## Prefatory Note

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## MONETARY POLICY ALTERNATIVES

Prepared for the Federal Open Market Committee
By the staff Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

## MONETARY POITCY ATTERNATIVES

## Recent Developments 1

(1) In keeping with a strategy of moving away from an accommodative stance in reserve provision at this stage in the economic expansion without severely unsettling financial markets. the intended federal funds rate was raised 25 basis points. to 3-1/2 percent, immediately following the March 22 FOMC meeting. On April 18. with incoming data having confirmed considerable momentum and diminishing slack in the economy, and financial markets seemingly more able to absorb further tightening, the intended funds rate was raised another 25 basis points. to 3-3/4 percent. Throughout the intermeeting period, the funds rate generally has traded near its intended level. ${ }^{2}$
(2) As indicated in the upper left panel of Chart 1 . just prior to the March FOMC meeting federal funds futures had embodied a rising path for the funds rate, including expectations of a 25 basis point tightening at that meeting and some probability of another move in April. As shown in the lower panel of the exhibit, the markets rallied after the March meeting, but only briefly. On March 24, banks increased the prime rate 25 basis points, to $6-1 / 4$ percent, and over the next week and a half, market rates backed up. partacularly after the release on April 1 of the strong March employment report:

[^1]

Yield Curve Movements

(3) Shorter-term market rates rose further when the Syster. Eightened in mid-April-although less than the quarter-point increasミ in the funds rate. ${ }^{3}$ The mid-April action caught marke= par=i=ipants somewhat unawares and was interpreted as putting policy tighter.ing on a steeper trajectory with a higher endpoint, as can be seen in. the upward revision to federal funds futures. Short-term rates continued to edge up in the latter part of the month. Nonetheless. there was little net movement in intermediate- and long-term rates over most of April. as data indicated subdued trends in costs and prices. However, in late April, rates across the maturity spectrum began rising again with the release of data suggesting to the market considerable additional vigor in economic activity. Weakness in the dollar over this period appeared to contribute to the upward movement in interest rates. because it implied additional price pressures in an economy operating at high levels of output and provided a rationale for more aggressive policy action.
(4) On balance, since the day before the March meeting. while the funds rate has been raised 50 basis points. other short-term interest rates have risen 60 to 85 basis points, intermediate rates 85 to 100 basis points, and long-term rates 60 to 75 basis points. The weakness in the dollar suggests that a portion of the increase in interest rates likely represents a market view that some of the developing price pressures will ultimately show through into higher actual inflation than previously anticipated. However. real rates probably also have risen. judging in part by declines in major stock price indexes of 5-1/2 to 10 percent over the intermeeting period. Some of the increase in real rates likely resulted from the effect of

[^2]heightened uncertainty on term premiums．The upper right pare：ニミ ニロー exhibit shows that expected volatility inferred from near－term ç：ここ：． on bond prices rose sharply toward the end of March．The rise ir． expected volatility probably owed to the persistence of higher actua： price volatility and to uncertainties about the course of monetary policy and inflation in the face of strong aggregate demand．
（5）Increased uncertainty premiums in U．S．interest rates． not fully matched by similar increases abroad，would reduce the demar：$:$ for dollar assets．and thus could explain part of the downward pressure on the foreign exchange value of the dollar．despite increases in nominal interest differentials in favor of dollar assets． The dollar＇s weighted average exchange value declined a little more than 1 percent，on balance，over the intermeeting period．Monetary authorities in several key foreign countries eased their policies． Three－month interest rates declined 75 basis points in Germany，and the Bundesbank reduced its discount and Lombard rates $1 / 4$ percentage point on April 14 and $1 / 2$ percentage point on May 11 ．Nonetheless． bond rates rose 25 basis points in Germany．Three－month and ten－yea： rates declined 15 and 40 basis points，respectively，in Japan．The political disarray in Japan seemingly had the perverse effect of strengthening the yen against the dollar，on the grounds that the ner minority government would have greater difficulties in implementing trade reforms；the yen would therefore have to appreciate to help reduce Japan＇s huge current account surplus．For most of the inter－ meeting period，the market believed that the U．S．government would welcome a further decline in the dollar against the yen and perhaps a weaker dollar generally．In part to dispel such impressions，the Desk intervened on two occasions to purchase dollars against yen and marks．

