
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
### **Appendix 1: Materials used by Mr. Kos**


June 25-26, 2002 131 of 179
















### 1- month Euro-Dollar and Dollar-Yen Exchange Rate Option Implied Volatility
















June 25-26, 2002 134 of 179


### **Domestic Credit Spreads to Comparable Treasuries**


March 1, 2002 to June 24, 2002



### U.S. Corporate High Yield, EMBI+ and the Brazilian Sub-Component







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### Appendix 2: Materials used by Mr. Rolnick

### Are Phillips Curves Useful for Forecasting Inflation? 40 years of debate

June 25, 2002 FOMC Arthur J. Rolnick June 25-26, 2002 138 of 179


4

The Phillips Curve has not been stable.


Unemployment is not useful for predicting inflation. In the long run, money growth is a reliable predictor of inflation. June 25-26, 2002 139 of 179

~

June 25-26, 2002 140 of 179




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A new Phillips Curve emerged in 1970-84...





9

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7.5 ...But the new Phillips Curve became less visible (1984-2000).. 6.5 Unemployment Ŋ က 4 Change in Inflation

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 $\infty$ 

# The Phillips Curve has not been stable.

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unemployment can predict inflation. Some economists still insist that

The test: Can NAIRU-based models forecast better than a naive model? 9


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9

## The Naive Model

predicted to be equal to inflation over the Inflation over the next period is previous period June 25-26, 2002 147 of 179

NAIRU-based Board Staff Model has not forecasted better than the Naive Model



## **Evaluating Forecasting Models**

A better forecasting model has smaller average forecasting error

The measure of success:


### Average Error of NAIRU Model Average Error of Naive Model

NAIRU wins if the the measure is less one than

12

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have not forecasted better than the Naive Model A large class of NAIRU-based models



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
, ,

## Unemployment is not useful for predicting inflation.

## The Quantity Theory

International Evidence

for 94 Countries 1960-1990



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In the long run, money growth is a reliable predictor of inflation. June 25-26, 2002 154 of 179

Appendix 3: Materials used by Mr. Roberts and Mr. Lebow

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Material for

Board Staff Presentation on Explaining Low Inflation Since the Mid-1990s


Division of Research and Statistics


June 25, 2002

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### Exhibit 1

### Overview





### Questions

- Have changes been occurring in the economy, over time, that have altered the inflation process?
- Why did inflation remain so low in the late 1990s when unemployment was also low?
- Can the recent good performance be repeated in coming years?

### Three key factors

1. Changes in monetary policy A relatively small part of the recent story.

2. The pickup of productivity growth Our main explanation for the late 1990s; effects

should diminish over time.

3. Labor market developments Also important; effects likely to persist.

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### Exhibit 2

### The FRB/US Model of Inflation Dynamics

•  $\pi_t = \beta \pi_{t-1} + (1-\beta) \pi_t^e - \gamma (U_t - U_t^n) + relative price shocks + unit labor costs$ 

 $\pi$  = rate of price inflation

 $\pi^e$  = expected rate of price inflation

U = unemployment rate

 $U^n$  = natural rate of unemployment

 $\beta$ ,  $\gamma$  = coefficients


- $\pi^e$  reflects knowledge of the structure of the economy, including the conduct of monetary policy.
- How do our factors fit in this model?
  - Changes in the conduct of monetary policy alter the influence of U on  $\pi^e$ .
  - ► Changes in labor productivity growth affect inflation through unit labor costs.
  - ► Labor market developments shift *U*<sup>n</sup>.
- Movements of  $(U U^n)$  explain about 20 percent of the variation of year-to-year changes in inflation.


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Exhibit 3

### **Monetary Policy**

### Change in Core PCE Inflation vs. Unemployment







- Since the early 1980s, monetary policy has moved more aggressively to stabilize the economy than in the 1960s and 1970s.
- In FRB/US, such a change reduces the sensitivity of inflation to unemployment.
  - Alters the formation of inflation expectations.
  - Low unemployment is no longer as strong a signal of higher future inflation.
  - Sensitivity reduced by about a third.
- So, low unemployment in the late 1990s induced less deterioration in inflation expectations, and thus in actual inflation.
- But policymakers cannot "exploit" this lower sensitivity.
  - ► A reversion to a less-aggressive policy would alter how expectations are formed.

### **Productivity**

Exhibit 4

- Hourly compensation responds only gradually when productivity accelerates.
  - Costs of acquiring and processing information.
- Unit labor costs rise less rapidly, helping hold down inflation.
  - A lower unemployment rate is consistent with stable inflation.
- Effect may be long-lived but not permanent.
- Effect worked in the opposite direction in the 1970s.





