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ESSAYS

ON THE

SPIRIT OF JACKSONISM,

AS EXEMPLIFIED

IN ITS

DEADLY HOSTILITY

TO THE

BANK OF THE UNITED STATES,

AND IN THE

ODIOUS CALUMNIES

EMPLOYED FOR ITS DESTRUCTION.



BY ARISTIDES.



“What profits all the ploughman’s skill and pain,
If tares and brambles choke the rising grain?
What force have laws to make the people blest,
If *factions spirits* do the State molest?”



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DEDICATION.



I INSCRIBE

THESE ESSAYS TO THE HONEST AND JUST MEN OF THE

REPUBLIC, BY WHATEVER PARTY NAME

DESIGNATED. TO OTHERS, THEY

WILL, OF COURSE, BE AS

“SOUNDING BRASS, OR TINKLING CYMBAL.”

ARISTIDES.

PREFACE.



I HAVE a few words to say to the reader before he begins to read these essays. He will find in them, some severity, but no rancour; a free handling of the parties, but no malice. My position will be found to resemble that of the surgeon. He probes the ulcer—exposes its corroded and corroding parts, for the purpose of separating them from the sound and healthful. His object is sometimes two-fold:

1st. To save the subject.

2d. To prevent the spreading of the *leprous-like* disease, and thereby rescue society from its distressing effects. I have not much hope of succeeding under the first similitude. My main object is, I confess, to save the yet uncontaminated citizens of the country from the fatal effects of following the example set by those actors, whose conduct I have exposed. I hold it to be as dangerous to our liberty, as is the cholera to human life. I would, it is true, delight in restoring them, as individuals, to those honourable political relations, which all just men maintain, towards our common country,—who prefer that country, and its prosperity, *to party*—and the “general welfare,” to their individual preferment. I sincerely wish they would abandon their reckless course, turn their backs upon the arch-enemy of all that is dear to the Republic and its hopes, and practice those lessons which were bequeathed to us by the Father of his Country. I have, however, little hope.

If these men suffer by the exposure which these essays make of their conduct, they will bear in mind that no one is to blame for it but themselves. They are supposed to be free agents. When they consented to come in contact with the loathsome cause of their present condition, they did it *voluntarily*. They doubtless weighed well the ignominy

that they were destined to endure, and balanced against it the "*rewards*" which prompted them to the sacrifice. They preferred to endure the former, rather than forego the latter. I wash my hands of having, directly or indirectly, encouraged one of them to place himself in the condition in which the reader will find them all. Let me, therefore, not be blamed. These men are alone responsible. They chose their present condition, (humiliating enough, in all conscience,) and are entitled to all the *honour* it confers, and to all the *disgrace*.

The reader is now respectfully requested to pass on, and look at *the picture* which the following essays will expose to his view; and if, after he shall have surveyed *the whole of it*, he does not turn from it in deep sorrow for his country, he may take my word for it that his moral vision is defective, and all is not right with himself.

ARISTIDES

ESSAYS

ON THE

SPIRIT OF JACKSONISM, &c.



No. 1.

I DESIGN under this head, to make an appeal to the intelligent and candid of all parties, on that which may, perhaps, seem to many, at the first blush, as not concerning any of them. But let no man, or corporation, pass the subject over lightly, or think, because calumny has carried its end in producing the downfall of the Bank of the United States, (*or rather in defeating its recharter,*) that therefore *the truth*, touching this whole business, is not to be regarded, and its solemn injunctions noted. The *very success* of a calumny is the very reason why it should be exposed, and why those who have been its victims should be vindicated. The *failure* of calumny to carry its ends, *might* be a reason why it should not be regarded; but its success should rouse every man, (and it will have this effect on every *honourable* man) who has been misled by it, to vindicate his *own conduct* when acting under its influence, by hurling back upon its authors such a judgment of condemnation as will make them *pause* at least, before they venture again thus *wilfully to delude*, and thus *murderously to destroy*.

Is it said by the designing and wicked, that a citizen is *rabid*—and shall men who have confidence in the declaration, seize and confine the victim, and shut him out from light and liberty, and there keep him until he dies; and shall it be *proven* afterwards, to the satisfaction of all parties, that the charge was groundless, and that it was made for *personal* or *vindictive* ends, or *both*, and then because the man is dead,

shall it be permitted to those who thus wickedly destroyed him, to go, not only unpunished, but unrebuked? Yet this is the doctrine of those who say, because the Bank has been run down by *calumny*, there is no need of exposing that calumny, or of vindicating its reputation from the foul, but too successful attacks of its enemies; and its officers from the no less foul designs upon their "good name."

If there ever has been an unholy war waged, and with the unholyest of purposes, and prosecuted with a spirit diabolical and fiend-like, it has been the war waged by *Jacksonism* against the Bank of the United States. It will be my business to demonstrate this. All that relates to this subject, is now matter of history. Facts must now speak. The days of trick, and deception, and chicanery, are gone by. The Bank, so long and so shamefully abused, may be considered as out of the question. It is with the living, vindictive actors, the public have to do. From *Levi Woodbury*, down to the *spies*, the subject may now be handled without creating suspicion that selfishness or personal or political objects govern. The heartless politician, the fool and the knave, must now come in for their share of glory and of shame. The curtain will be lifted. Let those who have played their parts, take the consequences. Infamous deeds should be recorded, and their authors held up to merited public execration and contempt.

ARISTIDES.

No. 2.

The election of General Jackson to the Presidency opened a new, and, as the results have demonstrated, a *fearful era*, in the history of the Government. His utter incompetency for the place, his habits, his passions—all conspired to make him any thing else than a suitable person to fill an office so high, so dignified, and so responsible. His very presence in that lofty place, operated as the signal for the profligate of all parties to stir the elements of discord. The unprincipled of every party were seen wending their way to the presence

chamber, there to offer the incense of their flattery, and to ask for the "rewards" for which they had been struggling; whilst others, just escaped from the throes of sudden conversions, knelt also before the throne, to receive from the hands of him who sat upon it, some crumbs of favour. Very soon after, the proclamation was formally issued, that "*General Jackson will reward his friends, and punish his enemies.*" He proceeded as the world knows, to fulfil this proclamation, *to the letter.*

Here, then, for the first time in this free country, was witnessed the alarming spectacle of an open perversion of all that had been held sacred in the doctrines of republicanism. An *ukase* had been issued; and for the constitutional exercise of the freedom of opinion, and the exercise of the elective franchise, the great body of the freemen of America, including the most wise, and the most virtuous, were *proscribed!* Such a perversion of Executive authority, and such a prostration of all that was just and right, whilst it alarmed the friends of constitutional liberty, served but to rally the wicked, the profligate, and the irresponsible of every party. They beheld in Andrew Jackson, the very elements upon which alone they could operate, when it was resolved by the leaders to employ *them*, and to use *him*, to perpetuate "*the party,*" and secure to themselves the honours and emoluments of office.

High-handed and oppressive as were those measures, it had not yet entered into the head of even the most abandoned of the party, to conceive that such outrages would be committed as followed. Not a man of them dreamed, that, standing upon Executive ground, General Jackson would order a solemn compact between the United States and a corporation to be violated; seize the public treasure, wrest it from the place where the laws had assigned it; and that too, on his *own "responsibility;"*—and that he would sanction the use of the public money, as has been done through the Post Office, and employ the patronage and power of the other departments of the Government to *perpetuate "the party."* Nothing of all this was thought possible. Reckless as the leaders were even then, such high-handed measures, if mentioned, would have made them tremble. Digitized by Microsoft®

The question, at the period of which I am writing, was—“where shall we realize *the monied power*, to secure to ourselves and our successors, the places we now occupy, and to our party its *perpetuation?*” As was natural, perhaps, the eyes of the leaders were turned to  THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES. It was the great monied power of the Union. Its branches were in many of the States. Its five hundred officers were looked upon as having power and influence. These it was thought indispensable to secure. Already possessed of the patronage of the Government, which, it was settled, should be faithfully employed in behalf of “*the party*,” it remained only to secure the Bank, when all would be well. *How* to accomplish this, was the question. It was not long before an opening presented itself. The Branch at Portsmouth, in New Hampshire, “had originally the misfortune to have at its head a Mr. Cutts, who ended by defrauding the United States of upwards of \$20,000 of the pension fund, which the Bank was obliged to replace; and in other respects its affairs had become so deranged, as that “of \$460,000 of loans, \$148,000 was thrown under protest.” It was at this period that “the President, a worthy man, but not calculated for such a state of things, resigned his place.”

Now, who would have thought that the appointment of a successor, and such a man, too, as Jeremiah Mason, would be seized upon as a pretext for feeling how far the party might calculate upon the co-operation of the Bank of the United States in confirming its power and perpetuating its existence? I venture to say, that, except with the actors in this nefarious scheme, such a thought would have occurred to no man.

It was seen that, in righting the condition of the Bank, Mr. Mason would have, of necessity, to act with decision and firmness. In doing this, he must, as President of the Board, occupy a foremost place in all proceedings which were required to reinstate the Bank in its former prosperous condition. This would of course involve an obligation to move upon the parties to the \$112,000 then under protest, and others, perhaps, beside these, might have felt, incidentally, this new but necessary action for the recovery and preservation of the funds of the Bank. Here, then, was the field in which the seeds

for a large crop of dissatisfaction and personal hostility were sown. Into this field, and when the crop ripened, and after a full examination of its condition, *Levi Woodbury* and *Isaac Hill*, choice spirits of "the party," entered. Now was the moment. The administration at Washington was thought to be firmly settled—and whatever it might indicate to the Bank as *its wish*, it was hoped would be cheerfully responded to. It was necessary, at all hazards, to *make the trial*. And now, reader, I am going to disclose an act on the part of Woodbury, which I will call *the first embodied calumny* that "the party" hurled at the Bank; a calumny in the formation of which there is as much coward duplicity and profligacy, and personal degradation, as has ever attached to any man of the party since.

Availing themselves of the state of things as they existed between the Bank and its dealers, Woodbury and Hill procured (as it was easy for them to do under such circumstances,) the signatures of some forty or fifty persons to a petition for the removal of Mr. Mason; and for the appointment of *such a board* as the petition named. But this was not all. Mr. Woodbury took upon himself to act a *particular part*, which, as long as he lives, will operate to degrade him in the estimation of every honest man; and will have the further effect to tarnish his honour in the view of posterity. What was that act? To write, I answer, *two letters*—one to Mr. Biddle, President of the United States Bank, in which he presents himself as brooding, most disinterestedly over the interests (excluding political considerations from the subject,) of that institution; whilst, perhaps with the same pen, he wrote a "*confidential*" letter to Mr. Ingham, then Secretary of the Treasury, in which he says: "The new President of the Bank at this place, (Portsmouth, New Hampshire,) Jeremiah Mason, is a particular friend of Mr. Webster; and his  POLITICAL CHARACTER is doubtless well known to you. Mr. Webster is supposed to have had much agency," &c. &c. Here, then, in this "*confidential*" letter to Mr. Ingham, the removal of Mr. Mason is placed, by the writer, on *political* grounds; whilst, in his letter to Mr. Biddle, he places it upon

grounds wholly different, and says, "the charges against him (Mr. Mason) originated *exclusively* with his political friends!

I will, in my next, (that there may be no cavil on this subject,) publish extracts from both these letters; and from them further illustrate the design of "*the party*," which was to see how far the Bank might be counted on as a *subservient tool* in the hands of those men, who sought its agency to promote their own selfish and party ends. I have said: "the curtain shall be lifted," and it shall be.

ARISTIDES.

No. 3.

I have shown what encouraged the profligate of all parties to rally around Gen. Jackson; and also their *design* in doing so. They derived their encouragement from their knowledge that Gen. Jackson had no one qualification for the office to which he had been elected, and that his prejudices and passions made him the fit instrument for their stratagems and wiles. Having secured his mandate, proscribing *all* except members of "*the party*," and become possessed of the offices; and the press, the concluding part of the design was to get possession of the Bank. This could be done, only, as the public offices had been secured—by putting *tools* into them. The Presidents, Cashiers, Directors, &c., who might not be of "*the party*," were to be reformed out, and Jackson men put in; when the monied power would be united with the patronage of office and the press, and then, as the torrent sweeps down all before it, it was calculated to devastate every party, and fragment of party, save "*the party*." That was to be made *invincible*. Hence, as I have shown in my last No., the movement upon the New Hampshire Branch. But my particular business in this No. is with Mr. Woodbury, at the time United States Senator from New Hampshire, and now  *Secretary of the Treasury*. I have said, that this political functionary took upon himself to act a *particular* part; and that, in acting that part, he descended from the level of

honourable conduct, and has made himself hateful to all honest men. I proceed to furnish, as promised, extracts from his double-faced letters. On the 27th June, 1829, Mr. Woodbury wrote to Mr. Ingham, then Secretary of the Treasury. From that letter I make the following extracts:

EXTRACT 1.

"The President of the Branch at this place, (Portsmouth) was changed last year, and the salary greatly increased; both which measures have given much dissatisfaction, as well to the public, as to many of the Stockholders."

REMARKS.

Now, here are two distinct falsehoods: 1st. as Mr. Biddle, in his reply to Mr. Ingham, of whom he received the "confidential" letter of Mr. Woodbury, says: "The President of the Bank was not changed. The late President, Mr. Shapley, voluntarily declined serving, without the slightest intimation of a wish on the part of the Bank, and solely, as he stated, 'in consequence of his advanced age and declining health, together with his close confinement to the office, which prevents in a great measure, his attention to his private business.'"

2d. "The Salary of the new President was not increased a dollar."

Now then, let any candid man, who is in his senses, answer, whether he believes a word about the "*dissatisfaction*" that Mr. Woodbury asserts was felt by the public, and many of the stockholders? At least on account of the *only* reasons he assigns for it.

EXTRACT 2.

"The new President, Jeremiah Mason, is a *particular friend of Mr. Webster*, and his *political character* is doubtless well known to you. Mr. Webster is supposed to have had much agency in effecting the change."

REMARKS.

Here is a clear and undisguised avowal that the writer aimed to displace Mr. Mason by a political onset. It was sufficient for this object to style him "a particular friend of Mr. Webster." That was the drop relied upon according to

the proclamation of Jackson, which promised *rewards* to his friends, and *punishment* to his enemies, to poison the subject of the onset, and secure the agency of the administration at Washington in procuring from the mother bank an order for Mr. Mason's expulsion;—meanwhile, Mr. Woodbury's co-operating friend, Isaac Hill, had submitted a list of names for Directors and a President.

It so happens that the *supposition* of Mr. Woodbury that "Mr. Webster had *much* agency in effecting the change," had as little grounds to rest upon as had his more formal declarations touching the *changing* of the Presidency, and the increase of the salary, for Mr. Biddle says:—"Mr. Webster had not the slightest agency in obtaining for him (Mr. Mason) the appointment. His nomination was resolved upon without the knowledge either of Mr. Webster or Mr. Mason."

After remarking further upon Mr. Mason's unfitness for the office of President, Mr. Woodbury discloses the object, and says:

EXTRACT 3.

"If any relief can be afforded by the selection of different directors for this Branch, as any board without him (Mason) in it, or with him *not at its head* would at once furnish relief."

REMARKS.

No doubt. Put out capable and honest men, and put in *Jackson men*, and the sought for relief would have been instantly experienced, since that much of the Bank of the United States, according to the plan (*and which I assert was matter of canvass in a Jackson caucus at Washington*) TO SECURE THE BANK, would have become the instrument of "*the party.*" And this was the object of this letter writer, and in his conscience he knows it; and whether that monitor be sufficiently elastic, pressed upon as it has so long been, and as it yet is by the lumber of party, and the employment it demands, the day will come when the light breaking in upon it from a throne higher than that on which Gen. Jackson sits, will give to it life and energy, and a power to its sting which no mortal agency can resist or destroy.

I turn now to the correspondence between the same Levi Woodbury, and upon the same subject, with Mr. Biddle. On the same 27th day of June, 1829, the former addressed the latter a letter. That letter is not published, nor have I seen it. But its character may be inferred from Mr. Biddle's reply to Mr. Ingham, touching Mr. Woodbury's "confidential" letter to Mr. Ingham. He says:—"I am surprised that Mr. Woodbury should consider the complaints about Mr. Mason, as having *the remotest connexion with politics*, and I am surprised for this reason,—Mr. Woodbury wrote to you on the 27th June, on *the same day* he wrote a *similar* letter to me. I answered, thanking him for his suggestions, and requesting him to guide my inquiries, by stating what was *the nature* of the complaints against Mr. Mason. To this he replied on the 3d instant, and *that* letter has the following declaration:

———"From the confidential character of this letter, it is due in perfect frankness to state, that the President of the present board, as a politician, is not *very* acceptable to *the majority* in this town and state—*But, it is at the same time notorious that the charges against him, in his present office, originated EXCLUSIVELY WITH HIS FRIENDS.*"

REMARKS.

Nothing is more clear, than, that in his letter to Mr. Biddle, of the 27th June, Mr. Woodbury spoke not a word about politics—except perhaps to give to Mr. Biddle the assurance that politics had nothing to do with his request for the removal of Mr. Mason, but only the *welfare of the Bank*, and this he abundantly confirms in his letter of the 3d, when he says, "*the charges* (of course *all* of them) originated exclusively with Mr. Mason's *friends*. They could not therefore have been political. So then we find Levi Woodbury in one letter to "the Government" plying *political* reasons for the removal of Mr. Mason; and in another of the same date, to the President of the Bank, reasons wholly distinct, and relating to any thing and every thing but politics!!!

And now let me ask the reader what he thinks of a man who would thus employ his high station in attempting a double injury to his fellow, by making him first obnoxious to a domi-

nant party, on political grounds; and secondly to his employers, on grounds relating to their pecuniary interests? Does it not approximate most fearfully to *robbery*? And to robbery of the worst kind—to the plundering a man of his “*good name?*”

But *the end* to be accomplished by these nefarious means, this skulking and lurking after men’s character, is a thousand fold more shocking than are the means for its accomplishment. That end was the *subversion* of a great moneyed institution, established and conducted with a sole view to the fiscal concerns of the country, and the advancement of the general prosperity, and a *converting it* into a political engine, for the purpose of making permanent *the very worst political dynasty that has ever cursed any Country.*

I shall show in my next that simultaneous movements were made upon two other Banks, one in the South and the other in the West, and in what these resulted:—After that I will return to Mr. Woodbury, and show the *result* of the examination into Mr. Mason’s conduct, which ought, (but did not,) to have satisfied the most impudent defamer under the sun.

ARISTIDES.

No. 4.

When Mr. Ingham, moved upon by Woodbury, as I have shown, opened his correspondence with Mr. Biddle, in 1829, on the alleged mal-administration of the Branch at Portsmouth, he had been reached by charges of a like character, implicating other Branches. “Complaints,” he says, in his letter of the 11th July, 1829—“of a similar nature have also been suggested from other places, particularly Kentucky and Louisiana.”

This reveals the plot. If the onset had been confined to the Branch at Portsmouth, there might be some reason to suppose that those who conducted it acted under honest, though mistaken views. But when we see political partisans, as in the case of Woodbury, plying upon the administration similar charges, implicating other and distant Branches, we are

forced into the conclusion, that the attacks were not only premeditated, but that they were the result of party deliberations, and contemplated the same end, which was to put the dominant, or Jackson party, in possession, through the agency of *subservient political agents*, of the monied power of the country. Or, if the charges implicating those Branches were not conclusively proved to be false, we might then infer, that, however apparent concerted action might be on the face of the proceedings, that still those who made the charges *might* have done so under erroneous impressions. But when to the clear evidence of a concert of action, is superadded the fact that the charges were false, there is no escaping the conclusion that they were made for political effect, and to bring the branches attacked into subserviency to the party making them.

I will state from document No. 121, published by Congress, the charges made against the Kentucky Branch. The President, John Tilford, in his letter to Mr. Biddle, says:—"I think it my duty to inform you, that, within the two last days, a most shameful attempt has been made to induce the public to believe that the officers of this Branch were influenced by *political considerations* in making loans."

Here we have it. The Woodbury slang all over. The directors, in a statement printed in the Lexington Observer, denied, in terms the most unequivocal, the truth of the charge. That statement says:—"The charge attempted to be made is, that the board required that the politics of the party applying (for discount) should be known to them, and that if they belonged to the Jackson party, their applications were rejected. In this state of the case, what proof can be offered to the public of the *utter falsity* of such a charge? Certainly the best evidence is the testimony of those members of the board *who are themselves supporters of the present (Jackson) administration.*"—An array of names, sufficient to put down any calumny, is published—and among these are letters from Mr. Robert J. Ward, Mr. Joseph Bruen, and Mr. Benjamin Taylor, who are known, says the statement, *as supporters of General Jackson.*

Mr. Ward says:—"I have been a director during the present year, and have no hesitation in declaring that I have never known an instance where the political opinions of the applicant had the *remotest influence* upon the directory, in granting, or refusing a loan. On the contrary, I have believed, and always so stated, that the board of directors were entirely impartial, and that loans were invariably made, or refused, entirely with reference to the responsibility of the persons applying, and the situation of the Bank at the time, and *without any reference whatever* to the political opinions of the applicants."

Mr. Taylor says:—"The imputation is *utterly without foundation*." He had been a punctual attendant at the board for nearly three years. There had been "no occurrence furnishing the *slightest foundation for such charge*." These extracts may suffice. They could be multiplied. The calumny was confronted and exposed by members of the Jackson party, who were too honest to permit a slander so foul to go unrebuked and unpunished. The man who acted the *Woodbury of the West* in this plot, is named *David Thomas*. I think it proper not to shroud the glory of such a calumniating agency, nor deprive those who seek to revel in its magnificence of any of the benefits it may confer on them.

A like onset was made on the Louisiana Branch.—The Cashier happened to be, at the time it was put in circulation, in Philadelphia. He repaired to Washington, and met the foul imputators face to face. Wm. B. Lewis can bear testimony, if he will, to the flat denial of their truth, and to the frank and full offers made by the Cashier to disclose the *entire transactions of the Bank*, to any agent that might be sent, and to undergo any examination that it might be thought proper to order. And so can General Jackson himself. The charges were requested of this functionary to be embodied, the specifications to be made, but *no*—nothing of the sort was granted. The affair was dropt, and the calumniating Woodbury of the South, whoever he was, lies secreted, perhaps in executive confidence, without the honour of a public exposure; or perhaps he may, like Woodbury, be basking in the

rays of Presidential favour, as a "reward" for his *good intentions* to fasten a calumny on the Branch Bank at New Orleans.

I will conclude this No. by a few remarks on *the issue* of the trial between truth and falsehood, in the Woodbury case. Mr. Biddle, accompanied by one of the officers of the Bank, repaired to Portsmouth. Immediately on their arrival, a note was addressed to each of the persons who signed Isaac Hill's paper, implicating Mr. Mason and the Bank, in which the object of the visit was stated, accompanied by a request that the charges, &c. might be made, with a view to their examination, &c. There were two petitions addressed to the United States Bank. To convey the idea that they were not the work of one mind, one was addressed "to the Directors of the Bank of the United States," and the other "to the President and Directors of the Bank of the United States, at Philadelphia." The first dealt in implications of "the course pursued" by the Bank, and remonstrated against the reappointment of Mr. Mason, and asked that the concerns of the Branch might be in future placed under the immediate control of officers well acquainted with the business and character of the trading community, and well disposed to manage the affairs of the Branch with *impartiality*, &c. &c. &c.

The other charged the Branch with similar defections from a right course of action, and making a sweeping hit at "*the head of the board*," passed off into a most generous recommendation of *suitable* persons, out of whom to form the direction, &c.

The first list was signed by fifty-eight names, and the last by fifty-seven names. To each of these co-operators of the Woodbury plot, Mr. Biddle addressed a note, as I have stated. Now, if these men were honest, and knew what they stated to be true, and were really in earnest to relieve the community of Portsmouth, from the evils charged, as proceeding from the mal-administration of the Bank, is it not reasonable to suppose they would, when thus invited, and when the opportunity was thus given them to substantiate their charges, come forward, and make them? Nay, was it not their duty, and did not personal *honour* demand it? Well, reader, not one of

them responded, or under any forms came forward to make the charges for examination, which they had been so free to subscribe to on the papers mentioned, in obedience to Woodbury's schemes, and Isaac Hill's request.

But if these men, one and all, should thus indirectly commit themselves of calumniating the Branch and its President, it were hardly to be supposed that a Senator of the United States, and an Ex-Governor, would flinch from so high an obligation, and skulk in shameful and degraded cowardice from the duty he had imposed on himself. *But he did so*—yes reader, even Woodbury, who had essayed to move the powers at Washington, and did move them by enlisting them in a crusade against the President of the Bank at Portsmouth, and to bring down upon him the strong arm of the Mother Bank in Philadelphia, skulked from the proffered opportunity of making good his charges, and now stands out before the eyes of the world as a blighted and blasted recreant, to warn in future times the unprincipled and reckless, who would, like him, to serve his party, and aggrandize himself, stab an honourable citizen to the heart, and turn the tide of a monied benefit, which like the waters of the Nile, contribute to make every thing fruitful, into poisoned waters, refreshing, *only to himself and his friends.*

ARISTIDES.

No. 5.

I have developed the *plot* of the dominant party, on which it relied to possess itself of the Bank of the United States. It was, as has been shown, by the agency of such instruments as Woodbury and Hill, to prize out the officers of the Bank, then charged with its management, and fill their places with the creatures of "*the party.*" The power and influence of the administration were relied upon, together with a secret fawning and professions in favour of the Bank, conveyed to its President, to procure that to be done in regard to turning out the officers of the Bank, which has been carried so extensively into practice with the officers of the Government. That no

time might be lost, or chance given to the Bank to make other appointments, "*suitable*" names were handed in for its adoption by "*the party*." It needs no illustration to convince the most illiterate of the fatal issue of a yielding, on the part of the Bank, to *such a course*. Nothing put a stop to similar movements upon *all* the branches, (for a Woodbury could have been found ready to blow the same foul breath upon each of them,) but the answer of the President of the mother Bank, to the accusations against Mr. Mason. That answer was not expected. It was to the hopes of the party what the blight and the mildew are to the harvest; it was entirely out of the line of action of "*the Government*," in all that related to those within *its* power. It was only necessary *with it* for some party tool, or some office-seeker, to whisper a charge against an innocent and unsuspecting incumbent in an office of *the Government*, when out he went, no matter how serviceable he was, or what his experience, or how ruinous it should prove to himself and family; and if he dared to inquire into the cause, or lift up a voice of complaint, the press, having been subsidized for the purpose, was ready to blacken him all over, and hold him up as worthy, not only of just such treatment, but of the hate and execration of society, whilst it lauded every new appointment, and cursed it in turn, as it was found necessary to make the change, in carrying out the views of "*the party*." "Ever and anon," as one after another of those victims to party violence, was thrust from office, the press shouted, "*the work goes bravely on!*"

Scarcely a doubt was entertained by the Woodburys and Hills of the party, that when *senators* and *comptrollers* should make charges, and ask for the removal from office of the officers of the Banks, especially when backed by the Secretary of the Treasury, under, *of course*, the sanction of the President of the United States, the request for the removal would, (as was the practice with "*the Government*,") be *forthwith* complied with, and an order issued for the expulsion of the accused. But the United States Bank did not chime in with this practice. The President and Directors acted not upon the principles of this new and reckless party, but on the

principle of *eternal justice*. "This communication, (Woodbury's *confidential* letter to Mr. Ingham,) says Mr. Biddle in answer to Mr. Ingham, "has been submitted to the board of directors, *who will not fail to examine the allegations of Mr. Woodbury*, and should they appear to be well founded, to apply an appropriate corrective." *This was worm-wood!* It was precisely what Woodbury would not wish,—it was moreover what he did not expect,—and doubtless when he heard that his *secret* influence, conveyed "*confidentially*" to the Secretary of the Treasury, had not resulted in an *immediate dismissal* of Mr. Mason, but that justice was to be done that officer, he felt all the misgivings of that period when he, and his coadjutors should be summoned to appear, and give in, and substantiate their charges, and trembled, caitiff-like, in view of the disgrace in which his calumnies would involve him; and mourned in spirit over a failure of his *deep-laid scheme*. In the conclusion of the same letter, Mr. Biddle says, "I shall be happy to hear from you, whenever you obtain the communications from Kentucky and Louisiana, which shall receive immediate attention."

Not a whisper from those quarters was heard against those Banks. This examining process,—this fixed purpose to *give the accused a hearing*, silenced the political blood hounds, who were held in readiness to seize and devour those whom their keepers *knew* to be as innocent as they were unsuspecting.

The plot to get possession of the Bank by the same process that obtained "the party" such uncontrolled use of the offices of the government, was exploded by that *single letter* of Mr. Biddle's, which indicated that whatever might be the practice of "*the government*" in killing off the federal officers, to fill their places with *mercenaries*, and *tools*, that those who assisted in administering the affairs of the Bank, should, at least, have *justice* done them.

The reader will bear in mind, that although the same movement that was made on the New Hampshire Branch, was, as Mr. Ingham's letter of 11th July, 1829, discloses, to be made also upon "other branches," particularly those in Kentucky

and Louisiana, yet it was not made until 1832—and then, it was made, *not in aid of the plan to get possession of the Bank*, as at first designed, by a change of officers; but in aid of *the elections!* The same foul calumny was employed, it is true, but for *another object*.

I have now arrived at that point in the history of this shocking business, in which a new movement upon the Bank was to be made. The first was, as I have shown, to get possession of the Bank—but the Bank not being willing to unite with “*the government*” in its plan of *proscription*, and all hope failing *from that quarter*, it was resolved by “*the party*,” to  DESTROY THE BANK!!!

And what was it, I ask, that this infuriated and profligate party resolved to destroy? I ask this question *only in the relation which the now doomed institution stood, at that very time, to the government of the country*—not in the relation in which it stood to merchants, traders, and every class of society. What was it, I ask? A useless incumbrance? A fungus on the body of the government? Was it a restless, distracting, and wicked agent? Did it *oppose*, or *co-operate* in all the great measures which lawfully connected it with the government? Let Mr. Ingham, then Secretary of the Treasury, and the fiscal organ of the government, and a member of “*the party*,” and a disciple of the school of the *proscribers*, answer. To keep up a proper connexion between the extracts I am going to give from Mr. Ingham’s correspondence with the Bank, I will take a paragraph from the letter of Mr. Biddle to him, in which Mr. Biddle vindicates the character of the Bank, and shows not only how entirely aloof it kept itself from *party politics*, but how sincerely desirous it was to promote the just policy of the administration, and further its views in whatever related to the connexion which existed between the government on the one hand, and the Bank on the other. Mr. Biddle says to Mr. Ingham, in his letter of Sept. 15, 1829: “The earliest operation of the treasury, since you were charged with it, in which the Bank had any share, was the reimbursement of the public debt on the 1st July last. This was your first essay

in the department, the *first important measure of the new administration*; and if it had occasioned any inconvenience, or any pressure, these would certainly have been made the pretext of great reproach against yourself, and your political associates; and undoubtedly much inconvenience and much pressure would have been felt, if the Bank had not laboured to avert them with a promptness, a cordiality, and an efficacy, rare even in its own active history. Before determining on the measure, you did the board the honour to consult them, and certainly if they had listened to considerations merely pecuniary, they would have discouraged it; if they had desired to shun the responsibility of an operation, of which the result might be doubtful, they would have been silent; and, if it had been possible for them to feel any reluctance to aid the new administration, it would have been sufficient merely, and irreproachably, to have done their duty. But regarding only what they considered the enlarged interest of the country, and too conscious of their own independence to fear that their zeal *in the public service* should be mistaken for a devotion *to the public servants*, they at once assumed *all* responsibility, within their proper sphere, of encouraging the operation, and, from the commencement to the termination, watched and guarded its progress with an unwearied attention, which the most zealous friend of the administration could not have surpassed."