Both operations were accompanied by statements from the Secretary $=$ f the Treasury: The first emphasized countering disorderly markets: =h: second highlighted concerns of U.S. authorities with the dollar's weakness, which was viewed as inconsistent with economic fundamentals. and rejected an undervalued dollar as a U.S. policy objective. The second intervention was coordinated with a substantial number of foreign central banks. In total. U.S. authorities purchased $\$ 1.950$ million against yen and marks. equally divided between System and Treasury accounts.
(6) The broad monetary aggregates accelerated somewhat more than expected at the time of the March FOMC meeting. M2 rose at a 4 percent rate and M3 at a $2-1 / 2$ percent rate over March and April. compared with projected growth rates of $3-1 / 4$ and $1-3 / 4$ percent, respectively. These increases left M2 somewhat below the midpoint of its 1 -to-5 percent range for 1994 and M3 somewhat above the lower end of its 0-to-4 percent range. Data through early May suggest a slowing in the growth of both aggregates.
(7) The strengthening of the broad aggregates, which runs counter to what might normally be anticipated with rising interest rates, appears mainly attributable to a reassessment on the part of households of the attractiveness of investing in capital market instruments. Bond mutual funds suffered substantial net redemptions over March and April, and there was a corresponding surge in retail money funds: in addition, a slowing in runoffs of small time deposits may represent reduced shifting to stock and bond funds. The broad
money aggregates were also boosted in March and April by hefty increases in overnight and term repurchase agreements. which heiped banks fund sizable net acquisitions of government securities. The rise in short-term opportunity costs does seem to have had its usual effect of restraining demand for a number of components of M2. especially liquid retail deposits. Ml expanded at only a $1-1 / 2$ percent rate over March and April. held down by a drop in mortgage refinar:ings as well as the wider opportunity costs. ${ }^{4}$ In addition, savings deposs $=s$ (including MMDAs) registered a small decline in April.
(8) Bank credit expanded rapidly in March and April. reflecting strong growth in consumer and business loans. as well as the increase in securities holdings. An early May survey revealed continued increases in the willingness of banks to lend to households and a further easing of credit standards for businesses. The strength in bank credit in part represents a rise in the share of banks in household and business debt creation. As capital market prices have dropped. firms have cut back on bond and stock issuance: mounting external financing needs have been concentrated more on commercial banks.
(9) While the backup in rates has altered the pattern of financing and discouraged refinancing of outstanding obligations. it appears to have little affected nonfinancial debt growth. Debt of the nonfederal sectors has increased at a $4-1 / 2$ percent rate in recent months, about in line with the more rapid pace of the second half of 1993. Overall business borrowing has remained subdued. Consumer credit is growing briskly, but household mortgage indebtedness appears

[^3]$$
-6-
$$
to be expanding only moderately. State and local governments have slowed their net debt issuance of late. owing to improved fiscal positions and considerable previous advance refunding. While federa: debt growth surged in March. it now appears to be slowing, even after allowing for the usual tax-season swings. as fiscal restraint and strong economic performance reduce deficits. Total domestic nonfinarcial debt is estimated to have grown at a 5 percent pace from the fourth quarter through March, leaving this aggregate somewhat above the lower bound of its 4-to-8 percent monitoring range for 1994.