### Caveats


- Uncertain speed of adjustment
- Results sensitive to measure of structural productivity

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
Exhibit 5

### **Labor Market Developments and the Natural Rate of Unemployment**

### Impact on the Natural Rate of Unemployment In Recent Years




### Factors pushing natural rate lower



### Index 50 ISR employment insecurity index 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10

### Factor pushing natural rate higher



### On balance:

- Demographics aside, the natural rate may be about 1/2 percentage point lower than in the mid-1980s.
- One reason we don't favor a larger number:

Errors in hourly compensation models have not been large, on average, in recent years. June 25-26, 2002 161 of 179

### Exhibit 6

### Accounting for Inflation since 1995 (based on dynamic simulations of the FRB/US price-wage sector)

### 

### Contributions to the 2002:Q1 Difference Between the Two Simulations (percent)

Productivity acceleration	63
Labor market developments	25
Change in monetary policy	12

### The role of pricing power

- Firms appear to lack "pricing power" in the low-inflation economy.
- This perception may be a natural consequence of accelerating productivity:
  - Innovation may create winners and losers; the losers "lack pricing power."
  - A productivity acceleration causes profit share to rise and then decline.
- Greater competition from globalization, deregulation, and the low-inflation environment – may also have reduced pricing power.
  - Reduced pricing power may spur firms to seek new technologies.

### Looking ahead

- If *monetary policy* remains aggressive, the smaller sensitivity of inflation to unemployment should continue.
- The productivity effect will fade, but may persist a while longer.
- Labor market developments should have a durable effect.

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Appendix 4: Materials used by Mr. Stockton, Mr. Oliner, and Ms. Johnson

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
Material for


Staff Presentation on the Economic Outlook

June 25, 2002


### Chart 1 **Forecast Overview**

Real GDP (Percent change, annual rate)







Real GDP and Final Sales



**Unemployment Rate** 



Total and Core PCE Inflation




Staff Projection

		Percent char	
		2002	2003
Real GDP	June	3.5	4.1
	(Jan.)	2.7	3.6
Unemploy-	June	5.9	5.7
ment Rate	(Jan.)	6.0	5.9
PCE Prices	June	1.5	1.4
	(Jan.)	1.3	1.2


Revision to Projection since January


_ Perce	Percentage points, Q4/G	
	2002	
Real GDP	.8	
Contributions:		
Household Spending	.5	
Business Fixed Investment	nt .4	
Government	.0	
Net Exports	.1	
Inventories	2	


Chart 2
Near-term Indicators



















# The Policy Setting















Unified Budg (Billions o	
Fiscal year	
2000	236
2001	127
2002	-154
2003	-127
2003	-127


# Financial Conditions: Corporate Sector
























\* Consumer loans and residential real estate loans from Call Report.


\*\* Staff calculations using Moody's data.













Business Investment


Real Business Fixed Investment (Percent change, annual rate)

		2002			
		Q1	Q2	H2	2003
1. 7	Γotal BFI	-8	1	5	11
2.	E&S	-2	4	8	13
3.	NRS	-23	-7	-2	4


## Semiconductors and Computers









## **Accelerator Effects**



Nonresidential Buildings



Office Buildings




less year-earlier 8-quarter percent change)

Household Spending


	Growth in	Real PCE and Reside (Percent, annual re		
		Four quarters ending at peak	Recession	Four quarters after trough
1.	Average in previous cycles	2.0	5	6.3
2.	Current cycle and forecast	3.2	3.3	2.5

Note. Previous cycles include all postwar peaks and troughs through 1991. Trough of current cycle is assumed to be 2002:Q1.

### Growth of Real Capital Stocks



### Growth of Real Disposable Income and Labor Productivity




# Productivity


Alternative Estimates of Labor Productivity (Percent change)

<u> </u>		
	2001:Q1 2000:Q1	2002:Q1 2001:Q1
Product side:		
Establishment hours	2.6	4.2
Household hours	2.2	3.4
Income side:		
Establishment hours	2.7	5.1
Household hours	2.3	4.3


## Structural Labor Productivity



## Contribution of Private Capital Deepening



## **Multifactor Productivity**




2002

2003

Adjustment Costs and (Percent change)			ty
1998	1999	2000	2001

1.	Measured productivity	2.9	3.0	2.6	2.1	3.1	1.8	
	Productivity net of adjustment costs	s:						
2a.	Low adjustment costs	3.0	3.0	2.7	2.0	3.2	1.9	
2b.	High adjustment costs	3.3	32	29	1.8	32	22	

Chart 9 Labor Markets




1999

\*P&C basis.

2000


Chart 10 Prices




2001

2002

2003














Chart 11

# **Financial Developments**










#### Interest Rates


	Level 6/24/02	Change 1/29/02 to 6/24/02
Three-Month		
1. Euro	3.46	0.09
2. Japan	0.02	-0.02
3. United States	1.81	0.01
Ten-Year		
1. Germany	4.93	-0.08
2. Japan	1.32	-0.15
3. United States	4.84	-0.18



\*Three-month moving average.