Was any of this denied? Hear Mr. Ingham, in his letter of the 6th June:—"I am fully sensible of the disposition of the Bank to afford all practicable facility to the fiscal operations of the government, and the offers contained in your letters, with that view, are duly appreciated." On the 19th June he again writes:—"I cannot conclude this communication without expressing the satisfaction of the department at the arrangements which the Bank has made for effecting these payments in a manner so accommodating to the treasury, and so little embarrassing to the community." Again, on the 11th July:—"I take the occasion to express the great satisfaction of the Treasury Department, at the manner in which the President and Directors of the Parent Bank have discharged

their trusts *in all* their immediate relations to the government, &c., and especially in the facilities afforded in transferring the funds of the government, and in the preparation for the heavy payment of the public debt on the 1st instant, *which has been effected by means of the prudent arrangements of your board at a time of severe depression on all the productive employments of the country, without causing any sensible addition to the pressure, or even visible effect upon the ordinary operations of the State Banks.*"

This, reader, was the fiscal agent, the efficient, effective, and valuable agent, which was marked as the prey of "the party," and which that party had now resolved, at all hazards, to destroy!

The stir, however, had not yet become general.—True, the refusal to expel Mr. Mason, and to give up the Portsmouth Branch to the management of the Woodburys and Hills of that quarter, and thus open the way for like changes elsewhere, had acted upon their feelings like the arrow that wounds the Jackall. The bleeding caterers for their royal master had felt the sting, and run back into his presence, but the royal beast was not yet himself hit. He heard their cries, but had yet to learn the quarter whence the arrow came, and to know the hand that sent it.

A period soon after arrived, however, when the royal beast, in attempting to trespass upon a domain not his own, received a shaft himself, and then, and not till then, the forests resounded with his roar, and all the lesser, congenial, and sympathising animals, set up a cry!

This particular event, with some of its subsequent results, shall form the subject of my next.

ARISTIDES.



No. 6.

The forest, I have said, was not made to roar until the royal beast, in attempting to trespass on a domain not his own, was

himself hit. I drop the figure. The sequel will furnish the illustration.

Out of the move upon the New Hampshire Branch, and from Woodbury's "*confidential*" letter to Mr. Ingham, arose a correspondence between the latter, as Secretary of the Treasury, and Mr. Biddle, as President of the Bank, of *unusual interest*. It were worth while, did the limits which are forced upon these essays, by newspaper rules, permit it, to give this correspondence entire. But there is not room.—The defeat of Woodbury, as has been shown, and the disgrace in which he and his coadjutors became involved in their skulking from the charges they had themselves made, and declining, under any forms, to appear against the accused, was too signal, and too humiliating, to be allowed to pass without an effort by the party to screen them from the odium that awaited them. The charges *they* had made, "the government" determined to respond to, and by thus dividing the odium, relieve its faithful servants from bearing it all.

The swell that had been made to roll over the New Hampshire Branch, and that was intended to engulf Mr. Mason, now fell back upon Washington, and gurgled and foamed, and agitated those who were watching from that common centre its final effects upon those whom it had been commissioned to destroy. This gave impulse to the fiscal organ of the party, and hence the continued correspondence referred to between Mr. Ingham and Mr. Biddle, or the Treasury and the Bank. It was Mr. Ingham's drift to ply, and he did it very adroitly, *implications*, against the Bank, on the grounds of its *political partialities*. This was the flimsy covering which it was thought proper to throw over the shoulders of Woodbury and his coadjutors. Mr. Biddle met, and denied the existence of any such partialities in all that related to the administration of the affairs of the Bank. In his letter to Mr. Ingham, of July 18, 1829, he says—"The infusion of the spirit of party into every thing around us, causes a constant effort to draw the institution within the sphere of what we called *politics*.

☞ WITH THESE THE BANK DISCLAIMS ALL CONNEXION."

Here was the time, when, if "the party" had proof to the

contrary, it should have produced it. That it had not a particle, has been *demonstrated* in its refusal to appear when invited, to make good its charges against Mr. Mason, and the New Hampshire, and Kentucky, and Louisiana Branches.—Had Mr. Biddle overlooked that little streamlet that meandered through Mr. Ingham's correspondence, and which it was designed to increase, and widen, and deepen, until it should "boil, and foam, and thunder through," and overwhelm, and overwhelm all before it, the struggle might not have begun when it did, between "the Government" upon the one hand, in its attempt to crush the Bank; and the Bank on the other, in its efforts to save itself, and preserve the country from the fatal consequences of its overthrow. And what was that little streamlet? A disclosed purpose, I answer, on the part of "*the party*" to exercise over the affairs of the Bank a control which neither the charter, nor any law gave it the right to exercise; and with the sole view of driving the Bank into a compliance with its mandates. One power assumed about this time, was to take from the Bank its agency in the Pension Department—And Mr. Eaton, then Secretary of War, always ready to comply with the orders of "the party," and with his characteristic inefficiency, did actually order a transfer of the Pension Agency from the Branch Bank at Portsmouth, to a small Bank at Concord, of which before Isaac Hill went to Washington to act as Comptroller, he was President! This was a movement, as has been since decided, and as all intelligent men knew at the time, in violation of law!—It was got up by Isaac Hill himself, in a memorial which was circulated among, and signed by "divers of his political partisans, and *Others especially interested in the matter.*"

This was the sort of game that these bold adventurers had begun to play; and thus was it attempted to overawe the Bank, and drive it from the position in which the laws had placed it, when Mr. Biddle, in connexion with the above extract from his letter of June 18th, says: "Belonging to *the nation*, and feeling that its prosperity and its usefulness are destroyed, the moment it loses its *independence*; the Bank owes

allegiance to no party, and  WILL SUBMIT TO NONE."

This bold and honourable independence that ought to have inspired even *such* a party with respect for the Bank, produced a directly contrary effect, and henceforth the resolve to "destroy it!" And why destroy it? Not because it had not been faithful and zealous, as I have shown it was, in co-operating with, and aiding the new administration, but because the bank refused to throw itself into the arms of the party to be used by it for party and political purposes. Because it chose to exercise its powers within the circle prescribed by the laws, and to confine its action to its own legitimate sphere. It presented itself in strong contrast with the officers of the federal government. These had all yielded up their just action, and losing sight of the object of their origin, had fallen victims to the withering blight of that baleful influence which Jacksonism had now infused into them all. This bright, steady light from the bank, could not be looked upon by men who preferred and acted in such darkness. The great plan had been devised—the purpose was fixed—the decree had gone forth, that the "party" would possess ALL, (as for example it has the post office department,) or if any should dare to think or act for themselves, whether corporations or individuals, the decree had now gone forth that they should *perish*. The entire history of the party is fruitful in proofs of this. From the moment Mr. Biddle, in the name of the bank, declared that it "would not submit," from that moment the whole country, through the officers and expectants of the new administration, and the press, was put in motion, and the welkin was made to ring with the shouts of "the party," urging it upon all *true friends*, to aid in producing the downfall of the bank.

"*The Bank owes allegiance to no party, and will submit to none,*" was to the party, what the barbed arrow is to the depredating lion; it set it in one general "*roar.*" How lamb-like, when unopposed, is the monarch of the Lybian desert. How comparatively gentle, when he is permitted to trespass, unchafed, upon lands filled with spoils. How little he regards

the limits that bound his domain, if he perceive inducements beyond. So with this new party—this Jacksonism, that had now gone forth, regardless of the limits which law and justice had set to its movements. To be checked with—“the bank owes allegiance to no party, and *will submit to none*”—and at the moment too when every other province in its dominion had yielded, (*save two**) was not to be borne. Hence the war cry—“*down with the bank!*” And this annunciation (“*will submit to none*”) crossed the path of President Jackson himself. *This* was the shaft in the side of the royal animal. He had been taught that he was “*monarch of all he surveyed*”—and that none would dare to “dispute his right.” He believed and acted on the principle. No wonder the effect should be what it was!

Up to this moment the bank had the power of making itself as great a favourite with the party, as it was now detested by it. It had only to yield and turn out any officer, who might be marked by the party, as not suited to the purposes of the party; to surrender the pension and other treasures that the laws and individuals, had put in its keeping, and in *all* things to acquiesce in the dictates of the party, to have been the most *constitutional*, the most *useful*—*aye, indispensable* establishment in the Union. Mr. Biddle would have been lifted, by the press, as high as any of Gen. Jackson’s favourites, and shouted to as one of the most wonderful men of this or any other age. But, alas, for him, standing as his position required he should, in the front rank of this warfare, and being faithful to his trust, and defending it ably and nobly, he was destined to receive the discharges from the opposing ranks, of no matter what material composed, and to be in very spite, and in impotent malice, dubbed “*Nick Biddle.*”

I shall in my next commence the calumnies which the party, from this moment determined to *invent*, and send among the people, by the agency of its presses, with a view to disaffect them towards the bank, and thus undermine and destroy it. If, before I have done with *these men*, and their

* The Senate and Supreme Court.

acts, the honest of *every party*, will not feel disgust at their conduct even to loathing, I mistake the quality of public virtue, and have overrated the power and influence of truth.

ARISTIDES.

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No. 7.

I beg the reader's attention to a short review of the *right* set up by "the party" to exercise an agency over the affairs of the Bank, other than that which is provided for by law. This is what I have denominated "*the little streamlet*" that the Bank detected running through Mr. Ingham's correspondence.

"After," says Mr. Biddle in his reply to Mr. Ingham of Sept. 15th, 1829—"a very deliberate, and we hope a very dispassionate consideration, &c. &c. the Board of Directors think it evident that the Secretary of the Treasury believes—

1st. That "the relations between the Government and the Bank" confer some supervision of the choice of the officers of the Bank to the "proper management" of which his interposition is authorized.

2d. That there is some "action of the Government on the Bank" not precisely explained, but in which he is the proper agent—and finally,

3d. That it is his *right* and *duty* to suggest the views of the administration as to the  POLITICAL OPINIONS AND CONDUCT of the *officers of the Bank!*"

Now this is precisely the sort of supervision the administration had determined on exercising over *every other office or institution* within its reach, and it thus sought, by *the same levelling process*, to bring the Bank also at its feet. The rights assumed were promptly and spiritedly, though respectfully met, and *denied*.—"The Board of Directors of the Bank of the United States, and the Board of Directors of the Branches of the Bank of the United States, says Mr. Biddle, acknowledge not the slightest responsibility" to the Secretary of the Treasury, touching the political opinions of their offi-

cers, that being a subject on which they never consult, and never desire to know the views of *any* administration."

Nothing but the limits prescribed to these essays keeps me from giving, entire, the masterly exposition of the views of the Bank on those three levelling and corrupting assumptions of the Secretary. [The reader is referred to the appendix of Reports of the Committee of Inquiry, appointed March 14, 1832, by the House of Representatives—pages 139 to 147, inclusive.]

I have recurred to this subject merely for the sake of *demonstrating* that the "new administration" *did* set up a claim of *right* to meddle with, and control the Bank, *for political ends*, precisely as it had resolved on doing, and has done, with all the departments and offices of the federal government. I consider the settlement of this point essential to a right comprehension,

1st. *Of the plot*, and

2d. *Of the cause for excitement in which the party and its head were thrown, when the Bank resisted.*

I now proceed.

"*This world was made for Cæsar*," would seem to have been one of the early lessons of President Jackson. Flattered as he was by the sycophants around him; hearing from their lips, then, in private, what afterwards broke out in public, that he was "*The second Washington*"—"the *Rock of Ages*"—"the *greatest and the best*"—and  that "*his popularity would stand any thing*"—it was natural for him, with his early impressions, derived from the motto—"This world was made for Cæsar," to infer, that "the government" was made for *him*; and that whatever power he might choose to exercise, whether lawful or unlawful, to *perpetuate his government*, he had the right to employ. That he has *acted* on this principle, whether he reached the conclusion through the channel I have suggested, or by any other, no well informed citizen, *if he be honest*, will deny. Irritate, or cross the path of such a man, and what limits will bound his revenge? Besides the annunciation that "*the Bank owes allegiance to no party, and will submit to none*," which as I have said, was the shaft in the side of the Lion, there were

divers smaller arrows that stung no less keenly. One of them especially passed through the entire phalanx of "*the party*," wounding in its passage the whole array of *proscribers*, and lodging at last, *in the President himself!* It is preserved, as a relic, in that same letter of Mr. Biddle's of the 15th June. This is it:

—————"The Bank is strong enough to exercise the noblest prerogative of strength, not to be afraid of being just to its officers; and content that they perform their duty, it will not  PURSUE THEM INTO PRIVATE LIFE WITH INQUISITIONS INTO THEIR FRIENDSHIPS, NOR WILL IT EVER SACRIFICE THEM, EITHER TO APPEASE ANY CLAMOR, OR PROPITIATE ANY AUTHORITY!"

This was a *scortcher!* It went to the very heart of the foul practice of the new administration, and in connexion with what preceded its discharge, ought to have driven from the party that fell spirit of proscription which was at that moment pursuing unsuspecting and innocent men, "with inquisitions into their friendships," and sacrificing them, Moloch-like, to appease (party) clamour, and 'propitiate' party authority, and *promote party ends*.

Is there any one who knows the spirit of Andrew Jackson—its impatience at restraint—its violence when resisted—and the desperate issue which he has always made with even a *fancied* antagonist, who does not see in all this the elements of those vindictive and lawless acts with which he has pursued the Bank, with a view, in his own words, to "*crush the monster?*" Is any body at a loss now to know the cause of his vengeance? But that vengeance, to be effectual, must not break forth prematurely. There lives not a man who knows General Jackson, who does not know that he hides the incipient fires of the most consuming vengeance with a covering—or, if he carry the pistol, or the dagger, they are carefully concealed under a robe, and never drawn, but when a vantage ground justifies him in concluding that the stroke, or the shot, when made, will be fatal. It were easy to illustrate and *prove* this by facts. Hence his first move against the Bank did not sparkle, nor hiss, nor was the flame of his revenge permitted then to burst forth. It was covert. Before I state what it was, I will prove, *from under his own hand*, that he had not been, before the events which I have stated, the enemy of the

Bank—nay, I will prove that he considered it a *valuable institution*, worthy of *his patronage*, and meriting to be extended for the benefit of the people. The following is his own letter addressed to Mr. Cheves in 1821, when that gentleman was President of this *same Bank*. He seems to have thought, when he wrote it, that the mother Bank in Philadelphia was a “*Branch!*”

PENSACOLA, Aug. 15, 1821.

“Sir—At the request of the citizens of this place, I have taken the liberty of enclosing you a memorial addressed to the President and Directors of the *Branch* of the United States Bank at Philadelphia, which has been generally signed by the respectable inhabitants of this city.

“The *advantages* to be derived from the establishment of a *Branch* of the United States Bank in Pensacola have been *ably set forth* in the memorial, and *I have no doubt* that a branch here, under a judicious direction, would not only prove *convenient to the inhabitants* in this section of the country, but also beneficial to that institution.

“I have the honour, &c.

ANDREW JACKSON.”

Langdon Cheves, Esq.

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* I shall be excused for introducing here a letter from General Jackson's chosen successor, written five years after to Mr. Biddle, asking to have extended, for the benefit of the citizens of Albany, a branch of this same bank. The remark that Mr. Noah makes on *this letter of Mr. Van Buren*, is,—“Had the Branch been established at Albany, at that time and under *their*—(i. e. the signers,) *control*—(these signers are, among others, Wm. L. Marcy, M. Van Buren, B. F. Butler, Charles E. Dudley, and Nathan Sanford,) the Safety Fund would have been unknown, and the United States Bank re-chartered.”—What a figure this letter makes Van Buren cut, with his “UNCOMPROMISING HOSTILITY TO THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES,” flying out of his mouth. It was *figs* then, but thistles now—very wholesome bread indeed in 1826, but a *serpent*, now!!!

ALBANY, July 17, 1826.

Dear Sir—At the instance of a highly respectable portion of the *good* people of this city, *I have signed*, and now *transmit*, the enclosed. *Personally I neither have nor desire any connexion with Banks!!!!* and the sole object of my agency is to gratify the wishes of our citizens, and to *promote the interests of the city*.

Of the fitness of the proposed measure it would be idle for me, who *know nothing*, to speak to you, who *know every thing*, upon the subject. I will, therefore, only say that the applicants are men of the first character in point of business and credit, and that the present state of the city is that of unexampled prosperity. *I shall be happy to hear from you as soon as convenient!!*

M. VAN BUREN.

N. BIDDLE, Esq.

No hostility towards the Bank is discovered in any of General Jackson's acts, or sayings afterwards, until in 1829, it refused, as has been shown, to become tributary to the political schemes of "his administration." The first act of General Jackson, which, however, conceals his wrath which was kept then from bursting forth, only by the agency of those around him, we find in his message to Congress, of December, 1829:

"The charter of the Bank of the United States, says that message, expires in 1836, and its stockholders will, most probably, apply for a renewal of their privileges. In order to avoid the evils resulting from *precipitancy*, in a measure involving such important principles, and such deep pecuniary interests, I feel, that I cannot in justice to the party interested, too soon present it to the deliberate consideration of the Legislature and the people. Both the constitutionality and the expediency of the law, creating this Bank, are well questioned by a large portion of our fellow citizens, and it must be admitted *by all* that it  HAS FAILED *in the great end of establishing a uniform and sound currency.*"

There is only one charge made in this against the Bank, and that relates to its agency in effecting "a uniform and sound currency." As to the *reference* to the "constitutionality and expediency of the law creating the Bank," the President assumes nothing, except to say they "are well questioned by a large portion of our fellow citizens."

He does not say that *he* questions them. My business is with the unqualified assertion touching the currency. This is an *executive calumny* against the Bank. It is even more barefaced than were the calumnies of Woodbury and Hill, and others. It was made in the face of the whole nation and the world, and of facts no less notorious than are the revolutions of the seasons, or the shining of the sun by day, and the moon and stars by night. It were almost as great an outrage upon the common sense of the people, had the President said the Bank had not faithfully and effectually fulfilled its obligations to the government, or that it had issued no bills, made no discounts, or that there was no Bank in existence.

The flame which Woodbury and Hill, and the under cabi-

net, had kindled in the President against the Bank, must, however, have some outlet. At first it was not intended to be of much moment, but passing off at some remote quarter, it would, after answering that end, by casing somewhat the President, furnish an earnest to those who had him in charge, as to what they might count upon for the future.

I shall demonstrate in my next, the absolute ignorance of the state of the currency, which such a calumny disclosed; expose its wickedness, and then pass off to others emanating from the same high source; treating each with as much respect as its nature and object will permit, but with that independence which truth demands, and which, as a citizen, I have the right to exercise.

ARISTIDES.



No. 8.

It required all the assurance of the worst men, and all the ignorance and corruption upon which that assurance operated, to force out through a Presidential message to Congress, an assertion so utterly devoid of truth, as that "the Bank had failed to establish a uniform and sound currency." I hazard nothing in saying that those who contrived this calumny, caused it to be put forth only as a *feeler*, or a decoy duck, to ascertain the state of the public mind; and how far the President might go in the desperate effort which it was now resolved to make, to be revenged of the Bank for the firm and honourable stand it had taken, and its refusal to lend itself as a *party tool* to the new administration.—The assertion was not intended to operate upon the enlightened and virtuous, but only upon the ignorant and vicious. To give it effect, those whom the President had "*rewarded*," as also all who were *promised* to be rewarded, together with the press that had been subsidised for the purpose, were all required to echo *whatever* the President might say, and back him in the attitude which he now assumed, of *personal hostility to the Bank*. The plan of operations was agreed upon—the advances upon the Bank,

with the mode of attack, were all settled. The leader of the conflict was no less a personage than the "hero of two wars"—"the second Washington," and the head of "*the party*;" who, in the victory that was promised over the Bank, was to be crowned with a new chaplet, and those who should aid him in the enterprise, with "*rewards*."

But the Bank was at that time deeply seated in the affections of the great body of the people. Pennsylvania was unanimous for a re-charter, and proved this, by passing in her Legislature corresponding resolutions. The people every where enjoying the benefits of the *fifty millions* which were in circulation, and no portion of the country feeling any distress, but, on the contrary, every portion of it improving and flourishing, it was necessary in taking a first step of hostility to do it with great caution. A breath was to be blown upon the almost extinguished embers of "*constitutional*" objections, and doubts were to be revived touching the "*expediency*" of the Bank. But it was necessary, at that time, not to *commit the President* upon either of these points. He had a second term of office to cater for, and those who basked in the sunshine of his favour, (except Kendall, who announced his intention to serve but one term,) were solicitous to remain where they were, during, at least, *two* Presidential terms. Hence the extreme caution necessary to be observed in touching those points of "*constitutionality*" and "*expediency*," and the absolute necessity of avoiding *any* committal in regard to them by him who was, henceforth, to be the leader in this war. There was nothing left, at that time, but to issue a bold and daring calumny.

There was no ground yet, upon which it was deemed safe to rest a direct charge against the Bank, or the personal honour of those who administered its affairs. The "*spies*" had not yet got to work, nor a *party* committee appointed. It had been certified by the Secretary of the Treasury (one of the party) that it had ably and efficiently fulfilled all its obligations to the Government, and the people every where felt its agency, as the earth feels the influence of the vernal year. But something must be said—the Bank must be struck—and

the President was the man ; (for "his popularity could stand any thing,") who must say the word, and give the blow. The attempt was certainly hazardous—especially as Woodbury and Hill, and others, *the scouts*, had been driven back in disgrace. But the onset *must* be made—the voice of Jackson must be heard—his finger must point the way—and he must be seen now in the van. Then let him, who dare, of all *in* office, and of all who *expected* to participate in the spoils ; or let any press, having flying over it the Jackson flag, falter for a moment, if they dare,—*they knew better*.

At such a crisis of doubt and desperation, and in such an emergency, "*revenge! revenge!*" was sounded—when up went the Presidential Banner, with the foul and calumniating inscription :

☞ "*It must be admitted, BY ALL, that the Bank has failed, in the great end of establishing a UNIFORM and SAFE currency.*" ☞

At sight of it, every intelligent citizen, *who was honest*, felt ashamed—marvelled at the ignorance of the President—and was startled at the wickedness of the declaration! All previous proofs to the contrary, were now to be utterly disregarded; and all subsequent evidence trodden, by *the party*, under foot. What, if the Secretary of the Treasury, had only about a year before, said :—

"That during the four years preceding, the receipts of the Government had amounted to more than *ninety-seven millions* of dollars, and that all the payments had been *punctually* met; that it is the preservation of a sound currency, that can *alone* impart stability to property, and prevent those fluctuations in its value, hurtful alike to individuals and the nation; and that ☞ this advantage THE BANK has secured to the community."

It was as though such testimony had never been borne. Now, either the President uttered a calumny against the Bank, *in ignorance, or knowing it to be one*; or the Secretary of the Treasury palmed upon Congress and the people, in an *official report*, a *falsehood!* There is no escaping one or the other horn of this dilemma. Let us now see which of the parties is sustained.

Congress, in 1829, had both the President's and Secretary's declaration before it; and indeed whatever else bore on the question. The Committee of Ways and Means of the House

of Representatives, (Mr. M'Duffie, Chairman,) to whom was referred that part of the message relating to the Bank, "*decidedly dissented*" from the President's assertion, that the Bank had failed to establish a uniform and sound currency. It had, on the contrary, and in this respect, "been productive of results, more salutary, than were anticipated by the most sanguine advocates of the policy establishing it.  IT HAS ACTUALLY FURNISHED A CIRCULATING MEDIUM MORE UNIFORM THAN SPECIE," &c.

A Committee of the Senate, also, upon the same subject, in 1829, says: "The Government had, for ten years preceding the 1st of January, 1830, received from 9,000 agents, \$230,068,855 17. This sum has been collected in every section of this widely extended country. It has been disbursed at other points, many thousand miles distant from the places where it was collected, and yet, it has been so collected, and distributed without the loss (so far as the Committee could learn,) of a single dollar, and *without the expense of a single dollar to the Government.*"

The committee of the Senate proceed—

—————"That the currency by which the government has been enabled to collect and transfer such an amount of revenue, to pay its army and navy, and all its expenses, and the national debt, is UNSAFE, OF UNSOUND, cannot readily be believed."

Now let the reader, adding to all this his own *experience*, and comparing the condition of the currency before the Bank of the United States was organized, with the state of the currency when General Jackson said it was neither "uniform nor safe," and decide what reliance ought afterwards to be placed on any thing which that high functionary might assert touching the affairs of the Bank,—and especially when it was known that *vengeance* was sought of it, for refusing to become the creature of "the party."

Who does the reader believe—Andrew Jackson, upon his *naked assertion*, or the Secretary of the Treasury, backed as he is by a committee of each house of Congress, and by his own personal experience?—For where is the man who does not *know*, that he could have travelled, at that very time,

over this whole country, and found in Bank Notes, of the United States Bank, and its Branches, a medium as uniform as the light; and a safety as unquestioned as the consciousness of his own existence.

The *wickedness* of the President's assertion need not be exposed. The dimmest eye will perceive it in the injury which *doubts*, even touching the "*soundness*" of the currency, were calculated to inflict on the government itself, by lessening the value of the seven millions it owned of the bank stock, and that owned by every individual stockholder. Such a foul breath, blown over the reputation of the Bank, was calculated to produce (coming from a President of the United States) effects not less fatal than the incendiary seeks to produce when he fires and lays waste property. Whether it be for plunder, or to glut his revenge, changes not the character of the act. There is no law of morals that exempts the former from the weight of public indignation, to the benefits of which the latter is not equally entitled. In my eye they occupy the same level, and are entitled to like punishment. It was not owing to any agency of the President, nor to any *motive* in him, that a fall in bank stock did not occur, of *deep and lasting injury* to those who owned it, but to the *unshaken public confidence in the Bank, and in the wisdom and discretion of those to whom its interests were confided*.

I will show, in my next, how this first Presidential calumny operated, and what results it produced.

ARISTIDES.



No. 9.

The President had struck his first blow, and his retainers were required to follow it up.

I did not notice in my last, one part of the Presidential plan of attack on the bank. I omitted it, because my business in these essays, is with the *calumnies*, and their *authors*.— But the appeal which it made to the *speculators* and *plunderers*, was so direct, and so intimately connected with the pro-

fligacy of the plot, that I beg leave to mention it here. It formed part of the same Presidential message of 1829. It was a proposition for another Bank, in place of the present, to be founded on the resources of the Government. The design was to make it easier for men, who were willing to go with the President, but who, like Pennsylvania, *at that time*, was not prepared to keep him company in his crusade against the *currency* of the country, and the war that was commenced against the *prosperity* of the nation, to fall in with, and cooperate with him. "Oh, well, it was argued, it's no matter—if the Bank of the United States shall go down, it's only overthrowing *a monopoly*, and a power that is made potent, and hurtful by *foreign capital*, and put in its place a *genuine American Bank* founded on the resources of the government; in a word, an institution that will consent to go with our *party*." The bait sure enough took, even to the silly prejudice against foreign capital, which has just the same reason in it, as would be a hatred of the sun's light, because it comes from the *solar*, and not the *mundane* system. Even Pennsylvania began, under this calumny, and this silly delusion which was born with it, to relax her hold on the Bank, and to place herself in an attitude of rebellion to her own best interests.

Tidings of all these workings and heavings, in the minds of men, were transmitted like so many rays of light through the appropriate organ, the under cabinet at Washington, to the President, who was told that nothing could exceed the greetings with which *his* plan had been received by ☞ "*the people*."

Well then, at the next session of Congress, in 1830, the President in *his* message, having become delighted with the success, of which he was assured, there never was any thing to equal it, and *in the face* of the rebuke which Congress had uttered at the previous session, repeated his views; and so again, (encouraged by the same means,) in 1831. Meanwhile the executive machinery, under the direction of the under cabinet, had been so extended, and the press had become so effectually drilled, and the office holders were so thoroughly impressed with the *nature* of the service that was required of

them, as not to *dare*, even to *think*, much less *speak*, except as they were commanded, that no two voices could be heard from Maine, to the extreme south; no inharmonious tone from the Hills of New Hampshire, to the Bentons of Louisiana, but all united in harmonious concert, to sustain the "*venerable President*" in his "*enlightened*, and patriotic design" upon the Bank!

The *new Bank* was yet held out as one of the most invaluable of all designs—stamped, in its very features, with the impress of Presidential wisdom, and dandled on the lap of his own personal favour, it must be of all things in the world, in the eye of "the party," the very best adapted to promote—not the interests of the people, but of "*the party*." Of course every party man was taught to believe that it was for *him* it was intended, and that from its paps, he should draw, for the remainder of his life, the most nourishing benefits. Pennsylvania was half persuaded to apply her lips to this fountain, but one of her eyes not being, *yet*, quite closed to her own interests, she saw a design in her sister, New York, to push her aside, and take *the whole to herself*. It became necessary to bring a film over that eye—and *it was done!* "THE PARTY" has always been expert in blinding certain people; and certain *states*.

This scheme of a national Bank, was so monstrous—the thing itself was so improbable, and ridiculous, that every intelligent man in Congress, and out of it, treated it with contempt. I need not say, that after answering, like the "gold bill" of more recent origin, the delusive end of its creation, it was permitted to *sink into oblivion*.

But to the calumnies, and their authors.

I have no intention of enumerating and exposing *all* the calumnies against the Bank, or naming all their authors. I had just as well attempt to count the stars. It will not be expected of me to enumerate the number of members of Congress, whom the Bank has been charged with bribing; nor those who, having been stabbed in party broils, it has been asserted, owed their wounds to the agency of this institution—nor shall I number the dead, who have been sent to their

long home, by its agency. I shall treat these, and like slanders, as a man in battle would the bites of musquetoos, or the presence of toads; or, as would the physician those agents of his art which are used to expel only the ordinary causes of disease, when the stomach had lodged within it, deadly poison. True, those miserable contrivances, as venomous as they are odious, have not been without their use. "The party" have kept them buzzing and hopping in every body's path; and many have yielded themselves up to the fatal influence of their presence. They were generated for the grog shop gentry; and to be used at party meetings, to operate upon and influence minds incapable of relishing any thing more pure, comprehending any thing more intricate, or of digesting any thing more substantial.

My business is with *Presidential calumnies*—and with *those of his Secretaries of the Treasury*—and with *those of his "spies,"* and such sort of people. It will be seen before I have done with these, that what those men have said and done, aided, as they have been, by the press, and their party army; and the patronage of the Government was enough, not to destroy a Bank, but, when applied in the same spirit, *the liberties of a whole people.* How far the use of the same agencies, prompted by a like spirit, may ultimately effect this object, a few years more will determine,—perhaps, *a few months.*

I have named "*the spies*" last—but their employment was among the earlier movements of the President. How long they worked in their disgraceful and secret employment, I have not the means of knowing. That they were employed by President Jackson, I have his own letters to prove—and these also prove *the nature* of the work that it was made their "*duty*" to perform. I will pass over the spies for the present, to notice a witness procured for the occasion, by Col. Thomas H. Benton; and who came forward prepared, as the sequel will prove, to damn the Bank—to damn its President—and to blow a mildew over the reputation of the whole of the Bank's officers. It was fitting that he who could write such a letter as did Col. Thomas H. Benton, about the East room

of the President's House, should be found in fellowship, and urging on to this work of destruction of both the currency of the country, and the reputation of men,—such a man as Reuben M. Whitney. I say this witness was sent on to appear before the Examining Committee, by *Col. Benton*. Mr. Adams says, in his unanswered, and unanswerable Report: (*Let it be read.*) That Mr. Whitney, upon being asked, “What had been his motive for giving the testimony?” gave the answer, that “*he did not recollect, whether it had been voluntary, or asked of him;*” but on being further questioned, he answered, “that Judge Clayton (the Chairman of the Committee,) had been *recommended* to him by a letter from **¶** *Mr. Benton*. Here then we have these “*birds of a feather.*” What sort of bird Col. Benton is, can be shown by certain North Carolina and other reminiscences, and by that particular reminiscence touching the East room letter, &c. &c. What sort of bird Reuben M. Whitney is, the reader will judge for himself, for I shall give him to him, *just as I find him*, in his character of witness, giving his testimony *against* the Bank, and in *favour* of the President's war upon it, **¶** *upon his oath!* I will further premise, that this is the same Reuben M. Whitney, who has been ever since *such a special favourite* of the President, and “the party.” But to Reuben M. Whitney, before the Committee.

