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## SUPPIEMENT

## CURRENT ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS

Prepared for the Federal Open Market Committee

March 17, 1972

By the Staff
Board of Governors

## The Domestic Economy

Housing starts. Seasonally adjusted private housing starts rose to a record annual rate of 2.7 million units in February- 8 per cent above the downward revised January rate. The sharp further rise in starts, which may have been heightened by seasonal adjustment problems, was concentrated entirely in structures containing 2-or-morefamily units. Unlike starts, building permits held at a rate slightly below the advanced fourth quarter average. Given the unexpectedly high starts rate in February, the first quarter average is likely to be above the rate projected in the Greenbook.

PRIVATE HOUSING STARTS AND PERMITS (Seasonally adjusted arnuel rate, in millions of units)

|  | 1971 |  |  | 1972 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | QII | QIII | QIV | Jan. (p) | Feb. (p) |
| Starts | 2.00 | 2.11 | 2.24 | 2.47 | 2.68 |
| 1-family | 1.14 | 1.18 | 1.25 | 1.41 | 1.32 |
| 2-or-more family | . 86 | . 94 | . 99 | 1.06 | 1.36 |
| Permits | 1.80 | 1.99 | 2.14 | 2.10 | 2.11 |
| MEMORANDUM: |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mobile home shipments | . 49 | .53 | . 51 | . 55 | n.a. |

Unit auto sales. Sales of new domestic-type autos in the first 10 -day period of March were at an annual rate of 7.7 milion units, down 6 per cent from a year ago. The decline from 1971 reflected both the ending last month of sales incentive programs by four major car-making divisions and the fact that last year GM cars were becoming more plentiful after the strike. In the first 7 reporting periods of 1972, sales averaged 8.4 million unitsmonly slightly above the 8.3 million rate over the same period of 1971.

Personal income. Personal income increased nearly \$5 billion in February to a seasonally adjusted rate of about $\$ 897$ billion. The slowing from the $\$ 8$ billion (revised) increase of January was concentrated in wages and salaries, with the rise in disbursements only half as large as in January. In January, government payrolls had been boosted by a pay increase for the military and for civilian workers, totaling $\$ 2$ billion. The moderation of expansion in private industry payrolls in February reflected a much smaller increase in employment, with both employment and payrolls down in construction. In manufacturing, however, the $\$ 1.7$ billion gain in payrolls was much larger than in January, reflecting mainly a rebound in hours of work. Aside from the continued increase in transfer payments, other components of nonwage income increased relatively little.

PERSONAL INCOME
(Seasonally adjusted, annual rates, billions of dollars)

|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Dec. } \\ & 1971 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | 1972 |  | Net Change <br> Jan. $1972-$ <br> Feb. 1972 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Jan. | Feb. |  |
| Total | 883.9 | 892.0 | 896.9 | 4.9 |
| Wage and salary disbursements | 594.8 | 602.1 | 605.8 | 3.7 |
| Government | 128.8 | 131.2 | 131.8 | . 6 |
| Private | 466.0 | 470.9 | 474.0 | 3.1 |
| Manufacturing | 165.3 | 165.8 | 167.5 | 1.7 |
| Distributive | 144.7 | 146.3 | 147.5 | 1.2 |
| Services | 109.9 | 111.4 | 112.1 | . 7 |
| Other | 46.1 | 47.4 | 46.9 | -. 5 |
| Nonwage income | 321.0 | 323.7 | 325.1 | 1.4 |
| Less: Personal contributions for social insurance | 32.0 | 33.9 | 34.0 | . 1 |

Industrial relations. The Pay Board on March 16 , by a vote of 8 to 5 , rejected the first-stage wage and benefit increase of 20.6 per cent provided by the West Coast longshoremen's settlement retroactive to December 25, 1971. In order to win the Pay Board's approval, the first-stage increase would have to be reduced to 14.9 per cent. The cut-back is in wage rates, which are permitted to increase 10 per cent. The remainder of the increase is in fringe benefits, including pensions and life insurance. The Pay Board also authorized its Chairman to approve the second-stage 7 per cent package increase scheduled to go into effect on July 1, 1972.

## The Domestic Financial Situation

Corporate profits. According to Bureau of Economic Analysis (Commerce) published estimates, corporate profits before tax in the fourth quarter of 1971 were at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of $\$ 86.2$ billion, up $\$ .4$ billion from the preceding quarter and $\$ 14.6$ billion above ( 20 per cent) a year earlier. For 1971 as a whole before tax profits totaled $\$ 85.5$ billion, $\$ 10.1$ billion ( 13.4 per cent) more than in the preceding year. Corporate profits originating in the rest of the world rose by $\$ 1$ billion in the fourth quarter of 1971 , and corporate profits before tax exclusive of these, were off $\$ 0.6$ billion.

Mainly because of liberalization of depreciation allowances and the restoration of the investment tax credit, after tax profits, including those originating in the rest of the world, rose $\$ 1.6$ billion in the fourth quarter and were $\$ 10.6$ billion ( 27 per cent) above a year earlier. In the fourth quarter, dividends did not rise seasonally because of cutbacks in year-end payments, and undistributed profits rose $\$ 2$ billion to a rate $\$ 10.3$ billion above a year earlier. Corporate cash flows net of dividends (domestic)--i.e., undistributed profits and capital consumption allowances (mainly depreciation allowances)-were up $\$ 3.2$ billion in the fourth quarter and were $\$ 16.0$ billion (23 per cent) above a year earlier.

CORPORATE PROFITS

|  | 1971 - IV |  |  |  | 1971 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Billions of dollars |  |  | $\frac{\text { Per cent change }}{\text { from }}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { Billions } \\ \text { of } \\ \text { dollars } \end{gathered}$ | Change from 1970 |  |
|  | Change from |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 71-IV | 71- II | 70-IV |  |  | Bill. S | Per cent |
| Corporate profits before tax | 86.2 | . 4 | 14.6 | 20.4 | 75.4 | 10.1 | 13.4 |
| Corporate profits after tax | 49.8 | 1.6 | 10.6 | 27.0 | 41.2 | 6.4 | 15.5 |
| Undistributed profits | 24.5 | 2.0 | 10.2 | 71.3 | 16.2 | 5.9 | 36.4 |
| Cash flow, net of dividends ${ }^{1 /}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| All corporations | 85.6 | 3.2 | 16.0 | 23.0 | 80.9 | 11.1 | 15.9 |
| Nonfinancial corporations | 77.9 | 3.1 | 15.2 | 24.2 | 73.5 | 9.8 | 15.4 |

Bond markets. The Bond Buyer index of yields on long-term municipal bonds rose 14 basis points in the week ending March 17, and dealer inventories of tax-exempt bonds still in syndicate rose sharply. Apparently the recent moderation in bank acquisitions has had considerable impact on the municipal market. Yields on corporate new issues remained almost unchanged during the week, although there was some upward pressure on yields in the secondary market.