#### Chart 12


# Foreign Outlook





\*\*U.S. total export weights.


# **Emerging Market Countries**

(Weekly data)









Real GDP Growth Percent, SAAR\*

of which: 2. China 7.1 7.8 7.2 7. 3. Korea 5.8 6.9 5.5 6. 4. Taiwan 2.3 6.7 5.0 5.		27	2001 H2		02 H2	2003
2. China       7.1 7.8 7.2 7.         3. Korea       5.8 6.9 5.5 6.         4. Taiwan       2.3 6.7 5.0 5.	1. [	- A	3.1	5.7	5.2	5.6
4. Taiwan 2.3 6.7 5.0 5.	2.		7.1	7.8	7.2	7.5
	3.	Korea	5.8	6.9	5.5	6.0
5. Thailand 3.4 7.1 4.5 4.	4.	Taiwan	2.3	6.7	5.0	5.0
	5.	Thailand	3.4	7.1	4.5	4.5

<sup>\*</sup>Years are Q4/Q4; half years are Q2/Q4 or Q4/Q2.

Real GDP Growth Percent, SAAR\*

		2001 H2	<u>20</u> H1	002 H2	2003
1. l	_atin America**  of which:	-1.8	1.4	3.2	3.6
2.	Mexico	-1.6	2.2	4.1	4.3
3.	Brazil	-0.7	3.7	0.7	2.1
4.	Argentina	-17.5	-8.5	-5.0	-0.3

<sup>\*</sup>Years are Q4/Q4; half years are Q2/Q4 or Q4/Q2.

<sup>\*\*</sup>U.S. total export weights.

<sup>\*\*</sup>U.S. total export weights.

#### Chart 14

## **External Outlook**

Recent Developments: Exports and Imports Billions of dollars, SAAR


2002:	Q1	April
Goods Exports     of which:	659	683
<ol><li>Capital goods</li></ol>	284	290
3. Services	276	279
4. Total Goods and Services	934	961
5. Goods Imports of which:	1084	1162
6. Oil	77	111
<ol><li>Capital goods</li></ol>	277	285
8. Services	230	231
9. Total Goods and Services	1314	1393
10.Balance	-379	-431

Real Export Growth Percent, Q4/Q4

	2000	2001	2002	2003
Growth of real	exports			
1. G & S	7.0	-10.9	6.0	8.4
Percentage po	int cont	ributior	1	
2. Services		-2.0		1.9
3. Goods of which:	5.8	-8.8	3.6	6.5
4. Core*	3.5	-5.8	2.4	3.8

<sup>\*</sup>Excludes computers and semiconductors.


Real Exchange Rate Outlook\*



Real Import Growth Percent, Q4/Q4

	2000	2001	2002	2003
Growth of real	imports			
1. G & S	11.3	-8.5	9.4	9.2
Percentage po	int conti	ributior	า	
2. Services	1.9	-2.4	1.2	0.6
3. Goods of which:	9.5	-6.4	8.1	8.4
OI WITHOIT.				

<sup>\*</sup>Excludes computers, semiconductors, and oil.



189 72 103


-117 -138 -90

37 -15 51

#### Chart 15

## **External Sector**

Capital Flows




### Billions of dollars, SAAR H2 1. Official capital, net 37 39 -37 2. Private capital, net 414 350 359 of which: 3. For. purch. of U.S. sec. 448 352 259 of which stocks 148 91 100 U.S. purch. of for. sec. -157 -32 8 of which stocks -155 -59 6


For. D.I. in U.S.


U.S. D.I. abroad


9. Statistical discrepancy

## Real GDP; Simulation Results









## **ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR 2002**

	F	OMC	
	Range	Central Tendency	Staff
	Per	centage change, Q	4 to Q4
Nominal GDP	4½ to 5½	4¾ to 5¼	4.7
February 2002	(3½ to 5½)	(4 to 4½)	(4.3)
Real GDP	3 to 4	3½ to 3 ¾	3.5
February 2002	(2 to 3½)	(2½ to 3)	(2.7)
PCE Prices	1¼ to 2	1½ to 1¾	1.5
February 2002	(1 to 2)	(About 1½)	(1.3)
	Av	rerage level, Q4, per	ce nt
Une mplo yment rate	5½ to 6¼	5¾ to 6	5.9
February 2002	(5¾ to 6½)	(6 to 61/4)	(6)

Central tendencies calculated by dropping high and low three from ranges.

# **ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR 2003**

	FOMC			
	Range	Central Tendency	Staff	
	Percentage change, Q4 to Q4			
Nominal GDP	4½ to 6	5 to 5¾	5.6	
Real GDP	31/4 to 41/4	3½ to 4	4.1	
PCE Prices	1 to 21/4	1½ to 1¾	1.4	
	Average level, Q4, percent			
Une mployment rate	5 to 6	51/4 to 51/2	5.5	