“*Whispers*, says Mr. Adams, it now appears had been in circulation even from the year 1824, ripening for a term of seven years, in rumours of combined and concerted frauds and embezzlement of the funds of the Bank to the **¶** *private purposes* of the President of the Bank and the principal Brokers of Philadelphia.” “The charges against the President of the Bank were, that Thomas Biddle, a distant relative of his, and one of the most eminent Brokers of Philadelphia, had been in the habit, by permission of the President, of taking money out of the first teller's drawer, leaving in its place certificates of stock; of keeping the money an indefinite number of days, and then replacing the money and taking back his certificates of stock, *without payment of interest* upon the monies of which he had had the use.” The quintessence

of the charge was, the use by Mr. Thomas Biddle, of the monies of the Bank without interest." (See Mr. Adams' Report for this, and for what follows.) To all this Reuben M. Whitney *swore!* He swore also that he went to the President's room, and finding him alone, told him what he had discovered, &c., and requested that no such transaction should be repeated whilst *he* was a Director of the institution. He swore also that the President did not deny the facts as he stated them. He swore that the President coloured up very much, and promised that no such thing should happen again. Now this, if true, was enough to kindle a fire sufficient, not only to destroy all that was favourable towards the Bank in public opinion, but to consume to ashes the fair fame of Mr. Biddle. It was worse than an attempt to murder! Well, was all, or any of this true? NOT A WORD OF IT, reader!!! (Mr. Whitney made other charges, the nature of which will appear in their refutation.) Mr. Adams, in commenting on this act of shocking depravity, says—

"The instinct of calumny is inventive in details. (Mr. Whitney had produced a tattered and torn memorandum of much of this, and dealt in minute detail) precisely because details make their way most easily to the credit of the hearer, and it has been long remarked by keen observers of human action, that he who accustoms himself to make a truant of his memory, is oftentimes the first to credit his own lie." Mr. Adams does not pretend to say this was the case with R. M. Whitney. But he does say, "that the charges respecting the notes (this relates to the other charges referred to) which he (Whitney) had discovered in the Teller's drawer, and which he swore had not been entered on the books when he discovered them, but which were so entered when he discovered them, and that they were so entered by *his* direction, was  RETRACTED BY HIMSELF after the statement had been blasted by the production of the entries upon the face of the books themselves!" It also turned out that Whitney's pretended interview with the President, Mr. Biddle, at the time he rebuked him, and when he received the confession, accompanied by a blushing promise of future amendment, that this identical Mr. Biddle *was absent from Philadelphia!!!* When this fact was

proven, Mr. Adams says—"Mr. Whitney was not prepared with any substituted invention of details to supply its place."

Which, I ask, of the leaders of "the party;" which of its pensioned presses; which of its "rewarded" officers, and which of the expectants, ever sought to disabuse the public mind of this foul and damning calumny? Nay, I ask which of them, (except Judge Clayton, the Jackson chairman of the committee who revoked all his agency against the Bank in the horrible fraud committed by his report on the public confidence, by a speech confessional on the floor of Congress) omitted to send the testimony of Whitney, blasted as it was, round among "the people?" No, the poison of the slanders was not only left to work upon its victims, but channels were cut to send it over the land!

Is it for this most daring attempt to slay men's reputation, and entail infamy on themselves and families, that President Jackson holds by the hand, to this hour, and with all these facts before him, this same Reuben M. Whitney? If not, for what else is it? Let no man suppose I cherish a particle of personal hostility towards Mr. Whitney. I do not even know him, and so far as I know, never saw him. I am discussing his official acts, and demonstrating the foulness of the calumnies which have been invented to destroy one of the best institutions that ever existed. If they immolate him, he has nobody to blame but himself. I feel in common with all the humane, sympathy for his family—and so did the public for the family of Arnold, when by his defection he sought to bring down ruin on our country and its hopes. But the traitor was blasted!

I shall in my next pay my respects to "the spies," and to their testimony.

If any ask, as some have, why this re-opening the wounds of the past, and in defence of an institution that is destined to go down?—I answer by referring to my first number, and by quoting the couplet with which Mr. Adams concluded his masterly report,—

"When truth, or virtue, an affront endures,
The affront is mine, my friend, and *should* be yours."

ARISTIDES.

No. 10.

I am not ready for the spies yet. I reserve them for my next. I have a few words to say on the issue of the examination into the affairs of the Bank by the committee before which Whitney was sent by Col. Benton to appear. The chairman of that committee, the reader knows, was Judge Clayton, of Georgia, a leading member of the Jackson party. His report, which, as the reader also knows, was responded to by the minority of that committee, at the head of which was Mr. McDuffie, and by a report from a member of that committee, Mr. Adams—and so effectual were these reports, and the facts on which they were based so overwhelming; so entirely did they vindicate the Bank from the charges and implications contained in Judge Clayton's report, that a bill passed both Houses of Congress to re-charter the Bank. Goaded almost to desperation by such a succession of defeats, from Woodbury's and Hill's to his own, the President gave out that the Bank *had bribed Congress!* The Globe sent round the charge. The affiliated presses echoed it. "If I had been *venal*, said the President, I should have sold myself to its designs." How mad he got!

Having failed to secure the Bank, to be used as a political instrument to carry on the designs of "the party," as have been the post office, the land office, and the whole official patronage of the government, it became necessary, on the principle which prompts the incendiary, having fired the house and thrown the torch from his hand, to cry "fire;" and the thief to join the cry "stop thief," for the President and his associates to set up the cry that the Bank had joined the league against him, and was employing its power to *prevent his re-election to the Presidency*. This was as much as to say to his army of office holders, "here now is your antagonist, as well as mine: if you are supine, or neglect to give all diligence in circulating what the Globe and its associates shall publish, and I shall say, we shall be defeated." "The spoils" to which we have succeeded will be no longer ours, therefore be up and doing, and let *every office holder* go forth

armed with newspapers, and pamphlets, and speeches, and convince the people that the Bank is employing its great power for the overthrow of our party. He who shall not prove zealous in this struggle, will not only jeopard his office by losing it, (in the loss of the cause,) but *I will wrest it from him by virtue of my own power to do so.* I will “*punish*” any officer of mine who shall not prove zealous in assisting me to carry out my designs against the Bank.”

This was well understood. Hence, when the public press remonstrated against the interference of the officers of the federal government with elections, so far from exciting in the President a disposition to practice upon the doctrine of his inaugural message, in which he inveighs against this very practice, it served to fix every such zealous officer more firmly in his affections, and secure to him additional claims to “rewards.”

But to the Report of the Committee, of which Judge Clayton was Chairman. It was sent over the whole country, with notes and annotations. Stage loads of the Globe, filled with every description of poison that could be extracted from that report, and other sources, accompanied it. Every where the charges were reiterated, Whitney’s and all, blasted as he was, until the people were every where literally drugged with them. In vain did the press strive to scatter the proper light among the people. A cloud of darkness had been raised, and the power and patronage of the Government, headed by Presidential authority, and guided by it, gave support to those who were engaged in increasing its darkness. It was of no avail that Congress passed its judgment of condemnation upon the proceedings of the party, and upon Judge Clayton’s Report, in a re-charter of the Bank. This, as I have said, was charged to Bank influence, and to *bribery*. Wherever, and whenever truth, in regard to these calumnies, showed itself, it was hacked and cut to pieces, and trampled in the dust.

At last, and in 1834, alarmed, and justly so, at the usurpations of the President, and at his disregard of Congress, (and feeling contempt for the President’s slanders against that body) of law, and of justice, and witnessing the encroachments by the President upon the constitution, Judge Clayton was roused

into a review of the part he had acted, and stung with remorse, no doubt, yielded to the most honourable impulse of our nature. He rose in his place in the House of Representatives, and with his own hand severed the head from his own report, and throwing its lifeless trunk into the arms of the party, admonished it, President and all, to ponder on what they had done! The following is the speech on that occasion :

“Mr. Speaker, this is the first fair opportunity that has presented itself to make satisfaction for *wrongs* which I believe, I myself, have committed; not from malice, for I entertain that passion against no human being, but from an overwrought and incautious zeal. In my opposition to the Bank, on a former occasion, I have carefully reviewed my remarks, and find reflections which are unworthy of me, and the cause they were designed to support. They were calculated to wound the feelings of many high and honourable men, *in*, and *out*, of the Bank, and if such has been the effect, I can offer no higher reparation than the public expression of my regret. I retract every thing personal, whether in fact or tendency, &c.—neither a dictate of false pride, nor a dread of even deserved punishment, shall ever interpose between the injury, of which I have been the unguarded cause, and the due retribution necessary to its full atonement. I do not pretend that this is a sentiment peculiar to myself—it exists in every mind to some extent, and, sooner or later, is apt to exert its just control. Sir, the day may yet come when the present chief magistrate shall feel and own its sway. When he shall have reached the repose of private life, removed from the tempests of political strife—when he shall have ceased to be useful to *flatterers* and *sycophants*, and standing on the confine where the time past of a long life is to be reviewed in the short span of that which is soon to end—if no other wrong, of which he has been the author, shall extort his merited confession, that at least to the injured Duane will wring a repentant sigh. His imagination must wander into the innocent family of that abused individual, from whose quiet bosom he was reluctantly withdrawn, and surveying the peace which he has disturbed, the feelings he has tortured, the friendship with which he has sported, the integrity he has distrusted, the independence he has despised, and, above all, that spotless reputation his *minions* have attempted to defame—if his heart shall not obey the dictates of the generous sentiment I have described, it will be wanting, greatly wanting, in a principle with which even his fame in battle cannot compare, and will justly reduce the glory of his military fortunes to an empty pageant.”

This, it would seem, ought to have sufficed to silence the calumny against the Bank. But like all previous defeats, it served only to increase it. Which of the presses, in the pay

of "the Government," dared to send this speech among the people? Where is the office-holder who dared to lift his voice to disabuse those, into whose minds poison from the Report of Judge Clayton had been injected? Where was the expectant in waiting for his "reward," for the part he had taken in making it tributary to the overthrow of the Bank, who did not shut his eyes to this speech, and continue, in spite of it, to repeat the foul implications of "the party" against the Bank?

That the reader may understand something of the bitterness of spirit which operated with the majority of the committee, of which Judge Clayton was Chairman, against the President of the Bank, who had been brought out as standing in the attitude of personal hostility to General Jackson, I extract the following from Mr. Adams' report.—Speaking of Mr. Biddle, Mr. Adams says—

"No scruple had crossed the mind of any President of the United States (during ten years) to deter him from nominating him year after year as a Government Director. Not a voice had ever been raised in the Senate to cause their hesitation to confirm his appointment, and so perfectly in harmony with this confidence, has been that of the public, that not a rumour has ever been raised of a prospect, or even of a project for the election of any other person as President in his place. After ten years of fair fame, thus sustained, without an adverse whisper being heard, it has been a source of deep mortification to the subscriber to see the character and feelings of such a citizen treated by a committee of the House of Representatives, as if he had been an inmate fresh issued from a penitentiary, to preside over the Bank of the United States!"

This, reader, is a specimen of the spirit of that report which Judge Clayton, on reflection, seized with his own hand and tore in pieces, and dashed to the ground, as "unworthy of himself, and the cause it was designed to support."

But as I have said it had been circulating over the country, and poisoning the minds of the people for about two years before its author discarded it. And thus was public confidence sported with and abused! And thus were the foundations of the Bank undermined, and thus its presiding officer, and his associates, were covered all over with party political venom, its principal and most disgusting stream issuing from the lips of President Jackson himself.

“*Directors!*” exclaimed Mr. Calhoun, in his powerful speech in the Senate, on the removal of the deposits, and in reference to H. D. Gilpin, John T. Sullivan, Peter Wager & Co.—“*Directors*, did I say?—No—☞ *Spies*, is their proper designation.”

I have shown that Reuben M. Whitney was the chosen instrument of Col. Thomas H. Benton; I will now show that the “spies” were the chosen instruments of President Jackson. What sort of work they were commissioned to perform, will be exposed in the sequel.

How long these “spies” had been secretly at work, and in conveying to their employer the result of their labours, and under whose influence, I have no means of ascertaining—but their regular, and published commissions, bear date, the first, “April 14, 1833,” the second, “August 3, 1833.” Both are signed “Andrew Jackson.” That there may be no mistake touching the object of these commissions, and the nature of the employment required by them, I will copy so much from these notable documents as will illustrate both.

The following is the whole of the first, which is dated at Washington. It is addressed to “Messrs. Sullivan, Gilpin, and Wager, United States Bank Directors.”

——— “Your letter of the 8th instant has been received. (They had been at work, it appears.) In reply, I have to remark, that the information requested is for *my own satisfaction*, and I do not wish it extended beyond the *knowledge of the Government Directors*. In case of a *gross violation* of the charter, it is my duty to issue a *scire facias* against the Bank. If the ☞ *rumours* I have heard be true, it will probably be incumbent on me to do so; and those rumours relate to proceedings which must have come within the personal knowledge, or ☞ *observation*, of some of you. If they shall be confirmed by your report, I shall not only be able to judge of my particular duty, but may, if thought proper, cause to be made, through the Secretary of the Treasury, that more formal and thorough investigation ☞ which *you suggest*.

“In conclusion, I would remark, that the discounts granted to individuals, are not deemed to constitute those *private* accounts, which by the charter are so carefully guarded; but that provision only embraces the debtor, and *creditor* accounts of individuals on ☞ *the books of the Bank*. If any discounts be **CORRUPTLY**, or *improperly* granted, it is not only

deemed right, but, in aggravated cases, *the duty* of the government directors to communicate the fact to THE GOVERNMENT."

(Signed)

ANDREW JACKSON.

REMARKS ON THIS FIRST COMMISSION TO THE "SPIES."

In the first place, the information requested was for the President's own satisfaction; but in getting at it, he did not wish to excite the attention of the other directors—hence it was to be so secretly managed, as not to extend beyond "the knowledge of the government directors."

In the next place, the President announces what, under a particular state of the case, he understands to be his "duty." It is in case of a *gross* violation of the charter to issue a *scire facias*. The President has, in instances almost without number, and under forms as various as the prismatic hues, charged upon the Bank, not only "a gross violation of the charter," but gross violations of it—but that keen sense of "duty" has never been sufficient to induce him to fulfil its requirements. The reason is obvious. *There was no evidence to commit the Bank.* Hence no *scire facias* was sued. In the third place, "*rumours*" had reached this functionary. This nobody doubts. They fell upon the President like snow flakes, and were made to sound in his ears like rumbling thunder. It could not have been otherwise, when he stood always ready with "rewards" in his hand to pay such as were prepared to join in his crusade against the Bank. He proceeded to *pin* a knowledge of the truth of those rumours upon his selected spies. He says "they *must* have come within the personal knowledge or observation of *some* of you." Not to "know" something of them after that, would be to belie the President; and not to have "observed" them, would indicate supineness and inattention. In either case, they very well knew they would lose their employer's favour, and be forever thereafter excluded from executive "rewards." So they had, as the sequel will show, to "know" even more than had ever been rumoured, and to have "observed" what had been not only the most revolting and criminal, but until then, unimaginable proceedings, &c.

In the fourth place, these "spies" had themselves been

secretly conveying something, for they had suggested before their commission arrived, a thorough investigation "through the Secretary of the Treasury."

In conclusion, the President shows that he had been in close communion with Reuben M. Whitney. He did not want to know any thing about discounts granted to individuals.— But that (although "the charter so carefully guarded these private accounts,) was afterwards made by the President, through one of his examining committees, an indispensable part of the meditated examination." He wanted, it seems, to know what discounts had been made that had *not* been entered on the books of the Bank, or which had been "corruptly" or "improperly" granted. Here then is a direct reference to the cases of which I have treated in No. 9, and which Reuben M. Whitney swore so awfully about.

These are the sort of things the President considers his, by telling the "spies" it was their *duty* to communicate to the "government"—that is, to Andrew Jackson, for he said he wanted this information for *his own* satisfaction.

This then is the first commission. The reader will be at no loss to understand its scope and object. Now for so much of the second as may further illustrate the first. This is dated at the "Rip Raps, August 3, 1833." It is addressed also to Messrs. Sullivan, Gilpin and Wager.

"Gentlemen,—I am *informed* that there is a book of expenses kept at the Bank, which comes before the dividend committee semi-annually. If any of *you* have had, or *can* have access to that book, I should be glad to learn what were the expenses of the last year, and also the preceding year, and for *what particulars* incurred. ALL directors have a right to see, and inspect this book, and if it is *refused* to  THE GOVERNMENT DIRECTORS,  report the same to ME.

"Mr. Walsh admitted in his paper, that his publisher had received about \$1,000 for printing newspapers, calculated to operate on  the elections. This leads me to believe that a considerable sum of the expenses of the Bank has been incurred in this way."

The President goes on then to expatiate upon "his duty," and to tell his "spies" what agency he is bound to exercise over the business of the Bank; he then says:—

"I desire that you will obtain and furnish me a statement of the Bank

account of expenses. They are the accounts of a public institution's expenditures, upon the honest and proper appropriation of which must depend, to some extent, the confidence which the administrators of Government may feel at liberty to repose in it. I should consider it proper, and even **YOUR DUTY**, if an examination of these accounts should be denied, by the officer keeping them, to demand a view of them by motion at the board of directors. If it be refused, then report the same forthwith to **ME**—and, at the same time, give me **ALL** the information and knowledge, in regard to the accounts which you may have acquired in the discharge of your duty, as directors," &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW JACKSON.

REMARKS ON THIS SECOND COMMISSION TO THE "SPIES."

In the first place we are to infer, that if General Jackson had not been "informed" that the Bank kept an expense account, he would never have considered such a book as making part of its records! In the next place he seems to consider it an affair of so mysterious and private a character, as to make it doubtful whether the "spies" had, or could have access to it. He seems to have fancied that the discoveries to which that mysterious "expense book" would lead, would not only conclude the whole matter of the Bank's iniquity, but that these secret sins, when discovered, would be of a character so damning as to enable "the Government," whether at Washington or the Rip Raps, to whistle down the Bank in a jiffy. This expense book was a beautiful vision, that some wag had "informed" the President was kept by the Bank, and of the existence of which he hastened to inform the spies. "Get that book, if you can—you have a right to see it, and to inspect it—and in case of its being refused to the Government directors, report the same to me!"

Thunder and lightning! what vengeance was gathered under that idea of refusal!!! It needed only for the Government Directors to report that it was refused to them for the lightning of Jackson's wrath to break out and consume the whole concern. "*Report the same to ME!*" When the book was all the while as open to all the directors, as was the light of Heaven. This indeed was a tempest in a tea pot.

In the next place, among *the rumours* that had reached the President, was one of a most unforgiving character. A

thousand dollars he says upon the *admission* of Mr. Walsh, had been paid to him for printing newspapers. Out of this pops the inference, that "a considerable sum of the expenses of the bank has been incurred in this way for the purpose of *(P operating on the elections!*" The reader may be surprised, perhaps, on being assured, that Mr. Walsh *never admitted any such thing!!!*

We shall see in the sequel what a marvellous use the "spies" made of this expense book, and how grateful their returns were to "the government." The only "duty" of the President growing out of his relations to the bank, was that which bound him, in the event of a violation of its charter, to sue out a *scire facias*. Yet we find him tumbling like a blind man pursued by an alligator, or stung by reptiles, into apartments where his presence was no more justifiable than would be that of an elephant, whose keeper should lead this unwieldy beast into the President's own drawing room.

Yet harping upon the doubt whether his "spies" could get a sight of these accounts, that were as open to them, as was the door through which they entered to take their seats at the board, he enforces it, as a "duty" binding them, "should they be denied, not by the board of directors only, but even "the officer keeping them," to report the same forthwith to *him!*—And lastly, whether they can get a sight of them or not, (for such is the sense of the reading,) the "spies" are required to give all the information and knowledge, in regard to them, which they may have acquired.

Having thus opened the way, and shown the sort of power, and whence it emanated, which was conferred on the "spies," I shall in my next proceed to show how faithfully and satisfactorily to every thing except HONOUR, JUSTICE and TRUTH, they executed the trust reposed in them.

ARISTIDES.

I have shown the commissions under which the "spies" acted. It were difficult to conceive it possible, on a review of them, how men, professing to be honourable, and to be influenced by those principles which uphold the moral and social compacts, could, for a single moment, hesitate as to the course which it became them to pursue; or question the obligation which the spirit and object of the commissions imposed upon them—which was, *indignantly* and with *contempt*, to throw them under their feet. It is not possible to conceive how, without some *overpowering inducement*, the work required to be performed could be undertaken. Subsequent events demonstrate what that inducement was. As in the case of Sullivan, who was 'rewarded' for the part he took, by Presidential favour, and by official station and emoluments as paymaster in the army; so has Mr. Gilpin, the active spirit of the league, in the nomination for the office of Governor of Michigan. It is true, the Senate rejected both. But history has not been more faithful in recording the price for which Judas agreed to betray his Lord, and that for which Arnold consented to sell his struggling and bleeding country, than it will be in recording the nature of the 'rewards' for which the 'spies' consented to obey the requisition of President Jackson. Even General Jackson questioned the propriety of his demands upon these men. He certainly saw the degrading nature of the work in which he sought to enlist their services, and apprehending that they might refuse to comply, enforced his claims upon them by insisting that obedience on their part was their 'duty.' The same as if he had said—'I know, gentlemen, this is a low business—that it involves degrading services—the character and offices of a *spy*, no man knows better how to appreciate than I do—but, gentlemen, there are times when the country needs the services of spies—in which emergency, it is 'the duty' of those who love their country to engage even in such employment. 'The party' is menaced. The Bank has made war upon it. 'Rumours' confirm this. I exact it of you, therefore, as 'Govern-

ment Directors,' to engage in the service I have planned. I need not repeat to you my maxim—I WILL REWARD MY FRIENDS—nor hint to you, (having read the Scriptures,) that 'they who are not for us, are against us'—and if you refuse to be 'for us' in this business, especially where 'duty' binds you, you will be numbered with my *enemies* and 'punished' accordingly. For Andrew Jackson 'rewards his friends, and punishes his enemies.'

The revelation of the President's will being thus made, and being fully invested with his commissions, and after consultation and agreement, as to the course they should pursue in the SECRET examination now to be made of the acts of the Bank, and especially of the 'Book of Expenses,' the spies began the work.

I fancy I see them enter the Bank. They are mailed in Presidential authority—but a cloak of *secrecy* is thrown over it and them. They seat themselves at the board, and bow, and smile, and pass round among their unsuspecting and honourable associates, the usual salutations. Not a whisper of their design is breathed to any other Director of the Bank, whilst each of these honourable men sit in unsuspecting confidence by their sides. Stealthily do they go to work. This part of their commission was never for a moment lost sight of. All was to be "confined to the knowledge of the Government Directors." There, too, were the officers of the Bank, each employed at his desk, faithfully and honourably, and without suspicion. Even the clerk who had attracted so much of General Jackson's attention, and who was looked upon in the light of some stiff, uncomplying *confidential* fellow, who it was thought was the *sworn* keeper of that 'expense book,' not even did *he* suspect who they were that were coming in and going out, wearing the exterior of Directors of the Bank, when in fact they were the secret and commissioned spies of Andrew Jackson! Never did sleeping innocence lie in more unconscious state, when the robber hung over her with the drawn dagger, to strike home the fatal blow, should she awake to consciousness, and to a sight of the ravages that were going on, than did the President and the other Directors of the Bank,

and its officers and clerks, when these "spies" were secretly and silently engaged in picking out from the acts of the board, and from that "expense book," such items as they supposed would most effectually serve their employer, and gratify his taste, and bring down destruction upon the Bank, and all that related to it!

For nearly two months were these men thus employed, before their unsuspecting associates were awakened to an observation of what was going on. During this period, it is not given to mortal man to know what shifts and doubles were resorted to by the "spies;" nor how, when an occasional ray from the almost extinguished light of honour, would dart in upon their minds, they recoiled from the business they had undertaken. How stirring, sometimes, was a glance from President Biddle's eye! How cutting the rebuke, when the honest labours of the other Directors, (headed by their efficient President, all of whom the "spies" knew to be honourable men,) were witnessed. Meeting the first, there was no alternative but to drum with the fingers on the table, or perhaps to whistle; and on beholding the last, to bow, or yawn. Or when a clerk would pass, and they were hurrying secretly through the papers, hunting for items, there would be a sudden huddling of the whole together, and a bow, accompanied with a smile, or some act to turn aside suspicion as to what these men were about.

At last, and at about the expiration of the eighth week of *such* labours, the newspapers revealed the plot! Instantly the cloaks which had hitherto secreted their design, fell off; and the "spies" had to meet their associates in their true character. They were, it is true, screened by their commissions. These furnished but a flimsy shield, however, against the justly excited indignation, which all men feel, when a spy is detected in the camp. Flash after flash, like lightning, blazed in upon the consciences of these men; and a deadly sinking of all the moral energies foreboded the judgment, not of the board, only, but of all civilized and christian people. This was a horrible hour! But the best was to be made of it. About the persons of the spies hung dangling the items

they had abstracted, thus secretly, from the records of the Bank; and in their faces was visible that peculiar hue, which succeeds detection. What now was left for these truly unfortunate men? Nothing but confession! That was made in the declaration that "*it was feared, if they had avowed their object, the Board would not have permitted its execution!*"

A report of their proceedings was now to be made to their employer. Any undertaking commenced, and prosecuted under such hurried and flurried circumstances, could not, of course, be well done. There could be neither order, regularity or correctness. They had, however, kept the secret, and that is the first duty of a spy. President Jackson could not reproach them with divulging it. But it seems to have been thought, even by themselves, that what they had done, was not well done. Hence the "spies" speak of "the want of time"—and of the "labour," which the mode imposed upon them required. They could only prosecute their object, they say, as they had "time, and opportunity." "TIME and OPPORTUNITY!" These words, in such like business, are extremely ominous, as well as confessional. What else does the highwayman seek? Any thing but "time and opportunity!" or the slanderer, or calumniator—do they not seek for "time and opportunity?"—It was all that Arnold wanted, when he sought the services of Andre. Both occurred, but "time" was denied the unfortunate youth to escape with the hellish plot of his seducer; and "opportunity" was refused him to get out of the hands of the three patriots who intercepted, and captured him.

The "spies" say, they made "*enquiries, but they were partial.*" Of course, if they had been *general*, there would have been a disclosure; and then the truth, and the whole truth, would have been told, which was exactly, as the sequel will prove, what these men were not in quest of, and what their employer did not want. When, however, they came across any *expenditures*, they take care to say they were "*discovered by US.*"—As a matter of course, then, the inference was intended to be incontrovertible, that they had been

concealed before! Sometimes, when they requested any thing of the board—not as spies—but as directors, and the good sense of the board led it to withhold its assent, why then they excuse themselves, by saying, they had “to depend on their own *partial* enquiries.”

From this very partial picture, the reader may infer, how much of *honour* actuated these men. I will pursue the subject in my next.

ARISTIDES.



No. 13.

Is it necessary that I should inform the reader that, in discussing the acts of public men, the actors must, themselves, be spoken of? Can the criminal be separated from his crime? Or if he can, ought he to be? Who can separate the shadow from the substance? Tell me not of that mawkish sensibility that, when the acts of public men are spoken of, would whisper “*silence*” as the names of the perpetrators are about to be pronounced. If men in official stations will employ themselves in undermining the great principles of honour, of justice, and of truth, let them not take it amiss when public opinion resolves to hold them responsible for such outrages. Those who would throw over such the mantle of concealment, little think how much they contribute to destroy those safe-guards upon which society has been taught to rely for protection against wrong and outrage. What! hide the public plunderer from the public gaze—separate him from all connexion with the public judgment—and denounce his *acts* only!—discourse only about the evil he may have committed, and not name the *author* of it? Establish this doctrine, and where, I ask, shall we go for a shield to protect either property, character, or life?

I have named “the Government Directors” whom President Jackson employed to perform the office of “spies.” I have shown by their commissions, under which they consented to act, and did act, that the “duty” required of them was to be

performed *secretly*, and without the knowledge of the other Directors. These commissions required it of those to whom they were addressed, to *spy* out, and report to Andrew Jackson, such acts as "rumour" had informed him the Bank was guilty of, which acts, he took special care to tell his "spies," they *must* know something about. Believing that these men moved Andrew Jackson to commit upon the Bank the outrage he did, in the removal of the Deposits, and in separating the ties which bound him to the laws, and the laws to him, I consider it a high and solemn duty, in some one, to trace out their conduct, and expose the means they adopted to produce such a result. Public justice requires this. The violated rights of the Bank plead for it. The assailed characters of the President and officers of the Bank, have a high claim to be vindicated, and the violated honour of the nation demands it.

I have said these men moved Andrew Jackson to commit the outrage he did commit on the Bank. I derive my proof from himself. He says, explicitly, that the reports of these men, to him, *decided* the question in his mind, and produced the resolve to remove the deposits. How fearful, then, is the responsibility that rests upon them!

I have, in my last, given a glimpse of the *honour* which actuated these men, in "the *mode*" they consented to adopt in complying with the terms of their commissions. Let us look, for a moment, at the relations in which they stand to Justice and Truth.

Justice! What is it? That principle, I answer, which prompts a man to do to others, that, which he would have others do to him. Let us try the "spies," first, by this standard. They knew that a party political spirit was excited against the Bank and its officers, particularly its President. They knew also that this spirit was vindictive. They had all witnessed the course which their own party had taken to destroy the Bank, and implicate the honour of its officers. There was not one of them that did not know that all this was the result of a refusal on the part of the Bank to lend itself as an instrument to promote the ends of "the party." They were, as "Government Directors," in a situation, in which, they

could increase this excitement, or allay it. Justice, under such circumstances, made to them a direct appeal. On their report, on the truth or falsehood of the charges, was destined to turn, the personal and official judgment of their employer. Facts, under such circumstances, ought alone to have been resorted to. They were alone competent to decide the question. Here then stood these men. Can the reader conceive a position more responsible, or one in which honour, and justice, and truth, could all more effectually combine, to enforce their demands. They were made by their position, and by their commission (as they chose to respect it as such, and act under it) not the judges only, but executioners of the Bank! I know Col. Benton claims this honour—but Andrew Jackson awards it to his “spies.” He says, they decided him.