MONEY, CREDIT. AND RESERVE AGGREGATES
(Seasonally adjusted annual rates of growt..

|  | $E \in b$. | Mar. | AF: | $\begin{gathered} 9 E: n 7 \\ \tau \\ \therefore= \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Money and credit aggregates |  |  |  |  |
| M1 | 5.4 | 4.0 | -1.2 | 4.3 |
| M2 | $-1.4$ | 4.9 | 2.8 | 2.2 |
| M3 | -7.7 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 0.4 |
| Domestic nonfinancial debt <br> Total <br> Federal <br> Nonfederal | 4.4 4.9 4.3 | 5.8 9.1 4.6 | -- | 5.4 7.2 4.7 |
| Bank credit | 5.5 | 10.4 | 10.4 | 8.C |
| Reserve measures ${ }^{2}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Nonborrowed reserves ${ }^{3}$ | 3.3 | -3.1 | -8.9 | 0.2 |
| Total reserves | 3.2 | -3.4 | -7.5 | 0.1 |
| Monetary base | 13.4 | 9.3 | 6.1 | 9.5 |
| Memo: (Millions of dollars) |  |  |  |  |
| Adjustment plus seasonal borrowing | 70 | 55 | 124 | -- |
| Excess reserves | 1140 | 967 | 1139 | -- |

1. Figures on domestic nonfinancial sector debt are from 93:Q4 to March.
2. Monthly reserve measures. including excess reserves and borrowing. are calculated by prorating averages for two-week reserve maintenance periods that overlap months. Reserve data incorporate adjustments for discontinuities associated with changes in reserve requirements.
3. Includes "other extended credit" from the Federal Reserve.

## Policy Alternatives

(10) Three monetary policy alternatives are presented beioni for Committee consideration. Under alternative B, federal funds uic: $d$ continue to trade around 3-3/4 percent, in association with the al. lowance for adjustment plus seasonal borrowing remaining initially at $\$ 175$ million. ${ }^{5}$ Under alternative $C$, the federal funds rate would move up $1 / 4$ percentage point (one-half the usual adjustment shown in previous bluebooks for "alternative C") to 4 percent. effectuated by increasing the initial borrowing allowance to $\$ 200$ million. Under alternative $D$, the federal funds rate would be raised to 4-1/4 percent, either by increasing the initial borrowing allowance to $\$ 225$ million or by raising the discount rate to $3-1 / 2$ percent. while keeping the initial allowance for discount window borrowing at $\$ 175 \mathrm{mil}$ lion.
(11) In the staff's economic forecast, the federal funds rate is assumed to be raised gradually to $4-1 / 2$ percent by the fall of this year and maintained at that level through the end of next year. Long-term interest rates are seen as holding close to their most recent levels in the face of the assumed policy tightenings, but subsequently to drift lower, as market participants come to realize that economic trends imply lower inflation and a lesser degree of needed policy restraint than now built into market rates. In effect, this funds rate path is broadly consistent with the attainment of "policy neutrality," in that real GDP, after moving into the vicinity of its estimated potential in the current quarter, grows about in line with its potential over the next six quarters. The unemployment rate