INTEREST RATES

|  | 1971 |  | 1972 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Highs | Lows | Feb. 14 | Mar. 16 |
| Short-Term Rates |  |  |  |  |
| Federal funds (wkly. avg.) | 5.73 (9/8) | 3.29 (3/10) | 3.25 (2/9) | 3.88 (3/15) |
| 3-month |  |  |  |  |
| Treasury bills (bid) | 5.53 (7/19) | 3.22 (3/11) | 3.00 | 3.90 |
| Comm. paper (90-119 day) | 5.88 (8/18) | 4.25 (4/12) | 3.88 (2/11) | 4.25 (3/15) |
| Bankers' acceptances | $5.62(8 / 23)$ | 3.63 (3/12) | 3.50 | 4.12 |
| Euro-dollars | 10.00 (8/17) | 4.94 (3/17) | 5.04 | 5.30 |
| CD's (prime NYC) |  |  |  |  |
| Most often quoted new | 5.75 (8/11) | 3.62 (3/24) | 3.63 (2/9) | 4.13 (3/15) |
| Secondary market | 6.05 (8/18) | 3.80 (3/17) | 3.70 (2/9) | 3.98 |
| 6-month |  |  |  |  |
| Treasury bills (bid) | 5.84 (7/27) | 3.35 (3/11) | 3.54 | 4.30 |
| Comm. paper ( $4-6 \mathrm{mo}$.) | 5.88 (8/18) | 4.00 (3/24) | 4.00 | 4.38 |
| Federal agencies | $6.20(7 / 23)$ | 3.67 (3/16) | 3.84 | 4.58 |
| $C D^{\prime}$ 's (prime NYC) |  |  |  |  |
| Most often quoted new | 6.00 (8/11) | 4.00 (3/24) | 4.13 (2/9) | 4.38 (3/15) |
| Secondary market | 6.40 (8/18) | 3.70 (3/3) | 3.95 (2/9) | 4.50 |
| 1-year |  |  |  |  |
| Treasury bills (bid) | 6.01 (7/28) | 3.45 (3/11) | 3.94 | 4.54 |
| Federal agencies | 6.56 (7/28) | 3.93 (3/16) | 4.39 | 4.90 |
| CD's (prime NYC) |  |  |  |  |
| Most often quoted new | 6.25 (8/11) | 4.25 (2/28) | 4.75 (2/9) | 4.88 (3/15) |
| Prime municipals | 3.60 (8/12) | 2.15 (3/24) | 2.60 (2/10) | 2.80 (3/17) |

Intermediate and Long-Term
Treasury coupon issues

5-years
20-years

Corporate
Seasoned Aaa Baa

New Issue Aaa

Municipal
Bond Buyer Index
Moody' E Aaa

Mortgage-wimplicit yield
in FNMA auction 1/
7.03 (8/10) 4.74 (3/22)
$6.56(6 / 15) \quad 5.69(3 / 23) 6.07 \% \quad 6.08$
$\begin{array}{lllll}7.71(8 / 13) & 7.05(2 / 16) & 7.30 & 7.22 \\ 8.93(1 / 4) & 8.33(2 / 25) & 8.23 & 8.24\end{array}$
$8.93(1 / 4) 8.33(2 / 25) 8.2388$
$8.23(5 / 20) 6.76(1 / 29) \quad 7.30(2 / 10) 7.14$
$6.23(6 / 24) \quad 4.97(10 / 21) \quad 5.27$ (2/11) 5.32 $5.90(7 / 1) \quad 4.65(10 / 21) \quad 5.00(2 / 11) \quad 5.00$
8.07 (7/26) $7.32(4 / 12) \quad 7.61$ (2/7) $7.56(3 / 6)$

1/ Yieid on short-term forward comitment after allowance for commitment fee and required purchase and holding of FNMA stock. Assumes discount on 30-year loan amortiged over 15 years.

$$
\begin{gathered}
\text { A - } 1 \\
\text { SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX A } \\
\text { THE SURVEY OF CHANGES IN } \\
\text { BANK LENDING PRACTICES * }
\end{gathered}
$$

For the three month period ending February 15, the Quarterly Survey of Changes in Bank Lending Practices showed no marked alteration in nonprice terms of lending. However, reflecting prime rate reductions from $5-1 / 2 \%$ in mid-November, 1971, to a split rate of $4-1 / 2 \%$ and $4-3 / 4 \%$ as of mid-February, 1972, the Survey indicated interest rates have eased at about three-fourths of the respondent banks. (See Table 1.)

This restructuring of interest rates has accompanied a readjustment of lending policies with banks more willing to make consumer loans and real estate loans. Bankers are somewhat more receptive to term lending to businesses and lending to brokers, and some respondents, as a result of increased bank liquidity and weak business loan demand, are seeking new borrowers outside their local service area.

Despite the search for new credits, coments on the Survey reveal attempts to upgrade the quality of loan portfolios-most likely because of adverse loss experiences in 1970-72. As part of these efforts, some bankers state they are becoming more selective in designating "prime" customers.

About a third of the respondents reported weakening in loan demand during the three months ending February 15, although nearly half of the respondents anticipate some improvement during the next three months. (Table 2.) Such expectations, however, probably should be discounted since bankers in the past have not proved to be good forecasters. For example, of the 38 banks in the November, 1971 Survey reporting expectations of stronger loan demands, only 12 actually experienced increased demands. Bankers had a similar poor forecasting record for the August Survey.

Looking at data on regional information and by size of bank indicates that business loan demands were much weaker and lending terms were slightly easier both in the Cleveland and San Francisco Districts where unemployment has been severe. (Tables 2 and 3.) Throughout the entire country, it appears that smaller banks (with deposits less than $\$ 1$ billion) have been more willing than larger banks to make consumer installment loans and single family mortgages.

[^1]| A - 2 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Not for oudtation or publication table l |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| quarterly survey of changes in bank lending practices at selected large banks in the U.S. $1 /$ <br> (STATUS OF POLICY ON FEBRUARY 15, 1972 COMPARED TO THREE MONTHS EARLIER) INUMBER OF BANKS \& PERCENT OF TOTAL BANKS REPORTING |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | total |  | MUCH STRONGER |  | MODERATELY <br> STRONGFR |  | ESSENTIALLY UNC,HANGED |  | modfratfly <br> WFAKFD |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { MUCH } \\ & \text { WEARER } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| STRENGTH OF DEMAND for ccmmercial ano INDUSTRIAL LCANS (AFTER ALLOWANCE FOR bank's usual seasonal variationi |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Compared tc three months ago | 125 | 100.0 | 1 | 0.8 | 23 | 18.4 | 61 | 48.8 | 39 | 31.2 | 1 | 0.8 |
| anticipated demand in next 3 months | 125 | 100.0 | 2 | 1.6 | 57 | 45.6 | 52 | 41.6 |  | 11.2 | 0 | 0.0 |
|  | ANSHERING QUESTION |  | MUCH FIRMER POLICY |  | moderately FIRMER POLICY |  | ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED PDLICY |  | MODERATELY EASIER POLICY |  | MUCH EASTER POLICY |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| terms and conditions: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| interest rates charged | 125 | 100.0 | 1 | 0.8 | 2 | 1.6 | 31 | 24.8 | 73 | 58.4 | 18 | 14.4 |
| COMPENSATING OR SUPPORTING BALANCES | 125 | 100.0 | 1 | 0.8 | 4 | 3.2 | 99 | 79.7 |  | 16.8 | n | 0.0 |
| Standards cF credit mgrthiness | 125 | 100.0 | 1 | 0.8 | 3 | 2.4 | 116 | 92.9 | 5 | 4.0 | 0 | 0.0 |
| maturity of term loans | 125 | 100.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 2 | 1.6 | 108 | 86.4 | 13 | 10.4 | 2 | 1.6 |
| Reviewing credit lines or lean applications |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| eStablished custemers | 125 | 100.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 2 | 1.6 | 102 | 81.6 | 18 | 14.4 | 3 | 2.4 |
| new customers | 125 | 100.0 | 1 | 0.8 | 1 | 0.8 | 94 | 75.2 | 27 | 21.6 | 2 | 1.6 |
| local service area customers | 125 | 100.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 1 | 0.8 | 106 | 84.8 | 15 | 12.2 | 3 | 2.4 |
| nonlocal service area customers | 125 | 100.0 | 1 | 0.8 | 5 | 4.0 | 100 | 80.0 | 17 | 13.6 | 2 | 1.6 |