I fancy I see these men when engaged in writing their report to President Jackson. Before their judgment passed the claims of the stockholders, who were entitled to all the benefit which a just and true report would ensure to them. By one dash of the pen, the value of the stock was to be affected. If, for the Bank, it would enhance it; if against it, the stock would be depressed. The government was here interested, or in other words, the people, for they held a fifth of the stock. Then came the characters of the officers of the Bank. These had been assailed—deeply. Next came the general embarrassments of the whole country, the failure of men, and the necessarily prostrating effects that must attend upon the withdrawal of fifty millions from the circulating currency of the country. The hammer of the Auctioneer was seen to rise and to fall; the rich were seen buying up the buildings and other property, at a reduced price, which the mechanic had built, and purchased, partly on credit, for his family—manufacturers were seen to stop, and commerce to languish—and public confidence every where shaken, and men every where in embarrassment and trouble! All this, and more, was present, when the report was to be made. There was, no doubt, an occasional twinge of the conscience, as one after another of the points were decided on—and when it was determined so to colour the report as to convince General Jack-

son that he was right, and the Bank was all, and a good deal more than he had suspected, even when assisted by his "rumours," there was, doubtless, that shiver felt, which attends upon men's last agonies, when they die a forced and ignominious death!

The report signed, and the work done, it only remained for the "spies" to watch the effects of that mildew which they knew it would enable the President to breathe over all that related to the Bank and its affairs.

Let the reader pause here for a moment, and contemplate the position of the Government Directors, and their power for evil, and for good, and ask himself if an obligation was ever more binding, or more holy upon men to do JUSTICE. There lives not a stockholder, nor an officer of the Bank, that would not have said, "*Justice, gentlemen, is all we ask.*" But was it justice to go in and out for eight weeks, with the other Directors, appearing to be of them, and watching, like them, over the great interests of the Bank, with which were so intimately connected, the great interests of the country, when they were employed, under a *secret* commission, in abstracting detached items from the records of the Bank, upon which to base charges for its *condemnation*?—Was this acting in conformity to that golden rule, "as ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them!" Was it not rather a subversion of that rule? Was it not rank injustice?

If the other directors had been convicted felons, in league, each with the other, to exclude their acts from all eyes but their own, and the government directors had reason to believe such to be the fact, and that their acts were working prejudicial effects to the Bank, and to the interests of the stockholders, then it would have been their 'duty' to adopt any practical mode to arrive at a knowledge of the real condition of the Bank, and of the conduct of its managers. But were the President, and Directors, such men? On the contrary, were they not, and are they not, *all of them*, honourable men—capable men—and did they not then, and do they not now devote themselves to promote the interests of the stockholders, and the welfare of the dealers of the Bank? Were

they not even then, as now, careful to watch the calumnies that were sent among the people to injure the Bank, and to send truth after them, as fast as they could, to neutralize, and, if possible, put a stop to their ruinous tendency and effects? Are not these gentlemen, in a word, in all their private, and social, and official relations, among the most estimable of our race? Then what do these high minded and honourable men say of the reports of the "spies" to their employer? But first, what did the "spies" report? Why, among other things, that their examination which President Jackson referred to them to make, [I have shown in my last what sort of 'examination' it was, and how it was conducted]  'Undoubtedly presents circumstances which in our opinion, warrant the belief *you* have been led to entertain.' And what was that belief? Why, that the Bank had employed itself and its means in a way to influence the elections—General Jackson's re-election, among the rest.

The sole object of their commission was to elicit something on which the press, urged on by General Jackson, might rest the charge. Every circumstance, therefore, had a channel cut for it, to swell the general tide upon this point. Complaints were made against the other Directors. They were charged with concealments, &c. In a word, every thing was reported that could be made subservient to the great end, viz: an implication of the Bank on the charge of having interfered in the elections. I could prove this by numerous quotations. The reader may find what I say substantially confirmed in the report of the "spies" to their employer.

What say the other Directors?

—————"Nothing was concealed—no one *designed* to conceal—no one *could* conceal this whole matter. The resolutions of the board were on the minutes—the expenses under them were all recorded in the book—the vouchers all referred to, by number, in that book; and *all* of them, minutes, expense book, and vouchers, were  ALWAYS to be seen and examined by the Directors, so that the whole process of discovery was to  ask for the books and vouchers, and to receive them."

Is there a man living that doubts the truth of this? *Not one* to whom the character of the Directors is known, on whose veracity the statement rests. There was the open

door, into which *honourable* men would have preferred to enter. But truth was not the object of either President Jackson or his "spies." If it had been, why did he enjoin secrecy on them; and why, with these means all open to their inspection, did they choose to climb up some other way? President Jackson knew, and his "spies" knew, that the truth would be death to the scheme, which was to implicate the Bank on the charge I have named, of interfering to control the elections. This was, as I have said, the great object; and for this duty were the "spies" set to work.

Now let us see what sort of use they made of one sum. They say: "Under the head of stationary and printing, they have discovered charges for the first half of the year 1831, amounting to the *enormous* sum of \$29,979 92." The inference intended to be conveyed to General Jackson was, that this "enormous sum" bore on the point of their enquiry, and that it had been employed in connection with the charge of interfering in elections.

Well, reader, how do you suppose this "enormous sum" was expended? and for what? I will tell you.

\$1080 32	was for common stationary,
443 76	" printing blank forms and rules,
267 68	" books,
179 91	" newspapers,
4178 37	" engraving bank notes,
300 00	" paper,
2886 67	" silk for making paper,
1421 94	" sheeting for do.
2121 64	" silks do.
788 13	silks do.
10 00	subscription to the Coffee House.

\$13,678 42

Well, now, how much of these items, which, I assure the reader, forms part of the 'enormous sum' of \$29,979 92, is it believed was expended with the remotest design to operate on the elections? Look at the items. Sullivan, one of the Government Directors, who signed the report that carried this

'enormous sum' to General Jackson, and which was sent purposely to implicate the Bank in the charge I have stated, had himself received of these *very expenditures*, under one of its heads, \$302 37!!! But every item, no matter to whom paid, or for what paid, or by whom received, was essential to swell the sum, and make the amount 'enormous'—hence, although he had put \$302 37 in his own pocket, for articles in his own line of business, furnished the Bank, he was willing that it should form part of the 'enormous sum' that the President was left to INFER the Bank had paid in furthering the ends of those who opposed the election of Andrew Jackson, and of his party. I will not stop to inquire where a man's conscience, or sense of common honesty, is, who would lend himself to such an act as this.

The balance of the \$29,000 and odd, had about as little to do with controlling elections, as that which was expended, as above stated. Nearly \$4000 of the residue was paid for printing and circulating Mr. Gallatin's able work on Banking; and the residue on documents essential to be sent among the people to disabuse them of falsehoods uttered by President Jackson against the Bank, and reiterated by his presses and his party—but for which falsehoods, and the levelling doctrines on which they were made to rest, there would not have been one cent expended. The crime is, to be sure, a curious one, that is so constituted by the act of an individual, or corporation, taking measures to repel calumny and refute injurious and vicious falsehoods.

I have some other facts and figures for my next, in further illustration of this subject, and demonstrative of the absence from the consciences of these men of both justice and truth, while in the performance of the service assigned to them by President Jackson.

ARISTIDES.

No. 14.

I am aware that the light in which 'the government directors' are put, is repulsive. I know, also, it is calculated to excite sympathy—but it can, of course, be that species of sympathy *only*, which men feel for the criminal, when the sentence of the law, which he has violated, is enforced. But shall this species of sympathy be permitted to operate as a shield to interfere between the culprit and his merited punishment? He who says YES, has not well considered the subject. It had just as well be decided, that there ought to be no law; or, what amounts to the same thing, no penalty. What is a law without a penalty? And what are both law and penalty, if they be not enforced.

Does the reader think, I do not myself feel deeply for these "spies?" If he do, he wrongs me. I do, from my very soul pity them! But having undertaken this business of demonstrating the wrong, and outrage, that have been committed on one of the best fiscal agents that this or any other country ever possessed, and through it, upon the rights and interests of its stockholders, and the CHARACTER of men, and upon the general prosperity, painful as it is, I shall proceed, until I make manifest to all who are intelligent and honest, (I expect nothing from the fool or the knave,) that a most damning fraud has been committed by 'the party,' through its INSTRUMENTS, upon that fiscal agent; upon the rights and interests of its stockholders; upon the character of its officers, and upon the general prosperity.

If, in the further prosecution of my purpose, from which I do not mean any thing shall turn me aside, I shall throw a light even more repulsive, upon 'the government directors,' and cast even a more odious shade upon their doings, they will find the elements which I may embody, in their own acts, and the colouring matter I use, in their own party recklessness.

Some may suppose it impossible for the "spies" to have meant to convey to their employer, that the \$29,979 92 had been employed for the purpose of controlling the elections.

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in his own pocket, and which he knew had been paid for articles of *his trade*, which the Bank bought of him.

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been employed for the purpose of controlling the elections.

For the satisfaction of such, I will prove, by their own words, that they did so intend; and that they intended NOTHING ELSE. Hear them:

—————“We deemed it expedient, at present, to confine our investigation to that portion which EMBRACED expenditures  CALCULATED TO OPERATE ON THE ELECTIONS.”

Now, what does the reader think? Almost the first question that an intelligent reader will ask, will be—were all these items for stationary, printing blank forms; for books, for engraving bank notes, &c. &c. ‘calculated to operate on the elections?’ and especially, were the three hundred and odd dollars that were paid by the Bank to Sullivan, for articles in the line of his business, and which formed a part of this very 29,000 and odd dollars, ‘calculated to operate on elections?’

But this is not all. The “spies” tell their employer that “All expenditures of  THIS kind, (made to operate upon the elections,) introduced into the expense account, and discovered by us, we found to be, so far as regards the institution in this city, embraced under the head of Stationary and Printing.”

Now let us analyze this a little. Not only were expenditures made, according to the “spies,” ‘to operate on the elections,’ but they were entered under the head of ‘Stationary and Printing’—and though thus ingeniously contrived, the true nature and object of these expenditures, were  ‘discovered by us.’ But this was not all. The drift of the information was intended to convey to their employer’s mind the belief that ALL the branches were engaged in the same business of making ‘expenditures to operate on the election,’ for what the “spies” reported, regarded only, ‘THE INSTITUTION IN THIS CITY.’

I trust there will be no more doubt on any body’s mind as to what were the object and aim of the “spies.” Thus it was, that “the enormous sum” of 29,000 dollars was reported as having been expended by the Bank, to “operate on the elections,” even to the 300 and odd dollars that Sullivan had put in his own pocket, and which he knew had been paid for articles of *his trade*, which the Bank bought of him.

A most remarkable feature in this case is, that the miscellaneous expenses in the item of 29,979 92 *could* not, as the Board of Directors very appropriately remarks, 'have been spent on elections, from the fact that in the first half year of 1831, no elections of any kind, in which the Bank could, by any possibility, have any interest, were impending for eighteen months to come, or even in remote agitation.' But no matter, "Rumour" had told President Jackson otherwise, and his "spies" were compelled, by virtue of their employment, and its hoped for "rewards," to sustain it.

I said I had some more facts and figures for this number. If they were not facts and figures, I would myself discard them. But they are. Either these are false, or the "spies" are. The reader shall decide.

The "spies" say—"It appears by the expense account of the Bank for the years 1831 and 1832, that upwards of \$80,000 were expended"—————For what?—"STATIONARY AND PRINTING"—and charged, under that head—that is, the head so denominated, but which, as "discovered by us," was to "operate on the elections." The "spies" further "discover" that a "large proportion" of this 80,000 dollars was paid to the proprietors of newspapers, and periodical journals; and for the printing, distribution, and postage of immense numbers of pamphlets and newspapers."

Let the reader connect this "discovery" of the "spies" with their own declaration that they "deemed it expedient to confine their interrogatories to that portion which embraced expenditures calculated to operate on elections," and then decide whether the charge was not distinctly made that the Bank had employed these 80,000 dollars, or a "large portion of it," in electioneering against "the party." If this conclusion is denied, then does he who denies it implicate the understanding of President Jackson himself—for he so interpreted it, and he so said in his famous manifesto. The words of this functionary are: "The expenditures *purporting* to have been made under authority of these resolutions, (resolutions of the Board authorising the President of the Bank to expend money to detect and expose calumnies,) during the years

1831 and 1832, were about 80,000 dollars." Now suppose this had been true, which, by the way, it happens not to be, it would prove no more than that calumnies had multiplied; and that it required an "enormous" expenditure on the part of the bank to detect and expose them. But it was *false*— (I do not mean false, as regards the multiplication of calumnies, but as to the objects on which the sum was expended) for of this very sum there were paid for

Making and printing bank notes,	\$24,591 96
Printing blank forms, and other necessary papers,	1,848 08
Books and stationary,	6,053 88
Various miscellaneous expenses,	653 25
	<hr/>
Total,	\$33,147 17

This is demonstration. Euclid himself could not more clearly detect a falsehood in figures, than this simple statement detects and exposes the rank falsehood of the "spies."

A few words on the cause of the expenditure of a cent by the Bank for any thing else except for its necessary materials. It is to be found exclusively in the calumnies which commenced in 1829, and which followed its refusal to throw itself into the arms of "the party," to be used by it as *a tool*. At every point was its credit, its honour, and the fair fame of its officers assailed. Driven by the necessity of the case, the Bank employed in its own defence, in the years 1829, 1830, 1831, 1832, and 1833, \$58,265 04, or an average of between eleven and twelve thousand dollars a year, not in interfering in elections, but in detecting and exposing calumnies. Now all this the "spies" knew. The use they made of it, I have exposed. On the question which ignorance and prejudice have started as to the right of the Bank thus to defend itself, whether against calumniators or counterfeiters, I will discourse in my next, promising, meanwhile, to demonstrate, that, as between calumniators and counterfeiters, the former required to be watched with ten-fold vigilance; and that of the two, in moral guilt, and infamy, and ability, to injure the Bank, the counterfeiter was the less exceptionable character.

ARISTIDES.

The reader will be at no loss to discover what has been my object in tracing as I have done, the calumnies with which partisans have assailed the Bank; and all the world knows how effectual they have proved in undermining that incomparable institution. This is a fearful commentary on the moral condition of the public mind! It would seem that when men, otherwise estimable, good citizens, kind husbands, affectionate brothers, and faithful friends, become invested with a little brief Governmental authority, there passes over them a blinding influence, which closes their eyes to every thing, except that which may promote their own and their employer's ends. Now, why, I ask, should this be so? Or, why, if it be so—(and whether it is so or not, I have endeavoured to let facts decide) should there be the slightest objection in those who permit themselves to be thus blinded, or in the mind of any just and honest man, to such a discussion of the subject as shall expose it in its deformity, and in the recklessness with which the spirit that sustains it manifests itself.

It was my intention in this number to institute a comparison between the evil effects of calumny, and of counterfeiting, and to demonstrate that in the relation which these two bear to the Bank, that calumny is a tenfold more dangerous enemy; and that if it is right in the Bank—(and who will deny this?) to expend its money in detecting counterfeiters, and protecting itself against their doings, the obligation is no less binding upon it, to expend money, also, in detecting and exposing calumnies. But I waive this point for the present, to expose the origin and analyze the cause of these calumnies, which have been so multiplied of late, and employed with such effect against the Bank and its interests.

I have no difficulty in finding their origin. They were not commenced, however, with any view to use this monstrous engine against the Bank— but to break down the party

* Erroneously numbered. It should have been 15. Not to break the series, or to disturb the references, 16 is preserved.

then in power and build up another. The success of the experiment was so complete, that when the Bank was to be assailed, calumny was resorted to, and employed, as the great instrument to produce its downfall.

I trace the first bold and reckless calumny, the calumny which may be denominated the fruitful mother of the thousands that have since been sent around the country, to Col. Thos. H. Benton, of the U. S. Senate. It is to be found in his famous letter, usually denominated the *East Room Letter*. "The party," the present dominant party, I mean, was then just beginning its struggle for the ascendancy. It was daily and hourly employed in finding out causes of complaint against the administration. Truth *could not* be employed against it—because there was no cause of offence in its acts—and nothing in any of its measures, when fairly told, to which the people could take the slightest exception. It therefore became necessary to try a new experiment, and one that had never before, in the history of this government at least, been attempted. It was, in plain language, to INVENT FALSEHOODS, and to employ presses, subsidized for the purpose, to send them around among the people for truths! It required a daring spirit, a reckless partisan, to commence a war, which, if the first demonstration should prove successful, was afterwards to be carried on by the same instrument. We all know how extremely sensitive the people were at *that* period on the subject of the right and economical use which they expected the Executive to make of their money; and how (as it was right they should) they resented the slightest departure in the expenditures from the most rigid economy. Well, the purpose was to lash into fury this feeling; and by bringing all its force to bear on President Adams, to turn him out, and turn their favourite leader in. Col. Benton, throwing aside all those guards which honourable partisans take care to set round their acts, came boldly out, and in the very face of truth, and in utter contempt of what Twenty Thousand persons at that moment personally knew, (for there was not a man in the District of Columbia, and no visiter to the President's mansion, that did not know better,) penned and published a

letter setting forth, in substance, that President Adams had, at immense cost, and in *a most gorgeous style* furnished that famous East room! The reader sees the object. It was to make the people believe that *that* Administration made a wanton use of their money, and that republican simplicity was discarded—in a word, as the slang of the day was, Mr. Adams was *King John*; and he must therefore live in regal splendour!!

How strange to tell—that calumny was successful! Whilst not a dollar had been spent on that room, and a studied economy characterized all the expenditures of Mr. Adams, as the world knows. This fabrication usurped the place, and exercised the power of truth itself. The people every where reeled before it, and from it arose a flame of unextinguishable fierceness, which actually consumed to ashes that Administration.

Here then the party knew what power, an artfully invented calumny could, when spiritedly, and perseveringly employed, possess. It became, from that hour, the chosen instrument of the party, as much so as was the battering ram with the people of old, when the wall of a city was to be battered down. And like that ancient engine, it has proved itself to be formidable and irresistible.

The Bank had been variously beset. It passed through siege after siege. It came out in triumph of the Woodbury plot—it drove back the assailants, even including the Examining Committee, of which Judge Clayton was chairman—It came out unscathed of the deep plot of a witness sent, as I have shown, by this same Col. Benton, to bear testimony against the President of the Bank, and whose testimony must have, like the lightning, killed the fair fame of President Biddle, and mutilated, if not destroyed the Bank, had not a conductor most happily conveyed the fluid from the line of its direction. I have illustrated this in a previous number. The Bank came out of all this, and more than I have enumerated, in triumph,—and had, by a surprising unanimity, considering the party character of the times, its charter renewed.

There remained no hope now of the downfall of the Bank,

but in the veto of President Jackson. That was of easy accomplishment. He had by this time been taught to believe that the Bank was HIS enemy. That was enough. But still there would be wanting reasons to bear him out in his purpose.

The older calumnies, though exploded by the action of Congress in the renewal of the Charter, were kept, nevertheless, in perpetual circulation by the presses that had been subsidized for the purpose, by the office-holders, who knew that their tenure of office was limited to their exertions; and by those who expected to be rewarded for assisting in their circulation.

Among the calumnies originating in this object was that, which announced that the Bank was not a safe depository of the public money. This annunciation was ushered amidst the shouts of 'the party.' It was attempted, by means of this calumny, to batter down the Bank, officers and all. Nothing, of course, was supposed to be strong enough to withstand the effects of the doubts intended to be created by this declaration, in the minds of the people. It was as much as to tell them 'your money is in danger!' Upon this point the people had proved themselves to be sensitive. It was intended to confirm the truth of the charge; and Mr. Toland, a personal and political friend of the President, was charged to examine and report upon it. The conspirators mistook their man. He was honest. No political cawl covered the sight of his eyes; no political bias warped HIS judgment. He reported the truth; the Bank was in his view, a perfectly safe depository of the public money. This was, for the moment, a stumper. But though sustained by a report of the Committee of the House of Representatives, it was still kept going the rounds among the people, that the Bank WAS NOT a safe depository of the public money, and that Gen. JACKSON HAD SAID SO.

At the very time when this calumny was uttered, the Bank, as the documents prove, was in the full power of its strength. I would insert the proofs in figures, but am relieved from this necessity, by the promulgation of an opposite calumny; namely, that the Bank was 'TOO STRONG,' and therefore,

‘DANGEROUS TO THE LIBERTIES OF THE PEOPLE!!’ Instead of awakening public suspicion as to the game that ‘the party’ was playing with the public confidence, even this calumny was made to operate just as if not a word had been said about the feebleness of the Bank, and the insecurity of the public funds.

As in the case of Col. Benton’s attack on Mr. Adams’ prodigal waste of the public money, illustrated by him in a most extravagant exhibition of the manner in which the East room was said by him to be furnished, when not a dollar had been laid out upon it, so with these calumnies against the Bank. There was not a particle of truth to support either of them; nor, in fact, was it needed. The presses, the office-holders—the expectants, were now all firmly leagued, to say every thing was true, that the President might choose to utter, or his supporters to fabricate. In vain did truth lift up her voice in this war of falsehood—in vain did justice plead—and in vain did the consciences of the abettors in this nefarious work, smite them. The charges were still sent round.—Every appeal that human ingenuity could invent, was made to inflame the public mind against the Bank.—It was a monopoly—it had foreigners among its stockholders—it was opposed to Andrew Jackson, who for that reason and for no other, denounced it as “a monster.”—And was it a monster? “The party” told the people so under every form of speech-making, and by its press. Some poor ignorant souls, fancied it was a living thing, with horns and a forked tail, and club feet, and having fire issuing from its mouth. “Down with the monster,” was kept going the rounds of the country. Engravings were got up, representing President Jackson and Mr. Biddle, as engaged in personal combat. All this, like the fire fanned, or blown upon by strong winds, ignited every combustible material, until the purpose was formed, and the plan devised, to throw President Jackson in the foreground of this commotion, where, having taken his stand, he was to decide on his own responsibility—against the decision of Congress—against the report of Mr. Toland, and against the unqualified report of the committee of the House of Repre-

sentatives, that for the reasons stated, (though proved to be false,) he would remove the public deposits. He did so. He did this in violation of law; and by the usurpation of a power more threatening to Republican Liberty, than any thing that has ever occurred previous, or subsequent to the formation, and adoption of the Constitution.

But there was one *incentive* that has not yet been named. It was the prospects which these movements opened, of *pecuniary gain* among those who were *in the secret* of what the President had resolved to do. Is there a reader so uninformed as not to know how this Bank Stock was speculated in, and **BY WHOM?**

I will not pursue this demoralizing view further, nor will I name the speculators, at least at present, but will conclude this number by again referring to the power of calumny and falsehood; and how, when they are employed as they have been, by the profligate, in regard to the Bank, the public may be duped, and deeply, if not irretrievably injured! The very same combination, and the same weapons if employed against our *Liberties*, would make slaves of us all.

ARISTIDES.



No. 17.

A few, and very few words on *Counterfeiters* and *Calumniators*. I hold them to be alike criminal. I verily believe, nevertheless, that men will, as politicians, calumniate as I have demonstrated they have done, who would die a thousand deaths, rather than counterfeit. My object is to expose the gross delusion under which men labour, who, acting on the maxim, that "*all's fair in politics*," will utter a calumny, and contemplate it in the light of an innocent device, either to *obtain* or *retain* power.

A counterfeiter, suppose he gets into circulation all the notes he may prepare, injures *the Bank*, whose notes he represents, to a very trifling extent, for the operation is, when the spurious issue is detected, to make people more cautious

in ascertaining the genuineness of the notes offered. The loss falls upon individuals, who may have been cheated, and not upon the Bank, except partially. It has rarely occurred, that the annunciation that counterfeit notes of any Bank were in circulation, produced any depression in the value of the stock of the Bank. Not so with calumnies. They operate upon the stock, as immediately, and as sensibly, as does the atmosphere upon mercury. Now let us see what effect the calumnies that I have exposed, and the action of President Jackson, who was influenced by them, had on the stock of the Bank. Mr. Calhoun says in his masterly speech on the removal of the deposits, that "the value of shares was reduced from 130 to 108,"—a Senator near him said, "much more." Now let me ask if all the counterfeiting that has been carried on, of the notes of this Bank, from its origin to this day, ever injured so deeply, the interests of the stockholders? Has any body ever questioned the right, or duty, of the Bank to expend money in detecting counterfeiters? Nobody.—Can any body assign a single good reason why the Bank should not be equally bound to expend money in disabusing the public mind from calumnies which tend so immediately, and to such vast extent, to injure every individual stockholder. I will suppose a case. Suppose a person, or persons, to be appointed by President Jackson, to give him secret information of the acts of the Bank, whether in regard to its expenditure of money, to detect counterfeiters, or rebut calumnies. And suppose he should be written to in reply, and told that the Bank had expended a large portion of the enormous sum of \$80,000 in *controlling elections*; and that President Jackson, on the faith of such a statement, should promulgate his purpose to *veto* any bill that might be passed for a recharter of a Bank that would thus act? Suppose the Directors of the Bank to remain perfectly indifferent as to the charge, and the stock should fall from "130, to 108,"—Suppose that a stockholder, feeling himself aggrieved, should appear at the Bank, and expostulate with the President and Directors, against a conduct so extraordinary, and that he should be shown the proofs that the Bank had done no such thing.

Suppose it had never occurred to the Board to disabuse the public mind, except by relying on its denial in Congress, and on the circulation of public documents, and this stockholder had said—"Why, gentlemen, if the people in my neighbourhood could be convinced, as I am, that this is a calumny; their confidence would be restored in the Bank; and its stock, so far as they are concerned, would be restored to the point whence this calumny dislodged it, and from which it has fallen." Suppose the President of the Bank to reply, "Why, my dear sir, this has been done. Mr. Clay, Mr. Calhoun, Mr. Binney, Mr. Webster, and others, have all declared the charge to be false, and proven it to be false, and the Board have sent to Washington copies of the very documents I have shown you." Well, I will suppose the stockholder to reply, "That may be, but my neighbours know nothing of all this—they do not get the public documents, and very few of any, except our little country papers. Suppose the Board should pass a resolution giving you authority to publish and circulate extra copies of these *proofs*, used by Mr. Calhoun and others, going to vindicate the Bank, and that you send a few hundred or a thousand to me, for distribution?" And suppose some one to move such a resolution at the Board, and that it was NOT carried—and for the want of these very facts, the exhibition of which had satisfied the stockholder of the falsity of the charge made against the Bank, stock should, under the influence of public opinion, (for that is the *mimosa pudica*, or the Mercury, which indicates the touch of depressing or elevating influences,) continue thus depressed; and that stockholder being in want of the amount of his stock, for which his stock might be pledged, and he compelled, under such circumstances, to sell it—I ask, would he not have reason to complain of rank injustice? Nay, to denounce the President and Directors as unworthy of their trust, and unfitted to manage the great concerns of the Bank?

Well, the Board of Directors being intelligent men, competent and just men, and having an eye to the interests of the Bank, instead of refusing to comply with the suggestion of the stockholder, as I have supposed, did NO MORE by comply-

ing, in the money expended for *extra* Speeches, and *extra* Documents, exculpatory of the Bank, and vindicating it against the effects of calumny, than was its solemn and *sacred duty*—a duty it owed alike to the government and all its other stockholders. It is to this very course, I have no doubt, that public opinion was enabled to sustain the Bank, and that the stock of the Bank maintained, against all the attacks upon it, and in spite of the plans of the Speculators, who are known to have been in the secret at Washington, its price as it did. But for this, it would have been the subject of perpetual fluctuation; and the “buyers and sellers,” men not a whit better than they whose tables once disgraced the temple at Jerusalem, and which the purest and holiest of beings, overturned, would have continued to “buy and sell” and “make gain;” because they were in *the secret*, and knew when the spring was to be touched, and when the pressure upon it was to be withdrawn.

I have now briefly endeavoured to illustrate the comparative injury which may be done to a Bank, by Counterfeiters and Calumniators; and the *DUTY* of the Bank, to guard its interests against both—but as the *greater* enemy of the two, against the Calumniator.

ARISTIDES.



No. 18.

The object for which the Bank made these expenditures, which the Government Directors asserted to have been made to control the elections, are now obvious. How easy, how *natural* was it for these men to have perceived in these expenditures the same object, viz:—to defend the Bank against calumny, and protect it against counterfeiters. How unnatural to see them in any other light! And how equally natural, and at the same time easy of comprehension was it, that when larger expenditures were seen to have been made during election periods, that they were called for by the multiplicity of calumnies that were sent round, at these periods,

among the people. But no—having been, in their own language, ‘*devised as instruments,*’ and commissioned to perform specific duties, and under a *stipulated form*, that is, ‘without the knowledge of the other Directors,’ there was no medium through which the acts of the Bank could be seen, by them, but that which went to ‘impair its credit,’ and to ‘excite odium against the other Directors.’ One leading design would seem never to have been lost sight of by these Government Directors, and that was, by the scintillation of spark after spark, to fire the magazine of President Jackson’s vengeance. They succeeded, as has been before stated, for he says himself they ‘decided him.’

I will pursue, in this No., some of the means resorted to, to effect this object. The Government Directors say, ‘Publications have been prepared, and extensively circulated, containing the grossest invectives against  the Officers of the Government; and the money which belongs to the stockholders, and to the public, has been freely applied in efforts to degrade, in public estimation, those who were supposed to be instrumental in resisting the wishes of this grasping and dangerous institution.’

What is the answer of Messrs. Willing, Eyre, Bevan, White, Sergeant, Fisher, Lippincott, Chauncey, Newkirk, Lewis, Holmes, Biddle? Hear it:—“IT IS NOT TRUE, that any ‘publications have been prepared and extensively circulated, containing the grossest invectives against the officers of the government.’” Who are they that say it is true? H. D. Gilpin, J. T. Sullivan, and Peter Wager. The public will, of course, decide for itself which party to believe.

Again—the same three assert, that ‘The fact has been RECENTLY disclosed, that an unlimited discretion has been, and is now vested in the President of the Bank, to expend its funds in payment for preparing and circulating articles, and purchasing pamphlets and newspapers, calculated, by their contents, to OPERATE on Elections, and secure a renewal of its charter.’

What is the answer to this assertion?—“NOR IS IT TRUE, that ANY power is vested in the President ‘for preparing and

circulating articles, and purchasing pamphlets and newspapers, calculated, by their contents, to operate on elections.' NO SUCH POWER IS GIVEN, AND NO SUCH POWER IS EXERCISED."

Here, again, the public will decide which party tells the truth, and which not. That both do, NONE will believe.

The twelve gentlemen whose names are given above, unite in saying what the power given actually is. 'The power,' they say, actually given, which has been exercised, and will continue to be exercised, is, for  *the defence of the Bank* against the CALUMNIES with which, for four years, the institution has been pursued.'

Once more. The three Government Directors say: 'The fact that the Bank *controls*, and in some cases substantially *owns*, and by its money *supports* some of the leading presses of the country, is now more clearly understood.'

What is the answer to this by those twelve gentlemen?— 'THIS WHOLE ALLEGATION IS DENIED.' They proceed in detail thus—and put the extinguisher of Truth, upon each point of Calumny, in order. They say, 'The Bank does not *now* control, and *never did* control any press whatever—the Bank does not *OWN*, and never did own *ANY* press—the Bank does not *SUPPORT*, nor did it *EVER* support, by its money, *ANY* press.' This, it must be confessed, is a stumper! They proceed—'Created for the purpose of giving aid to every branch of industry, it has not presumed to *proscribe* the conductors of the press from their share of the accommodation due to their capital and industry. Of the extent and security of these loans, the Directors claim the exclusive privilege of judging.'

Now this is all very plain, very honest, and very just. Who that reads what these twelve honourable Directors say, doubts a particle of it?

But no matter. The source whence these charges sprung, was prepared with a channel, and a reservoir, whence again they were to be issued, by means of conduits already made for the purpose, all over the land. The reservoir was "*the Government.*" Mr. Taney made much use of these charges.

