the solution of problems that may arise to endanger the peace of the world.

We met in the Crimea, determined to settle this matter of liberated areas. Things that might happen that we cannot foresee at this moment might happen suddenly—unexpectedly—next week or next month. And I am happy to confirm to the Congress that we did arrive at a settlement—and, incidentally, a unanimous settlement.

The three most powerful nations have agreed that the political and economic problems of any area liberated from the Nazi conquest, or of any former Nazi satellite, are a joint responsibility of all three governments. They will join together, during the temporary period of instability after hostilities, to help the people of any liberated area, or of any former satellite State, to solve their own problems through firmly established democratic processes.

They will endeavor to see to it that interim governments—the people who carry on the interim governments between the occupation of Germany and the day of true independence—will be as representative as possible of all democratic elements in the population, and that free elections are held as soon as possible thereafter.

The responsibility for political conditions thousands of miles away can no longer be avoided, I think, by this great nation. Certainly, I do not want to live to see another war. As I have said, the world is smaller—smaller every year. The United States now exerts a tremendous influence in the cause of peace. Whatever people over here think or talk in the interests of peace is, of course,

known the world over. The slightest remark in either House of Congress is known all over the world the following day. We will continue to exert that influence only if we are willing to continue to share in the responsibility for keeping the peace. It will be our own tragic loss if we were to shirk that responsibility.

Final decisions in these areas are going to be made jointly and, therefore, they will often be the result of give-and-take compromise. The United States will not always have its way 100 per cent—nor will Russia, nor Great Britain. We shall not always have ideal solutions to complicated international problems, even though we are determined continuously to strive toward that ideal. But I am sure that—under the agreement reached at Yalta—there will be a more stable political Europe than ever before.

Of course, once there has been a true expression of the people's will in any country, our immediate responsibility ends—with the exception only of such action as may be agreed upon by the International Security Organization we hope to set up.

The United Nations must also begin to help these liberated areas adequately to reconstruct their economy—I do not want them to starve to death—so that they are ready to resume their places in the world. The Nazi war machine has stripped them of raw materials, machine tools, trucks, locomotives, and things like that. They have left the industry of these places stagnant and much of the agricultural areas unproductive. The Nazis have left complete or partial ruin in their wake.

To start the wheels running again is not a mere matter of relief. It is to the national interest of all of us to see that these liberated areas are again made self-supporting and productive so that they do not need continuous relief from us. I should say that was an argument based upon common sense.

One outstanding example of joint action by the three major Allied powers was the solution reached on Poland. The whole Polish question was a potential source of trouble in postwar Europe, and we came to the Conference determined to find a common ground for its solution. We did. We know everybody does not agree with it—obviously.

Our objective was to help create a strong, independent, and

prosperous nation—that is the thing we must all remember—those words agreed to by Russia, by Britain, and by me; the objective of making Poland a strong, independent, and prosperous nation with a government ultimately to be selected by the Polish people themselves.

To achieve this objective, it was necessary to provide for the formation of a new government much more representative than had been possible while Poland was enslaved. There are, you know, two governments: one in London, one in Lublin, practically in Russia.

Accordingly, steps were taken at Yalta to reorganize the existing Provisional Government in Poland on a broader democratic basis, so as to include democratic leaders now in Poland and those abroad. This new, reorganized government will be recognized by all of us as the temporary Government of Poland. Poland needs a temporary government in the worst way—an interim government is another way to put it. However, the new Polish provisional government of national unity will be pledged to holding a free election as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and a secret ballot.

Throughout history Poland has been the corridor through which attacks on Russia have been made. Twice in this generation, Germany has struck at Russia through this corridor. To insure European security and world peace, a strong and independent Poland is necessary to prevent that from happening again.

The decisions with respect to the boundaries of Poland were frankly a compromise. I did not agree with all of it by any means. But we did not go as far as Britain wanted in certain areas; we did not go as far as Russia wanted in certain areas; and we did not go as far as I wanted in certain areas. It was a compromise.

While the decision is a compromise, it is one, however, under which the Poles will receive compensation in territory in the north and west in exchange for what they lose by the Curzon line in the east. The limits of the western border will be permanently fixed in the final Peace Conference. Roughly, this will include in the new, strong Poland quite a large slice of what is now called Germany. It was agreed also that the new Poland will have a large

and long coast line and many new harbors; also that East Prussia—most of it—will go to Poland. A corner of it will go to Russia; also—what shall I call it—the anomaly of the Free State of Danzig—I think Danzig would be a lot better if it were Polish.

It is well known that the people east of the Curzon line—this is an example of why it is a compromise—the people east of the Curzon line are predominantly White Russians and Ukrainians—a very great majority—not Polish; and the people west of that line are predominantly Polish, except in that part of East Prussia and eastern Germany which would go to the new Poland. As far back as 1919, representatives of the Allies agreed that the Curzon line represented a fair boundary between the two peoples. You must remember also that there was no Poland or had not been any Polish government before 1919 for a great many generations.

I am convinced that this agreement on Poland, under the circumstances, is the most hopeful agreement possible for a free, independent, and prosperous Polish State.

The Crimean Conference was a meeting of the three major military powers on whose shoulders rests the chief responsibility and burden of the war. Although, for this reason, another nation was not included—France was not a participant in the Conference—no one should detract from the recognition which was accorded there to her role in the future of Europe and the future of the world.

France has been invited to accept a zone of control in Germany, and to participate as a fourth member of the Allied Control Council on Germany.

She has been invited to join as a sponsor of the international conference at San Francisco next month.

She will be a permanent member of the International Security Council, together with the other four major powers.

And, finally, we have asked France that she be associated with us in our joint responsibility over the liberated areas of Europe.

There were, of course, a number of smaller things I have not time to go into on which joint agreement was had. We hope things will straighten out.

Agreement was reached on Yugoslavia, as announced in the communiqué; and we hope that it is in process of fulfilment.

We have to remember that there are a great many prima donnas in the world all wishing to be heard before anything becomes final; so we may have a little delay while we listen to more prima donnas.

Quite naturally, this Conference concerned itself only with the European war and with the political problems of Europe—and not with the Pacific war.

At Malta, however, our Combined British and American Staffs made their plans to increase their attack against Japan.

The Japanese war lords know that they are not being overlooked. They have felt the force of our B-29's, and our carrier planes; they have felt the naval might of the United States, and do not appear very anxious to come out and try it again.

The Japs know what it means to hear that "the United States marines have landed." And I think I may add, having Iwo Jima in mind, that "the situation is well in hand!"

They also know what is in store for the homeland of Japan now that General MacArthur has completed his magnificent march back to Manila and with Admiral Nimitz establishing air bases right in their own back yard. But lest somebody lay off work in the United States I can repeat what I have said—a short sentence—even in my sleep: "We haven't won the wars yet," with an "s" on wars. It is a long tough road to Tokyo; it is longer to Tokyo than it is to Berlin in every sense of the word.

The defeat of Germany will not mean the end of the war against Japan; on the contrary, we must be prepared for a long and a costly struggle in the Pacific.

But the unconditional surrender of Japan is as essential as the defeat of Germany. I say that advisedly with the thought in mind that that is especially true if our plans for world peace are to succeed. For Japanese militarism must be wiped out as thoroughly as German militarism.

On the way back from the Crimea I made arrangements to meet personally King Farouk of Egypt, Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia, and King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia. Our conversations had to do with matters of common interest. They will be of great mutual advantage because they gave us an opportunity of meeting

and talking face to face, and of exchanging views in personal conversation instead of formal correspondence. For instance, from Ibn Saud of Arabia I learned more of the whole problem of the Moslems and more about the Jewish problem in five minutes than I could have learned by the exchange of a dozen letters.

On my voyage I had the benefit of seeing the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force at work.

All Americans, I think would feel as proud of our armed forces as I am if they could see and hear what I did.

Against the most efficient professional soldiers and sailors and airmen of all history, our men stood and fought—and won.

I think that this is our chance to see to it that the sons and grandsons of these gallant fighting men do not have to do it all over again in a few years.

The conference in the Crimea was a turning point, I hope, in our history and, therefore, in the history of the world. There will soon be presented to the Senate and to the American people a great decision that will determine the fate of the United States—and I think, therefore, the fate of the world—for generations to come.

There can be no middle ground here. We shall have to take the responsibility for world collaboration, or we shall have to bear the responsibility for another world conflict.

I know that the word “planning” is not looked upon with favor in some circles. In domestic affairs, tragic mistakes have been made by reason of lack of planning; and, on the other hand, many great improvements in living, and many benefits to the human race, have been accomplished as a result of adequate, intelligent planning—reclamation of desert areas, developments of whole river valleys, provision for adequate housing.

The same will be true in relations between nations. For the second time in the lives of most of us this generation is face to face with the objective of preventing wars. To meet that objective the nations of the world will either have a plan or they will not. The ground work of a plan has now been furnished and has been submitted to humanity for discussion and decision.

No plan is perfect. Whatever is adopted at San Francisco will doubtless have to be amended time and again over the years, just

as our own Constitution has been. No one can say exactly how long any plan will last. Peace can endure only so long as humanity really insists upon it, and is willing to work for it—and sacrifice for it.

Twenty-five years ago American fighting men looked to the statesmen of the world to finish the work of peace for which they fought and suffered. We failed them. We failed them then. We cannot fail them again, and expect the world to survive.

I think the Crimean Conference was a successful effort by the three leading nations to find a common ground for peace. It spells—and it ought to spell—the end of the system of unilateral action, exclusive alliances, and spheres of influence, and balances of power, and all the other expedients which have been tried for centuries and have always failed.

We propose to substitute for all these a universal organization in which all peace-loving nations will finally have a chance to join.

I am confident that the Congress and the American people will accept the results of this Conference as the beginnings of a permanent structure of peace upon which we can begin to build, under God, that better world into which our children and grandchildren—yours and mine, the children and grandchildren of the whole world—must live, and can live.

And that, my friends, is the only message I can give you. I feel it very deeply as I know that all of you are feeling it today and are going to feel it in the future.

THE ACT OF CHAPULTEPEC

DECLARATION ON RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE AND AMERICAN SOLIDARITY BY THE GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTED AT THE INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE ON WAR AND PEACE¹

WHEREAS:

1. The peoples of the Americas, animated by a profound love of justice, remain sincerely devoted to the principles of international law:

2. It is their desire that such principles, notwithstanding the present difficult circumstances, may prevail with greater force in future international relations:

3. The Inter-American Conferences have repeatedly proclaimed certain fundamental principles, but these must be reaffirmed and proclaimed at a time when the juridical bases of the community of nations are being established:

4. The new situation in the world makes more imperative than ever the union and solidarity of the American peoples, for the defense of their rights and the maintenance of international peace:

5. The American States have been incorporating in their international law, since 1890, by means of conventions, resolutions and declarations, the following principles:

(a) The proscription of territorial conquest and the nonrecognition of all acquisitions made by force (First International Conference of American States, 1890).

(b) The condemnation of intervention by a State in the internal or external affairs of another (Seventh International Conference of American States, 1933, and Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, 1936).

(c) The recognition that every war or threat of war affects directly or indirectly all civilized peoples, and endangers the great principles of liberty and justice which constitute the American ideal and the standard of its international policy (Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, 1936).

¹ Text as approved by Committee III, March 3, 1945. Reprinted from Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. XII, No. 297, March 4, 1945.

(d) The procedure of mutual consultation in order to find means of peaceful cooperation in the event of war or threat of war between American countries (Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, 1936).

(e) The recognition that every act susceptible of disturbing the peace of America affects each and every one of them and justifies the initiation of the procedure of consultation (Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, 1936).

(f) That any difference or dispute between the American nations, whatever its nature or origin, shall be settled by the methods of conciliation, or unrestricted arbitration, or through the operation of international justice (Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, 1936).

(g) The recognition that respect for the personality, sovereignty and independence of each American State constitutes the essence of international order sustained by continental solidarity, which historically has been expressed and sustained by declarations and treaties in force (Eighth International Conference of American States, 1938).

(h) The affirmation that respect for and the faithful observance of treaties constitutes the indispensable rule for the development of peaceful relations between States, and treaties can only be revised by agreement of the contracting parties (Declaration of American Principles, Eighth International Conference of American States, 1938).

(i) That in case the peace, security or territorial integrity of any American republic is threatened by acts of any nature that may impair them, they proclaim their common concern and their determination to make effective their solidarity, coordinating their respective sovereign will by means of the procedure of consultation, using the measures which in each case the circumstances may make advisable (Declaration of Lima, Eighth International Conference of American States, 1938).

(j) That any attempt on the part of a non-American State against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty or the political independence of an American State shall be considered as an act of aggression against all the American States

(Declaration of the Second Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Habana, 1940).

6. The furtherance of these principles, which the American States have practiced in order to secure peace and solidarity between the nations of the continent, constitutes an effective means of contributing to the general system of world security and of facilitating its establishment: and

7. The security and solidarity of the continent are affected to the same extent by an act of aggression against any of the American States by a non-American State, as by an American State against one or more American States.

PART I

Declaration

THE GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTED AT THE INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE ON WAR AND PEACE

DECLARE:

First. That all sovereign States are juridically equal amongst themselves.

Second. That every State has the right to the respect of its individuality and independence, on the part of the other members of the international community.