[^4]remains near its estimated natural rate of about 6-1/2 percent, aṅ core CPI inflation runs just below a 3 percent rate through the end z: next year. Variations in the timing and size of the steps taken tc raise the funds rate to $4-1 / 2$ percent by this autumn probably would not have a persistent influence on economic activity but could affe: inflation expectations for a time and the near-term paths of financia? market prices.
(12) Compared with the staff's assessment. financial market participants now appear to be anticipating appreciably more Federal Reserve tightening by the fall, judging by the rate of 5-1/4 percent on federal funds futures for October. Many in the market expect the Committee to increase the funds rate 50 basis points at this meeting. though others anticipate only a 25 basis point increase, and the federal funds futures quote is in between. Very short-term rates might thus increase slightly under alternative $D$. The behavior of rates on instruments of a few months maturity or longer would depene importantly on whether the market interpreted the larger increase o alternative $D$ as indicating a steeper trajectory of future policy actions, and perhaps the need for greater cumulative tightening. If expectations were to ratchet up in this manner. as appeared to have been the case in some of the tightenings earlier this year, there could be sizable hikes along the maturity spectrum. However, several factors suggest that the market may react more favorably this time. For one. such a move--larger than recent ones-might assuage concerns that the Federal Reserve was "falling behind the curve." A rise in the foreign exchange value of the dollar, which would be expected under this alternative, would also help to reduce inflation concerns. Moreover, an action of this magnitude coupled with a discount rate
increase. depending perhaps on the wording of the associated arrouraement, might be seen as suggesting that the Federal Reserve though: : : had reached the neighborhood of "neutrality." If the action is seer. this way, policy would be expected to be kept on hold for a while. or at least to tighten more slowly and be more dependent on incoming data. With one source of uncertainty diminished. at least for a f . $\mathrm{m} \in$. investors who had been avoiding longer-term instruments pending the Federal Reserve's action might be tempted to extend maturities. Bord yields could still back up somewhat in the aftermath of an announcement of the Federal Reserve's choice of alternative $D$. but these other influences should limit any increase and work to reduce yields over time. provided incoming data on the economy indicate a moderate path. for activity, in line with the staff forecast.
(13) The case for increasing the intended federal funds rate only 25 basis points as under alternative $C$ would seem to hinge or -ite judgment that financial market participants have exaggerated the lijiely strength of future spending relative to the economy's potentiai and hence of prospective inflation pressures. In this view, taking the fundamentals reasonably into account. the markets have gotten "ahead of the curve" and the risk of disappointing them should not be allowed to divert the Federal Reserve from a gradual course of 25 -basis-point adjustments in the stance of policy toward neutrality. With the location of a neutral funds rate itself a moving target--and lower to the extent that real long-term interest rates are higher--such an approach would allow more time to assess the needed federal funds rate increases as new information on the economy and prices becomes available. Short-term rates likely would edge off immediately after a modest policy tightening. The initial reaction in capital and foreign
exchange markets could be adverse if the smail size of the move inez= seer as signalling a relučance to move aggressively tc head cfi ã. inflationary buildup. However. the odds on such a reactior may häe been reduced by the recent favorable price data. In this contex.. market participants might be more inclined to interpret the smalie: move as sufficient to counter coming inflation pressures and to project a lower trajectory of short-term rates. which would pass through to lower longer-term rates.
(14) The case for standing pat. alternative B. is a more extreme version of the rationale for alternative $C$ : In this case. the market assessment, and even that of the staff, of the strength of aggregate demand would be judged to be seriously off the mark. perhaps because the rise in long-term rates, along with the decline in household wealth. will have a more significant restraining influence on aggregate demand. Choice of alternative $B$ would come as a consider. able surprise--and disappointment--to financial markets: very shor:term interest rates would be likely to fall appreciably, but this alternative risks a significant sell-off in the bond market before weakness in aggregate demand becomes apparent.
(15) Material differences in nominal spending and overall borrowing under the three policy alternatives outlined above are unlikely to emerge in the next several months. Under all three alternatives, the debt of domestic nonfinancial sectors should expand at around a 5 percent rate from March through September, matching its pace this year through March. A pickup in growth of nonfederal debt is expected to fill in the gap left by a softening of federal government borrowing. Higher long-term rates and lower price-earnings
ratios present a less favorable environment for balance shee: restria. turing, but borrowers will continue to tind banks and other irtermediaries to be willing lenders. Business borrowing should remain. well above last year's meager pace, as corporate capital spending rises appreciably further relative to internally generated funds. Households too are likely to continue taking on consumer debt more quickly than they did on average last year. although with recent increases in mortgage rates restraining housing activity, mortgage debt expansion is not anticipated to outpace last year's performance.
(16) Projected growth rates of the monetary aggregates from April to September under alternatives $B$ and $D$ are shown on the table below. (More detailed data are presented in the table and charts on the following pages.) While we foresee Ml growth picking up some, at