I will conclude this number by showing what sort of reception the charges met at the hands of Mr. Calhoun, in his famous speech in the Senate. He says:

“The Secretary (of the Treasury) alleges that the Bank has interfered with the politics of the country. If this be true, it certainly is a most heinous offence. The Bank is a great public trust, possessing, for the purpose of discharging the trust, great power and influence, which it could not pervert from the object intended, to that of influencing the politics of the country, without being guilty of a great political crime. In making these remarks, I do not intend to give *any countenance* to the *truth* of the charge alleged by the Secretary, nor to deny to the officers of the Bank the right which belongs to them, in common with every citizen, freely to form political principles, and act on them in their private capacity, without permitting them to influence their official conduct. But it is strange it did not occur to the Secretary, while he was accusing and punishing the Bank on the charge of interfering in the politics of the country, that the Government also was a great trust, vested with powers still more extensive, and influence immeasurably greater than that of the bank, given, to enable it to discharge the object for which *it* was created; and that it has no more right to pervert its power and influence into the means of controlling the politics of the country than the Bank itself. Can it be unknown to him that the Fourth Auditor of the Treasury (Amos Kendall) an officer in *his own department*, the man who has made so prominent a figure in this transaction, was daily, and hourly meddling in politics, and that he is one of the principal political managers of the administration! Can he be ignorant that the whole power of the government has been perverted into a great political machine, with a view of corrupting and controlling the country? Can he be ignorant that the avowed and open policy of the government is, to *reward* political friends, and *punish* political enemies? And that, acting on this principle, it has driven from office hundreds of honest and competent officers, *for opinion's sake*, only, and filled their places with devoted partizans? Can he be ignorant that the *real offence* of the Bank is not that it *has* intermeddled in politics, but because it  **WOULD NOT INTERMEDDLE ON THE SIDE OF POWER!**

“The Secretary next tells us, in the same spirit, that the Bank had been wasteful of the public funds. That it had spent some thirty, or forty, or fifty thousand dollars in circulating essays, and speeches, in defence of the institution, of which sum, one-fifth part belonged to the government. Well, sir, if the Bank has really *wasted* this amount of the public money, (say \$12,000,) it is a grave charge. It has not a right to waste a single cent. But I must say, in defence of the Bank, that, assailed as it was by the Executive, it would have been unfaithful to its trust—both to the stockholders and to the public, had it not resorted to every proper means in its power to defend its conduct, and among others, the free circulation of able and judicious publications.

“But admit that the Bank has been guilty of wasting the public money to the full extent charged by the Secretary, I would ask if he, the head of the financial Department of the Government, is not under as high and solemn obligations to take care of the monied interest of the public, as the Bank itself? I would ask him to answer me a few simple questions: How has he performed this duty in relation to the interest which the public holds in the Bank? Has he been less wasteful than he has charged the Bank to have been? Has he not wasted thousands where the Bank, even according to his own statement, has hundreds. Has he not, by withdrawing the deposites, and placing them in the State Banks, where the public receives not a cent of interest, greatly affected the dividends of the Bank of the United States, in which the Government, as a stockholder, is *loser* to the amount of one-fifth of the diminution? A sum which I will venture to predict will many fold exceed the entire amount which the Bank has expended in *its defence*.*

“But this is a small, a very small proportion of the public loss, in consequence of the course which the Executive has pursued in relation to the Bank, and which has reduced the value of the shares from 130 to 108, (a Director near me says much more,) and on which the public sustains a corresponding loss on its share of the stock, amounting to seven millions of dollars, a sum more than *two hundred fold* greater than the waste which he has charged upon the Bank. Other Administrations may exceed this in *talents, patriotism and honesty*, but certainly in AUDACITY, in EFFRONTERY, it stands without a parallel.”

The public now see with whom the reasons of the Secretary, such as they are, originated.

I will in my next point out a few more of these sparks which the Government Directors sent in the direction of the

* Mr. Adams goes into detail upon this point. He says:

“The people of the United States own Seventy Thousand Shares of the stock of this Bank. When the President of the United States declared war against this institution, every one of these shares was worth one hundred and thirty dollars. What are they worth now? At the utmost one hundred and five dollars a share. Every share of the Bank stock owned by the people of the United States, has lost twenty-five dollars of its value to them, by this electioneering of the President of the United States *against* the Bank and *for himself*. Twenty-five dollars a share upon seventy thousand shares is One Million Seven Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars, and this is the sum which the President of the United States has levied upon the people by his electioneering *against* the Bank, and *for himself*.

Whilst the Bank has expended forty-eight thousand dollars of the money of the stockholders, the President of the United States has taxed them to the amount of seven millions of dollars.”

magazine of President Jackson's vengeance; and show the light in which Mr. Binney viewed both the *design* and the *execution*.

ARISTIDES-



No. 19.

There is nothing with which men profess to be familiar, that is better understood by the intelligent, of all parties, and even by the well informed in countries other than our own, than is *the character* of Andrew Jackson. No well informed man questions, for a moment, that *passion*, and not *reason*, governs him. The time has been, I am aware, when he was supported by honourable men, who *hoped* otherwise. But whatever of hope may have remained on this point, his conduct towards the Bank of the United States, must have dissipated it; or, if there were any lurking remains of it, they must be now disposed of for ever, by the recent *ravings* and *acts* of that functionary towards Senator Poindexter. The power and influence of the Presidential station, governed, as all men know, by passion, were employed, and successfully, to overthrow the great financial system of our country; and the same power and influence, governed also by passion, and a thirst for vengeance, have been put in requisition to assassinate the character of Senator Poindexter! That this member of the Senate is not at this moment prostrated, with the curses of millions upon him, with a name riven, and blasted, and damned, is no fault of Andrew Jackson, or those who cater for his passions. But is he, who handled and circulated the poison, or they who mixed it, the less excusable? Is the physician, who, as the metaphysician, REED, illustrates, less the murderer of his patient, because the pills, made of spiders, with a view to kill him, worked his cure? Certainly not.

This plot against Senator Poindexter is but another bursting forth, in another place, of the same covert stream, whose principal source is Col. Benton's calumny respecting the East room. It is no less bold and daring, but it is decidedly more

wicked. It is, however, of the same family. The whole of it is resolvable into one simple element, viz:—the wrath of Andrew Jackson, kindled by those around him, against ANY thing and ANY body, that he is made to believe is his enemy. Look how its flames were tossed about, when Martin Van Buren kindled it against Mr. Calhoun. See how it consumed the first Cabinet—even to Mr. Branch, who, in an unfortunate hour, had denominated Andrew Jackson “the greatest and best.” Mark how it has ravaged the financial system, in the overthrow of the Bank, consuming in its course both laws and chartered rights;—with what unrelenting fury it consumed the unbending Duane, and how it has blazed out for the destruction of Senator Poindexter. Where, I ask, is the man, I care not how close his fellowship with Andrew Jackson, and where is the institution—(the Senate and Supreme Court YET excepted)—that artful, and designing, and corrupt men, could persuade him was his enemy, that he did not attempt utterly to destroy? Let any man name one of either, if he can. Here lies the secret of that subserviency to the man which is so degrading to his followers. They know his will must be obeyed, or they must, as was Mr. Duane, be immolated, to appease his vengeance.

As to the recent attack upon Senator Poindexter, it is even more characteristic of Andrew Jackson than the attacks upon his first Cabinet, and upon members of the Cabinets which have succeeded. I call upon the citizens of Tennessee to say, whether “the Affidavit System” was not his favorite one there? Let Wm. B. Lewis answer. How deeply to be deplored is it, that Andrew Jackson CANNOT lose himself in the President of the United States; but that this high office should be sunk and degraded, and lost in Andrew Jackson! I take no pleasure in such an exposition.

This, then, is the sort of man who commissioned “the Government Directors,” and “devised them as (his) instruments,” to examine into and report to him, the conduct of the Bank. What did he want? Reasons, I answer, to send among the people, whether good or bad was of no moment, to justify him in wreaking his vengeance on this institution. They were

required, or as Mr. Binney has it, "coerced," to furnish them.

I have shown the nature of the reports made under the commissions conferred, *in part*; and as far as I have gone what sort of reasons were furnished. There remains one other scintillation to expose to the public, and which was alone sufficient to fire the magazine of President Jackson's wrath against the Bank. It was that which exploded it—or in other and his own words, "decided" him. What was it? The representation, I answer, by his *chosen ones*, that they were treated, whilst employed in the business entrusted to them, and under the forms which *he* had prescribed, with *indignity!* That was enough. It amounted, in his view, to a direct assault upon himself. He so considered it, and he so treated it.

The complaint made by the Government Directors, (after they had implicated both the Bank and its officers, as I have shown, and with what truth I have shown, also,) was, in substance, that they were *excluded* from important Committees of the Bank, and were, in effect, treated with *contempt!*

Mr. Binney, in his admirable speech in the House of Representatives, disposes of the claim of *right* set up by these men to be put on committees, thus:

"Their right," he says, "to be members of *any* committee, has no more legal support than the right of a member of this House (the House of Representatives) to be upon a committee appointed by this House. In this House it depends upon its pleasure, or upon the pleasure of the Speaker. In the Board of Directors, on the pleasure of the Board—either directly or indirectly, as they may make the appointment themselves, or give the power of appointment to the President of the Board."

Where is the man, or set of men, not intent on exciting some revengeful passion of some despot, or who should not be grossly misled, that would ever have thought of making a grave charge against the President and Directors of a Bank for not *preferring* them over experienced Directors, to represent the great interests of the Bank on important committees. The complaint *might* have come with some grace from the Neckers, the Gallatins and Biddles of the world—(though they would have scorned to make it;) but coming from those

who made it, however well qualified they might be for the duties of their callings, or estimable in private life, the complaint is, in all eyes except their own and President Jackson's, truly ludicrous.

What these Government Directors thought of themselves, I must let the reader know. They were exalted, in their own estimation, as gods! The *other* Directors were even as grass-hoppers in their sight. Hear them—(after an amplification of their attributes:)

————— “And yet (they say) we are told with a *hardihood* which nothing but the *pride of purse* can explain, that the PUBLIC Directors, (that is themselves) thus devised for NATIONAL purposes; thus designated by the HIGHEST NATIONAL AUTHORITY; thus invested as NATIONAL OFFICERS, with NATIONAL trusts, and RESPONSIBILITIES, have *no other attributes, or duties, than the other Directors!!!*”

The foregoing is a true quotation, from “the memorial” of the Government Directors. It is a marvellous illustration of the fable of the frog and the ox. But I forbear, and will leave it to Mr. Binney to throw upon these extraordinary pretensions, and no less extraordinary *principles* and *conduct*, the light of his powerful mind.

“Heretofore,” says this great man, (in the speech to which I have referred) “in the history of the bank, the directors appointed by the President of the United States, have mingled in all the transactions of the Bank, mutually giving, and enjoying universal confidence, and being in *no respect whatever* distinguished from the other directors. Mr. Biddle himself was a director, appointed by the President, for many years, and particularly in the important years of 1829, '30, '31, and '32; and other gentlemen have, from time to time, acted upon all the important committees, including the committee of Exchange, so as to give the Bank the benefit of their peculiar *qualifications*, for, it must always have been a question of qualification, and if a director was not qualified for a particular post, it is not probable, *whatever* was the source of his appointment, that he would be placed in it.

“But, sir, in the time of the *present* government directors, a change has come upon us, and upon the Bank, of a very important kind, and it is not surprising that it has affected those directors also.

“It was *vehemently* suspected, sir, at the time of their appointment, that their notions of duty and right were *peculiar*; that they deemed themselves bound, or entitled to use their posts for the purpose of making representations to the President of the United States, tending to *excite* odium against their co-directors, by impeaching their motives and acts, and thus to *impair the credit of the Bank*, that they deemed themselves at

liberty, &c. to pursue objects which they did not care to avow; and which *they were not PERMITTED to avow*; and finally, sir, that in some way, by some unexplained theory of their appointment, they had come to the opinion that they possessed *political* powers in the institution which they were authorised to use for *political* purposes. All this, sir, was *vehemently* suspected; and if the suspicions were just, the propriety of placing them in posts of trust and confidence in the Bank, was not so clear, particularly, as, if they were so placed, it might have been difficult to persuade other gentlemen to *sit beside them in the occupation of those posts*. **¶** I say, sir, it might have been extremely difficult to persuade *gentlemen of character*, having *some feelings and reputation* of their own, to sit in a post of trust and confidence by the side of directors holding such notions of duty and right, and carrying them out, without avowing their objects, into measures of extreme personal annoyance, as well as discredit to the Bank.

“Sir, what was at that time, perhaps, no more than *vehement suspicion*, is now, and for some time past has been; matter of **¶ UNQUESTIONABLE CERTAINTY**; and the certainty is derived from the best possible authority—the **CONFESSION OF THE VERY PARTY.**”

Mr. Binney here called the attention of the house to “a part of a letter addressed by three of the government directors to the President of the United States on the 22d April, 1833, which is annexed to the letter of the Secretary.”

They say—

“Without considering any portion of our remarks as falling within the limits of those private accounts, which, as *you* state, the charter has so carefully guarded, since the whole relate to the action of the Board upon matters fully open, and discussed, before them, and extend, in no instance to the private debtor and creditor accounts of individuals, yet we may be excused for expressing much gratification at your assurance that the information requested is for your own satisfaction, and that you do not wish it to extend beyond our personal knowledge. We may be permitted also to add, that the wishes and opinions which we took the liberty of expressing in our former letter have been since more strongly confirmed, and that we should not only feel more satisfaction ourselves, but be enabled to convey to you more full and correct information, were we to proceed in an investigation, **WHOSE OBJECT IS AVOWED**, and if we were strengthened by that official sanction which we suggested.”

“Then, sir,” exclaimed Mr. Binney, “they were not altogether comfortable in their new position; and I do not wonder at it. Then, their object *was not avowed*, and they **¶ were not PERMITTED to avow it**, but were **COMPELLED**, by their own sense of distress, to ask for an official sanction under which they might avow it. Then, further, they were practising *concealment* themselves and trying to prosecute an investigation, without avowing its object, when that object is now known to have been to inculpate the Board, and particularly the gentleman at the head of it, and by means of the odium thus excited, to justify to public prejudice an act of

deadly hatred to the Bank, of which they were Directors—the removal of the public deposits; and then, sir, I say in conclusion that there is not an honourable man in this House, or IN THIS COUNTRY, who will respond to the sentiment that they were treated *at least* as well as they deserved to be, by not being assisted in the performance of these remarkable labours. With this confession of concealment by the Government Directors, to which they were *coerced* by the Executive, the Secretary of the Treasury arraigns the Board for concealing its operations from them; he charges the Board with concealment, in violation of their charter, and in *contempt* of the Government, when the head and front of their offence is this, *only* — that they would not consent to be the dupes of concealment that was practised by others.”

I bespeak the public attention to a continuation of Mr. Binney's remarks, with which I shall commence, and perhaps close, the next number. They are upon a most extraordinary part of the memorial of the Government Directors.

ARISTIDES.

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No. 20.

The reader is respectfully solicited to follow out in connexion with the foregoing number, this further extract from Mr. Binney's speech:

“But sir,” said Mr. Binney, “this is not all. The memorial of the Government Directors to this House, for the doctrines of which we are, I presume, indebted to the professional gentleman (H. D. Gilpin) whose name is at its head, cannot be too much adverted to, in connexion with both the charge of concealment by the Board, and *another* charge hereafter to be noticed, of a graver description. It is a document that may be considered as a sort of small *martyrology*—a history of the sufferings incident to disappointed efforts and mortified pretensions; and it contains, as is natural, a confession of the faith by which the sufferers have been sustained at the stake, where they have placed themselves.”

“I beg permission,” says Mr. Binney, “to exhibit it to the House.” And I beg the reader's particular attention to it. This is it:

————— “It has pleased the majority of the Board of Directors, (says the memorial,) in the document to which we refer, in order, we suppose, in some degree, to *extenuate* their conduct, in systematically nullifying the *REPRESENTATIVES* of the GOVERNMENT and the PEOPLE, (meaning themselves,) to deny that the public directors are seated at the board in any

other relation than themselves to deny the existence of any difference in the official character and duty of themselves and us. * * *

Nothing can be plainer than that the public Directors were **DEvised AS INSTRUMENTS**—(I beg the House, said Mr. Binney, to advert to the felicity of the language—‘were devised as instruments.’)—Nothing, (proceeds the memorial,) can be plainer, than that the public directors were devised as instruments for the attainment of public objects; that their being insisted upon in the charter itself, was in obedience to the will of those who elected the Legislative body by which it was passed; and that their appointment was given to the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, (not to the mere fiscal representative,) in order to clothe them with all the character of official representatives, and to **EXACT** from them a discharge of ALL the duties, public, POLITICAL and patriotic, incident to a trust, so conferred. If we are mistaken in this, we acknowledge that our solicitude about the rights, and morals, the practical purity and freedom of our countrymen, has misled us. But WE KNOW that we are not.”

Mr. Binney proceeds:

“Devised as instruments, and given to the President, to ‘exact’ from them a discharge of ALL the duties, public, POLITICAL, and patriotic, incident to a trust so conferred!—The sense would not have been more complete, sir, though the alliteration would have been more perfect, if they had described their functions as extending to ALL duties, public, political, patriotic, and PARTY.”

One word here—though I regret to make a breach in Mr. Binney’s onset upon such a train of absurdities. I am only surprised with such high notions of their superior dignity, these men consented to sit at the same board with “the *other* directors;” or upon seats made of the same materials. It were easy to show that this was not the first time in the history of the world and its affairs, that men were not only made “dizzy,” by a call to places of trust, &c., but argued themselves into the belief that but for them, creation itself would be embarrassed by a vacuum that nothing, merely human, could fill. But to Mr. Binney.

“Now, sir,” says Mr. B. “without at present saying whether this theory was true, the *other* directors had a right to counteracting theory for themselves: and if it is true that the government directors were *devised as instruments*, and that they are by their creation *political* directors, the other directors, who have not been so devised, are entitled to consider themselves as *antipolitical* directors, and not bound to assist the political operations of the other branch; but rather, by the momentum of their greater numbers, to keep them from moving the Bank out of place.

“But, sir, the heads of the memorialists have been made dizzy by their elevation. Their theory has no foundation in reason, or in the charter. I deny, says Mr. Binney, that they were devised as instruments, whatever they may have made of themselves. There is not a shadow of difference between the rights and duties, the powers, or the obligations of any of the directors; they are *all* directors, neither more, nor less, and owing the same duties to all the interests confided to them. The directors appointed by the President, owe a duty to the nation, and so do the others, and in my poor judgment, they (the others) have performed it. The directors elected by the stockholders, owe a duty to the Bank, and so do the directors appointed by the President, but they (the directors appointed by the President) have neither performed, nor acknowledged it. They are not placed there to make enquiries for the President. The President has no authority to direct enquiries to be made by them. This is a question of charter power, of power over a corporation, all of whose privileges are rights of property. The charter gives to the President no such right. It expressly gives to the Secretary of the Treasury a right of limited enquiry, &c.”

Mr. Binney here shows what powers are given by the charter, not by implication, but expressly. He then proceeds:

“But here is a power to be *implied* greater than all, and *worse* than all, a power to be exercised secretly, and without avowal, *ex parte*, without notice, without opportunity of reply or explanation being given to those whom it affects, and by persons who are holding, to all appearance, the relations of amity with their co-Directors, setting on the same seats, and professing the same general objects.

“Sir, the Board did right not to aid them; it would have done right to resist them, and I inquire of the members of this House, and ask them to follow out their honourable feelings into the reply—Would they consent to sit in committee by the side of men who professed principles like these, AND SUBMITTED THEMSELVES TO THE WILL OF ANOTHER, as to the manner in which they should carry them into execution.”

The reader will need no further enlightening on the assumed nature of the rights and duties of the Government Directors. Nor will he need ever again to be told why the Senate rejected these men, when put in nomination as government directors for another term; or why the Senate rejected the nomination of one for Paymaster in the Army; and another for Governor of the Michigan Territory.

Whether the minds of these men be peculiarly constituted, or whether, by reason thereof, they arrive at conclusions so preposterous and unjust, as those into which they reasoned

themselves touching the relations they bore to "the other Directors," and the right of the President of the United States to use them as "instruments," or whether they were unconsciously governed by other influences, the Senate saw, doubtless, that they were not the sort of persons, however harmless they might be as citizens, to invest with Government authority, or to put in commission for the discharge of responsible Government trusts. The same train of reasoning would have led one of them to believe that "all" the money put in his possession to pay the troops, belonged, of right, to himself; and the other that the good people of Michigan were like those "other Directors," entirely *beneath* him; or that they were to be operated upon, and reported about, as were the acts of the Bank and its officers, and to be, with their laws, judged, and condemned, and executed accordingly.

Well has Mr. Binney alluded to the condition of these men to be one of their own choosing. They are "at the stake, where they have placed themselves."

ARISTIDES.

No. 21.

Throughout the whole progress of this war of calumny against the Bank, the party prosecuting it, never, for a moment, lost sight of one of the principal parts of the contrivance, viz:—to *create new*, and successive suspicions in the public mind, *and send round, by its presses, not only new, but old and exploded calumnies*. This was done by holding the Bank up, always, as a corrupt institution, and needing to be constantly *watched*, and *examined*, either by agents, appointed by the Treasury, or by 'instruments,' appointed by the President, or by committees, appointed by Congress. It was reasonable to suppose, that after the public treasure, which the Law had confided to the safe-keeping of the Bank, had been wrested from it by President Jackson; and its agency, which the Charter had conferred, was, by that same functionary, dispensed with, that there would be no more agents of

any sort appointed, further to misrepresent, calumniate, and criminate the Bank. But the character of this party persecution against the Bank, being of the same quality with that of individual persecution, it sought to *justify* itself, after the commission of the wrong, by some new discovery, of some sort, on which to rest some new charge of guilt, and justify the outrage that had been committed. Where is the officer of Government, upon whom the fangs of proscription have been fastened, who has not been pursued by 'the party,' and its presses, with personal abuse, and missiles of every description, to blacken his character? And what for? To justify, I answer, to public opinion, the act that drove him from office. Just so with the Bank. It was 'proscribed.' The same lawless violence that has been exerted for the destruction of hundreds, nay, thousands of individuals, had been exerted against the Bank. It had been rifled of the treasures confided to it by Congress—and the agency which the Charter conferred upon it, together with its connexion with the Government; the one had been dispensed with, and the other ruptured and broken up. But those high-handed and lawless proceedings were not carried on without producing in the consciences of the actors, an occasional stir, which startled them with the apprehension that the people, catching a glimpse of the enormity of the wrong and outrage which had been committed, would speak in a voice of terrible rebuke, and drive them from their positions into that ignominy which they felt they merited. Hence, as was, and *is* their conduct, in pursuing the victims they 'proscribe,' and drive from office, so was, and *is* their conduct towards the Bank. They dread, to this hour, the lifting of the curtain that shall expose to public view the lawlessness of their acts, and the corruption of their plans and purposes towards the Bank.

It was this feeling—and when the country, alarmed, and embarrassed, from one extremity to the other, as it was—when it beheld the President of a free people, professing to act under the Constitution and Laws of this Republic, wresting, without law, and against law, the public treasure from the place where the laws had placed it, that prompted 'the

party' to get up a Committee in the House of Representatives, and place Mr. Thomas, of Maryland, at its head. The sole object of this manœuvre was, to keep alive suspicion against the Bank, and to feed the public mind with such exciting food, as the plan of operations determined upon might place within their reach. It was, in a word, a shield thrown up by 'the party,' to guard Andrew Jackson and his followers from the indignation of an insulted and outraged people.

The reader will bear in mind, that the Bank had been examined and reported upon, by a committee, of which Judge Clayton was chairman, and of which committee Mr. Thomas was a member. It will also be borne in mind that Judge Clayton, after making his report, criminating both the bank and its officers, made ample atonement, on the floor of the House of Representatives, for the wrong which he had done both to the Bank and its officers. The able counter reports of Messrs. M'Duffie and Adams, and others, will also be borne in mind, nor will it be forgotten that when Judge Clayton actually repudiated his report, it left the report of Messrs. M'Duffie and Adams, to stand not on their own merits only, but supported by the testimony of Judge Clayton himself.

This committee, designed as a shield to protect "the party," was formed for the *avowed* purpose of "ascertaining the cause of the commercial embarrassment and distress complained of by numerous citizens of the United States in sundry memorials," &c.—and "whether the charter of the Bank has been violated; and what CORRUPTIONS, and ABUSES have existed in its management;" and whether it has used its corporate power, or money, to control the press, to interfere in politics, or influence elections, and whether it has had any agency, through its management, or money, in producing the existing pressure, &c. &c.

Now here we have it! The only new feature in the business entrusted to this new committee, that was not on the face of the committee, of which Judge Clayton was chairman, is that which relates to the cause of the commercial embarrassment; and this was got up to make the people believe, by implication at least, that the Bank was the author of it.

I sincerely wish the limits to which I feel bound to confine these essays, permitted a detailed history of the proceedings of this committee. Never in the world's history, did men, professing to be intelligent and honest, so weaken their claims on public opinion, to both these characters. The whole affair, to the intelligent eye, must look like some low farce. In the first place they refused the aid of a committee of the Bank, or to permit it to be present in the room while they were overhauling the books and papers of the Bank. Now I put the question to every intelligent reader, and ask, if the Board had not appointed such a committee, whether the examining committee ought not to have asked it to do so? If their object was truth, could not such gentlemen as the board named as its committee have pointed the way to it better than a set of men could find it from books and papers with which they could not be supposed to be familiar? Or would the presence of the committee of the Bank have changed in the slightest degree, a single entry, or overshadowed a single fact?

The refusal to sit in the room with the Bank committee, or to conduct, in their presence, the inquiries with which they were charged, can be regarded in no other light, than as a confession of a purpose to pick, and cull, and work up such colouring matter, (as had been before prepared by men of the same party,) as to make the Bank look to the eyes of the people just as Andrew Jackson and his followers wished it to look. Being so seen, he, and they, calculated on being sustained in the lawless acts of which they had been guilty.

The next move of this examining committee was to demand to have the Bank's books and papers sent through the streets, and all custody of the officers of the bank over them to be surrendered, to the North American Hotel!!!

I am bound to believe that when this demand was made, not a single member of the committee believed it would be complied with. The object was, to make a charge against the Bank, and through the party and subsidized presses, to make the people believe that the Bank refused to have its

conduct examined, out of which, by implication, the sentence of GUILTY was to come.

The last act of this farce was to command, through the Marshal, the personal presence of Nicholas Biddle, and the other Directors, before the examining committee, at their room, at Mrs. Yohe's North American Hotel. I never heard but one feeling among enlightened people on this whole proceeding, and that was CONTEMPT.

It may suffice to conclude this number, and this sketch of referencé to the acts and doings of this famous committee, by saying, if any opinion can be deduced from the action of Congress on this report, it was in corroboration of that which was felt and expressed out of Congress, for so far as I have been able to ascertain, the report, with the recommendation with which it closed, were (except to print it) left to expire in its own utter worthlessness. Not a muscle of it has been stirred, nor a breath perceived to expand its chest, since it was presented to the House. There it lies a monument of the weakness of its authors, and of the recklessness and wickedness of "the party."

I shall notice Mr. Tyler's report in my next; and show from it that all I have said in these essays in defence of the Bank, and its integrity, and great public utility, and of its calumniators, is true.

ARISTIDES.



No. 22.

The reader need not be reminded, that, upon the Senate of the United States has devolved the high and sacred duty of preserving what *remains* to us of our free institutions, and the liberty which these confer. The fact is notorious. All intelligent people know it; and all honest citizens admit it. Profligate party leaders, it is true, denounce and call it the "refractory Senate," and their instruments echo the denunciation. But in this very opposition to the Senate, and in the attempts to degrade it in the eyes of the people, in connexion

with the glorious stand it has taken against Presidential usurpation, lies the proof of its devotion to liberty and the constitution, and to the "general welfare."

The Senate witnessed the repeated onsets made by Jacksonism upon the rights of the citizen, the constitution, and the laws,—one of the most alarming of which was, its utter contempt of the rights of the Bank of the United States, in the vindictive war which was waged upon it, and in the removal of the public deposits. It heard the war cry:—"UNCOMPROMISING HOSTILITY TO THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES," it saw the measures resorted to for the overthrow of that Bank, and along with it, the prostration of the best interests of the people—and it was acquainted, as its position enabled it to be, with the workings of the entire machinery that was put in motion, to produce all these consequences. Yes, from the Woodbury plot, down to the Thomas Committee, the Senate saw the workings of that mischievous and vindictive spirit, that, regardless of consequences, though it should involve the very liberties of the country, had resolved on crushing (as Gen. Jackson denominated the Bank) "the monster."

It was most natural for this august body, amidst the shower of disgraceful rumours, which 'the party' had caused to fall all over the United States, implicating the integrity of the Bank, and the character of its officers, to resolve on having the whole matter put forever to rest, by an examination, to be conducted by a committee of its own. If what had been so boldly charged against the Bank be *true*, the Senate doubtless reasoned, let the facts be disclosed to prove it; if *false*, let the world know it. It is high time for those who seek to know the truth in this matter, to be possessed of the means for reaching it.

The Senate determined, therefore, to confide this important examination to its own Committee on Finance. Instructions were accordingly given to that Committee, in a resolution of the 30th June last, when it, (Mr. Tyler, of Virginia, being Chairman,) immediately after the adjournment of

Congress, commenced the investigation with which it was charged.

We all know the confusion into which the appointment of this Committee threw the calumniators of this abused and proscribed institution. There was a quailing that the dimmest eye could not fail to discover; and a blanching was visible in the faces of even the most hardened Bank denouncer. Nobody doubted the *honour* of this Committee; none its *intelligence*. Every body looked to its report with confidence; whilst those who had falsely implicated the Bank, knew, that though justice had been slow in overtaking them, it was now to be awarded.

I deeply regret that I have not the power to put this report, entire, in the hands of every citizen of the Republic. I feel that in the analysis I propose to make of it, I shall be doing injustice to both it and the reader. It ought to be sought after, and read by every one who takes any interest in this great question, (and who, as an American, is not interested in it?) or who has been influenced by any thing that has hitherto been written, or said, in regard to the subject of it.

The Thomas report contains a charge against "the President and Board of Directors of the Bank of the United States, for REFUSING to submit for inspection the books and papers of the Bank"—and otherwise it implicates them as COMBINED TO FRUSTRATE the examination, and as having, finally, frustrated it.

Now what says the report of the Tyler Committee?

—————"They deem it proper to say, that, in the examination which they have made, every facility was afforded by the officers of the institution, which the committee could have desired. No hesitation or reluctance was manifested in furnishing *any* book or paper which was requested, and every avenue to a *full* and *free* investigation, not only at the Bank, but at the several branches visited by the committee, or any member of it, was promptly laid open."

What a comment on the text of the Thomas report? One of two conclusions must be arrived at by every reader—either the Thomas report is false; or the committee so conducted itself as to make it obligatory on the President and Directors of the Bank, from self-respect, or to secure the

institution from some heavy calamity, which that committee must have been discovered meditating, to take the ground they did. There could have been nothing personal against the one committee, or in favour of the other. But the Thomas report is its own best comment. It needs not that the Bank, or any one for it, should explain why such a charge was made against the President and Directors. The report explains, and to any honest mind, *justifies* the course which *that* committee *compelled* the President and Directors to take.

It is enough for the public to know that when another sort of committee, one carrying with it just notions of right and justice, presented itself at the Bank, the whole bank, books, papers and all, were thrown open to its examination, and it is on an examination thus made, that the Tyler committee rests its report.