Third. That every attack of a State against the integrity or the inviolability of territory, or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American State, shall, conformably to Part III hereof, be considered as an act of aggression against the other States which sign this declaration. In any case, invasion by armed forces of one State into the territory of another trespassing boundaries established by treaty and demarcated in accordance there with shall constitute an act of aggression.

Fourth. That in case acts of aggression occur or there may be reasons to believe that an aggression is being prepared by any other State against the integrity and inviolability of territory, or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American State, the States signatory to this declaration will consult amongst themselves in order to agree upon measures it may be advisable to take.

Fifth. That during the war, and until treaty recommended in Part II hereof is concluded, the signatories of this declaration recognize that such threats and acts of aggression as indicated in paragraphs Third and Fourth above constitute an interference with the war effort of the United Nations, calling for such procedures, within the scope of their constitutional powers of a general nature and for war, as may be found necessary, including:

- recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions;
- breaking of diplomatic relations;
- breaking of consular relations;
- breaking of postal, telegraphic, telephonic, radio-telephonic relations;
- interruption of economic, commercial and financial relations;
- use of armed force to prevent or repel aggression.

Sixth. That the principles and procedure contained in this declaration shall become effective immediately, inasmuch as any act of aggression or threat of aggression during the present state of war interferes with the war effort of the United Nations to obtain victory. Henceforth, and with the view that the principles and procedure herein stipulated shall conform with the constitutional principles of each republic, the respective Governments shall take the necessary steps to perfect this instrument in order that it shall be in force at all times.

PART II

Recommendation

THE INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE ON PROBLEMS OF WAR AND PEACE

RECOMMENDS:

That for the purpose of meeting threats or acts of aggression against any American republic following the establishment of peace, the Governments of the American republics should consider the conclusion, in accordance with their constitutional processes, of a treaty establishing procedures whereby such threats or acts may be met by:

The use, by all or some of the signatories of said treaty of any one or more of the following measures:

recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions;
breaking of diplomatic relations;
breaking of consular relations;
breaking of postal, telegraphic, telephonic, radio-telephonic relations;
interruption of economic, commercial and financial relations;
use of armed force to prevent or repel aggression.

PART III

This declaration and recommendation provide for a regional arrangement for dealing with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action in this hemisphere and said arrangements and the activities and procedures referred to therein shall be consistent with the purposes and principles of the general international organization, when established.

This declaration and recommendation shall be known as the Act of Chapultepec.

A CORRECTION

In the chart on National Organizations and International Policy appearing in the issue for March, Federal Union and also World Federalists (now Federal World Government, Inc.) and World Government Association were listed mistakenly as opposing the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. The attitude of World Government Association should have been classified as supporting the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, and the attitude of Federal Union and of Federal World Government, Inc., should have been classified as favoring an international organization with force and considering the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals as a beginning.

A resolution passed at the Federal Union convention of September 30 last stated:

We recognize the value of the efforts made by the United Nations at Dumbarton Oaks and elsewhere to organize peace and promote international cooperation. Despite the inadequacies and shortcomings the various proposals may contain, we welcome these efforts as steps in the right direction and we urge our members to do what they can to support them and to make the projected general and functional organizations as effective as possible.

This is wholly in accord with the second point in our basic statement of policy. Lest, however, the public be persuaded that the adoption of these proposals will finish the job, we must strive harder than ever to show that the true goal remains a **FEDERAL UNION OF THE FREE.**

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UNIVERSITIES COMMITTEE ON POST-WAR INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS

SUMMARIES OF REPORTS
OF COOPERATING GROUPS

POSTWAR TREATMENT OF JAPAN

CHINA IN THE POSTWAR WORLD

INTERNATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC AFTER THE WAR

POSTWAR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

POSTWAR RELATIONS

WITH THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS



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DIVISION OF INTERCOURSE AND EDUCATION

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CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Preface	227
Introduction, by Ralph Barton Perry	229
Summaries of Reports of Cooperating Groups	
XI—Postwar Treatment of Japan	231
XII—China in the Postwar World	244
XIII—International Air Traffic after the War	249
XIV—Postwar Relations with the Soviet Union	261
XV—Postwar Relations with the British Commonwealth of Nations	274

PREFACE

Since the autumn of 1942, the Universities Committee on Post-War International Problems has published and distributed analytical reports on various questions of the peace settlement and the post-war years. Cooperating groups in more than a hundred universities throughout the United States have studied these reports and expressed their views on the questions raised. Summaries of the replies received from the university groups have been prepared by the Universities Committee and brought to the attention of the public. Ten such summaries appeared in issues of *International Conciliation* for June, 1944, and November, 1944. Five more are presented in this pamphlet.

The summaries are preceded by a statement on the purpose, organization, and procedure of the Universities Committee on Post-War International Problems by Professor Ralph Barton Perry of Harvard University, Chairman of the Committee.

NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER

New York, March 14, 1945.

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UNIVERSITIES COMMITTEE ON POST-WAR INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS

INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

The Universities Committee on Post-War International Problems was organized in the summer of 1942 and began its activities in the following autumn. Its purpose may be summarized as follows:

1. To recognize, and to develop interest in, the grave international problems with which this nation and all nations will be faced in the postwar period, and which must be examined now if they are to receive a timely and intelligent solution.

2. To provide a form of organized activity by which members of the faculties of American institutions of higher education can discuss the major international problems, and by which their reasoned opinions, and agreements and disagreements, can be brought to the attention of the public and of the responsible government officials.

ORGANIZATION

The organization consists of a Central Committee, which decides all matters of policy, and which meets at intervals of several months; a Board of Sponsors who as leaders of higher education have endorsed the plan; an Executive Committee which meets biweekly in Boston, and administers the activities of the organization in the intervals between meetings of the Central Committee; and Cooperating Groups of college and university faculty members. Approximately one hundred Cooperating Groups have been organized, some of which have been continuously active, and others only intermittently. New groups are added from time to time.

The Committee's permanent headquarters are at the World Peace Foundation, 40 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston. The work of the Committee is carried on in close cooperation with the World Peace Foundation, and has been supported by grants of funds from the World Peace Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the New York Foundation.

PROCEDURE

The Central Committee, through the Executive Committee, prepares at monthly intervals a Problem Analysis, in which a problem is presented systematically, together with the more important proposed solutions, the arguments for and against them, and a bibliography. These Problem Analyses are printed in an edition of from three to eight thousand, and are distributed to all members of Cooperating Groups, to a considerable and growing number of outside subscribers, to interested and influential persons in the Government or in the press, and to other organizations which are working in the field of international relations. They may be obtained by applying to the Executive Secretary at 40 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston.

The Problem Analyses form the basis of study and discussion by the Cooperating Groups, which send reports to the Executive Committee, expressing the views of the Group, whether individual or collective, together with the arguments, which have been advanced. These reports are then analyzed by the Executive Committee, and Summaries such as these included in the present publication, are sent to the Groups, as well as to the press, to Government agencies and personnel, and to other interested persons.

The Cooperating Groups do not officially represent the institutions to which they belong, nor can they be said to represent prevailing Faculty opinion in these institutions. Their number would not warrant any statistical conclusions as to faculty opinion in the country as a whole. Nor are the Groups composed wholly, or even predominantly, of experts in the field of international relations. It is believed, however, that the Reports and the Summaries here published not only throw light on the problems themselves, but have an added significance as expressing the reasoned views of a considerable and widely distributed number of responsible, thoughtful, and well-informed citizens on issues of paramount importance to the American public.

RALPH BARTON PERRY

SUMMARIES OF REPORTS OF COOPERATING GROUPS

PROBLEM XI—POSTWAR TREATMENT OF JAPAN¹

With only negligible exceptions the 54 Cooperating Groups agree that our postwar policy toward Japan should envisage from the outset her reorientation and ultimate readmission in good standing to the community of nations. We must teach her not only that aggression does not pay but that peaceful international collaboration does pay. We must convince her militarists and imperialists and racists that she has been thoroughly defeated and that any further attempts at aggression will be quickly and ruthlessly suppressed. But we must convince the people of Japan that the methods of democracy and respect for individual rights and international agreements will lead to acceptance of Japan by the other nations of the world as a cooperative member of a peaceful world order in which Japan and her people will have a place of political dignity and economic prosperity.

1. JAPANESE LEADERSHIP

The Groups distinguish between the Japanese authorities we shall deal with in arranging for "unconditional surrender" and those with whom we shall conclude the peace settlement. They agree that the latter should be representative of the democratic and peace-loving groups in Japan, but hold that it would be a mistake to burden such a government with the responsibility for "unconditional surrender." That responsibility should fall, as far as pos-

¹ Issued in January, 1944. Replies were received, largely during February-April, 1944, from 53 Cooperating Groups located at Berea, Boston University, Brown, Bryn Mawr, Bucknell, Butler, California Institute of Technology, Carleton (Two Groups), Central YMCA College, Colorado, Dartmouth, Denver, DePauw, Dunbarton College of Holy Cross, Georgetown, Georgia, Goucher, Harvard, Holy Cross, Hood, Iliff School of Theology, Illinois, Johns Hopkins, Kent State, Kentucky, Louisiana Polytechnic, Miami, Michigan, Milwaukee-Downer, Nebraska, New Jersey State Teachers College at Trenton, New York University, Notre Dame, Oberlin, Occidental, Pennsylvania, Rollins, Russell Sage, St. Louis University, Skidmore, Smith, Southern California, Stanford, Swarthmore, Sweet Briar, Vanderbilt University (Peabody and Scarritt Colleges), University of Washington, Wellesley, Wheaton (Mass.), Wilson, Wisconsin, and Wooster.

sible, on the military leaders who started the war. Some of these leaders will have been killed in the war; others may commit suicide or be liquidated should a revolution occur, but those among them who are left should assume the disgrace of surrender. A number of Groups state specifically, that, if at all possible, the Emperor himself, or his direct representative at his explicit order, should sign the surrender.

Some Groups suggest putting all of our harsh requirements into the armistice terms, so that the blame for them will fall squarely on the military men who sign the armistice. By contrast, the peace terms, oriented toward reconstruction, would seem a great step forward and would enhance the prestige of the liberal government which negotiated them.

During the interval between the end of hostilities and the peace settlement we should do all we can, the Groups agree, to support the liberal and democratic forces in Japan. We should not impose a government of our own choosing, but we can do much to encourage and support elements in Japan that will undertake the necessary reforms. The peace settlement should be made, after a suitable interval to allow these changes to occur, with whatever responsible government has emerged by that time. The very fact that a government responsible to the people and committed to peaceful international procedures will be able to arrange a much less harsh peace than an unreconstructed regime will do much toward bringing such a government into being.

Some of the Groups list their reasons for believing that the roots out of which a democratic peace-loving Japanese Government could grow actually exist in Japanese soil. They believe that popular government has been within reach at various times in the history of Japan and was prevented only through the application of force by the ruling minority. An "unholy alliance" of military and bureaucratic leaders with feudal lords and industrial leaders has been able to suppress incipient labor or agrarian movements, using Shintoism, with its dogma of the divine origin of the Emperor, as one of its means. The necessity which the ruling clique felt for suppressing liberals and leftists, especially since 1936, and for imposing even thought-control bears witness to the existence

of a democratic potential in Japan. So also does the growth of a labor movement up to 1927, and the development of a small but active Communist group. It is not by any means certain that these liberal elements among the Japanese are strong enough to form an effective government, but their chances of success will be improved to the extent that the United Nations, without making political prescriptions save to prevent a native dictator from usurping control, tactfully and discriminatingly encourage the forces of liberalism.

Many of the Groups are interested in the future of the Emperor and his dynasty. Most Groups confess to considerable ignorance as to the role the Emperor plays in the Japanese political scene and especially as to the extent to which Emperor Hirohito is responsible for the bellicose course the Japanese Government has taken in recent years. They are content for the most part to say that decision as to the future of the Emperor, both as an institution and as an individual, should be determined by the answers to such questions as the following: To what extent is he a real stabilizing influence? To what extent is he a tool of unscrupulous governmental leaders? To what extent does his own view of ends and means coincide with those of men like former Premier Tojo?

Of the groups that offer definite proposals some favor Hirohito's abdication but the preservation of the dynasty. Others, in about equal numbers, would do away with the whole institution. Still others would keep Hirohito or Chichibu on the throne as a source of continuity and stability and would use him to appoint the leaders of the postwar government. Under this plan he would acquire the status of a limited constitutional monarch. Some would try to destroy the doctrine of his divinity, while others say that they do not object so long as he is peacefully divine. In all cases the number of Groups making these various suggestions are too small to make their quantitative comparison significant.

2. TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT

Nearly all the Groups accept, without serious question, the territorial dispositions which were agreed upon at the Cairo Conference in December, 1943. Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pesca-

dores shall be restored to China; Korea shall achieve independence "in due course"; and the Pacific islands which Japan has acquired since 1914 shall be taken from her. Of the few minor exceptions to this program, most propose self-determination for the various territories involved. A few urge immediate independence for Korea. For the most part the Groups regard the actual disposition of these territories, save for the mandated islands, as settled.