|  | Alt_B | Alt_ D |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Growth from April <br> to September |  |  |
| M2 | $1-1 / 2$ | $1-1 / 4$ |
| M3 | 1 | $3 / 4$ |
| M1 | $3-3 / 4$ | 3 |

around 3 to 4 percent, it remains damped relative to spending. The recent increases in opportunity costs on liquid retail deposits arising from the previous tightenings in the stance of monetary policy. and under alternative $D$ from an additional firming move as well, will serve to hold back growth of M1 and some of the other components of M2 and M3. With any further backup in long-term interest rates not expected to be sustained under either policy alternative, another surge in outflows from bond mutual funds does not appear to be in the cards. As a consequence. the effects of higher opportunity costs show through


[^5]0.0104 .0

## ACTUAL AND TARGETED M2



Chart 3

## ACTUAL AND TARGETED M3




## DEBT


to the growth of the broader ageregates. contributing to ar appreviable slowing from the stepped-up pace of March and Aprij. Under botr. alternatives. growth from the fourth quarter of last year to September will be at almost a 2 percent rate for $M 2$ and at less than a $3 / 4$ percent rate for M3.

## Directive Ianguage

(17) Draft language for the operational paragrapi. inciuai:. the usual options and updating, is shown below. In light $c \neq t h e r \in-$ commendations for a discount rate increase from all twelve Federal Reserve• Banks, wording is given in brackets in the first sentence should the Committee wish to make reference in the directive to a porsible change in the discount rate. This suggested wording is similar to that used by the Committee in comparable situations in tit past. Of course. the minutes would explain the Committee's approach to implementation and its rationale.

## OPERATIONAI PARAGRAPH

In the implementation of policy for the immediate future. the Committee seeks to increase slightly (SOMEWHAT)/maintain/DECREASE SLIGHTLY (SOMEWHAT) the existing degree of pressure on reserve positions, [TAKING ACCOUNT OF A POSSIBLE INCREASE IN THE DISCOUN2 RATE]. In the context of the Committee's long-run objectives for price stability and sustainable economic growth, and giving careful consideration to economic, financial, and monetary developments. slightly (SOMEWHAT) greater reserve restraint MIGHT/WOULI or slightly (SOMEWHAT) lesser reserve restraint might/WOULD be acceptable in the intermeeting period. The contemplated reserve conditions are expected to be consistent with moderate MODEST growth in M2 and M3 over COMING MONTHS the first half of 1994.

SELECTED INTEREST RATES
(percent)



 rate morigages (ARME) at major insitutional lenders oflering both FAMs and ARMs with the same number of discounl pomis



Net of money market mutual fund holdings of these items
Includes money markol deposit accounts.
Includes retail repurchase agreements. All IRA and Keogh accounts at commercial banks and thrift institutions are subfracted from small time deposits
Excludes IRA and Keogh accounts.
Net of large denomination time deposits held by money market mutual funds, depository institutions, U.S. government, and foreign banks and official institutions.