The "Government Directors," and the Thomas committee, could see many acts of the Bank which had "violated its charter." This, though continually harped upon and enforced, was never believed, if by these men, by those who held the key of President Jackson's purposes—for if it had, even in a single instance, as was so often asserted, violated its charter, there is no man of common sense who will for a moment doubt that steps, such as are provided for in the charter, would have been instantly taken, and the work of the Bank's overthrow been made as *sudden* as *complete*. It was because the declarations were NOT TRUE, and because they were *known* to be not true, that a *scire facias* was not sued out simultaneously with their being made.

The first question which the Tyler Committee propose to examine is:

"Has the Bank violated its charter?"

In the examination of this question, the several acts of the Bank, in which it was charged to have violated its charter, were minutely examined.

These are embraced under the following heads.

1. The Exchange Committee.
2. The Branch Drafts.
3. The Contract with the Barings.

It will be borne in mind that the "instruments" of President Jackson, under all their forms, including his official organ, near him, at Washington, and its subordinates all over the country—all pressed these points upon the public; and even Mr. Secretary Taney, and the President, asserted and enforced the declaration, that the Bank had violated its charter. But as I have said, there was not a man of them believed it—or rather, I should say, those who *managed* President Jackson, and kept the key of his purposes, knew that the charges were false. But they were necessary to the plan, and "the party."

Hear the conclusion of the Tyler report on the question—
 "Has the Bank violated its charter?"

"The language of the Bank charter is almost in substance the language employed in the Constitution of the United States, in reference to the two Houses of Congress, which declares that '*a majority*' (of each House) shall be necessary to constitute a quorum to do business. With as much propriety might it be urged that the Senate and House of Representatives had violated the Constitution by creating committees, or appointing agents to execute the laws, as that the directors, 'seven of whom are necessary for the transaction of business,' had violated their charter by the exercise of a similar power. The committee of Exchange was created at the same time with the committee on the offices, and other committees, has continued ever since, (it is almost coeval with the Bank itself,) and exists, as your committee believes, not only in STRICT CONFORMITY WITH THE CHARTER, but with advantage to the Bank, and CONVENIENCE TO THE PUBLIC."

The reader will lose the masterly, and demonstrative illustration which brought the committee to this conclusion. He will miss also the sight of that consuming fire which has burned to cinders the declarations of those who, with such varied effort, strove, and succeeded in making many, too many, believe, that this committee was not only unconstitutional, but used by the Bank for *corrupt* purposes. If ever the agents of any plot were discomfited, and *disgraced*, those are, who joined the hue and cry against the Bank, on the acts of this *exchange committee*.

The second head of examination was:

"THE BRANCH DRAFTS."

The issuing of these drafts was denounced as violating the

charter. Under this head the committee make an exposition that must put the subject to rest forever. They say:

“The committee purposely avoid an elaborate *argument* on *either* side. They content themselves with stating the general principles on which their several opinions are founded, and submitting them to the Senate and the country. Those who maintain the legality of these issues are sustained by high, legal opinion, (Mr. Binney, Mr. Webster, and Mr. Wirt) and in a great degree by the fact, that for years past, the government has taken those drafts; uniformly, as money, in the payment of its dues; thus virtually acquitting the Bank from all liability to forfeiture, and giving the drafts themselves the impress of a legal currency. Nor do they perceive that the country has, by the proceeding on the part of the government, sustained any loss. These drafts are, every where, current, are redeemed by the Bank with promptitude and readiness, and answer to commerce all the purposes of an unquestionable legal currency.”

Here again I regret, that it is not practicable for me to give to the reader, the exposition of this branch of the committee's enquiry in detail. I urge it upon those who seek a full enlightening on this subject, to get, and read the report, and the documents on which it rests.

The third branch of enquiry under the charge of “the Bank has violated its charter,”—is, “the contract with the Barings.” I defer this to my next, and painful as it will be, I shall have to send round a palpable falsehood, which the committee *pin*, (and which it doubtless gave them great pain to do,) on President Jackson himself—I will not say *falsehood*, for when he came across the declaration, which was written in his address to his cabinet, I will assume that he believed it was true. But then, as he had “his foot on the neck of the monster,” why did he not slay it at once by a *scire facias*. It was, as I shall show, nevertheless, false. Who palmed this falsehood on the President, it concerns *him*, not *me*, to know.

ARISTIDES.

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No. 23.

I have said the Committee of the United States Senate have, in their report, under that decision of it, headed—“The contract with the Barings,” pinned a falsehood on President

Jackson's address to his cabinet. The Committee call it "a direct allegation against the Bank." What is it? Here it is:—

—————"The agent (Gen. Cadwallader) made an arrangement (with the Barings, in relation to the 3 per cents) on terms, in part, which were in DIRECT VIOLATION OF THE CHARTER; and when some incidents connected with this SECRET negotiation ACCIDENTALLY came to the knowledge of the Public, and the Government, *then*, and not before, so much as was palpably in violation of the Charter, was disavowed."

Now, here again I must remark, that the writer of this, (I take for granted it was not Gen. Jackson,) I care not who he was, KNEW that what he asserted, as to the violation of the Charter, was not true; and the conclusion is forced upon me, that if Gen. Jackson believed it was true, there were those who knew it was not, having sufficient control over him, to prevent him from suing out a scire facias, and putting an end, at once, to the Bank. Does it not constantly occur to every reasonable mind, that, if the Bank really had violated its Charter, as President Jackson, and Mr. Taney, and the Government Directors, and the Globe, and all the affiliated presses constantly asserted it had, that, if they believed what they said, they would not have struck it out of existence by a scire facias? Would men carry on a strife, such as they conducted—expose themselves to the effects of a warfare so protracted, and finally to the heavy judgments of an insulted people, for *usurping* a power for the Bank's overthrow, when, by a simple *legal* process, provided for in the Charter, the destruction of the object of their hate and vengeance, could have been made complete? I answer--No; and I shall be responded to by all men, of all parties, who have sense enough to comprehend the clearness of the proposition, and honesty enough to speak what they think. But hear the Committee on this grave charge:

—————"The charge thus made," (says the Committee,) implicates most strongly the *character* of the Directors of the Bank—not only as *unworthy*, but DISHONEST agents." It is no more or less than a charge, that if the negociation could have been kept a profound secret, they would have sanctioned it in all its parts; but that they were driven from this purpose by the fact, "that some incidents connected with this secret negociation accidentally came to the knowledge of the public and the government," and that in order to save themselves from public odium, and the Bank

from the effects of this violation of its Charter, they dishonoured, so far as they could do so, the agent (Gen. Cadwallader) whom they had employed, by disavowing his act. "If this charge" (proceed the Committee) "be well founded, the Committee have no hesitation in saying, that the Bank is not only responsible for the conduct of the Exchange Committee, that Committee having acted in the matter under a resolution of the Board, investing them with full authority, but that the Directors connected with the transaction have proved themselves unworthy of their places."

From this opinion of the committee the reader may infer how rank and deadly was the poison that was thus attempted to be infused  by President Jackson himself, into the characters of honourable men, and into the fiscal agent of the country!

Here again, I feel how important it is for the reader to know the details of this case. They are no less satisfactory than abundant and well attested. I must beg to employ so much of them, as will settle the question of the truth or falsehood of the direct allegation made against the bank by the President of the United States to his cabinet, as above quoted.

"Two of the members of the Exchange Committee," says the report, "men of acknowledged probity and honour, were examined on oath before a committee of the House of Representatives, in February, 1833, and in reply to the following questions: 'Had the President of the Exchange Committee any intention to disavow Gen. Cadwallader's authority to make the contract he did, until after the appearance in the New York papers of the 11th or 12th of October last, of the circular of the Baring's to the foreign stockholders of the United States three per cent. stocks, announcing to them that they had the authority of the bank to purchase or negotiate a postponement of the stocks held by them?'" Answer of Mr. Eyre—"I can say **YES, POSITIVELY**. I recollect it perfectly well. When I first read this letter of Gen. Cadwallader (of 22d August) I said it was not proper, and disavowed it."

Answer of Mr. Bevan—

"I never did see, myself, the notice referred to in the New York papers, but well recollect the moment the letter was received giving information of the proceedings in relation to that negotiation. The President of the Bank, with the approbation of the Exchange Committee, immediately wrote, disavowing the nature of that arrangement—it having been made under a misapprehension."

These, say the Committee, are the facts, then, (including a most satisfactory history of the case, which I have not room to insert) which attend on this transaction. If reference be had to the letters of instructions, continues the report, under

which the agent acted, those instructions look to an arrangement for the *postponement* of the period of redemption of the stocks, and  not a word is said about a purchase.

“If, says the Committee, Mr. Eyre and Mr. Bevan are to be believed, when testifying on oath before a Committee of Congress, then, is there no reason to believe that “incidents connected with this secret negotiation, accidentally coming to the knowledge of the public and the government, induced the Bank to disavow the act of its agent in opposition to its own views and previous intentions.”

And here let the reader pause and ask himself, especially if he be of the number of those who have been led astray by such glaring and mischievous falsehoods, what it is he owes to the men who have thus misled him, and to himself? If after a just analysis of this matter, he can feel for those libellous slanderers who make it their business, as is proved they have done, to cut and thrust at the reputation of honourable citizens, and pour on their “good name” one constant stream of malignant slander, and to level to the ground by such means, one of the most useful public monied institutions that has ever existed; I say, if after this, he can entertain for them any other feeling than contempt and loathing, he must have a medium through which to contemplate such acts, other than that through which high-minded men are accustomed to look. The duty every man owes to himself under such circumstances, is no less plain. He cannot do else than resume the ground he may have occupied before he was seduced from it by such reckless and wicked instruments, without sharing in the infamy of their doings.

There is in such an exposure, cause of deep grief. Blushes must suffuse the cheeks of every American citizen, at home and abroad, when he sees the chief magistrate of his country lending himself to his own ‘instruments,’ to be used by them for the destruction of what is more dear to men than their lives—viz: their ‘good names,’ and for the prostration of a fiscal agent, the creation of the wisest counsels, and of the most patriotic hearts. But shall these doings not be exposed? Shall men be permitted to intrench by themselves behind the

bulwarks of such malicious slanders as these? pull to pieces, without cause, all that is good around them, and leave the garden of our liberty *a wild?* and that, which, through the toils and blood of the revolution, was made a fit and glorious residence for the free, not only of the present, but future generations, *a desert?* Instead of that harmony that should characterize the citizens of the republic, a discord more fell than any that has ever disgraced the most corrupt governments of the old world, has been introduced by Jacksonism, exhibiting as one of its first fruits, a scramble for office and a lust of place, that gives to its proscriptive character, all the ferocity that belongs to the beasts of the forest. This is the secret of that professed regard '*for the people,*' which under cover of that false pretence, has placed Andrew Jackson in the front rank of his followers, to defend, and keep the power and places they hold; and to trample down any thing, and every thing that is suspected, even, of controlling, or regulating their outrageous proceedings, and to *secure a succession.*

Painful as the task is which I have imposed on myself, and lead to what consequences it may, I shall go through with it. It grieves me to say, I have yet other demonstrations to give of the vindictive character, and disreputable acts of those who have rallied under the standard bearing the motto—

———"UNCOMPROMISING HOSTILITY TO THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES."

ARISTIDES.



No. 24.

'These,' say the Committee, 'are ALL the charges against the Bank, tending to implicate it in a violation of its charter, into which the Committee deemed it *necessary* to enter.' The intelligent reader will understand the committee as excluding a whole mass of insignificant implications made on this head, by the government directors, and the Thomas Committee, and by the President of the United States, and his hosts of retainers and followers. All but the ignorant, and those

who knew better, but chose to employ this charge against the Bank, knowing it to be false, I mean the enlightened portion of the community, knew, while these 'instruments' were employed in this branch of the war, that there was no foundation in truth, to support their assertions—but they were relied upon as a part of 'the party' *scheme* to *delude* the people.

We have had a remarkable illustration of the readiness of Gen. Jackson's 'instruments' in two most remarkable cases, to do what he commands: First, in the readiness with which the government directors undertook the business entrusted to them,—MODE and all; and second, in the readiness of another set of instruments to back him in his war upon Gov. Poindexter. He commanded, as if by magic, the ready assent and labours of each, having the same object in view, viz:—the utter destruction of both. He procured mutilated and false reports from the one, (as I have proven in these essays,) and OATHS from the other, and he made the same use of both: and both have turned out to be as false as vindictive. And yet, with proof piled upon proof, and demonstration upon demonstration, there are found men who continue to harp upon the worn-out charge that 'the Bank has violated its charter.' I would commend to all such, a daily use of the prayer—

—————"That gift to gie us,
To see ourselves as others see us."

The next point of inquiry, in order, by the Tyler Committee, is, into the charge made by President Jackson, and instantly backed by his retainers, that the public deposits were not safe in the keeping of the Bank. I have adverted to this charge in a previous number, and would pass it over here, were it not that I desire to introduce a few figures, for the confirmation of the wavering. At the very moment when this charge was made to resound through the land, it is proven that the liabilities of the Bank amounted to \$60,059,909 85; and that to meet them the Bank had resources amounting to \$67,931,511 36, or a surplus of \$7,871,601 51. It is further shown by the Committee, that after deducting all losses, real and probable, the Bank had, on the 1st November last, an

actual surplus of Four Millions, Eight Thousand, Five Hundred and twenty Dollars and sixty-six cents.

Well does the Committee remark, after making this exhibit, that they 'might well take leave of this branch of the subject'—but as there are facts of high import bearing on this question, the Committee give them. I will glance at them presently—first premising, that when this branch of the machinery for the destruction of the Bank was put in motion, not doubting its results, the President, in anticipation, came to the conclusion, that he had so effectually weakened the institution, as to justify the assertion, that the Bank was not a place of safe-keeping for the public deposits. Like the man who lays a train to fire a house, and runs away, saying that the house, doubtless, is burned down; or, like he who gives the stab to a man, or administers poison to him, goes off, and asserts that 'there can be no doubt he is dead'—just so with President Jackson, after he and his 'instruments' had set in motion the following plan for the Bank's overthrow. 'It began to work in 1832. 'From the fall of that year,' the committee say, 'the Bank has been put to the *severest trial*.' The Secretary of the Treasury led the van of the attack, and in his report of the 5th day of December, 1832, questioned the responsibility of the Bank! Congress was informed that an agent was appointed to inquire into the security of the Bank; an examination into its concerns was suggested; the conduct of the Bank in regard to the three per cents was referred to a Committee of the House of Representatives. Out of this report, (after charging the Bank with having made deceptive reports,) was born this monster of an assertion—'It hence appears that the Bank is in a worse condition, by *seven and a half millions*, than it was in March, 1832, when, it is admitted on all hands, to have been under pressure.'

Who gave birth to this monstrous design? The minority committee, who, says the Tyler report, "were regarded at the time as holding sentiments somewhat congenial with those of the Executive department." O yes—and if angels from Heaven had denied the truth of the statement and its in-

ference, and brought down with them truth, lighted up with rays from the source of truth, they would have been by '*the party*,' denounced as devils, and their light, absolute darkness.

This minority committee felt awkward in making such an assertion; hence they must, further to gull the people, and furnish material for their presses, and party, explain the reason why, under such a state of things, there was so little pressure felt. The reason was given—and what does the reader think it was? why,—“the Bank has so arranged its affairs, as to *evade* making payments which were required by the government.”

But this was not enough: these blows were not considered to be hard enough. Another was given by the same committee: “the condition of the bank is no more favourable than in the most perilous moment of its existence.” But this was not enough. Then comes another—and here we have a world of doubt, whether the Bank can be any longer *trusted*. “There is not time left, says the Jackson committee’s report, for the further action of Congress, with a view to a more perfect information at the present session. ¶ Whether existing *facts*, (such as the above) are sufficient to justify THE EXECUTIVE in taking any step against the Bank, authorised by the Charter, is a matter for the decision of the proper officers, acting upon their own views, and responsibility. An opinion by Congress, can make it neither more, nor less, its duty to act.”

This suggestion contains the germ of that notable affair, which resulted in the removal of the deposits. Even this committee looked only to an action by “the *proper* officers” —of course none could be meant other than such as the laws had designated. But when the act was consummated by an *improper* officer, viz:—President Jackson, over the head of ‘the proper officer,’ and with his feet upon his neck, for he prostrated Mr. Duane, to get at the Bank, with this final blow, these same men, followed by the army of office holders, and expectants, harked on by the presses in pay of the

former, shouted "well done—it's all right, down with the bank."

But President Jackson was not content with the blows that preceded his last and final blow—so it was secretly continued anterior to that last blow, to make a concerted run upon one of the Branches—that at Lexington, being supposed to be the easiest of conquest, was selected; all these brought the President to the conclusion, that the Bank was ruined, and hence he asserted the deposits were not safe. But before they were withdrawn, that assertion, as I have in a previous number stated, was contradicted, and the same lips pronounced the Bank to be too strong !!!

The Tyler committee question, in view of all this, "whether any other monied corporation in the world, could have stood up against trials so severe."

And for what, I ask, was all this falsehood, and shuffling, and violation of law resorted to? Wherefore should men thus combine, and plan a conspiracy against *such* an institution as the Bank of the United States has proved itself to be? *In revenge*, I fearlessly answer, for its refusal to throw itself into the arms of Jacksonism, to be used by it as a political tool in the support of *his* measures, 'right or wrong,' and in the ulterior hope that was relied on, that "the party" might employ its means freely, in the election of Andrew Jackson's successor. Here is the secret. Mr. Duane says that the Administrative department was actuated, in all its measures against the Bank, by a spirit of VINDICTIVENESS. And who doubts it? Who is there, in fact, who is not an ignoramus, that does not know this to be true?

These measures of vindictive hostility having been consummated by the final blow of President Jackson, given on his own responsibility, and for which in any other country, and among any other people, he would have been made suitably to atone, and the work of "pilfering," as Mr. Calhoun has it, and of destruction being done, this same party, knowing that great distress would grow out of this rash and lawless course, tacked about, and occupied one of the strangest and most contemptible positions, that ever disgraced any party, in

this, or in any other country. From this position, they denied, might and main, with body and soul, through their press, and through its office-holders, and expectants, that there was **PANIC** "PRESSURE;" and in the same breath declared, "THE BANK CREATES THE PRESSURE."

I appeal to high minded and honourable men of, I care not what party, and ask if ever such a position was occupied by men pretending to be honest, before? And yet, when the leaders shouted "there is no pressure," it is panic; so shouted their army of subsidized followers; and when they shouted again "The Bank creates the pressure," so shouted these same followers. The very echoes of this contradictory shouting mingled!

What was this position taken for? I will answer. Those who had committed the rash act, *knew* there would be pressure; and they knew there *was* pressure; but it answered their ends to deny it. When proof upon proof, when twelve thousand of as honourable men from the city of Philadelphia, as ever graced a city, told the President to his face, there *was* pressure; and when the cry arose from all parts of the country, and was made to resound in the Halls of Congress, and over the land, then, answered the king on his throne, and then shouted his followers, "The Bank makes it," "Go to Nick Biddle."

It mortifies one to show human nature under an aspect so revolting, and to see men as I do every day professing attachment to a set of men that has so trifled with their confidence, and degraded them. Men may think of this business as they please, but let them take my word for it, there is no coming in contact with such doings, and giving them support, without contracting some of their bad odour; and participating in their disgrace.

ARISTIDES.



No. 25.

———Yes———"Go to Nick Biddle," was the insulting reference of President Jackson, to the free citizens of this

Republic, who, goaded by the pressure inflicted on them by his own hand, sought, from that same hand, the relief of which they stood so much in need. Thousands upon thousands, as the world knows, through the mediums of petitions and committees, endeavoured by appeals to his head and his heart, to quench the fire of his wrath against the Bank, and thus save the country from the devastating evils which threatened it.

The plan had been laid. These evils were foreseen by the President's prompters; and when the time should arrive when they would be felt, it was arranged for the President and his backers, boldly and impudently to charge them to the Bank. Hence the courteous and gentlemanlike reference, "Go to Nick Biddle."

It is among the strangest of all the strange events of these strange times, that a people professing to be intelligent, and to have some discretion and will of their own, should have permitted the charge, that the Bank caused the pressure, to live a single hour. They all knew that there was nothing but mutual confidence and prosperity, that the whole country was flourishing from one extreme to the other, before that confidence was prostrated, and that prosperity blighted, by the measures of the President preceding and accompanying the act of removing the deposits—and it is no less universally known, that a pressure began and advanced with these measures, and that it was consummated by the last and final blow which took from the bank nine millions of its means; and which, of course, carried with it the proclamation, that as many millions would be required by the Bank, of its debtors, to supply the place of those removed. No sensible man could arrive at any other conclusion—of course, all who were capable of reasoning on the subject, came to that conclusion. The effect of this was to weaken and destroy that confidence between men, without which fiscal operations cannot be sustained; and to lead every man who might be proximately, or remotely, indebted to the Bank, to act in reference to a demand upon him.

The cabal who surrounded the President, therefore, pro-

vided him with a shield, to ward from himself and it, the excited and apprehended vengeance of an injured and deeply wronged people. He was told to say to the people, that the sufferings they endured were caused by the Bank. He did so tell them, and then to make good his own belief in the truth of the charge, he told them to "Go to Nick Biddle," called the Bank "A Monster," and then left his press at Washington, and its affiliated tribe, and his 100,000 office-holders, to make the people believe that the effects produced by his own measures were produced by the Bank!

The Tyler Committee look into this charge, under the head of—"What has been the conduct of the Bank since 1832, in regard to the extension and *curtailment* of its loans and discounts?"—It is impossible for me to give in detail this *matter of fact* division of the Committee's labours. Never were acts of any institution so conclusively proved to be acts of self-preservation, as were those of the Bank, in placing itself in an attitude to meet this new position which the Executive of the United States had taken against it; nor were ever any proofs more conclusive of the studious purposes of any institution to avoid taking a single step beyond what was demanded of it on the principle of SELF-PRESERVATION.

The reader will bear in mind that the Executive and PARTY hostility to the Bank, were not confined to a removal of the public deposits, amounting to Nine Millions and upwards, but that it contemplated the annihilation of the Bank. Schemes were concerted, and plans laid, to make runs upon its branches; and every measure was adopted that could be made to weaken its claims to public confidence, at home and abroad. Who, I ask, but a reckless politician, or a maniac, would expect it of the Bank to continue its business, under such circumstances, or remain idle, and adopt no measures for its preservation?

What was the first step of the Bank, in front of such an enemy as this?—On the 13th August, 1833, it decided:

First, That the discounts of the Bank and the Officers should not be *increased*.

Second, That domestic bills purchased, should have but 90 days to run.

Third, That the five Western officers should purchase ninety days bills only, on the Atlantic cities, except when taken in payment of debt, when they might be taken at any place at four months. These orders were issued on the 12th October, 1833.

To the five Western branches the President of the Bank wrote thus.—“It is a subject of regret to be obliged to impose any restraint on your business, especially on your operations in exchange, to which we attach particular value. The measure will, however, I trust, be only temporary, and will not be continued when the circumstances which render it expedient have passed.” To the other officers it was said only:—“These resolutions make, as you perceive, but little change in your present arrangements of business, and whatever restrictions they contain, will, I trust, be temporary, and cease with the causes which have rendered them expedient at present.”

Could any mode have been adopted in *such a crisis*, more tender, or more lenient to the dealers of the Bank? Who sees in this any thing else than a purpose to place the Bank in a state of safety, against the marauding array of mercenaries in its front, who, pirate-like, had hoisted the bloody flag? or any thing beyond a cautious regard for the welfare of those who were its debtors?

As the Executive continued to press on the Bank, the Bank continued to guard itself—but only then. This is proven by the action of the Bank having, in the first division of its movements, called in, of the Nine Millions Eight Hundred Sixty-eight Thousand and odd Dollars, that President Jackson had ordered to be removed from the Bank, only \$5,825,906 74. At another period, \$3,320,000 were called in. This was under directions from the President of the Bank, in these words:

—“The present situation of the Bank, and the new measures of hostility which are understood to be in contemplation, make it expedient to place the institution beyond the reach of all danger; for this purpose I am directed to instruct your office to conduct its business on the footing, &c.”

The total amount curtailed between October, 1833, and

January, 1834, was \$9,145,905 74, being upwards of *seven hundred thousand dollars* less than President Jackson had ordered to be removed from the Bank. Meanwhile, the orders for reduction were from time to time relaxed, where they bore heavily on the community.

Having placed itself in a secure position, on the 27th June, 1834, a committee of seven was appointed to take into consideration the present state of the Bank, and to inquire whether any further measures be necessary, in consequence of the expected adjournment of Congress, without taking any steps on the subject of the removal of the deposits. A resolution was adopted, revoking all orders for the reduction of loans, and authorising the officers to expand their loans, and purchase bills, *where it might be necessary to relieve any pressure on the community.*

This gave rise to a new chime among the assailants. If the Bank, in its own defence, forced by executive acts, and executive threats of vengeance, took a position of security, it was charged with causing the pressure. Having gained that point, and feeling for the condition of the people, and Congress not doing any thing, it gave relief where it could, when up started the whole pack, and the cry was of exactly an opposite sort!

Was there ever such a profligate set of men? Does history furnish any thing like a parallel to their acts? And yet by their impudence and patronage, they succeeded in imposing upon a deluded people, and inducing them, even at the cost of their own degradation, and ultimate sufferings, to sustain all this conduct, together with the President's lawless acts, and his utter contempt for the petitions of those who sought to have what he himself had made wrong, put right.

I shall glance rapidly, in my next, over the remaining points of enquiry by the Tyler committee; and afterwards give a picture of the relations in which Gov. Wolf, and Geo. M. Dallas, and others of 'the party,' stand to this subject. If men will, for the sake of office, or the *hope* of office, make "*instruments*" of themselves, and in that capacity, succeed in deluding the people, a duty arises, and should be recognized

and respected by some one, to expose their conduct. That duty I have assumed.

ARISTIDES.



No. 26.

With the next question, in order, proposed and examined by the Tyler committee, viz:—"What has been the management of the Bank?" I have but little to do. It is true, "the party" assailed it—and made itself ridiculous in all intelligent eyes, by its efforts upon a point which was known to be invulnerable—and especially as every blow struck the assailants in their own faces. The "management" of the Bank, whether for good or for evil, *could* affect only three parties—

First—The Government.

Second—The public, generally.

Third—Itself.

I have shown in a previous number, how it affected the Government. I beg to repeat the testimony here. It is true, like all other testimony from the same quarter, it will be deemed good by "the party," only whilst it served "the party;" but when it stands opposed to "the party," it will, in their eyes, be no testimony at all. *Honest* men will not fail, however, to give it due weight. Here it is. Mr. Rush, on the 13th of December, 1828, then Secretary of the Treasury, says of the Bank, as agent of the Treasury for paying off the public debt—"In this manner, heavy payments of the debt are, in effect, made gradually, instead of the whole mass being thrown at once upon the money market, which might produce injurious shocks. *So prudently* in *this*, and in *other respects*, does the Bank aid in the operation of paying off the debt, that the community hardly has a consciousness that it is going on."

It is true, this just tribute was paid before Jacksonism prevailed—and may be considered, especially since Mr. Rush is known to occupy other ground now, as the testimony of another administration—as a mere Adams trick—a sort of trap

to catch Bank gudgeons. Well, then, let us see what Mr. Ingham says. He was Jackson, up to the hub. He swam in Jacksonism—his feet found no resting place until a bough from the hickory tree was protruded for him to repose upon. Being there, hear him. He writes in July, 1829, thus:—

“I take the occasion to express the great satisfaction of the Treasury Department, at the manner in which the President (that same ‘Nick Biddle’) and Directors of the parent Bank have discharged their trusts, in  ALL their immediate relations to the Government. So far as their transactions have come under my notice, and especially in the facilities afforded in transferring the funds of the Government, and in the preparation for the heavy payment of the public debt on the first inst., *which has been effected by the prudent management of your board, at a time of severe depression on all the productive employments of the country, without causing any sensible addition to the pressure, or even visible effect upon the ordinary operations of the State Banks.*”

An *honest* man would think this was a faithful Bank, and a very useful Bank. But it had not yet been felt by “the party” on the question of becoming its tool. Next comes the testimony of President Jackson himself. This, we all know, now, is esteemed to be good, or applicable, only so long as it may suit his purposes, and the plans of his party. He is for a man to-day, and against him to-morrow; advocates a measure at one time, and condemns it at another. He came into power for one term, and so announced it, as did his beloved friend and co-worker, Amos Kendall: then he goes for two. He is shocked at the bare suspicion of the Federal officers interfering with State elections, and now requires it of his army of office-holders to bring all their influence to bear upon them, and actually comes out at last under his own hand, to hector and bully those who may dare to stand in the way of the election of his chosen successor. I know very well the testimony of such a witness in behalf of the Bank, may well be considered as worthless—but hear him—in 1829—hear him:—

“It was apprehended that the withdrawal of so large a sum from the banks in which it was deposited, at a time of universal pressure in the money market, might cause much injury to the interests dependent on bank accommodations. But this evil was wholly averted by an early anti-

cipation of it, at the Treasury,  aided by the judicious arrangement of the officers of the Bank of the United States."

I leave it for the report of the Tyler committee to solve the doubts (if there be any) touching the "management of the Bank," under the two remaining heads, viz: towards the public and itself.

"The summary of all which is," says the committee, "that the Bank, in the last eleven years, has overcome all difficulties which stood in its way, has given to its notes a universal circulation, redeemable wheresoever presented; has increased the circulation from four to twenty millions, has  purified the general currency, and has doubled the profits of the Bank itself." There need not be another word added to this testimony.

It was after this that "the party" sought to secure the Bank as one of its "instruments." The Bank nobly spurned the attempt upon its honour. Then devices were formed to destroy it; and then were causes hunted after to justify the crusade which it was resolved to set on foot for its overthrow. The postponement of the period for the redemption of the three per cents. was seized upon, as was the expansion of its operations in 1831; and then in order, all the rest that I have named, including the notable duties assigned to Messrs. Gilpin, Sullivan, and Wager; and those other duties undertaken by the Thomas committee, &c.

Among the charges against the Bank, was that of establishing its branches in the States. At this point a hue and cry was raised. The hair of every "instrument" was made to bristle with fear, and every such tongue was loud in its anathemas against the Bank, for thus daring to interfere with the "rights of the States." The land resounded with the cry, "the Bank is extending its influence—stop it—stop it."

Well, the Tyler committee look into this business, and what do they find? Why, reader, that the leaders of this very cry were the petitioners to have branches sent among the States, and into the territories named by them. They find the Bank was not "intrusive," and very conclusively say,

"It is difficult to conceive how it could in any way enlarge the

sphere of its influence by locating a branch where neither the wants of commercial men, or of any other class, required increased banking facilities. The want of borrowers would seem to be as fatal to the spread of its influence, as the want of money to lend."

Every body knew this; and even "the party" who chose to assail the Bank on this ground, knew it.

But the foul purpose is disclosed by the proof that those who thus waylay the Bank, were the very men who invited it to come among them!

Eight original branches have been established within the last sixteen years, viz: at NASHVILLE, Natchez, St. Louis, Mobile, Portland, Burlington, Utica, and Buffalo.

The people of Nashville began so long ago as 1817, to earnestly solicit a branch. First, by a petition signed by FELIX GRUNDY, and others. Grundy was very importunate—he wrote often and, pressingly—meetings of the citizens were called—a committee was appointed to urge upon the Bank to send them a branch. There were "only six persons who refused to sign" the petition for a branch. George W. Campbell urged it; so did John Bell, late Speaker of the House of Representatives; and so, reader, did  ANDREW JACKSON! The Bank declined, notwithstanding, for several years, and at last sent them a branch, but not until the Legislature virtually asked for it.