Most of the Groups that express a view as to the disposition of Japanese property in Manchuria distinguish between property acquired before September 18, 1931, and that acquired after that date, on the ground that title to the latter is colored by Japanese aggression. Many accept also the distinction between private and public property, though some argue that the difference between them is rendered extremely small by the common Japanese practice of government subsidies to private enterprises. In general the Groups hold that government-owned Japanese property, whenever acquired, be taken over by China, and that privately owned property acquired after September 18, 1931, be similarly transferred. They urge that all industrial machinery be transferred to Chinese ownership, compensation being paid where it was privately owned by Japanese prior to the specified date in 1931. Some Groups urge that the value of such property be credited against reparations claims and that Japan be left to reimburse the Japanese civilians who are thus dispossessed. One Group proposes that all Japanese property be confiscated and that claims for compensation be referred to an international claims commission.

As regards Korea, the vast majority of the Groups favor provisional administration by the international organization, or some agency thereof, with transfer of power as rapidly as feasible to a government of the Koreans' own selection. Two Groups favor immediate independence, two autonomy within China, one direct transfer to China, and one a period of trusteeship under the United Nations with a guarantee of independence after a stated interval of say ten or fifteen years. Three Groups suggest that the international organization should retain rights to strategic bases in Korea. A large number of Groups remark that Korean independence will need external guarantees for many years, either by

a group of powers or, preferably, by the international organization.

Almost all the Groups agree that Formosa should go to China, but four propose plebiscites after a brief period under international supervision. As regards property rights, the Groups take much the same position as they did in the case of Manchuria, though they recognize that a good many Japanese claims will be better established in Formosa. Most of the Groups who comment on the proposal to retain strategic bases in Formosa favor returning the territory to China without any strings, and then making arrangements for bases at a Pacific or world conference in which the need for these bases will be presented as part of a general plan, and in which the request made to China will be accompanied by similar requests to other powers.

Nearly all the Groups regard the disposition of the Japanese mandated islands as a matter for international decision. A large majority hold that the islands should remain under the control of an international organization or a special commission of that organization. The reports are not clear on the matter, but they give the impression that the Groups prefer that this international administration be direct. A number suggest, however, that it would be satisfactory were the control exercised through a mandate, provided that the supervision of mandates by the international organization is improved. Some Groups, however, are strongly of the opinion that the mandates system has failed rather completely and that it would be better not to return to it.

Two alternatives to control by the international organization are given scattering support. Four Groups favor joint control by a commission representing Australia, China, New Zealand, and the United States or some selection among them. Three favor direct cession of the islands to the United States. A much larger number specifically oppose this, and urge that the United States should assume control only at the request of the international organization and only as a trustee acting for that body. A number of Groups urge that decisions as to the Japanese mandated islands should be part of an over-all settlement of Pacific territorial problems.

Several Groups see a grave danger to Japanese economy in the

sudden loss of all but her main islands. They urge that we give due consideration to Japan's economic needs and that, if we take away all her recently acquired territories, we make available some other means by which she can support her economy. The Groups seem generally agreed, and a number specifically remark, that any satisfactory settlement of territorial problems in the Pacific requires a strong international organization to enforce the settlement against change by aggression and to provide the necessary means for peaceful change as the need for it arises.

3. REPARATIONS

The Groups are practically unanimous in holding that Japan should be required to restore or compensate for property unlawfully acquired or destroyed in the course of her military aggression. They admit that the problems involved will be many and varied and some of them suggest an international mixed claims commission to settle disputes in accordance with principles that have been formulated for universal application.

Reparations, on the other hand, it is agreed, are quite a different problem. There is almost complete agreement that, in principle, reparations claims against Japan are eminently justified. But concerning how much, in practice, Japan can reasonably be asked to pay, there is considerable disagreement. A number of Groups urge that decision here is a matter requiring expert study. The principles to be kept in mind, nearly all Groups agree, are (1) the justice of the claims for reparations, (2) the ability of Japan to pay, ultimately in terms of goods and services, without crippling her economy beyond the danger point, and (3) the effect of reparations upon Japanese reorientation and reform.

In general the Groups are agreed that we should not exact reparations that would cripple Japanese industry. Japan's economy should be kept functioning not only for her sake but because its effective functioning is necessary to reconstruction in the Pacific, to the welfare of China, and to stability and peace in the whole area.

4. PUNISHMENT OF WAR CRIMINALS

There is little, if any, demand among the Groups to mete out

punishment to the Japanese as a whole. To be sure they must be convinced that the aggressive militarism of their leaders is a policy that does not pay and that those who attempt it will be ruthlessly crushed. But, the Groups feel, the shattering impact of total defeat should suffice for that purpose. The defeat will be accompanied by loss of life, suffering, occupation and reparations, and by unilateral disarmament and special international controls. These will supply all the punishment of the people as a whole that is desirable.

Some would hold that even such automatic punishment goes farther than strict justice would warrant. We should remember, these Groups say, that, strictly speaking, there are no "wicked nations." Megalomaniac desires and actions in support of them are always the desires and actions of individuals. Likewise, punishment can only deter or reform individuals. Those who hold this view would argue that a State should never be punished as such, but they would doubtless admit that there are occasions when most of the citizens of a State need to have their attitudes changed and that punishment is one means of obtaining reform.

With regard to individuals, on the other hand, there is overwhelming agreement that punishment is very much in order. Except for one Group all those favoring punishment agree that the same principles should be followed as in the treatment of German war criminals. The one exception regards the German cases as worse and favors greater leniency for the Japanese. Only two Groups favor no punishment for individual Japanese. One of these urges that neither of the justifiable purposes of punishment, deterrence or reform and rehabilitation of the criminal, would be likely to be realized, and that in any case there are no adequate tribunals for such trials. The other dissenting Group urges that our knowledge of Japanese psychology is very incomplete so that we do not know what the effects of punishment would be. It is better, therefore, this Group believes, to leave whatever punishing is done to the Japanese themselves. Another Group, one which favors the punishment of individual war criminals, echoes the view that the execution of Japanese criminals by Japanese would be much more effective than similar action by the conquerors.

There is little agreement among the Groups as to what courts

and what laws should be used. Some would favor trying those who have committed atrocities by the laws and courts of the areas where the crimes were committed. Others point out that such a procedure would not reach Japanese who torture prisoners in Japan. For those responsible for Japan's policy of military aggression, it is generally agreed that some form of international court will be necessary. It should act in accordance with principles laid down by some appropriate body of the United Nations or of the international organization. A few Groups urge speedy action by United Nation military tribunals. There seems to be a common feeling that the Emperor's position should not lead us to spare him if he is shown to be really responsible for Japanese policy. On the other hand it is admitted, that, should he prove a political asset to the United Nations, it might well be that the advantages of punishing him would be outweighed by more important considerations.

5. PREVENTION OF FURTHER MILITARY AGGRESSION

Without dissent the Groups agree on the great importance of a general system of collective security to prevent further Japanese aggression. Without such an organization they feel that other steps are but temporary devices which may at most be successful for a short period. With an international organization firmly established and effectively functioning, on the other hand, certain additional measures may prove very helpful.

a. They agree almost unanimously on the desirability of military occupation of Japan. Most of them urge that the occupation should be partial or relatively brief or both. They feel that the presence of victorious troops in Japan's major cities would furnish visual evidence of total defeat but believe that an extended occupation would only promote bitterness. Two Groups mention specifically that they favor occupation of Japan's six principal cities. Some Groups say military occupation should last until a stable civil government to our liking is established. Others urge that it be as brief as possible, and others that it be merely a token occupation. Two urge that it be avoided altogether if possible. Some of the Groups suggest that it would be better to have the occupying forces composed exclusively of Orientals.

b. The Groups are agreed again on the unilateral disarmament of Japan after the close of hostilities. They differ as to how long detailed control and supervision on the spot should continue. About half favor an extended period of direct control. The other half believe that, after the initial disarmament, effective control can be exercised by the international organization from outside. They argue that Japan, deprived of her empire could not rearm without extensive importation of raw materials, and such imports could be stopped at their source. Further, a strong China and a strong international organization should be able to discover and meet effectively in its early stages any threat Japan might develop.

Many Groups go on to say that when Japan reforms and is accepted again into the community of nations she should be treated on the same basis as other States and should be allowed by the international organization to retain her due share of national armament. Some Groups express the hope that by that time there will be a truly internationalized force with only internal police contingents left to individual States.

c. All but three Groups oppose the liquidation of Japanese heavy industry. They point out that such a drastic change in Japanese economy, following the serious effects due to the loss of the empire, would lower the Japanese standard of living so disastrously and cause such unemployment and suffering that revolutionary chaos would be likely to ensue. With the Japanese economy ruined, rehabilitation and reconstruction throughout the Far East would be gravely retarded and the establishment of a strong Chinese economy would be rendered extremely difficult. Some Groups remark that the Chinese have been much less interested in the destruction of Japanese heavy industry than have certain industrialists in the Western powers. Finally, the reform and rehabilitation of Japan and her reentry into the community of nations would be made almost impossible by such crippling action.

The Groups realize, of course, the war potential inherent in heavy industry. They believe, however, that prohibition or control of the production of armaments can be established effectively without such drastic action. Indeed, some Groups remark, less severe action would be much more likely to be continued over a

long period of time than the sweeping prohibition of all Japanese heavy industry. The Groups point out that effective import controls on raw materials would suffice to halt any incipient moves toward rearmament that Japan might make. Further, the growing strength of Japan's neighbors, Russia and China, should serve as effective checks on potential Japanese aggression.

d. The Groups agree that certain fundamental changes in the political, economic, and educational structure of Japan are highly desirable, but they are inclined to believe that few of these changes can be imposed, or even prescribed, from the outside. About all we can do is to help the Japanese to reform themselves.

There is little agreement as to the causes of the recent and present militarism and expansionism of the Japanese leaders. Some attribute these attitudes to ancient feudalistic and warlike traditions reinforced by Shintoism with its doctrine of the divine descent of the Emperor. Others promptly reply that Shintoism has been a feature of Japanese life for centuries and yet that the Japanese were not involved in a war from 1598 to modern times; hence, something other than their religion must be the cause of the recent resurgence of militarism. Some Groups attribute it to a Japanese inferiority complex due to their stature, their insular home land, their lack of raw materials, and so forth. Still others point out that the Western powers, since they opened Japan to world trade and influences, have given her excellent examples of militarism, imperialism, and most of the other evils with which we now reproach her. Most of the Groups remark that they don't know what the roots of Japanese militarism are, but they favor scientific investigation at once to find out. Research, they hold, would be much more fruitful than speculation.

As to political, economic, and educational remedies, the Groups favor increasing the effective power of the Diet, guaranteeing individual liberties including religious freedom, reforming the educational system, and introducing agrarian and industrial reforms.

Most of the Groups believe that we would do more harm than good by trying to impose changes upon Japan. Some Groups pick out one or two reforms which they regard as especially desirable and urge that we insist upon these, but their proposals meet with

little general support. Among the changes most in demand are a popularly responsible, representative government with civilian cabinet ministers in charge of the army and navy, a free education for all that will stress the values of democracy and peace, the socialization of heavy industry, agrarian reforms, and other changes designed to produce a more equitable distribution of the national income. Insistence, even upon one of these favored changes, however, is generally regarded as unwise. The best we can do is to lend aid and encouragement to those forces in Japan which want what we regard as desirable. Even this modest degree of participation by us in Japanese affairs, a number of Groups warn, requires the utmost tact and discretion if it is to be successful. Our assistance must not offend Japanese pride. Perhaps we can help most by providing an international environment favorable to the internal reforms we want the Japanese to institute.

6. TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEMOCRATIC PEACE-LOVING JAPAN

The Groups are unanimous in believing that our long-range policy should support democratic peace-loving forces in Japan and plan for the eventual participation of a reformed Japan on terms of equality in an international community of nations. Two Groups want the term "long-range" emphasized, but the rest attach no serious qualifications to their acceptance of this goal. They agree that its realization is a prerequisite of enduring peace in the Pacific and they hold that short-run goals in so far as they conflict with it must be modified.

The Groups agree that maintenance of freedom of communications is necessary to the attainment of this end and vote, with only one exception, in favor of insisting upon the abolition of such practices as strict newspaper censorship, prohibition of short-wave receiving sets, and State control of news services and broadcasting.

Further, there are a number of steps which the United Nations, including the United States, can take which will encourage the development of a peaceful and cooperative Japan. Of these the

Groups are almost unanimously agreed in recommending the following:

a. Relief and rehabilitation

At the conclusion of hostilities, we should assist the Japanese people in the work of relief and rehabilitation on the same terms as the Germans. It is granted that the minimum needs of those who have suffered from Japanese aggression should be met first, but beyond this we should not be less ready than in the case of Germany to aid in meeting the minimum Japanese needs. The only modification proposed to this program is the requirement suggested by two Groups, that Japan support democratic government and social reform, and the suggestion of two other Groups that we wait until our aid is requested.

b. Equal trade rights

Save for the import restrictions required to prevent aggression, nearly all Groups agree that equality of commercial treatment should be accorded Japan. If we are not to exterminate the seventy million or more Japanese, we must try to live with them peacefully and, accordingly we must allow them a decent standard of living. If we cut off their empire, we must allow them equality of access to the raw materials and markets of the world. We are committed by the declarations of the Atlantic Charter to this. Unless we keep our word no Japanese government supporting peaceful international cooperation could long survive.

