

FORTY-THIRD

ANNUAL REPORT

of the

**BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM**



**COVERING OPERATIONS FOR
THE YEAR**

1956

DIGEST OF PRINCIPAL FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY ACTIONS, 1956

Period	Action	Purpose of action
January	Reduced System holdings of U. S. Government securities by over \$1.4 billion through sales in the market, redemption of maturing bills, and termination of repurchase agreements. Member bank borrowings increased to weekly averages of \$900 million in late January.	To offset seasonal return flow of currency and reduction in reserve needs and restore degree of restraint prevailing before December action to moderate restraint temporarily.
February and March	Bought small amounts of Government securities at times. Member bank borrowings declined somewhat in February but increased substantially in March as result of sharp increase in required reserves.	To meet changing reserve needs and avoid an increasing degree of credit restraint in view of growing tone of uncertainty as to economic prospects.
April and May	Discount rates raised from 2½ per cent to 2¾ per cent at 10 Reserve Banks and to 3 per cent at 2 Banks around middle of April; System holdings of U. S. Government securities reduced by \$350 million. Member bank borrowings at Reserve Banks rose to over \$1 billion.	To increase restraint on credit expansion, in view of sharp increase in bank credit in March and indications of broad increase in spending, growing demands for credit, and upward pressures on prices and costs.
Late May-early August	Increased System holdings of U. S. Government securities around end of May and end of June and maintained holdings at higher level than in previous period.	To meet currency needs around holidays, to cover added demands for reserves around tax payment and midyear settlement periods, and to avoid increasing the degree of restraint in view of uncertainties in economic situation.
August-November	Discount rates raised late in August to 3 per cent at the 10 Reserve Banks with rates of 2¾ per cent. System holdings of U. S. Government securities increased by nearly \$1 billion; member bank borrowings at Reserve Banks rose to average of \$900 million in August and averaged between \$700 and \$800 million in other months.	Discount rates increased in conformity with rise in market rates resulting from vigorous credit demands. Policies designed to increase and maintain restraint on undue credit expansion while covering seasonal and other temporary variations in reserve needs, including effects of frequent Treasury financing operations.
December	System holdings of U. S. Government securities and bankers' acceptances increased by over \$550 million, including substantial repurchase agreements with dealers. Member bank borrowings declined to weekly averages of around \$600 million, except in last week of year, and at times were less than excess reserves.	To supply reserve funds in recognition of additional pressures in money, credit, and capital markets resulting from seasonal factors and international conditions, at a time when lower liquidity ratios of banks were themselves exerting restraint on bank lending.

RECORD OF POLICY ACTIONS

FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE

At the beginning of the year 1956, the policy directive of the Federal Open Market Committee, issued to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as Agent selected by the Committee to execute transactions for the System open market account, was the one that had been approved at the meeting on December 13, 1955, reading as follows:

To make such purchases, sales, or exchanges (including replacement of maturing securities, and allowing maturities to run off without replacement) for the System open market account in the open market, or in the case of maturing securities, by direct exchange with the Treasury, as may be necessary in the light of current and prospective economic conditions and the general credit situation of the country, with a view (a) to relating the supply of funds in the market to the needs of commerce and business, (b) to restraining inflationary developments in the interest of sustainable economic growth, and (c) to the practical administration of the account; provided that the aggregate amount of securities held in the System account (including commitments for the purchase or sale of securities for the account) at the close of this date, other than special short-term certificates of indebtedness purchased from time to time for the temporary accommodation of the Treasury, shall not be increased or decreased by more than \$1 billion;

To purchase direct from the Treasury for the account of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (with discretion, in cases where it seems desirable, to issue participations to one or more Federal Reserve Banks) such amounts of special short-term certificates of indebtedness as may be necessary from time to time for the temporary accommodation of the Treasury; provided that the total amount of such certificates held at any one time by the Federal Reserve Banks shall not exceed in the aggregate \$500 million;

To sell direct to the Treasury from the System account for gold certificates such amounts of Treasury securities maturing within one year as may be necessary from time to time for the accommodation of the Treasury; provided that the total amount of such securities so sold shall not exceed in the aggregate \$500 million face amount, and such sales shall be made as nearly as may be practicable at the prices currently quoted in the open market.

The policy actions listed on the following pages were taken by the votes indicated at the nineteen meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee held during 1956.

term money rates had tended to rise further, despite a somewhat easier bank reserve position than had existed a few weeks earlier.

The consensus of the Committee was that no change should be made at this time in the policy of restraint on inflationary developments. This did not imply a greater degree of restraint, for the Committee wished to avoid a tightening that might seriously unsettle the capital markets and intensify the demand for short-term credit. It observed that seasonal demands for credit could be expected automatically to cause some tightening during the next several weeks, besides which additional Treasury financings for cash and refunding would exert further pressure. The Committee also observed that banks could use the Federal Reserve discount facilities as pressure increased. In addition, it contemplated that, if undue tightening developed, reserves should be supplied through the open market with a view to maintaining substantially the present degree of restraint.

November 13, 1956

Authority to effect transactions in System account.

No change was made at this meeting in the wording of the Committee's directive that System operations in the open market be with a view, among other things, to restraining inflationary developments in the interest of sustainable economic growth.

Votes for this action: Messrs. Martin, Chairman, Hayes, Vice Chairman, Balderston, Erickson, Fulton, Johns, Mills, Powell, Robertson, Shepardson, Szymczak, and Vardaman. Votes against this action: none.