The Natchez branch was sent on invitation of the Legislature.

That at St. Louis, upon the application of the citizens of that town, aided by a letter from Mr. RUSH, in reply, say the committee, to a letter from Mr. BENTON, (not Jesse, but Thomas, the Senator,) and transmitted by Mr. BENTON to the President of the Bank.

The branch at Natchez was twice urged upon the Bank by Mr. RUSH, who also urged the establishment of another at Detroit; but the Bank, believing Buffalo to be a better place, and seconded in this by C. C. CAMBRELENG, who took a thousand dollars fee for looking into the superior fitness of Buffalo over Detroit, and reporting upon it.

The Mobile and Portland branches were also called for, says the committee, by letters from the Treasury Department.

Of the eight branches established within sixteen years, says the committee, only two, those at Burlington and Utica, were established by the Bank.

But, as the committee very conclusively remark, "if the Bank had sought, by multiplying its offices, to exert a controlling influence over public sentiment, it would have been furnished a fair apology in the numerous applications addressed to it from every quarter, to have multiplied them almost *ad infinitum*. Those applications have been sustained by men of the most exalted character." Among the names applying for a branch at Lynchburg, (Va.) Mr. Jefferson's is one. Among those for a branch at Fredericksburg, (Va.) are Judge P. P. Barbour, Mr. Madison, James Barbour, Hugh Nelson, and James Pleasants. Among the names applying for a branch at Pensacola, is found  ANDREW JACKSON'S. Among those asking for a branch at Albany, is  MARTIN VAN BUREN'S, the same personage who fills the office of Vice President of the United States, and has been chosen by President Jackson as *his* successor; and who has, for wily, and fox-like reasons, proclaimed—"Uncompromising hostility to the Bank of the United States."

Many reasons operate to make me wish that Mr. Rush occupied the ground now, he occupied in 1828. I contemplate his present position, and his relation to his new associates, with pain! He was never born to occupy the one, or to harmonize with the other.

I will not follow up the rejections by the Bank, of applications for branches, but will merely add, that *sixty-three* applications were rejected, though, as the Tyler committee say, "pressed upon by the memorials and petitions of most respectable citizens of the several places from whence the applications proceeded."

Now, then, let the candid reader ask himself, what sort of judgment an insulted people ought to award those political instruments? Can they be regarded as entitled to confidence? Are such men, in party political matters, to be trusted? And

above all things, should not an institution that has been crushed by the weight of calumny alone, find in every honest heart, a friend?

I meant only to make a summary of what remained of the committee's report, but found I could not do the reader justice by any such analysis. I shall come to a close soon. I am in quest of nothing but truth; nor do I seek for any thing beyond such an enlightening of public opinion, as may enable it to exercise itself upon a great question, according to truth and justice.

ARISTIDES.



No. 27.

Who is there that has not heard the denunciations of "the party" against the Bank on account of the course it has pursued in relation to the French Bill? Over what part of this Union has any man travelled, without coming in contact with President Jackson's delectable organ, the *Globe*, and its servile copyists, pouring forth their poisonous streams of abuse and detraction, and diffusing their tainted matter every where, in the hope (alas! that hope has been too fatally realized) of innoculating people with that VENGEANCE against the Bank which their employers had wreaked upon it? The French Bill! Does the reader know what sort of transaction this was? Has he informed himself? If he have, then if he be honest, he can feel nothing but loathing for a set of men who would implicate the Bank for its action on the case.

For the information of such as may not have had access to the documents, I will copy the summary made by the Tyler Committee of the history of the Bill. The Committee say:

—"The simple state of the case is as follows. The Government has a Bill of Exchange on Paris for sale. In consequence of the magnitude of the sum, it would, in order to meet with a purchaser in the person of a private individual, have had to be divided into several sums. This would have been attended with delay, which the Government sought to avoid, and probably with loss, by effecting a reduction in the price of Exchange. The offer of the bill, under these circumstances, is made to the Bank, and

the Bill is PURCHASED by the Bank. It is duly presented, and protested for non-payment, and the purchaser demands the USUAL damages arising under the protest. The Attorney General, (Taney) expresses the opinion that the purchaser has no title to damages, and says he will give his reasons at another time. He is asked the reasons for his opinion, at another time, by the party most interested in knowing them, and he declines giving them! The Bank urges the claim upon the Treasury, which is ultimately decided against it; and having no recourse against the Government by suit, retains an amount, arising out of the dividends of the Government, one of the stockholders, equal to the damages. The President of the Bank addresses a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, advising him of this, and stating the object to be to carry the question before the Courts, and expressing his readiness to adopt any other course of proceeding upon the subject which would be more agreeable to the Government, which is altogether declined by the Government. These," say the Committee, "are the FACTS in the case."

I will not occupy the reader's time by giving the reasons of the Committee justifying the Bank in the course it adopted. None but a man devoid of common sense would require reasons to satisfy him upon a case so self-evident; and none governed by a feeling of common honesty would deny to the Bank the right to the damages claimed by it. But some who have common sense and common honesty, may, possibly, doubt the right of the Bank to retain the damages. The Committee may enlighten such :

"The doctrine of retainer," says the Committee, "well understood by the Courts, applies as well to a corporation as to an individual; and when that retainer is avowedly made in order to procure a submission to the Courts and Juries of the country, and would have been waived, as is plainly intimated in Mr. Biddle's letter to Mr. Woodbury, if the submission could in any other way be secured, your Committee are unable to see why there should be either clamor or objection raised to the course pursued by the directors."

Let this suffice. There is one other reference, by the Committee, to this case, which I cannot omit introducing. It ought to cover with shame those conspirators against the Bank, and awaken in every honest bosom a feeling of contempt for them. I commend to the reader's attention the following quotations from the same report :

—"The Government has often purchased Bills of Exchange on foreign countries, and the Committee is ignorant of a single case of protest in which it has ever remitted the damages!"

The Committee then cite the case of Stephen Girard, one of the largest stockholders of this very Bank. The Government bought a bill of him. It was protested. Damages were demanded. Mr. Girard remonstrated. The Government was *inflexible*. The damages were paid. The same Bank, of which this same Girard is a large stockholder, buys, in its turn, a bill of the Government. It is protested. Damages are charged—when, lo! in the plenitude of its justice, the Government refuses to pay them!! The reasons are asked for this refusal. Mr. Taney, General Jackson's *tool* for removing the Deposites, promises to give them—but after casting well about him, well disposed as he was to serve his employer, declines giving them. Resort is proposed, by the Bank, to the Courts, as the final arbiter in the case. Does the Government accept the proposition? No. Wherefore? For the same reason, I take the liberty of answering, that Andrew Jackson declined to sue out a *Scire Facias* on the charge made by himself and his "instruments," that the Bank had violated its charter. *There were no grounds upon which to rest the charge.* In this way are reluctant, though indirect CONFESSIONS EXTORTED from those assailants of the Bank, that their clamor and abuse are employed for OTHER PURPOSES than those they proclaim. And yet, with a conduct so palpably degraded, and a course of proceeding so spotted with infamy, these men have the hardihood to present themselves before the American people, and to ask their support, their confidence, and their RESPECT!!!

Now for another movement by this crusade army of the Executive, against the Bank. The throats of the office holders, upon this tack, were strained almost to splitting;—the press fulminated clouds of the most appalling aspect. The very welkin was made to ring with the shouts, and to wear, by the fumes of "the party," a lurid hue!—What's the matter? the unconscious stranger asked—And why is all this clamor? inquired the unsuspecting farmer, and the busy mechanic who had not watched the movements of these Bank pirates. The answer was given in a tone of thunder—

"THE BANK IS INTERMEDDLING IN POLITICS!"

“DOWN WITH IT!” was shouted from those same mouths. “DOWN WITH THE MONSTER!” exclaimed Andrew Jackson. “UNCOMPROMISING HOSTILITY TO THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES!” screamed little Van Buren.

“THE BANK IS INTERMEDDLING IN POLITICS!” came back in echoes; and anon the charge rose again, and rolled over the land like waves over the bed of the ocean.

The Tyler Committee look into this clamor, and the causes of it. They analyze it, and state that “the way in which such power and influence would be most likely to display itself,” would be—

1st. In the appointment of Directors for the several branches, with reference chiefly to their political sentiments.

2. In an injurious discrimination between persons: granting accommodations to some, and refusing them to others, on party political grounds.

3. In the granting of large and unusual loans, on insufficient or doubtful security, to persons supposed to have political influence; and extending indulgencies to such, not extended to others.

4. In efforts of direct bribery, by the donation of its money.

5. In rendering the press its stipendiary, by bestowing gratuities on editors, or making to them extravagant loans.

6. In large and unusual loans, and accommodations to members of Congress, and other public functionaries, on insufficient security.

7. In paying for publications not necessary for a true exposition of its condition, or to defend itself against injurious charges.

On the first of these heads, the Committee say, they “have no reason to believe that any other motives have operated with the Bank, than those having reference, mainly, to the interests of the institution. The object seems to have been, to place at the board of directors, men of character and standing, acquainted with the circumstances of the citizens composing the community in the midst of which the office was situated, and of business habits,” &c. Let this suffice.

How keenly must “the government directors” have felt the

rebuke arising out of the following quotation from this report. (It refers to the selection of directors friendly to the Bank.)—

—“It would be strange,” say the Committee, “if this were not so; for to commit its [the Bank’s] management to the hands of those who were *opposed* to it, and **TO SOUGHT ITS DESTRUCTION**, would be an act of madness and folly, for which it could have neither excuse nor apology. No man of *lofty* or *correct* feelings, would assume a guardianship, when he found in his breast, upon self-examination, none other than a feeling of hostility to the object placed under his control, and a desire to **DESTROY**, in place of a wish to sustain, and uphold.”

If any man has a vision keen enough to detect in General Jackson’s “devised instruments,” though acting as directors of the Bank, any other purpose than to “destroy” it, he sees quicker, and truer, than is usually given to mortals to see.

Under the second head, the Committee say:

“We have carefully examined the discount books of the Bank, and the several branches which it visited, for the purpose of ascertaining the course pursued towards those who are **KNOWN** to be **HOSTILE** to the Bank. The result of that examination is, that many who are known to be hostile to it, **TO** publicly and privately, who have co-operated in measures to **DESTROY** it—who, in short, are its most uncompromising opponents, are among those who, at some period or another, have received accommodations at the Bank, or some one of its branches. This remark embraces men in public and private life; in the **EXECUTIVE**, as well as **LEGISLATIVE** departments; in high, as well as in subordinate offices.”

Let this suffice. But let not the reader peruse this decided testimony, demonstrating the Bank’s entire political impartiality, without holding those traducers, who may have seduced him into a belief that this charge against the Bank was true, responsible for the deception. And let him bear in mind, how widely such a liberal and just policy differs from that proscriptive policy, which, at the same time, distinguishes and disgraces the very party that has the impudence thus falsely to implicate the Bank in the charge of political partiality. Guilty itself—it would involve the Bank in the same disgrace! How common is this practice among the profligate. Debased by their own acts, they make it a business to seek to involve others in a similar disgrace. Jacksonism made a political instrument of the government, and conscious that all honest men would hold such conduct in contempt, it became part of

its duty to implicate the Bank in like conduct ; and thus lessen the weight of that load of infamy upon itself which it was foreseen must, sooner or later, become too intolerable to be borne.

I shall remark upon the remaining heads in my next.

ARISTIDES.



No. 28.

I proceed with the remaining points, as enumerated in No. 27. The next in order is—"Unusual loans, on insufficient security, or unusual indulgencies to persons supposed to possess enlarged political influence."

I will give the answer of the Committee on this question, so far as it embraces it, entire. I do this because it is short, and because it sweeps away thousands of the most inveterate falsehoods which "the party" extracted from this very question, and fastened, like so many blister-plasters, upon the public credulity. Hear the Committee :

—"The Committee has discovered *nothing* in the proceedings of the Bank to induce a belief that it has adopted *ANY* policy of the kind. Each borrower is held to comply with the rules of the Bank. When these rules are violated, the violation is followed by a protest, or such other proceedings as are usually adopted in other cases. In some instances, where the borrower has failed to renew his note at the proper time, either from inadvertence, or from circumstances beyond his control; or has neglected to pay the discount upon each renewal; or has changed his endorser, by substituting one name for another, equally good; or has drawn a draft on one who declines accepting it, and offers another already accepted by a person, or persons, entirely responsible, the Bank may have failed to have the note protested. In *such* cases, to protest, would be but a *useless* proceeding, injurious to the individual, and without benefit to the Bank. It (the Bank) seeks to secure its debt, and if that be done satisfactorily, all is accomplished which it could desire.

"The Committee are not aware of a loan to *ANY* one possessed of an enlarged political influence, of an unusual amount, or, in fact, of *ANY* amount resting on insufficient security," &c.

Now let such as may have permitted themselves to be drugged with the slanders of the official organ of President

Jackson, the Globe, at Washington, whose slang is continued to this hour, reflect a moment, and compare those swarms of wicked and malicious falsehoods which were made to infest the land, as did the frogs, and locusts; and disgusting vermin of Egypt, with this flat and unqualified declaration of the Committee; and then ask, if such reckless propagators of calumny—such foul conspirators against the Bank, its officers, and the currency, ought not to be held up to the indignant rebuke of all honest men, and to the execration and contempt of the world. It would seem from the complacency with which President Jackson contemplates the calumnies of the Globe, and its aids, that he delights in breathing the atmosphere filled with such a moral pestilence, and, unlike the Pharaoh of Egypt, he cultivates the closest familiarity with those frogs, and locusts, and disgusting political vermin. How humiliating is such an exposition!

The fourth head of the inquiry, viz:—"Efforts of direct bribery, by donations of its (the Bank's) money."

Let it be borne in mind, that President Jackson himself made this charge, direct. It originated in his own heart, and came, full formed, out of his own mouth. It was seconded and sustained, *of course*, by his sycophants and followers, just as was his declaration when Lawrence snapped his pistols at him, that "it is that damn'd rascal, Poindexter." He said this, and that was enough. His "instruments" were immediately in motion to prove it. The conspiracy exploded, and master and men, all alike stand transfixed by the spear of truth, and the lie being given to their assertions, by a committee of the Senate, and to their OATHS—they cry out against their own witnesses, procured by themselves,  "PERJURED VILLAINS." What a spectacle!!

Just so with this charge of bribery against the Bank. President Jackson announced it, and intimated that, but for his special purity, the Bank would have bribed him too! He had not a doubt but it had bribed Congress—Oh, no—and whenever a member, a little more honest than some of the Jackson members have proved themselves to be, would give a vote according to his oath, and his conscience, (things get-

ting now most fearfully out of vogue,) out comes the *Globe* with a pretty strong implication that it was "bribery"—"the Bank"—"the Monster!"

Now what says the Committee? Hear it—

☞ "NO CASE of this sort is known to the Committee; no such case appears (of course where such *would* appear) on the books of the bank."

But this was not enough. For it had been already, by Whitney, charged against the Bank, touching other matters, that it paid out its money without making any entries at all. Well, the committee summon before them the two Government Directors; Messrs. Macalister and Ingraham, and put the question—"Could any money go out of the Bank without the same appearing on the books?"

Answer—"We do not think it could."

Now what becomes of President Jackson's favourite and cherished charge against the Bank of "bribery?" Where shall honest men go to find even the *atoms* of this broken up and scattered calumny? No where within the range of truth, or justice, or honour, I answer; but even to this hour, *the whole* may be found, in an embodied form, in President Jackson's keeping, alongside the Poindexter affidavits; and in the *Globe*, and in its affiliated presses—aye, and perhaps it even yet lingers in the minds of those, to delude whom the scandalous falsehood was *invented*.

The 5th—"In rendering the press its (the Bank's) stipendiary, by bestowing gratuitous rewards on editors, or making to them extravagant loans."

"The Committee know of no case of gratuity to any."

The Committee go over the old grounds of the Jesper Harding, and the Webb and Noah loans, and the loans to Gales and Seaton. The Committee take a range from New York to Norfolk, and state the loans made to, and balances due from, editors in New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, Richmond, Va. and Norfolk: "Some of these loans were granted (says the Committee) at a period too remote from the present times to be subject to any suspicion of impropriety, while others have been obtained by editors known to be hostile to the Bank itself." Again—"Loans made to

editors have existed from the origin of the Bank." But which of the Presidents, except President Jackson, saw, or even suspected in the Bank, a design to render the press its stipendiary, because an editor of a newspaper got a note discounted by it? But if any one of those high minded and honourable men, had so far forgot the honour due to his character, and to the nation, as to have, as has President Jackson, by "rewarding" publicly and otherwise, the editors of the press; and forcing into the press as he forces to this hour into the Globe, and as his office-holders are compelled by him to force into the Globe's allies, thousands of the public money, he might be supposed dishonourable enough to originate a charge, as has General Jackson against the Bank, of bribery of the press, when the Bank, acting in the business of its calling, (which is to loan money, and to judge of the proper amount and of the security,) loans a portion of its funds to editors.

As with other things, so with the press. Does General Jackson disgrace the country by appointing in the face of his own published denunciation of the practice, subservient members of Congress to office? Does he, in this way, destroy the independence of that body, as he has, most effectually, the independence of the House of Representatives? He directly charges the Bank with a like interference, and a like purpose, to make Congress subservient to its ends. Does he reward editors and pay them out of the public treasury for their fidelity to himself and his measures? Instantly he starts the cry—"the bank is buying up the press."—And so of all the rest. It is as old as the days of Æsop, that an old fox of his times, loosing his own tail in a trap, set to work to have all the foxes appear in a like disgraceful predicament. The old fox of modern times has had the luck to make a good many silly ones believe that the fashion set by himself, odious as it is, is followed by others, especially by so dignified an institution as the United States Bank. To have appeared a *solitaire* in this disgrace, was more than even the old Roman, or the hero of three wars, could bear. The public can be at no loss to understand this whole business. If it were cheap, or did not cost the country too much in suffering and in dishonour,

the cunning of the scheme might be laughed at. But it is too serious a matter for a joke.

The Committee bestow much labour and occupy much space in describing the 6th point in order, viz: "Loans to members of Congress and functionaries of the Government."

Here the Committee meet President Jackson and his host of calumniators face to face. And what does the Committee tell them? "The same remark, says the Committee, which was made in regard to editors, is applicable also to members of Congress and other public functionaries—loans have been obtained by them of the Bank at every period of its existence. The remark applies to those who now hold executive offices, as to those who now are, or have been, members of Congress, and this without regard to the political predilection of the borrowers."

This every honest man might have expected. But now let us see how far President Jackson's charge of bribery is true. If the aggregate sum had been *increased*, to any considerable amount, then a disingenuous mind like his, might have *some* ground for its suspicions. But if, instead of this, the loans to members of Congress, and public functionaries, are diminished, by a comparison between present and former times, showing a *less* sum loaned now, than previously, I should like to know if that fact, clearly set forth, ought not to cover with shame these bold and reckless calumniators? Well, let us see what the committee bring forth. Let the committee speak:—

"In the year 1826, the loans to members of Congress at the Bank and all the branches, then in existence, amounted to 237,437 dollars; and in the present year, with the addition, since 1826, of several branches, and an increase in the number of members of Congress, to 258,227 dollars. The amount of loans during the present year is less by 111,539, (deducting from the loans of 1833 a large loan on stock, and drafts in this office, than in 1833,) by \$69,826, than in 1832; and by \$63,971, than in the year 1831; and that there has been a similar declension in comparison with the loans of each of the officers with the exception of one, at which the amount is not extravagantly large, whilst at many others no loans for any amount exist in 1834. It is proper to remark, that the amount at Philadelphia and Washington in the year 1832, over succeeding and preceding years, arises from the fact, that in that year, a loan on stock, amounting to 100,000 dol-

lars, was granted to one member, now dead, at Philadelphia, and that at Washington, discounts to the amount of 50,000 dollars, on Post Office acceptances, &c. were granted to another."

The committee vouch for the correctness of this statement.

Now what becomes of the cry of "Bribery—Corruption—Congress bought by the Bank, &c." I will answer what is destined to become of it. It will rebound, laden with all the disgrace and infamy it was sent forth to heap upon others, and settle, in noisome, and festering, and corroding effects, upon those who sent it forth; and upon those who gave it circulation. History will preserve these men, not in the gums and spices of Egypt, but in the offensive and disgusting materials from the laboratory of their own calumnies.

On the seventh and last point, I shall make but a few remarks; referring the reader to my 17th number, he will find there, perhaps, reasons enough why the Bank should publish and circulate documents and speeches for its defence: The committee think the Bank was extravagant. So might a looker-on, at an assault made by desperadoes, of another sort, upon a family mansion. *He* might suppose the inmates, whose *all* was at hazard, would have been equally successful in driving back the assailants, by a discharge of ten, instead of a hundred guns; in which case, there would, of course, have been saved ninety rounds of powder and ball. But those within, to whom the defence was entrusted, and whose *all* was in jeopardy, would, nevertheless, choose to judge in *that matter*, for themselves. So with the Bank.

The committee would seem to desire that the Bank accounts, or its President, should disclose the mode and names of the officers, &c. by whose agency counterfeiters were detected and calumnies were exposed. The Bank had just as well surrender all its power, and every future attempt to detect and expose either. It is a branch of police. Suppose the Mayor of the city, and the High Constables, were to expose to the public their plans for detecting the plunderers of property, and give the names of those they employ to guard the city from the ravages of the incendiary? Would it not be, virtually, surrendering all their power, and giving the

city up? Just so with the Bank. It has to contend against a double enemy; and to adapt its operations and expenses to these double movements. On the one hand, it has to meet the calumniator; and on the other the counterfeiter; and then again, to watch the incendiaries, in their attempt, by runs upon, to break its branches! In 1832 the Bank had to pay \$4,040 for protecting the Western Branches from the hirelings which "the party" employed to make a run upon, with a view to break them!

Upon the point of disclosing the objects of the Bank's expenditure, the President of the Bank has satisfied every man who knows what he averred to the committee his willingness to do. And what was it? Why, reader, "to verify under *any* form of solemnity, in *any* way agreeable to the committee, for what the expenditure *had not been* made;" and "that *no portion* of it had been made to subsidize *any portion* of the public press, or to tamper with, or affect the purity of *any* public functionary."

This will silence for ever, among honest and honourable men, all the clamor which has been raised against the Bank on these heads—for lives there a man who would not believe Nicholas Biddle on his *word*? Who then would for a moment question his *oath*?

In my next I shall review the conduct of Governor Wolf, George M. Dallas, Joel B. Sutherland, and others, on this subject; and then, with an appeal to the public, close these essays.

ARISTIDES.

No. 29.

The position occupied by the leaders of the Jackson party in Pennsylvania, is one which no high-minded or honourable man can contemplate without disgust. "Poor human nature!" Here we have it sunk many degrees below its ordinary condition—with Pennsylvania selected for the theatre on which to exhibit the excess of its degradation.

Let us first, and for a moment only, contemplate the position of Gov. Wolf,—I do not mean in the relation which he *now* stands to his *own* party, and to those whom, at the expense of principle, he patronized. He is in rougher hands than mine. His own creatures have clutched him by the throat, and hold, at this moment, the nauseous cup of his own mixing to his lips—forcing it upon him till he shall drink it to the very dregs. This is retributive justice, and may be regarded as a specimen of what these Jackson *patriots* hold in reserve for one another in detail. As deserters from principle, from the constitution, and liberty—as men in close alliance with the grossest selfishness, following after the loaves and fishes, in utter recklessness of what may befall their country, when such men get by the ears, there is no quarter. Like the Kilkenny cats, they never fail to devour one another. I have nothing to do with their family quarrels, nor with the loathing exhibitions they make of each other. My business is with their leaders, when they acted in concert, first FOR the Bank, and then AGAINST the Bank. Let us to Gov. Wolf.

It is very well known, nor will the most illiterate deny the truth of the position, that down to 1832, the policy of *democratic* Pennsylvania, was formed of three cardinal points, viz:—THE BANK; DOMESTIC PROTECTION; and INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT.” That man who might have attempted, down to that period, and even for some time after, to sever these, would have been denounced as a traitor, not to the State only, but to his party, and to the nation. Upon this ground, we find George Wolf. What did he say, so late as his message of December, 1832?—

—“I cannot omit,” he says, “whilst bringing before your notice such measures of national policy, as it is believed Pennsylvania OUGHT to sustain, to take a passing notice of one that has excited no ordinary state of feeling,” &c. He then adverts to the resolutions which passed both branches of the Pennsylvania Legislature, “with great unanimity,” calling upon their Senators and Representatives in Congress to “use their exertions to obtain a renewal of the charter of the

Bank of the United States." He next speaks of the bill which had passed Congress for that purpose, and of the President's veto; and cannot believe that the same fate awaited every bill that might pass both Houses of Congress on that subject, and then adds:

—"The Bank of the United States, whatever may be alleged to the contrary, has CERTAINLY done the country service. It has established a circulating medium, in which the people have confidence. It is not denied, I believe, that it has greatly facilitated the operations of the General Government, so far as its pecuniary transactions were concerned; and it is admitted, that it has materially aided individuals in their pecuniary arrangements with each other, and especially in the transmission of money to distant parts of the Union. It would (he continues) be a subject of deep regret, therefore, if a too strict adherence to a critical construction of the constitution, &c., or a too critical analysis of its expediency, in a moral or political point of view, &c. should have the effect to prevent a renewal of its charter—thus unsettling that which has heretofore been considered PART of the established policy of the country."

So much for Governor Wolf, as he *was* in December, 1832, and as he had been antecedent to that period. In previous messages, he advocated the Bank, and urged upon the Legislature its excellence, and the importance of its continued existence.

Now let us take a bird's-eye view of Charles Jared Ingersoll. Let us look at him in 1831. We find him in the House of Representatives of Pennsylvania, upon his feet, bolt upright, offering the following resolution:

"Resolved, as the sense of this House, (of his own as a member of it,) that the constitution of the United States authorizes, and near a half century's experience sanctions, a Bank of the United States, as necessary and proper to regulate the value of money, and prevent paper currency of an unequal and depreciated value."

There is no mistaking this. It is true, it was offered when Governor Wolf was for the Bank; when the Legislature was for the Bank; and when Andrew Jackson was not understood to be altogether against it. The ground, therefore, felt pretty safe. C. J. Ingersoll never risks any thing *except principle*.

Let us take a look at Doctor Jesse R. Burden. We find him plump up by the side of Charles Jared Ingersoll, flourishing a resolution in the same Legislature, in these words:

"Resolved, That whereas the Bank of the United States has tended, in

a great degree, to maintain a sound and uniform currency, to facilitate the financial operations of the Government, to regulate foreign and domestic exchange, and has been conducive to commercial prosperity, the Pennsylvania Legislature recommend a renewal of its charter, under such regulations and restrictions, as to the power of the respective States, as Congress may deem right and proper."

On the question on this resolution, it passed 75 to 11.

During the same session of the Legislature, but at an earlier period, viz: June, 1832, the following resolution was passed **UNANIMOUSLY**:

"Resolved, That, connected as the prosperity of agriculture and manufactures is, with the successful financial operations and sound currency of the country, we view the speedy rechartering of the Bank of the United States, with such alterations as may secure the rights of the States, if any be necessary, as of  VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE PUBLIC WELFARE."

Quitting the Legislature, we go to Congress. Let us see who stands up there in support of those resolutions, and in favour of a recharter of the Bank of the United States. Foremost stands **GEORGE M. DALLAS**. He was Chairman of the Committee of the Senate, and reported a bill, rechartering the Bank of the United States. The bill reported, he stood by it, defending and sustaining it, at every step; and at last records his vote in its favour. Mr. Wilkins was no less ardent and active in supporting the bill, than Mr. Dallas. Through the Senate, the bill finds its way into the House. It goes through that body, and next in the hands of President Jackson, when it was made to share the fate of other bills, since that time, by being **VETOED**.

We return to the House, to see by whose special agency the bill was fostered and taken care of there. Foremost we find, in all the ardour of one anxious to support this branch of Pennsylvania policy, **JOEL B. SUTHERLAND**. I must beg to possess the reader of some of the words, that on the 9th January, 1832, fell from the lips of this *consistent* personage. Hear him—

"There was one point on which he felt bound to put a question to the Honourable gentleman from Georgia. Did that Honourable gentleman mean to assert that the president and directors of the United States Bank, residing in Philadelphia, (men of as lofty character, of as strict honour and respectability, as any set of men in this country, in this House or out of it;)

did he mean to say, that these men were influenced to bring this measure forward by the movements of a political party? It was no political movement," &c.

If there was any one man, in either House of Congress, more ardent than any other in defending the Bank and in advocating its recharter, that man was Joel B. Sutherland. The whole Pennsylvania delegation in Congress, with only a single exception, advocated the bill for a recharter. Even Henry Horn, who "cannot lie," said the Bank was good, and must be preserved.

Now then, we have Gov. Wolf, the whole of the Legislature of Pennsylvania, Ingersoll, Burden, and Petrekin, as its leaders. All the Delegation except one, in Congress, with Dallas, Wilkins, Sutherland, and Horn, as leaders, ALL warmly and zealously advocating the Bank, and calling loudly for its recharter. On a sudden they *all* change!!!

Like the tide that bears onward the materials when it floods, and back again when it ebbs, so we find the whole of these men, borne by a current of *another sort*, in the directly opposite course. All for the Bank, as we have seen; and anon, all, not only against it, but bitter and reproachful enemies—real hunters, blood-hounds, in full run after its destruction!

Were there no inducements to this change? Wilkins has got his 18,000 dollars for the first year, and will get his 9000 dollars for each remaining year that he may fill the appointment which he has received as his "reward" for his defection from himself, from principle, and from his country's good and his country's honour.

Jesse R. Burden has never been known, even in the affair of the State Loan, to act without inducement; and whether he comes under the denomination of a *seeker* after office, under General Jackson's promise to "reward his friends," those who know him better than I do, may determine.

If Mr. Dallas can assign one good reason for his conduct, I shall be happy to hear and record it. The school in which he was instructed, never taught a conduct so liable to damn the reputation of a citizen for consistency, and to establish a

preference of self over a love of country. And if he can show that he has not had the promise of several offices, (although disappointed to this hour,) he will go far towards shaking public opinion touching *the motive* which prompted him to such mysterious and humiliating conduct; and for myself, I shall be happy to record it.

As to Sutherland, he has written in ever-during characters his political creed. He has avowed that he is "*a man of principle according to his interest.*" It would seem that after having made a tool of Governor Wolf, he has used him since pretty much to his own liking. He can command a Judgeship with as much ease as a bird can pick from its stem a cherry; and he can drop it as quickly—when a riper, or more inviting object strikes his eye.

As to Governor Wolf's motives for his conduct, besides securing a permanence of office for a son at Washington, they can be resolved into nothing but those which demonstrate his abandonment of the State, and its honours and interests, into the hands of a party, whose object is to surrender all that is Pennsylvanian to him of Kinderhook, and to the rulers of the Albany regency. Or, in other words, as has been said by another, he has condescended to surrender his guardianship of the state, and its interests, and come down from the elevated position of Governor, to hold the candle whilst Martin Van Buren writes the will of the State!