Only two Groups reject this proposal. One other warns us to guard against the danger that equal commercial rights for Japan would involve lowering our standard of living and that of other people. A number of Groups suggest that such equal treatment should be accorded only if Japan undergoes a change of heart and supports democracy at home and peace abroad.

c. Abolition of legal discrimination on racial grounds

Many of the Groups admit that it is now politically impossible to repeal those provisions of our national legislation which discriminate against the Japanese because of their race. Nearly all of them however, favor repeal. It is recognized that racial discrim-

ination of this kind gives deep offense to the Japanese and provides their militaristic leaders with a ready-made weapon with which to support their own racist program. The only qualifications of support of repeal are the following: One Group adds, "eventually"; another "ultimately"; another says, "not until the Japanese have proved themselves worthy of respect and trust."

d. Participation in the international control of dependent areas

There is more opposition to allowing the Japanese to participate in an international regime for the development and administration of backward areas. A number of Groups point out she has recently abused her trust in this field and should not be allowed another chance until she has proved over a period of years that her change of heart is genuine. Most Groups seem to be thinking here of the possibility of again assigning territories to Japan under a mandate. Some Groups point out that Japan's abuse of her mandates was at least encouraged by the looseness of the whole mandate system and the relative lack of supervision and control. While opposed to giving Japan direct administrative control over a dependent area, most of the Groups envisage for the postwar period a more effective *international* control of dependent areas and they would favor Japanese *participation* in such control on equal terms with other States after Japan has been admitted to the international organization as a member in good standing.

e. Participation on equal terms in a general international organization

The Groups are almost unanimous in holding that enduring peace requires the reorientation of Japan and her ultimate inclusion on equal terms in the international organization for the preservation of peace, security, justice, and human welfare. Admittedly Japan is not now fit for full participation in such an international organization. But for the sake of enduring peace she must be given every encouragement to undergo such an international change of attitude as is necessary to become fit, and then she must be welcomed as an equal cooperator in the task of maintaining world order.

PROBLEM XII—CHINA IN THE POSTWAR WORLD¹

The development of a strong, friendly, democratic China in the postwar years is, all the Groups reporting are agreed, highly desirable. Her growing strength will serve as an immediate deterrent to Japanese aggression; her cooperative action with the Soviet Union, the British Commonwealth, and the United States in a general international organization will supply the best available guarantee of enduring peace throughout the Pacific area. Advances in her agriculture and development of her industrial potentialities will do much to raise the standard of living in China, thereby making possible increased trade relations with the United States. In so far as China becomes united and democratic she will at the same time serve as a desirable example and influence for Japan and satisfy the deep yearning of the Chinese people for responsible self-government and a respected place in the community of nations.

To help in this development, the Groups are well agreed, is both the privilege and the duty of the United States. They warn, however, that our help must be friendly without being meddlesome. Though we have many interests in China's development, we must avoid any direct interference in decisions of policy which China must make for herself. China faces many grave problems in the coming years and she will want our advice and our financial and technical assistance. But her need for independence is still greater and she would be forced to reject our aid were we to attach political strings to it.

1. CHINA'S DEMANDS IN THE SETTLEMENT WITH JAPAN

It is generally agreed that China was well pleased with the

¹ Issued in February, 1944. Replies were received, largely during March-May, 1944, from 45 Cooperating Groups located at Brown, Bucknell, California Institute of Technology, Carleton College (Two Groups), Colorado, Dartmouth, DePauw, Georgetown, Georgia, Goucher, Harvard, Hood, Illinois, John Carroll, Kansas, Kent State, Kentucky, Louisiana Polytechnic, Miami, Michigan, Middlebury, Milwaukee-Downer, Mount Holyoke, Nebraska, New Jersey State Teachers College at Trenton, New York University, Northwestern, Notre Dame, Oberlin, Occidental, Ohio State, Rollins, Russell Sage, St. Louis University, Skidmore, Smith, Southern California, Swarthmore, Sweet Briar, Vanderbilt University (Peabody and Scarritt Colleges), University of Washington, Wellesley, Wilson, and Wooster.

Cairo Declaration on the treatment of Japan. Add to this, Chiang Kai-shek's speech of January 1, 1944, and the conclusion is justified that China's demands for the peace settlement are to a very large degree identical with ours.

As to territory, the outstanding area in which China is interested beyond those mentioned at Cairo is Hongkong. Nearly all the Groups urge that a decision with regard to Hongkong be reached soon. A few suggest that it is a matter for China and Great Britain to settle between themselves and that the United States should maintain a strictly "hands-off" policy with regard to it. More hold, however, that it is a matter of international concern and that a satisfactory settlement can be reached only as part of a general agreement about all Western power possessions in the Pacific. There is little agreement as to just what the settlement should be. Some urge that Great Britain return Hongkong at once without any "strings" attached. Others, pointing out that Great Britain has made a large investment there, thereby greatly enhancing the port's value, urge that these legitimate British interests be protected by some sort of special arrangements or guarantees. Some urge joint Sino-British control during a transitional period; other direct payments to Britain by China. Still other Groups favor international control of the area or at least certain international commercial and strategic guarantees. But all agree that an amicable settlement, reached as soon as possible, would remove the provocative stimulus to Chinese resentment which the *status quo* affords.

Several Groups call attention to China's interest in the Ryukyu Islands between the Japanese main islands and Formosa. Though ceded to Japan prior to 1895, they occupy a very strategic position, and might well, it is suggested, be taken from Japan, and either be given to China or be placed directly under international control.

The Groups are in hearty agreement with the Generalissimo's statement that Japanese militarists must be wiped out and the Japanese political system purged of aggressive elements. They agree, too, that the United Nations should encourage such liberal democratic and peace-loving groups as come forward in Japan, helping

them, but avoiding the appearance of dictating the character which a reformed Japanese government must take.

The Groups urge the effective disarmament of Japan, this to be enforced through an international commission during the transitional period before Japan becomes again a respected and equal member of the community of nations.

The Groups believe that, in principle, China is justified in claiming heavy reparations. In practice, however, these claims will be limited by the capacity of Japan to meet them. The Groups tend to favor the proposal that Japanese assets in China (including Manchuria) be surrendered to China. They tend to oppose the proposal that Japanese heavy industrial machinery be dismantled and shipped to China. They hold that if a liberal and cooperative Japanese government comes to power, it will be much wiser to allow it to retain this machinery at home, and they think Chinese leaders will come around to this view.

2. THE UNITED STATES AND THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF CHINA

The Groups are agreed that the economic development of China is desirable from our point of view on humanitarian, strategic, and commercial grounds. An economically strong China would bring China's poverty-stricken millions a much needed rise in their living standards. It would provide a strong stable counterweight to Japan which would go far toward preserving peace in the Pacific and it would result in a prosperous nation able and eager to increase its international trade with us and with the rest of the world.

In spite of this interest in the economic development of China, the Groups are aware of the many difficulties involved. Aside from the need for greater political unity, the immense problem of Chinese inflation must be solved and sound currency and banking policies established before significant economic advances can be made. Further, the Groups point out, China is and will long remain primarily an agricultural country. China's supplies of raw materials are limited and this, in the case of copper and oil especially, will severely handicap industrial expansion. There is an absence of skilled labor in China and of capital. All these problems must be solved if China is to become industrialized. Their solution, and

consequently China's industrialization, will require many years of stable government persistently devoted to this cause.

Probably the agricultural problem will be more pressing in the early postwar years than the industrial one, several Groups suggest. Improved agricultural methods and land reforms are needed, most of the Groups hold, if China's primitive agriculture is to be modernized.

As to capital there seems no doubt that China will need it in very large quantities. Most of the Groups foresee both private and governmental loans to China or Chinese enterprises. Only a few suggest restricting the loans made exclusively to one type or the other. Many Groups urge that all large loans be made under international control and preferably by some international bank or agency for reconstruction. This, they urge, would remove the taint of imperialism which might attach to loans from a single State.

As to foreign enterprise in China, the Groups are practically unanimous that it must conform to rules laid down by the Chinese themselves and should not even ask its home government to seek special privileges for it.

Nearly all the Groups agree that the choice between heavy and light industry and between government and private enterprise, though it will have considerable effect on the United States, should be left strictly to China. It is primarily her decision and she would justly resent any attempt on our part to control it.

Most of the Groups judge that China will wisely choose to develop heavy industry and light industry side by side. They judge also that in the case of the former, emphasis will be on government ownership and control, and in the case of the latter on private enterprise subject to considerable government control.

3. UNITED STATES POLITICAL POLICY TOWARD CHINA

The Groups are agreed that China must be accorded a status of full equality in her relations with other States. She should be accorded representation on all commissions dealing with Japan and the problems of the Pacific, and equality in any general international organization that is established. At the same time the Groups recognize that China is today only potentially a great power and

that for some years to come she will be unable to bear fully the financial and military responsibilities carried by more completely industrialized States. The chief problem will be to treat her in all respects as an equal of the great powers while she is in fact still in the process of achieving full equality.

An elementary need for China is full territorial jurisdiction and abandonment by the other powers of special concessions and privileges. Another matter of great importance is that no suspicion even of racial discrimination should enter into the relations of the occidental powers with China. A third requirement is that Russia should join with the United States and the British Commonwealth in treating China as a respected equal.

Political unity and democracy in China, the Groups agree, are of great importance to the United States and the world. But, they also agree, we must not seek these desirable ends by direct means. China will resent deeply any outside "interference" with her development and if pushed will tend to react in the opposite direction. We can do much indirectly to influence Chinese development through abolishing racial discrimination, through treating her as a full equal, through helping her in her agricultural reforms and industrial development and in her growing educational program. We can mark with interest and warm friendliness every advance toward unity and democracy which China makes. We can be patiently sympathetic with her mistakes. But we must not intervene actively. The only exception to this program which the Groups allow is action by the international organization should the differences between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists seriously threaten a breach in the peaceful relations of China and the Soviet Union. Otherwise they recommend a "hands off" policy. China needs and wants our help and advice but not our dictation.

PROBLEM XIII—INTERNATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC AFTER THE WAR¹

Of the many questions raised in the Analysis issued by the Universities Committee on this problem the Cooperating Groups reached almost unanimous agreement on the following points: They deprecate but accept for the transitional period, until an effective international organization for the preservation of the peace is established, the need of taking military considerations into account in planning for postwar civil aviation. They strongly favor an international air police force. They believe that the strategic air bases acquired in the course of the war should be placed under international control rather than be assigned to any one nation. They recognize national sovereignty as extending to the air space above a nation's territory, but they favor an international agreement allowing commercial air transit over specified routes subject only to certain regulations in the interest of safety, health and national security. They would leave arrangements for commercial outlets to reciprocal agreements between the countries concerned. They favor international agreements limiting subsidies to airlines, extending freedom of commercial air transit to the Arctic and setting up an international commission to regulate international air navigation. Concerning a number of other points there was much more diversity of opinion among the Groups, but even in these areas they reached majority agreements favoring for the United States regulated competition for domestic air transportation, and regulated monopolies for air transportation to other countries.

I. MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL AVIATION

The Cooperating Groups are unanimous in regretting the necessity, but accepting the need of taking military considerations

¹ Issued in March, 1944. Replies were received, largely in May and June, 1944, from 37 Cooperating Groups located at Brown, Bucknell, California Institute of Technology, Carleton College (Two Groups), Central YMCA College, Colorado, Dartmouth, Denver, DePauw, Goucher, Harvard, Hood, Illinois, John Carroll, Kentucky, Louisiana Polytechnic, Miami, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey State Teachers College at Trenton, Notre Dame, Oberlin, Occidental, Pennsylvania, Rollins, St. Louis University, Smith, Stanford, Swarthmore, Sweet Briar, Vanderbilt University (Peabody and Scarritt Colleges), University of Washington, Wellesley, West Virginia, Wheaton (Mass.), and Wooster.

into account in planning for postwar civil aviation. They regret the restrictions and controls over civilian traffic that reasons of military security will demand. They foresee that efficient and rational planning will often have to give way to the views of military leaders who regard some aspects of the program as endangering national security. It is with reluctance that they accept such controls as necessary in the immediate postwar period.

Nearly all the Groups distinguish between this transitional postwar era in which the responsibility for security will fall very largely on the principal United Nations who, to meet it, will be forced to maintain extensive armed forces of their own, and a later period when, they hope, the establishment of an effective international organization for the preservation of peace will, to a large extent, relieve individual nations of this responsibility. They recall the promise in the Atlantic Charter of eventual reduction of armaments, and urge the speeding of the day when the preservation of peace can safely be entrusted to a world security organization. When this is achieved, civil aviation can develop unaffected by the needs of national security.

For the transitional period, however—and that may last for a long time—the Groups admit that the motive of self-preservation will have, and should have, very considerable weight in the development of civil aviation programs. They note that, even though, because of increasing functional specialization of airplane design, planes for civil air traffic cannot be directly converted to military use, aircraft production facilities, aircraft mechanics and air crews can be. They acknowledge the value of air reconnaissance photographs and though they recognize that other types of spying may function effectively even though air spying is banned, they agree that the great powers will be sure to insist on restricted areas over which commercial flying will be prohibited. They urge that restrictions on civilian air traffic for military reasons be kept at a minimum, but they recognize that in default of an effective system of collective security, a nation would be unwise if it did not give primacy over the requirements of commercial aviation to such rules and regulations as may be judged necessary to protect the country from aggression.