$1 /$ SURVEY of lending practices at 125 Large banks reporting in the federal reserve ouarterly interest rate survey AS OF FE日RUARY 15. 1972.
table 1 (continued)

|  | MUCH | MOOERATELY | ESSENTIALLY | MODERATELY | MUCH |
| ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ANSWERING | FIRMER | FIRMER | UNCHANGED | FASIER | PASIER |
| OUESTION | POLICY | POLICY | POLICY | POLICY |  |
| BANKS PCT | BANKS PCT | BANKS PCT | BANKS PCT | BANKS PCT |  |

FACTCRS RELATING TO APPLICANT $2 /$
VALUE AS DEPCSITCR OR
SOURGE OF COLLATERAL BUSINESS
INTENDED USE DF THE LOAN
$125 \quad 100.0$
21.6
$7 \quad 5.6$
10281.6
$14 \quad 11.2$
$0 \quad 0.0$
$125 \quad 100.0$
3.4
10.8
11188.8
97.2
10.8

## LENDING TO mNONGAPTIVE' FINANCE COMPANIES

TERMS AND CONDITIONS:
INTEREST RATES CHARGED
COMPENSATING CR SUPPORTING BALANCES
ENFORCEMENT OF BALANCE REOUIREMENTS
ESTABLISHING NEW OR LARGER CREOIT LINES

| 125 | 100.0 |
| :--- | :--- |
| 125 | 100.0 |
| 125 | 100.0 |
| 125 | 100.0 |


| 0 | 0.0 |
| :--- | :--- |
| 0 | 0.0 |
| 0 | 0.0 |
| 1 | 0.8 |


| 0 | 0.0 |
| :--- | :--- |
| 1 | 0.8 |
| 2 | 1.6 |
| 4 | 3.2 |

$70 \quad 56.0$
$46 \quad 34.8$
97.2

118
A 4.8
$0 \quad 0.0$
115
$8 \quad 5.4$
$0 \quad 0.0$
3225.6
10.8
WILLINGESS TO MAKE OTHER TYPES OF LOANS

TERM LGANS TO BUSINESSES
CONSUMER INSTALMENT LCANS

| ANSWERING | GONSIDFRABLY | MODERATELY |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| LUESSION | LILLING | WESS |  |  |  |
| BANKS PCT | BANKS PCT | BANKS PCT |  |  |  |
| 125 | 100.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 3 | 2.4 |
| 124 | 100.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 |
| 122 | 100.0 | 1 | 0.8 | 1 | 0.8 |
| 121 | 100.0 | 1 | 0.8 | 3 | 2.5 |
| 123 | 100.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 4 | 3.3 |
| 123 | 100.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 2 | 1.6 |
| 123 | 100.0 | 1 | 0.8 | 1 | 0.8 |

ESSENTIALLY
UNCHANGED
BANKS PCT
$92 \quad 65.6$
7187.2
8287.3
10087.7
89
94
90.3
90

| MODERATFLY MORE WILLING |  | CONSIDERARLY MORE WILLINT. |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BANKS | PCT | BANKS | PC. $T$ |
| 38 | 30.4 | 2 | 1.6 |
| 44 | 35.5 | 9 | 7.3 |
| 39 | 31.1 | 0 | 0.0 |
| 17 | 14.0 | $n$ | 0.0 |
| 30 | 24.4 | 0 | 0.0 |
| 26 | 21.1 | 1 | 0.8 |
| 21 | 17.1 | 1 | O. 8 |

PARTICIPATIGN LGANS WITH CORRESPONDENT BANKS

LOANS TG BROKERS

$$
A-4
$$

NOT FQR QUCTATION OR PUBLICATION
TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF QUARTERLY CHANGES IN BANK LENDING PRACTICES AT BANKS GROUPED RY SIIE DF TOTAL TEPOSITS I/
ISTATUS OF POLICY ON FEBRUARY 15,1972 , COMPARED TD THREE MONTHS EARLIERS
( $N$ UMBER OF BANKS IN EACH COLUMN AS PER CENT OF TOTAL BANKS ANSWERING QUESTION)

|  | total |  | SIZE OF BAN MUCH STRONGER |  | -- total depostts in billions |  |  |  |  |  | MUCH WFAKER |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | MODERATELY STRONGER | ESSENTIALLY <br> UNCHANGED |  | MODERATFLY WFAKER |  |  |  |
|  | $\$ 1$ \& OVER | UNDER \$1 |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 1 \varepsilon \\ & \text { OVER } \end{aligned}$ | UNDER $\$ 1$ | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 1 \varepsilon \\ & \text { OVER } \end{aligned}$ | UNDER $\$ 1$ | $\$ 1$ E QVER | UNDED $\$ 1$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { SI E } \\ & \text { OVER } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { UNDER } \\ \$ 1 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{ll} \$ 1 & \varepsilon \\ \operatorname{HVFR} \end{array}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { UNDFR } \\ \$ 1 \end{gathered}$ |
| STRENGTH OF CEMAND FOR COMMERCIAL AND <br> industrial lgans iafter allowance for <br> bank's usual seasonal variationi |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Compared tc three months ago | 100 | 100 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 24 | 52 | 47 | 35 | 28 | $?$ |  |
| ANTICIPATED DEMAND IN NEXT 3 MONTHS | 100 | 100 | 0 | 3 | 43 | 48 | 46 | 38 | 11 | 11 | 0 | 0 |
|  | TOTAL |  | MUCH <br> FIRMER |  | MODERATELY FIRMER |  | ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED |  | MODERATELY EAS IER |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { MUCH } \\ & \text { EAS IER } \end{aligned}$ |  |
|  | $\$ 1 \varepsilon$ OVER | UNDER $\$ 1$ | \$1 8 OVER | UNDER <br> $\$ 1$ | $\$ 1$ E OVER | UNDER $\$ 1$ | $\$ 1$ E OVER | UNDER $\$ 1$ | $\$ 18$ QVER | UNDER | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 1 \varepsilon \\ & \text { OVER } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { UNDFR } \\ \$ 1 \end{gathered}$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| TERMS ANC CONDITIONS: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| INTEREST RATES CHARGED | 100 | 100 | 2 | 0 | $c$ | 3 | 27 | 22 | 56 | 61 | 15 | 14 |
| COMPENSATING DR SUPPORTING BALANCES | 100 | 100 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 83 | 77 | 15 | 18 | 0 | 0 |
| STANDARDS QF GREDIT WORTHINESS | 100 | 100 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 94 | 92 | 4 | 4 | $\bigcirc$ | 0 |
| MATURITY OF TERM LOANS | 100 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 87 | 85 | 11 | 10 | 0 | 3 |
| REVIEWING CREDIT LINES CR LCAN APPLICATIONS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ESTABLISHED CUSTOMERS | 100 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 81 | R2 | 11 | 17 | 6 | 0 |
| NEW CUSTOMERS | 100 | 100 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 79 | 73 | 17 | 25 | 2 | 1 |
| LOCAL SERVICE AREA CUSTOMERS | 100 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 81 | 87 | 11 | 13 | 6 | 0 |
| nonlocal service area customers | 100 | 100 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 79 | 81 | 15 | 13 | $?$ | 1 |