| May 13, 1994 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Period |  | Treasury bills |  |  | Treasurycoupons |  |  |  |  |  | Federal agencies redemptions (-) | Nel change outright holdings total 4 |  |
|  |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { Net } \\ \text { purchases } \end{gathered}$ | Redemptions <br> (-) | Not change | Net purchases ${ }^{3}$ |  |  |  | Pedemptions$(-)$ | NeI Change |  |  | Net RPs ${ }^{5}$ |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { within } \\ & 1 \text { year } \end{aligned}$ |  |  | 1.5 | 5.10 | Over 10 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1991 |  |  | 20,038 | 1,000 | 19,038 | 3.043 | 6.583 | 1,280 | 375 | ... | 11,282 | 292 | 27.726 | -1.614 |
| 1992 |  | 13,086 | 1,600 | 11,486 | 1.096 | 13,118 | 2,818 | 2,333 | -.. | 19,365 | 632 | 30,219 | -13,215 |
|  |  | 17.717 | 468 | 17,249 | 1,223 | 10,350 | 4,168 | 3,457 | ... | 19,198 | 1,072 | 35,374 | 5,974 |
| 1993 | ...a1 | $\cdots$ | -.. | --- | 279 | 1.441 | 716 | 705 | -.- | 3,141 | 289 | 2,851 | -461 |
|  | -.-Q2 | 7.749 | --- | 7.749 | 244 | 2,490 | 1,147 | 1,110 | ... | 4,990 | 91 | 12,648 | 10,624 |
|  | ...O3 | 1,268 | --- | 1,268 | 511 | 3,700 | 1,297 | 817 | $\ldots$ | 6.326 | 526 | 7,067 | -8,644 |
|  | --Q4 | 6,700 | 468 | 8,232 | 189 | 2.719 | 1,008 | 826 | ... | 4,742 | 166 | 12,807 | 4.455 |
| 1994 | --Q1 | 2,164 | --- | 2.164 | 147 | 1,413 | 1,103 | 618 | 616 | 2.665 | 411 | 4,418 | -11,663 |
| 1993 | May | 349 | -.. | 349 | ... | --- | --- | ... | ... | ... | 41 | 308 | 4.112 |
|  | June | 7.280 | ... | 7,280 | $\cdots$ | … | -.. | -.. | ... | $\cdots$ | 22 | 7,258 | 12.027 |
|  | July | $\cdots$ | --- | --- | $\cdots$ | 200 | --- | --- | -.- | 200 | 366 | -166 | -14,435 |
|  | August | 902 | ... | 902 | 100 | 1,100 | 500 | 100 | ... | 1.800 | 125 | 2.577 | 4.528 |
|  | Seplember | 366 | -.. | 366 | 411 | 2,400 | 797 | 717 | .-- | 4,326 | 35 | 4,656 | 1,262 |
|  | October | 1.396 | 468 | 927 | ... | ... | .-- | ... | -.. | $\cdots$ | 70 | 857 | -6.723 |
|  | November | 5.911 | ... | 5,911 | .-. | 100 | --- | $\cdots$ | ... | 100 | 15 | 5,996 | 7.232 |
|  | December | 1,394 | -.. | 1,394 | 189 | 2,619 | 1,008 | 826 | ... | 4,642 | 81 | 5,954 | 3.947 |
| 1994 | January | $\cdots$ | --- | .-. | $\cdots$ | ... | -.. | --- | 616 | -616 | 202 | -817 | -7,757 |
|  | February | 1,264 | ... | 1,264 | $\ldots$ | --- | --- | $\cdots$ | ... | --- | 102 | 1,163 | -3,946 |
|  | March | 900 | --- | 900 | 147 | 1.413 | 1,103 | 618 | - | 3,281 | 108 | 4.073 | 40 |
|  | April | 1,101 | --- | 1,101 | 209 | 2.817 | 1,117 | 896 | 440 | 4.599 | 180 | 5,520 | 8,208 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| January | 19 | --- | --. | --- | --. | ... | --- | ... | 616 | -616 | --- | . 616 | 4,336 |
|  | 26 | --- | --- | $\cdots$ | --- | ... | -.- | --- | ... | ... | 85 | . 85 | -6,244 |
| February | 2 | --- | --- | $\cdots$ | ... | ... | --- | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 11.046 |
|  | 9 | $\cdots$ | --- | $\cdots$ | --- | ... | $\cdots$ | -.. | $\cdots$ | ... | ... | $\cdots$ | -13.244 |
|  | 16 | $\cdots$ | --- | $\cdots$ | ... | ... | ... | --- | ... | $\cdots$ | 55 | . 55 | 1.927 |
|  | 23 | 246 | ... | 246 | --- | --- | --- | $\ldots$ | --- | ... | $\cdots$ | 246 | 4,096 |
| March | 2 | 1.197 | --. | 1,197 | --- | $\cdots$ | --- | --- | ... | -.- | 145 | 1.052 | 1.114 |
|  | 9 | 100 | ... | 100 | -.- | --. | ... | ... | ... | $\ldots$ | ... | 100 | -3,656 |
|  | 16 | 55 | --- | 55 | $\cdots$ | $\ldots$ | ... | --- | - | $\cdots$ | ... | 55 | 4,446 |
|  | 23 | 42 | ... | 42 | 147 | 1.413 | 1,103 | 618 | .-. | 3,281 | .-- | 3.324 | -4.258 |
|  | 30 | 351 | --- | 351 | ... | ... | .-. | -.- | $\cdots$ | $\cdots$ | 10 | 341 | 1.314 |
| April |  | 370 | ... | 370 | ... | --- | ... | ..- | .-. | ... | 50 | 320 | B.695 |
|  | 13 | 235 | --- | 235 | --- | -.- | ... | --- | - | - | 75 | 160 | -6.025 |
|  | 20 | 669 | $\cdots$ | 669 | 209 | 2.817 | 1,117 | 896 | 440 | 4.599 | 4 | 5.264 | 2.333 |
|  | 27 | -.. | ... | ... | -.- | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 51 | . 51 | 3,059 |
| May | 4 | ... | -.. | --- | -.. | --- | --- | ... | --- | -.- | ... | --. | 3.490 |
|  | 11 | --- | - | $\cdots$ | --- | $\cdots$ | $\cdots$ | $\cdots$ | $\cdots$ | $\cdots$ | 25 | . 25 | -2.299 |
| Memo: LEVEL (bil. \$ ${ }^{6}$ ( ${ }^{\text {May }} 11$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | 171.2 | 199.1 | 85.2 | 25.0 | 33.6 |  | 342.9 |  | 354.1 | 62 |