A number of the Groups, though accepting an important role for military considerations during the transitional postwar period, warn against the dangers of encouraging military rivalries and airplane armament races. One Group urges banning the construction of air weapons of aggression, i.e., bombers, except for the world security organization. Another suggests that the United Nations set up machinery for the full exchange of all new information obtained about military flying and that this exchange together with international inspection of aircraft construction continue later as a function of the world organization.

All but two of the Groups that considered the matter, believe that an international air police force is both feasible and desirable. Even those two regard an international air police as desirable when a real World State comes into being; they simply regard this as highly unlikely in the near future. Of the Groups which at present favor the proposal, several remark that we now have in the cooperative action of the various United Nations air forces the nucleus for a world air force. As one Group put it, the RAF, the USAAF, the RCAF, and other Allied air forces are now pretty well scrambled together; after the peace we should take care not to "unscramble" them.

Several of the Groups qualify their advocacy of an international air police force by remarking that it should exist as an integral part of a comprehensive international police force and should function as one arm of that force. Some Groups caution that an international air force will require international air bases at strategic locations in all parts of the world. Others remark that in spite of such complexities a world air force would be the least difficult form of international policing.

Nearly all the Groups favor placing strategic bases acquired in World War II under international control. One, regarding a general international organization as not realizable in the near future urges that in the interim the United States for its own sake as well as that of other nations should assume control over all strategic air bases throughout the world. Others, noting the interests of the British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union, and other States, suggest a friendly agreement as to the distribution of strategic bases or some arrangement for cooperative control.

The vast majority of the Groups are outspoken in recommending international control of strategic air bases as the only ultimately satisfactory arrangement and in urging that the transition to this system be as rapid as possible. Several Groups suggest that the actual ownership of the soil on which the bases are located is unimportant so long as their international use is effectively guaranteed. One Group says specifically that the relation of the international organization to the country on whose territory bases are located might well be analogous to that of the United States to Great Britain as regards American air bases in the British West Indies. Several Groups specifically condemn as outrageously imperialistic the suggestion that the United States should keep for herself exclusive control of all the bases she has built or conquered during the war.

2. FREEDOM OF THE AIR

The Groups are almost unanimously agreed that the analogy between freedom of the seas and freedom of the air is far from complete. Freedom of the air over the high seas is analogous to freedom of the seas, and this concept could, perhaps, be extended to the air over the polar regions or other practically uninhabited areas of the earth's surface. But the air over populated areas is another matter and the Groups feel that States are justified, at least until effective collective security is achieved, in regarding it as subject to their sovereignty. In this they are in agreement with the Air Navigation Convention of 1919 which recognized the principle of the full and absolute sovereignty of each State over the air above its territories and territorial waters, including the right to exclude foreign aircraft and the right to regulate such traffic as is permitted.

The justification of this view rests largely on considerations of national security. The aircraft of a potential enemy nation constitute a much greater menace than her merchant ships. Aside from the training given to foreign air crews and the opportunities for air reconnaissance, protection against a sneak air attack is much less easy than against a sneak attack by naval vessels. As one Group put it, "innocent passage" may in any given case be much less innocent than it appears. The opportunities for misuse

of air transit facilities are much greater than those for misuse of maritime transport.

Most of the Groups regard a very large measure of *freedom of commercial air transit* as thoroughly desirable but hold that such reasons for security as those mentioned will make a certain amount of national regulation of international air traffic necessary for some time to come. As collective security becomes a fact instead of a theory and as it grows in effectiveness the need for imposing restrictions for the sake of national security will progressively lessen. Most of the Groups hold that even in the early post-war years it would be reasonably safe for the nations of the world to agree on freedom of air transit over stated international routes. Strategic defense areas could be specifically excluded from the courses agreed upon as freely navigable. The provision of commercial outlets, these Groups note, is another matter to be decided largely on economic grounds.

A number of Groups mention the desirability of restrictive provisions setting up minimum safety standards and health regulations, and urge that the freedom of commercial air transit is properly subject to limitations of this kind. A few Groups are opposed to general international freedom of commercial air transit even though this is limited by security, safety, and health restrictions. Their objection is based on the ground that national sovereignty is of considerable importance and would be too seriously impaired by such a grant. The preponderant view, however, is that if only it is given reasonable freedom, air transportation will develop so rapidly as to revolutionize living in the coming era much as rail transportation has done in the past. Because they regard such development as desirable they favor the maximum of freedom that is consistent with reasonable precautions for national security, safety, and health.

There is strong feeling among the Groups that basic agreements concerning freedom of commercial air transit, the routes to be internationalized and the minimum safety standards to be established should be multilateral ones of the sort that might well be formulated by an international commission and recommended by them either to an international assembly or to the various nations for approval.

Agreements with regard to commercial outlets on the other hand, it is held, should probably be made on a bilateral basis. In such cases, most of the Groups urge, reciprocal agreements are in general preferable to nonreciprocal ones, because they are less imperialistic and will do less violence to the sensibilities of the smaller States. It is admitted that some States would not be interested in acquiring commercial outlet rights for air traffic because of their lack of an aviation industry. In such cases, it is suggested that nonreciprocal arrangements would be satisfactory to all concerned, especially if, as would doubtless be the case, some other *quid pro quo* were arranged. Some Groups urge that all agreements in this field should be intergovernmental rather than private.

The Groups do not regard as serious the argument that a small State might turn over its reciprocal air rights to some dummy corporation that would in fact be controlled by aggressive interests in some potentially hostile country. They are inclined to believe that adequate provisions to prevent such action could be included in any reciprocal arrangement that is made, and that at worst an agreement that is abused could be cancelled.

Several Groups urge that all bilateral arrangements for commercial air traffic contain a "most-favored-nation" clause. This would discourage such malpractice as driving a hard bargain and then giving some competitor somewhat better rights and privileges. More important, however, such a provision would speed up the spread of each advance toward greater freedom in international air traffic.

All but three of the Groups respond negatively to the proposal that the United States insist on commercial control over the air bases built abroad during the war by lend-lease or other American funds. Most of them condemn such a proposal as thoroughly imperialistic. Several Groups remark that it would involve a species of extraterritorial rights which we wouldn't think of granting to others and should not expect any other nation to grant to us. Another Group says that we might as well demand the right to maintain a large standing army in Britain because we have had one there during certain periods of the war. Others point

out that a request of this sort would negative our good neighbor policy and destroy much of the good will we have built up in other ways.

Most of the Groups urge that our financial expenditure in building these air bases be regarded simply as part of the war cost. Some add that permission to build the bases was doubtless granted in most cases solely as a war measure and that had such a request as the one proposed been made at the time, it would have been firmly refused.

Several Groups suggest that we use our investment in these bases as a means of obtaining equal air rights in them for all States, as a lever for doing part of the big job of internationalizing air traffic. The danger of pushing our privileged position too far is suggested by the remark of one Group that we use our own air power as Great Britain has used her preeminence on the seas.

The Groups are practically unanimously agreed that, with suitable restrictions to protect our security, safety and health, we should extend as widely as possible reciprocal rights to innocent passage and emergency and service landings. Following the analysis they group these rights together under the name "freedom of commercial air transit." There is nearly as great agreement among the Cooperating Groups in favor of granting reciprocal privileges for commercial landings for through traffic and for terminal traffic. On the other hand, almost all the Groups regard rights to cabotage (foreign rights to intranational traffic) as undesirable.

3. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

Domestic commercial air transportation is regarded by nearly all the Groups as a public utility like railroad transportation and subject therefore to strict government regulation. As to whether it should be government owned or not, the Groups are inclined to believe that most of the traditional arguments for and against government ownership apply. Though the Groups themselves individually and collectively divide on the wisdom of public ownership, they tend to agree that popular support for such a program is lacking and that regulated competition will be the practice for domestic air transport for some time to come. About the only

special argument advanced in favor of government ownership is that the government, through its building of air bases and emergency landing fields, its installation of radio beams and other safety devices and its provision of meteorological information, is in fact contributing a rather large subsidy to domestic airlines, and that the fact that government subsidies are necessary or desirable is itself strong evidence in favor of government ownership. If you have to support an industry, it is urged, you may as well own it.

In the case of foreign air transportation several additional arguments for government ownership emerge. To meet competition direct subsidies, sometimes rather large, will probably be needed. The government will be in a better position to arrange reciprocal rights with foreign air industries, which in many cases will be State owned, than would a private corporation whose efforts in this direction are merely "facilitated" by government agencies. Further, since there seem to be certain special advantages for a national monopoly in this field (see sec. 4, below) closer and more effective regulation is called for and can be more readily achieved through direct government ownership. Again, in so far as the development of a strong commercial air force is needed for national defense, its usefulness for this purpose and ready convertibility to military needs would be enhanced by government ownership.

In spite of these and other arguments which various Groups advance a majority of them favor private ownership of American airlines engaged in foreign transport. If monopoly proves necessary to meet competition, let the government have a chosen private instrument for any given area and impose such regulations as seem necessary but leave ownership and management in private hands.

4. AIR MONOPOLY

A majority of the Groups hold that probably a national monopoly would function better than competition in the field of foreign air transportation. Although a majority favor competition at home and a strong minority hold out for competition even in the foreign field, most of the Groups feel that the exigencies of obtaining reciprocal agreements with foreign firms that are government owned or "chosen instruments" or at least heavily subsidized,

and the problems involved in meeting their competition require that our air transport rights to any country where such practices prevail should be assigned to one company. Some Groups would try to keep a measure of competition by allocating foreign routes after competitive bidding in terms of rates and services. Others urge that different private instruments be chosen for different foreign routes. But most of them agree that monopoly operation will prove necessary over foreign routes.

The Groups diverge widely as to whether an international cartel in this field would be better or worse than unlimited competition. Some say that cartels cannot properly be judged in the abstract, that some are good and others bad, and that the question can be answered satisfactorily only when the specific cartel proposed is weighed against the available alternatives. Some urge that an international cartel in this field would be desirable, or at least satisfactory, if it were subjected to international supervision and regulation. Others think strict national regulation by the various countries concerned would suffice. Others condemn all cartels in the field. Still others regard cartels as one extreme and unlimited competition as another and hold that there are many intermediate solutions which would be more satisfactory than either. One of the more popular of these middle ground proposals envisages limited international control of various competing lines whose own structure will be determined largely by national policies and may vary a good deal from one country to another.

The Groups divide also on whether or not steamship companies should be allowed to engage in air transportation. They tend to recognize the conveniences of jointly owned air and sea transportation services, but fear the resulting fostering of monopoly and the tendency which steamship companies might acquire if they achieve control of air traffic in a given area to restrict the otherwise rapid development and expansion of air transport. A majority conclude that these undesirable features can be sufficiently controlled by regulation and favor allowing steamship companies to enter the air transport field.

Nearly all the Groups agree that there are no insurmountable objections to allowing air carriers to engage in both domestic and

international air transportation. They recognize certain dangers which might arise from giving such additional power to certain companies but they judge that these can be met by adequate regulation. Only three Groups are entirely opposed to operations by one company in both fields.

Only a few Groups answered the specific question included in the body of the *Analysis* as to whether foreign terminals should be restricted to border areas or should be at the foci of air traffic in the country concerned. Of those who did, all favor the latter alternative, accepting the consequence that the United States should, and probably would have to, grant reciprocal rights to use terminals at the foci of air traffic in this country.

5. GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES

Subsidies to airlines are distasteful to all the Groups, who favor limiting them rather sharply. To lines engaged only in domestic air traffic most of the Groups would limit subsidies to deficits incurred in pioneering and in maintaining socially desirable but economically marginal or submarginal lines. In foreign air transportation the vast majority of the Groups favor meeting competitive subsidies but seeking international agreement to limit or abolish them. The Groups point out that aside from prestige, nationalistic reasons for maintaining strong air fleets in foreign commerce are based on military considerations and they hold that most of these should drop out if an effective international organization for general security comes into being. The Groups unite in deploring strongly the alternative to an international agreement to limit subsidies, namely, a subsidy race comparable to an armament race. Several Groups, including some opposed to government ownership, point out that subsidies greatly strengthen the argument for public ownership.

6. THE ARCTIC ZONE

All the Groups regard such an international agreement concerning air navigation in the Arctic Zone as desirable, though a number of them express doubts as to its feasibility at the present time. Several suggest that this is a test of the possibility of international collaboration, that if a reasonable agreement with regard to the

Arctic Zone cannot be obtained, it will be a sign that extreme nationalism is really dominant in the world despite soft words about international collaboration.

Most of the Groups favor some sort of international agreement about air traffic over the Arctic without being very specific as to the form that the agreement is to take. They seem to favor freedom of commercial air transit but beyond this do not specify. Some six Groups, however, propose full internationalization of the whole Arctic area, one Group specifying everything north of 80° North latitude.

Many of the Groups explicitly oppose the sector principle, holding that this would serve to spread the evils of nationalism to areas which are now free of it. The only excuse for such an extension of nationalism, they feel, would be the pursuit of security, and this aim, the Groups hold, should be sought through an international organization rather than through a process of trying to grab strategic territory before someone else does.