[^2]NOT FOR OUCTATICN OR PUBLICATION

|  | NUMBER ANSWERING QUESTION |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { SIZE OF BANK } \\ & \text { MUCH } \\ & \text { FIRMER } \\ & \text { POLICY } \end{aligned}$ |  | -- total D mODERATELY firmer POLICY |  | ITS IN BILL ESSENTIALLY INCRANGED POLICY |  | moderatfir EASTFR POLIC.Y |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { MUCH } \\ & \text { FASI } 1 \text { ROLICY } \\ & \text { POL } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 1 \varepsilon \\ & \text { OVER } \end{aligned}$ | UNDER $\$ 1$ | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 1 \varepsilon \\ & \text { OVER } \end{aligned}$ | $\underset{\substack{\text { UNDER } \\ \$ 1}}{ }$ | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 18 \\ & \text { OVER } \end{aligned}$ | under $\$ 1$ | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 1 \varepsilon \\ & \text { OVER } \end{aligned}$ | UNDER <br> $\$ 1$ | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 1 \varepsilon \\ & \text { OVER } \end{aligned}$ | UNDER $\$ 1$ | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 1 \varepsilon \\ & \text { חVER } \end{aligned}$ | $\underset{\$ i}{\text { UNDER }}$ |
| factors relating to afplicant 28 \% ol |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| VALUE AS DEPCSITOR OR source of ccllateral business | 100 | 100 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 7 | 79 | 84 | 15 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| intended use of the loan | 100 | 100 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 88 | 90 | 6 | 9 | 0 | 1 |
| Lending to "ncncaptive" finance companies |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| terns anc conoitions: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| interest rates charged | 100 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 60 | 53 | 31 | 41 | 9 | 6 |
| compensating cr supporting balances | 100 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 91 | 77 | 7 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| enforcement of galance requirements | 100 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 91 | 93 | 7 | 6 | 0 | 0 |
| establishing new or larger creoit lines | 100 | 100 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 68 | 71 | 26 | 25 | , | 0 |
|  | NUMBER ANSHERTNG QUESTION |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { CONSIDERABLY } \\ \text { LESS } \\ \text { WILLING } \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { MODERATELY } \\ \text { LESS } \\ \text { WILLING } \end{gathered}$ |  | ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED |  | moderately MDRE <br> WILLING |  | CONSIOERABLY Mire WILLING |  |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 1 \varepsilon \\ & \text { OVER } \end{aligned}$ | UNOER <br> $\$ 1$ | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 1 \varepsilon \\ & \text { OVER } \end{aligned}$ | UNDER <br> $\$ 1$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { S1 } \varepsilon \\ & \text { OVER } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { UNDER } \\ \$ 1 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 1 \varepsilon \varepsilon \\ & \text { OVER } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { UNDER } \\ \$ 1 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 18 \\ & \text { OVFR } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { UNDER } \\ \$ 1 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & S 1 \quad \varepsilon_{1} \\ & n V=R \end{aligned}$ | under $\$ 1$ |
| WILLINGNESS to make cther types cf llans |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| term leans ti businesses | 100 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 67 | 64 | 31 | 30 | 0 | 3 |
| censumer instalment leans | 100 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 63 | 53 | 28 | 41 | 9 | 6 |
| single fanily mortgage loans | 100 | 100 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 73 | 83 | 25 | 36 | 0 | 0 |
| multt-family mcrigage leans | 100 | 100 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 85 | 82 | 13 | 14 | 0 | i |
| all cther mertgage lcans | 100 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 75 | 70 | 23 | 24 | 0 | 0 |
| participaticn leans with CORRESPONDENT BANKS | 100 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 77 | 76 | 19 | 23 | 2 | 0 |
| LOANS TC BRCKERS | 100 | 100 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 76 | 95 | 22 | 13 | 2 | 0 |

21 FOR THESE FACTORS. FIRMER MEANS THE FACTORS WERE CCNSIDERED MORE IMPORTANT iN MAKING DECISIONS FGR APMMUVING CREDIT REGUESTS. AND taSIER mEans they were less important.

$$
A-6
$$

## table 3

## Quarterly surver of changes in bank lenoing practices at selected large banks in the u.s. i/ status of policy un february 15, 1972 compared ro three months earliter (NUMBER OF BANKSJ



STRENGTH OF CENAND FCR CCMMERCIAL ANC
industrial lcans after allowance for
BAAK'S USUAL SEASONAL VARIATIONJ
COMPARED TC 3 MONTHS AGC 125
MUCH STRCNGER

MOUERATELY STRCNGER
ESSEATIALLY UNCHANGEC
MODENATELY WEAKER
MUCH WEAKER

| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ---: | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 23 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 3 | 3 |
| 61 | 4 | 7 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 4 |  |
| 39 | 4 | 8 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 9 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2 |  |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

ANTICIPATED DEMAND NEXT THREE MONTHS

125

MUCH STRCNGER
MODERATELY STRONGER
ESSEATIALEY UNCHANGEC
MODERATELY WEAKER
MUCH WEAKER

| 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 57 | 3 | 10 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 5 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 8 |
| 52 | 2 | 8 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 7 | 6 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 4 |
| 14 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1 | : | 1 | 1 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | c | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

LENDING TO NCAFINANCIAL BUSINESSES

## TERMS ANE CCNOITIONS

INTEREST RATES CHARGEC 125

| MUCH FIRNER POLICY | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| MODERATELY FIRMER PCLICV | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGEC POLICY | 31 | 0 | 8 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 2 |  |
| MODERATELY EASIER POLICY | 73 | 7 | 9 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 7 | 5 | 6 |
| MUCH EASIER POLICY | 18 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| COMPENSATING BALANCES | 125 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| MUCH FIRMER POLICY | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MODERATELY FIRMER PCLICY | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED POLICY | 99 | 6 | 17 | 8 | 9 | 3 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 11 | 6 | 3 | ค | 8 | 12 |
| MODERATELY EASIER PCLICY | 21 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| MUGH EASIER POLICY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

I/ SURVEY OF LENOING PRACTICES AT 125 LARGE BANKS REPORTING IN THE fEDERAL RESERVE QUARTERLY INTEREST RATE SURVEY AS OF FEBRUARY 15. 1972.