1. Change from end-oi-period to end-ol-period.
2. Outright transactions in market and with loreign accounts.
3. Outright transactions in market and with toreign accounts, and short-lerm notes acquired
in exchange lor maturing bills. Excludes maturity shifts and rollovers of maturing issues
. Aeflects nel change in redemptions ( $\cdot$ ) of Treasury and agency securities
4. Includes change in RPs (+), malcherl sale purchase transactions ( - ), and matched purchase sale transactions (*)
5. The levels of agency is sues were as flllows

| within <br> 1 year | 1.5 | 5.10 | over 10 | total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1.6 | 1.8 | 0.6 | 00 | 40 |


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ In some cases, original copies needed to be photocopied before being scanned into electronic format. All scanned images were deskewed (to remove the effects of printer- and scanner-introduced tilting) and lightly cleaned (to remove dark spots caused by staple holes, hole punches, and other blemishes caused after initial printing).
    ${ }^{2}$ A two-step process was used. An advanced optimal character recognition computer program (OCR) first created electronic text from the document image. Where the OCR results were inconclusive, staff checked and corrected the text as necessary. Please note that the numbers and text in charts and tables were not reliably recognized by the OCR process and were not checked or corrected by staff.

[^1]:    1. Financial market quotations in this section are taken as of noon. Friday. May 13.
    2. The allowance for adjustment plus seasonal borrowing was raised to $\$ 175$ million in four $\$ 25$ million steps, two to implement the policy moves and two to reflect usual seasonal increases. On average, borrowing ran about $\$ 12$ million above its allowance over the intermeeting period.
[^2]:    3. After the April 18 action banks raised the prime rate another 50 basis points to 6-3/4 percent.
[^3]:    4. Following the behavior of transactions deposits, total reserves fell at a 5-1/2 percent clip over March and April. With currency decelerating to a $10-1 / 4$ percent growth pace, the monetary base slowed to a $7-3 / 4$ percent average growth rate over the two months.
[^4]:    5. Later in the intermeeting period, upward technical adjustments to the borrowing allowance may be required to account for the normal upswing in seasonal credit.
[^5]:    1.0105 .0