7. INTERNATIONAL AIR NAVIGATION CONTROL

Every Group, save one, favors establishing an international commission to regulate international air navigation. That one does not oppose the proposal but reports that not enough evidence is available on which to decide. As to the structure of such a commission the Groups are for the most part indefinite. But eight of them specify explicitly that it should function as an agency of a general international organization.

The Groups are agreed with practical unanimity that the international commission should standardize safety regulations, communication and meteorological facilities and lay down requirements looking to the prevention of the spread of disease. Many Groups would go farther and give it power to regulate for international air traffic, services, rates, allocation of routes and similar matters. Only a very few Groups explicitly oppose this extension of the commission's powers. A number of Groups propose that it lay down and enforce limitations on subsidies and regulations concerning the use of patented devices in air traffic. Several urge that it be placed in charge of all air traffic regulations in international-

ized zones such as the Arctic or internationalized Pacific islands. A number urge that it be charged with control not only of civilian air transportation but of such international military air forces as are established. One Group suggests that it supervise and enforce the rules laid down for the air forces of the defeated States, and later the rules prescribed for all States.

In spite of such a divergence of opinion as to the extent of its functions the Groups seem agreed that the only alternative to at least a moderately empowered international air commission is anarchy modified by a multitude of varied reciprocal agreements. Faced with such a choice they turn, with only the exception noted, to an international commission which to begin with shall have power in certain matters of air safety, and which can be granted increased powers as confidence in it grows and as the need for international control of such things as services, routes, rates, and subsidies becomes more imperative.

PROBLEM XIV—POSTWAR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION¹

The Groups reporting on this problem are agreed on the very great importance of continued cooperation and mutual friendly understanding between the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States. As permanent members of the proposed United Nations Security Council, they must collaborate in maintaining the peace as they have in prosecuting the war if further large-scale wars are to be avoided. Though their attitudes toward the Soviet Union range all the way from general suspicion to almost complete trust, the Groups unite in urging that we do all in our power to promote friendly collaboration between the Soviet Union, the British Commonwealth, and ourselves.

I. FUTURE SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Though the Groups carefully disclaim any special insights into the future course of Soviet foreign policy, they are in fact agreed to a very large extent on the bases on which that policy will rest and the directions it will take. There seems to them to be good reason for concluding that the primary interests of the Soviet Union in the postwar years will be security and reconstruction. Since her most pressing needs will be to repair the ravages of this war and to safeguard herself as thoroughly as possible from the recurrence of such a catastrophe, it seems safe to assume that she will concentrate on those major objectives. All of the Groups that express an opinion on the matter agree on this. Six Groups urge that pan-Slavism and a desire to extend communism beyond her own borders will still be underlying motives of Soviet policy, but nearly all of these Groups agree that such motives will be definitely subordinated to her major interests in reconstruction and security. Two Groups suggest that the Soviet Government, like

¹ Issued in April, 1944. Replies were received, largely during June–October, 1944, from 32 Cooperating Groups located at Brown, Bucknell, California Institute of Technology, Carleton, Central YMCA College, Colorado, Dartmouth, Fordham, Georgetown, Harvard, Holy Cross, Hood, John Carroll, Kentucky, Louisiana Polytechnic, Loyola College (Baltimore), Miami, Mount Holyoke, Nebraska, Notre Dame, Ohio State, Pennsylvania, Rollins, Skidmore, Smith, Stanford, Swarthmore, Sweet Briar, University of Washington, Wellesley, Wheaton (Ill.), and Wilson.

the Czarist regime before it, probably retains a lively interest in obtaining outlets to the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean as well as control of the outlet from the Baltic Sea into the Atlantic.

The Groups are completely agreed that the methods the Soviet Union will adopt to realize the two principal aims described above depend to a large extent on the policies to be followed by the United States and Great Britain. If we are friendly and cooperative her course of action is likely to be quite different from what it will be if our attitude is one of suspicion and armed watchfulness. If we join with her in creating a strong international organization that shows considerable likelihood of being able to guarantee security against aggression, she will find it necessary to rely much less exclusively on her own resources than would be the case were we to give only grudging lip service to a security organization and withhold our participation or hedge it about with so many restrictions as to make effective collective action seem unlikely. Though government leaders in the United States and Great Britain promise full collaboration in a collective security organization, the record of our Senate is more than enough to justify Russian caution. Most of the Groups recognize that the Soviet Union would be extremely unrealistic did she not take proper precautions against the breakdown of present plans for an effective collective security system.

The Groups are almost unanimously agreed that the Soviet Union will prefer to follow a policy of international cooperation. Such a policy would bring her a maximum of assistance in her gigantic reconstruction problem and would reduce to a minimum the energies she would have to devote to defense against the danger of further aggression. Before committing themselves exclusively to such a policy, however, the Soviet leaders will have to be convinced of the prompt creation and effective functioning of a world security system. As it is, they have justifiable doubts about the possibility of obtaining such an organization in the near future and hence, as prudent men they will accompany their cooperation with unilateral measures of their own to safeguard themselves against the dangers which would beset them were the collective security plan to collapse.

It is the general opinion of the Groups, therefore, that Soviet Government policy will be a mixture of international cooperation and independent national action, the exact proportion of each to be determined by a realistic appraisal of the actual situation. Some of the Groups remark that to the extent that the Soviet leaders doubt the effectiveness of international cooperation and feel compelled to resort to purely national action, they will doubtless also return to some elements of their earlier policy of socialist isolationism. They will be isolationists not in the sense of withdrawing from world affairs, but in the sense of seeking as high a degree of self-sufficiency as possible.

Nearly all the Groups judge that the Soviet Government has abandoned for the foreseeable future the early policy of revolutionary interventionism. Some of them point to the evolution of communism within the Union, involving the progressive abandonment of the more extreme Marxist positions, and to the relative ineffectiveness of communist movements outside the Union, save in China, where the spread of communism has been accompanied by a considerable doctrinal modification. These Groups believe that the present Soviet leaders recognize the relative unimportance of communist propaganda abroad and are probably quite sincere in their pledge not to promote communism by revolution. Such considerations are strongly reinforced, the Groups believe, by the recognition that the pursuit of a policy of revolutionary interventionism would seriously endanger Russia's more pressing present interests in security and reconstruction. In view of such factors as these, nearly all the Groups agree that revolutionary interventionism is the least likely of all the policies that may conceivably be adopted. A few Groups warn that a return to this policy will always be a possibility, but they agree with the majority that the needs of security and reconstruction are so paramount that policies such as revolutionary interventionism which might interfere with their realization will be side-tracked for some time to come.

Because they hold that the emphasis of Soviet policy will swing from independent national action to international cooperation in proportion to the trust which Soviet leaders feel justified in placing in an international security organization, the Groups urge that

the United States and Great Britain give as early as possible the utmost assurance of their full cooperation and willingness to participate in the proposed international undertakings to attain enduring peace and economic well-being. They point out that the more friendly and cooperative our relations with the Soviet Union become, the less likely is Soviet policy to assume a form which we would deprecate.

2. SOVIET TERRITORIAL DEMANDS

Even as the Groups discussed this problem, definite additional evidence, in the form of Soviet armistice terms for Finland, Rumania, and Bulgaria, delineated more sharply Soviet territorial demands. There is now substantial agreement that in addition to the territory which was recognized as belonging to the Soviet Union in 1939, the Soviet Government will claim Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, a substantial portion of prewar Poland, corresponding roughly to the territory east of the Curzon line, the three Baltic States of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, portions of Finnish territory, including the Karelian Isthmus, the Petsamo area, and a few other strategic points. It seems likely also that the Soviet Union will demand certain of the easternmost sections of East Prussia. She will doubtless insist on full internationalization of the Dardanelles to give her guaranteed access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea, but there is no evidence that she will make territorial demands on Turkey. A few Groups suggest that later the Soviet Government will make certain territorial demands in the Far East, in particular to certain parts of Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Northern Manchuria.

In contrast to their general agreement as to the territorial demands of the Soviet Union, the Groups are widely divided as to the principles which should be applied in judging these claims. They agree that no one principle suffices by itself as an adequate criterion, that it is only through the interaction of a number of them that sound conclusions can be reached. Most often mentioned as an important factor is self-determination, which was stressed in the Atlantic Charter. Though over half of the Groups specify it as of considerable weight, nearly all of them agree that it should

not be used in isolation. For one thing the real wishes of the people of a given area in eastern Europe are difficult to determine. Plebiscites in the Baltic States have shown a suspicious degree of unanimity for incorporation in the Soviet Union. Yet it is most unlikely either that Russia would welcome a plebiscite under international auspices, or that a thoroughly impartial one could be held. A further difficulty arises from the fact that the populations of certain areas are so mixed that exclusive adherence to the principle of self-determination could only result in the creation of a large number of very small States, the "Balkanization" of the area that would entail a situation worse than that in the Balkans.

After self-determination, the consideration most often mentioned by the Groups is the need for a peace settlement which in the long run will make the largest possible contribution to enduring world peace. Essential to such a settlement, they maintain, is the continued collaboration, in an atmosphere of friendly mutual trust, of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States. For this reason, many of the Groups urge, the Western powers would do well to temper the demands of their sense of abstract justice, by giving full consideration to the very real strategic and other grounds which support the Soviet claims. Some Groups put it rather bluntly this way: The Soviet Union regards certain of her claims as so far beyond dispute that she will insist on their realization, if necessary, even in the face of the most determined opposition from the Western powers. There is little use in antagonizing the Soviet Union and thus jeopardizing the peace by vain opposition to what is already practically a *fait accompli*. This argument is applied especially with regard to Russian claims to Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, the Baltic States and segments of Finland. With regard to Poland and East Prussia, these same Groups argue that we should *urge* that their boundaries be settled by joint consultation but that we should not *insist* on this or *demand* certain solutions unless we are prepared, as obviously we are not, to back our demands with force. To withhold recognition, for example, from boundary changes on which we were not consulted, would simply exacerbate the Soviet Union and endanger the whole peace structure we are seeking to build. We should remember,

these Groups urge, that Soviet claims will seem just to Soviet leaders, and a straight-laced attitude on our part may seem to them to be further evidence of underlying antagonism to the Soviet Union.

We should give considerable weight, a large number of Groups urge, to the Soviet Union's deeply felt and very real need for national security. The Groups feel that the Soviet Union is fully justified, after her experiences of recent years, in pressing certain claims which, if satisfied, would reduce substantially the feasibility of new aggression against her. Yet it is equally clear that such claims can be pushed too far, that nations in their eagerness to control all areas from which attacks against them might conceivably be launched have sometimes aroused so much hatred and desire for revenge that they have increased rather than lessened the danger of attack. The demands of the people for self-government should not be sacrificed lightly to the need for security.

Ethnic, historical, and economic considerations are also mentioned by a number of Groups as deserving some, though less consideration. Ethnic groups in Eastern Europe are too mixed to permit settlement exclusively along such lines. The application of historical considerations alone seldom results in an acceptable solution—witness Poland—and economic factors, though important, can often be adjusted in such a way that economic and political boundary lines need not coincide.

As different Groups give varying weight to the various principles on which territorial settlements should be based, they also give different answers as to the justification of specific Soviet claims. In many cases the Groups refrain from drawing conclusions in the various special cases proposed for consideration. Where they do, the trends are as follows. They are inclined to accept Soviet claims against Finland. The areas demanded are judged to be of real strategic importance for the defense of the Soviet Union. Sympathy for the Finns is counter-balanced by a feeling that, considering the significant aid which Finland gave to Germany over a long period, the Soviet terms were far from being unduly harsh.

Most of the Groups that comment also accept Soviet demands

for Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, the first on ethnic grounds, the second on historical ones.

As to the Baltic States there is less agreement. It is believed that, if a real measure of local autonomy is granted them as Soviet republics within the Union, the lot of the people of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania will not be bad, and will be very much better than their fate under Nazi domination. Nevertheless many of the Groups believe that in a free plebiscite the peoples of these States would undoubtedly vote for independence. On the other hand the strategic value of these States to the Soviet Union is admitted. It is also recognized that the Soviet Government will doubtless insist that the Baltic States are, and have been since before the Soviet Union became an ally of Great Britain, a part of the U.S.S.R., and that she will be ready to discuss the question of their secession when the United States cares to have an international conference to discuss the possible separation of Texas from the Union. In the face of these facts, most of the Groups are inclined to favor our acceptance of the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union.

The greatest disagreement occurs with regard to Soviet demands for Eastern Poland, with the Curzon line as a basis for discussion. Many of the Groups acknowledge that only some such line would have any measure of international sanction. Yet they are disturbed by the fact that if the boundary were drawn in this way, large segments of population predominantly Polish would be placed under Soviet sovereignty. Some suggest that if this solution materializes we should urge the Soviet Union to do all it can to facilitate a voluntary transfer of populations.