TABLE 3 (CONTINUED)

| LENIIMG í ACNFiVANGIAL MUSINESSES | $\begin{array}{r} \text { ALL } \\ \text { DSTS } \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { BOS- } \\ & \text { TON } \end{aligned}$ | total | $\begin{aligned} & \text { NEW Y } \\ & \text { CITY } \end{aligned}$ |  | RK QUTSIDE | $\begin{aligned} & \text { PHIL- } \\ & \text { ADEL. } \end{aligned}$ | GleveLAND | $\begin{aligned} & \text { RICH- } \\ & \text { MOND } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { ATLAN- } \\ \text { TA } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { R.HIC- } \\ & \text { AGO } \end{aligned}$ | ST. LOUIS | MINNE APOLIS | KANS. GITY | $\begin{aligned} & \text { DAL- } \\ & \text { QAS } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { SAN } \\ & \text { FRAN } \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| REVIEWING CREUIT LINES CR LOANS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ACNLCCAL SERVICE AREA CUST | 125 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| MUCH FIRMEK POLICY | 1 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MGCERATELV FIRMER PCLICY | 5 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | $i$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGEİ PCLICY | 100 | 6 | 18 |  | 9 | 9 | 6 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 10 | 7 | 2 | 7 | 8 | 12 |
| MODERATELY EASIER PCLICY | 17 | 2 | 2 |  | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 |  | 1 | 1 |
| MUCH EASIER POLICY | 2 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | C | 0 | 0 | $1$ | 0 | $0$ | 0 | 0 |
| FACTERS RELATING TG APPLICANT 21 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| VALUE AS DEPCSITCR GR SGURCE |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| je ccllatefal business | 125 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| MUCL FIRNER POLICY | 2 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MGCERATELY FIRMER PCLICY | 7 | 0 | 2 |  | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED POLICY | 102 | 7 | 17 |  | 9 | 8 | 5 | 9 | 11 | 8 | 11 | 7 | 1 | 8 | R | 10 |
| moderately easier policy | 14 | 1 | 1 |  | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | $2$ |  | $1$ | $0$ |  | $1$ |
| MUCH EASIER POLICY | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $0$ | $0$ | $0$ | $0$ | $0$ | 0 |
| INTENDED USE CF LOAN | 125 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| MLCH FIRNER POLICY | 3 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |
| MODERATELY FIRMER PCLICY | 1 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| ESSEAT I ALLY UNCHANGEC POLICY | 111 | 7 | 20 |  | 9 | 11 | 5 | 11 | 10 | 8 | 13 | 7 | 2 | 9 | 9 | 10 |
| MNDERATELY EASIER PCLICY | $\bigcirc$ | 1 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| MUCH EASIER PGLICY | 1 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| LENDING TO "ACNGAPTIיE" FINANCE COMPANIES |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| TERMS Anİ CCNDITIONS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| INTEREST RATES Chargec | 125 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| MUCA firmer policy | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MODERATELY FIRMER PCLICY | 0 | 0 | 6 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGEC PGLICY | 70 | 2 | 13 |  | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 10 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 8 |
| MODERATELY tASIER PCLICY | 46 | 5 | 6 |  | 1 | 5 | 1 | 5 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 4 |
| MUCH EASIEN POLICY | 9 | 1 | 1 |  | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | ? | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |

$2 /$ FOR THESE FACTOKS. FIRMER MEANS TME FACTORS HERE CONSIDERED MORE IMPORTANT IN MAKING DECISIONS FOR APPROVING CREDIT REGUESTS. AND EASIER MEANS TMEY GERE LESS IMPORTANT.

|  | $\begin{array}{r} \text { ALL } \\ \text { DSTS } \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { BOS- } \\ & \text { TON } \end{aligned}$ | total | NEw YORK CITY | RK OUTSIDE | PHILADEL. | Cleve- <br> LAND | RICHMOND | $\begin{gathered} \text { ATLAN- } \\ \text { TA } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { CHIC- } \\ \text { AGO } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 5 \pi \\ \text { couls } \end{array}$ | MINNEAPOLIS | $\begin{gathered} \text { KANS. } \\ \text { CITY } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { DAL- } \\ & \text { LAS } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { SAN } \\ & \text { FRAN } \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| lending tc "ncincaptive" <br> finance companies |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| TERMS ANC CCNOITIONS: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| SIzt dF COMPENSATING BALANCES | 125 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| MUCH FIRNER POLICY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | C | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MOUERATELY FIRMER PGLICY | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ESSENTIALLY UNCHAMGED PGLICY | 118 | 7 | 19 | 5 | 10 | 6 | 10 | 11 | 10 | 13 | 9 | 3 | 8 | 9 | 13 |
| MODERATELY EASIER POLICY | 6 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| MUCH EASIEK POLICY | 0 | 0 | c | C | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $n$ | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ENFCRCEMENT OF |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| batance heguirement | 125 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| MUCH FIRMER POLICY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MCDERATELY FIRMER PGLICY | 2 | C | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ESSFNTIALLY UNCHANGEC PGLICY | 115 | 6 | 19 | 9 | 10 | 6 | 10 | 11 | 10 | 12 | 0 | 2 | R | 9 | 13 |
| moderately Easier pGlicy | 5 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| MUCH EASIEK POLICY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| Establishing new or lafger CRECIT LINES | 125 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| MUCH FIRNER PGLICY | 1 | C | c | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | $\bigcirc$ | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MUCEKATELY FIRMER PCLICY | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| ESSENTIALIT LNCHANGED PGLICY | 87 | 5 | 14 | 8 | 6 | 4 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 9 | 5 | $?$ | 6 | 9 | 8 |
| MODERATELY EASIEF PCLICY | 32 | 2 | 6 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 4 | i | 2 | 0 | 4 |
| MUCH EASIER FOLICY | 1 | 0 | 0 | C | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | c | 0 | 0 | 0 | '0 |
| wILLINGNESS TC MAKE CTHER TYPES CF LCANS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| term leans tc businesses | 125 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CCNSIGERABLY LESS WILLING | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $?$ | 0 | 0 |
| MODERATELY LESS WILLING | 3 | C | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | ก | 1 |
| FSSENTIALLY UNCHANGEC | 82 | 7 | 13 | 7 | 6 | 3 | 7 | 9 | 6 | 13 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 6 | 8 |
| MGEFRATELY MORE WILLING | 38 | 1 | 6 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 4 | $?$ | 4 | 2 | 4 |
| CENSIDERAPLY MERE WILLING | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 9 | $n$ | 0 |
| Consumer instalment lcans | 124 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CENSIDERABLY LESS WILLING | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $n$ | 2 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| MODERATELY LESS WILLING | 0 | C | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $\bigcirc$ | 0 | $r$ | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGEC | 71 | 7 | 13 | 8 | 5 | 3 | 7 | 5 | 5 | 9 | 4 | $?$ | 3 | 6 | 7 |
| Mliderately mare willing | 44 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 5 | i | 4 | 2 | 5 |
| Clisiceratiy mekt milling | 9 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 0 | $n$ | $\overline{0}$ | 1 | 1 |