The over-all economic situation still appeared to be inflationary. Since the preceding meeting the Middle East war crisis had caused major uncertainties, however, and cumulative pressures from restrictive monetary and fiscal policies were showing up at the same time that there were indications that the upward momentum of the boom might be losing some of its force.

Industrial output during October had increased slightly further from the September level and during the current month appeared to be at least equal to the October rate. Employment continued at a high level and upward drift in industrial prices persisted. On the other hand, information on industrial construction showed some decrease in recent weeks and residential construction, although still

high, continued below the record 1955 levels. Department store sales in October were only 1 per cent higher than a year earlier despite higher retail prices.

Bank credit growth had slackened perceptibly during recent weeks. This slowing reflected in part restraint on bank lending because of the continued tight reserve position as well as the lowered liquidity position of the banks; it appeared that demand for funds was still strong. Capital markets continued under pressure from the large volume of new issues offered and awaiting offering, and bond yields had risen to postwar highs. Corporate profits were showing signs of leveling off or declining.

The prospect for further seasonal expansion in demand for credit and for additional Treasury financing before the end of the year, with their possible effects on the money market, led the Committee to the conclusion that the degree of restraint should not be intensified at this time. Also, while there was no real indication that the boom had leveled off, there were a number of uncertainties growing out of the international situation, the profit squeeze that had been in evidence for almost a year, the somewhat reduced level of total construction, and the lack of factors pointing definitely to higher levels of economic activity in the future.

Accordingly, in continuing its policy of credit restraint, the Committee did so with the thought that another meeting should be held within two weeks, that in the meantime the degree of pressure in the money market should remain substantially unchanged, and that the members of the Committee should be alert to the possible need for a modification of policy that might develop as a result of the divergent influences noted at this time.

November 27, 1956

Authority to effect transactions in System account.

The Committee continued its directive calling for a policy of restraining inflationary developments in the interest of sustainable economic growth, but it added a qualifying instruction to clause (b) that in carrying on such a program recognition should be given to additional pressures in the money, credit, and capital markets resulting from seasonal factors and international conditions.

Votes for this action: Messrs. Martin, Chairman, Hayes, Vice Chairman, Balderston, Erickson, Fulton, Johns, Mills, Powell,

Robertson, Szymczak, and Vardaman. Votes against this action: none.

Since the meeting held two weeks previously, information becoming available had made it clearer that the economic effects of the Middle East crisis were serious and would not soon be overcome. Domestically, business advance was general, although housing was an important exception. At the same time, there were some "straws in the wind" suggesting possible slackening of activity later on.

Industrial prices had continued upward because of advances in fabricated items and industrial materials, some of which reflected the Middle East situation. Wholesale prices had remained stable on the average reflecting the offsetting effects of lower farm products prices, mainly seasonal reductions in livestock prices. Consumer prices had continued to rise. Industrial output had increased somewhat further in November, and department store sales had rebounded from the reduced October level.

The straws in the wind included October declines in the principal segments of construction—residential, industrial, and public utility. Preliminary data suggested that plant and equipment expenditures for 1957 would rise only slightly from the current rate. Inventories of most goods seemed abundant relative to sales, considerably higher than a year earlier. Business failures had risen to a new postwar high in October. Third quarter corporate earnings data showed that the cost-profit squeeze was continuing to increase with more than two-fifths of the large firms for which data were available showing earnings below the third quarter totals of 1955.

Among financial developments, there had been a sharp decline in Treasury bond prices just before this meeting, accompanied by a rise in the Treasury bill rate to a new high level even though the reserve position of banks outside New York and Chicago had been relatively easy. Expansion in bank loans during the past four weeks had been smaller than in the comparable period of 1955 and banks had made further reductions in their investments. All in all, credit restraint seemed to have taken hold more effectively in the autumn of 1956 than at any time in the past two years.

While the immediate situation impressed the Committee as continuing to be inflationary, it took cognizance of the suggestion

that a fundamental change in the foreign and domestic outlook could be in the making. It did not wish the disturbed conditions in the securities market to become worse and bring on a disorderly situation which might require that more reserves be put into the market than would be necessary to meet the seasonal and growth demands. However, in adding to the directive the qualifying instruction to recognize "additional pressures in the money, credit, and capital markets resulting from seasonal factors and international conditions" the Committee did not intend an overt change away from a policy of restraint; it desired to indicate that the Committee was alert to the kind of pressures that developed toward each year-end as well as to the uncertainties implicit in the international situation and in financial markets.

December 10, 1956

Authority to effect transactions in System account.

The Committee made no change in credit policy at this meeting, and the directive to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York was renewed in the same form as at the meeting held two weeks earlier. This directive called for continued restraint on inflationary developments in the interest of sustainable economic growth, while recognizing additional pressures in the money, credit, and capital markets resulting from seasonal factors and international conditions.

Votes for this action: Messrs. Martin, Chairman, Hayes, Vice Chairman, Balderston, Erickson, Fulton, Johns, Mills, Powell, Roberston, Shepardson, and Szymczak. Votes against this action: none.

Recent international developments had had important economic effects abroad including a substantial drain on British monetary reserves, curtailment of the flow of petroleum to Western Europe, and sharp increases in shipping rates. One result of the Middle East developments and the current British sterling crisis had been the announcement by the United States Treasury of an additional financing for cash in the amount of \$1 billion. This announcement, which came just prior to this meeting, surprised the money market because it had been generally assumed that the Treasury's financing needs had been taken care of for the remainder of the calendar year.