Even in the face of the difficult complexities of the Soviet-Polish border problem, none of the Groups favors an isolationist withdrawal by the United States on the ground that the affair is no concern of ours. On the contrary, many of the Groups specifically advocate the opposite—peace is indivisible—view. Nearly all the Groups favor our full participation in a joint discussion and settlement of the problem. In fact the vast majority propose that we urge very strongly—just short of insistence—that the matter be decided through joint consultation rather than bilaterally by di-

rect settlement between Poland and the Soviet Union. A few Groups urge that we *insist* on a joint settlement. Most of the Groups, however, feel that we should not endanger the peace structure which we hope to create by absolute insistence on any one point. That the Soviet Union is willing to go at least a reasonable way toward joint consultation is shown by the joint imposition of armistice terms on neighboring and formerly enemy countries, and by the conferences in Moscow, in October, 1944, between Stalin, Churchill, the Lublin Polish Committee, and the London Polish Government-in-exile. A few Groups temper their view on this point, by remarking that if we ask the Soviet Union to let us participate in the settlement of matters so close to her homeland and vital interests, we must be prepared to welcome her to consultation with us on Western Hemisphere problems.

On the supposition that Great Britain and the United States do meet with the Soviet Union for joint consultation and settlement of some or all of the Soviet territorial claims, most of the Groups seem inclined to urge that we avoid assuming an intransigent position. They suggest that we should examine all the evidence available and listen sympathetically to an objective statement of the Soviet position. Having reached our conclusion on this basis we should state our opinion clearly and forcefully, but not adamantly or threateningly. Even if the best agreement that can be reached is one we do not relish, we should be willing to accept it for the sake of advancing our long-run plans of an international organization which ultimately will, we hope, be in a position to correct any injustices done in the settlement reached during the turmoil of the first period of postwar adjustment. The Groups base this position on their belief that the alternatives to it would be worse. One alternative, not to oppose but also not to subscribe to decisions which the Soviet Government will accept, would prevent an immediate break, but would sow such seeds of distrust and suspicion as to make impossible the international cooperation so necessary to an enduring peace. Far better would it be for us to urge our point of view but be prepared to yield if necessary.

3. SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY

Many of the Groups preface their comments on the Treatment

of Germany by referring to their reports on Problem III on the Postwar Treatment of Germany.² They reaffirm the positions they took on the various problems at that time, and urge that we should do our best to convince Soviet leaders that they should view these problems in the same way.

a. On the subject of the *military occupation of Germany*, the Groups are united in holding that plans should be agreed upon in advance by the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States and carried out under the direction of a joint control commission. Some urge joint occupation, but most accept as already decided upon the plan of different spheres of occupation, and confine themselves to urging an over-all plan with a common policy to be followed throughout Germany. Several Groups repeat the opinion expressed in their earlier reports that the period of occupation be as limited as possible.

b. As to the *punishment of war criminals* the Groups emphasize again the desirability of agreement in advance on the procedures to be followed. They favor extension of the work of the United Nations Commission to Investigate War Crimes. Principles which it establishes should be followed in the case of those charged with war crimes. Those accused of specific crimes against specific individuals in specific areas should be turned over to tribunals in those areas in accordance with a general procedure agreed upon in advance. Some Groups caution against allowing motives of revenge to have undue play here, and warn that the punishment of war criminals is a very small and relatively unimportant part of the peace settlement and should not be overemphasized. Some Groups suggest leaving as much of this task as possible to the Russians, on the theory that they will make a quick and effective job of it. Others suggest encouraging the Germans to deal with their own war criminals so that the danger of making heroes out of those punished will be eliminated.

c. Russian proposals for the *German territorial settlement* set off the most disagreement among the Groups. Many reaffirm their opposition to the dismemberment of Germany and a considerable number oppose in particular the suggested transfer of the major

² See Summary of the Replies of Cooperating Groups on Problem III, *International Conciliation*, June, 1944, No. 401, pp. 446-472.

portion of East Prussia and Eastern Silesia to Poland. They point out, that even if provision is made for a transfer of populations the change proposed would provide a serious irredentist problem and would promote in German hearts for generations to come a feeling of outrage and a passionate desire for vengeance. Some Groups argue, contrary to Prime Minister Churchill, that the Atlantic Charter does and should apply to Germany. Other Groups are willing to forego its application in this case and some are inclined to approve the proposed transfer to Poland.

d. On *reparations*, too, the Groups tend to reaffirm their earlier views which would allow reparations in limited degree but not in such amounts as to destroy German industry or pauperize her people. Many Groups explicitly recognize the justice of the Soviet Union's demands for reparations in the forms of goods and labor and they favor granting such demands within the limits mentioned. Again they emphasize the advantages of joint agreement in advance on a comprehensive reparations program.

e. As to *the political and economic future of Germany*, the Groups unite in proposing advance agreement on a common plan to be followed by all the occupying States. In general the Groups favor leaving Germany a free choice of any non-Fascist government. They tend also, but with less unanimity, to favor leaving Germany strong economically—for the sake of European economy as a whole—but imposing effective controls which will keep her weak militarily. The Groups are inclined to believe that the Soviet leaders would agree to such a program.

4. SPECIAL SOVIET SECURITY PROPOSALS

With only three exceptions the Groups are inclined to accept, or at least acquiesce in Soviet demands for strategic frontiers and bases even though these conflict with such principles as that of national self-determination. They recognize the heavy price the Soviet Union has just paid to resist aggression and they are sympathetic with her desire to take every practicable measure to eliminate the likelihood of the early recurrence of such an attack. They urge that her demands be discussed and settled by an international conference within the framework of a general interna-

tional organization. Many Groups remark that Russian desires for strategic areas are comparable to demands being raised in many quarters in this country for United States possession or control of certain island territories for strategic bases. Both sets of demands should be settled by joint agreement, the Groups urge, and not by unilateral "grabbing."

The Groups are less favorably inclined to the proposal of a Soviet "zone of safety" within which the Soviet Union would be free to make special security arrangements and claim special and exclusive interests. Eight Groups vote "no" specifically on this suggestion. They feel that it smacks too much of the old notion of "spheres of influence" and imperialistic power politics. On the other hand, a number of Groups point out that what is proposed is comparable to the special interests which the United States already insists it has in the Western Hemisphere. We feel that our relations with our neighbors in the Americas are of a special sort and we would be shocked were any world organization to interfere with them. Some Groups mention specifically certain types of special relations with her neighbors which the Soviet Union might well develop, and which should be heartily approved so long as they are not inconsistent with global security arrangements. Among these are her treaty with Czechoslovakia, and the possible development of special relations with an Eastern European or Danubian Federation if the Soviet Union should find such an arrangement to her liking. Agreements of this kind, the Groups urge, should be made within the framework of the general international organization, but if they are so made should be generally accepted.

5. SOVIET-AMERICAN COOPERATION

There are many things, the Groups agree, which the Soviet Union and the United States can do to increase the chances of postwar friendly cooperation between them. Both should participate fully in the various international agencies which are likely to be set up and particularly in the general security organization. On this point the Groups are unanimous. Such cooperation will require a friendly willingness to yield on some points and to compromise on others. It will be increased by the other methods pro-

posed and in turn will facilitate them. Nearly all Groups mention the value of developing mutually advantageous trade relations. Others stress the importance of mutual cultural exchanges and the helpfulness of increased understanding of each other's divergent customs and ways of life.

Many Groups point out that the Soviet Union can do much to reduce fear and suspicion of her in this country by adhering strictly to her pledge of nonintervention in the economic and political affairs of this country and particularly of abstention from Soviet-directed underground activity in support of communism. Most of the Groups urge that increased emphasis within the Soviet Union on human rights and liberties, particularly freedom of expression, would do much to improve American attitudes toward the U.S.S.R. Others, in somewhat less numbers, mention the anti-Russian feeling that has been aroused in religious groups in America by the earlier Soviet opposition to religion. They regard as very helpful the statement in the Soviet constitution acknowledging religious freedom, and more recent evidence, such as suspension of *The Godless* and recognition of leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church, which indicates Soviet tolerance in practice of religious institutions. Some Groups express the hope that Soviet officials will relax their secretiveness and will welcome exchanges of information and of visitors after the war. With regard to Soviet aid against Japan, the Groups express understanding of the absence of direct aid at this stage of the war, and comment warmly on the indirect aid the Soviet Union has given through her successful fight against Germany.

The Groups agree also that there is much that the United States can do to help eliminate Soviet suspicions of our intentions. The tone of many American articles and speeches, by Congressmen as well as private citizens, has often been inflammatory in its denunciation of all things Russian as communistic and therefore beyond the toleration of decent men. Though we do not censor American publications and addresses, a show of popular interest in articles and talks which are friendly to the Soviet Union and which present in a sympathetic way information and understanding of Russian aims and Russian ways, would be of great help in

overcoming the not altogether groundless Russian belief that Americans would rather denounce than understand the Soviet Union. Continued cooperation by our Government after the war, participation in international agencies, and adoption of a reasonable lend-lease settlement will do much, the Groups urge, to counter the Russian impression of America as a land of isolationists who are inclined to limit their contacts with the rest of the world to selling and exploiting. The Soviet Union would particularly appreciate American assistance, technical as well as financial and material, in meeting her difficult problems of reconstruction.

Beyond such general remarks a number of Groups make specific suggestions of ways in which the United States could show a friendly and cooperative spirit toward the Soviet Union. Among these are participation by American labor in the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Council, abandonment of our diplomatic relations with the governments of the former Baltic States, greater freedom for Soviet publications to enter the United States, and so on.

More important than any of these details is the continued growth of friendly mutual interest, knowledge, and trust between the citizens of the two countries and between their governments. The Groups emphasize the need for this over and over again. With the development of such friendly feeling, the continuation of international cooperation between the Soviet and American governments, so vital in the postwar years, has an increasing chance of being realized.

PROBLEM XV—POSTWAR RELATIONS WITH THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS¹

The Groups are unanimously agreed that continued close cooperation between the United States and the British Commonwealth is required if our two great postwar aims of security and prosperity are to be realized. They recognize that there are divergent interests and that the coming of peace will bring with it the danger of a return to the economic rivalry and general distrust which so often characterized our relations with Great Britain before the war. The Groups emphasize the great importance of avoiding this danger and of following instead a policy of friendly collaboration. The Groups point out that such a policy is indispensable to the welfare of the world and to the satisfaction of our own long-run basic interests.

I. POSTWAR POLICIES OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

There is no dissent among the Groups from the view that Great Britain, like most of the other countries of the world, will be interested primarily after the war in peace, security, and prosperity. If the United States and the Soviet Union will cooperate she will seek to realize these aims through participation in a general international organization. This is the course she will much prefer. On the other hand, several Groups caution that she will be on her guard against withdrawal from cooperative action by the other big powers and, if forced, will do her best to achieve her aims by independent action. Her security, like that of the rest of the world, will be best served by a world security organization, but failing that she may be forced to resort to the old game of balance of power politics, seeking to strengthen her ties with

¹ Issued in May, 1944. Replies were received, largely during July–December, 1944, from Cooperating Groups located at Brown, Bucknell, California Institute of Technology, Carleton (Two Groups), Central YMCA College, Colorado, Dartmouth, Dunbarton College of Holy Cross, Georgetown, Goucher, Harvard, Holy Cross, Hood, John Carroll, Kentucky, Louisiana Polytechnic, Loyola (Baltimore), Marquette, Miami, Milwaukee-Downer, Mount Holyoke, Nebraska, Notre Dame, Oberlin, Pennsylvania, Rockford, Rollins, Skidmore, Smith, Sweet Briar, West Virginia, Wheaton (Ill.), Wheaton (Mass.), and Wilson.

France and even to reestablish Germany as a strong continental power.

To rebuild her economy, the Groups are convinced, Britain will have to expand her exports very considerably. To this end she will doubtless seek to develop world trade on an extensive scale through the reduction by multilateral action of trade barriers. World cooperation to this end will be her first choice. If, however, such cooperation is not forthcoming she will have no other course, a number of Groups warn, than to fall back on such bilateral or empire preference agreements as she can negotiate, combined perhaps with devaluation of the pound, and strict governmental regulation of her foreign trade. These are undesirable last resorts, but they will become increasingly likely to the extent that world cooperation in a program of international economic collaboration fails to materialize.

Nearly all the Groups believe that Great Britain will seek closer ties with both the United States and the Soviet Union. They believe that she would prefer to cooperate with both in a general international organization, but that she would, if rebuffed in this, be quite capable of playing one off against the other. Many Groups remark that certain of the Dominions, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, have entered into closer relationships with the United States during the war and will doubtless wish to maintain and develop their collaboration with us in the years of the peace.

Eleven Groups state specifically that they believe that Great Britain will include maintenance of her empire as one of her major postwar policies. Most of them quote the Prime Minister's remark of November 10, 1942, "I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire," as evidence of this. One Group, however, remarks that we should take into account the many provocative statements that had stirred Mr. Churchill to this reply.

2. BRITISH-AMERICAN COOPERATION FOR SECURITY

The Groups are unanimously and whole-heartedly agreed that we should cooperate fully with the British Commonwealth, as

with the other nations of the world, in a general international organization for peace and security. They hold that cooperation within such an organization offers far and away the most hopeful prospect of preserving peace, and many Groups would say, the only real opportunity. Twelve Groups say that if no international organization can be formed they would accept a four-power alliance as better than nothing. They insist, however, that such an alliance presents real dangers of its own and is definitely a second choice to a global security organization. Four Groups regard the evils of such an alliance as so great that they vote flatly against it.