A few words to the men I have thus arraigned at the bar of public opinion. First to Governor Wolf. For which of the benefits conferred by the Bank, as avowed in your Message of December, 1832, as quoted, have you become the enemy of the Bank? Is it because the Bank, "whatever may be alleged to the contrary, has done the country service?" Or is it because "it has established a circulating medium, in which the people have confidence?" Or because (there being no "denial") "it has greatly facilitated the operations of the General Government?" Or, as "it is admitted," "that it has materially aided individuals in their pecuniary arrangements with each other—and especially in the transmission of money to distant parts of the Union?" For which of these confessed

and recorded benefits, I ask, is it that you consented to seize the dagger of your official station, and plunge it in the vitals of this great public and private beneficiary? Or did you thus eulogise it in derision? Either you were honest then, or you are not honest now; or you are honest now, and were dishonest then. Do you resort to the calumnies I have exposed, in your justification! Sir, you *knew* they were calumnies. You can take no refuge there. Take, then, the reward of your inconsistency—your perfidy—the pay of the time-serving politician—the contempt of all honest men.

I will not pursue the men, your co-workers, who are transfixed with the poisoned arrows of their own make. They are, one and all, in the same predicament. On them devolves the duty to justify their recreant conduct, and explain to a disgusted and injured people how they could act the parts they have acted, in behalf of the Bank of the United States, and then turn, as one man, to cut and hack it in pieces!

These acts may be, for a while, screened from the public ire by the shield of party and party success—but a day will arrive, in this world, when a wasting pestilence will unnerve all that may now seem to be bold; when the office holder, and the office seeker, who have united to carry on this iniquitous war upon the currency, the very life blood of the country, will tremble in the presence of men, who, breathing a higher and purer atmosphere, will dart from their eyes indignant glances of contempt upon all such conduct, and when a patriotic and renovated people will consign to merited disgrace all such time, and party serving men.

ARISTIDES.



No. 30.

I have gone, generally, over the field of this Bank controversy. I have found it filled with official and pensioned calumniating enemies. Like all mercenaries, their labours in the cause of their master, have been, in the precise ratio of the “rewards” promised to them. At this point

lies the *secret* of Jacksonism. Some will have it that the support given by the people to the high-handed acts of this party—even in its war on the Bank, and the atrocious plunder of the Post Office Department, is owing to the personal popularity of Andrew Jackson. This is an error. It is owing, exclusively, to the proofs he has given that he will “reward,” not the virtuous, the intelligent, the competent, but however incompetent, or vicious, or ignorant, those who will throw themselves at his feet, shout to his honour, and commend, “right or wrong,” his acts. This, and this alone, is the secret of Jacksonism, and of this debasing lure, comes the power of “the party.” Cunning men—men versed in human nature, and who know the springs which control it, in its most degraded state, planned this contrivance, and Andrew Jackson was the very man on whom they knew they could rely for the consummation of their debased and debasing schemes. The avenue to his favour is that of the grossest flattery. This is easy to be administered, especially by those who have the *honour* of his respect and confidence, and any man can secure these by administering a copious dose of flattery. It is only necessary for an intelligent mind to survey the men (with a few, and only a few, exceptions) that are in the service of the present administration, to perceive at once, the motives that led to their adhesion and their appointment. It is a question with me, whether, if the crusade set on foot against the Bank, had been organized against the Constitution and Liberty, *direct*, the same men who have been employed to produce the downfall of the former, would not have been just as ready to engage in a war of extermination against the latter. It is a question, did I say? I recall this, and before God, I declare, I believe the great body of them would have been found as ready to overthrow the one, as they have been active in destroying the other. The only inducement necessary to this, would, at this moment, be additional “rewards.”

I copy the following paragraph, from a public journal. It illustrates in what the charm of Jacksonism consists. It shows in what Gen. Jackson’s popularity consists. Strip him of this “rewarding” and bribing power, or confine him to a constitu-

tional exercise of Executive patronage, and to a decent respect for himself, in the use of it, and there would not exist, any where, a man who would be so universally despised. And it is this "rewarding" system alone, that keeps alive, and imparts action and power to "the party;" and it is this that operates upon the sort of men who surround the person of their Chief, and who are heard shouting to him over the country. But to the paragraphs:

"The appointment of Robert T. Lytle, the Cincinnati Representative in the last Congress, to the Surveyor Generalship of Ohio, by the President, before his seat in Congress, from which he had been indignantly rejected by his abused constituents, had got fairly cold, affords another striking evidence of the regard which the President entertains for his solemn pledges to the people. He declared previous to his election, that when such appointments were practised, "*corruption would be the order of the day,*" and he would render members of Congress ineligible to any such appointment during the term for which they were elected, and two years thereafter, by amending the constitution. Yet he does not hesitate to add another to the numerous precedents which his administration has afforded of Executive bribery, or what he declared to be bribery.

"Another case, in the appointment of Mr. Kavanagh, to a high diplomatic station, in less time after his seat in Congress became vacated, than it would require for his journey to his constituents. Lytle and Kavanagh were both members of Congress, both were candidates for re-election, both rejected by the people for supporting the corruptions of the administration, and both returned from Congress, with their appointments in their pockets, to show their constituents that when *the people* would not sustain them, the power of the President *would.*"

A power like this, and thus prostituted, requires to be overcome, the prevalence of Roman virtue, and the employment of the opposite and counteracting means. Can Patriotism successfully combat this power, or drive back this stream of corruption, if those who are influenced by it keep back any part of the sacrifice required to make its efforts effective? Is it rational to see an evil, and feel its effects, and sit quietly with folded arms, and mourn over, and expect it to retire? Are the rich in this great contest justifiable in turning the key upon their treasures, when money may be required to scatter light among the people, and employ the appropriate power for meeting and driving back the armies of mercenaries that are laying waste the land?

It is to the government patronage, prostituted as it is, and the use of the public money, in employing and rewarding officers, and to the calumnies they are, in these ways, paid for circulating, that we must look for the secret of the success of Jacksonism; and we may find in our own want of union and of action, the secret of the failure of our designs, so far, to save the country.

The friends of the constitution have to encounter a fearful responsibility. They must surrender sectional and personal predilections, and forego what they would desire, for what they can obtain, or as certain as their is a sun in the Heavens, all will be lost! Thrown by the power—forced by the stream of corruption from their position, the patriots of the Republic have nothing left but to get footing where they can. The question at present is, not whether Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun, or Daniel Webster, or any other great man, shall be President of the United States, but whether Liberty and Union shall be, or cease to be. If general Jackson shall succeed, by his system of “rewards,” in buying up enough of Swiss power to elect his successor, as he has been in sustaining himself, I would not give a pinch of snuff for our Liberty, our Constitution, or our Union. Success here, and under the circumstances of the case, would amount to a virtual abandonment of the first, and a dissolution of the last. It would be so, since the evils we endure now, are borne, not because they are not destructive of Liberty, but from the hope that there is enough of virtue in the Republic to save it. This hope once extinct, and the power of General Jackson to *entail* upon us a successor of his own choice, being clearly shown, there will be an end to the Republic.

Let patriots, therefore, in view of this horrible catastrophe, unite. Let them, with the proofs I have given in these essays, of the power of Jacksonism, and of the mode of its operation, when brought to bear on the great monied interests of the country, take the alarm, and with one eye on this war on the Bank, and the other on the rank corruptions of the Post Office Department, and all the departments, resolve, to throw

back this title of despotism, and restore to the country, its honour, its peace, and its hopes.

So utterly corrupt has the whole mass of "the Government" become, that it boasts of it! Bribery—purchase of votes—the exercise of the Federal patronage in state affairs, who pretends to deny? As well might it be attempted to deny that night and day succeed each other, or that light makes manifest. No longer able to hide the corruptions on which the minions of the government fatten, they are held up by the party as purity personified. Bitter is called sweet, and sweet bitter. Who was more honoured at the late Jefferson dinner in Philadelphia, than Wm. T. Barry, upon whose horrible administration of the Post Office Department, a unanimous vote of the Senate cast a censure—even Isaac Hill voting against it!—And what awaits him? A mission to Spain!!! Eighteen thousand dollars for one year, and nine thousand dollars a year afterwards, for what? For carrying out to the letter, I answer, the scheme of rewarding partisans; and making public money subservient to the perpetuation of Jacksonism. Well might Mr. Calhoun say that the very demonstration of this corruption went to increase the power of the party. Let any man look this matter full in the face. What does he see? I have shown him in these essays how this profligate party moved upon the Bank. First, by slanders the most foul, to get rid of an honest and honourable direction—then to put in tools of their own selecting—this failing, calumny was made the great instrument for battering it down—men were commissioned to act as "spies"—committees were formed to implicate—a man was selected to swear away the good name of President Biddle, and to impeach the honour of the other officers of the Bank. Every resort was had to break down the system of currency which has no equal on the face of the earth, because the Bank, which gave it being, and sustained it, would not bow down to, and become the tool of Jacksonism. I have proved all this. What next? The Senate by a unanimous vote, has demonstrated the corruptions of the Post Office Department. The records demonstrate the shocking depravity of the Land Office, and of the Indian Depart-

ment. A smell has gone forth!—It sickens every man of honest or honourable feelings! Laws are violated—the Constitution spurned at.—Marshals are subservient—and a Secretary of the Treasury, for daring to be honest, is kicked out in the face of all the people, and a tool put in his place to do the will of his master. All this, and more, is as visible to all eyes as the sun at noon-day. Why is it the people do not rise and cast from them this state of things? Because, I answer, they are made the victims of calumny!

Look at these charges—all sent round to deceive the people!

Extract from the President's letter to one of his Secretaries.

“The Deposites must be removed before Congress meets, or the Bank will ~~BRIBE~~ enough of the MEMBERS to prevent it.”

Extract from the Government Press.

“Senators Clay and Webster are the feed lawyers of the Bank, and hence their great exertions in its behalf.”

From the same.

“Senator Calhoun instigated the assassination of the President.”

From the same.

“Senator Tipton has valuable lands on the Wabash, and hence he is trying to get an appropriation to improve the navigation of the latter, with a view to improve the value of the former.”

Extract from the letter of a Washington correspondent.

“Senator Webster gets a fee of \$5,000 to aid in passing a bill to pay off the French claims.”

From the same.

“Governor Tazewell, of Virginia, pure and immaculate as he is considered, has received \$50,000 from the United States Bank.”

From the same.

“Representative A. S. Clayton, who was so violent against the Bank, has received an accommodation from that institution, and it has glued his tongue to the roof of his mouth.”

These, reader, are the sort of things that have been contrived to gull the people. This is the stream of poison, and this its *quality*, that has been kept constantly running from the lips of President Jackson, and from the Globe, his chosen and “rewarded” organ; and on these, and the like, have the

people been taught to rely for intellectual, and moral, and political nourishment.

So far as these calumnies have been employed against the Bank, I have exposed them. I defy successful contradiction. From the Woodbury and Hill scheme, to get possession of the Bank, to the Thomas Committee, contriving to destroy it, I have followed the "devised instruments" of the party, and exposed them, and their degrading and degraded agencies. Aye, and I have shown the position of your Wolfs, and your Ingersolls, and your Burdens, and Dallases, and Sutherlands;—and what sort of positions do they occupy? Such as must degrade them in the eyes of all honourable men, I answer, in the present and in all future time.

I have done my duty—faithfully, but feebly. In abler hands, the exposition of this foul conduct, of men professing to be honourable, must have shaken "the party" to atoms—that is, if corruption be not an overmatch for purity, and licentiousness for liberty.

ARISTIDES.

APPENDIX.*

ARISTIDES TO THE PUBLIC.

PHILADELPHIA, February 20, 1835.

The following address appeared in the United States Gazette of this morning:

TO THE PUBLIC.

PHILADELPHIA, February 19, 1835.

My attention was called, a few days since, to two essays in the Pennsylvania Inquirer of the 10th and 12th inst.; the effusions of a writer who assumes and disgraces the signature of Aristides. They are obviously the production of a false and malignant libeller, venting personal slander, under the pretence of political discussion. With the assistance of the editor, frankly afforded, so far as he conceived his own position allowed, I endeavoured immediately to ascertain the name of this concealed traducer. He has baffled my efforts, on pretexts the most shuffling and contemptible.—Nothing therefore is left me but to make this statement, from which my fellow citizens may appreciate the character of a slanderer, who, to the baseness of anonymous defamation, adds the meanness of evading that responsibility which no honest or honourable man would hesitate to assume.

H. D. GILPIN.

That the public may judge of the truth and candour of H. D. Gilpin's assertions, *Aristides* begs leave to submit the following copies of letters which have passed on the subject:

PHILADELPHIA, 14th February, 1835.

To the Editor of the Pennsylvania Inquirer.

Sir:—My notice has been called to two essays, published in the Pennsylvania Inquirer of the 10th and 12th instant, under the signature of Aristides.

They are obviously to me the productions of a false and malignant libeller, who, while venting his long-brewed venom, strives to avoid responsibility, by mingling personal slander with political discussion.

As you disclaim the authorship in your editorial columns, I demand that the name of a writer, who has thus wantonly assailed my character, shall be communicated to the bearer of this note, Gen. A. M. Prevost.

Your obedient servant,

H. D. GILPIN.

* To complete this work, the publishers include the correspondence, which the essays, at a certain stage of their progress, gave rise to. They give that correspondence under the title of Appendix.

Mr. Morris, the Editor of the Inquirer, having communicated the above letter to Aristides, Aristides immediately answered it as follows:

PHILADELPHIA, February 15, 1835.

To R. Morris, Esq.

Dear Sir: I have read and reflected upon the papers you have sent me, namely, a letter from H. D. Gilpin to you, demanding the author of certain essays in the Inquirer, and a copy of your answer.

I have been engaged, and yet am, in the discussion of a great public question, involving the conduct of important public functionaries. That conduct I have spoken of freely, but in no instance have I placed it in a light which *admitted* facts, or *official documents*, would not justify. I have yet to learn that a free exercise of the right of a citizen to examine the conduct of public officers creates a personal responsibility to every individual officer who may find himself incommoded by the exposure.—Such, from the tone of H. D. Gilpin's note, and the channel by which it reached you, I take to be the responsibility which he contemplates. It is one, that I must, at present decline.

I have said in No. 13 of my essays, that "nothing shall turn me aside" from the prosecution of my plan for exposing to the public the calumnies against the Bank. But when the series shall be completed, my position will be changed, and I shall be willing to waive the ground taken in the first part of this letter upon one indispensable condition.

I consider the three individuals, namely H. D. Gilpin, J. T. Sullivan, and Peter Wager, as jointly referred to in my essays, and so blended together, by the very nature of their own acts, that they cannot be severed, and that it is impossible to decide what cause of offence may have been given to either, separately. It follows that I cannot recognize the separate right of either, to personal satisfaction. If, however, these three persons will sign a paper, pledging themselves, after the conclusion of these essays (which will be within two weeks) jointly to call upon me for the same sort of satisfaction which the tone of H. D. Gilpin's note, and the channel by which it was delivered, authorize me to infer he contemplates, I hereby authorize you, *on the receipt of such paper*, to give up my name.—I pledge myself upon the receipt of such a joint invitation, promptly to accept it, and to render satisfaction to each; and in order, to be determined by lot.

I have the honour to be,

With great respect, your ob't serv't.

ARISTIDES.

On the receipt of the foregoing, Mr. Morris sent a copy of it to General Prevost—and soon after he received from the General, the following note, which he communicated, forthwith, to Aristides.

Dear Sir:—I have carefully read the copy of your correspondent's note, which you put in my hands at 5 o'clock this afternoon.

It conveys no answer to the demand of Mr. Gilpin, and my confidence in your own character and sense of justice, leads me to expect such a

prompt and explicit communication on the subject of that demand, as a man of honour should give, and can alone consent to receive.

I am respectfully yours,

A. M. PREVOST.

ROBERT MORRIS, Esq.

February 14, 6, P. M., 1835.

Aristides then addressed the following note to Mr. Morris.

Philadelphia, February 15, 1835.

TO R. MORRIS, Esq.

Dear Sir:—I will not permit any occurrence to drive me from my purpose of exposing the calumnies against the Bank of the United States. I do not mean to be shot off, on account of my labours to defend truth and justice, at least, yet awhile. I therefore prohibit the annunciation of the name of the writer of "Aristides" to the party "demanding" it, or to any other, until I shall have concluded the essays. These being finished, you have my *free consent* to give up my name to General Prevost, if you deem it necessary or proper to do so.

I am yours, &c.

ARISTIDES.

Mr. Morris, after reserving some time for consideration, and availing himself of such counsel as he thought necessary, addressed a letter to General Prevost, of which the following is a copy:

Philadelphia, Feb. 16, 1835.

Dear Sir:—After the receipt of your letter of Saturday, announcing that the answer of "Aristides" (of which I handed you a copy) was unsatisfactory, I had a further interview with that individual. In the course of the same day, I received from him a note, at the close of which he gave his free consent to the surrender of his name, at the expiration of a certain period, provided "*I should then think it necessary or proper to do so.*"

This answer of course threw upon me the responsibility of deciding whether, in such circumstances, I ought, as the conductor of a public press, to give up the name of my correspondent. It is proper here to say, that in all my intercourse with him, both before and since your application, he has denied any motive of personal enmity, or any design to go beyond the official character and conduct of public agents—and that if I had given to his articles a different construction, they should not have been admitted into the columns of the *Inquirer*, as will be seen on reference to the editorial paragraph with which the first essay was introduced.

Whether a writer *avowing such motives*, and discussing a subject manifestly proper for public examination, ought voluntarily to leave his concealment, and present himself as a mark for personal assault; and whether, as an editor, *with or without his consent*, I should place him in that predicament, are questions of such delicacy and moment, that I would not decide

them, without ample time for reflection, and the aid of the best advice within my reach. They involve the rights and independence of the press, both of which I am bound, as a citizen and a professional man, to protect, so long as they may not interfere with the rights and just demands of others. They involve the sanctity of the relation between editors and correspondents, which being impaired, the press must lose its just influence with the community. To the time thus necessarily devoted to reflection and counsel, you are to attribute the delay of which you complain.

That the whole matter might be brought before those whom I deemed it proper to counsel, *and whose names are at your service, if required*, the following queries were propounded to them, by me:—

“Query 1. Aristides having distinctly averred that in the papers complained of, he meant to speak of the *official acts* of the Government Directors—that he has not referred to their private character, nor designed to implicate that character beyond what was inseparable from a free investigation of their public conduct,—is he bound to authorize the surrender of his name upon the demand of one of the individuals whose public conduct is thus criticised?”

“Query 2. Should Mr. Morris give up the name upon a similar application?”

Upon both the points thus submitted, my friends have answered in the negative. I therefore feel it my duty, very respectfully to decline furnishing you with the name demanded.

The decision of my friends has been given on the ground that the subject of the articles being unquestionably a proper one for public discussion, and the writer having *disclaimed allusion to any thing but public and official acts*, of which every citizen is free to speak and think as he pleases, he has incurred no personal responsibility to the parties named, and I therefore would do wrong to him, to the community, and to the profession of which I am a member, by any act tending to dislodge him from his position.

Very respectfully,

ROBERT MORRIS.

Upon the foregoing correspondence, Aristides confidently leaves his case with the public. His essays speak, and will continue to speak, for themselves. Their nature cannot be changed, nor their proper effects diminished, by the impotent epithets which H. D. Gilpin has pressed into his service.

In conclusion, Aristides begs leave to remark that whether his name shall finally become known, is to him a matter of perfect indifference. He is influenced by no apprehensions of H. D. Gilpin's vengeance. His first impulse on hearing of H. D. Gilpin's application, was to request Mr. Morris to surrender his name immediately. He would do so now, but for one consideration. Believing that his remarks on H. D. Gilpin's conduct as a Bank Director, owe their severity to their intrinsic and unanswerable truth,

he feels no obligation, *at this stage of the affair*, and IN CONNEXION WITH WHAT HAS PASSED, to gratify that individual with an opportunity to vent his own passions, or divert public attention from his own merits by private warfare.

ARISTIDES.

The foregoing appearing, Mr. Gilpin addressed the following note to the Editor of the U. S. Gazette.

To the Editor of the United States Gazette.

PHILADELPHIA, 21st Feb. 1835.

Sir:—"Aristides" has mutilated the correspondence published in the Pennsylvania Inquirer of this morning, by suppressing six letters. I annex a complete copy for publication.

Very respect'y, your ob't serv't,

H. D. GILPIN.

No. 1.

PHILADELPHIA, 14 February, 1835.

To the Editor of the Pennsylvania Inquirer.

Sir,—My notice has been called to two essays, published in the Pennsylvania Inquirer of the 10th and 12th inst, under the signature of Aristides.

They are obviously to me the productions of a false and malignant libeller, who, while venting his long-brewed venom, strives to avoid responsibility, by mingling personal slander with political discussion.

As you disclaim the authorship in your editorial columns, I demand that the name of a writer, who has thus wantonly assailed my character, shall be communicated to the bearer of this note, Gen. A. M. Prevost.

Your obedient servant,

H. D. GILPIN.

No. 2.

INQUIRER OFFICE,
Saturday morning, Feb. 14, 1834.*

Sir:—Your note of this morning, has just been placed in my hands by Gen. Prevost. I will immediately wait upon the *author* of the articles alluded to, who will cheerfully and promptly, no doubt, assume all proper responsibility in this affair. I will embrace the earliest opportunity, after an interview with him, of communicating further with your friend, Gen. P.

Very respectfully,

ROBERT MORRIS.

HENRY D. GILPIN, Esq.

*Error in the original.

No. 3.

INQUIRER OFFICE,
Feb. 15, 1835. }

Dear Sir:—Immediately after you left me this morning, I called upon the author of *Aristides*; handed him Mr. Gilpin's note, also a copy of my reply to it. At 3 o'clock, he called upon me with the original of the enclosed, which I hasten to communicate to you.

Very truly,

ROBERT MORRIS.

Gen. A. M. PREVOST.

No. 4.

(COPY :)

PHILADELPHIA, February 15, 1835.

To R. MORRIS, Esq.

Dear Sir: I have read and reflected upon the papers you have sent me, namely, a letter from H. D. Gilpin to you, demanding the author of certain essays in the *Inquirer*, and a copy of your answer.

I have been engaged, and yet am, in the discussion of a great public question, involving the conduct of important public functionaries. That conduct I have spoken of, freely, but in no instance have I placed it in a light which *admitted facts*, or *official documents*, would not justify. I have yet to learn that a free exercise of the right of a citizen to examine the conduct of public officers creates a personal responsibility to every individual officer who may find himself incommoded by the exposure. Such, from the tone of H. D. Gilpin's note, and the channel by which it reached you, I take to be the responsibility which he contemplates. It is one, that I must, at present, decline.

I have said in No. 15 of my essays, that "nothing shall turn me aside" from the prosecution of my plan for exposing to the public the calumnies against the Bank. But when the series shall be completed, my position will be changed, and I shall be willing to waive the ground taken in the first part of this letter; upon one indispensable condition.

I consider the three individuals, namely, H. D. Gilpin, J. T. Sullivan, and Peter Wager, as jointly referred to in my essays, and so blended together, by the very nature of their own acts, that they cannot be severed, and that it is impossible to decide what cause of offence may have been given to either, separately. It follows that I cannot recognize the separate right of either, to personal satisfaction. If, however, these three persons will sign a paper, pledging themselves, after the conclusion of these essays (which will be within two weeks) jointly to call upon me for the same sort of satisfaction which the tone of H. D. Gilpin's note, and the channel by which it was delivered, authorize me to infer he contemplates, I hereby authorize you, *on the receipt of such paper*, to give up my name. I pledge myself upon the receipt of such a joint invitation, promptly to ac-

cept it, and to render satisfaction to each, and in order, to be determined by lot.

I have the honour to be,
With great respect, &c.

ARISTIDES.

You are especially enjoined to keep this original, and tender to Gen. Prevost a true copy of it.

No. 5.

Dear Sir:—I have carefully read the copy of your correspondent's note, which you put in my hands at 5 o'clock this afternoon.

It conveys no answer to the demand of Mr. Gilpin, and my confidence in your own character and sense of justice, leads me to expect such a prompt and explicit communication on the subject of that demand, as a man of honour should give and can alone consent to receive.

I am respectfully yours,

Robert Morris, Esq.

A. M. PREVOST,
Feb. 14, 6, P. M. 1835.

No. 6.

PHILADELPHIA, Feb. 16, 1835.

Dear Sir:—"Aristides" declines authorizing me to give up his name *for the present*. I hold the subject under consideration—will immediately consult a friend, as to the course it becomes me to pursue under the circumstances, and inform you of the result of the conference at the earliest opportunity.

Very respectfully,

ROBERT MORRIS.

Gen. A. M. PREVOST.

No. 7.

PHILADELPHIA, 16th Feb. 1835, 11, A. M.

Dear Sir:—I have received your note of this morning, in reply to mine of Saturday evening. Mr. Gilpin specially directs me to say, that he considers the evasive course of your correspondent as pitifully shuffling as his libels are false. He still looks to you for his name, and after the delay which has already occurred, I have a right to expect your answer, which cannot reach me a moment too soon, as on such a subject, protracted postponement is inadmissible.

Respectfully yours,

A. M. PREVOST.

ROBERT MORRIS, Esq.

No. 8.

TUESDAY, 17 Feb. 1835, 10, A. M.

Sir:—I have waited three entire days for a reply to my just demand on your correspondent, who assumes and disgraces the name of Aristides. I believe further effort to be vain with this concealed and dishonourable slanderer. I shall, however, wait until four o'clock this afternoon. If he still evades my demand, I shall take such course as the circumstances require.

Your ob't serv't.

H. D. GILPIN.

ROBERT MORRIS, Esq.

Editor of the Pennsylvania Inquirer.

No. 9.

PHILADELPHIA, Feb. 17, 1835.

Dear Sir:—I regret that any further delay should occur in relation to the author of "Aristides." I am anxious to act in this affair as becomes my character as the editor of a public journal, and at the same time, with due consideration for the rights of all parties concerned. Unwilling to trust altogether to my own judgment in a question of considerable delicacy, I referred the whole matter to the decision of two highly respectable gentlemen of this city. They read the articles complained of, together with the correspondence that has grown out of them, yesterday afternoon, and unable to agree in opinion, called in the counsel of a third person. The three will meet together at ten o'clock this morning, and I will hasten to communicate to you their decision, *which will also be mine*, the moment it is communicated to me.

Respectfully,

ROBERT MORRIS.

Gen. PREVOST.

No. 10.

PHILADELPHIA, Feb. 17, 1835.

Dear Sir:—After the receipt of your letter of Saturday, announcing that the answer of "Aristides" (of which I handed you a copy) was unsatisfactory, I had a further interview with that individual. In the course of the same day, I received from him a note, at the close of which he gave his free consent to the surrender of his name, at the expiration of a certain period, provided "*I should then think it necessary or proper to do so.*"

This answer of course threw upon me the responsibility of deciding whether, in such circumstances, I ought, as the conductor of a public press, to give up the name of my correspondent. It is proper here to say, that in all my intercourse with him, both before and since your application,

he has denied any motive of personal enmity, or any design to go beyond the official character and conduct of public agents—and that if I had given to his articles a different construction, they should not have been admitted into the columns of the *Inquirer*, as will be seen on reference to the editorial paragraph with which the first essay was introduced.

Whether a writer *avowing such motives*, and discussing a subject manifestly proper for public examination, ought voluntarily to leave his concealment, and present himself as a mark for personal assault; and whether, as an editor, *with or without his consent*, I should place him in that predicament, are questions of such delicacy and moment, that I would not decide them, without ample time for reflection, and the aid of the best advice within my reach. They involve the rights and independence of the press, both of which I am bound, as a citizen and a professional man, to protect, so long as they may not interfere with the rights and just demands of others. They involve the sanctity of the relation between editors and correspondents, which being impaired, the press must lose its just influence with the community. To the time thus necessarily devoted to reflection and counsel, you are to attribute the delay of which you complain.

That the whole matter might be brought before those whom I deemed it proper to counsel, *and whose names are at your service, if required*, the following queries were propounded to them, by me:—

“Query 1. Aristides having distinctly averred that in the papers complained of, he meant to speak of the *official acts* of the Government Directors—that he has not referred to their private character, nor designed to implicate that character beyond what was inseparable from a free investigation of their public conduct,—is he bound to authorize the surrender of his name upon the demand of one of the individuals whose public conduct is thus criticised?”

“Query 2. Should Mr. Morris give up the name upon a similar application?”

Upon both the points thus submitted, my friends have answered in the negative. I therefore feel it my duty, very respectfully to decline furnishing you with the name demanded.

The decision of my friends has been given on the ground that the subject of the articles being unquestionably a proper one for public discussion, and the writer having disclaimed allusion to any thing but public and official acts, (of which every citizen has a right to speak and think as he pleases,) he has incurred no *personal* responsibility, and I, therefore, would do wrong to him, to the community, and to the profession of which I am a member, by any act tending to alter his position.

Very respectfully,

ROBERT MORRIS.

Gen. A. M. PREVOST.

To the foregoing, Aristides thus replied:

PHILADELPHIA, February 23, 1835.

To R. Morris, Esq. Editor of the Pennsylvania Inquirer.

Sir: I find in the United States Gazette of this morning, a further communication from H. D. Gilpin, alleging that a certain correspondence, (which appeared in your paper of Saturday last) had been mutilated by me, and professing to give "a complete copy" to the public. On a comparison of H. D. Gilpin's "complete copy" with the correspondence published by me, as above stated, it will be seen that his additions consist of five or six unimportant notes between him and yourself, with which I had no concern; which throw no light on the question before the public, and several of which grew out of H. D. Gilpin's inability to be calm and patient under a reasonable delay, the cause of which you explain in your letter to General Prevost. It will be seen, too, that my communication in the Inquirer, did not profess to give all the correspondence, but only so much as was necessary to explain the case. Whether I did so, or not, I cheerfully leave to the public to decide.

But in H. D. Gilpin's communication of this morning he does promise 'a complete copy' of all the correspondence. Let the public judge of his candor and love of justice, from the fact, that, in his 'complete copy,' my letter to you of the 15th February, (authorizing you freely to give up my name, if you thought it proper and right to do so,) does not appear! That letter, which was published in your paper of Saturday, and which H. D. Gilpin must have seen, and which is indispensable to a right understanding of the case, is SUPPRESSED by H. D. Gilpin, at the very moment when he is professing to lay the whole correspondence before the public, and is charging me with mutilation, because, forsooth, I deemed it of no importance to let the public see how much he fretted and foamed, whilst you were (after the receipt of my letter) deliberating upon a reply; the very cause of which delay, you explain in your letter to Gen. Prevost.

I forbear comment upon a fact that speaks for itself; and only ask you, in conclusion, to republish my letter to you of the 15th inst. as referred to.

ARISTIDES.

Philadelphia, February 15, 1835.

To R. MORRIS, Esq.

Dear Sir:—I will not permit any occurrence to drive me from my purpose of exposing the calumnies against the Bank of the United States. I do not mean to be shot off, on account of my labours to defend truth and justice, at least, yet awhile. I therefore prohibit the annunciation of the name of the writer of "Aristides," to the party "demanding" it, or to any other, until I shall have concluded the essays. These being finished, you have my *free consent* to give up my name to General Prevost, if you deem it necessary, or proper to do so.

I am yours, &c.

ARISTIDES.

☞ The Editor of the United States Gazette very kindly essayed to account for Mr. Gilpin's omission of the 15th February, in his "*complete copy*" of the correspondence, by saying Mr. Gilpin *did* not, and *could* not, have known of that letter. But the public saw differently—and that the kindness of the Editor of the United States Gazette, or some other feeling, led him astray, since *the very* paper which Mr. Gilpin asserted to furnish only a mutilated copy of the correspondence, contained that *very letter*. He therefore must have seen it. The publishers have no other object in this note but to put the matter in its true light.

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