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX B

## QUARTERLY SURVEY OF BANK LOAN COMMITMENTS*

The most recent survey of bank loan commitments, for the three months ending January 31, indicates a strong increase in the volume of unused commitments at the 42 reporting banks.(See Table 1.) This upsurge in commitments seems to be connected with marketing efforts on the part of commercial banks attempting to stimulate business borrowing. In addition, the increase is related to the continued vigor of construction activity.

The change in commitments to commercial and industrial (C\&I) firms, as usual, dominated movements in total commitments. The reported large increase in C\&I unused commitments, in turn, was mainly determined by the expansion in confirmed lines of credit; such commitments typically arise as bankers early in the new year extend lines without charging a fee in order to attract and hold customers. Other categories of C\&I commitments, however, were not strong. Although new commitments for term loans rose markedly, unused commitments fell sharply from the record peaks achieved in the previous quarter. Unused revolving credits, meanwhile, rose only modestly.

A vigorous rate of construction activity strongly affected the other commitments. The growth in unused and new commitments for real estate mortgages was high-as were takedowns for this purpose. Data on construction loans showed large takedowns as well as strong growth in new and unused commitments.

Turning to nonbank financial institutions, the Survey shows a large growth in unused commitments. Underlying this increase was a buildup in unused commitments to finance companies and a large growth in unused commitments to other nonbank financial institutions--including mortgage and insurance companies, savings and loan associations, and mutual savings banks.

[^3]Financing of mortgage warehousing, moreover, was heavy as takedowns were the highest since the Survey began in the first quarter of 1969. According to information available to the staff, some of these takedowns were by mortgage bankers who were expecting lower mortgage rates in the future and hence were accumulating mortgages that they expected to resell at a profit.

As commercial banks have maintained ample liquidity in the face of modest business loan demands, respondents eased commitment policies further. (See Table 2.) No bank in the Survey, in fact, has become more restrictive in the last six months.

QUARTERLY SURVEY OF BANK LOAN COMMITMENTS AT SELECTED LARGE U.S. BANKS ${ }^{1 /}$
January 31, 1972
Table 1: NEW AND UNUSED COMMITNENTS
(Billions of dollars, not seasonally adjusted)

|  | New commitments made during 3 -month ending |  |  | $\|$Takedowns, expirations <br> and cancellations during <br> 3-months ending |  |  | Change during 3 -monthsending |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Outstanding } \\ & \frac{\text { on }}{\text { January } 31} \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Grand total commitments | 35.0 | 21.2 | 23.4 | 32.0 | 19.3 | 20.1 | 2.9 | 1.9 | 3.3 | 70.3 |
| Total-Comm. \& Industrial <br> Total-Nonbank Financial | 27.4 | 16.8 | 18.2 | 24.8 | 15.6 | 16.2 | 2.5 | 1.2 | 2.0 | 53.2 |
| Institutions | 5.5 | 2.9 | 3.6 | 5.2 | 2.4 | 2.8 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 13.0 |
| Total-Real Estate Mortgages | 2.1 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 3/ | 0.2 | 0.5 | 4.1 |
| MEMO: Construction Loans (included above) | 1.4 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.2 | 3/ | 0.3 | 3.2 |
| Total-Comm. \& Industrial |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Term Loans | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 2.1 | Q. 1 | 0.4 | -0.2 | 2.1 |
| Revolving Credits | 6.8 | 3.8 | 4.4 | 6.4 | 3.5 | 4.0 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 14.0 |
| Total Term \& Revolving 2/ | 8.9 | 6.2 | 6.5 | 8.4 | 5.6 | 6.3 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 16.7 |
| Confirmed Lines of Credit | 14.9 | 9.5 | 9.9 | 13.4 | 9.0 | 8.2 | 1.5 | 0.5 | 1.7 | 32.7 |
| Other Commitments | 3.5 | 1.1 | 1.7 | 3.9 | 1.0 | 1.6 | 0.5 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 3.8 |
| Tota1-Nonbank Financial Institutions |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Finance Companies | 3.5 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 3.4 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 8.1 |
| For Mortgage Warehousing | 0.9 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 1.9 |
| All Other | 1.1 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 3/ | 0.3 | 3.0 |
| Total-Real Estate Mortgages Residential | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 1.6 |
| Other | 1.2 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 0.7 | 0.5 | -0.1 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 2.6 |

$1 /$ Participants in Quarterly Interest Rate Survey with total deposits of more than $\$ 1$ billion ( 42 banks).
$\frac{2}{3} /$ This item may exceed sum of previous two items because some banks report combined total only.
3/ Less than $\$ 50$ million.
NOTE: Figures may not add to total due to rounding.

Table 2: VIEWS ON COMMITMENT POLICY


## RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DEMAND DEPOSIT OWNERSHIP*

The failure of the demand deposit component of $M_{1}$ to increase (on a seasonally adjusted basis) during the fourth quarter of 1971 appears attributable to changes in deposit balances owned by depositors other than Individuals, Partnerships, and Corporations (IPC). As may be seen by examining the seasonally unadjusted data in Table 1, growth in the estimated combined category of certified and officers' checks and State and local government deposits (line 6) during the fourth quarter of last year fell considerably short of the increase recorded in the same period of 1970. In addition, it is estimated that deposit balances held by foreign commercial banks (line 4) declined rather sharply last quarter, probably reflecting efforts of such institutions to reduce their holdings of dollars. In contrast, balances held by IPC depositors (line 7) increased at a significantly faster pace in the fourth quarter of 1971 than in the same period of 1970.1/

As may be seen in the bottom portion of Table l, data obtained in the Demand Deposit Ownership Survey indicate that growth in gross demand deposits held by both categories of business depositors and by depositors in the "all other (IPC)" category (mainly nonprofit institutions and bank trust departments maintaining balances with their own banks) exceeded that recorded in the same period of 1970. Last year's fourth quarter gain in consumer deposits, on the other hand, fell. substantially short of the gain recorded in the fourth quarter of 1970.

Reference to the experience of only one earlier year is at best a very weak basis for judging whether a change is or is not stronger

[^4]than seasonal. And, given that the fourth quarter of 1970 was significantly influenced by a major strike in the auto industry, it may easily be the case that the changes recorded in that year are not at all "normal." With these caveats, the shifts in patterns of ownership suggested by the data do not appear unreasonable. It seems quite possible that consumer demands for precautionary balances could have been reduced because of a favorable acceptance of the President's economic program and that demands by businesses and others could have strengthened in response to the decline in interest rates recorded after mid-August and the pickup in business activity.