Four Groups would accept a military alliance with the British Commonwealth as a poor third choice, but they join with all the others in deprecating such a proposal and in pointing out that such an alliance would inevitably give the impression of being an alliance against certain States and would consequently provoke counter-alliances. Thus the stage would be set for future conflict. Six Groups are explicit in their rejection of this proposal.

As to the suggestion of adopting parallel policies with the British Commonwealth without making any advance commitments, four Groups reject it as entirely inadequate and as not giving sufficient guarantees to members of the Commonwealth that cooperation would be forthcoming. The result, these Groups feel, is that the British Commonwealth would have to plan on getting along without cooperation and thus would be forced into restrictive policies. Other Groups suggest that this proposal offers a residual solution for problems that are not met by direct commitments. They feel that the security problem and the economic problem are so important that they demand definite commitments within a general international organization. But they admit that there are many matters of detail where collaboration will be called for but need not be promised in advance. In such cases it will be sufficient to follow parallel policies without previous agreements to do so.

The Groups give careful consideration to various proposals that have been made that the United States would be wise to commit itself in advance to the defense against external attack of certain British territories, such as (1) Canada and British colonial pos-

sessions in the Western Hemisphere, (2) Australia and New Zealand and British colonies in the western Pacific, (3) the British Isles. Nearly all of them agree that regional commitments such as those proposed should be undertaken within the framework of a general international organization rather than bilaterally. In the former case the commitment would be undertaken jointly by all the peace-loving nations of the world and would be backed by their joint strength. In the latter the responsibility for aid would fall on us alone. Nevertheless, most of the Groups agree, should a global organization not be achieved, it would still be to our interest to make arrangements of the kinds mentioned, or at least to assist in defending such areas against attack even if previous commitments had not been made. For in all cases, the Groups believe, these areas are vital to the defense of the United States and we could not look with equanimity on their seizure by an aggressive power.

The Groups point out that following the Ogdensburg Agreement of August 18, 1940, we have set up with Canada a Permanent Joint Board on Defense "to consider in the broad sense the defense of the north half of the Western Hemisphere." Our long-term leases on bases in the British West Indies and the development of cooperative defense plans with Latin-American countries point to our determination to resist external attack anywhere in the Western Hemisphere.

Four Groups vote against committing ourselves to defending Australia, New Zealand or British colonies in the West Pacific against external attack. The other Groups that comment on this point either favor such a commitment or believe that we would in fact defend them were they attacked, even though no formal agreements to this effect had been entered into in advance. Again the Groups urge that our commitments in this area should be made within the framework of a general international organization or at least a Pacific Council which would serve either as a regional agency within such an organization or independently were a global organization not forthcoming. A number of Groups point out that because we shall doubtless wish to retain our dominant (naval) position in the Pacific, we shall be involved almost inevitably in

putting down any aggression in that area which involves naval and air forces.

There is less agreement among the Groups with regard to the defense of the British Isles. Four Groups definitely oppose our making any such commitment and two say that they do not know whether an agreement of this kind would be wise or not. The others that comment either favor such an undertaking or believe that we would help to defend the British Isles were they directly attacked even if we had not previously promised to do so. These Groups urge again, that agreements of this sort should form part of a joint agreement entered into by all members of an international organization to crush aggression anywhere. A number add that it would be unwise for us to enter into a bilateral agreement with Great Britain to this effect, for such an arrangement would look, again, like an alliance against the Soviet Union and would serve to cause unnecessary distrust and suspicion. These Groups admit, however, that it is probable that we could not stand idly by and see the British Isles taken over by a strong aggressor. The threat to our own security in such a case would be too obvious and too great.

Nearly all of the Groups hold that existing staff arrangements should be continued until a general international organization is established and becomes effective, but that then they should be merged into the general staff arrangements which would be set up by the Security Council. Even before that, a number of Groups urge that our present arrangements with Great Britain should be expanded to include military consultation at the general staff level with representatives of the Soviet Union, of France, and of China. A joint general staff of all the States which—it is hoped—will ultimately be permanent members of the Security Council is much to be preferred to merely bilateral military cooperation.

3. LEND-LEASE SETTLEMENT

The Groups are agreed in urging a liberal lend-lease settlement. The same policy, they remark, should be followed for all recipients of lend-lease aid, though of course there will be different applications in detail. A number of Groups argue that a

liberal settlement will minister both to the general good and also to our own economic welfare. Nearly all the Groups urge settlement along the following lines. Lend-lease goods which have been expended in the war effort should be regarded as part of our contribution to that effort. Their use by our allies has saved American lives and material of far greater value. In the case of goods that are still serviceable and returnable, most of the Groups suggest that they be returned. Others suggest that we retain title to them and dispose of them as we think best. In case of their sale abroad an agreement with the country concerned would of course be required.

Greater divergence of opinion arises in regard to immovable capital investments in such things as airports, wharves, warehouses, and factories. In so far as these promise to be of real utility to the country in which they are located, most of the Groups feel that we are entitled to some return for them. Many Groups point out the difficulties in the way of payment for them in gold or goods, the former because of the scarcity of dollar exchange, the latter because of our reluctance to accept additional imports. Many Groups urge that we should not repeat the mistakes of the post World War I period and try again to collect uncollectible debts. They point out also the harm to ourselves as well as to our debtors that would result from our insistence on payment in a form that would injure seriously the economies of the debtor States. For such reasons several Groups specifically urge avoidance of direct payments in money or goods.

Several Groups suggest that settlement for such usable capital goods be made in accordance with Article VII of the master lend-lease agreement which emphasizes the long-run aim of economic well-being for all the nations of the world. Nine Groups urge that we might well regard acceptance of certain principles of economic and political cooperation by our allies as satisfactory payment. One Group objects to this on the ground that we should not mix such political and economic questions with the lend-lease settlement problem, and another on the ground that to use lend-lease aid as a lever for special concessions of this sort would create undue antagonism.

Four or five Groups believe that we might accept as payment certain strategic bases which we desire providing that they are willingly offered. To demand such payment is regarded by all as unwise because it smacks too much of using our power for imperialistic purposes. A number of Groups urge that it would be better to internationalize the use if not the ownership of these strategic areas rather than to transfer them from one power to another.

There are several scattering answers. One Group regards it as unwise to give the President such wide discretionary powers. Another, expressing a much more widely held view, points out that from the economic point of view cancellation of any outstanding lend-lease debt is desirable, and that it is only because of political considerations that a settlement is needed. To meet this political demand with the least economic cost they propose a carefully developed formula which would take account of the war expenditures and the national income of countries which have received more lend-lease than they have provided. Such a system, they claim, would minimize the economic cost to the world of a lend-lease settlement.

4. POSTWAR ECONOMIC REQUIREMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN

It is generally agreed that the postwar economic and financial position of Great Britain will be a difficult one. While intent on providing an acceptable standard of living at home, the British will be faced with the loss of important foreign assets and the serious dislocation of their foreign trade. The Groups agree that we should give very considerable weight to British economic needs. The influence of British economy on world economy and of world economy on United States economy is so great that we should undoubtedly be wise, they hold, to mesh our economy to hers at least to the extent of avoiding policies which would have a catastrophic effect on British economic well-being.

The Groups are unanimously agreed that we should lower our tariff rates substantially and reduce other trade barriers. Such action, they believe, would greatly aid our trade with Great Britain and world trade in general. A number of Groups suggest that it

would be even more desirable to make a multilateral world agreement removing trade barriers generally. Lacking this, however, they would support a bilateral arrangement with Great Britain or with all of the members of the British Commonwealth. The Groups are completely agreed in recognizing the vital need Great Britain will have in the postwar years to increase her exports very substantially. Since they are convinced that in the long run we cannot sell without buying, and since they regard the expansion of our own trade as also important, they agree that the removal of tariff and other trade barriers offers to a very considerable degree an unusual opportunity to help ourselves while giving much needed aid to Great Britain.

Again the Groups are completely agreed that we should strive to maintain high levels of consumption at home. Such levels are necessary for our own prosperity and our prosperity is a very important factor in world prosperity. We must not, however, adopt unilateral policies which promise direct returns to us without carefully weighing the repercussions these policies would have on the rest of the world. Our economic decisions should be based on a policy of international economic collaboration rather than on one of economic nationalism. Again, several Groups remark that we should not concentrate on a high level of domestic consumption in the sense of regarding that as the only thing we need to do if our economy and the world economy in general are going to prosper. We should seek to maintain a high level of domestic consumption but not at the expense of other peoples or at the expense of other needed action.

The Groups are unanimous in believing that loans and technical assistance in the development of backward areas offer a means of developing new markets for British and American products alike. At least ten of them specify that such aid should be given primarily through an international investment agency to avoid the dangers of developing American spheres of influence or American imperialism. The economic development of backward areas would increase their ability to participate in world trade, and an increase in world trade, the Groups are confident, would be beneficial both to Great Britain and to us.

The Groups tend to be vague in their statements as to the shipping policy we should adopt after the war. They agree that Great Britain, as well as other countries such as Norway, will be desperately in need of regaining a prominent shipping position if their economies are not to suffer seriously. Great Britain will need a large income from shipping to offset her losses due to an unfavorable balance of trade and necessary large-scale expenditures for reconstruction and rehabilitation. The Groups agree, too, that a prosperous British economy is a needed prop for world economy. But they are not sure how far we should go in sacrificing our own merchant marine to meet this need. Some of this uncertainty, they confess, is due to their lack of technical knowledge as to the amount of shipping we need for national defense and for coastwise trade. In part it is due to lack of knowledge as to how best to dispose of our surplus of ships beyond these two needs.

Over half the Groups favor some modification of our shipping policies which will make possible the rehabilitation of the merchant marines of countries whose economy requires that they maintain a strong maritime position. Just what that modification should be they are content for the most part to leave to experts. Many mention that they are opposed to shipping subsidies, at least beyond the needs of national defense, and suggest that elimination or pronounced reduction in these would soon enable the "natural" maritime powers of the world to regain their normal shipping position. One Group takes an opposing position with the statement "There is no need to wreck our merchant marine."

There is almost complete agreement that generous credits should be made available to Great Britain if she needs them in the difficult days of her reconstruction. Nearly half of the Groups, however, hold that it would be much better for us to make such credits available through some international agency such as an international bank, or an international investment agency, rather than directly. The Groups are concerned, as they indicate in their answers to the question on lend-lease, that we do not repeat the errors we made after the last war of being creditors for a lot of uncollectible war debts. Some guard against this danger by saying that loans should be made only on a sound financial basis. The

more usual method proposed, however, is that loans should be made by an international agency.

The Groups recognize that credits to Great Britain would be but temporary palliatives and they urge that in making them available we do not fail to render aid in support of more permanently beneficial measures.

Throughout their consideration of the means by which we should help members of the British Commonwealth, and particularly Great Britain, to reestablish their economies on a sound basis, the Groups give due consideration to the much less desirable alternatives to which Great Britain might be forced were such aid not forthcoming. They regard all the alternatives commonly mentioned, devaluation of the pound sterling, special bilateral agreements, imperial preference, establishment of a sterling trade area, or strict government control of foreign trade, as being indeed courses which Great Britain might be forced to take, if the more generally beneficial measures proposed should not be taken or should prove insufficient. And they agree that to avoid the consequences of these special alternatives to which Britain might be forced, we should be prepared to go a long way in adapting our postwar economic policies to British and Commonwealth needs.

5. THE BRITISH IMPERIAL SYSTEM

The Group reports show much interest in the future of the British Imperial System and concern as to the type of development the United States should favor. Many of the Groups express the view that we have very little right to say much about British imperial policy outside of an international organization. As one sovereign nation to another we should adopt pretty much of a "hands off" policy. If, however, we cooperate in promoting world prosperity and security, Great Britain will be much more inclined to listen to our proposals and we will have a much better right to make them.

Nearly all the Groups express a strong preference for some form of international supervision over all colonial administration. A large number look forward ultimately to a system of direct international administration of dependent areas, but most of them

regard that as impractical now, except perhaps in a few special cases. Some remark the value an experiment of this sort on a small scale would have. The predominant attitude, however, remains what it was when the Groups reported on Problem IX—*Colonies and Dependent Areas*. They regard responsibility for the development of such areas as a trust which should be administered under the supervision of an international organization backed by responsible world opinion. Only three Groups reject this view, one on the ground of preferring direct international administration, one on the ground that we shouldn't interfere in a major power's colonial relationships, and the third on the ground that giving an international organization supervision or control of colonial affairs would tend to make a super-State of it. With these exceptions, however, the Groups agree in recommending international supervision or administration, with emphasis for the near future on supervision.

Many of the Groups point out that the alternatives listed under this question are not at all exclusive, and think that each of the methods proposed will be used in certain cases. Eight Groups regard empire development along the lines already laid down by the British Government as fairly satisfactory. In support of their view they point to the generally high standards of British colonial administration and to the actual progress made in a number of areas under British control toward independence or dominion status. They judge that present policy does commit Great Britain to the promotion of increased self-government for her colonies within a Commonwealth framework.

Most of the Groups oppose transfer of any territory to the United States, even strategic areas in the Western Hemisphere. They would prefer to see international control of such areas or at least joint control by several nations. They favor, for example, establishment of Joint Commissions for certain areas such as the Caribbean or the South Pacific. They conclude that defense needs would best be met through allocation of the use of strategic areas to an international security organization, which might then ask specific countries to assume special responsibilities for their control.

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