Preliminary estimates of IPC demand deposit ownership at weekly reporting banks for January 1972 (Table 2) suggest that, at large banks, consumer demands for deposits continued to fall below those recorded during the comparable period of a year ago. In addition, growth in financial business balances fell somewhat below the gains recorded a year ago, while non-financial business deposits declined sufficiently to just match the 1970 drop in these balances.

1/ Continued:
collection at nonmember banks, deposits of mutual savings banks and deposits of foreign governments and official institutions. Each of these latter items are of relatively small magnitude, do not appear to be subject to sharp fluctuation and appear to be estimated accurately. Nevertheless, the "All Other Deposit" category may be subject to some estimating error.

A second and more important consideration is that the estimate of gross IPC deposits based on DDOS data is, of course, subject to sampling error. Examination of these data suggest that if these estimates are in error, it is most likely that they tend to overstate the 1971 increase and understate the 1970 increase.

Consequently, the 1971 change in IPC deposits may not have been as relatively strong-and that for certified and officers' checks and State and local government may not have been as relatively weak-as is indicated by the data. However, even if generous allowance is made for this possibility, the generalization offered in the text still appears to hold.

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C - 3
```


## TABLE 1

CHANGES IN DEMAND DEPOS IT COMPONENT OF M AND IN DEPOSITS COMPKISING THIS COMPONENT ${ }^{1}$ (\$ billion, not seasonally adjusted)

|  |  | Fourth Quarter |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | 1970 | 1971 |
| (1) | Demand Deposit Component of $\mathrm{M}_{1}$ | 8.1 | 7.2 |
| (2) | Plus: Cash Items in Process of Collection and Federal Reserve Float, Adjusted ${ }^{1 /}$ | 1.5 | 1.9 |
| (3) | Gross Deposits in $M_{1}$ (Total) | 9.6 | 9.1 |
|  | Less: $M_{1}$ Type Balances at Agencies and Branches of Foreign Banks | -. 1 | -. 1 |
|  | Foreign Deposits with the Federal Reserve Banks | -- | -- |
|  | Foreign Commercial Bank Deposits 2/ | . 1 | -. 5 |
|  | Foreign Government and Official Institution Deposits 3/ | . 1 | . 1 |
| (5) | A11 Other Deposits (Total) | 9.5 | 9.5 |
| (6) | Less Certified and Officers' Checks and State and local Government Deposits 4/ | 2.2 | . 6 |
| (7) | Gross IPC Demand Deposits ${ }^{\text {/ }}$ | 7.3 | 8.9 |
|  | Financial Business | . 3 | 1.0 |
|  | Nonfinancial Business | 4.6 | 5.7 |
|  | Consumers | 2.2 | 1.2 |
|  | Foreign | -. 1 | . 1 |
|  | All Other | . 3 | 1.0 |

I/ Adjusted for transactions of Edge Act Corporations and Agencies of foreign banks.
2/ An estimate of deposits held by mutual savings banks deducted from the category, foreign commercial and mutual savings bank deposits, to obtain this estimate.
3/ Estimated using data from weekly Condition Reports and from semiannual call reports.
4/ Calculated by deducting DDOS estimate of:Gross IPC deposits from all other deposits (total).
5/ Estimate based on data from Demand Deposit Ownership Surveys.

$$
c=4
$$

## TABLE 2

# CHANGE IN OWNERSHIP OF GROSS IPC DEPOSITS <br> AT WEEKLY REPORTING BANKS <br> (Not seasonally adjusted, \$ billions)* 

|  | January 1971 | January 1972 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Financial Businesses | . 4 | . 1 |
| Nonfinancial Businesses | -1.7 | -1.7 |
| Consumers | . 8 | . 5 |
| Foreign | -- | -- |
| All Other | -- | - |
| Total IPC Deposits | -. 4 | -1.2 |

\% Sum of ownership categories may not equal total because of rounding.

SURVEY OF STATE AND IOCAL-LONG TERM BORROWING ANTICIPATIONS AND REALIZATIONS: FOURTH QUARTER, 1971*

State and local governments borrowed $\$ 4.6$ billion as planned and another $\$ 1.2$ billion in excess of previously reported long-term borrowing plans during the final quarter of 1971. Results projected from the FRB-Census Survey of State and Local Long-term Borrowing Anticipations and Realizations indicate, however, that some State and local units experienced borrowing shortfalls of $\$ 1.5$ billion. These shortfalls led to a postponement or cancellation of $\$ 275$ million in capital spending. Alternative financial expedients were substituted for $\$ 550$ million of the unfulfilled planned borrowing while another $\$ 725$ million in shortfalls represented money not currently needed.1/

## Table 1

LONG TERM BORROWING ANTICIPATYONS AND REALIZATIONS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENIS 4th Quarter, 1971
(Billions of dollars)

| Unit Type | Anticipa- <br> tions | Borrowed <br> as planned | Borrowed <br> above plans | Borrowing <br> Shortfalls |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| State <br> State colleges | 2.3 | 1.9 | .5 |  |
| Counties | .5 | .4 | .1 | .4 |
| Cities and Towns | 1.7 | 1.2 | .1 | .1 |
| Special districts | .9 | .7 | .2 | .4 |
| School districts | . .8 | -.4 | .3 | .2 |
| Totals | 6.2 | 4.6 | 1.2 | .4 |
| Memo: <br> Per cent of <br> Anticipations <br> 3rd quarter <br> 4th quarter | 100.0 | 77.5 |  | 1.6 |

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.
(Footnote 1 on next page)

* Prepared by Paul Schneiderman, Economist, Capital Markets Section, Division of Research and Statistics.

Results compiled irom survey responses show that interest rate levels and changes induced a net long-term borrowing of almost $\$ 240$ million above planned levels. More than $\$ 500$ million in borrowing above plans came to market as a result of favorable yields, while, on the other hand, $\$ 270$ miliion of planned financing was postponed, mostly in expectation of even lower rates. Project postponements induced by borrowing shortfalls associated with interest rate behavior were insignificant.

State and local responses to the survey place long-term borrowing plans at $\$ 6.3$ billion for the first quarter of 1972 and $\$ 5.1$ billion for the second quarter of 1972. While borrowing plans usually tend to be somewhat understated for future quarters, past survey experience and other information suggests that borrowing in the first half of 1972 will fall short of that issued during the latter half of last year.

## Long-term Borrowing Shortfalls

Over $\$ 1.5$ billion of state and local long-term borrowing plans went unrealized during the fourth quarter of 1971 , as compared with $\$ 1.3$ billion in quarter 3. However, more than 60 per cent of such shortfalls had been rescheduled for the January through December, 1972 period. As shown in Table 2, administrative and legal delays were responsible for over two-fifths of the borrowing shortfalls with delays in the progress of the projects themselves responsible for about 55 per cent of the reported $\$ 680$ million. Litigation involving the current state of property tax based financing may be responsible for a substantial portion of the delay since school bonds are often backed by revenues from this source. Additional delays have arisen in some cases because of delays in release of pollution control revenue bond guidelines by the Treasury.

Expectations of lower interest rates in the future led to over $\$ 200$ million of postponements of long-term borrowing. This represented a rise in such postponements from the quarter earlier and coincide with the sizable decline in rates following the administrations New Economic Program: As would be expected, shortfalls attributed to rate levels declined.

## (Footnote 1 from previous page.)

1/ The survey is administered by the Governments Division of the U.S. Bureau of the Census. The 80 per cent response rate on the Realizations Survey captured 97 per cent of the long-term borrowing completed during that quarter. The Anticipations Survey had a response rate of 74 per cent. It is assumed that nonrespondents to the Anticipations Survey had no borrowing plans to report. No information is available about the behavior of nonrespondents responsibile for the unreported $\$ 200$ million of the $\$ 6.06$ billion borrowed during the fourth quarter.
D-3

Table 2

## STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SHORTFALLS FROM LONG-TERM BORROWING PLANS 3rd and 4th Quarters, 1971

| Reason for BorrowingShortfall | 3rd Quarter |  | 4th Quarter |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Millions of } \\ & \text { dollars } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Per } \\ & \text { Cent } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Millions of } \\ & \text { dollars } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Per } \\ & \text { Cent } \end{aligned}$ |
| Authorization not obtained | 90 | 6.7 | 227 | 14.6 |
| Administrative and legal delays | 851 ${ }^{1 /}$ | 63.2 | 678 ${ }^{2 /}$ | 43.6 |
| Interest rate ceiling | 94 | 7.0 | 9 | 0.6 |
| Interest rate too high | 55 | 4.1 | 47 | 3.0 |
| Interest rates expected to fall | 32 | 2.4 | 213 | 13.7 |
| Other | 224 | 16.6 | 379 | 24.4 |
| Totals | 1,346 | 100.0 | 1,553 | 100.0 |

I/ Of this total, $\$ 404$ million represents delays not necessarily related to financing.
2/ Of this total, $\$ 298$ million represents delays not necessarily related to financing.

## Effects of Borrowing Setbacks

Responses to the survey inquiry indicate that some of the long-term borrowing shortfalls resulted in capital outlay cutbacks of more than $\$ 275$ million, or 18 per cent of all shortfalls. About three fourths of these capital spending adjustments were considered temporary, and long-term borrowing to finance such outlays has been rescheduled over the next year.
D-4

Table 3

## EFFECTS OF LONG-TERM BORROWING SHORTFALLS <br> 4th Quarter, 1971 <br> (Millions of dollars)

|  | Permanent | Temporary | Total |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Used alternative financing |  |  |  |
| Short-term borrowing | 24 | 190 | 214 |
| Use of liquid assets | 13 | 106 | 119 |
| Postpone other outlays | 69 | 86 | 155 |
| Other methods | 44 | 17 | 61 |
| Money not needed now | 175 | 550 | 725 |
| Capital outlays cutback | 74 | 204 | 278 |
| Total | 399 | 1,153 | 1,552 |
| Per cent | 25.7 | 74.3 | 100.0 |

Where long-term financing suspensions did not force the cancellation of projects, funds were not needed immediately or an alternative financing source was utilized. Errors of judgment as to timing or need or amount, as well as other delays in the projects themselves are generally the circumstances under which funds are not currently required.

Short-term borrowing in lieu of suspended long-term issues provided almost 40 per cent of the alternatively sought financing. As Indicated in Table 3, current plans call for all but 10 per cent of the $\$ 214$ million to be refinanced in the long-term markets. A reevaluation of projects was apparently also undertaken by some units as $\$ 155$ million of alternative financing came from funds originally allocated to other projects.

## Long-term Borrowing Above Planned Levels

As in the third quarter of 1972, State and local authorities expanded their borrowing by $\$ 1.2$ billion dollars above planned levels previously reported. More than 40 per cent of this long-term borrowing was brought to market in response to lower interest costs. In addition an appreciable number of reporting units indicated that the purpose of their borrowing above previously planned levels was to prerefund issues marketed in 1969 at higher costs.

## Anticipated Jong-term Offerings

Projected anticipations for long-term borrowing for the first and second quarters of 1972 are shown in Table 4. It appears that, governments could fall short of long-term borroving expectations by as much as 15 per cent of $\$ 6,3$ billion planned for the January through March period, given the staffs monthly estimates of municipal volume. In part the shortfalls may be attributed to continued administrative and legal delays that have anterrupted borrowing plans for some time.

Anticipations for the second quarter may be expected to increase from those reported at year end 1971. Some of the probable increase could rerlect the typical problem of uncertain borrowing plans not reported at the time of the survey, and its also possible that prerefunding and pollution control bonds will grow in importance. However, the sharp drop in such plans from the first quarter level is unlikely to be made up entirely in view of past survey experience.

Table 4
LONG-TERM BORROWING ANTICIPATIONS
OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENIS
As of
December 31, 1971

|  | January through March |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Authorized | 5.37 | April through June |
| Unauthorized | $\frac{.96}{}$ | 3.34 |
| Total | 6.33 | $\frac{1.75}{5.09}$ |


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ In some cases, original copies needed to be photocopied before being scanned into electronic format. All scanned images were deskewed (to remove the effects of printer- and scanner-introduced tilting) and lightly cleaned (to remove dark spots caused by staple holes, hole punches, and other blemishes caused after initial printing).
    ${ }^{2}$ A two-step process was used. An advanced optical character recognition computer program (OCR) first created electronic text from the document image. Where the OCR results were inconclusive, staff checked and corrected the text as necessary. Please note that the numbers and text in charts and tables were not reliably recognized by the OCR process and were not checked or corrected by staff.

[^1]:    * Prepared by Marilyn Barron, Research Assistant, Banking Section, Division of Research and Statistics

[^2]:    I/ SURVEY OF LENDING PRACTICES AT 54 LARGE BANKS IDEPOSITS OF $\$ 1$ BILLION OR MOREI AND 71 SMALL BANKS IDFPOSITS OF LESS THAN $S 1$ BILLIUNI REPORTING IN THE FEDERAL RESERVE OUARTERLY INTEREST RATE SURVEY AS OF FEBRUARY 15.1972.

[^3]:    * Prepared by Marilyn Barron, Research Assistant, Banking Section, Division of Research and Statistics.

[^4]:    * Prepared by Frederick M. Struble, Economist, Banking Section, Division of Research and Statistics.

    1/ The estimate for the combined category of Certified and Officers' Checks and State and Local Government deposits was derived on a residual basis by subtracting the estimated level of gross IPC deposits based on data from the Demand Deposit Ownership Survey from the "All Other Deposit" category (line 5 of Table 1). Thus the estimate for the combined category is subject to two types of estimation error.

    First, the estimates for the "All Other Deposit" category were obtained by using data employed in the calculation of the money stock together with the estimates for cash items in process of (continued on page 2).

